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COMMAND REPORT

QUARTER ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1965

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

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AVF-GC-TNG

(11) 14 January 1966

SUBJECT: (1) Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965.
Reports Control CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
APO US Forces 96307

(12) 141

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

(18) OACSFOR

(19) OT-RD-650116

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) GENERAL:

a. The major activities conducted by Field Force Vietnam (FForceV) during the quarter (1 Oct - 31 Dec) were offensive combat operations and the reception of additional assigned and operational control units. Units under operational control of FForceV carried the counterinsurgency effort deep into the Viet Cong (VC) infested areas. Major operations inflicted heavy casualties on the VC (Incl 1) and severely hampered his war effort by destroying base areas, training sites and field hospitals and by restoring to the government of Vietnam control of numerous isolated areas that accommodated resettlement of many refugees.

b. Two Free World Military Assistance Force units became operational during the period. These were the ROK Capital Infantry Division and the ROK 2d Marine Brigade (Incl 2). The command relationship which existed on 31 Dec between Hq, FForceV and those two units is outlined in Letter of Instruction, dated 31 Dec (Incl 3).

c. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XXX Corps Artillery arrived in Nov. This battery, at reduced strength, provides the artillery section for the headquarters. Four artillery battalions arrived in Vietnam and were assigned to this headquarters. The 3d Bn, 18th Arty (8" Howitzer) became operational 21 Nov and the 6th Bn, 14th Arty (175mm gun) became operational 10 Dec. These units were attached to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The 5th Bn, 27th Arty (105mm Howitzer) became operational 11 Nov and was attached to the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm Howitzer) became operational 24 Dec and was located in the Qui Nhon area with the mission of reinforcing the ROK Capital Infantry Division.

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d. The 54th Signal Battalion, assigned to this headquarters became operational on 15 Oct. The 10th Aviation Battalion arrived 28 Oct and became operational on 1 Dec with Dong Ba Thin as its home base. By the end of the quarter advance elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division had arrived and begun to establish a base area at Pleiku.

e. Units under OPCON of and assigned to this headquarters at the end of the quarter are shown in inclusion 4.

2. (S) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

The scope of intelligence production activities was expanded considerably during the quarter. The intelligence resources gained at the end of the previous quarter became operational and were integrated into the intelligence effort. The flow of information increased as more US/FWMAF units were committed in the II CTZ; and operational relationships between subordinate, supporting and cooperating intelligence agencies were clarified and regularized.

The order of battle and editorial sections of the 55th MI Detachment were combined to form the basic research and analysis elements of the G2 Operations Division. Order of Battle files were expanded and all available basic data was carded and indexed. Because of the large size of the CTZ, responsibility for research and analysis was assigned to three order of battle teams. G2 operation officers are also assigned specific geographic areas of responsibility. This provides a higher degree of expertise in specific and critical areas of interest, such as in Pleiku, Kontum, Binh Dinh, Phu Nen, Ninh Thuan and Ninh Thuan Provinces. The remaining six provinces in the II CTZ are covered on a general basis, except for Khanh Hoa Province which is handled as a separate case as discussed below under counterintelligence activities. The responsiveness of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance activities under the direction of the G2 Air was greatly improved during the quarter as the imagery interpretation section of the 55th MI Detachment became fully operational and the 45th MI Detachment (ARS) came under the operational control of this headquarters. This improvement in local capabilities was further enhanced by the arrival of additional Air Force reconnaissance aircraft in theater. This permitted the allocation of a greater number of missions in support of the command. By the end of Nov, the imagery interpretation section had established semi-permanent operating facilities following the arrival of its imagery interpretation vans and remaining equipment. During the quarter, the imagery interpretation section completed 155 missions of 164

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received, completed 108 imagery interpretation reports, 68 imagery interpretation overlays, 20 mosaics, and 50 miscellaneous projects such as LZ/DZ studies, strategic B-52 bomb damage assessments, and Special Forces Camp vulnerability studies. The 45th MI Detachment (ARS) did not become fully operational until Dec because of the late arrival of its organic equipment and the damaged condition of major items. However, the personnel were employed throughout the period in direct support missions such as augmenting the imagery interpretation effort of the 55th MI Detachment; providing liaison with the Tactical Air Control Center and the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam in Saigon; and in providing imagery interpretation assistance and advice to the ARVN II Corps Targeting Center. In Dec, the 20th ASTA Detachment, a USARV unit under the operational control of J2, USMACV, became operational at its base in Nha Trang following arrival in-country in late Oct and early Nov. Employed in direct support of FForceV and II Corps, this detachment is providing valuable reconnaissance results, particularly with its airborne infrared sensors which greatly improve the aerial surveillance capabilities of the command.

Infrared reconnaissance by Army and Air Force aircraft is a valuable asset to the aerial surveillance and target acquisition effort. Under proper conditions, it is highly useful in confirming target locations indicated by other collection means, and also provides excellent leads for confirmation by other sources and agencies. Airborne radar is of limited value for tactical reconnaissance or targeting since the enemy lacks mobile equipment susceptible to detection by radar. Adverse weather conditions, particularly during the northeast monsoon, severely hampered both airborne infrared and conventional photographic reconnaissance efforts throughout the II CTZ. Heavy jungle cover severely restricts effective aerial surveillance of critical areas.

The problem created by the necessity to forward requests for Air Force reconnaissance through the II Corps DASC at Pleiku reported during the last quarter has been resolved with the establishment of the DASC Alfa at Hq, FForceV. Requests forwarded by II Corps elements to II Corps DASC are now also processed through DASC Alpha so that all Air Force reconnaissance requirements within the II CTZ are effectively coordinated, eliminating duplications and permitting the combining of missions when feasible.

Normal counterintelligence security activities are conducted by the G2 Counterintelligence Branch, assisted by the Counterintelligence Section of the 55th MI Detachment. Liaison activities with local intelligence and police activities in the Nha Trang area were broadened,

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with the assistance of the local office of the 704th Intelligence Corp Detachment, the USMACV unit responsible for area counterintelligence coverage. At the end of the quarter, liaison and coordination was being maintained with 14 local US and RVN intelligence and police agencies, either directly, or through the 704th INTC Detachment. As an outgrowth of these liaison and coordination activities, the G2 CI Branch is also charged with the responsibility for monitoring the overall enemy situation within Khanh Hoa Province, with particular attention to the enemy threat to Nha Trang. This mission was assigned to the CI Branch because the security of this headquarters and the base area surrounding it depends upon a coordinated intelligence effort which encompasses all spheres of intelligence, counterintelligence and police activities.

To further assist in the coordination of the overall FForceV intelligence effort, the CO, 55th Military Intelligence Detachment was appointed as assistant G2 (Executive Officer) concurrently with his duties as detachment commander. Since the tables of authorization do not provide for a G2 executive officer, the above mentioned assignment provides greater flexibility in the supervision and coordination of the intelligence effort. This assignment permits him to assist in the supervision and coordination of the overall activities of the G2 Section and also maintain direct control over the Interrogation and Technical Intelligence Sections of the MI Detachment.

No interrogations were conducted during this period because of two considerations. First, current policy requires that Viet Cong captives be turned over to RVNAF as soon as possible after immediate local tactical exploitation. Therefore, this command could not retain control of them long enough for exploitation at this Hq. Secondly, and more important, of the four officers and an average of eight enlisted men assigned to interrogator positions, only one enlisted man had been trained as a Vietnamese linguist. The unqualified interrogators have been given on-the-job training in the Vietnamese language so that a sufficient number are now capable of scanning captured documents and selecting those items worthy of more complete translation. Three enlisted men on TDY from the US 25th Inf Div for in-country Vietnamese language training were attached to the section for approximately 45 days during Oct and Nov and one Vietnamese National assisted in document processing, translations and in the language training program. Other civilian employees are being sought but are not locally available. As a result of this effort, over 700 documents were processed, from which 24 local translation reports were completed. At the end of the quarter there was no outlook for improvement in the shortage of US linguists, or for hiring qualified civilian translator-interpreters.

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The technical intelligence effort during the quarter was assisted by the five technical intelligence detachments reported as having joined during the previous quarter. However, the exploitation of technical intelligence was relatively limited in view of the conglomerate and relatively unsophisticated weaponry and equipment in the hands of the enemy forces. Principal activity in this area consisted of identifying various types of ordnance materials, and the analysis of limited numbers of chemical, signal and quartermaster type material. All technical intelligence detachments were detached from this command and placed under the operational control of J2, USMACV, with duty station in Saigon as of 7 Dec 65. However, as of the end of the quarter, they had not been moved to Saigon because of the lack of facilities there.

The major problem during the quarter as it affected intelligence operations was the difficulty in communicating with higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. The unreliability of voice circuits and the slowness of secure means greatly constricted the flow of intelligence and information, and complicated coordination and liaison activities. The problems of communication was further complicated by the multiple channels of communication and command. With two distinct channels, the ARVN channels, paralleled by the US advisory channels, and the US/FWMAF channels which do not necessarily parallel the ARVN/advisory channels, the exchange of information and coordination of effort at appropriate echelons is extremely difficult and complicated. The existence of these multiple channels also contributes to the duplication of effort in the reporting of information, and also results in part in false confirmation of information. Information originating from a single source, but reported through different channels in different contexts without proper attribution are frequently reported as separate reports. The ultimate complication in the problems of communication is the existence of multiple language barriers and insufficient numbers of bilingually or multi-lingually qualified personnel in RVN/US/FWMAF units (i.e., personnel linguistically qualified in combination of Vietnamese, English and/or Korean). The difficulties in rendering accurate and meaningful translations of informational reports between these languages not only obstruct the flow of intelligence information, but also frequently and regularly causes misinterpretations and misunderstandings which tend to invalidate final intelligence products. Although the complete correction of these deficiencies is beyond the capabilities of this headquarters, efforts continue to improve the situation through recognition of the problems, correction of local procedures which tend to compound these problems, and making allowance for these obstructions in the processing and transmission of information.

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The major objective of the intelligence effort during the period, in addition to the normal support of specific operations, was determination of the identification and locations of major enemy formations within the II CTZ and the location of specific targets for various weapons systems, principally B-52 strategic bombers.

At the end of the last quarter, the infiltration of enemy troops from North Vietnam was accepted as consisting of cadre personnel to bolster Viet Cong main force units. However, by early October, it was determined that the infiltration flow had consisted not only of cadre and replacement personnel, but that complete PAVN regiments had been infiltrated into the II CTZ. In Oct a PAVN regiment, the 250th, was located and identified in Quang Duc Province of II CTZ. Finally, as a result of the Plei Me - Chu Pong - Ia Drang operation in western Pleiku the 32d, 33d and 66th PAVN Regiments were positively identified. The disposition of major PAVN and VC main force units is shown in Incl 5. As of the end of the quarter, there were an estimated 50,000 enemy troops in the II CTZ, 20,000 within the PAVN and VC main force units and the remaining 30,000 in VC local force units of platoon and company size scattered throughout the II CTZ.

During the quarter, 19 targets for strategic bombing preplanned missions were selected and nominated, of which five were struck with 30 sorties. Although precise results of these strikes could not be obtained due to inaccessibility to the target areas, information received from captives and other sources indicated that the B-52 strikes in the Chu Pong area in support of the Chu Pong - Ia Drang operation had devastating effect.

The major actions by VC/PAVN forces were those conducted by the PAVN regiments in western Pleiku during October and November and the PAVN/VC attacks in Phu Yen in Nov. The western Pleiku activity was initiated by the PAVN 32d and 33d Regiments as a typical use of the "bait and trap" tactic. The 33d Regiment was employed in an attack on Plei Me CIDG Camp in order to draw in a relief force, while the 32d Regiment was positioned along the route expected to be taken by the friendly relief force so that the relief force could be ambushed. Captured documents reveal that the enemy had made a fairly accurate estimate of the friendly forces which would be committed in the relief of Plei Me. However, the PAVN forces were thwarted in their effort by superior friendly air power, and the fact that the use of this tactic was recognized and effective countermeasures were taken. The enemy's plans were apparently further disrupted when major elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and later an ARVN airborne task force,

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was committed in pursuit of the withdrawing PAVN forces. As a result of this pursuit, the PAVN 66th Regiment was uncovered, and severe damage was inflicted on all three PAVN Regiments.

In the Phu Yen operations, elements of the 95th PAVN Regiment and the 3d VC Regiment reacted strongly to ARVN efforts to protect the rice crop in the area generally west of Tuy Hoa. As a result of these operations, the PAVN and VC forces again suffered heavy casualties.

The month of Dec saw a relative lull in VC and PAVN initiated actions throughout the II CTZ. It appeared that PAVN and VC main force elements were avoiding contact with friendly elements, while the bulk of the activity, which consisted of harassing actions and attacks against lightly held and vulnerable positions, was conducted by local force elements of platoon and company size. There were also indications that the PAVN forces, last located in western Pleiku, had crossed over into Cambodian sanctuary, while there were firm indications that some major elements, but not all, of the 18th PAVN Regiment and the 3d VC Regiment, previously located in Binh Dinh Province had moved northward into Quang Nga Province into the I CTZ. However, the movements do not materially reduce enemy strength available for employment within the II CTZ, nor their capability for launching attacks of multi-regimental size at any place and time of his choosing.

3. (S) Operational and Training Activities:

a. 1st Air Cav Div: After assuming responsibility for its TAOR on 28 Sep, simultaneously continued improvement of the base area and commenced limited operations (reinforced company) in the local area. On 10 Oct, 1st Bde TF jumped off the division's first major operation, vic Soui Can Valley. Light resistance was encountered, except along the western high ground where 1st Bn, 12th Cav encountered stiff resistance from well fortified VC positions. In Vinh Thanh Valley elements of 2d Bn, 5th Cav conducted search and destroy operations to clear the valley for restoration to GVN control, resettlement of refugees and construction of a CIDG camp. Friendly casualties were minor whereas the VC suffered heavy losses. As a result of heavy VC attacks in the Bong Son/Phu Cu area (Binh Dinh Province) 1st Air Cav was alerted to provide an Artillery Task Force and a reinforced Infantry Battalion TF to support ARVN Operation Than Phoc 6 (destruction of

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elements of 18th PAVN Regt). Because of a vicious attack on 19 Oct against Plei Me CING Camp (Pleiku Province) only the Artillery Task Force was committed Operation Thang Phong 6, the other elements were deployed to Pleiku. Subsequently, 1st Bde was moved to vicinity of Plei Me, with the mission of establishing a large area of operations to find, fix and destroy VC/PAVN forces threatening that area.

After deployment of 1st Brigade to Pleiku Province (Operation Long Reach), an area of operation was established which extended from Plei Me CING Camp to RVN/Cambodian Border. This area included the Chu Pong Secret Base Area. Initially, operations were limited to mop-up actions in the vicinity of the relieved camp. The first significant action occurred on 1 Nov, when 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry assaulted a heavily defended VC hospital area, killing 50 VC, capturing 21, and destroying a field hospital. On 3 Nov, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry liberated a VC controlled village and evacuated 700 refugees. VC contact diminished to an occasional engagement with elements up to company size. Accordingly, the brigade continued search, destroy and reconnaissance operations to ferret out the larger VC and PAVN units. 3d Brigade relieved 1st Brigade on 9 Nov (Operation Silver Bayonet I); reconnaissance operations continued, contact remained sporadic. It was determined that the enemy forces that had been plaguing the area had withdrawn toward the Cambodian border and Chu Pong Secret Base Area. Impetus of operations was shifted west. On 14 Nov, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducted a heliborne assault and immediately became heavily engaged with VC forces counterattacking the Landing Zone. Elements of 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry were ordered to reinforce. Heavy contact was maintained until 16 Nov, when the enemy began to withdraw after having been beaten back by air, artillery and mortar fire. Initial reports from this action reflected a VC KIA body count of 259. During this action the VC used human wave assault tactics and assault fire against US automatic weapons positions. Fighting again diminished to an occasional engagement with a VC company. On 15 Nov, the first of 15 immediate strikes were flown in support of ground operations against 15 targets by B-52 aircraft. A total of 90 sorties were flown. 2d Brigade assumed responsibility for operations on 20 Nov (Operation Silver Bayonet II), and continued pursuit of an infuriated but broken enemy. Extraction of friendly forces commenced 26 Nov with the last elements redeploying on 28 Nov. These operations established contact with elements of 66th Regiment, 101st Regiment and 250(B) Regiment, believed to be elements of the 304th and 325th PAVN Divisions. Results: US 240 KIA, 529 MIA (total), 10 KIA; VC 1506 KIA

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(body count), 2926 KIA/MIA (est) and 136 Viet Cong Captured. The low number of VC captives indicates the determination, aggressiveness, discipline and high morale of PAVN forces. Concurrently, operations continued in An Khe Base Area, Song Con River Valley (Happy Valley) and in support of ARVN operations vicinity Tuy Hoa. On 14 Nov, elements of 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry captured 14,000 pounds of rice in the vicinity of Song Phu Phong River Valley. Elements of the division assured unopposed deployment of the Cavalry Regiment, Capital BOK Infantry Division into its base area and TAOR vicinity of Binh Khe.

In Dec and following a two week rehabilitation period, 1st Air Cavalry Division conducted nine battalion and multi-battalion size operations within TAOR. These highly successful search and destroy operations were directed against VC forces that had been threatening the division's base area and opposing refugee resettlement of hamlets within Son Con River Valley (Happy Valley). In the Pleiku area, the division committed an infantry battalion task force and one battalion of heavy artillery to provide additional security for key GVN/US installations, long range fire support for RVN forces, and security of arrival airfields and assembly areas for in-country deployment of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Elements of the 9th Cavalry provided continuous reconnaissance and surveillance along the Cambodian and Laotian borders in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces from Chu Pong Mountain in the south to the I Corps boundary in the north.

b. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div: On 1 Oct 65, after termination of Operation Highland (deployment of 1st Air Cav Div), the brigade commenced Operation Sayonara (Operation Good Friend II). OPLAN 8-65 (Good Friend II) was published on 13 Sep 65 assigning FForceV units the mission of conducting operations in coordination with 22d ARVN Div in the Binh Khe - Qui Nhon area to permit the unopposed deployment and combat configuration of the BOK Capitol Div (-) scheduled to arrive in early Oct. The proposed TAOR for the BOK Cap Div was divided into four (4) areas. An area each was assigned to the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 1st Air Cav Div, 2d Bn, 7th Mar and 22d ARVN Div with instructions to conduct independent but coordinated operations in order to clear and secure these areas for the initial deployment of the BOK Div. Upon assumption of responsibilities by the CG BOK Cap Div for their TAOR, US Forces would redeploy as directed by FForceV. This OPLAN also provided for Joint/Combined search and destroy operations on the Qui Nhon peninsula, but this was later rescinded upon receiving information from MACV that an Air Base programmed for construction on this peninsula was changed to another location. This OPLAN became OPORD 8-65 on 1 Oct 65.

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Employing infiltration tactics to develop intelligence, the brigade conducted numerous company and battalion (minus) search and destroy and clear operations in VC dominated areas to the West, Northwest and North of Qui Nhon. Many VC infested villages were liberated and returned to GVN control. Areas in the Song Con, Song Binh Hoa and Song Dap River Valleys were resettled, VC infrastructures were disorganized and the Korean Capital Infantry Division deployed without incident. Concurrently, 2d Bn, 502d Abn Inf provided security for brigade's base area and TAOR vicinity Cam Linh Peninsula/Dong Ba Thin and assisted the advance party, 2d Korean Marine Brigade prepare for reception of the main body (Operation Good Friend I). 2d Korean Marine Brigade deployed unopposed and assumed responsibility for its TAOR on 19 Oct. 2d Bn 502d Inf redeployed to a new base area Southwest of Nha Trang.

