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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (6 Nov 67) FOR OT RD 670631

20 November 1967

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 30 April 1967

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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
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5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1st SPECIAL FORCES

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

FOR OT RD FILE
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TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGE

SECTION 1, Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. General ---	---	---	---	1
2. Intelligence ---	---	---	---	4
3. Operations and Training Activities ---	---	---	---	5
a. Plans ---	---	---	---	5
b. Operations ---	---	---	---	5
c. Special Operations ---	---	---	---	14
d. Training ---	---	---	---	16
e. Aviation ---	---	---	---	18
f. Research and Development ---	---	---	---	19
4. Logistics ---	---	---	---	21
5. Revolutionary Development ---	---	---	---	22
6. Psychological Operations ---	---	---	---	24
7. Personnel and Administration ---	---	---	---	25
8. Medical ---	---	---	---	28
9. Signal ---	---	---	---	30
10. Engineer ---	---	---	---	34
11. CIDG Finance ---	---	---	---	36
12. Comptroller ---	---	---	---	37

SECTION 2, Commanders' Observations and Recommendations

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. Personnel ---	---	---	---	38
2. Operations ---	---	---	---	38
3. Training and Organization ---	---	---	---	41
4. Intelligence ---	---	---	---	42
5. Logistics ---	---	---	---	44
6. Other ---	---	---	---	45

Part II, Recommendations ---	---	---	---	50
------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	----

INCLOSURES

1. Troop Disposition List and Maps
2. Operations Data
3. Enemy Casualties
4. USASF Casualties
5. CIDG Casualties
6. RF/PF Casualties
- *7. Aircraft Availability & Utilization Chart
- *8. Visitor Briefings
9. Employment of CIDG, Mike Force, Mobile Guerrilla Force and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects
- *10. Organizational Chart for Staff Engineer Section

REC CONTROL
82943
82943

11. Construction Program
- *12. CIDG Camp Construction Standards
- *13. Detachment B-35 After Action Report:
(Operation Checkmate) Tra Cu Camp Opening
14. Detachment A-424: My Phuoc Tay Camp
Opening Highlights
- *15. After Action Report: Operation Harvest Moon
- **16. Detachment B-23 After Action Report:
23-27 February 1967 (67X085)
- **17. Detachment A-302 After Action Report:
20-21 February 1967 (67X084)
- **18. Detachment A-341 After Action Report:
Operation 4/3, 22-23 March 1967 (67X086)
- **19. Detachment A-341 After Action Report:
Operation 5/3, 24-25 March 1967 (67X087)
- **20. Project Sigma After Action Report:
Operation Regina (67X079)
- **21. After Action Report: Blackjack 31 (67X080)
- **22. After Action Report: Blackjack 32 (67X081)
- **23. After Action Report: Blackjack 12 (67X082)
(Operation Oconee)
- **24. Project Sigma After Action Report:
Operation Liberty Blackjack (67X083)
25. Detachment B-23 Civic Action Success Story
- *26. Campaign Plan for Special Forces
Revolutionary Development in
Vietnam (Copies 1 thru 8 only)
- *27. Implementing Instructions:
Campaign Plan for Special Forces
Revolutionary Development in
Vietnam (Copies 1 thru 8 only)

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** Denotes Combat After Action Reports withdrawn at Hqs, DA, to be published separately. Numbers in parentheses are control numbers for those reports.

5
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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

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15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96307

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1 () SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: During February, March, and April combat forces advised by the 5th Special Forces Group expanded and intensified their operations in remote areas previously under the control of the Viet Cong. Five new camps were opened in the midst of traditional enemy strongholds. Mobile guerrilla force and long range reconnaissance operations penetrated deeply into Viet Cong base areas and effectively interdicted his lines of communication. CIDG units mounted increasingly aggressive operations within their areas of responsibility and also contributed significantly to several large scale operations conducted by Free World Military Assistance Forces. A total of 1,632 Viet Cong were killed during the reporting period by USASF advised CIDG and RF/PF forces.

Much of the Group's activity this quarter was focused on the opening and construction of new camps. In War Zone "C", the establishment of Camps Prek Klok and Ton Le Chon has been an important step in restricting the enemy's use of this notorious base area. Camp Bunard, which is now under construction on the northern edge of War Zone "D", has already been effective

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6

AVGB-3

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

in limiting infiltration into this stronghold. In IV CTZ, Camps My Phuoc Tay and My An have been opened in the infamous Plain of Reeds. In addition to these five new camps, it should be noted that three camps--Con Thien, Cau Song Be, and Tra Cu--were opened shortly before the beginning of this reporting period. (See inclosures 11, 12, 13).

The first mass parachute assault by Special Forces advised troops in Vietnam was conducted by Mike Force elements and USASF advisors to initiate Operation Harvest Moon, a search and clear action in preparation for the opening of Camp Bunard. The operation went exactly as planned (see Inclosure 15), securing a landing zone for the subsequent deployment of a large heliborne force.

In several cases the enemy has reacted strongly to these intrusions into what he had considered to be his territory. On 14 April Camp Prek Klok received approximately 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, followed with a ground attack by an estimated two VC battalions. This was the first large scale attack on a Special Forces camp since Ashau was overrun in March 1966. In the vicinity of Camps My Phuoc Tay and My An, numerous contacts were made with company and battalion size VC units. Because of the aggressive tactics employed by CIDG and Mike Force units and the rapid reaction of tactical air and artillery support, the VC suffered several telling defeats in this area (see Inclosure 14).

A few days after the end of this reporting period, on 8 May, Camp Con Thien was subjected to a determined attack by two NVA battalions employing mortars, rockets, and flame throwers as well as grenades, satchel charges and small arms. A complete report of this action, and also the attack on Lang Ve1 which occurred on 4 May, will be included in the next ORLL.

During the past three months the Mobile Guerrilla Forces were expanded so that there are now two of these units in each corps area. Mobile guerrilla operations penetrated deeply into enemy held areas and successfully interdicted enemy routes of infiltration over extended periods. During these operations unconventional warfare tactics and techniques were refined, perfected, and, in some cases adapted for special situations. (see Inclosures 21, 22, 23, 24).

Heavy enemy contacts continued to be made in the vicinity of Camp Bu Dop by CIDG and Mike Force elements. The enemy showed increasing willingness to stand and fight, often in spite of severe losses. (see Inclosures 17, 18, and 19).

The Group's Revolutionary Development Support Activities (RDSA) Section published the "Support Plan for Special Forces Revolutionary Development in Vietnam" on 1 March, delineating the responsibilities for all elements of this command (see Inclosures 26, 27). To acquaint RD personnel in the detachments with this plan, courses were given at the SFOB for NCO's from each company, "B", and "A" detachment. The Group's RD support program is pushing ahead aggressively in the task of pacification. Detachments are assuming a sense of urgency with regard to the RD mission and are striving to integrate RD projects with their tactical operations. In some cases, however, enemy action such as that at Suoi Chan in Long Khanh Province (see pages 11 and 12) has been directed at RD personnel in a determined effort to block progress in this field.

CONFIDENTIAL

7

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

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Throughout the reporting period the Forward Supply Bases in each corps area have proved their value by handling increasing amounts of supplies with steadily improving efficiency. The shipment of supplies by sea to the Forward Supply Bases has sharply increased, resulting in a great saving of airlift capability and, consequently, more timely delivery of critical items.

PICTURE OMITTED FROM COPIES 9 THRU 50

AIRBORNE ASSAULT - OPERATION HARVEST MOON

3

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8

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. During the reporting period the Group S-2 Section was reorganized, and three new sub-sections were formed and staffed from personnel resources within the Group. The three sub-sections are the Counterintelligence Branch, the Collection Branch, and the Source Control Office. The formation of these sub-sections was necessitated by the increased scope of intelligence operations being conducted by the Group and by the desire to exploit the intelligence collection potential which is inherent with the country-wide deployment of the 5th Special Forces Group.

b. The MI augmentation detachment, which was discussed in the preceeding Quarterly Report, completed its move to Viet Nam during the final week of the reporting period. The majority of the augmentation personnel were assigned to Special Forces units located in all four Corps Tactical Zones. A small contingent was kept at the SFOB in Nha Trang to be used primarily to conduct special projects. Three projects were initiated: analysis of Viet Cong infrastructure, study of Viet Cong PW camps, and area studies and analyses. The personnel who were assigned to subordinate headquarters will staff the intelligence analysis centers at each company headquarters, and they will assist "B" and "A" detachments with establishing and maintaining counterintelligence/counterespionage programs and with collection nets. A report of the accomplishments of these organizations and the successes of these programs will be made in the next Quarterly Report.

c. In order for the new organizations and programs to function, regulations had to be written. The major accomplishment within the S-2 section during this reporting period has been the completion of these regulations. They have been disseminated in draft form to all detachments for implementation. Any problems which arise will be corrected before the regulations are published in final form. The regulations cover four topics; the Group intelligence program, intelligence and information reporting, expenditure and funding reports, and source control. The regulations will be discussed in the next Quarterly Report after they have been published in final form.

CONFIDENTIAL

9

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AFGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

3. (C) Operations and Training:

a. Plans.

(1) During this quarter, planning guidance for the 5th SFGA concept of operations for CY '68 was developed, coordinated with the LLDB, and dispatched to the companies. Based on this planning guidance letter, companies will develop plans for their respective CTZ and submit to this headquarters by 1 June 1967. The input will be incorporated into the 5th SFGA Campaign Plan for CY'68, which will be published by 31 July 1967.

(2) Contingency plans for employment of 5th SFGA assets in a general war posture were developed and will be published by 15 May 1967.

(3) Budgetary planning for FY '68 was initiated during this Quarter. Planning will be completed and the budget submitted to appropriate agencies on Okinawa during a forthcoming staff visit in the month of May.

(4) 5th SFGA input to USARV Staff Study on CIDG post-hostilities disposition was completed and forwarded to that headquarters.

(5) The mission statement for 5th SFGA is being revised and will be submitted to MACV in the near future.

b. Operational Highlights.

(1) Summary of significant operations by Corps Tactical Zones.

(a) I CTZ: Operation 1-67 (Austin) was a reconnaissance of the northern half of the Ashau Valley in early February. Its primary mission was to determine if the area of operation was being used for enemy infiltration from Laos and to find out what forces were in and near the valley. Because of heavy contact with a superior enemy force, the operation was extracted on the third night. Even though the operation remained in the area for only two days, the information it collected added greatly to the overall intelligence picture in I CTZ. Operation Rio Grande, a joint USMC, ARVN, ROKMC, and CIDG operation was launched nine kilometers east of Ha Thanh. Two hundred and thirty CIDG and 68 Mike Force provided blocking and screening forces for the operation. Results of the CIDG portion of the operation were eight VC killed (confirmed), one VC killed (probable), three VC wounded, one VC captured and one weapon captured. On 21 Feb an operation from Camp Minh Long, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, made contact with an estimated VC squad and maintained contact for several hours. Results of the contact were two USASF wounded, one CIDG killed, seven CIDG wounded, 11 VC killed, three weapons captured, 15 structures, 250 kilos of rice and one grenade destroyed. On 20 Feb an advance party from Detachment A-110 arrived at Con Thien in preparation for the main body of troops and supplies, which were airlifted to the camp during the remainder of the month. On 24 Feb the camp

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

was subjected to enemy 82mm mortar attack five times during the day. Friendly casualties totaled two USASF wounded, one CIDG killed, and six CIDG wounded. During March Con Thien received six mortar attacks, resulting in one USASF and two CIDG wounded, and one CIDG killed. On 6 Mar, an operation from Camp Minh Long, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, was fired on by an estimated VC company. A reaction force was called and was dispatched a short time later from the camp. As the reaction force was moving to the area of contact, it was taken under attack by an unknown size VC force resulting in two USASF killed, one USASF wounded, 15 CIDG killed, eight RF/PF killed, one interpreter killed, four RF/PF wounded, seven CIDG missing, one LLDB missing, five VC killed, and one VC captured. On 11 Mar Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, and the District Headquarters were taken under attack by an unknown size VC force. Results of the attack were: district police chief killed, six RF killed, five RF wounded, and five CIDG wounded. Camp Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, was taken under attack on 19 Mar by an unknown size enemy force. The attack lasted approximately one hour and 20 minutes, resulting in five CIDG wounded and slight damage to the camp. Six local security patrols made contact in the vicinity of the camp, resulting in eight CIDG killed, 14 CIDG wounded, one VC killed (confirmed), 25 VC killed (probable), five weapons and eight Chicom grenades captured. On 31 Mar an operation from Camp Ha Thanh, A-104, Quang Ngai Province, made three contacts with the VC, resulting in no friendly casualties, two VC killed by the operation and 80 VC killed (probable) by airstrikes. On 8 Apr a convoy moved from Dong Ha to Con Thien, marking the first time that men and supplies have been moved to a Special Forces camp in I CTZ by means other than airlift. The convoy consisted of 93 vehicles escorted by tanks and troops of the 3rd Marine Division, moving a Sea-Bee detachment complete with 760,000 pounds of equipment and construction material to the camp. No enemy contact was made, and the operation was completed without incident. On 9 Apr in the vicinity of Camp Ha Thanh, a USAF FAC accompanied by a USASF observer sighted an estimated 200 VC and immediately directed an airstrike on them. After the strike 40 bodies were counted lying on the ground and another 40 were estimated to have been killed. Camp Con Thien received three mortar attacks during April. Shortly after the end of the reporting period, on 5 May, the camp received another mortar attack, and on 8 May was attacked in force by an estimated two battalions of NVA supported by mortars, rockets, and flame throwers. A complete report of this attack, and also the attack on Camp Lang Vei which occurred on 4 May, will be included in the next ORLL.

(b) II CTZ: Operation Gatling was conducted from 1 to 4 Feb as a joint operation with the 1/101 Airborne Division in the southern part of II CTZ. The CIDG force, Task Force Trap, was under the command and control of the Commander, Company B. It consisted of four CIDG companies, three Mike Force companies from Nha Trang, and a control element from Company B, a total force of 817 personnel. The results of this operation were not overwhelming, but they showed that a large CIDG provisional

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AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

battalion could be gathered from diverse sources and operate as a unit within a short span of time. For Operation Sam Houston the Commander of Company B, with the LLDB "C" detachment commander, effected coordination with the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division to commit a total of four CIDG companies with units from the 4th Division in the vicinity of the Ia Drang to 15 kilometers north of Camp Duc Co, A-253, during the period 18 to 23 Feb. On 18 Feb a command element from B-24 (USASF) and B-13 (LLDB) at Kontum was placed in control of the CIDG units and established their headquarters at Camp Duc Co. The CIDG were airlifted into their respective areas. This operation continued until 23 Feb when it was revamped in order to assist the 24th STZ with two CIDG companies performing screening and border surveillance between Highway 19 and the Ia Drang River. Phase II of Operation Sam Houston continued through March and April; Camps Plei Kleng, Plei Mrong, Plei Me, Duc Co, and Plei Djereng participated, with very successful results from the CIDG units involved. In mid-February six CIDG companies were committed to the assistance of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for Operation Pershing in the vicinity of Camp Bong Son. Additional CIDG elements were deployed later in the month. This operation presently continues with operational control of Vinh Thanh and Bong Son held by the Commanding General, 1st Cav Div. Bong Son is providing two companies on a continuing basis conducting search and destroy operations in the southwestern portion of the TAOR, and at the same time providing one platoon for 1st Cav Div Headquarters security. During the period 16 to 28 Feb Camp Luong Son, A-237, worked with the 1/101 Airborne Division in Operation Farragut with two CIDG companies in a search and destroy operation within the Camp Luong Son TAOR. On 22 Feb a joint operation consisting of elements from the 23rd ARVN Division, Detachment B-23 from Ban Me Thuot, Camp Trang Phuc, A-233, and Camp Buon Blech, A-238, was conducted in reaction to an NVA attack on an RF outpost at Buon Dlung. Two companies each from Camps Trang Phuc and Buon Blech were helilifted into the area of operations to cut off the withdrawal route of the NVA unit. The operation lasted for five days, resulting in 22 NVA killed, and 24 assorted small arms, 90 grenades, various types of Chicom and Czech communications equipment, and 5,000 kilos of rice captured. Friendly casualties were one USASF wounded, one CIDG killed, and three CIDG wounded. See Inclosure 16 for the after action report of this operation. Operation Rice Hunt (I FForceV FRAGO 18/67) was conducted by the four CIDG camps located in Pleiku Province--Plei Me, Duc Co, Plei Djereng, and Plei Mrong. The mission of the operation was to conduct an extensive search and destroy operation within given areas to locate rice, ammunition, and weapons caches. All the AO's were within the 4th Division's AO, and the Commanding General, 4th Inf Div, preempted the mission of three of the camps due to higher priority targets. Plei Mrong completed the search of its assigned area of operation on 26 Apr with negative results. For Operation Francis Marion operational control of five camps was passed to the 4th Infantry Division. Plei Me provided one company of CIDG for the entire month of April working with the 2nd Bn, 8th Inf, within Plei Me's TAOR. This combined operation with the 2/8 Inf has made heavy contact with estimated

CONFIDENTIAL

12

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

battalions on three separate occasions, and has captured documents from one contact which indicated the NVA unit was the 6th Bn, 95B Regiment. An extension of Francis Marion occurred on 25 April when the 3rd Bn, 8th Inf, was helilifted into an area southeast of Buon Blech. Buon Blech is presently providing one company of CIDG assisting on a search and destroy mission. This portion of Francis Marion is to continue until the 25th of May. Francis Marion presently has CIDG support from Plei Djereng, Plei Me, and Duc Co. Operation Summerall was conducted from 3-29 April with two companies from Lac Thien attached to the maneuver element of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Camps Buon Blech, Cung Son, Phu Tuc, and An Lac, were directed to assist by performing blocking operations on the periphery of the area of operations. A total of 63 VC were killed on this operation, 24 of which were credited to the CIDG units. The action which occurred near Camp Trung Dung, A-502, on 8 Apr was an outstanding example of classic infantry small unit tactics applied by CIDG units to decimate a force of selected NVA regulars. At 0138 hours on 8 Apr, an RF platoon located approximately three kilometers southwest of Camp Trung Dung was attacked by an NVA force. It was later learned through interrogation of a PW that the enemy troops came from an NVA company located in the mountains five kilometers southwest of the RF position. Because the battalion's food supply was nearly exhausted and the majority of the personnel were incapacitated with malaria and other diseases, a composite company of 105 of the strongest and most able troops was formed and sent out to obtain food. The intent was to overrun the RF platoon and capture all rice available in the immediate area. A squad of eight NVA was sent north of the RF position to set up an ambush and attack any type of reaction force that might be sent to assist the RF unit. Unknown to the enemy, three CIDG platoons on night security and ambush operations were located approximately two to three kilometers northwest, west and southwest respectively from the RF position. When the attack was started, the RF platoon was caught by surprise, but quickly recovered and prevented the enemy force from penetrating their defenses. Meanwhile, the NVA ambush squad initiated contact against one of the CIDG platoons which was moving east towards the firing at the RF position. While the firefight was in progress, the CIDG platoon in the northwest moved to the east toward the NVA squad. Closely coordinating by radio and using superb fire and maneuver, the two CIDG platoons laid down a devastating crossfire which completely annihilated the NVA squad. These platoons then moved to blocking positions west and southwest of the other NVA force, along with the third CIDG platoon which had moved to a position south of the NVA force. A CIDG reaction company was dispatched from Camp Trung Dung and moved south and southeast. By 0230 hours, CIDG units had completely surrounded the NVA force, directing deadly accurate small arms fire on enemy troops who attempted to move. With flareships providing illumination, the situation remained static until morning. At first light a FAC arrived over the area and began identification of friendly units in preparation for an airstrike. The friendly units withdrew to a safe distance as the airstrikes came on target, and then moved back into the area for an assessment. Accumulated results of the ambush, the attack on the RF platoon, and the airstrikes were 22 NVA killed, one NVA captured, and 20

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AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

weapons captured, including three RPD light machine guns, 10 AK-47 assault rifles, and seven SKS carbines. Friendly casualties were two CIDG killed, five CIDG wounded and six RF wounded. Later, on 15 Apr, 20 more bodies were found in fresh graves seven kilometers southwest of the point where the action took place. Since there had been no other recent contacts in the area, these could only have resulted from the action on 8 Apr, bringing the total to 42 NVA killed.

