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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (29 May 68) FOR OT-RD-68X018

4 June 1968

SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED
LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign,
199th Infantry Brigade (Lt) (Sep 1967 - Feb 1968) (U)

Headquarters,
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

for period ending

9 Combat after action report 19 Feb 68.

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

11 15 Apr 68

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 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
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AFTER ACTION REPORT

LONG BINH / SAIGON

TET CAMPAIGN




199th INFANTRY BRIGADE
(SEPARATE) (LIGHT)

12 JANUARY - 19 FEBRUARY

1968

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**AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET CAMPAIGN**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LIGHT)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96279

AVBH-OT

15 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commander
II Field Forces, Vietnam
ATTN: AVFBC-A&O
APO 96266

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96243

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: The LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign was both an offensive and defensive operation designed to preclude rocket/mortar attacks and ground assaults on the LONG BINH/SAIGON areas.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 14 January - 19 February 1968.

3. (U) LOCATION: BIEN HOA and GIA DINH Provinces.

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Robert C. Forbes.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex E.

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Supporting forces during LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign.

(1) USAF: The 7th United States Air Force provided air support for brigade operations during the LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign in the form of visual reconnaissance, forward air controller and artillery adjustment missions, as well as fighter, bomber and skypot missions.

(2) Air Cavalry: Throughout the operation, aerial reconnaissance, light fire team support and aero-rifle platoon reaction force capabilities were provided to the brigade by the attached air cavalry troop, A Troop, 3rd Squadron 17th Air Cavalry. This added asset gave the brigade commander more flexibility in the employment of the maneuver units. The troop was frequently used in an economy of force role.

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(3) Army Aviation: The assets of the 12th Combat Aviation Group and the brigade were continuously employed throughout operations.

(a) 11th Combat Aviation Battalion:

- 1 128th Assault Helicopter Company
- 2 162nd Assault Helicopter Company
- 3 173rd Assault Helicopter Company
- 4 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company
- 5 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company

(b) 145th Combat Aviation Battalion:

- 1 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company
- 2 117th Assault Helicopter Company
- 3 118th Assault Helicopter Company
- 4 334th Armed Helicopter Company

(c) 214th Combat Aviation Battalion:

- 1 17th Assault Helicopter Company
- 2 135th Assault Helicopter Company
- 3 191st Assault Helicopter Company
- 4 195th Assault Helicopter Company
- 5 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company

(d) 222d Combat Aviation Battalion:

- 1 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company

(e) 269th Combat Aviation Battalion:

- 1 188th Assault Helicopter Company

(4) Artillery: 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery was in direct support of the brigade elements during the entire operation. Additional artillery support was provided by the 3rd Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry organic artillery battery while the squadron was OPCON to the 199th.

(5) Logistical: 7th Support Battalion (Sep Lt Inf Bde) provided continuous logistical support to the brigade in all classes of supply during operations.

(6) Engineer: 87th Engineer Company (Sep Lt Inf Bde) provided support through teams attached to each battalion task force.

(7) Signal: 298th Signal Platoon and the Communications platoon, 199th Inf Bde supported the brigade through radio relay systems, wire and messenger service and FM and AM/SSB radio nets.

(8) PIO: 40th Public Information Detachment provided support for brigade activities and operations by performing public information functions. By its coverage of operations, it helped to project a favorable image of the brigade.

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(9) 44th Military History Detachment: Collected information in the field which supplemented and amplified the accounts of events which took place during the course of the LONG BINH/SAIGON Campaign.

(10) 49th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog): Supported the brigade by providing dog teams for numerous patrols. The 11th Combat Tracker Team provided tracker team support.

(11) Military Police: 152nd Military Police Platoon provided security at the brigade main base, Camp FRENZELL-JONES, convoy security, traffic control and coordination and routine military police functions.

(12) 179th Military Intelligence Detachment (Sep Lt Inf Bde) supported the Brigade S-2 with intelligence and counter-intelligence which provided valuable information on which to base tactical decisions.

(13) 503rd Chemical Detachment supported brigade operations through use of agent CS and conducted "People Sniffer" missions.

b. Performance of Supporting Arms and Services.

(1) USAF:

(a) The USAF Tactical Air Control Party gave continuous support to the 199th Inf Bde during the LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign. FAC flew 183 missions and logged a total of 467 hours. Support included directing air strikes in support of ground forces as well as day and night visual reconnaissance. The TACP maintained a "Scramble" capability so that they could give timely response to the needs of the ground commander during the time that a FAC was not airborne.

(b) USAF aircraft flew the following missions.

1	Air Strikes	147
2	Skyspots	15

(c) Bomb damage assessment was as follows.

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
1 Structures	8	14
2 Bunkers	22	14
3 Secondary Explosions	6	

	<u>Body Count</u>	<u>Estimated</u>
4 VC Killed by Air	160	100

(2) Air Cavalry:

(a) A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry supported the brigade with continuous aerial reconnaissance of the brigade area of operations and outer rocket belt, light fire team support and an aero-rifle

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platoon reaction force. Intelligence information was quickly exploited using the air cavalry troop. During darkness, stand-by light fire teams were ready to support long range attacks within the brigade AO. The responsiveness of the troop contributed greatly to the accomplishment of the brigade mission, particularly during the VC attack on 31 January. A Troop flew 5,052 sorties in support of the brigade, totaling 2023.2 hours of flying time.

(b) Significant Statistics were as follows.

1 Hours:

a	OH-6A	1060.1
b	UH-1	963.1
c	Combat Assault	1810.9
d	Total	2023.2

2 Class V:

a	7.62 mm	367,350
b	5.56 mm	6,054
c	2.75" rocket	2,373
d	M-5 (40mm)	1,330

3 Class III: 89,700 gallons

4 VC KIA (BC) 80

(3) Army Aviation: Army aviation assets supported the brigade with airmobile companies, daily resupply ships, CH-47 sorties for build up of fire support patrol bases.

(a) Missions performed:

- 1 Command and Control
- 2 Airmobile combat assaults
- 3 Eagle flight missions
- 4 Troop extraction and repositioning
- 5 Aerial reconnaissance
- 6 Artillery fire adjustment
- 7 Medical evacuation
- 8 Radio relay
- 9 Liaison
- 10 Resupply
- 11 Leaflet drops

(b) Analysis:

1 Resupply UH-1: The three resupply UH-1 helicopters were assigned, one to each rifle battalion. In addition, these helicopters were used as command and control ships when the situation required. By assigning the aircraft to the battalion, more efficient utilization was realized. This arrangement provided a quick response to immediate requirements.

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2 Airmobile Companies: Airmobile operations were normally company size. The brigade aviation officer monitored the operation, however, the battalion commander retained control. During the period, the brigade achieved a "first" in that a night airmobile operation was conducted into a suspected VC division headquarters base camp. Normal employment consisted of repositioning of companies followed by reconnaissance in force operations.

3 Artillery Observation and Adjustment: Artillery observation and adjustment was conducted extensively through the use of the O-1 aircraft. The brigade had a daily asset of one aircraft for use during daylight hours. Night observation was conducted only when the operation required it.

4 CH-47 Resupply: Resupply missions were flown almost daily during the period. 217 sorties were flown lifting a total of 542.5 S/T as follows.

a	Artillery and ammunitions	127
b	Water trailers	6
c	Passengers	28
d	Mixed Cargo (Class I, II, III)	56
		<u>217 sorties</u>

5 Organic Aviation: The three UH-1 and four OH-23 helicopters assigned to the brigade provided only a limited capability and therefore organic aircraft were primarily utilized to fill the gaps and meet immediate requirements.

(4) Artillery: See Annex B, Artillery.

(5) 7th Support Battalion: Logistical support for brigade operations were in most cases routine. The two exceptions were on the 31st of January and the arrival of the infantry packets in February. For a detailed summary of logistical operations, See Annex C, Logistics.

(6) Engineer: Tactical engineer support was provided by the 87th Engineer Company in the form of the construction of three fire support patrol bases and demolition teams attached to each infantry battalion.

(7) Military Police: Prior to the VC TET offensive, the military police support consisted primarily of brigade main base security, convoy escort missions, and traffic control. During the attack and the ensuing days, the military police maintained constant perimeter surveillance, security of the Detainee Collection Point, convoy security, traffic control and other basic military police functions pertaining to discipline, law and order.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex F, Intelligence.

9. (C) MISSION: 199th Light Infantry Brigade continues Operation UNIONTOWN to preclude rocket/mortar and/or ground attacks on LONG BINH and BIEN HOA; maintains brigade forces in or close to areas from which enemy may launch rocket/mortar and/or ground attacks during TET ceasefire. Operation HAVERFORD commences under direction of Capital Military District.

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10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Each battalion conducts extensive patrolling and increased night surveillance in its area of operations. The attached air cavalry troop provides continuous daylight aerial reconnaissance of the brigade AO. Operations will be based on current intelligence and collective planning. All operations will be aimed at precluding enemy rocket/mortar and/or ground attacks on LONG BINH/BIEN HOA.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Tactical Operations. See Annexes H and I.

(1) 14-24 January 1968: On 13 January units of the brigade were redeployed with 2/3 Inf in AO COLUMBUS, 3/7 Inf in support of the Capital Military District, Saigon, in AO HAVERFORD and 4/12 Inf in AO UNIONTOWN. (See attached Maps) Intelligence gathered prior to this period indicated that enemy forces were planning a major attack on the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex and SAIGON. In this light, extensive small unit patrols were conducted throughout the AO during the day. These were increased at night. The maximum number of LRP teams were employed along suspected enemy routes of infiltration and exfiltration. People Sniffer missions were flown during the early morning and early evening hours. A Troop, 3/17 Air Cav provided continuous aerial reconnaissance within the AO and outer rocket belt.

(2) Very little contact was made with enemy forces; however, it was evident that the enemy was increasing his activity. Reconnaissance in force operations revealed through the discovery of base camps and newly used trails, that the number of enemy in the area was increasing.

b. Tactical Operations. See Annexes J and K.

(1) 25-30 January 1968: At approximately 1200 hours on 24 January, the 2/3 Inf terminated its operations in AO COLUMBUS and commenced operations in AO UNIONTOWN. This realignment of forces strengthened the defensive posture of the brigade in preparation for the possible TET offensive. Maneuver units continued to conduct extensive day and night patrols. Sightings of and contacts with small groups of VC and other signs of enemy activity increased during this period. Continuous patrolling of potential rocket launch sites was effected in such a manner as to avoid establishing a recognizable pattern.

(2) See Annex F for further intelligence.

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c. 30 Jan-02 Feb 68: LONG BINH 2. Throughout January, intelligence reports indicated a possible rocket/mortar and ground attack against LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex. On the night of 30 January elements of the 199th Brigade were disposed to counter either rocket/mortar or ground offensives. The following sequence of events took place on 30 Jan - 02 Feb during the NVA/VC attack on LONG BINH/BIEN HOA.

(1) 199th elements were deployed as shown at overlay.

(2) At 302310 January, H and I fires from Battery C, 2/40 Artillery caused a secondary explosion at YT 042226. This explosion was observed by the 2nd Platoon, Company E, 4/12 Infantry, which was patrolling nearby and the Company Command Group. Additional artillery fire was requested and delivered. The 2nd Platoon was assigned the mission to search the site of the secondary explosion. At 2320, Spooky (AC-47) was requested to provide illumination and mini-gun support and was on station at 2345. At 310020, the 2nd Platoon arrived in the vicinity of the secondary explosion and stopped to listen and observe. The platoon reported hearing a large number of enemy in the area. Additional artillery fires were requested. The 3rd Platoon moved to link up with the 2nd Platoon. Meanwhile, the 4th Platoon moved to the Company CP and arrangements were made for the company to move to the 2nd Platoon location. Spooky continued support until approximately 0045 hours, expending more than 15,000 rounds of mini-gun ammunition on the target area. By this time, all brigade units were on "Red" alert status.

(3) In another area of the brigade AO, Team 37, 51st Inf (IRP) reported a sighting of 80 VC moving east of its position, vicinity of YT 085136. The enemy were running and carrying small arms and automatic weapons. Time was 0105. A Troop, 3/17 Air Cav was called upon to send a light fire team (LFT) to Team 37's position. Spooky was also requested.

(4) Shortly after 0100, Company C (-), 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, the Brigade Ready Reaction Force located at Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) CONCORD, along with seven Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV) of D Troop, 17th Cavalry were ordered to move to link up with Team 37. The reaction force consisted of 44 men and seven ACAV's. At 0143, it was held at the road junction in the vicinity of YT 029126.

(5) At 0230, Company E (-), 4/12 Inf had joined the 2nd Platoon. An estimated 200-300 enemy continued their activities in the area.

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(6) At 0300, NVA/VC located in the vicinity of YT 046226 launched five to seven 122mm rockets. Artillery fire was called and resumed at 0310. Also a Forward Air Controller (FAC) and air strikes were requested. Company A, 4/12 Inf moved to establish a blocking position along enemy escape routes. The 2nd and 4th Platoons of Company B, 4/12 Inf moved to set up blocking positions in the vicinity of YT 115203. At the same time, C/4/12 and D/17 were moving east along the highway toward Team 37. Several enemy mortar rounds impacted along the road which parallels the northwest portion of the brigade main base perimeter. This is also the location of the brigade helipad. The brigade aviation section personnel and a People Sniffer team from the 503rd Chemical Detachment were pinned down by incoming small arms fire. In anticipation of a possible ground attack on the brigade main base, a provisional rifle company had been created from personnel in the 7th Support Battalion to act as a reaction force to bolster the brigade perimeter defense. A portion of this company was sent to the area of the helipad to suppress the attacking force. On the north side of the perimeter small arms fire was received from an unknown number of VC who were located in the huts and houses of HO NAI village which hugs the base perimeter. The perimeter defense reacted quickly and saturated the area with small arms and automatic weapons fire to silence the enemy action. At approximately 0302, the NVA/VC launched 122mm rockets from the vicinity of YT 098160. However, the LFT and Spooky supporting Team 37, were practically on top of the launch site at the instant the rockets were launched, destroying it with rockets and mini-guns. At 0308, Company B, 2/3 Inf was directed to move and establish a blocking position at YT 090160. At 0320, the NVA/VC launched two-five more 122mm rockets from the vicinity of YT 066228 and YT 088237. At 0345, C/4/12 and D/17 reached the road junction just south of Team 37's position and moved north. At 0355, FAC arrived on station at E/4/12 position.

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(7) C/4/12 and D/17 moved northward and almost immediately came in contact with a small group of VC manning a 12.7mm heavy machine gun. The point squad identified and charged the position, killing all VC and destroying the machine gun. Several enemy were located in a house and fired a RPG rocket which hit and damaged one of the ACAV's. Four crew members were injured. The enemy in the house were engaged with small arms and M-79 grenade launchers. The house caught fire and after burning for several minutes was totally destroyed by a secondary explosion.