Brigade terminated Operation Sayonara (Operation Good Friend II), effective with assumption of responsibility for TAOR by Capital ROK Infantry Division on 13 Nov. The brigade conducted one significant operation (2d Battalion, 327th Airborne Infantry) in An Nhon District during which 200 tons of rice were captured and evacuated. On 14 Oct 65 OPLAN 11-65 (Operation Bald Eagle) was published and disseminated. This plan provided for the redeployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to a new cantonment area just south of Nha Trang (Soui Tan). Initially, one battalion TF and the brigade trains were to move from the Cam Linh Peninsula area by truck and prepare the area for reception of the brigade (-). On or about 10 Nov 65 the Brigade (-) was to redeploy from the Qui Nhon area to Cam Ranh Bay by ship and then by truck to the new cantonment area. Once the brigade was established in the new area they were to conduct operations to contribute to the security of the US Army Support Command, Nha Trang complex. On 17 Oct a message was dispatched making OPLAN 11-65 and OPCODE, effective 19 Oct 65 with the operation to commence on 20 Oct 65. The first phase of the operation went as scheduled.

During the second phase a message from COMUSMACV changed the final brigade destination to Phan Rang. On 19 Nov, Brigade (-) commenced deployment by sea lift to new base area vicinity Phan Rang, closing 17 Nov. Brigade conducted search and destroy operations within TAOR to provide security for base area, security for a new airfield being constructed, prepared defensive positions, conducted parachute proficiency jumps and prepared for operations vicinity of Pha Thiet (Operation Monroe).

The brigade was alerted on the evening of 28 Nov for deployment

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to Bien Hoa, by air, to support operations vicinity Tuy Ninh. Upon the closure of the brigade elements, 1st Bn, 327th Inf, 2d Bn, 502d Inf, 2d Bn, 320th Arty and an Australian Artillery Battery in the Bien Hoa area, operational control passed to the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. These elements remained in the Bien Hoa area and conducted offensive operations southwest of Michelin Plantation until 22 Dec at which time all elements closed by air back into the Phan Rang TAOR. During December, elements in the brigade's rear at Phan Rang conducted small unit search and destroy operations, patrols and ambushes within the TAOR and provided security for the base area and to insure unopposed construction of the tactical airfield in that area.

c. 2d Bn, 7th Marines: On 1 October the battalion undertook search and destroy operations in upper Van Canh Valley in support of Operation Good Friend II, and in addition, provided security for US Army Support Command Qui Nhon complex. The aggressive operations, though limited in size, removed VC influence and control in the upper Van Canh Valley, permitted resettlement by refugees and secured the base area for deployment of Korean ROK Cap Div. As added assistance the battalion permitted selected ROKA officers and NCOs of ROK Capitol Division to accompany USMC reconnaissance and ambush patrols to obtain first hand experience in counterinsurgency warfare. During Operation Bunker Hill, 9-24 Oct, Company H, later replaced by Company G, was placed under operational control of 2d Bn, 327th Abn Inf.

The battalion provided effective security for deployment of Capitol ROK Infantry Division and TAOR until relieved of these responsibilities on 3 Nov. Battalion prepared for embarkation, and return to operational control III Marine Amphibious Force. Passage of operational control occurred at 071200H Nov.

d. ROK Marine Brigade: The brigade began arriving on 25 Sep and became fully operational on 19 Oct when it assumed responsibility for the Cam Linh Peninsula/Dong Ba Thin TAOR. The brigade deployed a battalion sized task force to Phan Rang on 2 Oct to provide security for airfield construction. This battalion maintained security of the Phan Rang TAOR until 5 Nov when it was relieved by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The Brigade (-) conducted Operation Lightning northwest of Nha Trang with the 1st and 3d Battalions. Brigade (-) prepared for Operation Jefferson. OPLAN 12-65 (OPLAN Jefferson), published on 18 Nov, assigned the 2d ROK Mar Bde the mission of attacking a suspected VC base area just south of Tuy Hoa, and to conduct search and destroy operations north of Tuy Hoa prior to D-Day by elements of the 22d ARVN

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Div to allow for the deployment of the 2d ROK Mar Bde by sea and air lift to the Tuy Hoa area. On D-Day two battalions each from the 22d ARVN Div and the 2d ROK Mar Bde would launch a coordinated attack to seize initial objectives. Simultaneously a RF/CIDG force would occupy blocking positions to secure the east flank and prevent the enemy from escaping north along the coast. Once the initial objectives had been secured the 2d ROK Mar Bde (-) would conduct search and destroy operations in a pre-designated area. Following this phase of the operations the 2d ROK Mar Bde would deploy by sea lift back to their base area. This OPLAN became OPOD 12-65 effective 21 Nov 65 with D-Day established as 26 Nov 65.

Due to adverse sea and weather conditions which prevented movement of the elements of the brigade to Tuy Hoa this operation was postponed and placed on a standby basis pending improvement of weather and sea conditions. On 18 Dec, one battalion of the brigade moved by air to Tuy Hoa. On 21 Dec, this battalion in coordination with ARVN units conducted search and destroy operations north and northwest of Tuy Hoa (Operation Big Chief I). On 24 Dec, another battalion and the brigade CP arrived by air at Tuy Hoa, and made preparations for Operation Jefferson, scheduled to begin 1 Jan 66. In the Cam Linh Peninsula/Dong Ba Thin base area the brigade provided continuous security for Dong Ba Thin/Cam Linh Peninsula base area, National Highway 1, National Railroad (within TAOR), US Army Support Command (Cam Ranh) and close-in security against VC infiltration and sabotage for Cam Ranh Air Force Base. The brigade completed two very successful search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Nha Trang. Platoon and squad size patrols and ambushes were conducted along National Highway 1 and National Railway north, west and south of Nha Trang. The lack of VC initiated incidents against the railroad in this critical area, during the entire month, can be attributed to the efforts of this brigade.

e. Capital ROK Infantry Division: This division began arriving on 28 Sep and assumed complete responsibility for its TAOR in Qui Nhon area on 15 Nov.

During Nov, units of the division conducted limited search and destroy operations, patrols and ambushes within sector to provide security for base area, Route 1 and 19, and US Army Support Command Qui Nhon complex. The Division conducted one battalion (-) search and destroy operation and provided one battalion (-) to secure the An Khe Pass area so that 1st Air Cavalry Division forces could be released for operations vicinity Plei Me CIDG Camp. Through out the period the Division provided artillery support and assured GVN control within TAOR.

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Capitol MOK Infantry Division provided effective security for its base area, US Army Support Command (Qui Nhon), Highways 1 and 19 and other key GVN/US installations in the vicinity of Qui Nhon-Binh Khe. The division conducted several highly successful battalion size search and destroy operations to relieve VC pressure against RF/PF outposts and units within TACR. One of these operations was a coordinated effort with elements of 1st Air Cavalry Division, northwest of Binh Khe district headquarters.

f. 3d Brigade, 25th Division: OPLAN 17-65 (Operation Blue Light) was published on 21 Dec 65 for the purpose of securing the in-country arrival of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and to prepare the brigade for subsequent commitment in counterinsurgency operations within RVN. The concept of opns called for the arrival of the unit through multiple off load air bases vic new Pleiku airfield and movement to a designated assemble area. At a later date, one Inf Bn, plus certain heavy equipment would arrive by ship at Cam Ranh Bay for subsequent airlift to Pleiku. Additional heavy equipment would arrive at Qui Nhon by sea and move by land LOC to join the brigade vic Pleiku. Until the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div becomes operational, security will be provided by US and ARVN forces. This plan became OPORD 17-65 for execution on 22 Dec with a D-Day of 28 Dec 65. By the end of the quarter advance elements of the brigade had arrived and had begun to establish the base area in the vicinity of Pleiku.

g. Psychological Warfare:

(1) Psychological Operations: Psychological operations conducted by units under the OPCON of this headquarters included both tactical and consolidation efforts with emphasis being placed on the former. Themes that have been used to date are:

- (a) Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program.
- (b) Stressing the overwhelming strength of ARVN and FwMAF troops.
- (c) The marginal and less than marginal conditions under which the Viet Cong are now forced to exist. (Of these themes, intelligence has indicated that this is potentially the most profitable for exploitation in the near future.)
- (d) Quick Reaction Leaflet: This form of propaganda media is most effective demanding complete and timely exploitation of

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psychological opportunities. Leaflets of this type were produced capitalizing on timely intelligence which identified the 101st B PAVN Regiment at Plei Me (Incl 6).

(e) Korean Leaflet: The ROK presence in Vietnam has far reaching ramifications. "An Asian nation that has defeated Communism on the battle field helping another Asian nation against communist aggression", is a profitable theme. The intuitive Korean understanding of the Oriental "face" has also been exploited by a direct challenge to the Viet Cong to stand and fight (Incl 7).

(f) "Fire Dragon": (See para 3i) "Fire Dragon" is a combined USAF/US Army operation exploiting quick response surveillance with aerial read out, followed by napalm air strikes and using PsyOps to send the message home through its shock effect on the enemy. Being a combined Psy Ops Tactical effort, "Fire Dragon" creates uncertainty and fear within the VC/PAVN ranks. (Incl 8)

(2) Operations Supported: During the period, the 24th and 25th Psy Ops Detachments operated Propaganda Support Centers at Nha Trang and Pleiku.

(a) The Propaganda Support Center in Nha Trang supported the following operations:

1. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div in TAOR, Qui Nhon, and Phan Rang.

2. 1st Air Cav Div in TAOR, An Khe, Bong Son, Vinh Tanh, and Chu Pong.

3. Capital ROK Division in TAOR.

4. 2d ROK Marine Bde in TAOR and in plans and operations and in operations in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa.

5. Field Force Vietnam in plans and operations.

(b) The Propaganda Support Center in Pleiku supported the following operations:

1. 1st Air Cav Div at Plei Me and Chu Pong.

2. 2d ARVN Psy War Battalion in operations conducted

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by 22d Division (ARVN).

3. ROK 2d Marine Brigade in Tuy Hoa.

4. MACV Advisory System psychological operations.

(3) One major change in procedure was that of establishing a coordination center at Hq FForceV to consolidate all Psy Ops aircraft support within II CTZ.

h. Chemical Operations:

(1) Crop Destruction Operations. Chemical crop destruction was conducted in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Province during the reporting period (Incl 10). Results are as follows:

(a) Phu Yen: Six sorties flown with approximately 600 hectares of crops destroyed. 6-26 Oct 65.

(b) Binh Dinh: Twenty nine sorties were flown destroying approximately 2900 hectares of crops. Intense ground fire resulted in numerous hits on USAR C-123 spray aircraft. 20 Sep - 26 Oct 65.

(2) Defoliation Operations. Aerial defoliation by USAF C-123 aircraft was conducted in Binh Dinh and Pleiku Provinces on Highway 19 and the Duc Co Special Forces Camp. Numerous handspray missions were completed throughout II CTZ. Significant results of aerial spray missions are as follows: (Incl 9)

(a) Highway 19 (4 Sep - 16 Nov): Seven sorties were flown to defoliate the An Khe Pass and thirteen sorties were flown to defoliate the Mang Yang Pass. Observation in both passes has increased approximately 75%. (Incl 9)

(b) Duc Co SF Camp (Nov-Dec): Five sorties were flown to defoliate the perimeter of the camp to a distance of approximately one kilometer. Minor touch-up spraying is planned.

(c) During Jan-Feb 66, defoliation of several segments of National Highway 1 and National Railroad 1 in Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, and Khanh Hoa Provinces is planned.

(3) Riot Control Agents (RCA).

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(a) During the reporting period many requests for authority to employ RCA were received from OPCON units. On 15 Nov 65, COMUSMACV delegated approval authority for RCA to CG, FForceV subject to the following guidelines:

1. Area of operations contains tunnels, caves or other underground fortifications.

2. Use is contemplated in situation in which VC are intermingled with civilians and use of conventional munitions would result in an unacceptable level of non-combatant casualties.

(b) On 26 Dec 65 certain restrictions on use of RCA were lifted. Agents CS and CN may now be employed at discretion of CG, FForceV and all means of dissemination, to include E-159 Air-Dropped Multiple Source Cluster, may be used.

(c) "Mity Mite" Buffalo Turbine Blowers have been issued to all OPCON units and have been successfully used on several occasions with smoke and/or riot control agent CS. Many non-combatant civilians intermingled with VC in caves and underground fortifications, were taken alive through use of the Mity Mite.

(4) Equipment. Significant quantities of chemical items are becoming unserviceable through rapid deterioration. Upon arrival of Phase IIA units, to include a Chemical Maintenance Company, a Chemical Company (Direct Support), the equipment maintenance problems should be corrected.

1. G3 Air Operations:

(1) Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) for the ROK Capital Div and the ROK 2d Marine Bde became operational in Oct.

(2) There were eight hundred twenty-three (823) tactical air sorties flown in support of Field Force Vietnam operations. Two hundred fifteen (215) of those were flown in close air support for the 1st Air Cav Div operation "Silver Bayonet" (14-24 Nov) in the Plei Me Chu Prong area.

(3) The B52 bomber (ARC Light) was employed for the first time in direct support of a ground operation involving a FForceV OPCON unit. In Nov during operation "Silver Bayonet", ninety (90) B52 sorties

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were flown against 15 targets (para 3a) resulting in approximately 90 square kilometers within the area of operation being hit. Five preplanned targets (para 2) were struck with 30 sorties. Total B52 bomber sorties flown for the quarter was 120.

(4) During the quarter an air operation known as Fire Dragon was developed by Hq FForceV. Fire Dragon is a plan to provide a continual harassment to VC forces during the hours of darkness. The plan is in a 30 day test phase. The concept employs the following:

(a) A Mohawk Infra Red Aircraft will fly over a pre-selected target area - locates a target and mark the target immediately with a flare.

(b) A C-123 flare ship picks up target and provides necessary illumination for strike aircraft.

(c) Four to eight A-1E aircraft hit the target with Napalm and an C47 aircraft with Gatling (7.62mm) gun strafes the area.

(d) Psychological war aircraft follows with leaflet drop and loudspeaker announcements with theme to surrender. Four "Fire Dragon" missions were completed during Dec.

j. Aviation Operations: During the quarter the following aviation units were under the OPCON of Headquarters Field Force Vietnam:

52d Aviation Battalion with assigned units:

52d Airlift Platoon
119th Aviation Company (Airmobile)
155th Aviation Company (Airmobile)
219th Aviation Company (Airmobile)
145th Airlift Platoon

Operational control of the 145th Airlift Platoon passed to 5th Special Forces Group on 26 Dec 65.

The 10th Aviation Battalion arrived in Oct and became operational on 1 Dec 65. The battalion was delayed in becoming operational due to late arrival of ASL/PIL items. This battalion has following units assigned:

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117th Aviation Company (Airmobile)
129th Aviation Company (Airmobile)
48th Aviation Company (Airmobile)

The 161st and 170th Aviation Companies (Airmobile) arrived in Dec but were not operational as of the end of the quarter. These two companies will be assigned to 52d Aviation Battalion upon achieving operational status. The 161st will be located in Qui Nhon and the 170th at Pleiku.

One Marine helicopter unit, 363d HHM Squadron, is presently under OPCON of this headquarters.

Company A, 1st Aviation Battalion was redesignated the 155th Aviation Company (Airmobile) without change of personnel or equipment.

At the present there are not sufficient command and control (C&C) helicopters with consoles and radios in the aviation elements of FForceV to provide necessary communication for major commanders during combat operations. One C&C ship with radio console was on loan from III CTZ and further allocated to CO, 1/101st Abn Div. This aircraft has since been withdrawn and the support required has been accomplished with a helicopter not equipped with the radio console. This support did not prove adequate. This headquarters has requested Hq MACV furnish four command and control UH-1 helicopters equipped with command consoles be assigned to the 10th Aviation Battalion for further allocation by this headquarters as required. 52d Bn is preparing eight UH-1 helicopters to accommodate either two PRC-10 or two PRC-25 radios, or a combination of the two, for use as airborne command posts. Radios would be furnished from organic resources of the using unit. When these aircraft are modified sufficient command and control helicopters should be available to units in II CTZ.

Due to operational requirements during the months of Oct and Nov 65 the 1st Air Cav Div overflow the DA program for CV-2s and CH-47s. This situation will continue to exist as long as maximum aviation resources are committed. The 1st Air Cav Div requested consideration be given to raising the flying hour program for CV-2s, UH-1 B&Ds and CH-47s in RVN. Since the 1st Air Cav Div is designed to execute combat operations utilizing aerial vehicles as the primary means of transportation, and aerial mobility is of prime importance in the counterinsurgency effort in RVN, this headquarters concurred in the 1st Air Cavalry Division's request. Action was initiated by this headquarters recommending the DA program be increased as requested and

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a comparable adjustment be made in the procurement of aircraft parts. CG, USARV informed this hqs that the RVN Flying Hour Program would remain as stated and must be considered as a limiting factor for operations.

k. Training: The Viet Cong have utilized a great number of mines and booby traps. Because of this, units under OPCON of this headquarters desired as much information as possible on this subject. Quotas for qualified engineers from 1st Air Cav Div and 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div were obtained on 1 Oct to attend the III Marine Division's Mine and Booby Trap School. Upon completing this course, personnel returned to their units and have organized courses of instruction for their own units.

On 5 Oct 65, the In-country Training Team (ICOT) previously assembled to instruct the 1st Air Cavalry Division was reorganized. The team updated their "Pre-Combat Training Program" so it could be presented to the newly arrived ROK personnel. During the period, 17-23 Oct 65, the ICOT presented instruction to 1700 members of the 2d ROK Marine Bde. During the period 27-30 Oct 65, the team shifted to the Qui Nhon area where it presented its instruction to 1200 members of the ROK Capital Infantry Div (-).

On 25 Oct, the 117th Avn Co, at Field Force Vietnam direction, conducted a 7 day course of instruction consisting of orientation, familiarization flight and a tactical exercise for the ROK Marine Bde.

On 2 Nov, the In-country Training Team was again assembled and prepared to return to the ROK Capital Infantry Division so as to complete the Pre-Combat Orientation of the Division. During the period 6-8 Nov the team conducted training for 335 members of the 1st Cav Regt of the Capital Division. Upon completion of this training the team then returned to Nha Trang where it was dissolved.

On 26 Dec the In-country Training Team was again reorganized and prepared for the Pre-Combat Orientation of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. By 31 Dec the team made up of company grade officers and non-commissioned officers from the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was prepared to begin orientation on 3 Jan 66.

1. Doctrine: On 15 Oct 65, MACV message number 36310 (Incl 10), Hq FForceV was given responsibility for the development of recommendations of Doctrine as it relates to US Army combat units operating in South Vietnam. In order to comply with this mission this head-

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quarters, on 31 Oct 65 requested an augmentation to its Doctrine section. Due to the time involved in receiving approval for this increased augmentation, it was necessary to request personnel from in-country units be placed on TDY to this headquarters so that work in this area could commence immediately.

