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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 67) FOR OT

14 Mar 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam [u].
for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 66.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

18 OACSFOR / 19 OT-RD-660502

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-GC-TNG

30 NOV 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General:

a. In August, September and October 1966, United States and Free World Military Forces (FWMAF) with 41 maneuver battalions, 23 US and 18 ROK, supported by 23 artillery battalions, conducted operations primarily in the west along the Cambodian-Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Darlac and Pleiku Provinces; and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Binh Thuan Provinces. Along the Cambodian/RVN border, combat operations were oriented primarily toward interdiction of enemy infiltration routes. On the east coast, operations were oriented on search and destroy and revolutionary development in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Binh Thuan Provinces and rice harvest protection in Phu Yen Province. Enemy forces continued to avoid large scale contacts and attacked only when they had superior forces in the immediate area. When a contact was made the enemy forces fought only until they could break contact and exfiltrate the area. This tactic exposed the local VC units and cadre that had to remain in the area, to military and to police action creating a psychological vulnerability.

b. I FFORCEV and GVN tactical operations resulted in a substantial increase in enemy losses within II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ) this reporting period. Enemy losses for the period are: 5,955 KIA (BC), 3,894 captives, 1,643 individual and 150 crew served weapons captured. The US/FWMAF kill ratio for this quarter is 14.8 to 1 as compared to 7.2 to 1 for the last reporting period (Incl 1 and 2).

c. US/FWMAF in II CTZ had a greater buildup of tactical ground forces in this quarter than any other reporting period. There was an increase of 13 maneuver battalions, 7 US and 6 ROK, and 6 artillery battalions. The manpower increase exceeded 22,100.

(1) The 4th Infantry Division Command Group closed into its CP 12 miles south Pleiku vic AR805350 (Incl 3) on 8 Sep and became operational on 19 Oct.

(a) The 2d Brigade, 4th Inf Div closed into its CP, co-located with HQ, 4th Inf Div 10 Aug and became operational on 27 Aug-66.

(b) The 1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div closed into its CP vic ZB139544 and became operational on 6 Oct 66.

(2) The 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry closed in Camp Radcliff on 20 Aug and became the 9th maneuver battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(3) The 7th Howitzer Battalion, 13th Arty closed in Phu Cat vic PR9149 on 28 Oct 66.

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(4) ROK Forces Vietnam Field Command (ROK FVFC) consisting of 129 officers and 233 Army enlisted personnel moved to Nha Trang from Saigon and set up headquarters in what was formerly a school house (Incl 4 and 5). The headquarters became operational on 15 Aug 66.

(5) The 9th ROK Inf Div Command Group closed into its CP at Ninh Hoa vic RP992850 (Incl 6) on 27 Sep and became operational on 28 Sep.

(a) The 28th Regimental Combat Team, with one battalion at Dong Ba Thin, closed into its CP at Tuy Hoa vic CQ271343 on 7 Sep and became operational on 6 Oct 66.

(b) The 29th Regimental Combat Team closed into its CP at Minh Hoa vic BP998853 on 27 Sep and became operational 17 Oct 66.

(c) The 30th Regimental Combat Team closed into its CP vic Cam Ranh, CP026226 on 9 Oct and became operational 12 Oct 66.

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. General: During the quarter, several new staff activities were organized to improve the collection effort and elements of the military intelligence detachment were integrated in the operations division to improve the production and dissemination of intelligence. Results have been excellent with information being received on a more timely basis and intelligence produced, providing a more detailed and accurate enemy situation.

b. Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(1) Although ground reconnaissance was the most reliable means of confirming the presence and actual locations of enemy troops in the area of operations, special agent reports provided the best information of general locations, movements, and indications of future operations.

(2) Captured documents and enemy personnel were the primary source of reliable order of battle information. Captives taken during operation Paul Revere II in Pleiku Province identified eight enemy battalions in contact. Most significant identification was the 5th Bn, 88th NVA Regt, previously carried in Kontum Province, being engaged in what was believed to be its first combat. Documents captured by the 1st Bde, 101 Abn Div included detailed sketches of a planned attack by 18B NVA Regt on the village of Tu Bong (CQ 1612). Other documents captured by the 1st Cav Div (AM) during Paul Revere II, provided some details of possible enemy installations in Cambodian sections of the Chu Pong base area. Captives and documents taken during operations Thayer I and Irving in Binh Dinh Provinces have reconfirmed that elements of the 610th Div are operating there. Timely and accurate exploitation of the vast amount of information continued to be handicapped by the inadequate number of US personnel proficient in the Vietnamese language and lack of photo copiers at division level to reproduce captured documents. An indication of the shortage of US personnel proficient in Vietnamese is shown by comparing the number of authorized linguists in the 55th M I Det, versus assigned. Although the unit has 11 linguists assigned against 11 authorized positions, only two are Vietnamese proficient.

(3) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance were handicapped in Aug and Sep by adverse weather in the interior of the II CTZ. During Oct, transitional weather caused some mission cancellations throughout the II CTZ. The poor weather and lack of directly responsive surveillance aircraft restricted the use of repetitive cover for comparative analysis. Aerial photography continues to be used extensively for detailed studies of areas of interest. Infrared (Red Haze) imagery provided some indications

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of possible enemy activity. Again, the lack of repetitive cover hindered the complete exploitation of infrared imagery. Sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR) remained of little value to the I FFORCEV intelligence collection effort. Visual reconnaissance was handicapped by poor weather and insufficient aircraft to meet all requirements within the II CTZ. Timeliness of information is a continuing problem. At present, photography is normally not received by Detachment D, 1st MI Bn (ARS) in Nha Trang until three or four days after the missions are flown. The sole processor of this film is the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron located at Tan Son Nhut. To assist in improving the collection effort, and filling intelligence gaps, the G2 Air adapted a type sketch map (Incl 7), which shows completed reconnaissance missions for each day. These sketches are provided on a daily basis to the G2 Section where they are correlated and provide area desk officers with a quick reference, especially in primary areas of interest. Additionally, in an attempt to improve the overall air reconnaissance effort within II CTZ an intense study is currently being conducted to determine the best possible employment of O-1 aircraft assets to obtain maximum results. This study group, chaired by the G2 Air, I FFORCEV, includes representatives of II Corps Advisory Group and the 17th Aviation Group. Results of the study should be announced by 15 Nov 66.

(4) To improve the coordination and timely dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence information by the various US agencies in the Nha Trang area, an intelligence conference was held on 10 Aug 66 and 23 Sep 66. The conferences, chaired by G2, I FFORCEV, had representatives from 15 of the intelligence agencies in the Nha Trang area. As a result of these conferences, a facility named Intelligence Exchange Center, was established by the Counter-intelligence and Security Division, G2 Section, I FFORCEV. The mission of the center is to provide a focal point for these agencies to pass and receive information of mutual interest. Although it is too soon to determine the success of this endeavor, thus far it has provided this headquarters with more information in a more timely manner than has been experienced in the past.

(5) In the continuing attempt to improve the intelligence effort, a collection division was established during the quarter. Chief of the division, the 55th MI Int Det Cmdr, has the mission of overall coordination of the collection effort. Since the detachment commander has direct control over several collection agencies and knowledge of the capabilities of all other agencies, it is anticipated that the collection effort will be greatly improved by the full utilization of all collection agencies and sources through proper tasking and monitoring. Although operating only a short period of time, the collection division has already demonstrated its ability to improve the intelligence effort. As an example of its function to obtain current information, to assist in operational planning for operation Thayer I, the division dispatched IPW teams to the Chieu Hoi Center at Qui Nhon to interview returnees with reference to the enemy disposition and activity. The results of this action, together with other information collected, provided timely and accurate information.

(6) To further develop the intelligence effort at this headquarters the Order of Battle and Editorial Sections, 55th MI Det were integrated into the operations division. The excellent results have been two fold: Elimination of duplication of effort in the maintaining of order of battle maps, files and records, and a vast improvement in order of battle information. This action has provided much needed depth to the various area desks and has provided a more accurate picture of the enemy. At the same time, there has been a great improvement in the various periodic intelligence reports submitted by this headquarters. Perhaps the most significant improvement occurred in the area of special requirements and studies. Recent publications include a II CTZ Order of Battle Book, a study

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of enemy infiltration groups and various studies on VC recruitment, supply operations, and troop strengths in various provinces. As an example, Incl 8 is a strength study of Phu Yen Province for the period 1 Jan - 31 Aug 66. US/PWMAF units remained constantly in this area conducting operations Jefferson, Van Buren, Harrison, Fillmore, Nathan Hale, Henry Clay, and John Paul Jones.

c. Deviations from Current Intelligence Doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

d. Significant changes from Previous Report: The organization of the collection division and the intelligence exchange center provided a great increase in the flow of timely information. Integration of the Order of Battle and Editorial Section, 55th MI Det, in the operation division significantly improved the overall intelligence operations within the division. Therefore, the above actions have, to date, resulted in an overall improvement in the I PFORCEV intelligence effort.

e. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Disposition of NVA and VC mainforce is shown in Incl 9; of VC local force in Incl 10.

(2) Despite the heavy losses suffered by NVA and VC regular and irregular forces throughout the II CTZ as a result of ARVN, US and PWMAF operations during the period, there were no indications that NVA and VC forces would not be able to regain their personnel strength through the absorption of replacement troops infiltrated from North Vietnam and recruitment and/or forced conscription of locals. There is much evidence that the enemy is upgrading his efforts as evidenced by the confirmation of the HQ, 5th Division in Phu Yen Province during the reporting period. This is further amplified by the commitment of elements of the 88th NVA Regt with the LE LOI Division in the Paul Revere II AO in Pleiku Province. At the local level, evidence continues to be received indicating formation of new units, especially in Military Region VI Provinces of II CTZ.

(3) Enemy losses during the period:

<u>August 1966</u>				
<u>Forces</u>	<u>Total KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>Indiv Wpns</u>	<u>C/S Wpns</u>
US	819	155	141	22
PWMAF	270	11	86	27
GVN	<u>551</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	1620	302	398	54
<u>September 1966</u>				
US	545	154	197	47
PWMAF	351	156	124	7
GVN	<u>757</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	1653	439	502	60

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	<u>October 1966</u>			
US	1111	723	276	24
FWMAF	776	206	196	8
GVN	<u>796</u>	<u>1144</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	2683	2153	743	36
GRAND TOTAL	5956	2894	1643	150

(4) Enemy strength within the II CTZ as of 31 Oct 66:

21,855 - NVA troops

12,400 - VC regulars

3,400 - combat support troops

16,900 - militia (VC irregulars)

11,815 - political cadre

TOTAL 66,370

f. Weather:

(1) During August and first three weeks in September II CTZ experienced generally good weather except for a few afternoon and evening rain showers. The last week of September and first week of October saw transition into the northeast monsoon resulting in considerable low stratus and periods of heavy rain. For the remainder of Oct the weather in eastern CTZ was good except during 17-22 Oct when a tropical depression of the southeastern coast of Vietnam resulted in low ceilings and visibilities with occasional heavy rain during the morning hours.

(2) Pleiku, Kontum, southern Darlac, western Lam Dong and western Binh Dinh provinces experienced typical southwest monsoonal weather during Aug, with morning stratus, light drizzle and fog which lifted by 1200H daily and generally was followed by afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rain showers. The first two weeks of Sep found an intensification of the poor weather and low ceilings and visibilities persisting longer into the day. An increase in rainfall was noted. The last two weeks in Sep and first two weeks of Oct found the weather generally good over the interior and highlands. As an example of the rapid change, in Pleiku Province, the Catecka area recorded 17 inches of rainfall in the three week period prior to 15 Sep and only .17 inch in the three weeks subsequent to 15 Sep. The last two weeks of Oct, the area was under a quasi-southwest monsoonal regime of early morning stratus and fog followed by afternoon and evening rain showers. Total rainfall during the two weeks was generally light.

(3) Effects of weather on operations were numerous during the period, particularly during Aug and Sep.

(a) A total of 17 troop movement delays occurred; 10 in Aug, 6 in Sep and 1 in Oct. Almost all of these delays were during the morning hours in the highlands near Pleiku, but there were instances of heavy afternoon showers along the coast delaying movements. Five troop movements were cancelled due to weather.

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(b) A total of 83 tactical air support missions were cancelled, two were delayed, and six were diverted due to weather. A large percentage of the cancellations occurred in Oct in the coastal areas due to variable weather occurring in the area and the fact that the Sky Spot system at the time did not cover portions of the area.

(c) Over 1,600 photo reconnaissance missions were weathered out. This number includes those which were cancelled and those which produced less than the established minimum coverage required for the missions. The first two months of the period saw the greatest effect on reconnaissance missions.

(d) There were other effects of weather during the period, including isolated reports of roads being washed out in the highlands, and there were no doubt many effects which were not reported. The weather was close to the seasonal norm, however, and the effects on operations were not greater than had been expected.

(4) Changes to Concept of Operation.

(a) On 8 Jul 66, Det 31, 5th Weather Squadron was activated with a mission to provide staff weather officers to I PFORCEV and the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). The detachment was composed of two personnel.

(b) During the past three months the mission of Det 31 was expanded to include direct weather support to all USARV tactical units of brigade and division size in II CTZ. This support consists of:

1. I PFORCEV

- a. Staff Weather Officer
- b. Forecast Center for II CTZ
- c. Climatological support

2. 1st Cav Div (AM)

- a. Forecaster support at base camp
- b. Forecaster support at the division forward CP
- c. Observations at An Khe airfield
- d. Observation at brigade tactical CP's and
division forward CP
- e. Climatological support

3. 4th Inf Div

- a. Forecaster support at base camp
- b. Observations at base camp
- c. Observations at base camps of subordinate
brigades

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d. Observations at Brigade tactical CP's

e. Climatological support

4. 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

a. Observations at the brigade tactical CP

b. Climatological support

5. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

a. Climatological support

b. Direct weather support was not desired by this

unit.

g. Significant Enemy Activities:

(1) As the reporting period began, operation Paul Revere II was initiated in Pleiku Province with heavy contact. Elements of three regiments of the 630th Division had infiltrated into western Pleiku and appeared to be making final preparations for attack when friendly forces in two separate actions uncovered elements of the 32d and 66th Regiments. Unlike previous engagements, the enemy remained in the battle area rather than fragment and exfiltrate the area after the initial violent contact. When friendly forces blocked the enemy's normal routes of withdrawal in an attempt to relieve pressure, the enemy was forced to deploy elements of the 88th NVA Regt after a reported 12 hours forced march to the battle area. This action was the first known contact with elements of the 88th NVA Regt. Enemy casualties for this operation were 809 KIA (BC) and 104 NVAC's.

(2) In mid-September attention was shifted to Binh Dinh Province where US/ARVN/FMMAF initiated operations which continue as the reporting period ended. To date the enemy has suffered severe losses with elements of the 2d VC, 18th NVA Regts, and also the E210 and 50th Local Force Battalions being engaged. Operations in the Phu Cat mountains of eastern Binh Dinh Province by the Cap ROK Inf Div rendered the 50th Local Force Battalion ineffective and freed this area from its long period of VC domination. Contacts with the 18th Regt (aka 12) reduced its strength by 50% and rendered two battalions combat ineffective. Indications are that many of the local irregulars have also been captured or killed. The most significant result of this operation to date is that it appears the area from the Phu Cat Mountains, north to Dong Son, east of Hwy 1 will be freed from VC domination.

(3) Enemy operations in provinces other than Pleiku, Darlac and Binh Dinh remained at a low level during the quarter with harassing attacks and acts of terrorism on isolated villages, outposts and RF/PF units. Reports however do indicate the possible build-up of local forces in Ninh Thuan and Binh Than Provinces, elements of the 18B NVA in Khanh Hoa, and a possible unidentified regt in southeastern Darlac Province.

(4) As the reporting period came to a close, once again the enemy became active in the western portion of II CTZ in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. During August, September, and early October reports and sightings indicated the enemy was once again preparing the battlefield. However, the area of operations was shifting from the Cau Pong Mts area north to the southwestern Kontum - western Pleiku area. The build up continued and on the 14th of Oct, CIDG elements from Plei Djereng had repeated contacts with

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NVA forces in the vicinity of Plei Djereng. As additional information became available it appeared that the enemy perhaps had developed a three phase operation, the initial phase being an attack on Plei Djereng. As more information from captives, reports, and sightings became available, it was determined that the enemy strength was deployed in the area N & W of the Se San River and that a second phase of his operation would be to lure friendly forces into a well prepared ambush site following withdrawal from Plei Djereng. As the situation unfolded and identification of elements of the 95B NVA Regt was made, it was determined that the enemy forces could possibly consist of from five to seven regiments with portions of this force still south in the general vicinity of the Chu Pong Mountains. In view of this analysis a third phase of the operation was developed. In conjunction with the lure and ambush plan of phase II, if a major portion of the friendly forces did move N & W of the Se San River, thus leaving the southern portion of the AO uncovered, the enemy would attack either Plei Me or Duc Co. As the reporting period closed, Phase I - an attack on Plei Djereng appeared to have been aborted because of rapid deployment of friendly forces to area. The enemy continues in strength in the lure and ambush area of Phase II and although actual sightings of enemy forces in the south were not made, reports of extensive trail activity in the vicinity of Duc Co and Plei Me could make phase III of the operation possible.

h. Enemy Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action: Based on the enemy's order of battle and trends at the end of the period, the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action were viewed as follows at the end of the period:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) Attack in Binh Dinh Province with elements of three under strength regiments supported by elements of the division support units. Attack in Phu Yen - Khanh Hoa Provinces with up to two regiments supported by one artillery battalion and one local force battalion. Attack with one division of up to four regiments and a possible second division of up to three regiments in southwestern Kontum, Pleiku, and northern Darlac Provinces. Attack in II Corps portion of MR VI with up to three regiments from adjacent III Corps provinces supported by local force battalions, and in remainder of II CTZ with local force units of up to multi-battalion strength supported by guerrilla forces.

(b) Attack in any province isolated outposts, installations, and units with up to reinforced battalion strength in conjunction with attempts to ambush relief forces.

(c) Conduct holding or diversionary attacks against I FFORCEV OPCON units anywhere in the II CTZ in support of offensive operations in II CTZ or in other corps areas.

(d) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassination, and probing activities throughout II CTZ.

(2) Discussion and analysis: As discussed and analyzed in para 2g, Binh Dinh Province as a result of operations by US/ARVN/FRMAF forces, combat effectiveness of elements of the 610th Div was reduced. The 18th NVA (aka 12th) Regt suffered severe losses in two of its battalions and is considered only 50% combat effective. The 2d VC Regt is also considered to be approximately 75% combat effective, while the 22d Regt suffered only slight losses. In the western part of II CTZ there is strong evidence of an increase in enemy strength with from five to seven regiments possible.

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Control headquarters consists of one (630th) division and possibly a second division and a front type headquarters present. Elsewhere, continued reports are being received that indicate local force units are on the increase and that guerrilla forces are being upgraded.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption:

(a) Attack in Pleiku, southern Kontum, and/or northern Darlac Provinces with multi-regimental forces, supported by artillery.

(b) Avoid decisive contact with major US/GVN/FWMAF while continuing to harass vulnerable units and installations, overrun RF/PF outposts and district towns where the chance of success is the greatest. Continue low level guerrilla type activities.

(c) Attempt to build up forces in Phu Yan and Binh Dinh Provinces with the objective of controlling the population and rice harvest areas.

3. (S) Operation and Training Activities:

a. Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence, and the overall concept of strategy for conducting operations, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published 12 OPLANS and six Frag Orders during the reporting period. In addition to these eighteen operations, three were planned and cancelled prior to publication.

(1) Contingency Operations:

(a) FRAG ORDER 42-66 msg A-0614 DTG 261116Z Aug (ALBANY)

For the deployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to III CTZ for ops in Phuoc Long Province under OPCON II FFORCEV. This plan was directed by USMACV based upon a request by II FFORCEV. Initial plan was for period 10 Aug - 10 Sep 66; a time when all II FFORCEV assets were fully committed. USMACV directed that even though the period has passed, this plan will be retained for possible future use.

(b) OPLAN 44-66 (WHITTIER).

This plan was not published in final form, for administrative reasons, relative to security. This contingency plan was republished as OPLAN WINTHROP.

(c) OPLAN 45-66 (ROOSEVELT)

For the commitment of a force, varying in size from a rifle company to a division (-) to destroy enemy forces attacking a CIDG camp, regional force/popular force (RF/PF) outpost, or a critical signal site in II CTZ. The operation is planned to employ assets from any of the tactical forces within II CTZ with the unit and location to be determined at the time of execution.

(d) OPLAN 47-66 (MARSHALL)

For the relief/reinforcement of Duc Co CIDG camp in the event of a sudden enemy attack. Preparation of the plan was generated by intelligence reports indicating a strong build up of NVA strength west of the RVN/Cambodian border in the vicinity of Duc Co CIDG camp. The plan employs I FFORCEV forces in phases I, II, and III, for the relief of the CIDG camp and destruction of NVA forces. Phase IV envisions deployment of the 173d Abn Bde from II FFORCEV under OPCON I FFORCEV.

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(e) OPLAN 48-66 (WINTHROP) (formerly OPLAN WHITTIER)

Developed against the possibility that I FFORCEV might be called upon to deploy a force to I CTZ for operations. The 1st Cav Div (AM) is tasked to commit a brigade of three or four battalions into the provinces of either Quang Ngai or Quang Tin to conduct search and destroy operations against the DO XA base area.

(f) FRAG ORDER 23-66 msg A-0939 DTG 200851 Sep (TENNESSEE)

To deploy one brigade, 1st Cav Div (AM), to I CTZ for operations under OPCON III MAF. This plan is a contingency to identify a force for commitment after the initiation of Operation North Carolina and/or South Carolina.

(g) FRAG ORDER 31-66 msg A-1119 DTG 051055 Oct (ALLEN)

A Frag Order tasking the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div, to conduct a battalion sized airborne assault to the relief/reinforcement of Duc Co Special Forces CIDG camp. Based on the guidance in USMACV msg (S) 40367 DTG 070202Z Sep 66 that COMUSMACV desires to have the capability to conduct one and two battalion airborne operations. Frag Order Allen was published and authority to execute on 18 Oct was requested. On his 8 Oct visit to I FFORCEV, COMUSMACV requested that the proposed D-day be slipped to 28 Oct. On his 20 Oct visit, COMUSMACV again indicated his desire that the 1/101 Abn Div conduct a battalion size, airborne operation prior to 1 Jan 67 and that the airborne operation should be in conjunction with a conventional one. USMACV in secret msg 46322 DTG 200315Z Oct requested that Operation Allen be held in abeyance as a contingency plan for execution on order from USMACV. I FFORCEV concurred and tasked 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div, in I FFORCEV msg A-1476 DTG 310850Z Oct, to prepare plans for battalion airborne operation in conjunction with Operation GERONIMO I, II, or III, or Operation Farragut for execution prior to 1 Jan 67.

(h) FRAG ORDER 32-66 msg A-7287 DTG 190216 Oct (TRAVIS)

To insure the rapid employment of reinforcements to the western highlands in Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac Provinces. This operation is in three phases: Phase I - 4th Inf Div secures and/or reinforces with organic and OPCON forces. Phase II - 1st Cav Div (AM) deploys one brigade into a separate AO and operates in conjunction with forces in contact. Phase III - 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division is committed, either as a separate brigade or under OPCON of the 4th Inf Div or the 1st Cav Div (AM), to reinforce forces in contact. This contingency plan was necessitated by intelligence indicating strong NVA buildup west of the RVN/Cambodian border vic Plei Djereng to Chu Pong mountain.

(2) Scheduled Operations:

(a) OPLAN 38-66 (IRVING)

OPLAN originally planned for execution for the period 26 Aug - 3 Sep 66. This operation had as its major objective the reduction of VC/NVA forces and control of the Phu Cat mountain complex immediately north of Qui Nhon. Initial planning envisioned a combined operation with a 1st Cav Div (AM) brigade, three battalions of the Cap ROK Inf Division, and two battalions of the 22d ARVN Div participating in a converging attack. Irving was delayed by intelligence indications of more lucrative targets in

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the vicinity of Van Canh SF CIDG camp and again by the commitment of the 1st Cav Div (AM) forces in support of operation Paul Revere, an operation conducted by the 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div along the RVN/Cambodian border in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces. Subsequently, the date of execution was changed to o/a 2 Oct 66 and the task organization deployed two brigades, 1st Cav Div (AM) (5 brns); one regt, 22d ARVN Div (3 battalions), and two regiments Cap ROK Inf Div (5 battalions). Phase I was the encirclement of the Phu Cat mountain objective area and phase II was the search and clear operation with the eventual objective of incorporating the Phu Cat mountain into the Cap ROK Inf T.O.R. and to re-establish GVN control over the surrounding lowlands.

(b) OPLAN 41-66 (SEWARD)

An OPLAN employing the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div, the 47th ARVN Regt (2 Battalions), and the 28th ROK Regt (2 Battalions) o/a 7 Oct 66 to protect the Tuy Hoa rice harvest, the Vung Ro Bay complex, and the LOC from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa. Participation of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was scheduled to terminate when the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division became operational in the Tuy Hoa area, o/a 21 Oct 66. Planned dates, keyed to rice harvest requirements, were o/a 1 Sep - 15 Dec 66.

(c) OPLAN 42-66 (THAYER)

An OPLAN, originally named Operation Oliver Wendell Holmes, initially scheduled for the period 5 - 25 Aug 66 employing two brigades of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in Binh Dinh Province. A temporary suspension of Operation Thayer was planned to allow Operation Irving to be conducted against the Phu Cat mountain. Rationale for the suspension was that in all previous 1st Cav Div (AM) operations in the Bong Son area of Binh Dinh Province, the operations terminated after a few weeks and as the friendly forces departed, the enemy returned. No immediate return was previously executed; by returning, it was intended to take full advantage of the principle of surprise. Because of the 1st Cav Div (AM) participation in Operation Paul Revere I & II, and the VN National Election, Operation Thayer was delayed until 13 Sep 66 and the duration of the operation was increased to approx 90 days. Initial deployment from An Khe base was planned to be directed into the suspected VC base area in the Eagle's Claw.

(d) OPLAN 43-66 (SITTING BULL)

To provide deception concerning the withdrawal of the 1st Cav Div (AM) from Operation Paul Revere II. The objective was to deceive the enemy as to forces continuing operations in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces and to create confusion as to future US intentions in the central highlands. Deception measures employed included false reconnaissance missions, personnel wearing patches of units outside II CTZ, false radio traffic and telephone messages and "allowed" information to civilians in towns in the highlands.

(e) OPLAN 49-66 (ADAMS)

An OPLAN for search and destroy operations and continuation of the protection of the Tuy Hoa rice harvest as the 1st Brigade 4th Inf Div assumed responsibility for the harvest area. This operation was planned to be conducted in coordination with the 47th ARVN Regt (eventually with 3 battalions) for approximately 100 days.

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(f) OPLAN 50-66 (GERONIMO): an OPLAN tasking the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, in conjunction with two battalions of the 47th ARVN Regt, to conduct search and destroy operations oriented on the enemy forces, in the area west of Tuy Hoa, vicinity Waroi base. This operation was planned to be executed against the 18th NVA Regt suspected to be within the AO. Operation GERONIMO I is the first of a series of three operations to be conducted by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div in Phu Yen Province. D-Day was planned as o/a 31 Oct and operation to continue for approximately 30 days.

(g) OPLAN 127-66 (FARRAGUT): An OPLAN for a weather contingency operation. Should seasonal weather negate planned operations by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div in operation GERONIMO I, II, or III to the extent that efforts in the AO's are no longer possible or practical, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div would then shift the area of operations south to vicinity Binh Thuan Province for 30-45 days. The plan requires reduction in the size of the area of Operation Byrd and allows the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to conduct operations in an area where more favorable weather conditions exist. This operation will also lend authority to the Revolutionary Development effort being conducted by a 1st Cav Div (AM) battalion TF in Binh Thuan Province.

(h) FRAG ORDER 14-66 msg A-0584 DTG 250845 Aug (BYRD): (formerly referred to as Richard E Byrd) A Frag Order for search and destroy operation and support of the initial phase of Revolutionary Development in the Phan Thiet area of Binh Thuan Province. As planned, this operation envisioned initial efforts in the AO with a 1st Cav Div (AM) battalion conducting search and destroy operation based out of Phan Thiet. D-Day was planned as o/a 5 Sep 66 and the operation was to continue for approximately 52 days. However, because of increased activity by VC local force units in Binh Thuan Province and in the Phan Thiet area in particular, and in conjunction with the GVN national election date of 11 Sep 66, Operation Byrd was advanced to 25 Aug 66. This operation was originally an initial phase of Operation Pike. Because of the duration of Operation Pike, Operation Byrd was subsequently separated from that operation.

(3) Scheduled Operations cancelled prior to publication:

(a) Operation Pike (unpublished): A plan for conducting operations in Binh Thuan Province utilizing elements of the 1st Cav Div (AM), the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. As initially planned, a 1st Cav Div (AM) battalion would be deployed into the AO for a period of approximately 52 days (this portion later named and conducted as Operation Byrd). This battalion was to be followed by and become OPCON to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (-). Subsequently the battalion was to be released and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (-) was to receive OPCON of two battalions of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The scheme of the operation envisioned the eventual employment of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (-) as the control force with one battalion based out of Phan Thiet and one battalion based out of Bao Loc with the mission changing from search and destroy to Revolutionary Development. Because of the diversion of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from II CTZ to III CTZ, and because of the further plans developed for employment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, this plan was cancelled.

(b) Operation Whitney (unpublished): A plan for continuing operations along the RVN/Cambodian border with emphasis upon reconnaissance, surveillance, spoiling attacks, patrols, and ambushes to deny the VC/NVA entry into the AO. This plan was to be conducted by the

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4th Infantry Division with a planned D-Day of o/a 25 Oct and the operation was to continue for approximately 90 days. The operation was cancelled because the 4th Inf Div assumed OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div and the elimination of the need for two separate operations, Whitney and Stimson, along the border area. Both operations were combined as Paul Revere IV.

(c) Operation Stimson (unpublished): A plan similar to operation Whitney envisioning deployment of elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Planned D-Day was o/a 10 Nov 66 and the operation was to continue for approximately 90 days.

(4) Special Operations:

(a) OPLAN 43-66 (ROAD RUNNER): An OPLAN for a coordinated effort with the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) wherein the US/FWMAF/ARVN forces within II CTZ demonstrated intentions and capabilities to use existing roads and to progressively restore the control of the road network to GVN. The conduct of an operation envisions specifically tailored forces traversing main and secondary roads at irregular intervals and in random patterns to gradually increase friendly influence over the roads within the selected AO.

(b) Project Omega:

1. Detachment B-50, 5th SFG, Project Omega, was organized in response to directives by COMUSMACV to inquire into the feasibility and desirability of providing each CTZ with long range reconnaissance and reaction forces, OPCON to the FFORCEV commander controlling the operational area.

2. The detachment is composed with a command element of US personnel, 8 RECON teams, six men each (2 US, 4 CIDG), 4 ROAD RUNNER teams (2 CIDG), 3 COMMANDO companies and 1 SECURITY company.

(c) FRAG ORDER 22-66 msg A-0944 DTG 201115 Sep (CLINTON): A plan for the employment of Omega assets on a border surveillance operation along the RVN/Laotian/Cambodian border in Kontum Province. Operation was scheduled for 30 days with D-Day o/a 2 Oct 66.