(8) At the time this action took place, the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot received small arms fire. LFT and Spooky were on station and saturated the suspected enemy locations with rockets and mini-guns. One platoon of C/4/12, 199th Security Platoon (-), five ACAV's from D/17 Cav and one ARVN infantry platoon had been positioned to secure the POW Compound located at YT 039124. At 0415, this security force received small arms and automatic weapons fire. A LFT was requested and on station in a matter of minutes. Enemy activity was silenced. At 0450, air strikes were conducted in the area of the rocket launch site north of the river. By 0455, C/4/12 and D/17 were in heavy contact with at least a battalion.

(9) Company B, 2/3 Inf which had become OPCON 4/12 Inf at 0400, was moving south on the road to link up with C/4/12. Company E, 2/3 Inf, OPCON 4/12 Inf, which was working the area to the west of FSPB CONCORD, was subsequently moved to provide security for the FSPB.

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(10) At 0500, a portion of Battalion Headquarters and Companies A and C, 2/47 Infantry became OPCOM to the 199th. This force was southeast of HO NAI and was directed to proceed to and link up with C/4/12. B/2/3 Inf continued to move south toward C/4/12. Due to heavy fighting, it was necessary for C/4/12 to regroup, reorganize and dustoff wounded personnel. At this time, a total of seven men from Company C and four men from D/17 had been wounded.

(11) During the period of time from the initial sighting of NVA/VC activities, LFT's from A Troop, 3/17 Air Cav were flying the skies over the battlefield. At one time during the fighting, all gunships of A Troop had been hit from enemy fire, however the A Troop elements continued to pour round after round into enemy locations. Additional gunship support was obtained from II Field Force Headquarters.

(12) At 0615, C/4/12 initiated another attack northward along the road. LFT was in support. At about the same time, 4/12 Inf elements located at the POW Compound received small arms and automatic weapons fire once again. A LFT supporting the action scored direct hits on the enemy locations resulting in two secondary explosions. A second air strike was conducted in the area of E/4/12. C/4/12 continued to push forward and received enemy mortar fire. The enemy mortar position was destroyed and the momentum of the attack carried C/4/12 onward. Once again C/4/12 was decisively engaged. Heavy small arms fire was received from both the east and west. The enemy was in a creek bed on the west and in a cemetery on the east. C/4/12 moved to close with the enemy in the creek bed.

(13) At the POW Compound, two ACAV's and 10 ARVN soldiers conducted a patrol to the north of the compound. The patrol killed 12 VC and found many VC bodies killed in earlier action, weapons, grenades, web equipment and drugs. Company C, 2/3 Inf moved to a location east of HO NAI village to establish a blocking position along Highway 1. Company A, 2/3 Inf began to move to establish a blocking position to the northeast of C/4/12.

(14) At approximately 0715, the northwest and south portions of the brigade perimeter received small arms fire. At 0730, an ammunition pad of the LONG BINH Ammunition depot exploded. Small arms fire increased on the southern side of the perimeter. The Sapper unit that had set the satchel charge at the depot had planned to use the gorge running along the southern edge of the base perimeter as an escape route, however, they were detected and taken under fire. Artillery, located on the main base, fired direct fire into the area along with air strikes and gunships which saturated the area with rockets and machine gun fire for almost two hours.

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(15) C/4/12 withdrew from the point of contact to permit a LFT to engage the enemy in the creek bed and cemetery with machine gun and rocket fire. At 0800, 2/47 Inf elements linked up with C/4/12. Company B, 2/3 Inf was in a blocking position at YT 082143. At 0815, C/4/12 and 2/47 elements attacked northward. C/4/12 was on the west of the road and 2/47 was on the east with the APC's from 2/47 on the road. All the ACAV's of D/17 Cav remained as a reserve force. The attack was so aggressive that enemy forces withdrew to the north. In doing so, they encountered the B/2/3 blocking force. A/2/3 continued to move toward its blocking position on the northeast. An enemy force at the cemetery was engaged and destroyed after an hour long battle. Seven POW's were captured. Air strikes were called in on the enemy positions. The LFT's engaged the enemy in front of the sweeping force. The enemy forces were trapped between the advancing friendly forces and the blocking force.

(16) Enemy activity ceased in the E/4/12 area and the company commenced a sweep of the rocket launch site. The following items were found.

- (a) 35 5-man fighting positions 2' x 10' x 4'
- (b) 50 2-man fighting positions 5' x 2' x 4'
- (c) 4 12.7mm HMG positions
- (d) 12 rocket launch sites
- (e) A large number of M-79 grenade launcher rounds
- (f) 47 VC KIA (BC)
- (g) 1 AK- 50 Rifle
- (h) Numerous canteens, pistol belts, sandals and blood trails.

(17) E/4/12 completed its search of the area and pursued the enemy forces but was unable to make contact with them. The company continued to search and sweep the area until about 1600 at which time it set up for the night. Ambushes were established along the Dong Nai River to intercept infiltrators.

(18) By 1400, C/4/12 and 2/47 elements had linked up with the blocking force, B/2/3. A/2/3 was in position and had made contact with an unknown size enemy force. LFT continued to strafe the enemy positions.

(19) At 1505, C/4/12 and B/2/3 moved south and established a night defensive perimeter.

(20) At 2200, B/2/3 had contact with 60-80 VC who were attempting to probe the company perimeter. Two LFT's were dispatched to the area and supported the action. Contact continued until approximately 0100 hours. At 2355, elements of the 11th ACR arrived and assumed responsibility for the POW Compound defense.

(21) Results of actions on 31 January were as follows: 8 US KIA, 54 US WIA: Enemy Losses: 527 VC KIA (BC), 200 VC KIA (Poss), 30 POW, 42 Detainees, 78 small arms and 68 crew served weapons captured.

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(22) Actions of the 199th Brigade units at LONG BINH on 01 February consisted primarily of mop up operations. A/4/12 remained in its blocking position and conducted sweeps in the area. B/4/12 conducted platoon sweeps in the vicinity of FSPB HOTEL. E/4/12 continued search and destroy operations in its area of operations. At 0900, C/4/12 searched the houses in HO NAI village with negative results. At 1410, C/4/12 returned to the position it had occupied the previous night. At 1600, the 1st Platoon and five ACAV's of D/17 joined the company. They had previously been securing the POW Compound. C/4/12 established a night defensive position in the vicinity of YT 0831A1.

(23) A/2/3 remained in its blocking position. Troop G, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR replaced C/2/47 elements at 1214 hours. B/2/3 conducted reconnaissance in force with C/4/12, D/17 Cav (-) and G/2/11 ACR. There were no major contacts with enemy forces until 2030 hours. C/4/12 observed movement to the south and southeast. Small arms fire was received from the north. The enemy was engaged in all three locations with small arms and M-79 fire. Defensive concentrations were fired. Spooky and a LFT arrived on the scene and saturated the area with mini-gun and rocket fire. Still the fighting continued. C/2/3 and G/2/11 were ordered to the area of contact. Air strikes were called in. Contact continued until about 0200. C/2/3 found 100 VC KIA (BC) as a result of air strikes and LFT support.

(24) At 0800 on 02 February, C/4/12 swept the area of the previous night's contact. A and B, 2/3 Inf conducted a search of HO NAI village. One platoon, D/17 Cav, provided a screen to the north. At 1023 B/2/3 received 50 Cal. fire from an unknown size VC force, dug in on both sides of a creek. B/2/3 withdrew and air strikes were called in. G/2/11 and C/2/3 conducted reconnaissance in force to the northeast of B/2/3 and then swept toward the southwest to the area of contact. After another air strike and artillery was fired, the contact terminated.

(25) At 1300, 02 February, the 199th Brigade became OPCON to the 101st ABN Div. 3/7 Inf remained in support of Capital Military District in SAIGON. 2/3 Inf continued reconnaissance in force operations in the area of the morning contact. There were no further contacts with enemy forces on 02 February.

(27) Cumulative results for the period 31 Jan - 02 Feb 68 as follows: 9 US KIA, 78 US WIA, 1 APC destroyed, 5 APC's damaged. Enemy Losses: 775 VC KIA (BC), 200 VC KIA (Poss), 47 POW, 65 Detainees, 86 small arms and 79 crew served weapons captured.

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d. 31 Jan - 02 Feb - SAIGON:

(1) Early on the morning of 31 January, intelligence reports received by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry located in AO HAVERFORD, indicated that large numbers of VC were moving toward SAIGON and some actions within SAIGON had already begun. All planned operation in HAVERFORD were cancelled and 3/7 Inf elements were alerted for possible movement to SAIGON. At 0808, CMD ordered 3/7 Inf to send one company to the PHU THO Racetrack and secure the area.

(2) Company A, 3/7 Inf and eight ACAV's from D/17 Cav moved to SAIGON using Highway 4 as a route of advance. Approximately six blocks from the racetrack, heavy automatic weapons fire was received from VC firing from roof tops and houses along the street. A/3/7 deployed immediately and slowly inched its way forward. Sniper fire increased and many Vietnamese civilians, killed by the Viet Cong, were found lying dead in the streets.

(3) As A/3/7 moved forward, one POW was captured. Progress continued for two more blocks when a company size enemy force engaged the advancing elements with a hail of small arms, automatic weapons and rocket fire. Two more VC companies joined the battle. The command track of the cavalry platoon was hit by rockets, killing the platoon leader and two of the crewman. The company medics and truck drivers, aided by the battalion Chaplain began evacuation of the wounded. Many of the wounded personnel refused to be evacuated and remained to fight. On several occasions, friendly forces had to hold their fire to allow hundreds of civilians to pass through the area to areas of safety. A platoon of VC, using civilians as a human shield, rushed one of the M-60 machine gun positions. The attack failed. The enemy suffered heavy casualties and began to withdraw.

(4) By 1300, the advancing force had moved to within two blocks of the racetrack. The lead elements were engaged in house to house fighting. Gunships were called in to make mini-gun and rocket runs on the enemy positions. The VC broke and withdrew to the racetrack. The VC were dug in behind concrete park benches and had heavy weapons located in concrete towers on the spectator stands inside the racetrack. The initial attack by friendly forces was repelled by the VC. A/3/7 withdrew, regrouped and attacked the racetrack from the southeast. Gunships and M106 Recoilless Rifle fire supported the attack. The volume of fire placed on the enemy forced the VC to scatter and flee the area. By 1630, A/3/7 had secured the racetrack. At approximately 1830, B and C Companies, 3/7 Inf were airlifted into the racetrack to establish the battalion forward Command Post.

(5) Company E, 3/7 Inf remained at BINH CHANH to secure the FSPB. It was later reinforced by B and C Companies, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (Mechanized). In the late evening, the FSPB came under enemy attack. The VC attacked with small arms, automatic weapons, M-79, rockets, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The Battery Commander, B Battery, 2/40 Artillery reported a recoilless rifle located in a tall concrete house. Artillery fired direct fire and destroyed the position. The gun crews, while under heavy fire, continued to engage counter-mortar targets. Elements of the 2nd Platoon, 87th Engineer Company and battalion clerks

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and mess personnel moved into perimeter positions and began placing fire on the enemy. The volume of fire received from the artillery, riflemen APC's forced the VC to withdraw.

(6) On 01 February, B and C Companies, 5/60 Inf moved to the racetrack. VC elements were reported to be regrouping a few blocks to the northwest of the racetrack. 3/7 Inf commenced a search and sweep operation in the area utilizing B and C Companies, 3/7 Inf and B and C Companies, 5/60 Inf. A/3/7 and D/17 Cav remained in defensive positions at the racetrack. B and C Companies, 3/7 Inf moved and swept the area south and west of the racetrack. B/5/60 made contact with an unknown size VC force approximately 1000 meters west of the racetrack. The VC were positioned in a grave yard. A company size VC force using HMG's and rockets ambushed the last three APC's of B Company. Two were destroyed and one heavily damaged. One of the APC's was on fire, but the crew continued to place fire on the enemy so that wounded and dead could be evacuated. C/5/60 was ordered to the area of contact. After a lengthy battle, the VC were forced to withdraw.

(7) A second VC force attacked the west side of the racetrack. The perimeter defense quickly returned the fire. The defending forces brought all their fires to bear on the VC. B and C Companies, 5/60 Inf moved back to the racetrack and their added firepower drove the VC from their positions and broke the attack on the racetrack.

(8) On 02 February, 3/7 Inf continued to sweep the area in a mopping up operation and found many Viet Cong bodies and equipment in the area of contact. It appeared that the VC had withdrawn in defeat and had given up the PHU THO Racetrack.

(9) Results of the actions during 31 Jan - 02 Feb were as follows: 7 US KIA, 43 US WIA, 3 APC's destroyed and 26 APC's damaged: Enemy Losses: 178 VC KIA (BC), 7 POW, 17 Detainees and 9 small arms captured.

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e. 03 - 07 February - LONG BINH/SAIGON:

(1) 199th elements at LONG BINH continued reconnaissance in force operations to clear the local area. Many dead NVA/VC, equipment and supplies were found scattered throughout the area. Small groups of VC who had been hiding since the 31 January attack attempted to withdraw from the area. Due to extensive patrolling efforts and constant aerial reconnaissance, these groups were rapidly detected. OPCON of the 199th Brigade to the 101st ABN Div terminated on 07 February. 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR (-) became OPCON to the 199th.

(2) Results of actions during the period: 7 US WIA: Enemy Losses: 66 VC KIA (BC), 8 POW, 15 Detainees, 27 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured.

(3) 3/7 Infantry continued operations in SAIGON to secure the PHU THO Racetrack. On 24 February, 3/7 Inf terminated operations in SAIGON and moved back to BINH CHANH to conduct operations in that area. For the next two days, 3/7 Infantry made contact with enemy forces while conducting reconnaissance in force operations.

(4) Results of actions during the period: 6 US KIA, 38 US WIA: Enemy Losses: 59 VC KIA (BC), 6 POW, 1 Detainee, 11 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured.

f. 08 - 19 February - LONG BINH/SAIGON:

(1) On 09 February, the 199th elements were redeployed. Because of newly initiated VC activity in SAIGON, 3/7 Inf was ordered to secure the PHU THO Racetrack. 2/3 Inf was airlifted from LONG BINH to BINH CHANH. 4/12 Inf and 3/11 ACR (-) continued operations at LONG BINH.

(2) 11 February- SAIGON: 3/7 Inf elements conducted reconnaissance in force operations. At approximately 1515 hours, Company D received small arms fire from an estimated VC company. Company B and 2nd Platoon, D Troop, 17th Cavalry reinforced. Artillery supported. After three hours of heavy fighting, the contact was terminated leaving 5 US KIA and 12 US WIA. Enemy losses were 24 VC KIA (BC), 2 POW, and 7 small arms weapons captured.