On 25 Oct 65, an Aircraft Planning Data Card (Incl 11) was published in order to give commanders and staff officers a guide when planning use of Army aircraft.

On 5 Nov 65, the first of the TDY Doctrinal Personnel arrived and by 10 Nov all personnel had reported in.

The first project undertaken was compilation and analysis of "Lessons Learned" from all documents available in this headquarters.

On 24 Nov 65, this headquarters was given the mission to review, update and rewrite as necessary a draft "Handbook for US Forces" which will be published by MACV in January 66. The book was updated and rewritten to include experiences of US Forces and was circulated for concurrences from all major US units in Vietnam. The final draft of the hand book was forwarded on 15 Dec to MACV for approval and publication.

On 28 Nov, in keeping with a desire of the units under OPCON of this headquarters to have the latest information on VC Mines and Booby Traps, a document was published showing the different types of VC mines and techniques of their use (Incl 12). At the same time information was compiled and published on the subject of VC Tunnels and Fortifications (Incl 13).

On 17 Dec this headquarters published a list of "Tactical Tips" (Incl 14) which provided commanders and staff with a list of basic fundamentals of tactical doctrine. These tactical tips were furnished to all major units under OPCON of this headquarters and to major ARVN units.

On 31 Dec, in keeping with MACV policy, an after action critique on the Plei Me and Chu Pong action was held at Pleiku. Representatives of all major units under OPCON of this headquarters and major ARVN units in II Corps Tactical Zone attended.

Plans were developed to establish a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) for operation Jefferson. MACV Directive Number 525-6

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(Incl 15) requires that a CSCC be organized for all ARVN regimental size or larger operations to insure that all combat support elements are coordinated.

m. Signal Operations: The 54th Signal Battalion, which is assigned to provide communications support to Headquarters, FForceV, and between Headquarters FForceV and major subordinate units, closed Nha Trang and became operational on 15 Oct.

The Signal Section during the report period was concerned with the following:

(1) Maximum emphasis has been placed on upgrading command and control communications. Progress has been made in improving the austere command control communications available in that additional circuits have been allocated to this headquarters in the in-country system. Additional circuits to the Saigon and Qui Nhon areas are badly needed but sufficient circuits have not been allocated to date. Secure radio teletype (RATT) has been provided to all major subordinates and VHF communications to two of these units by the 54th Signal Battalion. Additionally, 54th Signal Battalion aircraft fly twice-daily courier runs to major subordinate units.

(2) Planning mid-range and long range tactical communications for FForceV. Considerable progress has been made in this area. At a meeting held at Headquarters, MACV, on 1 Nov 65, at which this headquarters was represented, the following improvements were developed:

(a) Radio Relay frequency assignment was delegated to Headquarters USARV and request time reduced to a one or two day lead time.

(b) Authority to assign FM frequencies directly on a noninterference has been given to this headquarters.

One problem that arose during the period is that much of the TO&E equipment of the Corps Signal Battalion TO&E 11-15 as well as that of infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored division signal battalions, TO&E 11-35E, can not be moved over jungle terrain and interdicted roads. It is necessary, due to terrain, base camp protection factors, limited maneuver room in many cases, and nature and size of enemy units, to conduct separate or individual brigade operations. This results in an increased number of smaller ~~communications~~

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tions support requirements.

There is no satisfactory means of solving this problem at the level of this headquarters. Attempts to borrow lightweight and $\frac{1}{2}$ ton configured equipment have met with limited success. This is not a lasting or adequate solution. The 54th Signal Battalion is preparing a request for equipment in excess of authorized allowance for $\frac{1}{2}$ ton mounted single side band AN/MRC-95 radios to augment RATT capabilities and $\frac{1}{2}$ ton configured HF radio terminal set AN/MRC-111 and AN/MRC-112.

Another problem which developed during the period is due to inadequate communication equipment in the ROK units. It has been difficult and sometimes impossible to conduct operations with adequate communications support. In some instances the 54th Signal Battalion has had to provide communications equipment down to battalion level in the ROK 2d Marine Brigade.

In order to solve this problem, additional equipment has been requested and some radios have been received by ROK units.

n. Artillery: Upon arrival, the artillery section, made up of men and officers from HHB XXX Corps Artillery, was reorganized to perform the following missions.

(1) Provide a Fire Support Coordination Element for the Tactical Operations Center.

(2) Supervise the administrative and logistical activities of attached units.

(3) Supervise the fire planning and tactical employment of attached units.

The great distance between commands and the large area assigned to each of them makes control of non-divisional artillery extremely difficult. In order to solve this problem, most of the non-divisional artillery units have been attached to the major subordinate combat commands. The disadvantage to this solution is the increased response time required for this headquarters to employ artillery which has been further attached to subordinate commands.

The high ordinates and extreme ranges of heavy artillery units in FFerocv and the necessity to fire all four quadrants together with large number of aircraft operating in the area poses a problem of

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airspace control. The problem has been solved by disseminating artillery data by means of NOTAM's (Notice to Airman) through Air Force and Army aviation channels to warn all military and civilian aircraft that may be in or passing through the danger area.

There are insufficient Army aviation assets available to meet artillery aircraft requirements for observation reconnaissance, command and control and adjustment of fires. Priorities are being set on the use of current assets and an additional aviation unit has been requested for artillery support to minimize this problem.

4. (U) Logistical Activities:

a. General. G4 developed and monitored logistical plans in support of operations described in para 3. Frequent visits to each OPCON unit were found to be especially beneficial. In addition, permanent G4 representation at points of entry of newly arriving units was also established. Maximum utilization of liaison officers from 1st Log Command and OPCON units proved advantageous in disseminating, coordinating, and expediting actions caused by changes to existing plans.

b. Specific projects accomplished during the period included:

(1) Gathering, updating, consolidating, and disseminating trafficability information on Routes 1, 14, 19, and 21 in the zone of operations.

(2) Coordinating recommendations to upgrade the Phan Rang and Cheo Reo airfields to provide a C-130 capability.

(3) Consolidating and disseminating information pertaining to the location of friendly mine fields throughout II CTZ.

(4) Compiling and monitoring data on maintenance and repair parts for aircraft and non-standard engineer equipment.

(5) Conducting a study of the equipment of the ROK Capital Infantry Division and ROK Marine Brigade in relation to similar US units to determine their capability for fighting more effectively in the combat environment of Vietnam.

c. Problems encountered during the reporting period included:

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(1) The difficulty of resupplying the 1st Air Cav Div with aviation fuel while employing a brigade-size force during the Plei Me Operation. Such a force requires 50,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel daily, necessitating the use of a major portion of in-country USAF airlift when land LOC's were not available. Use of 500-gallon collapsible drums delivered by C-130 aircraft on a 24-hour basis was employed. Even at this rate adequate reserves could not be built up in the objective area until operations decreased in intensity. Use of C-130 aircraft converted to tankers, in conjunction with portable 10,000-gallon storage tanks, should facilitate stockage during future operations.

(2) During Nov, Operation Jefferson in the Tuy Hoa area had to be postponed due to the inability to land forces by sea in the objective area. A combination of high winds and a variable and unpredictable current caused the first LST to broach on the beach, even though a beach survey had been conducted immediately prior to the operation. Amphibious operations during the northeast monsoon season are risky at best. Subsequent preparation for the operation in late Dec was accomplished solely by air lift. Logistic support was complicated by the requirement to furnish ROK, ARVN and American forces with supplies from two widely separated support areas, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon, utilizing both US and ARVN supply channels.

(3) During the reporting period, the incidence of malaria among tactical units reached serious proportions. Cumulative totals in the 1st Air Cav Div were 1070; ROK Marine Brigade, 147; 1/101st Abn Div, 379; and ROK Capital Div, 81; total - 1677. Approximately 14% of the cases are being returned to duty after convalescence of six to eight weeks.

(4) Critical items in short supply throughout the reporting period included:

- Cots
- Water trailers for ROK forces
- Jungle boots and fatigues
- Tentage, GP
- Demolition and pyrotechnic ammunition
- Engineer RMU supplies
- Refrigeration for mess halls
- Material handling equip, particularly rough terrain fork lifts.
- Repair parts for aircraft and non-standard engineer equipment
- TA 50-901 items

Availability of most items is showing gradual improvement. Implementation of the Red Ball Express during Dec, an expedited requisitioning and delivery service direct from CONUS, has already produced significant results. Deadline rates of aircraft, generators, trucks, and heavy engineer equipment have shown a downward trend.

(5) Available in-country transportation assets continue to be limited. Insufficient land, sea, and air transportation to clear port areas and simultaneously move tactical units has resulted. The situation has been aggravated by the lack of operational materials handling equipment to quickly load and unload the limited transportation means.

5. (U) Civil Affairs (G5) Activities: During the period the G5 Section of FForceV continued to coordinate civil actions in the Nha Trang area and coordinated the civil affairs section of subordinate units. The section prepared to receive an incoming civil affairs company in Dec.

a. Increased efforts of the part of United States Overseas Mission is resulting in improved support for civic action efforts. Many units are faced with local problems of security and social problems which include poor sanitary conditions and widespread prostitution in adjacent communities. Units are being encouraged to work with Vietnamese authorities in order to control the population and improve sanitary conditions. Numerous request from units under operational control of this headquarters for civic action funds and civil affairs personnel augmentation have been forwarded to higher headquarters for action.

b. Units under the control of Field Force Vietnam have inaugurated broad civic action programs in order to lessen the possibility of discontent among Vietnamese civilians due to US troops presence and to convince the Vietnamese that their interests lie with the GVN and its supporters. These civic action efforts range from the teaching of English by units with limited civic action capability to assistance in the feeding, clothing and medical treatment of destitute civilians and assistance in the resettlement of large numbers of refugees. VN personnel are included in the civic action activities whenever practicable. Results are revealed in the form of an increasing flow of information from the population. As mentioned in the last report the problem preventing the implementation of a more successful program is the lack of availability of USOM programmed supplies, particularly medicine, for US unit civic action efforts. This results from the fact that

USOM supplies become the property of the GVN on arrival in-country.

c. A letter, Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance, (Incl 16) was published on 22 Oct to cover an existing gap in information available to personnel operating in the civil affairs field. Since civil military relationships are sensitive ones and must be constantly under observation to avoid unpleasant results, a bulletin (Incl 17) was published as a follow-up to the letter. The bulletin provided up to date guidance and disseminates ideas which are helpful in unit civil affairs programs.

d. The 41st Civil Affairs Company arrived on 26 Dec and was briefed during the following week by representatives of MACV Civil Affairs Section, FForceV G5 Section, FForceV In-Country Orientation Team and United States Overseas Mission in Nha Trang. Plans are to use the company to assist and advise units under OPCON of FForceV, III MAF and 1st Inf Div in control, in care and disposition of combat generated refugees. When not actively participating in combat operations elements of the company will be attached to MACV Sector Advisors to assist in area refugee operations.

6. (U) Personnel and administrative activities:

a. GI activities:

(1) During this quarter the personnel strength of all FForceV assigned units remained satisfactory except for the 272d MP Company. The 272d MP Company experienced numerous programmed and unprogrammed losses that reduced its effective strength to 77 percent. Request was made to Hq, USARV, to select qualified personnel from the replacement stream for training by the 272d MP Company. This request was accepted and immediate fill action was taken. At the end of the quarter, the 272d MP Company was at an effective strength of 88 percent. Major OPCON units: 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and 52d Aviation Battalion all experienced tremendous personnel turmoil during this quarter. Battle, other unprogrammed and programmed losses reduced these units to less than 80 percent effective strength during month of Nov and 1st half of Dec. Emergency requests to USARV to fill these units was met with immediate action and by the end of the quarter all units were at 95 percent or better assigned and effective strength. However, these replacements arrived in-country without adequate field gear and individual weapons. This headquarters recommended to USARV that (1) replacements be equipped

upon arrival of 90th Replacement Battalion or (2) bring equipment and weapons from CONUS. USARV advised that (1) 90th Replacement Battalion did not have capability to equip personnel (2) a message was forwarded to Department of the Army recommending individuals carry all field equipment and weapon upon departure from CONUS.

(2) General Order 322, (Incl 18) Hq, USARPAC, dated 12 Nov 65, activated Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam, effective 15 Nov 65, and discontinued Task Force Alfa. Authorized strength for Hq, FForceV, is 114 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 149 enlisted men - total 265. Following additional functions were given to the headquarters: Tactical evaluations, operating unit personnel section for approximately 750 assigned and attached personnel, increase in supply and transportation activities. A modified TO&E was prepared requesting an additional 37 personnel spaces: 18 officers and 19 enlisted, to perform the aforementioned functions.

(3) Replacements, hospital returnees, R&R personnel processing through Nha Trang did not have a central location to obtain billets, mess or onward transportation to final destination. This headquarters recommended to USARV that a replacement unit be assigned to the Nha Trang Support Command. On 28 Nov 65, the 526th AG Replacement Company was assigned and joined the Nha Trang Support Command.

(4) The 41st Civil Affairs Company arrived in-country on 26 Dec 65, and was placed under OPCON of this headquarters. This unit is not administratively self-sufficient and no prior action had been taken to attach the unit to a unit having an administrative capability. This headquarters requested USARV take immediate action to have the unit attached to an appropriate unit. This request was immediately reacted to and the unit was attached to Nha Trang Support Command for administration and logistics.

(5) The advanced planning group from 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div arrived in-country during Dec 65. The S1 of the Brigade was given an orientation and furnished appropriate MACV, USARV, and FForceV regulations. The S1 and a representative from FForceV G1, made a liaison visit to the Qui Nhon Support Command to establish personnel services requirements and finance support.

(6) The Bob Hope Christmas Show played in Nha Trang and Cam Ranh during Dec. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div requested assistance to obtain transportation for 800 troops to see the show. In coordination with G4 Transportation Officer, vehicle and air transportation

was obtained for 600 and 200 men to Cam Ranh and Nha Trang respectively.

(7) This headquarters obtained authority to hire an additional 30 aid-in-kind civilian employees for a total authorization end of quarter of 80. A total of 17 Vietnamese Nationals had been employed on 1 Oct 65, and 47 on 31 Dec 65.

(8) Personnel strengths of assigned and OPCON units is reflected on Inclosure 19.

(9) Layout of Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam is shown in photograph, Inclosure 20.

b. Chaplain activities:

(1) Chaplain Fund: Since the 15th of Nov 65, chapel offerings are received at regular Sunday services and are deposited through the Consolidated Chaplains' Fund of Nha Trang with the Bank of America, San Francisco, Calif, for use in support of the FForceV religious program as well as missionary activities and orphanages in Vietnam.

(2) Staff visits: Staff chaplains made a total of ninety-seven (97) flights to visit with chaplains and troops assigned or attached to this headquarters. Included in the itinerary were visits to the ROK Inf Div and the ROK Marine Bde.

(3) Religious services: In addition to conducting regular Sunday and Sabbath services for FForceV personnel in the Nha Trang area, the Staff Chaplains provided religious coverage on request for units without assigned chaplains as follows: Twenty-two (22) Catholic Masses (at Tuy Hoa, Island Hon Mot, Soui Dau - Rubber Plantation, Phan Rang, Dong Ba Thin, IST's in Nha Trang Bay, and Duc My); eight (8) Protestant Worship services at (Island Hon Mot, Dong Ba Thin, Soui Dau - Rubber Plantation, and Tuy Hoa); and twenty-four (24) Jewish Sabbath services at (Pleiku, An Khe, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Phan Rang).

(4) Civic action:

(a) Protestant personnel donated contributions received in the chapel offering 1) for the erection of a guest shelter for refugees in the village of Quang Thinh (north of Nha Trang), 2) for the training of Vietnamese ministers at the Evangelical Bible School

of Nha Trang, and 3) for the purchase and distribution of Scriptures in the Vietnamese language. Other chaplains related to FForceV have been instrumental in giving truck loads of food and clothing to local orphanages. These materials were gifts of civilian churches in the United States.

(b) The Catholic personnel, through voluntary chapel offerings, donated 15,000 piasters to the Holy Family Church (Nha Trang area) for the completion of the unfinished parish church; 15,000 piasters to the Religious Community of St Joseph Brothers (Nha Trang area) for the training of candidates for the teaching profession; gave twelve (12) sizeable parcels of food, clothing, and toys (received from stateside families) to needy families, mostly refugees, residing in the Nha Trang area; and donated several boxes of candies and cookies to the Christian Brothers Junior High and the St Joseph Brothers School for use at their Christmas observance.

c. Provost Marshal Activities:

(1) By the end of the quarter the Provost Marshal Section established of active operation and coordination channels with OPCON and USARV military Police units in II CTZ to insure adequate military police support. These channels will facilitate the prompt solution of discipline, law and order problems for tactical and support commanders and advisors. Physical security surveys and inspections of facilities of the headquarters and its assigned units were conducted by the PM.

(2) Three problems arose during the quarter which should be noted. First, over a month elapsed between the time military police support was requested by the 1st Air Cav Div and the time support was received, due primarily to lack of clear understanding of who controlled the area military police. Second, billets for headquarters personnel were not adequately secured due to lack of guards and materials for implementing necessary physical security features. Last, the 147th CID was assigned and joined this headquarters on 5 Nov 65, although there was no need for this unit, since USARV could better employ the services of this unit it departed this command 8 Nov 65 for Hq, USARV.

(3) A unique operation for the PM Section started this quarter with the Nha Trang area Vietnamese National Police being given off duty English courses. Members of the PM and 272d MP Co give this instruction while classrooms, books and all other materials are furnished by United States Information Service (USIS).

d. AG Activities:

(1) The shortage of office supplies and equipment had a notable impact on the capability of the administrative services section in accomplishing its mission. Shortage of reproduction equipment and paper was of particular significance. Through use of imprest funds and procurement, a great deal of this shortage was relieved; however, resupply of reproduction paper is inadequate.

(2) Transportation of mail was discussed during liaison visits to USARV and with representatives of 8th Aerial Port authorities at Saigon. Increased effort to transport mail on additional aircraft to cope with troops increase and "Christmas mail rush" was satisfactory. Coordination was accomplished with assigned and OPCON units for planned equitable distribution of "Operation Starlite" parcels. Action was taken to re-route mail for the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div from Qui Nhon to Phan Rang.

(3) Awards and decorations processed and/or approved during this quarter were as follows:

DSC	1
Silver Star	1
Legion of Merit	None
DFC	None
Soldier's Medal	3
BSM "V"	2
BSM "M"	5
Air Medal "V"	2
Air Medal "M"	21
ACM "M"	2
Cert of Achievement	3
CIB	3

e. Judge Advocate Activities: Pursuant to a request submitted by FForceV to the Judge Advocate General of the Army on 2 Oct 65, the Secretary of the Army authorized this command to convene General Courts-Martials, effective 16 Nov 65.

In view of the large concentration of troops in the vicinity of Hq, FForceV, who do not have local Judge Advocates, a determination was made that this command would render complete legal services on

a geographical basis rather than on a command basis.

During this quarter no General Courts-Martial were tried by FForceV. Eight records of trial by Special Courts-Martial were received for review from commands under FForceV. There were no records of trial by Summary Courts-Martial or appeals from Article 15 punishment received from commands under FForceV.

Claims activities were limited to providing advice and assistance to local commands in the investigation of incidents involving members of the US Armed Forces and Vietnamese Nationals, which could result in Foreign Claims. During this quarter, seven (7) Claims Officer Reports and three (3) Foreign Claims in the total amount of 1,199,000\$VN were received. All reports and Foreign Claims received were forwarded to the Claims Judge Advocate, USMACV, who has the responsibility of settling all Foreign Claims arising in the Republic of Vietnam.