(5) Other activities:

(a) Campaign Plan: A plan was formulated to cover the tactical pursuit of the war through April 1967. As incoming assets were affected by changes in time of arrival or diversion (3d Bde, 4th Inf Div diverted to the III CTZ) corresponding modifications were made in the overall plan. However, the mission as originally determined remained constant throughout this portion of the period. The mission for the campaign plan is stated below:

1. Attack main force units and base areas.
2. Provide population security as a part of Revolutionary Development.
3. Open highways.
4. Initiate the opening of railways.

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(b) The accomplishment of these missions is programmed as follows:

1. Keep under continual pressure the main force VC/NVA units in the three major areas, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku/Darlac Provinces, by conducting operations in those areas for periods up to 120 days. This in turn adds stability to long range Revolutionary Development through neutralization of enemy forces in and near selected hamlets and population centers.

2. Return continuously increasing numbers of the population to governmental control. This will be accomplished by supporting Revolutionary Development with a significantly large number of battalions. Current plans envision 28 US/FWMAF/ARVN battalions involved in support of Revolutionary Development in the populated areas along the coast by April 1967.

3. Conduct road and railroad opening dependent on engineer support and planned troop levels. Roadrunner operations are conducted in conjunction with all operations. The campaign plan based on current battalion strength of major commands follows:

a. 1st Cav Div (AM)	9 battalions
b. 4th Inf Div	6 battalions
c. 1/101st Abn Div	3 battalions
d. 3/25th Inf Div	4 battalions (includes tank battalion).
e. Cap ROK Inf Div	9 battalions
f. 9th ROK Inf Div	9 battalions
g. ARVN	28 battalions
TOTAL	68

(c) Base Development: On 1 Aug 66, the first of a series of base development conferences occurred which were ultimately to decide the final locations and internal arrangements of camps for the 4th Inf Div. Base camp sites at Dragon Mountain, Tuy Hoa, and Ban Me Thout, were selected. Of major significance in each development, was the requirement to consolidate all assets in the tightest possible perimeter, to permit defense of the base with a minimum number of troops. Such configuration of complexes allows the maximum number of combat troops to participate in operations away from base camp. A decision by COMUSMACV to divert the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div from II CTZ to III CTZ caused suspension of development at Ban Me Thout. Return of this brigade is anticipated and base development will then continue as programmed.

(d) Agreement with Republic of Korea Forces:

1. A memorandum of agreement between I FFORCEV and ROKFV FC was prepared for conduct of operations by ROK forces in II CTZ. Since CG, I FFORCEV was designated by COMUSMACV as the commander responsible for all US ground forces in II CTZ, he is ultimately responsible for all security and combat operations involving US and FWMAF. CG, I FFORCEV is also designated Senior Advisor to CG, II ARVN Corps.

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2. Memorandum of Agreement: The Memorandum of Agreement was handcarried to General Chae, CG, ROKPV FC on 13 Sep 66. The agreement provided for:

- a. Location of ROK units within II CTZ.
- b. Assignment of Tactical Area of Responsibility and Tactical Zones.
- c. Coordination of operations with the Commanding General, II Corps (ARVN).
- d. Defense of US and FVMAF base areas.
- e. Provisions for reserve/reaction forces.
- f. Support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program.
- g. General guidance for the conduct of offensive operations within II Corps Tactical Zone.

3. CG, ROKPV FC returned the agreement in that he thought a written agreement was unnecessary.

(e) Exercise Phalanx: On 3 Sep 66, intelligence sources indicated the movement of significant NVA forces, approximately one NVA division, toward either the northern portion of Kontum Province and/or the Chu Pong Mountain. This threat was in addition to one NVA division confirmed to be located in Cambodia, in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain. COMUSMACV verbally directed I FFORCEV to conduct a war game, Exercise Phalanx, in order to analyze possible reactions to enemy courses of action. From the results of the game, it was concluded that any major VC/NVA attack in the II CTZ would aim at restoration of infiltration routes through the western highlands and concurrently attempt to draw US/FVMAF away from coastal areas in order to allow VC forces to secure food from the coastal plains. The war game presented three possible situations.

1. Situation number one envisioned the NVA executing a two division coordinated attack into northern Kontum and southern Pleiku Provinces. Initial objectives were Dak Nuk, Dak Seang CIDG camps, and Dak To, in the north; and Duc Co, Plei Me CIDG camps in the south. Two battalions of ARVN, the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div and a 1st Cav Div (AM) brigade were deployed to counter the northern threat. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 2d Brigade, 4th Inf Div countered the southern threat.

2. Situation number two envisioned two NVA divisions attacking abreast, east into Pleiku and southern Kontum Provinces. Initial objectives in this attack were the Plei Djerng, Duc Co, and Plei Me CIDG camp. Simultaneously one NVA regt attacked the Cung Son CIDG camp as a diversionary effort. The northern threat was thwarted by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The threat in the south was countered by movement of two ARVN battalions, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div and a 1st Cav Div (AM) brigade into the Plei Me - Duc Co areas. The diversionary effort against Cung Son was countered by commitment of two battalions of the ROK 28th Regt.

3. Situation number three gave the enemy the capability of conducting a coordinated attack with one NVA division in northern Kontum Province, one division in southern Pleiku Province from the west,

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and simultaneously conducting regimental size attacks against the Bong Son and Cung Son CIDG camps. Enemy moves in the north were countered by movement of two ARVN battalions, a 1st Cav Div (AM) brigade and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The southern threat was countered by the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div. A Cap ROK Inf Div regt was sent to Bong Son and two battalions of the 28th Regt to Cung Son, in order to counter the threats in those areas.

4. In all situations a full evaluation of local and main force VC capabilities was made. This evaluation was taken into account when considering feasibility of tactical moves and requirements to support the operations logistically. It was felt that any major effort by NVA would be in coordination with local and main force VC attacks against airfield, communications centers, lines of communications, and logistical complexes. COMUSMACV, CG, I FFORCEV, and CG, 1st Log Comd were briefed on results of Exercise Phalanx.

(f) In order to insure continuity of tactical and logistical efforts between HQ, I FFORCEV and an OPCON HQ implementing an OPLAN, use of the planning directive was initiated as a coordinating vehicle. In essence, the directive provided the following guidance:

1. Concept of the proposed operation.

2. Area of operation.

3. Requirement for a planning conference to be conducted at the implementing HQ at which time both tactical and logistical plans for the operation are to be presented to CG, I FFORCEV and appropriate staff members.

b. Operational Activities.

(1) OPLAN 39-66 (John Faul Jones).

(a) This operation conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div in conjunction with the 2d Korean Marine Brigade, commenced 21 July, and continued until 5 Sep in Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay area (Incl 11).

(b) On 2 Aug the 2d Battalion, 502d Inf made a dawn helicopter assault to exploit two B52 bomber strikes west of Song Cau within 20 minutes after completion of the strikes. Search operations in the B52 target area produced insignificant results and the battalion was extracted on 3 Aug to rejoin the two battalions of the brigade which had been designated I FFORCEV reserve. Elements of the brigade remained in reserve; trained and refitted until 8 Aug when the 1st Battalion, 327th Inf conducted operations west of Dong Tre to exploit four B52 strikes. Again, within 20 minutes following the strikes, an airmobile assault was executed directly into the target area. The 1st Battalion, 327th Inf swept south with light contact, finding indications that the enemy had moved to the west. On 9 Aug, in an attempt to block the enemy's escape, 2d Battalion, 502d Inf joined the exploitation by helicopter assault into LZ's to the west and south. Both battalions conducted search operation with light contact until extraction 14-15 Aug. Recon platoons of each of the battalions remained in the area as stay-behind forces to capitalize on the enemy's tendency to return to base areas after US forces have departed.

(c) On 16 Aug 2d Battalion, 8th Cav, 1st Cav Div (AM) was placed OPCON 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div, and, on 17 Aug the battalion executed an assault by helicopter, sweeping southeast toward Dong Tre.

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(d) During the period 16-18 Aug, 1st Battalion, 327th Inf and 2d Battalion, 502d Inf relieved the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in place by securing Tuy Hoa south airfield and the area to the south between Highway 1 and the beach. This allowed the Marine Brigade to be extracted from the Tuy Hoa area and be deployed to I CTZ.

(e) 2d Battalion, 327th Inf, relieved in the Vung Ro area by a task force composed of C Company, 2d Battalion, 502d Inf and A Company, 2d Battalion, 17th Cav, reentered offensive operations on 18 Aug by air movement to Dong Tre and conducted an overland sweep enroute to Tuy An in order to protect the rice harvest in that area.

(f) On 22 Aug 2d Battalion, 8th Cav conducted an air-mobile assault west of Dong Tre to exploit intelligence gained by the stay behind forces of 1st Battalion, 327th Inf and 2d Battalion, 502d Inf. Little enemy contact was made during this operation; however, a cache of 400 Chinese hand grenades was uncovered.

(g) On 27 Aug 1st Battalion, 22d Inf, 4th Inf Div was placed OPCON 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div and assumed responsibility for security of the Vung Ro Pass area. With little prospect of engagement elsewhere in the AO, the brigade conducted search operations 26 Aug through 4 Sep between Tuy Hoa and Tuy An to exploit intelligence reports of enemy concentrations. Operation John Paul Jones terminated on 5 Sep with no further significant activities or enemy contact.

(h) Combat losses for this operation:^{1&2}

<u>ENEMY LOSSES¹</u>		<u>US LOSSES¹</u>		<u>ROK LOSSES²</u>
KIA (BC)	294	KIA	23	1
Detainees	384	WIA	132	2
Captives	44	MIA	0	0
Ralliers	2			
Crew S/Wpns	5			
Indiv Wpns	86			

(2) OPLAN 19-66 (Paul Revere II).

(a) Instead of moving to the east coast and launching Oliver Wendell Holmes (now known as Thayer I) in Binh Dinh Province on 3 Aug as planned, the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) was committed to the west in Pleiku Province (Incl 12) because of a sizeable enemy force encountered by the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. This operation, initiated at 0001 1 Aug 66 was an extension of Paul Revere I, a border surveillance operation in the vicinity of the Chu Pong Mountain, and the Duc Co and Plei Me CIDG camps. The operations followed a maneuver of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, in which an area containing a suspected NVA Regt was surrounded. Based on the resulting contacts and intelligence generated by this maneuver, it was decided to commit the 1st Cav Div (AM). There were six major contacts during the operation.

(b) On 2 Aug A Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, while pursuing 2 NVA, made contact with an estimated NVA battalion. The NVA battalion surrounded the US company and brought heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire to bear. C Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf linked-up with A Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf late in the afternoon and also became heavily engaged. Enemy automatic weapons fire prevented medical evacuation until the next day. Results of this action: Friendly - 9 KIA, 51 WIA; Enemy 100 NVA KIA.³

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¹ I FFORCEV msg B1216 DTG 060235 Sep 66, subj: SITREP 050001 - 052400 Sep

² I FFORCEV msg B0793 DTG 172359 Aug 66, subj: SITREP 170001 - 172400 Aug

³ I FFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 37, 5 Aug 66.

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(c) At 021300 Aug 66 a platoon size element of A Co, 2d Bn, 7th Inf, 1st Cav Div (AM), air assaulted to position LZ Pink after extensive preparation by air and artillery. Upon touching down the platoon was subjected to heavy automatic and small arms weapons fire. Radio contact with the force was lost shortly after they landed. As reinforcements were brought to assist, poor weather condition closed the LZ, and a relief force was dispatched overland. Densely vegetated terrain slowed the movement of this relief force so that it did not reach the area until 030825 Aug. Prior to the relief force reaching the besieged element, the NVA force stripped the dead and bayoneted some of the bodies. Some men pretended to be dead to keep from being killed by the enemy. Results of the action: Friendly: 18 KIA, 6 WIA, 2 PRC-24, 20 individual weapons captured. Enemy: 12 NVA KIA, 2 captured, 14 rds 82 mm mortar captured.⁴

(d) On 8 Aug 66 A Co, 1st Bn, 7th Cav, 1st Cav Div (AM) was conducting search operations to the south in the Ia Drang River Valley in conjunction with B and C Cos, 1st Bn, 7th Cav. The lead element of the company engaged a small NVA force. As the platoon built up its base of fire, the unit began to receive heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire. The company commander pulled the lead platoon back into the LZ and formed a company perimeter. Air strikes and aerial rocket artillery (ARA) were employed in support of the company, and B and C Co, 2d Bn, 12th Cav, 1st Cav Div (AM) which were airborne on a move to another LZ, were ordered to reinforce overland. The NVA broke contact as the two companies of 2d Bn, 12th Cav began to land. The airborne reinforcement and B and C Co, 1st Bn, 7th Cav were formed into a provisional battalion, but were unable to regain contact with the enemy. Results of this action: Friendly - 22 KIA, 36 WIA. Enemy - 98 NVA KIA, 8 captured, 6 individual weapons and 3 crew served weapons captured.⁵

(e) On 9 and 10 Aug 66 the 9th Co, 3d Bn Cav Regt, Cap ROK Inf Div came under heavy mortar attack early on the night of the 9th. Soon after the mortar attack began, the enemy was observed approaching the company position using the "Moving Bush" technique. The searchlight of a tank was turned on and weapons were brought to bear on the enemy. A reinforced platoon from the 10th Co in the north and the 11th Company in the south conducted a counter attack. Early the next morning, the enemy broke contact after a severe mauling. There were 2,100 rds of 105mm and 155mm Artillery fired in support. Result of this action: Friendly - 7 KIA (ROK), 42 WIA (ROK), 4 WIA (US). Enemy - 197 NVA KIA (US EC), 6 Cptr WIA, 53 individual weapons and 28 crew served weapons.⁶

(f) At 140820 Aug 66 A Co, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, 1st Cav Div (AM) engaged a 15 man NVA force and pursued it. In early afternoon the company became heavily engaged with dug-in enemy of the southern slopes of hill 534, vic YV858956 in the Chu Pong Mountain area. B Co, 2d Bn, 5th Cav, was dispatched to assist and made contact with enemy, north of A Co, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, vicinity YV882947. B Co, 2d Bn, 5th Cav continued to push toward A Co, 1st Bn, 5th Cav but came under mortar fire from the north and was pinned down by small arms fire from bunkers. C Co, 1st Bn, 5th Cav was dispatched to assist B Co, 2d Bn, 5th Cav. The 2d Brigade Commander indicated he had an estimated enemy battalion plus boxed in on hill 534. Maximum artillery, mortar, and air were employed. Fighting against the bunkers required very close contact. To better employ artillery and air support contact was broken by friendly forces at 1850H. One thousand and fifty rounds of 105mm how and 15 rounds of 175 mm gun was fired in support of the contact. The following morning, 15 Aug 66, two companies again made contact with the enemy, and C Co 2d Bn, 5th Cav was committed to reinforce B Co.

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⁴ I WFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 49, 4 Aug 66

⁵ I WFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 84, 8 Aug 66 and Entry 80, 10 Aug 66

⁶ I WFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 21 and 68, 10 Aug 66

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2d Bn, 5th Cav. By noon all contact had been broken by the enemy. On 16, 17, and 18 Aug the units continued to search the area to regain contact with the enemy force without success. Results of this action: Friendly - 30 KIA, 106 WIA. Enemy - 194 NVA KIA, 12 captured, 10 individual weapons.

(g) At 171335 Aug 66 a squad of "Strikers" which was in an ambush position along Hwy 19 (vicinity YA7422) and a CIDG company (CL 65) located at Dry Lake (YA749234) were reported under attack by small enemy elements. The USSF Det Commander had coordinated with the 2d Bn, 35th Inf in case assistance was needed. At 1445 the 1st Cav Div (AM) Combat Operation Center (COC) reported that the CIDG Company at Dry Lake was in contact with an unknown size force and that a CIDG Company (CL 66) was enroute to assist. At 1520 the relief company (CL 66) and the company in contact (CL 65) were reported to have linked-up and that contact with the enemy had broken at 1500. At 1620, HQ 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div received notification that CIDG elements in the vicinity of Dry Lake were in heavy contact and needed assistance. At 1630, 2d Bn, 35th Inf was alerted to prepare one company for commitment ASAP. The Commander, 1st Bn, 69th Armor was directed to release B Co, 1st Bn 69th Armor, OPCON to 2d Bn, 35th Inf. At 1635 the 1st Cav Div (AM) reported that ARA was enroute and that artillery was in position to support. At 1645 ammunition resupply for forces in contact areas was requested by USSF however it was learned that the LZ at Dry Lake was not secure. Based upon the available information of the situation at the time, it was determined that the best course of action for conduct of a relief, was to mount a tank/infantry attack. The additional firepower and assurance of reaching the area of contact prior to darkness outweighed other considerations. At 1740, B Co, 2d Bn, 35th Inf and B Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor were committed to relieve the surrounded CIDG elements. At 1900 the tank/infantry force effected a link up with CIDG Company (CL 66). At 1945 while attempting to conduct a link up with CL 65 this force became engaged with an estimated enemy battalion. Fighting continued until 2040H when the enemy broke contact. Although fighter aircraft, ARA and artillery support were available throughout most of the action, the lack of communications with CIDG elements in contact precluded the maximum use of this firepower, thus affording the enemy the opportunity to break contact without becoming effectively engaged. Combat losses for this action were: Friendly: 3 USSF KIA, 29 CIDG KIA, 11 CIDG WIA, 12 CIDG MIA. Enemy - 14 NVA KIA (US BC).

(h) During the period 19-25 Aug 66 only light sporadic contact was reported scattered throughout the southern portion of the AO. Paul Revere II was terminated at 2400 hours, 25 Aug 66.

(i) Combat losses for operation Paul Revere II were:

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	809	KIA	111
VC Captured	104	WIA	451
Detainees	78	MIA	2 (drowned)
Crew Serve Wpns	40		
Indiv Wpns	157		

(3) FRAG ORDER msg A-0584, DTG 250845 Aug 66 (BYRD).

(a) Task Force 2d Bn, 7th Cav 1st Cav Div (AM) launched on 251830 Aug, Operation Pyro in Binh Thuan Province in the same general area where the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div conducted Austin II, 12-26 Apr 66 (Incl 13). The Task Force consisted of the 2d Bn, 7th Cav; 1 plat C Co, 1st Bn, 9th Cav, and B Btry, 1st Bn, 21st Arty. The operation, planned primarily to support the Revolutionary Development Program, started 11 days earlier than originally scheduled in order to reinforce a regional force in Phan Thiet which had been heavily engaged with the 602d LF Battalion

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three days prior. Search operations were conducted to secure the Phan Thiet area prior to the 11 Sep election. Operation Byrd can be characterized as a series of search operations with company size air assaults into the Byrd AO, having light and sporadic contacts. The most significant enemy initiated action was on 270000 Aug 66 when an estimated VC platoon attacked the Phan Thiet air strip with small arms and mortar fire. The result of the 1 1/2 hour contact were: Friendly - 8 WIA and 8 aircraft damaged. Enemy - 2 VC KIA.

(b) In the national election of the assembly to draft the RVN's Constitution, held on 11 Sep 66, 72% of registered voters went to the polls. The significance of this turnout demonstrates that the severe control and influence on the populace of Binh Thuan Province by the 602 LF Bn has been considerably diminished.

(c) Task Force 2d Bn, 7th Cav revised its operation plan on 16 Oct 66 to support ARVN tactical actions in Operation Byrd. C Co, 2d Bn, 12th Cav became OPCON to TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav and this released the third company of the TF for operational purposes. A significant contact occurred on 25 Oct 66 when C Co, 2d Bn 7th Cav engaged an estimated reinforced VC rifle company of the 486th Co, 482d Bn (aka 602) in the vicinity of BN841279. The results of this contact were: Friendly: 1 KIA, 4 WIA. Enemy 42 VC KIA, 2 captured and 12 individual weapons captured.

(d) Combat losses for this operation as of 31 Oct are:⁸

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (RC)	223	KIA	4
Captured	25	WIA	40
Indiv Wpns	35		
Detainees	303		

(4) OPLAN 19-66 (PAUL REVERE III)

(a) Paul Revere III, a border surveillance mission began at 260000H Aug 66 by the 3d Bde, 25th Inf as an extension of Paul Revere II as the 1st Cav Div (AM) departed the AO for its base area. Current intelligence and the light scattered contacts from 18-25 Aug 66 substantiated reports that the NVA forces had successfully exfiltrated to the west - across the Cambodian border; therefore, the need for large US force in the AO no longer existed. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div assumed responsibility for the AO (Incl 12) from the 1st Cav Div (AM).

(b) An additional mission was added when the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div was required to coordinate the defenses of the CIDG camps at Plei Djereng, Plei Me and Duc Co.

(c) There were no major contacts during the operation. The operation was characterized by numerous air assaults, extensive patrolling, blocking, ambush, and surveillance operations, which resulted in light, widely scattered, and infrequent contacts throughout the period of the operation. The operation was terminated at 181000H Oct 66.

(d) Combat losses for the operation were:⁹

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA	36	KIA	2
Captured	20	WIA	22
Detainees	182		
Indiv Wpns	15		

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⁷ I FFORCEV msg 1378 DTG 260228 Oct and I FFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 14 26 Oct
⁸ I FFORCEV msg 1486 DTG 110230 Nov, subj: SITREP 310001 to 3124000 Oct
⁹ I FFORCEV msg 1288 DTG 190220 Oct, subj: SITREP 180001 to 182400 Oct

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(5) OPLAN 41-66 (SEWARD)

(a) The 101st Abn Div began Operation Seward on 050500H Sep in Phu Yen Province (Incl 11), immediately following the termination of Operation John Paul Jones, with brigade maneuver elements already in their operational areas. The brigade's primary mission, as directed by I FFORCEV, was protection of the rice harvest in the Tuy Hoa areas. Other missions were security of the Tuy Hoa south airfield, and protection of the LOC between Vung Ro and Tuy Hoa.

(b) In addition to the brigade's assigned maneuver elements, the 1st Bn, 22d Inf, 4th Inf Div was under OPCON of the brigade until 13 Oct when it was released to join 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div at Pleiku. Primarily, search and destroy tactics were used throughout the operation as a means of accomplishing all security missions. The four maneuver battalions available to the brigade generally were deployed to protect the Tuy An rice harvest with one battalion; protect the rice harvest in the Hieu Yuong valley with one battalion; secure the Vung Ro and Pass area with a third battalion and having a fourth battalion as an immediate action force to exploit any contact or suspected enemy locations elsewhere in the AO. Throughout the operation, battalions were rotated from one area and mission to another. 1st Bn, 22d Inf furnished security for the Vung Ro and Pass area and protection for the LOC from that location to Tuy Hoa.

(c) The operation was characterized by counter guerrilla operations encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces.

(d) Significant action during the operation included a VC attack on the company command post and a US raid on a VC prisoner of war camp. During the night of the 17 Sep, the command post of B Company, 2d Bn, 327th Inf was attacked and overrun by a force estimated to be 100 VC. The CP location had been probed by small VC elements on nights prior to the attack and the US forces had been in the same location for several days. Ten US personnel, including the company commander, executive officer and artillery FO, were killed and twelve were wounded. During the operation, the 1st Bde, 327th Inf, acting on good intelligence, raided a VC prisoner of war camp in the Hieu Yuong Valley. Twenty-three Vietnamese Nationals, all in poor physical condition and in need of medical attention, were liberated.

(e) Operation Seward terminated 252400H Oct following relief of 2d Bn, 502 Inf in the Tuy An area by elements of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

(f) Combat losses for the operation were:¹⁰

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA	200	KIA	27
Indiv Wpns	79	WIA	173
Captured	34		
Crew served Wpns	1		
Detainees	800		

(6) OPLAN 42-66 (THAYER I)

(a) The 1st Cav Div (AM) moved east into the AO (Incl 14), south of Bong Son and initiated Operation Thayer I, formerly known as Oliver Wendell Holmes, on 130600H Sep 66. The operation was launched by the air

¹⁰ I FFORCEV Msg A-1378 DTG26022G Oct 66, SITREP 250001 - 252400 Oct

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assault of five battalions into central Binh Dinh Province with the mission of conducting extensive search operations to fix and destroy the 610th NVA Division and VC local force units believed to be operating in the AO. The basic scheme was to encircle the enemy forces in the "Eagle's Claw" and to contract the encirclement by successive air assaults and attacks. Additionally, three battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 41st Regt and the 5th and 9th ARVN Abn Bn established blocking positions north and east of Hwy 1 to deny the enemy escape routes and to secure Hwy 1 from south to north in zone. Contacts by elements of the 1st Cav Div (AM) throughout the operation were light and sporadic. The heaviest engagement occurred on 23 Sep when an estimated reinforced NVA bn attacked the 3d Bn, 41st Regt in vicinity Tan Loc at 0330H. The enemy attempted to disengage at 0530H, however contact was maintained until approximately 0930H at which time contact was lost and the enemy began extracting its forces toward the southeast. Two companies of the 2d Bde, 12th Inf were airlifted into blocking positions but contact with the main enemy force was never re-established. Results of the engagement were: Friendly: 8 ARVN KIA, 38 ARVN WIA, 1 US WIA; enemy 132 NVA KIA, 6 captured, 10 individual weapons and 7 crew served weapons captured. The operation was officially terminated on 012400H Oct 66, with the 1st Cav Div (AM) postured to launch operation Irving on 2 Oct 66.

(b) Combat losses for the operation (not including ARVN casualty figures outlined above) were:¹¹

<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>FRIENDLY</u>	
KIA	230	KIA	32
Captured	70	WIA	243
Detainees	681		
Indiv Wpns	104		
Crew Served	20		

(7) OPORD 10 (DEUL KUK HWA)

(a) The Cap Rok Inf Div began Operation Deul Kuk Hwa, also known as Maeng No 6, on 230650H Sep 66. The operation was initially launched into the southern region of the Phu Cat Mountains, an area containing known VC/NVA base areas. This area had never before been penetrated in strength by elements of ARVN or I FFORCEV. The mission was to search for and destroy enemy forces in the AO and to further secure the area for eventual inclusion as a portion of the Cap Rok Inf Div TAOR.

(b) On D-2, a company sized force of the 26th Regt launched a deception type operation by air assaulting into the lower Hung Luong Peninsula. This element immediately made contact with small groups of enemy with contact remaining light and sporadic throughout the two day mission period. At H-5 hours, one company of the 1st Regt began infiltrating into a blocking position within the AO. Simultaneously, remaining elements of the 1st Regt began motor and foot approach marches to the LD. At H-Hour the attack was launched with a reinforced battalion of the 26th Regt air assaulting into the Phu Cat Mountains, seizing initial objectives and establishing blocking positions in the east. A simultaneous attack to the east was launched by two battalions (-) of the 1st Regt. Contact throughout the initial period of the operations (through 1 Oct 66) was from light to moderate with small and scattered enemy groups. At the outset of the assault, the enemy force appeared to have fragmented into small groups in their base camp area in an attempt to exfiltrate the AO or to hide and avoid contact. Throughout this phase significant numbers of these groups were located in caves. These contacts often resulted in finds of various size caches of weapons and food.

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¹¹ I FFORCEV Msg A-1088 DTG020228 Oct 66, Subj: SITREP 010001-012400H Oct

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(c) Operations in the Phu Cat Mountains continued in conjunction with the launching of Operation IRVING on 2 Oct 66 by the 1st Cav Div (AM) and elements of the ARVN 22d Div and 3d & 5th ARVN Abn Bn's. The scheme of maneuver generally envisioned US and ARVN forces simultaneously converging on and encircling the enemy in the populated areas north of the Phu Cat Mountains, with ROK forces establishing blocking positions and conducting intensive sweep operations to the north through the mountains. Contact continued to be light and sporadic. In the mountains the continuous and intensive search and destroy effort began to reveal its effects in that significant number of VC being captured reported they had been without food, water or ammunition for several days.

(d) The operation continued with decreasing contacts. The most significant aspect has been the success achieved by continued ground operations over the same terrain for an extended period of time. The often applied VC tactic of evasion and "wait-out" the departure of pursuing forces was thwarted by the continued ROK presence. This ROK tactic caused a continuous reduction of enemy forces and their established logistical bases in the Phu Cat Mountains. Additionally, infrastructure cadre who must remain in the area to accomplish mission were slowly eliminated along with the combat units.

(e) Combat losses for the operation as of 312400H Oct were:

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u> ¹²	
KIA	1127	KIA	28
Detainees	642	WIA	110
Captured	499		
Ind Wpns	428		
C/S Wpns	42		

(8) OPERATION CLINTON:

(a) Operation Clinton 1-30 Oct was a border surveillance and reconnaissance of VC/NVA infiltration routes. The operation was conducted in northwest Kontum Province with the reconnaissance effort directed to the area adjacent to the Laotian/RVN and the Cambodia/RVN border.

(b) On 29 Sep a Commando Company composed of (a Mike force of 5 USSF, 125 VN) and a reconnaissance team of two USSF and 5 VN, were infiltrated into the AO. The Commando Company remained in the AO for a three day period and was then extracted. The reconnaissance team remained as a stay-behind patrol and was extracted and replaced by two reconnaissance teams infiltrated by helicopter. A total of eight reconnaissance teams were employed at different times in the operation with two teams normally operating in different parts of the AO at the same time. The teams remained in the AO for a 24 to 72 hour period and were extracted and replaced by two other teams infiltrated by helicopter into different portions of the AO. A Commando Company was retained as a reserve-reaction force. No significant contacts have been reported.

(c) Combat losses for the operation were: Friendly 4 WIA. Enemy 6 KIA, 3 captured, 1 ind wpa.

(9) OPLAN 38-56 (IRVING)

(a) With Operation Thayer I completed, Irving was launched on 020607H Oct 66 in coordination with ARVN (Operation Dia Bang 800) and ROK (Deu Kuk Hwa) to reduce the known VC/NVA base located in the Phu Cat Moun-

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tains by destroying enemy located therein and by securing the terrain to facilitate expansion of the Cap Rok Inf Div TAOR and elimination of VC influence in the area (Incl 15). The basic scheme of maneuver for the operation envisioned the encirclement of the Phu Cat Mountains on its three landward sides by ground forces using the natural obstacle of the South China Sea as the "anvil" into which enemy forces were to be driven. To further complement the advantages of this natural barrier, extensive coastal patrolling was planned by USN PCF craft and VN junk fleet in an effort to deny the enemy routes of egress from the AO. Naval gunships and rocket launching craft were available to provide interdiction and destruction fires.

(b) Shortly after 0600H the lead elements of five assault battalions of the 1st Cav Div (AM) landed into initial objective areas south of the Nui Mieu Mountains and east of Hwy 1. Contact with enemy forces was initially light, however at approximately 0930H, elements of the division became heavily engaged. The engagement occurred when a UH-1 aircraft was downed by hostile ground fire. Two OH-13 helicopters were sent in to search for the downed UH-1 and were in turn shot down by intensive enemy ground fire. A Company, 1st Bn, 9th Cav was committed into the area to secure the OH-13 helicopters and to extract the pilots and observers when they immediately became heavily engaged with an estimated 300 man VC/NVA force. A Company, 1st Bn 9th Cav was extracted from the area of contact after being reinforced by A and B Company, 1st Bn, 12th Cav. At 1215H 1st Bn, 12th Cav pursued, regaining contact at 1350H. However, contact broke almost immediately. Results of this engagement were: Friendly 3 KIA, 3 WIA.¹³ Enemy 176 KIA, 35 Captured, 22 Detainees, 15 Ind Wpns, 2 C/S Wpns captured.