(3) 12 February-BINH CHANH: 2/3 Inf, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations had sporadic contact with enemy forces. At approximately 1020 hours, Company A discovered a large weapons cache containing 68 small arms, 4 crew served weapons, 148 82mm mortar rounds and 27,800 7.62 mm rounds. Twelve VC were killed during the day.

(4) VC activity at LONG BINH and SAIGON had significantly decreased to the point that very few contacts were made. However, 199th elements remained in a high state of readiness.

(5) 13 February - BINH CHANH: At 1320, Company B, 2/3 Inf uncovered an enemy base camp capturing 9 small arms, 20,440 rounds of small arms ammunition, 130 RPG-7 rockets, 195 B-40 rockets, 7 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 1.42 tons of demolitions and 217 grenades.

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(6) 16 February - BINH CHANH: At 1130, Company D, 2/3 Inf made contact with an unknown size VC force. Company B, 2/3 Inf was airlifted into the area of contact at 1409 hours and came under heavy enemy fire. At 1702, Company A, 2/3 Inf was airlifted to join the fight. The VC force was estimated to be a battalion, well dug in. Three immediate air strikes were called in on the enemy positions. Artillery, LFT's and Spooky supported. Contact terminated at 2047 hours.

(7) Results of the action on 16 February: 3 US KIA, 11 US WIA. Enemy Losses: 61 VC KIA (EC), 3 small arms captured.

(8) 17 - 19 February: Elements of the brigade continued reconnaissance in force operations at LONG BINH, SAIGON and BINH CHANH on 17 February. Contact with enemy forces was very light. On 18 February 2/3 Inf became OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division and continued operations in BINH CHANH. 3/7 Inf terminated operation in SAIGON and moved to LONG BINH. 2/3 Inf remained in BINH CHANH on 19 February. 3/7 Inf, 4/12 Inf and 3/11 ACR(-) continued reconnaissance in force operation in the LONG BINH/BINH HOA area with negative enemy contact.

12. (C) RESULTS: A summary of significant resultant statistics is listed at Annex G, Statistics.

13. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: People Sniffer-Manpack Personnel Detector E-63 (Modified for airborne use). The 199th Brigade's 503rd Chemical Detachment conducted people sniffer missions during the period 14 January to 17 February 1968, identifying 264 hotspots of probable enemy activities. The people sniffer enjoyed several successes identifying VC base camps and supplementing other intelligence means in locating areas of enemy activity. The E-63 is a chemical personnel detector which samples the air, at low levels, for products found in basic human environment (primarily ammonia produced by perspiration). Two basic and distinct type missions were flown; the "Hunter-Killer" in which the accompanying LFT immediately engages the target and the recon only mission in which no targets are engaged unless ground fire is received. The techniques and methods of employment for this additional intelligence to have proved themselves in recent operations.

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. Brigade had dual mission: to preclude rocket/mortar and/or ground attack on Long Binh - Bien Hoa, and to support Capital Military District with a battalion task force. The brigade was unable to completely preclude rocket attack on Bien Hoa. However, it is clear from reports that such attacks were minimized by brigade action. Other aspects of the brigade mission were accomplished with maximum enemy and minimum friendly casualties.

b. Several important concepts were either refined or validated during the action covered by this report. The following briefly summarize these concepts:

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(1) Night airmobile assaults. This type of operation is extremely complicated and hazardous. It involves serious risks both for personnel and materiel. Its use should be limited to those situations in which there has been an opportunity for thorough area reconnaissance and in which there is definitive information regarding the target. Such a situation presented itself during the Tet offensive. Intelligence reported the location of the 5th VC Division Headquarters at a temporary halt during a succession of moves. The reported position was within the brigade AO and the terrain in the vicinity was such that there was capability to execute a night insertion. Further, at the location of the ready reaction company, there was a known pickup zone. Under this combination of circumstances, the brigade was able to move the company by air. The air movement was successfully completed, and the sweep of the area in question was also accomplished without mishap. The fact that the basic report was in error is not the important consideration. The feasibility of air night assaults was established, and brigade techniques for accomplishment of such assaults were enhanced.

(2) Counter rocket/mortar surveillance techniques. The brigade mission dictated the surveillance of approximately 35 kilometers of rocket belt area and a comparable mortar belt area. To accomplish this along with other tactical missions, the brigade had available two battalions, and artillery H and I fires. Aerial surveillance was accomplished by the use of aero scouts of the air cavalry troop on first and last light missions along with daylight scouting missions. Ground operations were closely coordinated with artillery H and I fires. Night patrolling in platoon size increments was so oriented as to allow company elements to reinforce within reasonable time. Areas representing likely rocket positions were identified. Patrol plans were developed to provide maximum coverage without developing a pattern. Artillery fire was placed on these areas which were not covered by patrol activities. It was a combination of patrol action and artillery fires which resulted in the destruction of rocket positions almost simultaneously with the launching of the first salvo. Another surveillance agency, FAC who was airborne during the night, was able to bring immediate fire in on the third rocket position.

(3) CRIP Platoon. A Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon was needed to provide the main base early warning at the time that the VC initiated the Tet offensive. This had not been accomplished and the VC were able to infiltrate the Honai village because the brigade had little intelligence from the village itself. During the course of the offensive, a platoon was formed, composed of RVN personnel and a rifle platoon of Brigade HHC. The mission of the combined force was to provide surveillance of and intelligence regarding Honai village, and to conduct roving patrols and ambushes to preclude VC infiltration. The platoon was of particular value because of the proximity of the village to brigade main base. Its value would appear to decrease if the location of the village were more remote from the main base. By providing this combined force with adequate communications and weapons, to include the M-79, a force with a limited reaction capability and staying power was created. Because of this, the security of the base was enhanced.

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
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(4) Use of LRRP's as a counter sapper force. The concept of LRRP employment visualizes a long-range reconnaissance function. It was found that the LRRP's could be very profitably employed as a part of internal screen against sappers in the Long Binh a.c.a. This involved positioning LRRP teams within the external screen provided by the mission battalion and permitted interdiction of routes of ingress and egress for sapper units. It is believed that sapper activities were reduced to the minimum by this employment technique. During the period subsequent to the main attack of 31 January, reports indicated that the VC's intention was to attack Long Binh post by sappers. Contacts between LRRP elements and small parties of VC indicated that the VC were attempting to move to areas within the Long Binh complex where demolition materials probably were in caches. These indications were further substantiated by sweeps which uncovered VC areas containing significant amounts of demolition materials.

(5) Decentralization of clearance authority for artillery fires. Rapid clearance of artillery fires is essential in the defense. Obtaining this clearance is particularly difficult in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh areas. Based on experience, decentralizing clearance authority to the operating battalion level provides the most rapid response. Centralized control causes unacceptable delays. This was demonstrated by one situation in which more than 50 minutes were required to get clearance from an adjacent organization which employed centralized clearance procedures. If decentralization is employed, information as to the exact location of friendly forces must be disseminated.


ROBERT C. FORBES
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVFBC-RE-H (15 Apr 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 10 MAY 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The attached after action report for the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)
(Light), Operation Long Binh/Saigon TET Campaign, is forwarded in accordance with MACV Dir 335-8, 1 September 1967, subject: Combat Operations After Action Reports (MACV J3-32(K-1)).


FOR THE COMMANDER:

OB For

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Appendix 1, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 14-24 Jan 68.

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


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Appendix 2, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign
(1: 100,000) 13-24 Jan 68

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
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Appendix 3, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON, TET Campaign (1:100,000) 14-24 January 1968.

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
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Appendix 4, Operations, after Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON T&T Campaign. (1:100,000) 24-30 Jan 68.

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


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
Appendix 5, Operations After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SIAGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 24-30 Jan 68.



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
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Appendix 5, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
T&T Campaign, (1:100,000) Unit Disposition on 30 Jan 68.


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APPENDIX C, OPERATIONS, AFTER ACTION REPORT, LONG BINH,
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 31 Jan 68.

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
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
Appendix 9, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH,
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 31 Jan 68.

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Appendix 10, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 31 Jan 68.


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
Appendix 11, Operations, After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON T&T Campaign. (1:100,000) 31 Jan 68.

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Appendix 12, Operations, After Action Report, IDMG BINH/
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100, 000) 31 January 1968.




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
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Appendix 15, Operations After Action Report, LONG BINH/
SAIGON TET Campaign. (1:100,000) 13-16 Feb 68.



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Annex B, Artillery, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign

1. (C) Artillery Support:

a. Artillery support was provided to the 199th Brigade's elements by the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery. In order to insure extensive support, the battalion established liaison and close coordination with other artillery units. During the period 14 Jan to 19 Jan 1968, the 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery coordinated artillery fires and supported or answered calls for fire from:

(1) US Elements

- (a) 199th Infantry Brigade
- (b) MACV Headquarters
- (c) II Field Force Artillery
- (d) 101st Airborne Division
- (e) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
- (f) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery

(2) Republic of Vietnam Elements

- (a) ARVN elements and advisors at Tan Uyen
- (b) Regional Force/Popular Force Units in AO and Binh Chanh
- (c) Dong Nai Sensitive Area Command
- (d) III ARVN Corps Headquarters

(3) Australian Task Force

b. Task Organization of Artillery

A Battery, 2/40th Arty	DS	2/3 Inf
B Battery, 2/40th Arty	DS	3/7 Inf
C Battery, 2/40th Arty	DS	4/12 Inf
A Battery, 2/40th Arty	DS	3/7 Inf (9-17 Feb)
B Battery, 2/40th Arty	DS	3/7 Inf (9-17 Feb)

c. The artillery displaced to the following positions in order to effect maximum coverage of the Brigade's areas of operation: At the beginning of this reporting period Bn Hq (-) was at YT 076122; A Battery, 2/40th Artillery at YT 216125; B Battery, 2/40th Artillery at XS 712795; C Battery, 2/40th Artillery at YT 032172.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>FSPB</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MEANS</u>
C Battery (-)	YT 102207	HOTEL	21 Jan 68	Convoy
A Battery (-)	YT 102207	HOTEL	24 Jan 68	Convoy
A Battery (-)	YT 076122	Camp Frenzell-Jones	24 Jan 68	Convoy
C Battery (-)	YT 032172	CONCORD	24 Jan 68	Convoy
Battery (-) 1/83 OPCON	YT 102207	HOTEL	27 Jan 68	In Location
B Battery (-)	XS	SAIGON RACE TRACK	3 Feb 68	Convoy
B Battery (-)	XS 712795	ZINDERNEUF	4 Feb 68	Convoy
A Battery (-)	YT 076122	Camp Frenzell-Jones	7 Feb 68	Convoy
Battery (-) 1/83	Released From OPCON	HOTEL	7 Feb 68	In Location
A Battery	XS 796950	Ton Son Nhut	9 Feb 68	CH-47
C Battery (-)	YT 076122	Camp Frenzell-Jones	9 Feb 68	Convoy

A. Utilization of Artillery

- (1) Fire support of units in contact.
- (2) LZ Preps and supporting fires during airmobile assaults/extractions.
- (3) Direct fire into close in enemy locations.
- (4) False preps of areas to confuse the enemy and add surprise to actual airmobile assaults.
- (5) Recon by fire for maneuver elements.
- (6) Defensive concentrations were integrated into mortar plans and were fired to support defensive positions.
- (7) H&I's, and saturations were used against known and suspected VC locations, trails, streams and other likely sources of movement.
- (8) High Burst, White Phosphorus, as check points for ambushes and to aid the infantry in land navigation.
- (9) Practice missions for training of infantry forward observers.

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e. Artillery ammunition expenditure was as follows:

LONG BINH (14 Jan - 02 Feb 68)

	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
Support	415	6727	447	744
H&I's	1536	2020	137	0

LONG BINH (02 - 07 Feb 68)

	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
Support	88	1077	32	1231
H&I's	96	190	0	0

LONG BINH (07 Feb - 19 Feb 68)

	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
Support	12	181	39	0
H&I's	316	500	50	0

SAIGON/BINH CHANH (B Battery, 14 Jan - 19 Feb 68)

	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
Support	212	6721	503	2380
H&I's	1360	1781	0	36

f. Ammunition expended was as follows:

(1) LONG BINH/SAIGON (14 Jan - 19 Feb 68)

	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
Support	727	14706	1021	4355
H&I's	3308	4491	187	36

(2) The total figures for all operations conducted from
14 Jan - 17 Feb 68:

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
4,035	19,197	1,208	4,391

g. Enemy Losses from Artillery:

VC KIA (BC)	123
VC KIA (POSS)	56
VC WIA	15
Bunkers (Dest)	21
Mil Struct (Dest)	3
Sampans (Dest)	2
Mil Struct (Dam)	16
Secondary Explosions	34
Rockets/Mortars	4

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2. (C) Analysis

a. The movement and positioning of the artillery was primarily dictated by the area of operations of the supported unit. Exceptions to this were Fire Support Base HOTEL, YT 102207, and the positioning of tubes on the Brigade Main Base, (BMB), Camp Frenzall-Jones. FSPB HOTEL was established to provide direct support to the supported unit and to cover infiltration and exfiltration in the northern portion of the AO. The tubes at Main Base, (BMB), were positioned for defense of the Long Binh area and AO South Uniontown.

b. During the attack on 31 Jan and 1 Feb there were several unusual fire missions. Both C Battery and A Battery (-), at one point, were required to fire three missions simultaneously. Also, C Battery was firing a recon by fire mission at the time the enemy launched rockets on II FFORCEV Headquarters area. The observer saw the launching and shifted fire onto the area. More than fifty VC were KIA and all remaining rockets were destroyed by this mission.

c. Target acquisition and surveillance continues to be limiting factors. The battalion fired on every target provided by SLAR, People Sniffer, Red Haze and Agent Reports. Surveillance after firing was not possible. Another means of target acquisition employed during this period was the TPSI/25 Radar operated by the 101st Division Artillery. When the TPSI/25 acquired a target, the 101st notified the 4/12 Infantry TOC at FSPB Concord, YT 032172. The artillery LNO would coordinate the 2/40th Artillery Q4 Radar to adjust mortars or artillery on the target. Surveillance was conducted the next day when possible. On one occasion blood trails and some small arms ammunition were found. The jungle growth was too dense for an adequate search. The enemy was forced to discontinue use of a normal movement route.

d. During the 31 January attack, all illumination resources were being utilized to the maximum. Spooky (Flare Ship) was not able to fill all requests and artillery illumination was utilized to an unusual degree. All batteries were firing two or three simultaneous illumination missions during the attack.