Legal assistance continued to consume a large amount of the time of Judge Advocate personnel. During this quarter 575 legal assistance cases were processed.

7. (U) IG Activities:

The Inspector General Section received and processed 24 complaints and request for assistance, advice, or information during the quarter. These pertained to mess conditions, inequitable and excessive duty, living conditions, promotions, pay and allowances, transfers, medical care, conduct of individuals, shipment of household goods, and unit funds. None of the complaints indicated any evidence of trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

Inquiries were made into the problem areas of the 54th Sig Bn and the 30th Hq Co during periods 18-20 and 27-30 Oct, respectively. The problem areas of the 54th Sig Bn pertained primarily to those inherent in the establishment of the Nha Trang Cantonment Area to include staffing, recreational facilities, health and comfort items, security, physical setup of the units, support, sanitation, labor, roads and drainage, rations, and transportation. The significant problems areas of the 30th Hq Co concerned assignment, duty details, maintenance forms, scheduling of aircraft, and shortage of equipment, components, repair parts, accessories, and special tools. The problems found to exist in these units have already been corrected or are in the process of being corrected.

Visitations for the purpose of coordinating inspector general activities and determining problem areas were made to 2d ROK Marine Bde, 2d Bn 502d Abn Inf, 1st Air Cav Div, Hq USARV, and Hq USMACV.

8. (U) Information Office Activities:

With increased US combat operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone, the information office concentrated its major efforts in assisting news media representatives in covering the war; filed daily war communiques with US Military Assistance Command Information Office on combat actions of OPCON units; reported the activities of Field Force Vietnam and the individual soldier through the hometown news release program; and rendered command information assistance commanders through preparation of troop topics.

In October, Field Force Vietnam Information Office assisted numerous news media representatives in the reporting of the first significant combat operation of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Soui La Thin valley. Similar assistance was given to press covering the landings of the ROK Marine Brigade, the ROK Capital Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. In Nov, the information office was the major channel of telephone communication for war communiques between the 1st Air Cav Div and US Military Assistance Command Information Office during the Flei Me campaign.

The section turned out 63 "hard" news releases, more than double the amount of the last quarter. One hundred sixty-three hometown releases were made on Field Force Vietnam personnel, and 27 feature stories were cleared for general release.

Five command information topics were produced and distributed.

SECTION II - COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) As pointed out in paragraph 3j, the 10th Aviation Battalion arrived in Vietnam on 28 Oct but did not become operational until 1 Dec due to the late arrival of ASI/PLL. Recommend units that are deployed from the US be shipped so that the complete ASI/PLL for the unit arrives at the same time as the major items of equipment.

2. (U) The ROK Capital Infantry Division and ROK 2d Marine Brigade arrived in Vietnam without adequate communications equipment (par 3 a (b)). Recommend Free World Military Assistance Forces to be deployed to Vietnam be surveyed for adequacy of equipment prior to deployment.

3. (U) The planning group for the 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division arrived on 21 Dec, the advance party on the 26th and the main body began arriving on 28 Dec. The short time interval between arrival of those increments of the brigade did not allow proper orientation of each group before the next one arrived. Recommend that major units on orders to Vietnam arrange for planning groups to complete a liaison visit with appropriate in-country headquarters as early as possible.

20 Incl

a'

Stanley R. Larsen

STANLEY R. LARSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

SECRET

AVC (14 Jan 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965,
Reports Control CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307 FEB 2 0 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-MH,
APO US Forces 96558

(U) Concur with the comments and recommendations of Field Force,
Vietnam. At MACV direction, USARV supplied 150 AN/PRC-10's to the ROK
Capital ("Tiger") Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Henry L. Denney

HENRY L. DENNEY
CWO USA
Asst Adj Gen

04-S-66- 504

00-00- 433

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HQ USARPAC
8-66- 1184

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GPOP-ME (14 Jan 66) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965
Reports Control CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96358

19 APR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Command Report of Field Force, Vietnam (FFV I) for the quarterly period ending 31 December 1965, is forwarded herewith. This is an outstanding, highly informative report, the value of which is considerably enhanced by the attachment of significant supporting documents.

2. (U) The following comments are keyed to the paragraphs in the basic Command Report:

a. Paragraph 4c(4), which contains a list of critical items in short supply in the RVN. These items have all been previously reported by MACV and/or USARV. Expedited action has been or is being taken through normal supply channels for those items for which sufficient information (requisition, number, FSN, quantity, etc.) is available.

b. Paragraph 4c(5). A number of actions have been taken, and are continuing, to provide additional truck and marine capabilities. Capacity is being expanded by increasing military equipment assets and through commercial leases and service contracts.

3. (C) In regard to intelligence portions of the Command Report (Paragraph 2, pp 2 - 7) the following comments are provided:

a. Production of technical intelligence is not normally performed at corps level, and transfer of such assets from FFV I to USARV should not adversely affect FFV I's intelligence effort.

b. The lack of a bilinguistic capability within FFV I is not expected to improve in the foreseeable future. Therefore, difficulties in exploiting enemy documents and captured personnel, as well as exchange of intelligence information with other FVN Forces, are expected to continue. However, improved procedures being instituted by MACV should provide better capabilities for all forces.

c. The Command Report (in the future, Operational Reports on Lessons Learned) could have been improved by inclusion of comments concerning area

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
2d Ind (C)

19 APR 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965
Reports Control CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

analysis intelligence and timeliness of weather information in support of FFV I tactical operations. Such inclusion will aid higher headquarters to assess, more adequately, all G2 functions of FFV I.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

36

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COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES FOR FFORCEV


	<u>KL</u>	<u>WL</u>	<u>ML</u>		<u>KL</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US	496	724	22	VC	2045	399
ROK	27	94	13			
TOTAL	523	818	35		2045	399

TOTAL LOSSES -- 1376

TOTAL LOSSES -- 2444

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-GC-PL

31 DEC 1965

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO US Forces 96490
Commanding General, Capital ROK Infantry Division, APO US Forces 96238
Commanding General, 2d ROK Marine Bde, APO US Forces 96312
Commanding Officer, 1st Bde 101st Abn Division, APO US Forces 96347

References: a. Maps: Indochina and Thailand, Series L509, 1:250,000. Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, NE 4816, NE 4913, NE 484, ND 488, NE 4818 ND 4816 ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 483, NC 484, NC 485, NC 486, NC 487.

b. FFORCEV Field SOP

Task Organization: 1st Air Cav Div	Maj Gen Kinnard
Cap ROK Inf Div (-)	Maj Gen Chae
2d ROK Mar Bde	Brig Gen Lee
1st Bde 101st Abn Div	Col Timothy

1. (S) Situation:

a. General. The United States, Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMF) and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) control the South China Sea, maintain air superiority in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), conduct air strikes against enemy targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) and are actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong (VC) and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units that are located in the Republic of Vietnam.

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PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

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31 DEC 1965

b. Definitions.

(1) Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). The term "Tactical Area of Responsibility" is used to define a land area for which responsibility is specifically assigned to a tactical commander for the purpose of controlling movement therein. In this area the responsible commander has the authority to conduct operations after local coordination with RVNAF officials, without first obtaining approval from this headquarters. Conversely, forces not under the control of the responsible commander must obtain his approval before they undertake operations within the area. Since TAORs will normally be large enough to allow the commander maximum flexibility and maneuver, an assigned TAOR will usually be larger than the unit can physically secure. Thus the TAOR is designed so as to place those enemy concentration areas, that immediately threaten the commander's base area, within his TAOR so that they can be engaged at the commander's discretion. It is not intended that TAORs be completely defended, but that they be dominated to a degree that prohibits unrestricted movement of enemy forces and accomplishes the commander's mission. The mission of the responsible commander should dictate the disposition of his forces and not the size of the area for which he is assigned tactical responsibility.

(2) Tactical Zone (TZ). The term "Tactical Zone" is used to describe areas, normally contiguous to the TAOR, which include VC bases and concentration areas regarded as a potential threat to the TAOR.

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

Commanders assigned Tactical Zones may conduct operations in their zones after coordination with appropriate RVNAF officials and after this headquarters has been notified.

(3) Area of Operations (AO). The term "Area of Operations" is used to define the area of a combat operation. Hence, an AO may or may not be within the TAOR or TZ.

(4) Free Fire Zone. The term "Free Fire Zone" is used to define an area established by mutual written agreement with GVN-RVNAF authorities to minimize immediate coordination requirements for artillery fires into the area. Artillery fires may be delivered into a Free Fire Zone without further coordination, except against targets in hamlets or villages occupied by noncombatants. A Free Fire Zone may be limited by time and space no-fire restrictions.

c. Enemy Forces. See current intelligence summaries (ESUMS).

d. Friendly Forces. See current situation reports (SITREPS).

2. (B) Mission: FFORCEV conducts military operations in II ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in support of and in coordination with III ARVN Corps, and in other areas of RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, in order to assist the GVN to defeat the VC and extend GVN control over all of Vietnam.

3. (S) Execution:

a. Concept of Operations. FFORCEV will be deployed in the II CTZ generally along the RVN coastline and inland along National Route 19

with major base areas at An Khe, Binh Khe, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh

and Phan Rang. FFORCEV will defend and secure these bases and will conduct

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

31 DEC 1965

search and destroy operations against more distant VC base areas in order to destroy and disrupt the VC operating in these areas. Clearing operations will be conducted in selected areas contiguous to major bases. FFORCEV will be prepared to conduct reserve/reaction or contingency operations in II CTZ or elsewhere in RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, to support the defense of critical bases, to reinforce the defense of population centers and to assist friendly forces in contact with the enemy. Selected portions of Highways 1 and 19 will be opened and secured to the degree necessary to insure continuous support of US and ROK military forces by land LOC.

b. Deployments.

- (1) HQ FFORCEV: Vic Nha Trang
- (2) 1st Air Cav Div: Vic An Khe
- (3) Capital ROK Inf Div (-): Vic Qui Nhon - Binh Khe
- (4) 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div: Vic Phan Rang
- (5) 2d ROK Mar Bde: Vic Cam Ranh Bay

c. Subordinate Commanders will:

- (1) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations against major VC forces and bases as directed by FFORCEV.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct reserve/reaction operations in accordance with established contingency plans and elsewhere in II CTZ of RVN as required, to assist in the defense or relief of critical bases

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

and selected population centers, and to assist friendly forces in contact.

(3) Be prepared to place one reinforced battalion in an alert posture, ready within six hours after receipt of initial deployment instructions from this headquarters, for deployment and subsequent commitment as either a FFORCEV or MACV reserve.

(4) Be prepared to open and secure selected LOCs.

(5) In coordination with II Corps Advisory teams assist insofar as possible in the training of and rendering support to Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PP).

d. 1st Air Cav Div will:

(1) Secure and defend US bases vic An Khe.

(2) Secure Route 19, within the division's assigned TAOR east of An Khe, to the extent necessary to permit continuous use of the route as a land LOC.

e. Capital ROK Inf Div will:

(1) Secure and defend US/FWMAF bases in and between Qui Nhon and Binh Khe.

(2) Secure Route 19 and Route 1 within assigned TAOR to the extent necessary to permit continuous use of the routes as land LOCs for logistic support of the 1st Air Cav Div and US/FWMAF units within the division's assigned TAOR.

f. 1st Bde 101st Abn Div will: Secure and defend US bases vic Phan Rang.

g. 2d ROK Mar Bde will:

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

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(1) Secure and defend US/FMAF bases VIC Dong Ba Thin/Can Linh Peninsula.

(2) When Bde has 2 Inf Bns deployed within Bde's TACR, secure route 1 within TACR between Dong Ba Thin and Nha Trang to extent necessary to permit continuous use of route as a land LOC. When Bde has two Bns deployed on operations outside of Bde's TACR, requirement for securing route 1 is limited to portion of route between Dong Ba Thin and road junction at BP 995380.

(3) In close coordination with Sector Advisor Khanh Hoa Sector and when forces are available, conduct frequent company size or larger operations to provide security to the Nha Trang complex.

h. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Maximum coordination will be effected between US/FMAF and II Corps Advisory teams prior to and during counterinsurgency operations within II CTZ.

(2) With due regard to security, close coordination will be established with Province and District Chiefs through US sector and subsector advisory personnel.

(3) Maximum use will be made of competent Vietnamese (VN) liaison personnel during operations to identify friendly military forces and to contact and identify civilians.

(4) Operations and all associated activities will be conducted so as to minimize noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property.

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(5) Maximum effort will be made to support the GVN and its effort to extend its control over the people and the land mass of the RVN. To this end, subordinate commands will emphasize civic action projects and psychological operations. USOM and JUSPAO representatives assigned to II Corps will be used to the maximum extent in planning for and executing these activities. Civic action projects and psychological operations will be coordinated with CG, II ARVN Corps, or his designated representatives.

(6) TAORs, TZs and AOs will be assigned by this headquarters after coordination with CG II Corps. Changes to these areas that are later desired by responsible commanders will be submitted to this headquarters after coordination with local Vietnamese officials.

(7) Artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes.

(a) In other than built up areas, artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes may be directed against VC forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, observed and unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, observers, or forward air controllers (FAC).

(b) Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in RVN against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by noncombatants are governed by the following criteria:

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (U)

1. All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.

2. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

3. Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(a) Procedures for obtaining naval gunfire support are contained in Annex H to FFORCEV Field SOP.

(d) Procedures for obtaining close air support are contained in Annex F to FFORCEV Field SOP.

(e) Coordinating procedures are contained in Annex C FFORCEV Field SOP.

(8) In the event of civil disturbance, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. FFORCEV units will take no action other than to defend themselves and their property.

(9) Psywar. Annex J, FFORCEV Field SOP.

(10) Intelligence. Annex E, FFORCEV SOP.

(11) Engineer. Annex C, FFORCEV SOP.

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

31 DEC 1965

(12) Civic Action. The following references apply: HQ, FFORCEV, Regulation 1-10, dtd 8 Sep 65; HQ, FFORCEV ltr AVF-GC, Subject: Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance, dtd 4 Oct 65, Subject: Concept of Military Civil Affairs and Civic Action in the RVN.

(13) Rural Construction: See Ltr HQ FFORCEV, Subj: Increased emphasis on Rural Construction, dtd 18 Dec 65.

(14) Army Aviation. Annex L, FFORCEV Field SOP.

(15) Tactical employment of forces. FFORCEV message cite 3500 from AVF-GC-TMG, 241131Z Dec 65; Subj: Tactical Employment of Forces, sets forth COMUSMACV guidance pertaining to tactics and techniques to be adopted by units under OPCON FFORCEV.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics.

a. Administration. Annex M, FFORCEV Field SOP.

b. Logistics.

(1) HQ USARV supports US Forces through 1st Logistical Command and its subordinate agencies. FMAF will be supported as provided by appropriate military working agreements.

(2) Logistical matters that cannot be resolved by normal support agencies will be referred to ACoFS, G4 this headquarters.

(3) Annex N, FFORCEV Field SOP.

5. (S) Command and Signal.

a. Signal.

(1) Annex D, FFORCEV Field SOP.

(2) Inclosure 1.

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b. Command.

(1) CG, FFORCEV exercises operational control over 1st Air Cav Div, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div, 3d Bde 25th Inf Div (Separate LOI issued), 10th Avn Bn, and II Corps Advisory Group. USARV exercises command, less operational control of 1st Air Cav Div, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde 25th Inf Div. 12th Avn Group exercises command, less operational control, of 10th Avn Bn. MACV exercises command, less operational control, of II Corps Advisory Group. HQ Btry XXX Corps Arty and attached Arty units are assigned to FFORCEV.

(2) CO, II Corps Advisory Group exercises operational control over Special Forces Operational Detachment C-2 (Pleiku), while CO 5th SF Gp exercises command, less operational control, of the Detachment. 52d Avn Bn is under operational control of CO II Corps Advisory Group. 12th Avn Gp exercises command, less operational control, of 52d Avn Bn.

(3) Command relationships between US and ROK Armed Forces will be as mutually agreed in appropriate US/FWMAF military working arrangement. CG, FFORCEV currently exercises OPCON over the 2d ROK Mar Bde while COMBROKMACV exercises command less OPCON over the Bde.

(4) Command relationship between CG, FFORCEV, and CG II ARVN Corps, is one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of both commands.

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31 DEC 1965

6. (U) Recisions:

a. Letter TFGC, HQ, USATFA, 31 Aug 65, Subj: Employment Instructions: 1st Air Cavalry Division (U).

b. Letter AVTFGC-PL, HQ USATFA, 22 Sep 65, Subj: Employment Instructions: RCK Capital Division (U).

c. Letter AVTFGC-PL, HQ, USATFA, 22 Sep 65, Subj: Employment Instructions: 2d RCK Marine Brigade (Prov) (U).

7. (U) Acknowledge receipt.

2 Incl

1 - Signal

2 - Distribution

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Maj Gen

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SIGNAL
COMMUNICATION SUPPORT

1. (U) Purpose: To delineate responsibilities and tasks involved in communications support.

2. (C) General:

a. USARV has the mission of providing area telephone switching facilities and long line communications.

b. Field Force Vietnam (FFORCEV) has the mission of providing, or arranging for those communications external to subordinate commands required for FFORCEV command and control functions.

c. Each subordinate command has the mission of providing its own internal communications and terminating external communications as directed.

d. The 54th Signal Bn will support subordinate commands with operating personnel and equipment as directed by FFORCEV.

3. (C) Responsibilities:

a. USARV:

- (1) Install, operate and maintain area switchboard.
- (2) Install, operate and maintain a communications center.
- (3) USARV and STRATCOM will provide telephone and teletype circuits over the in-country long lines system as validated by MACVJ 6.

b. Field Force Vietnam:

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(1) Initiate requests for sole and common user circuits routed over the in-country long lines systems.

(2) Process requests for frequencies, callwords, call signs and routing indicators.

(3) Prepare appropriate communications-electronics plans for all FFORCEV directed operations.

(4) Prepare and disseminate FFORCEV SOI-SSI.

(5) Plan and direct communications support as necessary.

c. 54th Signal Bn:

(1) Install, operate, and maintain:

(a) FFORCEV Net Control Stations.

(b) Two AN/GRC-26 radios at the Main CP of subordinate commands. Radios will act as subordinate stations in FFORCEV Radio Nets.

(c) One 12-channel VHF system between FFORCEV headquarters, NHA TRANG, and the Main CP of subordinate commands, insofar as the geography, equipment, and availability of circuits in the in-country system will permit.

(d) FFORCEV communications center facility, at the Main CP of subordinate commands.

(2) Provide special and scheduled air messenger service between FFORCEV and subordinate commands.

(3) Provide other communications services within capabilities and as directed by FFORCEV.

