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AGAM-P (M) (1 May 67) FOR OT

9 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
1ST SPECIAL FORCES



OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

SECRET REPORT 1000

In addition to the information contained in this document, the following information is being transmitted to the personnel of the 5th Special Forces Group. This information should be made only with personnel of the 5th Special Forces Group.

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AVGB-C

11 15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96307

12 213 p.

18 OACSFOR

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

19 OT-RD-670787

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION 1 (A) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General: Throughout the last quarter CIDG forces have aggressively pursued the Viet Cong and successfully thwarted his attempts to mass forces for large scale attacks on CIDG camps. The increasingly rapid response by CIDG units, Mike Forces, tactical aircraft, and artillery to enemy contacts and intelligence reports has unquestionably limited VC operations and caused him to sustain large numbers of casualties. This steadily improving reaction capability has also given a tremendous boost to the confidence of the CIDG troops. During the last three months CIDG forces were credited with killing 1,302 VC, as compared with 817 for the previous reporting period. (see ~~inclosure 5-6~~). Particularly noteworthy was the contribution of the CIDG units in joint operations with other Free World Military Assistance Forces. The missions given to CIDG units include reconnaissance, search and destroy, flank security, blocking force, reaction force, road and convoy security, and special missions. In all such operations the CIDG forces have proven to be a potent, flexible supplement to conventional units. Outstanding examples are Operation Rio Blanco, Task

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Force Prong (see Inclosure 10), the Mike Force in Tay Ninh Province prior to Operation Attleboro (see Inclosure 11), and Project Delta reconnaissance operations. The Mobile Guerrilla Force concept was further developed and refined with the successful completion of Blackjack 21 and 22 (see Inclosures 16, 17). These operations were of significant value in restricting the VC use of safe havens in areas where he had been previously unmolested. In addition, experience gained in unconventional warfare operations of this type will be an invaluable aid to the future development of Special Forces doctrine. The flood conditions which existed throughout the Delta area in the fall of 1966 turned out to be an opportunity as well as a hardship (see Inclosures 13 - 15). By exploiting a responsive, prolific logistical system, superior firepower and mobility, and personal ingenuity and determination, the detachments in IV CTZ were able to achieve several telling victories over the enemy. The employment of airboats and U.S. Navy Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) together with armed helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and air-mobile reaction forces proved to be a formidable operational asset against the Viet Cong. Using information gained and lessons learned during this period, Company D is preparing a rainy season offensive plan for 1967 which is designed to capitalize on the potential advantages of flood conditions to friendly units. To cope with the personnel problems generated by the expanding scope and intensity of Special Forces operations, a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) was written and submitted to USARV (see Inclosure 22). The approval of the MTOE will solve one of the greatest problems facing this unit, i.e., maintaining sufficient personnel to accomplish currently assigned missions. The Group staff was reorganized in order to facilitate coordination and planning of the Revolutionary Development program for 1967. The S5 section has been redesignated the Revolutionary Development Support Activity, and PSYOP is now a function of the S3 section. The group historical program was given additional impetus by the visit of BG S.L.A. Marshall. Under his guidance selected unit personnel were trained in the technique of conducting combat after-action interviews. Also, a Group regulation outlining the historical program is being published. As an adjunct to this program, a Historical/Group Behavior Pilot Study is being conducted among selected "A" detachments (see Inclosure 19). To accommodate and stimulate the spiritual aspects of a soldier's life, a new Group Chapel was built in a period of only 17 days. It was completed in time for the visit of Francis Cardinal Spellman, who led Christmas Mass and Blessed the attractive new Chapel.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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2. (C) Intelligence: During the reporting period the Group S2 continued implementation of previously initiated plans to increase the intelligence collection and production effort within the command. For greater efficiency and economy of personnel there has been a consolidation and reorganization of intelligence resources at the "A" detachment, "B" detachment, and company levels (Incl #2). Plans for utilization of the DOD authorized MI augmentation detachment have been finalized, and the first of these personnel have already arrived in the Group (Incl 2, Annex 2). As an aid to lower level units and to insure receiving maximum timely information and intelligence, many new group regulations are being published and distributed. To insure the maximum utilization of all intelligence resources and prevent costly duplication of effort, an aggressive program of close coordination with all intelligence agencies in the Republic of Vietnam has been instituted. (Incl 2, Annex 1).

a. It has been recognized that one of the major advantages enjoyed by the free world military forces over the enemy is the superiority of our modern technology as applied to warfare. This same technology which has proven so effective on the battlefield in terms of mobility and firepower can also be put to use in the intelligence field. The Group is currently engaged in the development, procurement and use of advanced electronic devices to aid in combat surveillance and specialized intelligence projects (Incl 2, Annex 3).

b. On 18 January 1967 the Group conducted an S2 Conference/Seminar to discuss the variations of Special Forces in-country intelligence activities and arrive at a standard program in consonance with current Group policy and MACV directives. All participants were encouraged to present their personal views on their areas of the proposed intelligence program. Recommendations for intelligence requirements and procedures were finalized.

c. The final phase of the intelligence cycle is dissemination of the finished intelligence product. The increasing capability of the Group's collection and analysis elements and the greater number of intelligence report recipients has seriously overloaded the Group's reproduction facilities. One "3M" Brand Model 209 has been requisitioned for use by the Group headquarters, which processes an average of more than 450 duplications of documents, records, letters, and supporting inclosures each day. Five "3M" Brand Model 107's have been requisitioned for use by Companies A, B, C, D, and Detachment B-55 in order to more effectively administer to higher, lower and adjacent units.

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3. (C) Operations and Training:

a. Plans.

(1) The plan for special operations during the first half of CY 1967 was drawn up and submitted during the quarter. Additionally, revisions and updating on existing plans and directives concerning 5th SFG CI and UW missions were completed and submitted as directed by MACV. 8

(2) The preparation of specific contingency plans for the 5th SFG was initiated and will be completed during the next quarter.

(3) The 5th Special Forces Group MTOE 31-105E, dated 11 January 1967, was forwarded to U.S. Army, Vietnam, on 13 January 1967 and is currently being staffed by that headquarters. The approval of the MTOE will solve one of the greatest problems facing this unit, i.e., assignment of sufficient personnel to accomplish currently assigned missions. Although certain increases in unit strength were approved and authorized as far back as 1965, the obstacle of troop strength limitations in Vietnam has caused the MTOE to be slowed up pending identification of trade-off spaces. U.S. Army, Vietnam, has attempted to alleviate the personnel shortage problems by indorsing a 5th Special Forces Group request for TDY personnel for 180 days as a stop-gap measure, and by attempting to expedite the transmittal of the MTOE. In house measures being taken by the 5th Special Forces Group to address the personnel problem include: assignment of personnel within the group to insure maximum manning of operational units and minimum manning of headquarters units, encouragement of voluntary tour extensions, and a hard look at all requests for curtailment of tours.

b. (C) Operations. Summary of Significant Operations by Corps Tactical Zones:

I CTZ: During the period 20-23 November, CIDG and RF units from several camp areas in I Corps participated in the first joint/combined operation in I Corps. Other units participating in Operation "Rio Blanco" were ARVN, ARVN Rangers, Korean Marines, and U.S. Marines. In December USASF detachment members from Camps Tien Phuc, A-102, Quang Tin Province; Ha Thanh, A-104, Quang Ngai Province; and Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, were attached to the 1st USMC Reconnaissance Battalion to participate in operations that were being conducted in or near the TAOR's of their individual detachments. This program proved to be highly successful and will be continued.

Operational activity in the area of Camp Thuong Duc increased in size, number and scope during the reporting period. The most successful operation was conducted on 21-22 January 1967. This search and destroy operation, consisting of four USASF, two LLDB and two companies of CIDG, became heavily engaged with an estimated two companies of VC main force troops in the vicinity of ZC 2054. Due to the requirement for quick reaction by an exploitation force, an additional company of CIDG and RF were dispatched from the camp. The Mobile Force, which was on standby as a company reserve at Danang, was shuttled into Camp Thuong Duc to provide additional exploitation forces and to augment camp defense. By aggressive maneuvering

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and excellent fire and air support, this operation resulted in 49 VC killed (confirmed), 25 VC killed (probable), and large amounts of supplies and equipment destroyed.

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During the period 19-21 December Detachment A-101 moved from Khe Sanh to Long Vei II. Prior to the move Long Vei had been an ARVN camp. The camp was completely operational by 21 December.

II CTZ: On 8 November Task Force Prong was initiated in the area of Operation Paul Revere IV. Initially the Task Force consisted of one Mike Force Company (3rd Co), one CIDG company from Camp Duc Co, A-253, Pleiku Province, and a command element from Company B. At 101330 Nov the Duc Co company, the Plei Djereng company and the command element were in heavy contact with an estimated battalion from the 33rd NVA Regiment. Contact was broken when two companies from the 4th U.S. Infantry Division linked up with the CIDG force at 110030 Nov. On 110630 Nov the Mike Force company was in heavy contact with an estimated battalion from the 88th NVA Regiment. Contact was broken when a U.S. company linked up with the Mike Force at 111630 Nov. In these actions two USASF were killed and three were wounded. On 190900 Nov the Mike Force company was relieved by two infantry companies from the 4th U.S. Infantry Division. (See inclosure 10 for After Action Report).

During the month of January there was a significant increase in activity around Camp Lac Tien, A-236, Darlac Province. Operations conducted on 5, 10, and 13 January made contact with VC units up to company size, resulting in a total of 22 VC killed (confirmed) and over 100 probably killed. One CIDG was killed, 9 wounded, and two USASF wounded in these contacts. On 13 January one CIDG company was airlifted from Camp An Lac, A-234, Darlac Province, to provide reinforcement for Camp Lac Tien. The next day two ARVN battalions commenced operations in this area to further augment the security of the camp. A company size operation from Camp Lac Tien again made contact on 19 January during which seven VC were killed by airstrikes (confirmed), 35 probably killed, and five automatic weapons destroyed. Reaction forces were sent out from camp, but were called back because of intelligence reports indicating that a large enemy force was moving from the south with the intent to overrun Lac Tien District Headquarters and Camp Lac Tien. Although this attack has not materialized, it is considered to be well within the enemy's capability, and the threat to the camp still exists.

Construction of a new camp at Plei Djereng, A-251, Pleiku Province, began in December. A concentrated effort started on 13 Dec with the arrival of the Special Forces Engineer Team KB-7 of the 539th Engineer Detachment. This is the first camp to be built under the "fighting camp" concept (See Inclosure 3).

III CTZ: The most significant action during this reporting period occurred near Camp Soui Da, A-322, Tay Ninh Province. On 2 Nov the III Corps Mike Force was moved by air into the Soui Da area to conduct reconnaissance missions against a known VC base area. Eight separate contacts were made with elements of several VC regiments. The Mike Force was credited with rendering a VC battalion ineffective. Total

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confirmed enemy casualties were 35 killed, and another 148 probably killed in ground action. This action was part of a developing situation which later became Operation Attleboro, the largest operation of the war up to that time. (See Inclosure 11 for After Action Report).

On 10 Jan a combined CIDG, ARVN and Mike Force heliborne operation was initiated in support of the opening of a new CIDG camp at Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province. Continuous light-to-moderate enemy contacts have been made since the operation began. On 21 Jan one Mike Force Company and one CIDG company on a search and destroy operation engaged an estimated reinforced VC company armed with automatic weapons. A heavy firefight ensued, and artillery and airstrikes were called in. Two USASF were wounded on the initial contact, and a Medevac helicopter came in to perform the evacuation. After take-off, the helicopter received heavy ground fire and was shot down, resulting in one U.S. pilot killed and one helicopter destroyed. As the firefight continued, one USASF was killed, one CIDG killed, and seven CIDG wounded in an assault on VC positions. After airstrikes were received, the VC broke contact and withdrew southwest. As of 31 Jan, 19 VC had been killed, four captured, and nine suspects detained. Also, the operation had suffered a total of 42 friendly casualties, the majority of which had been caused by mines and booby traps that had been encountered in the area.

On 14 Jan a company size search and destroy operation from Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province made contact with an estimated NVA battalion in defensive positions. Airstrikes and artillery supported, and the 31st ARVN Ranger Battalion from Song Be, B-34, Phuoc Long Province, was dispatched to Bu Dop to reinforce camp defenses after another CIDG company was sent to the contact area as a reaction force. Results of this contact were 55 NVA killed and 13 weapons captured. Friendly casualties were three CIDG killed and 11 wounded, with six weapons lost. (See Inclosure 12 for After Action Report).

During the last quarter Detachment B-35 was relocated from Hiep Hoa to Duc Hoa in Hau Nghia Province, with Detachment A-351 assuming operations at Hiep Hoa. On 4 Jan Detachment A-333 moved to a new location at Cam Song Be, Phuoc Long Province. As mentioned above, Camp Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province was opened on 10 January.

IV CTZ: The past quarter began with much of the Delta area still flooded. As a result of Special Forces logistical capability and the vulnerability of the Viet Cong forces, the flooded conditions gave friendly forces a clear tactical advantage. This advantage was further enhanced by the employment of airboats, U.S. Navy Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV), and armed helicopters in combined operations. Three airboat platoons completed training and were deployed to the operational areas of Moc Hoa (B-41) and Cai Cai (A-412). These platoons participated in forty-five search and destroy operations during the month of November and the first half of December (See Inclosure 14). Three U.S. Navy PACV's were deployed in Kien Tuong Province on an experimental basis and proved excellent for use in this area. The speed, firepower and shock effect of the airboat platoons and PACV's together with armed helicopters turned many operations into decisive victories. The most outstanding operation of this type was conducted on 22 Nov by Camp Moc Hoa, A-414, Kien Tuong Province. This search and destroy operation was supported by five airboats,

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// three PACV's, and armed helicopters. The helicopters made contact with 75 VC in 25 sampans who were attempting to withdraw to the north when sighted. The PACV's and airboats moved to the location and engaged the VC. CIDG forces were helilifted into position east of the contact and advanced approximately 200 meters northwest until they had to be extracted due to proximity of the Cambodian border. Results of this operation were 56 VC killed, 11 small arms various other items captured, with only one CIDG wounded. (See inclosure 14, annex 1, for After Action Report.)

When the water table receded in mid-December, camps damaged by the floods began their assessment of damage and reconstruction within their capabilities. An after action report on the flood period has been included in this report as Inclosure 13.

A significant contact was made by Camp Thuong Thoi, A-425, Kien Phong Province, on 6 Jan. A company size search and destroy patrol engaged an estimated VC company in fortified positions. A-425 requested assistance from the Mike Force in trying to hold the VC in position and destroying them before they could slip across the Cambodian border. A USAF FAC adjusted artillery fire and called for an immediate airstrike while the Mike Force company was being committed. Within three hours of the request, sufficient helicopters had been assembled and the Mike Force company had been helilifted into position. Even though the VC company was able to withdraw into Cambodia under cover of darkness and carry away the dead and wounded, all indications were that the VC suffered heavy casualties.

Detachment A-427 on Phu Quoc Island continued operation Pepperbush, which is designed to pacify the entire island during 1967. Phase IV was completed in December 1966 with favorable results. The VC no longer band together in large units, but move about in small groups mostly talking evasive action.

c. (S) Special Operations.

(1) Project Omega: Project Omega participated in Operation BLACKHAWK under the operational control of CG. I Force V with eight reconnaissance teams, the 3rd Reaction Force company, and two platoons from the Security Force during the period 12 November-3 December 1966. On 12 December 1966, the detachment returned to the field for continuation of BLACKHAWK, which lasted until 12 January 1967. The results of these operations were highly profitable with regard to intelligence gathered for use in planning future FVMAF operations.

(2) Project Delta: Since the last reporting period Project Delta conducted the following activities:

(a) Opn 13-66 Phase I - (14 Oct - 18 Nov)

(b) Opn 13-66 Phase II - 28 Nov - 24 Dec 66. The Phase II operation resulted in six VC KIA, nine KBA.

(3) Project Sigma: Since the last reporting period, Project Sigma has conducted 5 operations as follows:

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- (a) Operation Point Lansing (4-9 Nov).
- (b) Operation 5-66 (10 Nov - 6 Dec).
- (c) Operation Toronto (4-8 Jan).
- (d) Operation Nashville (17-19 Jan 67).
- (e) Operation Sheboygan (17-18 Jan 67).

The operations resulted in 18 VC killed.

(4) The following is an outline of the long range reconnaissance patrol program of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne):

(a) Concept:

1. Overt reconnaissance and commando assets, Projects Omega and Sigma, are deployed to provide a long range reconnaissance and interdiction capability to Commanding General IFFV and IIFPV.

2. Reconnaissance and Airborne Ranger force assets, Project Delta, are deployed to provide long range reconnaissance and interdiction capability to Senior Advisors I and IV CTZ or provide a MACV reserve for in-country operations.

(b) Forces:

1. Special Operations Command Element-NHA TRANG:

Deputy Commander for Special Operations, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. Project Delta (USMACV Reserve)-NHA TRANG:

- a. Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).
- b. 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (5 companies).
- c. One camp defense company.
- d. 12 reconnaissance teams (Recondo).
- e. 6 CIDG Road Runner Teams.

3. Project Omega (IFFV)-NHA TRANG:

- a. Detachment B-50, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).
- b. 3 commando companies.
- c. One camp defense company.

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d. 8 reconnaissance teams.

e. 4 Road Runner Teams.

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4. Project Sigma (IIFV)-HO NGOC TAO:

a. 3 commando companies.

b. 1 camp defense company.

c. 8 reconnaissance teams.

5. MACV Recondo School-NHA TRANG:

<u>STRENGTH RECAPITULATION:</u>			Recon	RR	Commando	Security
Det	Off	EM	Teams	Teams	Companies	Companies
B-50	7	52	8	4	3	1
B-52	19	71	12	6	*5	1
B-56	11	49	8	4	3	1
MACV RECONDO SCHOOL	3	27				

* - 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (VNSF).

(c) Tasks:

1. The long range reconnaissance task of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is to find the enemy. This task is a country-wide effort extending through the four CTZ's of the Republic of Vietnam and related to conducting special operations against VMC/NVA headquarters, communications facilities, supply lines and bases in areas along the SVN/Laos and Cambodian borders.

2. Special Operation Projects:

a. Project Delta maintains an operational command, providing advisory personnel for 12 US/VN reconnaissance teams and the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (VNSF). Project Delta missions are assigned jointly by MACV/JCS and the project is then placed under the operational control of a specified VN Corps. Project Delta has been continuously deployed for periods up to 30 days with 5 to 7 days rest and refit between operations. MACV continues to have a Project Delta force for use in I and IV Corps or to satisfy unfulfilled requirements in II and III Corps.

b. Project Omega maintains an operational command providing command and control personnel for 8 US/VN reconnaissance teams, 3 commando companies and 1 camp security company. Project Omega is organized

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with US personnel and Mike Force assets, obviating the necessity for obtaining ARVN/JGS concurrence prior to employment. Project Omega is commanded by Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and is under the operational control of Commanding General IFFV. Missions are assigned by Commanding General IFFV and operational control may be passed to a US divisional command. Project Omega is normally deployed for periods up to 20 days with 5 to 7 days rest and refit between operations. 14

c. Project Sigma maintains an operational command providing command and control for 8 US/VN reconnaissance teams, 3 commando companies and 1 camp security company. Project Sigma is organized with US personnel and Mike Force assets, obviating the necessity for obtaining ARVN/JGS concurrence prior to employment. Project Sigma is commanded by Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and is under the operational control of Commanding General IFFV. Missions are assigned by Commanding General IFFV and operational control may be passed to a US divisional command. Project Sigma is normally deployed for periods up to 20 days with 5 to 7 days rest and refit between operations.

(d) Campaign Plan:

1. General:

a. Projects Omega, Delta and Sigma remain responsive to their respective control headquarters. Following alert for operational commitment, projects are assigned areas of operation (AO).

b. Liaison and coordination is effected, support requirements stated, and an operational plan formulated. This plan is presented to the controlling headquarters for approval. A Forward Operating Base (FOB) is established and required force deployed to the FOB. Reconnaissance teams are assigned Reconnaissance Zones (RZs) and infiltrated in accordance with the approved operation order. Commando forces are held ready for commitment to support extraction of reconnaissance teams in the event an emergency should develop. During the conduct of the operation, SITREIS and SIOT REPORTS are transmitted to the control headquarters with info copies passed to interested headquarters. Upon completion of the reconnaissance mission, teams are extracted and debriefed, and a detailed after action report is published and distributed.

2. Support Requirements:

a. Army Aviation Support:

(1) Deputy Commander for Special Operations, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), assumes control of Army aviation support normally in direct support of Detachment B-52 operations so that no loss of team work or operational capability will occur.

(2) Appropriate FFV commander provides Army

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aircraft air support to Projects Omega and Sigma. Every effort is made to use the same aircraft crews in order to enhance operational techniques and teamwork.

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(3) Supported headquarters provide continuous air radio relay support to insure that a dawn-to-dusk communications link with deployed reconnaissance teams is maintained.

(4) Airlift for 132 man Commando Company on a 2 hour stand-by basis.

3. Tactical air support:

a. Project Delta continues to be augmented by 1 USAF ALO and FAC with OLE aircraft.

b. Appropriate FFV commander provides Projects Omega and Sigma with similar support, at least to include 1 FAC and O-1E/F aircraft.

c. Tactical air support is provided through respective corps DASC. Air strikes are normally delivered within 30 minutes from the time of request.

4. Fire support: When operational, Projects Omega, Delta and Sigma receive fire support from the supported command.

5. Exploitation force: An exploitation force of company to brigade strength may be provided, as required and appropriate, to exploit targets of opportunity uncovered by reconnaissance teams and/or commando forces.

(5) Mobile Guerrilla Force: During the past reporting period, two Mobile Guerrilla Force operations were completed. Blackjack 21, 9 Oct - 9 Nov 66, was conducted in southwestern Kontum Province (see Inclosure 16 for After Action Report). Blackjack 22, 10 Dec 66 to 12 Jan 67, was conducted in Boun Me Ga area of II CTZ (see Inclosure 17 for After Action Report). As of 31 Jan 67 two operations, Blackjack 31 and Blackjack 41, are in progress. The following is an outline of the Mobile Guerrilla Force program as developed by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

(a) (S) Concept: USASF Mobile Guerrilla Forces are deployed into VC dominated areas to establish a series of secret patrol bases and conduct reconnaissance and combat operations against VC/NVA forces.

(b) (S) Forces:

1. 8 USASF "A" Detachments.
2. 8 Combat Reconnaissance Platoons.
3. 8 Guerrilla Companies.

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(c) (S) Phases of Execution:

1. Phase I: Each "C" detachment, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is assigned two (2) USASF "A" detachments and from within Corps recruiting resources, provided two (2) Combat Recon Platoons and two (2) Guerrilla Companies. Mike Force reaction forces are currently assigned and require no augmentation. All units, except USASF "A" detachments, will consist of indigenous personnel responsive to US command and control.

2. Phase II: An intensified training period will be conducted by the USASF "A" detachment at a location to be designated by Commanding Officer, "C" detachment. Primary emphasis will be placed on individual and small unit tactics and operations. This training will cover:

- a. Intelligence collection.
- b. Reconnaissance operations.
- c. Raids and ambushes.
- d. Marksmanship.
- e. Communications.
- f. First aid.
- g. Survival.
- h. Land navigation.
- i. Physical conditioning.
- j. Special subjects to include DZ selection,

reporting and operations.

3. Phase III:

a. Operations commence on I-Day (to be announced) with the land infiltration of the guerrilla force into the area of operation from a pre-selected and established Forward Operating Base (FOB) and/or Mission Support Site (MSS).

b. The Combat Reconnaissance Platoon (CRP) will be dispatched in advance of the main body to provide route reconnaissance, collect intelligence information and establish the initial resupply point. The CRP will secure the patrol base (PB) and receive the first resupply. Within the operational area, the CRP will perform reconnaissance to determine routes of infiltration and provide intelligence information on the location of communications liaison stations and other Viet Cong installations.

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17 c. The guerrilla company will move on order, infiltrating into the operational area following deployment of the CRP. The guerrilla company will operate from a series of pre-selected patrol bases acting as a strike force to ambush routes of infiltration and attack VC installations based on intelligence information furnished by CRP. Primary emphasis will be placed on night operations.

d. (S) Campaign Plan:

(1) General: Although CIDG camps are established to conduct border surveillance and reconnaissance, numerous infiltration routes along the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam border afford NVA/VC combat forces a means of continued access. The guerrilla force is designed as an "Economy of Force" effort intended to project into remote isolated areas not under ARVN/FWMAF/CIDG surveillance. This force is especially tailored and trained to strike against enemy forces who have heretofore operated with seeming impunity.

(2) Planning: Commanding Officer, Detachments C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) initiate an immediate study to ascertain profitable areas of employment for their respective guerrilla forces. Areas will be assigned priorities and recommendations forwarded to this headquarters. Particular attention will be afforded the following areas:

- (a) Detachment C-1 - A Shau Valley
- (b) Detachment C-2 - Bu Prang
- (c) Detachment C-3 - Rung Sat Zone
- (d) Detachment C-4 - 7 mountains

(3) Command and Control:

(a) The guerrilla force operates under operational control of USASF "C" detachment upon orders from this headquarters. The guerrilla force is commanded by the USASF "A" detachment commander.

(b) Communications are established using the AN/PRC-64 (CW) direct to the USASF "C" detachment, monitored by headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Air-ground tactical support and radio relay are provided by AN/PRC-25 (FM). The HT-1 radio provides inter-command communications.

(4) Mission: The guerrilla force deploys into assigned operational area (AO) from FOB and/or MSS and establishes a series of secret patrol bases, and from these bases conducts border surveillance, interdiction of VC/NVA forces and installations in operational area. Air-strikes are employed against all targets of opportunity.

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(5) Capabilities:

- (a) Conduct ground reconnaissance.
- (b) Provide border surveillance. 18
- (c) Conduct raids and ambushes against company size NVA/VC units.
- (d) Conduct sustained ground operations against platoon size VC/NVA forces.
- (e) Improve and secure LZs for reinforcing friendly forces for a limited time.
- (f) Provide flank and local security for larger sized friendly forces.

(6) Support requirements include:

(a) Tactical Air: There will be no requirement for pre-planned airstrikes. Tactical air support required for the guerrilla force will be requested by the USASF "A" detachment personnel as required.

(b) Continuous airborne radio relay.

(c) Air resupply of the guerrilla force will be conducted every third to fifth day during the hours of darkness. Bundle codes will be employed.

d. (C) Training:

(1) The MACV Recondo School conducted three classes between 6 Nov and 28 Jan.

<u>Class</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Number Graduated</u>
RS-3	6 Nov 66-25 Nov 66	30
RS-4	4 Dec 66-24 Dec 66	36
RS-5	9 Jan 67-28 Jan 67	<u>22</u>
	TOTAL	88

(2) Detachment B-50 conducted six basic airborne classes during the reporting period.

<u>Class</u>	<u>Date Qualified</u>	<u>Number Qualified</u>
4-66	25 Nov 66	139
5-66	8 Dec 66	211
6-66	20 Dec 66	201

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<u>Class</u>	<u>Date Qualified</u>	<u>Number Qualified</u>
7-66	30 Dec 66	158
1-67	14 Jan 67	118
2-67	28 Jan 67	<u>198</u>
TOTAL		1,025

e. (C) Aviation:

(1) The C-7A (Caribou) was transferred from Army control to Air Force control on 1 January 1967. The operational control of the seven aircraft supporting the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) remained under the Group Commander. The transition required no adjustment by the 5th Special Forces Group air movement section since the same personnel continued to perform a similar mission. The Air Force has provided the responsive air lift required by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to perform its tactical mission.

(2) The 281st Aviation Company (AML) provided a portion of the helicopter support for the MACV Recordo classes R-3-67, R-4-67, R-5-67 and R-6-67. This unit's experience in supporting Special Forces reconnaissance operations proved to be of great value in the training and helped to insure continuity of procedures for infiltration, ex-filtration and use of airborne emergency equipment such as the McGuire rig. The school is also supported by a Special Forces USAF FAC. The USAF FAC presents a formal class on FAC procedures and participates in tactical operations.

(3) The 281st Aviation Company (AML) employed a heavy fire team in the IV Corps Tactical Zone of South Vietnam from 7 January to 20 January 1967.

(4) Aircraft availability and utilization:

See inclosure 18.

f. (S) Research and Development Projects Currently Under Evaluation:

(1) Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD). The MPD is a device intended to alert a foot patrol to the presence of concealed humans in ambush by detecting certain human chemical effluents. This device weighs 23 pounds. It is 19 inches long and 14 inches wide. The 5th SFGA presently has ten MPD's. Seven are located in the field and three are located at SFOB. At the SFOB, one MPD is out of order, two are kept as replacements. The evaluation is to be completed NLT 28 Feb 67. Indications are that the MPD will have limited use for Special Forces use.

(2) Battlefield Illumination System. The prototype system consists of 12 individual flares each contained in a filament wound launch tube.

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These 12 launch tubes are bonded to a molded plastic breech plate and further bonded into an extended plastic outer case. The overall dimensions of the system are 5 inches by 6 inches by 21 inches, and the total weight is 9 lbs. The system is designed to provide six minutes of continuous illumination or a combination of one and five minutes, or three and three minutes. The 5th SFGA presently has 14 illumination kits. Seven will be located in II CTZ and seven will be located in III CTZ. Preliminary tests indicate item is excellent.

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(3) 40mm Grenade Launcher (XM-148). This item was designed to be mounted under the front hand guard of the M-16 rifle. It has an extension bar attached to the right side of the weapon to bring the launcher trigger near the trigger of the rifle. 5th SFGA is presently evaluating five XM-148's. Two are located with Project Delta, two with Project Omega and one in IV CTZ. Results to date are excellent.

(4) Battery Operated Fluorescent Lamp. This lamp has an 11 inch miniature fluorescent tube powered by two 69 volt batteries or by 110 volt AC current. The lamp is designed to be hand carried or suspended from two eyelets on the back of the lamp. 5th SFGA has three lamps located at Project Delta. One is located in the medical tent, one in the Commo bunker and one in the TOC. It is an excellent item.

(5) Mine, Apers, Linear (Fragmacord). The mine consists of a 25 foot length of waterproof, flexible, explosive cord, beaded with coiled fragmentation rings crimped to the cord. Each ring is one inch long. Rings are spaced $\frac{1}{4}$ inch apart along the length of cord to provide flexibility in handling and emplacement. It may be initiated by electric or non-electric means. 5th SFGA will receive 120 mines. Thirty will be located in each CTZ.

(6) 40mm Rapid Fire Grenade Launcher. This weapon is 22 inches long, $9\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide and 12 inches high. It is mounted on a lightweight aluminum tripod. The launcher is hand-crank operated. It is fed from a 24 round ammunition box using plastic belted ammunition. The weapon uses the same ammunition as the M-79 Grenade Launcher. 5th SFGA has been scheduled to receive one weapon for evaluation.

(7) Submachine Gun, 5.56mm, CAR-15. This weapon is similar to the XM-16 rifle, however, it has a shorter barrel and hand guard, a telescoping butt stock, and different type of flash suppressor. It weighs 5.6 lbs, is 28 inches long with stock closed, and has a cyclic rate of fire of 750-900 rounds per minute. 5th SFGA will evaluate 100 CAR-15's. They will be located in each CTZ.

(8) See Inclosure 2, Annex 3, for additional developments in the field of intelligence.

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4. (C) Logistics:

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a. General. During the reporting period the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang, with a liaison detachment in Saigon, continued providing logistical support to all personnel in support of Parasol-Switchback projects. Over 10,000 tons of supplies were air lifted to the operational detachments by Army and Air Force aircraft. Approximately 600 tons of food, ammunition and other supplies were dropped by parachute to isolated camps and in support of special operations in the field.

b. Supply.

(1) Requisitions for all classes of supplies and equipment except class III and V are still submitted to the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO), 2d Logistical Command on Okinawa. The interservice support agreement initiated in October 1966 between the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn.) and the United States Army, Vietnam, has proven to be very satisfactory. This agreement authorized 5th Special Forces to requisition, on a fill or kill basis, common class II and IV and class V items directly from the 1st Logistical Command. In the past three months two and sometimes three convoys per week have transported supplies from the 1st Logistical Command at Cam Ranh Bay to the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang.

(2) From 1 November to 31 January more than 200 new 2½ ton trucks have been received enabling 5th Special Forces to begin its vehicle modernization and standardization program. As the older model 2½ ton trucks become uneconomically repairable they are being replaced with the new multifuel vehicles.

(3) In November, Group Regulation 725-2, Issue of Supplies and Equipment was published. This document establishes command policy and prescribes procedures for requisitioning all classes of supplies/equipment from in-country support activities utilizing single line item requisition system document. This enables the subordinate companies to requisition, on a fill or kill basis, directly from the closest support activity for Army common items, thus reducing transportation time.

c. Maintenance.

(1) Considerably more dry working space has been added to the maintenance facility by extending the overhead cover. An addition to the vehicular maintenance building was completed in December providing space for an engine rebuild shop.

(2) The empty RO/RO trailers are now being returned to Okinawa back loaded with engineer items, i.e., fork lifts and generators for rebuild. The fourth and fifth echelon repair facilities on Okinawa will be able to rebuild and return this equipment to the system.

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5. (C) Revolutionary Development:

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a. On 1 December 1966, the 5th Special Forces Group S5 Section was redesignated Revolutionary Development Support Activity. This change was in keeping with the realization that military defeat of the Viet Cong must go hand-in-hand with a true political and social evolution in Vietnam, achieved as rapidly as is realistically possible. Our primary objectives in RF are two-fold: first, to help the people help themselves; secondly to gain the support and loyalty of the people for the government of Vietnam. In order to provide closer supervision and support for the RD program, the S5 section was reorganized with a Major as Chief/RDSA and four officers as assistants, each responsible for a particular phase of the RD program. These phases are Civic Action, RD and Motivation Training, Logistics Support, and Field Training and Plans.

b. Motivation Indoctrination Training as conducted by a 60-man civilian cadre was cancelled effective 15 January 1967. The closing out of this cadre reduced the annual cost of motivation training by \$190,000. The CIDG CA/PSYOP Squad has assumed the responsibility for Motivation Training with an evident increase in effectiveness. To accomplish the additional missions assigned, all Corps are retraining the CA/PO squads using a 90-hour Program of Instruction. Many teams have been reorganized to insure that the squad meets the ethnic background of the CIDG troops and the civilian population.

c. The GVN has selected National Priority Areas which are to receive major emphasis in 1967. In most cases our "A" detachments will not receive formal RD support. In these areas a feeling of permanence and stability can be achieved through long range RD programs performed by the CIDG. When the CIDG are used as "acting cadre", the CA/PO squad becomes the catalyst for the program. Normally a hamlet or village will be selected which is near a camp, or one which can be secured continuously by the CIDG. Once the security is established the CA/PO squad, augmented with other CIDG personnel, works on long range programs to help the hamlet meet the 6-point criterion of a secure hamlet. The six points are:

- (1) Census, infra-structure, intelligence net.
- (2) Security forces.
- (3) Integrated defense.
- (4) Grievance and project councils.
- (5) Self defense, self-help organization
- (6) Selection of hamlet chief.

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d. During the three month reporting period ending 31 January 1967, 2,032 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local civilians, and to expand the GVN area of control and influence were completed in Special Forces operational areas. Included in this figure are the construction and/or repair of 76 schools, 42 dispensaries, 14 hospitals, 98 bridges, 85 latrines, 67 fish ponds, 927 wells, 1273 dwellings, and 13 VIE booths. Other projects included provision of 4,419,316 pounds of food for over 31,200 refugees who are located in detachment operational areas. USASF and VNSF medical and 199 Special Forces trained Hamlet Health Workers treated 266,748 patients in camp dispensaries while conducting 168 civic action medical patrols.

e. Christmas was celebrated country-wide by both the Christian and non-Christian people. Christmas trees obtained by the VNSF were delivered to every team in country. Special Christmas kits consisting of candy, school kits, health kits and a toy were distributed to dependent children. Many detachments received toys, clothing, and food from friends and organizations in the U.S.A. These items were distributed and a tremendous feeling of mutual cooperation and respect was evident in all camps between the Americans and the Vietnamese. Several detachments visited orphanages and provided the children with a party and toys.

f. Both the Hamlet Health Visitors Course and the CIDG Mechanics Course were successes. New courses have been started in several areas. During the reporting period 17 Hamlet Health Visitors Courses were conducted for 199 students. 200 strikers (CIDG) attended the three week Mechanics Course.

g. The RDSA instituted the mailing of a monthly newsletter to all detachments. Its purpose is to provide the detachments with timely information on current trends and developments. It is also used as a media for requesting information and data from the field. It is published after all the MOPSUM's are received so that successful techniques of individual detachments can be presented, and to clarify or offer assistance in problem areas that are mentioned. This technique has been very well received by the operational detachments, and several "B" teams have decided to use the same technique to present information to their "A" detachments. A book on "Tips of the Trade" is being compiled from tips sent in by operational detachments.

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6. (C) Psychological Operations:

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a. During this reporting period the Group staff has undergone a reorganization which places the psychological operations section under the S3. The S5 has been redesignated Revolutionary Development and no longer has the responsibility for psychological operations.

b. A thorough target analysis is being conducted in the tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) of all Special Forces detachments. When completed, it will become a valuable tool in the Group's psychological operations effort. This psychological operations analysis will provide the foundation for programs to be launched in the months ahead by Special Forces units in each Corps Tactical Zone.

c. Exploitation of combat operations by psychological operations continues to add immeasurably to the Chieu Hoi program. The technique of using the voices of individuals who have been captured or have surrendered during the course of an operation has been an effective means of convincing other Viet Cong to turn themselves in. Similar results have been achieved by printing the hand-written message of a Hoi Chanh as well as his photograph on a leaflet and disseminating it in a suspected Viet Cong concentration area.

d. The maintenance of good relations between psychological operations personnel, their counterparts, and all supporting RVN and US agencies in an area is proving to be one of the decisive factors in the success of the psychological operations program. A case in point is Special Forces Detachment B-32 in III Corps Tactical Zone, Tay Ninh Province. Captain Gregory, the detachment's psychological operations officer, is in close contact with every individual or agency that is in any way related to the psychological operations effort in the province, i.e., JUSPAI, VIS, 196th Brigade S5, PHILCAG, the Chieu Hoi center director and his assistants, LLDB counterparts, etc. As a result of the detachment's effort, the Chieu Hoi program in the Province is showing a marked degree of success.

e. Refugees who have been willing to cooperate with the psychological operations effort have been effectively used in II Corps Tactical Zone. Tape recordings are made by the refugees in which they appeal to other relatives and friends to join them. By allowing these refugees to use familiar names and local phrases in the recording, the message attains higher credibility among the target audience. These messages are broadcast over aerial loudspeakers in Viet Cong controlled areas and have been effective in encouraging other civilians to resettle in government areas.

f. Reports have confirmed the psychological operations potential of Polaroid cameras. The camera provides the detachment with the capability of photographing "proof" that certain events took place or that certain projects are being carried out, e.g., civic action. By turning the photographs over to a supporting psychological operations company, the detachments have been able to carry through with personalized leaflets and posters. Photographs taken are protected from the weather by wrapping plastic film and sealing with Scotch or "typhoon" tape.

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g. Distribution of printed materials by hand continues to be one of the most effective means of dissemination. This method approaches face to face communication, is far more personal than the use of aircraft, and contributes towards creating a feeling of participation among the indigenous personnel carrying out the distribution.

h. The Montagnard newspaper published in II Corps Tactical Zone in Vietnamese and three dialects hit a new high in production during the period with 9000 copies a month now being produced and distributed. The newspaper has served to fill the news and information vacuum that exists in some of the more isolated areas where the people are starved for current news and information items.

i. The attached inclosure #20 represents a successful example of a psychological operations effort during the reporting period.

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7. (U) Personnel and Administration:a. Unit Strength:

(1) At the beginning of reporting period:

OFF	494
WO	8
EM	<u>2087</u>
TOTAL	2589

(2) At the end of reporting period:

OFF	627
WO	12
EM	<u>2106</u>
TOTAL	2745

b. Supply of blank forms and publications: The lack or inadequate supply of blank forms and publications was the source of problem areas in the personnel and administration field. Undue delays and erroneous personnel actions were at an increase as a result. Action was taken to correct this discrepancy by the establishment of pinpoint accounts with the various AG Publication Centers in CONUS in accordance with AR 310-1. In addition, a request for a distribution increase of USARV publications sufficient to meet the unit's needs was submitted to HQ, USARV.

c. Officer Assignment Instructions: During the reporting period, 28 officers received assignment instructions less than fifteen days prior to DEROS, causing undue personal and family hardships and a considerable increase on the administrative workload. By close monitoring of DEROS, a suspense system was established to notify HQ USARV 60 days prior to an individual's DEROS in the event instructions have not been received. Followup notices are submitted 45 and 30 days prior to DEROS if no action is taken. This system makes higher headquarters cognizant of the situation and allows them to take immediate action to resolve the matter with appropriate career branch at DA.

d. Critical MOS Shortage (Officer): The need for school trained CA/PO officers, MOS 39305, in the grade of lieutenant, has been prevalent. At the end of the reporting period, only 10 school trained CA/PO officers were assigned. The MTOE authorization for this specialty is 106. Officers have been assigned to occupy these vacancies on an OJT basis.

e. Casualties: The number of casualties suffered by the unit during the period were:

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	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
OFF	2	24	0
EM	<u>11</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	13	68	3 (See Incl #6)

f. Voluntary Extension of Foreign Service Tours: The establishment of the 30-day special leave policy on 2 November 1966 has resulted in a marked increase on extensions of foreign service tours. A total of 32 officers and 157 enlisted men extended their tours during the reporting period. This favorable trend has alleviated certain critical MOS shortages and has contribute to the elimination of the rotational hump.

g. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:

(a) Medal of Honor	0
(b) Distinguished Service Cross	1
(c) Distinguished Service Medal	0
(d) Distinguished Flying Cross	5
(e) Silver Star	30
(f) Legion of Merit	18
(g) Soldiers Medal	12
(h) Bronze Star Medal "V"	89
(i) Army Commendation Medal "V"	44
(j) Air Medal "V"	5
(1) Bronze Star Medal	368
(m) Air Medal	245
(n) Army Commendation Medal	154
(o) Combat Infantryman Badge	428
(p) Combat Medical Badge	<u>36</u>
TOTAL	1167

(2) A request for delegation of authority to award the BSM, ARCOM, and AM was submitted to HQ, USARV during the reporting period. This request was based on the recent delegation of such authority to separate brigades of which this unit's strength equates. The request was not favorably considered because of DA's policy requiring a commander in the grade of Brigadier General. 28

(3) Two recommendations for the award of the Medal of Honor were still pending approval at the close of the period. These recommendations pertain to SSG E6 Billie Hall, RA 18621886 (Posthumous), and SFC Bennie G. Adkins, RA 54193612, for action in Ashau. Recommendations were submitted on 29 April 1966 and 4 January 1966 respectively.

h. Rest and Recuperation Program: The R&R program has been a significant morale factor. During the reporting period the Group filled 399 R&R quotas. Quotas to unpopular R&R centers such as Taipei, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur are difficult to fill. However, the increase of allocations for Hawaii and supplemental allocations for more favorable areas such as Hong Kong and Bangkok have compensated for the difference. Operational commitments account for a minor portion of unfilled allocations.