e. Clearance of fires, both air and ground, during the attack was an extremely difficult problem. The AWCC of the Dong Nai Sensitive Area handled an unbelievable volume of clearance requests including air, ground and request for Spooky and gun ships. The crew at DNSA cleared all fires without delay or confusion even during the period their area was under heavy attack. Inexperience or shortage of qualified personnel could have been disastrous during this period because most of the enemy activity was in no fire zones and under the Bien Hoa Air Corridor. The current regulations prohibit firing in these areas without clearance even when in contact. This period also provided an opportunity to evaluate clearance procedures of the 2/40th Artillery in comparison to other units of II FFORCEV and the 101st Abn Div Artillery. The 2/40th Artillery has decentralized the clearance process. The Artillery LNO of the maneuver battalion clears all fires (ARVN, Air, US Ground) within the AO of the maneuver battalion. He also coordinates the clearance

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with adjacent units within 1000 meters of boundaries. The clearance channel is from the firing unit to the LNO to the ANCC and ARVN clearing agency. Most of II FFORCEV Artillery units employ a similar decentralized system. The centralized process decreases the response time. The centralized agency was unable to handle the large volume of clearance requests during peak periods of firing. This experience points out the necessity for well defined AO's for each maneuver battalion or task force with the artillery LNO operating the clearance process from the TOC of the supported unit.

f. Three 105mm howitzers were positioned at Camp Frenzell-Jones during most of this period to protect the Main Base, (EMB), and Long Binh Post from ground attack. A direct fire plan with positions around the perimeter was established. Direct or indirect fire coverage of the perimeter from the primary firing positions was not possible because of the buildings, towers and rolling terrain. Each howitzer section was briefed on its direct fire location for each contingency. Direct fire procedures were employed twice during this period. The 195th ARVN Company was receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from the densely overgrown area behind their perimeter and II FFORCEV Headquarters area vic YT 075113. One howitzer of A Battery was displaced to the area and fired three White Phosphorus rounds and 20 High Explosive rounds. The enemy was still returning fire. LTC Meyer, Battalion Commander ordered a Beehive round be fired. One Beehive round was fired. Enemy fire ceased and the howitzer section returned to its primary position. An air strike was placed on the same target later in the day. The engineers cleared the dense jungle growth out a few days later and reported 18 VC KIA (BC). The other direct fire mission was employed from the primary firing position against an automatic weapons position in a tower in Ho Nai Village. The gun scored six hits on the tower and enemy firing ceased. This mission was conducted at night under illumination provided by aircraft dropping flares.

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Annex C, Logistics, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign

1. (C) Supply: The average strength supported during the operation was approximately 4,500 troops. Units were resupplied by both road convoy and army aircraft with classes of supplies coming from the 506th Field Depot. For a few days after the VC attack on 31 January, it was necessary to draw supplies from LONG BINH Post. No combat operations were cancelled due to the lack of logistical support.

a. The following significant logistical activities occurred during the operation.

- (1) The infantry battalions were reorganized on 1 February by GO 20, HQ USARPAC, 15 January 1968.
- (2) On 8 and 10 February the new company packets arrived in the Brigade. The companies were outfitted in the minimum time and prepared for combat.
- (3) The following items of equipment were issued to the companies.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u> (Ea. Company)
Pistol, Cal .45	9
Rifle, M-16	164
Machine Gun, M-60	6
Mortar, 81mm	3
Grenade, Launcher M-79	24
Flame thrower, PTBL	3
Bayonet, Knife	164
Radio, AN/PRC-25	6
Antenna, RC-292	3
Switchboard, SB-993	2
Radio, Squad AN/PRT-4	18
Tool Kit, Radio	1
Receiver, AN/PRR-9	6

(4) In addition to the daily commitments, the 120th Transportation Company, Light Truck Platoon moved two infantry battalions with supporting artillery from one field location to another. Significant activities were as follows.

Mileage —	24,203 miles
Tonnage —	900 S/T
Personnel moved —	5,500 troops

(5) During the TET offensive, Class III and V consumption increased by three to four times the normal rates.

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b. Class I:

- (1) Units were deployed with prescribed loads of "C" Rations.
- (2) Class I issued:
 - (a) Total "A" Rations issued - 247 S/T
 - (b) Total "C" Rations issued - 75 S/T
 - (c) Total tonnage issued - 322 S/T

c. Class II and IV:

- (1) Units deployed with a 5 day supply level.
- (2) Requisitions were forwarded to Brigade Supply office where they were filled or back-ordered. The Brigade Supply Office requisitioned on the 506th Field Depot.

(3) Class II and IV issued:

- (a) Total tonnage - 250 S/T
- (b) Total number of requisitions - 2956

d. Class III:

- (1) Type fuel issued:
 - (a) JP-4
 - (b) AVGAS
 - (c) MOGAS
 - (d) DIESEL
- (2) Total POL issued - 647,405 gallons.

e. Class V:

- (1) Brigade Ammunition Officer controlled the issue of ammunition and units made direct pick up from the ammunition supply point. Units maintained their load of ammunition.

- (2) Total tonnage issued - 1560.66 S/T

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2. (U) Maintenance:

- a. Units performed organizational maintenance.
- b. Direct support maintenance was performed by Company B, 7th Spt B.
- c. Direct support maintenance was performed, as far forward as dictated by urgency of the situation, by the use of contact teams. Additionally, direct support maintenance was performed at the brigade main base.

3. (U) Treatment, Evacuation and Hospitalization of Casualties:

- a. Company C operated a thirty bed hospital ward and a dispensary in support of the 199th Infantry Brigade for 2nd echelon medical care. All patients are referred from their battalion aid station for treatment.
- b. The majority of patients seen by this unit can be categorized as gastroenteritis acute, combat fatigue, upper respiratory infections, venereal disease and various types of communicable diseases.
- c. Seventy per cent of the patients seen during the period were returned to duty, fifteen per cent were hospitalized for approximately four to five days at the brigade hospital and fifteen per cent were evacuated to Evacuation Hospitals.

4. (U) Analysis:

- a. It was noted, that each unit should appoint a sanitation team to conduct sanitation inspections once a week in the brigade main base and daily in the field.
- b. Malaria control program increased to a daily dose of Dapsone, plus the weekly tablet of Chloroquine-Primaquine. A significant increase in the use of antimalarial drugs was noticed during this period.

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Annex D, Civic Action/PsyOps/MEDCAP, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign.

1. (U) Civic Action:

a. Period 14 - 30 Jan 68: During this period, the Brigade S5 Staff continued to help the victims of the Air Force F5 jet crash at TAY HAI Hamlet, HO NAI Village, and participated in pre-TET activities with civilians residing in the AO. The S5 installed two 55 gallon collapsible water containers and insured a continuing supply of water after it was learned that the village well had been contaminated by the crash. Two civic action projects are selected as having particular human interest appeal. On 24 Jan 68, at the hamlet of TAN KIEN #3, BINH CHANH District, GIA DINH Province, the S5 Staff of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, distributed 1,400 pounds of commodities as TET gifts. The hamlet chief and the villagers were very pleased, and invited the Battalion S5 Staff to return to their hamlet during Feb 68 as guests at an appreciation dinner/festival and to receive an inscribed plaque as an award. On 25 Jan 68, the Brigade S5 Staff provided materials for decorating the DA MINH Orphanage, HO NAI Village, in preparation for a TET Children's Party. The nuns in residence supervised the decoration of a dining area. The Brigade S5 Staff then arrived at the orphanage with twenty gallons of Kool-Aid and gifts of Halloween masks, candy and CARE school kits for the children. The children accepted their gifts and then sang their thanks to the S5 Staff. The children played with members of the S5 Staff, wore their masks, and a good time was had by all.

b. Period 31 Jan - 19 Feb 68: The mission given the S5 Staff during this period called for the initiation and support of social welfare projects designed to aid 15,000 - 20,000 displaced persons generated by the hostilities in and near HO NAI Village, Duc Tu District and Bien Hoa Province. The following highlights illustrate the sweep of the civic action effort: wounded civilians were passed over the Camp Frenzell-Jones perimeter wire and treated even as hostilities continued; five tents were raised to shelter the displaced persons who had gathered at a hospital and a churchyard; 20,000 gallons of water were delivered to the people; and coordination was effected for the rebuilding of private homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed during the hostilities. The Deputy Commander, Provost Marshal, and the S5 coordinated activities with the HO NAI Village and Police Chiefs at the HO NAI Village Office. In addition, the S5 coordinated activities with the Duc Tu District Chief/Sub-Sector Advisor and the Bien Hoa Province Chief/Sector Advisor. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, OPCON to CMB, also carried out civic action activities in the SAIGON/CHOLON area.

2. (U) A resume of significant statistics of civic action follows:

- a. 16,456 pounds of foodstuffs distributed.
- b. 50 pounds of emergency medicine distributed.

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- e. 550 bars of soap distributed.
- d. 20,000 gallons of potable water distributed.
- e. 6,000 board feet of lumber distributed.
- f. 1,200 pounds of cement distributed.
- g. 10,320 pounds of other construction material distribution.
- h. 5 tents raised for accomodation of displaced refugees.
- i. 3 schools whitewashed.
- j. 2 TET parties.
- k. 1 38' 6" vehicle bridge constructed.
- l. 1 electrical system repaired.
- m. 1 Vietnamese Information Service TV repaired.
- n. 1 well dug.
- o. Repairs are in process at 1 water tower
- p. 3 acres land graded.
- q. 2 body disposal missions completed.

3. (U) Conculusions: The civic action program during this period was successful because:

a. Extensive information gathering surveys had been completed and discussed before hostilities, thus allowing better coordination during the LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign.

b. Projects were undertaken with the aid of the villagers who directly benefited and were coordinated with village and hamlet officials who retained administrative control and personal prestige throughout the effort.

c. Projects undertaken were important to the people and enhanced the image of the Brigade and the GVN.

4. (U) Psychological Operations:

a. Period 14 - 30 Jan 68: During this period PsyOps activities were directed toward the first phase of the TET/CHIEU HOI Campaign, a national effort throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The Brigade achieved saturation of its AO by airdropping 2,540,000 TET/CHIEU HOI/Safe Conduct Pass leaflets. In addition, units of the Brigade hand-distributed 25,245

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Chieu Hoi/Weapons Reward/MEDCAP/Safe Conduct Pass leaflets. PsyOps in support of Brigade operations was devoted to undermining the confidence of the Viet Cong units in the AO. By taking advantage of "people-sniffer" missions, LRP contacts and reports received from the maneuver battalions, this headquarters has been able to target areas of troop concentrations. It is believed that the effort to drop leaflets on known occupied areas led to an undermining of the Viet Cong's confidence in his ability to hide.

b. Period 31 Jan - 19 Feb 68: The mission given the PsyOps Staff of the 199th Infantry Brigade involved both the organization of the civilian population in HO NAI Village, and offensive PsyOps against Viet Cong troops. The Brigade was aided in both efforts by a six-man POLWMA Team provided this headquarters by the G5, III CTZ, BIEN HOA. A total of 649,045 leaflets were distributed and 26 hours of loudspeaker time was broadcast. Themes were: the organization of the villagers to protect themselves against VC hostilities; general information about the situation in the village; and appeals to the villagers to convince the Viet Cong to surrender. The Viet Cong were told that their campaign was a failure and that it was advisable to surrender. Two quick-reaction leaflets were developed and dropped on the village warning the people to stay away from areas where the Viet Cong were operating.

5. (U) A resume of significant statistics of PsyOps follows:

- a. Total leaflets distributed: 3,209,545.
 - (1) Total leaflets airdropped: 3,061,500.
 - (2) Total leaflets hand-distributed: 148,045.
- b. Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts time: 8 hours.
- c. Ground loudspeaker broadcast time: 18 hours.
- d. 2 TET billboards (3'x 5') erected at Camp Frenzel-Jones Main Gates, announcing: "The 199th Inf Bde wishes all of its Vietnamese friends and employees the best wishes for the new spring".

6. (U) Conclusions: The PsyOps program during this period was successful because:

- a. PsyOps in support of the GVN related to the needs and concerns of the civilian population, therefore relating the PsyOps with the local context.
- b. The population-control PsyOps conducted by this Brigade effectively guided the people of Ho Nai Village into two refugee areas and explained the meaning of the hostilities to them.

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c. The offensive PsyOps conducted by this Brigade was targeted on known Viet Cong concentrations. A quick-reaction Chieu Hoi appeal was also targeted and broadcast.

7. (U) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP):

a. Period 14 - 30 Jan 68: Upon moving into the AO, the needs of the people and the abilities of the Brigade aidmen were researched with the intent of establishing a permanent MEDCAP system similar to the one introduced during Operation FAIRFAX. Sites were chosen which were proximate to population centers and each battalion under this command introduced a MEDCAP. As the battalions maneuvered throughout the AO, however, the MEDCAPs became roving and the Brigade Headquarters maintained the only permanent site. 2,645 patients were treated by the MEDCAPs.

b. Period 31 Jan - 19 Feb 68: Medical assistance during and after hostilities was provided by the S5 Staff. Wounded civilians were examined by the Brigade Surgeon and the S5 medical specialist, treated and evacuated. Pure water and 50 pounds of critical medical supplies were delivered to the THANH TAM Refugee Hospital. The MED 'P' Dispensary located at LOC LAM, TAY HAI Hamlet, HO NAI Village, was held for a time by the Viet Cong forces, but was reoccupied and normal MEDCAP operations resumed on 7 Feb 68. The maneuver battalions also established MEDCAP sites including areas in SAIGON/CHOLON. 2,671 patients were treated during this period.

8. (U) During the period Jan 14 - 19 Feb 68, a total of 5,316 patients were treated.

9. (U) Conclusions:

a. Roving MEDCAPs traveled with the maneuver battalions. Thus, the American presence provided civilians with physical security and medical care; benefits which were appreciated.

b. The Brigade medical capability effectively cared for the wounded civilians and evacuated them when necessary. Provisions was also effected for emergency supplies to be delivered to the refugee hospital, operated by the Christian Brothers, which was treating an overload of patients at the refugee gathering point.