(c) III CTZ: On 3 Feb, a two company search and destroy operation from Camp Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province, made contact with an estimated NVA battalion approximately eight kilometers northeast of camp. The friendly force met a heavy volume of fire and called in airstrikes and artillery, causing the NVA to break contact and withdraw north into Cambodia. This operation resulted in 25 NVA killed, one CIDG killed, one LLDB killed, eight CIDG wounded, and one USASF wounded. On 5 Feb one CIDG company was moved from Camp Tra Cu, A-352, to the eastern side of the Oriental River to relieve the Mike Force Company which had been occupying this area earlier. At 0045 hours, 6 Feb, an estimated two VC battalions attacked and overran the CIDG position employing a heavy volume of automatic weapons and mortar fire. The VC then took up firing positions along the north side of the river and directed mortar and small arms fire into the camp. Flareships and FAC's were dispatched to the area and received continuous automatic weapons ground fire. The VC broke contact at 0120 hours after inflicting heavy CIDG casualties. A total of 14 CIDG were killed, nine wounded, 29 missing, one USASF wounded, 65 weapons and four radios lost as a result of this attack. Two confirmed VC kills were reported. On 7 Feb, an operation in the same general area was attacked by an estimated two VC companies, employing mortar and small arms fire. Seven VC kills resulted, with no friendly casualties. On 15 Feb, a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Bu Dop made contact with a VC company approximately eight kilometers east of camp. Heavy small arms fire was exchanged for approximately 45 minutes. The VC broke contact and withdrew northwest after artillery and airstrikes were called in. At 1745 hours, one CIDG company from Bu Dop was helilifted into the area of operation as reinforcement, meeting VC resistance immediately upon arrival at the LZ. The VC main force broke contact at 1800 hours withdrawing northwest. Sporadic small arms fire continued from VC rear guard elements. Friendly casualties resulting from this action were one USASF wounded, 10 CIDG killed and four wounded. Fifteen VC were killed. Two Mike Force companies were airlifted to Bu Dop on 17 Feb and were immediately deployed to the operational area. On 20 Feb, one Mike Force company engaged an estimated NVA battalion approximately 10 kilometers east of Camp Bu Dop. A heavy firefight ensued, and artillery and airstrikes were placed on VC positions. Within minutes after notification of the contact, 10 "slick" helicopters and a fire team departed for Bu Dop to transport reinforcements into the area. One of the helicopters crashed just prior to landing because of a collision with tree tops, resulting in six Mike Force personnel wounded. Total friendly casualties for this operation to include the helicopter crash were one USASF killed, five CIDG killed and 12 wounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

Forty NVA were killed. Sporadic contact with the enemy continued for approximately four hours. Artillery was fired on suspected enemy withdrawal routes. The helicopter that crashed was destroyed by airstrikes. On 19 Feb, a three company search and destroy operation from Camp Dong Xoai, A-342, Phuoc Long Province, engaged an estimated VC platoon armed with small arms and 60mm mortars. Airstrikes were called in causing the VC to withdraw east after a firefight lasting approximately one hour. Results of this action were 10 CIDG killed, two wounded, 23 VC killed and one weapon seized. On 23 Mar, two CIDG companies from Bu Dop made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA battalion approximately 13 kilometers east of camp. After two unsuccessful frontal assaults on fortified enemy positions, friendly elements disengaged from action and were extracted from the area. Twenty of the enemy were killed, with another estimated 40 killed by airstrikes that supported the operation. Friendly casualties during this contact were one VNSF killed, 11 CIDG killed and 11 CIDG wounded. On 24 Mar, one CIDG company and one Mike Force company conducted a heliborne assault in the same area. Shortly after infiltration they made heavy contact with an estimated two NVA battalions armed with automatic weapons and recoilless rifles, and supported with mortars. Under extremely heavy pressure, the CIDG elements conducted a retrograde movement and attempted to consolidate positions around the LZ supported by airstrikes. Communication was lost with the Mike Force element and was never regained. A Mike Force platoon attempted to land on the LZ, but was forced to abort the reinforcement because of intense enemy fire. Later, a few helicopters managed to land and extracted a squad of CIDG. Remaining forces splintered into small groups and infiltrated into Camp Bu Dop during the night and the next day. Segments of the Mike Force also began infiltrating into camp on the 25th. Overall friendly casualties were three CIDG killed, 11 wounded, two USASF missing and 14 Mike Force personnel missing. Ninety-eight enemy were confirmed killed, with another estimated 170 killed by airstrikes. In another significant action, a company size CIDG operation from Ben Soi, A-321, Tay Ninh Province, engaged a VC platoon on 27 Mar, accounting for 10 enemy killed. Two new CIDG camps were opened during March. Camp Prek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Province, was occupied on 20 Mar; Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Tay Ninh Province was opened on 24 March. Both camps, assisted by U.S. forces, opened without incident. Three other camps were closed. A MACV advisory team assumed duties at Go Dau Ha, A-326, Tay Ninh Province, on 16 March. USASF assets reverted to Detachment B-32 and were reassigned to other "A" detachments. On 20 Mar, Camp Soui Da, A-322, Tay Ninh Province, was turned over to an artillery unit; USASF assets moved to Prek Klok. Xom Cat, A-312, Long Khanh Province, was closed and destroyed on 24 March; USASF assets and CIDG troops moved to Dong Xoai, A-342, Phuoc Long Province. The opening of Camp Bunard was initiated by a parachute assault conducted by Mike Force elements from Nha Trang (A-503) and USASF advisors. The purpose of the jump was to secure an LZ where a larger heliborne force could be airlanded close to the projected campsite. The operation proceeded as planned; only 10 personnel of the parachute assault force received minor injuries. The DZ/LZ was secured immediately upon landing, with the heliborne force entering

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

the area only minutes afterward. Although no enemy contact was made by the force until the following day, VC mines caused light casualties during movement to the objective. Also, resupply helicopters reported sniper fire in the general vicinity of the campsite. See Inclosure 15 for the after action report of this operation. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 16th U.S. Infantry, closed in to Bunard on 5 Apr and began offensive operations the following day. A US engineer company began construction of an airfield at the new camp on 6 Apr. On 14 Apr at 1925 hours, Camp Prek Klok, A-322, received approximately 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from the east by an estimated two VC battalions. Preplanned artillery concentrations were fired, and the attack was repelled with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Airstrikes were called in, and a US unit adjacent to the camp was dispatched as a reaction force. The VC broke contact at approximately 2025 hours and withdrew east. Artillery and airstrikes were placed on suspected withdrawal routes. Friendly casualties resulting from the attack were three USASF and 11 CIDG wounded, VC casualties unknown. On 16 Apr at 0100 hours Suoi Chon Hamlet, Long Khanh Province, was attacked and overrun by an estimated VC company. Terrorist type actions were used by the VC as they swept through the hamlet killing seven Revolutionary Development cadre and 11 PF soldiers, and wounding three PF soldiers. Also as a result of this action, eleven PF soldiers are missing, as well as 11 weapons, two PRC-25 and 10 HT-1 radios. The VC also destroyed 57 houses and bunkers during the attack. By 0700 hours on 16 Apr, a two platoon CIDG force from Xuan Loc, B-31, was in the area as reinforcement. Once in the area, booby trapped grenades were encountered and resulted in eight CIDG wounded. Following the VC attack photographers were immediately on the scene obtaining information to be used for counter-propaganda purposes. At the same time Suoi Chon was attacked, Bao Hoa Hamlet was attacked by an estimated reinforced VC company armed with assorted small arms, automatic weapons, 60mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles. The VC destroyed several friendly bunkers in the area using bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges. Friendly casualties as a result of this attack were 11 PF killed, three wounded and three weapons lost. The VC suffered no casualties or losses during either of the attacks. On 21 Apr, two RF squads on local security vicinity of Xuan Loc, B-31, made contact with an estimated 40 enemy who were occupying a rest area. A 30 minute firefight ensued resulting in 12 VC killed, five weapons, assorted documents, drugs, clothing and food captured. There were no friendly casualties.

(d) IV CTZ: During February, new camps were opened at To Chau in Kien Giang Province and My Phuoc Tay in Dinh Tuong Province. Detachment B-43 was deployed to Cao Lanh in Kien Phuoc Province, and provisional Detachment B-44 was formed on Phu Quoc Island to provide command and control for the two "A" detachments there. In March Detachment A-426 was deployed to My An in Kien Phuoc Province. On 23 Feb two RF companies accompanied by two USASF and a USASF engineer officer departed My An RF post (prior to the opening of the USASF camp at that location) to reconnoiter

CONFIDENTIAL



THESE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE, THREE YOUNG GIRLS, WERE SHOT BY THE VC DURING THE ATTACK ON SUOI CHAN HAMLET IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE ON 16 APRIL. NOTE THAT THEIR HANDS WERE TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. PHOTO WAS TAKEN BY USASF DETACHMENT B-31, WHOSE CIDG TROOPS REINFORCED THE VILLAGE AFTER THE ATTACK.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

the area approximately seven kilometers to the east for a possible new campsite. At 1110 hours contact was made with an estimated 300 VC dressed in black pajamas and dug in along the canal. Contacts lasted until 1405 hours. Gunships from the 281st Aviation Company and tactical aircraft continued airstrikes on VC positions until 1510 hours, and the operation terminated at that time. Results were two RF wounded, 25 VC killed (confirmed), and 25 VC killed (probable). A request to continue the operation was disapproved by the Province Chief because the fight was nearing the Province boundary. On 19 Mar at 1630 hours, CIDG and RF companies with USASF advisors from Camps Kinh Quan II, A-416, Tuyen Nhon, A-415, and My Phuoc Tay, A-424, departed on a search and destroy operation south of Camp Kinh Quan II. Light contact was made with small bands of VC during the first day. On 20 Mar at 0945 hours, CIDG companies from Camps Binh Thanh Thon, A-413, Moc Hoa, A-414, and My Phuoc Tay, A-424, were heli-lifted into the northern portion of the AO to conduct a sweep operation south through the AO. The operation terminated on 21 Mar at 1750 hours with the following results: six contacts were made with small VC units; one RF soldier was killed, nine CIDG wounded and one weapon lost. Enemy losses were 24 killed, 16 captured three suspects detained, five weapons seized, and 115 structures, 37 sampans and six bunkers destroyed. On 22 Mar at 2300 hours, one CIDG platoon, one combat reconnaissance platoon, one VNSF and three USASF from Camp Phu Quoc, A-427, Kien Giang Province, departed on a search and destroy operation. The friendly element was broken into three separate elements. On the 25th, a total of three contacts were made with small VC units which accounted for 13 VC killed, two Chicom rifles, a home-made bolt action shotgun, 250 rounds of small arms ammunition, two hand grenades, 500 kilos of rice, two kilos of documents, three packs, two axes and assorted uniforms and equipment captured, and four structures destroyed. On 26 Mar at 0400 hours, one CIDG company, two VNSF and two USASF from Camp My Phuoc Tay departed on a search and destroy operation. At 0630 hours, friendly elements initiated contact with an estimated 500 VC. VC were armed with automatic weapons and assorted small arms. After a 40 minute firefight, the VC broke contact and withdrew southeast. Results were no friendly casualties, 13 VC killed, nine VC and 10 hand grenades captured, and three sampans destroyed. The operation terminated at 1400 hours with no further contact. On 26 Mar at 2115 hours, two combat reconnaissance platoons in support of Camp My An, A-426, Kien Phong Province, initiated contact with an estimated VC company. The operation was supported by artillery, and an AC-47 was on target by 2130 hours. Airstrikes were requested and received at 2230 hours, at which time the VC withdrew. Results were no friendly casualties, 20 VC killed, and 30 rounds of 81mm mortar, one hand grenade, one VC flag, 12 shovels, assorted photos and documents captured. On 2 Apr at 0030 hours, one Mike Force company in support of Camp My An made contact with a large VC force south of the camp. The friendly element pulled back to night defensive positions and requested AC-47 and gunship support. The VC fired 15 rounds of 60mm mortar at the Mike Force positions and followed the mortar attack with a heavy probing action. A three-hour firefight ensued which included hand to hand combat. The VC broke contact at 0330 hours

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1967

18

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

and withdrew southwest. Results of the action were one USASF wounded, six Mike Force killed, 22 Mike Force wounded and two carbines lost. Enemy losses were 73 killed, eight small arms and assorted ammunition and supplies captured. At 1500 hours, a new Mike Force company was moved from Don Phuc, A-430, and relieved the Mike Force company at My An. Company D recommended the Mike Force company for the award "The Order of the Green Scarf" for their outstanding action against a confirmed VC battalion. On the 19th of April at 0400 hours, two companies of CIDG, three VNSF and four USASF from Camp Kinh Quan II, A-416, departed on a search & destroy operation. The friendly elements had moved approximately seven kilometers southeast of camp when they were taken under fire by an estimated two VC companies. Due to rapid reaction of Camp Moc Hoa, B-41, subordinate "A" detachments, Army and Air Force aircraft, the initiative was taken from the VC in a minimum amount of time. Results of the contact were one USASF and seven CIDG killed, one VNSF and 19 CIDG wounded. VC losses were 26 killed, four weapons captured, ten structures and 50 anti-personnel mines destroyed. The operation terminated at 0910 hours on 20 April. On 23 April at 0400 hours, two companies of CIDG, two VNSF and four USASF from My Phuoc Tay, A-424, departed on a search and destroy operation. The friendly elements had moved approximately seven kilometers east of camp when they made contact with the 514th VC Local Force Battalion. The operation terminated at 1900 hours with the following results. The 514th Battalion headquarters was completely overrun; 26 VC were killed, 10 VC captured, numerous structures and material destroyed, one Mauser rifle, large amounts of documents, propaganda material and medical supplies seized. Friendly losses were two CIDG wounded.

(2) Command relationships and the employment of CIDG assets: With the increased deployment of FWMAF into the more isolated areas of Vietnam, which until recently had been the private domain of Special Forces, this headquarters initiated a study to determine the command relationship which should exist between these two forces. Upon completion of this study a letter was transmitted to COMUSMACV giving the 5th Special Forces Group's position on the tactical employment of CIDG, Mike Force, Mobile Guerrilla Force, and long range reconnaissance projects in support of FWMAF. This letter covers the background, capabilities, limitations, and concept of employment of indigenous assets, and delineates this organization's position on the proper command relationships which should exist between the FWMAF commanders and the indigenous units. A copy of the letter has been included in this report as Inclosure 9.

c. Special Operations.

(1) B-50, Project Omega: Operation Stark, which began 22 Jan and terminated 12 Feb, was conducted in the same general area as Operation Blackhawk I and Blackhawk II. The lack of enemy contact and the lack of signs of heavy foot traffic or trails indicated that there was very little enemy activity within the AO or movement through it at that time. The only

19

AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

exception occurred on 2 Feb when helicopters received ground fire from at least two locations while attempting to infiltrate a recon team. The enemy unit was estimated to be at least company size. The three Montagnards captured during the operation were found to be tribesmen indigenous to the Chu Pong Mountains. Signs of movement of such small tribes were noticed in the area. Extensive fortified areas large enough to accommodate battalion size enemy units were found in two recon zones. Project Omega initiated Operation Dawes in western Kontum Province on 3 Mar, terminating on 3 Apr. No major infiltration was detected in the AO. Actual enemy contact was limited to the central area along the Cambodian border. It is believed that the activity in this area is localized and that it is a foraging area for an enemy installation in the immediate vicinity west of the Cambodian border. Trails within the AO showed no signs of heavy use within the past two or three months.

(2) B-52, Project Delta: Operation Knox was conducted in the An Lao Valley, Binh Dinh Province, from 4 Mar to 3 Apr. A total of 28 team missions and 7 ranger company operations were conducted, resulting in 27 enemy contacts. One USASF and two rangers were killed; two USASF and five rangers were wounded. Although a total of 11 airstrikes were conducted, only three VC were confirmed killed.

(3) B-56, Project Sigma: Operation Regina was conducted in the northeastern portion of Phuoc Long Province. Phase I began on 20 Jan and ended on 6 Feb; Phase II lasted from 13 Feb to 26 Feb. The complete after action report for this operation is included as Inclosure 20 of this report. During the period 10-19 Mar Project Sigma conducted Operation Ocean Drive in western Long Khanh and eastern Bien Hoa Provinces. The operation was mounted on very short notice with road runner teams being infiltrated on 10 March, the same day the verbal order was received from the Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam. The operation was generated on information obtained through interrogation of a VC returnee. The source stated that a battalion of the 274th VC Regiment was located in the operational area with the mission of attacking friendly installations along National Route One between Xuan Loc and Long Binh. On 11 Mar, one recon team made contact with an enemy force estimated to be platoon or company size. The 1st and 2nd Mike Force Companies were committed as soon as sufficient helicopters were made available, but were landed approximately three kilometers west of the recon team's point of contact because a closer LZ could not be found. The delay in getting the companies to the objective provided the enemy sufficient time to disperse or to move from the area. The two companies swept the area until the morning of 14 Mar, and no significant contact with the enemy was made. On 17 Mar, road runner teams discovered two battalion size enemy positions with dug in, camouflaged emplacements. One of these had evidently been vacated the night before. Operation Liberty Blackjack, 4-7 Apr, had the mission of liberating American PW's believed to be located in Binh Long Province. Although the intelligence appeared to be reliable, no PW camp was found at the designated location. The operation was significant, however, in that valuable experience was gained for future

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

operations of this type. See Inclosure 24 for the after action report of this operation.