1. A&R and Special Services:

(1) Athletic and Recreation Program: During the reporting period a well balanced A&R program was organized and implemented by the Group. New recreational facilities constructed at the SFOB during this period were a four-wall handball court and weight lifting-Judo-Karate building.

(2) Special Services: The SFOB movie theatre was renovated with the objective of presenting better quality of movie entertainment in a more pleasant atmosphere. Thirty-five movie projectors were issued to Special Forces detachments during the reporting period, allowing more of the field units movie entertainment. Magazines, paperback books and newspapers are mailed direct to all detachments weekly. Special Services accounts are being consolidated at Group Headquarters. Equipment is procured through Special Services sources and issued directly to the requesting agency.

j. Post Exchange Facilities: The SFOB PX Annex was doubled in size during the month of November 1966 to provide more storage and sales floor space. The PX inventory was increased in quantity and variety of items. The PX Annex has been unable to stock electronic equipment for the troops because of scarcity of this type of equipment.

k. Labor/Civilian Personnel: In keeping with MACV objectives to reduce the amount of dollars expended, a reduction in force was put into effect. Civilian positions not absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of the mission were deleted from the TD. Employees were retained on the basis of length of service and merit. The work force was reduced by 127 employees, and a monthly savings of 433,512\$VN was realized.

l. Religious Activities: A Group Chapel was constructed in the SFOB complex during the reporting period and dedicated on Christmas Eve, 1966. His Eminence Francis Cardinal Spellman blessed the new chapel on Christmas Day, 25 December 1966, during his visit to the 5th SF Group.

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8. (U) Medical:

a. Hospital Facilities:

(1) Construction of a 40-bed CIDG hospital at Co C, Danang began in December 1966. Completion is expected by the end of February 1967.

(2) Construction plans for general surgical facilities at the CIDG hospital at Co B, Pleiku, were approved.

(3) Construction of a general surgical installation at the CIDG hospital at Co A, Bien Hoa, began in January 1967.

(4) Hospital and surgical facility construction will increase the level of medical care of CIDG, permitting faster treatment and faster return to duty.

b. SFOB Dispensary: With the exception of the dental clinic, the new two story SFOB dispensary was completed in January 1967. With less crowding and a more functional arrangement, the dispensary provides for more adequate care of supported troops. Also, because the medical administrative offices are in the same location, it provides for closer, more responsive administrative control of dispensary operations. Dental facilities should be completed by early February 1967.

c. Hamlet Health Worker Program: Training of Hamlet Health Workers continued in I, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. II CTZ Province Chiefs opposed the training. Consequently, Company B utilized its medical teaching team to instruct CIDG medical aidmen in lieu of Hamlet Health Workers.

(1) Co C: 62 health workers graduated.

(2) Co A: 48 health workers graduated; 32 students presently enrolled.

(3) Co D: 22 health workers graduated; 26 students presently enrolled.

(4) Co B: 150 CIDG medica completed training courses.

d. Medical civic action: Medical civic action programs continued. Civilian outpatient treatments during calendar year 1966 totalled 1,467,935. A dispensary was built at Ban Me Thuot for the treatment of both CIDG and civilians.

e. Local rodent control: Rodent control at the SFOB was expanded by the assignment of a rodent control officer, NCO, or EM for each billet. This has resulted in increased billeting area sanitation and decreased population of rats.

f. SFOB Sanitation: Sanitation of the SFOB compound has improved significantly during the last quarter. This is at least partially a result of increased inspections.

g. Malaria Prophylaxis: During January 1967, a directive was transmitted to all subordinate units requiring that all indigenous troops be administered chloroquine prophylactically as a measure against malaria.

h. Narcotics shipment control: In November 1966, Group Regulation 40-4 (Alcohol and Narcotic Item Control) was changed to require that all shipments of narcotics be accompanied by a responsible person assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, and that all transfers of such items be documented by hand receipt.

i. Narcotics Accountability: In January 1967 a directive was published increasing accountability of narcotic items. This is implemented by the documentation of all loose narcotics issued to individuals and aid kits but not actually used.

j. Group Regulation 40-2, Medical Reports and Records, was superseded in Jan 67. The new regulation provides adequate instructions for the maintenance of medical records and the preparation of recurring medical reports at all levels within this command.

k. Medical Supply: To expedite pickup of perishable and valuable medical supplies by subordinate detachments, all containers which contain medical supplies have been coded with the number "16".

l. Medical cross-training of USASF personnel: The 30-60 minute informal medical classes conducted after normal duty hours by the USASF medics has been well worth the effort and benefit both pupil as well as instructor. In an operational emergency that followed one of these classes, a non-medical USASF gave life saving treatment to a severely injured man, based on the instruction he had received.

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9. (C) Signal:

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a. Communications Traffic:

(1) No appreciable increase has been made in communication equipment or circuits and absolutely no additional personnel have been employed, yet the total traffic count for this reporting period has more than doubled that of the previous quarterly report. The present circuits will not absorb an additional increase in traffic, nor can the teletype equipment be expected to hold up without a sufficient maintenance float on hand. The message traffic volume is as follows:

(a) Traffic volume report for Hq, 5th SFGA, 1st SF.

	<u>Nov 66</u>	<u>Dec 66</u>	<u>Jan 67</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Outgoing messages:	3740	3080	3120	9940
Incoming messages:	<u>2574</u>	<u>2722</u>	<u>2830</u>	<u>8426</u>
Total traffic handled:	<u>6314</u>	5802	5950	18366

(b) Substation RTT traffic volume reports for A,B,C, and D Co's.

	<u>Nov 66</u>	<u>Dec 66</u>	<u>Jan 67</u>	<u>Unit Totals</u>
Co A, Bien Hoa Send/Received	428/357	828/908	342/362	1598/1627
Co B, Pleiku Send/Received	352/290	922/911	357/422	1631/1623
* Co C, Danang Send/Received	343/287	194/179	282/238	817/704
Co D, Can Tho Send/Received	829/264	637/704	637/704	1503/1672
Monthly Totals Send/Received	1350/1198	2581/2702	1618/1726	5549/5626
Quarterly Totals				
Sent:	5549			
Received:	<u>5626</u>			
Total Traffic:	11175			

* Includes "A" detachments' CW traffic counts.

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(c) Total traffic handled over 5th Special Forces communications systems between 1 November 1966 and 31 January 1967: 29,541 messages. NOTE: These figures do not include re-run (re-transmission) of traffic due to garble or re-run for additional copies. 32

(2) The problem can only be solved with additional teletype equipment to terminate and operate the Radioteletype (RTT) circuits and the six currently authorized long line point-to-point troposcatter circuits simultaneously. Presently, a combination of only four circuits can be utilized at any one time. The necessary equipment to terminate eight additional circuits is currently on requisition. It is also anticipated that an increase of teletype operator personnel will be required in order to maintain the additional circuits and handle the increased traffic load.

b. Base Radio Communication System AN/TSC-26:

(1) One AN/TSC-26 Radio Set has arrived, and training is now being conducted for cadre personnel only. Before the set can be employed on a 24-hour basis, a minimum of 14 to 18 men must be thoroughly trained to man the three major components consisting of (1) the Control Van, (2) the Transmitter Van and (3) the Receiver Van. Due to essential tactical support requirements, the 5th Special Forces Group Signal Company has provided 13 three-man radio teletype teams and 3 two-man radio teletype teams to augment the "B" detachments with RTT capability. Therefore the Signal Company is stripped of personnel to sufficiently man the newly acquired AN/TSC-26 Radio Set. However, the employment of the AN/TSC-26 is essential in the support of special operations requiring a separate long range HF radio capability to expedite tactical intelligence and operational traffic of immediate nature.

(2) The training of a cadre is an intermediate step to resolving an immediate problem. It is anticipated that the Signal Company will have to be augmented with additional personnel from other resources to provide adequate communication support.

c. AN/PRC-25 Radio Sets:

(1) The AN/PRC-25 is the best ground to ground FM radio for Special Forces type operations. It is also the most suitable for ground to air communications. The present plan for using an HT-1 radio to relay air strike information is, in the opinion of the Air Force FAC's, possible but very impractical for directing close air strikes. Special Forces operations require the USASF advisors to maintain communications with (1) FAC Aircraft, (2) helicopters, (3) friendly artillery, (4) friendly troops, (5) other USASF units and (6) elements within the operation. Due to the fact that communications must be maintained on several different frequencies, some beyond the frequency range of the AN/PRC-10, its use is thereby precluded. To cover the frequency range of the AN/PRC-25, an AN/PRC-8, 9, and 10 would have to be utilized. Because Special Forces units depend upon the use of air support

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to accomplish many of their missions and to insure maximum possible safety for the USASF advisors, it is imperative to have the most suitable ground-to-air communication available, and at the same time maintain adequate ground-to-ground communication.

(2) The 5th Special Forces Group has an immediate need for four hundred and twenty-five (425) AN/PRC-25 radio sets to adequately support the numerous USASF operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Efforts to expedite supply action have been to no avail.

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10. (C) Engineer:

a. There are three Engineer K-B Teams presently operating in-country under the control of one K-A team located at the SFOB. These teams are on TDY from the 53rd Engineer Detachment, 1st SFG (Abn), at Okinawa. Their mission is to provide engineer planning and supervision during the planning and construction phases of "A" camp development. A Staff Engineer Section at the SFOB has been created to give engineer planning and guidance for new "A" camp construction.

b. During November, December, and January, three "A" camps and three airfields were constructed. The new camps are located at Lac Ninh, Duc Lap, and Dak Seang. Four "A" camps at Cau Song Be, Tra Cu, Ban Don, and Plei Djereng are presently under construction. The new airfields at Cau Song Be and Plei Djereng have a C-130 capability, and the one at Dak Seang has a CV-2 capability. Two airfields were rehabilitated during the same period. These are located at Plei Me and Plei Mrong and have a CV-2 and C-123 capability respectively. One airfield at Duc Lap is presently under construction.

c. Plei Djereng is the first camp to be built under the "fighting camp" concept, which was conceived after an analysis of tactics, tactical support, and logistical support. From an engineering standpoint this concept results in rapid construction with a reduction in the amount of materials and equipment required. See Inclosure #3.

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11. (S) CIDG Finance:

a. The FY67 Budget and the FY68 Command Budget Estimate were completely revised and submitted through MACV to USARPAC on 2 November 1966. These budget revisions were necessitated by the extensive organizational changes within the 5th Special Forces Group and the new concept of operations for CY67. Current FY68 requirements are as follow:

	<u>FY67</u>	<u>FY68</u>
In-Country OMA	\$45,498,000	\$ 54,990,000
Out-of-Country OMA	21,125,000	22,951,000
Out-of-Country PEMA	<u>31,210,000</u>	<u>31,911,000</u>
TOTAL:	\$97,833,000	\$109,852,000

b. A representative from Comptroller of the Army visited the Group from 18 - 23 November 1966 and was thoroughly briefed on the revision of FY67 Command Operating Budget which was forwarded to USARPAC two weeks earlier. This particular individual is responsible for monitoring the Parasol-Switchback Budget at Department of the Army level and he indicated at the time that the budget would probably be approved shortly. He was also briefed on the accounting procedures and internal control measures utilized by CIDG Finance to insure adherence to established budgetary limitations. He concluded his tour by visiting Company C in Danang and visiting with representatives from Combined Studies Division in Saigon.

c. This headquarters was notified on 31 December 1966 that the Secretary of Defense had approved the revised FY67 Budget and the revised FY68 Estimate in the amounts as requested in paragraph 1. This approval action gave the Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group the necessary financial resources with which to fully implement the programs outlined in the Concept of Operations for CY67.

d. The newly established Centralized Pay System became effective on 1 November 1966. Under this system, CIDG payrolls are prepared at the "B" detachment level and distributed to the "A" detachments for payment, thus relieving the "A" detachment commander of another administrative burden. Company C, because it is considerably smaller than the other companies, has adopted a fully centralized pay system. The company prepares all of the CIDG payrolls and miscellaneous vouchers, distributes them to the "A" teams along with the money, and consolidates all of the paid vouchers in one fund report on a monthly basis. This system works well for I CTZ but it is doubtful that it would succeed in the other Corps areas. The main disadvantage is the lack of aircraft to transport payrolls to and from the detachments.

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e. Representatives from the MACV Comptroller's Office visited the 5th Special Forces Group in early November to discuss the Piastre Expenditure Limitation Program. Although it was pointed out that the Switchback Program is exempt from this limitation, these personnel were briefed on the many actions taken by the 5th SFGA to reduce piastre expenditures. Some of the more important actions taken are as follows:

- (1) Stricter controls on in-country construction.
- (2) Transfer of in-country boot and blanket contracts to Okinawa in FY 67.
- (3) Purchase supplies such as lumber and tin, formerly procured from within RVN, from out-of-country resources.
- (4) Establishment of recreation facilities to include an air conditioned movie theater, basketball and handball courts, and an Officers Club.
- (5) Increased emphases placed on the Soldiers' Deposit and Savings Bond Program.

f. 5th Special Forces Group Regulation 37-1 entitled CIDG Financial Administration was revised on 1 December 1966. Major changes include the authorization of solatium payments, death gratuity based on total pay and allowances instead of base pay only, higher rates of incentive pay for reconnaissance platoons, parachute pay for Mike Force personnel, additional incentive pay of 200\$VN per day per man for selected units while on combat operations, and an increase of 5\$VN per day in the II Corps subsistence rate. A list of common errors made by funds officers was also included in the revised regulation in an effort to point out and subsequently reduce the number and type of errors made by funds officers in their monthly fund report.

g. A total of 30 detachments were visited by audit teams from CIDG finance during the period 1 November 1966 - 31 January 1967. These audits are designed primarily to assist the agent officer and to insure that he is administering his CIDG fund in accordance with prescribed regulations. It would be desirable to audit each detachment every three months, but this has proven virtually impossible because of lack of aircraft and poor weather conditions. The program itself has proven mutually advantageous to the command and the detachments.

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12. (C) Comptrollers:

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a. On 1 November 1966, the revision of the FY67 Switchback Budget and the FY68 Budget Estimate were submitted to MACV for review and forwarding to USARPAC. The budget revision was necessary to support the 5th SF Group Concept of Operations for CY67. The major increases in the budget were required to support additional troop strength, conversion and relocation of CIDG camps and the procurement of 73 AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets for use at selected detachment sites. The Secretary of Defense approved the budget revision on 30 December 1966.

b. In November the funds authorized each month for repair and maintenance at the company level were increased from \$200 to \$400. A study had revealed that \$200 per month was insufficient. Increased costs have been experienced by the companies, in particular, because of the number of non-Special Forces personnel that are being billeted and/or messed at Special Forces camps. These personnel generally fall into the categories of Air Force FAC's, Artillery FO's, Engineers, and Signal Detachments attached for support of USASF.

c. An analysis of SFOB signal traffic, which was conducted by the Comptroller at the direction of the Group Commander, revealed that 90% of the traffic arrived at the communications center between 1600 and 1800 hours daily. The large flow of traffic at this time often hampered the receipt of the daily SITREPS. All detachments were directed to reduce traffic during the peak period. Routine messages will be sent at periods other than the late afternoon.

d. On 7 November 1966 the Comptroller conducted a meeting of the funds officers from each company and separate "B" detachment. The primary topic was the establishment of a centralized funding at the company or "B" detachment level. The pilot program in I CTZ proved the system to be practical, not only by relieving the "A" detachment of the administrative burden, but also providing a better means of monitoring the level and type expenditures made in each detachment.

e. Funds were authorized for the establishment of a photo developing facility at each company. This allows for rapid processing of intelligence photographs and CIDG ID photographs.

f. During this reporting period, Regulation 37-1, CIDG Financial Administration, was revised and published. Regulation 37-1 delegates responsibilities, describes authorized expenditure ceilings in each cost code, outlines procedures for claims, and details the preparation of the fund report required monthly from each funds officer. Many of the changes were necessary as a result of the budget revision which included a number of increases in specific cost codes. Principal changes were:

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(1) The amount of funds authorized to be maintained on hand in the company was increased from 500,000\$VN to 2,000,000\$VN. This allows for better flexibility in case of unforecasted expenditures in a particular cost code. An example of this could be the requirement to pay an above average number of death gratuities causing a larger expenditure than was anticipated.

(2) Incentive Pay was authorized for CIDG personnel assigned to Combat Reconnaissance Platoons. This incentive pay is intended to assist in recruiting and maintaining high caliber personnel in these units.

(3) Jump pay was established for Mike Force personnel to provide additional incentive and to encourage high caliber personnel to become airborne qualified.

(4) Death gratuity benefit scale was changed due to an increase in benefits in the CIDG program. Previous benefits for CIDG and Mike Force dependents totaled twelve times base pay. A comparison of benefits for the RF/PF program revealed a serious shortcoming and possible morale problem in the CIDG program in that RF/PF benefits were much higher. CIDG benefits were increased to twelve times pay and allowances to equalize them to similar benefits in the RF/PF program.

(5) A list of common errors made by funds officers was included to assist the funds officers in maintaining and reporting monthly expenditures.

(6) The claims section was revised to give more detail on positive actions to be taken when a claim is presented or an incident occurs where a claim may be warranted.

(7) Detachments were authorized to expend \$400 a month in Phase I of the camp development for CA/PO projects. Previously no money had been authorized.

(8) A Payday Procedure Guide was added for use when paying CIDG personnel. Prior to this no standard procedure had been established.

g. A study was made of subsistence costs in II CTZ. Reason for the study was the repeated overexpenditure for subsistence by almost all detachments in II CTZ. The study revealed that rice stockage levels were far in excess of the level authorized; several detachments were purchasing rice locally at exorbitant prices; few detachments were submitting requests for relief of responsibility for spoiled rice; many detachments were feeding dependents free and still paying the CIDG their family allowance; and several thought the rice was in addition to the 45\$VN per day per man authorized for subsistence. All of the above were reconciled by a letter to the Company B Commanding Officer. In addition, the Company B S4 is required to submit a report each Saturday to the LSC as to the rice stockage level at each detachment. The LSC closely monitors the shipments of rice to insure no overstockage at any detachment.

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39 h. The section initiated a monthly summary by detachment of all cost code 906 (construction) fund authorizations. A copy of this summary is distributed to the S4 to provide a quick reference for assuring the S4 that a detachment requesting construction materials has a fund balance to pay for the materials. If the requesting detachment has an insufficient balance or none at all, the request is referred to the Comptroller, who in turn, sends a message to the detachment requesting justification for the requested materials. This system is designed to reduce the number of unauthorized expenditures in construction funds.

i. To further reduce excess expenditure of construction funds, a directive was sent to the field stipulating that each "B" detachment would appoint an officer to monitor construction at "A" detachments under their operational control. It has been discovered that too many personnel are involved in requesting or purchasing materials for the same project, thus causing duplication, excess ordering, and excess expenditure of authorized funds. In addition, many changes are made during the actual construction, causing construction costs to rise from the original estimate. By appointing one individual responsible for monitoring, these malpractices should discontinue.

j. The Administration and Functions Manual was revised during the reporting period. Necessary revisions were the result of:

- (1) The Group S5 being redesignated as Revolutionary Development Support Activity.
- (2) The reorganization and redesignation of responsibilities of the S2 Section.
- (3) The transfer of responsibilities for Psychological Operations to the S3 Section.
- (4) The change in designation of "C" detachments to line companies. This is due to the addition of an Administrative Detachment. The company now consists of an Administrative Detachment and a "C" detachment with subordinate B's and A's.

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13. (U) Judge Advocate:

a. Upon a determination that claims generated by CIDG personnel are not payable under either the regular US Foreign Claims Act or the MILCAP financed GVN claims program, a CIDG claims system was devised and implemented. Under this system, field commanders are authorized to make co-the-spot settlements of claims arising from the activities of the CIDG, resulting in improved relations with local Vietnamese nationals and sharply decreasing the administrative burden on the operational detachments. 40

b. A study of the disposition of Military Police Reports and other delinquency reports revealed that approximately 50% of those issued in country never were received at Group level. To correct this situation, arrangements were made with higher headquarters for more emphasis on proper routing of these reports by provost marshals and a system of internal reporting was devised. Observation of the results continues.

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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4

PART I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

1.(U) Personnel:

- a. ITEM: Lack or inadequate supply of blank forms and publications.
(Source: Gp S1).

DISCUSSION: Need-to-know publications and a sufficient supply of blank forms are absolutely essential to the proper and effective execution of administrative and personnel functions.

OBSERVATION: Pin-point accounts are a must down to and including company size units. Command distribution system is inadequate for this unit because of the nature of its mission and the wide deployment of its elements. The time lag experienced in transmitting material from the SFOB to over 100 remote and widely dispersed sites compounds the complexity of the requisitioning and distribution system.

- b. ITEM: Late receipt of Officer Assignment Instructions (Source: Gp S1)

DISCUSSION: Late receipt of assignment instructions create an undue personal and family hardship on the service member. Shipment of household goods and baggage are delayed and in some cases, delay enroute leave is curtailed.

OBSERVATION: A system to closely monitor DEROS and suspense control in reporting cases of non-receipt of assignment instructions enables higher headquarters to take action in time to preclude the problems which arise as a result.

- c. ITEM: Shortage in MOS 39305 (Officer) (Source: Gp S1)

DISCUSSION: The majority of the shortages in this MOS are in the grade of Lieutenant. Because of the accelerated promotion program and too early programming of officers for assignment to RVN, officers programmed in the grade of lieutenant, arrive in the command as captains. This excess in captains has created an imbalance in the grade structure.

OBSERVATION: Career branch programming should take date of rank as one of the primary considerations when programming officers for assignment to RVN.

- d. ITEM: Post Exchange Run (Source: S1, Co D)

DISCUSSION: The remoteness of USSF camps makes it difficult for detachment members to visit the PX on a regular basis and often enough to maintain a supply of PX items at the "A" team location.

OBSERVATION: Post Exchange Officer, Can Tho, has agreed to provide a representative to accompany the pay officer on his rounds of the camps carrying a stock of selected items. Morale and welfare of the "A" detachments were greatly improved.

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2. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Setting an Operational Pattern

(Source: S3, Co D)

DISCUSSION: The strategic location of some "A" detachments necessitates setting a pattern of operations.

OBSERVATION: When the situation dictates that a pattern be set it can be used as an advantage by the friendly unit involved by doing the following: Vary the departure and return of operations as much as possible. Mount operations on a parallel course in an attempt to intercept any enemy elements moving against the normal operational route.

b. ITEM: Long range patrol diet

(Source: S3, Co C)

DISCUSSION: Personnel engaged in long range patrolling over extended periods of time require lightweight food items which are palatable and possess the required nutrients and bulk. C rations have on occasion proven too heavy for usage alone and "LRP" type rations do not provide enough bulk for many individuals. "Indigenous ration", i.e., packaged, pre-cooked rice and dried meat with condiments, is not palatable for US personnel over extended periods.

OBSERVATION: A varied diet consisting of the three items mentioned above appears to be the most reasonable solution for satisfying food needs of long range patrols. Such a diet would be satisfactory for extended periods and could be supplemented during resupply with small amounts of high appetite appeal foods such as candy.

c. ITEM: Viet Cong Rice Caches

(Source: S3, B-23)

DISCUSSION: During the past 3 months, a period when the bulk of the rice harvest has taken place within the province, combat operations RF/PF, CIDG in nature have discovered large numbers of rice caches. Because of distance involved and the location of these caches it has been difficult to extract or destroy this rice.

OBSERVATION: Prior planning during this period must include methods of extracting this rice or destroying it in place. Dependence on choppers to assist in this should not be the primary solution as they will more than likely not be available. It is a tremendous psychological defeat when troops must leave an operational area knowing that such a cache was left behind undamaged because of lack of prior planning.

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d. ITEM: Forward Observer Procedures

(Source: S3, B-32)

DISCUSSION: With the ever increasing number of US conventional units in Vietnam more and more artillery has become available to the USASF advisor in support of ground operations.

OBSERVATION: It is imperative that proper coordination is effected between the "A" detachments and artillery units available and that all members of the detachment can call for and adjust artillery fires.

e. ITEM: Helicopter Use to Extend Operations

(Source: S3, B-32)

DISCUSSION: Some camps are reluctant to extend operations into areas where formidable concentrations of Viet Cong are believed to exist or where physical barriers such as rivers hinder operations. This is so in spite of USASF assurance that adequate air and arty support exists, and river crossings, when properly executed, are not hazardous.

OBSERVATION: Helicopters can be used to move operational companies far enough from camp and into areas where the troops would be reluctant to go by foot thus forcing them to sweep back through these areas of VC concentrations so that they would be able to return to camp.

f. ITEM: Operations and Camp Defense During the Flood Season.

(See Inclosure #13, paragraph 3-d (pages 13-6 to 13-11))

g. ITEM: Airboat Tactics and Techniques.

(See Inclosures #14, paragraph 2 (pages 14-1 to 14-5); Annex 1, paragraph c (page 14-1-5). NOTE: All Lessons Learned have been incorporated into the Airboat Program, Inclosure #15).

h. ITEM: Lessons Learned During Task Force Prong.

(See Inclosure #10, paragraph 4 (page 10-6))

i. ITEM: Operations Lessons Learned at Bu Dop, 14 Nov 66.

(See Inclosure #12, paragraph 9 (page 12-3))

j. ITEM: Operations Lessons Learned During Blackjack 21.

(See Inclosure #16, paragraphs 14, 15, 16 (pages 16-6 to 16-9; Annex 6, pages 16-6-3 to 16-6-4))

k. ITEM: Operations Lessons Learned During Blackjack 22.

(See Inclosure #17, paragraph 9 (pages 17-6, 17-7); Annex 4.)

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3. (C) Training and Organization:

a. ITEM: Use of Claymore Mines

(Source: B-32)

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DISCUSSION: In camp defense use there is a tendency to detonate claymore mines prematurely before the enemy main force has entered the killing zone.

OBSERVATION: RF/PF and CIDG troops must be trained to allow the VC to come within the optimum zone before detonating their claymores.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. ITEM: Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (Source: Gp S2)
(SICR's)

DISCUSSION: The group intelligence collection guidance in the past was primarily directed toward gathering information to improve the security of unit installations. In August 1966 a program was initiated to also direct collection efforts by issuing SICR's for information to fill gaps in intelligence data and support areas of special interest. A recent modification of this program is to extend the direction of this program to a tasking on subordinate units to employ their organic resources in general areas to confirm or deny enemy buildup during the earliest stages of development.

OBSERVATION: The periodic issuance of Specific Intelligence Collection Requests is an excellent means to direct the efforts of collection agencies in furnishing information for our own analysis. This program maintains an additional element of flexibility in our collection effort and insures that collection agencies remain responsive to the requirements of higher headquarters. The Group S2 will continue to issue Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements when the need arises.

b. ITEM: Reproduction Facilities

(Source: Gp S2)

DISCUSSION: The greatly increased intelligence capability of this Group has created a few administrative problems. One of these is the physical task of reproducing documents, reports, requirements and supporting inclosures in sufficient quantity to reach all subordinate, lateral, and higher units concerned. The success of the entire intelligence program depends upon the adequacy of facilities to provide a continuous flow of the intelligence information to all friendly agencies concerned.

OBSERVATION: The Group S2 has taken action to alleviate the reproduction problem. One "3M" Brand Model 209 and five "3M" Brand Model 107 copy machines have been requisitioned. Their receipt will allow rapid reproduction and distribution of valuable intelligence reports to the proper agencies.

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5. (C) Logistics:

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a. ITEM: Use of the G1-A Cargo Parachute

(Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: This unit was able to obtain 200 G1-A cargo parachutes from the property disposal office in Saigon. There are over 7000 of these parachutes in the PDO awaiting salvage. Since all cargo parachutes have no set life span, these chutes can be used until they are damaged or destroyed. The technical manual states that these chutes have a 300 lbs load capability.

OBSERVATION: These parachutes were tested at this location and found capable of handling airdrop loads of 500 lbs or less. They were also used in clusters of two and three on loads in excess of 1000 lbs. To date over 50 airdrops have been made with these parachutes in the I Corps area with excellent operational results. This parachute is on equal par with the standard G-13 and T-7A parachutes.

b. ITEM: Automatic POL Resupply

(Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Formerly, requests for POL were submitted on a high priority basis requiring immediate delivery. This situation resulted in a continuous disruption of planned supply deliveries. To alleviate this situation each camp's normal daily usage was calculated and established. Based on this usage factor, a planned delivery schedule was established for each camp on a month basis.

OBSERVATION: After a two month trial period the automatic POL resupply schedule has been finalized with excellent results. During this period, each camp received enough POL to meet daily needs and still build a small reserve for emergency use. These regularly scheduled POL deliveries fit perfectly into the planned logistical delivery effort of the FSP.

c. ITEM: Generator Repair

(Source: Gp 94)

DISCUSSION: Units in the field were requesting individual repair parts such as valves and pistons, and were attempting to make major overhauls to inoperative 5KW and 10KW generators. The result was a long delay while parts were ordered and a large increase in the deadlined rate on small generators.

OBSERVATION: The deadline rate was lowered by ordering a stock of military standard engines and other major components so that whole major components could be replaced, resulting in a drastic reduction in down time for many of the small generators. The defective major components are now being evacuated to fourth and fifth echelon repair installations where parts, skilled mechanics, and adequate equipment are available.

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- d. ITEM: Inconspicuous Aerial Resupply System (Source: Gp S4)

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DISCUSSION: Units deployed deep in hostile territory for extended periods are in need of a resupply system less conspicuous than the conventional parachute resupply by cargo aircraft requiring a fairly large, open drop zone.

OBSERVATION: The problem was solved by modifying napalm bombs to accommodate up to 400 pounds of supplies and a T-7A cargo parachute. The resupply drop can be made by tactical aircraft. Carrying several napalm bombs modified into cargo containers on its bomb racks, tactical fighter aircraft such as the A-1E can make accurate drops into relatively small drop zones. Since the resupply drop is made at low altitudes and can be combined with bombing and strafing missions, it is less likely to be detected.

6. (C) Other:

- a. ITEM: Area Assessment for Psychological Operations (Source: S5, Co D)

DISCUSSION: At the present time, most leaflets disseminated in operational areas are of a general type supplied by JUSPAO. The effectiveness of these leaflets is doubtful because for the most part they are based on general information obtained from a large area. In order to produce an effective and specific leaflet, a complete and detailed area assessment is needed of the target area. The leaflet can then be based on accurate and current information and will ultimately be highly effective.

OBSERVATION: A detachment should have a complete and current area assessment for PSYOPS purposes. Social, religious, and economic groups should be indicated, as well as key communicators in the area. Enemy and friendly vulnerabilities should be analyzed for potential exploitation by propaganda. All leaflets and tapes which are produced should be based on this area assessment to include current intelligence. The CA/PO squad is ideal for accomplishing this task. They can be given the mission to make an area assessment in their own area of responsibility. This will enable the commander to have a rapid and aggressive PSYOPS capability.

- b. ITEM: Feedback (Source: S5, Co D)

DISCUSSION: In order to create effective propaganda leaflets, feedback is needed from the requesting unit as to the effectiveness of the leaflet. Without feedback, poor and ineffective propaganda is used over and over causing a harmful effect in our propaganda effort.

OBSERVATION: The detachments are in good position to evaluate the effectiveness of disseminated propaganda. Feedback does not have to be dramatic, such as a large number of PW's or Chieu-Hoi's. In most instances an indication that a leaflet was picked up by a member of the target audience will

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47 suffice, as the CIDG CA/PO squads are in an excellent position to obtain feedback. They must be alert at all times for any indications of change in the target audience during the conduct of their patrols.

c. ITEM: Rapid Reaction Propaganda

(Source: S5, Co D)

DISCUSSION: The process of requesting, printing, and disseminating propaganda is in most instances slow. Consequently, the detachments have little rapid reaction capability to exploit successful combat operations, Chieu-Hoi returnees, VC terrorism and enemy vulnerabilities. So much time elapses between an incident to be exploited and the finished propaganda product that most of the effectiveness of the propaganda is lost.

OBSERVATION: Field printing and hand dissemination of leaflets and posters can provide a degree of rapid reaction to a propaganda campaign. A mimeograph machine provides an excellent rapid reaction means. Other processes such as silk screens and jelly rolls may also be used. Field printing should be used by all CA/PO squads.

d. ITEM: Utilization of Forward Air Controllers (FAC) Ol-E Bird Dog to Disseminate Leaflets

(Source: S5, Co C)

DISCUSSION: Normally leaflet missions are targeted against areas in which the effort might produce overall results. On many occasions FAC's on visual reconnaissance missions observe small groups of civilians or VC carrying parties. These type targets are usually too small for a routine leaflet mission to be worthwhile but are susceptible to a psychological warfare effort. Small bundles of leaflets rigged with fuse cutters have been tested in such cases and pin-point accuracy has been obtained.

OBSERVATION: This system of leaflet dissemination provides more exact coverage and is considered a worthwhile supplement to the overall psychological warfare effort.

e. ITEM: Dispensing of leaflet from U-10 aircraft with chute installed

(Source: S5, B-32)

DISCUSSION: When dropping a handful at a time, the wind and air pressure will keep several hundred together which in turn minimizes area coverage.

OBSERVATION: If leaflets are held over the mouth of the chute and riffled as in riffling playing cards, into the chute, the dispersion pattern and area coverage will be greatly increased.

f. ITEM: Increased input of refugees after a large scale operation.

(Source: S5, Co)

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DISCUSSION: After the conduct of large scale operations in densely populated areas, a large influx of refugees have been collected in most of the Special Forces camps. The camps have limited amounts of refugee supplies on hand and due to bad weather conditions, resupply activities to some camps will be hampered and camps will experience some difficulty in providing adequate support for the refugees. 48

OBSERVATION: Reserve refugee supplies must be kept on hand, whenever possible, at the camps in order to take care of any unexpected influx of refugees that might result from any of the operations in large inhabited areas and in order to be able to support the refugees during periods of inclement weather when resupply activities are held to a minimum.

g. ITEM: Routing of CIDG Medical Evacuees by ARVN Helicopters
(Source: B-32)

DISCUSSION: ARVN pilots in III CTZ always take CIDG patients to Cong Hoa Hospital in Saigon, regardless of the fact that medical facilities for CIDG personnel exist in Bien Hoa and other locations which are often closer to the site of injury. The increased travel time to Saigon endangers life and limb of CIDG personnel. Moreover, the already overcrowded conditions at Cong Hoa Hospital lead to poor treatment of CIDG troops.

OBSERVATION: Medical treatment of CIDG personnel in III CTZ would be greatly enhanced if ARVN medical evacuation helicopters were to route casualties to the nearest medical facility providing necessary treatment.

h. ITEM: Packaging and Selection of Long Range Patrol Medical Supplies
(Source: Co C)

DISCUSSION: Medical supplies used by long range patrol must be adequate for the common diseases and emergencies, be lightweight, and be packaged to withstand exposure to weather and rough handling. The use of glass vials should be avoided when possible. Experience has dictated that there are possible a few exceptions necessary, i.e., an injectable anti-vomiting agent should be available in order to use the other oral drugs.

OBSERVATION: Most items packaged in glass vials can be omitted in the selection of long range patrol medical supplies, i.e., substitute tetracycline tablets for penicillin and streptomycin. Omitting glass vials also eliminated the need for most syringes and needles. Exceptions, such as Compazine (Anti-vomiting agent), can be placed inside a 6cc syringe while still inside its cardboard container and the plastic tube sealed with waterproof tape. Needles and syringes can be packaged in crush resistant plastic tubes and waterproofed by wrapping in tape.

i. ITEM: Pets and Rabies Control (Source: B-32)

DISCUSSION: Although detachments pets (dogs, cats, etc.) have received rabies shots and records have been kept, there has been no readily available way of making rabies tags for the inoculated animals.

OBSERVATION: A metal punch and die set could be used to fashion tags for the animals in all subordinate detachments.

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49 J. ITEM: Blood Donor Program

(Source: B-32)

DISCUSSION: A great aversion to donating blood has been observed in Vietnam in this area. Whether this reluctance stems from religion, ignorance, or plain fear is not known. The MILPHAP surgical team have been unable to get next of kin to donate blood for critically-in-need patients.

OBSERVATION: An intensive program should be initiated on a national level, utilizing posters, films, demonstration, etc. to persuade the Vietnamese to donate blood.

k. ITEM: Endemic Scrub Typhus, Det B-51.

(Source: Gp Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Classes of indigenous personnel taught at Dong Ba Thin were noted to contract scrub typhus. The training area involved is vegetated by lunai grass, the typical vegetation for a scrub typhus area.

OBSERVATION: Detachment B-51 was directed to impregnate all field clothing on both cadre and students with M-1960 miticide. This action may not be sufficient. If not, and scrub typhus persists, then a change of training area is necessary.

1. ITEM: Chloroquine Resistant Malaria in Indigenous Troops.

(Source: Gp Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: In II CTZ, especially, exist many strains of chloroquine resistant malaria, against which chloroquine prophylaxis has no real effect. However, there is evidence that indigenous troops have a high incidence of G-6 PD deficiency, which would cause reactions if indigenous personnel were placed on Dapsone. The Special Forces-Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Team is now studying this problem.

OBSERVATION: Administration of Dapsone to indigenous personnel must wait upon result of studies being made by SF-WRAIR Research Team.

m. ITEM: Hamlet Health Worker Program

(Source: Gp Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Although 195 hamlet health workers have been trained since early 1966, none have been hired by GVN, as province chiefs are not appropriating money to hire these workers. This leads to two results:

(1) Rural communities are not provided medical care by health workers in spite of the number certified.

(2) Certified graduates become discouraged when not hired, leading to disaffection with both GVN and USASF.

OBSERVATION: The future of the Health Hamlet Worker Program is in doubt as long as graduates of the program are not hired by GVN.

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n. ITEM: Staffing of CIDG Hospitals

(Source: Gp Surgeon)

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DISCUSSION: At the present time, two CIDG hospitals, one in II CTZ, and one in III CTZ are operational. The III Corps facility is already expanding and the II Corps installation will expand. I CTZ is building a hospital which will be operational by late February 1967. The only personnel available to staff these facilities are those assigned to the Special Forces Company Medical Operations Section, which by themselves are not sufficient. Use of "A" detachment medics to staff such hospitals would be detrimental to the "A" detachment mission.

OBSERVATION: In spite of the need for CIDG hospitals, USASF does not have the internal resources to staff them.

o. ITEM: AN/PRC-74 Radio

(Source: Co D Sig)

DISCUSSION: This radio is desirable for field use providing both voice and CW transmissions but is too heavy with the standard BA-30 battery pack.

OBSERVATION: This radio requires 12 to 15 volts DC for operation. By using 2 AN/PRC-25 batteries (BA-386) in parallel the weight is decreased by 25 pounds. The 3 volt DC plugs are cut out and the 15 volt plugs are connected in parallel. A BA-317 battery cord is modified and installed on the radio. (See Inclosure #17 for description of field expedient battery box.)

p. ITEM: Antennas/Proper Length for Desired Frequency (Source: Co D Sig)

DISCUSSION: Constructed antennas were found to have stretched from their original cut and the need for resonate antennas with zero reflected wave became apparent.

OBSERVATION: By recutting antennas using the standard half wave formula $\lambda/2$ divided by the desired frequency and loading the antenna on the T-368, this unit was able to determine the exact frequency where zero reflected wave existed. Minor adjustments were then made which were needed to have the desired zero reflected wave for the original frequency.

q. ITEM: Radio Set AN/PRC-64

(Source: Co C Sig)

DISCUSSION: During mobile guerrilla force operations conducted by this unit it was found that communication difficulty was experienced when patrolling from the patrol base extended beyond the range of the AN/PRC-25. The AN/PRC-64 was utilized in these cases and found to be acceptable. Using the voice mode and an extremely unsophisticated antenna system, the two elements were able to maintain communications on a periodic basis.

OBSERVATION: It has been found that the AN/PRC-64 can provide voice communications at short ranges under adverse terrain conditions over distances which exceed the range and capability of the AN/PRC-25. Since only a short piece of antenna wire tied to a branch or layed on the ground is sufficient, the AN/PRC-64 can be set up to transmit in a few minutes. This will allow frequent scheduled communications checks if required.

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r. ITEM: UHF Radio Capability for Mobile Guerrilla Forces (Source: Co C Sig)

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DISCUSSION: The success of mobile guerrilla forces in remote areas of Vietnam sometimes hinges on the supporting fires available on call and the ability of the force to communicate with agencies providing the fires. On occasion adverse weather conditions prevented the O-1E Bird Dog with its FM radio capability from controlling supporting air strikes. In such cases it is necessary for the mobile guerrilla force to control air strikes by high performance aircraft from the ground. In most cases tactical fighter bombers are only capable of UHF radio communications. Therefore, it is necessary for the mobile guerrilla force to have either a tunable or multi-channelled UHF radio of light man-pack construction. A light weight battery power source is also necessary. Operation Longstreet which was mounted by this unit in late 1966 carried the AN/PRC-41 radio. It was found that, though the radio was needed for its capabilities, it was unacceptable from the operational standpoint. The total weight of the radio, as carried to the field, was approximately forty (40) pounds. This weight is unacceptable for a fast moving lightly armed force. In addition, at least two spare wet cell batteries, each weighing sixteen (16) pounds, had to be carried to insure reliable communications. Though it was relatively simple to resupply the force with batteries, it was impossible to extract the spent batteries. A total of five BB-451/U batteries were discarded during the operation. These batteries are not expendable. They are rechargeable and cost approximately \$300.00 each.