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d. Major Subordinate Commands:

- (1) Prepare and disseminate internal SOI-SSI.**
- (2) Plan, install, operate, and maintain internal communications.**
- (3) Install, operate and maintain subordinate stations in FFOCEV Radio Nets as directed.**
- (4) Provide terminal equipment for sole user voice circuits.**

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UNIT ASSIGNED TO OR OPCON OF FFORCEV

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1st Air Cav Div	An Khe		X	
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	Qui Nhon		X	
40K 2d Marine Bde	Cam Lin Peninsula Dong Ba Thin		X	
2d Bn (Reinf), 7th Marine	Qui Nhon		X	O CON III ILaF 7 November
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	Fleiku		X	Adv Party Only
10th Avn Bn	Dong Ba Thin		X	
52d Avn Bn	Fleiku		X	
1st Bn, 30th Arty (155E)	Qui Nhon	X		Reinforcing Cap 40K Div
4 Btry	Thu Cat			GS 22d ARVN an. Cap 40K Div
3d Bn, 18th Arty (8")	An Khe	X		Attached to 1st Air Cav Div
5th Bn, 27th Arty (105mm)	Phan Rang	X		Attached to 1st Bde, 101st Abn
6th Bn, 14th Arty (175mm)	Fleiku	X		Attached to 1st Air Cav Div
Hq & Hq Btry, XXX Corps Arty	Nha Trang	X		
13th Adl History Det	Nha Trang		X	
18th Chem Det	Nha Trang	X		
24th Ray Ops Det	Nha Trang		X	
30th M. Co	Nha Trang	X		
41st Civil Affairs Co (-)	Nha Trang		X	
54th Sig Bn	Nha Trang	X		
45th LI Det (ARVN)	Nha Trang			


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Unit 4

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55th MI Det (Corps)	Nha Trang	X	
204th Sig Det	Nha Trang	X	Attached to 54th Sig Bn
272d MP Co	Nha Trang	X	
571st Engr Det	Nha Trang	X	
Det 4, 3d RRU	Nha Trang		X
363d MM Squadron (Marino)	Nha Trang		X

SECRET



1. Proceed N.E. to the hard surfaced road.
2. Sling your weapon on your back, muzzle down.
3. You will be approached by Allied troops. Do not run.
4. Carry something white.

Leaflet 11-1 Directed toward PAVN soldiers of the 101-B Regt. Plei ke

Long

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

FATE HAS DECIDED

The war for you Soldiers of 101-B Regt is nearly over. The condition of you and your unit has deteriorated to the point where more suffering is pointless. It is not our hope to cause your death when you can have life so easily. Follow the instructions on this leaflet and leave an unjust cause that has left you without hope.

PICTURE SIDE OF LEAFLET

1. Proceed N.E. to the hard surfaced road.
2. Sling your weapon on your back, muzzle down.
3. You will be approached by Allied Troops. Do not run.
4. Carry something white.

LEAFLET 11-1 Directed toward PAVN soldiers of the 101-B Regt. Plei Me

End



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lie of Korea
n equal sized
nge you to
ou going to

LEAFLET 1-66-1 Used Operation Jefferson ROK MAR EDE

Unit 7

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

SOLDIERS OF THE 95TH PAVN REGIMENT

Why do you run away from us? In the past you have fought bravely, why not now? Why do you not fight the 2d Bde of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps? Is the 95th PAVN Regiment afraid to fight an equal sized unit, as the 2d Marine Bde of the Republic of Korea challenge you to battle. We allow you to choose the time and place. Are you going to keep on running away?

PICTURE Allied troops chasing VC

LEAFLET 1-66-1 Used Operation Jefferson ROK MAR BDE

Unit 7



but soon it will be multiplied
death will strike from the sky,
t. Beware, all who seek rest-

Amel 8

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET


The spectre of death is not new to you, but soon it will be multiplied many times over. A new constellation of death will strike from the sky, seeking and destroying in the dark of night. Beware, all who seek rest - a death by fire awaits your slumber.

PICTURE SKULL IN FLAMES

LEAFLET 12-1 Used with Operation Fire Dragon.

Amel 8

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CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNVV NSA099EAVV MAA316

RR RUMSAB

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMEMA 1705K 2861733

ZNY CCCCC

R 131710Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSAB/CG FFORCEV

INFO ZEN/CG USARV

RUMFUAQ/CG III MAF

ZEN/CDR 2D AD

ZEN/CDR CTF 115

RUMSVB/CG 1ST INF DIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 36310 FROM: MACJ32

SUBJ: DEVELOPMENT OF US ARMY TACTICAL DOCTRINE (U)

1. (U) THE US ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES AND RECOMMENDING CHANGES IN DOCTRINE WHICH WILL IMPROVE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF US ARMY FORCES IN VIETNAM. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, IT IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO DELEGATE THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO A COMMAND HAVING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ARMY TACTICAL FORCES.

2. (C) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CG FFORCEV WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON DOCTRINE

FMC-3600-65

CONFIDENTIAL

Amf/10

AS IT RELATES TO US ARMY COMBAT UNITS OPERATING IN SVN. THIS WILL ENTAIL THE STUDY OF ALL ACTIONS INVOLVING US ARMY COMBAT TROOPS OPERATING UNILATERALLY AND IN COORDINATION WITH USAF/VNAF AND US/VN NAVY. THERE WILL BE A FURTHER REQUIREMENT TO STUDY ARVN OPERATIONS, EXCHANGE EXPERIENCES WITH US MARINE CORPS FORCES, STUDY VC OPERATIONS AND TACTICS AND CONDUCT CONFERENCES. THE PRODUCT OF THIS EFFORT WILL BE PUBLISHED BY COMUSMACV AS LESSONS LEARNED, PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION, SPECIAL TEXTS ON TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES AND MEMORANDA ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF

COMBAT UNIT TACTICS. DIRECT LIAISON FOR THIS PURPOSE IS AUTHORIZED ALL CONCERNED.

3. (U) DOCTRINAL MATERIAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ FOR APPROVAL AS DEVELOPED. SUBSEQUENT TO APPROVAL, DISTRIBUTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY HQ USMACV.

4. (U) A MACV JOINT TACTICS REVIEW BOARD WILL BE CREATED SHORTLY AND WILL PROVIDE AN AGENCY FOR REVIEW, ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES FOR JOINT AND COMBINED FORCES. THE JOINT TACTICS REVIEW BOARD WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BY MAKING AVAILABLE THEIR RECORDS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS ON TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. GP-4

BT

FFMC-3600-65

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**FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
AIRCRAFT PLANNING DATA**

(Load and Range figures must be verified by the DS Aircraft Unit Commander)

	UNIT	D-1 Bird Dog	DV-1A Mohawk	U6A Sever	U1A Otter	CV2 Caribou	UH1B Huey	UH1D Huey	CH34 Choctaw	CH47 Chinook	CH 54 Crane
Door Width and Height	Inches			39x40	46x45	73x74	48x48	82x49	53x48	80x78	146x94
Cargo Space	Cu Ft			125	293	1150	140	220	363	1462	2888
Internal Pay Load	Lbs		304	935	1500	5400	1000	2000	1500	12300	10,000
External Pay Load	Lbs	500	4000	1000			1500	2000	2000	12300	16,000
Passengers		1		4	7	28	4(6)	6(12)	6	32	Not yet approved
Litters and Ambulatory		0 + 1		2 + 2	4 + 2	20 + 2	3 + 0	6 + 0	6 + 0	24 + 3	Not yet approved
Normal Speed	Knots	87	190	105	100	156	80	90	85	100	90
Oper Time Hours + Min		4 + 30	1 + 55	5 + 30	6 + 30	7 + 0	1 + 50	2 + 0	2 + 45	1 + 45	1 + 0
Type Fuel		115/145	JP-4	115/145	115/145	115/145	JP-4	JP-4	115/145	JP-4	JP-4
Radius of Action in Nautical Miles		194	190	280	350	550	75	90	120	85	45

NOTE: Figures in parenthesis () under UH1B and UH1D are for aircraft without armament or door gunners

ARMY AVIATION MISSIONS

1. Combat Support:

- Hunter Killer Operations (Eagle Flights)
- Command and Control (Aerial Command Posts)
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance (Visual, Photographic, Infrared, Radar)
- Target Acquisition
- Conduct of Fire (Aerial Artillery OP)
- Battlefield Illumination
- Armed Aerial Escort
- Snooper Flights
- Airdrops (Pathfinders, Paratroop, Equipment and Supply)
- Airmobile Operations
- Outpost relief or withdrawal
- Smoke laying
- Psyop loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination
- Search and Rescue

2. Combat Service Support:

- Liaison and Courier Service
- Logistics Supply and Resupply
- Aeromedical and PW Evacuation
- Wire laying
- Radio Relay
- Administrative Troop Movements
- Military Civic Action Support
- Message Drop and Picky

HELICOPTER SAFETY TIPS

- Always approach the helicopter from the front or side.
- Do not approach the helicopter until it is firmly set on the ground.
- Do not ride in helicopters with legs or arms outside the aircraft.
- Do not exit the helicopter until it comes to a complete stop on the ground.
- When departing the helicopter move away from it straight to the sides—
if it is necessary to move to the opposite side always move around the
nose where the pilot can see you.
- Always be alert to the tail rotor.

Hand 11

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HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-GC-TNC

24 November 1965

SUBJECT: Mines and Booby Traps

TO: **SEE DISTRIBUTION**

1. The Viet Cong has long been known for his ability to use mines and booby traps both offensively and defensively. His efforts have resulted in sizable casualties to both US and ARVN forces. Casualties can be reduced and even eliminated if personnel are trained in the detection and elimination of mine and booby trap hazards.

2. To assist commanders in alerting troops to the different types of VC mines and booby traps, a collection of known items and techniques has been made. This material is enclosed for your information and use.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

/s/ W L Hinspeter
/t/ W. L. HINSPIETER
Captain, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, 1st Air Cav Div 30 cys
CG, ROK Capital Div 30 cys
CG, ROK Marine Bde 20 cys
CO, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div 20 cys
CO, Dep S/A II Corps 20 cys

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Vol 12

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VIET CONG TECHNIQUES IN TRAINING AND USE OF MINES

BOOBY TRAPS AND PAVI TRAPS

VIET CONG TRAINING

VC specialist training in mining, booby traps, and other personnel hazards is conducted in both DRV and RVN. Training in DRV is reported to be thorough. In RVN, training is continuous within units and as much training as possible is performed by actual experience followed by critique. In the technical fields the training courses last at least 3 months. The military region (MR) is the responsible echelon for the training courses for technical services. These courses are attended by main force, local force, guerrilla or militia personnel, and a fourth group -- the terrorists. The training given to the first three types of personnel is conventional in that graduates will become members of units that will wage war against US and RVN forces, organized militia and fortified positions. The training given to the terrorist is unconventional in that graduates will become members of assassination or sabotage teams whose operations are directed against CMI officials and US personnel and installations.

Training of VC guerrillas in mine warfare is marked by the same strong political thoroughness and severe discipline that characterizes the training of VC main and local force units. Training of guerrillas varies from a few days to as much as 3 months and is largely dependent on local requirements and capabilities. As with the main and local force units, guerrilla teams and units train continuously and use combat as a means of testing the effectiveness of training.

VC USE OF MINES

In ambushes of patrols of their routes of movement, the VC use mines to attack possible motorized reinforcements.

In the ambush on motorized equipment, the VC emplace mines in the roadway, wait for the vehicles, touch off the mines and withdraw. To counteract mine detection teams, methods of attack were improved by using various forms of camouflage, diversionary actions, counter-action to mine detection, and by activating lightly equipped cells (3 men), or squads, for attack with grenades and mines. When objectives appropriate to VC capabilities and equipment are located for destruction, mines and bombs are used to destroy convoys. To attack a small number of vehicles (3 to 5), ambushes are conducted in conjunction with bombs, mines and explosive for destruction of vehicles and seizure of weapons.

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ATTACK ON ONE VEHICLE

An attack on a single vehicle is conducted by using mines, obstacles or diversionary action to stop the vehicle. A rapid assault is then made using grenades to destroy the vehicle, followed by a rapid withdrawal from the area.

ATTACK ON A SHORT CONVOY

Mines are used to attack the vehicle in front, in the middle and in the rear to split up the convoy. Destruction is focused on tanks and armored vehicles. If favorable terrain features can not be occupied, mines are laid to preclude use by RVN or US troops. If troops can be deployed on only one side of the road, mines and booby traps are laid on the other side.

ATTACK OF MOTORIZED REINFORCEMENTS

Regardless of the number of vehicles, attack has usually been focused on the first vehicle. To attack motorized reinforcements, mines are used extensively with sabotage and an assault element.

AMBUSH AGAINST TROOPS MOVING IN TO MOP UP AN OPERATION AREA

If the terrain features and situation allow an attack on an element of the force, the VC rapidly concentrate to destroy it. If the terrain features and situation are not favorable to such an attack, the VC break down into small elements to coordinate with guerrillas and partisans and use spikes, mines, booby traps and rifles to harass the mop up force, reducing the speed of movement and creating enough reaction time to allow VC elements stationed in villages to escape.

VEIT CONE TRAPS, BOOM TRAPS, FOOT TRAPS, PUJI STAKES

The most common type of mines and booby traps thus far encountered is that utilizing a Chi Co hand grenade. These grenades have been used effectively and ingeniously in every area. The following are the more common manners of employment:

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In VC controlled or well infiltrated areas these grenades are buried in well travelled areas and detonated electrically. Thus, they can be controlled so that local people can walk back and forth over the booby trap. When enemy troops are in proper position and local people safely distant, VC or VC sympathizers detonate the booby trap. Long lead wires allow the person detonating the device to be well clear of the area at the time of detonation or immediately thereafter. The grenades are sometimes buried in groups, producing the same effect as anti-personnel mines.

Most often VC traps employ a pull type friction fuze consisting of a crooked wirebedded in phosphorus. The fuze is connected to mono-filament line or camouflaged nylon thread or even vines, which are used for trip wires. The friction produced by the wire ignites the phosphorus detonating the grenade.


Booby traps have most often been found at grave yards, gates, in booby trapped punji pits around helic. or landing zones, and on paths leading to and from unsecured hamlets. Various types of detonating devices and booby traps are described and illustrated on the following pages.


In addition to explosive devices many non-explosive devices are employed, the most effective being punji pits. The most common punji pit is about four feet square and about four feet deep. Punji stakes (sharpened bamboo) about six to eighteen inches long are placed upright in the pit. There are about six or eight stakes in the average pit.

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COMBAT TRENCHES WITH BOOBY TRAPS


MINE EMPLACED COMBAT TRENCH





COMMAND DETONATED GRENADES

In the above situation the VC have tied a series of hand grenades to bushes, trees or in grass clumps along trails or avenues of approach to his position. The safety pins of the grenades are linked by fish cord or wire to an enemy position overlooking the site. When our patrols pass the enemy grenade ambush point the one or two man team, by pulling the string or wire, can detonate one or any number of grenades without warning.





CARTRIDGE TRAP

STEEL ARROW TRAP




STEEL ARROW TRAP READY FOR USE







**BOOBY TRAP TO BE EMPLOYED
AGAINST TANKS**



. (U) Above booby trap found by the 3rd Marine Div, 27 Sep 65, in I Corps. Consisted of two (2) bamboo poles, 15 feet high, spaced 30-40 feet apart with barbed wire suspended between poles. Lowest part of wire is about 10 feet above ground. Two grenades are attached, evenly spaced, to the wire.



A tank, or other vehicle, passing between the poles will strike the overhead wire and detonate the grenades. The grenades are placed at such a height to cause injury to tank mounted infantry, or other vehicular mounted personnel. The booby traps will cause no damage to the tank itself.

PUNJI "BEAR" TRAP



The VC, knowing the US Forces are employing steel insoles in their boots, have made a variation of the old punji pit in order to counter our new equipment.

A man stepping into the punji pit hits two boards or steel plates with steel spikes affixed, the boards or plates then pivot, wounding the leg above the area protected by the boot.



TRIP WIRE
ACROSS THE ROAD

BARBED SPIKE PLATE

THE TOP OF THE
BARBED SPIKE PLATE



BOTTOM OF
SPIKE WELDED




GULLIEY TRAPS




Quite often short stakes are employed on banks of gullies & streams, in areas where it is a likely that troops might jump from one bank to another. The stakes (2" to 3" long) are hidden when possible in grass or other growth on the stream banks.

Schematic drawing of Man-Trap (Prone shelter constructed with concealed punji stakes). All dimensions shown are approximate.




COCONUT TYPE MINE

BURIED 6" UNDERGROUND



This mine is made from a hollowed out coconut filled with black powder. Using a friction type fuze this mine is employed in much the same manner as handgrenades. It is usually buried approximately six (6) inches under ground. It has been covered by rock and brick for missile effect. These mines are also effectively employed at gates.




The most common type of booby trap consists of a trip wire stretched across a trail, anchored to a small bush or tree and to a friction type fuze in the grenade. Most other booby traps are a variation on this basic idea.



In most cases involving gates the grenades are buried (shallow) under the gate. A short trip wire is attached to the gate so that when it is moved even slightly, the grenade is detonated. Pressure release fuzes have also been employed. If there is heavy growth around the gate, the grenades have been camouflaged in the growth.


COCONUT TYPE MINE

BURIED 6" UNDERGROUND




This mine is made from a hollowed out coconut filled with black powder. Using a friction type fuse this mine is employed in much the same manner as handgrenades. It is usually buried approximately six (6) inches under ground. It has been covered by rock and brick for missile effect. These mines are also effectively employed at gates.

SPIKE TRAP PIT



SPIKE TRAP BOX




COMMAND DETONATED OVERHEAD MINE



The VC have very effectively used artillery round projectiles and mortar rounds as overhead mines. The projectile or round is hung in the limbs of trees over a trail or likely route of approach, an electrical detonator is attached and wires run to an overlooking enemy position. When a patrol or other unit comes under the camouflaged round the VC detonate it using a battery power source.

This arrangement has proven extremely effective, particularly against troops or units returning from an operation with their guard relaxed.

There is also a smaller pit that is widely employed. It is about 12" to 18" across and about 12" deep. Thin bamboo slivers are laced across the top of the pit and the pit is then camouflaged. The weight of the camouflage material causes a slight depression which helps in locating the pit. (Panji pits of good size give a very loud reading on an ANPRS-4/Mine detector).



In likely helicopter landing zones there are two types of stakes effectively employed. One type is a long stake about 6 feet to 8 feet high, sharpened on one end. The stakes are placed very close to one another so that the copter cannot set down without some of the stakes piercing the hull. Also employed is a type of stake about two to three inches long. This stake is designed to puncture tires if the copter sets down as well as provide a hazard to deplaning troops.




There are indications that the VC have a special way of marking the panji traps so that other VC, and sympathizers, can stay out of them. There are two ways that Marines have observed. In the first case the pits are marked by placing a bamboo bonnet, much like the bonnet of a minefield marker kit, over the pit. The bonnet is made of split bamboo and tied in the proper shape.




Another method is to use a large palm leaf; split the leaf, then place the split leaf on the deck with the end touching the panji pit. These markings have only been observed on the small, foot size holes. The method for marking larger holes is undetermined.

COMBAT TRENCHES WITH
BOOBY TRAPS

GUARDED AND SPIKED COMBAT TRENCHES



HOLLOW BAMBOO MINE




PULL FRICTION TYPE FUZE

MINE MADE OF HOLLOW BAMBOO

This mine is made from a large joint of bamboo. It is cleaned out and filled with plastic explosive or black powder. In addition to the explosive the section is also filled with nuts & bolts, rocks, nails & scrap metal or whatever material is available. Usually detonated by a pull friction type fuze. Other means can readily be substituted.