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Annex E, Task Organization, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TEST Campaign

1. (C) 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry
Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery
2. (C) 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry
Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery
2nd Platoon, D Troop, 17th Cavalry
2nd Platoon, 87th Engineer Company
3. (C) 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry
Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery
D Troop, 17th Cavalry (-)
4. (C) Brigade Control
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 199th Infantry Brigade
2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery
87th Engineer Company (-)
7th Support Battalion
49th Infantry Platoon, (Scout Dog)
71st Infantry (IRP) Detachment, 199th Infantry Brigade
11th Combat Tracker Team
293th Signal Platoon
152nd Military Police Platoon
503rd Chemical Detachment
40th Public Information Detachment
44th Military History Detachment
856th Radio Research Detachment
179th Military Intelligence Detachment

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5. (C) ATTACHMENTS:

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (07 - 19 Feb 68)
 I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (19 Feb 68)
 K Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (12-19 Feb 68)
 L Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (07-16 Feb 68)
 M Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (07-19 Feb 68)
 G Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (01-07 Feb 68)
 A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (20 Jan - 19 Feb 68)
 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (-) (31 Jan 68)
 Company A, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (31 Jan 68)
 Company C, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (31 Jan - 01 Feb 68)
 1st Platoon, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (20-31 Jan 68)
 Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (Mech) (31 Jan - 05 Feb 68)
 Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (Mech) (31 Jan - 05 Feb 68)
 F Company (LRP) 51st Infantry, II FFV (22 Jan - 19 Feb 68)

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Annex F, Intelligence, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

1. (C) General Background:

a. The 1967-1968 VC Winter-Spring Campaign is a three-phase effort begun in late October 1967. The purpose is to bring a victory or a coalition government to the National Liberation Front in the Vietnam war. Phase I, which began on 20 October 1967, to last through December, involved intense efforts by the NLF SVN in propaganda, proselyting and resupply activities. During Phase I, major combat as well as rear service units were involved in vast resupply and realignment operations, while the political wing devoted their organization to the achievement of a propaganda advantage over the South Vietnamese government. The resupply activities were carried out with some measure of success, as well as the recruitment of "volunteers". Infiltration was increased. The propaganda and the political objectives, however, were failures.

b. In late 1967, the VC/NVA forces realigned the VC Military Regions in such manner as to create a "wagon-wheel" effect with Saigon as the hub. (See Appendix 1). This allows forces assigned to any of these Military Regions to operate on the periphery of Saigon. This realignment also created a small "special zone" encompassing the US bases at Bien Hoa and Long Binh.

c. Six VC Local Force, District and Provincial Force Battalions were known to operate around the US AO HAVERFORD, located southwest of Saigon (See Appendix 2). From 15 January through 29 January 1968, contacts with VC elements were of platoon size or smaller. Only three company sized contacts were reported during the same period. The VC activities consisted primarily of mortaring and small unit harassing actions designed primarily to cover the movements of the larger VC units infiltrating in to the outskirts of Saigon. From 31 January 1968 through 19 February 1968, extensive sweep operations were conducted in the vicinity of AO HAVERFORD. A general withdrawal of the Local Forces (VC) was detected. Several large caches of ammunition, medical supplies, large quantities of rice, and communication equipment were discovered. On 12 February 1968, heavy contact with an estimated VC company was established along a canal in vicinity of XS 717839. This contact yielded large amounts of small arms ammunition, explosives, medical supplies, and important VC documents.

d. Phase II of the VC offensive started as scheduled in late January 1968, with emphasis on large scale, coordinated attacks on military installations, units government agencies throughout South Vietnam. The objective was to force the allies to commit large numbers of troops in a static defensive posture, thereby relieving some of the pressure on VC movement throughout the country. This phase was originally geared to last through March 1968. On 30 January 1968, after several months of training, planning and intelligence activity, the VC launched a well planned series of coordinated attacks on nearly every major city and large US installation in the I, II and IV Corps areas. The VC offensive

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in III Corps Tactical Zone began at 0300 hours, 31 January 1968.

e. Elements of the 1st, 2nd, 3d, 4th, and 6th Saigon-Gia Dinh Local Force Battalions (the 5th LF Battalion joined these forces later) and the C-10 Sapper Battalion began operations in their respective areas of responsibility in and around Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh and Tan Son Nhat. These units were reinforced by 5 other battalions later in the attack.

f. After a brief rocket and mortar barrage, the 5th VC Division (recently strengthened by new infiltrators of group 747 and 742), supported by a battalion of the 84A Rocket Regiment and guided by members of the U-1 Battalion, attacked the LONG BINH - BIEN HOA Complex. The 274th VC Regiment attacked the Bien Hoa Air Base and the 101st Abn Division; the 238th Local Force Company (of the U-1 Battalion) attacked the III Corps Compound in Bien Hoa; Division support companies attacked the III Corps PW Cage, and the 275th VC Regiment plus the Division support elements attacked the LONG BINH complex. Sapper elements (probably 5th VC Division Sappers and a reconnaissance elements of the U-1), attacked the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot. This attack ended in a disastrous defeat of the 5th VC Division.

g. One Battalion of the 199th Infantry Brigade participated in the operations in Saigon with Task Force Ware. The VC infiltrated Saigon in small elements, including Sapper units. They were well armed and equipped, possessing RPG's, AK-47s, mortars and assorted new small arms. Each man in a organized unit (to be distinguished from the sapper and terrorist elements) carried a basic load of ammunition as well as many grenades. Common techniques included stolen civilian, ARVN, and US military vehicles to gain entrance into the city. Many of the VC operating independently throughout the city were dressed in police, ARVN Marine or Ranger uniforms, as well as civilian clothing. There were caches of rocket and mortar ammunition as evidenced by the fact that several of these in Cholon and the vicinity of Phu Tho Racetrack exploded during the intense fighting. Indications initially pointed toward the VC reinforcing elements in the city within 48 hours. However, reinforcements failed to arrive and it appears that COSVN had no intentions of committing further troops in Saigon at that time. The 9th VC Division was reported to be moving steadily south. Named by the VC as being the Saigon Liberation Division, the 9th Division will undoubtedly participate in the mass attacks planned for the Phase III of the VC offensive. Heavy weapons were not employed to any large extent, but will probably be used in Phase III. This heavy weapon and rocket support will be provided by the 69th VC (COSVN) Artillery Command.

h. During the attack and subsequent mopping up operations in the vicinity LONG BINH Post, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and supporting elements accounted for 870 VC and NVA killed (Body Count). An additional 83 prisoners and 3 returnees, made it clearly evident that the 275th VC Regiment of the 5th VC Division was reduced to an ineffective fighting force.

2. (C) Developing the Situation:

a. From 15 through 25 January 1968, numerous reports were received

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that elements of the 5th VC Division infiltrated with a battalion of the 84A Rocket Regiment were moving south from War Zone D. On 27 January, the 5th VC Division headquarters was located in East Uniontown AO. Division Artillery and the supporting divisional elements were confirmed in the central Columbus AO. The 274th and 275th VC Regiments were also located in AO Columbus and Uniontown. The 8230th and the C303rd Local Forces Companies operated in the Central Uniontown and South Uniontown AOs respectively. The movements of the 274th and 275th Regiments gave a clear indication of impending attack. The 83th NVA Regiment which in the past has been known to operate with 5th VC Division was still unlocated. It was later determined from interrogation of prisoners and returnees that the 83th NVA Regiment furnished fillers for the 274th and 275th Regiments, but was not committed as a unit. VC reconnaissance and intelligence activities continued until 30 January 1968.

b. On 29 January 1968, two Local Force VC were captured. Immediate interrogation revealed that the Local Force Companies were to guide the Main Force units into the attack. Several company sized VC elements were sighted on the 29th and 30 January. LRP patrols and agents reported numerous VC elements moving west and south west into the Central Uniontown AO.

c. At 0100, 31 January 1968, a 51st Inf Long Range Patrol reported a VC company carrying small arms and automatic weapons moving rapidly west from vicinity YT 085136. Several additional reports were later received. At 0300 hrs, 31 January, the 199th Brigade Main Base, Long Binh Post, and Bien Hoa Air Base received rocket and mortar fire.

d. The scheme of attack was reconstructed from a VC sketch of the maneuver and was corroborated by two prisoners and one VC returnee. The sketch, attached as Appendix 3, was removed from a VC body. The body had no identification. The enemy attacked with one battalion of the 275th Regiment from the southeast. This attack was to cover the movement of a Sapper unit which infiltrated the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot. A second battalion was to conduct a frontal assault from the north. The third battalion moved to the west flank of the Brigade Main Base to engage the 12th Aviation Group and the helipad. The heavy weapons support came from the north and northeast. The Regimental machine gun company infiltrated southwest of the Brigade perimeter to engage helicopters on the helipad.

e. The attack on the southeastern flank was discovered and successfully repulsed by heavy defensive fires, TAC Air, and armed helicopters. What was to be the frontal assault was repulsed at greater range by the ground fires, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and armed helicopters. The battalion on the west and the Regimental machine gun company were reduced to an ineffective fighting force by armed helicopters.

f. It must be noted that only one volley of 122mm rocket was fired on BIEN HOA Air Base and LONG BINH Post. Intelligence reports and ground troops sightings indicated a possible rocket launching site in vicinity of YT 044225. Artillery scored direct hits on the launching site causing

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a large secondary explosion. Later, troops sweeping the area found pieces of bodies, destroyed equipment and blood trails leading north from the launching site. A second rocket launching site vicinity of YT 098160 was sighted during the initial launch by Spooky (AC 47 aircraft). Immediately after the rockets were fired, Spooky engaged this target causing two large secondary explosions. This action eliminated the rocket threat from that location.

g. The elements of the 199th Brigade successfully blocked all possible enemy routes of withdrawal thereby forcing the enemy to remain in contact the entire day of 31 January. Continuous air strikes, artillery fires, and relentless ground operations by the infantry decimated the 275th VC Regiment. The immediate intelligence exploitation of prisoners and returnees revealed that the enemy was dispersed, demoralized and unable to maintain effective communication and control over his elements.

h. Continuous intelligence reports and small unit contacts indicated that the enemy was trying to regroup and exfiltrate from the Central and South Uniontown AO's to the East and North East to War Zone D. Their reports were further confirmed by the 1st Australian Task Force located in Columbus AO. Their sightings, contacts, exploitation of PWs, identified the C238 Co (U-1 Battalion) and the 274th, 275th Regiments, Divisional support units and Division Artillery. From 1 through 15 February 1968, units of the 199th Brigade did not have any large unit contacts in AO Uniontown. Numerous intelligence reports were received indicating that elements of the 5th VC Division were moving to War Zone D to regroup, reorganize, and to receive replacements. On 16 February 1968, several agents reported that some elements of the 5th VC Division were again moving down to AO Columbus. The 5th VC Division Headquarters was tentatively identified as being located in the vicinity of YT 2026.

i. The following represents an estimate of VC units and base locations in the 199th Brigade's area of operations as of 19 February 1968. These locations are based on correlated intelligence from many sources, including OB holdings, IPW reports, VR, contacts, and II master defense plot.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5th VC Division HQ and Support	Effective	Northern AO Columbus Vic YT 2026	Some elements South of Route 1
274th VC Regt	Marginal	Vic Bau Ham Supply Depot YT 272144	Attempting to regroup and resupply
275th VC Regt	Ineffective	Dispersed in AO Columbus	Possibly attempt- ing to withdraw to War Zone D

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
88th NVA Regt	Effective	Prob in southern War Zone D, vic Song Be River	One Bn detached
7th NVA Division Hq and Support Elem	Effective	Unlocated	Possibly moving south
141st NVA Regt	Effective	Lai Xhe Area	Mission of containing 1st US Division
165th NVA Regt	Effective	Unlocated prob in Phu Giao Distr.	
9th VC Division Hq and Support elem.	Effective	Unlocated	
271st VC Regt	Marginal	Hoc Mon area North of Tan Son Nhut	Regt had heavy casualties in Post TET actions
272nd VC Regt	Marginal	Cu Chi area	heavy casualties in Post TET action
101st NVL Regt	Effective	Unlocated, prob North of Saigon vic VC Go Mon	
69th Arty Command COSVN (aka: U-80 Regt)			
Hq and Support Elem	Effective	Unlocated, prob. in War Zone C.	
52nd Arty Bn	Effective	Probably attached to 9th VC Division	
58th Arty Bn	Effective	Probably North of Tan Uyen	
56th AA Bn	Effective	Unlocated	
841 Rocket Regiment	Marginal	Broken down to support VC & NVA Divisions	

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CONFIDENTIAL**3. (C) Terrain and weather considerations:****a. General description of AO UNIONTOWN and AO COLUMBUS:****(1) CLIMATIC CONDITIONS**

(a) General summary of prevailing weather conditions in the AO UNIONTOWN - AO COLUMBUS area: The period from 14 January to 19 February is in the heart of the Northeast Monsoon or "Dr. Season". During this period rainfall is at a minimum. The small amounts of rain received during this period are generally in the form of occasional brief showers and thunderstorms. These generally occur in the afternoon or evening hours. Humidity is also very low during this period. Rainfall during this period has no significant effect on military operations.

(b) Temperature: The temperature in the AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS varies very little from month to month. The highest temperatures are normally recorded between noon and 1500 hours. Lowest temperatures normally occur just prior to sunrise. The mean high temperature in the AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS area during the dry season (December - March) varies from 86 to 88 degrees in December and 92 to 94 degrees in March. The mean low temperature in the area for this period varies from 69 to 71 degrees in January and 72 to 74 degrees in March. The record high for the period is 103 degrees in March and the record low is 56 in January.

(c) Precipitation: Rainfall reaches a minimum during the Northeast Monsoon Period. Average number of days per month on which precipitation occurs varies from 5-9 in December to 0-2 days in February. The average amount of rainfall per month in inches varies from 4-8 (maximum) to 0 (minimum) in December to 1-3 (maximum) and 0 (minimum) in February.

(d) Winds: During the period from December through March, mean low-level winds come predominantly from the east and northeast. Local surface winds can deviate significantly from mean winds. Both wind speed and direction are influenced by local topography. Strong gusty surface winds associated with thunderstorms occur all year, but are least likely to occur during the Northeast Monsoon Period. Record surface gusts reported in SVN are 60 knots.

(e) Visibility: Visibility in the AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS area during this period is generally good (normally 7-10 miles). At times however visibility can be reduced to less than 3 miles by early morning haze and light overcast. For the most part this phenomenon occurs in the late morning hours or early afternoon near rivers. During thunderstorms visibility is usually 5 miles or less. December, January and February are usually the foggiest months of the year. On the average 5-9 days each month may have morning fog.

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(f) Cloudiness: During this period skies are usually clear to partly cloudy. During the late morning and afternoon hours convective type clouds form over the area. Cloud ceilings with bases 2,000 - 3,000 feet are common toward the end of March. Ceilings below 1,000 feet occasionally occur over or near rivers about 0400 hours, but burn off by 0900.

(g) Relative Humidity: Relative humidity is high throughout the area. This results in conditions favorable for mildew, corrosion, and decay of susceptible items. Periods of highest humidity are during the early morning hours (88-99%) and after rain showers. Lowest periods of humidity (55-65%) occur during the maximum heating period (1200-1500 hours).

(2) Terrain

(a) General Description: The AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS area is bordered on the north by the Song Dong Nai. Most of the area is composed of flat to gently rolling plains which flow into the Song Dong Nai. The vast majority of the area is covered with heavy jungle growth, but along the western sector there are large open areas.