(4) Mobile Guerrilla Force operations: During the past three months mobile guerrilla force operations have been conducted in all four Corps Tactical Zones with significant success. There are now six operational mobile guerrilla forces--two in Company A (III CTZ), two in Company B (II CTZ), one in Company C (I CTZ), and one in Company D (IV CTZ). Companies C and D each have one mobile guerrilla force in training which will soon be operational. Blackjack 31, the most successful mobile guerrilla operation to date, was conducted from 8 Jan to 7 Feb in southern Phuoc Long and northern Long Khanh Provinces, the area known as War Zone "D". A total of 55 contacts were made, and 77 airstrikes were directed against a wide variety of targets. In addition to 56 confirmed VC kills, numerous base areas and large amounts of foodstuffs were destroyed. There were no USASF casualties and only one Mike Force soldier killed and four wounded. See Inclosure 21 for the after action report of this operation. On 10 Jan Blackjack 41 was initiated in Chau Doc Province, IV CTZ. This is an open-end operation which is still in progress. At the end of the reporting period there had been 24 contacts, 11 airstrikes, 110 VC killed, and one captured. Five Mike Force soldiers were killed, 35 wounded, and three USASF wounded. The operation has made significant progress in driving the VC out of their long-secure base area in the Seven Mountains region. Blackjack 23, in Binh Dinh Province of II CTZ, began on 7 Mar and ended 3 Apr. Twenty-two contacts and nine airstrikes resulted in a total of 10 VC killed, one wounded, and one captured. Friendly casualties were one USASF killed, two wounded, two Mike Force soldiers killed, and 12 wounded. Blackjack 32 was conducted from 15 Mar to 3 Apr in southeastern Long Khanh, southwestern Binh Tuy, and eastern Phuoc Tuy Provinces. This operation made eight contacts and directed 24 airstrikes against the enemy. Enemy losses were 26 killed; friendly losses were one USASF wounded, two Mike Force personnel killed and six wounded. See Inclosure 22 for the after action report of this operation. Blackjack 12 was a reconnaissance in force mission conducted in Quang Nam and southern Thua Thien Provinces from 31 Mar to 19 Apr. Results were 15 contacts, nine airstrikes, 63 VC killed, and 12 wounded. Friendly losses were one AATTV killed, one USASF wounded, and seven Mike Force wounded. See Inclosure 23 for the after action report of this operation.

d. Training: MACV Recondo School.

(1) During this reporting period the MACV Recondo School received student classes R-7-67 through R-12-67. The following is a breakdown of students by units and Corps areas for these classes:

CONFIDENTIAL

21

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>DROPPED</u>	<u>GRADUATED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>IN TRAINING</u>
1st Mar Div	5	4	1	0	1
3rd MAF	4	0	1	0	1
ROK Marines	4	0	3	0	1

II CORPS

1st Cav Div (AM)	45	24	18	3	0
4th Inf Div (-)	36	12	19	0	5
3/25th Inf Div	16	8	4	1	3
1/101st Abn Div	19	7	9	0	3
ROK Forces	42	2	20	14	6
Hq Tng Div MACV	11	3	7	1	0

III CORPS

1st Inf Div	14	10	4	0	0
25th Inf Div (-)	19	12	4	0	3
173rd Abn Bde (Sep)	19	2	11	1	5
196th Lt Inf Bde	24	14	9	1	0
199th Lt Inf Bde	46	17	20	2	7
9th Inf Div	43	23	16	4	0
11th Arm Cav Reg	12	6	2	1	3
TOTAL:	359	146	148	28	38

NOTE: R-6 was in session before start of this quarter. R-12 is in session at the end of this quarter.

(2) Training Operations:

(a) Number/type operations conducted:

	<u>Day</u>	<u>Night</u>	<u>Recondo</u>	<u>CIDG</u>
1. Attacks	0	0	0	0
2. Blk Action	0	0	0	0
3. Escort Action	11	0	0	11
4. Cmbt Patrols	3	0	0	3
5. Recon Patrols	49	0	14	0
6. Ambushes	0	90	90	0

(b) Number of friendly initiated contacts:

<u>Day</u>	<u>Night</u>	<u>Recondo</u>
0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

22

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(c) VC losses (confirmed):

1. VC killed:	1
2. VC captured:	0
3. VC wounded:	0
4. VC suspects:	21
5. VC weapons:	1

(d) Friendly Losses:

	USASF	VNSF	RANGER	RECONDO STD	CIDG
1. Killed:	0	0	0	1	0
2. Wounded:	1	0	0	2	0
3. Missing:	0	0	0	0	0
4. Weapons Lost:	0	0	0	1	0

(3) Logistics: The MACV Recondo School as of 15 Feb 67 is supported logistically by USARV and the 1st Logistical Command respectively.

e. Aviation.

(1) The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) employed a combat control team from the U.S. Air Force for the first time in February 1967. The team supported the tactical move of Project Delta from the base camp to the forward operating base. The team provided very effective support in controlling the flow of U.S. Air Force aircraft and coordinating the loading and unloading of equipment. The team will be requested on future moves for Project Delta when normal aerial port facilities are not available.

(2) The 483rd Troop Carrier Wing (C-7A) requested and received safety harnesses for all crew chiefs and kickers. The harness was fabricated in the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Logistical Supply Center and provided to the wing to increase the freedom of movement of the C-7A crew while complying with all safety requirements. The safety harness was provided in adequate numbers to support the entire C-7A Caribou fleet in Southeast Asia.

(3) In March 1967, Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Pleiku, obtained operational control of one U-1A Otter. This aircraft, provided by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, has increased the command and control capability of the company commander and the three "B" detachment commanders. The aircraft is responsive to Special Forces requirements in the II Corps Tactical Zone and has provided both staff transport and an emergency means of resupply for small items.

(4) The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) employed a joint tactical air control party to support a Project Delta long range reconnaissance operation and an adjacent mobile guerrilla force operation. The joint TACP provided the most efficient means of supporting both operations and permitted

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

control of the FAC under a single U.S. Air Force coordinator. The immediate exchange of information and the increased flexibility permitted maximum support for both operations. The location of the Forward Air Controller aircraft at the joint TACP resulted in a saving of one hour flying time per mission in support of the mobile guerrilla operation.

f. Research and Development Projects, currently under evaluation:

(1) Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD). The MPD is a device intended to alert a foot patrol to the presence of concealed humans in ambush by detecting certain human chemical effluvia. The evaluation of this item was completed on 28 Feb 67. The results of the tests indicated that Special Forces would have very limited use for MPD's.

(2) Battlefield Illumination System. The prototype system consists of 12 individual flares each contained in a filament wound launch tube. These 12 launch tubes are bonded to a molded plastic breech plate and further bonded into an extended plastic outer case. The system is designed to provide six minutes of continuous illumination or a combination of one and five minutes, or three and three minutes. The 5th SFGA presently has 10 illumination kits. Tests to date indicate that the item is excellent.

(3) 40mm Grenade Launcher (XM-148). This item was designed to be mounted under the front hand guard of the M16A1 rifle. 57 XM-148's were issued to Group on 30 March for tests on a mass issue basis. The results of the tests indicate that the 5th SFGA would have only limited use for the weapon.

(4) Battery Operated Fluorescent Lamp. This lamp has an 11 inch miniature fluorescent tube powered by two 69 volt batteries or by a 110 volt AC source. The lamp is designed to be hand carried or suspended from two eyelets on the back of the lamp. Tests were completed on 5 April with very successful results. A basis of issue and total number required has been submitted to USARV G-3. This item is an "off the shelf" item, and procurement should not take long.

(5) Mine, A-Pers, Linear (Fragmacord). The mine consists of a 25 foot length of waterproof, flexible, explosive cord, beaded with coiled fragmentation rings crimped to the cord. Thirty mines have been issued to each CTZ. The results to date have been excellent.

(6) 40mm Rapid Fire Grenade Launcher. Evaluation of four systems of rapid fire grenade launchers will begin in the latter part of May 1967. The evaluation of each system will be staggered two months apart. The systems to be evaluated, and the order in which they will be evaluated, are: (a) Hand cranked, low velocity grenade launcher; (b) automatic, low velocity grenade launcher; (c) hand cranked, high velocity grenade launcher; and (d) automatic, high velocity grenade launcher. The 5th SFGA is scheduled to receive two of each system for evaluation.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(7) Colt, sub-machine gun, 5.56mm, CAR-15. This weapon is similar to the M16A1 rifle; however, it has a shorter barrel and hand guard, a telescoping butt stock, and different type of flash suppressor. It weighs 5.6 pounds, is 28 inches long with stock closed and has a cyclic rate of fire of 750-900 rounds per minute. 25 weapons are located in each CTZ. Tests were concluded on 1 May 1967. Results of the test have proved that this weapon is an extremely valuable asset to the 5th SFGA.

(8) Rucksack, lightweight nylon. This item is constructed of lightweight nylon with quick-release buckles on the shoulder straps, plastic holding device on the drawstrings, five sections of webbing with eyelets for mounting additional equipment. Thirty-one rucksacks were received on 21 Mar and were distributed to II CTZ and III CTZ for evaluation. The tests will be concluded on 10 May. To date the item has proven to be a great improvement over existing rucksacks.

(9) Evaluation of sniper activities and operations. ACTIV is conducting an evaluation of the sniper program presently existing in RVN. The purpose of this evaluation is to: (a) determine if a need exists to re-institute an Army-wide program of sniper training; (b) evaluate new sniper equipment and effectiveness of existing equipment; (c) evaluate the effectiveness of present sniper activities in RVN. 5th SFGA participation in the ACTIV program will constitute evaluation of sniper activities with the M-1D rifle with M-84 scope.

(10) Improved M-79 ammunition carrier vest. The vest has six pockets, four in front and two on the back, which will hold a total of 18 rounds of ammunition for the M-79 or XM-148 grenade launcher. The ammunition vest, fabricated of mesh type nylon material, is split down the center of the back with three elastic cross straps and has drawstring tighteners down each side below the arm openings. Closure of the front of the vest is accomplished by a velcro fastener. 5th SFGA has been issued 40 vests and they have been distributed to each of the four CTZ's. Evaluation to date indicates the item is excellent.

(11) 105mm, XM-546 (beehive) A-Pers cartridge for howitzers. The XM-38OE2 beehive projectile contains a payload of 8,000 eight-grain flechettes which attain nose-first stable flight in a forward moving, cone shaped pattern, about 50 feet from point of ejection. The lethality of this round for direct fire situations is far greater than that of the HE projectile. This ammunition has been procured by 5th SFGA and is presently being distributed to camps in II CTZ for evaluation in conjunction with camp defense.

(12) Nightingale device. This device is a battle sound simulator which is designed to be used to create diversions, deceive the enemy as to the exact location or strength of friendly units. Eighteen devices have been distributed throughout the four Corps areas. No results have been received to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

4. (U) Logistics.

a. General: During the past three months the Logistical Support Center continued providing logistical support to 82 "A" detachments, 12 "B" detachments, four companies, and six special project detachments positioned in over 100 different locations from Con Thien, near the DMZ, to Phu Quoc Island in the Bay of Thailand. More than 9,850 tons of supplies were delivered to these subordinate units by air, land and sea. Over 350 tons of food, ammunition and general supplies were parachuted into isolated camps and in support of special operations.

b. Supply:

(1) Most requisitions for all classes of supplies except limited Class II and IV, Class III and Class V are still submitted to the Counter-insurgency Support Office on Okinawa. Under the provisions of an Inter-Service Support Agreement, Class III, Class V and common Class II and IV items are obtained from the 1st Logistical Command Depot at Cam Ranh Bay. A liaison NCO is now stationed there to expedite supply shipments from Cam Ranh Bay to Nha Trang. It is anticipated in-country procurement will continue to increase.

(2) Each Forward Supply Point was provided with two-4,000 pound forklifts which have alleviated a critical problem. The seven new forklifts obtained for the LSC insure proper loading of aircraft and have eliminated aircraft down time due to insufficient and in-operable MHE.

(3) The use of LST's to ship supplies by sea to all four Forward Supply Points has been sharply increased. Over 2,075 tons of supplies were delivered to Danang, Qui Nhon, Saigon and Can Tho during the reporting period by this means.

(4) To provide a rapid response to urgent supply requests, a "Red Ball" priority system has been established. This is a method of identifying high priority requests with a distinctive marking to insure prompt handling.

c. Considerable improvement has been made in the physical facilities at the Logistical Support Center.

(1) To protect supplies awaiting shipment, a 1,000 foot covered ready line was constructed.

(2) Extensions have been added to six warehouses to provide sheltered working areas.

(3) A receiving warehouse has been completed and a new ration warehouse is now under construction.

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(4) The entire Logistical Support Center area including the ammunition storage area is being inclosed with cyclone fencing and security has been improved by placing Nung guards on the gates and sentry dogs inside the yard and warehouse area at night.

d. The logistical briefing given all newly assigned officers during their in-processing has been expanded to a detailed explanation of the logistical support provided the Special Forces mission in Vietnam. The briefing is illustrated with the use of more than 80 color slides.

e. To insure a quick, effective means of combating fire within the Logistical Support Center, four damage control and fire fighting teams have been created and a detailed and workable damage control plan prepared. Fire fighting equipment has been obtained and is located throughout the area to insure adequate tools for extinguishing fires are readily available.

f. An agreement has been made with Air Force personnel at Cam Ranh Bay whereby 5th Special Forces Group receives extra aircraft on Saturdays. The movement section has been able to use these aircraft to move cargo that would otherwise have gone into the Aerial Port System. Much of this cargo consists of low priority items in small quantities and is therefore difficult to justify additional aircraft scheduling. Extra aircraft under 5th Special Forces Group control make it possible to move this cargo without jeopardizing priority cargo.

5. (U) Revolutionary Development.

a. The Group's Campaign Plan for Special Forces Revolutionary Development in Vietnam was published 1 March 1967. This plan clarifies and assigns responsibilities for the planning and implementation of Revolutionary Development support within the 5th Special Forces Group. The plan delineates responsibilities for the SFOB, letter companies, "B" and "A" detachments in conducting the RD support program. Each company, "B" and "A" detachment is required to prepare a plan for their respective areas to implement the Group's Campaign Plan.

b. On 3 and 4 March 1967, the Revolutionary Development Support Activities Section sponsored a conference at Camp Goodman, Saigon, for all Group company and "B" detachment S-5 officers. The course was designed to provide a general orientation of the RDSA program for the more recently assigned officers. Representatives from the voluntary civilian agencies (OCO, USAID, CARE, IVS, CRS, etc) were introduced and the commodities these agencies can provide in support of the CA/RDSA programs as well as the procedures for obtaining them were explained. The Group's Campaign Plan for Revolutionary Development Support was discussed in detail. This discussion brought to light the need for specific implementing instructions to execute the Campaign Plan. The conference also provided an opportunity for discussion of problem areas, problem solving techniques, and presentation of lessons learned in the conduct of RDSA.

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

c. During the periods 13-15 March and 22-24 March 1967, the Revolutionary Development Support Activities Section conducted courses for the Group's non-commissioned officers who are assigned primary or additional duties of RDSA. Students were requested by RDSA from each company, "B" and "A" detachment. The primary purpose of the courses was to acquaint these NCO's with the Group's Revolutionary Development Campaign Support Plan and the procedures for its implementation. Instructors were furnished by RDSA. Guest speakers were furnished by the 41st CA Company, the 245th PSYOP Company, US Agency for International Development, and Joint US Public Affairs Office. An NCO was selected from each of the four Corps to give a presentation of the CA program in support of RD in his respective area. Initially, the majority of the NCO's accepted RDSA as a "necessary evil"; however, at the conclusion of the course, they realized the importance of Revolutionary Development as a major factor in accomplishing the Free World's mission in RVN.

d. On 20 April 1967, Implementing Instructions to the Group's Campaign Plan for Revolutionary Development during 1967 were published. Essentially, Special Forces RD support operations for Calendar Year 1967 will be divided into four phases:

(1) Phase I (1 May - 30 Jun 67) During Phase I, each letter company will train CIDG CA/PSYOP squads for its respective corps area. "B" detachments in sector roles and "A" detachments in sub-sector roles will assist local officials and the LLDB in establishing Survey Census Committees to conduct an RD Support Survey. The RD Support Survey will be the basis for determining which of the three support roles (active, advisory, or preparatory) the detachments will adopt.

(2) Phase II (1 Jul - 31 Aug 67) During Phase II, the CIDG CA/PSYOP squads will receive additional training; a detailed survey of AO's will be conducted; and, based upon the information developed in the surveys an RD Plan for Support Activities during the remainder of CY-67 will be drafted as a joint USASF/LLDB effort.

(3) Phase III (1 Sep - 31 Oct 67) During Phase III, detachments will begin execution of the approved plan.

(4) Phase IV (1 Nov - 31 Dec 67) During Phase IV, execution of the CY-67 Plan will continue; detachments will collect information to update the RD survey of their AO; and, a detailed plan for RD support during CY-68 will be drafted, coordinated and submitted through channels to reach the SFOB NLT 31 December 1967.

AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

6. (C) Psychological Operations.

a. As a result of a thorough study of PSYOPS documentation, Group Regulation 515-1, Psychological Operations, has been revised and increased from a nine page document to a 14 page document complemented by seven annexes containing formats and pertinent data required for conduct of psychological operations.

b. The reporting format for the Monthly Operational Summary (MOPSUM) has been revised to provide uniform reporting, and more complete statistics as required by COMUSMACV. Study revealed that the statistics compiled by Group were not being reported to COMUSMACV as required by MACV Directive 515-1. Corrective action has been taken and as a result the national figures should show a substantial increase in the future. Ultimately, 5th Group requests should receive higher priorities and more consideration in the future.

c. The Group PSYOPS News Letter was initiated to provide a means of passing on ideas, methods, and current information pertinent to psychological operations and civic action. The letter is written by the Group PSYOPS Officer and disseminated monthly.

d. During the reporting period it became apparent that the number of CA/PSYOPS documents supplied to Group for distribution to subordinate units was far below the required number. Corrective action was taken, and an increased number is presently being supplied. When adequate copies are not supplied, the materials are reproduced by the PSYOPS Section.

e. The JUSPAO catalog of PSYWAR tapes was reproduced by this headquarters and distributed to all detachments. This was necessary because the catalogs needed were not available through JUSPAO channels and detachments had no way of knowing what material was available. The tapes are designed for rapid reaction aerial loudspeaker operations and can be effectively used in support of ground loudspeaker operations.

f. The S-5 recently sponsored a conference for officers and two training courses for NCO's. The conference was supported by one hour of PSYOPS orientation on the role of psychological warfare in Revolutionary Development. The NCO courses each received two hours of the same instruction.

g. A total of 51 CA/PSYOP teams have been organized and are presently operational. This step was necessitated when the Indoctrination and Motivation teams previously employed were redesignated Revolutionary Development Teams and no longer available to aid Special Forces detachments.

h. In the month of February the first NVA ralliers were received under the Chieu Hoi program. A total of 37 were received from II and III CTZ's. VC and NVA personnel continue to rally at a record high rate with a total for the reporting period of 1,557.