OBSERVATION: The AN/PRC-41 is not acceptable as a UHF radio for mobile guerrilla force type operations. A small, light weight UHF radio which utilizes either a disposable dry cell battery or a very light nickel cadmium battery is required. A possible solution is the AN/PRC-71 which is currently in the Air Force inventory. The RT-775/PRC-71 has four (4) preset crystal controlled channels. It weighs approximately six (6) pounds and is powered by a lightweight rechargeable nickel cadmium battery. This set or any other with similar capabilities is more compatible to mobile guerrilla type operations.

s. ITEM: Radar controlled (TPQ-10) Aerial Resupply Drops
(Source: Co C Sig)

DISCUSSION: The TPQ-10 controlled airdrops of supplies were conducted in this unit during the month of November 1966. This type airdrop was developed to overcome the difficulty of resupplying Special Forces camps during periods of inclement weather. In most cases drops were conducted when the drop zone was completely obscured. The aircraft were guided by the US Marine TPQ-10 guidance control systems located at Chu Lai and Quang Ngai, RVN. Data required by the system included drop zone location, elevation above sea level, ground winds aloft, type of parachute to be used, and parachute rate of descent. Data was fed into the computerized guidance control system which actually controlled the aircraft. As a refinement, a ground controller has been used to adjust the desired impact point on the drop zone. Adjustments can be fed to the computer and corrections made after each drop.

OBSERVATION: Radar controlled aerial resupply drops have proven quite successful and accurate. Inclement weather as a deterring factor to aerial resupply becomes far less significant when such capabilities exist on a permanent basis.

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t. ITEM: Pre-planned TPQ-10 radar bombing lists for targets in vicinity of fixed installations. (Source: Co C Sig)

DISCUSSION: A pre-planned list of targets for contingency TPQ-10 radar strikes has proven to be a rapid and accurate method of obtaining air strikes. The unit commander requests targets by number rather than by coordinates, the request is passed to supporting tactical air in the same manner. Such targets are pre-selected at choke points, likely avenues of approach and assembly areas, critical terrain features, etc.

OBSERVATION: The pre-planning of TPQ-10 radar bombing lists for contingency type strikes provides a rapid, secure, and accurate method for supporting threatened installations.

u. ITEM: Revision of 5th Special Forces Group Regulation 37-1, CIDG Financial Administration (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: Regulation 37-1 provides guidance for the proper handling and disposition of CIDG funds. A number of changes in the pay scale, incentive pay scale, death gratuity benefits, and claims procedures made the publication of a new regulation anecessity. The principal changes are discussed in para 12.

OBSERVATION: The revision of the regulation on CIDG Financial Administration to accompany changes in pay scales, benefits, and claims assures proper financial procedures in the handling of government funds.

v. ITEM: Analysis of Subsistence Costs in II CTZ (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: Each detachment in II CTZ is authorized to spend 45\$VN per man per day for subsistence. Because of high rice prices in II CTZ, rice is purchased in Saigon and shipped to detachments. The cost of the rice is deducted from the subsistence funds authorized the detachment. Many detachments in II CTZ were overspending their subsistence allowance. A study was initiated to find the reason and the solution. The study revealed that rice stockage levels were much higher than authorized; several detachments were purchasing rice at exorbitant prices; few detachments were submitting requests for relief of responsibility for the cost of spoiled rice; several thought the rice was in addition to the 45\$VN per man per day; and many were feeding CIDG dependents and not charging them for food consumed. All of these malpractices were eliminated by a letter to the Commanding Officer of Company B. To provide closer coordination between Company B and the LSC with regard to rice shipments, Company B now submits a list of rice stockage levels at each detachment weekly. This will assist in avoiding overstockage and the resulting loss from spoilage.

OBSERVATION: Close analysis of the reasons for overexpenditures and developing a workable solution eliminates wasteful and unauthorized use of government funds.

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- w. ITEM: Analysis of Traffic Level at the SFOB Signal Facility
(Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: An analysis of signal traffic received at the SFOB revealed that 90% of the traffic arrived between 1600 and 1800 hours daily. This overload often delayed the receipt of the daily SITREP's which are due at this same time. All detachments were directed to reduce traffic during the peak period.

OBSERVATION: The reduction in traffic during the period the daily SITREP's are transmitted has allowed for more rapid receipt of these SITREP's.

- x. ITEM: Centralized Funding System in Effect in all CTZ's
(Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: Company C in I CTZ had conducted a test project of handling all financial accounting for subordinate detachments at the company level. The largest task of the project was to prepare all the CIDG and civilian payrolls at the company, then forward them and sufficient funds to the "A" detachments on payday. The system relieves the "A" detachment of the administrative burden of preparing payrolls and allows a closer monitoring of all expenditures at the company level prior to the expenditure being made. The pilot program proved successful and was adopted by all companies during the month of November. Centralized funding was modified in II, III and IV CTZ's, in that the "B" detachments were responsible for their subordinate detachments. The reason for this being that companies A, B and D have too many detachments subordinate to them as compared to only eleven in Company C.

OBSERVATION: Centralized funding relieves the "A" detachment of an administrative burden and provides closer monitoring of CIDG fund expenditures.

PART II - Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel:

- a. Reference Section 1, paragraph 7; and Section 2, Part I, para 1, Item b.
- b. Action should be considered at DA level to eliminate the problem of late programming of personnel for reassignment to CONUS. A minimum of 90 days for officers and enlisted grades E-7 through E-9; and 60 days for E-6 and below, prior to DEROS for receipt of reassignment instructions should be the objective. *Desper*
- c. Commanders having custody of personnel records should be authorized to communicate directly with the appropriate career branch concerning officer reassignment instructions when urgency of the situation dictates.

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2. (U) Operations: None.
3. (U) Training and Organization: None.
4. (U) Intelligence: None.
5. (U) Logistics: None.
6. (C) Other:

a. Hamlet Health Worker Program

(1) Reference Section 2, Part I, paragraph 6, Item m.

(2) It is recommended that discussions occur between Vietnamese Ministry of Health and the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). If the GVN cannot insure utilization of the certified hamlet health workers, then SF participation in the program should cease.

b. Medical Evacuation of CTF Troops in III CTZ:

(1) Reference Section 2, Part I, paragraph 6, Item g.

(2) It is recommended that ARVN medical evacuation personnel be directed to take CIDG casualties to the closest medical facility providing necessary treatment.


c. AN/PRC-25 Radio Sets:

(1) Reference: Section 1, Part I, paragraph 9, Item c.

(2) It is recommended that necessary action be taken to expedite delivery of the AN/PRC-25 Radio Sets which are critically needed to efficiently execute tactical operations and provide maximum possible safety for USASF advisory personnel.

22 Incl

1. Troop Disposition List
2. Intelligence Objectives and Responsibilities
3. The Fighting Camp
4. Operations Data
5. Viet Cong Casualties


FRANCIS J. KELLY
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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6. U.S. Special Forces Casualties
7. CIDG Casualties
8. RF/PF Casualties
9. After Action Report: Thuong Duc, 21-22 Jan 67
10. After Action Report: Task Force Prong
11. After Action Report: Mike Force/Attleboro,
1-7 Nov 66
12. After Action Report: Bu Dop, 14 Jan 67
13. After Action Report: Delta Flood 1966,
Detachment B-41
14. After Action Report: Company D Airboat
Operations
15. Airboat Program
16. After Action Report: Blackjack 21
(Task Force 777)
17. After Action Report: Blackjack 22
18. Aviation Availability and Utilization
19. Historical/Group Behavior Pilot Study
20. CA/FSYOP Success Story: Det A-411
- ~~21. Visitor Briefings~~ w/D
- ~~22. MROE (Cys 1-8 only)~~ w/D

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AVHGC-DH (15 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 12 APR 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 7b, Section 1, Page 22, and Paragraph
1a, Part I, Section 2, Page 37: On 20 December 1966, a publication
assistance team visited the unit and provided assistance in the establish-
ment of pinpoint distribution accounts for all DA publications and blank
forms. This will eliminate the time lag in transmitting material from the
Special Forces Operational Base. USARV Circular 310-2 prescribes the
command formula distribution which is transmitted directly to Headquarters,
5th Special Forces Group. A request to increase the USARV distribution
from 16 copies to 165 copies under Formula A was received and approved on
27 February 1967.

b. Reference Paragraph 7c, Section 1, Page 22; Paragraph 1b,
Part I, Section 2, Page 37; and Paragraph 1b, Part II, Section 2, Page
49: The nonreceipt of assignment instructions is a continuing problem
of which this headquarters is thoroughly cognizant. Action is taken
by this headquarters to report to DA those officers not in receipt of
reassignment instructions 60 days prior to DEROS. Additionally, 30 days
prior to DEROS telephone calls between this headquarters and DA are utilized
in an effort to obtain reassignment instructions. This headquarters and DA
both recognize the personal inconvenience caused by late receipt of assign-
ment instructions and marked improvement has been made in reducing the
number of officers receiving late reassignment instructions. Subordinate
units can assist in alleviating this problem area by ensuring accurate and
timely reporting of DEROS date.

c. Reference Paragraph 7d, Section 1, Page 22, and Paragraph
1c, Part I, Section 2, Page 37: The shortage of school trained CA/PO

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officers is a command-wide problem. The MTOE authorization of 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) is still being processed by this headquarters and it is anticipated it will be dispatched to USARPAC subsequent to 1 May 1967. Until such time as the MTOE arrives at USARPAC no requisition action can be taken by this headquarters.

d. Reference Paragraph 9c, Section 1, Pages 28 and 29; and Paragraph 6c, Part II, Section 2, Page 50 Concur. There are insufficient assets to fill the high requirement generated by the 5th SFG at this time. Radios have been and will continue to be issued when assets are available. AN/PRC-25 radios are short in the command at this time. Inter-Service Support Agreement with the 5th SFG is a "fill or kill" proposition.

e. Reference Paragraph 13b, Section 1, Page 36: Concur. The uniform routing of Military Police Reports through headquarters of major commands has been recognized as a problem prevalent throughout USARV. A regulation designed to provide detailed guidance concerning the use, preparation and disposition of the Military Police Report (DA Form 19-32) has been completed, staffed and is currently pending final approval and publication by this headquarters.

f. Reference Paragraph 1c, Part II, Section 2, Page 49: Nonconcur in the recommendation that commands having custody of personnel records communicate directly with DA career branches. The centralization of this function at the major component level is in consonance with the established chain of command and is considered more effective than fragmenting this task. Additionally, to allow subordinate commands the prerogative of communicating directly with DA on reassignment instruction queries would compound the magnitude of the problem from the DA position.

g. Reference Paragraph 6a and 6b, Part II, Section 2, Page 50: The recommendations of the 5th SFG concerning ARVN medical evacuation personnel and GVN hamlet health workers have been forwarded to MACV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Jerry Van Horn

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT, AGC
Asst. AG

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

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DET LOCATION COORDINATES PROVINCE/DISTRICT COMMANDER MISSION ETHNIC GROUPS

I CORPS

CO C	DANANG	BT075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	LTC STEIN	CONTROL	NONE
LNO	QUANG NGAI	BS640734	QUANG NGAI/CAN THANH	CPT BEESON	LIAISON	NONE
A-101	LANG YXI	XD793363	QUANG TRI/HUONG HOA	CPT DAVIS	CIDG/BS/SS	VN, BRU
A-102	TIEN PHUOC	BT107142	QUANG TIN/TIEN PHUOC	CPT DEGIMAN	CIDG/SS	VN
A-103	GIA VUC	BS378270	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CPT COX	CIDG	HRE, CUA, VN
A-104	HA THANH	3S390701	QUANG NGAI/SON HA	CPT TALLEY	CIDG/SS	VN, HRE
A-105	KHAN DUC	20008081	QUANG TIN/HAU DUC	CPT TOLLEY	CIDG/BS	VN, HRE
A-106	BA TO	BS567323	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CPT HAGELEBERGER	CIDG/SS	VN, HRE
A-107	TRA BONG	BS344884	QUANG NGAI/TRA BONG	CPT SCHEER	CIDG/SS	VN, HRE
A-108	MINH LONG	BS536510	QUANG NGAI/MINH LONG	CPT EVELAND	CIDG/SS	HRE, VN
A-109	THUONG DUC	ZC145533	QUANG NAM/DAI LOC	CPT BEDINGER	CIDG/SS	VN
A-110	DANANG	BT075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CPT CHAMBERLAIN	NOT DEPLOYED	NONE
A-100	DANANG	BT075724	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CPT JOCHIS	MIKE FORCE	RHADE, CHINESE
A-113	DANANG	BT075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CPT LA GALLE	MIKE FORCE	RHADE, CHINESE

II CORPS

CO B	PLEIKU	AR765475	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	LTC ROSSI	CONTROL	NONE
A-217	PLEIKU	AR765475	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CPT FRY	MIKE FORCE	RHADE
A-218	PLEIKU	AR765475	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CPT SINCERE	MIKE FORCE	RHADE
A-219	PLEIKU	AE765475	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	LT JENKINS	MIKE FORCE	RHADE
B-22	QUY NHON	CR088236	BINH DINH/QUY NHON	MAJ DUKES	CONTROL	NONE
A-221	QUY NHON	PC801435	PHU YEN/SONG HOA	CPT WATERS	CIDG/SS	JARAI, VN
A-222	DONG TRE	BQ907706	PHU YEN/DONG XUAN	CPT EDMONDS	CIDG/SS	RHADE, VN
A-223	TAN CANH	BF830060	BINH DINH/THY PHUOC	CPT VESSIER	CIDG	BAHMAR, VI

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Inclosure #1 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

LT	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	COMMANDER	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-224	PHU TUC	BQ504598	PHU BON/PHU TUC	CPT LE CLAIR	CIDG/SS	JARAI, BAHNAR
A-226	MAI LINH	BQ245922	PHU BON/PHU THIEN	CPT NICHOLS	CIDG/SS	JARAI, BAHNAR
A-227	BONG SON	BR846947	BINH DINH/HOAI NHON	CPT CRUMPLER	CIDG	VN, BAHNAR, HPE, JARAI
A-228	VDINH THINH	BR614605	BINH DINH/BINH KHE	CPT DYER	CIDG	VN, BAHNAR
B-23	BAN ME THUOT	AQ780040	DARLAC/BAN ME THUOT	MAJ JONES	CONTROL	NONE
A-232	TAN RAI	ZT095873	LAM DONG/BAO LOC	CPT STRILLER	CIDG	KOHO, VI
A-233	TRANG PEUC	ZV021265	DARLAC/BAN ME THUOT	CPT WOLFE	CIDG	READE, JARAI, LAO
A-234	AM LAC	AP865484	TUYEN DUC/LAC THIEN	CPT PARRISH	CIDG	CRU, CHILL, KOHO
A-235	NEON CO	YU801250	QUANG DUC/KIEN DUC	CPT SEGLER	CIDG	VN, MNONG, KOHO, READE
A-236	LAC THIEN	AP971756	DARLAC/LAC THIEN	CPT GERST	CIDG/SS	READE, JARAI
A-237	LUONG SON	BN124384	BINH THUAN/HOA DA	CPT BARRATO	CIDG	CHAM
A-238	BUON BIECH	BQ008594	DARLAC/BUON HO	CPT EVANOFF	CIDG	RHADE
A-239	DUC LAP	YU913751	QUANG DUC/DUC LAP	CPT CASSIDY	CIDG/BS	RHADE, JARAI
B-24	KONTUM	AR793889	KONTUM/KONTUM	LTC RADOSEVICH	CONTROL	BAHAR, SEDANG, JARAI
A-241	POLEI KIENG	ZA031932	KONTUM/KONTUM	CPT ENLOE	CIDG	HALONG, SEDANG, JARAI
A-242	DAK TEK	YB947684	KONTUM/DAK SUT	CPT PETERS	CIDG	HALONG, JEH, VN
A-243	PLATEAU GI	BS084155	KONTUM/KONTUM	CPT CARR	CIDG	BAHAR, SEDANG, VN
A-244	DAK TO	ZB013212	KONTUM/DAK TO	CPT MILLER	CIDG	JEH, RANGAO, SEDANG
A-245	DAK SEANG	YB903412	KONTUM/DAK SUT	CPT KALLAM	CIDG	RANGAO, BAHNAR, SEDANG
A-246	MAUNG BUK	AS990420	KONTUM/DAK TO	CPT WERNER	CIDG	SEDANG
A-251	PLEI DJERENG	YA857531	PLEIKU/LE THANH	CPT MOORE	CIDG/BS	KUBUAN, RHADE, MNONG, JARAI

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TRAMP DEPOSITION LIST

DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	COMMANDER	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-252	PLEI MUC NG	Z113675	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CPT WILLIAMS	CIDG/BS	HANANG, VN, JARAI BAHNAR, SEDANG
A-253	DUC CO	YA841248	PLEIKU/LE THANH	CPT PONZILLO	CIDG/BS	VN, JARAI
A-255	PLEI ME	Z1162059	PLEIKU/PHU NHON	CPT SCOTT	CIDG/BS	ROBUYAN, JARAI, BAHNAR, PANGAO
III CORPS						
A-300	BIEN HOA	XT007123	BIEN HOA/DUC TU	LTC HUDDLESTON	C&C	NUNGS
A-301	TRANG SUP	XT166555	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT CAREY	CIDG/TRANG	VN, CAMB, NUNGS
A-302	BIEN HOA	YT007124	BIEN HOA/DUC TU	CPT YLAROUT	NINE FORCE	VN, CAMB, NUNGS
A-303	HO NGOC TAO	XT958011	GIA DINH/THU DUC	CPT CRITZ	MGF	CAMB
A-304	TRANG SUP	XT166555	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT TERRELL	MGF	CAMB
B-31	XUAN LOC	YT461085	LONG KHANH/XUAN LOC	MAJ BOLAN	C&C/S/SS	CAMB/VN
A-311	TANH LINH	YT929262	BINH TUY/TANH LINH	CPT SPRADLING	CIDG	VN, CHAM, NUNGS MIEN, THUNG
A-312	XOM CAT	XT154285	LONG KHANH/XUAN LOC	CPT O'MALLEY	CIDG	CAMB
B-32	TAY NINH	XT205508	TAY NINH/PHU CHUONG	LTC HAPPERT	C&C/S/SS	VN, CAMB, CHINESE, MONTIGNARD
A-321	BEH SOI	XT093475	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT COX	CIDG/SS/BS	CAO DAI, CAMB
A-322	SOUT DA	XT339577	TAY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CPT FUKUSHIMA	OIDG	VN
A-323	TRAI BI	XT112702	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT PARKS	CIDG	VN, CAMB
A-324	NUYEN DEN	XT281581	TAY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CPT PINGRY	RAD RELAY	VN
A-325	BAO DON	XT436353	TAY NINH/KHIEU HANE	CPT BIDDLE	SS	VN
A-326	GO DAU HA	XT367252	TAY NINH/HIEU THIEN	CPT JOHNSON	SS	VN
B-33	HON QUAN	XT758378	BINH LONG/AN LOC	MAJ MENDOZA	C&C/S/SS	VN, MONT, CAMB
A-331	LOC HINH	XT731082	BINH LONG/LOC NINH	CPT VICKSELL	CIDG/SS/BS	VN, CAMB
A-332	MINH THANH	XT645670	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	CPT HALTEMAN	CIDG	VN, CAMB, MONT
A-333	CAU SONG BE	XT915735	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	CPT EORN	CIDG	VN, CAMB, MONT

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TRUP DISPOSITION LIST CONFIDENTIAL

DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	COMMANDER	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
B-34	SONG B2	YU178113	PHUOC LONG/PHUOC DINH	LTC BERNIER	C&G/S/SS	VN, MONT
A-341	BU DOP	XU976271	PHUOC LONG/BO DUC	CPT GARRETT	CIDG/SS/BS	VN, CAMB, MONT
A-342	DONG KOAI	YT079762	PHUOC LONG/DON LUAN	CPT BRENNAN	CIDG/SS	CAMB, MONT
A-343	DUC PHONG	XU436043	PHUOC LONG/DUC PHONG	CPT JORDAN	CIDG/SS	CAMB, MONT
35	DUC HOA	XS593968	HAU NGHIA/DUC HOA	MAJ LUTZ	C&C	VN, CAMB
A-351	HIEP HOA	XT437072	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT STEWART	CIDG/SS	VN, CAMB, CHAM
A-352	TRA CU	XS178984	HAU NGHIA/DUC HOA	CPT PERDUE	CIDG	VN, CAMB
A-353	NOT DEPLOYED					
A-354	NOT DEPLOYED					
B-55	SAIGON	(CITY)	GIA DINH/CAP HIL DET	MAJ ROOPER	LIAISON	NONE
B-56	HO NGOC TAO	XT958011	GIA DINH/THY DUC	MAJ SKILES	PROJ SIGMA	CAMB, CHINESE
IV CORPS						
CO D	CAN THO	XS843115	PHONG DINH/PHONG DINH	LTC HASSINGER	CONTROL	VN, CAMB
B-41	MOC HOA	XS030909	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	LTC FERNANDEZ	CONTROL/S	NONE
A-411	BINH HUNG	VU815815	AN XUYEN/HAU YEN	CPT LASTER	CIDG/SpS	CHINESE, VN
A-412	CAI CAI	LT562073	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CPT GEORGE	CIDG/RS	VN
A-413	BINH THANH THON	WE867032	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN BINH	CPT LAUGHEN	CIDG/BS/SS	VN, CAMB
A-414	MOC HOA	XS028899	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	CPT PEYTON	CIDG/BS/SS	VN, CAMB, CHAM
A-415	TUYEN NHON	XS273773	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN NHON	CPT GARDNER	CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-416	KINH QUAN II	XS9714757	KIEN TUONG/KINH BIEU	CPT DAUGHERTY	CIDG/SS	VN
B-42	CHAU DOC	WT131842	CHAU DOC/CHAU PHU	MAJ THIEME	CONTROL/S/SS	VN
A-421	HA TIEN	VS438468	KIEN GIANG/HA TIEN	CPT SMITH, R.D.	CIDG/BS/SS	VN, CAMB
A-422	VINH GIA	VS762610	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CPT SMITH, B.G.	CIDG/BS	VN, CAMB
A-423	TINH BIEN	VS953712	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CPT BRUSCHETTE	CIDG/BS/SS	VN, CAMB

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

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DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	COMMANDER	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-424	CAM THO	WS843116	PHONG DINH/PHONG DINH	CPT GERHARDT	NOT DEPLOYED	
A-425	THUONG THOI	WS313955	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CPT GRAHAM	CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-426	PHU QUOC ISL	US865304	KIEN GIANG/PHU QUOC	CPT HARALSON	TRAINING	NONE
A-427	PHU QUOC ISL	TS864289	KIEN GIANG/PHU QUOC	CPT MAPIES	CIDG/SS	VN, CHINESE
A-428	TAN CHAU	NS231945	CHAU DOC/TAN CHAU	CPT MILES	CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-429	BA TOAI	WS956629	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CPT KAPP	CIDG	CAMB, VN
B-43	CAM THO	WS843116	PHONG DINH/PHONG DINH	MAJ FROST	NOT DEPLOYED	
A-430	DON PHUC	WT513010	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CPT MARECEK	MIKE FORCE	CHINESE, CAMB
A-431	PHU QUOC ISL	US865302	KIEN GIANG/PHU QUOC	CPT MARECEK	MGF	CHINESE, CAMB
B-50	NHA TRANG	CP033514	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	MAJ CHING	CONTROL PROJECT OMEGA	READE, CHAM, CHINESE
A-502	TRUNG DUNG	BP937557	KHANH HOA/KIEN KHANH	CPT DEESON	CIDG/SS	VN
A-503	NHA TRANG	CP033514	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	CPT WILSON	MIKE FORCE	READE, CHAM, CHINESE
B-51	DONG BA TRIN	CP040270	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	MAJ BOYD	CIDG/TNG	NONE
I 2	NHA TRANG	CP031518	PHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	LTC HAYES	PROJ DELTA	CHINESE

MISSION ABBREVIATIONS: CIG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group

BS - Border Surveillance

S - Sector Advisory Role

SS - Subsector Advisory Role

Spc - Special Sector


4 Annexes:

- 1- I Corps Camp Locations
- 2- II Corps Camp Locations
- 3- III Corps Camp Locations
- 4- IV Corps Camp Locations

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CONFIDENTIAL I CORPS

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
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ANNEX 1 TO MOLOGURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
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II CORPS




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ANNEX 2 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967
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CONFIDENTIAL III CORPS



LEGEND

- + - + - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- CORPS BOUNDARY
- PROVINCE BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- COASTLINE


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ANNEX 3 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
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(RCS CSFOR-66)

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IV CORPS



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ANNEX 4 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
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INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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1. General: The intelligence requirements of the "A" camp commander are threefold. Primarily he needs early warning indicators of enemy activities. He needs to know the VC infrastructure within his TAOR and its relationship to adjacent and higher organizations. Finally he needs to know the enemy order of battle in proximity to his TAOR. The proposed intelligence program to fulfill these needs and establish responsibilities at the various levels of command (A & B Det, Companies and SFOB) is outlined below. This program is to be a bilateral intelligence effort and will be implemented in Feb 1967.

2. "A" Detachment Objectives and responsibilities:

a. Collection: Early warning information, VC infrastructure data and enemy order of battle data are within the collection capabilities of the personnel in the "A" detachment. The collection program to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the "A" camps consists of two types of informant nets. One net will be targeted at the enemy order of battle. It will require informants, who know the area, to report VC movements within the TAOR and its periphery. The second net will be targeted at the VC infrastructure. This net requires informants to report names, positions, and relationships of members and leaders of the VC organization. These informants would preferably be VC who have defected in place. The Group S-2 has set up a Mobile Training Team, which will assist in the establishment of these nets on a case by case basis. The prototype is to be initiated at LANG VEI, QUANG TRI Province.

b. Analysis: To facilitate the analysis of the information gathered by these nets the Group S-2 has directed that the following three analytical instruments be employed at each "A" camp by 15 Feb 1967.

(1) Handbooks: One will cover enemy OB; the other VC infrastructure. The VC infrastructure handbook will record the names, personalities, modus operandi, positions and relationships of members and leaders of the VC infrastructure. The order of battle handbook will record the organization, strength, mission, location, armament, morale, limitations and capabilities of the enemy.

(2) Map Overlays: One will display enemy OB data; the other, VC infrastructure. The infrastructure overlay will plot known and suspected locations of personnel, safe houses, meeting spots, communication points, and security of nets of the VC organization. The OB overlay will plot the locations, lines of communication and infiltration routes of enemy units.

(3) Wiring Diagrams: One will be for OB and one for VC infrastructure, showing organizational structures within the TAOR and its periphery. Known, unknown and suspected elements of these structures will be indicated in the diagrams.

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Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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c. Dissemination: The "A" detachments will disseminate all information up through channels to the SFOB and laterally to adjacent units. Spot reports will be transmitted electrically and all other information will be forwarded on 1396 Intelligence Information Report Forms.

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3. "B" Detachment Responsibilities:

a. Collection: The "B" detachments also have the mission of collection and analysis of information on VC infrastructure and OB. The "B"s, however, target their collection efforts at the areas in between the "A" camp TAOR's. The "B" detachments will make maximum use of lateral and supporting intelligence agencies. In addition to their organic sources they will establish liaison with CIA, 149th MI, 135th MI, adjacent friendly units and sector agencies. To assist in the collection effort of the detachments, personnel from the MI augmentation will be assigned as available.

b. Analysis: The primary objective of the analytical efforts at the "B" Det will be to give early warning of enemy attacks to the "A" detachments. They will maintain the same analytical instruments as the "A" camps. Personnel from the group MI augmentation will be assigned to "B" detachments to assist in analysis and dissemination.

c. Dissemination: The "B" detachments will disseminate all information to the "A" camps and to the SFOB through Special Forces channels. Information copies will be sent to Detachment B-55 in Saigon and lateral dissemination effected. Spot reports will be transmitted electrically and all other reports will be submitted on 1396's, Intelligence Information Report Forms.

4. Company Responsibilities:

a. Collection: The company directs and assists the collection efforts of the "A" and "B" detachments. It will have trained interrogators and analysts ready for dispatch to assist the "A"s and "B"s in collection. These personnel will be provided by the MI augmentation. The company will be responsible for liaison with subordinate, adjacent, and higher intelligence agencies. The company has no further collection responsibilities.

b. Analysis: The primary mission of the company S-2 section is collation and analysis of information. The company will produce studies, estimates and summaries for specific sub-commands. These summaries will emphasize only current information without regard to agreement with confirmed MACV OB holdings. On a weekly basis the company will prepare and disseminate an intelligence summary to indicate critical areas and specific intelligence regarding each "A" camp. The company will maintain current summaries and 1:50,000 map overlays for each "A" camp TAOR.

c. Dissemination: The company is responsible for dissemination

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of intelligence to all subordinate commands, the SFOB and lateral agencies. All information obtained by the companies which has not been transmitted by other elements will be forwarded to the SFOB. Copies of all studies, estimates and INTSUMS will also be forwarded.

5. Group S-2 Responsibilities:

a. Collection: The SFOB has no collection responsibilities other than to establish liaison with adjacent intelligence agencies and to direct and monitor the collection efforts of the "A" and "B" detachments. The S-2, 5th SFGA will establish policies and provide directives governing the group intelligence program.

b. Analysis: The SFOB will provide weekly summaries of current intelligence, hot spots and build-ups within the CTZ's. The objective is to produce tailored studies that will provide guidance to the companies in the disposition of their intelligence resources. In addition the SFOB will prepare special studies and intelligence annexes for the special operations conducted by 5th SFGA.

c. Dissemination: The group S-2 will disseminate intelligence to all subordinate, lateral and higher headquarters on a scheduled basis. This dissemination will be in the form of INTSUM, MONEVAL, and PERINTREPS. Special studies and intelligence annexes will be published as required.

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SPECIAL FORCES COORDINATION WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

79 1. (S/NOFORN) The following is an excerpt from the intelligence briefing given General Harold K. Johnson by the Group S-2 Section on 27 Dec 1966.

"To satisfy the increased intelligence requirements of subordinate detachments and supported tactical units, the 5th Special Forces Group has initiated a program of close coordination and cooperation with all Free World Forces intelligence agencies for the development of equipment and the production of analytic studies in support of all operations."

"Many special studies governing all parts of the Republic of Vietnam are required to adequately support Special Forces combat operations. These studies are produced by MACV elements such as the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), and the Intelligence Operations Division of MAC J-2 (IOD). The studies include Area Analysis, OB Studies of enemy units and Secret Zones, and Target Analysis Studies for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and Mobile Guerrilla Operations. For example, a 30 day Mobile Guerrilla Operation began in the Seven Mountains area in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in early January. To support this operation, CICV was tasked to produce for us, an Area Study and Target Analysis Study of the Seven Mountains area. The Target Analysis Data confirmed our preliminary investigation that the area is a high-priority target. It further indicated that an operation in this area would seriously disrupt VC communication routes between Cambodia and Vietnam, interrupt VC food procurement programs in the southwestern part of the Delta, and have a psychological effect on area residents who are opposed to Communism but follow VC directives because they have no other option."

"Tactically, the study located VC storage depots, ordnance plants, hospitals, gun emplacements, and a host of other details essential to good operational planning."

"Our cooperative program is not all TAKE. 5th Special Forces is the action agent or support element for several joint intelligence projects. For example, we are conducting a sensitive experiment with CAS in the development of a technique employing an electronic device for the positive location of VC and NVA tactical headquarters. We provide more than 200 personnel for MAC SOG operations, and operate 26 weather stations for the US Air Force to increase the area coverage of their synoptical weather picture. We are negotiating with DIA to test a photo-electronic device to cover road and stream watch sites. We provide billet and office space for 149th MI Group collection teams in the four Corps Tactical Zones, and we are coordinating with the 509th Radio Research Unit to improve electronic intelligence coverage in Vietnam."

2. (C) In addition to the above mentioned agencies the Group has established a close working relationship with the 1st Mil Intel Bn - Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Detachment D, 1st MIBARS is located adjacent to the SFOB and has been very responsive to our request for aerial photography and electronic aerial surveillance.

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Annex 1 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

1. MI Detachment Counter Intelligence (6XHD TOE 300-500D). The Detachments composition will be: Six Warrant Officers, MOS 971A; Six E-7's, MOS 97B40; Six E-6's, MOS 97B40; and Six E-5's, MOS 97B40. The expected time of arrival is April 1967.

81

2. MI Detachment Collection (6XLD TOE 30-500D). The Detachments composition will be: Six Lieutenants, MOS 9668; Six Warrant Officers, MOS 972A; Six E-7's, MOS 97B40; Six E-6's, MOS 97C40; Six E-5's, MOS 97B40. The expected time of arrival is April 1967.

3. MI Detachment Administrative (2XAH TOE 30-500D). The Detachments composition will be four E-4's, MOS 71B20, and its expected time of arrival is April 1967.

4. MI Detachment Defense Against Methods of Entry (TOE 30-500D). This element will be one E-7, MOS 97B40 and its expected time of arrival is April 1967.

5. MI Detachment Clerical (4XHB TOE 30-500D). The Detachments composition will be four E-5's, MOS 97B40 and is expected to arrive in March 1967.

6. MI Detachment Counter Intelligence (2XHE TOE 30-500D). The Detachments composition will be: Two Captains, MOS 9666 and two Lieutenants, MOS 9666. The expected time of arrival is April 1967.

7. MI Detachment Interrogator (8XFD TOE 30-500D). The Detachments composition will be eight E-6's, MOS 96C40. The expected time of arrival is April 1967.

8. MI Detachment Order of Battle (18XJD TOE 30-600D). The Detachments composition will be 19 E-6's, MOS 96B40. The expected time of arrival is April 1967.

9. MI Detachment Order of Battle (4XJB TOE 30-600D). The composition of this Detachment will be: Four Lieutenants, MOS 9318, and four E-4's, MOS 96B20. The expected time of arrival is May 1967.

10. MI Detachment Imagery/Interpretation (2XOB TOE 30-600D). The composition of this Detachment will be: Two Majors, MOS 9309; two Captains, MOS 9309; two E-7's, MOS 96D40; two E-5's, MOS 96D30. The expected time of arrival is May 1967.

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Annex 2 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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11. Recapitulation of the MI Augmentation is:

a. Major	2
b. Captain	4
c. Lieutenant	12
d. Warrant Officer	12
e. E-7	15
f. E-6	39
g. E-5	18
h. E-4	8
TOTAL	<u>110</u>

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12. (S/NOFORN) Organization:

a. The Military Intelligence Detachment will be organized into a headquarters element, five intelligence analysis sections, and six intelligence collection teams.

b. The headquarters element will be composed of the counter intelligence, administrative, defense against methods of entry, and clerical sections. The element located at the intelligence analysis centers will be composed of order of battle, interrogator, imagery interpretation, administrative and clerical sections. Detachment B-57 (Ho Ngoc Tao) will have assigned to it all six collection teams in support of Project DANIEL BOONE.

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ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVICES

82 1. (S-NOFORM) At the present time many agencies are in the process of developing, field testing and producing various specialized devices for use in intelligence operations. Some of the advantages which accrue through the use of these devices are as follows:

- a. They increase security.
- b. They expedite operations.
- c. They conserve manpower.
- d. They make it possible for personnel to operate under less hazardous conditions.

2. (S-NOFORM) There are a great variety of devices available for use in the intelligence field. The Group is currently taking action to procure or experiment with the following:

a. Seismatic Anti-intrusion devices- The group has requested 100 each of these items; enough for employment of at least one each of every Special Forces installations.

b. Sub-miniature radios- There are numerous varieties of these radios and signaling devices. They are used for such things as agent communications and concealment within other items of equipment. When items of equipment, with a signaling device hidden inside, are deliberately allowed to fall into enemy hands they are invaluable in electronic tracking of the enemy's subsequent movements.

c. Lines of communications monitors- These are small photo electric devices which can be easily concealed near a trail or stream and then used in detect and record enemy movement along that route.

3. (C) In addition to the above mentioned programs the Group is continually looking for new ways to employ existing items and developing plans which lead to the development of new devices.

Annex 3 to Inclosure #2, to Quarterly Operational Report for period ending 31 January 1967.

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FIGHTING CAMPS

85 1. Concept - A Fighting Camp is a CIDG camp having a minimum essential position defense capability. The overall defensive posture of this camp is enhanced by continual, aggressive offensive operations conducted by camp personnel in their TAOR.

2. The camp itself embodies the principles of:

a. Speed of Installation

(1) Completed in thirty (30) days - assisted by one engineer platoon reinforced with selected items of construction equipment depending upon airfield requirements.

(2) Size is such that it can be defended by one quarter of the assigned strength.

(3) A standardized design is followed.

b. Austerity:

(1) Construction costs held to a minimum.

(2) No "frills" in this camp.

(3) Local materials are used whenever possible.

(4) Skilled labor requirements are held to a minimum.

c. Defense in Depth:

(1) Alternate and secondary positions are used to provide depth to the battle area.

(2) This camp has the ability to limit and to seal off penetrations.

(3) Outposts and listening posts for early warning.

3. The cost of this type of camp will vary depending upon:

a. Site location

b. Necessity to "harden".

c. Availability of local construction needs.

d. Anticipated camp "life".

4. Because this concept does not markedly differ from established defensive doctrine, a minimum of special skills, equipment, and material will have to be stockpiled and, later, imported into the construction site.

Inclosure #3 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

OPERATIONS DATA

1. Number/Type CIDG Operations Conducted:

67

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>
a. Attacks	153	71	8	28	144	44
b. Blocking Actions	173	90	0	33	213	17
c. Escort Actions	916	37	483	289	175	6
d. Combat Patrols	8401	6438	4841	5719	3884	395
e. Recon Patrols	7251	2162	6150	3106	149	8
f. Ambushes	4267	25268	24006	4955	561	13
TOTAL BY TYPE	21161	34066	35488	14130	5126	483
TOTAL OPERATIONS: 55227						

2. Number/Type RF/PF Operations Conducted:

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>
a. Attacks	161	25	24	59	82	21
b. Blocking Actions	274	124	63	146	180	9
c. Escort Actions	596	88	153	175	350	6
d. Combat Patrols	1565	343	832	814	238	24
e. Recon Patrols	2018	1382	2362	952	86	0
f. Ambushes	1212	19038	18273	1814	161	2
TOTAL BY TYPE	5826	21000	21707	3960	1091	68
TOTAL OPERATIONS: 26826						

3. Number of Friendly Initiated Contacts:

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. CIDG	524	98	67	166	292	97	622
b. RF/PF	98	68	52	62	33	19	166

4. VC Initiated Combat Action Against:

	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>
a. Attacks	99	52
b. Probes	122	172
c. Ambushes	101	36
d. TOTAL	322	260

Inclosure #4 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

5. Other VC Initiated Actions Against:

	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>RF/FF</u>
a. Mines/Booby Traps	513	50
b. Assassinations	5	12
c. Sabotage	17	1
d. TOTAL	535	63

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VIET CONG CASUALTIES

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1. (C) Continued VC Losses During 4th Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	286	351	490	378	1505
VCC	58	142	133	81	414
TOTAL	344	493	623	459	1919

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed VC Losses Country-wide:

	<u>CIDG</u>		<u>RF/PF</u>		
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Quarter	1857	319	438	125	2729
2nd Quarter	830	236	491	105	1662
3rd Quarter	817	391	263	140	1611
4th Quarter	1302	312	243	102	1959

NOTE: Above figures are USASF BODY COUNT

Inclosure #5 to Operation 1 Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67

USASF CASUALTIES

91

1. (C) USASF casualties during 4th Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone.

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	1	3	2	3	9
WIA	6	21	21	6	54
MIA	0	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	7	24	24	9	64

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of USASF Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Quarter	17	55	1	73
2nd Quarter	14	63	2	79
3rd Quarter	15	60	0	75
4th Quarter	9	54	1	64

Inclosure #6 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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CIDG CASUALTIES

1. (C) CIDG Casualties During 4th Quarter by Corps Tactical Zones:

93

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA	4	16	23	16	59
b. WIA	39	50	86	27	202
c. MIA	1	1	0	4	6
d. TOTAL	44	67	109	47	267

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of CIDG Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Quarter	361	592	95	1048
2nd Quarter	228	681	53	962
3rd Quarter	269	632	18	919
4th Quarter	59	202	6	267

Inclosure #7 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

RF/PF CASUALTIES

1. (C) RF/PF Casualties during 4th Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

95

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA	22	1	53	5	81
b. WIA	18	2	105	11	136
c. MIA	12	0	6	0	18
d. TOTAL	52	3	164	16	235

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of RF/PF Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Quarter	203	283	85	571
2nd Quarter	196	275	38	509
3rd Quarter	158	267	96	521
4th Quarter	81	136	18	235

Inclosure 48 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

DETACHMENT A-109
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96337, US Forces

26 January 1967

97 SUBJECT: After Action Report, Thong Duc (Operation DCC 11),
21 and 22 January 1967

1. The forces involved in Operation DCC 11 were 120 CIDG, one LLDB, and 4 USASF on the initial element, and 60 CIDG, 80 RF/PF, one LLDB, and three USASF on the exploitation force. In addition, 50 CIDG were sent to reinforce the operation on the second day.

2. The mission was to conduct a search and destroy operation in reaction to intelligence information.

3. The entire operation ran from 210430 to 221930 January 1967.

4. The operation was planned in anticipation of indicated enemy movement and resupply operations in the area to the east of Ngoc Kinh I, center coordinates ZC200543. Viet Cong units known to operate in the area were the Q-14 Company, the Q-17 Battalion, elements of a sapper battalion (designation unknown), and occasional NVA elements. Thirty VC were sighted in this area on 17 January. The plan was to have one CIDG company with advisors move into this area to find and destroy any VC they might find. At 210430 the operation departed camp Thong Duc and moved east through the villages to the south of the river, (see overlay). At 1100 the operation made initial contact at coordinates ZL187535, with an estimated two squads of VC who withdrew to the south-east. The advance was continued, and at 1315 the operation regained contact at coordinates ZC200543 with an estimated 200 VC. (This figure was later substantiated by intelligence reports and prisoner interrogation). Fire was returned, and the senior advisor requested immediate airstrikes and artillery. He also requested that an exploitation force be sent into the area immediately. The Detachment Commander radioed Company C and requested that the Mike Force be helilifted into the area. Due to the time involved in getting helicopters and the Mike Force ready to go, the Detachment Commander was ordered by the Company Commander to send all available personnel in the camp to the battle area. The Mike Force would then be sent to the camp for security purposes. At 1415 the exploitation force departed from the base camp and rapidly moved along the south bank of the river toward the east. At 1525, just as the exploitation element had reached a point north of the battle area and was beginning to wheel south, they met increasing enemy resistance. The exploitation force then moved west to skirt a body of water and swung back to the east towards the immediate area of the battle. VC resistance quickly slackened, and the exploitation force reached the position of the main operation. During the entire engagement, which was characterized by

Inclosure #9 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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a series of short violent firefights, friendly forces were taken under fire by automatic weapons, small arms, 60mm and 81mm mortars. Friendly casualties were three CIDG wounded. Firepower used against the enemy consisted of automatic weapons, small arms, 4.2" mortar, 105mm and 155mm howitzers, and 14 tactical airstrikes. A Forward Air Controller was in the air during the entire period. Enemy losses were five killed, and two wounded. At this point it became necessary to move back to the west in order to evacuate the wounded, effect resupply and gain room for maneuver. The operation, which then consisted of one RF/PF and two CIDG companies, moved to coordinates ZC 178536 where a medevac and re-supply landing zone was secured. By 1900 resupply and medevac were completed.