(b) Topography:

1. Relief: Flat to gently rolling plains is the dominant land form in the area. There are, however, hilly regions in the north-eastern portion of the area.

2. Drainage: The principle river in the area is the Song Dong Nai. The area is interdicted with meandering streams which flow into the Song Dong Nai. Major streams are generally less than 3.5 feet deep in the gorges and valleys. After heavy rains, however, rapid rises are common in gorges. During the dry season the courses of principle streams are shallow; tributaries become intermittent or dry and the marshland in the east is considerably reduced.

3. Vegetation: For the most part this area is covered with continuous double and triple canopy of broadleaved evergreen forest. These relatively undisturbed forests are a complex mixture of many different kinds of trees. The upper most layer of canopy in these forests is from 80-130 feet high. Below this is an understory of small trees, patches of bamboo and woody grasses. The undergrowth is dense where the canopy is broken and along stream banks. This area is not very susceptible to burning due to large amounts of water in the area. Scattered patches of dense, tangled, secondary forest with brush of rapidly growing grass and shrub are also prevalent in this area. Another form of vegetation which is scattered throughout the area is large patches of bamboo plants (20-40 feet high and 1-6 feet in diameter). This bamboo is moderately susceptible to burning during the dry season. Other forms of vegetation in the area include small patches of marsh grass and mangrove swamp; these are not susceptible to burning. There are also scattered patches of rubber trees up to 60 feet high and spaced 10-20 feet apart in rows.

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These are not very susceptible to burning due to lack of undergrowth.

(c) Water Sources:

1. Surface Water: The low water table takes place from December through April. Minor deposits of consolidated material along streams and all bedrock units contain small to meager quantities of fresh water at depths of 2-20 feet. Fresh water is perennially plentiful throughout the area. This water is generally soft to moderately hard and biologically contaminated in most places. During the low water period, hardness and biological contamination increases. Much of the surface water is brackish and/or saline. The water found in the lower courses of some streams is generally unpotable.

2. Ground Water: Fresh water sources are plentiful in the area. This water is soft to very hard with objectionable mineral contaminants and color. Alum concentrations are possible in the north-eastern portions near marshlands. This ground water is generally slightly acid to neutral. Shallow wells are easily constructed in this area, but gravel packing is required in most wells.

3. Surface Materials: Soil condition in most of the area is very wet. In densely forested areas, it is moist and in cleared areas where the canopy is broken it is dry. Generally maximum and minimum hindrance factors apply during the wet season and are negligible during the dry season. The soil will become miry under heavy traffic within a few hours during the wet season. In many areas direction of movement is restricted by steep sides of valleys and gullies and in wooded areas by rows of trees.

4. Manmade Features: Manmade features in the area consist of scattered villages, roads, and numerous VC defense installations which are scattered throughout the area.

(d) Military Aspects of Terrain.

1. Observation: Both aerial and ground observation is poor to fair throughout most of the area except for open areas along rivers and near the towns and villages. Otherwise, even in areas that have been defoliated, observation is limited to the immediate area.

2. Fields of Fire: Fields of fire will be good in the open area near the rivers and in the vicinity of the built-up areas. Elsewhere fields of fire will be limited except for isolated open areas.

3. Concealment: Concealment will be poor near towns and villages and in the scattered open areas. The open areas along streams afford some concealment as they contain old cultivated areas that have been left unattended in recent years. The forest which covers most of the area provides good to excellent concealment.

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4. Cover: The open areas around villages and towns provide no cover. Some of the hills in the area provide good to excellent cover. The remainder of the area provides fair to good cover.

5. Obstacles: The Song Dong Nai is a major obstacle to movement. Recently neglected areas will also be obstacles to movement in general, however, by careful selection some movement may be possible through some of the less heavily populated areas.

6. Cross Country Movement: Cross country movement is good in the open areas near villages and streams, however movement elsewhere in the area will range from fair, to almost impossible. Factors limiting cross country movement throughout the area include extensive heavily forested areas, steep hills and gorges, mangrove swamps and marshland.

7. Key Terrain: Control of the major roads and bridges in the area is essential for large scale tactical operations in the western portion of the area. Control of the central roads and crossing sites over the Song Dong Nai are essential to large scale tactical operations in the central and eastern portions of the area.

(3) General Summary:

(a) The area covered by AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS has a total population of approximately 19,328. This population is distributed throughout some 14 villages and hamlets concentrated in the southern and western portions of the area.

(b) AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS falls into VC U-1 District which covers GVN Cong Thanh and Duc Tu Districts. VC operations in this area are under the control of MR 1 which exercises its authority through the District Party Committees which have ultimate control over military units and political agencies within the districts. The actual planning of military operations is the function of the Military Staff which is subordinate to the District Party Committee. The responsibility for coordinating the plans of the Military Staff belongs to the Area Coordination Section which maintains contact with forces down to the village guerrilla level through the village infrastructure.

(c) There are three types of VC forces in the AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS area. These include two Main Force Regiments (274th and 275th), and one Local Force Battalion (U-1 Battalion). It is also known that there are numerous supply and arms caches and hospital facilities in the area.

(d) The 274th VC Regiment is a main force unit having an approximate strength of 1400, if replacements have been received. It is currently located in AO COLUMBUS as part of the current VC offensive against the cities and major US installations.

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(e) The 275th VC Regiment is also a main force unit and like the 274th it is part of the 5th VC Division. It had a strength of approximately 1450 before the attack on the Long Binh complex (31 Jan 68). Its current strength is unknown. Its presence in the area further emphasizes the Viet Cong's determination to continue their current offensive.

(f) The U-1 LF Battalion has a strength of approximately 200 plus and operates throughout the AO UNIONTOWN - COLUMBUS area. Its primary function is reconnaissance, liaison and supply. Ground operations are also conducted. At present its primary function is reconnaissance and commo liaison work for the 274th and 275th VC Regiments. The U-1 Bn also provide guides for units which are currently located in AO COLUMBUS.

(g) There are numerous guerrilla squads operating in the area. Their function here, as elsewhere in SVN, is to perform reconnaissance, collect taxes, conduct propaganda missions, and perform commo liaison functions. The operations of the VC units in this area have been hampered by malnutrition due to lack of rice and malaria. Despite mounting pressure the VC apparently intend to use this area as a base area from which they can conduct operations against ARVN and US forces in the Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Saigon area.

b. General description of AO HAVERFORD - GIA DINH Province

(1) Climatic Conditions

(a) General Summary of the prevailing weather conditions in Gia Dinh Province during the Northeast Monsoon Period: From mid-November through the latter part of March is the Northeast Monsoon Period. This is commonly called the dry season in Gia Dinh. Most of the very limited amount of precipitation which falls during this period is in the form of occasional brief showers.

(b) Temperature: The maximum mean temperature for this period is in the high 80's and the minimum mean temperature is in the high 70's.

(c) Precipitation: The period of least precipitation is from mid-November to late March. The average monthly precipitation during this period varies from 0.4 inches in March to 4.9 inches in November. The record high for precipitation during the period is 11.3 inches and the record low is 0 inches.

(d) Winds: From January to February, the prevailing winds are from the east at an average speed of 6 knots. It is apparent that the prevailing winds have little or no effect on artillery operations for either friendly or enemy forces. The wind is generally favorable for military operations throughout the area on a year around basis. The prevailing winds reflect the monsoon dominating the country during each period.

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(c) Visibility: The most unfavorable periods will be between 0500 (LST) and 1000 (LST). Air support and haliborne operations will be hindered by early morning low clouds and fog. Low clouds and fog begin thinning by 0700 (LST) and are generally completely dissipated by 0900 (LST). These clouds generally form an hour or two before sunrise. This phenomena occurs during both monsoon seasons. During this period ceilings are from 200 to 800 feet with visibility from 3 miles to less than a mile. During the Northeast Monsoon Period this phenomena is generally restricted to water sources such as the Song Saigon.

(2) Terrain.

(a) General Description: This area consists mostly of extensive rice paddy areas and large swamp lands. The major exceptions to the general pattern are extensive pineapple plantations located in the west and southwest portions of the area in the vicinity of XS 624837 and thin to moderately forested areas in the extreme southeast corner of the province bordering the Rung Sat Special Zone and there are also several deserted rubber plantations in this portion of the province.

(b) Topography.

1. Relief: Gia Dinh Province is essentially a low, flat land; it is only a few meters above sea level. Most of the higher ground in the area is covered with villages and plantations. The only other major relief structures are the numerous dikes which characterize the rice paddy areas.

2. Drainage: Due to the low elevation and flat land which characterizes drainage in Gia Dinh Province, drainage is generally inadequate. Water run-off is usually minimal and most of the rainfall received in the area is ponded. In the western portion of the province between the Song Saigon and the Song Vam Co Cong (vic XS 6179) is a large swamp which extends NNE for about 25 kilometers to vic, XT 5304 at which point it turns to the northwest and runs 15 kilometers in that direction to vic XT 5313. Inadequately drained rice paddies dominate most of the area. These rice fields are generally inundated from January through July. The largest areas of higher, better drained areas in the province are located adjacent to the major rivers in the area, i.e., Song Dong Nai, Song Saigon, and Song Vam Co Dong. These areas are dominated by built up areas and plantations (pineapple and rubber).

The principle means of drainage within the province are the Van Co Dong River, the Saigon River, the Dong Nai River and the Rach Cac River. The Song Vam Co Dong is from 70 to 120 meters wide, the Rach Cac River is from 40 to 70 meters wide, the Song Saigon is from 130 to 160 meters wide, and Song Dong Nai is from 250 to 1000 meters wide. Following meandering courses through the delta region, these rivers pour their water into the Nha Be River which flows into the South China Sea. These major rivers combined with numerous streams, rivers, and canals found throughout the riceland and swamp areas form an excellent system of

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navigable waterways. Nearly all the major rivers as well as small streams and canals are affected by tidal action.

3. Vegetation:

a The majority of the province is covered with rice paddys. These fields are characterized by highly compartmentalized fields which are usually bordered by dikes and hedgerows. These dikes are usually 0.3 to 1.0 meter high and 0.3 to 0.6 meters wide. Wetland rice forms a green grassy growth about 1 meter high before the fields are drained. This (draining the fields) generally occurs just before harvest time (around February) and the rice fields take on a yellow color at maturity. During the dry season the rice fields are either planted with dry crops or left in stubble.

b Marshes or swamps also abound in the area. They are generally found in the western portion of the area and when inundated they form a bog of brackish water and mud. Vegetation in these areas consists of rushes, reeds, vines, and marsh grass. By the end of the dry season much of this marsh vegetation is dry enough to be burned.

c In the southeast corner near the Rung Sat Special Zone is a small moderately forested area. The canopy is thick enough to seriously hamper but not eliminate aerial observation. Despite the fairly thick canopy, the undergrowth is generally passable to foot movement.

d Aside from the rice paddys the most common form of vegetation is nipa palm. This type of vegetation is prevalent throughout the area and is a favorite hiding place for the VC. The nipa palm prevents observation from both the air and the ground. It also presents a very serious handicap to foot movement which explains the VC's fondness for building base camps in areas where nipa palm abounds. Nipa palm is found along streams and rivers throughout the area.

e The only other significant vegetation in the area is the pineapple plantation (vic XS 624887) which consists of evenly spaced furrowed rows about 1.0 meters apart. This plantation which was abandoned by the French in the late 1940's, now heavily overgrown, is another favorite hiding place for the VC who build bunkers at strategic points along the many canals in the area. Nearly 4,000 enemy fortifications have been destroyed in the area during operation FAIRFAX, but many more are still intact in the area.

4. Water Resources (Surface Water):

a Large (1,500,000 to 15,000,000 gallons/day) to moderate amounts (150,000 to 1,500,000 gallons/day) of surface water are available in this area during the high water period (rainy season). Small quantities (1,500 to 15,000 gallons/day) are available during the remainder of the year. Usually this water is bacterially and chemically contaminated and sometimes is brackish. Access is fairly easy for the most part, but heavy vegetation (nipa palm) does present problems in some areas.

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b Small (15,000 to 150,000 gallons/day) amounts of water are available from wells in the area. This ground water is normally bacterially contaminated.

5. Surface Material: The surface material in this area ranges from silty sand in the northern part of the area to silty clay and hard and soft laterite in the south. Silty sand is poor to fair as a surface course, poor as a base material, fair for fill material, and fair to good as a natural foundation with a very low traction capacity when wet and a moderate traction capacity when dry. Silty clay with poor plasticity is a poor surface course and is unsuited as a base course or natural fill. Traction is low when wet but hard when dry. The layer of silty clay with high plasticity located directly beneath the surface is fair as a natural fill and poor as a foundation or base. Hard and soft laterite are available in small to moderate quantities in the area. Hard laterite can be crushed and used for aggregate and soft laterite can be cut with hand tools and then allowed to harden for use as brick.

6. Man-Made Feature: The largest single urban complex in the Republic of South Vietnam, the Saigon-Cholon area, is the center of the area. From Saigon the area extends about 45 kilometers to the west, 30 kilometers to the south, and 55 kilometers to the north. The busiest airfield in Vietnam, Tan Son Nhut, is also located in this area. Other significant cultural features in the area include Saigon University, roads, canals, and bridges.

7. Military Aspects of Terrain:

a Observation and Concealment: Both aerial and ground observation in the generally flat, open terrain is good, particularly aerial observation. Forested areas are nearly nonexistent. Where they do exist they are of the sparse, single (occasionally double) canopy type. The major hindrance to observation is the numerous nipa palm groves along the water courses and cultivated trees, etc., surrounding habitations. The dominant rice and marsh areas are not significant hazards to observation. The numerous dikes used to control water can be used to conceal low objects or troops from ground observation. Urban areas also present a considerable obstacle to both ground and aerial observation. The pineapple plantation offers good to excellent concealment for bunkers and foxholes from ground observation and fair to good concealment of this type of fortification from aerial observation.

b Fields of Fire: These are generally excellent throughout the province with minor restrictions due to built up areas, nipa palm groves along waterways, and the limited pineapple and forested areas.

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c Cover: This is afforded by few natural formations. Most of the extensive bunker and tunnel complexes are located along water courses, in the vegetation around hamlets, and in the pineapple plantation. The dikes of the rice paddys provide cover from direct fire weapons to troops in the prone position. Roadway also provides similar protection due to the fact that they are normally built on embankments 1 to 3 meters above the surrounding terrain. The numerous towns and hamlets and other masonry objects also provide some cover.

d Obstacles: The major obstacles to any type of movement in Gia Dinh Province are the numerous canals in the area. The swamp and marsh areas also provide obstacles to movement. Other areas in which movement is significantly impeded are in the pineapple plantation and the forest area just north of the Rung Sat Special Zone.

e Cross Country Movement: In this area it is generally fair to good for foot troops and APC's during the dry season. Movement for wheeled vehicles and tanks is usually restricted to the existing road network in all seasons.

f Key Terrain: Control of the major lines of communication are essential for the deployment and logistical support of military forces throughout the area. This can best be accomplished by controlling the major intersections of roads, rivers, and canals and by controlling bridges in the area. Control of these items is also important to the maintenance of political order and economic stability. Critical terrain that offers observation and control over large sections of terrain is non-existent. Terrain offering limited observation is too numerous to be identified. Avenues of approach are also too numerous to be identified on an individual basis.