24

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

7. (U) Personnel and Administration:

a. Unit Strength:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period:

OFF	598
WO	11
EM	2,123
TOTAL	<u>2,732</u>

(2) At the end of the reporting period:

OFF	511
WO	11
EM	2,175
TOTAL	<u>2,697</u>

b. Supply of blank forms and publications: The lack of an adequate supply of blank forms and publications discussed in the previous report has been corrected; adequate materials are now being received.

c. Officer Assignment Instructions: During the period, 13 officers received assignment instructions less than fifteen days prior to DEROS. One officer received instructions two days before DEROS. It is pertinent that this is but 50% of the numbers reflected on the last report, a reduction attributed to closer monitoring of DEROS and prompt follow-up action. Late assignment instructions, however, receive immediate adverse publicity, and in addition to undue personal and family hardships and a considerable increase in the administrative workload at all levels, the impact on morale is most significant. An individual's tolerance and understanding for these oversights diminishes exponentially in proportion to the number of days remaining in a combat zone.

d. Critical MOS Shortage (Officer): There is considerable disparity between the number of officers required on the basis of the MTOE, and those authorized by the TOE and General Order. The difference, to be exact, is 201. Requisitions are being validated for the most part on the basis of the TOE only, creating a shortage which impinges with increasing severity on the Group's ability to meet its requirements. For example, in the case

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

of Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Officers, MOS 39305, not only do we not have sufficient numbers of personnel available to fill these slots, but the shortage is compounded by the lack of school trained officers. Of 37 Officers filling such positions, 15 are school trained. The MTOE authorization for this MOS is 106.

e. Casualties: Casualties suffered during the reporting period are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
OFF	6	1	29
EM	20	2	85
TOTAL	26	3	114

f. Voluntary Extension of Foreign Service Tours: The high rate of voluntary extensions continued in this period as it has since the beginning of the special leave program, which confirms the effectiveness of this program. During the period 15 officers and 133 enlisted personnel extended their tours.

g. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The following is the status of awards and decorations processed during the reporting period:

	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
(a) Medal of Honor	0	3
(b) DSC	3	6
(c) DSM	0	1
(d) DFC	3	4
(e) Silver Star	14	10
(f) Legion of Merit	12	12
(g) Soldier's Medal	8	10
(h) Bronze Star (V)	67	40
(i) Bronze Star	231	83
(j) Air Medal	30	27
(k) ARCOM	85	66
(l) Purple Heart	40	12
(m) ARCOM (V)	8	12
(n) Air Medal (V)	3	6
(o) CIB	436	
(p) CMB	70	
TOTAL	1,020	292

Note: Number of awards approved includes recommendations submitted prior to the reported period.

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(2) There are three recommendations for the Medal of Honor currently pending at Department of the Army: 1LT Sisler, George K., OF 110068; SFC Hoskins, Gomer D., Jr., RA 25351557; and SSG Hall, Billie Allen, RA 18621886.

(3) The recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor to SFC Bennie G. Adkins, RA 54193612, was downgraded to award of the Distinguished Service Cross.

h. A&R and Special Services:

(1) Athletic and Recreation Program: Fourteen additional weight lifting sets were obtained for use at the SFOB and various detachments. Other athletic equipment has been ordered and will be distributed upon receipt.

(2) Special Services: Magazines, paperback books and newspapers are mailed directly to all detachments weekly. A reading room was opened at the SFOB. There are magazines, newspapers and over 1,000 paperback and hard cover books available; facilities for studying and writing letters have been installed. A tape library will be opened in May, and personnel will be able to dub tapes, record tapes to send home, and play tapes received from home.

i. Post Exchange Facilities: The SFOB PX annex now stocks various items of electronic equipment, television sets, radios and numerous other items.

j. Labor/Civilian Personnel: In keeping with MACV objectives to reduce the amount of piasters expended, additional consolidation of activities is planned. All hiring and firing of civilian personnel for Group units in the Nha Trang area will be centered at the SFOB Civilian Personnel Office. This will permit elimination of most CPO positions at the other four offices in the Nha Trang area.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

8. (U) Medical.

a. Hospital facilities.

(1) The CIDG hospital at Company C, Danang, became fully operational in early March 1967.

(2) Construction of a general surgical facility at the CIDG hospital at Company B, Pleiku, began in early April 1967.

(3) Construction of the Company A general surgical facility at Bien Hoa was completed in April 1967.

(4) A 15 bed hospital for CIDG became fully operational in late March 1967 at Detachment B-23, Ban Me Thuot. This facility provides hospital support to the CIDG troops in the nine A detachments under B-23. Thus, evacuation routes are simplified and the work load on the overburdened CIDG hospital at Pleiku is lessened. Furthermore, better medical support is provided CIDG in southern II Corps Tactical Zone.

b. SFOB Dispensary: The SFOB dental clinic was completed in February 1967, providing a high level of dental care to personnel assigned to the SFOB and to Special Forces personnel visiting the headquarters. An average of 450 dental treatments (not including examinations) are performed each month.

c. Medical Civic Action: Medical Civic Action programs continued. Civilian outpatients treated between 1 Jan 67 through 31 March 1967 totalled 214,132.

d. Rodent Control: A letter of instruction concerning rodent control was published and distributed to all subordinate detachments in mid-February 1967. This publication outlines a step-by-step program by which rat populations may be decreased to acceptable levels. In the camps where this program has been followed on a continuous basis, significant success has been noted.

e. Local Sanitation:

(1) Health evaluation examinations of all indigenous mess association employees were completed during March.

(2) SFOB sanitation continues to improve due to construction of more sanitary facilities and installation of efficient equipment, to include dishwashers.

f. Hospitalization and Evacuation: Due to the construction of new CIDG hospital facilities, 5th SF Group Regulation 40-3 was completely revised, dictating general policy concerning hospitalization and evacuation of CIDG troops.

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

f. Narcotics Control: In order that this organization fully comply with USARV Regulation 40-2, concerning narcotics, drug abuse control items, and restricted drugs, 5th SF Gp Reg 40-4 was completely revised and published in April 1967. The regulation lists the controlled drugs and directs control procedures to be utilized, complying with USARV directives.

h. Plague Immunizations: In coordination with USAID, all civilian employees of the SFOB, Detachment B-52, and the Detachment B-50 compound were immunized against plague in March 1967.

AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

9. (C) Signal:

a. Communications Traffic:

(1) The traffic analysis for the reporting period revealed that a total of 18,690 messages were processed by the SFOB Communications Center. This volume of traffic has saturated the communications system controlled by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and overflow traffic has to be sent by other in-country communication systems, i.e., STRATCOM, DCA-SAM, Air Force. The problem of handling overflow traffic is more prevalent when the point-to-point land line circuits are out, and traffic must be passed by radioteletype or CW.

(2) The four subordinate communication centers, one located in each corps area, processed an average of 2,670 messages during the reporting period.

b. Two new radios were brought to Group by the manufacturers for evaluation. Both of these, the AN/PRC-66 and the AN/PRC-70, have characteristics which make them especially applicable to Special Forces operations.

(1) AN/PRC-66 Radio Set: (See attached photos)

(a) The AN/PRC-66 is a small portable transceiver which provides effective AM communication on any one of 3,500 available channels in the frequency range from 225.0 to 399.95 MHz. The transmitter RF output is 2 watts, and the receiver sensitivity is better than 3 microvolts. The transceiver unit itself, including controls, connectors, and a storable flexible antenna, occupies a volume of only 75 cubic inches. It can be hand held during use, or it can be operated as a packset, vehicular, or airborne unit. Low power consumption and high efficiency have resulted in maximum battery life. Both rechargeable or throw away batteries are available for the AN/PRC-66. The rechargeable battery package uses nickel cadmium cells, and the throw away battery package uses alkaline cells. The UHF Transceiver AN/PRC-66 has been developed under contract number AF30(602)-3378 awarded by Rome Air Development Center in April 1964 to Collins Canada through Canadian Commercial Corporation.

(b) The AN/PRC-66 would solve the requirement for a communications mode between support aircraft and Special Forces ground elements engaged in combat actions. A FAC aircraft is required to be on station to direct air strikes due to a current void in air/ground UHF communications.

(2) AN/PRC-70 (SC-948) Radio Set:

(a) The AN/PRC-70 is a lightweight HF/VHF-SSB/FM manpack and vehicular combination transceiver. It has a power output of 40 watts and a communication range of approximately 1500 miles. The new, highly versatile HF/VHF-SSB/FM transceiver provides one radio to do the jobs which

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

formerly required three such packages. The radio was designed by General Dynamics/Electronics, Rochester, New York, under Signal Corps Contract DA-28-043-AMC-00137 (E). Extremely versatile, it will operate in a variety of modes, including SSB, FM, AM, and CW. 74,000 highly stable frequencies are easily selected by using five digital knobs. These and other controls have been human engineered. Compatibility with other less stable equipment operating in the 2 to 76 mc range is ensured by the inclusion of vernier tuning in the receiver. A variety of antennas can be used, such as six-foot whip, 15 foot whip, and longwire.

(b) The AN/PRC-70 is capable of performing the same function as any one of the following radio sets currently used by the Special Forces in Vietnam:


- * 1. AN/GRC-87
- * 2. AN/GRC-109
- * 3. AN/GRC-125
- * 4. AN/PRC-10
- * 5. AN/PRC-25
- * 6. AN/PRC-47
- * 7. AN/PRC-64
- * 8. AN/PRC-74
- * 9. AN/VRC-10
- * 10. AN/VRQ-3


* - Sets now being phased out.

(c) The AN/PRC-70 is not intended to replace the AN/PRC-25 (AN/PRC-77), the AN/GRC-125 or the AN/PRC-74, but rather would provide a single common set that a combat patrol can use for both internal control on FM and long range AM-SSB back to base camp.

CONFIDENTIAL

37





AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

10. (U) Engineer:

a. Organization: During this reporting period the Staff Engineer Section, which was first organized in December 1966, was placed into full operation. The organization is as depicted in inclosure 10. The Staff Engineer is a special staff officer working under the operational control of the Deputy Commanding Officer for Counterinsurgency. The Staff Engineer assists in the formulation of calendar plans, budgeting, advises on camp location, determines the type of fighting camp to be erected, effects coordination and support for camp construction, assists in defense and barrier planning, and supervises the construction to completion. One Engineer Officer from the Staff Engineer Section is placed in general support of each of the four line companies. These officers are billeted in the respective company areas and supervise CIDG camp construction and rehabilitation within each of the corps areas. The Engineer Construction and Advisory Detachment (EDAC) (KB Teams), attached to the 5th SFGA from the 1st SFGA, Okinawa, has been placed under the operational control of the Staff Engineer for mission assignments. There is no change in normal command relationships.

b. Camp Construction: The "fighting camp" concept has been continued and implemented. The last operational report gave the principles and parameters of a fighting camp. Since then, camp design has been further categorized, based on ground water table (GWT) characteristics in RVN, as follows:

(1) Type I: Subsurface. In those areas having a low GWT, all structures are placed in hardened underground bunkers.

(2) Type II: Surface. The entire camp is placed on the surface in areas where the GWT is usually located within three feet of the surface. The camp may or may not be enclosed by an earth berm. The two modifications of the surface fighting camp are:

(a) Standard. Crew-served weapons positions, ammo bunkers, emergency medical and commo facilities are placed in hardened CONEX containers. All other structures are wood frame.

(b) CONEX: All facilities, to include living quarters, are placed in hardened CONEX containers.

(3) Type III: Floating. Each structure in the camp is designed to rest on the ground during the dry season and rise with the water during periods of flooding. Floating helipads capable of supporting a fully loaded UH1D are also a part of each floating camp.

A list of camps completed during the period and those presently under construction is shown in Inclosure 11.

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

c. Camp Design and Construction: To further increase speed of construction, the erection and design of all buildings has been standardized. Each camp is authorized certain specific structures, the basic design of which is the same for all camps (Inclosure 12). In the past, a great deal of time has been spent in the procurement of materials both prior to and during construction. This deficiency has now been overcome by pre-stocking in the Logistical Support Command (LSC), Nha Trang. All construction materials required for a camp are pre-cut and stored on a building-by-building basis. The building materials are then banded and palletized so they can be delivered by C-130 aircraft as either air land, air drop or LOLEX cargo. If only certain buildings are required, for rehabilitation of an existing camp for example, buildings are ordered by name and shipped to the camp site. A stockage level of two complete camps is maintained in the LSC.

41

SECRET

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

11. (S) CIDG Finance:

a. Detachment Fund Report audit procedures were completely revamped. A list of standard remarks for 25 of the most common errors found in detachment fund reports was prepared. The auditor now simply checks off the type error, fills in the monetary amount, and the typist types the applicable standard remark on the back of the Statement of Accountability. Previously, auditors spent much of their time composing a description of each discrepancy. This list of standard remarks has greatly improved the auditors efficiency, and a more comprehensive report of discrepancies is sent to the Funds Officers.

b. A flip-style CIDG pay table has been prepared so that auditors can more quickly verify pay entitlements. The feasibility of producing these tables for issue to detachment funds officers is being considered. Previously, SF Regulation 37-1 had to be utilized to check entitlements.

c. A card index suspense file has been established for each corps. As major discrepancies are noted on detachment fund reports, they are posted to the appropriate index card. Corps fund officers now can be informed concisely as to the quality of their reports and many discrepancies cleared up quickly.

d. A total of 60 detachments were audited during the period 1 February through 30 April 1967. These audits are designed primarily to assist agent officers and to insure that the administration of CIDG funds is in accordance with prescribed SF regulations. This program has proven itself mutually advantageous to the command and the detachments.

e. On 8 March 1967 the Bank of Tokyo was notified that the Special Forces bank account was to be moved to the Bank of America effective 30 April 1967. This move was accomplished. The change was ordered by the Deputy Comptroller, MACV, as part of MACV's program to have all US funds in military banking facilities, i.e., the Bank of America or the Chase National Bank.

f. On 5 April 1967 a message was dispatched to USARPAC requesting that the in-country portion of our Annual Funding Program and the 4th quarter allotment of funds be reduced by \$4,368 million. This "turn-back" of excess funds was necessitated by slippage in recruiting of CIDG personnel and a shortfall in camp construction. DA message received on 8 April 1967, approved this request.

SECRET

42

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

12. (C) Comptroller.

a. A Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) was established consisting of the Comptroller (chairman), CIDG Finance, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, RDSA, Group Engineer and the Group Signal Officer. The purpose of the Committee is as follows:

(1) Coordinate program and budget actions with the 5th SFGA.

(2) Establish and maintain responsibility for one or more cost codes in the Command Operating Budget of the 5th SFGA.

b. An increase in subsistence costs in IV CTZ from 35\$VN to 40\$VN per man per day was approved. Due to the inflationary trend of food in IV CTZ the increase was necessary to provide a sufficient level of subsistence.

c. Revision of MACV Recondo School Support: A letter of instruction was published by USARV directing MACV to support the MACV Recondo School. The 1st Log Command has assumed responsibility for the support of the school. Items not available through the 1st Log channels will be issued by the 5th SFGA ISC, and ISC will be reimbursed with items of like value. The 5th SFGA will continue to support CIDG company and the school cadre.

d. Non-appropriated Fund Audits: The Comptroller conducted audits of non-appropriated mess funds. They showed need for a standardized and more formal accounting system. Numerous errors were uncovered, and records did not include substantiating documents. As a result of the audit a two day class was conducted at the SFOB to familiarize mess officers and NCO's with proper accounting procedures. Effective 1 May 1967 all clubs and messes will use a standard accounting system adopted from the SFOB Mess Association system.

e. Revised requirements for the receipt of jump pay for the Mike Force personnel: The new revision requires only that personnel make four (4) jumps a year rather than one monthly.

f. Two (2) additional personnel were received to help in the auditing of non-appropriated fund activities.

g. Revision of Regulation 335-20, dated 26 Nov 66 with change 1, Headquarters 5th SFG (Abn) 1st SF: This was to provide a current list of recurring reports initiated by or pertaining to this headquarters. This list indicates the staff section responsible for initiating, monitoring, consolidating, or preparing reports that are active in the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: None.2. (C) Operations:a. ITEM: Every tactical plan should include a deception (Source A-238) plan.

DISCUSSION: During a recent cordon and search operation against a village which was suspected of providing assistance to the enemy, deception was directly attributable to the success of the operation. Normal techniques were employed to isolate the village during the hours of darkness. However, at first light a CIDG squad dressed as Viet Cong was sent into the village. They were immediately greeted effusively and presented food by some of the inhabitants. These inhabitants were immediately processed as suspected Viet Cong sympathizers.

OBSERVATION: It is obvious this technique will eventually become known and villagers will become suspicious and hesitate to contact such parties. This will be to our advantage and to the Viet Cong's disadvantage.

b. ITEM: Deception can be used to preclude the establish- (Source: A-346, A-236) ment of patterns in combat operations.

DISCUSSION: When two camps have adjoining TAORs, deception can be used to increase the effectiveness of combat operations. Lac Thien conducted a company size operation in an area adjoining the TAOR of An Lac where they had received several intelligence reports. After searching the area thoroughly for five days with negative contact, the operation returned to base camp. In the meantime An Lac had dispatched a company into the area arriving in the "backdoor". Three contacts were initiated by friendly forces resulting in significant enemy casualties.

OBSERVATION: The enemy had layed low while the first company was searching and started movement again when the first company pulled out. The small ambushes on the trails employed by the second company accounted for the results.

c. ITEM: US Special Forces personnel in CIDG camps (Source: Co B) that are within an area of operations assigned to a US commander are placed under the operational control of that US commander.

DISCUSSION: In order to insure mutual support it is mandatory that liaison be established between Special Forces and the US unit at the lowest possible echelon. This is best accomplished at the "B" detachment level by attaching a liaison officer to the US unit. This liaison officer will insure that:

CONFIDENTIAL

44

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(1) The operations of the pertinent CIDG camps are providing mutual support to the US unit within their capabilities.

(2) The "B" detachment commander is abreast of the operational requirements, present and future, of the US forces.

(3) The US commander is provided with detailed information of the capabilities and activities of the CIDG forces within the "B" detachment AO.

(4) Coordination is provided between the maneuver units and fire support of both US and CIDG fires.

(5) Rapid communications exist between the US Hqs and " " Detachment.

OBSERVATION: The above procedures should be followed when Special Forces personnel in CIDG camps are placed under operational control of a US major unit commander.

- d. ITEM: Smoke Grenades are an effective munition (Source: Co B) for marking friendly positions.

DISCUSSION: Often medevacs, resupply, and FAC aircraft pilots ask patrols on the ground to mark their positions with smoke. For security reasons smoke should be used only as a last resort. Panels, mirrors, and flares are less likely to disclose friendly positions to the enemy. However, when smoke is used the following method should be employed:

- (1) The pilot should call for smoke.
- (2) The patrol will throw smoke.
- (3) The patrol will notify the pilot when the smoke grenade has been activated. Note: the patrol must not mention the color of the smoke.
- (4) When the pilot can see the smoke, he should identify the color.
- (5) If the color is correct the patrol will "Roger".

OBSERVATION: This system will preclude enemy intercept of the message from the patrol to the pilot and subsequent attempts by the enemy to deceive the pilots using smoke grenades of the same color.

- e. ITEM: Problems caused by flood waters. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: The wet season and the ensuing floods in the Delta region create numerous problems and difficulties which must be overcome so that the camps can maintain and even improve their combat effectiveness during this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

45

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

OBSERVATIONS:

(1) Berms and dikes must be reinforced and built up to withstand long periods of exposure to rains and flood waters.

(2) Drainage ditches and sumps must be cleaned out and new ones constructed, where necessary, in order to keep the water level down inside the camp.