At 220200 a flanking element of 120 CIDG and two supporting elements of 30 CIDG each began an encircling movement over the rugged hills to the south of the battle area. At daylight the remaining 20 CIDG plus the 80 RF/PF were to sweep back to the east to regain contact with the VC, at which time the southern element would prevent the VC from getting onto the highground to the south, and drive him to the river where he could be destroyed. At 1000 the southern force flushed 2 squads of VC with an automatic weapon and drove them towards the sweep element. One of the VC was wounded and the rest withdrew east. At 1100 the sweep element linked up with one of the 30 men supporting elements which had been sent to the village after the 2 squads of VC mentioned earlier. On advancing another 200 meters strong contact was again made. The southern element began to sweep northeast. At this time the CIDG radio operator for the USASF was wounded. The FAC spotted 40-plus VC running east, and an immediate airstrike with CBU (bobbles) was called. The VC broke contact and fled to the east. The 50 man reinforcing element from base camp arrived with replacement radio. 30 VC were caught in the open by aircraft armed with CBU's. An immediate assessment of the airstrike and battle areas showed 14 VC killed by small arms and artillery fire, and 30 VC killed by the airstrikes. Also several tons of food, clothing, ammunition, and medical supplies were found in caves and sampans along the river's edge. Five prisoners were taken at this time. The operation secured an LZ for medevac and prisoner evacuation. The operation then returned to base camp, closing at 1930 hours.

4. Conclusions, Observations, and Results:

a. Several things about the enemy were observed. Their fire discipline was excellent. Heavy volumes of fire were received and cut off promptly as if on signal. Tactical maneuver by the VC was good, he constantly tried to encircle friendly units and made good use of concealed avenues of approach. Uniforms of the killed and captured VC helped to identify the units as the Q-14 Company and, elements of a sapper battalion. Marksmanship on the part of the VC was poor, which accounts for our low casualty rate. Reports received from several sources confirm that Le Than, the Q-14 Company Commander, was killed, and that the Q-14 Company is no longer operational.

b. Enemy losses were:

49 Killed (conf)

25 Killed (prob)

After Action Report (or Inued)

4 Wounded

5 Captured

1500 pounds of food captured

750 pounds of medical supplies captured

4 Weapons captured

25 Sampans destroyed

c. Friendly losses were: 3 CIDG wounded.

/S/WILLIAM G BUHMANN, JR
/T/WILLIAM G, BUHMANN, JR
Captain, Artillery
Commanding

COMPANY B
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96295

AVSFB-CPN

11 January 1967

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SUBJECT: After Action Report Task Force Prong

TO: Commanding Officer
5th SFG Aon, 1st SF
APO 96240

1. BACKGROUND:

a. The 4th Infantry Division planned to conduct an operation beginning 3 Nov 66 to sweep and clear the area north of Plei Djereng, west to the Nam Sathay River and east to the 90 line, for suspected elements of the 325th Division (NVA) (Incl 1). In the original plan of the 4th Division no units were to be committed to the area west of the Nam Sathay River to the Cambodian border. The southern half of this Plei Trap Valley was an area well known to contain enemy infiltration routes.

b. Commanding Officer, Company B, 5th Special Forces formulated a plan for the employment of one provisional battalion of CIDG (west of the Nam Sathay River to the Cambodian border) to conduct search and clear operations and also to act as a screen for the 4th Division's operation which was to operate to the east of the Nam Sathay River. The plan of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group, was presented to G3, 4th Div, on 5 Nov 66. The 4th Div suggested instead that they would prefer to employ one of their battalions in that area and that the CIDG force would operate between that battalion and the main force conducting the sweep to the east generally on a north/south axis along the Nam Sathay River advancing by phase lines to the north. It was stated to the 4th Div that the CIDG could better operate next to the border since CIDG units operate better in an Area of Operation rather than along an axis of advance by phase lines.

c. The 4th Div accepted the recommendations of CO, Company B, 5th SFGA. On 8 Nov 66, modified plan (Incl 2) was issued by the 4th Div assigning a slightly revised area west of the Nam Sathay River to the CIDG force as an area of operation. This area was further broken down into three company areas by Company B, 5th SFGA (Incl 3, App A).

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

a. 08 Nov 66: One company from 2/8, 4th Inf Div, moved to LZ LANE (LORE), YA6OU530 to secure the LZ prior to deployment of Task Force Prong. The lift of TF Prong began 0830 hrs with the movement of 3rd Mike Force

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Company and the command group from Pleiku to LZ LANE. Plei Djereng and Duc Co elements were closed into LZ LANE by 1115 hrs. At 1310 hrs, Mike Force Company made contact with elements of an NVA antiaircraft battery, vicinity YA602542. Results were one NVA KIA, two 12.7 AA MG, two AK47 and 35 packs CIA with negative friendly casualties. Mike Force again made contact with an estimated NVA squad vicinity YA610540 resulting in two NVA KIA, one WIA, one pack CIA and one USSF WIA. At 1400 hrs, the Plei Djereng element of TF Prong made contact with a three man carrying party moving north on a large trail vicinity YA605526. Results were two NVA KIA, one NVA WIA, one AK47 CIA, two grenades and two packs CIA with negative friendly casualties. In vicinity of this action TF Prong divided forces approximately 1600 hrs with the Plei Djereng Company moving south and the Duc Co Company and the command group continuing to move west. At 1615 hrs, Plei Djereng observed three NVA vicinity YA605524, and after a short fire fight the NVA broke contact to the south with negative results. At 2000 hrs, TF Prong was located at: command group and Duc Co YA599526, Plei Djereng YA606512, and Mike Force YA611553.

b. 09 Nov 66: A security ambush of Plei Djereng caught an NVA recon platoon at 0805 hrs, vicinity YA606512, advancing north along the same trail that Plei Djereng had moved south on the previous day. Plei Djereng Company followed up this contact by moving south along the trail and across a stream. Here they made contact at 0815 hrs with an estimated NVA company in prepared positions, vicinity YA605509. Withdrawing to the north bank of the stream, Plei Djereng requested FAC support and called for artillery fires on the enemy positions. The artillery was lifted from the enemy positions on the south bank of the river at 1010 hrs. Plei Djereng assaulted across the river and was able to establish a platoon size position on the south bank. However, due to the heavy enemy fire which caused several friendly casualties, they were forced to withdraw to the northern banks at 1235 hrs. Plei Djereng called for continuous artillery support and requested assistance to locate an LZ so wounded could be evacuated. An LZ was located but Plei Djereng was unable to withdraw since the enemy had maneuvered between Plei Djereng and the LZ. Results of this contact were four NVA KIA and one RPD 6 IMG CIA. Friendly casualties were four CIDG KIA, five CIDG WIA and two USSF WIA. At this time Plei Djereng requested reinforcements.

(1) Duc Co and the command group had continued to move west to vicinity YA588528 where they crossed an old north/south trail at 0830 hrs. Reconnaissance was conducted by squad size elements 500 meters to the north and south with negative signs of enemy activity. A platoon size element moving west came across the remains of an ALE, 1500 meters from the trail. The only identifying marks were the letters ZB on the tail. The reconnaissance revealed no signs of enemy activity in the past several months.

(2) Mike Force closed on an LZ vicinity YA612553, 0830 hrs to infiltrate weapons captured the previous day. While waiting for the infiltration, a security element ambushed four NVA at 1115 hrs resulting in four NVA KIA, four AK47 CIA and one CIDG WIA.

SUBJECT: After Action Report Task Force Prong

103 (3) Duc Co departed vicinity YA588528 at 1315 hrs to reinforce Plei Djereng. Duc Co was cautioned by Plei Djereng to be alert for an NVA machine gun and snipers in trees, vicinity YA606511 where at 1430 hrs Duc Co made contact with an NVA machine gun. Results of this contact were one CIDG WIA, and NVA casualties UNK. At 1530 hrs, Duc Co linked up with Plei Djereng and covered their withdrawal to the north. As Duc Co withdrew it was covered by creeping artillery. At 1830 hrs, all casualties were evacuated from LZ LANE. A platoon from Plei Djereng remained overnight as security. TF Prong (-) (with one platoon at LZ LANE) remained overnight vicinity YA605527 and Mike Force Company at YA577545.

c. 10 Nov 66: At 0910 hrs, Co C, 1/14, landed at LZ LANE to participate with TF Prong (-) in the assault of the enemy positions that Plei Djereng had found the previous day. Co C was to move south from the LZ, cross the stream vicinity YA616511 and assault the enemy positions from the east. TF Prong was to move south from their night position down the trail to engage the enemy vicinity YA605508 and contain them for Co C to envelope. As TF Prong was beginning to move out an NVA recon platoon contacted the northern security element. After a short fire fight the enemy withdrew east toward LZ LANE. Results of this contact were one NVA WIA and two CIDG WIA. TF Prong made heavy contact at 1410 hrs with an estimated NVA Bn in an L shaped ambush position vicinity YA605515. The battle raged until TF Prong was able to consolidate a defensive position vicinity YA608515. Heavy enemy fire ceased approximately 1800 hrs with the exception of periodic sniper fire. Throughout the afternoon after an initial 1/2 hour small arms battle, there was continuous artillery and air support. Results of the engagement were twelve NVA KIA and four ARVN CIA. Friendly casualties were one USMC KIA, one US WIA, four CIDG KIA, seventeen CIDG WIA, 5 CIDG MIA, one PRC/74 destroyed and one M-16 damaged. Twenty-nine CIDG were separated from the TF Prong but made their way back to LZ LANE. Five kilometers away the Mike Force Company ambushed six NVA at 1430 hrs vicinity YA581339, killing four and wounding two. Mike Force WIA's and 2 NVA CIA were medevaced at 1715 hrs from an LZ vicinity YA570535. At 1630 hrs, a security element going into position vicinity a dry lake bed killed an NVA sniper. A perimeter was established vicinity YA571553 with ambushes positioned on a heavily used north/south trail paralleling the dry lake bed. One element of fifty-five CIDG secured the northwest edge of the lake bed while the remainder took up positions on the east side of the lake bed.

d. 11 Nov 66: At 0015 hrs, Co A and Co C, 1/14, linked up as reinforcements with TF Prong (-) (Cmdg Gp, Duc Co and Plei Djereng) vicinity YA605515. Five kilometers away the Mike Force element on the west side of the lake bed came under heavy fire from an NVA Company at 0600 hrs, vicinity YA571553. The attack was repelled, but the element was required to withdraw across the lake bed and rejoin the remainder of the company. As friendly air and artillery began to hit to the west of friendly defenses, the Mike Force came under heavy machine gun, mortar and small arms fire from the south, east and north. When air and artillery were shifted from the west to the eastern

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enemy positions, Mike Force again received heavy fire from the west side of the lake bed. During the course of the heavy fighting, the Mike Force fell back three times to take up new positions. The enemy pressed the attack with an estimated battalion. An attempt to resupply ammunition by HULD at 0900 hrs, was driven off by heavy enemy AA and small arms fire, killing two crew members. The aircraft managed to return to the airfield. Heavy fighting continued until 1240 hrs, and sporadic contact was maintained until 1530 hrs. Mike Force was successfully resupplied at 1230 hrs and seriously wounded were taken out on the same aircraft. All medevacs were completed by 1530 hrs. At 1630 hrs, Co B, 1/12 arrived from the north as reinforcements. Results of this contact were 58 NVA KIA, 13 CIDG KIA, 40 CIDG WIA, three USSF WIA, one USSF KIA (in helicopter), one US KIA (crewman in helicopter) and one M-79 was destroyed by enemy action. Casualties from TF Prong (-) (Duc Co and Plei Djereng) were evacuated from vicinity YA601515 at 0900 hrs. At 2000 hrs, TF Prong had re-established a perimeter with Co A, 1/14 vicinity YA601515. At 2200 hrs a security element from Co A, 1/14 ambushed an NVA squad vicinity YA606511, results UNK. Mike Force and Co B, 1/12 were located overnight vicinity YA571554.

e. 12-15 Nov 66: TF Prong (-) moved to LZ LANE 1100 hrs. Enroute five NVA were encountered, one was WIA and one was CIA (was a WIA) and medevaced. TF Prong (-) was helilifted to Plei Djereng 13 Nov 66. Plei Me Company (the replacement for Plei Djereng) was helilifted to LZ LANE to conduct operations with 1st Bn, 14th Inf. Plei Me with recon platoon of 1/14 conducted saturation patrolling south and west of LZ. No significant activity was reported by them on 15 Nov 66. On 12 Nov 66, the Mike Force along with Co B, 1/12, searched the area of the 11 Nov action with no significant contact. On 13 Nov, Mike Force and Co B, 1/12, moved to secure a fire support base for 1/12 Inf vicinity YA602550. The battalion arrived approximately 1800 hours. On 14 Nov, the 1st Mike Force Company replaced the 3rd Mike Force Company.

f. 16-20 Nov 66: Buon Blech Company was helilifted from Camp Plei Djereng staging area to vicinity YA610600 on 16 Nov to conduct search and destroy operations with the 2/8. Operations were conducted to the west with no significant activity. On 17 Nov, vicinity YA600595, Plei Me made contact with an estimated NVA company, but action was broken by enemy force. Plei Me Company with the recon platoon from 1/14 and B and C Companies, 1/14 continued to conduct search and destroy operations south of LZ LANE. Plei Me Company and recon platoon made contact at 1200 hrs, with an estimated two NVA battalions in bunker positions vicinity YA605503. They were pinned down by heavy small arms and automatic weaponsfire for two hours until Co B, 1/14 linked-up. Artillery and air support was called in on the enemy bunkers after Plei Me Company and US elements had withdrawn a safe distance. NVA units were able to get between friendly units and the LZ and caused numerous casualties. Plei Me suffered two USSF WIA, one LLDB WIA, three CIDG WIA and one CIDG KIA. Enemy losses caused by US, CIDG and air and artillery were 189 NVA KIA.

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g. 21-26 Nov 66: Buon Blech was released from the operation 25 Nov 66. They had negative contact. Phu Tuc Company was helilifted into the AO 23 Nov and began operations with 1/12. No significant enemy activity reported by Phu Tuc during this period. Mike Force was released from operation on 26 Nov.

h. 27 Nov - 02 Dec 66: A second Buon Blech Company was helilifted into the operation on 28 Nov to work with 1/22. Phu Tuc and Buon Blech encountered no significant enemy activity during the entire period. Operation Prong was terminated 021200 Dec.

1. Results of Operation Prong:

(1) NVA KIA - 272	(2) Friendly	USAF KIA - 2
NVA WIA - 2		US KIA - 1
NVA CIA - 3		USAF WIA - 12
		US WIA - 1
		CIDG KIA - 24
		CIDG WIA - 71
		CIDG MIA - 5
		LLDB WIA - 1

(3) Equipment CIA 2-12.7 AA MG
1-Rocket Launcher
25-AK 47
3-RP 46 LMG
3-RPD LMG
6-SKS (Aslt rifles)
38-Rucksacks
100-Chicom grenades

(4) Equipment losses 1-M16 damaged
1-PRC/74 destroyed
1-M79 destroyed

(5) Totals:

(a) Friendly - KIA 27, WIA 83, MIA 5

(b) Enemy - KIA 272, WIA 2

3. INTELLIGENCE ENCLOSURE TF PRONG:

a. The screening action conducted by TF Prong in conjunction with the 4th Infantry Division's conduct of Paul Revere IV was predicated on intelligence which indicated significant enemy activity in the area west of the 4th Division's TACR. Agent reports in the area covered by TF Prong

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indicated the presence of a large infiltration route running from north to south between the 4th Division's TAOR and the Cambodian border. Since the 4th Division's TAOR did not extend into this region, it was reasoned that enemy forces that sought to avoid contact with the 4th Division and return to Cambodia would use these infiltration routes in their flight.

b. The Mike Force contact on 11 Nov, vicinity YA572552, is believed to have been with elements of 88th NVA Regiment. Task Force command group plus Plei Djereng Company and Duc Co Company made contact on 10 Nov vicinity YA603515; this is believed to have been with elements of 33rd NVA Regiment. Plei Me Company on 19 Nov, vicinity YA605503, is believed to have made contact with elements of 33rd NVA Regiment.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

c. In any engagement between CIDG and NVA units of equal size, CIDG usually came off second best due to the difference in small arms and also the lack of responsive control down to squad level. When CIDG units are operating in areas of likely NVA contact, a greater number of automatic weapons and more USSF advisors should be utilized.

b. There are certain advantages to CIDG operating in conjunction with the better trained, equipped and controlled US troops, and vice versa. The CIDG soldier is indigenous to the land. He seldom uses a compass but he always manages to get to his destination and return. This is to a certain extent, based on his knowledge of the immediate area, but also his natural ability (gained from years of practice in moving through generally familiar country) is an experience which only comes with time. He is in many instances more familiar with home made local type booby traps, therefore he is in a better position to detect danger areas. Based on this we feel the CIDG unit is in a better position to find and fix the enemy, while the better controlled US unit maneuvers in for the finish. CIDG seldom have trouble finding the enemy, however, once a large contact is made, a quick response by the US unit is imperative. If CIDG are to continue working effectively with US units, a much quicker response by the reaction force will be needed.

c. The use of the M-79 grenade launcher in underbrush and thick vegetation is not satisfactory since it will detonate on many small branches and twigs. The use of the rifle grenade should be considered as a substitute in similar terrain situations, or an additional safety factor should be built into M-79 ammunition.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Harry E Warnberg
/t/HARRY E WARNBERG
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

10-6

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FRAGO 20-66

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Reference OPORD 12-66, 4th Inf Div

1. (C) MISSION. 4th Inf Div with 2 bdes continues attack north on zone conducting S&D operations.

2. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Maneuver. Div continues attack north in zone from present positions with 2/4 Bde on left and 3/25 Bde on right. Battalions advance so as to be mutually supporting.

(a) Phasing is as follows:

1. 2 Nov - 1/22 Inf Bn moves across SE SAN River and on line.

2. 3 Nov -

a. 2/4 Bde extend west flank to block trail east of NAM SATHAY River (Approx 1000 meters).

b. 2/4 and 3/25 Bdes limit of advance north 1000 - 1500 meters.

3. 4 Nov - 2/4 Bde extend west flank to NAM SATHAY River, approx 1000 meters.

4. 5 Nov - All units advance north with west flank refused.

(b) Limit of advance to be determined, based on enemy situation, terrain and status of support.

(c) Daily advance will terminate NLT 2 hours prior to darkness to permit establishment of perimeter defenses, LZ preparation, LPs, registration of Arty fires and dispatch of patrols.

(2) Fires: Preplanned and immediate support by artillery, gunship, SAC and TAC Air. Priority of fires to assembly areas, escape routes, and axes of maneuver. Artillery and Tac Air fire planning to compliment Arc Light and Quick Run Strikes.

Annex #1 to Inclosure #10 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.

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b. 2/4 Bde: Attack north in zone, orienting on enemy forces, with left flank on NAM SATHAY River.

c. 3/25 Bde: Attack north in zone, orienting on enemy forces, with right flank on YA KRONG BOLAL (SE SAN) River and YA TRI Stream.

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d. Div Arty:

- (1) 2/9 Arty: Atch 3/25 Bde.
- (2) 4/42 Arty: Atch 2/4 Bde.
- (3) B/5/16 Arty: OCA 4/42 Arty.
- (4) D/5/16 Arty: OCA 4/42 Arty.
- (5) A/1/30 Arty: OCA 2/9 Arty.
- (6) Flat/A/6/14 Arty (8 in): GSR 2/9 Arty.
- (7) A/6/14 (-): 3 SLT GS.
1 SLT Atch 2/9 Arty.
1 SLT Atch 4/42 Arty.
237 FA Det OCA 2/9 Arty.

e. 4th Engr Bn (-): Recon and construct road from Hwy 509 to SE SAN River and bridge river.

f. Reserve 1/14 Inf, 1/10 Cav (-).

g. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) This FRAGO effective for planning and execution on order.
- (2) D-Day tentatively 3 Nov 66.
- (3) Units will not cross NAM SATHAY except of Division order.
- (4) Troop Safety: 3000 meters for Arc Lights and Quick Runs.
- (5) Report crossing of all phase lines.

Acknowledge.

COLLINS
ME

OFFICIAL:

/s/Duquemin
/t/DUQUEMIN
G3

10-1-2

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Copy of Copies
Hq 4th Infantry Division
DRAGON MT RVN (AR802355)
081200H Nov 66
JMK

FRAGO 27-66

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Reference: a. Msg Cite #027, Subject: Warning airmobile Opns Request (DAN TH ANG 104) ITC 030300Z Nov 66.

b. Msg Cite #1235-66-8, subject: Combined Opns in PAUL REVERE IV AO, DTG 010330Z Nov 66.

Task Organization:

24 Bde, 4th Inf Div
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
TF PRONG
3d MECH Force Co
CIDG Co, DUC GO
— CIDG Co, PLEI DJERENG
TF NORTH
403d Scout Co
408th Scout Co
CIDG Co, POLEI KIENG
CIDG Co, ~~PLEI PRONG~~

1. (C) SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces: Current INTISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) TF ~~PRONG~~ - commenced opns 080900H Nov 66, conducted heliborne assault vic YA6053, moved to assigned AO to screen W and SW flank 4th Inf Div.

(2) TF NORTH - commenced 09 Nov 66, conducts heliborne assault in AO on selected LZs.

(3) TF 777 will be extracted 9 Nov upon TF NORTH's arrival.

2. (C) MISSION., 4th Inf Div cont attack North in zone conducting S&D opns. CIDG forces are employed in coordination with 4th Inf Div in establish blocking positions in North, conduct screening and surveillance missions along the border, and patrol all trail and routes in assigned AO.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Maneuver, 4th Inf Div continues attack North in zone conducting S&D opns in coordination with TF PRONG and TF NORTH.

(2) Fire Support. TF PRONG and TF NORTH supported by the air, armed helicopters, and Division GS Artillery within range. LZ preparation fired on request TF Commander

10-2-1

Annex #2 to Inclosure 10 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967.

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(FRAGO 27-66)

b. 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div: Cont present mission and be prepared to assist TF PRONG with Arty fire.

c. 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div: Cont present mission.

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d. Div Arty:

- (1) Provide LO party to TF PRONG and TF NORTH.
- (2) Provide AO for TF PRONG and TF NORTH as required.
- (3) Answer calls for fire from TF PRONG and TF NORTH.

e. 4th Avn Bn:

- (1) Coordinate with 52d Avn Bn for support of helilifts 8 and 9 Nov.
- (2) Be prepared to coordinate direct extraction of forces.
- (3) TF PRONG total 395 personnel.
- (4) TF NORTH total 450 personnel (estimate).

f. 4th Engr(-): Cont present mission.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Duration of operation for TF PRONG and TF NORTH 5 - 10 days.
- (2) TF PRONG and TF NORTH support and coordinate with 4th Inf Div during PAUL REVERE IV on mutual objectives.
- (3) AO TF PRONG on north along river from YA542600 to NS line YA60, on West, South along NS line YA70 to stream YA600529, along stream to NW grid line YA52 to NAM SATHAY River. South along NAM SATHAY River to Cambodian Border on West by Cambodian Border.
- (4) AO TF NORTH: NAM SATHAY River East along EW grid line YA87 to NS grid line YA 95; South along YA95 to KROING River, West along KROING River to Y A905735, North to YA80 EW grid line; West to NAM SATHAY River along EW grid line YA80.
- (5) AO boundaries are FCL for TF PRONG and TF NORTH.
- (6) Direct coordination authorized between U S and ARVN forces.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: See OPORD 12-66.

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
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ANNEX A (Ops Overlay) To FRAGO 27-66 (r)

III

6



TF . NORTH

PL KAY


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
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10-2-A-1

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: 17 DASC
7AR (TACC-WFP)

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1. Name of Operation and dates:

a. Operation Prong.

b. Inclusive date of operation 8 Nov 66

2. Reporting Officer: Lt Colonel Saroggia II Corps ALO.3. Area of Operation:

a. Command Area of Southwest Konton Province.

b. Specific area of operation from the Nam Sathay River west to the Cambodian border, and bounded on the south by the YA 49 line and on the North by the YA60 line.

4. Force in Operation:

a. Ground

(1) USAF 25

(2) CIDG 535

(3) LLDB 2

b. Air

(1) ALO/FAC's assigned to Fleiku Sector and II DASC.

(2) Tactical fighters provided by II DASC; see paragraph 6 for identification of flight.

5. Intelligence:

a. We have provided a continuous intensive VR of the area west of the Se San as well as the Nam Sathay River to the Cambodian Border. This effort was emphasized because the flood swollen Se San had precluded operations between the Se San and Nam Sathay. In addition as patrols had been under taken in the area between the Nam Sathay River and the Cambodian Border.

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Annex #4 to Inclosure #10 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967

The latter was a denied area even to the local tribesmen, and it afforded the NVA units a sanctuary with natural defense for refitting, resupply, training etc. In late August we discovered and obtained approval to hit a camouflaged area at coordinates YA 752 515. We continued to search the area until on 24 September the FACs discovered new camouflaged huts spread approximately 50 yards apart under a heavy canopy at YA 716 530 on the intersection of two small rivers. Following a hard-to-discern trail which was partially been uncovered by destruction of the above village we located and destroyed a second heavily camouflaged village at YA700 523. We discovered a trail running to the Nam Sathay River and lost the trail wh it crossed at YA 650 520. Because of intermittent small arms and automatic weapons fire during attacks to the above areas we became convinced that we had uncovered an area in which the VC were moving in relative security. At this time we began to coordinate intelligence from VR, agent reports, patrol sightings etc on a daily basis with Capt Moors, the "A" Team Commander of the Plei Dejereng Special Forces Camp which was the nearest friendly element to the suspected enemy forces. In early October we began to search the border area in an attempt to pin point trail origins. We discovered an abandoned village with an all weather, narrow road running into it from the Cambodian Border at YA 596 487. Heavily used trails radiated out of this village to the North east and East. Some of these trails linked up with the trail we had lost at the Nam Sathay River. Just to the North of the village we found a camouflaged group of huts which we obtained permission from the JCS to hit on 5 Oct 66. Lt Col Saroggia put two flights in, one VNAF and one 1st AGS, which resulted in 18 structures destroyed and 5 secondary explosions. Lt Syarto put in a follow-up strike which resulted in another secondary and additional structures destroyed. Based on this evidence plus continued numerous VR sightings we were sure that a significant NVA force was operating in the area.

b. The second week in October Lt Col Saroggia had landed at Plei Dejereng Special Forces Camp to coordinate sightings with Capt Moore. Major General Collins arrived during the discussion, and Capt Moore and Lt Col Saroggia briefed him on the evidence accumulated in the areas described above. This discussion may have solidified his intention to conduct extensive operations in the area. At that time a blocking force was recommended along the Southern and Western Cambodian boundary. Based on a planning briefing with the Special Forces, II Corps Staff and the 4th Divisions Staff on 8 November, the II Corps ALO agreed to provide OIH aircraft to cover Special Forces screening and blocking of the Cambodian Border Sanctuary in operation "Prong".

6. Details of the Operation:

A. On 9 November at approximately 1145, Major Hawkins was flying a VR mission to the South of Soapy Cause's position and Lt Col Saroggia was flying to the North. They both received a call for air support from Soapy Cause, who was in heavy contact with a large NVA force. At the direction of Lt Col Saroggia, Major Hawkins climbed to a higher altitude to establish better communication and effect an immediate air request.

* Soapy Cause: TF Command Group.

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Lt Col Saroggia dropped down to appraise the situation. Soapy Cause had been forced to withdraw across a small river into a tree line. The enemy was putting direct fire, from prepared positions, into the unprepared positions of the friendlies, 75 meters away. The friendlies had suffered moderate casualties by this time. While waiting for the first set of fighters to arrive, Lt Col Saroggia and Major Hawkins began an intensive VR of the area around the friendlies to check for enemy reinforcements, and possible ambush sites. The first set of fighters, Hobo 02, 2 AIE's arrived and were expended under the control of Lt Col Saroggia. Hobo 02 was expended directly on top of the enemy positions, dropping CHU's, Napalm and 20mm. Upon completion of the airstrike all ground contact had been broken and Soapy Cause felt that further airstrikes would not be needed. Hobo 07, 2 AIE's arrived over the area and were held for cover while the friendlies withdrew to a previously prepared LZ. Lt Col Saroggia covered a resupply on the LZ and an evacuation of all casualties. Hobo 07 was then diverted to other targets as there was no suitable targets available in the area. Lt Col Saroggia and Major Hawkins continued their VR of the area until dark and then proceeded to Fleiku and landed with minimum fuel. The Executive Officer of the Special Forces C-2 Detachment and Lt Col Saroggia briefed the 1st ACS on the deteriorating situation on the night of 9 Nov. Lt Col Saroggia called TACC for an increased alert of AIE's.

b. On 10 November at 1335 hours Capt Partridge departed Fleiku to fly air cover in the Prong C. A. He arrived in the general vicinity at 1430 hours and proceeded to VR the area, at approximately 1445 he flew directly over Soapy Cause's position and made radio contact with the ground forces. Soapy Cause at this time stated that he had made contact with an enemy force and was receiving moderate fire. He marked his position with smoke and stated that his flank was being hit and he had taken some WIA. On initial contact with the enemy Soapy Cause requested assistance from two army gunships which were orbiting overhead. They made several strafing passes and at the same time friendly artillery was employed 600 meters S.W. Capt Partridge made a pass over the marking smoke to positively identify the friendly position and picked up moderate automatic weapons fire. At this time the friendlies began to consolidate their position and move North and East of a trail which ran N.W. to S.E. Soapy Cause released a smoke to mark his new position and came under heavy attack. Since the enemy was hugging Soapy Cause on three sides, the gunships and artillery had little effect in suppressing the enemy fire. Soapy Cause could not withdraw further as the fourth side was an open area in which he suspected an ambush had been set up. Soapy Cause requested immediate air support and stated that the enemy had a much larger force and the friendlies were in grave danger of being overrun. Capt Partridge requested fighters at 1450 and they were in the area at 1500. The first flight was Caster, 3 VNAF AIE's loaded with 5-500# C.P. and 16, 220 Frag's Soapy Cause marked his position with smoke and Capt Partridge began expending Caster flight. He marked a target 30 meters south of the friendlies. Caster's first bombs were on target and all bombs thereafter fantastically accurate. Capt Partridge put in several more marks, some as close as 30 meters, as stated later by the ground Commander. During this

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time he set up a pattern so as to fly over the friendlies and the target area in a left hand pattern. It was while over the friendly position that he received most of his ground fire. As Caster flight expended the ordnance, the ground fire gradually decreased. After a NDA and a FAC body count of 5 KBA, he released Caster flight and immediately started expanding Hobo 01, 2 A1B's at 1535. This flight had 6, 500# Napalm and 4, 250# Napalm plus 10 UMC-14.6

He first put in two smokes placed parallel to the trail running NW to SE and about 50 meters SW of the friendly position. He directed the expenditure of CHU-14 as close to the friendlies as possible. The first pass was a little inside of the mark which made it more effective but too close to the friendlies. The next pass was right on target and all subsequent passes were gradually moved South and West to cover the area. Enemy contact started to break at this point with diminishing fire being directed at both the ground forces and the FAC. The strike was continued until all ordnance was expended at 1605. Lt Col Saroggia departed Pleiku at 1400 and proceeded to the "Prong" A.O. He made contact with Capt Partridge who briefed him on the ground situation. Capt Partridge was low on fuel and had to return to Pleiku. Lt Col Saroggia then assumed control of the remainder of the strike. Major Hawkins arrived in the area at this time and began an intensive VR of the area and acted as a radio relay and covered the LZ that was being prepared for the reinforcement. During the next hour and a half Lt Col Saroggia expended 5 sets of fighters, Jackpot, Hobo 03, and Hobo 05. Because of the requirement for continuous ordnance support to preclude the enemy from overrunning the friendlies and heavy smoke and dust ADA was impossible. Bombing was accomplished from about sixty meters of the friendlies out to about 400 meters on the west and south sides and out to 200 meters on the east. Artillery was used in conjunction with the airstrikes. While the airstrikes were still in progress, the reinforcements began landing on the LZ. Major Hawkins covered the LZ and observed what the reinforcement were not moving off the LZ. He made several attempts to contact them by radio but was unsuccessful. He made three low passes over the LZ trying to signal them to come up on frequency and to move out to the south, but was unsuccessful. He finally wrote a message on a large piece of map informing them of the proper frequency and the fact that the friendly force to the south was in urgent need of assistance. Major Hawkins made an extremely low pass over the LZ and dropped the message. The reinforcements immediately came up on frequency and began moving to the south. At this time the airstrikes had been completed and ground contact had been broken. Lt Col Saroggia was low on fuel and returned to Pleiku while Major Hawkins remained in the area to provide air cover until well after dark. Major Hawkins returned to Pleiku at 2000.

c. On the 11th of November Lt Syarto departed Pleiku at 0630 to provide aircover for the Prong A.O. Lt Syarto made contact with Lone Slump Alpha and Bravo, located 6 kilometers Northwest of the previous days contact. Lone Slump's position was located on the East and West side of a small dry lake and one kilometer East of the Cambodian border, at approximately 0700, Lone Slump Bravo, on the West side of the lake bed, made contact with a large force of NVA and an immediate air support was initiated. At the same time a request for another FAC was made since it appeared there would

be two separate contacts as Lone Slump Alpha was beginning to draw sniper fire. Immediately thereafter the friendly forces began to receive extremely heavy A.W. fire. Lone Slump Bravo was unable to hold his position and had to withdraw East across the lake bed to Lone Slump Alpha's position. The friendlies came under heavy mortar attack and were beginning to run low on ammo. At 0730 Hobo 03, 2 ALE's arrived and were immediately expended on both sides of the friendlies using Napalm, CHU and 20mm. During this strike all aircraft were receiving moderate ground fire. One of the ALE's received one hit in the wing. At 0800 Boxer 01, 2 F40's arrived and were expended in the same general area using 500# G.F., Napalm and 20mm. While the airstrikes were in progress the enemy ground fire would diminish, but as soon as the strikes were lifted the ground fire would resume. At this time Lone Slump stated that he would need an immediate resupply of ammo and reinforcements as he had suffered 50% casualties. Lt Syarto relayed this information to Cider 25 and Scrappy 56, who began to coordinate a resupply and reinforcements. Boxer 01 finished expending by making 20mm strafing passes along both sides of Lone Slump's position. Upon completion of Boxer 01 strike ground contact was broken. At 0830 Boxer 03 arrived and was held high for possible aircover for the resupply. Lt Syarto then cleared Scrappy 56 and Army L-19 to register his artillery for use between airstrikes if necessary. Again Lone Slump's position came under heavy attack from the North and South, artillery was terminated and Boxer 03 was expended against these positions and the contact was broken. Boxer 03 was then held high for aircover for the resupply which was due in and in radio contact. At this time three flights of ALE's, Sipa, Hobo 03 and Thunder flights checked in and were held in orbit over Plei Dejerang. Just prior to the helicopter arriving over the LZ, Boxer 03 was expended on strafing runs in the area. The helicopter landed on the LZ and immediately received heavy A.W. fire. The two gunners were hit and one USASF officer aboard the helicopter was killed. The helicopter had to make an immediate departure without unloading the ammo. Capt Twark arrived in the area at 0910 and after being briefed by Lt Syarto, took control of the airstrikes. Lt Syarto then returned to Pleiku. At 0930 Lone Slump's position came under heavy attack from the East and Capt Twark immediately expended Sipa flight on the enemy positions and suppressed the attack. At 0945 Lone Slump came under heavy attack from the West and Southwest and Thunder Flight was expended on this area and suppressed the attack. At 1000 the friendlies came under attack from the North and Hobo 03 was expended in this area. Again the attack was suppressed. All during the attack Lone Slump kept stating that he was in desperate need of ammo, medical supplies and reinforcements. This was passed on to Cider 25 who was coordinating the resupply. Hobo 05 was then held high to cover the resupply, at approximately 1030 two helicopters arrived and while over the LZ they received heavy A.W. fire. They were forced to airdrop the supplies they loaded in the middle of the lake bed, too far out of safe reach for the friendlies to retrieve. Hobo 01 laid ordnance in the tree line to the West where the ground fire was coming

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from. Lone Slump requested ordnance to the East and Northeast. Artillery was called in on the area while Hobo 03 was expended to the West, triggering two secondary explosions. At 1110 Blade 01 arrived over the area and was held high until 1115, at this time Capt Twark shut off the artillery and put Blade 01 flight in to the South and west and then strafed the area to the East. Blade 01 was expended by 1130 and had triggered one secondary explosion. At 1140 Capt Griffin arrived in the area and was briefed on the situation by Capt Twark. Capt Griffin assumed control of the TAC Air and Capt Twark returned to Pleiku. Blade 03 arrived over the area at 1140 and was immediately expended to the West of the friendlies. During the strike Lone Slump was receiving fire alternately from different directions and Blade 03 was put in on these positions. At 1150 Major Hawkins arrived in the area, noted no radio relay and began to coordinate another resupply as Lone Slump still had not received the supplies that were crucial. While Capt Griffin was expending one flight Major Hawkins was briefing the next flight on the ground situation. As Capt Griffin completed expending one flight the next was in position to be expended. Hobo 05 was put in at 1230 to the East of Lone Slump's location and was effective since Lone Slump received no more fire from this area. Hobo 07 arrived at 1255 followed by Blade 07 at 1315. The resupply helicopters arrived in the area at 1300 and were held 4 kilometers to the East while the LZ was "proped" by Blade 07. After this strike Lone Slump stated that the LZ was secured and had been secured by air power, Major Hawkins then cleared the helicopters into the LZ. The first helicopter into the LZ received light small arm fire from the South during the approach. Capt Griffin expended a portion of Hobo 07 in ordnance on this area and suppressed the fire. All three helicopters were able to get into the LZ, discharge their cargo and evacuate all the wounded. At 1320 reinforcements from the 4th Division began landing in a LZ 3 kilometers to the Northeast of Lone Slump's position. At approximately 1330 the helicopters covering the LZ began receiving 12.7 mm fire from the area to the West. Three helicopters were shot down in a period of 20 minutes. At 1400 Capt Griffin returned to Pleiku and Major Hawkins continued to VR the area. Twice he received moderate small arm fire and pointed out the area to a Cider FAC who expended a flight of F-100's on both positions and suppressed the fire. Major Hawkins returned to Pleiku at 1430 and was followed by Lt Syarto and Major Goodwin. They VR the areas til 1600. The 4th Division assumed operational control of the A.O. and all further air-strike were put under their control. Lt Col Saroggia departed Pleiku at 1700 with Capt Kienhart, 4th Division Liaison Officer, on board. They proceeded into the area to try and locate the 12.7mm positions. By continually maneuvering in the suspected area they were able to draw fire. Major Hawkins who had arrived in the area shortly behind Lt Col Saroggia relayed a request for an immediate strike for him. Blade 05 arrived in the area at 1900 and was briefed by Lt Col Saroggia. Because of the darkness Lt Col Saroggia had to use landing lights to give the fighters his position. With lowering clouds, the last attack was made by marking the target with a landing light and firing a rocket down the light line with the fighters following the FAC in. Major Hawkins had requested an AC-47 and contact in the area to expend the AC-47 on a suspected enemy location. The AC-47 arrived at 1920 and after being briefed by Major Hawkins was expended on the target area. The AC-47 triggered one secondary explosion. Major Hawkins departed the area at 2000 and returned to Pleiku.

7. Results of Operations

a. Enemy Losses:

- (1) NVA-KIA 272
- (2) NVA-WIA 2
- (3) NVA-CIA 3

b. Friendly

- (1) USSF KIA - 2
- (2) US KIA - 1
- (3) USSF WIA - 12
- (4) US WIA - 1
- (5) C KIA - 24
- (6) CIDG WIA - 71
- (7) CIDG KIA - 5
- (8) LLDB WIA - 1

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c. Equipment CIA

- (1) 2-12.7 MM AA Weapons
- (2) 1-Rocket Launcher
- (3) 3-RP-46 (LNG)
- (4) 3-RPD (LNG)
- (5) 6-SKS (Aslt Rifle)
- (6) 25- AK-47
- (7) 100-Chicom Grenades

d. Equipment Losses

- (1) 1-A-16
- (2) 1-FRC-74
- (3) 1-A-79
- (4) 2-FRC-25

8. Administrative Matters: The success of Operation Prong is credited by the USASF advisers to the professional performance by USAF and VNAF fighter pilots and USAF Forward Air Controllers in providing immediate and continuous air support.

9. Special Equipment and Technique: The continuous use of TAC Air and artillery broke up enemy attacks. Less than a minute was required to replace air with artillery and vice versa.

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a. All elements of the tactical air system which participated in this operation did an outstanding job. The questioning availability of TAC air saved the day more than once for the three greatly outnumbered CIGG companies. On 11 November a company of the Mike Force could have been annihilated had not TAC air been available on a continuous basis. Air Force actually secured and held on LZ until resupply of crucial ammunition could be effected.

b. The pilots of all the fighter aircraft and the Forward Air Controllers rate high praise for the effectiveness of their strikes against the enemy. I requested that the success of the operation described in this report be made known to all those air crews who participated, and they each be given thanks for a job well done.

ORVILLE O. SOROGGIN III. LT Colonel, USAF
II Corps ALO

10-4-8

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OPORD 6-66 (U)

171 REFERENCES: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, 6436I, PU TRONG, 6432II PU HAY

TASK ORGANIZATION

TF Control
3rd Mike Force Co
 CIDG Co, Duc Co
 CIDG Co, Plei Djereng

1. (C) SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces:
 - (1) 4th Inf Div conducts search and destroy opn to E and NE of TF PRONG.
 - (2) 1st Air Commando Wing support with TAC Air.
- c. Attachments and detachments: One LNO Team from 4th Inf Div Arty.

2. (C) MISSION: 080900 Nov TF PRONG conducts heliborne assault vic YA6053 to prevent infiltration/exfiltration of NVA Forces in operational area of 4th Inf Div (Paul Revere IV) and destroys enemy in zone.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

- a. Concept of Operations: TF PRONG conducts heliborne assault into DZ Lore vic 610527, moves to assigned AO to screen W and SW flank 4th Inf Div, conducts saturation patrolling, destroys force in sector. Third MF Co initial lift, moves directly to AO SPIKE. Co (PDJ) 2nd lift and Co (DC) 3rd lift with Command Group, lands LZ Lore, on order moves to vic 578529, on order deploys to AO's JAB and SLUG respectively.
- b. 3rd Mike Force Co
- c. CIDG Co (Duc Co) one platoon detached vic 578529 as a reaction force, attached to TF Control.
- d. CIDG Co (Plei Djereng) Primary direction of effort, along Cambodian border toward the SE and E.
- e. Coordination instructions: Annex A-Air Movement Schedule.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

- a. Administration: None.
- b. Logistics:
 - (1) Each individual carries 5 days rations.
 - (2) Local area water to be used; purification tablets.
 - (3) Basic load of ammo per weapon.
 - (4) Med-evac on call.