GRENADE DAISY CHAIN



The daisy chain of grenades is made by first attaching a grenade to a tree or bush and tying it in such a manner that the handle is free to activate if the safety pin (which is attached to a trip wire) is pulled. Successive grenade handles are held under tension by a line from the preceding grenade. All grenades but the first one have their safety pins pulled.

When the trip wire to the first grenade is tripped, the safety pin is pulled and the safety handle flies off allowing the grenade to detonate. As the grenade detonates, it releases the string to the next grenade allowing the handle to fly free, detonate and in turn release subsequent grenades in the line.

Placed along a trail this arrangement is very effective against closely spaced members of a patrol.



STEEL SPIKE ON EACH CORNER

PANJI PIT WITH COCONUT MINE (BOONY TRAPPED)


The trip wire of the coconut mine was attached to one of the stakes of the panji pit. The four stakes in the pit were tied together. When an individual steps into the pit the four stakes are drawn toward the center. The stakes then pull the trip wire connected to the coconut mine thus detonating the mine. So in addition to the panji pit there is also the effect of the mine.

COCONUT MINE (ANTI TANK MINE)

Lacking pressure sensitive devices for fusing anti tank mines the VC have improvised a very effective device. Two pieces of board are used, one above the other. On each board is a bare piece of cam wire connected to a battery (our PRC-1C battery) and connected to a charge of TNT. The first board has wooden pegs which pass through the second. A man standing on the board lacks sufficient pressure to force the boards together, but, if a tank or heavy truck rolls across the device the pressure forces the two boards together making the bare wires contact, detonating the mine.



GRENADA LAID AT ONE END OF A FOOT BRIDGE



GRENADA TRAP

OUT AT MIDDLE AND COVERED WITH MUD.




BRIDGE SPIKE TRAP



More recently VC have been making bamboo arches across trails. A grenade is secured at the top of the arch and the trip wire secured to the deck. Any contact with trip wire will detonate the grenade. This is employed most effectively at night as a warning device. However the location of the grenade gives a large casualty radius. During the day the trip wire is loosened from the ground and wound around the bamboo arch to allow use of the trail to VC & VC sympathizers.

Grenades have been attached to large panji stakes in helicopter landing zones to provide booby traps for helicopters.



**HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240**

AVF-GC-TNG

20 November 1965

SUBJECT: VC Tunnels and Fortifications

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The Viet Cong continue to practice the art of tunnelling in an attempt to escape from US/RVN/ARVN units or as protection from artillery and/or air firepower. The VC go to great lengths to camouflage their digging; entrances and exits as well as air holes are extremely difficult to detect. Troops should be aware of these tunnelling techniques and be alert to them during operations.

2. Attached are a series of sketches of typical VC tunnels encountered throughout South Vietnam. These sketches are forwarded for your information and use.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

**1 Incl
as**


**/s/ Heil H. Metzger
/t/ HEIL H. METZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General**

DISTRIBUTION:


**CG, 1st Air Cav Div 30 cys
CG, ROK Capital Div 30 cys
CG, ROK Marine Bde 20 cys
CO, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div 20 cys
CO, Dep S/A II Corps 20 cys**

Only 13

**HAYSTACK USED FOR
HIDING PLACE AND
MEETING PLACE**




OUTSIDE APPEARANCE




CUTAWAY DIAGRAM

(ENTRANCE IS GAINED BY LIFTING STRAW AND ENTERING THROUGH EITHER DOOR).

HIDING PLACES UNDER LOCAL HOMES



VC UNDERGROUND BUNKER




VC ENTRANCE SKILLFULLY CAMOUFLAGED



Bunker shown above was discovered in the vicinity of Danang during June/July 1965 by ARVN units.

It is a multi-bunker tunnel with angled connecting tunnels. Each bunker has space available for 3 or 4 men. The entrance to the VC bunker is built into the wall of the artillery shelter and skillfully camouflaged. A second bunker is concealed behind the first. The VC direct the people to close and camouflage the entrance and remain in the shelter.

GUERRILLA BASE




TUNNELS




NOTE:

Tunnel is out under bamboo grove. Root system is excellent reinforcement for roof of cave. Horizontal tunnel goes to fighting trench.


TRENCH LINE
SIDE VIEW




END VIEW




TOP VIEW




**RIVER CAVE
SIDE VIEW**




END VIEW




TOP VIEW




HOUSE BUNKER
SIDE VIEW




END VIEW




TOP VIEW



NOT TO SCALE




Shown above is a new type of VC hideout. It consists of one or two secondary trenches attached to a main trench. Hideout is usually dug by relatives of the VC or by villagers. The secondary trenches are dug on the side or bottom of the main one. They can contain one man and are covered by an earth door. When the hideout is manned either the person in the secondary or main trench can close the earth door. If the hideout is located under a house a board is placed on the earth door and people sit on the board. Each hideout has a small air vent leading to a concealed area, bushes, trees, etc.




SKETCH OF AN EMPLACEMENT

(TOP VIEW)



WELL - TUNNEL COMPLEX - BEN CAT AREA



- | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. AIR VENTS | 4. CAMOUFLAGED COVER | 7. CAMOUFLAGED ENTRANCE COVERS |
| 2. NOTCHED DIRT STEPS | 5. CAMOUFLAGED VENT HOLE | |
| 3. WATER | 6. NORMAL WELL TOP | |

Well-Tunnel Complex above was discovered in the vicinity of Ben Cat in September 1965 by US units.


It is a series of multi-bunker tunnels with angled connecting tunnels. Each bunker has space available for 15 to 20 men. The entrances to and exits from the VC bunkers are built into the walls of actual or simulated wells which are 20 to 30 meters deep. Access to these skillfully camouflaged entrances and exits is by way of notched dirt steps on the inside of the well or by the use of long notched bamboo pole ladders. These well camouflaged deep wells also served as deep pit man traps.



NOTCHED BAMBOO
POLE LADDER


TYPE OF POSITIONS RIVER AREAS

TYPE #1





This type of cave usually has entrance from below water line to about 1 foot above. There is about a 2 foot approach leading to the main room which is circular and about 6 to 8 feet across. Can only be entered from the water.

TYPE #2




FIRING FORTIFICATION
(TYPE 2 - LONG POD)





OPERINGS OF COVERT
TECHNIQUES AND TRENCHES

**FIXING FORTIFICATION
(TYPE #1 - SHORT POD)**



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
Office of the Commanding General
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-OC-TNG

17 December 1965

SUBJECT: Tactical Tips

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. As an assist to all unit commanders the attached list of tactical tips has been developed for use in operations against the VC.

2. While the points brought out may not solve all problems in the field, if more attention is paid to what can be done by the unit commander on the ground, our successes will be stimulated in every direction.



STANLEY R. LARSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- 10 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 30 - DSA II Corps
- 10 - CG ROK Capital Div
- 5 - CG ROK Marine Bde
- 5 - CG 1/101st Abn Bde

Incl 14

TACTICAL TIPS

1. Intelligence. Must be timely, reliable, and detailed. Stress importance of who, what, when, where, how many to troops for reporting. Speed is essential in acting on intelligence.
2. Operations Planning. Plan for an adequate force for the task to be accomplished. Both maneuver and fire support elements of sufficient strength are required for any operation. Provide an adequate reserve. Missions of subordinate units must contribute to the overall force mission. The initial force employed must be large enough to accomplish all phases of the operations.
3. Coordination. All interested and participating agencies must be knowledgeable of an operation and the extent of their mission. Problem areas must be resolved prior to the start of an operation.
4. Communications. An effective system of communications, to include radio, wire, audio, and visual is vital to the success of an operation. Communication with all elements of a force is required. Without communications there is no control. Multiple means of communication is desirable.
5. Fire Support. All available combat support means must be given maximum utilization. Special attention must be directed to fire support planning. The WC will take advantage of any discernable inadequacy in fire support efforts.
6. Artillery Support Planning. Plan artillery support for all operations. Observers on the ground with units must be supplemented by airborne observers. All elements to be supported must have the fire plan, call signs and frequencies, and current authentication system. Artillery must not be relied on as a substitute for organic weapons and maneuver forces. Plan support for all deployed units, especially when an enemy ambush attempt is anticipated. Fire support coordination must begin at the lowest level. Use "Flack Suppression" fire against WC ground fire directed at friendly aircraft.
7. Combat Reconnaissance Operations. Deception must be employed when conducting aerial reconnaissance. Overfly other areas as well as the objective area. Air reconnaissance is not a substitute for ground reconnaissance. Combat reconnaissance using small, highly trained units are effective against squad or smaller sized units in suspect areas. and are capable of collecting accurate and up to date information. Generally it is comprised of 20 to 24 men armed with lightweight automatic weapons. It is not capable of conducting sustained operations and should complete its task on the ground in 15 minutes or less.

8. Landing Zones. Select primary and alternate LZs. Repeated reconnaissance of primary landing zones may give the VC a premature advantage and allow time to plan, prepare, and execute an ambush at the critical time and place. As many leaders as possible should be on the initial flights to minimize flights required.

9. Terrain. Utilize the terrain. Take advantage of cover and concealment for deploying troops. Stay off trails, roads, and stream beds. When defending, select positions affording fields of fire and observation, or which will canalize the enemy in approaching the friendly position.

10. Maneuver. Maintain mobility and flexibility of maneuver. The situation may dictate changes. Unwarranted deviation from the plan will result in a lack of sufficient force at the point of decision. Control of forces must be maintained at all times.

11. Attacks. Use fire and maneuver; advance under cover of supporting fires. The assault must be violently executed. Momentum of the attack must be maintained.

12. Saturation Patrolling. Conduct saturation patrolling in areas under control of the VC to locate him. Area saturation tactics deny the VC free access to all areas within the area of operation. Conduct frequent and persistent night operations. Patrolling simultaneously on many axes in a large area results in a greater number of meeting engagements with the VC. Perform concurrent Psy War/Civic Action missions.

13. Search and Destroy Missions. Search and destroy missions require employment of flexible control measures such as zones of action and phase lines. The objective must be to gain and maintain contact with and destroy the enemy. Units should orient on the enemy, not on terrain objectives.

14. Eagle Flights. In addition to normal methods of employment an eagle force can be used to reinforce air strikes by landing immediately following completion of an airstrike to engage surviving elements of an enemy force.

15. Ambushes. Conduct ambush operations at night as well as during daylight. Conduct a detailed rehearsal prior to occupying the position. Each individual must thoroughly understand his task. Move to the ambush site by concealed routes, or move after dark. Spring the ambush quickly and violently; pursue escaping VC with fire.

16. Night Operations. Conduct frequent operations during darkness. Stay behind patrols and ambushes operating at night hinder VC movement.

Plan artillery fires on known and suspected VC assembly areas and routes of movement. Plan aerial infrared photography and airborne radar surveillance over suspect areas.

17. Prevention of Ambushes. A unit moving tactically from one point to another can not move both rapidly and maintain proper security at the same time. The commander must decide which he wants. Of the choices it should be only the exception when the situation demands rapidity of movement at the price of security. All around security on the move. Security elements must be posted to the front, on both flanks, and to the rear. Security elements must check every area within small arms range of the main force. A communications system must be provided. Assume that no area outside a perimeter or compound is secure. (See Par 6)

18. Counterambush. Reaction to ambushes must be swift and violent in nature employing automatic weapons and grenades, and rapid assault of the ambush position. Each unit must have a counter ambush plan understood by all. Personnel must be constantly alert and ready to fight. Weapons must be in the soldiers' hands. Sights must be set. Impedimenta must not be suspended from weapons. Plan and use artillery support.

19. Artillery Positions. VC operational plans take into account range and locations as well as battery response time. Frequent changes of position will add to the effectiveness of artillery and the disruption of VC plans. "Hip Shoots" add surprise to artillery target area coverage.

20. Defense. Plan for all around defense. Do not disclose automatic weapons positions by firing during sporadic sniper fire. Use ambush patrols and early warning devices to cover avenues of approach into the perimeter. Be especially alert during periods of limited visibility.

21. Night Halts. Halt on the most defensible terrain available. Establish a tight perimeter which means an all around defense. Dispose automatic weapons and grenade launchers to cover avenues of approach to the perimeter. Set out trip flares and anti-personnel mines. Schedule periodic illumination of the areas outside the perimeter.

22. Marking Ground Locations. Colored smoke should not be used to establish ground locations for pilot identification unless contact with the enemy has been made. Use colored panels when the situation permits. In thick jungle the aircraft can fly a criss-cross pattern over the jungle area and be given a radio signal when directly overhead.

23. Convoy. No route is 100% safe. Convoy protection depends upon common sense measures for security. Convoy operations must be thoroughly coordinated to include intelligence, communications, air and artillery support, route security forces, and alert reaction forces. Use agency

should be responsible for all coordination. Air cover (AIRCAP) reduces the likelihood of ambush.

24. Medical Evacuation. Casualty evacuation must be expedited. Insure that the evacuation system for civilians, ARVN, and Free World personnel is understood by all medical personnel.

25. Command and Control. Brigades and Regimental operations will be conducted under the personal control of the commander. An Airborne Command Post will be made available for use in all Regimental and Brigade sized operations and may also be made available to battalion commanders when their companies are operating separately over extended distances.

26. Counter Sniper Actions. Commanders moving units through thick jungle areas will employ reconnaissance by fire plus artillery and air strikes to disrupt enemy forces occupying defensive or ambush positions and to dislodge snipers from trees.

27. Air Cap. Commanders will call for Air Cap over all operations other than routine clearing and small unit actions in the vicinity of base camps. This applies equally to armed helicopters which will be rotated over units in action.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-6

3 December 1965
(MACJ3)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

1. PURPOSE. To establish policy and procedures for the organization and functioning of a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC).
2. GENERAL. In order to insure the effective and coordinated use of all available combat support, a standardized combined US/RVNAF Combat Support Coordination Center at the TOC's of ARVN divisions is needed during the planning and conduct of combat operations. For regimental size or smaller operations, a CSCC should be organized to insure that all combat support elements are coordinated. CSCC may be modified as necessary to suit the combat support elements available for the contemplated action.
3. DEFINITION. Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of artillery, air and other combat support units. These representatives assist the commander, through the G2/G3, in planning, coordinating and controlling all means of combat support available in an operation.
4. RESPONSIBILITY. Senior Corps, Division, and Regimental Advisors, in coordination with RVNAF Commanders, will insure that a CSCC, as described in this directive and applicable RVNAF Directives, is established prior to and during each combat operation.
5. ORGANIZATION OF CSCC.
 - a. As a minimum, the CSCC will be staffed with:
 - (1) Director.
 - (2) Artillery Support Element.
 - (3) US Army or Marine Aviation Support Element.
 - (4) Tactical Air Control Party.
 - b. Additionally, a Naval Gunfire Support Element will be included when naval gunfire is provided, and other support elements, such as River Assault Groups, shall be represented at the discretion of the Director of the CSCC. If US artillery units are supporting the operation, liaison officers from those units will also be included. Specific duties of individuals are listed in Annex A. A typical CSCC organization is shown in Annex B. A typical CSCC Communications Net is shown in Annex C.

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3 December 1965

c. Sufficient personnel must be provided to maintain a 24-hour capability in each element during field operations. Additionally, sufficient communications and operations personnel will be provided to insure a smooth and orderly flow of information and the timely posting of maps and status boards with all pertinent operational data. The CSCC will have shelter, maps, radios, status charts, and other equipment necessary for planning operations and maintaining records on all means of combat support.

6. GENERAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.

a. Prior to an operation, the CSCC elements will work in coordination with the G2/G3 planning group and prepare detailed fire plans based on the scheme of maneuver of the supported force. This plan must include both preparatory and on-call strikes and concentrations. The fire plan includes provisions for control which allow for the concurrent application of fire-power means.

b. Once an operation begins, combat support operations are coordinated through the CSCC. Tactical information is transmitted to the CSCC so that an accurate, detailed, and up-to-date record of the situation is maintained and immediately available. Close coordination will be required in the selection of air and artillery targets, landing zones, corridors for air strikes, and lanes for entry and exit of helicopters to assure effective and continuous support. Requests for support will be made and processed in accordance with existing Standing Operating Procedures.

c. Standing Operating Procedures will be continually reviewed in an effort to shorten reaction times. The organization and procedures outlined herein may be modified by the commanders and Senior Advisors to improve operations and shorten reaction times, but not at the expense of denying the supported units any available support.

d. This directive emphasizes simultaneous and continuous support. Prior plans will be made to deliver suppressive fires and air strikes during the movement of troops and landing of heliborne units.

7. COMMUNICATIONS. A rapid and reliable system of voice communications will be maintained with the force commander, higher headquarters, and supporting air and artillery units. Provisions will be made for airborne and ground relays as required.

8. LOCATION AND DISPLACEMENT.

a. The CSCC will be collocated with the Division Tactical Operations Center. Essential elements of the CSCC should have the capability of operating from a command helicopter.

b. The CSCC will be organized to facilitate and insure a continuous operational capability during displacements.

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. DIRECTOR. The Director is responsible for coordination of all combat support. The senior artillery commander is normally the Director. He is also Chief of Artillery Support Element.

2. DEPUTY DIRECTOR. The Deputy Director functions as the Director in the absence of Director. The Deputy Director is normally the US Artillery Advisor to the Senior Artillery Commander.

3. ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT ELEMENT (AASE).

a. Supervises and coordinates requirements for Army Air Support. This includes command and control aircraft, armed aircraft, transport aircraft, and observation and radio relay aircraft. Programs observation and radio relay aircraft on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis.

b. Coordinates use of air space in the operational area with the Air Force element.

c. Maintains current status of planned operations and availability of all types of Army aircraft.

d. When all or part of the air support is provided by other than the US Army, the organization providing the support will be represented, as required, to insure proper coordination and control of the air elements.

4. ARTILLERY SUPPORT ELEMENT (ASE). This element maintains control of artillery fire support by:

a. Supervising and coordinating artillery fire support operations.

b. Coordinating artillery fire support with other tactical support operations.

c. Allocating artillery fire support means.

d. Maintaining information on current status and location of weapons, capabilities, and other pertinent operational information.

5. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP). The TACP maintains control of all tactical (AF - VNAF, USMC & USN) air support by:

a. Supervising and coordinating requirements for tactical air support.

b. Recommending priorities for tactical air support.

c. Requesting air support over and above that allocated, if required.

3 December 1965

9. SUPPORT FOR CSCC. Initially, the CSCC will be organized and established from existing resources. After sufficient experience has been realized, a conference with representatives from US and RVNAF organizations concerned will be conducted. During this conference, recommended CSCC manning and equipment requirements will be developed. Appropriate action will be taken subsequent to the conference to obtain any additional personnel and equipment deemed necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Annexes

- A. Functions and Responsibilities
- B. CSCC Organization
- C. Typical CSCC Communications Net

DISTRIBUTION:

R

d. Recommending targets to be attacked.

e. Maintaining status charts of current and planned air support, PAC's available, capabilities of supporting air (USAF, VNAF, USMC, USN) and all other pertinent operational matters.

f. Assuring continuous communication as presently provided for in the USAF/VNAF TAC Air Control System Communication nets.

g. Supervising and coordinating requirements for and employment of observation and reconnaissance aircraft and flare ships.

h. Supervising and coordinating the employment of PAC's. This function must be programmed with adequate background information.


6. NAVAL GUNFIRE ELEMENTS (NGE).

a. Coordinates the integration of naval gunfire with the tactical operation and other fire and air support.

b. Maintains current status of available naval gunfire support to include fire capability charts, caliber of weapons, quantity and types of ammunition.

c. Assures proper location and orientation of naval gunfire spotters.