(c) The First Cav Div (AM) continued extensive search operations in its assigned zone along the Hung Lac Peninsula, in the Soui Ca Valley and high ground to its west, in the lower Nui Mieu Mountains and in the Kim Sor Valley. Although contacts continued to be light, primarily with small groups of enemy, each 24 hours period of ground operations revealed a significant toll of enemy killed and captured. Several large arms caches were discovered, and defensive and administrative type installations and bunkers were located and destroyed. Operations continued with light but continuous contact until 150842H Oct 66. While operating in the vicinity of Phu Ninh in the "Eagle's Claw" area, C Company, 1st Bn, 5th Cav came under heavy fire from an estimated enemy company sized force (later determined to be the 5th Company, 95th Bn, 2d VC Regt). Artillery and aerial rocket artillery were called in as the enemy tried to break contact at 1435H. Sporadic fighting continued throughout the night with the enemy able to break contact and withdraw from the area at 161215H. Results of this engagement were: Friendly 4 KIA, 13 WIA. Enemy 31 VC KIA (BC).¹⁴

(d) This operation proved to be highly successful and tactically significant for two major reasons. Unlike most current military operations conducted in which the destruction of the enemy forces is the principal objective, the decision was made to orient this operation on the seizure of critical terrain, primarily the Phu Cat Mountains. This decision was based on the long range objective of denying the enemy this mountain base complex, long a "safe haven" from which they could continue to control the surrounding populace. The second important aspect of this operation was the excellent use of the natural terrain obstacle in the overall schemes of maneuvers. Pinned to the "natural anvil" during the contraction of friendly forces upon the Phu Cat Mountains, the enemy was unable to infiltrate the area in any large numbers. As a result, the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 18th NVA Regt were destroyed as combat effective units.

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¹³I FFORCEV Msg A-1095 DTG 030308 Oct Subj: SITREP 020001 - 022400H Oct

¹⁴I FFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 33 and 42, 16 Oct

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(e) In support of the operation, I FFORCEV established a Fire Support Coordinator Center (CSCC) in the forward area to coordinate all fire support of the three national forces involved and to control all non-divisional fire support available.

242400 Oct are: ¹⁵ (f) Combat losses for this operation which terminated

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA	681	KIA	20
Captives	690	WIA	135
Ind Wpns	191	MIA	2
C/S Wpns	19		
Detainees	4136		

(IG) Operation Dia Bang 800 (ARVN Operation).

(a) Operation Dia Bang 800 was started on 2 Oct 66 in conjunction with the 1st Cav Div (AM) Operation Irving. The operation was an integral part of coordinated US, ROK, and ARVN effort to destroy enemy forces in the Phu Cat Mountains. The 22d ARVN Division had operational control of committed forces, (41st Regt (-), 3d and 5th Abn Bns) in zone just north of the Phu Cat Mountains. The mission of this force was to conduct sweep operations to the east of Hwy 1 and along Route 503 in an effort to deny enemy escape routes and to destroy enemy forces located in zone. Throughout the operation, ARVN elements experienced only light and sporadic contacts engaging primarily small groups of VC attempting to exfiltrate the zone. The most significant results of this operation were the large numbers of VC captured.

(b) Worthy of note during this operation was the significant divergence from the standard "one-way" sweep employed by ARVN. The sweep was executed by battalions attacking by alternate bounds from Hwy 1 east to the ARVN eastern boundary. The basic pattern was repeated as the ARVN forces conducted operations westward toward Hwy 1 through the same zone. By such sustained operations over the same terrain, small groups, food and weapons caches were continuously uncovered as the enemy was unable to relocate his forces or supply caches due to the constant pressure applied. The operation terminated on 241630 Oct 66.

(c) Combat losses for the operation were: ⁵

<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>FRIENDLY</u>	
KIA	221	KIA	2
Captured	518	WIA	18
Detainees	95		
Indiv Wpns	948		
C/S Wpns	5		

(11) Operation Hooker II (TF 777):

(a) Operation Hooker II (TF 777) began on 10 Oct 66 with the infiltration of elements of Task Force 777 into the area of operations in southwest Kontum Province. The mission of TF 777 is to conduct border surveillance, interdiction of infiltration routes, and operations against known VC installations. This is a pilot program to determine the feasibility of using a mobile guerrilla force in the area rather than establishing a permanent CIDG Camp.

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(b) TF 777 consists of a 196 man Mike Force Company, a 46 man combat reconnaissance platoon and one USSF "A" detachment of 16 personnel. TF 777 will conduct guerrilla operations in the area for a 30 day period. Resupply is by air drop. No significant enemy contact has been reported to date.

(c) Combat losses for the operation as of 312400H Oct are: Friendly 3 WIA. Enemy 11 KIA, 1 individual weapon.

(12) OPLAN 19-66 (Paul Revere IV)

(a) Paul Revere IV, a border surveillance mission with an additional mission to coordinate the defenses of the CIDG Camps at Plei Djereng, Plei Me and Duc Co, began 18100H Oct 66. Numerous intelligence reports indicated the presence of an NVA Division in the Plei Djereng-Pleiku area. To meet the threat posed by this large enemy force, the 4th Inf Div, with its 2d Bde, and 3d Bde, 2 Inf Div OPCON, assumed responsibility for the area of operations (Incl 12).

(b) There were two major incidents in the operation.

1. At 0643H on 25 Oct, C Troop, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav was enroute to reconnoiter an air strike when an APC struck a mine. To protect the unit from a possible ambush, several tanks were deployed to the flanks. Two tanks struck other mines and were damaged. The result of this incident: Friendly 4 KIA, 8 WIA, 1 Individ wpn, 1 Crew served, 2 tanks (Dam), 1 APC (dest). Enemy - none.

2. At 0015H on 27 Oct Company A 1st Bn, 12th Cav, while in defensive position, was attacked by an estimated NVA Company. The enemy employed mortars and automatic weapons fire. Contact was broken by the enemy at 0215H. Company A, 1st Bn, 12th Cav employed artillery and a flare ship. Harassing fires were continued after contact was broken. A search of the area at first light revealed the following results: Friendly 2 WIA. Enemy, 19 NVA KIA. 16

(c) Increased enemy activity in the AO dictated deployment of three battalions, 1st Cav Div (AM) into the south of the AO between 29 - 31 Oct in Phase II.

(d) Combat losses for the operation as of 312400H Oct were: Friendly 22 KIA, 114 WIA, 1 individual weapon, 1 C/S. Enemy 132 KIA, 37 Captured, 10 detainees, 68 individual weapons and 12 C/S weapons.¹⁷

(13) OPLAN 42-66 (Thayer II).

(a) After completing Operation Irving, the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) turned north and initiated Operation Thayer II on 250001H Oct 66. The mission was to locate, fix, and destroy elements of the 2d VC Regt and local force units believed to be in central Binh Dinh Province (Incl 15).

(b) On 261200H Oct 66, A Company, 1st Bde, 8th Cav engaged an estimated VC platoon vicinity PR782959. Enemy elected to break contact at 1230H. Results: Friendly - None, Enemy - 5 VC KIA, 12 Captured, 1 Individual weapon.

(c) On 30 Oct 66, elements of B Company, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, while exploiting the area of B52 bomber strikes executed on 27 Oct vicinity BR5694, located what was believed to be a CP area. Fifteen bodies, 2 tons

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¹⁶I FFORCEV G3 Daily Journal Entry 25 and 33, 27 Oct 66

¹⁷I FFORCEV msg 1486 DTG 010230 Nov subj. SITREP 310001 - 312400 Oct

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rice destroyed, 1 120mm mortar round, 1 mess hut, 1 cooking hut with 2 stoves, 1 barracks (150 man capacity) with double door and running water were found.

(d) From 29 - 31 Oct 66, 1st Cav Div (AM) deployed its 2d Bde with three battalions west into the southern part of Paul Revere IV AO (Incl 12).

(e) Combat losses for the operation as of 312400H Oct were: 17

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA	118	KIA	11
Captured	10	WIA	85
Indiv Wpn	34		
C/S Wpn	1		
Detainees	40		

(14) OPLAN 49-66 (ADAMS)

(a) 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div began Operation Adams in Phu Yen Province on 260001H Oct 66 (Incl 16). Primary mission given the 4th Inf Div and subsequently passed on the 1st Bde was to conduct search and destroy and rice protection missions in the Tuy Hoa/Tuy An area. At the beginning of the operation the brigade deployed its three maneuver battalions into the rice producing areas north of Tuy Hoa and near Tuy An area and commenced small unit patrolling. During the same period the 47th Inf Regt (ARVN) was deployed to protect the rice harvest west of Tuy Hoa in the Hieu Xuong Valley. The operation continues with no significant results reported to date.

(b) Combat losses for the operation as of 312400H Oct were: 17

<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>FRIENDLY</u>	
KIA	5	WIA	5
Captured	4		
Indiv Wpns	2		
Detainees	35		

(15) OPLAN 50-66 (GERONIMO I)

(a) With the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div taking over the rice protection mission in the Tuy Hoa/Tuy An area, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div initiated on 31 Oct Operation Geronimo I, a search and destroy mission in western Phu Yen Province (Incl 16). As of the close of the reporting period significant contact had not been made.

(b) Combat losses for the period were: 17

<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>FRIENDLY</u>	
KIA (BC)	10	KIA	1
Indiv Wpns	10	WIA	1
Detainees	0		

c. G3 Air Operations:

(1) Tactical Air Support: Tactical air sorties flown in support of I FFORCEV varied daily from 12 to 97 with a mean of 49 per day. This is a 44% increase over the three previous months. The increase is due

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mainly to three factors: increased emphasis of use of tactical air support, use of SKYSPOT for night bombing, and an increase in the number of battalions supported. The types of missions flown were:

- (a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.
- (b) Preparation fires on landing zones (LZ) and objectives.
- (c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy assembly areas and infiltration routes.
- (d) Landing zone construction.
- (e) Night illumination and strikes.

(2) Construction of LZ was a relatively new mission for tactical air support although it had been done occasionally before this period. The process of lowering personnel into the jungle to cut down sufficient trees is time consuming and hazardous. A tactical air strike with 1000 lb bombs clears sufficient area to enable a UH1D to land forces to secure the LZ and begin improvement.

(3) SKYSPOT:

(a) Requests for SKYSPOT missions exceeded the availability of sorties and it was necessary to establish priorities. To strike more targets, the Air Force began assigning two targets to each preplanned SKYSPOT mission. One-half of the ordnance was dropped on each target. In October to aid units in planning, the Army Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) began informing subordinate headquarters of the number of missions available to each headquarters daily. Also to improve reaction time, the deadline for preplanned SKYSPOT missions for the period 1900 to 0600 hours was changed from 1300 hours the day before to 1100 hours the same day.

(b) SKYSPOT controlled 58% of approximately 2000 missions flown for I FFORCEV.

(c) In October the SKYSPOT system at DALAT became operational, completing coverage of II CTZ and providing overlapping coverage of the southern half of II CTZ. The range of the BIEN HOA system was increased from 98 to 200 nautical miles.

(4) Tactical air sorties flown in support of major operations during the period were:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES/DAY</u>	
JOHN PAUL JONES	107	1.6	8 KBA, 6 sec exp
PAUL REVEPE II	656	24.2	30 KBA est, 2 sec exp
PAUL REVERE III	645	8.2	2 KBA est, 3 sec exp
BYRD	121	1.3	1 sec exp
THAYER I	297	6.1	15 sec exp
SEWARD	64	2.1	
SU ROK	600	3.2	24 KBA, 34 sec exp
DUEL KUK HVA	42	1.1	11 KBA est, 3 sec exp
IRVING	727	31.6	

(5) A comparison of sorties flown in I, II and III CTZ is shown in (Incl 17). The graph of each corps includes support of both ARVN and US/AFMA forces. Sorties in support of I FFORCEV are also shown separately from II CTZ totals.

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(6) While flares remained in short supply during the period and flareship support was still restricted to troops in contact, permission was received to expend up to 10 flares nightly in support of 1st Cav Div (AM) base camp security operations. Occasionally flares have been dropped in support of this operation.

(7) Strategic Air Support.

(a) There were 252 B-52 sorties flown this quarter compared with 179 last quarter in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OPERATION OR TARGET</u>
011130Z Aug	BLUE TULIP One	6	Op EMERSON
012130Z Aug	BLUE TULIP Two	6	Op EMERSON
022310Z Aug	BIG LEAD	12	Op PAUL REVERE I
050230Z Aug	DEAD BUD One	3	Op PAUL REVERE II
050230Z Aug	DEAD BUD two	3	Op PAUL REVERE II
080400Z Aug	PINK PUNCH One	12	Op JOHN PAUL JONES
080400Z Aug	PINK PUNCH Two	6	Op JOHN PAUL JONES
080400Z Aug	PINK PUNCH Three	3	Op JOHN PAUL JONES
080400Z Aug	PINK PUNCH Four	3	Op JOHN PAUL JONES
091100Z Aug	NEW SALT	12	Planned by MACV. Followed-up by ARVN
101745Z Aug	SLOW CUP	6	Op PAUL REVERE II
130120Z Aug	RED WIG	6	Op PAUL REVERE II
030720Z Sep	TRIM TAB	6	Op JOHN PAUL JONES
050100Z Sep	IRON ROCK Two	12	MACV originated strike
050100Z Sep	IRON ROCK Three	9	MACV originated strike
092200Z Sep	GREEN HOT One	12	Op THAYER I
092200Z Sep	GREEN HOT Two	3	Op THAYER I
102100Z Sep	ANCHOR CHAIN One	12	Op THAYER I
102100Z Sep	ANCHOR CHAIN Two	3	Op THAYER I
112210Z Sep	PEN KNIFE One	3	Op THAYER I
112210Z Sep	PEN KNIFE Two	3	Op THAYER I
112210Z Sep	PEN KNIFE Three	3	Op THAYER I
140930Z Sep	BLUE YARN	9	II Corps Target
302330Z Sep	IRON ROCK One	3	Base area interdiction
010400Z Oct	MUD BATH	6	Op THAYER I
042245Z Oct	OLD HEAD	12	Op IRVING
052230Z Oct	HOUSE MOUSE	6	Op IRVING
142000Z Oct	FOX BOX	6	Op PAUL REVERE III
160835Z Oct	HEAD BED One	6	Op PAUL REVERE III
171200Z Oct	HEAD BED Two	6	Op PAUL REVERE III
270100Z Oct	ALFA One	9	Op THAYER II
280100Z Oct	ALFA Ninety-two	9	Op THAYER II
282300Z Oct	ALFA Sixteen	6	Op PAUL REVERE IV
290230Z Oct	SHORT END One	15	Op THAYER II
301100Z Oct	ALFA Sixty-six	6	Op PAUL REVERE IV
311500Z Oct	ALFA Fifty-two	9	Op PAUL REVERE IV

(8) On 30 Oct 66, I FORCEV was visited by 13 B-52 crewmen, comprising two crews, to foster a better understanding between the crewmen and those they support. Following an orientation briefing at this headquarters, one crew visited the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, at TUY HOA and the other crew visited the 1st Cav Div (AM) at PHU CAT.

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d. Army Aviation Operations:

(1) The 179th Avn Co (AM) (CH-47), which arrived in RVN on 26 July 1966, became operational on 1 Sep 66.

(2) During the period 1 Aug through 31 Oct 66, this headquarters acquired operational control of a second CH-47 helicopter company, the 180th Aviation Company (AMM) (CH-47), which is assigned to the 10th Avn Bn, 17th Combat Avn Gp. The 180th Avn Co (AMM) arrived in country on 25 Oct 66 and is currently stationed at TUY HOA, training and outfitting as a helicopter company, with 15 assigned CH-47 helicopters. It was established on 15 Dec 66.

(3) The following fixed wing aviation companies were consolidated under the command of the 223d Combat Support Aviation Battalion in September. No unit moves or change of support concept was effected as the result of this consolidation.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE ASSIGNED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
183d Avn Co (O1)	4 Sep 66	DONG RA THIN
219th Avn Co (O1)	4 Sep 66	PLI KHU
220th Avn Co (O1) (OPCON III MAF)	4 Sep 66	HUE PHU BAI
131st Avn Co (OV1) (OPCON USMACV)	4 Sep 66	HUE PHU BAI
18th Avn Co (O1A)	4 Sep 66	QUI NHON
92d Avn Co (CV2)	25 Sep 66	QUI NHON
135th Avn Co (CV2)	4 Sep 66	DONG RA THIN

(4) Aviation units under OPCON I BUCORGV participated in the following significant BS operations in RVN during the reported period. This is an increase of four major operations over the preceding report periods:

<u>NAME OF OPERATION</u>	<u>AVIATION UNITS</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>AJORN UNITS</u>
JOHN PAUL JONES	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	21 Jul - 5 Sep	1st/01st Abn Div
PAUL REVERE II	119th Avn Co	1 - 25 Aug	1st Cav Div (AM) 2/25th Inf Div
PAUL REVERE III	155th Avn Co 119th Avn Co 170th Avn Co	26 Aug - 13 Oct	2/15th Inf Div
PAUL REVERE IV	155th Avn Co 119th Avn Co 170th Avn Co 117th Avn Co	16 Oct -	2/4th Inf Div
THAYER	161st Avn Co 174th Avn Co	17 Sep - 1 Oct	1st Cav Div (AM)
SEWARD	58th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	17 Sep - 25 Oct	1st/01st Abn Div
BYRD	62d	20 Sep -	2/21st Inf Div
DUEL KUY BUA	155th Avn Co 117th Avn Co	30 Sep -	1st Cav Div (AM)

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IRVING	Cav	2 Oct - 24 Oct	1st Cav Div (AM)
CLINTON	174th Avn Co	1 Oct - 30 Oct	SF OMEGA Project
ADAMS	48th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	26 Oct -	1/4th Inf Div

(5) Concurrently with the above FVMAF operations, thirty-eight ARVN operations were accomplished which lasted from one to eleven days. Assets allocated for the operations varied from a six aircraft reconnaissance of airstrike up to two aviation companies (airmobile) for initial lifts on multi-battalion size operations. Detailed coordination was required to release aviation assets previously committed to US operations for these ARVN operations. On several occasions ARVN requests for aviation support did not allow sufficient time to properly plan for shifting of assets resulting in cancellation of the proposed ARVN operation. This situation has greatly improved since the last reporting period and has resulted in a significant increase in completed ARVN operations. For example, the following ARVN operations were supported in September 1966:

<u>OPERATION NAME</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>
HOA LOA 66	CIDG, 5th SFG	29 Aug - 3 Sep 66	PLEY MONG
PHU DON 42	22d ARVN Div	2 Sep 66	CHEO REO
DANG THANG 83	24th STZ	2 Sep 66	DAK TO
THANG LONG 252	23d ARVN Div	4 Sep 66	BAN ME THUOT
QUANG DUC "B"	23d ARVN Div	4 Sep 66	DUC KUYEN
HAC HO 44	24th STZ	6 Sep 66	PLATEAU GI
ALPHA 3	24th STZ	10 Sep 66	PLEIKU
DAN THANG 87	24th STZ	10 Sep 66	KONTUM
DAN THANG 89	24th STZ	14 Sep 66	TAN CANH
LAST CHANCE	CIDG, 5th SFG	18 Sep 66	BUON BRIENG
LOI HOA 68	22d ARVN Div	22 Sep 66	TOY HOA
HAC HO 48	23d ARVN Div	23 Sep 66	KONTUM
MY FRIEND	24th STZ	29 Sep 66	DAK PEK

(6) I FFORCEV Reinforced I CTR and III MAF with a total of seventeen aircraft during this report period. Aircraft support was as indicated below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTING</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>
5 - 10 Aug 66	52d Cbt Avn Bn	6 OH1B (Guns)	III MAF
28 Aug 66	1st Cav Div (AM)	1 CH-54	III MAF
10 Sep 66	1st Cav Div (AM)	1 CH-47	III MAF
		2 OH1B (Guns)	
18 Sep - 30 Oct 66	225d Cbt Avn Bn	401.	III MAF
19 - 23 Sep 66	14th Cbt Avn Bn	2 OH1B (Guns)	Special Ops Gp
3 - 15 Oct 66	130th Cbt Avn Bn	4 OH1B (Guns)	III MAF
22 - 31 Oct 66	52d Cbt Avn Bn	5 OH1D (Sticks)	Special Ops Gp
		2 OH-13 (Guns)	Gp
21 Oct 66	1st Cav Div (AM)	1 CH-54	III MAF

(7) The 125th Air Traffic Control Company continued to provide, on request, this headquarters, essential Ground Control Agencies (CCA) and air traffic control equipment with personnel in support of joint Army/Air Force operation at forward airfields. Shortage of air traffic control personnel and equipment dictate that such support be allocated only to major operations.

(8) Administrative requirements for helicopters continue to detract from combat helilift capability.

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(9) Attached are two charts depicting the 17th Cbt Avn Gp's weekly average number of aircraft short crews (Incl 18 and 19) and a comparison of weekly average number of aircraft committed to maneuver forces OPCON to HQ, I FFORCEV and weekly average number of aircraft utilized in other support. Aircraft committed to other support include MACV directed administrative or special operations, HQ, I FFORCEV administrative and combat support flights, advisory efforts in I and II CTZ's, support of USAID and JUSPAO, required training of newly assigned aircrews and area defense requirements. These comparisons are contained in Incl 19. Data was obtained from daily unit reports to the 17th Cbt Avn Gp.

e. Organization and Training Activities:

(1) Inclosure 20 shows all OPCON, assigned and attached units.

(2) The command relationship of major FVMAF forces in II CTZ is shown in Incl 21.

(3) Arrival, departure of units, reorganization.

(a) On 7 Sep I FFORCEV assumed OPCON of 4th Inf Div (-) as directed by USARV OPLAN 78-66 (Operation Robin), 10 July 1966. Concurrent with becoming operational on 17 Oct the 4th Inf Div assumed OPCON of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, and the 1st Bn, 69th Armor in compliance with I FFORCEV Frag Ord 34-66, Ch 2, 17 Oct. The 1st Bn, 69th Armor was attached to the 4th Inf Div for logistic and administrative support on 20 Oct per USARV GO 6112, 22 Oct 66. I FFORCEV LOI to the 4th Inf Div is Incl 22.

(b) On 29 Aug, the 2d Korean Marine Brigade deployed to I CTZ under the operational control of CG, III MAF. In August, ROKFORCEV established a Field Command Headquarters in Nha Trang, with Capital Division and 9th ROK Inf Div coming under its operational control. I FFORCEV and ROK FV FC operate under the terms of mutual cooperation and coordination. However, in his capacity as the Senior Advisor to the CG, II CTZ, CG, I FFORCEV coordinates the employment of all FVMAF in II CTZ.

(c) On 15 Sep 66, the Doctrine and Training Division, I FFORCEV, was reorganized and became the Organization and Training Division. This division retained the same functions and assumed those pertaining to organization, previously a function of G3 Plans Division.

(d) The MTOE-52-1D HQ, I FFORCEV was submitted to USARV on 27 Sep 66 adding 24 spaces, primarily in Revolutionary Development Division of G3. Subject TOE was approved by USARV and forwarded through channels to DA for approval. As of 28 Oct the MTOE was in HQ, USARPAC.

(e) I FFORCEV developed the organization and concept of operation for a corps long range reconnaissance company and submitted it to HQ, USARV, on 22 Sep 66. It was recommended that the company consist of three long range reconnaissance platoons (LRRP) each consisting of eight, six men patrols. The concept of employment envisions the company performing long range reconnaissance patrols for and OPCON to I FFORCEV. This function is currently being performed by the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) OMEGA force. The company is to be organized and trained in CONUS and further trained in Okinawa and deploy to RVN.

(2) Training:

(a) From 24 to 30 Oct 66, 35 artillerymen from US II CTZ Artillery units participated in nuclear weapons refresher training conducted in Korea. Personnel were from 8 inch Howitzer and 155 mm Howitzer battalions.

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(b) In-country orientation of newly arrived tactical brigades, formerly accomplished by an I FFORCEV orientation team, was delegated in August 1966 to OPCON units. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, gave the orientation to 2,600 men of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div from 10 to 24 Aug 66. From 8 to 14 Oct 66, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, presented it to 3,500 men of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

(c) US Army Materiel Command sent a four man New Material Introductory Team, consisting of two officers and two Department of the Army civilians, to four I FFORCEV OPCON units to explain and demonstrate the effects of BEEHIVE/cannister ammunition for the 105mm How, 90 and 106 RR, and the 90mm Gun. The team visited the following units from 29 Oct to 6 Nov 66.

I FFORCEV Arty	1st Cav Div (AM)
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	4th Inf Div
52d Arty Gp	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

(d) MACV Recondo School. This school is designed to teach selected volunteer students from OPCON units the practical fundamentals and techniques of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. I FFORCEV received 27 student quotas for attendance in the October 1966 session of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) conducted MACV Recondo school. These quotas were reallocated to:

1st Cav Div (AM)	12
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	5
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	5
4th Inf Div	5

(e) The 1st Cav Div (AM) conducted a demonstration of the Jungle Canopy Aerial Platform in the vicinity of AN KHE on 19 Oct 66.

(3) Research and Development: Modular Armor Kits for 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton, 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton trucks were developed by the limited warfare laboratory and shipped to RVN for evaluation by OPCON units of I FFORCEV. The kits were designed to protect vehicle occupants from small arms fire. Units expressing a desire to participate in the evaluation were 1st Cav Div (AM), 4th Inf Div, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 52d Arty Gp and 272d MP Co. Anticipated date of kit distribution is 1 Jan 67.

(4) Doctrine: The airmobile battalion in separate tactical operations was studied as an application of the principle of economy of force; specifically, separate battalion operations conducted in support of revolutionary development in isolated areas to free the bulk of US/FWMAF for operations against hard core VC/NVA forces.

f. Revolutionary Development:

(1) In August 1966, a Revolutionary Development Division (G33) was organized under the general staff supervision of ACoS, G3. An identical organization was directed to be included in the other corps level headquarters by MACV Regulation 10-12 dated 13 Sep 66. The I FFORCEV G33.

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Division has an authorized strength of six LTC's one MAJ, two CPT's and three enlisted personnel. Present for duty strength during the reporting period consisted of two LTC's one MAJ, one CPT and three enlisted personnel. One noteworthy aspect of the G33 organization was the establishment of four project area chiefs in the grade of LTC. Subsequently, these titles were changed to field representatives. These officers coordinate Revolutionary Development doctrine and policies, publishing guidance directives, preparing plans and programs in support of Revolutionary Development, and coordinating the entire Revolutionary Development effort for II CTZ. This includes coordination with USAID, JUSPAO and OSA Country Team.

(2) During the reporting period G33 conducted these activities:

(a) Publication of I FFORCEV Staff Memo Number 10-1 prescribing Revolutionary Development responsibilities and functions. (Inclosure 23).

(b) Publication of I FFORCEV Regulation Number 525-5, 2 Sep 66, which provides guidance for combat operations in support of Revolutionary Development and the employment of GVN Revolutionary Development Cadre.

(c) A joint ARVN/ROK/US tactical doctrine seminar to discuss and share tactical concepts and techniques developed for the support of Revolutionary Development. The tactical doctrine seminar was conceived as a vehicle to instruct ARVN personnel on the highly successful techniques used by ROK and US Forces during search and destroy operations. The principals who attended the seminar were:

LTC Stanley R. Larsen, CG, I FFORCEV

LTC Chae, CG, ROKFV FC

MG Vinh Loc, CG, II Corps

RG Thang, Minister of PD, RVN.

(d) Initiated planning for the development of an overall plan for Revolutionary Development within II CTZ.

(e) Developed OPLAN HOP LUC, the I FFORCEV pilot project for Revolutionary Development in II CTZ.

(f) Organized and hosted a Region II Country Team Meeting on 25 Oct in NHA TRANG to consider the problems connected with Revolutionary Development. These meetings will be held on a regular bi-weekly basis or as deemed necessary in the future with membership consisting of the following representatives:

CG, I FFORCEV

Chief of Staff, I FFORCEV

DSA, II Corps

ACofS, G3, I FFORCEV

Regional Director USAID

Chief G33 Division, I FFORCEV

Regional Director JUSPAO

Senior ARVN Division Advisor(s)

Regional Director OSA (lowlands and/or highlands)

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(3) The Revolutionary Development program in II CTZ, while behind the programmed schedule, showed an increase of 77 secured hamlets over the last reporting period. Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Darlac, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon Provinces showed satisfactory progress during the quarter. A dramatic opportunity for accelerating the RD program was developed in the National Priority Area within Phu Cat and Phu My Districts of Binh Dinh Province as a result of Operations Thayer and Irving. Planning for RD by the Region II Country Team is underway. Inclosure 24 shows the hamlet status by province as of 31 July and 31 Oct 66.

(4) I FFORCEV Anti-Extortion operations during August - October were characterized by the following activities:

(a) Route responsibilities for conduct of anti-extortion operations were updated and realigned in I FFORCEV SECRET message A-1028, DTG 280351Z Sep 66, to coincide with those previously assigned by I FFORCEV SECRET message A-0277 for Road Runner Operations.

(b) Priority changes were planned, in coordination with G3 Plans, to conform to those in the MACV Combined Campaign Plan, 1957.

(c) Plans for increased helicopter support for II Corps anti-extortion operations along Route 20 were prepared and are being coordinated with CG, II CTZ.

(d) There were a total of 598 Road Runner Operations during the reporting period that resulted in 18,467 kilometers of roads being traversed and 30 enemy KIA.

(e) There was no significant change in the number and location of VC tax extortion points during the reporting period.

g. Chemical Operations:

(1) General:

(a) The 1st Cav Div (AM) request for consideration of the possible use of incapacitating agent BZ, which was reported in the May - July Operational Report - Lessons Learned, was favorably indorsed by USARV to COMUSMACV for consideration. On 20 Sep 66, a letter, HQ, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, subject: Use of Chemical Agents, was received informing this headquarters that the request had been favorably referred to COMUSMACV by his staff, but that a decision by COMUSMACV has been deferred until after 1 Jan 67.

(b) A major problem area in herbicide operations is the time required for the processing of herbicide requests. The present time from project inception to project execution is a minimum of three months. Current II CTZ policy requires that all GVN requests be prepared at the Province/Sector level. In accordance with MACV Directives 525-1, requests from US/FWMAF units within II CTZ must be submitted to I FFORCEV. The request is then forwarded to CG, II CTZ for subsequent processing at Province/Sector level. On 9 Oct 66, I FFORCEV received a letter from DSA, II CTZ recommending a change to MACV directive 525-1, the directive governing herbicide operations. The proposed change would permit US/FWMAF

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units to submit project requests directly to Province/Sector with three information copies to the appropriate Field Force HQ. The GVN request would then be prepared at Province/Sector and forwarded through channels as usual. Under the proposed system, processing time would be reduced 30 to 40 percent. This letter was favorably indorsed to COMUSMACV on 14 Oct 66 with additional recommendations by this headquarters.

(c) In conjunction with the problem listed in paragraph 3g(1)(b), this headquarters received a letter on 9 Oct 66 from CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, subject: VC Crop Destruction. This letter indicated that the present system of herbicide operations was not responsive to the needs of the field commanders, and cited the late execution of the crop destruction project in Phu Yen Province as an example. Action recommended would delegate herbicide operation approval authority to Province/Sector level and would augment the existing delivery system by modifying FAC aircraft into epray aircraft. This letter was forwarded to COMUSMACV on 14 Oct 66 by indorsement with additional recommendations by this headquarters.

(d) On 13 Oct 66, this headquarters favorably indorsed to CG, USARV, a 1st Cav Div (AM) letter, subject: Quick Reaction Material Requirement, which recommended development of a large area riot control agent dispersion system capable of dispersing 10,000 pounds of bulk CS-1 per week within an AO.

(e) The following maintenance capability for chemical equipment exists within II CTZ:

1. Third echelon by 69th Maint Bn in Cam Ranh Bay.
2. Fourth echelon by 554th Maint Co in Qui Nhon.

This unit also has mobile inspection/maintenance teams capable of performing on-site inspection. Equipment is repaired on-site when possible; the remainder is turned in to the company for necessary repair.