(3) Additional pumps must be requisitioned and checked for bad fittings and faulty parts before the start of the flood season.

f. ITEM: Local security during the flood season. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: During the flood season many camps in the Delta are surrounded by water. This makes it difficult to set up foot patrols and ambushes around the camp for local security.

OBSERVATION: Training is being conducted at all camps to enable them to send out patrols and ambushes on sampans during the high water season.

g. ITEM: Conduct of ambushes in flat, open terrain. (Source: B-42)

DISCUSSION: Problem in setting up effective ambushes in a large open area in Delta-type terrain.

OBSERVATION: Flat, open terrain ambushes can cover a much larger area by positioning listening posts at 300 to 500 meter intervals to screen a large area. The ambush party is located behind this screening line and can deploy to position on a light or radio signal, when an LP observes the line of movement of the enemy. This gives the ambush the advantage of an early warning and the flexibility to move the kill zone to the most effective position.

h. ITEM: PRC-25 Radios for roadrunner teams. (Source: Co E)

DISCUSSION: Field experience has shown that the HT-1 radio, currently being used by the roadrunner teams does not have the necessary range required for reconnaissance operations.

OBSERVATION: Indigenous roadrunner teams should use the PRC-25 radio.

i. ITEM: Combat Equipment for Vietnamese indigenous parachutists. (Source: Co E)

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that Vietnamese indigenous parachutists because of their physical makeup cannot effectively handle the weight and bulk of weapons and equipment normally required to be carried on a parachute assault.

40

CONFIDENTIAL

46

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

OBSERVATION: Substitution of the M-60 machine gun, the M-14 rifle, and the M-79 grenade launcher for the A-6 machine gun, the BAR, and the 60mm mortar greatly reduces the weight factor with no appreciable loss of firepower.

j. ITEM: Assembly aids in airborne operations. (Source: Co E)

DISCUSSION: Airborne operations conducted in Vietnam inherently pose a problem of assembly because of terrain, and the density of vegetation. As a result of this dense foliage/dispersion factor, leaders are often without communications for prolonged periods of time.

OBSERVATION: Unit leaders should be equipped with an HT-1 or radio with similar capabilities to insure communications and facilitate assembly.

k. ITEM: Resupply by fixed wing aircraft. (Source: Co C)

DISCUSSION: When utilizing fixed wing aircraft for resupply in the field, it is most desirable to give the pilot a target to release on, rather than have the ground commander order the drop executed. This is most advantageous in that personnel need not be in the drop area after the desired receiving point has been marked and results in more accurate delivery of the supplies. See Inclosure 23 for discussion.

OBSERVATION: It is suggested that gas inflated balloons, currently available through Australian Army channels, be utilized for marking resupply drop zones, and in cases of close air support, can aid in quickly identifying friendly positions.

3. (C) Training and Organization:

a. ITEM: Assignment of CIDG cadre and leaders. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: When a new CIDG company, just out of training, is assigned to a camp, there is an initial phase of adjustment to the new camp commander, the USASF and the VNSF teams. In addition, in many cases the application of tactics and formations at the camp differs from those taught at the Training Center.

OBSERVATION: Members of the USASF and VNSF teams at the camp should accompany the newly recruited company and be assigned as cadre at the Training Center while the CIDG company is undergoing training. The company, USASF and VNSF should be assigned to the same camp upon completion of training. This method creates more trust in the leaders and a better response on the part of the CIDG in combat situations. This method was used in the deployment of detachment A-424, My Phuoc Tay, and has resulted in a highly combat effective company.

b. ITEM: Special requirements for recon personnel. (Source: Co E)

41

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

DISCUSSION: Because of limited training facilities, and operational requirements and the nature of their mission, it is imperative that personnel assigned to recon units possess prior combat experience in Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: Assignment of personnel to recon units should be limited to those who have previously served at least three months with a combat unit. It is further desired that these people attend the MACV Recondo School when possible.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. ITEM: Evaluation of intelligence information reports. (Source: Co E)

DISCUSSION: Intelligence information reports are disseminated to using agencies. Evaluations are given at the appropriate level which include validity of the information and useability of the information. Based on these evaluations, the collecting agency is able to further direct his collection program and assess his collection assets. Evaluations are sometimes received which merely contain the statement that the authenticity "cannot be judged". These are of no help to the collecting agency.

OBSERVATION:

(1) In evaluating intelligence information reports, the collecting agency must be given, as a minimum, an indication whether the information is useable and if that particular collection effort has sufficient potential to be continued. This may not be possible with isolated reports, however, it is feasible with a series of information reports. The picture formed by a series of reports for a period of one month, for example, can be evaluated by relating the value received by the user or how the information may have been utilized in the tactical situation.

(2) Included with the evaluation should be a notification when a specific intelligence collection request (SICR) has been fulfilled or modified.

b. ITEM: VC use of rumors.

(Source: Co C)

DISCUSSION: It has been experienced that the VC/NVA have made extensive use of rumors and possibly even deliberate planting of false information by agents to relay the impression via the population to the CIDG camps of massive enemy concentrations in various parts of the Corps. This was most predominate in Quang Ngai Province prior and immediately following Tet and prior to the rice harvest. These rumors have normally been accompanied by threats of attack on CIDG camps and district headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

48

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

OBSERVATION: In practically every case the reports have proven to be only rumors and to be false. Extensive patrolling on the part of the CIDG and RF/PF forces which met with minimum resistance in areas of reported large enemy concentrations were the best positive proof of false information. With a concerted psychological effort supported by vigorous patrolling these rumors will continue to be ineffective. In the Gia Vuc TAOR the false report/rumor campaign was most vigorous. When rumors failed to curtail operations, a mortar and RR attack was made on Gia Vuc.

c. ITEM: Use of uncoded agents.

(Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: The use of uncoded agents by some detachments has resulted in source agents selling the same information to more than one agency. This practice has, in some cases, created an erroneous intelligence picture.

OBSERVATION: The coding of agents has greatly reduced the selling of information to a number of agencies by the same source. Source data information has been processed through a single agency, examined for source, recorded, and forwarded to other elements, thereby protecting the user from having his source sell information to others.

d. ITEM: Utilization of visual reconnaissance pilots. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: In many cases units fail to take advantage of the knowledge and experience of visual reconnaissance pilots, for intelligence purposes.

OBSERVATION: Aerial reconnaissance is most effective when there is close coordination between the using unit and the pilot. Briefings should be scheduled so that capabilities and limitations of both are discussed to insure better coordination between the two. The pilot should be kept abreast of all operational and intelligence activities so that he can become thoroughly familiar with his area. Directives, SOP's and guidance should be issued by the using unit to insure maximum utilization of both the aircraft and the pilot. Visual reconnaissance aircraft are also capable of adjusting supporting fires, pinpointing enemy locations, movements, and routes of withdrawal, and informing the ground commander of any change in the tactical situation.

e. ITEM: Improper photo coverage.

(Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: In many instances mosaics are produced at various scales making it difficult to obtain a complete and accurate picture of an area. Aerial photo missions are often flown in two separate missions and at different altitudes.

OBSERVATION: Photo missions should be processed in one mission, thereby insuring correct altitude and complete coverage of the area requested. All mosaics should be produced on one scale for standardization.

CONFIDENTIAL

49

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB.C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

5. (C) Logistics:a. ITEM: Red Ball priority system.

(Source: Gp S-4)

DISCUSSION: Supplies requested from the field were being pulled from stock, packaged and placed on line for shipment on a first in/first out basis. At times units were receiving supplies they did not immediately need ahead of items for which they were in short supply.

OBSERVATION: It was determined that a need existed for identifying high priority supply request and the supplies themselves to insure expeditious handling. The Red Ball method was established to identify these requests and the supplies with a distinctive "Red Ball" marking to insure special handling from time the request is received until the supplies are pulled from the warehouse, packaged, placed on line, and loaded on the aircraft.

b. ITEM: Rice bags ripped and torn while warehousing. (Source: Gp S-4)

DISCUSSION: Rice was stored in the ration warehouse in bags until pulled for shipment. It was found much time was lost re-bagging rice because of ripped and torn bags and much time was lost handling each bag individually. A method of speeding up the out loading of rice was needed and the need existed to reduce the damage to rice while in storage.

OBSERVATION: The problem was solved by palletizing and banding the rice bags at the time they are received. The uniform pallets of rice facilitate handling, speed up out-shipments, reduce damage and make inventory of rice on hand much simpler and faster.

c. ITEM: To provide building materials to the new camp in such a way as to minimize construction time. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Personnel at the construction site have a minimum of tools and construction knowledge. They must construct the camp with little supervision and in a minimum amount of time while at the same time, securing the camp from attack.

OBSERVATION: The lumber should be prefabricated and delivered in sections. This is suitable if the sections can be delivered by convoy. However, it presents many problems for aerial delivery means. The final solution (Detachment A-426, for example) was to precut the lumber, identify it, and let the camp put it together.

44

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

d. ITEM: RF/PF/CIDG dependent housing can be constructed out of discarded wooden ammunition boxes. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: Dependent housing for CIDG/RF/PF, in some cases, is either substandard or nonexistent due to lack of funds or lack of initiative on the part of local commanders. US and ARVN ammunition supply points have several types of ammunition that comes in wooden boxes. Normally these boxes are given to anyone who is willing to carry them off. In some cases enterprising Vietnamese have been known to transport these boxes to villagers and hamlets and sell them to the local inhabitants.

OBSERVATION: These boxes properly dismantled provide lumber, nails hinges and screws which can be utilized to construct sturdy dependent housing with little additional materials.

e. ITEM: In the hardening of camp defenses cement blocks have proven extremely valuable. (Source: A-232)

DISCUSSION: The use of the 4.2" ammunition box for the manufacture of cement blocks has proven very successful. By placing a divider in the box, two blocks can be made. In addition to the construction of bunkers, cement blocks have many valuable uses in camp.

OBSERVATION: When there is a need for concrete blocks this technique can be used.

f. ITEM: 175mm ammo container metal.

DISCUSSION: Arty ammo container (175mm) can be improvised and used for drainage pipe. This method is sturdy, allows drainage ditch to run under road and walkway, and saves man hours. Use of container provides for:

- (1) More permanent drainage ditches.
- (2) More safety since drainage ditch is covered.
- (3) Longer life - open trench has tendency to erode with heavy rain, requiring ditch to be dug frequently.
- (4) Better sanitation.

OBSERVATION: If discarded 175mm containers are available, they can be put to good use in the company area during the rainy season.

6. (C) OTHER:

a. ITEM: Emergency CA Supplies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

DISCUSSION: During a recent VC mortar attack on a refugee village various refugee houses were destroyed. Within a few hours after the attack SF personnel utilizing emergency CA supplies stored in the camp started re-building the destroyed houses creating a very favorable environment and attitude of the local population toward the CIDG camp personnel.

OBSERVATION: Emergency CA supplies should be kept at all times at the CIDG camps or at the company level in order to achieve quick response in the event an emergency arises. The refugee village cited was Thuong Duc. The attack was on 13 April 1967.

b. ITEM: Leaflets dropped during operations. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Experience from supporting two combat operations showed that leaflet drops have little effect on the target audience during the conduct of the operation. The primary difficulty is trying to pinpoint the enemy so that the leaflets can be dropped in the path of the moving elements and can be picked up. In most cases this type of pinpointing is not possible and the effect of the leaflets is negligible because they are picked up by a few people at best.

OBSERVATION: A good deal of success was experienced using taped loudspeaker broadcasts during combat operations in place of leaflets. The broadcast missions are flown by U-10 or C-47 aircraft and can be heard over a large area. Pinpointing of the target is not necessary. The tapes can be made in a very short time, compared to the time involved in preparing a leaflet. The use of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts is especially effective when used in conjunction with, or immediately following an airstrike on enemy positions. Tapes can also be made quickly and can be effectively used to exploit PW's captured during an operation.

c. ITEM: Increased incidence of bubonic plague in and about detachments in II CTZ. (Source: Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Perennial increase in bubonic plague generally occurs during the first quarter of each year. This organization has responded to plague outbreaks by providing teams which effect better rodent control and provide plague immunizations to the endangered indigenous population.

OBSERVATION: Increased sanitary vigilance and rodent control is required in plague endemic areas. Total immunization of the civilian population is desirable, but not feasible due to lack of sufficient vaccine and often lack of sufficient population control.

CONFIDENTIAL

52

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

d. ITEM: Reluctance of GVN in the hiring of Special Forces trained Hamlet Health Workers. (Source: Gp Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Coordination with the Vietnamese Ministry of Health revealed that GVN can only hire 100 new Hamlet Health Workers each year, which are trained by various agencies. Furthermore, the Ministry of Health requests that it approve each and every separate training course conducted by Special Forces.

OBSERVATION: It appears unlikely that GVN will hire the approximately 200 Hamlet Health Workers trained by Special Forces from July 66 to March 67.

e. ITEM: Interest evinced by Revolutionary Development National Training Center in Special Forces trained Hamlet Health Workers. (Source: Gp Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: On 21 April 1967, the Senior Medical Advisor to the National Training Center evinced a sincere interest in placing Special Forces trained health workers on the Revolutionary Development cadre payroll.

OBSERVATION: Providing Hamlet Health Workers for the Revolutionary Development Program would be an excellent outlet for Special Forces training efforts in the field.

f. ITEM: Employment of AN/PRC-74 radios with power supplies modified for operation with BA-386. (Source: Co B)

DISCUSSION: The AN/PRC-74's continuous tuning capability which allows entry in almost all existing USASF SSB and CW nets has proved to be a positive reliable communications medium for long range patrols, mobile guerrilla and other special operations. When power supply is modified for battery BA-386, the weight of the radio set is reduced to approximately 20 pounds complete. Resupply problems are minimized because this battery is also used in AN/PRC-25 radios. SSB Voice capability allows cross-trained individuals to operate the set. The ability to enter any of several existing radio nets insures diversified listening stations thus minimizing effects of poor radio propagation conditions and skip distance for high frequencies.

OBSERVATION: The AN/PRC-74 powered by BA-386 is not only an excellent reliable means for scheduled radio contacts but provides for positive emergency communications when required.

g. ITEM: Mobile/Air Transportable CP Communications Facility (Source: Co B)

DISCUSSION: The increased employment of CIDG forces in large and special operations which pool resources from two or more CIDG camps and operations conducted jointly with Free World Military Forces has created a requirement for USASF Tactical Command Post Communications. Further, these communications facilities must be air transportable by C-7A and CH-47 aircraft. In fulfilling

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

the above requirement, Company B, using available materials, has designed and built a TAC CP facility which can terminate the following communications means:

- (1) On-line radio teletype.
- (2) SSB Voice.
- (3) FM Voice.
- (4) CW Radio.
- (5) Land line telephone.

Facility consists of a 3/4 ton shelter (AN/GRC-46) and a 3KW DC generator mounted on a specially modified Air Force baggage trailer. Overall dimensions are 73 inches high, 115 inches long, and 65 inches wide. Total weight packaged for air movement is approximately 2300 pounds. Communications equipment contained in facility are as listed below:

- (1) One ea Radio Set AN/GRC-46, modified for On-line Crypto (mounted in shelter).
- (2) One ea T/SEC equipment KW-7 (mounted in shelter).
- (3) One ea Radio Set KWM-2 (mounted in shelter).
- (4) One ea Radio Set AN/PRC-74 (battery powered back-up, can be operated in rig or portable separately.)
- (5) One ea Radio Set AN/PRC-125 (mounted in shelter)
- (6) One ea Radio Set AN/PRC-25 (operated portable separately)
- (7) Two ea Telephone TA-312.
- (8) One ea Antenna RC-292.
- (9) Materials to construct three doublet antennae for HF radios.

OBSERVATION: Communications facility was deployed by C-7A aircraft to CIDG Camp Dak Pek (A-242) on 14 April 67 and is currently undergoing field testing. Results thus far are extremely encouraging and indicate that equipment will operate at peak efficiency for extended periods of time.

h. ITEM: Air-ground frequencies.

(Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Due to the large volume of traffic between aircraft and air-to-ground in a given area detachments have experienced difficulty in transmitting and receiving between the ground and the supporting aircraft during the conduct of operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

54

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

OBSERVATION: Three new air-ground frequencies were put into effect for each of the "B" detachments in Company D. This has greatly reduced the volume of traffic in all three areas, allowing for better communications.

i. ITEM: Interference from antenna fields. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Sensitive test equipment, vacuum tube volt meters, field strength meters and frequency generators very often cannot be used in the alignment of signal equipment because the test equipment picks up spurious RF signals from a near-by antenna field causing meters to give false readings.

OBSERVATION: RF shielding installed and connected to ground copper or aluminium screen wire can be used. Install shielding completely covering the inside ceiling, walls and doors.

j. ITEM: Dust problem. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: Dust and mud settles into porous concrete floors, dries out, and when swept causes an excessive amount of dust to be stirred up, settling on and in the chassis of the signal equipment being repaired.

OBSERVATION: Wet mopping does not alleviate this problem. Install American-type vinyl asbestos floor tile that can be kept dust free by use of a dust mop.

k. ITEM: Requisitioning and Issue. (Source: Co D)

DISCUSSION: The S4 at the company level does not have an assigned signal supply clerk who is able to associate nomenclature to a particular type of signal equipment.

OBSERVATION: Assign the requisitioning and issue of signal equipment to a man as a full-time job in the supervision of the Signal Officer.

l. ITEM: Operational Capability of the AN/MPQ-10 Counter-Battery Radar Set. (Source: Co E)

DISCUSSION: Because of a predominant mountain range in this area, return echoes reflected by this range back to the set tends to obscure the tracking area from 60mm mortar rounds.

OBSERVATION: By creating an artificial crest from sandbags to screen these echoes and preclude their return to the set, tracking of the 60mm round is improved. Experiments are being conducted to determine favorable distances and heights for this barrier.

m. ITEM: Rapid and accurate transcription of records of trial by special courts-martial. (Source: Gp SJA)

49
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

DISCUSSION: The absence of a sworn professional court reporter in trials by special court-martial forces reliance upon handwritten notes by clerical personnel to preserve testimony and proceedings for preparation of records of trial. This procedure is time-consuming and not always accurate.

OBSERVATION: Utilize a long-running tape recorder with suitable microphones to record all proceedings, providing a source of reference for details and a "back-up" for the clerk taking notes. The recording should be preserved until the case has been finally approved by the GCM authority.

PART II - Recommendations:

1. (C) Personnel shortages.

a. Reference: 5th Special Forces Group Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967, Section 1, Part 1, paragraph 3.a.(3); and Inclosure 22 (5th Special Forces Group MTO&E 31-105E, dated 11 January 1967.

b. Insufficient personnel to accomplish currently assigned missions continues to be one of the greatest problems facing this unit. The 5th Special Forces Group MTO&E 31-105E, dated 11 January 1967 was forwarded to U.S. Army, Vietnam, on 13 January 1967 and is still under consideration by that headquarters. This unit is already organized and operating as described in the proposed MTO&E in order to execute missions assigned by COMUSMACV. At present, there is a critical shortage of personnel, especially in the medical, communications, and intelligence fields. The requirement for 240 radar operators stated in the proposed MTO&E has been deleted by USARV, and this unit has already initiated action to MACV for cancelling procurement of 73 AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets. Approval of the proposed MTO&E, with the exception of the deleted radar operators, would greatly facilitate the accomplishment of currently assigned missions.

c. It is recommended that Special Forces personnel be programmed for this unit in accordance with the proposed MTO&E, except for the radar operators, in anticipation of its early approval.