Annex 5 to Inclosure #10, to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

- (1) Current SOI Item 1-5 in effect.
- (2) Liaison SSB station at 4th Inf Div Hq.

b. Command:

- (1) Units report locations to TF Control.
- (2) Command Group initially with 3rd Mike Force Co.

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ACKNOWLEDGE:

PARMLY
Lt Col

ANNEX: A-Air Movement Schedule (omitted)

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/s/Buttmore

/t/BUTTERMORE/S3

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- MF - MIKE FORCE
- DC - DUC CO
- PDJ - PLEI DJERENG
- 1. - LZ LORE (TF PRONG CLOSED IN 081115 Nov)
- 2. - CONTACT BY MF 081310 Nov, 1 NVA KIA
- 3. - CONTACT BY MF 081400 Nov, 2 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA
- 4. - CONTACT BY PDJ 081400 Nov, 2 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA
- 7. - CONTACT BY PDJ 090815 Nov, Est Position on N bank
- 8. - CONTACT BY PDJ 091010 Nov, Est Position on S bank
- 9. - CONTACT BY PDJ 091235 Nov, Re-est position on N bank, 4 NVA KIA, 4 CIDG KIA, 5 CIDG WIA & 2 USSF WIA
- 10. - MF EXFILTRATE WEAPONS AT THIS LZ
- 11. - MF CONTACTED 4 NVA KILLING ALL 4
- 14. - 2ND OVERNIGHT SCTY POSITION OF TF PRONG (-) 092000
- 15. - 1ST OVERNIGHT SCTY POSITION OF TF PRONG (-) 092000
- 16. - TF PRONG (-) HVY CONTACT 101410 NOV W/NVA BN, HVY FIRE CEASED 1800 HRS, 12 NVA KIA, 1 USSF KIA, 4 CIDG KIA, 1 USSF WIA, 17 CIDG WIA
- 17. - CONTACT BY MF 101430 NOV, 4 NVA KIA, 2 WIA
- 18. - MF EST 2 POSITIONS NEAR DRY LAKE, 101630 NOV
- 19. - MF (HVY CONTACT) HIT BY EST BN FROM ALL SIDES 110600 NOV, ELEMENT TO NE OF LAKE FORCES TO JOIN OTHER ELEMENT, FIRED DIED DOWN 1200 HRS. 58 NVA KIA, 13 CIDG KIA, 1 USSG KIA, 1 US KIA, 40 CIDG WIA
- 20. - PLEI ME (HVY CONTACT) 171200 NOV, WITH TWO NVA BN'S, REINFORCED BY CO B, 1/14 - NVA LOSSES BY CIDG, AIR & ARTY & US TROOPS, 189 NVA KIA, 1 CIDG KIA, 3 CIDG WIA, 1 USSF WIA, 1 LLDB WIA

DETACHMENT A-302
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96227

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19 November 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report Mike Force/"Attleboro" 1-7 Nov 66

1. Reference: 5th Special Forces Regulation 351-1.

2. General:

a. Third Corps Mike Force had moved to Loc Ninh on 30 October 1966 in support of moving to new camp site, and was on an operation in Loc Ninh area.

b. Third Corps Mike Force was alerted 2 November 1966 to move from Loc Ninh to Suoi Da. The move was completed at 1430 2 November 1966.

3. Task Organization:

a. 530 Chinese in three (3) companies.

b. Seven USSF EM.

c. One USSF Officer.

4. Mission: Combat Reconnaissance.

5. Sequence of Events:

1 Nov 2210 - China Boy alerted for movement from Loc Ninh to Suoi Da.

2 Nov 0800 - 1st Mike Force company extracted from LZ.

0900 - Company closed Loc Ninh.

1045 2nd Company extraction began.

1215 - Completed extraction 2nd Company.

1030 - C-123 aircraft began arriving Loc Ninh.

Direct support helicopter company moved from Loc Ninh to Tay Ninh East to lift MF from Tay Ninh East; to lift MF from Tay Ninh West to Suoi Da.

1352 - Tay Ninh.

1530 - Movement of MF from Tay Ninh to Suoi Da completed.

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Inclosure #11 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.

- 2 Nov 1630 - China Boy Company 3 deployed.
- 3 Nov 0830 - China Boy Company 1 deployed.
- 1220 - China Boy Company 3 engaged est VC Co vic XT486687, VC broke contact 1245, fled north. SSG Monaghan wounded right arm and fingers (GSW).
- 1815 - China Boy Company 1 made contact vic XT458587 with est VC platoon. VC broke contact 1830. SSG Garza WIA (GSW buttocks).
- 4 Nov 0730 - China Boy Company 1 hit mined area vic XT561588. One MF KIA, two MF WIA. Medevac chopper downed by SF fire vic XT485622, while enroute to China Boy Company 1's location. One US KIA (Crew Member), chopper was recovered.
- 1445 - China Boy Company 3 made contact vic XT416670 with est VC Bn or Regt. China Boy Company 3 withdrew south and called in airstrike. On initial contact chain saws, generators, and trucks could be heard. VC counterfired with 81mm and 60mm mortar, AW and SA fire, then tried to close with China Boy Company 3 elements.
- 1800 - Received resupply of ammunition and food vic XT435668.
- 2200 - China Boy Company 3 indicated that he was receiving heavy casualties and VC were encircling him. SFC Finn MIA.
- 2300 - China Boy Company 3 indicated light contact.
- 5 Nov 0230 - China Boy Company 3 indicates contact with VC has ceased.
- 0730 - China Boy Company 3 receiving heavy volume of fire. Requested reinforcements.
- 0745 - Radio contact with China Boy Company 3 broken.
- 0800 - China Boy Companies 1 and 2 proceeding to China Boy Company 3's location.
- 0845 - China Boy Company 2 hit VC bunkers. Negative contact.
- 0940 - 28 MF personnel picked up by CIDG CO from Suoi Da.
- 0935 - China Boy Company 3 having casualties evacuated vic XT388634.
- 1200 - Three USSF MIA (Heaps, Hunt, Finn).
55 MF from China Boy Company 3 made linkup with China Boy Companies 1 and 2. Of those 15 to 25 WIA.

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5 Nov 1330 - One MF drowned while crossing river with China Boy Company 1.

6 Nov 1040 - Est VC platoon with mortars attacked Suoi Da airfield, 4 CIDG KIA, 2 WIA.

1700 - 9 MF personnel ~~closed~~ in to Suoi Da.

7 Nov 1430 - MF begins move to Loc Ninh.

1600 - MF completes move to Loc Ninh.

1645 - One US body found. Indications are that it is SFC Finn.

1830 - MF bodies returned to Bien Hoa by CV-2 aircraft.

6. (C) On 30 October, all 3 companies of the Mike Force deployed to Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province, to conduct operations in response to intelligence reports that the camp was a possible target for a major VC attack prior to 11 November 1966. However, hard intelligence reports received on 1 November indicated that a VC regiment had moved into the operational area of Camp Suoi Da, A-322, Tay Ninh Province. A decision was made to move the Mike Force into that area, and this was accomplished on 2 November. On 031220 November, the 3rd Mike Force Company made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC immediately broke contact and an air-strike was called in on their route of withdrawal. At 031845, contact was again established with an estimated VC platoon which resulted in 10 VC KIA and two USASF WIA. At 040730, the 1st Mike Force Company hit a mined area and suffered one KIA and two WIA. A Med Evac chopper in the same general vicinity was shot down by small arms fire and resulted in one US KIA. At 041445, the 3rd Mike Force Company made contact with an estimated battalion or regiment-sized VC force. This contact resulted in 15 VC KIA and two Mike Force WIA. The Mike Force Company was still in contact at 041540 and attempted to withdraw to the south. At 042000 the Mike Force Commander reported that he was surrounded and had suffered 35 casualties (KIA). The remaining two CIDG companies departed Camp Suoi Da to reinforce the operation. At 042305 the 3rd Mike Force Company Commander reported that he was still in contact. Enemy casualties reported at this time were 50 VC KIA. Contact with the VC was broken at 050330. At 050900 the 3rd Mike Force Company again reported that they were receiving a heavy volume of fire. They were instructed to secure an LZ so that an attempt could be made to extract them from the area. This was accomplished at 051200. All Mike Force elements were extracted at 051830.

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At 021630 Nov China Boy 3 landed at LZ vicinity XT491644, and began moving north (see attached overlay). At 031220 Nov vic XT473683 China Boy 3 discovered tunnel complex and fortifications. While destroying complex, VC fired on China Boy 3 wounding SSG Monaghan. China Boy 3 withdrew east to LZ, vic XT487686. Med Evac arrived, casualties were loaded, but because chopper was overloaded it could not take off. SSG Hunt, who came in with the Med Evac elected to remain with China Boy 3 so that casualties could be evacuated. Again China Boy 3 moved west to tunnel complex, but could not take it because of intense fire. China Boy 3 broke contact and moved to vicinity XT465692 (see overlay). Here they heard several motors that sounded like generators and trucks, plus several chain saws. Heavy contact was made. China Boy 3 received heavy automatic weapons fire and mortar fire. Mortars sounded like 60mm. China Boy 3 broke contact and moved to LZ vicinity XT435667 (see overlay). All during the time they were moving to LZ they were receiving sporadic small arms fire. Also when they crossed road vic XT453667, they received mortar fire.

At LZ vic XT435667 China Boy 3 received resupply of food and ammunition. From resupply LZ the unit moved to vicinity XT444672, went into defensive perimeter and began breaking down ammo. While they were breaking down ammo, the VC attacked from the east in a "U" shaped formation. It was beginning to get dark and the VC withdrew to approximately 100 meters east of China Boy 3's position and maintained contact all night. After the initial attack, SFC Heaps said he didn't see SFC Finn again. At approximately 0645-0700 the following morning the VC made another assault on China Boy 3's position and overran them. SFC Heaps and SSG Hunt were wounded during this assault. SFC Heaps said he was knocked unconscious and when he came to SSG Hunt was giving him first aid. Heaps and Hunt decided to get to the LZ vic XT424680. They had two Mike Force with them, one was wounded. They couldn't move very fast or very far without resting, and Heaps and Hunt would pass out periodically. Finally Hunt said he could go no further so Heaps left one Mike Force with Hunt and continued to the LZ. After this Heaps didn't remember anything.

Interview of SFC E7 Heaps on 7 Nov 66, 3rd Field Hospital.

174 REFERENCE: LOC NINH Map Sheet 6245 II
465691 to 473681, first contact

Area of Operations: Major contact overrun at 440669

Weather: Excellent, high clouds, temperature

Terrain: Jungle, (thick) close to water supply, within 500 meters of road on high ground.

Fortifications: Tunnel and bunker complexes for one, two or squad size positions. All with overhead cover and pre-arranged fields of fire. Positions were hardened against direct fire.

Weapons, uniforms and equipment: Automatic weapons were in abundance; of the two weapons captured they were AK's. They had a lot of machine guns, sounded like 30 cal, heavy. Uniforms were mixed, personnel KIA had on black shoes. All of the soldiers encountered had complete sets of web gear.

Significant weapons: Grenade launcher which looked like our "LAW", light in weight, approximately 3 feet long, markings appeared to be Chinese, possible identification: Chinese antitank grenade launcher type 56, P.155 DA pamphlet 381-10. Indirect fire was provided by 60mm mortars, identification by rounds.

Tactics: Fire discipline was excellent. Upon making contact, VC fired in mass; upon breaking contact VC ceased fire without sporadic firing. The VC maintained contact while the unit was trying to break contact. They mortared and sniped at them in the retreat. After fixing the new location of the 3rd Company they (VC) attacked using squad fire and maneuver up to grenade range and then reverted to individual action. By this time, it was almost dark, so the VC withdrew approximately 100 meters and maintained contact all night. At 0645-0700 the next morning they assaulted using the same tactics with a heavy volume of fire suppressing the 3rd Company's position.

Movement was forward by flanks and frontal assault forces.

Other: The VC troopers were young and aggressive.

At grid 465691 - Generators and chain saws were heard.

US Mike Force and VC casualties from 2 - 11 Nov, Opn "ATTLEBORO"

UNIT	FRIENDLY			MF			UNIT	VC		
	K	W	M	K	W	M		K	VC POSS	VCC
1st Div	22	72					1st	721		5
196th, 25th	46	300	5				25th	181		
USASF	1	3	1				173rd	4		
Mike Force	25	17	7				MF	85	448	
TOTAL:	94	392	13					991	448	5

Following units identified.

271, 272, 273, 320 MFPMB, 70 Regt, 10th NVA Inf.

All by contact and/or documents.

273 Regt and 272 Regt contact XT4254 by 2/1st Inf.

272 Regt contact on 4 Nov at Suoi Cau XT4530 one of our agents says the 320 are also involved. This is reasonable since this whole area is in their AO.

101st Regt by captive XT431559 on 8 Nov.

70 Regt possibly contact by 1/16 Inf on 9 Nov.

271 by 1 PW on 3 Nov, this unit identified by ASPAR in the southern part of the contact area SW of Dau Tieng.

All of the documents and PW intell reports are still at lower level Headquarters and have not reached FFII yet for closer examination.

US units committed to Operation.

US 173d Abn Bde - 2 Bns

ARVN Ranger Bns (Attached) - 2

US 1st Div - 8 Bns

US 25th Div - 4 Bns

196th Bde - 1 Bn

/s/ Thomas Myerchin
/t/ THOMAS MYERCHIN
CPT, INFANTRY
COMMANDING

DETACHMENT A-341
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
A10 U.S. Forces 96227

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15 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Bu Dop, 14 Jan 67

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION: One CIDG company, two LLDB and two USSF
2. MISSION: Conduct search and destroy operation and recon trail vicinity YU1134 to YU1125.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 140400 Jan 67

TIME OF RETURN: 142245 Jan 67

4. CONDUCT OF PATROL:

a. Patrol Route. Patrol moved by foot from Camp Bu Dop to YU018335 along route 14A. Proceeded along trail east to Obj 1, vicinity of YU065335. Route of march was altered when enemy fire was signaling the patrol's presence. Patrol moved northeast to YU069338 where contact was made. Patrol moved to YU065336 to secure LZ for Med Evac. Patrol then assaulted northeast thru contact area to YU072337. Patrol then withdrew back to YU065336 to secure LZ for Opn 15/1. Opn 15/1 relieved patrol and it was extracted by helicopter to base camp.

b. Terrain. Terrain consisted of rubber trees, thick undergrowth, bamboo thickets, and savannah grass.

c. Obstacles. None.

d. Mines and Booby traps. None.

e. Action upon encounter with the enemy. The concept of operation for this patrol was to move by way of intermediate objective to recon trail which the enemy had constructed from YU1134 to YU1125, and to establish ambush in that vicinity. The route of march took the patrol through an area where our reconnaissance platoon had made contact on 8 Dec 1966. The company was briefed to search that area and report any new enemy activity. As the operation got closer to that area, they received warning shots along the route of march. The company immediately broke their elements into three files and started to search the area. At 141155 Nov the point squad received fire at YU069338 and suffered one KIA and one WIA. Immediately the company went into the assault. The enemy was dug in at some locations and not in others. Firing broke out all around the company and it seemed to SFC Williams and SSG Boorman, who were advising the company, that the enemy was attempting to circle them. Radio

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contact was made with a FAC and airstrikes were requested. The company was receiving heavy fire from the right flank and several soldiers were WIA and two KIA. SFC Williams and SSG Boorman advised the company that they should assault the right flank and prevent an encirclement. The unit was still in their initial assault, and a lull momentarily allowed them to follow this advice, as this maneuver momentarily confused the enemy. By this, the unit had gained momentum and was assaulting the enemy positions, overrunning them. The enemy was disorganized and withdrawing in disarray. The time was 141220 Nov and an airstrike was put into the area where the enemy was retreating. The troops continued the assault, and there were 25 NVA KIA's confirmed as they overran the enemy position. By this time the company had suffered three KIA and 11 WIA. Under the cover of darkness the company withdrew to the west to locate an LZ for Med Evac which had been previously requested. While waiting for the Med Evac all equipment captured was assembled and all documents collected. The company was still receiving small arms fire from the east and additional airstrikes were put on that location. The LZ was secured and Med Evac was completed by 141500 Nov. LTC Bernier, CO Det B-34; Col Berry, CO, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div; the Detachment Commander from A-341; and LLDB counterparts landed to see what assistance was needed. It was decided at that time to bring in one additional company to assist in the operation. The troops were nervous and in a near state of panic. At 141700 Nov Captain Garrett, with the supporting company, landed and immediately started searching the area. The company that made contact was extracted at 141830 Nov, and returned to base camp. While searching the area Captain Garrett confirmed an additional 16 NVA KIA and properly reported them. His radio was not functioning properly, and LTC Bernier, who was in the air at the time, brought one into the operation. While he was on the ground, he was shown the additional bodies and documents captured confirmed an NVA regular unit. Further searches revealed that one NVA Captain, one 1st Lt, three 2nd Lt, and four WO's were killed in action. Twenty-five maps and schematics were also found which indicated that plans were being made to attack Camp Bu Duc and Bo Duc Sub-sector. Numerous documents were captured and sent for analysis. LTC Bernier when he left the operational area. A thorough search of the area was made to assess the damage and to ascertain additional enemy killed or wounded in the area. At 141915 Nov the relief force withdrew to the base camp closing at that location at 142245 Nov.

5. ENEMY INFORMATION:

- a. Location. YU069338
- b. Strength. One Battalion (+).
- c. Composition. NVA regulars fully equipped and armed. Documents identified Q-12 of the 7th Division.
- d. Activity. It seemed as if the enemy were inexperienced evidenced by the unusually high number of officers were killed in the initial contact.

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e. Equipment. The force was equipped with AK 50's, 7.65mm pistols, mortars (type unk), anti-aircraft wps (type unk), rucksacks, gamasks, and plastic canteen.

f. Uniforms. Khaki, helmets made of bamboo with a plastic covering, and thick black sandals made from truck tires.

6. RESULT OF ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY:

a. Friendly losses.

- (1) Three CIDG KIA
- (2) 11 CIDG WIA
- (3) None ~~WIA~~
- (4) Six US carbines, cal.30, one HT-1 radio destroyed in action.

b. Enemy losses.

- (1) 15 KIA USASF body count
- (2) 11 unknown
- (3) 10 ~~WIA~~
- (4) One AK 50's, four 7.65mm pistols, gas mask, documents, canteens, rucksacks, Foster personnel, three map and document cases, 24 AK 50 magazines, and five ~~hand~~ pistols.

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

- a. Propaganda analysis. Forwarded to higher headquarters.
- b. Change in tactics. Unit was infiltrated into area to relieve elements in contact. Relieved unit was extracted by helicopter.
- c. Hostiles encountered. None.
- d. Suspected infiltration route. YU075345 to YU035225 then south across the Song Be River.

8. WAS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED? Yes.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conclusions. The operation was successful because of fire support given to the operation by the FAC's, who immediately responded when the element made contact. Were it not for their untiring efforts, our casualty reports might have been very high. They put 11 airstrikes into the area allowing friendly troops to withstand and inflict numerous casualties on a superior force.

b. Recommendations. Recommend that special operational frequency within the "B" Detachment be established when contacts are made, since the primary air-to-ground frequency is too crowded. A unit in contact loses valuable time in contacting their base camp when lines are tied up continuously.

/s/ Chester Garrett
/t/ CHESTER GARRETT
Captain, Infantry
Detachment Commander

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/s/ Vincent N. Hartmann
/t/ VINCENT N. HARTMANN
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

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DETACHMENT B-41
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96215

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AVSFD-B-41

27 November 1966

SUBJECT: Flood After Action Report (U)

1. (U) Reference: Ltr, Co D, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dated 15 October 1966, subject as above.

2. (U) General: The 1966 flood of Det B-41 tactical area of responsibility during the period 17 September 1966 - November 1966 reached such proportions that many special flood control measures had to be adopted in order to save the camps from inundation. Special equipment was required for continued operations and defenses, and new tactics were utilized to take advantage of this flood condition. The purpose of this report is to point out some of the significant effects of the flood and show what was done to deal with these effects and the lessons learned.

3. (C) Effects of the flood on friendly operations:

a. In general, flood conditions had a good effect on friendly operations. There were many modifications which had to be made to the normal operating procedures. However, with the increased support gained for the detachments during this period, they were able to take advantage of the high water and move freely throughout their areas of responsibility and reach areas formerly controlled by the VC which were inaccessible without long marches or heliborne operations. Prior to the flood, VC mines and booby traps made certain areas of VC control extremely dangerous to enter by foot troops. With the high water and use of boats, these areas could be entered with much less chance of encountering these obstacles. Consequently a significant decrease in casualties from mines and booby traps was experienced during this period.

(1) The water forced the VC from his prepared positions, inundated his caches forcing him to move from his traditional safe areas and forced him to move into boats or up into the trees, each of which made him more vulnerable. Consequently, when the enemy was sighted, he had little advantage of prepared positions and was either forced to move, becoming more vulnerable due to his lack of rapid transportation, or stand and fight normally being overwhelmed by superior forces.

(2) Flood conditions are ideal for the armored cavalry concept in that targets can be spotted by air reconnaissance or light reconnaissance elements, and then reaction forces rapidly employed. A successful tactic utilized was the use of an Ol observation aircraft to cover the boat elements and guide them to anything that looked suspicious. A section of armed

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helicopters was on standby to be committed once any significant contact was made. Additionally, it was found that the armed helicopter was an excellent weapon for seeking out and destroying VC forces attempting movement by sampan. 126

(3) Because of the emphasis placed by the highest levels on taking advantage of this flood condition in conducting aggressive offensive operations, exceptional support was received in the area of armed helicopters. Except in unusual circumstances, at least one section of armed helicopters was made available to the Sector on a daily basis for support of CIDG operations. Additional assault boats and motors were issued to the detachments from IV Corps ARVN along with ARVN operators and mechanics. Daily operations of company size and larger were the norm and practically every operation had the advantage of Ol aircraft cover, armed helicopter support, and in many cases Command and Control helicopter support.

(4) During the period 6 - 17 October at the height of the flood, eight US Navy PBR (Patrol Boat River) were deployed to this sector. They provided the additional capability of performing armed waterborne reconnaissance patrols throughout the TAOR. These craft aided us in confirming the existence or departure of VC elements from various parts of the Province and participated in several joint CIDG/Navy combat operations. The PBR were especially effective in providing flank security for the CIDG boat elements and providing .50 caliber suppressing fire when VC elements were engaged.

(5) During the period 21 November - 26 November, three Navy patrol Air Cushion Vehicle (PACV) were deployed to the Sector to participate in operations in conjunction with the existing airboats. These vehicles were an exceptional offensive threat to the VC in that they could cover the whole Province at will and had the ability to transport two squads of troops to be utilized in investigating and exploiting any contact or significant finding. PACV's were a tremendous asset, and during their stays several successful operations were conducted.

(6) Three platoons of airboats, six each platoon, arrived in B-41's sector during the flood period. The first boat platoon arrived in the latter part of October and by the first of November were being incorporated into the CIDG operations. Due to the newness of the boat, the requirement to train crews and control personnel, and the initial maintenance difficulties, full scale utilization of airboats on a regular basis could not begin until water levels had started to become a limiting factor. Considerable success was gained with the airboats during the latter part of November, with combined airboat, PACV and sampan operations. Results of these operations are outlined in para 3 b. Much knowledge has been gained as to modifications required to make this vehicle a more effective weapon in flood operations. It is anticipated that having these boats on hand and ready to be deployed at the initial stages of the next flood season will greatly enhance this detachments offensive capability.

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b. Flood Operations:

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(1) Most flood operations used engineer assault boats with either 25 HP, 40 HP or sampan engines with regular sampans being pulled to and from the objective area. Visual reconnaissance aircraft and/or Command and Control helicopters provided continuous overhead cover for these operations. Armed helicopters were either on station covering the operation or on call, awaiting significant contact. Airboats, Navy PBR and Navy PACV boats supported cited operations.

(2) Summary of significant offensive operations: Only those operations which were conducted during the main portion of the flood will be cited, it must be kept in mind that these comprise only those that met with some success and that there were numerous others conducted during this period of time.

(a) 27 September: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by one company (-) of CIDG. Results: Two enemy captured, one enemy KIA, 18 tons rice, 30 houses and five bunkers destroyed; one rifle, assorted mines, small arms ammunition and documents captured.

(b) 29 September: Reconnaissance and search operation in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company (-). Results: one enemy KIA, two VC captured, 39 suspects detained, 100 kilos of rice destroyed.

(c) 2 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by elements of four CIDG companies. Results: 12 sampans, assorted documents, rice, medicine and mines captured; 18 houses and two sampans destroyed.

(d) 3 October: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by one CIDG company. Results: three enemy KIA, one carbine and one medical kit captured.

(e) 5 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Nhon District by two CIDG companies. Results: two VC captured, assorted documents and grenades/booby traps captured, 27 structures destroyed.

(f) 7 October: Search and destroy operation in Chau Thanh District by one CIDG company, with two PBR's in support. Results: one rifle and assorted grenades/booby traps captured, 30 structures and one ton of rice destroyed.

(g) 8 October: Night ambush patrol in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company (-). Results: three VC captured, 500 kilos of rice, one rifle and one sampan captured, 1000 kilos of rice destroyed.

(h) 8 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by elements of two CIDG companies, with six PBR's in support. Results: one US Navy EM and one CIDG WIA, large amounts of enemy documents, grenades and

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booby traps captured, and 77 houses, two sampans and 1600 kilos of rice destroyed. The support provided by the PBR'S was outstanding in providing flank security and suppressive fire when ground elements were ambushed from positions in Cambodia.

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(i) 9 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by elements of two CIDG companies, with PBR's in support. Results: two US Navy EM and two CIDG WIA, four VC KIA, assorted grenades/booby traps captured, and 30 houses and 15,000 kilos of rice meal destroyed. Again Navy PBR's protected the disengagement of ground elements when they were taken under fire from positions in Cambodia.

(j) 11 October: Reconnaissance for VC mine factory in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company (-). Results: Discovered abandoned three building complex containing large quantities of metal work, apparently used recently for munitions manufacture and repair.

(k) 12 October: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by one Platoon CIDG and one RF Platoon. Results: one USSF, two CIDG and one LLDB KIA, 30 VC KIA (estimate only).

(l) 15 October: Reconnaissance for enemy base camp in Tuyen Nhon District by one CIDG company. Results: one VC KIA, 24 houses destroyed.

(m) 16 October: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by three companies CIDG, one RF platoon, with PBR's in support. Results: 13 VC KIA, 11 KBA (51 more estimated), 18 VC captured, 87 individual small arms, two BAR's, two LMG's, large quantities small arms ammo, explosives and weapons parts captured; 124 sampans, 56 houses, 58 buffalos and 10 bunkers destroyed. In this action south of La Grange canal, the PBR's had difficulty moving due to low water and weeds.

(n) 15 - 17 October: Search and clear operation in Kien Binh District by one CIDG company (+) and PBR's in support. Results: nine individual small arms, one BAR and many grenades/booby traps captured. The PBR's had extreme difficulty with pumps clogging on loose weeds.

(o) 17 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company, and PBR's in support. Results: five suspects detained, four sampans captured, four sampans destroyed.

(p) 18 October: River reconnaissance patrol in Tuyen Nhon District by one CIDG Recon Platoon (later reinforced with two CIDG platoons). Results: eight VC KIA, 40 structures, 45 sampans, eight bunkers destroyed; and nine large sampans with two motors captured.

(q) 20 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company. Results: 38 refugees relocated; 50 houses, 11 bunkers, 10,000 lbs of rice and assorted booby traps/grenades destroyed.

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(r) 20 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company. Results: two VC KBA, 33 captured or detained, four individual small arms, large quantities of ammo, grenades and explosives captured, 21 sampans and one motor captured, 70 houses burned, 40 sampans and one repair facility (mines and weapons) destroyed.

(s) 21 - 22 October: Search, clear and destroy operation in Tuyen Nhon District by two CIDG companies (-). Results: four individual small arms and 500 lbs of rice captured; one ton of rice and 35 structures destroyed.

(t) 23 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by two CIDG companies (-). Results: 10 VC captured, one rifle and 10 sampans captured, three sampans destroyed.

(u) 26 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by two CIDG companies (-). Results: five CIDG, one LLDB and two USAF WIA, 11 VC KIA/KBA.

(v) 27 October: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by one CIDG company. Results: one VC KIA, three rifles and assorted small arms ammo/grenades captured.

(w) 28 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by one CIDG company (+). Results: 21 sampans, 500 ft of lumber, 100 kilos of rice and assorted grenades, mines, documents captured; 22 houses and seven sampans destroyed.

(x) 28 October: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Nhon District by one CIDG company (+). Results: one VC KIA, 75 kilos of manioc captured.

(y) 29 October: Ambush patrol in Tuyen Nhon District by two CIDG platoons. Results: five VC KIA and one rifle captured.

(z) 30 October: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by two CIDG companies. Results: five VC KIA, two VC captured, two weapons captured, 72 houses destroyed.

(aa) 2 November: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Binh District by two CIDG companies. Results: Friendly unit ambushed by estimated two VC main force companies positioned in Cambodia; two CIDG KIA, 12 CIDG WIA, six CIDG MIA, VC casualties unknown.

(bb) 3 November: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by two CIDG companies. Results: three CIDG KIA, five CIDG WIA; assorted VC grenades and mines captured.

(cc) 4 November: Search and destroy operation in Tuyen Nhon District by four CIDG companies. Results: eight VC KIA (3 USSF confirmed), two CIDG KIA, three rifles captured, 32 structures destroyed; assorted mortar rounds, grenades and mines captured.

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(dd) 12 November: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by two RF companies and Airboat Platoon. Results: 37 houses and 11 sampans destroyed.

(ee) 14 November: Search and clear operation in Tuyen Nhon District by one CIDG company and Airboat Platoon. Results: six VC KIA (confirmed); two USSF KIA, six CIDG KIA, captured one 60mm mortar; lost five individual weapons, one LMG, one assault boat with motor.

(ff) 17 November: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by one CIDG company and Airboat Platoon. Results: five VC KIA (confirmed), one CIDG KIA; destroyed 10 sampans and one bunker.

(gg) 20 November: Hummingbird operation in Tuyen Binh District by 34 CIDG with one platoon of airboats, one platoon of gunships and four slicks. Results: six VC KIA, (confirmed), two VC captured; destroyed one mine and grenade factory.

(hh) 21 November: Reconnaissance in Tuyen Binh District by two platoons of airboats with one helicopter VR. Results: four VC KIA (confirmed); destroyed 23 sampans and five bunkers (two secondary explosions).

(ii) 22 November: Search and destroy operation in Chau Thanh District by one CIDG company w/three Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles and one platoon of airboats supported by one platoon of gunships and six slicks. Results: 56 VC KIA (confirmed); destroyed 50 sampans, 50 houses, one VC aid station; captured nine rifles and 20 kilos of documents; recaptured one 40 HP motor (lost 14 Nov).

(jj) 25 November: Search and destroy operation in Kien Binh District by two CIDG companies w/three PACV's and one platoon airboats supported by one platoon of gunships and six slicks. Results: 25 VC KIA (confirmed); nine VC captured, 20 kilos of documents and one carbine; destroyed 100 sampans, 103 houses and 20 bunkers.

c. Accumulated enemy and friendly losses: From 26 September to 25 November there have been 225 confirmed VC KIA and 99 VC captured. Major items of equipment captured included 2157 hand grenades, 147 weapons, 543 assorted size mines, 154 sampans, 150 kilos of documents. Additionally, 1012 structures, 139 assorted size mines, 333 sampans and 85 bunkers were destroyed. Friendly casualties are 36 KIA and 75 WIA.

d. Problems encountered and solutions or recommendations:

(1) Initially each CIDG camp had on hand only approximately 50 small sampans, between five and ten plastic assault boats and between four and six sampan motors. None of the camps had any outboard motors. Since all operations during the flood were to rely upon boat transportation, it was evident that more boats and outboard engines would be required. When IV Corps asked what assistance they could provide for tactical exploitation of the flood, the main item requested was boats and motors. Fifty one outboard engines (19-40 HP and 32 - 25 HP) were provided together with 30 assault boats.

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141 Drivers and mechanics accompanied these boats. Each "A" detachment was allocated sufficient boats and motors to allow it to conduct a two company operation.

(2) The complete changeover in tactics from foot operations to waterborne operations presented some problems in training. Boat operators assigned to accompany the engines were found to be unfamiliar with care and maintenance of engines, and the troops that participated in waterborne operations had, for the most part, little or no experience in the use of boats in a tactical situation. These problems were solved by quick indoctrination and training in boat tactics and in many cases the training took place on actual operations. It is recommended that prior to the coming of the flood season in the future, classes be organized to teach techniques of employing boats and of prime importance, care and maintenance of outboard engines.

(3) The flooding of mortar pits and artillery positions within the sector caused the loss of a most valuable asset both to defense and to operations. All 105mm howitzers in the Province had to be evacuated. Thus the coverage of camps and FOB's by these pieces was lost for the majority of this period. In addition to their defensive role, a significant amount of support normally available for offensive operations was lost. The nightly harassing and interdictory role of the howitzer was totally lost. No substitute for this asset was found. It is recommended that in the future, the artillery be transferred to the CIDG camps which are above the level of past floods, namely, Binh Thanh Thon, Moc Hoa and Tuyen Thon. In this manner, total loss of artillery support will be avoided, and although different areas would be covered than prior to the flood, a significant amount of the Province will be able to benefit by their presence. It should be noted that this suggestion was followed in the case of bringing back two howitzers previously evacuated from downtown Moc Hoa and placing them in the Moc Hoa "A" camp.

(4) Mortar positions within the camps in many cases were flooded. The 4.2" mortar at Kinh Quan II had to be taken out of action until the camp could be pumped dry. The other mortars that were affected by the flood were for the most part moved either to higher ground or were placed on floating type platforms. In most cases, due to the instability of these platforms, there was a decrease in the capability of the mortar through limitation of charge that could be used. Displacement of mortars on operations was also limited. Unless the mortars could be fired from a boat it could not be used. Experimentation with firing an 81mm mortar mounted in an aluminum engineer assault boat was found to be only marginally effective.

(5) With the exception of Binh Hiep FOB, all other fixed Forward Operational Bases of the CIDG had to be evacuated due to total inundation of the posts. In the case of Binh Chau FOB, no attempt to control the evacuated area was made due to the concurrent evacuation of all civilians in the area and the consequent lack of strategic importance of the post. In the case of Tuyen Nhon FOB and Kinh Quan II, it was decided to maintain a mobile sampan FOB to protect those two areas that were evacuated. Considerable success was gained thru this solution. On several occasions VC were ambushed by the roving FOB's and it is felt that they were, in effect, of more value in the modified role than they had been previous to the flood.

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(6) The airfields in this Sector were totally flooded. From the tactical standpoint this was significant in that the fixed wing O1 observation aircraft were forced to remain approximately 30 minutes away from Sector. The reaction time for getting one of these aircraft alerted, airborne and over the designated area was increased from 15 minutes to a minimum of one hour and usually more. Although this never proved to be a problem, it was certainly a significant loss in our reaction capability to support any camp or post under attack. Additionally, the coverage of operations by these aircraft could not be coordinated except over the radio, leaving many questions normally covered in a briefing of the pilots unanswered due to security. Also significant in the flooding of the airfield at Moc Hoa, the servicing facility for helicopters was lost under the water. All helipads were submerged, and each camp was directed to prepare raised platforms for at least one helicopter to be able to land. At Moc Hoa, in addition to the raised pads built for administrative helicopter use, it was decided that a set of helipads for armed helicopters would have to be provided because of their additional weight and consequent need for longer take off area. IV Corps provided three pontoon type floating rafts manned by ARVN engineers, and these were handled up the river to Moc Hoa and emplaced adjacent to the runway. These helipads proved to be a satisfactory servicing facility for armed helicopters because all the ammunition, rockets and POL could be stored right on the pads, with the ARVN engineers guarding the equipment. With these pads operational, a heavy section of gunships could be serviced at any given time. This capability increased the effectiveness of our overall operations during this period immensely. Prior to this capability, the closest servicing facility for armed helicopters was some 30 minutes flying time away and for the extremely distant operational areas within Province, this represented an on-station time for gunships of only approximately 20 minutes. With the facility, we could keep the guns on station for at least one hour anywhere in the operational area. Therefore, of prime importance, prior to any coming flood season, consideration should be made in advance for the construction of armed helicopter helipads. This asset accounted for as many confirmed VC KIA as did the ground elements and provided a tremendous amount of security for committed forces.

(7) Since the majority of the Regional Force/Popular Force units were without organic sampans or boats, the conduct of offensive operations was borne for the most part by the CIDG. This represented a significant loss in the number of troops within province that could be employed in the offensive role. Although the success of the CIDG was impressive during this period, it is believed that even better results could have been obtained if the RF/PF force had been given the support needed in boat transportation. After the flood had reached its peak, six assault boats and motors were allocated to each district to provide a reaction force capability. This enhanced the security of each district considerably.

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(8) With the coming of receding waters and the consequent drop in water level, a period from approximately 1 November to 25 November was reached wherein the use of assault boats with outboard motors became increasingly difficult. The boats were able to be operated; however, the constant entanglement of debris in the propeller, the channelization of suitable routes, the constant shear-pin breakage and consequent lack of maneuverability for search and assault made boat operations during this period minimally effective. Increased casualties and less results of operations indicated that new tactics must be developed for this period of recession of the water. The use of transport helicopters was limited because although the water was receding, it was still too deep for foot operations. Until approximately 22 November the logical solution was to concentrate on sampan operations of a small unit size. Multiple platoon sized saturation patrols and night ambushes should be emphasized. Company and larger sized operations should be used only when heavy air support is guaranteed. On 14 November an example of this took place. One company of CIDG in assault boats and sampans entered into an area that had been thoroughly screened by another force on two weeks prior. The area had been found empty and deserted. All of the houses and bunkers underwater. However, on this date, no sooner had the company entered the area than they found that enough of the water had gone down to allow the VC to utilize their bunkers. Although the water was still deep enough to use outboard engines with difficulty, the maneuverability and reliability was insufficient to cope with fortified prepared positions. The lesson learned here is that although the flood still exists, flood type operations must be suited to the actual depth of the water. To continue the same tactics as long as boats can run was found to be unsuitable. Operations must be continually analyzed from the standpoint of advantage over the VC.

4. (C) Effect of Flood on Camp Defenses:

a. A-413 (Binh Thanh Thon): BTT was more fortunate than the other camps in that it is situated on relatively high ground and did not flood to a great extent inside the camp itself. Problems encountered were as follows:

(1) Erosion of outer wall, causing portions of camp to flood. It is believed that building the wall higher, using a revetment type construction of steel pickets and interlaced tram trees, and capping the wall with sandbags will eliminate this problem.

(2) Flooding of machine gun bunkers on outer wall: These bunkers are constructed in three layers and built into the wall itself. There is no feasible way to prevent flooding of lower compartments, however MG's were moved to a higher level and the bunker remained operational.

(3) Barrier wire and claymores: Wire was completely covered with water. This caused a problem when portions of the wire broke loose and drifted into channels used by assault boats leaving and entering camp. Solution to this is to use more pickets and tie in wire more securely. Claymores were mounted on 6" steel pickets and remained above water. The major difficulty here is maintaining the firing system.

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(4) Damage to mortar ammunition in firing pits: A large quantity of 81mm, 60mm and 4.2" mortar ammunition was ruined due to flooding of ammo bunkers in the firing pits. This problem can be solved by building improved type concrete storage bunkers in the pits with waterproof doors and a drainage systems. 144

(5) Flooding of emergency communication and medical bunker: This was due to a combination of no door on the bunker and the bunker being below the ground water level. Construction of a water tight door, re-concreting the inside of the bunker and installation of a sump that can be pumped dry would solve this problem.

(6) Collapse of individual firing positions on outer walls: Present positions are built of a combination of sandbags, cemented brick, steel pickets and scrap tin. Many of these positions collapsed. Construction of brick and cement positions with sandbag overhead cover will solve the problem. Existing brick can be reused and the only expense will be for the additional bricks, cement, and sandbags. Local tram track would be used for overhead cover reinforcing material.

b. A-414 (Noc Hoa).

(1) Water achieved the level of the sandbag wall. Consequently a small boat of any type could float up to any part of the camp wall right over the wire barriers. In order to solve this problem more barrier material will have to be placed on top of existing wire to raise the level of the barrier.

(2) Ammunition bunkers and corner fighting bunkers: Pumps were used to keep the ammo bunkers relatively dry. Water pumps should be delivered prior to the arrival of high water to prevent initial flooding of ammunition bunkers and other critical installations.

(3) Outer compound sandbag wall was 85% damaged or completely washed away. A more permanent wall with concrete capping or cement bricks should be constructed, otherwise replacement of complete sandbag wall each time it floods will have to be accomplished.

(4) Movement of dependents inside compound because of flooding away of dependent housing made the camp vulnerable to sabotage and infiltration. Dependents should be evacuated to non tactical area if forced to leave their homes, and not be allowed to move into the compound.

c. A-415 (Tuyen Hoa):

(1) Claymores going under water: Claymores could be mounted on floating boards between two stakes so that they may rise and fall according to the water level and still stay in place.

(2) Barrier wire became ineffective because of ability for sampans to float over. Utilization of barge pickets and higher rows of wire so as to have at least one foot above highest water level.

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(3) FUGAS Devices: A simple expedient of staking these devices into position can be utilized due to their natural buoyancy.

d. A-416 (Kinh Quan II):

(1) Stable positions for the 81mm mortar and 4.2" mortar: An expedient used at this location was to mount the 81mm mortar in a metal assault boat. This proved only marginally effective. It is recommended that stable raised positions be constructed for use during flood conditions.

(2) All positions along the wall flooded: Floating platforms mounted on 55 gallon drums were built, and sandbagged firing positions were staked down around the perimeter to fight from. Similar platforms were used for machinegun and 60mm mortar positions. Banana log rafts were also utilized for individual fighting positions along the perimeter. It is recommended that all crew served weapons have raised, stable positions to be used in the event of flooding.