(f) On 18 Aug 66, local USAID representatives requested the assistance of this headquarters to control a leaf hopper attack on the rice crops of Khanh Hoa Province. In conjunction with I FFORCEV Aviation Section, Helicopter-Mounted Riot Control Agent Dispensers were borrowed from the 10th Avn Bn and loaned to USAID. With this system approximately 1,700 hectares of rice were successfully treated with insecticide.

(g) On 8 Aug 66, two VC protective masks and five atropine vials were captured in the John Paul Jones AO by C Co, 1st Bn, 327th Inf (Incl 25). The masks are of simple canvas construction with charcoal filter elements and a plexiglass eyepiece sewed to the canvas. The eyepiece is very brittle and is cracked on the two masks captured. Straps tied at the back of the head hold the masks in place. A flap on the inside of the mask possibly acts as an exhalation check valve. The atropine was in a medical kit, its intended use is unknown.

(2) Crop Destruction Operations (Incl 26). Intelligence report, 1 Oct 66 Field No FVS-13,854, reports that "damage to crops by enemy (US) defoliation chemicals was responsible for a 40 percent decrease in subsistence for VC troops in South Vietnam over that in 1965".

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(a) The following projects were active during the reporting period:

1. Project 2-22 consists of six target areas in Phu Yen Province. Targets 4, 5, and 6 were reinitiated for the period Aug through December 66. Although the province chief recommended spraying during early August it was not started until late September when rice harvesting was either in progress or within a week of being started. As a result, the spraying was largely ineffective for the rice crops. Other crops in the area were about 50 percent destroyed even though only 40 percent of the project was completed. The late execution of this project which was partially delayed because of a higher priority requirement for the spray aircraft in Quang Tri Province prompted the letter from CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div discussed earlier in the report.

2. Project 2-31 consists of two target areas containing approximately 800 hectares of rice in Tuyen Duc Province. The project was approved for the period September 66 through February 67. No sorties have been flown.

3. Project 2/2R/01/66 consists of four primary target areas and one alternate containing approximately 6,000 hectares of various crops in Kontum Province. Although this project was approved for the period July through Oct 66, only approximately 50 percent of the project has been executed.

4. Project 2/2R/02/66 consists of three target areas containing approximately 2,500 hectares of crops in Binh Thuan Province. This project was approved for the period July 66 through March 67 and is approximately 50 percent completed. Intelligence reports indicate that the VC in target area one are critically short of food supplies due to this crop destruction project. Binh Thuan Sector has reported that 70 percent of the crops in the area sprayed have been destroyed.

(b) The following projects are currently being processed:

1. Project 2/2R/03/66 consists of three target areas containing approximately 1,000 hectares of rice and corn in Phu Bon Province. This request was forwarded to MACV on 17 Aug 66 by indorsement recommending approval. MACV requested consolidation of target area. An overlay with this information was forwarded on 18 Oct 66.

2. Project 2/2R/05/66 consists of three target areas containing 115 hectares of rice in Darlac Province. This project was forwarded to MACV on 13 Oct 66 by indorsement recommending approval.

3. Project 2/2R/06/66 consists of five target areas containing approximately 10,000 hectares of rice, corn and manioc in Ninh Thuan Province. This project was forwarded to MACV on 25 Oct 66 by indorsement recommending approval.

(3) Defoliation Operations (Incl 26).

(a) The following projects were active during the reporting period:

1. Project 2/2C/03/66 originally consisted of three target areas near Dong Ba Thin-Dan Ranh Bay in Khanh Hoa Provinces. Two target areas were approved for the period August through December 66. One target was cancelled. Spraying was started in August and is approximately 40 percent completed.

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2. Project 2/20/06/66 originally consisted of eleven target areas along LOC's in Phu Tho Province. Eight targets were approved for defoliation during the period September through December 66. Targets 4, 6 and 7 were disapproved. Two sorties have been flown.

3. Project 2/20/05/66 consists of four targets around the perimeter of the Tak Puk Special Forces Camp in Kontum Province. Project was approved in August 66 for execution during the period September 66 through March 67. No sorties have been flown.

(c) The following projects are currently being processed:

1. Project 2/20/06/66 consisting of five target areas in Lam Dong Province along Highways 20 and 28 were proposed by the province chief. USAID representatives at Sector and Region and DSA, II CTZ did not concur in the project. The objection was that tea and rubber plantations in the area might be affected by the spray. The project was forwarded by this headquarters on 22 Sep 66 to MACV recommending disapproval. The project is presently at MACV.

2. 2/20/(un-numbered) with three target areas in Binh Dinh Province was requested by the Cap ROK Inf Div on 28 July 66 to assist in operation in the Phu Cat Mtn. The request was forwarded to CG, II CTZ by this headquarters on 10 Aug 66. The GVN request is being prepared by Binh Dinh Province officials.

3. Project 2/20/07/66 with three target areas in the mountainous regions of Northeastern Khanh Hoa Province was requested by CG, II CTZ to assist in proposed operations in this area. The GVN request has been prepared by province officials. USA II CTZ position is being drafted.

4. Project 2/20/(un-numbered) with a target area in the southwestern corner of Kontum Province, between the Cambodian - Kontum border and the Kontum - Pleiku border was requested by CG, II CTZ by this headquarters on 28 Oct 66 to assist in operations in this area.

(d) As reported in the previous report, project 20/50/ for defoliation of eight target areas along the National Railroad in Binh Thuan Province, remains suspended until January 67.

(4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations.

(a) During Operation Paul Revere II the 1st Cav Div (AM) dropped five E159 tactical CS canister munitions. Timer malfunction resulted in all, failing to open at the desired height and bursting on the ground with lessened effect. The reason for the malfunction has not been determined. In September, forty E159 munitions were allocated to this headquarters. The 1st Cav Div (AM) and 4th Inf Div each received twelve, and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div each received eight.

(b) During operations Thayer and Irving the 1st Cav Div (AM) used E8 tactical CS munitions in battalion and brigade CP defense situations. In one instance the E8's were fired into a village suspected of harboring VC prior to moving troops in. As a result, the village occupants were incapacitated and enemy fire was reduced. In September twenty E8 munitions were allocated by this headquarters. The 1st Cav Div (AM) and 4th Inf Div each received six, and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div each received four.

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(4) Other RCA Users.

1. During Operations Thayer and Irving over 6,000 M7A3 grenades were air delivered by the 1st Cav Div (AM) using a modified M8 Grenade Dispenser locally fabricated from discarded 2.75" rocket launcher tubes and mounted in OH-1A helicopters, one on each side. Each dispenser can deliver 168 grenades, or a total of 336 grenades per helicopter load. An intervalometer setting of 0.3 second is normally used with a maximum helicopter speed of 90 knots at an altitude approximately 20 feet above tree top level. The dispenser used concurrently, with an ARA preparation has been very successful in suppressing enemy fire in LZ preparations. A major advantage of this system is that it can be preloaded for rapid installation in helicopters without restricting their normal use and without reducing the availability of ARA delivery systems. Twenty sets are being fabricated locally to provide a multi-mission capability.

2. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div utilized limited quantities of M7A3 CS grenades on four occasions during Operations John Paul Jones and Seward. These grenades were dropped from helicopters to harass the enemy and assist in suppression of ground fire.

3. On two occasions during Operation Seward the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div successfully used bulk CS-1 to contaminate trench and tunnel complexes. Five hundred meters of trench were contaminated by blowing up 48 pounds of bulk CS-1 with detonating cord. Fourteen hundred meters of deep tunnel were contaminated by blowing 350 pounds with detonating cord. The tunnel entrances were collapsed by an Engineer team. It is estimated that the complexes will remain contaminated for several months.

4. During Operations Thayer and Irving, the 1st Cav Div (AM) encountered tunnels for the first time and successfully utilized M7A3 CS grenades with Misty Mite Blowers on several occasions to neutralize and force their abandonment. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and Cap ROK Inf Div also used this item with success in Operations Seward, and Deul Kuk Hwa - Mang Ho 6 respectively.

(5) Summary.

(a) Herbicide Operations: Defoliation along LOC's and in vicinities of base camp areas has considerably improved visibility. Respraying is required to suppress new growth and maintain the increased visibility. Crop destruction operations, when conducted sufficiently in advance of the harvest season, are very effective in reducing the availability of food in VC - controlled areas. Estimates of such damage indicate from 40 - 70 percent less food available than in 1965. Forthcoming operations in Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, Darlac, Phu Bon and Pleiku Provinces, as well as completion of operations in Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, Kontum and Binh Thuan Provinces should be highly effective in further reducing VC food supplies.

(b) Riot Control Operations: Continued progress has been made in RCA employment during the reporting period. Usage has proven the effectiveness of air-delivered M7A3 CS grenades in LZ operations as a means of suppressing fire and as a means of harassing the enemy. The greater weight of this grenade over the M158/159 submunition has made it a more useful munition in the heavy jungle canopy, normally encountered in the II CZ. Likewise, continued use of RCA in the neutralization of tunnel complexes has further proven the worth of this agent. Observations noted in after-action reports of operations with respect to chemical employment are:

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1. Reaction time of no more than 30 minutes is considered necessary or the target will disperse.

2. Units must have protective masks readily available in order to exploit an RCA attack.

3. Early morning RCA strikes are considered to be most effective due to weather conditions.

4. Close coordination with ground troops and Arty LNO is necessary to avoid friendly troops and arty fire.

5. Preplanned strikes in conjunction with exploitation operations should be requested on suspected enemy locations in the AO, especially at first light and late afternoon.

h. Psychological Operations:

(1) General:

(a) From 1 Aug through 31 Oct 66, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) were conducted by FWMAF and GVN in II CTZ and supported by the 245th PSYOP Co (-) in Nha Trang, (eight officers and twenty-three enlisted men), a detachment in Pleiku (five officers and twenty enlisted men), 5th Air Commando Squadron (PSYOP), 6th PSYOP Bn, Saigon, 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa, US Coastal "Junk and Swift" Fleet, 20th PSYWAR Bn (ARVN) and 114th Liaison Squadron (VNAF).

(b) In II CTZ operations, 14,902,300 leaflets were disseminated, of which, 21,790,000 were printed by the 245th PSYOP Co, with the remainder being taken from stocks and/or supplied by 6th PSYOP Bn, 7th PSYOP Group, ARVN and JUSPAO. In addition 446 hours of aerial loudspeaker time was logged by the 5th ACS (PSYOP).

(c) Leaflets disseminated by operation:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>BEFORE</u>	<u>DURING</u>
John Paul Jones	4,040,000	5,043,000
Irving	2,750,000	9,250,000
Thayer	785,000	4,457,000
Paul Revere II and III	2,050,000	6,130,000
Byrd	800,000	1,715,000
Seward	2,200,000	5,443,000
Windy	NA	6,000,000
JUSPAO Operations	NA	500,000
Revolutionary Development & Other i.e., rice protection, pre & post election, VC tax collection, VC atrocities	NA	98,749,300

(d) The contents of leaflets used before tactical operations were generally:

1. Population control.
2. GVN/FWMAF military power.
3. How to rally.
4. Assurances of humane treatment to prisoners and returnees.

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5. Exposure of VC/NVA.

6. Post B52 strike.

(e) The objectives of leaflets used during tactical operations were:

1. Demoralize the VC and NVA troops.

2. Create attitudes in the local populace and NVA ranks conducive to accepting the terms of the Chieu Hoi program.

3. Assure potential prisoners and returnees of fair treatment.

4. Exploitation of prisoners and returnees in developing leaflets.

(f) Leaflets used prior to an operation, gave would-be-ralliers the reason for rallying. Those leaflets used during operations described how to rally and the consequences if the VC/NVA continued to fight.

(g) For examples of leaflets used in tactical operations in II CTZ see:

1. Demoralization leaflets (Incl 27).

2. Quick reaction and special leaflets (Incl 28).

3. Pacification leaflets (Incl 29).

(h) Results of psychological operations show 1,453 ralliers for period 1 Aug through 31 Oct 66, an increase of 154 over last quarter. The returnee total since 1 Jan 66 is 6,415 in II CTZ.

(i) Loudspeaker missions were flown in conjunction with leaflets mission and in support of separate operations down to and including platoon sized units. During the reporting period a total of 576 1/4 hours of aerial loudspeaker time was flown by the 5th ACS in II CTZ.

(j) Seven two man loudspeaker teams, from the 245th PSYOP Co, were attached to US OPCON units for each major operation in II CTZ. The direct support role of loudspeaker teams was used effectively in population control, support of the Chieu Hoi program, search and clear operations and Revolutionary Development operations.

(2) Support:

(a) Leaflets disseminated in II CTZ during the reporting period were provided by:

1. 6th PSYOP Bn, Saigon: 19,862,000.

2. 7th PSYOP Cp, Okinawa: 41,700,000.

3. 245th PSYOP Co, Nha Trang/Fleiku: 21,790,000.

4. JUSPAO and locally: 66,550,300.

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(b) The 5th ACS flew a total of 673 PSYOP missions disseminating 149,902,300 leaflets and provided 576½ hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. There were no cancelled flights due to aircraft non-availability, however, there were 81 (10%) cancelled flights of the 754 requested due to weather or maintenance.

(c) Boats of the "Junk and Swift" Fleet, fitted with loudspeakers, averaged two hours of loudspeaker broadcasts per mission to selected target audiences in Operation Irving and along the II CTZ coastal area.

(3) Operations and Training:

(a) The 245th PSYOP Co maintains operational elements for the development and dissemination of propaganda in II CTZ. Elements consist of:

1. An area assessment and intelligence team consisting of one officer and three enlisted men charged with researching and determining potential propaganda targets.

2. Propaganda development team with one officer and one enlisted man, which receives all requests for aerial support. Missions are scheduled in coordination with the 5th ACS. In addition this team forwards mission requests to the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) for confirmation of mission support. Mission briefings of aircraft crews are conducted by a representative of this section.

3. Graphics and reproduction sections located in Nha Trang and Pleiku with one officer and four enlisted men each, are responsible for illustrating and printing of leaflets, posters, handbills and other printed matter.

(b) During the period ten major psychologically vulnerable targets were determined and appropriate propaganda developed for dissemination to the targets. On four occasions aircraft, disseminating propaganda, received small arms fire from the target areas.

(c) Request for PSYOP support are channeled from the PSYOP representative in the tactical unit through the PSYOP element I FFORCEV, which takes the necessary action to provide the requested support, in accordance with priorities.

(d) II CTZ Coastal "Junk and Swift" Fleet boats, have the capability to utilize loudspeakers in the PSYOP program. This capability greatly enhances psychological operations along the coastal areas.

(e) Training for PSYOP elements in II CTZ is being conducted for:

1. Seven officers and thirty-one enlisted men from the Republic of Korea (ROK) PSYOP units, for twenty days ending on 4 Nov 66. Fifty-six hours conference and 169 hours practical work was presented to ROK personnel in psychological operations and techniques as conducted in II CTZ.

2. FWMAF/GVN PSYOP personnel attended a special two day course in leaflet development and low altitude dissemination techniques at Nha Trang. Training was conducted by personnel from the 7th PSYOP Gp with an attendance of thirty-three officers. Attending this instruction were representatives of G3 I FFORCEV (PSYOP), 5th ACS, US Air Force Advisors, ROK PSYOP elements, members of the 245 PSYOP Co, ARVN and VNAF personnel from the

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114th Liaison Squadron. A similar presentation will be given on 15 Nov 66 in Pleiku.

(4) Enemy Propaganda:

(a) The VC/NVA continues to rely extensively on propaganda directed to the populace in VC controlled areas and members of FWMAP utilizing the same basic themes as reported in the last reporting period. In addition, radio news broadcasts and human interest programs directed at the US forces are heard on the 40 meter radio nightly from approximately 2200H to 2400H in Binh Dinh Province.

(b) A captured Viet Cong Internal Document (Incl 30) described in JUSPAO Field Memorandum, Number 24, provides a description and an evaluation of US PSYOP efforts and orders a series of counter-measures designed to minimize the effects of the FWMAP propaganda program.

(5) Problem Areas:

(a) Mission request channels for aircraft support of psychological operations in II CTZ.

1. On 26 Oct 66, this headquarters was told by formation to forward PSYOP aircraft support requests, to TACC, in coded form. To comply with this requirement all subordinate units must submit their requests to this headquarters using secure means. In turn, after receipt of mission requests, this headquarters assigns priorities and schedules PSYOP missions to be supported. The common channel for forwarding consolidated mission requests to TACC is not explicitly delineated. Therefore, no operational channel exists for transmitting the PSYOP mission request to TACC. This problem was discussed with the I FFORCEV G3 Air, Commander 5th ACS, AGLNO 14th Air Commando Wing and subsequently turned over to the TACC on 27 Oct 66. No action has been taken by TACC as of 31 Oct 66.

2. References cited for information on this subject: MACV Directives 95-3, 95-4, and MACV letter SN 01235. Recommend that MACPD issue directive to establish request procedures.

(b) Critical items of equipment with broken or worn out parts are hampering the operations of psychological operations elements. Necessary parts and items have been requisitioned, however, in the case of the printing presses it has become necessary to cannibalize one press to keep the other two presses operational. Back-up and replacement equipment must be given priorities commensurate with the psychological operations mission.

(c) The lack of qualified PSYOP personnel continues to hamper the PSYOP program considerably. At the present time the officers assigned as PSYOP officers in the 1st Ede, 101st Abn Div; 4th Inf Div; 3d Ede, 25th Inf Div and the 1st Cav Div (AM) are not trained and PSYOP is an additional duty for all but three PSYOP officers.

(d) The projected enhancement of the quick reaction printing capability of the 245th PSYOP Co was impaired by diverting the 26th PSYOP Det (reproduction) to the 6th PSYOP Bn in Saigon. Reproduction capabilities of the 245th will continue to be limited to approximately 8,000,000 leaflets per month.

(6) Miscellaneous Activities:

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(a) Considering the analysis of the Phu My District (in Binh Dinh Province) survey (1 Oct 66) by the Research and Analysis Section of the AFB 1st Div Bn, a recommendation was forwarded to MACPF for the purpose of placing emphasis on a public information program directed to the rural populace in VC controlled areas of II CTZ by the GVN. The recommended theme for such a program is the introduction of the government and its accomplishments to the target audience.

(b) A request for MIOB was submitted by the 6th PSYOP Bn, to CG, USAFV. The significance of this change is that it will convert the PSYOP companies in each corps from a PSYOP battalion and the 6th PSYOP Bn to a PSYOP Group. This change will increase PSYOP support in II CTZ.

(c) A significant trend in the support of PSYOP by ARVN has developed. Advisors to ARVN have been successful in getting their counterparts to request PSYOP support through ARVN channels. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the VNAF received and supported six separate PSYOP missions from 21-24 Oct 66, with all requests being handled in the ARVN/VNAF channels. A total of 11 missions were flown by VNAF in October. The absence of a loudspeaker capability is delimiting in the use of vNAF in PSYOP. The ARVN printing press has been producing an average of 400,000 leaflets per week during the reporting period.

(d) A few returnees from Operation Seward and Irving stated that their decision to return was based upon a cleavage in the VC/NVA relationship. This response was to aerial loudspeaker tapes played in both AO's, which informed the VC that the NVA were using them as a buffer. The significance of this is:

1. A wedge between the NVA/VC can be driven and is an exploitable psychological vulnerability.
2. The comments are positive feedback to the wedge campaign being conducted in II CTZ.
3. References for this trend are found in the after action report for operation Seward and PSYOP SITREP of the 1st Cav Div (AM) dtd 22-23 Oct 66.

(e) A method for immediate re-transmission of PSYOP messages from prisoners of war or returnees to selected targets was used during Operation Irving. This method allowed a pilot in flight to record tapes and re-transmit, through the aerial loudspeaker system, messages transmitted from either ground stations or other aircraft by radio. This capability is possible with organic equipment, with a single removable jumper cable which was locally manufactured. However, the quality of tapes produced in this manner is not good.

4. (C) Logistical Activities:

a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the I FFORCEV G4 placed major emphasis on the planning, coordinating and monitoring of logistical support of I FFORCEV tactical operations.

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(2) I FFORCEV logistical planning conferences, cited in the last ORLL from this headquarters, were discontinued because:

(a) Units know where to go for logistical and services support and whom to contact.

(b) Units are now dealing directly with the support command and sub area command in the area where they operate.

(3) I FFORCEV G4 presently monitors the coordination and resolves any problems by dealing either with the support command staff or the 1st Log Comd headquarters. Excellent cooperation and support have been experienced during the past several months. During the initial conduct of operation and as required thereafter, a G4, I FFORCEV liaison representative was sent to the field to insure tactical units were receiving the support requested and assisted, where possible, in resolving logistical problems.

b. Supply:

(1) Existing supply shortages did not affect any tactical operation. However, several items were, and are still, in short supply. These items are: Fatigues, tropical and OG 107, in medium size and regular; light weight airmobile construction equipment (expected to arrive (EAD August 67)); 500 GPH water purification units (EAD August 67); material handling equipment (MHE), all kinds, especially rough terrain to include repair parts; 4.2 inch mortars and tubes; slings and cargo nets.

(2) Class I, III and IIIA supplies have been adequate to support all operations.

(3) Available supply rate (ASR) was established by USARV on the following:

<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AMMUNITION CODE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>ASR</u>
B568	Ctg, 49mm m406	1 Rd/wpn/day
B626	Ctg, 60mm HE	1 Rd/wpn/day
B627	Ctg, 60mm Illum	5 rds/wpn/day
C222, C223, C225, C232	Ctg, 81mm HE (all types)	5 rds/wpn/day; same as last report.
C226	Ctg, 81mm Illum	0.50 Rds/wpn/day
C249	Ctg, 81mm Smk WP	1 Rd/wpn/day
C445	Ctg, 105mm How HE (all types)	30 Rds/wpn/day
C449	Ctg, 105mm Illum	0.64 Rds/wpn/day; same as last report.
C705	Ctg, 4.2 HE w/o fuze	2 Rds/wpn/day; increase of 2 rds/wpn/day since last report.

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DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
AMMUNITION
CODE

NOMENCLATURE

ASR

G	Gen. Hand, Frag, M26A (all types)	100 Bde/day
H	Rkt, 2.75 HE (all types)	0.25 rds/tube/day; increase of .05 rds/tube/day since last report.
H555	LAW, M72, 66mm	6 Bde/day; decrease of 4 per Bde/day since last report.
K	Mine, AP M18 (all types)	15 Bde/day
L	Sig, Illum, Ground, white star cluster M159	6 Bde/day
L310	Sig, Illum, ground, green star para, M19A1	5 Bde/day
L311	Sig, Illum, ground, red star, para M126	7 Bde/day
L312	Sig, Illum, ground, white star para M127	10 Bde/day
L314	Sig, Illum, ground, green star, cluster, M125	5 Bde/day
L323	Sig, smk green, red, para M12971	2 Bde/day
L407	Flare, aircraft, para M124	4 Bde/day
L495	Flare, surface, trip, M49	30 Bde/day

c. Service and Support: Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Support Commands, under the 1st Logistical Command, continued to improve their support to I FFORCEV tactical operations. No report was received from a unit expressing dissatisfaction.

d. Transportation: Increased utilization of highway and sea modes of transportation to support tactical operations and relocation of units were realized.

e. Medical: The two malaria tests conducted on 1st Cav Div (AM) and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div were completed. Although the report has not been completed, several "lessons learned" have been derived.

5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. Two of the nine Civil Affairs (CA) (Displaced Persons) Teams, of the 41st CA Company, changed attachments due to the civil affairs requirements of newly assigned tactical units. These two CA teams were attached to the 4th Inf Div to assist in initial civil affairs/civil action operations in and around their new base areas. During Operation Irving in Binh Dinh Province, the three CA teams attached to the 1st Cav Div (AM) assisted in the handling of 37,000 refugees which came out of the Phu Cat Mountains and the Phu My Valley. The CA teams combined civil

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affairs actions and various civic action projects in support of military operations. One CA team with the 1st Cav Div (AM) was positioned in Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province, to support the Revolutionary Development program in that area. Projects performed by the CA teams during the period consisted of holding sick calls (28,000 treated out of a total of 66,000 for all of II Corps); distribution of food and clothing; advising and coordinating in the construction of public facilities, such as latrines, schools, dispensaries, spillways, bridges and roads; teaching English; making area surveys and assisting in PSYOPS.

b. An up dating of all province area surveys was started during the latter part of the quarter. As of 31 Oct a survey on Binh Thuan Province was published and four others initiated. All surveys will be completed and distributed during the first part of the next quarter.

c. Another rice harvest was completed on 21 Oct in Phu Yen Province resulting in a yield of 17,344 metric tons compared to 33,363 metric tons for the harvest last February (Incl 32). The harvest was protected by the combined use of American, Korean and ARVN troops, Regional Force platoons and national policemen. The control of the rice after harvest was carried out as planned in most cases. Mobile and fixed check points were established to prevent rice from being taken out of the valley. After harvest the rice was brought into secure hamlets and stored in private homes. Stations were set up to count the rice as it was brought into the secure areas. The farmers were allowed to keep up to six months supply of rice for their families in their own homes. The province chief planned to buy a portion of the rice from the farmers but funds could not be obtained from GVN to purchase the rice. The protection of the rice harvest was considered a success although a small amount was believed to have slipped out to VC control. Means by which the VC were able to obtain small amounts of rice were (1) buying on blackmarket (2) buying on free market in small amounts (1 kilo sacks) and slipping it past the check points (3) cutting rice at nights and moving it around check points, and (4) rice taxes on farmers. This 17,344 tons of paddy rice or 11,620 tons of eating rice is sufficient to feed the population of 246,000 persons in Phu Yen Province under GVN control for a period of approx 2½ months (based on 20 kilograms per person per month). This is barely enough rice to last until the next harvest in January. During the past quarter 2,250 metric tons of rice were imported into the province due to insufficient rice from the February harvest.

d. The community relation councils continued to meet monthly at all installations. There were no significant changes in the activities of the councils. Councils continued to extend counter-inflationary measures particularly with respect to billeting rentals and price ceiling. Suggested fair price lists have been published by several units and distributed (Incl 33). In addition, attention was given regularly to emphasizing safe driving habits, countering blackmarket activities, and supporting civic action projects.

e. This headquarters monitored the GVN election for a Constituent Assembly held on 11 Sep 66. Within II CTZ 85% of the registered voters went to the polls. The isolated province of Phu Bon had the highest percentage, 95%. Kontum and Binh Thuan Provinces had the lowest percentage, each with 72% (Incl 34).

6. (C) Personnel and Administrative Action:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(1) HQ I FFORCE: key personnel and FVMAF senior commanders are shown in Incl 35.

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(2) Authorized and assigned strength of assigned, attached and OPCON I FORCEV units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Shortages continue to exist in hard skill MOS areas such as: linguists, aircraft maintenance, signal maintenance and installation, and medical personnel. Personnel strengths of assigned, attached, and operational control units are shown in Incl 36. Present for duty % of assigned strength of maneuver battalions is shown in Incl 37.

(3) Outstanding requisitions for replacements are not considered a critical problem at this time. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div (an OPCON unit) is approaching its peak rotation period and some delay is being experienced in receiving timely replacements for a few key slots. HQ USARV is aware of this situation and is taking actions to correct it.

(4) HQ USARV established a Patient Casual Company on 27 Oct 66 to provide a morning report unit only, for hospitalized personnel. This action reduced the assigned strengths of units and the present for duty strength may be more accurately compared against those personnel available for duty. Though this action reduced the assigned strengths of units it does not constitute authority to requisition and receive replacements. However it should assist Army in assigning the replacements received for unprogrammed losses to the unit with the greatest need.

b. Personnel Management:

(1) Receipt of assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation continues to be sporadic. Time element has varied during the reporting period from six months to the day prior.

(2) Qualification and motivation of the vast majority of personnel within the assigned, attached, and operational control units of this headquarters are excellent. Training bases in CONUS are providing personnel in excellent physical condition and with a general knowledge of guerrilla tactics that may be encountered in this command.

c. Civilian Personnel: Civilian personnel management procedures continued to improve. Pay procedures are adequate. Civilian personnel status of this headquarters is shown below:

Aid in Kind (AIK) employees authorized	91
AIK employees on Hand 1 Aug 66	64
Released during reporting period	5
Released for cause	3
Released per individual request	2
Transferred	0
Employed during period	17
Number of Employees on Hand 31 Oct 1966	76

NOTE: Five additional spaces have been authorized for the 11th PI Detachment.

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d. Enlisted promotion allocations for assigned, attached and OPCON units are shown in Incl 38. Utilization of allocations is excellent. The turnbacks which occurred were due to administrative error resulting in receipt of excess allocations. USARV message AVHGA 28339, DTG 040145Z, Subj: Discontinuance of Promotion Allocations, decentralizing promotion allocations in pay grades E4 thru E6 to commanders reporting directly to USARV will assist in reducing administrative error and reduce or eliminate turnbacks.

e. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The morale of all assigned, attached, and operational control units remained excellent throughout the reporting period. Morale services within the command continued to improve.

(2) R&R quotas for assigned, attached, and operational control units were received, distributed and used as shown in Incls 39 and 40. Revision of administrative procedures relating to the handling of "bookings" has facilitated the administration of the program. Difficulty is being experienced in completely filling quotas to areas such as Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Taipei and Manila. The main reason for this is lack of knowledge on what these areas have to offer. Greater publicity emphasizing attractions, to include descriptions and photos of the shopping, sight seeing, and living facilities would assist in filling these quotas.

(3) Awards and decorations for the period are shown in (Incl 41). In addition to those shown in (Incl 41), the Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to 12 personnel in the 1st Cav Div (AM), 12 in the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3 in the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. The delegation of authority from USARV to this headquarters to award the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, and Soldiers Medal to separate brigades commanded by a General Officer has improved the timeliness of the presentation of awards and decorations. During the reporting period this headquarters processed five Distinguished Unit Citations, two Valorous Unit Citations, and one Meritorious Unit Commendation. Final actions are still pending.

(4) Delivery of personal mail has shown a marked improvement during the reporting period. The primary factor for non-delivery during the period has been monsoon weather preventing arrival of aircraft. Dates on which personal mail was not received are shown at Incl 42.

(5) Chaplain's activities:

(a) In II CTZ there are 127 US Military Chaplains compared to 88 on 31 July:

113 US Army; 87 Protestant, 25 Catholic, 1 Jewish

14 US Air Force; 7 Protestant, 7 Catholic

(b) Religious Services:

1. Protestant services in OPCON units and in combat support and service support units are adequate. Actions are being taken to improve chaplain coordination.

2. Catholic services in OPCON units are adequate. In combat support and service support units Catholic coverage needs to be improved. Action is being taken to improve chaplain coordination to render more effective coverage.

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3. Jewish services are adequate. The I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain conducted religious services at 13 locations within II CTZ.

4. In several locations in Nha Trang the following worship services were held.

- a. Sundays: 12 Protestant, 10 Catholic.
- b. Friday evenings: Jewish Sabbath service.
- c. Daily: Three Catholic services.

5. On 12 Oct, 35 Protestant Chaplains attended a one day retreat in Nha Trang.

(c) Particular facets of chaplain coverage in II CTZ:

1. 14 US Air Force Chaplains assist in providing coverage in Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, Phu Cat.