2. (C) Hamlet Health Worker Program.

a. Reference: Section 2, Part I, paragraph 6, items d. and e.

b. It is recommended that the hiring of Special Forces trained hamlet health workers be emphasized through MACV channels to GVN. Also, the use of hamlet health workers in the Revolutionary Development Program should be fully explored.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

36

AVGB-C

15 May 1967


SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

3. (C) Signal equipment.

a. Reference: Section I, paragraph 9. b. and c.

b. The AN/PRC-66 Radio Set (UHF) and the AN/PRC-70 (SC-948) used in conjunction with the AN/PRC-25 (AN/PRC-77) and AN/PRC-74 would meet all tactical field radio communication needs for Special Forces operations in Vietnam.

c. It is recommended that expeditious action be taken to procure, test, and evaluate the AN/PRC-66 and AN/PRC-70 (SC-948) Radio Sets.


FRANCIS J. KELLY
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

27 Incl

1. Troop Disposition List and Maps
2. Operations Data
3. Enemy Casualties
4. USASF Casualties
5. CIDG Casualties
6. RF/PF Casualties
- * 7. Aircraft Availability & Utilization Chart
- * 8. Visitor Briefings
9. Employment of CIDG, Mike Force, Mobile Guerrilla Force and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects.
- * 10. Organizational Chart for Staff Engineer Section
11. Construction Program
- * 12. CIDG Camp Construction Standards
- * 13. Detachment B-35 After Action Report
Operation Checkmate (Tra Cu Camp Opening)
14. Detachment A-424: My Phuoc Tay Camp
Opening Highlights
- * 15. After Action Report: Operation Harvest Moon
- * 16. Detachment B-23 After Action Report:
23-27 February 1967 (67X085)
- * 17. Detachment A-302 After Action Report:
20-21 February 1967 (67X084)
- * 18. Detachment A-341 After Action Report:
Operation 4/3, 22-23 March 1967 (67X086)
- * 19. Detachment A-341 After Action Report:
Operation 5/3, 24-25 March 1967 (67X087)
- * 20. Project Sigma After Action Report:
Operation Regina (67X079)
- * 21. After Action Report: Blackjack 31 (67X080)
- * 22. After Action Report: Blackjack 32 (67X081)
- * 23. After Action Report: Blackjack 12 (67X082)
(Operation Oconee)
- * 24. Project Sigma After Action Report: (67X083)
Operation Liberty Blackjack

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

25. Detachment B-23 Civic Action
Success Story
26. Campaign Plan for Special Forces
Revolutionary Development in
Vietnam (Copies 1 thru 8 only)
27. Implementing Instructions:
Campaign Plan for Special Forces
Revolutionary Development in
Vietnam (Copies 1 thru 8 only)

NOTE: * Denotes "Withdrawn, Hqs, DA"

** Denotes Combat After Action Reports withdrawn at Hqs, DA, to be
published separately under control number in parenthesis.

59

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHQC-DST (15 May 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (HCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 13 SEP 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

→ Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Developments, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning officer assignment instructions, paragraph 7c, section I, page 25: Concur. Late receipt of assignment instructions causes undue personal inconvenience and an increase in administrative workload to obtain assignment instructions for those officers within 30 days of DEROS. Every effort is made by this headquarters to expeditiously process and disseminate assignment instructions to major subordinate commanders, for all personnel, in sufficient time to accomplish administrative outprocessing actions. Further improvements of the assignment procedures can be made by Department of the Army, Office of Personnel Operations by providing more timely notifications to this headquarters of individuals' assignments. Special attention by the 5th Special Forces Group to insure that individuals are reported for reassignment at the proper time will also assist in solving this problem.

b. Reference item concerning insufficient personnel to accomplish assigned mission, paragraph 1b, section II, part II, page 50: Nonconcur. Recently DA-imposed officer manning levels preclude recognition and validation of requirements based on proposed MTOE. To do so at this time would be to the detriment of other units. When the MTOE is approved, resulting in new requirements, a supplemental requisition with justification should be submitted through personnel support channels. Such supplemental and regular requisitions should specify the desire for school trained officers. The shortage and lack of school trained Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Officers is being analyzed and appropriate action to effect intra-command reassignments or to present the problems to higher headquarters should alleviate problems related to the current authorizations.

c. Reference item concerning hiring of Special Forces trained hamlet health workers, paragraph 2, page 50: Concur.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

60

AVHCC-DST (15 May 67)


1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning the AN/PRC-66 and AN/PRC-70 radio sets, paragraph 9b, page 30 and paragraphs 3a - c, page 51: This headquarters cannot make any recommendations in this matter. No information is on hand concerning these sets. The impact on maintenance support facilities should be carefully considered before procuring special equipment for which no support presently exists in RVN.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

27 Incl
nc


E. L. KENNEDY
CPT AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

61
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT(15 May 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 5th Sp Forces Gp (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report, as indorsed, subject to the
following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 1b, Section II, page 50: Proposed
MTOE and TDA for the 5th SFG are currently under review by this
headquarters. 660 personnel are included under Program V.

b. Reference paragraph 3, Section II, page 51: Further
evaluation of radio sets referred to appears to be in order. These
sets are low density items and, due to r.f. power limits, have
restricted use within the Army. Though these radios may fulfill a
Special Forces requirement, it has been noted that delivery of these
items to the field is usually followed by a request for a power
amplifier to increase their capabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


R. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

27 Incl
nc

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL WHEN
SEPARATED FROM SECRET
INCLOSURES
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS,
DOD DIR 5200.10

55

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HQ USARPAC

S-67-5119

G3-S-67-1343

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	TROOPS				CA/PO TEAMS	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS	
			CIDG	RF	PF	MGF				
I CORPS										
Co C	Danang	BT075719	1/83					C&C	VN	
C-1	Danang	BT075719	1/83					C&C	VN	
A-100	Danang	BT075719				1/186		MGF	Rhade, Chinese	
A-101	Lang Vei	XD795363	3/437				1/5	BS	VN, Bru	
A-102	Tien Phuoc	BT107144	4/497	2/726			1/12	CIDG/SS	VN	
A-103	Gia Vuc	BS378171	3/352					CIDG	Hre, Cua, VN	
A-104	Ha Thanh	BS392702	3/291	1/430	1/210			CIDG/SS	VN, Hre	
A-105	Kham Duc	ZC005080	3/226					CIDG/BS	VN, Hre	
A-106	Ba Te	BS558328	3/279	1/105	1/204			CIDG/SS	VN, Hre	
A-107	Tra Bong	BS344883	3/441					CIDG/SS	VN, Hre	
A-108	Minh Long	BS535510	3/355	2/235	1/228		1/2	CIDG/SS	VN, Hre	
A-109	Thuang Duc	ZC145534	3/358	1/184	5/124			CIDG/SS	VN	
A-110	Con Thien	YD117703	3/288					CIDG	VN	
A-111	Danang	BT075719				1/95	2/191	MGF	VN	
A-113	Danang	BT075719						MF	Rhade, Chinese	
TOTAL			32/3607	7/1680	8/766	2/281	2/191 3/29			

II CORPS

Co B	Pleiku	AR765475						C&C	VN
C-2	Pleiku	AR765475	1/132					C&C	Rhade
A-217	Pleiku	AR765475				1/196		MGF	Rhade
A-218	Pleiku	AR765475				1/190		MGF	Rhade
A-219	Pleiku	AR765475					3/543	MF	VN
A-220	Qui Nhon	CR088236	12					C&C	Jarai, VN
A-221	Cung Son	BQ801350	4/526	2/239	350		1/12	CIDG/SS	Rhade, VN
A-222	Dong Tre	BQ910699	4/468	4/411	485		1/12	CIDG	Bahnar, VN
A-223	Van Canh	BQ832064	4/493				1/12	CIDG/SS	Jarai, Bahnar
A-224	Phu Tuc	BQ504598	4/513	2/196	9/257		1/12	CIDG/SS	Jarai, Bahnar
A-226	Mai Linh	BQ243922	5/660	4/568	428		1/12	CIDG	VN, Bahnar, Hre
A-227	Bong Son	BR848948	4/498				1/12	CIDG	VN, Bahnar
A-228	Vinh Thanh	BR614605	4/460				1/12	C&C	VN
B-23	Ban Me Thuot	AQ780040	34					CIDG	Keho, VN
A-232	Tan Rai	ZT099874	4/307				1/9	CIDG	Rhade, Jarai, Lao
A-233	Trang Phuoc	ZV037268	5/660				1/12	CIDG	Cru, Chill, Keho
A-234	An Lac	AP865484	4/489				1/12	CIDG	Mnong, Koko, Rhade
A-235	Nhon Co	YU805248	4/415				1/12	CIDG	Rhade, Jarai
A-236	Lac Thien	AP 71756	4/528	1/115	786		1/12	CIDG/SS	

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Ref 1 to 5th SFGA ORILL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

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DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	TROOPS				CA/PO	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
			RF	PF	MGF	MF			
A-237	Luong Ton	BNL24389	4/384				1/10	CIDG	Cham
A-238	Buon Blech	BQ007594	4/465				1/12	CIDG	Rhade
A-239	Duc Lap	YU913751	5/403				1/11	CIDG	Rhade, Jarai
B-24	Kontum	AR773889	1/116					C&C	Bahnar, Sedang
A-241	Polei Kleng	ZA032933	4/406				1/12	CIDG/BS	Halong, Sedang
A-242	Dak Pek	YB949682	5/590				1/9	CIDG/BS	Halong, Jeh
A-243	Plateau Gi	BS086154	3/347				1/9	CIDG	Bahnar, Sedang
A-244	Dak To	ZB012212	4/473				1/11	CIDG/BS	Jeh, Rangao
A-245	Dak Seang	YB895405	4/457				1/12	CIDG/BS	Rangao, Bahnar
A-246	Mang Buk	AS984417	3/364				1/12	CIDG	Sedang
A-251	Plei Djereng	YA874458	4/525				1/11	CIDG/BS	Kubuan, Rhade
A-252	Plei Mrong	ZAL13678	4/536				1/13	CIDG	Hanang, Jarai
A-253	Duc Co	YA840248	4/331				1/12	CIDG/BS	VN, Jarai
A-255	Plei Me	ZAL65062	4/306				1/12	CIDG/BS	Robuyan, Rangao
TOTAL			104/11898	13/1529	9/2306	2/386	3/543	25/282	

III CORPS

Co A	Bien Hoa	YT000123						C&C	VN
C-3	Bien Hoa	YT000123	34					C&C	Camb, Nung
A-301	Trang Sup	XT166555	3/348			5/928		CIDG Tng	Camb, Nung
A-302	Bien Hoa	YT000124						MF	Camb
A-303	Trang Sup	XT166555						MGF	Camb
A-304	Trang Sup	XT166555						MGF	Camb
B-31	Xuan Loc	YT461085	1/66	18/1925	1559			C&C/S	Camb
A-311	Tanh Linh	YT929262	4/475					CIDG	Cham, Nung, Mien
B-32	Tay Ninh	XT205508	1/127	17/2207				C&C/S/SS	Camb, Chinese
A-321	Ben Soi	XT093475	5/521	4/505	525		1/12	CIDG/SS/BS	Cao Dai, Camb
A-322	Prek Klok	XT285785	2/183					CIDG	VN
A-323	Trai Bi	XT112702	5/571					CIDG	VN, Camb
A-324	Hui Ba Den	XT281581	1/85					Radio relay	VN
B-33	Hon Quan	XT758878	38	5/644	274			C&C/S	Mont, Camb
A-331	Loc Ninh	XU731082	5/537	3/259	103			CIDG/SS/BS	VN, Camb
A-332	Minh Thanh	XT645670	4/390					CIDG	Camb, Mont
A-333	Chi Linh	XT915735	5/461					CIDG	Camb, Mont
A-334	Tong Le Chon	XT623811	5/551					CIDG/BS	Camb, Mont
B-34	Song Be	YU178113	63	7/995	1065			C&C/S/SS	VN, Mont

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DET	LOCATION	COORDINATE	TROOPS			GA/PO TEAMS	MSN	ETHNIC GROUPS
			RF	PF	MF			
A-341	Bu Dop	XU976291	1/95	140			CIDG/SS/BS	Camb, Mont
A-342	Dong Xcai	YT079762	1/121	239			CIDG/SS	Camb, Mont
A-343	Duc Phong	YU436043					CIDG	Camb, Mont
A-344	Bunaru	YT269888					CIDG	Camb, Mont
B-35	Duc Hoa	XS593968					C&C	VN, Camb
A-351	Hiep Hoa	XT437072	1/100	46		1/12	CIDG/SS/BS	Camb, Cham
A-352	Tra Cu	XS478984					CIDG/BS	VN, Camb
		TOTAL	57/6851	3951	5/928	322	2/24	
IV CORPS								
Co D	Can Tho	WS843116					C&C	VN
C-4	Can Tho	WS843116					C&C	Chinese, VN, Camb
A-411	Binh Hung	VQ845815			1/126		CIDG	Camb, Nung
A-421	Ha Tien	VS438468					CIDG/BS/SS	Camb, Nung
A-430	Don Phuc	WS515015					MGF	Camb, Nung
A-431	To Chau	VS456453				1/190	MGF	Camb, Nung
A-432	To Chau	VS456453				1/182	MGF	Camb, Nung
B-41	Moc Hoa	XS030909					C&C/S	VN, Camb
A-413	Binh Thanh Thon	WT863032					CIDG/BS/SS	Camb, Cham
A-414	Moc Hoa	XS028899					CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-415	Tuyen Nhon	XS273773					CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-416	Kinh Quan II	WS974757					CIDG/SS	VN
A-424	My Phuoc Tay	XS202600					CIDG	VN
B-42	Chau Doc	WS131842					C&C/S/SS	VN
A-422	Vinh Gia	VS762609					CIDG/BS	VN, Camb
A-423	Tinh Bien	VS953715					CIDG/BS/SS	VN, Camb
A-429	Ba Xcai	VS956628					CIDG	VN, Camb
B-43	Gao Lanh	WS695562					C&C	VN
A-412	Cai Cai	WT562076					CIDG/BS	VN
A-425	Thuong Thoi	WS313955					CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-426	My An	WS999620					CIDG	VN
B-44	Phu Quoc	US864289					C&C/SS	VN, Camb
A-427	Phu Quoc	US864289					CIDG	VN, Camb
A-428	Phu Quoc	US864304					CIDG Tng	VN
		TOTAL	60/7568	26/3112	122/4304	4/600	2/372	17/180

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DET	LOCATION	COORDINATES	CIDG	TROOPS			CA/PO	MISSIONS	ETHNIC GROUPS
				RF	PF	MGF			
<u>SPECIAL DETACHMENTS</u>									
Co E	Nha Trang	CPO31518						C&C	
B-50	Nha Trang	CPO31518				3/539		MF/OMEGA	Rhade, Cham
B-51	Dong Ba Thin	CPO40290	3/350					Training	VN
B-52	Nha Trang	CPO31518	148					DELTA	Chinese
B-55	Saigon	(City)	1/185					LNO	VN
B-56	Ho Ngoc Tao	XT958011				3/117		SIGMA	Camb; Chinese
A-504	Trung Dung	BP937557	6/651				1/12	CIDG/SS	Rhade, Cham
A-503	Nha Trang	CPO31518	111			4/605		MF	Rhade, Cham
RS	Nha Trang	TOTAL	10/1425			10/1861	1/12	Training	VN, Camb

LEGEND: RS - MACV Recondo School
 C&C - Command and Control
 CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
 MF - Mike Force
 MGF - Mobile Guerrilla Force
 BS - Border Surveillance Role
 S/SS - Sector/Subsector Advisory Role
 VN - Vietnamese
 Camb - Cambodian
 RF - Regional Force (Province level)
 PF - Popular Force (District level)
 CA/PO - Civic Affairs/Psychological Operations
 Corps - Corps Tactical Zone


71

66

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I CORPS



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
ANNEX 1 TO MOLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

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68

II CORPS




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ANNEX 2 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

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III CORPS



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
ANNEX 3 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

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IV CORPS

70



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71

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OPERATIONS DATA

1. Number/Type CIDG Operations Conducted:

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>
a. Attacks	70	52	10	35	42	35
b. Blocking Actions	217	170	2	238	135	12
c. Escort Actions	835	136	497	368	87	19
d. Combat Patrols	7154	3604	2416	4462	3385	495
e. Recon Patrols	6691	2446	5311	3473	336	17
f. Ambushes	4611	22487	22440	4439	513	6
TOTAL BY TYPE	19578	28895	30376	13015	4498	584
TOTAL OPERATIONS: 48473						

2. Number/Type RF/PF Operations Conducted:

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>
a. Attacks	115	18	9	80	26	18
b. Blocking Actions	454	84	121	164	224	29
c. Escort Actions	977	83	138	652	254	16
d. Combat Patrols	1495	786	1215	746	286	34
e. Recon Patrols	2604	1466	3161	832	70	7
f. Ambushes	954	15753	13730	2739	213	25
TOTAL BY TYPE	6599	18190	18374	5213	1073	129
TOTAL OPERATIONS: 24789						

3. Number of Friendly Initiated Contacts:

	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>SQD</u>	<u>PLAT</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>CO+</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. CIDG	604	163	76	230	314	147	767
b. RF/PF	76	50	40	55	24	7	126

4. VC Initiated Combat Action Against:

	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>
a. Attacks	108	34
b. Probes	113	77
c. Ambushes	138	24
d. TOTAL	359	135

Incl 2 to 5th SFGA ORLL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

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CONFIDENTIAL

72

5. Other VC initiated actions against:	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>
a. Mines/booby traps	199	43
b. Assassinations	4	9
c. Sabotage	2	8
d. TOTAL	205	60

2-2

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VIET CONG CASUALTIES

1. (C) Confirmed VC Losses During 1st Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	208	399	460	565	1632
VCC	49	144	79	229	501
TOTAL	257	543	539	794	2133

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed VC Losses Country-wide

	<u>CIDG</u>		<u>RF/PF</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	
4th Quarter 66	1302	312	243	102	1959
1st Quarter 67	1444	438	188	63	2133

NOTE: Above figures are USASF BODY COUNT.