(3) Economics:

(a) Existing Situation: The economic situation has steadily deteriorated due to inflationary pressures caused by the influx of Allied Forces and speculation hoarding by businessmen. The fixed income group has suffered most since their money buys less.

(b) Effect on Enemy Capability: Economic isolation of the capital is the goal of the VC. The VC will exploit the unstable economic situation.

(c) Effect on Friendly Forces: Failure to rectify current shortcomings (rising prices and income distribution) will produce added difficulties for the present government (GVN).

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(4) Sociology: Estimated population in Gia Dinh Province is approximately 4.5 million. 1,400,000 people live in the Saigon-Cholon area. 700,000 are ethnic Chinese and 129,000 are North Vietnamese Catholic. There is some anti-foreign sentiment evident.

(a) Effect on Enemy Capabilities: The concentration of the population allows the enemy to infiltrate with relative ease. Chinese people are indifferent to GVN and are potentially exploitable by the VC.

(b) Effect on Friendly Capabilities: GVN has satisfactory control of the people in metropolitan areas of Gia Dinh, but in surrounding areas the GVN has little or no influence.

(5) Psychology: The pacification program had been very successful in Gia Dinh. There was a great deal of pro-government and pro-US sentiment in the area. The people had come to feel that the government with the US Forces can provide them with the degree of military security they need to live the kind of life they desire. Many people had become quite dependent on the US assistance and commercialism. A large number of businessmen catered to the US population. As a result of the recent TET offensive, both GVN and US prestige has been dealt a severe, but hopefully not insurmountable set back. The success (in the psychological sense) that the VC enjoyed during their brief but violent assault on what was heretofore regarded as a safe area has no doubt left very grave doubts in the minds of many Vietnamese citizens as to the wisdom of supporting GVN and US Forces in any overt manner. The extent of anti-government and anti-US feeling engendered by these events can not yet be properly assessed. It is conceivable that the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, the violation of their own declared truce, the abuse of religious leaders and shrines by the VC may possibly have counter balanced whatever psychological success they may have gained during the offensive.

4. (C) Evaluation and Comments:

a. Morale: It has been determined from interrogation of PWs and returnees, and from the civilian population that the morale of the VC was high prior to the TET attack. The high level of morale prior to the attack can be attributed to the extensive VC indoctrination and propaganda. There are numerous reports from PWs and Returnees of the VC promises of heavy artillery support, complete support of the civilian population, and resupply from the US and ARVN resources after the victory. To boost the VC morale even more, a new rocket weapon, was described as having 7,000 meters range, with destructive powers of developing heat to 15000 degrees Centigrade, incinerating everything within 200 - 1,000 meter radius. It is then understandable that the morale of the enemy dropped drastically when their leaders promises were not realized. Perhaps the greatest factor towards the enemy's demoralization was his gross underestimation of our capabilities and assets.

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b. Leadership: The VC leadership was judged as being good prior to the attack. As in other communist organizations, the Viet Cong emphasizes blind obedience and leadership by fear. The Viet Cong were pushed into the battle against insurmountable odds, while their leaders must have known the futility of their efforts. It was evident from the attack that the Viet Cong leaders were ready to sacrifice their troops for an uncertain objective. Following the TET attack, the VC leadership and control deteriorated. This was evidenced from the chaos and panic when the units were hit by air strikes and artillery. Further evidence was furnished by the prisoners and returnees who stated that in one instance a third battalion of the 274th Regiment did not attack as planned due to the divisions hopelessness of the mission. The battalion commander decided that the attack was compromised and gave an order not to attack but to remain in place. The remaining battalions of the 274th Regiment failed in their objectives. Many of the wounded VC were left in place to die. Few attempts were made to organize the units and aid the wounded. Scattered individuals were left to their own devices since no plans for withdrawal were made.

c. Tactics and Techniques:

(1) General: Although the tactics and VC modus operandi are well known, the pattern of the TET offensive did not follow the norm of VC combat principles. Their basic maneuver indicated a coordinated attack, but the friendly actions disorganized the VC movements and forced him to commit his forces piece-meal. The VC were waiting for the heavy rocket and mortar support which never came. Although it was confirmed that the 5th VC Division Artillery was in the area, it was not really used to support the attack. Reports from PW and Returnees indicate that VC did not deploy their artillery because of lack of time and too much enemy activity. The entire operation appeared to lack the usual tedious preparation for which the VC has been known.

(2) Camouflage: Prior to the attack, the VC used camouflage to the utmost. Their defensive positions were well camouflaged and concealed. The base camps and caches were well camouflaged and have shown constant camouflage maintenance. The VC observers and reconnaissance elements wore camouflaged suits. However, during the attack itself very little camouflage was used. Following the attack and the subsequent dispersal of VC troops, camouflage was not evident.

(3) Offensive Tactics: The tactics used by the 275th Regiment during the TET offensive were different from the normal pattern of offensive tactics. Their attack was reasonably well coordinated and violent. However, there were several basic errors committed in the conduct of the attack. The VC troops force-marched for several kilometers to get into position to begin the attack simultaneously with VC units throughout the III Corps tactical Zone. This rapid movement through virgin forests at night caused confusion and dispersal. Being rushed, the VC units were unable to maintain their normal stringent security and noise discipline,

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and hence were detected by elements of the brigade, which the VC did not expect to be in positions. These incidents caused further confusion and disorganization of the VC elements and prevented them from reaching their positions on time. The VC had planned to attack after a maximum rocket and artillery preparation, but the immediate destruction of his rocket launching sites and the 199th Brigade counter mortar fires did not allow him to fire subsequent barrages. The VC was trying to reorganize, but the sweep and reconnaissance in force operations conducted by the elements of the 199th Brigade, prevented him from doing so.

(4) Defensive Tactics: During the sweep operations before the attack, the VC defended his base camps and supply areas from prepared defensive positions. His defenses were good and appeared to be well organized. The bunkers and fighting positions were generally well prepared, camouflaged and well built. The defenses of the rocket sites were generally hasty and ineffective. Anti-aircraft artillery was not positioned near the sites to protect the launching sites from friendly air attacks. Booby traps and mines were used in defensive role very extensively.

(5) Miscellaneous: It must be reemphasized that the VC did not follow their normal modus operandi in the TET offensive. The major difference was noted in the total absence of withdrawal plans. Prisoners and returnees stated that they were convinced of their coming success and were to link up with other VC Main Force elements in Eastern Bien Hoa. It was also reported that an unusual number of VC and NVA officers were killed, primarily by air. This fact may account for the extensive deterioration of organization after the attack. Another vulnerability of the Viet Cong is his inability to change plans at the last minute. The lack of communications and control require the VC to make detailed preparations and coordination prior to an operation. Once the operation has started it is very difficult to modify, change or cancel. Perhaps the gravest error committed by the VC was the underestimation of our determination, capabilities, resources, and will to fight. This was evidenced by several PWs and returnees who were heard to comment while they were passing prepared positions, "our leaders were stupid, they have told us that we could walk in".

d. Logistics: Most of the weapons, ammunition and supplies were prepositioned well forward where they could be distributed easily. An important fact is the lack of food supplies. One prisoner stated that his unit left BA RIA with three days of rations and two days travel ahead. They were told that they would resupply from US and ARVN resources when they took Long Binh and Bien Hoa Complexes. In most cases, small unit leaders were given money to purchase food from the civilian population. Again the VC leaders and planners were confident that the civilian population would support the VC. The VC lines of resupply were effectively interdicted and prior to the attack numerous weapons and food caches were captured by the elements of the 199th Brigade. The VC impressed

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many civilians as laborers for moving ammunition, weapons, and food. The civilian people did not fully support the VC. Many of them escaped and reported the VC presence to the US and RVN authorities.

e. Weapons: Weapons used by the VC were mostly new and in a very good condition. Many of the new weapons such as the AK-47, light machine guns, and anti-aircraft machine guns still had traces of cosmoline type preservative and of these many were lacking evidence of recent use. Appearance of new and more sophisticated weaponry, the possible appearance of the 240mm Soviet Rockets, and weapons firing components indicates the modernization of VC and NVA arsenal.

f. Intelligence Techniques: Extensive VC intelligence and reconnaissance activities were noted since 15 January 1968. VC agents dressed as civilians were spotted in villages inquiring of US and ARVN installations and activities. VC observers with some sophisticated sighting and fire direction equipment were reported in surrounding areas around the Long Binh-Rien Hoa Complex. One VC observer killed in Ho Nai Village was equipped with a new Russian pistol, compass and East German Zeiss binoculars 8x30. All the equipment was new. A VC reconnaissance team was killed by members of F Co 51st LRP. The VC wore US type camouflage clothing, carried US M-16 rifles and had US cigarettes. The VC intelligence and reconnaissance activities were extensive and detailed.

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
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Appendix 1, Military Regions, Annex F, Intelligence, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign.

REALIGNMENT OF VC MILITARY REGIONS

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
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Appendix 2 to Annex F, Intelligence, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign

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
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Appendix 3. VC Plan of Attack, Annex F, Intelligence, After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign.

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Annex G, Statistics, After Action Report, LONG BINH - SAIGON TET Campaign

STATISTICS

US KIA	47	VC KIA (BC)	1,252
WIA	269	KIA (POSS)	256
ARTY RDS FIRED		DETAINEES	166
HE -	19,197	SMALL ARMS CAPTURED	248
WP -	1,208	CREW SERVED WPNS CAPTURED	107
ILL -	4,391	SMALL ARMS AMMO (RDS)	
TOTAL RDS	24,796	CAPTURED	56,365
		CREW SERVED WPNS AMMO RDS	1,205
		CAPTURED	
		GRENADES	298
		FORTIFICATIONS DESTROYED	488
		MIL STRUCTURES DESTROYED	13
		SAMPANS DESTROYED	14
		RICE CAPTURED/TONS	28.3

ANNEX G

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Annex H, (Extract FRAGORD 1 -68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign

***** EXTRACT *****

Copy No 1
199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 065123
122320 January 1968
DMD

FRAGORD 1 - 68

Reference: Map, Vietnam, Sheets 6330 III, 6330 IV, 6230 I and 6230 III,
1: 50,000

1. Task Orgn: Task Force 3-7

2d Plat D/17 Cav
B/2-40 Arty (DS)
Det 49 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
Plat (-) 87th Engr
Sqd 199th MP Plat
Det 199th Sig Plat
IPW Tm 179th MI Det
Tm 856 RRD

2. (C) Commencing 131245 January, Task Force 3-7 moves overland and by air from BMB to establish a forward support base vicinity XS 713795.

3. (C) Route for road movement as follows:

- a. SP - YT 065123
- b. CP - YT 016054
- c. CP - XS 864934
- d. CP - XS 790889
- e. CP - XS 722791
- f. RP - XS 712795

4. (C) Mission is to conduct sweep and search operations in AO HAVERFORD.

5. (C) Task Force 3-7 remains under brigade control in direct support of Capitol Military District.

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6. (C) Coordinating Instructions:

- a. Coordinate with Brigade Aviation Officer for airmobile means.
- b. Task force moves in 3 serials by road SP times are: 1st Serial 131245 hours; 2d Serial - 131300 hours; and 3d Serial - 131315 hours.
- c. Coordinate with Brigade PMO for MP escorts.

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex H (Annex 1 to FIAJORD 1-68, 122320 January 1968)

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HAVERFORD

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Annex I, (EXTRACT FRAGORD 2 - 68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

*****EXTRACT*****

Copy No 1
199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 065123
122330 January 1968
SPD

FRAGORD 2 - 68

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 6330 I, 6431 II, 6431 III, 6430 IV

1. Task Orgn: Task Force 2-3

C/2-40 Arty (DS)
Det 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
Sqd 87th Engr
Sqd 199th MP Plat
IPW Tm 179th MI Det
Tm 856 RED

2. (G) Commencing 130900 January, Task Force 2-3 moves by air and land to establish a forward support base vicinity YT 2112.

3. (G) Route for road movement is as follows:

- a. SP - YT 065123
- b. CP - YT 119124
- c. CP - YT 136119
- d. CP - YT 184110
- e. CP - YT 206121
- f. RP - YT 219129

4. (G) Mission is to conduct sweep and search operations in AO COLUMBUS.

5. (G) Coordinating Instructions:

- a. Coordinate with Brigade Aviation Officer for airmobile means.
- b. Task force moves in 2 serials by road. TF 2-3 (-) forms 1st Serial with SP time at BMB of 130900 hours. C/2-40 Arty forms 2d Serial with Start Pt at FSPB CONCORD at 131030 hours.
- c. Coordinate with Brigade PNO for MP escorts.

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d. PAC will be on station commencing 130900 hours.

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex I (Annex A, Opns Overlay to FRAGORD 2-68, 122330 Jan 68)

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Annex J, (EXTRACT OPORD 1 - 68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

*****EXTRACT*****

Copy No 1 of 45 Copies
HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, IT 072122
231200 January 1968
IMD

OPORD 1 - 68

Reference: Map RVN, 1:50,000, sheets 6330 I, 6331 II, 6431 II and
6430 IV

Task Orgn:

Bde Control

HHC (-) 199th
51st Inf (LRP)
49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)(-)
Det 71st Inf (LRP)
2-40 Arty (-)
87th Engr (-)
179th MI Det (-)
199th MP Plat (-)
199th Sig Plat (-)

TF 4-12

Co 2-3 Inf
1/B/2-47 Mech Inf OPCON
Tms 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
Plat (-) HHC 199th
D/17 Cav (-)
C/2-40 Arty (DS)
Sqd 87th Engr Co
Det 199th Sig Plat

2-3

Tms 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
A/2-40 Arty (DS)

3-7

Tm 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
2/D/17 Cav
B/2-40 Arty (DS)
Plat (-) 87th Engr
Sqd 199th MP Plat
IPW Tm 179 MI Det
Det 199th Sig Plat

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces: Current INTSUM

b. Friendly forces: FVMAF operate in vic of BIEN HOA - LONG BINH
complex to preclude VC rocket, mortar or ground attack prior to and
during TET holiday truce period.

Annex J

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c. Attachments and detachments: A Trp 3-17 Cav released OPCON, on order, 24 Jan 68.