2. Three US Advisory Team Chaplains assist in Pleiku, Kontum and Ban Me Thuot, covering Advisory Teams in II CTZ.

3. Five Special Forces Chaplains cover all Special Forces Camps in RVN.

(d) Actions at this headquarters to influence chaplains' activities in II CTZ:

1. Chaplain's office supervises the area and denomination coverage of units in II CTZ.

2. Chaplain's office has advised all CFCOM units to request assistance of this headquarters whenever the unit is unable to provide chaplain coverage from its own resources.

3. A letter has been prepared to assist in the implementation of the forthcoming I FFORCEV Regulation 10-4, concerning coordination authority.

(e) I FFORCEV chaplains made the following contributions to assist civilian organizations in the Nha Trang area:

1. Protestant

a. Bible School: Offerings from Services on 1st Sunday of the month which amounted to 18,733 \$VN.

b. Evangelical Medical Clinic: 2d Sunday of the month amounted to 3,225 \$VN.

2. Catholic: Offerings from 1st, 2d, and 3d Sunday services to Holy Family Church and St. Joseph's School which amounted to 44,336 \$VN.

3. In addition, every chaplain in II CTZ receives designated offerings for civilian organizations.

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(i) Civic Actions:

1. The Catholic Chaplain, 1st Ede, 4th Inf Div and the men of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div, in conjunction with the G5 have constructed classrooms for the Montagnard children in the vicinity of Dragon Mountain.

2. The Jewish Chaplain and his assistant provide Bible instruction to the Christian Bible School.

3. Three assistants teach English to Vietnamese clergy and civilians.

(g) Coordination: The existence of units of three major commands; MACV, Logistical Command, and I FFORCEV in II CTZ demands coordination and coordinating authority for chaplains' activities. This coordination will be accomplished through the implementation of I FFORCEV Regulation 10-4, soon to be published.

(h) Imbalance of denominational assignments: Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku areas have an imbalance of Protestant chaplains in combat support and service support units. This imbalance has been noted by the Chaplain USARV. A procedure is being followed by which replacement chaplains for those units are being assigned on a more equitable denominational basis.

f. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Discipline, law, and Order: No unusual law and order problems developed during the period of this report. Command rates by unit (assigned, attached and OPCON) were generally lower than USARV rates for offenses and incidents as indicated in Incl 43.

(2) Traffic Safety Program: The high number of Vietnamese Nationals killed in traffic accidents by US Forces personnel was of command concern during the period. COMUSMACV dispatched a message on 20 Sep 66 expressing his concern over this matter. In his capacity as Zone Coordinator, II CTZ, the Commanding General, I FFORCEV emphasized the gravity of the situation in a letter on 28 Sep 66 and directed corrective measures.

(3) Military Police: Replacements for Military Police units have been received in adequate numbers and personnel have been well qualified. When divisions and separate brigades were fragmented as task forces in widely dispersed locations, authorized strengths of organic military police units were inadequate to support combat operations. Necessary additional support was provided to these units from the 272d MP Co, assigned to I FFORCEV. MTOE's for separate brigades have been submitted for approval.

(4) Prisoners of War:

(a) The II Corps Combat Captive (PW) Camp in Pleiku City became operational on 1 Sep 66. At first, prisoners were accepted only from provincial jails in II CTZ. Commencing 4 Oct 66, prisoners were accepted directly from US units. To date, 218 prisoners have been moved from division and separate brigade collecting points to the camp.

(b) Responsibility for administrative and operational supervision of the US Forces PW Program was assigned to USARV, effective 26 Sep 66. All provisions of MACV Directive 190-3 remained in effect except:

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1. MACV Form 343 and ARVN Form QCS 101 will be forwarded to USARV rather than to MACV.

2. Divisions and separate brigades will submit a roster of all PW's captured to USARV weekly.

3. CO, 18th MP Bde is responsible for evacuation of US Captured PW's from division and separate brigade collecting points to the combat captive camp.

(c) OPCON units have had difficulty in classifying captured personnel partly because of the interpretation of Article 4 General Prisoner of War (GPW), and partly because of the variances of definitions in MACV Directives 190-3 and 381-11. The daily intelligence summary method of reporting captured personnel as VC's has also contributed to confusion and conflict in accounting for those captured. The provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war was formulated as the basis of experience gained in conventional warfare where the enemy is readily identified; strict application of its definitions is extremely difficult to apply under counter-insurgency or unconventional conditions. As experience is gained and procedures are modified and definitions clarified, many of these vexing problems will be solved. Transportation of PW has also presented difficulty. The location of the II Corps Combat Captive (PW) Camp at Pleiku does not place it within an area which best uses the natural flow of empty logistical vehicles. In the majority of cases, specific transportation means must be assigned to an evacuation move; this necessitates diverting transportation assets for PW evacuation which could be more profitably used in forward logistical movements.

g. Headquarters Internal Arrangement:

(1) Internal rearrangement of headquarters:

(a) Several moves within the Headquarters Complex were made to provide additional space and to facilitate operation.

(b) A 20x100 structure was completed to house headquarters company supply. A portion of this building is temporarily used as office space by the 64th Engr Det (Terrain) and the 4th Inf Div.

(c) Construction of a 20x100 office building and three quonset structures for billets has begun.

(2) Physical Security: Annex Five (Immediate Reaction Force) of Physical Security Plan was rescinded and a new Annex Five (IRF) was published and became effective 1 Sep 66. The new annex provides for the use of personnel working at night to form IRF under the control of G3 TOC OIC, instead of headquarters company operating a duty roster with the Duty Officer in charge of the IRF.

(3) Water Supply: Two additional shallow wells were dug to facilitate ample supply of water while awaiting contract for a deep well. Since then the area engineers have cancelled the contract for a deep well as the three shallow wells are more than adequate.

h. Protocol: There were 135 distinguished visitors to the command during the reporting period (Incl 44).

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7. (S) Artillery:

a. HQ I FFORCEV Arty participated in Combined Operation Irving from 2 through 15 Oct 66. Colonel Ashley A. Blinn, Commanding Officer, I FFORCEV Arty, served as Fire Support Coordinator for this operation. Maneuver forces included those from the Republic of Korea, Regional and Regular Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam and US Army, Navy and Air Force elements. Letter, HQ, FSCC, Phu Cat, RVN dtd 14 Oct 66, subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, FSCC Operation Irving and addressed to Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam contains details concerning the missions, concept of operation and execution of this operation and the activities of the FSCC. This operation was of particular significance because it illustrates the problems and the potential of such combined operations.

b. I FFORCEV Policy Statement 66-2 was approved and published on 28 Sep 66. This statement, staffed at HQ I FFORCEV Arty, was formulated for the purpose of enhancing the combined effect of strategic bombers (US Air Force) and tactical field artillery. The policy established therein specifies that where possible, artillery fire is to be planned adjacent to and coincident with heavy bomber strikes. This is to be accomplished by planning concentrations on avenues of approach to bombing target zones. These concentrations are fired prior to, or simultaneously with the bomb strike to fix the enemy in the kill zone.

c. No fire zones for cannon/mortar have been established in the II CTZ. Artillery and mortars are prohibited from unobserved firing within 2000 meters of the Cambodian border except when in direct support of friendly elements. Observed and/or unobserved firing in this zone is prohibited when the dispersion may carry the projectile beyond the border. Firing in self defense is not prohibited.

d. The 175mm guns and 8 inch howitzers of the 6th Bn, 14th Artillery and 3d Bn, 18th Artillery have been redistributed to produce six identical batteries, each consisting of two 175mm guns and two 8 inch howitzers. This composite organization produces a more flexible and responsive firing unit which combines the range and lethality of the 175mm gun with the known dependability of the 8 inch howitzer. Experience over the past year has shown that with the wide spread and independent firing battery deployment, the combination of the salient characteristics of both weapons is extremely effective. Additionally, the targets most frequently fired on rarely exceed battalion size forces. Two 8 inch howitzers and/or two 175mm guns firing on such targets are adequate.

e. Artillery statistics for reporting period, I FFORCEV.

(1) Missions Fired:

	<u>OCT</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>AUG</u>
Neutralization	2113	846	2133
Destruction	9	44	24
H&I	40712	37361	48699
Other	3505	3465	3120

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	<u>Q1</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>AUG</u>
Total	46339	42216	53976
Observed	4960	3744	4441
Unobserved	41379	38472	49535
(2) Ammunition Expended:			
2.75 HE	9567	11227	10579
105 HE	117625	133443	172920
105 I11	1843	3110	2647
105 WP	10654	3461	3977
105 SMK	3482	2778	2433
105 Other	58	0	0
TOTAL	133662	142792	181977
155 HE	18845	16289	28708
155 I11	1672	666	572
155 WP	1318	777	538
155 SMK	227	257	166
155 Other	8	0	0
TOTAL	22070	17989	29984
8-inch HE	4798	6914	6748
175-mm HE	4445	4127	4332

8. (C) Engineer.

a. Overall engineer combat support requirements increased over the previous quarter due in part to an increase in the number of tactical troops requiring support and also to a backlog of deferred work. The Engineer Section prepared a study on the engineer support for the I FFORCEV Campaign Plan for the period Sep 66 to Apr 67. This study revealed that 49.8 battalion months of engineer effort would be required during the period to provide necessary roads and airfields to support the tactical plan.

b. A revised consolidated minefield data report was prepared and disseminated throughout II CTZ.

c. The majority of the activities of the Engineer Section during the period were directed to the planning, supervision, and coordination of the engineer combat support of I FFORCEV tactical operations provided by 18th Engr Bde units. I FFORCEV directed engineer projects in support of current and future operations include:

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(1) Construction of a new C-130 airfield 3500'x60' in Binh Dinh Province at Van Canh (BR 833061) between 5 and 21 Sep 66 by the 70th Engr Bn (C). The field has a parking area for five C-130 aircraft, and is surfaced with T-17 membrane. This field will be utilized in support of upcoming tactical operations in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces. In conjunction with the construction of the airfield, Highway 6B was opened to allow access from Qui Nhon for the work party and resupply during construction.

(2) Construction of a new C-130 airfield 3500'x60' in Lam Dong Province at Bao Loc (ZT 080790). The 62d Engr Bn (Const) in conjunction with the ARVN 202nd Engr Bn (C) continues construction of the airfield with parking for five C-130 aircraft, a forward assault support heliport, and a FSA complex. Completion of this project is scheduled for early Nov 66.

(3) Construction of a new C-130 airfield 3500' long in Phu Bon Province at Pnu Tuc CIDG Camp (BQ 490590). Work commenced on 26 Sep by elements of the 20th Engr Bn and completion is scheduled for early Nov 66. The scope of the project includes lengthening the existing runway, surfacing with T-17 membrane, construction of a parking area for five C-130 aircraft, clearing of an area for three airmobile companies, and a FSA.

(4) Construction of a C-130 airfield in Binh Dinh Province at English airfield (BS 875013), commencing 19 Sep 66 by the 937th Engr Gp. The project consists of lengthening the existing C-123 field to 3500', constructing a parking area for five C-130 aircraft, and laying matting on the runway surface and parking areas. This field will support the 1st Cav Div (AM) in Operation Thayer as well as future operations in Binh Dinh Province. Its completion date is dependent upon favorable weather and availability of M&A matting in early November 1966.

(5) Construction completion of Camp Radcliff airfield in Binh Dinh Province on 30 Apr 66. The old emergency airfield at Camp Radcliff was reconstructed when the PSP on the An Khe Field failed. The 70th Engr Bn (C) reshaped and recompactd the runway and parking area with AM-2 matting. This project provides a C-130 airfield for the 1st Cav Div (AM). Construction of a new airfield at An Khe is continuing by the 84th Engr Bn (Const).

(6) Application of an asphaltic seal coat on Kontum airfield. In order to insure that Kontum airfield remains capable of supporting all-weather C-130 traffic, the 299th Engr Bn (C) applied an asphaltic seal coat to the runway surface. This project was completed on 15 Oct 66.

(7) Repair and expansion of facilities at Maca Co airfield (YU 805254) in Quang Duc Province. Elements of the 20th Engr Bn (C) initiated 15 Sep 66 repairs to the runway surface and cleared sufficient area for three airmobile companies and a bivouac area for a three bn bde. The runway surface was recompactd, and an asphaltic double-surface treatment was initiated to insure an all-weather C-130 capability. The completion of this project in early November 1966 is dependent upon air delivery of engineer equipment and asphalt.

(8) Upgrading of Cung Son airfield (BQ 808424) in Binh Dinh Province. The 39th Engr Bn is currently preparing Cung Son airfield for a T-17 membrane surface and constructing a parking area for five C-123 aircraft, scheduled for completion in early Nov 66.

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(9) Repair of Phan Thiet Airfield (AN 802071) in Binh Thuan Province. During the conduct of Operation Byrd, the 62d Engr Bn (Const) made repairs to the existing runway consisting of asphalt patches. Additionally, a parking area for five C-130 aircraft, LST ramp and access road to the beach were constructed. Repairs are continuing to the airfield on an as-required basis.

(10) Construction of Vinh Thanh airfield (BR 6159). The 937th Engr Gp began construction of a new C-123, T-17 membrane surfaced all-weather airfield with parking for five C-123 aircraft in the vic of Vinh Thanh CIDG camp on 19 Oct 66. Additionally, they improved the road from the Jct of Rt 19 north to the CIDG camp to a CL 31 one-way road. The road and the airfield will allow rapid relief of the camp in the event of attack and serve as a base and LOC for future operations. The work on the airfield was temporarily halted on 25 Oct due to poor weather.

(11) Opening and maintaining a Class 31 land LOC from Qui Nhon to Bong Son. Elements of the 937th Engr Gp in general support of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in Operation Thayer and Irving have:

(a) Maintained for Cl 31 traffic the 20 by-passes around damaged or underclassified bridges.

(b) Decked 1,320 feet of railroad bridge across the Song Lia Giang River (BR 870960) to support vehicular traffic. This project entailed welding in additional steel stringers and placing a timber deck. Work on the bridge was accomplished by the 19th Engr Bn (C) 4-15 Oct 66.

(12) Upgrading of the Nha Trang by-pass. This is a joint US/ARVN project to provide an all-weather two-way Cl 50 by-pass road around Nha Trang. The 577th Engr Bn (US) completed redecking the 720' Dien Khanh bridge on 15 Oct 66. The ARVN 203d Engr Bn continues to widen the route with US supplied materials. This 12.5 km stretch of road is currently open to one-way Cl 31 traffic and is to be completed in early December. This will provide an all-weather land LOC to support troops in Ninh Hoa and Tuy Hoa.

(13) Opened Hwy 1 between Ninh Hoa and Tuy Hoa. Elements of the 45th Engr Gp in support of Operation Seward opened Hwy 1 from Ninh Hoa north into Tuy Hoa for movement of limited traffic. This is the first time in two years that this route has been traveled by military vehicles. The road remains trafficable for limited traffic.

(14) Tuy Hoa tactical road net. Elements of 39th Engr Bn and the 612th ARVN Engr Co are constructing a tactical road net throughout the Tuy Hoa Valley. This road net when completed will permit rapid movement of troops overland to insure security of the valley and will also provide improved routes for marketing of farm produce.

(15) Opened Hwy 14 from Kontum north to Dak To airfield. The 937th Engr Gp constructed a M&T6 float bridge at ZB 093175 and a M&T6 dry span bridge at ZB 058222 during 26-28 Oct 66. This will provide a land LOC for Cl 31 traffic in support of contingency plans and will permit movement of engineer equipment into Dak To airfield to make repairs to the runway during November.

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(16) Fortification of CIDG camps and rehabilitation of access roads. Elements of a two battalion task force, comprised of the 20th Engr Bn (-) and the 299th Ingr Bn, expanded the field fortifications at Duc Co (YA 829251) CIDG camp in order to give it a better defensive posture. In conjunction with this, a number of major roads are being upgraded to handle CI 31 traffic -- Hwy 19 from (at Hwy 14 to Duc Co, Hwy 509 from Pleiku to Plei Djereng, and the unnumbered Hwy from Duc Co to Plei Djereng. The field fortifications at the Duc Co CIDG camp have been completed, and the other projects are continuing.

(17) Construction of Vung Ro Port (Port Lane). Elements of the 39th Engr Bn and the 492d Port Construction Company turned over the new port facility at Vung Ro to the Cam Ranh Support Command on 16 Oct 66 and named it Port Lane. Construction began on 25 July and entailed opening Hwy 1 from Tuy Hoa South to Vung Ro Pass, construction of 1.5 km of access road to the beach, leveling and hardening of the beach storage area, and construction of a Navy cube pier and two LST ramps (Incl 45). This port will be utilized in resupplying the troop complexes in the Tuy Hoa area.

9. (U) Signal Operations.

a. Maintenance and upgrading of all I FFORCEV communications continue to make up the majority of Signal Section activities. Distribution of 54th Signal assets are and will continue to be the foremost and most critical task in meeting fluid tactical needs. Daily review of plans, signal equipment and its maintenance posture, and monitoring of over one hundred and thirty individual circuits to combat and combat support units contribute the information required for decision making by the Signal Officer. Maintenance of signal equipment and associated communication outages continue to be a daily problem. Some relief has been gained in the status of operational signal equipment through the release of tactical equipment from base camp communication missions. This added equipment provides back-up for operations while the solution to maintenance problems is being sought. However, the status of HF radios (AN/GRC-26D) remains crucial with operational equipment available just meeting operational demands.

b. The 21st Signal Group is now operational and has assumed responsibility for base camp communications in the II CTZ. Communications facilities have been provided at Phan Rang, Pleiku South (Dragon Mountain) and at Phu Hiep. This communications support to subordinate units of I FFORCEV contributes significantly toward better I FFORCEV communications by allowing use of the 54th Signal Battalion assets for support of combat operations rather than base camp communications.

c. The requirement to replace tactical signal equipment, used to provide I FFORCEV semi-fixed communications facilities at the Grand Hotel, still exists. Request for authorization and requisitions for replacement equipment were submitted to USARV o/a 8 Oct 66.

d. Extension of secure voice telephone communications (TALK QUICK) to divisional units in USARV remains under consideration. A project officer has been assigned to this area by USARV. However, installation of equipment at division level does not appear imminent.

e. A requirement for lightweight mobile multi-channel telephone teletype equipment exists in I FFORCEV. Eight jeep mounted 8 channel radio terminal sets have been authorized and delivered to the 54th Signal Bn and should be ready for deployment c/a 5 Nov 66. Seven more

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sets are authorized and scheduled for delivery to the 54th Sig Bn. Four lightweight switchboard and four lightweight teletype centrals are authorized and scheduled for delivery to the 54th Signal Bn by the end of the 1st Quarter CY 67.

f. During the quarter the ROKFV FC established its headquarters at Nha Trang and the 9th ROK Infantry Division established its CP at Ninh Hoa. Circuit requests were submitted to MACV-J6 for ten command circuits for HQ ROKFV FC in Nha Trang, the HQ 9th ROK Inf Div in Ninh Hoa and technical assistance was provided to these forces to complete these circuits. Sharing of additional US cable facilities installed on an accelerated basis contributed significantly to early communication for these new ROK forces. Direct communication from I FFORCEV to the ROK forces is limited to one Direct Air Support Center (DASC) landline circuit to the ROKFV FC, 9th Inf Div and Cap ROK Inf Div and a secure radio teletype facility to the I FFORCEV Liaison Officer at each of these headquarters and switchboard to switchboard trunks to ROKFV FC.

g. In Operation Irving, I FFORCEV Forward Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the 1st Cav Div Forward CP were supported with I FFORCEV communications by the 54th Sig Bn. It is significant that the FSCC requires the same quantity of communications as an I FFORCEV Tactical CP without an FSCC or a division CP. Only one HF radio was provided as emergency back-up communications for both the FSCC and the 1st Cav Div CP. The two CP's were collocated.

h. Initial communication was provided to the base camp of the 4th Inf Div headquarters and the 2d Bde (the Pleiku south CP) by the 54th Signal Bn using 12 channel VHF radio (AN/MRC-73) and secure HF radio teletype (AN/GRC-26D). Initial communications to the 1st Bde base camp at Phu Hiep was secure HF radioteletype (AN/GRC-46) operating in the I FFORCEV Command Net Alpha. The VHF radio mission providing communications to the Pleiku South CP was assumed by the 278th Signal Co of the 21st Signal Group o/a 15 Oct 66. The mission of base camp communication to the Phu Hiep area is being absorbed by the 278th except for provision of HF radios. The 4th Inf Div is now providing the secure HF radios, entering the I FFORCEV radio nets effective o/a 20 Nov 66.

10. (U) Information Office.

a. The quarter was initiated by the visit of Major General Keith L. Ware, DA, OCINFO, and was thereafter marked by significant activity in three major areas: (1) A series of press interviews with the commanding general during the first half of the quarter. (2) The public information support of both United States and Free World Forces unit landings in Vietnam. (3) Employment of two press detachments that arrived during the summer.

b. General Ware arrived at HQ I FFORCEV on 2 Aug 66 accompanied by Colonel Robert Coakley, Information Officer, HQ, USARV. After conferring with the IO, I FFORCEV, for the remainder of the day, the general was escorted on an extended visit throughout II CTZ visiting 1st Log Command installations at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh, OPCON units in the Central Highlands, and 5th Special Forces camps in the field.

c. From 11 Aug 66 - 10 Sep 66, General Larsen granted eight extended interviews to the press corps, the first of these a joint interview by Dick Fryklund of the Washington Star and Hank Trehitt of the Baltimore Sun. On 17 Aug 66, he was interviewed by

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retired Israeli General Moshe Dayan representing MAARIV; and on 19 Aug 66 an interview by Howard Tuckner, NBC-TV, was taped for television. John Dillin of the Christian Science Monitor talked to General Larsen on 26 Aug 66, and Bill Beecher of the New York Times on 30 Aug 66. The first day of September saw the return of Howard Tuckner; and on the 7th, Richard Wilson of Comes Publications visited the general. Finally, Joseph Alsop interviewed General Larsen on 10 Sep 66, the day before the South Vietnamese elections.

d. The quarter was marked by a significant build-up of US and Free World Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone. August was only five days old when a team from the 11th Public Information Detachment was dispatched to Qui Nhon to provide information support for the landing of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div. On the 16th, similar support was provided for the landing of 100th ROK Log Command units at Nha Trang, and on 5 Sep 66, for the landing of elements of the ROK White Horse Division, also at Nha Trang. Responding to an eleven-hour request, the Information Office, HQ I FFORCEV, provided photographic coverage of the landing at Cam Ranh Bay of the 1st Philippine Civic Action Group on 16 Sep 66. October saw two additional landings being covered, first, that of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div at Nha Trang on 5 Oct 66, and second, that of the 7th Bn, 13th Arty at Qui Nhon on 28 Oct 66.

e. Support provided by the 5th and 11th Public Information Detachments during the quarter enabled the Information Office of HQ I FFORCEV, to expand its capability considerably. The 11th arrived on 10 July 66, before the quarter began; the 5th arrived on 31 Aug 66. In addition to playing a role in unit landings, the 11th also provided press-camp support for operations in the interior of II CTZ. From 4-7 Aug 66, an 11th PID team assisted the Information Officer of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div in handling an influx of press at the beginning of Operation Paul Revere II. In addition, during the period 11-19 Oct 66, a team was dispatched to Pleiku in support of the Information Liaison Officer at HQ II CTZ for the Montagnard Rally (the ceremony marking the return of 10,000 Montagnards to allegiance to the South Vietnamese Government).

f. Additional events of significance during the three-month period were; the coverage of the promotion of General Larsen, CG, I FFORCEV, to the rank of Lieutenant General on 1 Sep 66; the activation of the 11th PID's Nha Trang Press Camp on 1 Sep 66; and the photographic coverage of the visit of the US Secretary of Defense to Qui Nhon on 13 Oct 66.

g. Major press interest during the quarter centered on Operation Paul Revere II, 1-25 Aug 66 and Operation Thayer I, 13 Sep-1 Oct 66. Both operations were conducted by the 1st Cav Div (AM), with the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div also participating in Paul Revere II. Both operations were marked by a large influx of press (24-36) at the outset.

h. During the period there were two Troop Topics; 689 Home Town News Releases; 247 Home Town News Photos; 129 Home Town News Tape interviews; four tape interviews sent to DA, OCINFO; 600 feet of color motion picture film; 19 feature stories with photographs; and 68 feature stories without photographs.

i. The 5th Public Information Detachment (Press) which arrived in Nha Trang on 31 Aug 66, was initially given the mission of establishing a press camp at Pleiku, but it was soon decided by HQ USAFV, that the detachment would be converted from an AE Team of 7 officers

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and 11 EM to an FA Team of 4 officers and 9 EM. Although the change had not taken place by the end of the quarter, three officers had already been transferred from the detachment, and the Information Officer, HQ I FFORCEV, employed the 5th in the area of public information, sending small teams from the detachment into the field for feature material. The 5th has operated from a tent within the HQ I FFORCEV, compound since the arrival of its equipment in September.

j. The 11th Public Information Detachment operated during the month of August from the Information Office, HQ I FFORCEV, with a five man team from the detachment continuing to operate from HQ I FFORCEV, during the months of September and October. The team remained behind to better smooth a period of transition which found the two officers and two EM assigned to the Information Office at the beginning of July departing before the end of October. The 11th operated in its primary role as a press camp during September and October continuously improving its physical plant (a villa complex approximately one-half mile southwest of HQ I FFORCEV) and refining its method of operation as the press corps began to make use of its facilities. In October the detachment was also given the mission of establishing a press camp at Pleiku. As the quarter ended, the commanding officer of the 11th had established the necessary liaison with Pleiku Sub Area Command and was making additional preparation to meet the press camp requirement.

11. (U) Inspector General Activities:

a. There were nine complaints and fifty-one requests for assistance, advice, or information received during this period. Four of the complaints were justified. These pertained primarily to reduction in grade, reassignment, mess and food, medical actions and actions of superiors. There was no evidence of any trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

b. There were no annual general inspections conducted during this period.

SECTION II (U) - COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

I. (S) Operations:

a. Item: Deployment of Howitzer, Self Propelled, 105mm M108.

Discussion: Since its August arrival in the Republic of Vietnam, the howitzer, SP, 105mm, M108 has been a highly responsive, flexible and valuable addition to the artillery weapons inventory. These weapons have been deployed on combat operations in the coastal lowlands, the central highlands and the Cambodian border areas.

Observation: Air mobility is not the sole solution to light artillery support requirements of maneuver elements. Proven principles of self-propelled and towed artillery deployment are still valid and have wide application in the counterinsurgency environment.

b. Item: Radar Registration of Artillery.

Discussion: Present practice in I FFORCEV area of operations is to register artillery almost exclusively by an aerial observer (AO). This system has several inherent deficiencies.

(1) Misplots of registration points by the AO may produce an invalid registration. This is particularly dangerous since the fire direction center (FDC) does not have accurate chart data.

(2) The conduct of a registration is almost totally dependent upon the availability of aircraft and/or observers and the weather.

(3) Site must be determined using map inspected altitudes.

(4) A time registration cannot be conducted. These deficiencies can be overcome by use of the Radar Set, AN/APQ-4 for the registration. FDC and radar operator personnel, in general, however, have been found to be almost totally untrained in this potentially valuable technique.

Observation: Service schools and units training for deployment should exploit the possibilities of radar registration of artillery. Key personnel in battery and battalion FDC's and radar operations should be trained in this procedure.

c. Item: Landing Zone (LZ) Construction.

Discussion: Tactical air strikes can be used to blast holes in the jungle to allow helicopters to land crews to expand the LZ and security forces. If crews must be landed by rope ladder or hoist the process is lengthy and hazardous.

Observation: 1000 or 2000 pound bombs will clear an area sufficient for one UH-1D to land a crew. If 500 pound bombs are used, additional clearing is needed before the helicopter can safely land personnel.

d. Item: Separate Airmobile Battalion Operations.

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Discussion: Operation Buid, initiated on 25 Aug 66 with the 2d Bn, 7th Cav TF (1st Cav Div (AM)) in Binh Thuan Province was studied as an application of the principle of economy of force. From 25 Aug 66 to 25 Sep 66, this battalion operated against one VC battalion and five separate VC companies in Binh Thuan Province. Its mission was to conduct search and destroy operations against the VC revolutionary development program. The Battalion TF kept the VC off-balance and, by using its airmobility to strike even the small formations to which the VC were forced to resort, completely disrupted his activities in the province. While a US force was urgently required there, critical operations elsewhere necessitated employment of minimum forces in Binh Thuan Province. Employment of the 2d Bn, 7th Cav TF therefore freed the bulk of I FFORCEV forces for concentration in other areas of II CTZ. While support requirements have been proportionately greater than for a larger force, the Battalion TF's true effectiveness is reflected in the highly favorable casualty ratio: 28 VC KIA for every Friendly KIA (25 Aug 66 to 25 Sep 66).

Observation: A separate airmobile battalion TF can operate effectively in a province as an economy force measure.

e. Item: Current data on minefields throughout II CTZ is incomplete.

Discussion: On 10 Oct 66, two members of a US Engr survey party were injured by an anti-personnel mine while inadvertently working in an ARVN minefield vic ARVN NCO Academy, Nha Trang. A check of the minefield data available at I FFORCEV HQ revealed that this field had not been reported through US advisory channels. Further investigation and subsequent discussion with MACV advisory personnel revealed that numerous ARVN minefields are not reported through US channels, and in many cases not reported to II Corps HQ.

Observation: US MACV advisory personnel will have to place more effort in obtaining and reporting ARVN minefield information. This HQ directed DSA II Corps to obtain this information from all ARVN units within II Corps and report it ASAP. This new data will be included in a revised minefield information letter and will be disseminated to both US and ARVN units within II CTZ and RVN.

f. Item: Airmobile support concept using geographic area concept versus centralized control.

Discussion: Concept of airmobile support II CTZ for tactical operations was on a general support basis and was provided using an area support concept. For this purpose, the II CTZ was divided into three areas, Coastal North, Coastal South, and the Highlands. This concept was very effective, however, the rapid influx of troop units into the II CTZ together with a significant increase of tactical operations required re-evaluation of the area concept.

Observation: Evaluation of airmobile resources and future operational plans indicated that more efficient utilization and effective command and control could be realized through centralized control. A letter of instruction was issued directing the CO, 17th Cbt Avr Gp to provide aviation support for all elements in II CTZ on a general support basis with priority to the major units conducting tactical

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operations. When Army aviation resources are limited and support demands from a large geographical area are high, centralized control is essential.

g. Item: County Fair Operation: A tactical operation for clearing a village or hamlet, in support of Revolutionary Government

Discussion: County Fair type operations in a village or hamlet are often conducted by forces that will be operating in the area on a temporary basis. The people are persuaded to commit themselves to the GVN and provide timely information of an intelligence nature. When friendly forces leave the area, these people are subjected to retaliation by the VC.

Observation: During County Fair operations of a short duration, the people must be informed of how long friendly troops will remain in the area. They must be encouraged to support the GVN but not in an open manner that will subject them to VC retaliation.

2. (C) Training and Organization:

a. Item: Malaria Protective Measures.

Discussion: Some units with high malaria rates have not been following the established Army training doctrine to the maximum extent possible. Units were especially lax in the use of mosquito nets, DDS tablets and insect spray bombs. In a sample study, involving one hundred (100) individuals, 30% of the men with falciparum malaria missed zero days while taking the daily DDS tablet in the month prior to becoming ill. About 40% missed 2 to 3 days and 25% missed 4 to 10 days of prophylaxis in the previous month. The remainder missed taking the drug for 10 days or more. The men questioned revealed lack of knowledge of protective measures and reasons for them.

Observation: There is a requirement for all personnel in CONUS to receive instruction on malaria prevention, and practice malaria discipline three to six months prior to arrival in RVN. This should include use of mosquito nets, daily intake of placebo tablets and use of the aerosol bombs in an effort to make all these measures a daily habit.