CSCC ORGANIZATION



- - - - Collocated with other CSCC elements

* When Naval gunfire support is provided

TYPICAL CSMC COMMUNICATIONS NET



NOTE: Air observer may be FM relay.

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-GE

4 October 1965

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. References: a. F Force V Regulation 10-1, Subject: Military Civic Action, dated 8 September 1965.

b. Headquarters, MACV Directive 525-3, Subject: Combat Operations; Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties, dated 7 September 1965.

c. Headquarters, MACV Directive 25-1, Subject: Claims, dated 14 May 1965.

d. Headquarters, MACV Directive 551-3, Subject: Foreign Nationals, Community Relations, dated 5 June 1965.

e. AR 25-90, Claims Arising in Foreign Countries.

f. Headquarters, USARV Regulation 25-20, Subject: Claims, dated 14 July 1964.

g. Headquarters, USARV Regulation 10-1, Subject: Civil Affairs/Civic Action, dated 9 September 1965.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this letter is to present in a single document the varied civil affairs/public affairs efforts of the more important agencies operating in the Republic of Vietnam and to provide units under the control of this headquarters information which will assist them in expeditiously fulfilling their civil affairs/public affairs responsibilities.

3. Background. a. The government structure of the Republic of Vietnam has been a priority target of the Viet Cong since the insurgents first commenced terrorist activities after the 1954 Geneva Agreement. In fact, the government chain of command can be called the front line in a war that has no geographical front lines. One of the objectives of the insurgents is to disrupt the machinery of government in all areas and at all levels. Thousands of local and national leaders have been assassinated or kidnapped. In doing this the Viet Cong have attempted to break, and in many parts of the country have broken, the government chain which links the national administration with the people.

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4 October 1965

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance (Cont'd)

b. The government of Vietnam is centralized in Saigon and exercises its authority through provincial, district and village officials. The villages are further divided into hamlets which are usually composed of several families. Our operational areas will be within provinces where these local governments are functioning. Therefore, we will not be called upon to conduct functions of government. Our efforts will be essentially of the civic action variety. However, we have a vital interest in the affairs of local government for two reasons: (1) It is through working and coordinating with the local leaders that the greatest good can be accomplished, and (2) One of the objectives of the United States is to aid and strengthen the local government and increase the respect of the people for the duly constituted authority.

4. Programs of the GVN. The government of the Republic of Vietnam has the primary responsibility for attaining and maintaining internal stability. It has in being numerous programs of a social, economic and military nature designed to bring this about. These programs, although planned and largely financed from Saigon, are designed to provide assistance at the province, district, village and hamlet level -- the level at which personnel of this command will be functioning. If in our attempts to be of assistance we are to avoid nullifying the effects of these programs and complement them instead, we must familiarize ourselves with their purpose. A description of the more important of these can be found at Inclosure 1.

5. Programs of the U.S. We are all aware that for many years prior to the dispatch of U.S. combat units to Vietnam the United States has been providing extensive assistance. This assistance has been largely in the form of goods, financial support and advisory personnel. Inclosure 2 lists those efforts which can be of assistance to U.S. units.

6. Voluntary Relief Agencies. In spite of the many official agencies involved in assisting the Vietnamese people there are still gaps which they cannot fill completely. Most of these gaps are in the field of social welfare--aid for the destitute and homeless. Into the gaps have stepped two private voluntary U.S. agencies, CARE and the Catholic Relief Services. Many commodities are now stockpiled in Saigon and await only a request from units which desire to use them in their civic action program. In order to avoid duplication of effort and conflicts among the various agencies and because of the private voluntary nature of these two agencies, certain special requirements exist for the receipt and distribution of their commodities. Instructions for requesting these commodities are at Inclosure 3.

7. Allied Assistance. The United States has been joined by other countries in its efforts to help the Vietnamese people. Teams of medical

4 October 1965

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance (Cont'd)

and other personnel from allied countries are at work in the Vietnamese countryside performing essentially civic action functions. Units should not hesitate to contact such teams in their area and offer assistance or request assistance as deemed appropriate for a coordinated, effective effort.

8. Spreading the Word. Propaganda emanating from Hanoi is ever insistent that the American forces are in South Vietnam to exploit its people and its resources to the benefit of the United States. We recognize this as patently ridiculous, but we shouldn't be lulled into thinking some people won't believe it. This is particularly true when we do nothing to counter such allegations by tactfully publicizing our good works in this country. Inclosure 4 contains further guidance on a public information program.

9. Claims against U.S. Forces. The prompt and equitable settlement of valid claims against the US is essential to an effective population support program. Inclosure 5 elaborates on claims procedures.

10. Relationships with GVN Officials. The uncoordinated distribution of largesse to all persons without regard for the psychological effects not only may not make a positive contribution, it may actually have undesirable results. It is important that whenever possible those efforts made to help the people be associated with the GVN as well as the United States. Such techniques as the use of GVN and U.S. flags or other national symbols at gatherings, the integration of Vietnamese cultural programs in U.S. civic action programs and the use of combined U.S. -- ARVN teams will help to associate the programs with the GVN. Units should always coordinate with local Vietnamese officials, preferably through MACV advisors or USARV representatives prior to embarking on programs involving the Vietnamese populace.

11. Command Emphasis. Because of the large number of diversified agencies involved in stability operations in Vietnam, no directive or written guidance can effectively spell out all that should or should not be done. The effectiveness of the program will depend in large measure on the personnel assigned the primary responsibilities for carrying it out. Commanders should insure that personnel assigned to supervise and implement the civil affairs/public affairs function are highly motivated and professionally competent and that they receive positive command support.

12. Clarification and Assistance. Personnel who have any questions regarding the information contained herein or who desire assistance in the conduct of their civil affairs/public affairs program should contact the AC of S G3, F Force V, (Typhoon 234) at any time and by the most expeditious means.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



NEIL H. MATZNER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

5 Incl
as
DISTRIBUTION

4

PLUS

150 - Pub Stockroom

GVN PROGRAMS FOR CIVIL ASSISTANCE

1. Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP). The MILCAP program is designed to provide means whereby military resources may be utilized to assist the civilian population and thereby develop more effective military-civilian cooperation. Funds are made available to the province chief so as to enable him to make rapid disbursements in support of civic action projects. The funds are distributed to sectors based on population density and civic action activity of the previous year. They may be used for:

a. Information and education—Psychological operations to support military civic action projects.

b. Entertainment—Cultural performances, sport competitions and movies.

c. Gifts—Useful items appropriate to the needs of the local population (cooking utensils, clothes, school supplies, small farm tools).

d. Construction and Repair of Public Utilities—For the purchase of materials required for the construction of such things as bridges, drains and roads in hamlets, irrigation systems, well digging, schools, medical stations, churches, pagodas, markets, etc. Labor must be contributed by the local populace with the Army providing limited labor, technical supervision and equipment. New construction may not be undertaken without the prior concurrence of the Provincial Committee consisting of the Sector Commander, the MACV Advisor and the USOM provincial representative.

e. Identification - For bodily harm or material damages caused by ARVN military activities. This includes surviving relatives of VC victims.

2. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP I). This program is supplied by ARVN medical depots, funded by USOM and implemented at the subsector level by U.S. Army medical working under the direction of the Sector Advisor and the Corps Surgeon.

3. Self-Help Program. This program is designed to help the people help themselves. Project recommendations are made by the hamlet thru village and district to the province where the projects must be approved. The province chief has a fund to help finance the project. The people are expected to contribute money, materiel and labor. USOM also contributes materiel. Present fund distribution policy calls for pacified hamlets in the coastal provinces to receive 40,000 \$VN annually and pacified hamlets in the interior provinces to receive 30,000 \$VN annually to support their self-help projects. Among the many possible projects, local electrification has been one of the most successful. US units can assist with equipment and technical advice.

4. Supplementary Provincial Development Funds. These funds are available to the province chief for use at the village and district level. The

self-help provisions need not be met for projects financed with these funds. Expenditures may not exceed 200,000 \$VN per project. Included among the type projects which may be financed with these funds are the building of bridges and docks and electrification. USOM also contributes materiel to these projects.

5. ARVN Funds. The Vietnamese Army has funds available to it for building dependant housing and related facilities.

6. Local Cadres. Units may find available in some areas Vietnamese governmental personnel (cadres) trained to work in the Pay Ops and Civic Action fields. They include Rural Construction Cadre, Vietnamese Information Service Action Teams and rural health workers. The organization and training of these personnel is limited and, as in the case of the Rural Construction Cadre, their functions are not always clearly defined. It may be possible for US units to provide these cadres with sufficient guidance and assistance to raise their civic action potential.

7. Regional Forces/Popular Forces. The tremendous requirement for local security has necessitated the organization of what are referred to as Regional Forces and Popular Forces. These are a form of home guard with the Regional Forces operating under the control of the Province Chief anywhere in the province and the Popular Forces, also under the Province Chief, performing static guard and patrol missions within the village and hamlet. These forces also have MACV military advisors. The RF/PF are of particular interest to us because they have been given responsibility by the GVN for civic action and its accompanying psychological operations. They are in the process of receiving Vietnamese Pay Ops/Civil Affairs teams to assist them in this. In addition, cultural teams for entertaining the populace are available through the Regional Forces. The RF/PF and its specialized teams might be effectively integrated into US unit civic action projects.

PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1. Civilian Agencies. One of the major obstacles to bringing about stability in Vietnam has been the lack of material and trained human resources. Two U.S. Government civilian agencies have been involved for a long time in helping to overcome these deficiencies.

a. USOM. One of these is the United States Operations Mission (USOM), the overseas element of the Agency for International Development. USOM is attempting to train Vietnamese officials, to provide materiel assistance for the economic development of the country and to raise standards of living and alleviate suffering. Many of the programs of the GVN referred to in Inclosure 1 are supported in large part with USOM assistance and USOM exercises some influence over how this assistance is used. However ownership of the funds and materials provided by USOM rests with the GVN. In order to provide guidance and coordinate the provision of assistance at the lower political levels, where it is needed most, USOM has assigned a representative to each province. These provincial representatives can be helpful in integrating civic action projects into the overall economic development program for Vietnam and provide some food and materiel assistance for these projects. Contact them during your initial planning. Items available vary from time to time. Units will be informed of the availability of commodities by this Headquarters or by the USOM province representative.

b. JUSPAO. Experience has shown that assistance to a people who are the victims of a communist-inspired insurgency is not effective if the people are not fully aware of the government's side of the story. This is particularly important in an area such as Vietnam where previous governments have often revealed by their behavior a disregard for the welfare of the people. The GVN has a psychological operations program designed to present the government's story and counter the propaganda of the Viet Cong. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provides advice and assistance to the GVN on its psychological programs and, in addition, it coordinates and directs U.S. psychological programs in Vietnam to include those in which military personnel are involved. JUSPAO has representatives with the ARVN Regional Headquarters, and is in the process of providing them to each province and major U.S. military headquarters. Since every act, military, political or civic action affects the population and therefore the psychological operations program, it is imperative that the advice and guidance of JUSPAO representatives be sought when there is any doubt as to the reaction which a particular act might arouse. Only in this way can we be sure that various agencies are not inadvertently working counter to an established psychological operations program.

2. MACV Advisors. On the military side we have the advisors of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). MACV has assigned U.S. Military advisors to all Vietnamese units of battalion size or larger. In addition, advisors have been assigned to the static military organization of the country -- Corps Tactical Zones, Sectors and Subsectors. The Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) is somewhat analogous

to our CONUS Army area or military district while the Sectors and Subsectors are subordinate elements of the CTZ. CTZ boundaries coincide with the Region, sector boundaries coincide with the province and subsector boundaries coincide with the district. The CTZ, Sector and Subsector chiefs are very influential in local political as well as military activities due to the fact that the country has lacked internal security for so many years and the police have been unable to handle the problem. In fact, the commander of the CTZ is also Government Delegate for the Region and wields considerable influence over province/sector chiefs. Sector and Subsector chiefs are at the same time Province and District chiefs respectively thus wearing both a military and a political hat. As a result of this, the U.S. advisor at the Sector level has been close to both the security problem of the Sector and the economic and social problems of the province. The Sector Advisor receives funds through MACV channels for the purpose of supporting the Vietnamese Psy Ops/CA program. This fund amounts to a minimum of 40,000 \$VN per month and could conceivably be utilized for combined US-Vietnamese operations.

3. MILPHAP. A Military Provincial Hospital Augmentation Program for Vietnam has been inaugurated. Under this program 45 US Department of Defense medical teams will be assigned to Vietnamese civilian hospitals. The teams will each consist of three military doctors and 13 military assistants. These teams are not mobile; they will remain in facilities where equipment is available for them to instruct as well as practice. All of the teams are expected in country by early 1966. There are six teams in Vietnam now. They may be able to utilize your assistance.

4. MEDCAP II. The MEDCAP I program mentioned in paragraph 2, Inclosure 1, was designed to be accomplished through a Vietnamese third person and limited to insecure peripheral areas. MEDCAP II may be implemented directly by non-Vietnamese military personnel and applied in any area deficient in medical care. MEDCAP II projects will be initiated by the submission of a formal plan which has the written concurrence of the Province Chief, the USOM Province Representative and the Senior Sector Advisor. Plans will not involve areas where adequate civilian medical resources exist. Supplies will be furnished by USOM. Further details concerning this program will be forthcoming.

RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

A. Catholic Relief Services.

1. These supplies are available to persons of any faith. Although the type and quantity of items available will vary from time to time, the following items are usually available:

- a. Bulgar Wheat (Pre-cooked) (100 lb or 66 lb bag)
- b. Salad oil (Carton contains 6 one gallon cans) (60 lbs)
- c. Cornmeal (100 lb bag)
- d. Flour (100 lb bag)
- e. Milk (4½ lb box) (54 lb carton)
- f. Clothing

2. The following categories of persons, listed in order of priority, are authorized to receive Catholic Relief Services supplies:

- a. Widows and orphans of ARVN, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, CIDGs or Combat Youth.
- b. Disabled veterans.
- c. Other orphans.
- d. Refugees.
- e. Needy or destitute families.
- f. Others as approved by this Headquarters.

3. Dependents of military personnel may not receive these supplies.

4. Requests for Catholic Relief supplies will be forwarded in duplicate to this Headquarters (ATTN: AC/S G5) in the format at Annex 1.

B. CARE

1. Items available through CARE are listed in Annex 2. CARE items are available to all persons listed in paragraph A2 above and to families of military and paramilitary personnel. CARE school supplies, however, may be issued to schools for military dependents and private schools only. Other schools receive such supplies from GVN or USOM.

Inclosure 3

Incl 3, Relief Supplies for Military Civic Action (Cont'd)

2. Requests for CARE items will be made in duplicate to this Headquarters (ATTN: AC/S G5) in the format at Annex 3.

C. General

1. Acknowledgments for the receipt of CARE and Catholic Relief supplies is mandatory. Informal letters of thanks from the recipient or a local official and from a US officer involved in the distribution are required. Letters will be forwarded to this Headquarters (ATTN: AC/S G5) for transmittal to the appropriate agency in Saigon.

2. Pictures showing the transfer of supplies to the Vietnamese recipient will be forwarded with the letters. Caption all pictures before forwarding and indicate the names of all persons in the picture. For US military personnel indicate name, rank, serial number and home town in the US on the back of the picture. Some of the better pictures will be used for home town releases. Others will be utilized by the relief agencies to provide visual evidence to donors in the US as to how their donations are being utilized and to encourage future donations.

3. All units handling the issue of these supplies will maintain informal accountability. Units will use a receipt and issue slip system and will maintain records to indicate the amount and type of supplies distributed, time and place of distribution and, if practicable, the names of the recipients.

4.. These supplies will not be used to compete with any existing program sponsored by any US or GVN agency. They are designed to fill the many gaps not covered by existing programs.

5. These supplies will be issued by US personnel or under the direct supervision of US personnel. Care should be exercised that the supplies are not misused or acquired by persons not so authorized.

6. The outright distribution of relief supplies is encouraged only to those who are otherwise unable to work for them. Adults capable of performing usable labor should be required to work for their relief supplies when practicable.

7. Units will pick up supplies at designated storage or delivery sites. Supplies will be issued to the unit at these sites on issue slips. Annex 4.

8. Units will be informed of any changes in the availability of commodities in a periodic "Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Information Bulletin" to be published by this Headquarters.

REQUEST FOR CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES COMMODITIES FOR MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

TO: CG, HQS FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
ATTN: ACoFS G5
APO US Forces 96240

DATE _____

1. Name of person requesting (Print or Type) _____

2. Rank: _____ Serial Number _____

3. Unit: _____

4. Are items requested available thru USOM? _____

5. Are items requested available thru any other US or GVN agency
_____.

6. Does the Vietnamese province chief, district chief, USOM representative, US sector advisor, as applicable, concur in this request?
_____.

7. Commodity and quantity requested:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

8. Descriptive paragraph on where, how, for whom and when the commodity will be used. Use additional paper if there is insufficient space and attach to this form.

9. What assistance have you requested from: (a) GVN, (b) USOM?
If so by commodity and quantity what was received?

10. Commodities not distributed within 3 months after receipt will

Annex 1 to Inclosure 3

AVP-GE

4 October 1965

Annex 1 to Inclosure 3 Request for Catholic Relief Services
Commodities for Military Civic Action (Cont'd)

be reported to this headquarters for redistribution. All commodities remain the property of the CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES until distributed to the ultimate user.

Signature block of applicant

MIDWIFERY KIT - Code 42

The recipient must be trained midwife, ambitious and lacking adequate supplies to perform her duties to the best of her ability.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 each	Sponge Bowl
1 each	Tray, Stainless Steel
1 pair	Surgical Scissors
2 pair	Forceps
2 each	Bottles, plastic
1 bunch	Safety Pins
18 each	Sterile packets
1 each	Soap Container, plastic
2 each	Toilet Soap
1 each	Nail Brush, plastic
2 each	Hand Towel
1 each	Apron, plastic
1 each	Sheeting, clear vinyl plastic
1 each	Waterproof bag

MIDWIFERY REPLACEMENT KIT - Code 43

This kit is intended to replenish code 42 but if a midwife has proper equipment and lacks these basic supplies this kit can be requested.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
8 cakes	Soap
2 each	Hand Towels
2 each	Nail Brushes
2 each	Vinyl Plastic Aprons
18 each	Sterile Packets, each containing 2 umbilical tapes, 16" strand, one muslin binder 18" x 40", and one gauze pad, 3", 12 ply.

PHYSICAL EDUCATION KITS - Local Purchase

This kit is intended for instructions which have basketball courts.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 each	Soccer Ball
1 each	Volley Ball
1 each	Volley Ball Net
1 each	Basketball

PHYSICAL EDUCATION KIT - Code 120-1665-4

Local Purchase

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 pc	Soccer ball "FLECHE", made in Vietnam
1 pc	Volley ball "FLECHE", made in Vietnam
1 pc	Volley ball net, made in Vietnam

Preference in distribution given to rural schools.