(3) In the case of Kinh Quan II, the ground level of the camp is far below the level of the flood. Any camp constructed in the flood areas should be filled prior to construction to a level above that of the highest recorded flood. The defensive capability of KQ II was significantly reduced by the fact that during the flood period the camp interior was approximately four feet under water. Living conditions, facilities, and defensive positions were by necessity makeshift and consequently substandard. AWOL rate was high, and families brought into the camp only added to the vulnerability through infiltration.

e. B-41 (Moc Hoa):

(1) Perimeter wall open on one side: It was not felt that the water would ever rise to such an extent as to reach the level of the "B" team. However, as the runway began to disappear it was decided that a complete wall would have to be constructed of sandbags to hold water out of the compound. Not only did the water achieve the level of the compound, but at the peak of the flood it was approximately 2½ feet above. Permanent walls should be constructed around the entire perimeter so as to eliminate this extensive project.

(2) Bunkers filling with water: Seepage through and under the walls caused flooding of corner bunkers and ammo bunkers. Since the majority of the water seeps through the ground, this can be controlled only by pumping. Ammunition in bunkers must be raised well off the ground on pallets.

(3) Claymore positions under water: Claymores had to be removed during the height of the flood. It was impractical to put them up on stakes above the water level in that no protection from backblast could be afforded and their proximity to friendly positions makes this a requirement.

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5. (C) Effect of Flood on Enemy Activities:

a. Enemy forces were forced to abandon traditional defenses, living in and defending from sampans and/or tree platforms. Probably the one most important effect of the flood was that enemy movement via sampan was effectively spotted by visual recon aircraft. 146

b. Significantly, on 17 September, the first instance which ushered in the flood effects was an intelligence report to the effect that VC were moving their dependents from the Vinh Loi Village area (Tuyen Binh District) to the "Tao Lat" VC area adjacent to the Cambodian border in Chau Thanh District. From this date forward, intelligence reports, aerial sightings, and interrogations indicated a general exodus from the traditional VC areas within the Province.

c. The order of evacuation seemed to be for main force units to leave the Province, leaving local guerrilla forces behind to retain control of the area and to guard what caches were left behind.

d. Most of the VC caches (rice, weapons, explosives, etc.) were either evacuated out of Kien Tuong Province or stored in sampans. Those items which were stored in sampans were very vulnerable to armed gunships, as evidenced by the fact that armed gunships were responsible for eight (8) secondary explosions from sampans. One secondary explosion rose over 1,000 feet in the air.

e. VC activity during the flood was in the form of harassments and minings. Seven (7) bridges within Province have been either damaged or destroyed by the VC during this flood period. Four small RF/PF outposts were overrun. District Hqs of Tuyen Binh District was mortared and two Special Forces camps were harassed.

f. The effectiveness of aerial surveillance precluded the assembly of VC troops, who by necessity, would have had to be in sampans. As the water level drops, the effectiveness of aerial surveillance also decreased.

g. Interrogation of returnees and POW's indicates that the morale of the VC reached a low ebb during the flood. This was mainly due to lack of adequate food supplies and sickness.

h. Confirmed Enemy Movements during the Flood Period: (17 September to 25 November):

(1) 18 September - 300 U/I VC moved from unknown location to "Xom Tra Lon" (XS085655) to receive 200 sampans from Prov Liberation Front.

(2) 18 September - One U/I VC platoon escorted their dependents from loc WS943989 into Cambodia (XS115977).

(3) 21 September - Two VC platoons withdrew south into Kien Phong Province (WS920740) after making contact with friendly forces.

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(4) 25 September - 411 VGT (60 troops) moved south across La Grange Canal (XS038748) and moved into Dinh Tuong Province.

(5) 27 September - One U/I VC Bn loc XS15857 to XS179842 moving south. Men-to move dependents out of flooded area.

(6) 2 October - One company U/I VC withdrew NE into Cambodia after contact with friendly forces loc XS134978.

(7) 2 October - VC Prov Com organization and officers are being collected and moved out of Kien Tuong Province to escape the flood.

(8) 5 October - 100 VC of the 504 PMB loc (XS185953)(Cambodia).

(9) 8 October - one platoon VC moved from Kien Tuong Province to Cambodia (WT776170).

(10) 13 October - one U/I VC company moved from south to XS250956 (Cambodia).

(11) 20 October - 502 PMB loc 658934 moving southwest.

(12) 21 October - 80 U/I VC withdrew north into Cambodia after attacking RF outpost loc WT927075.

(13) 21 October - 300 troops of 261 DT Bn moved from Kien Phong Province to loc XS035655.

(14) 31 October - one platoon U/I VC moving NE from loc XS025965.

(15) 3 November - two U/I VC Co loc WT828188 (Cambodia).

(16) 7 November - 400 troops of 267 DT Bn moved from Kien Phong Province to Kien Bang Lang Canal (XS033643 to XS033685).

NOTE: Only these enemy movements that have been absolutely confirmed are listed above. From an average of 12 to 15 intelligence reports received at this location daily, the following conclusions can be made concerning enemy troop movements during the flood: (1) During the latter part of September and early October, enemy main force units were withdrawn from Kien Tuong Province, with the majority moving to higher ground in Cambodia; (2) Enemy main force units began moving back into Kien Tuong Province as soon as the flood receded and cover and concealment became available (around 5 November); (3) Local force units stayed at their normal location throughout the flood.

i. Suspected Enemy Flood Havens: Intelligence Reports indicate that because of the total inundation of this province the only safe haven was Cambodia. Enemy units moved their dependents and supplies onto higher ground in Cambodia whenever possible.

j. Changes in VC Tactics caused by the Flood Conditions:

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(1) Banana tree rafts were constructed and used as floating gun platforms and to move troops into attack positions.

(2) VC on one occasion used automatic weapons mounted in sampans to attack CIDG forces. This attack took place in broad daylight during a five hour firefight with friendly forces.

(3) VC used sampans as mobile supply caches.

6. (C) Flood Effect on Logistical Mission:

a. The flood affected our logistical mission to the extent of doubling our requirements for support.

b. Our means of transshipping supplies was affected. Loss of our airstrips denied us our main means of transshipping. To alleviate this, five high water helipads were constructed. Three of these were built and floated in by 40th Engineers (ARVN).

c. Supplies shipped into B-41 (Moc Hoa) to combat flooding conditions were as follows:

- (1) Sandbags - 22,000
- (2) Water pumps - six, which have since been turned in.
- (3) Cement - 125 bags.

d. Supplies needed by subordinate detachments:

(1) A-414:

- (a) Sandbags - 40,000
- (b) Assault boats are needed before water comes up.
- (c) Motors should come with a basic load of spare parts.
- (d) Current of water should be evaluated prior to air drops.
- (e) Free drops are unsatisfactory.

(2) A-413:

- (a) Sandbags - 25,000
- (b) Cement - 300 bags
- (c) Steel pickets - 1,000 - 6'; 500 - 4'.
- (d) Wire - 200 rolls.

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- (e) Lumber - 1,000 each of 2x4 and 1x6.
- (f) Nails - 10 kilo assorted sizes.
- (g) Tin Roofing - 100 sheets.
- (h) Authorization to purchase thatch for roofing (CIDG billets).
- (i) Chicken wire - 4 rolls
- (j) Requested bulldozer, front loader and dump truck.
- (k) Shovels - 50
- (l) Picks - 25

(3) A-415:

- (a) Sandbags - 20,000
- (b) Cement - 100 bags

(4) A-416:

- (a) Sandbags - 20,000
- (b) Cement - 100 bags
- (c) Requested front loader.

e. Materials needed to construct floating camp. Only one camp in B-41 fits into this category, (Kinh Quan II (A-416)). The following materials would be needed for construction and to sustain Kinh Quan II during the rainy season: Lumber- One hundred 2x4; one hundred 1x6 (length should be 8 to 10 ft). Fifteen rolls of wire for use as tie downs.

f. During flood period recommend that supplies be sent to detachments only on their request. Reason: Due to insufficient storage space, rodents, and water, much of the excess supplies are destroyed. Shipment of boats and motors prior to flood stage is also required. Training and preparation for boat operations necessitates having the equipment on hand at least one month prior.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Operations can continue throughout flood conditions with even greater mobility. Normal small unit tactics may be applied to boat operations.

b. Recommend that standard boat engine be the 9 HP type sampan engine. The 9HP engines are reliable, easily maintained and can be operated with a minimum of instruction. These engines operate well in grassy areas

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where other types do not. They have sufficient power while pushing an assault boat to pull an additional 4-6 sampans. The 40 HP engine should be issued for command boats to enable them to move faster and control the formations. 150

c. 25 HP engines proved undependable and were of little or no value for operations. Recommend that these engines not be issued in the future.

d. POL resupply was a continuing problem. Premixed fuel and oil was prepared and extra gas tanks and cans were carried for each boat. However, on extended operations, enough fuel containers could not be procured to provide sufficient gas for each boat. A POL train element consisting of several large sampans with POL drums aboard accompanied by a security element is almost a must. Too many times, boats ran out of fuel and relied upon a helicopter to deliver premixed POL to enable them to get back to home base. Five gallon gas cans must be issued in sufficient quantity to enable each boat a minimum of four cans.

e. Issue of the standard plastic boat repair kits is mandatory on operations, the plastic boats get ripped and sometimes fired into. The kits are easy to use and give good results. Without repair kits, plastic assault boats will not be able to be maintained through their usage period.

f. When issuing motors, there should also be issued a basic load of spare parts, spark plugs, shear pins, etc.. Nails cut in sections proved satisfactory, however they were not of the proper tensile strength and consequently risked damage to the motors. Without the actual shear pins, which were unavailable, improvisation was required.

g. The requirement for radios increased with flood operations. Dependence on boat transportation necessitates less physical coordination and consequently a need for communication with more elements. An additional two PRC-25 radios were issued to each detachment for this period and they were utilized to the maximum.

h. Armed helicopters are an invaluable asset during the flood period. Their capability of getting down low on the deck and arriving over the target areas prior to being sighted has proven to be especially effective when the VC are forced to remain in sampans instead of in their flooded bunkers. Daily screening of suspect VC areas by armed helicopters not only prevented VC movement but also forced him to disperse into non tactical elements. Gunships scouting ahead of waterborne units were able to uncover enemy positions and helped direct friendly elements to suspect positions and avoid ambushes.

i. There is a need for formal training in boat tactics, formations, and control, prior to the flood period. Control of boat formations is a continual problem, especially when in the assault. Normal small unit tactics can be applied to boat operations. Use of sampans to move ahead of assault boats to reconnoiter danger areas has been found effective.

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j. Gas fires are a hazard when operating with boats carrying extra cans of fuel. One serious fire was experienced during this period obviously caused by spillage of gasoline in the boat while refueling.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Gordon R. Luce
/t/ GORDON R. LUCE
CIT Inf
Adjutant

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COMPANY "D"
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96215

1 December 1966

SUBJECT: Airboat Operations

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1. General: Two (2) platoons of airboat trainees arrived at Can Tho on 2 October. Seventeen (17) airboats arrived by LST from Saigon on 13 October. By 27 October and upon completion of phase I of airboat training, two (2) operational airboat platoons (12 airboats) arrived at Moc Hoa (Det B-41). On 9 November one (1) operational platoon six (6) airboats arrived at Cai Cai. During 2 November - 12 November period Phase II and Phase III training was being conducted at B detachment level.

2. Summary of Operations (See operations overlay).

a. On 2 November four CIDG Companies (Det A-414 & A-415) 1 airboat platoon and 2 armed helicopters conducted a search and destroy operation down the Vam Co Tay River. CIDG elements in assault boats initiated contact with estimated VC squad at Coord. XS468718. This contact resulted in no friendly or Viet Cong casualties; however, two (2) Chinese carbines, two (2) each 4 HP sampan engines, one (1) pound of documents, 6 sampans, and 100 kilos of rice were captured. Airboats were used as flank security and were not involved in contact. Operation terminated on 4 November.

Lessons learned.

(1) Heavy vegetation along river and canal banks prevented use of airboats in river.

(2) As a result of increased mobility a small force with airboats was able to provide flank security releasing a number of troops to the main force element.

(3) Lack of adequate communication with airboats prevented their use to cut off Viet Cong withdrawal.

b. On 12 November one airboat platoon (B-41) conducted flank security and screening mission south of Ap Bac Coord. XS123658. Airboats were fired at by 3 - 5 snipers from a woodline. Airboats were unable to enter woodline and Viet Cong withdrew. Operation terminated at 1430 hours 12 November.

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Lesson learned: Airboats employed alone are ineffective in closing with and destroying Viet Cong located in covered concealed positions.

c. On 13 November, one company of CIDG (A-412) and one airboat platoon conducted search and destroy operation in vicinity of Cai Cai Village. Friendly element initiated contact with Viet Cong Platoon Vic. WS6398. Viet Cong withdrew to the southeast; one USASF was accidentally wounded, four Viet Cong were killed and 18 houses and 8 sampans were destroyed.

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Lesson learned. Lack of communications with airboats hampered control and limited their effectiveness.

d. On 14 November, one CIDG company (A-414), 3 sections of armed helicopters, and one airboat platoon conducted a search and clear operation north of Tuyen Nhon vicinity Cambodian border. Airboats were deployed as a flank security element; however, airboats moved ahead of main body and made contact with estimated Viet Cong company while reconning by fire. Sgt Boyd, USASF commander of the airboat platoon, was killed when Viet Cong opened fire. Control of airboats was not regained for about 10 minutes. Main element upon arriving at contact point assaulted enemy; SP4 Mayo was killed in assault. Results of the encounter with the enemy were 2 USASF, 6 CIDG, 1 MF killed in action and 1 USSF, 1 LLDB, 9 CIDG, 2 MF, and 1 ARVN engineer wounded in action. Friendly equipment lost included 2 ea sampans, 2 ea HT-1 radios, 1 ea IMG, 3 ea carbines, one 40 HP engine, one pair of binoculars, one M-16 rifle; in addition, one assault boat and 2 M-1 rifles were destroyed. Enemy losses included 6 VC KIA, and 1 60mm mortar captured. Operation terminated at 142045 Nov.

Lessons learned.

(1) Airboats when reconning by fire must maintain at least 100 meters from target area.

(2) When making a strafing run, airboats must continue to run to the end of target area and turn must be covered by following airboat.

Comment: To replace Sgt Boyd, Captain Marecek, new Mike Force commander, was assigned responsibility for airboats at B-41.

e. On 14 November, 1 CIDG company (Det A-412) with one airboat platoon conducted search and destroy operations northwest of Cai Cai camp in vicinity of Cambodian border. Airboats were used as a flank security element and reaction force. There was no enemy contact.

Lessons learned. None

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f. On 17 November, one (1) company of CIDG (Det A-416) and one airboat platoon conducted search and destroy operation northwest of Kinh Quan II (A-416 ~~CIDG~~ camp). One Viet Cong platoon was spotted moving south out of the operational area. Airboats pursued and made contact with enemy at V 939742. Four Viet Cong were killed and 10 sampans and one bunker were destroyed; one CIDG was wounded with a mine.

Lesson learned: Airboats can be employed effectively as an enveloping force once enemy is located.

g. On 16 November, one reinforced company (A-412) with one airboat platoon conducted search and destroy operation from Tam Bua (WT 602022) to Cai Cai (WT 620000). Airboats were used as a flank security and screening element. There was no enemy contact, although two rifles, 2 hand grenades and 8 sampans were captured.

Lesson learned: Airboats can only cross Cai Cai River at the canal entrances.

h. On 18 November, one company minus (Det A-416) and one airboat platoon conducted search and destroy operation south of Kinh Quan II. Airboats were used as a flank security element and reaction force. There was no active contact.

Lesson learned. None.

i. On 20 November, three (3) CIDG companies (Det A-412) with one airboat platoon established blocking force position north of Cai Cai Village. Three (3) PACV boats moved from An Long airfield, attacked Cai Cai Village and then continued to Moc Hoa. There was no enemy contact; however, twelve sampans, 2 structures and 23 bunkers were destroyed. Airboats were used as flank security northeast of Cai Cai Village.

Lesson learned. When airboat engine was idling, communication with the airboats was loud and clear.

j. On 20 November, 1 platoon of CIDG (A-413), 1 section of armed helicopters, and 1 airboat platoon conducted humming bird search and destroy operation northwest of Det A-413 camp in vicinity of Cambodian border and 9th and 7th ARVN Divisions boundary. Contact vicinity WT723108 killed 4 Viet Cong. Two Viet Cong were killed vicinity SW669038 and two (2) VC were captured at WS693981. Friendly elements destroyed 20 sampans, 1 mine and grenade factory, 11 houses, 50 hand grenade molds, and 4 water buffalo, and in addition, friendly elements captured 50 hand grenades, 100 rounds of small arms ammunition, 40 kilo of rice, 5 kilo of documents, 1 transistor radio and 2 gas stoves. There were no friendly losses. Airboats were used to sweep a portion of the objective area; airboats made no contact with Viet Cong.

Lesson learned. Airboats complement helicopter operations very effectively.

k. On 20 November, 2 CIDG companies, 2 RF companies (Det A-416) and 1 platoon of airboats conducted search and destroy operation south of Kinh Quan II. Airboats were used to screen for attacking force. Contact

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was made with 3 Viet Cong vicinity WS924767. Casualties include 4 CIDG wounded by booby trap, 3 VC killed in action. One VC weapon, 20 hand grenades, 15 carbine magazines, and numerous Viet Cong documents were captured. Twenty houses and 300 kilos of rice were destroyed. Operation terminated at 201500 Nov.

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Lesson learned. Airboats can be effectively used for medical evacuation of wounded.

1. On 21 November, two airboat platoons (A-413) conducted search and destroy operation in vicinity of Kien Tuong Province boundary. 1st airboat platoon destroyed 9 sampans and 200 kilo of rice and captured 5 kilo of documents, 3 grenade launchers, and one Thompson SMG magazine vicinity WT660043. 2nd airboat platoon destroyed 4 sampans and 5 bunkers and killed 2 Viet Cong vicinity WS74694C. Helicopters destroyed 10 sampans, 1 barge and killed 2 VC vicinity WS719923. A helicopter was used to locate the Viet Cong, mark the location, and radio for the airboats. Airboats were used as waterborne attacking force.

Lesson learned. Airboats can effectively be used as an assaulting element when the enemy is located in sampans in open water.

m. On 22 November 3 PACV boats with 24 CIDG, one airboat platoon with 20 CIDG, 2 sections of armed helicopters conducted search and destroy operation northeast of Moc Hoa in the vicinity of the Cambodian border. 1 company of CIDG with airlift was held in reserve at Moc Hoa. The armed helicopters discovered and initiated fire on one company of Viet Cong in 25 sampans vicinity XSL63938. PACV boats and airboats were notified of VC location and moved to contact. PACV boats were first to make contact and approached the enemy from the south. Two minutes later the airboats, which were attempting to intercept the Viet Cong prior to their entrance into Cambodia, attack the Viet Cong on their west flank. The reserve of 1 CIDG company was airlifted to the border in an effort to block the Viet Cong withdrawal. The Viet Cong dispersed in all directions in order to prevent their encirclement. Enemy casualties include 56 KIA; airboats accounted for 32 of 56 VC KIAs. Nine (9) weapons, 20 lbs of documents, 24 hand grenades, and one 40 HP engine were captured by CIDG and Mike Force. Only one friendly soldier was wounded. This operation is one of the most successful offensive operations in the Delta this year. It was successful because of increased mobility of CIDG and the decision to airland troops on the Cambodian border. Operation terminated 1138 hrs, 22 November.

Lesson learned. The increased mobility of PACV and airboats and the fast reaction of airmobile force enabled a two company size force to obtain a decisive victory.

n. On 24 November one (1) CIDG company, one (1) CRP (A-412) and 1 platoon of airboats conducted an operation to clear area surrounding R.F. outpost northwest of Cai Cai Camp, and hold sick call for personnel in outpost. Airboats were used as a screening and reaction force. There was no enemy contact.

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Lesson learned. None

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o. On 24 November 3 CIDG companies (Det A-415) and one (1) section of armed helicopters, one (1) platoon of airboats and two (2) PACV boats, conducted search and destroy operation north of Tuyen Nhon in vicinity of Cambodian border, PACV and airboats initiated contact with estimated VC platoon vicinity XS223918, to XS312927. Enemy casualties include 9 Viet Cong killed in action and 3 suspects captured; one (1) kilo of documents, three (3) hand grenades, one (1) each one kilo mine, 31 toe poppers, 78 structures, 8 water buffalo, 11 sampans, and one printing plant were destroyed. Operation terminated 251930 Nov.

Lesson learned. The receding flood water is limiting the movement of airboats to smaller areas.

p. On 27 November, one (1) platoon CIDG, (A-415) one (1) platoon of airboats and one section of armed helicopters conducted a humming bird search and destroy operation, west of A-413 camp vicinity of the Kien Phong, Kien Tuong Province boundary. Airboats were used in independent search and destroy operation in conjunction with armed helicopters. Contacts vicinity WT862165, WS690958 resulted in 8 Viet Cong killed, 2 Viet Cong and two suspects captured; 38 sampans, one (1) bunker, and an ammunition cache were destroyed. Operation terminated 271600 Nov.

Lesson learned. Dry ground continues to limit the use of airboat in much of Kien Tuong Province.

q. On 28 November three (3) CIDG companies (A-412) 2 airboat platoons (A-413 and A-412) conducted search and destroy and linkup operation vicinity Cai Cai Village. There was no contact, however, two sampans, two houses and 32 bunkers were destroyed. Operation terminated 281500 Nov.

Lesson learned. Receding waters required that airboats be moved from Cai Cai to Moc Hoa area.

/s/ Frank J. Dallas
/t/ FRANK J. DALLAS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

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DETACHMENT A-414
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96215

23 November 1966

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SUBJECT: After Action Report for Operation of 22 November 1966 (U)

1. (C) Size and composition:

a. Three (3) PACV's, 24 CIDG, and two (2) LLDB advised by Capt Jencks and SSG Wofford; Capt Baughn accompanied as an observer.

b. Five (5) airboats accompanied by Capt Maracek, SP4 Gaede, and SP4 Thorpe.

c. Fifty-three (53) CIDG and two (2) LLDB advised by Capt Walton and SP4 Hamblin.

d. Three (3) Sea wolf UH-1B helicopters.

e. Three (3) UH-1B armed helicopters.

f. Two (2) US Army OLE's.

g. One (1) US Air Force OLE (FAC).

h. Six (6) UH-1D helicopters.

i. One (1) UH-1D helicopter Command and Control ship with Capt Hendrick and Capt Tai (LLDB).

2. (C) Mission of Operation:

a. To conduct a search and clear operation in Area I (see overlay), utilizing the combined forces of PACV, air boats, and helicopter borne CIDG forces.

b. If no contact was made in Area I to continue the operation into Area II (see overlay).

3. (C) Time of Departure and Return:

a. PACV'S departed Moc Hoa 0730.

b. Sea Wolf gunships departed Moc Hoa 0730.

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c. Command and Control ship departed Moc Hoa at 0735.

d. Air boats departed Moc Hoa at 0835.

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e. CIDG in UH-1D's left Moc Hoa at 0740, but four (4) of the UH-1D's later returned to Moc Hoa to remain on call. The two (2) ships in the air were intermittently rotated.

f. Lancer armed helicopters alternated intermittently with Sea Wold gunships.

g. PACV's closed Moc Hoa at 1245.

h. Air boats closed Moc Hoa at 1235.

i. Command and Control closed Moc Hoa at 1215.

j. CIDG in UH-1D's and all armed helicopters closed Moc Hoa at 1215.

4. (C) Conduct of Operation:

a. Routes: PACV's, air boats, and all aircraft moved to the operational area (see overlay) by direct azimuth.

b. Terrain: Terrain within the operational area was flooded, with intermittent areas of high ground which had emerged from the flood waters.

c. Obstacles: Air boats experienced difficulty in moving to the area; some areas were dry enough to prevent passage of air boats. These dry spots were by-passed.

d. Mines and Booby Traps:

(1) The cache site vic XS158938 was heavily booby-trapped.

(2) Although the area was known to be heavily booby-trapped, no others were discovered during the operation.

e. Air Boats:

(1) How Deployed: Air boats were given the mission of screening the north flank of the operation.

(2) Results: Air boats were able to engage 25 enemy sampans as the enemy attempted to leave the operational area.

(3) Problems encountered: N/A

f. Action Upon Encounter with Enemy Forces:

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(1) Sea Wolf 07 helicopter engaged the 25 sampans when the sampans fired on the helicopters vic XS163938, at 1005. At 1007 US Army armed helicopters arrived and took up the chase. They continued to give fire support until forced to leave station. Viet Cong continued to move northeast.

(2) At 1006, the PACV's began to move to contact area. At 1025, PACV's engaged the enemy and maintained contact until the order to cease fire was given. The PACV's pursued the enemy and their approach drove the enemy northward.

(3) At 1007, the air boats began to move to the area of contact. They were attempting to intercept the enemy from the north. However, they engaged him from the west flank at 1022. They maintained contact by fire until cease fire was given. Air boats received one casualty from grenade fragments at approximately 1027.

(4) Heliborne troops were called for at 1035, were airborne at 1038. They arrived at the area of contact (XS177948) at 1050. The CIDG moved approximately 200 meters northwest until told to regroup, fall back and prepare for extraction. They engaged the enemy by fire until ordered to cease fire.

(5) At 1100, Capt Tai (LLDB) indicated that the activity was approaching the Cambodian border and that the VC were in Cambodia. Cease fire was given, all elements were pulled back, and extraction began.

(6) By 1120 all elements had regrouped south of the area of final contact. At 1138, extraction was completed.

(7) Throughout the entire engagement, the VC continued to fire on the friendly elements.

5. (C) Enemy Information:

a. Location: Enemy fired on Sea Wolf helicopters from vic XS162938.

b. Strength: Approximately 75 persons in 25 sampans.

c. Composition: Main force.

d. Activity: Enemy was moving to the northeast in sampans when he was observed by the Sea Wolf helicopters. He fired on the helicopters and continued to move northeast, apparently seeking refuge in Cambodia.

e. Equipment:

(1) Twenty-five sampans.

(2) Two LMG's.

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- (3) Bolt action rifles as individual weapons.
- (4) Web gear with black leather pouches centered on rear of belt.

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f. Uniform:

- (1) Black pajamas
 - (2) Sun helmets with camouflage cover and camouflage net.
- Not all VC wore headgear.

6. (C) Results of Encounter with Enemy:

a. Friendly losses:

- (1) KIA: None
- (2) WIA: One (Mike Force), evacuated to Moc Hoa Province Hospital for treatment.
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) Equipment: None

b. Enemy losses:

- (1) KIA: 56 (US confirmed)
- (2) WIA: None
- (3) Captured: None
- (4) Equipment:
 - 1 - US carbine
 - 3 - Russian carbines
 - 2 - MAS 36's
 - 1 - US M-1 Garand
 - 1 - Chinese carbine
 - 1 - Rifle destroyed beyond recognition
 - 1 - 40 HP outboard engine (recaptured)
 - 20 - pounds of documents
 - 24 - Hand grenades

7. (C) Significant Activities:

- a. Propaganda analysis: N/A
- b. Hamlets encountered: N/A
- c. Change in tactics: None

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163 d. Suspected infiltration routes: The trail-canal-stream system vic XS174947 to XS180948 is probably used by VC in moving to and from Cambodia.

e. Miscellaneous:

(1) Preliminary examination of captured documents indicates that the VC unit which was engaged is the same unit which was engaged by Detachment A-414 on 14 November 1966.

(2) The 40HP outboard motor captured on 22 November has been identified by the province as the one lost to the VC by the CIDG during the operation conducted on 14 November 1966.

8. (C) Was the mission accomplished: Yes, the enemy was engaged and he was driven from the operational area, suffering heavy casualties.

9. (C) Conclusions and Recommendations: The PACV's are an excellent vehicle to support search and clear operations in flooded areas. It's troop carrying capacity should be increased.

/s/ Thomas G. Hendrick
/t/ THOMAS G. HENDRICK
Captain, Infantry
Commanding

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AIR BOAT PROGRAM

N.5

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

REGRADE UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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AIR BOAT PROGRAM

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1. **GENERAL:** During the rainy season of 1965, Special Forces cooperated with ACFIV in the development and testing of the prototype airboats. The airboats were found to be particularly effective when employed as an element of a coordinated offensive operation. The model submitted by the Hurricane Fiberglass Company, the **AIRCAT**, was selected for operational use. Certain modifications were necessary in order to meet military standards. A summary of these modifications was forwarded to the manufacturer and 54 airboats were ordered with modifications to fulfill operational requirements. Twenty of these airboats will start arriving in Vietnam by air transportation in the near future. The balance will be shipped by surface vessel soon thereafter. (A description of the AIRCAT with the requested modifications are contained in Annex 1).

2. **PURPOSE:** The purpose of this program is to:

- a. Plan for the receipt and subsequent deployment of all incoming airboats.
- b. Establish airboat maintenance procedures up to and including 5th echelon.
- c. Prescribe the organization for combat.
- d. Prescribe comparable missions for airboats and suggested tactics to accomplish those missions.
- f. Plan for the continued analysis of the airboats and the future requirements.

3. **RECEIPT AND DEPLOYMENT:** The Asst S-4, LSC Annex, Camp Goodman, in coordination with the ACFIV Airboat Action Officer, will monitor all incoming invoices and receipt for the airboats at their point of entry in the Saigon area. Delivery of the airboats will conform to the priorities established in Annex 2. The mode of transportation for delivery will depend on the availability of aircraft and the weight/configuration of the packing container.

4. **ORGANIZATION:** Platoons of six boats each will be formed with the personnel to man the boats being furnished out of CIDG strengths currently authorized to the using "A" Detachment. The formation of airboat companies is considered feasible since the boats will be maintained at the highest level commensurate with the capability of that unit to furnish rapid reaction to subordinate units. Generally, the maintaining unit will be at the "B" Detachment level, but in isolated cases control will remain with the "A" Detachment. An organization chart for the air boat platoon is contained in Annex 3.

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5. MISSIONS AND TACTICS: The missions and tactics for airboats, as determined by the ACTIV evaluation, are considered valid by this Headquarters, and are contained at Annex 3. Innovation is encouraged to augment the suggested missions and tactics.

6. TRAINING: A recommended training program for the airboat crew members is contained at Annex 5. This program of instruction considers only the minimum subject coverage. Depending on the state of training of the crew member, additional training may be needed in subjects more basic in nature. The suggested POI is conducted in three phases: Phase I, Individual Training (16 hours), Phase II, Unit Training (23 hours), and Phase III, Combat Operations (length of time to be determined by the chief instructor).

7. MAINTENANCE: The maintenance program to support the airboats as envisioned by the S-4 is at Annex 6. This program is based on the current deployment schedule, and the anticipated spare parts and maintenance personnel available. Additional implementing instructions will be disseminated as more information comes available.

8. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS:

a. The use of airboats in combat operations is a relatively new development. Commanders should be continuously alert to detect new techniques and tactics, and to suggest methods to improve efficiency in the use of airboats.

b. Since the employment of USASF in the Republic of Vietnam is not stabilized in location, and due to the long lead time required for the procurement of airboats, all planned deployment should contain a reference as to the practicality of using airboats in the proposed area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/S/JAMES ASENTE
/T/JAMES ASENTE
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION
"C"

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION:

CO, DET C-4	15
CO, DET C-3	10
CHIEF, ACTIV	2

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DESCRIPTION AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE HU ONE AIRCAT

1. Description:

Length	17 feet
Beam	7 feet 3 inches
Weight (approx)	1150 pounds
Hull Composition	5 layers molded fiberglass
Hull Shape	semi-catamaran, for; flat bottom, aft
Controls	twin rudder, stick
Motor	C-360 Lycoming, 130 HP
Speed carrying approximately 300 pounds	38 MPH
Maximum load at which airboat will plane	1000 pounds (5 soldiers)

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2. Required modifications for military employment in the RVN:

- a. Redesign the starter drive system and employ stronger materials.
- b. Redesign the electrical system using military grade electrical components that are installed in protective inclosures.
- c. Install an all-metal propeller to avoid dry rot conditions that occur in the Southeast Asian area.
- d. Install governing mechanism to prevent damage from excessive high speed during operator training. Governor should be capable of being removed.
- e. Cover gasoline tanks with fiberglass to prevent rupture from vibration and enable crew or passengers to sit on tank without causing damage.
- f. Install stainless steel exhaust manifolds with high durability, strength and maximum silencing capability.
- g. Install self-sealing gasoline tanks for protection against enemy small arms fire.

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Annex #1 to Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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h. Fill closed spaces below deck with styrofoam plastic and construct internal water-tight cells to prevent boat from sinking.

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i. Install operators seat that can be adjusted vertically a minimum of one foot.

j. Install hand throttles in lieu of foot throttles.

k. Install towing and mooring cleats as standard equipment.

l. Install a pintle mount in the bow section for the caliber .30 machinegun.

m. Install an aircraft-type floating compass to facilitate both navigation and tactical control.

n. Install radio mount for the A-/PRC-25 radio.

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PRIORITY FOR AIRBOAT DEPLOYMENT

<u>BOATS</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>CONTROL</u>	<u>DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS</u>
6	A-414 Moc Hoa	B-41	Airland-Moc Hoa (C-130) LST -Can Tho
6	A-415 Tuyen Nhon	B-41	Airland-Moc Hoa (C-130) LST -Can Tho
6	A-412 Cai Cai	A-412	Airland-An Long (C-130) LST -Can Tho
6	A-413 Binh Thanh Thon	B-41	Airland-Moc Hoa (C-130) LST -Can Tho
6	A-425 Thuong Thoi	A-425	Airland-An Long (C-130) LST -Can Tho
6	A-351 Duc Hue	B-35	Airland-Hiep Hoa (C-123)
6	A-352 Tra Cu	B-35	Airland-Hiep Hoa (C-123)
6	A-422 Vinh Gia	B-42	Airland-An Long (C-130) LST -Chau Doc
6	A-416 Kinh Quan II	B-41	Airland-Moc Hoa (C-130) LST -Can Tho

NOTE: The priority listing of assignment and control is not intended to take the operational control and command away from the appropriate commanders nor to stabilize the use of the airboats in the localities indicated. The assignment of boats to a detachment indicate from which detachment the platoon will be formed and gives the general area of operation. The control detachment indicates at what level the training assets and maintenance support will be located.

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Annex #2 to Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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1 Plat Ldr	MSG	01
* 1 Asst Plat Ldr	CPL lc	01
1 Aidman	CPL	02
**1 Mechanic	CPL	02
1 M-79 Gunner	PFC	03

1 Sqd Ldr	CPL lc	01
* 1 Asst Sqd Ldr	CPL	02
1 Machine Gun	CPL	04
1 Asst Gunner	PFC	02
1 M-79 Gunner	PFC	03

WEAPONS:

01 -- Carbine Cal .30 M-2
02 -- Carbine Cal .30 M-1
03 -- Grenade Launcher M-79
04 -- Machine Gun Cal .30 A-6

* Also Airboat Operator
** Also Gunner on Machinegun

Equipment authorizations in excess of the equipment authorized to the CIDG Rifle Squad (TOE 1-66, CIDG Guerrilla Company, Light, dated 20 April 1966).

Airboat	6
Radio AN/PRC-25 w/vehicular mount and AC type HT Headset	6
Launcher, Grenade M-79	3
Machinegun Cal .30 A-6 w/mount, pedestal M31C and bipod	6
Life Preserver	30

A Tool Set, 3d Echelon is authorized each control headquarters.

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Annex #3 to Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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PROPOSED MISSIONS AND TACTICS

1. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The load-carrying capability, maneuverability, ability to operate through aquatic grasses off established waterways, and speed of the airboats give important advantages over units moving on foot, in boats without motors, or in boats with conventional motors. 172

Airboats may be used for the following tasks, particularly in areas containing heavy aquatic grasses:

- (a) Patrolling flanks or the attacking units or patrolling in conjunction with blocking forces.
- (b) Pursuing, intercepting, and if necessary, destroying VC boats.
- (c) Providing flank security for conventional boat operations.
- (d) Positioning blocking forces.
- (e) Performing reconnaissance missions similar to vehicle-mounted scout platoons.
- (f) Aiding in displacing crew-served weapons.
- (g) Performing resupply and medical evacuation.
- (h) Transporting reserves.
- (i) Serving as a command utility vehicle.

Occasionally airboats may be used to move attacking troops. It is preferable that the assault element be debarked and deployed before approaching close to known enemy position. A more thorough search of the area is assured, and in the event of contact, friendly fire and maneuver will be faster and more effective.

While airboats make it much easier to move crew-served weapons and equipment of assault units through areas containing heavy aquatic grasses, commanders must avoid carrying more in the airboats than can be unpacked when the operations continue on foot. Transforming these combat boats into logistical or administrative vehicles, especially on open waterways, must be avoided.

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Annex #4 to Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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When a large conventional boat force moves, it adopts a normal march formation. Advance, flank, and rear guards are deployed in adjacent waterways or off of established waterways to the extent permitted by terrain. These security elements should be supplemented by foot elements as needed.

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2. RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS:

Reconnaissance patrols should use at least two boats to provide for mutual support. They can move by successive bounds, alternating bounds, or continuous movement. The tactics are similar to those of motorized patrols.

a. Successive Bounds:

Moving by successive bounds, the boats in the patrol keep their relative places in the column. The two leading boats work as a team in moving from one point to another along the stream. The fleet boat takes a concealed position and troops debark, if necessary, to cover the movement of the second boat to the next observation point. When it is determined that all is clear, the leader of the first airboat observe carefully, select their next stopping point, and move forward to that point. The process is repeated until the mission is accomplished. (The lead airboat and personnel may be rotated frequently). Other craft in the patrol move by bounds from one concealed position to another behind the first two airboats. Sight contact is maintained but boats avoid closing on the craft in front of them.

b. Alternate Bounds:

Moving by alternate bounds, the two leading airboats alternate as the land craft on each bound. This method is more rapid than successive bounds, but it does not allow man in the second airboat to observe carefully before they pass the halted land craft.

c. Continuous Movement:

In continuous movement, all boats move at moderate speed, maintaining security by careful observation. Leading boats stop to reconnoiter areas that require investigation. This is the fastest but least secure method of movement.

Security is maintained by continued observation and by frequent halts to observe the surrounding terrain. Men and weapons are debarked to observe and to furnish fire support if required. Some members of the patrol are designated to protect the airboats when the patrol debarks. Specific zones of responsibility for observation are assigned to men in the airboats. Visual contact is maintained among airboats.

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Each airboat (or each major element of larger patrols) should be provided with a radio, if possible.

It is desirable to distribute men, weapons, and equipment among the boats in such a way that the patrol will remain effective even if the airboat and its equipment is lost.

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One member of the patrol should be designated to observe and record the condition of the waterway and banks.

This techniques described above also apply to airboat elements performing march security (advance guard, flank guard, and rear guard) for a larger force.

3. AMBUSHES:

Airboats can be used in position an ambush force and to conduct rapid pursuit or withdrawal through areas containing heavy aquatic grasses. Airboat-transported forces are not limited to laying waterway ambushes; they can operate in any area accessible to water.

Stealth in movement to final position can be achieved by using paddles or poles to propel the boats instead of motors. Boats can drift to position with the current or tidal flow. Small ambush parties can be left behind when patrols stop and dismount to observe or reconnoiter. This technique is useful only if boat forces commonly operate with frequent halts and debarkations, and if the stay-behind ambush party is small in comparison to the total force.

Whether the ambush is laid to cover a road, trail, or waterway, the riflemen normally debark and take up concealed positions. Airboat crewman remain in or near their craft, which are carefully concealed. The ambush security team leader is made responsible for security of the airboats. Both crewmen are under his control during occupation of the ambush site.

Because several hours of waiting are usually required at the ambush site a change in level and direction of stream flow often occurs because of tidal action. The ambush commander must anticipate these changes and plan his ambush accordingly. Changes in the level of water because of tides may require relaying weapons in a waterway ambush. The direction of approach of enemy boats may be based on the direction of current flow. These factors must all be considered in choosing the location, timing, and method of ambush.

4. RAIDS:

Airboats may be used by raiding parties in the same way as they are used to support other offensive operations in areas containing

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heavy aquatic grasses. Airboats provide a means for rapid withdrawal after the raid.

ms Airboat-borne raiding parties may debark some distance from the objective in order to approach stealthily on foot. When the objective is close to shore, the assault force may use airboats to storm directly into the objective area. Amphibious assault tactics are used. The storming tactics should be used only when surprise can be achieved and when the waterway is large enough to permit some evasive action by the assaulting boats.

Artillery fires and smoke should be planned to cover withdrawal of the raiding force.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION

Airboats provide a relatively fast means of evacuating casualties from any form of operation (boat-borne, foot, etc). When evacuation by airboat is planned, air stations are located for convenient access from the waterway net. A landing site is prepared, if necessary, to facilitate prompt and gentle unloading of wounded persons from the airboats.

6. MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES

Airboats can assist in all forms of logistical movement, such as ammunition resupply, fuel transport, and other general supply and service functions particularly in areas containing heavy aquatic growth. Diverting them to this use of open water where conventional boats are more effective, must be avoided. Security personnel accompany the airboats as required. Boats are loaded carefully so that the operator's field of vision is not obscured.

Airboat forces may be used for water convoy protection, escorting other small craft or large barges, and for hauling freight. Such operations are usually limited to smaller waterways where Navy river escort groups cannot operate. Occasionally airboat escorts operate in conjunction with larger escort craft, usually in an advance party or in the scouting role.

Airboat units should not be routinely used for supply or escort missions; they should normally be engaged in combat operations. Combat operations may, however, include evacuation and combat resupply tasks for the airboats.

7. COMMAND VEHICLE

The load-carrying capability of the airboat may make it desirable, under some circumstances, for use as a command vehicle. There is, however, no electrical system for radio power.

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8. RUSES AND FEINTS:

Because of their distinctive noise and appearance, airboats can be used effectively to conduct demonstrations, feints, and ruses. The airboat force can be used to divert the attention of the enemy from other courses or areas.

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9. CONTROL OF WATERWAYS.

The speed of airboats allows them to overtake all river craft normally used in commerce or employed by the insurgents. Thus the airboats can perform well in policing the waterways and searching suspect craft as part of the resources control campaign. Airboats can cruise the waterways or tie up and await passing craft at critical points.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MOVES:

From time to time airboats may be used for routine administrative transportation tasks when other means are not available. Airboats must not be diverted from combat-support missions for administrative use.

11. AIRBOAT ENGINE PROPELLER NOISE.

The high level engine/propeller noise associated with airboats may be compensated for or minimized in several ways in order to achieve surprise over an enemy. The techniques of this are described below and may be used singly or in any combination to best accomplish the mission.