3. (C) Intelligence:

a. Item: Establishment of a Collection Division.

Discussion:

(1) Although the current MOP does not include a Collection Division, the coordination of the collection of information and dissemination of requirements for information is necessary to provide a maximum intelligence effort.

(2) The selection of the III Detachment Commander as the chief of the Collection Division provides flexibility and continuity. In addition to having direct control over several collection agencies, it insures maximum utilization of all sources available.

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Observation: In the current environment where many agencies are operating, definite requirements exist for close coordination so that maximum information can be obtained.

4. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Monitoring Supply Status of FSA.

Discussion: The unit participating in an operation computes its day of supply for each item to be consumed or expended. This information is given to the support command providing direct support to the Forward Support Area. The support command uses these figures as a minimum and adds consumption factors based on its own experience to provide supplies on a daily basis to the Forward Support Area. I FFORCEV obtains day of supply figures from the tactical units accordingly.

Observation: It has been learned by using the support commands' day of supply figures, this headquarters would be able to effectively monitor the supply support being provided to I FFORCEV assigned and OPCON units through the Forward Support Area.

b. Item: Medical Evacuation.

Discussion: MEDEVAC helicopters will overfly a medical clearing platoon when the distance involved from battlefield wounded pick-up point to a hospital is less than 20 minutes flying time.

Observation: Clearing platoons located close to surgical hospitals should be by-passed by casualty flow, if total flying time does not exceed 20 minutes.

c. Item: Operation of Separate Brigades.

Discussion: Where a brigade operates as an independent organization, it lacks the administrative and professional support normally received from the division headquarters. This includes services of a division psychiatrist, preventive medicine officer and clerical personnel of the division surgeon's office.

Observation: Brigades should utilize the ambulance platoon leader's slot as an administrative assistant to the brigade surgeon.

5. (C) Other:

a. Item: Diagnosis of Malaria.

Discussion: About 50% of patients admitted to clearing company with an ill defined disease associated with fever were still sick at the end of the 7 day period and still without a definite diagnosis. These patients were evacuated to surgical or evac hospitals where 60% of these turned out to be cases of malaria. Unit medical services are not able to treat patients sufficiently to diagnose malaria at the unit level. Once the patient is transferred, it may be several weeks before the unit learns the actual number of malaria casualties it has.

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Observation: The 44th Medical Brigade should send weekly malaria totals to the individual units.

b. Item: Policies applied in determining the status of personnel captured by US forces are not uniform.

Discussion: MACV Dir 20-5 establishes the policies and procedures for determining whether personnel in the custody of the United States are entitled to PW status. The thrust of this directive is toward granting PW status to a broad range of persons who have committed a belligerent act. However, the current practice in the 1st Cavalry Division results in a large number of persons declared civil defendants. Legally this would permit trial by GVN courts and execution as traitors. Because of space limitations in civilian jails, GVN officials have been releasing civil defendants after a short period of imprisonment in order to make room for those more recently detained. Execution of civil defendants has not been the practice due to political considerations. Other US units in II CTZ have gone to the other extreme by classifying persons performing reconnaissance or trail watching missions as innocent civilians.

Observation: A detailed list of combat and combat support assignments common to VC and NVA operations should be prepared. Persons captured while performing these assignments should be classified as PW's and interned until cessation of hostilities. Lack of uniform or recognizable insignia should be discarded as criteria for classification as a civil defendant. By establishing a policy limiting the civil defendant classification, the protections of the Geneva Conventions will be afforded captured persons and they will be permanently removed from the enemy war effort.

c. Item: Liaison between G5 and USAID and Welfare Agencies.

Discussion: USAID is continuously involved in civic action projects, both furnishing commodities in accomplishing the projects and providing technical assistance to the Vietnamese in accomplishing the project. All civic action projects planned for in provinces are coordinated with the respective USARP provincial representative to ascertain that the project can be supported by USAID. Also, USAID is actively involved in refugee assistance and control (in coordination with province chiefs) public safety and resources control, all of which are of interest to the G5 section. The welfare agencies, such as CRS and CARE are also involved in furnishing commodities for civic action projects. These commodities are not normally available through provinces but must be obtained through central offices in Saigon.

Observation: The G5 section must maintain close coordination with USAID and the Welfare Agencies to ascertain that units are getting the required commodities for civic action projects, and to offer assistance where necessary. Other programs handled by USAID must be monitored by G5 so both higher and lower headquarters are informed on these matters.

d. Item: Evacuation of captured supplies.

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Discussion: The number of captured caches of rice and salt rose steadily during the period. Since January 1966 in II CTZ US forces have, for example, seized over 500 tons of rice. Much of this rice had to be destroyed because of difficulties in evacuation. Additionally a lack of rice bags or other suitable containers hampered evacuation.

Observation: Refine techniques for evacuation of captured supplies. Establish stocks of empty rice bags and other supplies to facilitate handling. In this connection the USAID Regional Logistics representative has requested from his home office that 5000 rice bags be procured for emergency purposes.

e. Item: Inadequate authorized strength of division/separate brigade organic military police units.

Discussion: When division/separate brigades are fragmented as task forces in widely dispersed locations, authorized strength of organic military police units have not been adequate to support combat operations. Necessary additional support has been provided to divisions/separate brigades from the 272d MP Company, assigned to I FFORCEV.

Observation: The Corps MP Company must have the capability of responding to requests for support from OPCON units.

f. Item: FM radio frequencies are now being distributed in II CTZ by use of list assignments to units.

Discussion: Difficulties have been encountered in the frequency spectrum of the old family series of FM radios due to the limited number of frequencies available at 100 kilocycle increments. Also, the rapid buildup of tactical and support units in the II CTZ has increased the demand for available FM frequencies. These frequencies have been assigned to individual units by lists in an effort to meet the demands. Specially selected frequency lists can be reused several times with reuse being governed by geographical separation of units and the type and method of operation.

Observation: The use of frequency lists for FM frequency management in II CTZ is apparently satisfactory. The difficulties encountered due to a lack of frequencies at 100 kilocycle increments will be reduced as all Army aircraft are equipped with the AN/ARC-54 radio. This is part of the retrofit conversion of aircraft to new family radios.

g. Item: Quick reaction:

Discussion: Loudspeaker broadcasts are the most effective quick reaction tool at the psychological operator's disposal. A tape using a returnee or a prisoner can be made and beamed back at his unit in the shortest possible time. During the reporting period, fourteen hours was the fastest time experienced in producing a quick reaction leaflet. Distance, weather, and topography are additional hindrances to the manufacturing of quick reaction leaflets in II CTZ.

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Observation: The use of loudspeaker broadcasts in quick reaction PSYOP will continue to be the most effective means of disseminating messages.

Part II: Recommendations:

1. (C) Operations. Reference para 3g(1)(b) Sect I: In order that herbicide operations will be more responsive to the field commanders' requests, recommend following actions:

a. Delegate herbicide project approval to the lowest possible echelon.

b. Implement a procedure to provide preplanned or on-call sorties to be used in conjunction with military operations.

c. Re-evaluate spray systems in fixed and rotary wing aircraft which could be stationed with tactical units to augment the UC-123B spray aircraft system and provide more rapid response to weather and crop conditions.

2. (U) Training. Reference para 3h(5)(c) Sect I: In order to have a more effective PSYOP program, recommend that augmentation of trained PSYOP personnel be expedited.

45 Incl.
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Stanley R. Larsen
STANLEY R. LARSEN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3-ACSFOP, DA
- 1-CINCUSARPAC
- 3-USARY
- 1-CG II FFORCEV
- 1-CG 1st Cav Div (AM)
- 1-CG 4th Inf Div
- 1-CG 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
- 1-CO 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
- 1-CO I FFORCEV Arty
- 2-OSA, II Corps
- 1-ACofS, G1
- 1-ACofS, G2
- 3-ACofS, G3
- 1-ACofS, G4
- 1-Comdt, USA C&GSC, Ft Leavenworth
- 1-13th Mil Hist Det

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COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 AUG - 31 OCT

<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US 258	6	2475	1032
ROK 71	0	1397	455
ARVN <u>211</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2083</u>	<u>2407</u>
TOTAL 540		5955	3894

KILL RATIO:

F/MAF	14.8 to 1
US	9.6 to 1
ROK	19.7 to 1
ARVN	9.9 to 1

COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 MAY - 31 JULY

<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US 354	14	2392	229
ROK 60	2	585	36
ARVN <u>220</u>	(Not Available)	<u>1690</u>	<u>229</u>
TOTAL 634	16	4670	494

KILL RATIO:

F/MAF	7.2 to 1
US	6.8 to 1
ROK	9.8 to 1
ARVN	7.3 to 1

COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 JAN - APRIL

<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US 446	50	2,437	343
ROK <u>202</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1,893</u>	<u>500</u>
TOTAL 648	69	4,330	843

KILL RATIO:

F/MAF	6.6 to 1
ROK	5.5 to 1
ROK	9.0 to 1

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
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DATA OBTAINED FROM REFERENCE REPORT
OR REF-5a FOR COMBATIVITY

31 Jul 7-13 14-20 21-27 27 Aug 4-10
6 Aug Aug Aug Aug 3 Sep Sep

PAUL REVERE II 1-25 AUG 66

ENEMY KIA
FROLY KIA
CAPT WPNS




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DUEL KUK HWA - 13 SEP - CONTINUING

THAYER 13 SEP - 13 OCT 66

IRVING - 2 - 24 OCT 66



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
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Job # 3


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
OR: CofS - JCS - J2 - TOC - J3 - J5 - J6 - M/CTR
 FLOOR: J4 & SPECIAL STAFF
 ROOMS: LETS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Incl #4



Incl # 5



Incl #6

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MSNS FLOWN —

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LEGEND

Photo - Black


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Stars - Blue


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
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II Corps - 2F



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PHU YEN PROVINCE ORDER OF BATTLE

57

1 January 1966

A. <u>NVA FORCES</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Regiments <u>1</u>	2000
B. <u>MAIN FORCE</u>	
Regiments <u>1</u>	1500
C. <u>LOCAL FORCE</u>	
Companies <u>5</u>	500
Platoons <u>11</u>	400
D. <u>OTHER</u>	
Guerrillas	5000
Combat Support	950
E. <u>INFRA STRUCTURE</u>	2000
TOTAL	<u>12,350</u>

31 August 1966

A. <u>NVA FORCES</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Divisions <u>1</u>	100 (Hqs strength)
Regiments <u>2</u>	3500
Sep Bns <u>1</u>	150
B. <u>LOCAL FORCES</u>	
Battalions <u>1</u>	500
Companies <u>8</u>	750
C. <u>OTHER</u>	
Guerrillas	4000
Combat Support	700
D. <u>INFRA STRUCTURE</u>	2000
TOTAL	<u>11,700</u>

Inclosure 2

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VC/NVA GAINS, PHU YEN PROVINCE

1 January 1966 thru 31 August 1966

1. INFILTRATION 1000
(NVA personnel also move in as units shown in number 3 below)

2. RECRUITMENT

$\frac{\text{Pop PHU YEN}}{\text{Pop SVN}} \times \text{Recruit/mo} \times \text{Recruiting potential factor}$

$$\frac{340}{15000} \times 3500 \times 2.5 = 200/\text{mo} \text{-----} 1500$$

3. UNIT MOVES

188 NVA Regiment 2000

95th NVA Arty Bn 400

TOTAL 5000

RECAPITULATION

1 Jan strength	12350
Add gains	5000
Sub Total	17350
Deduct Losses	5650
31 Aug strength	<u>11700</u>

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VC/NVA LOSSES, PHU YEN PROVINCE

1 January 1966 thru 31 August 1966


89

1. Killed in Action	2300
2. Prisoners of War	200
3. CHIEN HOI Returnees	1300
4. Estimated Died of Wounds	
2.00xMIA = wounded in action =	4600
0.25xMIA = Died of wounds or unfit for combat	1150
5. Unit moves from PHU YEN	
30th MF Bn to KHANH HOA =	400
32d MF Bn dropped from OS =	300
TOTAL	<u>5650</u>

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VC LOCAL FORCES IN II CTZ

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


CONFIDENTIAL AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
GPO 570 00000

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
VUNG LANG MAI

XUAN DAI

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
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CQ2



GLOSSARY

Ban	village	vil
Cho, Chu	montagne	moun
De	village	vil
Ea	riviere	str
Hon	montagne	moun
Hon	de	st
Kong	massif	ra
Krong	riviere	str
Lan	village	vil
Nu	montagne	moun
Phu	montagne	moun
Phu	village	vil
Sung	riviere	str
Sun	riviere	str
Yung	base	
Xu, Rom	village	vil




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
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**OPN PAUL REVE
1 AUG - 25 AUG**

**OPN PAUL REV
26 AUG - 18 OCT**

OPN PAUL

18 OCT



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HALANG

PLEI TRAP

PLEI TRONG DUNG

TONLE SAN

PLEI DURAO LUCK

PLEI LUON PANG


PLEI WU CHUN

PLEI LAUNG PANG

PLEI SENG KRECK

BUN YEN HA





OPN PAUL

18 OCT

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
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
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


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OPN THAYER
13 SEPT - OCT





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SOUTH


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
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
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103 SOUTH



SEUNG

OPN THAYER II

25 OCT



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OPN IRVING

24 OCT



Ho Tzuu

Dam Nuan

OPN IRVING
2-24 OCT




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
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- Pié, Plea, Plei,
- Pointe
- Poulo
- Phi-Trường
- Phụng, Phườn
- S., Sông, Suối
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- Tour, Tourcham
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20 OCT



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


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
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107



Jul 17

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 10-62-02-3501

107

AVERAGE NUMBER OF
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Jul 18

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Lift aircraft continued to increase in force

Lift aircraft for anti-submarine warfare

113

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8 nations continued to increase in force

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITS ATTACHED OR ASSIGNED TO
OR UNDER OPCON OF I FFORCEV
DURING THIRD QUARTER 1966

313


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STATUS (1)</u>	<u>AUTHORITY (3)</u>
HQ Co, I FFORCEV	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 56 11 Mar 66
HQB, I FFORCEV Arty	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 56 11 Mar 66
1st Bn, 30th Arty	nc		QNH	asgd (52d Arty Gp)	GO 1868 12 Dec 65
5th Bn, 27th Arty (2)	nc		PRG	asgd (1/101st Abn Div)	GO 1762 30 Nov 65
3d Bn, 18th Arty	nc		ANK	asgd (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1205 26 Oct 65
6th Bn, 14th Arty	nc		FKU	asgd (52d Arty Gp)	GO 1205 26 Oct 65
Btry B, 29th Arty	nc		ANK	asgd (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1205 26 Oct 65
235th FA Det	nc		PKU	asgd (52d Arty Gp)	GO 1913 28 Mar 66
237th FA Det	nc		NHA	asgd (54th Sig Bn)	GO 1913 28 Mar 66
238th FA Det	nc		LBT	asgd (17th Avn Gp)	GO 1913 28 Mar 66
77th FA Det	nc		QNH	asgd (52d Arty Gp)	GO 1913 28 Mar 66
68th Inf Det	nc		FKU	asgd (52d Avn Bn)	GO 1913 28 Mar 66
54th Inf Det	nc		NHA	asgd (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 3137 27 May 66
54th Sig Bn	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 668 20 Sep 65
272d MP Co	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 668 20 Sep 65
64th Engr Det	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 159 13 Jan 66
55th MI Det	nc		NHA	asgd	GO 1229 27 Oct 65
209th Sig Det	nc		NHA	asgd (54th Sig Bn)	GO 1590 15 Nov 65
297th TC Co	3 Oct 66		NHA	asgd	GO 5953 6 Oct 66
43d Army Postal Unit	3 Oct 66		NHA	asgd	GO 5953 6 Oct 66

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
52d Arty Gp	nc		PKU	atch	GO 4181 27 Jun 66
3d Bn, 6th Arty	nc		PKU	atch (52d Arty Gp)	GO 4181 27 Jun 66
2d Bn, 17th Arty	nc		ANK	atch (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1056 16 Oct 65
7th Bn, 13 Arty	28 Oct		Hammond	Exact status, pending publication of GO's	
41st CA Co (-)	nc		NHA	atch	GO 4079 22 Jun 66
184th Chem Plat	nc		ANK	atch (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1056 16 Oct 65
26th Chem Det	nc		ANK	atch (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1056 16 Oct 66
191st MI Det	nc		ANK	atch (1st Cav Div (AM))	GO 1056 16 Oct 66
13th Mil Hist Det	nc		NHA	atch	GO 2181 28 Dec 65
313th RRU	Formerly 13th RRU		NHA	atch	509th RRGp GO 78 29 Jul 66
11th PI Det	nc		NHA	atch	GO 4878 21 Jun 66
5th PI Det	8 Sep 66		NHA	atch	GO 5587 8 Sep 66
1st Cav Div (AM)	nc		ANK	OPCON	MACV LOI 1-66 29 Mar 66
4th Inf Div	7 Sep 66		PKU	OPCON	USARV OPLAN (Opera- tion Robin 78-66 10 Jul 66
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div (2)	nc		PKU	OPCON (4th Inf Div)	MACV LOI 1-66 29 Mar 66
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	nc		PRG	OPCON	MACV LOI 1-66 29 Mar 65
II Corps Adv Gp	nc		NHA	OPCON	MACV LOI 1-66 29 Mar 66
17th Avn Gp	nc		NHA	OPCON	MACV LOI 1-66 29 Mar 66
245th PSYOP Co	nc		NHA	OPCON	MACV ltr, subj: Employ- ment of 6th PSYOPS Bn 30 May 66
2d Kor Mar Bde		29 Aug 66	1 CTZ		
Capital Div (4)	nc		QNH		
9th ROK Div (4)	nc		TYH		

NOTES:

- (1) Further attached as indicated in parentheses.
- (2) OPCON delegated as indicated in parentheses.
- (3) General orders are published by USARV unless otherwise indicated.
- (4) Under the OPCON of CG, ROKFORCEV FC.



- - - - - OPEN
 - - - - - MUTUAL COOPERATION
 - - - - - ATTACHED

June 52

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96240

AVFA-GC-PL

3 SEP 1966

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (4th Inf Div)

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
APO 96335

REFERENCES:

- a. MAPS: South Vietnam, Series 1501, 1:250,000, sheets NE 48-11, NE 48-12, NE 48-16, ND 48-8, ND 48-16, NC 48-3, NC 48-4, NC 48-6, NC 48-7, NC 48-8, NC 48-10, NC 48-11, NC 48-15, NC 49-1, ND 49-13, ND 49-9, ND 49-5, ND 49-1, NE 49-13.
- b. MACV Directive 525-4, dated 17 September 1965; Tactics and Techniques for Employment of United States Forces in the Republic of Vietnam (U).
- c. MACV Directive 525-9, dated 27 February 1966; Combat Operations, Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food (U).
- d. RVNAF/MACV Campaign Plan AB 141, dated 31 December 1965.
- e. MACV Directive 525-3, dated 7 September 1965; Combat Operations Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties (U).
- f. MACV Message, cite 15445, date/time group 101440Z May 1965 (C); Naval Gunfire Support in the Republic of Vietnam (U).
- g. MACV Directive 95-4, dated 6 February 1966; Aviation, Air Operations in the Republic of Vietnam (U).
- h. MACV Directive 381-1, dated 2 June 1965; Military Intelligence/Visual Aerial Surveillance (U).
- i. USMACV Intelligence Collection Plan FY 1967 (To be published).
- j. MACV Directive 381-11, dated 5 March 1966; Military Intelligence Procedures for Handling, Processing and Exploitation of Captives, Suspects and Documents.
- k. I FFORCEV SOP, dated 20 December 1965, with changes (1, 2, 3, and 4).
- l. I FFORCEV Letter of Instructions dated 20 August 1966.

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Incl 22

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m. Letter, Headquarters, USMACV, Subject: Letter of Instructions (LOI 1-66) (U), dated 29 March 1966.

TASK ORGANIZATION: As assigned.

1. (S) SITUATION:

- a. Enemy forces: See current Intelligence Estimate.
- b. Friendly forces:

(1) 7th Air Force participates in and controls the air defense of RVN, maintains air superiority, conducts air operations against VC/NVA and supports ground actions in RVN as necessary.

(2) III Marine Amphibious Force, in coordination with the Commanding General I Corps, conducts operations in I CTZ against the VC/NVA and participates in the active defense of specific US and GVN critical installations and facilities.

(3) Task Force 115 conducts anti-infiltration operations in and over the waters contiguous to RVN and on certain major inland waterways.

(4) II FFORCEV conducts military operations in III CTZ in support of and in coordination with Commanding General, III Corps, and in other areas of RVN as directed by the COMUSMACV.

(5) Task Force 116 assists the GVN in denying the VC/NVA the use of RUNG SAT Special Zone and major rivers of the SREKON DELTA.

(6) MACV Advisory Groups provide RVN with combat support and advice for counterinsurgency operations against VC/NVA and perform a liaison role between US and RVN forces.

(7) USARPV provides administrative and logistical support to I and II FFORCEV.

2. (S) MISSION: I FFORCEV will conduct military operations in II CTZ in support of and in coordination with Commanding General, II Corps, and in other areas of RVN as directed by COMUSMACV to defeat the VC/NVA and extend GVN control over all of South Vietnam.

3. (S) EXECUTION:

- a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Combat forces assigned, attached or OPCON to I FFORCEV, will be deployed in the II CTZ and will conduct operations in accordance with directives from this headquarters and the Combined Campaign Plan. Combat operations will be coordinated with Commanding General, II Corps, and his subordinate commanders as may be appropriate. Emphasis will be

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 placed on the support of Vietnamese Regular, Regional and Popular Forces and appropriate communications and liaison arrangements will be established for this purpose.

(2) US base camps and areas will be defended with minimum combat elements so that sustained operations utilizing maximum offensive forces can be conducted throughout the CTZ. In this connection, units assigned TAOR's will habitually be prepared for extended employment outside assigned TAOR leaving minimum essential forces to secure base camps. Every effort will be made to gain the most accurate intelligence on the location on enemy formations followed by aggressive reconnaissance to maintain contact until they can be engaged. Engagement and pursuit of VC/NVA forces will be aggressively conducted. VC/NVA initiative will be countered by coordinated rapid reaction operations utilizing maximum forces even if it becomes necessary to modify or cancel current operations. In this connection, highly mobile, helilifted, light infantry units will be developed to respond rapidly to suddenly developing and/or fleeting enemy targets. Maneuver units will be tasked to provide specific forces placed on various degrees of alert prepared for release to COMUSMACV when directed by this headquarters.

b. Deployment:

Division (-) - vicinity Dragon Mtn (AR 7736).

One Brigade - vicinity BAN ME THUOT (AQ 8000).

One Brigade - vicinity TUY HOA (CQ 1040).

c. Tasks:

(1) Prepare to conduct intelligence operations within II CTZ as directed by this headquarters.

(2) In coordination with II Corps Advisory Teams, be prepared to assist insofar as possible in the training of and rendering support to Regional and Popular Forces.

(3) In coordination with II Corps Advisory Teams, be prepared to provide, consistent with tactical requirements and capabilities, maximum assistance to GVN in its efforts to extend control over the people and land of RVN. Civic action projects and psychological operations will be emphasized in support of the Revolutionary Development Program.

(4) Be prepared to participate in and support contingency plans as directed by this headquarters.

(5) Be prepared to conduct clearing operations in selected areas in support of the Revolutionary Development Program in accordance with directives issued by this headquarters.

(6) Be prepared to receive and deploy additional US and/or FIMAF as directed by this headquarters.

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(7) On order, prepare and maintain in current status detailed contingency plans for the relief of USMC CIVIC camps and Regional and Popular Forces isolated outposts as directed by this headquarters.

(8) Be prepared to provide highly mobile, well-armed, light infantry units capable of rapid response to assist in the defense or relief of critical bases, selected population centers or to assist friendly forces in contact.

(9) Develop plans and procedures for aggressive pursuit aimed at the destruction of the VC/NVA whenever they are engaged.

(10) When designated to provide I PROPCOMV reaction force (VICTOR FORCE), be prepared to release the following reaction forces to Commanding General I PROPCOMV:

(a) One rifle company prepared for surface or air deployment one hour after receipt of alert notification.

(b) Remainder of a battalion force prepared for surface or air deployment six hours after the deployment of the initial rifle company.

(c) Remainder of a three battalion brigade prepared for surface or air deployment twelve hours after the deployment of the battalion force.

(11) Occupy and defend base areas (Inclosure 2) to the limit of hostile 120mm mortar fire vicinity Dragon Hill, TAY HOA and HUNG THOAT.

(12) Secure and defend Highways 1, 14, 19 & 21 in the vicinity of base areas to the extent necessary for use as a land LOC.

(13) On order, conduct search and destroy operations and saturation patrolling in the area between BAN MI THUAN and PHU THU and in the vicinity of TAY HOA and throughout II CTZ in accordance with directives issued by this headquarters.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Operations in II CTZ will be coordinated with the appropriate ARVN division or Special Tactical Zone through II Corps Advisory Teams.

(2) With due regard for security, close coordination will be established with Province and District Chiefs through US Sector and Subsector advisory personnel acting in their liaison role.

(3) Maximum use will be made of competent Vietnamese liaison personnel during the conduct of operations to provide identification of friendly forces and a means of contact with civilians.

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(4) Operations and all associated activities will be conducted in such a manner as to minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to civilian property. Planning must include provisions for reporting, securing and disposing of food supplies and livestock encountered during operations.

(5) Maximum effort will be made to support the GVN in its effort to extend control over the people and the land mass of the RVN. To this end, subordinate commanders will emphasize civic action and psychological operations. USAID and JUSPAO representatives assigned to II CTZ will be used to the maximum extent in planning for and executing these activities. Civic action projects and psychological operations will be coordinated with Commanding General, II Corps, or his designated representative through II Corps Advisory Teams.

(6) Commanding General I FFORCEV will control and support II Corps Advisory Teams in the execution of their advisory mission. During coordinated operations, Corps Advisory Teams will perform combat liaison functions between ARVN II Corps and I FFORCEV.

(7) Artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes:

(a) In other than built up areas, artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes may be directed against VC/NVA in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by the GVN liaison personnel, observers or forward air controllers. Further, unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances and in areas where:

1. The requested naval gunfire support mission cannot be observed due to geography, weather or other factors; or

2. No US Air Liaison Officers, forward air controllers or airborne artillery observers trained in naval gunfire spotting are available (conduct of naval gunfire support missions under this provision must be undertaken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).

(b) Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in RVN against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:

1. All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground forward air controller, forward observer, or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval as appropriate.

2. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

3. Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if in the judgement

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of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(c) Procedures for obtaining naval gunfire support are contained in Annex H, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(d) Procedures for obtaining close air support are contained in Annex I to I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(e) Procedures for obtaining visual aerial surveillance/visual reconnaissance are contained in Annex K, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(f) Procedures to be followed by US personnel in the event of civil disturbances or mob violence are outlined in Inclosure 4.

(g) Psychological Warfare will be considered in all operations. Procedures for obtaining Psychological Warfare support are contained in Annex J, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(h) Intelligence: Annex E, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(i) Engineer: Annex G, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(j) Civil Affairs: The following references apply:

(a) Headquarters I FROPCOM Regulation 10-1, subject: Military Civil Action, dated 9 April 1966.

(b) Headquarters USMACV letter MACJ382, subject: Concept of Military Civil Affairs and Civil Action in RVN, dated 26 October 1965.

(c) Headquarters USMACV Directive 515-3, subject: Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs, dated 9 June 1966.

(k) Revolutionary Development:

(a) Headquarters I FROPCOM letter, subject: Increased Emphasis on Rural Construction, dated 18 December 1965.

(b) RVNAP/JCS Directive AN 140, MACV, dated 22 December 1965.

(c) RVNAP/MACV Campaign Plan AR 151, dated 21 October 1965.

(l) Army Aviation: Annex L, I FROPCOM Standing Operating Procedures.

(m) Tactical Employment of Forces: I FROPCOM message cite 3500 from AVF-CC-TVC, date/time from 241131Z December 1965, subject: Employment of Forces, sets forth COMUSMACV guidance pertaining to tactics and techniques to be adopted by units under OPCON I FROPCOM.

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123 (17) Rules of Engagement concerning the conduct of operations in vicinity of the Cambodian/RVN border are contained in TOP SECRET Inclosure 2 distributed under separate cover.

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Administration:

- (1) Annex M to I FFORCEV Standing Operating Procedures.
- (2) Strength Reports: Appendix 6 to Annex 3 to I FFORCEV Standing Operating Procedures.
- (3) Command Orientation: Headquarters USARV Reg 360-2.
- (4) Malaria Prevention: Headquarters USARV Reg 40-4.
- (5) Orient all personnel in the necessity for additional fire-arms discipline and vehicle accident prevention.

b. Logistics:

- (1) Headquarters, USARV supports US Forces through 1st LOGCOMD and its subordinate agencies. FWMAF will be supported as provided by appropriate military working agreements.
- (2) Logistical matters that cannot be resolved by normal support agencies will be referred to ACofS, G4, this Headquarters.

5. (S) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

- (1) Annex D, I FFORCEV Standing Operating Procedures.
- (2) Inclosure 1.

b. Command:

- (1) COMUSMACV exercises operational command over I FFORCEV.
- (2) CG, USARV exercises command, less operational command, over I FFORCEV.
- (3) CG, I FFORCEV exercises operational control of forces assigned and attached to I FFORCEV.
- (4) CG, I FFORCEV exercises operational control over the US Army Advisory Group assigned to II CTZ through Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
- (5) Commanding General, I FFORCEV, exercises operational control over USASF teams deployed in II CTZ through the Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.

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(6) Command relationships between US and RVN armed forces will be as mutually agreed in appropriate US/RVNAF military working arrangements.

(7) Command relationships between Commanding General, I FF BCSV and Commanding General, II ARVN Corps is one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of both commanders.

(8) As a matter of US policy, US forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of US forces by ARVN or RVNAF commanders or the temporary tactical direction of ARVN forces by US commanders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to this headquarters.

6. Acknowledge receipt.

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LTG

5 Incl

1. Signal
2. Rules of Engagement (TRP)
3. 4th Inf Div Base Areas
4. Civil Disturbances
5. Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Incl 5

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SIGNAL
COMMUNICATION SUPPORT

1. (U) To delineate responsibilities and tasks involved in communications support.

2. (C) General:

a. USARV has the mission of providing area telephone switching facilities and long line of communications.

b. I FFORCEV has the mission of providing or arranging for those communications external to subordinate commands required for I FFORCEV command and control functions.

c. Each subordinate command has the mission of providing its own internal communications and terminating external communications as directed.

d. The 54th Sig Bn will support subordinate commands with operating personnel and equipment as directed by I FFORCEV.

3. (C) Responsibilities:

a. USARV:

(1) Install, operate and maintain area switchboard.

(2) Install, operate and maintain area communications center.

(3) USARV and STRATCOM will provide telephone and teletype circuits over the in-country long lines system as validated by MACV J6.

b. I FFORCEV:

(1) Initiate requests for sole and common user circuits routed over the in-country long lines systems.

(2) Process requests for frequencies, callwords, call signs and routing indicators.

(3) Prepare appropriate communication electronics plan for all I FFORCEV directed operations.

(4) Prepare and disseminate I FFORCEV SOI-SSI.

(5) Plan and direct communications support as necessary.

c. 54th Signal Battalion:

(1) Install, operate and maintain:

(a) I FFORCEV Net Control Stations.

(b) Two AN/GRC-26 radios at the Main CP of subordinate commands. Radios will act as subordinate stations in I FFORCEV radio nets.