Incl 3 to 5th SFGA ORLL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

CONFIDENTIAL

74

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USASF CASUALTIES

1. (C) USASF Casualties During 1st Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	4	10	4	1	19
WIA	13	27	25	15	80
MIA	1	0	2	0	3
TOTAL	18	37	31	16	102

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of USASF Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
4th Quarter 66	9	54	1	64
1st Quarter 67	19	80	3	102

Incl 4 to 5th SFGA ORLL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

CONFIDENTIAL

75

CONFIDENTIALCIDG CASUALTIES

1. (C) CIDG Casualties During 1st Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	73	74	125	50	322
WIA	187	230	309	194	920
MIA	19	3	52	6	80
TOTAL	279	307	486	250	1322

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of CIDG Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
4th Quarter 66	59	202	6	267
1st Quarter 67	322	920	80	1322

Incl 5 to 5th SFQA ORLL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

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76

RF/PF CASUALTIES

1. (C) RF/PF Casualties During 1st Quarter by Corps Tactical Zone:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	14	22	51	7	94
WIA	12	17	87	45	161
MIA	7	0	20	2	29
TOTAL	33	39	158	54	284

2. (C) Quarterly Comparison of RF/PF Casualties Country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
4th Quarter 66	81	136	18	235
1st Quarter 67	94	164	29	287

Incl 6 to 5th SFGA ORIL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

CONFIDENTIAL

77
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco, 96240

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ 322
APO 96222

1. GENERAL: This letter presents this command's concept for the employment of CIDG forces and Special Operations forces in support of FVMAF deployed in Vietnam, the command relationship which should be established to effect optimum employment of assets, and the methods of effecting coordination and liaison between conventional units and supporting assets of this command. While procedures outlined herein may appear complex and time consuming, they are considered to be the only means of effectively coordinating operations between FVMAF, CIDG forces and Special Operations forces. It is recommended that the information contained herein be made available to subordinate commands of USMACV.

2. Civilian Irregular Defense Group:

a. Background:

(1) The CIDG program was developed to provide a means of filling the vacuum existing in many remote and underpopulated areas where ARVN units can not effectively be employed and which are not under government control. Basically the camps deployed under this program have the mission of border surveillance and/or interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and conducting operations against enemy base areas. Ancillary missions of these camps are the gathering of intelligence, the execution of Civic Action programs and the conduct of Psychological Operations.

(2) It is important to note at this time that the CIDG camps are under the command of the Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB). The USASF personnel are present as advisors only and do not command the camps or assigned personnel.

b. Capabilities and limitations:

(1) Capabilities: Due to their organization and indigenous background the CIDG troops have certain advantages. These are:

Incl 9 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

SECRET

SECRET

78

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force, Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(a) Familiarity with the area: Being locally recruited they are generally very familiar with the local terrain.

(b) Survivability: Their accustomed standard of living permits survival on local resources with less supplemental support than that required by conventional units. To a large extent they can live off the land.

(c) Mobility: Reflecting para b.(1)(b) above, they are capable of travelling with lighter loads. With their entire TCE they are foot mobile. They require fewer helicopters proportionally. At sea level one UH-1D aircraft can transport 11 fully armed and equipped CIDG with a two-hour fuel load.

(d) Language and ethnic origin: The CIDG will naturally have the support of the local populace to a greater degree than the Caucasian forces.

(e) Rapid reaction: Not being restricted by specific defensive missions as ARVN units are, they are free to react rapidly to changing situations. This is enhanced by the training of the ILDB commanders, and the presence of U.S. advisors at a low level, not found in ARVN units.

(2) Limitations: As with any military force the CIDG program has certain limitations which, of necessity, will dictate their method of employment. These limitations will vary in extent from Corps area to Corps area due to the difference in culture, language, education and motivation. They are:

(a) Training and discipline: The CIDG personnel are para-military employees recruited from the area in which the camp is located. The relative freedom with which they can terminate employment, their loss of motivation in proportion to their distance from their "home" area, and corollary training and discipline factors limit their reliability or use in complex, highly sophisticated, long range, or long term operations.

(b) Fire discipline: The CIDG can provide a heavy volume of fire but because of communication and training limitations, this fire is often difficult to lift or shift. Further, they tend to react to enemy fire or suspected presence by uncontrolled, premature, and undesired fire, disclosing, often completely, their own positions. This characteristic coincidentally poses special hazards in chance meetings of friendly units.

9-2

SECRET

79

SECRET

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(c) Physical limitations: The CIDG is not generally as strong as the US soldier. As a result his endurance is limited. The period in which he can operate effectively on long term operations varies from approximately five days in IV CTZ to 15 days in II CTZ.

(d) Leadership: The leadership capabilities of the CIDG unit leaders varies from mediocre to good. In no case does it approach the standard of the US units.

(e) Absence of supporting weapons: The CIDG company does not possess the heavy fire power capability of the normal US rifle company. Seldom are more than one 60mm mortar and two .30 caliber machine guns deployed. There are three M-79 grenade launchers or recoilless rifles organic to their TCE.

(f) Force structure: The maximum size of a CIDG company is 132 personnel. Normal strength deployed is 100 to 115 troops.

(g) Transportation: The CIDG companies have no organic transportation.

c. Missions and Capabilities: In view of the limitations and strengths of the CIDG companies there are very definite missions which they can be assigned and expected to execute in a highly effective manner. They are:

(1) Blocking missions: In view of their ground maneuverability they are capable of moving into relatively inaccessible areas to block the withdrawal of enemy elements.

(2) Screening force: For the same consideration as in (1) above they are able to screen the flanks of friendly units to prevent surprise attacks, and slow the withdrawal of enemy units to the flank.

(3) Light reconnaissance in force: The CIDG are ideally suited to locate enemy forces for destruction by a conventional force. Their familiarity with the area and their ability to associate with the local populace enhances this capability. They have only a limited capability to fix the enemy for destruction by a conventional force, but if assured of a reaction force, they will usually attempt to accomplish the mission.

(4) Search and destroy: The CIDG has the capability of searching out and destroying small enemy units of company and smaller size. Larger forces they can not normally destroy without assistance from conventional forces, to include air and artillery support.

9-3

SECRET

SECRET

80

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(5) Reconnoiter and secure LZ/DZ for larger more heavily armed units.

(6) Combat operations against local VC and VC infrastructure to include control over indigenous personnel when such action is necessary.

d. Concept of employment:

(1) The CIDG should be employed in a manner consistent with their capabilities, and assigned missions which they can normally be expected to perform satisfactorily. These missions should consider their fighting abilities, best exploit their knowledge of the area and exploit their maneuverability. Missions which they are not considered suited for include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Perimeter security: Due to their lack of supporting weapons and poor fire discipline they are not considered suitable for defensive missions.

(b) Guides to individual units: Fragmentation of the CIDG force into small groups of guides isolates them from their normal leadership and requires them to exercise a degree of initiative which they do not possess. They are not currently motivated to exercise this mission. A CIDG company with USASF advisors can perform this mission satisfactorily.

(c) Use as a reserve/reaction force: Their limitations preclude their employment in this manner with any reasonable assurance of success.

(2) The CIDG units should never be fragmented. This separates them from their LIDB commanders and US advisors and negates their entire training which has been centered around their employment as a cohesive unit.

(3) Communications from the CIDG to the supported unit will have to be through the USASF advisor. Accordingly two advisors, will of necessity, have to accompany each maneuver element.

(4) Transportation and fire support will have to be provided by the supported unit through the USASF advisor.

e. Liaison between Special Forces and conventional units:

9-4

SECRET

SECRET

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(1) The Senior Advisor in each Corps is advised by the Special Forces company commander on the employment of Special Forces assets within the Corps Tactical Zone. This commander has as a member of his staff a Special Operations officer who plans and exercises staff supervision over Special operations conducted in that Corps, advises the Senior Advisor on the capabilities, limitations and methods of employment of these assets and who effects liaison between the Senior Advisor and the Commanding Officer, 5th SFGA through the Company Commander. Special Operations include mobile guerrilla forces and long range reconnaissance and road runner teams backed up by reaction companies.

(2) When the area of interest of a major tactical commander (Division or Separate Brigade) encompasses all, or a portion of a CIDG camp's TAOR the "B" detachment or USASF company exercising command and control over that CIDG camp will provide a Liaison Officer to the Division/Separate Brigade. This individual will be a Major or senior Captain with considerable Special Forces experience. His duties will be as follows:

(a) Advise the Division/Separate Brigade commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations and techniques of employment of CIDG.

(b) Assist the Division/Separate Brigade commander and staff in the preparation of plans and orders for the employment of CIDG forces and other Special Forces assets in support of conventional units.

(c) During the conduct of operations be physically located with the command and control element to advise the commander and his staff in changes in employment, exploitation of contacts, and to provide close and continuous coordination between the conventional forces and the Special Forces elements operating in support.

(d) Provide fire support coordination between the deployed CIDG elements and the conventional fire support elements.

(e) Insure that the operations of the pertinent CIDG camps are providing the support envisioned by the Division/Separate Brigade commander. Keep the commander and his staff informed of the CIDG activities within their area of interest.

(f) Keep the "A" detachment, "B" detachment and company commanders abreast of the overall tactical situation, operational requirements and future plans of the US forces.

(g) Coordinate closely with the company Special Operations Officer to gain information required by the Division/Separate Brigade commander on Special Operations conducted within their area of interest and methods of

9-5

SECRET

SECRET

82

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

employing these assets when available.

f. Command Relations:

(1) As stated above, when the area of interest of a conventional commander encompasses all or a portion of the TAOR of a CIDG camp, liaison will be provided to that command. At this stage there will be no command relationship between the forces, but rather a flow of information to the commander and his staff on friendly and enemy activity, area analysis and other specific items deemed necessary.

(2) At such time as the AC of the conventional force encompasses all or a portion of the TAOR of the CIDG camp, the specific role that the CIDG force is to play in the future operations in that area will have to be determined. Their specific method of employment will have to be coordinated with, and agreed upon by the Vietnamese Corps Commander. If at this time it is determined that the CIDG forces from that camp will actively participate in coordinated operations with the Division/Separate Brigade then they will be placed under the OPCON of the conventional force. However, if it is determined that the CIDG forces will only conduct separate supporting operations disassociated from the conventional force then the two forces will be considered to be in a mutual support role. In any case it is essential that the Corps commander agree to and direct the overall concept of employment.

(3) It is then necessary that the Corps commander task the Vietnamese Special Forces "C" detachment commander with the responsibility of making the specific camp available to execute missions within the overall concept of operations.

(4) Responsibility for coordinating the employment of the CIDG camp with the conventional unit commander will be delegated to the Vietnamese and USASF "B" detachment commanders. Specific missions will be transmitted by the US major unit commander through the Liaison Officer and the US "B" detachment commander. He will then effect liaison with, and gain concurrence of his counterpart.

(5) The Vietnamese and USASF "B" detachment commanders will then inform their respective subordinates in the CIDG camp of the mission requirement and implementing instructions.

(6) It is essential that maximum coordination and planning consistent with the situation be effected prior to the execution of all missions. The Vietnamese at all levels must concur in the concept of operations and tasks to be assigned to the camps. The CIDG forces will

9-6

SECRET

SECRET

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

operate only under the command of the Vietnamese Special Forces chain-of-command. The USASF advisors will accompany the force and coordinate operations with the US forces, however, he is unable to exercise command.

3. Special Operations Forces:

a. Mike Force:

(1) Background. The Mike Force is organized as a multi-purpose reaction force to be located in each Corps area and at SFOB and responsive to the needs of the US Special Forces company commander and his VNSF counterpart. The mission of this force is to constitute a Corps reserve; conduct raids, ambushes and combat patrols; reinforce CIDG camps under construction or attack; search and seizure operations; and the conduct of small scale conventional combat operations to include airborne operations. It is important to note that the Mike Forces are under a joint command between the LLDB and USASF.

(2) Capabilities and limitations:

(a) Capabilities. Because of their organization, background, and mission the Mike Force troops have certain advantages that differ from those of the CIDG. These are:

1. Rapid reaction: The Mike Force rapid reaction capability is even greater than that of the CIDG in that they are not restricted by having to provide main force elements in camp defense.

2. The turn-over rate for personnel is lower due to the higher wages and esprit-de-corps generally found in the Mike Force.

3. The Mike Force is an airborne unit which enhances the means for employment under adverse and short reaction time conditions.

4. Because of the size and general operational commitments of the Mike Force a better and more comprehensive training program is conducted which increases the professionalism of the Mike Force.

5. A higher quality of leadership exists among the indigenous personnel due to the higher wages and other incentives.

(b) Limitations: Due to the fact that the Mike Force represents the entire Corps area some short comings must be realized. They are:

9-7

SECRET

SECRET

84

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

1. The Mike Force will not have an intimate knowledge of the area of operations and the people within the specific area of operation.

2. In some cases, language and ethnic origin will be entirely different and will create local frictions, particularly between Mike Force and CIDG personnel.

3. The logistical supply lines must of necessity be much longer in order to provide adequate resupply. This requires the use of aviation to a much greater extent.

4. The Mike Force is not organized as a battalion, but as separate companies.

(3) Missions and Capabilities:

(a) The Mike Force is the Special Forces company commander's reserve. By being located centrally in respect to the Corps the Mike Force can be deployed by air rapidly enough to influence the outcome or further develop the situation of a major engagement by the CIDG.

(b) The Mike Force is ideally suited to conduct raids, ambushes and combat patrols because of its airborne capability and greater degree of training.

(c) By utilizing Mike Force troops to conduct combat operations in the vicinity of new camp construction sites more CIDG personnel can be diverted from security to construction tasks.

(d) Because of the higher state of training and professionalism the Mike Force is able to perform more conventional combat missions on a limited scale to include coordinated joint US/Mike Force operations.

(4) Concept of Employment:

(a) To facilitate rapid reaction and minimum delay, each of the USASF company commanders and the VNSF "C" detachment commanders can deploy the Mike Forces in their Corps area without the prior approval of CO, 5th SFGA, and CG, VNSF.

(b) CO, 5th SFGA and CG, VNSF or their designated representatives reserve the right to deploy the Mike Force from one Corps area to another on any type of mission.

9-8

SECRET

SECRET

AVC-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(c) The SFOB Mike Force companies will be under control of Detachment A-503 as well as a VNSF "A" detachment (minus). The decision to deploy the Mike Force company at Nha Trang is at the discretion of CO, 5th SFGA, and CG, VNSF or their designated representatives.

(d) Normally each Special Forces company will utilize its Mike Force as its Corps reserve.

(5) Liaison: The liaison necessary for coordination and control of the Mike Force in relation to US and Vietnamese forces is essentially the same as exists for the CIDG except that the responsible coordination headquarters is always the company which is located in the Corps area of operation.

(6) Command relations: Command and control of the Mike Force is executed through a joint command between the LLDB/USASF.

b. Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF):

(1) Background: It has long been recognized that the VC enjoy freedom of movement and sanctuaries in certain areas of South Vietnam. The Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) has been organized which has the capability of denying the VC those favored routes and base areas. In effect, a Special Forces led indigenous force moves into a VC held area and employs guerrilla tactics against the VC.

(2) Capabilities and limitations:

(a) Capabilities: The Mobile Guerrilla Force has essentially the same desirable characteristics as the Mike Force with the following exceptions:

1. The MGF is highly responsive to the needs of the USASF companies of the Four Corps areas in that operational control rests with the USASF company commander for the MGF located in his CTZ. The MGF is commanded by the Special Forces "A" detachment commander.

2. Each MGF is trained to operate as an independent unit, with no reinforcement or mutual support.

(b) Limitations:

1. All resupply must be made by air.

2. Medical evacuation of personnel will tend to compromise the location of the MGF unless extensive precautions are taken.

SECRET

SECRET

86

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(3) Mission and Capabilities: VC base camps are located, watched and raided, if possible, or harassed if the enemy is too well defended and organized. Lines of communications are cut by raids and ambushes and interdicted by mines and booby traps. Storage areas of supplies are located and eliminated. Air strikes are directed and assessed.

(4) Concept of Employment:

(a) The MGF is designed as an economy of force effort, intended to be projected into remote, isolated areas not under ARVN or Free World Forces control or surveillance.

(b) The MGF is inserted into its assigned tactical area of operations by the most unobtrusive means available.

(c) Once in the area of operations, this force becomes a true guerrilla force in every aspect except that of living solely off the land.

(5) Liaison: The MGF requires complete freedom of action within a specified area of operations in order to achieve success. For this reason, once an area of operations is designated for the conduct of an operation, the MGF owns that area to include control of air support.

(6) Command relations: The MGF is developed, organized, equipped, trained and commanded by the USASF.

c. Project Delta:

(1) Background:

(a) Project Delta was organized to group together those assets of the LLDB, ARVN and USASF to form a highly mobile long range reconnaissance force.

(b) The missions assigned to Project Delta include reconnaissance patrolling, directing air and artillery strikes, guiding friendly forces to exploit targets discovered during reconnaissance, and employing the organic 91st ARVN Ranger Battalion to conduct raids, ambushes; search and destroy operations; and as a relief force for recon teams deployed in country at large.

(c) Project Delta consists of a headquarters, eight road runner teams, 16 reconnaissance teams, and the 91st ARVN Ranger Battalion.

9-10

SECRET

SECRET

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects(U)

(2) Capabilities and limitations:

(a) Capabilities: Due to their organization, background, and mission, Project Delta has certain operational capabilities. These are:

1. Confirming VC units, installations and activities for the purpose of using and exploiting tactics and strategy.

2. Teams can destroy small targets.

3. Teams can stay in the area for long periods with minimum of outside support.

(b) Limitations: Limitations to Project Delta are:

1. Reaction time for employment of Project Delta is slow because of the number of major commands that operations must be coordinated through.

2. The small size of the teams that are deployed makes them vulnerable.

(3) Missions and capabilities:

(a) Reconnaissance patrolling is highly effective due to the small size of the teams. These teams are able to move at will through their operational area with minimal probability of detection.

(b) Because of their mobility and secrecy the reconnaissance teams provide an excellent means to call air and artillery upon discovered VC base areas, installations, and troop concentrations.

(c) The knowledge gained of trail networks and exact locations of VC troop areas makes these teams ideally suited for guiding FWMF and their organic Ranger Battalion during the initial phases of conventional operations.

(d) The 91st Ranger Battalion is fully capable of exploiting the discoveries of the reconnaissance elements by being directly responsive to the needs of Project Delta. Their operations are enhanced due to the airborne capability of the battalion.

(4) Concept of employment:

(a) The road runner teams and reconnaissance teams are infiltrated into assigned areas by overland, paradrop, heliborne, and by water and can operate for a period of five days without resupply.

9-11

SECRET

SECRET

88

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(b) The operational area of the recon teams are concealed and covered and separated from populated areas.

(c) Recon teams will, according to the situation and terrain, be dropped into the selected areas during the hours of darkness to perform their missions.

(d) The road runner teams are utilized when the terrain in the target area is open, crossed with many trails, or very populated.

(e) Road runner personnel are indigenous personnel and will identify with the local population. If required, they will be equipped like the VC or NVA and move and operate openly in selected operational area.

(f) The airborne ranger battalion is used as a reaction force responsive to the immediate needs of the reconnaissance teams deployed.

(5) Liaison: Project Delta receives its missions from either of three sources:

(a) From JGS and MACV through the 5th SFGA and LLDB,

(b) Directly from MACV in the sense of a unilateral type operation.

(c) From the CG, LLDB and CO, 5th SFGA with concurrence of MACV and JGS.

(d) Under no circumstances will the operational control of Project Delta be delegated lower than to the Corps commander.

(6) Command relationships: The command and control relationships existing in Project Delta are identical with those found in the CIDG.

d. Project Omega and Sigma:

(1) Projects Omega and Sigma perform the same missions as does Project Delta. The difference exists in operational control and areas of normal operations. These differences are:

(a) Projects Omega and Sigma are commanded by the USASF.