(a) Stealth in movement to an attack position can be achieved by infiltration as described under Ambushes, paragraph 3 above

(b) One or more airboats may maneuver freely without specific detection by operating under a noise cover staged by other airboats or overhead aircraft.

(c) The high speed and surface mobility of airboats may be exploited to compensate for the warning effect of their noise and subsequent lack of surprise. This may be accomplished by holding the airboats out of action temporarily to the rear of far flanks until enemy contact has been established by the assault troops. The airboats can then be committed into action by the force commander. Because of their superior mobility and high speed they can, without appreciable delay, quickly close the distance to join the operation and carry out their own specific mission.

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TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AIRBOAT PLATOON

177 1. Purpose and Scope: This training program is a guide for the preparation of training program and schedules, and for conducting individual and unit training of airboat platoons.

2. Methods of Instruction: Emphasis will be placed on practical work rather than theoretical instruction. Lectures and conferences will be used only when practical training is not feasible, and then only to bring out points to be demonstrated and applied. The hours of instruction prescribed herein are the minimum required. Individual and unit proficiency can be attained only by additional application of individual and crew training exercises. Every opportunity should be used to conduct concurrent training for all boat crew members not tactically engaged in the principal subject scheduled; for example, maintenance, weapons training, and other similar training.

3. Supervision and Retraining: Training deficiencies and areas requiring additional emphasis will be uncovered during the latter stages of the training and during operations. All commanders should be on the alert to determine those areas and conduct retraining as needed.

4. Program of Instruction:

a. Phase 1, Individual Training (16 hours)

<u>INSTRUCTION PRESENTED</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>SUBJECTS FOR INTEGRATION OR CONCURRENT TRAINING</u>
Orientation	1	Introduction to the course outline: advantages, capabilities, limitations, and role of Airboat Platoon: VC mining of waterways.	
Safety	1	Lecture and demonstration on the safety measures that must be observed. Include on/off landing procedures, seating, the use of life preservers, handling of weapons and points of danger on the boats.	

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Ames #5 to Inclusion #15 to Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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<u>INSTRUCTION PRESENTED</u>	<u>HOURS:</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EFFECTS FOR INTEGRATION OF CONCURRENT TRAINING</u>
Operator Maintenance	4	Before and after operator maintenance, weekly main- tenance, procedures, and boat recovery and hull repair.	178
Deep Water Tng	4	Starting and stopping. Maneuvering at all speeds starting with the low speeds.	After operation mainten- ance, familiarization rides, embarking and de- barking.
Shallow Water Tng	4	Demonstration of the capab- ilities, limitations and ex- planation of the correct procedures for obstacle crossing. Practical exercise to develop skill and confidence.	Maintenance, observation, dry firing, and stowage of equipment.
Commander's time	4	To be used at the discretion of the commander.	

b. Phase II, Unit Training (23 hours):

Formations	3	Arm and hand signals used: explanation, demonstration and practical exercise using the file, column, line and echelon formations.	Communications, maint- enance, observation, dry firing and airboat recovery.
Live Fire Exercises	2	Live fire of individual and crew-served weapons under varying conditions of boat speeds.	Care and cleaning of individual and crew- served weapons.
Scouting and Patrolling	4	Combat and reconnaissance patrolling to include con- duct of boats during on- shore search operations	Formations, communica- tions, reporting and navigation.
Security Opns	2	Principles and techniques employed by individual boats and platoons in sec- urity missions.	Route selection, fields of fire, communications. observation and reporting

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<u>INSTRUCTION PRESENTED</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>SUBJECTS FOR INTEGRATION OR CONCURRENT TRAINING</u>
179 Pursuit Ops	2	Conduct of the pursuit of personnel afoot and of sampans; actions taken on op-counter, fire control and search procedures.	Duties of Individual crewman.
Raid Ops	4	Explanation and practical exercise using the airboat to achieve surprise in the raid.	All previous subjects.
Transport Ops	1	Moving personnel and equipment; evacuation of casualties, crew served weapons and transport of reserves.	Loading and first aid.
Other Ops	1	Use of the airboat as a sleeper, in the ambush and other innovations.	All previous subjects.
Immediate Action Drills	4	Practice of the individual actions required under various conditions such as in an ambush or receiving sniper fire until these actions become second nature.	All previous subjects.

c. Phase III, Combat Operations:

The length of time for this phase of training will depend on when the chief instructor feels his class is properly prepared for full tactical use. This phase is conducted under the surveillance of Special Forces personnel. Live targets are selected so that the intensity of combat actions will increase with the skill of the crew.

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MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

1. Personnel: Four Philippine aircraft mechanics have been acquired by the EOCI to provide maintenance for the airboats. These personnel should perform 2nd and 3rd echelon maintenance on site or at their facility. Facilities should be located at the following locations with personnel as indicated:

Moc Hoa 2

Chan Doc 1

Heip Hoa 1

(There are presently three of these personnel at Can Tho and one at Can Ranh Bay receiving instructions aboard the maintenance ship Corpus Christi Bay).

2. Support: First echelon maintenance and some second echelon should be performed by the user in compliance with the manuals provided with the boats. The majority of second echelon maintenance and all third echelon should be performed by the tech reps only. All fourth and fifth echelon maintenance will be evacuated to the LSC at Nha Trang for further shipment to the Corpus Christi Bay located at Cam Ranh Bay. Cannibalization of any of the newly received boats or their provided spare parts is forbidden. Item for item replacement or major assembly changes only will be made in the field. Unserviceable assemblies will be returned to LSC Nha Trang when ever possible. Separate A Detachments will be satellited on the closest location for maintenance support.

3. Parts: Airboats should arrive with a manufacturer's prescribed load of parts. These parts should include replacement engine assemblies. Parts will be gathered at place of delivery and major assemblies returned to the respective C Detachment S-4. A listing of all parts received will be provided LSC so that a back up of all required items may be placed on requisition immediately. If parts are received in separate containers a break out will be made in accordance with boat densities by Corps area.

4. Alternate Plan: Tech reps remain at C Detachments and perform similar to a contact team. All parts and the mechanics provide necessary support on an "on call" basis to the detachments having boats within the Corps area.

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Annex #6 to Inclosure #15 to Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SF
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

AVGB-

18 November 1966

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SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

1. NAME AND TYPE OPERATION: (Task Force 777) Guerrilla Type warfare against VC base areas and routes of communication. This operation was later renamed Blackjack 21.


2. DATES OF OPERATION: Planning _____ 1-10 Sep 66
Preparation and _____ 10 Sep - 9 Oct 66
Pre-deployment training.
Execution _____ 9 Oct - 9 Nov 66

3. LOCATION: 24TH DTA. AO Bounded by YA715999 - 580700 - YA 999999 YA 999700.

4. CONTROL OR COMMANDING HQ: HQ 5th Special Forces Gp (Abn) 1st SF.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Captain James A. Fenlon, 091812, Infantry, Task Force Commander;

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:



Inclosure #16 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.

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7. SUPPORTING FORCES: No ground forces. Air Strike via USAF forward air controller. Reaction time 25 minutes, (IMMEDIATE). 95% Target coverage. Date of air strike 05 1630 Nov 66. 182

8. INTELLIGENCE: Agencies included Det C-2, 5th SFG, Pleiku; Combined Intelligence Center, Saigon; Det C-5, 5th SFGA, Ho Ngoc Toa; HQ, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. Sources were agent reports and after action reports from USSF "A" Detachments at Poley Kleng, Plei Djereng, and Duc Co. It was believed that the operational area contained numerous way stations, cache sites, base areas, and infiltration routes. (See Annex A, Intelligence Overlay).

a. NVA troops were encountered, though firm unit identification was not made. No documents were captured. It is believed that the NVA were members of the 630th NVA division. One prisoner claimed to be a member of an infiltration group but refused to give unit identification. Contacts were made with NVA units of platoon size. An infiltration route was discovered at YA 712853. Two well-used company sized bivouac sites were located within 800 meters of the trail at this location.

b. The terrain in the AO was mountainous, reaching heights of 1000 meters. Most vegetation was two canopy primary jungle. Vegetation on slopes tended to be thicker than on the ridgelines and valley floor. Secondary vegetation on the valley floor consisted of bamboo, black palm, and vines. Rice fields which were untended for two or more seasons were covered with dense vines. Movement was most difficult through these areas. Foot movement on the valley floor was not exceptionally difficult with the exception of untended rice fields. A company size unit could expect to average 1000-1300 meters per hour on the valley floor, but movement on ridge lines and cross compartments would be limited to 3-4 KM per day (Straight line distance). Observation was limited to 15-25 meters in jungle, with exception of river banks. Visibility up and down water-courses was good. Overgrowth on banks of streams and rivers were minimal. Trails east of Dak Hodrai River are old and apparently seldom used. Trails west of Dak Hodrai River are well used and capable of supporting carts. Weather was dry during period of operation. Rivers and streams were falling.

9. MISSION: To infiltrate into the area of operations and conduct border surveillance, interdiction of infiltration routes, and conduct guerrilla type operations against known VC installations. Infiltration, reconnaissance, operations, and exfiltration were to be executed clandestinely.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Organize a Task Force using CIDG resources from the Detachment C-2 reaction (Mike) Force. Conduct pre-mission training designed to familiarize the CIDG force with US tactics such as raids, ambushes, mining and sniping. Organize a modified U.S. Special Forces "A" detachment for the purpose of operating within enemy controlled areas for extended periods of time. Communications and resupply to be conducted in a clandestine manner. The infiltration was planned as a long range

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overland move over difficult terrain in order to introduce the task force into the Area of Operations without being detected. A series of temporary operating bases was to be established in order to receive resupply drops and provide a base from which the Recon Platoon was to operate in locating suitable targets. Duration of the operation was determined by degree of success achieved. The operation was intended as a pilot project to determine the feasibility of developing a UW force on a permanent basis for employment in all CTZ's. Emergency exfiltration, reinforcement, and medevac were not to be made available to the UW force.

11. EXECUTION: Plan was developed during the period 1 Sep to 10 Sep. On 10 Sep the USSF assigned to the task force assembled at Det C-2, Pleiku, and began preparing for the mission. The first five days were devoted to intelligence collection from available agencies, determination of logistical requirements, and reorganization of the CIDG company selected for the operation. The period 14 Sep to 10 Oct was devoted to training the CIDG troops, visual reconnaissance of the operational area, and integration of intelligence into the plan as it became available. Training actually conducted is listed in Annex D, Training Schedule. On 9 October the task force was airlifted to the Special Forces Camp at Plei Djereng, on the southeast corner of the operational area. For the next two days the Recon Platoon searched for a crossing site on the Ya Krong Bolah River. The river was unfordable west of vertical gridline YA 85. An intelligence buildup took place during the period 1-10 Oct indicating heavy infiltration into the southern portion of the AO by the 630th NVA Division. It was decided to infiltrate over a different route, and on 13 Oct 66 the Task Force was airlifted to Camp Polei Kleng in the northeast corner of the AO. Infiltration began at 1500 hours that day with the infiltration of the Recon Platoon. The main body infiltrated at 0400 hours the following day. For route see Annex B, Situation Map.

a. The infiltration phase lasted from 13 Oct to 25 Oct. On 20 Oct a five day resupply drop was received. On 25 and 26 Oct additional resupply drops were taken. Target recon was initiated on 26 Oct.

b. On 27 Oct one VMC was killed in an ambush set by the recon platoon. One US carbine was captured.

c. On 29 Oct another VMC was killed from ambush.

d. On 31 Oct another VMC was killed from ambush. One KAR 98 Mauser was captured.

e. On 1 November one VC was probably KIA by an M-18 (Claymore) booby trap left in position on the trail where contact was made the previous day. A recon patrol, investigating the detonation, found the booby trap had been tripped. A large pool of blood was found on the ground and blood was spattered on trees and bushes in the impact area of the Claymore.

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f. On 2, 3 and 4 November, target recon was performed east of the Dak Hodrai River with negative results.

g. At 050430 Nov the main body crossed the Dak Hodrai River to the west. Two squad size ambushes were positioned on a main, well-used trail 200 meters west of the river. The trail, capable of supporting small carts, runs generally northeast by southwest (see annex A, Intelligence Overlay). At 0820 hours, 5 November, three NVA were killed while moving Southwest on the trail. They were transporting 100 newly manufactured hand grenades packaged in tin boxes, which were captured and destroyed. All three NVA were pushing bicycles. The three bicycles were left on the trail and booby trapped with C-4 and claymore mines. At 1600 hours the same day a detonation was heard from the site of the booby trap. The detonation was not investigated.

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h. One squad of CIDG with one USASF remained at the site of the first ambush. The main body moved 800 meters southwest between the trail and the river. (See annex B, Situation Map), and established an area ambush at network of secondary trails. At 1330 hours one NVA wearing green fatigues, carrying an AK-47 assault rifle, was killed by this ambush. The NVA soldier was moving in a northeasterly direction when ambushed. He was leading additional NVA soldiers who escaped. The unit is estimated as squad size.

i. The stay-behind ambush was called forward at 1345 hours. They moved for 12 minutes following the route of the main body when they encountered an estimated 20 - 30 NVA moving from the northwest. The first two CIDG were killed by automatic weapons fire from NVA. The USASF and remaining CIDG were pinned down by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire. The NVA immediately began to flank the CIDG and continued to hold the friendly force for a period of 45 minutes. A light machinegun of the Czech BRNO or British Bren type, with a crew of three men, was located a distance of 10 meters from the USASF, SFC Head. SFC Head heard noises of digging and chopping all around him, and the NVA appeared to be signalling to one another using animal imitations. No voice commands were heard, however a whistle was heard once. SFC Head believes that additional enemy troops were moving into the area during the 45 minute period that he was pinned down.

j. A relief force consisting of the Recon Platoon and one rifle platoon was dispatched to relieve the pressure on the isolated element and extract them from the site of the engagement. The vegetation in this area was extremely thick, limiting visibility to 4 - 8 meters. SFC Head decided to attempt to break contact on his own. He threw three fragmentation grenades, one CN grenade, and fired several bursts from his M-16 at the LMG crew and made a run for the river to his left, a distance of about 150 meters. At this location he linked up with the Recon Platoon and returned with them to the main body. An immediate airstrike was called in on the enemy position. It was my opinion that we had made contact with an NVA/VC unit of at least company size, which was probing us with recon patrols to determine our exact location. Under the cover of the airstrike, which was highly accurate, the entire force began to recross the river.

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k. As the first elements crossed the river, SFC Hancock, the USASF medic assigned to the 1st Platoon, observed several NV's crossing the river 200 meters to the northwest. SFC Roderick and SFC Young moved up the river bank and engaged the NV's with their M-16's, killing five. SFC Roderick was using a telescopic sight with his weapon.

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l. The main body finished crossing the river at 1720 hours, 5 November. We moved 1200 meters to the southeast, dug in a tight perimeter and held this position until 0600 hours the next day, at which time we received our final resupply drop. A platoon size ambush returned to the river and waited for 48 hours with no results.

m. The task force was extracted on 09 November by helicopter. This terminated the operation.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses:

VMC/VC - KIA: 3
CIA: 0
WIA: 1 (probable)

NVA - KIA: 12
KBA: 20 - 30 (estimate)
CIA: 1 (Died in captivity)

Weapons captured:

US carbine (1)
KAR 98 Mauser (1)
A.K. -50 (1)
Hand grenade, offensive (100)

b. Friendly losses:

USAF - KIA: 0	CIDG - KIA: 2
WIA: 0	WIA: 1
MIA: 0	MIA: 0

Weapons lost:

US Carbine, M-1 (2)

c. Resupply drops:

Total drops attempted: 5
Total drops received: 5
Total bundles dropped: 88
Total bundles received: 86
% Recovery: 97.7%

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13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Resupply was accomplished using A-1-E aircraft. Supplies were packed in sandbags in man portable loads of 25 lbs. The sandbags were packed in standard napalm containers and were dropped using T-7-A cargo parachutes. Class I items were pre-packed by the US members of the task force prior to infiltration. Class II and V items were pre-stocked but not prepacked. A bundle code was designed for Class V items. All resupply drops were made at an altitude of 50 to 150 feet. Dummy passes were made elsewhere in the AO to deceive VC elements as to exact location and the nature of the mission. Aircraft were guided to the drop zone by voice command from the ground. A single flashlight was used to aid the aircraft in locating the drop zone;

a. The basic weapon carried by the CIDG was the US carbine. Mortars were not carried. Twenty-one M-16's were issued, replacing half the BAR's. Five M-60 machine guns were taken to replace the cal.30 LMG. Total of 20 M-79 40mm grenade launchers were taken. A basic issue of two fragmentation grenades was made to each individual. Forty-eight M-18 (Claymore) mines were taken. Sixteen CN grenades were carried.

b. Medevac by helicopter was not available. A surgeon and four USASF medics provided all medical support to the Task Force.

c. Primary means of communications within the Task Force was made by AN/PRC-25 and HT-1 radios. (See annex G, Communications).

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: The FAC which brought in our airstrike was guided into the target area by voice. Once the impact area was determined, the FAC controlled the airstrikes.

a. The carbine was ineffective and unsatisfactory. On two occasions NVA/VMC were wounded by carbine rounds but managed to escape from the vicinity of the ambush and had to be followed by US personnel who killed them with the M-16. One NVA had been shot twice in the stomach and once in the thigh, yet he managed to move into the jungle for a distance of 100 meters before he was caught. He was still moving when apprehended. Cannister ammunition for the M-79 was available in limited quantity. The 20 round magazine for the M-16 is unsatisfactory. The rate of fire of this weapon on full automatic is too fast for the standard magazines.

b. The telescopic sight (non-military type) for the M-16 was highly effective.

c. The M-18 (Claymore) was invaluable. If the Task Force had been able to launch a company-size ambush, the claymore would have been even more effective. (They were intended for this purpose).

d. Hasty river crossings were made using 120 foot lengths of nylon climbing rope. Since the Montagnards who comprised the CIDG force could not swim, and were burdened with 30 - 40 lbs rucksacks and weapons, the rope was highly effective in reducing equipment losses and minimizing time required to make a river crossing.

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187 e. US type Long Range Patrol rations should be procured and pre-stocked prior to infiltration. The indigenous ration is absolutely unsatisfactory for an extended operation of this type. An adequate diet is essential for the morale and nutrition of all personnel. A recommended five days ration is shown below:

FOR US Personnel

5 US type LRP rations
5 C-ration meals complete
5 extra coffee packets
5 extra cream packets
5 extra cocoa packets
5 extra sugar packets
Candy (hard or chocolate)
Cigarettes
10 heat tablets

FOR CIDG

8 indigenous LRP's
2 US C-rations
5 cans (meat or fish)
Candy
Cigarettes
10 heat tablets

The above items should be packed in a single sandbag for rapid dissemination to troops and rapid evacuation of the DZ area.

f. If no medevac is available, the morale of all troops is adversely affected, especially after the first casualties have been sustained and are seen by other troops. There is a definite decline in aggressiveness which could hamper the effectiveness of the unit, therefore medevac by helicopter should be provided. Medevac by helicopter need not necessarily compromise the UW force. The fact that some opposing force is present in the area is already known to the enemy as a result of the contact which caused the casualties. An effective cover can be established by performing low-level overflights prior to and during the operation on a random basis. In dense jungle it is difficult to determine exactly what an aircraft is doing due to the lack of visibility and muffling effect on all noises.

g. The organization of the UW force should be modified. The group which makes the initial penetration should consist of no more than 170 personnel. A recommended TO&E is enclosed as annex E.

h. Medical. See Annex H, Medical.

i. Communications. See Annex F, Signal.

j. Classes should be given to the US members of the operation by Air Force Forward Air Controllers on techniques of requesting and directing airstrikes. Instruction on capabilities, limitations, and requesting Arc Light Strikes should also be scheduled.

k. A good quality camera (s) such as a Petrie 7s or canon, with telescopic lens, should be provided. Penn EE is unsatisfactory.

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15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: The stay-time in the operational area was too short. In my opinion we only scratched the surface. This type operation has greater potential than the results indicate. The VC/NVA we encountered in the area were using trails for all their movements. Most of our kills resulted from ambushes which were emplaced on trail networks. Security practiced by the VC/NVA forces in the operational area was lax. They evidently felt quite safe.

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a. Clandestine resupply over an extended period of time is possible.

b. A successful infiltration overland can be made if trails are avoided and difficult terrain is selected for the route. I am convinced the enemy within the AO did not know we were present until we initiated our ambushes. Though we had killed three VMC prior to the action of 05 November, the troops we encountered on that day gave no indication of awareness that a sizable force was in the area.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Replace the US carbine with the M-16 rifle. I consider this essential.

b. Provide each platoon sized element with some type of silent weapon. When operating deep in enemy controlled territory, the noise of a fire fight compromises the location of the friendly forces. Couriers and other individuals moving along through the area could be dispatched without compromising the friendly unit's location and the ambush could be maintained for a longer period of time. I recommend a weapon similar to the AR-7, with silencer, (Air Force Survival Rifle) for the following reasons:

(1) It fires high velocity 5.56mm ammunition. A single hit with this type ammo increases probability of a first round kill, or at least should inflict a wound of sufficient severity to prevent the victim from escaping.

(2) The ammunition is identical for the M-16.

(3) The size and weight are suitable for use by Vietnamese, and US personnel. The weapon should be equipped with a telescopic sight.

c. A long range recon patrol (such as Delta, Sigma, Omega, Recondo) should perform a recon mission in the AO 20 - 30 days prior to infiltration. This would enable the UW force to base their planning on intelligence rather than information. In addition the more lucrative targets could be selected for attack and minimum amount of time would have to be spent conducting reconnaissance by the UW force, which may or may not produce results.

d. The CIDG should be subjected to psychological motivation indoctrination prior to infiltration which will prepare them mentally to remain in the operational area for a period in excess of 60 days.

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(1) Squad leaders (CIDG) should have special classes on troop leading, including simplified squad tactics. These classes should include practical exercises, initially with the only members participating being the squad leaders and assistant squad leaders. Offensive battle drill, employing basic fire and maneuver techniques should be given emphasis. Leadership position should be rotated among all participants during NCO training. Training should be based on simplicity and aggressiveness, and the majority should be parade ground type instruction, where the soldiers can see clearly what is taking place.

(2) To insure that simplicity is adhered to a single reaction or maneuver to a situation should be taught. A multitude of reactions and complicated maneuvers will only confuse the soldier and squad leader. It would be far better to have the second best maneuver constantly well executed than spend valuable time searching for the perfect solution to every situation. Simplicity, repetition, and comprehension are the keys to effective training of the CIDG at small unit tactics. Once squad leaders and assistant squad leaders have mastered the technique of fire and maneuver the entire squad should be trained, with organic leaders filling their usual positions and assisting in the instruction. A recommended weekly schedule is listed below.

(a) Squad formations - 1 hour blackboard illustrations, lecture.
1 hour practical work open terrain
1 hour practical work thickly vegetated terrain.

(b) Fire and Maneuver - 1 hour blackboard illustrations, lecture.
3 hours practical work, open terrain.
3 hours practical work thick vegetated terrain.

This instruction is not to be given once and forgotten about, it should be given every week that the unit is in garrison, until they can do it in their sleep.

e. A Starlight scope should be issued to each platoon.

f. One 30 round magazine for each M-16 should be issued. The ambush is the most successful tactic the UW force can employ. An increase of fire-power of 50% can be realized by adding 8-10 rounds to the magazine. In most cases the entire ambush could be executed without changing magazines. Twenty rounds just goes too fast.

g. M-79 ammunition should consist of 50% cannister and 50% HE. The nature of terrain and type operation dictates that close combat (10-20 meters) will be the rule rather than the exception. Anti-personnel rounds are essential for ambushes.

/s/ James A. Fenlon
/t/ JAMES A. FENLON
Captain, Infantry
Commanding

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5th SF Op (Abn)
Pha Trang, RVN
182045 Sep 66
VS 7

ANNEX A (Intel) to OPORD HOOKER II

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Reference: Map 1:250,000, ATTOPEU, LAOS, JOG (C) 1501 ND 48-8; LAOS, VIETNAM and CAMBODIA, Map series 47014, 1:50,000, map sheets 653711, 111, 65361, IV, 643711, 1, 64361.

1. (C) SUMMARY OF AREA SITUATION

a. Appendix 1, situation overlay.

b. NVA forces continue to infiltrate through the PLEI TRAP VALLEY from CAMBODIA into SOUTH VIET NAM over two known crossing points located at YA532634 and YA601813. These forces use way stations located in the vicinity of YA759594, YA902719 and YA933742. These way stations are used as rest areas, as a changing of guides location, and as a pick up point for small arms and ammunition. There is a large logistical area bounded by coordinates YA465615, YA492648, YA491612, and YA543700. Storage areas located in the vicinity of YA838576 and YA767514 receive their supplies from the large logistical area just discussed. The enemy is known to maintain one communication liaison station located in vicinity YA651636.

2. (C) SECOND ORDER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

a. ESI.

(1) What is the location, disposition, strength, armament and intentions of VC and NVA forces in Western KONUM PROVINCE?

(2) Where are the infiltration routes used by enemy forces and what are the capabilities of the routes?

(3) What is the organizational structure, capabilities, and vulnerabilities, future plans and personalities of the VC Political and Military Infrastructure?

(4) What means of transportation do the VC and NVA use for heavy weapons and equipment?

(5) Where are VC and NVA units possessing mortars and artillery located?

(6) What security procedures are used by the VC and NVA Forces during movement and rest periods?

Annex A, to Inclosure #16, for Quarterly Report Period ending 31 January 1967

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b. Other Intelligence Requirements:

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- (1) Will the enemy continue to use infiltration routes after interdiction begins and the routes are compromised?
 - (2) Will the enemy avoid contact?
 - (3) Will the enemy attempt to defend way stations, logistical areas, or villages?
 - (4) What are the enemy counterintelligence capabilities in the area of operations?
 - (5) What is the probable enemy counterintelligence reaction after friendly troops enter the operational area?

3. (C) ORDERS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

a. Orders to subordinate and attached units.

- (1) Detachment C-2, PLEIKU. (Report as obtained)
 - (a) Infiltration routes.
 - (b) Number, size, composition, time and direction of enemy activity observed in or near the area of operations.
 - (c) Location and size of fortified areas, and trench network to include foxholes and in positions.
- (2) 400th BRU:
All SPAR Reports from the area of operation.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent and cooperating units.

- (1) IFORCEV is requested to provide information as obtained, of--
 - (a) Photo coverage.
 - (b) Red Haze coverage.
 - (c) SLAR coverage.
 - (d) Interrogation reports.
 - (e) Translated captured documents.
- (2) JTiC is requested to provide information, as obtained, of--

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(a) All agent reports concerning border area activity.

(b) Counterintelligence capabilities of enemy forces.

4. (C) MISCELLANEOUS

a. Instructions for exfiltration of VIPs will be requested subsequent to capture.

b. All captured document and material will be reported to this headquarters for determination of release.

c. Detachment C-2, PLEIKU, will coordinate the request indicated in paragraph 3b and forward information obtained to this headquarters.

d. Maps will be provided by this headquarters upon receipt of request.

Acknowledge.

KELLY
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Appendixes: 1-- Situation Overlay

Distribution: Special

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PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION


<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
193 Medical Training	3	Basic first aid, life saving techniques, improvised litters, treatment of gunshot wounds, bandaging and splinting, malarial prophylaxis, MEDEVAC techniques.
Ambushes	16	Sqd/Plt organ for ambushes, preparation, site selection, demolition and booby trapping techniques, employment of M-18 (Claymore mine), sterilization of battlefield, fields of fire, practical exercise.
Raids	16	Orgn for raid, planning, rehearsal, use of mock-ups, occupation of mission support sites, target recon, security forces, routes of withdrawal, actions on the objective, practical exercise.
Reconnaissance Patrolling	8	River crossings, immediate action drills, formations, size of patrols, composition, combat intelligence collection, surveillance techniques, route selection, signs of enemy activity, rally points, practical exercise.
Land Navigation	8	Map and aerial photograph reading UTM grid system, intersection and resection, use of lensatic compass, night navigation techniques, practical exercise.
Airborne Operations	8	Marking LZ and DZ, security of DZ, recovery techniques, sterilization of LZ and DZ, selection of LZ and DZ, use of bundle code, practical exercise.
Communications	4	Functioning and capabilities of PRC/25 field expedient FM antennas, HT-1, trouble shooting, maintenance of PRC/25 and HT-1, use of Diana Crypto system, message writing, use of the trigraph, functioning of AN/PRC-64, antenna theory, site selection, practical exercise.
Range Firing	16	Zeroing weapons, night firing, immediate action, magazine changing drill, firing positions, range estimation, target detection.
Physical Training	16	Endurance runs, cross country, forced marches
Language Training	24	Vocabulary, often used phrases, practical work.
FTX	144	Tactical exercise, including infiltration, reconnaissance, combat operations, airborne resupply
TOTAL	265 hours	

Annex C to Inclosure #16 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.

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Recommended TO&E for a UW Force

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
USSF PERSONNEL

<u>RANK</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
CAPT	Commanding Officer
MSG E8	Opns Sgt
SFC E7	Platoon Leader
SFC E7	Platoon Leader
SFC E7	Platoon Leader
SFC E7	Platoon Leader (Recon)
SFC E7	Medical Specialist
SSG E6	Medical Specialist
SFC E7	Communications Specialist
SSG E6	Communications Specialist


Annex D to Inclosure #16, to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967

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Appendix 1 to Annex D to Incl #16 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967



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Appendix 2 to Annex D to Incl #16 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT REQUESTED</u>	<u>AMOUNT ISSUED</u>
US LRRP Ration	850 ea	None - 48 cases of C Rations substituted
Canned Mackerel/Sardines	15,000	None
Fuel, compressed, trioxane, ration heat	6,000 boxes	5,000
Compass, Lensatic	48	47
Indigenous Rucksack	120	120
Lightweight Ponchos	17	17
Knife, K-bar	8	AF Survival 7
Hatchet, lightweight	8	None
Canteen, plastic with cover	10	10
Poncho liner	10	10
AR belt w/harness	6	6
Belt, pistol w/harness	6	6
 <u>SIGNAL</u>		
AN/PRC-64	4	4
AN/PRC-25	2	2
HT-1	16 same freq	16
Wrist watch, man's	15	15
Flashlight	16	16
Camera, Penn ee	2	2
Camera, Minolta w/telephoto lens	2	none
Binoculars 7x35	4	4
BA-30	1200	1200
BA-386	40	48
HT-1 Antennae	15	none
URC-10	4	4
URC-10 batteries	4	4
 <u>ORD</u>		
Oil, small can, wpn lub	17	17
Brushes, cleaning	16	16
Rod, cleaning	15	0
Patches, cleaning	500	500
M-16 magazines	220	150

Annex E to Inclosure #16 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT REQUESTED</u>	<u>AMOUNT ISSUED</u>
ORD (continued)		
Small file, metal	1	none
Magazine, carbine	500	500
Magazine, BAR	100	10
Claymore, M-18	100	96
M-79 Launchers	6	6
Telescopic sight, M-16	4	4
Light, anti-tank wpn, (LAW) M-72	48	48
Cartridge, ball, carbine, cal .30	175,000	43,200
Cartridge, ball, M-1 cal.30 in ctns	14,000	14,000
Cartridge, ball, 4xl, 7.62 linked	8,000	6,000
Cartridge, ball, 5.56mm	18,000	18,000
Cartridge, tracer, carbine, cal.30	10,000	10,000
Cartridge, tracer, M-1 cal.30	3,000	3,000
Cartridge, tracer, 5.56mm	2,000	2,000
Projectile, grenade, 40mm, M-79 HE	4,800	4,104
Cartridge, crimped, 5.56 mm	100	none
Grenade, hand, frag, M-26	1,500	1,024
Grenade, hand, WP	100	384
Grenade, hand, smoke, yellow	100	32
Grenade, Hand, HC, white	100	none
Grenade, hand, CN, irritant	48	48
Grenade, rifle, WP	24	10
Flare, cluster, red, hand held	24	36
Flare, cluster, green, hand held	24	36
Flare, cluster, white, hand held	24	36
Flare, parachute, white, hand held	48	36

ENGINEER

Demo, block, C-4, 2½ lb	200	96
Prima Cord	2 rolls	2 rolls
Fuze, lighter, waterproof	100	None
Fuze, time, blasting	2 rolls	2 rolls
Cap, blasting, non-electric	100	100
Cap, blasting, electric	100	50
Crimpers	12 pr	4
Machine, blasting, 10 cap capacity	2 ea	None

ITEMAMOUNT REQUESTEDAMOUNT ISSUEDMEDICAL

200

Morphine	50 boxes	50 boxes
Albumin	30 cans	30 cans
Tetracycline	20 btls	5 btls
Penicillin (Bicillin)	8 boxes	8 boxes
Foot powder	10 boxes	10 boxes
Insect repellent	400 btls	400 btls
Nonavitamin	4 boxes	1 box
Dextro Amphetamin	34 btls	24 btls
Ophthalmic ointment		
a. Tetracain	2	none
b. Teramycin	3	none
Aspirin	3 btls	3 btls
Donatol	3 btls	3 btls
Instrument set, minor surgery	4 sets	2 sets
Bandages, absorbent, med	20	20
small	300	300
large	10	10
Suture, 00 black silk	30	30
Suture 000 black silk	30	30
Needles, suture, curved size 3	20	20
size 6	20	20
size 20	20	20
Tourniquets, non-pneumatic	4	4
Airways, adults	4	4
Syringe, disposable, 6cc	1 box	1 box
Cold tablets	30 btls	10 btls

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ITEMAMOUNT REQUESTEDAMOUNT ISSUEDMEDICAL (continued)

20/ Xylocaine, 1%	3 btls	3 btls
Needles, 18cc	1 box	1 box
Cepacol	5 boxes	1 box
Polymagna tab	10 btls	10 btls
Benzylkonium chloride in pkg of 3's	16 pks	16 pks
Iodine tablets	200 btls	200 btls
Leach repellent	200 btls	none
Bacitracit ointment	600 tu	none
Mycolog	10 tu	3 tu
Undelycenic acid	10 tu	10 tu
Pragnatar comp	2 jars	2 jars
Dapsone	9 btls	9 btls
Chloroquin Primaquin	1 btl	1 btl
Euganol	5 btls	5 btls
Cotton	1 box	1 box
Band aids, box of 100	20 boxes	20 boxes
Alcohol, quart cans	10 cans	10 cans
Prescription bottles, 2 oz, 72's	1 box	1 box
Surgical knife blades 15's	20 pks	20 pks
10's	20 pks	20 pks
Adhesive tape, rolls	20 rolls	20 rolls
Elastic bandages, 3"	5 boxes	5 boxes
Phisohex, plastic btl	17 btls	2 btls
Thorazine, injection	4 pks	4 pks
Petrolatum guaze	5 boxes	1 box
Water for injection	3 boxes	none

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ITEMAMOUNT REQUESTEDAMOUNT ISSUED

Firing wire, insulated (commo wire)	500 ft	500 ft
Tape, cloth, adhesive	2 rolls	none
Rope, climbing, nylon	4 ea 120 ft lengths	4
Suspension line	500 ft	500
Machete	50 ea	50
Scabbard, Machete	50	none
Luminous tape	1 roll	1 roll
Green tape	3 rolls	1 roll
Camouflage sticks	17 each	none
Entrenching tool	22 each	22 each
Snap links	26 each	26

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ANNEX F SIGNAL

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Communications between TF 777 and the base station operated by Det C-2 at Floiku, Vietnam were considered by the detachment to be reliable with a few problem areas. The primary means of communication was the AN/PRC 64, the mode CW. Base station used a T-368 and R-390. All communications equipment used was organic to the 5th SFG. Coordination between the detachment operators and the C-2 signal officer was made on 12 Sep 66. Concept of operation and logistics needs were discussed and arrangements made to augment the signal equipment of the 2nd Mike Force Company to provide the necessary signal support for the operation. In addition to organic equipment it was decided to provide 2 PRC/64, 2 PRC/25's, and to change the frequencies of the HT-1's to the II Corps AM emergency frequency. This gave the detachment 2 PRC/64 available for resupply purposes, 2 additional PRC/25's for internal US communications, and put all HT-1's on a II Corps frequency which is monitored by all "A" camps. The first contact after the departure of TF 777 was made on 13 Oct 66. In general communications were good. Exceptions to this are discussed below.

1. Concept of Operation. The signal concept of operation was to use the PRC/64 radio as the primary means of communication with the PRC/25 and HT-1's as internal communications. The PRC/25 would also double as the air/ground communications means. Emergency communications consisted of the URC-10 using the airground mayday frequency, 243 MC. SOI and frequencies for the operation were provided by Det C-2. Two blind transmissions to the detachment were scheduled daily, one at 1200 and a second at 1300 hours. The detachment would contact base as necessary. Later the 1200 BTB was changed to 0730 because during infiltration we were usually on the move. Internal communications consisted of 1 PRC-25 per platoon, 1 with the 2nd Co CO, 1 with the detachment CO and 1 with the recon platoon. This provided AM communications between all US elements for command and control and provided each element, when separated from the main body, a means of air/ground communications. Indigenous internal communications was provided by the HT-1's. HT-1's were organic to all squads of both 2nd Co and the recon platoon. The crypto-systems were in use by the detachment, primarily, the Diana Crypto System using one-time pads between the detachment and base. An alternate means utilized the C-2 Apache Code and also served the detachment's internal system. Signal resupply was prepacked and allowed for signal maintenance and a battery change for HT-1's and PRC/25's every five days.

2. Use of Frequencies: Utilizing the AN/PRC-64, 4 channels were available for the operation. Each channel used a different frequency. Only 2 of the assigned frequencies were of any use to the detachment: the primary channel 2 3540Kc and the alternate channel 3 5995Kc. Each of the channels was monitored by a II Corps "B" detachment with the exception of channel 2 which was monitored by C-2 and the "A" detachment located at Duc Co which was to operate as a relay station for TF 777. Channels 1 and 4 were unsuitable

Annex F, to Inclosure 16, to the Quarterly Operational Report period ending 31 January 1967.

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for communications because of frequency propagation and heavy QRM. Channel 3 was used only once. Although tried often we were unable to raise the "B" team assigned to monitor this channel. On channel 2, which is the C-2 Apache frequency and Group Guard frequency, heavy QRM was encountered in the form of SSB voice stations, RTT and, most of all a SOG admin net. During the period 13 Oct to 1 Nov numerous interference incidents occurred as a SOG station continued to transmit routine traffic after being informed we had priority traffic to send. This problem was resolved after C-2 coordinated with SOG.

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3. Antennas: Little difficulty was experienced by the detachment in the erection of antennas in the jungle or the selection of sites. In all cases, the antenna issued with the 64 was used and found to be highly reliable. Sites were not selected as such but the inner perimeter of the TF was used as a site in every instance. The average antenna height was 12 feet with the antenna oriented in the general direction of the base station. Antenna length used was that recommended by the manufacturer. Transmissions made from the reverse slopes of high mountains, deep gulleys and large valleys were in all cases successful. Antennas were erected by placing the center of the antenna as high as possible above ground. This was accomplished by tying a string to the corba head and throwing it up into a tree, then pulling the corba head up to this height. The ends were then run out to the recommended length for the frequency in use.

4. Transmission Time: The detachment spent too much time in the transmission of messages to base station. Average time on the air was 35 minutes. This was due to lengthy messages, poor frequencies and operation training. Although in this case, it is felt, Radio Direction Finding Equipment was not used against us. Transmission time must be kept to a minimum. Messages over 30 minute groups were in most cases sent at least twice, due to the heavy traffic on channel 2 and the low power of the PRC-64. Receiving operators, in many cases, gave the detachment readabilities of 1 and 2 and then were unable to copy the message without repeats. However, the detachment operator, thinking his signal was very weak, would send all groups twice, doubling his time on the air. During the early stages of the operation, many messages were intercepted by SOG station and "C" detachment subordinate stations breaking in during the transmission of detachment messages. This was rectified only after requesting the "C" detachment to take the necessary action to put a stop to these violations.

5. Equipment: Four (4) different pieces of signal equipment were used during the operation.

a. HT-1's: The HT-1 radio was used during ambushes and short recon patrols. The sets were operated by indigenous operators. Communications were excellent for distances up to 1 Km. Towards the end of the operations, maintenance problems were encountered in the form of corroded antenna terminals and loose antenna connections.

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b. AN/PRC's: These were used primarily by US personnel and provided excellent communications throughout the operation. Maintenance problems were encountered because of moisture in the handsets due to continual exposure to rain during movement and the number of river crossings made by the detachment.

c. PRC/64: The AN/PRC/64 proved itself to be a highly reliable and efficient radio, well suited for this type operation. The only difficulty encountered was found to be in the batteries brought in on the resupply. The container in which the batteries were placed landed in the river and, although they had a waterproof cover, became wet. This occurred twice and in both cases the batteries lasted approximately 2 hours of receiving and less than 15 minutes of transmitting.

d. URC-10: The URC-10 was not in use enough to determine its capabilities or limitations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Concept of Operations: None.

2. Use of Frequencies: At least 2 workable frequencies should be available between the detachment and the base station. Both frequencies must be as clear as possible and one should be propagated for day use and one for night use. The additional channels available should have two more workable frequencies for day and night which would be monitored by a relay station set up as close to the operational area as possible. It is also recommended that the AN/PRC-74 be made available as an additional communications means. The PRC-74 would provide a large selection of frequencies and a greater signal output, however, it should be used only in emergencies or if communications cannot be made with the AN/PRC-64. Both the wet-cell and dry-cell power supplies should accompany the set. Each striker can carry 2 BA-30's for the dry-cell power supply. Much coordination will be necessary if frequencies must be used that are partly in use by other units. This coordination has to be made prior to infiltration to provide reliable communications.

3. Antennas: None.

4. Transmission Times: A simple format for sitreps, intell reports and resupply requests and confirmations would reduce message length considerably. Well trained receiving operators and accurate readabilities will also reduce detachment transmitting time.

5. Equipment:

a. HF-1's: Careful maintenance checks daily made by operators and supervised by detachment commo personnel will reduce problems. A careful cleaning of the antenna and connections will take care of 90% of the HF-1 problems.

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b. PRC-25: Strikers carrying the PRC-25 should be made to protect the handset from moisture and to keep it covered during river crossing operations. A check should be made of the moisture covers on the transmitters and, if needed, they must be replaced. 216

c. PRC-64: Batteries for the PRC-64 should be packed carefully for resupply in order to prevent water damage.


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AVGB-C

19 September 1966

SUBJECT: OPLAN HOOKER II. Proposed Concept for Employment of Guerrilla Forces in Southwest Kontum Province (S)

208

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO US Forces 96243

1. (S) Reference, Ltr 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Subject: Proposed Concept of Employment of CIDG Forces in Southwest Kontum Province, dated 5 September 1966.