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(c) One 12-Channel VHF system between I FRODOV headquarters NFA TRAC, and the Main CP of subordinate commands, insofar as the geography, equipment, and availability of circuits in the in-country system will permit.

(2) Provide special and scheduled air messenger service between I FRODOV and subordinate commands.

(3) Provide other communications services within capabilities and as directed by I FRODOV.

d. Major Subordinate Commands:

(1) Prepare and disseminate internal SIG-INT.

(2) Plan, install, operate, and maintain internal communications.

(3) Install, operate, and maintain subordinate stations in I FRODOV Radio Nets as directed.

(4) Provide terminal equipment for sole user voice circuits.

(5) Submit circuit request IAFMCOV CRO1 through I FRODOV.

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
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REF: MAPS: SWR Series L701
1:50,000, Sheets 6552 I,
6552 II, 6652 III, 6652
IV.






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nclosure 3

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Appendix 1 to Inclosure 3

. 1

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CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND REQUESTS FOR
POLITICAL ASYLUM, PROTECTION AND REFUGE

1. (U) REFERENCES:

- 131
- a. COMISMACV Msg 10529, DTG 030602Z Apr 66, Secret, subject: Civil Disturbances (U).
 - b. COMISMACV Msg 12074, DTG 071325Z Apr 66, Secret, subject: Civil Disturbances (U).

2. (S) GENERAL:

- a. The purpose of this inclosure is to furnish guidance for:
 - (1) US/PWMAF personnel in the event civil disturbances or mob violence is directed against US/PWMAF personnel or property.
 - (2) Requests for political asylum, protection or refuge on US military installations by Vietnamese nationals.
- b. Section I outlines policy and prescribes procedures to be followed in the event of civil disturbances or mob violence.
- c. Section II outlines policy and prescribes procedures in the event Vietnamese nationals request political asylum, protection or refuge on US military installations.

SECTION 7

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

3. (C) DEFINITIONS:

- a. US personnel are defined as members of the armed forces of the United States, US citizens who are employees of, or under contract to, the US armed forces, US members or employees of the US State Department and affiliated agencies, and US merchant seamen.
- b. PWMAF personnel are defined as members, military or civilian, of the armed forces of countries providing free world military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.
- c. US/PWMAF property is defined as installations, equipment or material belonging to or utilized exclusively by the personnel listed in paragraphs 3a and 3b above.
- d. Critical military installations are defined as any of the following which are critical to the war effort: troop unit areas, airfields, ports, major headquarters, supply and logistical installations and communications centers. Examples of military installations which are not necessarily critical are those offices and installations not critical to

Incl 4

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CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND REQUESTS FOR
POLITICAL ASYLUM, PROTECTION AND REFUGE

1. (U) REFERENCES:

131

a. COMISMACV Msg 10529, DTG 030602Z Apr 66, Secret, subject: Civil Disturbances (U).

b. COMISMACV Msg 12074, DTG 071325Z Apr 66, Secret, subject: Civil Disturbances (U).

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c. Section II outlines policy and prescribes procedures in the event Vietnamese nationals request political asylum, protection or refuge on US military installations.

SECTION I

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

3. (C) DEFINITIONS:

a. US personnel are defined as members of the armed forces of the United States, US citizens who are employees of, or under contract to, the US armed forces, US members or employees of the US State Department and affiliated agencies, and US merchant seamen.

b. PWMAF personnel are defined as members, military or civilian, of the armed forces of countries providing free world military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.

c. US/PWMAF property is defined as installations, equipment or material belonging to or utilized exclusively by the personnel listed in paragraphs 3a and 3b above.

d. Critical military installations are defined as any of the following which are critical to the war effort: troop unit areas, airfields, ports, major headquarters, supply and logistical installations and communications centers. Examples of military installations which are not necessarily critical are those offices and installations not critical to

Incl 4

SECRET

the war effort which can be safely evacuated such as: Separate billets, R&R centers and other recreational facilities, post exchanges, and administrative offices.

13c

4. (S) POLICY:

a. The security of US/FWMAF personnel and property in Vietnam is primarily the responsibility of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). US/FWMAF personnel have no authority to enforce US or GVN laws upon the Vietnamese people; however, US/FWMAF personnel have the same right as Vietnamese under Vietnamese law to protect lives and property. Where practical, protection for US/FWMAF personnel and property will be obtained from the National Police or VN military authorities. If such GVN protection is not available under the circumstances or is ineffective, US/FWMAF personnel may act as outlined herein.

b. An individual may defend himself or other US/FWMAF or Vietnamese personnel or property against looting, robbery or attack. The action of the individual taken in defense of person or property is restricted to those acts that are necessary and sufficient to avoid the consequences of the attack and must be taken simultaneously with the attack.

5. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. In the event of civil demonstrations, US/FWMAF personnel will remove themselves immediately from the scene and return to their troop area, billets, or place of duty. US/FWMAF personnel will avoid public places during any period when a civil demonstration or disturbance is in progress.

b. Should any civil disturbance or mob violence be directed against US/FWMAF property or installation, the senior person present will promptly inform the local US commander of the nature of the action and whether or not it appears that lives of US/FWMAF personnel are endangered. The local US commander will determine if the property or installation will be abandoned, or defended and if defended the degree of resistance to be employed.

c. Reasonable force, measured to meet the degree of violence of the attack, will be used to protect US/FWMAF lives or critical military installations endangered by civil disturbances. Resistance will, as appropriate and available, be graduated from the positioning of barriers and barbed wire, show of force by the appearance of an armed guard, water hoses, smoke and tear gas, warning shots, and finally, and only when absolutely necessary, firing upon the attackers. When possible, firing should be directed at identifiable ringleaders and should be aimed to stop the attack rather than to kill.

d. US/FWMAF forces will not be called upon to protect non-critical or non-military installations except during the time required to evacuate all persons from the installation. In such cases guidance in paragraph 5c above will apply.

Incl 4

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e. All reasonable force may be used to protect US/PVMAF property not on an installation. The most probable situation which may occur off an installation is when US/PVMAF personnel are in a vehicle and the vehicle is threatened. In this case, the property itself may not be of such value as to warrant killing, but the protection of the lives of the passengers would come under the guidelines of 5c above. The senior responsible person present will determine the degree of force to be used.

SECTION II

REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, PROTECTION
AND REFUGE BY VIETNAMESE NATIONALS

6. (II) DEFINITION:

For the purpose of this section, a US military installation is any area (even if within a larger RVN installation), billet, compound, enclave, airfield, port, ship, aircraft, vehicle, or other facility under total or partial US military control.

7. (S) POLICY:

a. There is no basis in international law for the use of US military installations as places of refuge.

b. As noted above, maintenance of security of all personnel and property in RVN is primarily the responsibility of the GVN. Allowing local nationals to enter a US military installation for the purpose of their personal safety and protection could be interpreted as evidence of a lack of faith in the GVN to carry out its responsibility.

c. Giving protection or refuge to local nationals could convert that installation into the object of a mob attack when it might otherwise remain unbolested. Additionally, granting protection or refuge to VN nationals could provide a cover for terrorists to infiltrate the installation.

8. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. In view of the foregoing, Vietnamese Nationals will not be afforded political asylum or sanctuary or allowed to enter and remain on a US military installation solely for their personal safety and protection, except that, when required by the interest of humanity in extreme or exceptional cases, protection may be afforded in such installations to uninvited refugees whose lives are in imminent danger, such as from mob violence. Under no circumstances will refugees be directly or indirectly invited to accept US protection. Protection and refuge will be refused to those who might be fleeing from the authorities of the GVN. In case refugees are admitted or found upon a US military installation, they will be delivered to JVN authorities or removed from the installation as soon as practical, consistent with the safety of the refugee.

SECRET

b. None of the foregoing should be interpreted to preclude the use of US military aircraft for assistance in the evacuation of non-Vietnamese civilians from potentially dangerous areas to places of greater safety.

13e

Incl 4

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HEADQUARTERS
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO 96240

STAFF MEMORANDUM
NUMBER 10-1

30 August 1966

Effective until 29 August 1967 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

1. GENERAL: The Assistant Chief of Staff G3 has primary staff responsibility for Revolutionary Development (RD) and for coordination of the support of Revolutionary Development when units assigned or under the operational control of this headquarters are involved. A Revolutionary Development Division has been established within the G3 Section for this purpose. The Assistant Chief of Staff G5 will be responsible within the guidelines established by the ACoS G3 for support of civic action and civil affairs aspects of Revolutionary Development.

2. PLANNING AND GUIDANCE: The Assistant Chief of Staff G3 will:

a. Establish Revolutionary Development policies for implementation in the II CTZ.

b. Formulate general doctrine for employment of military forces in support of Revolutionary Development activities.

c. Originate techniques for military support for the accomplishment of specific Revolutionary Development objectives.

d. Publish appropriate directives providing guidance to units assigned or under operational control for support of the Revolutionary Development Program.

e. Provide input on support of Revolutionary Development objectives for inclusion in combat orders as appropriate.

f. In coordination with regional offices of US and GVN agencies prepare I FFOPCEV plans and programs in support of the annual national Revolutionary Development program.

3. COORDINATION: The Assistant Chief of Staff G3 will:

a. Effect general coordination of all military support for Revolutionary Development activities within the command. Communications received and dispatched from the headquarters and visits from or to agencies outside the headquarters that pertain to Revolutionary Development will be coordinated with the Revolutionary Development Division.

b. Effect close and continuous coordination in operations involving units assigned or under operational control of I FFOPCEV, with a primary mission of providing support for Revolutionary Development,

23

30 August 1966

by deployment of a project area team in the area of operations. Within the guidelines established by the ACoFS G3, the ACoFS G5 will coordinate civic action and civil affairs activities in support of RD activities with appropriate US advisory and USAID elements at province and regional levels. Personnel assigned to HQ I FFORCEV and to assigned units may be used to augment project area teams from the Revolutionary Development Division; a representative designated by the ACoFS G5 will accompany each team.

c. Monitor the protection and control of critical resources, to include coordination with GVN, APVN/RF/TF, US/FWMAF, USAID, JUSPAO, and other agencies concerned.

4. REPORTING: The Assistant Chief of Staff G3 will:

a. Provide input as appropriate on military support for Revolutionary Development for reports prepared by this headquarters.

b. Keep the Commanding General and appropriate staff officers informed concerning the status, forecast, and progress of military support for Revolutionary Development within the command.

5. EVALUATION: The Assistant Chief of Staff G3 will:

a. Evaluate the effectiveness of techniques of support for Revolutionary Development employed by units of the command, and compile and disseminate information on those of general interest.

b. Make frequent liaison visits to other US/FWMAF units to observe, discuss and evaluate techniques of support for Revolutionary Development; compile and disseminate information on those of interest to units of this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

William H. James
WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DONNELLY P. BOLTON
Colonel, GS
Acting Chief of Staff


1 Incl
Revolutionary Development Division Chart

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

G3 SECTION



* Each Project Area Chief (PAC) will back up the planning for at least one other PAC.

** Augmentation from 101 IRRON and other sources.

HAMLET STATUS
As of 31 July 66


Province	Total Planned	Goal For This CY	Being Secured	Secured This CY	% Secured This CY	Total Now Secured	Cleared
Binh Dinh	675	119	16	35	29%	99	194
Binh Thuan	181	58	22	21	36%	106	41
Darlac	317	47	20	25	53%	25	121
Khanh Hoa	261	28	12	6	16%	140	101
Kontum	273	31	3	5	21%	53	135
Lam Dong	82	27	1	12	44%	34	37
Ninh Thuan	119	23	2	7	30%	93	23
Phu Bon	139	33	10	16	48%	48	57
Phu Yen	257	33	14	23	70%	35	106
Pleiku	253	46	0	7	15%	43	52
Quang Duc	81	32	5	9	28%	35	22
Tuyen Duc	203	79	6	25	32%	148	48
Cam Ranh	<u>32</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	2873	561	139	191	34%	859	937

HAMLET STATUS
As of 31 Oct 66

Province	Total Planned	Goal For This CY	Being Secured	Secured This CY	% Secured This CY	Total Now Secured	Cleared
Binh Dinh	675	119	19	57	48%	122	282
Binh Thuan	181	58	9	36	62%	117	55
Darlac	319	47	12	34	72%	34	153
Khanh Hoa	261	28	11	8	29%	141	101
Kontum	273	31	23	5	16%	53	116
Lam Dong	82	27	0	14	52%	36	35
Ninh Thuan	119	23	8	10	43%	95	15
Phu Bon	139	33	7	24	73%	56	63
Phu Yen	257	33	13	30	91%	38	97
Pleiku	198	46	5	10	22%	42	53
Quang Duc	81	19	5	14	73%	40	15
Tuyen Duc	160	52	7	30	58%	162	45
Cam Ranh	<u>31</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	2776	521	148	272	52%	936	1030

June 24

743



Incl 25 (1/3)


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inside

Incl 25 (2/3)

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
Incl 25 (3/2)


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SPECIAL MAP II CTZ, RVN








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


LEGEND

-  INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
-  CTZ BOUNDARIES
-  PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
-  ROADS
-  CITY
-  CROP DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS
-  DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS

12

SECRET



13

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

ONS

Greetings from the 2d Battalion 19th Artillery, 1st Air Cavalry Division!
This leaflet attack is to celebrate the 200,000 105mm artillery shells this unit has fired against the Viet Cong and NVA since arriving in Vietnam one year ago. You cannot escape the death and destruction of American artillery. We can go anywhere by helicopter or parachute in the jungle or on top of mountains. We will never run out of ammunition. We are invincible! To escape death and destruction, rally to the government of South Vietnam. Use a Safe Conduct Pass and contact the nearest allied unit, at a Chieu Hoi, you will be given food, medical attention, and a chance to resume a peaceful and safe life with your family.

245P-43-67



HAY DON TIẾP TIÊU ĐOÀN 2 KHÔNG VẬN, PHÁO ĐỘI 19, TỬA SỰ ĐOÀN 1 KỸ-BINH.
VỚI 200,000 TRUYỀN ĐÓN ĐƯỢC THẢ DO PHÁO ĐỘI 105 LY BẮN ĐỂ ĐỀ CHỐNG LẠI VIỆT-CỘNG VÀ QUÂN ĐỘI HẠC-VIỆT TỰ KHI ĐẾN VIỆT-NAM MỘT NĂM RỒI ANH KHÔNG THỂ THOÁT KHỎI CÁI CHẾT KHÔNG TOÀN THẬN DO PHÁO HÌNH HOẠ-KY CHÚNG TÔI CÓ THỂ ĐẾN BẤT CỬ NƠI NÀO BẰNG TRÚC THĂNG. HAY THẢ ĐÙ TRONG RỪNG KÂM HAY LÀ Ở ĐỈNH NÚI.
CHÚNG TÔI KHÔNG BAO GIỜ LUI BƯỚC VÌ ĐẠN-ĐƯỢC CHÚNG TÔI DƯ SỨC ĐỀ THĂNG.
THOÁT KHỎI SỰ CHẾT VÀ SỰ TÀN PHÁ CỦA CHÍNH PHỦ MIỀN-NAM VIỆT NAM, BAN DUNG THỂ CHỈ DẪN BÌNH AN VÀ LIÊN LẠC VỚI ĐÓN VI ĐỘNG MINH GẮN NHẤT HAY CƠ QUAN CHIÊU-HOÌ. BAN SẼ NHẬN THỰC AN, CHĂM SÓC, THUỐC MEN VÀ LÀ CƠ HỘI BAN LẬP LẠI ĐỜI SỐNG BẢO ĐAM VÀ YÊN LẠNH CÙNG GIA-ĐÌNH-BAN.

9+3(P) 43-67

Incl 29 (1/3)

English translation for 245N-33-67

K2

You have almost ended your long trip to the South. You have come many kilometers and now your ordeal will begin - an ordeal which will end only when the last shovel full of dirt is thrown over your grave so many miles from home.

You have been sent by your leaders to replace the thousand or more soldiers who were killed this past month by the American 25th Infantry Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division and other units of the Free World forces.

You may look forward to constant bombings by silent B-52 airplanes, which you will never see or hear until it is too late. You will be weakened by hunger, and many of you will die from disease. Then artillery, more airplanes, and the finest infantry in the world will hunt you down and put an end to your misery.

If you would avoid this fate, you must find a Safe Conduct Pass, and use it to rally to the GVN. You will be guaranteed safety and good treatment.

Nếu các bạn muốn tránh khỏi số phận này, các bạn hãy tìm ngay một tờ thông hành quy chính, và dùng tờ thông hành ấy để đi về với chính phủ quốc gia. Các bạn sẽ được an toàn và được đối đãi tử tế.

245N-33-67



Các bạn vừa kết thúc cuộc hành trình dài dằng dặc vào Miền Nam. Các bạn đã vượt hàng ngàn cây số vào đây và cuộc thử thách mới của các bạn sẽ bắt đầu. Một cuộc thử thách mà sẽ chỉ chấm dứt khi lát cuộc cuối cùng phủ đất đất bụi lên thây các bạn được với vàng chôn cất cách xa quê hương hàng ngàn dặm. Lãnh tụ của các bạn đã đưa các bạn vào đây để thay thế cho hàng ngàn đồng chí các bạn đã bị các đơn vị của Sư Đoàn 25 Lực lượng Hoa Kỳ, Đệ nhất Sư Đoàn Không Vận Hoa Kỳ cùng các đơn vị khác của lực lượng Đồng Minh tiêu diệt trong tháng vừa qua. Các bạn có thể thấy trước những cuộc oanh tạc liên miên, khủng khiếp của những máy bay ma khổng lồ B-52 mà các bạn chẳng bao giờ nghe, thấy cho đến khi các bạn chỉ còn là những cái xác không hồn thì đã quá muộn rồi. Sĩ lực của các bạn sẽ ngày càng bị tiêu hao vì bệnh tật, rồi thì pháo binh, máy bay, bom đạn và các đơn vị lực lượng tinh nhuệ nhất trên thế giới sẽ săn đuổi các bạn và chấm dứt tình trạng khốn khổ của các bạn.

245N-33-67

Incl 27 94

Men serving in the 630th North Vietnamese Division:

13. It has been over a year since you began your long trip to the South. Since then you have suffered many dead and wounded. One thousand of you were killed in action this past month and many more were wounded. Others of you have died of disease and still others are going hungry. But the worst is yet to come. In the next battle it may be you and your comrades place in a shallow grave and covered with dirt. It is only a matter of time.

The choice is yours. Be sure and save the Safe Conduct Pass when you find one. Wait until it is safe and then escape. Present the Pass to any of the Free World Forces and you will be well treated. If you cannot escape and are forced into battle by your leaders, take the first opportunity to rally and you will live.

245N-24-67



245N-24-67

Hội các bạn trong Sư-Đoàn 630 Bắc-Việt!

Đến nay tình ra đã hơn một năm rồi kể từ ngày các bạn bắt đầu cuộc hành-trình dài dằng dặc vào Miền Nam. Từ bấy đến nay các bạn đã chịu bao nhiêu thương-vong, đau khổ. Hàng ngàn đồng-chí của các bạn đã bị giết trong chiến-đấu hội-thắng của bạn đã chết vì sơn-lam-chướng-khí và bao nhiêu người nữa đang bị đói khát và ốm yếu. Nhưng chưa hết đau, tình-trạng-tệ-hại hơn còn đang đến với các bạn. Có thể trong trận đánh sắp tới, thấy các bạn cùng thấy với các đồng-chí khác sẽ chỉ được vài ngàn dặm tạm. Và điều gì chỉ còn là vấn-đề thời-gian mà thôi. Sự lựa chọn là do các bạn. Muốn cho chắc chắn các bạn hãy giữ lấy một tờ thông-điệp quy-chánh khi các bạn tìm thấy được và chờ đợi lúc thuận-tiên an toàn nhất hãy bỏ qua. Các bạn hãy tránh tờ thông-hành quy-chánh cho bất-cứ-đơn-vị Đông-minh nào, các bạn cũng sẽ được đối-xử tử-tử. Nếu các bạn không trốn thoát được thì sẽ bị bắt buộc phải ra trận thì hãy tìm mọi cơ-hội trở về với chính-phủ quốc-gia, sinh-mạng của các bạn bởi được bảo toàn.

245N-24-67

Jul 27 (3/3)

English Translation of the [unclear]

SOLDIERS OF THE 18TH and 95th REGIMENTS OF THE 325TH DIVISION:

You have been fighting and dying in South Vietnam for almost a year. Look around you, think of all your comrades that you will never see again. Is it your turn to die next? Sickness and death are everywhere. Death is following you. There is no shelter, no cave, no one chance to live and see your family in the North, unless you rally. There is no safe hiding place from the eagle's destructive powers.

RETURN TO THE NATIONAL CAUSE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE!

245N-14-67



T

Thưa gửi binh sĩ của trung-đoàn thứ 18 và 95
thước-sư-đoàn 325.

Các bạn đã chiến đấu tại Nam Việt gần một năm nay. Hãy nhìn quanh bạn! Bạn hãy nghĩ tới tất cả các bạn của bạn mà bạn sẽ không bao giờ gặp lại! Có phải sắp tới lượt bạn bị chết không? Tất cả mọi nơi đều có bệnh tật và thiếu lương thực. Bạn đang theo dõi bạn-Sức tàn phá của Pháo đài không để yên một nơi trú ẩn, một cái hầm hoặc một nơi trốn tránh vào.

Bạn chỉ còn một dịp may để sống sót và thấy lại gia đình bạn tại miền Bắc, đó là:

Hãy trở về với chính nghĩa Quốc-Giun trước khi quá chậm.

245N-14-67

II

Incl 28 (1/3)

24 0 46 67

Officers of the 450th Regional Company

I was a squad leader of the 450th Regional Company and I have some recommendations for you. On the 9th of September, my unit was engaged by a U.S. unit and I really realized that their weapons and firepower were too great. I was seriously wounded and was captured. At the beginning, I thought the Americans would leave me to die--but I was wrong, they saved my life. Now, I'm treating my wounds in a hospital and I am gradually recovering. The Americans are too powerful to be beaten so I call you to rally now to the GVN. Bring along your weapons and you will be rewarded. The Americans will treat you fairly.

Nguyen Van Dinh
 Squad Leader
 450th Regional Company



Cùng các bạn trong Đại đội địa phương 450!
 Tôi là tiểu đội trưởng thuộc Đại đội địa phương 450, có vài lời nhắn nhủ cùng các bạn. Hôm tháng 9 vừa qua, đơn vị tôi đã đụng độ với một đơn vị Hoa Kỳ và tôi đã thật sự thấy rõ vũ khí và hỏa lực của họ quả thật là quá mạnh. Tôi đã bị thương nặng và bị bắt. Thoạt tiên, tôi tưởng họ sẽ đả tặc tôi chết, nhưng không, tôi đã làm họ dễ dãi tôi sống. Hiện tại đang được điều trị các vết thương tại một bệnh viện và đang dần dần bình phục. Quân đội Mỹ thật quá mạnh, nên tôi kêu gọi các bạn hãy trợ vũ ngay với chính phủ quốc gia, mang theo vũ khí các bạn sẽ được trọng thưởng. Người Mỹ sẽ đối xử tử tế với các bạn.

245N-46-67

Nguyen Van Dinh
 Tiểu đội trưởng
 Đại đội địa phương 450

Incl 28 (2/3)

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Ref No. 245N-48-67

EVERYONE WILL PITY THESE PEOPLE

The people whose pictures you see on the reverse side have just been liberated from a VC prison camp by members of the American 101st Abn Div. Besides Mr. Truong, is Khu-Anh, the chief of the Trung Hamlet; Mr. Truong-Tung, secretary of Phuoc-Thinh Hamlet; Mr. Hoang-Kim Chinh, the Self Defense Corps official of Hien-Khang District; Mr. Phao-Thang, Self Defense Corps Private Second Class; Mr. Truong-Van-Dinh, a Free South Vietnamese Soldier; And there are Mrs. Vo-Thi-Hang, Mrs. Lam-Thi-Ao, Mr. Nguyen-Hung and Nguyen Huong; and four innocent civilians.

Their thin bodies and their haggard faces will prove that during their imprisonment they were without clothes, mistreated, and suffered miserably at the hands of the VC. But now, all of them have been fed in a temporary camp and treated by GVN medical personnel to restore their health before returning home.

Because of the VC, we see scenes such as this. Help the South Vietnamese Government bring security and safety to your land, and give you anew life of peace and good will.

245N-48-67



AI MÀ CHĂNG THƯƠNG TÂM

Đã bao giờ bạn thấy hình ảnh của những người dân
vừa được các chiến sĩ Sư Đoàn 101 Nhảy Dù Hoa Kỳ
thoát khỏi một trại giam Việt Cộng. Ngoài các ông
Trương Xuân Ấp trưởng ấp Mỹ Trung, Truong Tung (thợ
lợp lều), anh Hoàng Kim Chinh nhân viên phòng
lưu trữ của Hien Khang, anh Phan Thang binh nhì ĐVTN,
và anh Truong Van Dinh binh sĩ Công Hòa, các bà Võ Thị
Lam, Thị Ao, anh Nguyễn Hùng và Nguyễn Hương đều là
những người dân bị bắt giam trong trại giam này. Tất cả
các họ cũng đã cho ta thấy trong thời gian bị Việt
Cộng giam cầm họ đã bị Việt Cộng bỏ đói, ngược đãi các
địa ngục nào. Hiện giờ họ đang được nuôi dưỡng và
được phục hồi sức khỏe trước khi hoàn hương.
Việt Cộng là kẻ thù của nhân dân này. Hãy
chúng ta hãy giúp họ, tài trợ tiền, xây
các công trình trong tình thương và tương trợ.
245N-48-67

Incl 28 (3/3)

FRONT: Another soldier from the 320th NVA Regiment rallies to the GVN.

BACK: Nguyen Duc Phong has returned from the darkness and terrors of the jungle. Now, he is among happy people who live in the sunlight of freedom. Nguyen Duc Phong, like many of his comrades in the 320th NVA Regiment, is sick with malaria. While in the jungle with the NVA, he received no treatment. Now, he has the best medical care and medicine. Also, he was paid for bringing in his weapon. How did he escape to freedom?

He was carrying rice with two other soldiers. He walked slowly behind them until he was out of sight. Then he walked toward the artillery and aircraft noise of the Allied forces. When he saw a helicopter, he waved a white piece of paper above his head. He laid his weapon on the ground. The helicopter picked him up and within minutes he was among friends. There is plenty of food, clothing and cigarettes. The GVN Chieu Hoi Program will help him begin a new and happy life.

245P-20-67

Nguyễn-Dức-Phùng đã trở về từ nơi tối tăm và Kinh Khủng của rừng rú. Nay anh có mặt trong nhân dân vui sống trong ánh sáng của Tự-Do. Nguyễn-Dức-Phùng cũng như nhiều đồng chí của anh trong Trung-Đoàn 320 Bắc-Việt, có bệnh sốt rét. Trong khi ở rừng rú với quân đội Bắc-Việt, anh chẳng được chữa bệnh. Hiện giờ anh nhận được thuốc hay và được săn sóc. Lại nữa, anh được thưởng tiền về một vũ-khí của anh mang về.

LÀM CÁCH NÀO NGUYỄN-DỨC-THẮNG ĐÃ THOAT VỀ VỚI TỰ-DO?

Anh đang mang gạo với hai binh-sĩ khác. Anh đi chậm chậm sau họ đến khi Khuất đang. Rồi anh đi thẳng về hướng có tiếng vang của Pháo-binh và phi-cô thuộc lực-lượng đồng-miên. Khi anh thấy một trực-thăng, anh vẫy một miếng giấy trắng trên đầu anh. Anh đặt vũ-khí của anh xuống đất. Trực-thăng mang anh đi trong vài phút, anh đã có mặt với bạn bè. Nơi đây có đầy thực-phẩm, áo quần và thuốc là.

Chính sách Chieu-Hoi của Chính Phủ Việt-nam sẽ giúp anh bắt đầu một sự sống mới và hạnh phúc.

245(P)-20-67

Thêm một binh-sĩ thuộc Trung-Đoàn 320 Bắc-Việt qui-chiến về chính-phủ Việt-nam.



Nguyễn-Dức-Phùng được một Sĩ-quan Việt-nam về một Sĩ-quan thuộc Trung-Đoàn 1 Mỹ Bình Kháng-Vận Mao-tử tiếp cứu sống lại.

Jul 28 (2/3)

161 English Translation for 245P-23-67

FRONT: Two brave comrades find a way to reach the GVN-Allied Forces

BACK: The two soldiers pictured on the other side of this leaflet made the decision for freedom. They are intelligent and resourceful men. They realized long ago that the promises made by the cadre could never be kept. The Allied soldiers carry the attack to the NVA so-called "safe areas". There are no defenses against GVN-Allied artillery fires and aerial might. There is not enough medicine to treat malaria and other diseases. They live like animals in the forest. So... Ngo Huong and Nguyen Van Thanh seized an opportunity to rally to the GVN.

They took advantage of the confusion following a battle. They carried their weapons and ammunition to show their faith in the Chieu Hoi Program. They marched in the direction of the sounds of Allied artillery and planes. When they met soldiers of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, they waved leaflets above their heads. They were warmly received. Now, they have good food, shelter, money, the most modern medical care, and the chance to start a happy new life.

245P-23-67

**HAI ĐỒNG-CHÍ ANH DỪNG TÌM LỐI VỀ VỚI LỰC-
LƯỢNG CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT NAM VÀ ĐỒNG-MINH**



Đồng-chí quân-đội Bắc-Việt NGÔ-HƯƠNG và Nguyễn-văn-Thành thuộc Trung-đoàn 320 được chụp ảnh với cây đại-tầm 12 ly 7. Hai anh đã mang về cái lồng rơm nó cũ và vũ-khí này và hai chục kí-lô đạn được trong sáu tháng đồng hồ với không đồng một cây số để tìm về Quy-Chánh với Lực-Lượng Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam và ĐỒNG-MINH. Hai anh được trọng thưởng về việc này.

CHUYỆN CỦA HAI ĐỒNG-CHÍ.

Hai binh-sĩ chụp ảnh phía bên kia tờ truyền đơn này đã quyết định về với tự-do. Họ là người thông minh và tháo vác. Họ đã nhận định từ lâu rằng những lời hứa hẹn của cán bộ không bao giờ đúng giờ. Binh-sĩ ĐỒNG-MINH, tên công vào cái gọi là vùng 3, toàn cuối quân-đội Bắc-Việt. Không có sự chống đỡ những hỏa-pháo của Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam và ĐỒNG-MINH và súng và những phi-ca. Không đủ thuốc men, thiếu ăn sóc binh sốt rét và những binh khác. Chúng sống như thú-độc trong rừng. Vì vậy, Ngô-Hương và Nguyễn-văn-Thành nắm lấy cơ hội để quy-chánh Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam. Họ lợi dụng sự hỗn loạn của chiến-trường. Họ mang về vũ-khí và đạn được của họ để chứng minh sự tin-tưởng, của họ đối với chính-sách Chieu-Hoi. Họ đi ngay hướng có tiếng vang của trọng-pháo và phi-ca ĐỒNG-MINH. Khi họ gặp binh-sĩ của 3đ-Đoàn 1 Kỳ Bình Không-Vấn, họ vội là truyền đơn trên đầu họ. Họ được tiếp đón nồng hậu. Hiện giờ họ có thức ăn ngon, có nơi trú ngụ, tiền bạc, được sự săn sóc với thuốc men tối tân nhiều và may mắn đã bắt đầu một sự sống hạnh phúc.