BLACKSMITH KITS - Code 120-1665-1

Local Purchase

Recipient must have received training in blacksmithing and preferably live in a village or hamlet where no other blacksmith shop exist. Should be capable of making simple tools for agriculture and the trades. USOM has a more complete kit available through a Colombo Plan donation from Australia.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 pc	Bellow; steel gears with spike to stand bellows on, made in Taiwan.
1 pc	Hacksaw frame (wooden handle), made in Taiwan
1 doz	Hacksaw blades (12")
1 pc	Aluminum ruler, made in Taiwan
1 pc	Strong Steel tin snip, made in U.S.A.
1 pc	Sledge hammer (3 kilos) made in Taiwan
1 pc	Square hammer (1 kilo) made in Taiwan
1 pc	Vice (9.50 cm jaws), made in Taiwan
1 pc	12" Bastard file, made in Portugal
1 pc	12" 2d cut file, made in Portugal
1 pc	Half round 2d cut file, made in Portugal
1 pc	Ball peen hammer, made in Pakistan
1 pc	Pairs of tongs, 32" long, made in Vietnam
1 pc	Cold Chisels, made in Taiwan

RESETTLERS KITS - Code 114

To be distributed to those who are resettled and must clear their land of trees and brush before it can be cultivated. A request should be submitted to USOM before CARE since there are many such tools in their Saigon warehouse.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 each	Heavy Crosscut Saw, 36"
1 each	Pick Mattock
11 each	Shovel
1 each	Axe - single bit - 3½ lbs
1 each	Machete - 22" blade

WOODWORKING KITS - Code 120-1665-2

Local Purchase

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 pc	Ripsaw blade 18" x 1" 45 cm long, made in Japan
1 pc	Crosscut saw blade 27½ x 3/3" 70 cm long, made in Japan
1 pc	Large claw hammer, made in Taiwan
1 pc	Plane (steel only), 4 cm large, made in Germany
1 pc	Triangle file, 15 cm long, made in Germany
1 set	Chisel with wooden handles comprising ½ cm chisel, 1 cm chisel, 1½ cm chisel, 3 cm chisel, 4 cm chisel each, made in Germany
1 pc	Drill bit 12mm, made in Taiwan
1 pc	Drill bet 16mm, made in Taiwan
1 pc	Aluminum ruler, made in Taiwan

The recipient is expected to be able to build wooden structures and do cabinet work. Recipient expected to make box frame to put blades in tension and jack and smooth plane boxes. A request should first be submitted to USOM.

MASON KIT - Code 120-1665-3 Local Purchase

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 pc	Steel mason trowel, 11 cm long, made in Vietnam
1 pc	Brick hammer, made in Vietnam
1 pc	Spirit level, made in Japan
1 pc	Aluminum ruler, made in Taiwan

The recipient should be acquainted with the uses of these tools. A suggestion would be the montagnards who have completed training at one of the centers and will return to his hamlet to build pig stys and cattle sheds.

SCHOOL KITS - Code 214-1 Local purchase

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
2	Pen points
1	Pen holders
1	Ink holders
*3	Notebooks (100 pages)
1	Ruler (20 cm)
*24	Ink pellets
1	Slate
*2	Erasers
*4	Blotting paper
*2	Pencils

Schools must show supporting evidence that they do not fall into the category supported by GVN and USOM

SCHOOL KITS - Code 214-1 Local Purchase (Cont'd)

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
*4	Pieces of chalk
1	Plastic bag to contain the kit

*We would appreciate your assistance in developing a replacement kit consisting of those components marked by an asterisk. How many of the students for whom you are requesting school supplies have those components not marked by an asterisk?

PULWOOD SAWS

There is only the saw blade 1" wide by 42" and 48" long. A frame similar to the one used by Vietnamese carpenters would have to be made in order that the saw can be used properly. Could be used for felling trees in a land clearing project.

DIAL SOAP

A hand soap of the size commonly found in hotels.

SEWING KIT - Local Purchase

This kit is appropriate for distribution with used clothing.

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
1 pair	Sissors
1 packet	Needles
1 spool	Black thread
1 spool	White thread

TEXTILE PACKAGE - Code 213-1

Local Purchase

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Component</u>
12 m	Black rayon
1600 m	Black sewing thread
75 pos	Needles
0.750 kg	Laundry soap
144 pos	Black plastic buttons
1 pair	Scissors

REQUEST FOR CARE COMMODITIES

TO: CG, FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
ATTN: ACofS G5
APO US Forces 96240

DATE _____

1. Person Requesting (Print or Type) _____
2. Organization Applicant Represents _____
3. Address and Telephone No. _____
4. Province Chief _____
5. Deputy Province Chief of Administration _____
6. Social Welfare Team Leader _____
7. USOM Representative _____
8. Assistant USOM Representative _____
9. U. S. Army Civic Action Officer _____
10. IVS Representative _____
11. Commodity and Quantity Requested _____

12. Descriptive detailed paragraph on where, how, for whom, and when the commodity will be used. Use the outline given for various commodities to prepare a complete discription. Please use additional paper if there is insufficient space and attach this form. For tools, food, school kits, and physical education kits, use formats pages 2, 3 and 4, A, B and C.

13. CARE is an organization with very limited resources, as compared to the VN and US Governments. Therefore, before we will consider helping, you must ask the district or province Social Welfare Chief, the USOM representative and the VN Army Civil Affairs officers for assistance. If they cannot help you, CARE will consider your requests.

What assistance have you requested from government and other agencies and what were their responses?

14. Commodities not distributed two months after having been consigned from the CARE office may be returned to Saigon for redistribution or re-assigned to another program with prior approval from CARE. We include this clause since CARE funds are not adequate for each province to stockpile CARE commodities, and we request prompt distribution upon receipt of such commodities. Until the ultimate recipients receive them, CARE commodities remain the property of CARE.

USOM Representative

Civic Action Officer - U.S. Army

Signature of
Applicant

Note: Sometimes CARE may be able to furnish something that is not on the regular package list. If you have a self-help project that lacks something you are not able to furnish, describe your needs to us. We might be able to help.

A. SCHOOL KITS AND PHYSICAL EDUCATION KITS

1. Education Chief
2. How many students?
3. By whom was school built?
 - (a) Contractor
 - (b) Villagers (self-help)

4. Who provided building materials?
 - (a) USOM
 - (b) Contractor and paid by GVN
5. Type of school
 - (a) Primary
 - (b) Secondary
 - (c) Religious
 - (1) Catholic
 - (2) Buddhist
 - (3) Other
6. What are the students using for school and/or physical education supplies now?
7. Who is paying the teachers' salary?
8. Are the students refugees from VC or natural disaster?

B. HAND TOOLS

1. Have the proposed recipients received technical training in the skill for which the tools are requested? If "yes", where?
2. How will the recipients use these tools to better themselves?
 - (a) Are the raw materials such as wood, steel, and cement readily available to the recipient of the kit?
 - (b) Is there a market for the skill the recipient possesses where he is living? Can he sell whatever he plans to manufacture?
3. Will the kit be used by cadres?
 - (a) What does their extension work consist of?
 - (b) How many cadres in a team and what are their functions?
 - (c) How will they travel to their place of work?
 - (d) Will they live in the villages and hamlets where they are expected to perform?

C. FOOD (Rice and Salt)

1. Submit a list of the heads of each needy family and the number of people in the family.
2. Describe the nature of the disaster (accidental fire, flood, VC attack, etc.), and present living conditions.
3. Have the proper Social Welfare Authorities been notified of the emergency and what assistance has been requested from them? What money and/or food are they receiving from GVN or US Government?
4. What response did you receive?

D. GIFTS-IN-KIND

Since contributions-in-kind are donations to CARE by manufacturers, the commodities on hand at any one time are seldom the same. However, in most instances, they are something which would fit in well to supplement and for emergency distribution. We will attempt to keep you informed on the additions and deletions to this list. When making a request for these commodities, simply give the reason why these people need assistance and the number of people and families involved.

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

ISSUE SLIP
TO:

DATE: _____

The following items have been issued in quantities indicated:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT WEIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL WEIGHT</u>
FLOUR	<u>BAG</u>	_____	<u>100 LBS</u>	_____
CORN MEAL	<u>BAG</u>	_____	<u>100 LBS</u>	_____
SUGAR	<u>BAG</u>	_____	<u>52 LBS</u>	_____
BEANS	<u>BAG</u>	_____	<u>100 LBS</u>	_____
SALAD OIL	<u>CASE</u>	_____	<u>53.2 LBS (6 can)</u>	_____
CLOTHING	<u>BALE</u>	_____	<u>200 LBS</u>	_____
MILK POWDER	<u>CASE</u>	_____	<u>59.2 LBS (12 box)</u>	_____
MILK POWDER	<u>BOX</u>	_____	<u>4.5 LBS</u>	_____
SALAD OIL	<u>CAN</u>	_____	<u>7.5 LBS</u>	_____
SCHOOL KIT	<u>KIT</u>	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____

Issued by: _____

Received by: _____

Name (Print) _____

Name (Print) _____

Signature: _____

Signature: _____

Rank: _____

ASN: _____

Organization: _____

This issue slip to be prepared in three (3) copies
Copy 1 Retained by issuing depot.
Copy 2 AC/S G5 F FORCE V
Copy 3 Retained by Recipient

Annex 4 to Inclosure 3

PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. It is not enough that we help the people in a tiny village build a bridge which cuts the distance to their rice paddies. It is not enough to provide medicine and medical aid to the sick or to build a school or sink a well. Because communication between villages in Vietnam is often poor, it becomes imperative that we initiate reports to the people of the entire country when our good deeds come from the heart. As Americans, undoubtedly most of us find patting ourselves on the back distasteful. But in Vietnam it is a political and military necessity to advise the people of this democracy how we're trying to help, so that the ill-advised or easily misled will not distrust or misinterpret our mission in South Vietnam.

2. Consequently, in any civil action of note in which a command participates, the information officer should tactfully--the word is stressed--publicize this contribution to international brotherhood. This publicity should not be propaganda, the how-great-we-are approach, but rather a simple statement of facts. We can be assured that the friendly press in South Vietnam wants to assist us by publicizing these charitable acts on behalf of the South Vietnamese.

3. The information officer, Hqs Field Force, Vietnam, invites unit commanders or unit information officers to contact his office for any assistance, including preparation of a news story.

The following are important to any news release:

- a. The action itself, in sufficient detail to be understandable.
- b. Location (don't just name a tiny village; locate it by distance to a familiar point).
- c. Unit and individual participants (full names, ranks, street address and hometown).
- d. Number of people aided.
- e. Length of time action encompassed.
- f. Pictures, preferably close-ups so faces and expressions can be noted.
- g. What would have happened if there had been no assistance?
- h. If available, a comment from the village or hamlet chief, expressing thanks. Ask if you may use his name in a news release. Do not otherwise include his name.

FOREIGN CLAIMS

1. The main purpose of the Foreign Claims Act is to promote and maintain friendly relations through the prompt settlement of meritorious non-combat claims of foreign nationals arising in their countries. The proper implementation of the Foreign Claims Act can do much to foster the good will of the people of Vietnam and will contribute to the success of the US mission in this country.

2. Serious incidents which may be the subject of undue, adverse, or unfavorable publicity against the United States can be minimized by prompt investigation and payment of meritorious claims. In this connection telephonic reports to the Claims Judge Advocate, MACV (Tiger 516 or AV 40737) should be made in all such cases to obtain all available assistance towards an expeditious and amicable settlement.

3. Unit claims officers must be appointed by the commander exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over a unit. Accordingly, that commander is responsible for the prompt and thorough investigation of all non-combat incidents arising out of the activities of that unit which may result in a claim against the United States.

4. Claims arising from combat activities are not recognizable under the Foreign Claims Act and should be processed through Vietnamese Channels, usually starting with the District or Province Chief. Again, promptness is an essential factor.

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
BULLETIN NUMBER 1

22 October 1965

1. (U) PURPOSE: This bulletin is designed to supplement letter, Hq FFV, Subject, Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance, dated 4 October 1965. It will be published only as frequently as required and will attempt to assist units by offering ideas, highlighting deficiencies and possible solutions and listing materiel available for civic action projects.
2. (U) CORRECTION: Letter, Headquarters FFOCEV, Subject: Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Guidance, dated 4 October 1965 contains a significant typographical error. The first word of paragraph 1 e, Inclosure 1 should be "Indemnification"; not "Identification."
3. (U) REVOLVING RURAL CONSTRUCTION FUND: MACV has inaugurated a four month test of this fund. It is intended to provide sector and subsector advisors with readily available funds to support high impact rural construction projects. This is another potential source of funds for combined US Forces-ARVN projects.
4. (U) PRICE CONTROL: Rising prices are becoming a serious problem in areas of high US Troop concentrations. US military personnel who overpay for items purchased on the local economy are not only giving money away unnecessarily, they are causing prices to rise out of reach of the average Vietnamese. On items which are in limited supply, the merchant is most likely to restrict his sales to Americans since they will pay more. The result in terms of Vietnamese-American relations is undesirable. The establishment of maximum-price lists is a necessary first step but alone it is not enough. It must be enforced on both sides. Units should get on this one quick-like. It is beginning to get out of hand.
5. (U) CIVIC ACTION PLANNING: Since US units are subject to being moved into any province or district within II Corps Tactical Zone on short notice, sector and subsector advisors should plan for this eventuality in terms of civic action projects which these units might undertake on their arrival. Saves time at a time when time is critical and it can make a difference in Vietnamese-American relations in operational areas.
6. (U) RURAL CONSTRUCTION: Your attention is invited to MACV Directive 525-4, Subjects: Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, dated 17 September 1965.
7. (U) VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCY SUPPLIES: Although formal procedures have been established for obtaining voluntary relief agency supplies, do not hesitate to request by phone or message if the circumstances require more rapid reaction. We can't guarantee results but we can try.

Stockpiling of reasonable amounts in your area is authorized. The following is offered as a guide only: Bulgar Wheat-10 lbs/person/month, Corn Meal-3 lbs/person/month, Salad Oil-1 lb/person/month.

The following items are available through the Catholic Relief Services for refugees: Bulgar Wheat, Dried Milk, Salad Oil and Corn Meal. Salt, Canned Milk and medicines will be available within approximately 30 days.

The following items are available through CARE: Fish Oil (Nuoc Mam), Rice, Salt, Gravy Mix and Textile Packages. The textile

package contains 14 meters of black rayon cloth, 800 meters of black thread, scissors, 25 needles, 144 black buttons and 1 kilogram of laundry soap.

Your attention is directed once again to the fact that CRS items are not restricted to Catholic recipients. In issuing these items units should avoid giving the impression that the assistance is intended for a specific religious group.

Am/17
8. (U) GVN HOLIDAYS: 1 November is National Armed Forces Day. This is the anniversary of the overthrow of the Diem regime.

2 November - The morning is dedicated to those who have given their lives in the struggle against Communism.

9. (U) USOM SUPPLIES: The following items are available through the USOM province representative: Bulgar Wheat, Corn, Cooking Oil, Dried Milk, Cement, Roofing, Reinforcing Bars, Cloth, Sewing Kits, Sanitary Kits, Blankets, Mosquito Nets and Sleeping Mats.

10. (U) CLAIMS: Pressure is frequently put on US units to get VN civilian claims settled quickly. Don't let this pressure lead you into making promises which you are not certain you can fulfill. Check your facts out thoroughly before you commit yourself.

11. (U) REMOVING CAPTURED RICE: Some units are attempting to hire local civilians to haul captured rice from the "battlefield" to a point where it can be secured. Might be worth a try. II Corps advisory personnel are also looking for possible ways of assisting US and Third Country units in removing food and livestock captured from the VC.

12. (U) (FOUO) PEOPLES ACTION TEAMS: These Vietnamese teams are performing civic action in most II C.Z provinces. Contact Sector Advisors who will assist you in coordinating with these teams.

13. (U) CIVIC ACTION REPORTING: Weekly Civic Action reports required by FRV Regulation 10-1 dated 8 September 1965, are arriving at this headquarters as much as four days late and incomplete. Please note that the regulation says to forward by the most expeditious means. Dictionary definition of expeditious: efficient and speedy; prompt.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Neil M. Matzger

NEIL M. MATZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

PAUL F. SMITH
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC
APO San Francisco 96358

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 322

12 November 1965

	Section
ACTIVATION AND ORGANIZATION.	.I
DISCONTINUANCE	.II

SECTION I

ACTIVATION AND ORGANIZATION

1. TC 003. Following Organization/Unit ACTIVATED and ORGANIZED as indicated in Inclosure 1.

HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM 20035, TH P5 52-1D, 61 w/C 6

Assigned to: United States Army, Vietnam

Effective date: 15 November 1965

Authorized strength: As indicated in Inclosure 1.

Equipment: Required and not available will be requisitioned in accordance with normal supply procedures.

Personnel: Maximum number of personnel required by this action will be assigned from locally available resources without MP&ICS costs; the remainder will be procured through application of normal personnel requisitioning procedures. New enlisted personnel authorizations will be reflected immediately in the O&O-45 Report.

Files/records: Will be maintained in accordance with AR 345-210 or AR 345-45 as applicable.

Morning report: Initial and subsequent morning reports will be submitted in accordance with AR 335-60.

Mission: To command all assigned or attached troops.

Authority: DA message 735789, 11 October 1965.

Fund obligation: Obligate to the extent necessary the appropriate allotments in accordance with current fiscal procedures.

Special instructions: Not applicable.

SECTION II

DISCONTINUANCE

1. TC 022. Following Organization/Unit DISCONTINUED.

TASK FORCE ALPHA, TH P5-2501-00, APO 96240

Effective date: 15 November 1965

(GO 322, HQ USARPAC, 1965)

Encl 18

Equipment: Will be transferred to Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam.
Personnel: Will be transferred to Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam.
Files/records: Will be disposed of in accordance with AR 345-210 or
AR 345-215 as applicable.
Morning report: Final will be submitted in accordance with AR 335-60.
Authority: DA message 735789, 11 October 1965.
Special instructions: Unit fund will be disposed of in accordance with
AR 230-10.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

A. J. ADAMS
Major General, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

/s/JOHN S. TYLER
/t/JOHN S. TYLER
Colonel, AGC
Acting Adjutant General

1 Incl
Org of Unit

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A TRUE COPY:

JAMES O. DAY
Major, GS
Operations Officer

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PERSONNEL SUMMIES

UNIT	AUTH SURRENDER (30 Sep 65)	AUTH SURRENDER (30 Dec 65)	PD SURRENDER (30 Sep 65)	PD SURRENDER (30 Dec 65)	PERCENT OF AUTH (30 Dec 65)	PERCENT OF AUTH (30 Dec 65)
Hq FFORCOV	431	409	394	382	91	93
54th SIG Bn w/Atch	722	722	698	681	97	94
272 LP Co	182	182	166	151	92	83
MI Detachments	114	114	103	99	94	87
Hq & Hq FFW Arty	43	43		47		98
1st Bn, 30th Arty	600	600		578		96
1st Air Cav Div	15,895	15,955	15,606	15,078	98	90
1st Air Cav Div Atch Units	1,500	2,762	1,253	2,409	83	90
1st Bn, 101st Abn Div	4,179	4,471	3,796	4,578	90	100+
2/7 Marines	1,190		1,076		90	
II Corps		1,095		986		90
10th Avn Bn		925		900		86
52d Avn Bn		1,981		1,533		97
363d Bn		243		221		91
ROK Capital Div		12,510	979	12,413		99
ROK Marine Bde		5,841	277	5,125		98
3d Bn, 25th Inf Div		3,978		3,73(10)		
41st Civil Affairs Co		110		121		86

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Jan 20