2. (S) The guerrilla force deployed in accordance with this OPLAN will conduct guerrilla type operations for a period of approximately thirty (30) days. At the end of that time the force will be withdrawn, by foot, and an analysis will be conducted to determine:

a. If a requirement exists to conduct sustained operations within the area.

b. The feasibility of establishing a CIDG camp.

c. Forces required to conduct continuous guerrilla type operations.

d. The possibility of employment of FVMAF in the area.

Detailed planning for implementation of this plan continues.

4. (S) COORDINATION:

I FFV concur _____: nonconcur _____.

FRANCIS J. KELLY
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

1 Incl
as

Annex G, to Inclosure #16 for Quarterly Report Period ending 31 January 1967.

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5th SFGA
Nha Trang, Vietnam
19 September 1966
VS 7

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OPLAN HOOKER II (BLACKJACK 31)

Reference: Map, ND 48-3, 1:250,000, Attapeu, Laos
ND 48-12, 1:250,000, Virachey, Cambodia

Task Organization:

TASK FORCE 777

- 1 USASF "A" Detachment (16)
- 1 Combat Reconnaissance Platoon (34)
- 1 Mike Force Company (150)

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: Annex A. Intelligence.
- b. Friendly Forces: TBA.
- c. Assumptions:

(1) NVA will continue to infiltrate combat forces from Laos and Cambodia through the southeast area of Kontum Province.

(2) A mobile Guerrilla type force can operate more effectively in the area of operation than could a CIDG Force operating from a stationary, isolated, camp.

2. MISSION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) conducts guerrilla operations in southwest Kontum Province with the infiltration of Task Force 777 at H Hour, I-Day, into the area of operation to conduct border surveillance, interdiction of infiltration routes, and conduct operations against known Viet Cong installations.

3. EXECUTION:

- a. Concept of Operation: Annex B. Operational Area.

(1) Maneuver: This operation will commence on H-Hour, I-Day with the land infiltration of the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon from vicinity of Plei Djerang is a pre-selected Patrol Base in the area of operation. The Combat Reconnaissance Platoon enroute to the patrol base provides route reconnaissance, collects intelligence information and establishes the initial supply point. On order the guerrilla company will be infiltrated

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OPLAN HOOKER II

into the area of operation to perform guerrilla operations.

(2) Tactical Air Support: There will be no preplanned Tac air. Tac air support will be provided on request of the "A" Detachment personnel to Detachment C-2 in Pleiku. 70

b. USASF "A" Detachment: Provided command and control for the task force.

c. Combat Reconnaissance Platoon: Following infiltration into the area of operation perform area reconnaissance to determine Viet Cong infiltration routes and fix locations of Viet Cong points and installations.

d. Mike Force Company: On order, task force commander, infiltrate into the Area of Operation, perform guerrilla type operations against Viet Cong infiltration routes, units and installations.

e. Arty: Annex C, Fire Support: Omitted.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Task organization effective on order.

(2) This plan eff for planning on receipt and for execution on order.

(3) H-Hour, I-Day to be announced.

(4) This combat operation will terminate on order of the CO, 5th SFGA.

(5) DZs will be preselected and confirmed after infiltration.

(6) Border restrictions apply.

(7) CO, Det C-2 provides liaison personnel, as necessary, to coordinate FVMAF operations in or around the area of operation.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Material and Services: Annex D, Bundle Code.

(1) General - All resupply will be air dropped from pre-rigged bundles which will be pre-positioned at Det C-2 site in Pleiku.

(2) Class I:

(a) Pre-rigged Class I supplies will be further broken down into non-portable loads.

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OPLAN HOOKER II

2// (b) Included is Class I bundles will be signal and medical items which are required on a daily basis (mosquito repellent and batteries).

(c) Indigenous rations (5 types) will be utilized for this operation.

(d) First five days requirement of supplies will accompany personnel into the operational area.

(3) Class II and IV:

(a) Initial issue of individual clothing 1-2 days.

(b) Replacement of individual clothing 1-15 - 1-20. Individual clothing stocks pre-rigged and will be dropped with Class I when called for.

(c) Emergency stocks of medical, signal and engineer items will be pre-rigged and available on call.

(4) Class III N/A.

(5) Class V.

(a) Basic load to be carried by unit when deployed.

(b) Follow up supply will be available on an on call basis.

(c) Rigged loads further broken down to man portable loads.

(d) A proportionate stockage of loaded replacement magazines for M-16, carbine, and BAR will be packed with Class V loads.

b. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization.

(1) There will be no helicopter medical evacuation from the operational area.

(2) Task Force commander will establish a clandestine medical facility within the operational area.

(3) CIDG camp at Plei Djerong will provide a hard medical facility and will be prepared to treat patients as they are exfiltrated from the operational area.

c. Personnel:

(1) Personnel records will be revised and updated prior to departure of USASF personnel.

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OPLAN HOOKER II

(2) Casualty reporting: Group SOP.

(3) Personal mail will be held at Det C-2 until completion of the operation. 242

d. Civil Affairs: Omitted.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Annex E (Signal) to OPLAN HOOKER II. SOI, Index, in effect.

b. Command of forces on operation HOOKER II remains with CO, 5th SFGA.

c. Operational control of the task force, Commander, Det C-2.

d. Command of task force. "A" Detachment Commander.

Acknowledge.

KELLY
Col

5 Annexes: A - Intelligence

3
;

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - MACJ3

1 - SFCB

1 - C-2

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Annex H (U.S. Personnel) to A. A. R., TF 777

2/3

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
FENLON, James A.	091821	CPT	Task Force Commander
GOLF, Henry G	093040	CPT	Executive Officer
HOUSE, Homer G	05232576	CPT	Surgeon
JENKINS, Gilbert K	05325279	1LT	Recon Plt Ldr
WEAKLY, David	RA 13307958	SGM	Ops/Intell Sgt
NORRIS, Richard T	RA 16451758	SFC	Company Commander
RODERICK, William	RA 19521239	SFC	Plt Ldr
SMITH, Wayne L.	RA 11142327	SFC	Plt Ldr
HEAD, Robert F.	RA 16476827	SFC	Plt Ldr
HANCOCK, Ben W. RA	16447756	SFC	Plt Medic
PROSSER, John M.	RA 15263005	SFC	Plt Medic
COLE, George D.	RA 19815792	SGT	Plt Medic
YOUNG, Alvin H.	RA 14492098	SFC	Recon Plt Medic
RIGLEY, Harold J.	RA 15279730	SFC	Radio Operator
DOGS, William D.	RA 11193268	SFC	Radio Operator

Annex H, to Inclosure 16, to Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967.

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OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT A-219
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96240

27 January 1967

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SUBJECT: (S) After Action Report - Operation Blackjack 22,
10 December 1966 - 12 January 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
1st Special Forces
APO 96240

1. (S) SIZE AND COMPOSITION:

- a. (1) 173 CIDG
- (2) 6 Interpreters
- (3) 12 USASF

b. The company was organized into four 42 man platoons and one 11 man company headquarters. Each platoon had three 9 man rifle squads, one 9 man weapons squad, and a 6 man platoon headquarters. Each platoon was armed with one M-60 machine gun, four M-79 grenade launchers, 36 XM-16E1 rifles, with 16 magazines each, and one British sten with silencer. Each man carried two M-26 fragmentation grenades and each platoon had six M-18 claymore mines.

2. (S) MISSION:

- a. Conduct guerrilla operations.
- b. Interdict infiltration routes.
- c. Conduct operations against Viet Cong installations.
- d. Develop targets to be attacked by air and conventional forces.
- e. Establish, if the potential exists, a local guerrilla force for the eventual control of the area.

3. (S) TIME OF DEPARTURE/TIME OF RETURN:

- a. Mobile Guerrilla Force 768 started departing Pleiku airfield by CV-2 at 0815 hours, 10 December 1966. The entire element had closed

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into An Lac Special Forces Camp at 1500 hours, 10 December. The Company convoyed approximately 12 kilometers east of An Lac and started ground infiltration at 1630 hours, 10 December. The G.W.O.A. was reached 18 December.

b. The company was extracted from G.W.O.A. by helicopter 12 January 1967 and closed in Pleiku Mike Force 122200 January.

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4. (S) CONDUCT OF PATROL:

- a. Patrol route: See ANNEX A (Map).
- b. Terrain: See ANNEX B (Intelligence).
- c. Actions on encounters with enemy forces:

(1) At 240900 December 1966, the Recon Platoon captured two Montagnards who were moving on a trail at coord BP293705. After interrogation these men led the patrol to a village which was still occupied by the elders. This is the only village encountered that had any inhabitants. The majority of the villages had been vacated approximately 24 hours prior to the patrol entering. The prisoners further led the patrol to two other villages with negative results. The prisoners were shot while trying to escape at 0130 January 1967.

(2) On 29 December 1966 the patrol crossed the EA KRONG BOUNG River at coord BP352729. One platoon was sent south for reconnaissance. They killed one VMC and one VC at coord BP352727, and captured two Springfield rifles. This action took place in a platoon size way station which was destroyed.

(3) On 30 December 1966 a platoon size way station was destroyed. This way station had two very elaborate schools and a very good training area.

(4) On 31 December 1966 the reconnaissance platoon found some documents in a house at coord BP364749. This was a complete documentation of the entire Buon Me Ca area, listing every man, woman and child, their ages, those identified as guerrillas, etc.

(5) On 2 January 1967, destroyed platoon size way station.

(6) On 7 January 1967, reconnaissance platoon was fired on by approximately two VC squads at coord BP377805. They were on the south side of a stream that was very wide, deep and swift. The VC were on the north side and after a few minutes of firing broke contact. The reconnaissance platoon was unable to cross the river and pursue, however, it is believed that at least one VC was killed or wounded. The following day, 8 January 1967, the patrol was able to cross the river. They found a grave in the vicinity of the fire fight containing the body of a VC that had been shot in the chest.

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(7) On 8 January 1967 destroyed company size way station. The station was very elaborate, with excellent messing facilities and new training buildings (estimated two weeks old).

(8) On 8 January 1967 one platoon reconnoitering to the north drew fire from two VC squads at coord BP365822. The VC broke contact and fled to the west. Estimate several VC wounded. The platoon pursued them with negative results.

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(9) On 9 January 1967 platoon moved out about two hours before the rest of the company at coord BP365822. They found a main east-west trail at coord BP355834. Small reconnaissance parties were sent to the north, south and east. The party to the east found a platoon size way station at coord 377842. The party to the west found a company size way station at coord 353836. When the company caught up with the platoon reconnoitering, a decision was made to send platoon size reconnaissance elements in the same direction as the previous smaller parties, however, only for a maximum distance of three kilometers. One platoon established a patrol base at coord 355834 with instructions to remain at that location until the reconnaissance parties returned. At approximately 1630 hours when one platoon was returning and about six men had entered the perimeter the patrol base was attacked by approximately 40 to 50 VC. They were armed predominantly with AK-47's and several French M-1929 BAR's. They had fire superiority for about 10 minutes after which a very large volume of fire was returned enabling friendly forces to maneuver. The VC broke contact after about 15 more minutes of fighting. During the fire fight CPT Robert Orms was shot in the hand and a few minutes after he was wounded in the arm and face by a hand grenade. SGT Jackie L. Waymire was seriously wounded in the head. Two CIDG were wounded in the leg. Eleven VC were KIA and it is believed by the USASF that they were NVA although dressed in black pajamas. Radio contact was made with Ban Me Thuot during the fire fight. A FAC and medevac were requested. The FAC was never received. One platoon was sent to secure an LZ for the medevac. It took approximately one hour and 30 minutes to move the wounded to LZ at coord BP342823. The medevac arrived at the LZ about 1730 hours. It landed to conserve fuel. The chopper was fired on by automatic weapons fire. The medevac was accompanied by a gun ship and the USASF men on the ground directed fire and was successful in stopping the enemy fire. The gun ship had to depart the area about 1820 hours due to fuel shortage. After the gun ship departed the medevac chopper again was fired upon by semi-automatic weapons. The platoon that was securing the LZ was able to stop the firing. The four wounded were evacuated at 1845 hours.

(10) On 10 January 1967 requested a FAC to bring in an air strike on main way station at coord BP355836 and on ridge line at coord BP365822. The first sortie came in at approximately 0900 hours and dropped napalm and CBU on the village. Assessment: Way station, 17 buildings and training area were destroyed. Second sortie dropped CBU on ridge line. No assessment was made due to the patrol's movement north to receive a resupply drop.

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(11) On 11 January 1967 ambushed 12 VC who were attempting to destroy a bridge across river at coord BP339827. There were no friendly casualties. Four VC wearing black pajamas were KIA. One VC wore an American type cargo pack and pistol belt and carried a ten transistor radio locked on 12 megacycles. a document and maps. See ANNEX 2 (Intelligence).

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(12) On 12 January 1967 the B Detachment Commander from Ban Me Thuot came in by FAC to location at coord BP338828. The situation was explained to him. He was informed that the patrol had some kind of contact for the last six days. That the documents captured on 11 January 1967 revealed that the VC was under assumption that exfiltration would be made from the Boun Me Ga airstrip (coord BP302832) and that major forces were massing in that vicinity. Further, that the 301st and 308th Battalions were located in Boun Me Ghang coord BP335815. Their plan was for the main unit at Boun Me Ga to attack when the choppers came in to exfiltrate and if withdrawal to the south was necessary the 301st and 308th would act as blocking forces. If exfiltration was not made from the Boun Me Ga airstrip and patrolling to the south was continued the 301st and 308th had orders to attack. There was only one way across the Ea Krong Boun River. The B Detachment Commander was further advised the patrol was located on what was believed to be a main east-west infiltration route. There were two courses of action available: To recross the river to the east and attempt to reach the mountains to the north or to get re-enforcements and attack the enemy locations. The B Detachment Commander stated that he would return to his home base and inform higher headquarters of the situation. At 1300 hours received word from him to move to the east side of the river. At 1500 hours there was still one element to move across the river and word was received from one of the FAC's in the area that extraction of the patrol would be made. From 1500 until 1815 hours, six sorties of A1E's made air strikes from coord BP302832 to coord BP335815. Four secondary explosions were heard and counted during these strikes. Also, the FAC's reported uncovering three different large new ambush sites located along a trail at coord BP322823. After the first two sorties were brought in, the FAC's started receiving ground fire at coord BP335815. The extraction began at approximately 1745 hours. The last choppers leaving the LZ were being fired on from the old patrol base at coord BP338828. Also one A1E had caught 26 men trying to cross the river at coord BP338823. He fired 20mm and reported success.

(13) At 122200 January 1967 all CIDG and Americans closed into the Mike Force compound.

5. (S) ENEMY INFORMATION:

- a. Location: See ANNEX 1 (Map).
- b. Strength: See ANNEX 1 (Map) and ANNEX 2 (Intelligence).
- c. Composition: See ANNEX 2 (Intelligence).

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d. Activity:

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- (1) Area appeared to be a safe haven for VC units.
- (2) It appeared that VC had moved large units into the area to attack Blackjack 22.

e. Equipment:

- (1) American type packs, pistol belts, French and American type canteens.
- (2) AK-47's, French BAR M-1929, mausers.
- (3) Ten transistor radios.

f. Uniforms: Black pajamas.

6. (S) RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY:

a. Friendly losses:

- (1) KIA: 1 USASF - SGT Jackie L. Waymire
- (2) WIA: 1 USASF, 2 CIDG evacuated to 18th Field Surgical Hospital. CPT Robert Orms has been further evacuated to Japan.
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) Equipment: None

b. Enemy losses:

- (1) KIA: 17 VC, 3 VMC
- (2) WIA: 6 VC. No WIA's were recovered. This report is based on blood tracks after contact had been made.
- (3) Captured: 2 VMC. See ANNEX 2 (Intelligence) as pertains to interrogation. VMC PW's shot while attempting to escape.
- (4) Equipment:
 - (a) Houses - 118
 - (b) Rice - 51,700 lbs.
 - (c) Beans - 1,000 kilos
 - (d) Training areas - 8

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- (e) Pigs - 500
- (f) Black material - 1 bolt
- (g) Potatoes - 5,000 lbs.
- (h) Chickens - 100
- (i) Sub stations - 4
- (j) Main way stations - 2
- (k) Black pajamas - 50 pair
- (l) Corn - 2 acres
- (m) Salt - 200 pounds
- (n) Wood bridge crossing main infiltration route - 1

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7. (S) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. Propaganda analysis: Documents captured on 31 December 1966 and 11 January 1967 were turned over to HQ I FFORCEV. See ANNEX 2 (Intelligence) for details.

b. Hamlets encountered: All villages in area were considered enemy and were destroyed.

c. Change in tactics: None

d. Suspected infiltration routes: See ANNEX 1 (Map).

e. Miscellaneous: Many rice caches were destroyed in Boun Me Ga Valley. Contents listed under enemy losses.

8. (S) WAS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED:

It is felt that all parts of the mission were very well accomplished with the exception of the recruiting possibility. There was a potential in the valley, however, the VC have had very tight control over the population for the last five years and it would have been a very lengthy process. We were never approached by friendly natives.

9. (S) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conclusions:

- (1) Damage inflicted and information gained was worth the effort.

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(2) The clandestine movement is compromised after the first enemy contact.

271 (3) Once contact is made the enemy and friendly courses of action dictate the direction of the operation.

(4) These operations deny the enemy's unobstructed use of base areas or safe havens.

b. Recommendations: This type operation should be planned for 30 days (open end).

/s/Gilbert K. Jenkins
/t/GILBERT K. JENKINS
1LT, Infantry
Commanding

4. ANNEXES:

- 1 - Map
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Medical
- 4 - Communications
- 5 - TOE - GF 768.

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ANNEX 2 (S) (Intelligence) to After Action Report - Operation Blackjack 22 (S)

1. (S) Intelligence: Agencies included Company B, 5th SFGA at Fleiku; combined Intelligence Center, Saigon; Det B-23, Ban Me Thuot; 24th ARVN Div, Ban Me Thuot; and HQ, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. Sources were agent reports and after action reports from USSF "A" detachments at An Lac, Lac Thien and close out reports on Buon Me Ga Camp. It was believed that the operational area contained a main infiltration route running from the north to the coast, numerous way stations, cache sites, base areas and rice storage areas. 227

a. NVA troops were encountered. No firm unit identification was made. Thought to be cadre for the local VC forces.

b. The following documents were captured and turned in through S2, 5th SFGA, G2, to G2 I FFORCEV:

(1) A complete list of personnel living in Buon Me Ga Valley and equipment list.

(2) Day by day diary on Blackjack 22.

(3) Two maps of the Ban Me Thuot area north and east with 24 enemy locations marked on them.

(4) Operations plan for use of the 301st and 308th VC Bn's against Blackjack 22.

(5) Miscellaneous documents, training plan for local VC force.

c. Two VNO prisoners were taken at coord BP294694 on 240745 December 1966. They led the patrol to local villages and two way stations in addition they provided some information on personnel in the valley. These PW's were killed trying to escape on 040130 January 1967.

d. Mines and booby traps: No mines were found, booby traps were found on all trails and river crossings in the form of punji stakes and punji traps. Stream beds were lined with punji stakes at all crossings. All villages had punji traps and punji fences around them, some being only a day or two old.

2. Enemy Information: See ANNEX 1 (Map).

3. Terrain: The terrain in the GWOA was mountainous reaching heights of 2400 meters. Most vegetation was two to three canopy primary jungle. Vegetation on slopes was thicker than on the ridge lines and valley floor. Secondary vegetation on the valley floor consisted of bamboo, saw grass and vines. Rice fields were predominant throughout the valley floor. Corn and manioc was also being grown throughout the area.

4. (S) Obstacles: The main obstacles in the GWOA were the rivers and streams because of the heavy rain fall throughout the time of the operation. All rivers and streams were well out of their banks and unpassable. Most of the trails were well used and passable until you got to the river crossings. Movement on the ridge lines and cross compartments were limited to 2.9 km per day. On the valley floor a company could make from 500 to 1000 meters per hour not using trails. Observation was limited to 10 to 15 meters in the valley because of the heavy overgrowth.

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1. PROBLEM AREAS:

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a. Coughing caused by active tuberculosis, heavy smoking, and primarily URI due to weather conditions (i.e., rain and chilly nights).

b. Illnesses:

(1) Malaria was not a problem. Only two cases were noted during the first week and these were very mild. Troops were taking dapson and chloroquine tablets.

(2) Beri-beri - 4 cases.

(3) Pneumonia - 6 cases.

(4) Peptic Ulcer - 1 case.

(5) Secondary infections were numerous due to insect bites, leeches, and undergrowth.

c. Surgical conditions:

(1) Inguinal hernia - 1

(2) Punji wounds - 26

(3) Gun shot wounds - 4

(4) Numerous abrasions and lacerations.

d. Resupply: Misinterpretation of radio messages of supplies requested and their nonavailability in amounts requested caused some difficulties

e. Foot problems: Due to extreme wet weather conditions and crossing many streams slight immersion foot conditions appeared about the 25th day out.

f. General physical condition of the troops was good during the first thirty days. After this it became noticeable that all personnel were tiring easily.

2. Wild life encountered:

Antelope

Hogs

Chickens

Deer

Kangaroo rats

Bamboo viper

Russell's viper

Mosquito

Leeches

Blood flies

Body lice

Fish

Various birds

Brown ticks

Scorpions

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3. Edible vegetation:

Manioc	Rice
Hot peppers	Bananas
Mangoes	Oranges
Turnips	Sugar cane
Beans	Peas
Corn	Bamboo shoots
Ferns	

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4. Recommendations:

a. Equipment:

(1) US individual soldier:

Small battle dressings #2
Medium battle dressings #1
Morphine syrettes #5
Chloroquine - primaquine tabs 1/week
Dapsone tablets 1/day
Foot powder - 1 small can
Insect repellent - 2 bottles
Water tablets - 2 bottles/100
Salt tablets - 4/day
Ophthalmic, Bacitracin and Mycolog ointment
Darvon - 10 tablets
Polymagma - 9 tablets
Ornade - 12 tablets
Fonnatol - 12 tablets
Tetracycline - 12 tablets
Erythromycin or Penicillin - 12 tablets
Compazine - 6 tablets
Dexamil - 10 tablets
Benzylkonium chloride - 1 bottle
1 cal albumin/3 men

(2) US Medic:

Minor surgical set - 1
Penicillin in tubex - 10
Streptomycin in tubex or with water for injection - 10
(disposable with 21 gauge needles - 10)
5cc syringes
Demerol for injection 50cc bottle - 1
Vaseline gauze - 1 packet
Furacin gauze - 4 oz
30cc syringe - large needle - 1
Kyllocin 1% - 1 bottle
Morphine syrettes - 10

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Tincture of Benzein (2 oz bottle)
Mycolog ointment
Codiene $\frac{1}{2}$ gr 100/bottle, 2 bottles
Lomotil - 1 bottle
Benadryl 1M and 50 mgm P.O.
Adrenalyn - 1M i/1000 10 lcc ampules
Quinine PO, and injectable
Chloroquine PO and injectable
Phenobarbital, 1M $2\frac{1}{2}$ gr
Seconal 100 mg PO
1000 cc Normal Saline in plastic bottles
Benzylkonium chloride - 5 bottles
Stethoscope
Pen light

(3) Indigenous individual soldier:

Medium battle dressing - 1
Small battle dressing - 2
Chloroquine tablets - 1/day
Dapsone tablets - 1/day
Repellent, insect - 2
Water purification tablets - 2 bottles/100
Salt tablets - 4/day
Benzylkonium chloride - 1 bottle
1 can Albumen/6 men

(4) Indigenous Medic:

Bacitracin ointment - 2 tubes
Eye ointment - 2 tubes
Hydrogen Peroxide - 500 cc
Albumin - 1 can
Tape - 2 rolls
4 x 4's - 1 pack
Ace bandages, 2-2", 2-3", 2-4"
Cravats #4
Band-aids - 1 box
Benzylkonium chloride - 5
Diarrhea tablets - one bottle/100 tabs
Codiene - 1 bottle/100 tabs
Darvon compound - 100 tabs
ASA gr V - 100 tabs
Syrettes morphine - 10
Battle dressing - 2 lg, 4 med, 2 sm
Extra chloroquine - primaquine tabs - 100
Disposable nylon litter - 1

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(5) Senior US Medic:

Major surgical kit
Foley catheters #2
Nasogastric tubes #2
Flutter valve #2
3-way stop cock and direct transfusion tubing set
Tracheotomy set
30cc syringe
13 gauge needle
4 x 4's - 1 pk
Tape
Peroxide - 500cc, Benzylkonium chloride - 5 bottles/1 pk
Venocatheter size 8 - 17 #4
Scalp vein set #2
IV tubing #4
Snake bite kit with antivenom #2.

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b. It is recommended that ample time be allowed for the preparation of supplies prior to infiltration. Great care should be taken to avoid damage by breakage and water.

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Annex 4 (Communications) to After Action Report - Operation Blackjack 22. (S)

1. (S) GENERAL: Communications between BJ 22 and the base station located at Company B, Pleiku, were considered to be reliable with a few problem areas that will be mentioned.

271 The primary means of communication were the AN/PRC-74 single side band with mode of transmission CW and the AN/PRC-64 with mode CW as back-up for AN/PRC-74. The base station used T-368, R-390's and SSB. All commo equipment was organic to the 5th SFG (Abn). Coordination between Company B Signal Officer, Communications Supervisor at Ban Me Thuot, and BJ 22 communications supervisor was made on 20 Nov 66. The concept of operation, SOI's and logistical requirements were discussed and arrangements were made to augment the signal equipment to accomplish the mission. All additional signal equipment to accomplish the mission. All additional signal equipment requested arrived by 1 Dec 66 and the process of issuing it to the troops and training was initiated. All signal equipment was ordered, keeping in mind the capability of splitting into two separate units and still maintaining communications with the base station at Pleiku. Later upon infiltration into the GWOA, two additional AN/PRC-64 radios were requested as back-up. In general, communications were extremely good. The first contact with base station at Pleiku was made on 11 Dec 66.

2. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The signal concept of BJ 22 was to use the AN/PRC-74 SSB with CW as primary means of communications and AN/PRC-64 as back-up. This was based on the following reasons:

AN/PRC-74	as opposed to	AN/PRC-64
1 to 11.999 megacycles freq range		4 pre-set freq
15 watts output		5 watts output

The AN/PRC-74 allowed the capability of using CW for the main means of communication, in addition to the capability of entering Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang and Pleiku voice SSB nets if necessary in an emergency. The construction and modification of a battery container enabled the use of BA 368/U as a power supply for the AN/PRC-74 (See appendices 1 and 2). Two AN/PRC-74 radios were carried so that the main element could split and both elements could maintain communications directly with higher headquarters, as previously mentioned. One AN/PRC-64 was carried at the time of infiltration. Two more requested and received by resupply drop during infiltration. AN/PRC-25 radios were used for American internal communications and control, for resupply drops, and air-to-ground communications. Emergency communications would utilize AN/PRC-25 on standard II Corps, air-to-ground frequencies. As a precautionary measure a FAC would fly over the GWOA after any passing of a 24 hour period without contact, either directly or by relay, between the GWOA and the base station. All personnel were equipped with an emergency air-to-ground panel code. This code was also included in the main SOI. The FAC would either have a copy of this SOI, or a USASF with knowledge of the code would be on board the aircraft. HT-I's were used for indigenous internal control and were all on the same frequencies, SOI's and contact times provided by Company B. There was one scheduled contact in each 24 hour period. This contact would be made at either 0730 or 1700 hours. One BTB was initially

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scheduled at 1300 hours. After infiltration, an additional BTB at 1800 hours was instituted. This was done because movement at times prevented making the 1300 hour BTB.

Primary method: DIANA one-time pads. One each encypher and decypher. 228

FIRST ALTERNATE: The first alternate means was Company B's Apache code.

Second Alternate: Double transposition using pre-designated code words.

In case of compromise of the SOI, codes would be reversed in order of encryption until a new SOI could be infiltrated. Guerrilla Force 768 had an internal SOI for internal communications. A policy was established that all SOI's would be carried by Americans in their top left breast pocket of the shirt, in a water proof bag. The first thing done upon an American being hit and necessitating a Medevac would be to remove the SOI. Pads and logs were kept by the senior communications operator and all personnel were made aware of where he carried them on his person. In case the splitting of forces into two elements became necessary, it was planned to request another set of pads for the other element. All radios were powered by either BA-368/U or BA-30/U batteries.

3. (S) FREQUENCIES USED AND COMMENTS:

a. Primary CW frequency was 3.540 megacycles with first alternate 4.464 megacycles. Mode of transmission was CW. These were used between base station at Pleiku and Guerrilla Force 768. Communications were fair on these frequencies with strength of signal 2 - 3, but with heavy QRM at the base station. 4.464 was utilized once with fair to good communications. The main frequency used was 3.705 to 3.708 megacycles. CW and SSB between Ban Me Thuot and Guerrilla Force 768. When base station at Pleiku utilized this frequency, communications were excellent, because of negligible QRM at the Pleiku end. 3.705 to 3.708 frequency was clear 90% of the time during the day and night.

b. FM Communications Frequencies: Standard air-to-ground 46.00 was used, Company B ground-to-ground 38.9mc was used for resupply drops. Guerrilla Force 768 changed internal FM frequencies daily. Best communications on FM were between 32 and 56 megacycles due to mountainous terrain and heavy undergrowth within the GWOA.

c. AM Communications Frequencies: 38.65 was utilized with HT-I's. This frequency worked well.

4. (S) ANTENNAE AND COMMENTS: Antennae used:

a. With AN/PRC-74

(1) Standard doublet that comes with AN/PRC-64, cut to frequency. Loads on this antenna were from 75% to 90% with peak output wattage capacity of the AN/PRC-74.

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(2) Slant Antennae: Not too effective, hard to orient.

(3) Off Center Fed: This was used twice and very good results were achieved when counter poise was used. Normal antenna height above ground was from 4 to 10 feet. Transmission from reverse side of slopes, tops of ridges, mountains and out of wide valleys were 90% effective. Transmissions from deep gullies and thick underbrush were 50% effective.

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b. Antennae used with AN/PRC-25:

(1) Standard short and long antennae.

(2) A doublet cut to frequency and hung vertically was carried but it did not have to be used. This antenna could also be used very effectively with the HT-1.

5. (S) TRANSMISSION TIME: In general, transmission time from time of first contact to passing of traffic was kept to a minimum of approximately 10 to 15 minutes. By use of numerous formats, the average msg was 21 to 36 groups, with the only exception being resupply requests and special intelligence information. All personnel who will come in contact with the Bundel Code (for resupply) should be thoroughly briefed on it because of the possibility of misinterpretation. They must be thoroughly briefed in its use. A different pattern of encryption that is consistent should be used.

6. (S) EQUIPMENT: Type and disposition.

a. AN/PRC-74 w/modified battery pack - 2 each. The AN/PRC-74 radio was highly effective and with the capability of both voice SSB and CW was found to be a 100% reliable means of communication. Battery life was approximately 3 to 5 days. Batteries used were BA 368/U. Loading of antenna was better on CW and the signal lasted longer.

Problems encountered:

(1) Criticality of tuning. The band width was only 2 KC's wide and it was being used with radios of 100 KC's wide. Reception of base stations signal was possible, but he could not hear us many times if we were not 100% accurate in calibration.

(2) The clarify calibrate knob. Great care should be taken to insure that the clarify calibrate knob is not depressed with the set on for long periods of time.

Recommendations:

(1) That the AN/PRC-74 be used as the primary means of communication for this type of operation.

(2) The use of BA-368/U instead of BA-30/U to power the AN/PRC-74 radio.

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(3) That batteries be requested for the AN/PRC-74 at the rate of 3 per every five days.

(4) (See Appendix 2 for construction of field expedient battery container).

b. AN/PRC-64. This radio should be carried as back-up for AN/PRC-74. It only has 4 preset bands and the limitation of wattage output to 5 watts. These are its only weaknesses. Three (3) batteries should initially be carried per each radio.

c. AN/PRC-25. AN/PRC-25 radios worked outstandingly. We had best results on frequencies from 32 to 56 megacycles. This was due to the type of terrain. It is recommended that both short and long antennae be carried. Handsets can be protected from water and made practically water tight, by securing them in plastic bags from the BA-368 batteries. The cord at the base of the hand set should be tied to the hand set from 1 to 2 inches above where it joins the hand set and tied to the radio 1 to 2 inches above the jack on the end of the cord. This will prevent pulling out of the hand set cord at either end.

d. HT-I. HT-I worked well with the exception of water and moisture. This problem can be eliminated by making a water proof bag out of a poncho and taping the cracks of the set. Whenever possible, on hot days, expose the set to the sun to dry out moisture formed by condensation. Batteries should be replaced after every 5 days. Old batteries can be used for flashlights.

7. (S) DISTRIBUTION OF COMMO EQUIPMENT:

- a. AN/PRC-74: Two (2) each with battery pack 368 modified, with headquarters element.
- b. AN/PRC-25: Six (6) each. One per platoon and one each for CO - XO. 2 batteries each.
- c. HT-I: 16 each - 4 per platoon

Recommendations:

(1) It is recommended that one man each, be provided to carry each radio.

(2) Each indigenous AN/PRC-25 operator assigned to the USARF platoon leader should have an assistant.

3 APPENDICES:

- 1. Construction of Field Expedient Battery Container
- 2. Photographs of Field Expedient Box

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Appendix I (U) (Construction of Field Expedient Battery Container) to
ANNEX 4 (Communications) (S) to After Action Report - Operation BJ 22(S)

1. The battery box expedient for BA-368/U for use with the PRC-74 is very simple to make. Items necessary are:

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- a. Ammo can from either 30 cal LMG linked or 7.62 LMG linked with tops.
Hack saw
Drill or heavy punch
Hammer if punch is used
File
Male plug from BA30 carrying case from AN/PRC-74.

b. First Step: Decide whether you want to make it for one BA-368 or two. Then measure for the appropriate height allowing about $\frac{1}{4}$ inch higher for a projection that will be discussed.

c. Second Step: Remove top by opening box and sliding top to right and box to the left or vice versa. Draw line on the box for guidance in cutting and cut the box. When cutting, cut from each corner to the center or brace the open end of box utilizing wooden blocks inside the box.

d. Third Step: After cutting box down to proper size, file the rough edges.

e. Fourth Step: Measure the exact distance for center point to make the hole in the box top for the water proof plug w/wires. At this point, it is most critical to be exact in locations. A drill is best to use in making the hole, but a punch can be used. Then file down rough edges. The hole must be just a little smaller than the plug for a water tight fit. Drill the four holes for the screws to hold the plug in the top.

f. Fifth Step: Attach a piece of spring steel to the bottom of the box; this will enable you to latch the box to the radio utilizing the latches on the radio. In this case welding rod was used, but you can make other expedient substitutions.

g. Sixth Step: To remove the plug from the case of the AN/PRC-74 BA-30, unscrew all screws holding plug into top of case, unscrew all screws holding in battery terminal board in top of case and unsolder red and black wires. Then upon installation of plug into your modified ammo can the red wires go to A+15 volts and the black go to A-voltage on the BA-368.

AVIATION AVAILABILITY AND UTILIZATION

FIELD WING

	AVAIL. ACFT. AVE.	TOTAL CARGO HAULED	TOTAL TROOPS HAULED	NUMBER OF SORTIES
CARIBOU	4.63	4,897,976	1935	969
C-123	2.80	4,550,979	1261	373
C-130	6.33	10,147,189	1227	569
OTHER	1.80	14,895	451	455

ROTARY WING

	AVAIL. ACFT. AVE.	HOURS PROGRAMMED	HOURS FLOWN	PERCENT OF UTILIZATION	NUMBER/SORTIES
COMPANY C	88	274	354.7	144%	528
COMPANY B	117	3	525.3	156%	1090
COMPANY A	86	244	301.7	131%	768
COMPANY D	158	354	515.2	159%	1317
PROJECT DELTA	413	980	661.1	72%	986
SEPOS	543	868	997.1	144%	2211
TOTAL	1405	3058	3355.1	110%	7197

281ST AVIATION COMPANY AVAILABLE

	NOV 66	DEC 66	JAN 67
ASSIGNED	25	26	25
OPERATIONAL	23	21	19.2
% AVAILABLE	86.7 (UH-1C) 84.6 (UH-1D)	70.1 (UH-1C) 78.9 (UH-1D)	73.0 (UH-1C) 79.0 (UH-1D)

PERIOD COVERED: 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967

HISTORICAL/GROUP BEHAVIOR PILOT STUDY

TITLE: THE FIGHT-PACIFY GROUP - A study of group performance and communication as manifested by the group in the task of reporting a historical event.

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STATEMENT OF AIMS: To study the performance of a fight-pacify team as it reports an event from its group life. The report shall be given in a group conference conducted by the co-interviewers with military-historical/medical-behavioral training. It is the intent of the investigators to observe both the event and covert group processes evident and to define the significant indices of group effectiveness and non-effectiveness manifested within the context of a group interview.

It is further the intent of the researchers in this pilot effort to examine whether or not significant, meaningful, and accurate data concerning the overall group processes is obtainable by the method of group interviewing: i.e., to evaluate the technique concurrently with the analysis of the group's revealed performance.

THE UNITS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL FIELD:

1. THE "A" DETACHMENT TEAM: A specifically organized and formally designated twelve (12) man military unit of the US Army Special Forces, having the combined mission to fight and pacify.
2. THE RESEARCH TEAM: A two-person, co-interviewer team composed of:
 - a. A US Army tactical officer, a member of the Special Forces, the official military historian assigned the mission of assisting the CO, 5th SEGA in maintaining a flexible and responsive command historic program.
 - b. A US Army medical officer, a psychiatrist, a non-member of the Special Forces, trained in making observations of human behavior and attitudes.

METHODOLOGY

1. THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF STUDY: Selected units of the 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, serving in the Republic of Vietnam, II Corps Tactical Zone will be investigated.
2. SELECTION OF "A" TEAM: Initially, four (4) "A" detachments will be selected from the total number presently operational in II OTZ. Selection criteria will attempt to take into account the following variables:
 - a. Team operating at full TOE strength.
 - b. Primarily in combat mission phase vs. in pacification phase.

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- c. New camp as opposed to old camp.
- d. Team leaders newly assigned vs. on verge of rotation out of command.
- e. Geographic and tactical factors enhancing or reducing isolation.
- f. Accessible for conference scheduling on a routine basis.

g. The unique individuality of each "A" team's composition mission and overall need to conform to the long-range goal of the 5th SFGA in its total mission in this theatre.

3. SOURCE OF DATA: The data will consist primarily of that obtained in a group interview of "A" team members. Interview time will be for 60 to 90 minutes. The "A" team group will be set to the task of reporting an event from its recent group life (one to five days preceding the interview) whether of an ordinary or extraordinary character.

A tape recording of each group interview will be made. On the spot notes will also be taken. The general interviewing technique of the historian will be utilized to evoke responses to questions of "what happened?" and "when did it happen?" as opposed to "why did it happen?" The event reported on, will be itself broken down into time frames: (e.g., five minutes time frame, or one hour time frames) each member of the group will be invited to describe his actions and preoccupations per time period. The co-interviewers, in their manner will present a non-judge-mental, data gathering attitude. (Reference to S.L.A. Marshall's interviewing technique in Island Victory: Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D.C.)

4. ORGANIZATION OF DATA: The material gleaned from the group interview will be initially formulated under the following headings:

a. GROUP HISTORICAL DATA:

- I. METHODS OF OPERATIONS (Group and Sub-group procedures in response to an event.)
- II. TIME FRAME (When did it happen?)
- III. Description of OVERT GROUP BEHAVIOR (As known to and reported by the Group)

b. GROUP BEHAVIORAL DATA:

- I. EFFECTIVENESS (In terms of functioning) Scale 0 to 4
- II. COHESIVENESS (As vs. fragmentation)
- III. ACTIVITY (As vs. apathy)
- IV. AGGRESSIVENESS (As vs. conservativeness)
- V. MODE OF COMMUNICATION (Verbal as vs. Non verbal)
- VI. IDENTIFICATION OF LEADERS AND/OR DECISION MAKERS.

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5. PERIOD OF STUDY: The pilot study will take place from December 1966 to March 1967. Four "A" Team Detachments will each be visited once per month for each of the four months. This will constitute four interview conferences per team giving a total of sixteen interviews in all.

SPONSORS:

1. COL Francis J. Kelly, CO, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces
2. Dr. David Riech, Director, Department of Neuro-Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
3. LTC Arnold Johnson, Consultant in Psychiatry, Surgeon's Office, USARV.

THE CO-INTERVIEWER RESEARCH TEAM:

1. LTC M.H. Jenkins, CO, 21st Military History Detachment, 5th SFGA.
2. CPT L.R. Conte, MC, CO, 98th Medical Detachment, 8th Field Hospital.

DETACHMENT A-411
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96215

18 November 1966

239 SUBJECT: Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Success Story: Detachment A-411

TO: Commanding Officer
Det C-4, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF
ATTN: S-5
APO 96215

1. On 20 June 1966, the VC attacked the Cao Dai Hamlet (coordinates VQ856845), killing six people and wounding fourteen. The VC entered the hamlet on 22 June 1966 and burned the Cao Dai pagoda. The angered Cao Dai decided to hold a rally against the VC. On 27 June 1966 they gathered at Tan Hung Tay village. An honor guard of one Regional Force squad was present to represent the military support of the people, plus the Vietnamese and US military leaders of the area.

2. At the beginning of the rally the Vietnamese flag was raised, at which time all the people came to the position of attention. The honor guard presented arms, and an 81mm mortar fired three rounds in a salute to the flag. The Cao Dai leader then gave a speech, as did the Buddhist leader and the Catholic representative. They told the people that they must strengthen themselves and join themselves together to overcome the VC aggressor. The Canton chief spoke to the people also, and then the Regional Force Commander, Major Ho, told the people that they would be supported and protected by the military forces of Vietnam. A letter was read which had been prepared by the religious leaders prior to the rally. This letter was addressed to Premier Ky and pledged the local people's loyalty and support to the Government of Vietnam.

3. With the speeches finished, the military and civilian officials jointly gave out 10 kilos of rice, supplied by the Regional Forces, and other civil affairs commodities such as health kits and milk. The families of the six dead were given 500\$VN per family. The people then marched back to their hamlet, carrying bannors and flags, and held memorial services for the dead. They staged another brief demonstration, again pledging their allegiance to the Government of Vietnam.

4. This demonstration proved to be very successful because it enabled the hamlet chiefs, religious leaders, the Canton chief and military officials to come face to face with their people. It was also successful as CA items were given to the people, which proved that their government would take care of them and alleviate their needs.

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