245(P)-23-67

Incl 21 (3/3)

Extract of Viet Cong Memorandum

Addressing: Mr. [redacted] - U. S. PSYWAR Operations

The memorandum provides a description of our psywar efforts (and incidentally an evaluation of them) and outlines a series of countermeasures designed to stem the effects of our program.

"At present, the enemy is using psywar. The enemy is using psywar to attack us on the ideological plane. He has scattered many leaflets from aircraft and has appealed to us through (loudspeaker) broadcasts. The objective of this is to destroy our morale. The themes of this propaganda are that: only to the enemy side; the war causes much misery; U.S. weapons are very powerful and they menace us; rewards will be given those who leave their comrades and abandon their missions; the South Vietnamese are soldiers who receive much honor and (monetary) benefits; the enemy side is the side of authority (i.e., legitimate sides."

This does represent a fair sampling of the leaflet appeals which we employ, with an ideological exception. The certainty of victory theme (or conversely, certainty of Viet Cong defeat theme). It is not clear why there should be no reference to this theme; its absence is more likely to have been deliberate rather than accidental.

"These efforts, if not counteracted, will surely influence our troops. If we do not carefully control cadres and soldier thoughts, we shall face many difficulties. For this is a dangerous, wicked scheme by the enemy. It is related to the general war situation, all aimed at reducing the fighting spirit of our forces and having a great influence on our struggle toward victory in general, and during this summer in particular."

The steps to be taken, listed as "appropriate measures" are these:

"1. Carefully indoctrinated troops, cadres and soldiers (this distinction here is between troops and soldiers apparently is between Viet Cong main force troops and North Vietnamese army soldiers) about the enemy's psywar tactics. Make clear to all people the fact of his corruption and that he pretends to be very strong, but cannot hide his failures; that our people will gain victory. Make cadres and soldiers

June 1966

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understand the glory of a revolutionary soldier. Make everybody energetic and cause them deeply to resent the enemy and be determined to fight and win all battles under any circumstances.

"2. Whenever the enemy uses paywar, cadres should immediately hold indoctrination sessions and closely manage the people's thoughts and actions. Be prepared for all developments (i.e., for all enemy appeals). When leaflets drop, all people, even the cadres and soldiers, should tear them up without reading them. Only cadre chiefs (i.e., team chiefs) are authorized to read and then explain and analyze the contents of the leaflets to the cadres and to soldiers in their units. The latter are prohibited from reporting on the contents of this propaganda to others, or to discuss it. To discuss enemy propaganda is to voluntarily or involuntarily propagandize for the enemy. Set up a self-improved spirit in each unit so that cadres and soldiers help each other."

The two approaches to be employed, therefore, are: (1) Indoctrination — the communists place great faith in the indoctrination process — and (2) denial of access to the materials.

The above was extracted from JUSMAC Field memorandum Number 24.

This is a preliminary report of the ILO. The survey was conducted presently in progress. In about thirty of the completed interviews and will represent the findings to be presented in the final draft. In all 71 interviews were conducted so as to adequately substantiate any of the stated suggestions. This survey covered the following subjects: Who controlled the village, by what means was control maintained, were the subjects to taxes, what kind of taxes, were these taxes justified, did they have any knowledge of the VC government, did they have any knowledge of the DRV, how did they obtain this knowledge, what did they think of the DRV government and what did they think of US/AVN payees.

More than 90 percent of those talked to came from VC controlled areas. Ninety per cent said that the VC maintained this control through force. This included such things as being beaten, jailed, sent away from their villages and forced to attend ideological indoctrination sessions. Thirty-three per cent mentioned that if they did not follow the VC they would be sent to the "mountains". They did not know exactly why they feared the "mountains" but they did anyway. Ten per cent followed the VC because they felt that it was the right thing to do. The statement of one villager sums up the feeling of the area, "If we do not obey the VC, what will happen to us?"

All of the interviewed persons had been subject to VC tax in one form or another. Eighty-five per cent of the interviewed persons paid their taxes in kind and less than ten per cent had to pay their taxes in cash. Fifty per cent were reported as being to die with the promise that they would be released after the end of the war. Some said they requested to be released but were not consistent for whom they requested a year and one this year. All of the interviewed persons were reported as not believing in the DRV and never to recognize the DRV as a government. They were all in the area of the investigation and they were all in the area of the investigation.

Eighty per cent of the interviewed persons had no knowledge of the VC government or political structure in their area while only fifty-five per cent of the villagers had any knowledge at all of the DRV. Only three of the interviewed persons had any knowledge of the DRV's government, the DRV's capital.

Ind 31

most by the people was peace and a chance to live and travel as they desired. Twenty-five per cent desired more aid from the government.

Only one villager reported having received any aid from the VC and he was a VC Hamlet official. All the rest stated that the VC had done nothing for them, but bring taxes and hardship. On the other hand sixty per cent had received aid from the GVN, however, twenty per cent had received this aid prior to 1964.

Seventy-five per cent of those asked if they had seen psyops leaflets or heard their broadcasts, had been exposed, the majority to both. Most of those questioned believed the broadcasts and leaflets and those that did not return, could not, due to VC pressure or lack of mobility. Fifty per cent of those exposed to US/GVN psyops were also exposed to VC efforts to discredit the psyops messages and threats of harm if they returned.

Fifty-three per cent were told by the VC that the Americans would come into their villages, destroy, burn, steal their chickens and kill them. Of those villagers that did not receive any instruction, half expected good treatment and the rest did not know what to expect.

The following suggestions are either those put forth by the villagers or presented by analysts of the information gathered.

PSYOPS TECHNIQUES:

1. In an earlier interrogation with an NVA soldier, he stated that the time allowed between a leaflet drop urging them to throw down their weapons and surrender, and later air and artillery strikes was not sufficient. He stated that after reading the leaflets and hearing the broadcasts, several soldiers decided to defect; however, four hours later, before they could defect they were hit by air and artillery strikes. He further stated that after this he and others did not believe air psyops messages. It is suggested that the messages clearly spell out that if they do not defect within a specific period they will be subject to attack.

2. Another NVA soldier stated that if he knew where he was and which routes could be used to escape along, which food was available, he would have done so. It is suggested that maps of the area be dropped marking good escape routes back to SVN.

3. Three of the villagers stated that the air broadcasts were hard

to understand and preferred the leaflets. One stated that the broadcasts from the L-19's were clear, but those from helicopter were not.

SUGGESTED THEMES:

1. The grievances revealed in this district are similar to those found throughout SWN. The only suggested themes would deal with a few peculiarities of the area. Psyops based on grievances cannot do much more than widen the gap between the VC and the villagers.


No matter how much the villagers may hate the VC, so long as the GVN cannot offer them continuous protection nothing permanent can be affected.

The most that could be done would be to encourage more returnees. Such themes as the VC use of force, the threats of the "mountain", worthless bonds and no assistance from the VC could be highly effective.


2. Along with the above type theme, another offering them a definite alternative to life under VC control should be offered. The study revealed that only fifty-five per cent of them knew anything at all about the GVN. GVN psyops should not assume that they are recognized entity but rather should attempt to teach these people that there is a GVN and what it stands for. Aid in any form appears to make a big impression with the villagers. The source of any aid should be emphasized any giving of aid should be publicized. One villager stated that he would prefer to meet the GVN officials rather than just read leaflets or hear broadcasts. Another fairly well educated villager suggested that the best method to spread the word on the GVN would be by a "whisper Campaign".

BERT T. KOBAYASHI, JR.
1LT, AIS
Psychological Team, CIV, R&A Branch

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Inst 32 (1/2)



Incl 22/2/5

HEADQUARTERS
NHA TRANG SUBAREA COMMAND (PROV)
Office of the Installation Coordinator
APO 96240

INSTALLATION COORDINATION
MEMORANDUM NUMBER 13


4 October 1966

SUGGESTED FAIR PRICE LIST

1. The community Relations Committee has prepared a Suggested Fair Price List for goods purchased in Nha Trang. The Committee feels that by a concentrated program to inform the individual soldier of the prices he should pay, the problem of inflation will be reduced.

2. The Suggested Fair Price List is attached as Inclosure 1. It is urged that commanders make a concerted effort to inform and educate members of their commands on the purpose of the Suggested Fair Price List. The key to the success of the price list is convincing the individual that prices will decrease if everyone adheres to the price list. Suggested ways to inform the individual of the price list are: Distribute to incoming personnel as a part of processing, post on bulletin boards, "price of the day" signs, items in the Daily Bulletin, and distribution in Day Room areas.

FOR THE INSTALLATION COORDINATOR:


JOHN E. HUBER
1LT, ACO
Adjutant

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"

Incl 33

Incl 33

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SUGGESTED FAIR PRICE LIST

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>PRICE RANGE IN PIASTRE</u>
<u>LAUNDRY</u>	
1. Fatigue Shirt	10
2. Fatigue Trousers	10
3. Socks	2
4. Towel	2
5. Civilian Shirt	10
6. Civilian Trousers	10
7. Undershorts	5
8. Tee-shirt	5
9. Handkerchief	2
10. Hat	5

TAILORING

1. Sew on Patch or Insignia	5
2. Embroider Name Tag	40

CLOTHING

1. Cotton Shirt, Tailor Made	250-450
2. Trousers	600-1300
3. Woman's Dress, Vietnamese Ao Dai Design	450-1600
4. Woman's Sweater	300-500
5. Woman's Shoes, Elephant Skin, Snake Skin	800-1100
6. Man's Civilian Shoes, Elephant Skin, Snake Skin	900-1300
7. Fatigue Hat without Rank - with Rank	50-55

BEVERAGES

1. Vietnamese Beer	35
2. Whiskey Ccck	80
3. 'Haigon Tea'	80
4. Coca-Cola	30
5. Lemonade	20
6. Orange Soda	20
7. Iced Tea	15

FOOD

1. Beefsteak and French Fries	100-150
2. Chinese Noodle Soup	40-50
3. Fried Rice	90
4. Shrimp Cocktail	70
5. Salad	40
6. Fried Shrimp	90

ITEMS

PRICE RANGE IN PIASTERS

Services

1. Haircut	30
2. Shoeshine - low quarters	10
- boots	20
3. Engraved Plaque - 4"x6"	600-900
4. Maid Service - inexperienced (700 after 30 days)	600
(Per Person) experienced (after 6 Mo)	1000
5. Washing Vehicle - 1/2 ton	100
3/4 ton	150

Luxury Items

1. Women's Purse; approximately 10"x4"	
elephant skin	700-1000
snake skin	700-1000
2. Woman's Pocketbook; approximately 10" x 4"	
elephant skin	900-1500
snake skin	900-1500
3. Man's Elephant Skin Wallet	130-200
4. Vietnamese Doll - 12"	100
15"	130
5. Elephant Skin Attache Case	2000
6. Wooden Vietnamese Footlocker	500-1000
7. Metal (beer can) Footlocker	600-1100
8. Straw Beach Mat, approximately 3'x6'	120-180
9. Swim Fins	300- 500
10. Face Mask	350- 550
11. Bicycle	1600-3000

Miscellany

1. Hotel Room per night - single	500
double	500

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>EST POP</u>	<u>REGISTERED VOTERS</u>	<u>TURN OUT BY REGISTERED VOTERS</u>
Kontum	104,100	45,890	72%
Pleiku	162,300	56,819	90%
Binh-Dinh	850,000	198,832	90.7%
Phu Yen	342,300	85,345	81%
Phu-Bon	14,400	18,847	97.5%
Darlac	202,000	72,966	80%
Quang-Duc	28,000	16,870	83%
Tuyen-Duc	83,200	39,965	93.16%
Lam-Dong	65,300	22,174	85%
Khank-Hoa	292,000	163,439	84%
Ninh-Thuan	140,200	63,312	91%
Binh-Thuan	252,000	85,000	72%

Incl 34

Incl 34

HQ, I FORCE KEY PERSONNEL
and
FVMAF SENIOR COMMANDERS ON DATES INDICATED

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>1 Aug 66</u>	<u>31 Oct 66</u>
Commanding General	LTG S.R. Larson	NO CHANGE
Deputy Commanding General	VACANT	VACANT
Chief of Staff	COL (P) D.F. Bolton	NO CHANGE
Deputy Chief of Staff	COL J.G. Shanahan	COL R.J. Fairfield
Artillery Officer	EG C.A. Symoski	COL (P) L.S. Boatwright
Secretary General Staff	LTC E. Ingram	LTC R.H. Milan
Information Officer	LTC D.A. Williams	NO CHANGE
Inspector General	LTC J.H. Glandorf	NO CHANGE
Judge Advocate	LTC R.W. Kennedy	NO CHANGE
AC of S, G1	COL G.A. Bone	NO CHANGE
AC of S, G2	COL W.W. Cover	COL R.W. Williams
AC of S, G3	COL L.S. Boatwright	COL C.P. Hannum
AC of S, G4	COL C.P. Hannum	COL V. Kovalevsky
AC of S, G5	LTC T. Elaba	COL R.H. Renwanz
Adjutant General	COL R.M. Metzger	COL W.H. James
Provost Marshal	COL J.J. O'Donnell	NO CHANGE
Signal Officer	COL J.P. Coe, Jr	NO CHANGE
Engineer Officer	COL E.L. Waddell, Jr	COL H.C. Beaty
Chaplain	COL T.E. Waldie	NO CHANGE
HQ Commandant	LTC A.P. Kass	LTC C.W. Dryer
Aviation Officer	COL J.W. Marr	NO CHANGE
Chemical Officer	LTC J.P. Crispell	NO CHANGE
Director, DASC	LTC P.P. Hoza (USAF)	NO CHANGE
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)	MG J. Norton	NO CHANGE
CG, 4th Inf Div		MG Collins (21 Sep 66) (GO 101, HQ 4th Inf Div)
CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	EG W. Pearson	NO CHANGE
CG, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	EG G.E. Walker	COL J.G. Shanahan
CG, Capital ROK Inf Div	LTC M.S. Chae	MG B.H. Yoo
CG, 9th ROK Inf Div	MG S.D. Lee (9 Sep 66)	NO CHANGE
CG, 2d ROK Marine Bde	EG B.C. Lee	Transferred to III MAF, 25 Aug 66


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CONFIDENTIAL
 2 Apr 1976 - 31 Oct 1976

UNIT	AUTH	S.F.Y./AUTH	KIA	BATTLE		D/AD	NON-BATTLE		SICZ	SICZ	RETURN TO DUTY	REPL. CONTIN
				MIA	MIA		INF	SICZ				
HC, I FFCISEV (2)	289	126.7					22	1405			169	313
HH, I FFCISEV ARMY	195	49.7						31			21	53
52d Arty Gp (2)	2532	95.6					2	107	876		499	298
5/27th Arty	644	90.2					-1	2	67		29	90
54th Sig Bn (2)	701	98.1			1			9	209		77	230
41st CA Co	99	82.7		1				6	54		29	42
50th VC Det	70	97.2						6	61		41	32
372d AF Co	180	92.7		2				14	21		6	50
287th Trans Co	107	97.6							1			
1st Cav Div (AM)	16921	107.6	160	219	6	24	193	2002	11306		10314	7587
1st Cav Attn	1127	91.4	2	41			9	109	1222		574	590
4th Inf Div	11554	98.2	18	103		14	89	597	1175		1269	527
4th Inf Attn	712	95.1					1		10		11	5
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	2921	106.5	22	202		4	37	1125	2422		2471	1626
1st Bde, 103rd Air Div	4570	111.6	40	257		2	39		2220		1873	1048
1/101st Attn (5)												
II Corps Adv Gf	3129	106.7	1	1				2	214		8	203
17th Avn Gf (4)	5476	92.0	4	11		8	8	81	2256		1190	1543

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2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 3 4

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
1/12

2/12

1/9

5/7

1- AS OF 31 AUG 66
2- AS OF 31 AUG 66
3- AS OF 1 AUG 66
4- AS OF 26 AUG 66



0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

1/327 (1/10 AFM 13 V)

1
2
3
4

2/327

1
2
3
4

2/502

1
2
3
4

1/35 (3/25 INF DIV)

1
2
3
4

2/35

1
2
3
4

1/4

1
2
3
4

1/69

1
2
3
4

2/4 (INF DIV)

1/12

3
4

1/22

2

2/35

1
2
3
4

1/4

1
2
3
4

1/69

1
2
3
4

2/4 (NF DIV)

1/12

3
4

1/22

2
3
4

2/8

2
3
4

1/12

4

1/8

4

3/12

4

3/8

4

1 - A
2 - A
3 - A
4 - A

- 1 - AS OF 3 AUG 66
2 - AS OF 31 AUG 66
3 - AS OF 1 OCT 66
4 - AS OF 26 OCT 66

PROMOTION ALLOCATIONS

	AUGUST							SEPTEMBER							OCTOBER						
	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4		E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4		E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	
HQ I FFORCEV	1				1	3					2	5(3)	6(2)	9			1	1			7
HHB I FFORCEV AMIX					2	2				1	1	1	1	1							4
HQ CO I FFORCEV					2	10						2	2	2							8
52D ARTY GP					3	9				1	1	3	3	7							8
1ST BN 30TH ARTY						16						6	5	25				10	17		46
3D BN 6TH ARTY			2			28			1	2		2	2	10				1	5		15
3D BN 18TH ARTY																					15
5TH BN 27TH ARTY																					18
6TH BN 14TH ARTY																					15
7TH BN 13TH ARTY																					18
54TH SIG BN						18(1)				1	8	22(19)	11	11							33
5TH PI DET																					5
11TH PI DET																					2
13TH ME DET																					2
14TH CA CO					5						1	2	1	1							6
55TH MI DPT					4						1	1	1	1							1
64TH ENGR DET																					11
272D NP CO					1	12					3	4	4	8							10
297TH TRANS CO																					1072
1ST CAV DIV (AM)	2	32		69	101	351		9	53	392	1078	1961	1961	15	15	15	507(53)	940(323)	1072	1072	
1ST SDE 101ST ABN	1	7(2)		79	163	403				64	139	441	441	2	2	2	7	19	66	66	
4TH INF DIV				61(19)	162(99)	779(275)				2	1	56	56	2	2	2	63	294(225)	762(11)	762(11)	
3D BDE 25TH INF	1	5	9	64	111	244				38	124	269(21)	269(21)	2	2	2	22	84	248	248	
17TH AVN GROUP			1	16	62	256		1	1	32	65	295	295	1	1	1		78	285	285	
TOTAL	1	9	51(2)	305(19)	613(100)	2169(276)		1	11	60	558(3)	1459(21)	3116(21)	3	2	2	620(53)	1461(518)	2621(12)	2621(12)	

(TURN BACKS)

June 30

	BANBUOK	HAWAII	HONG KONG	KUALA LUMPUR	MANILA	PENANG	SINGAPORE	TAIPEI	TOKYO
HQ I FORCE	66.8% 10(2)	7	16(3)	1	1		4		6
HQB I FORCE	1	1	1	1	1			2	7
HQ CO I FORCE	2	4	2	1(1)			2	1	4
1ST BN 30TH ARTY	15	4	1	7	9		5	15	38
3RD BN 6TH ARTY	9	4	11	2	12		1	12	14
3RD BN 16TH ARTY									
5TH BN 27TH ARTY	15	5	8	7	4		4	16	17
6TH BN 24TH ARTY									
7TH BN 13TH ARTY	14	6	14				5	9	16
5TH PI DET									
11TH PI DET									
13TH ME DET			1				1		9
11ST CA CO	2		7				1(1)	2	1
5TH LI DET	6		5(4)	1					
6TH ME DET									
272D EP CO	5	1	7				2	2	2
297TH TRANS CO									
1ST CAV DIV (M) 76%	67(159)	218	532(102)	223(26)	228(42)	234(18)	182(14)	566(51)	832(69)
1ST BR 101ST ABN 81.6%	132	64	167	65	66	65	53	163	239
4TH INF DIV H/A	23	20	39(9)	10(25)	15(2)	19(32)	7	32(20)	47(8)
3RD BR 25TH INF 68%	136(27)	69(4)	119(37)	45(12)	68(13)	49(21)	39	115(28)	177(5)
17TH AVN GP 100%	147	45	131(3)	54	49	50	40	125	184
TOTAL	1200(163)	449(4)	1128(163)	423(64)	424(57)	442(69)	346(15)	1064(99)	1596(82)

() = STAFF

Sheet 29

R&R QUOTAS RECEIVED

R&R QUOTAS UTILIZED

	AUGUST			SEPTEMBER			OCTOBER		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HQ I FFORCEV	15		7	9		8	9		7
HHB I FFORCEV ARTY	3		2	2		3	1		5
HQ CC I FFORCEV	7		4	2		2	1	1	2
2D ARTY GP	7		4	3		2	2		2
1ST BN 30TH ARTY	35		27	2		36			47
3RD BN 6TH ARTY	23		14	2		25	1		28
3RD BN 18TH ARTY									
5TH BN 27TH ARTY	33		30			32			18
6TH BN 14TH ARTY									
7TH BN 15TH ARTY	39		14			21	2		22
50TH SIG BN									
5TH PI LET									
14TH PI DET									
13TH MB DET									
41ST CA CO	9		2	5		4			1
56TH MI DET	7		3	2		2			3
64TH ENGR DET									
242D MP CO	9		5			8			7
297TH TRANS CO	1147		1239	138		922	60		1042
1ST CAV DIV (AF)	374		349	9		353	13		326
1ST FJE 101ST AVN							9		212
4TH INF DIV	304		276	22		252	24		199
3RD BDE 25TH INF	276		232	53		178	10		212
17TH AVN GROUP									
TOTAL	2588		2149	249		1816	168		2136

Done 4/0

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

AUGUST

	SS	LM	PC	SM	BS	BE(V)	AM	AM(V)	ACM	ACM (V)	PH	CIB	CMB
NO I FFORCEV-OFF		4			17		12		1				
WO		1.											
EM					3		1		20				
NO I FFORCEV ARTY													
OFF		1			1		3						
WO													
EM									2				
NO CO I FFORCEV													
OFF					6		3						
WO													
EM													
1ST BN 30TH ARTY													
OFF							1						
WO													
EM													
3D BN 18th ARTY													
OFF					1								
WO													
EM													
4TH BN 14TH ARTY													
OFF					1	1	1						
WO													
EM					2	1							
5TH SIG BN													
OFF					5		4		1				
WO					1		2		3				
EM					1		1		6				
7TH PA DET													
OFF													
WO					1								
EM													
1ST CA CO													
OFF					2				1				
WO													
EM													
8TH MI DET													
OFF					4		1						
WO													
EM									3				
12D MP CO													
OFF													
WO													
EM									1				
1ST CAV DIV (AM)													
OFF	1		18	1	58	12	1161	5	12	4	11	120	36
WO			16	1	15		996	25	11	3	1		
EM	8		14		60	36	1304	15	30	12	162	489	124

*Amc 41
(1/3)*

	<u>SS</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BS</u>	<u>BS(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AM(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACM (V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIB</u>	<u>CMB</u>
101ST BDE													
OFF	10				8	19	61		1	8	6	53	
NO			1				3		2				
EM	14			1	47	77	14		63	202	107	488	4
25TH INF DIV													
OFF									1		1		
NO													
EM											5		
25TH INF OFF													
OFF	1				5	11	29	1	4(1)	2	1	2	
NO							3						
EM	9			2	14	59	3		13	10	33	59	3
17TH AVN BDE													
OFF		5	18		44		469	9	9	1			
NO			13		6		318	2	11				
EM			7		17		459	12	29				

* JSCM

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

SEPTEMBER

	<u>SS</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BS</u>	<u>ES(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AN(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACM (V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIB</u>	<u>CMB</u>
HQ I FORCEV													
OFF					6		9						
WO													
EM					1		4		6				
HQB I FORCEV ARTY													
OFF					2		1		2				
WO					1								
EM					3		1		2				
HQ CO I FORCEV													
OFF							3					1	
WO													
EM					1								
1ST BN 30th ARTY													
OFF					2		6		1				
WO									1				
EM					1				2				
BN 6TH ARTY													
OFF						1	1		2				
WO													
EM						2							
3D BN 18th ARTY													
OFF					1								
WO													
EM					1				1				
6 BN 14th ARTY													
OFF					8		5		2				
WO													
EM					11		2		15				
54th SIG BN													
OFF							3		1				
WO							1		1				
EM							2						
11ST CA CO													
OFF						1							
WO													
EM									1				
85th MI DET													
WO													
EM					1				1				
272D MP CO													
OFF													
WO													
EM									2				
1ST CAV DIV(AM)													
OFF	4		6	2	53	41	380	5	40	7	21	118	40
WO			4		11	1	393	8	19		2		
EM	5			2	44	22	2317	7	156	15	166	673	70

*Incl 41
(2/3)*

	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BS	SB(V)	AM	AM(V)	ACM	ACM (V)	PH	CIB	CMB
1ST BDE 101ST													
OFF		4			3	8	3		8	4	4	5	
WO					1				1				
EM	6				2	63	2	2	53	99	48	91	1
4TH INF DIV													
C									6				
WO													
EM									3				
3D BDE 25TH INF													
OFF			1		4	11	43		2		2	5	4
WO							5		1				
EM	3				5	55	6		3		27	4	17
17TH AVN GP													
OFF		2	26		35	2	451	4	5	5	4		
WO	1		14		4	1	278	8	17	2			
EM			10	1	10		519	24	21	10	6		

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

OCTOBER

	<u>SS</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BS</u>	<u>BS(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AM(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACM (V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIP</u>	<u>CMB</u>
HQ I FFORCEV													
OFF		1					1		5				
WO													
EM					4		5						
HQ I FFORCEV ARTY													
OFF						3							
WO													
EM						4			1				
HQ CO I FFORCEV													
OFF													
WO													
EM							14						
1ST BN 30TH ARTY													
OFF						1			12				
WO									2				
EM						4	2		7				
3D BN 6TH ARTY													
OFF													
WO													
EM									2				
6TH BN 14TH ARTY													
OFF						1			4				
WO									1				
EM						1			1				
5TH SIG BN													
OFF						1			2				
WO								1					
EM						1		4	2				
11ST CA CO													
OFF						2							
WO													
EM						2	1		6				
15TH MI DET													
OFF											1		
WO						1							
EM											2		
2ND MP CO													
OFF													
WO													
EM									1				
1ST CAV DIV(AM)													
OFF			1		3	2	110	3	3	2	35	26	20
WO					3		205	4	3		6	1	
EM					4	12	1840	1	13	8	205	260	125
1ST BDE 101ST													
OFF		2			1	11	10	1			5	5	
WO							2						
EM					16	58	23		18	23	33	236	3

*Level 41
(313)*

	<u>SS</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>DPC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>BS(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AM(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACM (V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIB</u>	<u>CME</u>
1ST INF DIV													
INF												1	
NO													
EM									1			8	
30 BDE 25TH INF													
OFF	1	1				110	20	22		10		7	4 2
NO						8		11					
EM	3					50	25	13		145	7	67	80 10
17TH AVN BDE													
OFF	5	5	25			38		480	14	5		4	
NO			16			4		203	17	7			
EM			8			27	12	653	49	43		8	

NON RECEIPT OF PERSONAL LETTER MAIL

The following is a breakdown of periods of non-receipt of personal letter mail by units assigned, attached or under Operational Control of HQ I FORCE during the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 66.

UNIT	DATES PERSONAL LETTER MAIL NOT RECEIVED	REASON
HQ I FORCE (includes assigned & attached units in Nha Trang Area)	29 Oct 66	NCISS
II CTZ Adv Gp	None	
5th Arty Gp (incl 3/3 & 6/14 Arty)	5, 6, 7, 8 Sep	Severe weather apparently hampered aircraft.
1st Cav Div (1st)	8 days	Exact dates are not available.
3d Inf 25th Inf Div	16, 22, 24 Aug 9, 14, 20, 25 Sep 5, 13 Oct	
1st Inf Div	3 days	Operations began 21 Aug. Exact dates of non-receipt are not available.
1st Bde 101st Airm	21, 25 Aug 3, 7, 13 Sep 5, 13 Oct	
17th Assn Gp	None	
52d Avn Bn	None	
10th Assn Bn	10, 20 Oct & approx 5 other days during Aug & Sep.	Exact dates are not available
10th Assn Bn	6, 15, 19 Aug 6, 16, 20 Sep 20, 27 Oct	
1st Bn 10th Arty	None	

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RATE OF OFFENSES PER 1000 TROOPS

MAJOR COMMAND	CLASS I		CLASS II		TRAFFIC	
	4 Qtr FY 66	1 Qtr FY 67	4 Qtr FY 66	1 Qtr FY 67	4 Qtr FY 66	1 Qtr FY 67
1. USARV	1.67	1.48	32.50	23.76	16.74	11.47
2. I PFCOMV (CoG and Atch) units	1.01	1.24	28.74	20.12	17.89	9.23
3. 1st Cav Div (AM)	1.37	1.85	26.29	13.72	3.75	4.86
4. 1/101st Abn	0.94	1.03	23.76	29.10 ³	13.13	4.79
5. 3/25th Inf Div	2.98	0.44	18.79	27.91	2.24	14.17 ²
6. 2/4th Inf Div	—	0.36	—	28.03	—	3.59

1. Excess rate attributed mainly to assault and larcenies.
2. Excess rate attributed mainly to speeding violations.
3. Excess rate attributed mainly to disorderly conduct and curfew violations.

Information extracted from USARV letter, AVHFM-PO, dtd 12 Oct 66, Subject: "Offenders Statistics, 1st Quarter, FY 67."


Incl 42

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
Dir. J-4, JCS	LTG Richard D. Mayer Party of 13	1 August 1966
Chief, Information Office	MG Keith L. Ware Party of 4	2-5 August 1966
Cmdr, VFW	Mr. Andy Borg Party of 2	3 August 1966
3 ARMY	Gen Harold K. Johnson Party of 6	5-7 August 1966
CG, 2d Log Cnd	MG C. C. Heng Party of 3	15-16 August 1966
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 2	21 August 1966
MAOV - J3	MG John Tillson Party of 2	21 August 1966
Vice Pres. Bell Helicopter Co.	Gen (Ret) H. H. Howze Party of 4	23-26 August 1966
POG, USARV	LTG Jean Engler Party of 2	28 August 1966
Regional Director, USAID	Mr. Hatcher James Party of 1	29 August 1966
DEPCOMUSMACV	LTG John Heintges Party of 8	1 September 1966
IGeff, Leg, DA	LTG I. J. Lincoln Party of 5	2-3 September 1966
COMROKFF	LTG Chae, Myung Shin Party of 11	3 September 1966
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 2	4 September 1966
Ch, Gen Staff Australian Army	LTG Thomas G. Daly Party of 3	10 September 1966
CG, USA Security Agency	MG C. Dembalm Party of 2	19 September 1966
ACeff, CG, USARPAC	MG G. I. Forsythe Party of 3	20-23 September 1966
USARPAC	Gen Dwight E. Beach	23-24 September 1966
CG, 4th Inf Div	MG Arthur S. Collins Party of 3	23 September 1966
Japanese Ambassador to RVN	Mr. Yoshita Hakyama Party of 6	24 September 1966
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 3	1 October 1966

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<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
Sp Asst for Readiness, DA	Mr. George Passala Party of 2	4 October 1966
Asst for Special Warfare, DOD	Mr. Leonard Sullivan Party of 1	5 October 1966
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 1	8 October 1966
COMUSARPAC	LTG Edgar D. Doleman Party of 5	11-13 October 1966
VCeSA	Gen Creighton W. Abrams Party of 5	16-17 October 1966
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 1	20 October 1966
Director, USAID II OTZ	Mr. Merton Party of 1	28 October 1966
Director UNIS & Chief of JUSPAO	Mr. Barry Zertman Party of 3	30 October 1966



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