(b) Project Omega is under the operational control of I FFV.

9-12

SECRET

SECRET

AVGB-C

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force,
Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(c) Project Sigma is under the operational control of
II FFV.

(d) The reaction forces for Omega and Sigma consist of
three Mike Force companies each of which are commanded by the USASF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.L. JERVELL
Captain, Artillery
Adjutant

Copies furnished:

CO, Co A, 5th SFGA
CO, Co B, 5th SFGA
CO, Co C, 5th SFGA
CO, Co D, 5th SFGA
CO, Co E, 5th SFGA
CO, Det B-55, 5th SFGA
CG, LLDB High Command

9-13

SECRET

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
1 Jan 67 to 30 Apr 67

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CONS UNIT</u>	<u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Con Thien, I CTZ	Subsurface	MCB 4 (Seabees)	C7A	Under cons
Dak Seang, II CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm	None	Completed
Plei Djereng, II CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm & 4th Engr Bn.	C-130	Completed
Duc Co Airfield	N/A	937th Engr Gp	C-130	Under cons
Trang Phuc, II CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm	C-130	Completed
Duc Lap, II CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm & 937th Engrs	C-130	Completed
Bunard, III CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm & 79th Engrs	C-130	Under cons
Cau Song Be, III CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm & ARVN Engrs	C-130	Completed
Prek Klok, III CTZ	Surface, CONEX	79th Engr Gp	C-130	Completed
Ton Le Cham, III CTZ	Surface, CONEX	79th Engr Gp	C-130	Completed
Tra Cu, III CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm	None	Completed
My Phuoc Tay, IV CTZ	Surface, frame	KB Tm	None	Completed
My An, IV CTZ	Floating	KB Tm	None	Completed
Airboat Facility	N/A	Contract	None	Under cons

Incl 11 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

CONFIDENTIAL

DETACHMENT A-424: MY PHUOC TAY CAMP OPENING HIGHLIGHTS

The following material was extracted from Detachment A-424's Monthly Operational Summaries (MOPSUM) for February, March, and April. The narratives were written by CPT John T. Haralson, the Detachment Commander.

On 2 Feb 67, I assumed command of A-424. I departed my old team, A-426, at Phu Quoc Island training center on 3 Feb and arrived in Can Tho. Upon arrival in Can Tho LTC Hassinger [CO, Co D] to report to B-41 at Moc Hoa on the next aircraft. At this time Det A-424 consisted of LT Lugo who was my executive officer. On the night of 3 Feb several persons were assigned to A-424. I told them that we would be constructing a new camp at My Phuoc Tay and set them to gathering all intelligence information, maps, and general information on the area. I sent two men to Saigon to procure interpreters and food supplies.

I arrived at B-41 on 4 Feb and was briefed on assigned mission and was told a recon would be made of My Phuoc Tay on 5 Feb. During the construction phase of the camp, operational control would be with Company D and on 15 March my detachment would come under B-41. On 5 Feb LTC Fernandez [CO, B-41], MAJ Jeffers, CPT Steine and myself flew to My Phuoc Tay. Upon arrival we met the MACV advisory team which belonged to the ARVN battalion located at My Phuoc Tay. While on site we discussed defensive positions, dependent housing, VC activity in the area, problems during monsoon season, and other items pertinent to placing in a Special Forces camp. At the camp we discovered two 155mm howitzers located in the inner-compound, which I felt could be very useful in the future. While at the camp we let two MACV personnel our UH-1B for a recon of the area. They drew heavy automatic fire 3,000 meters west of the camp and were shot down. Air strikes were called in and the helicopter evacuated. COL Lande, the 7th ARVN Division Senior Advisor, gave us a lift back to Moc Hoa. The first impression of the camp was that it was inadequate and would require a lot of construction to bring it up to SF standards.

I returned to Can Tho on the 4th and drew up a time schedule for deployment to My Phuoc Tay and the turnover of the camp to me. On 5 Feb, LTC Fernandez and I went to IV Corps where our deployment plan was approved. We were to deploy my team to My Phuoc Tay on 10 Feb. Construction materials and equipment were to be stockpiled between 10 and 15 Feb. On 15 Feb a KB team was to arrive with heavy equipment and camp construction was to begin on 16 Feb. My troops at this time were at various locations. The 441 Company was at Binh Thanh Thon with only 45 persons present; 442 Company was at Moc Hoa with 135 present; 443 was at Tuyen Nhon with only 30 present; and 444 Company was on leave in Can Tho.

On 6 Feb I briefed the staff on my requirements for deployment on 10 Feb. My requisitions were submitted and by now my team was assembled at Can Tho. On 7 Feb CPT Stiener (engineer officer for 5th SFG) and I flew to My Phuoc Tay for his estimate of construction at the site. I told CPT Stiener where I wanted the buildings constructed, and we discussed the layout of the camp at this time. Upon completion of this recon I went to B-41 and briefed the staff on my activities thus far. We discussed my TAOR and area of operations.

On 8 Feb LTC Fernandez and I went to 7th ARVN Div located at My Tho and discussed our proposed TAOR and area of operations. I also requested that half of the inner-compound presently occupied by artillery at My Phuoc Tay be turned over to me as my living quarters. This was agreed on by 7th Division Artillery.

14-1

Incl 14 to 5th SFGA ORLL - 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

92

On 9 Feb my team moved to B-41 where they were briefed on deployment by LTC Fernandez and myself. We left most of our personal equipment at B-41 and prepared for deployment on 10 Feb.

On 10 Feb the entire team and equipment closed at My Phuoc Tay. I effected liaison and coordinated with units located here immediately. We moved into the inner-compound and erected tents. CW communications were established with Company D and B-41 on the same day. On 11 Feb we took our first air drop consisting of POL. In the afternoon COL Lance arrived and was shown our progress up to that time. He seemed satisfied and very happy to have us in the area.

On the afternoon of the 11th I met with the village chief. I told him that we could employ 50 laborers, 10 carpenters, and 10 masons if they were available. He assured me that they were, and it was agreed to have them here for interviews on 15 Feb. I inquired as to the possibility of conducting a MEDCAP in the area. This was delayed until our medical supplies arrived.

On the 12th of Feb I flew to the various locations where my troops were located. I informed them that they would be coming to this location soon. The companies that were short of personnel were told to start recruiting to bring them up to full strength. All units assigned to my camp were trained by me on Phu Quoc Island. They seemed very anxious to rejoin my team at the new camp. After visiting my troops I went to Cai Lay and met the district chief and sub-sector advisor for the district my camp is located in. I briefed them on my activities and told them I would keep them informed.

On 13, 14 and 15 Feb, construction materials continued to arrive. I was at the commanders' conference in Can Tho on 14 and 15 Feb. I returned to My Phuoc Tay on 16 Feb. I brought several interpreters and much needed equipment with me. We continued to receive supplies and stockpiled same during this period.

On 17 Feb the 444 Company and our LLDB counterparts arrived. One company from the ARVN battalion at this location departed. We moved our company into their vacated positions. The local laborers began work on the 17th. We started them on leveling the ground for building construction.

On the 18th of Feb the 443 Company arrived by assault boat. There were only 30 men remaining in the company. I sent the company commander to recruit more men for his company. On the afternoon of the 18th LTC Hassinger and counterpart arrived for inspection. They were shown the area and what construction had taken place. They departed after about an hour's visit. We began clearing an unrecorded minefield surrounding the camp. We sprayed defoliant on heavy vegetation around the perimeter.

Our first operation against VC elements was conducted on the morning of the 20th. We captured two VC and destroyed various supplies. On the 21st we had a supply helicopter fired on while making an approach to this location. I took two platoons out to check the area. We engaged a VC squad with negative casualties to either side.

On the 22nd we conducted a road clearing operation to open the road to Cai Lay for a convoy bringing in our heavy equipment. The operation was postponed for 24 hours, at which time we conducted a search and clear operation which resulted in one VC KIA and one VC WIA. We also captured and destroyed numerous items. We again cleared the road on the 23rd and brought the convoy into the camp at 2000 hours. We found and destroyed one 10-kilo mine on the road, that appeared to have been recently planted.

14-2

CONFIDENTIAL

From the 24th until the 28th construction continued in camp. On the 28th of Feb LTC Hassinger again visited the camp and viewed our construction. Much has been accomplished this month. We have all worked extremely hard this month, and I feel we have accomplished a great deal. There is much to be accomplished yet at this camp.

TIPS OF THE TRADE: When conducting night operations in an area that has many canals and water obstacles, one squad from each CIDG company trained in putting up a one rope bridge is a great time saver and adds to an orderly crossing.

MARCH 1967.

This past month has been an extremely active month from an operational standpoint as well as camp construction. The first two days were as action packed as anyone could ask for. During the early morning hours of 1 March one CIDG company was led by a VC PW to a known enemy strongpoint. Much to our surprise it turned out to be a VC battalion headquarters for the 5th VC Bn and a regimental hospital. The VC lost eleven KIA, and thirty suspects were captured. The operational success was to set the trend for all operations conducted this month. The arrival of the Group Commander could not have been better timed than at the end of this successful operation. After the first two hectic days the team settled down to many more successful operations. Great strides were taken in the camp construction phase; our intelligence gathering sources were improved, and we began working on CA/PO programs and encountered our first refugees.

Operations this month were aimed at clearing VC elements from a five kilometer radius of the camp. We have had no difficulty in contacting VC. Every operation we have run has encountered enemy forces. Operations were conducted at a longer distance on timely intelligence with excellent success.

The ARVN battalion that was formerly located at My Phuoc Tay, departed this location on 14 March. At this time operational control of our TAOR and AO rested with us. On 15 March operational control of the detachment was transferred from Company D to B-41 located at Moc Hoa.

At the beginning of the month our CIDG companies were seriously under-strength and an immediate recruiting campaign was launched. At the present time we have three full strength companies, two recon platoons, and one security platoon. The new troops that were recruited will be trained at this location in classes beginning 1 April. We are in the process of recruiting a fourth company at this time. The three companies that are full strength are the 442, 443, and 444 CIDG Companies. The 441 Company which had 44 men was redesignated the 2nd Recon platoon, leaving 441 Company to concentrate on recruiting. I will request this company be trained at Phu Quoc Island Training Center. The 1st Recon Platoon is undergoing training at Dong Ba Thin Training Center at this time. At the present time six CIDG are attending the CIDG platoon leaders course and two are attending radio operators school.

Our intelligence net has been expanded to include our entire AO. At the present time we are receiving an average of four intelligence reports a day on VC activity and locations. In many cases our intelligence gathered from agents as well as PW's has been of considerable aid in planning operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

94

At the present time I believe we have the VC in this area off-balance and much confused as to our exact mission and as to what we will do next. Until we arrived this entire area was under VC control and I believe we have really suppressed him by our initiating operations against him in so many areas and so regularly. This conclusion is based on our many successes, questioning PW's, and intelligence reports. As of this date we have killed 56 VC, USASF confirmed, this month with the exact total possibly going twice that amount. Three VC WIA, and 62 suspects were returned to this location. We have definitely hurt the VC manpower, as well as the loss to him of captured equipment. This has been at a loss to us of five CIDG and one USASF wounded in action. The USASF was my team sergeant, MSG Crysel, who suffered a punji stake wound on 5 Mar and has not yet returned to this location.

We have made one leaflet drop as a reaction to the VC placing minefields around the camp. We have distributed 200 school kits to the local school at My Phuoc Tay. Over 200 refugees have moved into this area during the past month.

I have brought the Province representative and USAID to this area and they are providing money and food stuffs at this time. I am employing fifty of the refugees as laborers to work on our airstrip.

At the present time our camp is 60 percent completed. Three team buildings remain to be built. Work on CIDG barracks will begin on 1 April. At the present time we are also building an airfield capable of handling light aircraft. The KB team that was assigned to help with camp construction departed on 20 March. The team, with use of local labor, is continuing to build the camp.

The cooperation between LLDB and USASF has been outstanding. Our CIDG troops are outstanding fighters and the most aggressive CIDG I have ever seen. I expect to have continued success in the forthcoming month.

TIPS OF THE TRADE: Training of Troops - I feel that much of the success we have enjoyed here can be traced to the training given my troops. They were trained at Phu Quoc Island training center by half of my present LLDB and USASF team. This appears to make a great deal of difference in their performance on operations.

APRIL 1967.

The month of April has been our most active and successful thus far. Operations against the Viet Cong in our area of responsibility were increased by thirty-five percent. Unlike the first two months that we were at My Phuoc Tay, the VC are harder to locate and are much more reluctant to make contact with us on operations. Many search and destroy operations were conducted in areas where we had made numerous contacts in preceding months but which now fail to produce even sniper fire. This is an indication to me that we are accomplishing our assigned mission, pacification of this area. Our kill-wounded ratio to that of the VC remains at an almost unbelievable rate. This month we killed or captured over eighty VC while suffering only five CIDG wounded. This I credit to the aggressiveness of our troops. If the trend of successful operations continues, and I anticipate that it will, pacification of this area should be a reality within six months.

14-4

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In addition to our many successful operations we have been engaged in many other activities. The road leading from Cai Lay to Moc Hoa was opened this month. We spent several days on repairing this road and have to clear and secure it while convoys travel it. This requires us to clear the portion of the road in our operational area using mine detectors and securing it with troops on the average of twice a week. Due to the road network being operational I am able to resupply my camp by vehicle at this time. This greatly increases the flow of supplies. If this link were broken we again would be dependent on air drop and helicopter support. With the security we provide to the road in our area, the main canal is also safe to travel. The amount of canal commercial traffic in this area has increased five times since we have been established in the area. The canal traffic can now move without constant fear of VC ambush and tax collectors.

One large scale project that we are presently engaged in is opening the main canal to our west. This requires one company providing security in the area while two platoons pull grass, water plants, and other obstacles from the canal. At the same time we are destroying all bunkers, mines and booby traps in the area. While this is being accomplished our newly formed CA/PO squad works with the civilians. This area is where the heaviest concentration of VC are to be found in our area. The successful opening of this waterway I feel is an important step to pacification. At the present time this area is used as a base for many VC units. If it is opened I would be able to move by boat to react to intelligence gathered from the area. This opening would also allow us movement towards the Special Forces camp at My An and the ability to strike more quickly into the area known as the "Pocket".

During the past month much more time was devoted to CA/PO operations. We formed a CIDG squad that has proved to be very useful thus far. They will be sent for formal schooling next month. During the month we relocated many structures in the village, reopened the village market place, moved all troops out of town and conducted several clean-up projects using CIDG troops and civilians.

More refugees moved into the area. At the present time there are over 300 families. We have helped relocate them and have helped in building construction. We ran a MEDCAP using American doctors and Province and District representatives. This was aimed at the refugees and was well received. At the same time the MEDCAP was being run, refugee representatives from Province registered all new refugees and gave out clothing, mosquito nets, and toilet articles. The detachment has distributed several boxes of clothing received from our families during the past month.

The CA/PO effort is just starting to develop in this area and will see great strides forward in upcoming months.

During the month of April our recruiting drive was terminated. At the present time we have four full strength companies, two recon platoons, and a CA/PO squad; our first recon platoon returned from training at Dong Ba Thin and has worked out very well on recon operations. The 441 Company consists of all new material. In the near future they will undergo basic training at this location. At the present time they are being used for details around the camp.

Since the last reporting period we have completed construction of our dispensary, arms room, supply room, LIDB quarters and water tower. The camp is 80 percent completed. The major effort now will be on CIDG quarters and dependent housing.

To summarize the past month's activities I feel we are doing an outstanding job at My Phuoc Tay. Our troops and our counterparts couldn't be better. Morale of the troops, counterparts and my team is extremely high. I anticipate the month of May to be even a more successful month than the ones in the past.

14-5
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Detachment B-33 Civic Action Success Story

1. A new concept in the Medical/Civic Action Program has been initiated in Binh Long Province. The MILPHAP Assisted Public Health Operations to Rural Areas (MAPHORA) has resulted from expansion of the MEDCAP program over the last six months. The MAPHORA system has proven to be more successful than the MEDCAP due to its composition and flexibility. The team can be tailored to fit the situation and the type hamlet to be visited. The team is normally composed of the following elements:

- a. Military security.
- b. US Advisory Assistance.
- c. Medical Teams.
- d. CA/PSYWAR Teams.
- e. VN Information Service.
- f. VN Social Welfare.
- g. Hoi Chanh.
- h. Montagnard Affairs Representatives.
- i. Refugee Affairs Representatives.
- j. GVN Officials.

2. Military Security for the MAPHORA can be drawn from RF/PF units, CIDG, ARVN Rangers, other ARVN units, or elements of US Infantry units operating in the area. US advisory assistance can be in the form of medical advisors, military advisors, civilian, or CA/PO advisors from USASF, MILPHAP, MACV, OCO, or other US units in the Province.

3. Medical teams can consist of RVNAF medics, provincial medical personnel from the Province Hospital or hamlet health workers, USASF medics, MILPHAP doctors and medics, and US units' doctors and medics. These teams can provide medical assistance that might include treating minor illnesses, immunizations, and minor surgery, depending on the degree of medical proficiency of the team on the operation. Those cases that cannot be adequately treated in the hamlet are referred to the Province Hospital for further consultation.

4. The CA PSYWAR team from Sector and District command the MAPHORA unless a high ranking District or Province official accompanies the MAPHORA. This team is responsible for the organization and operation of the MAPHORA and conducts CA/PSYWAR surveys for planning future projects in these areas. Token gifts are distributed by members of this team.

5. The Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) accompanies the MAPHORA and gives lectures, distributes posters and leaflets, and shows movies in those hamlets in which the team remains overnight. GVN news, new decrees, information on the upcoming elections, and Chieu Hoi Program are a few of the subjects that are discussed with the populace of the hamlet. In addition, VC are given an opportunity to turn themselves in under the Chieu Hoi Program at this time.

Incl 25 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

Det B-33 Civic Action Success Story (cont'd)

6. The Hoi Chanh that accompanies the MAPHORA assists the VIS in their functions and blends into the crowd to spread the word about the values of the Chieu Hoi Program.

7. Social welfare personnel accompany the MAPHORA to distribute token gifts to the populace and to assess the living conditions of the hamlet to see if social welfare work or assistance is needed.

8. Montagnard Affairs and Refugee Affairs representatives accompany the MAPHORA when Montagnard or refugee hamlets are visited by the team.

9. The main purpose of this program is to promote Public Health. However security augmentation provides the opportunity to visit hamlets that are not ordinarily secure enough for them to visit. The people's reaction to this type operation has been extremely rewarding, and there has been a noticeable change in their acceptance of Americans and GVN agencies.

10. This program is also adaptable for intelligence gathering efforts and census grievance operations. People are more willing to tell of VC activities and submit their own grievances when GVN shows that it is interested in the welfare of the people.

11. During the month of March the MAPHORA team visited every hamlet in An Loc District that is not readily accessible to the Provincial Hospital. This was accomplished through a joint effort with the US 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions' support, setting an example for the District Chief to follow in meeting his goal of having at least one MAPHORA in every hamlet every month.