2. MISSION. 199th Light Infantry Brigade continues Operation UNIONTOWN to preclude rocket, mortar and/or ground attack on BIEN HOA - LONG BINH complex; maintains brigade forces in or close to areas from which enemy may launch rocket, mortar and/or ground attacks during TET ceasefire period. Operation HAVERFORD continues under direction of CMD.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation: Annex A, Operations Overlay. TF 4-12 and 2-3 Inf conduct sweep and search in assigned AO's; TF 4-12 will operate in AO NORTH UNIONTOWN with two companies reinforced, AO UNIONTOWN HOTEL with one company and in AO WEST UNIONTOWN with Task Force minus. 2-3 Inf operates in AO EAST UNIONTOWN with two companies and in SOUTH UNIONTOWN with one company. 2-40 Arty occupies FSPB CONCORD with one battery, FSPB HOTEL with one half battery and EMB with one half battery. No priority of fires and no assigned final protective fires. Annex B, Fire Support Plan.

b. TF 4-12

(1) Maintain brigade RRF of one Inf/Cav team at FSPB CONCORD.

(2) Maintain surveillance during daylight hours along west boundary of AO WEST UNIONTOWN with less than two platoons.

(3) Secure CHIEU HOI (PW) compound vicinity YT 040128 with 1/B/2-47 Mech Inf.

(4) Continue road security on Route 24.

(5) Secure FSPB HOTEL with not less than one platoon.

(6) Maintain 1/B/2-47 Mech Inf as LONG BINH Post RRF.

c. 2-3 Inf: Establish battalion CP at EMB.

d. 3-7 Inf: Disposition will be as directed by Hq CMD.

e. 51st Inf (LRP): Support brigade operations as directed by brigade S-2.

f. 71st Inf (LRP) Det: Support brigade operations as directed by brigade S-2.

g. 2-40 Arty: Be prepared to respond to calls for fire from 1st Australian Task Force.

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h. 87th Engr (-)

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(1) GS with priority of support to FSPB HOTEL.

(2) Be prepared to recover Class IV items from FSPB TRIGGER.

1. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Submit requests for airmobile assets ASAP.

(2) Priority of airmobile assets to 2-3 Inf, then TF 4-12.

(3) Road convoys (four or more vehicles constitute a convoy) will be escorted by MP's.

(4) All road convoys require air cover (surveillance) outside of built up areas.

(5) Close coordination with local sub-sector advisors is directed.

(6) Maintain surveillance of assigned AO's throughout TET cease-fire period.

(7) Reaction Force plans will be fully coordinated and completed by all units prior to commencement of TET ceasefire period.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

No change

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Signal: Current SOI and SSI in effect.

Acknowledge

DAVISON
Colonel

***** EXTRACT *****

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Appendix 1 to Annex J (Annex A Cpn
Overlay to OFORD 1-63, 231200 Jan 68)

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
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X — 82mm Mortar Belt

Poss Rocket
Launch Sites
122mm

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Annex K, (EXTRACT FRAGORD 3 - 68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

***** EXTRACT *****

Copy No 1 of 19 Copies
HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 072122
241700 January 1968
RDC

FRAGORD 3 - 68

1. (C) References:

- a. Map RVN, 1:50,000, sheets, 6330 I, 6331 II, 6431 II and 6430 IV
- b. OPORD 1 - 68, HQ 199th Lt Inf Bde

2. (C) Task organization listed in OPORD 1 - 68 is unchanged except 1/B/2-47 Mech Inf released from OPCON TF 4-12 and reverts to OPCON 199th Lt Inf Bde and 1/D/17 attached TF 4-12. These changes confirm previous verbal orders.

3. (C) Missions assigned TF 4-12 in paragraph 3, OPORD 1 - 68 are changed as follows:

- a. Paragraph 3b (3) change to read, "Secure CHIEU HOI (PW) compound vic YT 040128 with D Troop minus 17 Cav and Security Platoon minus HHC 199th Lt Inf Bde".

- b. Paragraph 3b (6) deleted.

4. (C) The following missions for 1/B/2-47 Mech Inf are added under paragraph 3:

- a. During daylight hours provide security for Rome Flows conducting land clearing operations around CHIEU HOI (PW) compound vic YT 040128.

- b. Be prepared for commitment as LONG BINH Post REF on order.

- c. Prepare and occupy blocking position vic YT 085115 during hours of darkness. (See Annex A, OPN O/L attached).

- d. Coordinate blocking position with facilities and units in vicinity and maintain communications with 199th Bde TOC and 2-3 Inf.

Acknowledge

DAVISON
Colonel

***** EXTRACT *****

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Appendix 1 to Annex K (Annex A, Oms Overlay to FRAGORD 3-68, 241700 Jan 68)

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Annex L, (EXTRACT OPORD 2-68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

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***** EXTRACT *****

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HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 072122
021800 February 1968
NOW

OPORD 2 - 68

Reference: Map RVN, 1:50,000, sheets 6300 I, 6331 II, 6431 II,
and 6430 IV

Task Orgn:

Bde Control

BHC (-) 199th
51st Inf (LRP)
49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog) (-)
Det 71st Inf (LRP)
A/3-17 Cav (OPCON)
2/40 Arty (-)
87th Engr (-)
179th MI Det (-)
199th MP Plat (-)
199th Sig Plat (-)

2-3

Tms 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
G/2-11 ACR (OPCON)
A/2-40 Arty (DS)

4-12

Tms 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
D-17 Cav (-)
C/2-40 (DS)
Sqd 87th Engr
Det 199th Sig Plat

3-7

Tm 49th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
2/D-17 Cav
B/2-40 Arty (DS)
Plat (-) 87th Engr
Sqd 199th MP Plat
IPW Tm 179th MI Det
Det 199th Sig Plat

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces:

(1) 274th Regiment reported on 1 Feb 68 to be in vicinity of rubber plantation YT 0217. This Regiment was reportedly hurt badly, is now trying to regroup for exfiltration to the east and south.

(2) Elements of 275th Regt may be located in vic YT 0817. Information unconfirmed. Elements possibly from 275th Regt located north of HO NAI Village vic YT 085139.

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(3) Headquarters elements of the 5th VC Division reportedly located via YT 122175 as of 021100 Feb.

(4) The 88th NVA Regiment unlocated at present.

b. Friendly Forces: 101st Abn Div conducts ops in assigned AO's northeast of Saigon to preclude VC rocket, mortar or ground attack on allied military installations.

c. Attachments and detachments:

(1) Security Plat (-) HHC 199th LIB attached to D/17 Cav

(2) Det 101st Abn Div (LRP) OPCON 199th LIB on order 3 Feb 68.

2. MISSION commencing 030700 Feb 68 the 199th Light Infantry Brigade continues to conduct reconnaissance in force in specified company sized AO's located in adjusted AO's NORTH UNIONTOWN, UNIONTOWN HOTEL, WEST UNIONTOWN and EAST UNIONTOWN with mission to seek out and destroy enemy forces.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations: See Annex, Operations Overlay. TF 2-3 continues to sweep AO's 1, 4 and 5, in that order, insuring that HO NAI Village is totally secured and completely cleared of all enemy elements. AO 5 will be swept with one company size element and remainder of forces in AO's 1 and 4. Armored Cavalry team will be retained to conduct reconnaissance in force in AO 8. Prepare to insert company size forces in AO's 6 and 7 to sweep from north to south on order; prepares to commit Armored Cavalry Team as Bde RRF on order; and establishes coordination with 9th US Inf Div vicinity coordinates YT 110123. 4-12 Inf conducts two company reconnaissance in force north to south in AO 2; maintains screen along north bank of DONG NAI River with one company in AO 3; conducts reconnaissance in force in AO's 9 and 10 with a company minus size element; and secures FSPB HOTEL with one platoon by day and two platoons by night. A/3/17 Cav supports TF 2-3 and 4-12 Inf operations as directed, maintains surveillance in unassigned AO's 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15; and supports LRP operations. F/51 Inf (LRP) will establish the surveillance screen assigned by S-2 with priority to EAST UNIONTOWN AO and maintain screen along northern boundary of NORTH UNIONTOWN AO. Det 71st Inf (LRP) and Det 101st Abn Div (LRP) will conduct missions assigned by S-2 in conjunction with F/51 Inf (LRP). 2-40 Arty supports operations with fires on call.

b. TF 2-3:

c. 4-12 Inf:

d. 3-7 Inf: Continues OPCON to CMD

e. F/51 Inf (LRP)

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f. Det 71st Inf (LRP)

g. Det 101st Abn Div (LRP)

h. 2-40 Arty

i. Coordination Instructions:

(1) All units be prepared to exploit contact with enemy.

(2) Reconnaissance in force elements will form into platoon size increments for night ambushes along selected LOC's in active AO's.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change

Acknowledge


DAVISON
Colonel

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex L (Annex A, Opns Overlay to OPORD 7-68)

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Annex A, (EXTRACT FRAGORD 4 - 68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

***** EXTRACT *****

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HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 072122
061200 February 1968
HEY

FRAGORD 4 - 68

1. Reference issued overlay
2. Task Orgn: No change
3. Brigade is released from OPCON 101st Abn Div and reverts to OPCON II FFV effective 071400 Feb 68. At 071400 Feb brigade relinquishes AO's East and West UNIONTOWN HOTEL to 101st Abn Div and assumes responsibility for SOUTH UNIONTOWN to continue clearing and reconnaissance in force operations.
4. 2-3 Inf moves from present locations to occupy northern portion of AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN assuming responsibility by 071400 Feb.
5. 4-12 Inf moves from present locations to occupy southern portion of AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN assuming responsibility by 071400 Feb.
6. 3-7 Inf continues present mission.
7. 2-40 Arty relocates batteries with battalions when move is made into AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN.
8. Movement to new positions may commence after 070730 Feb.
9. Airmobile assets first priority to 4-12 Inf for movement of A & D companies then to 2-3 Inf for move of C Company.
10. Priority on truck support to 4-12 Inf initially then to 2-3 Inf.
11. Direct coordination with LONG BINH Post and relieving units is directed.
12. Report CP locations.

Acknowledge

DAVISON
Colonel

***** EXTRACT *****


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Appendix 1 to Annex II (Annex 1 to FMAGORD 4-68, 061200 February 1968)

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Annex N, (EXTRACT FRAGORD 5 - 68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

***** EXTRACT *****

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HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 072122
082100 February 1968
YAH

FRAGORD 5 - 68

1. References:

- a. Map RVN, 1: 50,000, sheets 6330 III, 6330 IV, 6230 I and 6230 III
- b. Operations Overlay HAVERFORD I
- c. Operations Overlay UNIONTOWN III

2. Task Organization: Following changes only.

a. Cross attached elements of 2-3 Inf and 3-11 ACR will be detached and returned to parent unit control NLT 090900 February.

b. 4-12 Inf attaches two infantry platoons to 3-11 ACR in exchange for one tank platoon attached from 3-11 ACR. Cross attachments completed NLT 091300 February.

c. A/2-40 Arty becomes DS to 3-7 Inf upon completion of airmobile move to SAIGON.

d. B/2-40 Arty becomes DS to 2-3 Inf upon arrival of first element 2-3 Inf at FSPB ZINDERNEUF (XS 713795).

3. 2-3 Inf with attachments conducts airmobile move from present location to FSPB ZINDERNEUF commencing 091000 February to relieve 3-7 Inf and assumes responsibility for assigned AO (See Opns O/L HAVERFORD I). 2-3 Inf OPCON to TF WARE upon closure of headquarters at FSPB ZINDERNEUF.

4. 3-7 Inf with attachments move overland and by air to SAIGON (XS 815904) and continues OPCON to TF WARE.

5. 4-12 Inf continues present mission.

6. 3-11 ACR continues OPCON to 199th LIB, assumes responsibility for 2-3 Inf AO in SOUTH UNIONTOWN commencing 091000 February and continues reconnaissance in force in all assigned AO's. See Opn O/L, UNIONTOWN III.

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7. 2-40 Arty continues present mission with A Btry making airmobile move to SAIGON, B Btry remaining in place at FSPB ZINDERNEUF and C Btry location and mission unchanged.

8. LRP assets of brigade operate in LRP AO as directed by S-2.

9. Coordinating instructions:

a. Direct coordination between units for exchange of attached units is directed.

b. Units coordinate directly with Brigade Avn Officer for airmobile means.

c. 2-3 Inf coordinates directly with 3-7 Inf ASAP 09 February for movement into FSPB ZINDERNEUF.


Acknowledge

DAVISON
Colonel

***** EXTRACT *****

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103 Annex O, (EXTRACT FRAGORD 6-68) After Action Report, LONG BINH/SAIGON
TET Campaign

*****EXTRACT*****

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HQ, 199th Lt Inf Bde
LONG BINH, RVN, YT 072122
121800 February 1968
ERP

FRAGORD 6 - 68

1. References:

- a. Map RVN, 1:50,000, sheets, 6330 III, 6330 IV, 6230 I, and 6230 III
- b. Operations Overlay, HAVERFORD I (FRAGORD # 5-68)
- c. Operations Overlay, UNIONTOWN III

2. Task Organization: Following changes only:

- a. 4-12 Inf OPCON Co B to 3-11 ACR
- b. 3-11 ACR OPCON K Troop to 4-12 Inf

3. 2-3 Inf continues OPCON TF WARE

4. 3-7 Inf continues OPCON TF WARE

5. 4-12 Inf with attachments assumes responsibility for assigned AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN effective 130730H Feb 68, continues recon and security operations assigned AO. Secures FSB for Howitzer Btry and 4.2 Mortar elements 3-11 ACR via YT 138086. Conducts airmobile assault w/Co B into designated LZ. Releases Co B to OPCON 3-11 ACR on completion of an assault and establishment of communications. Provide logistical support K Troop 3-11 ACR (Annex A Opns Overlay).

6. 3-11 ACR continues OPCON 199th LIB conducts Recon in Force assigned AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN Extension employing airmobile elements, long range patrols, stay behind elements in successive daylight operations working East. Initial LZ YT 184063. Selects and reports subsequent landing zones. Establish liaison 199th LIB TOC. (Annex A Opn Overlay).

7. IEP assets of brigade operate in IEP AO and 3-11 AO as directed by S-2. Priority of employment 3-11 ACR AO all teams East of NS Grid 23 NLT 130730H.

8. 2-40 Arty continues present mission from present location.

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9. A 3-17 Air Cav remains OPCON 199th LIE selects and reports company and platoon size LZ's AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN Extension to 3-11 ACR. Provides 1 airborne rifle platoon reaction force to 199th LIE.

10. 503rd Chemical Det conducts daily "People Sniffer", missions AO SOUTH UNIONTOWN Extension commencing 13 Feb. Provides immediate readout to Co 3-11 Cav.

11. Coordinating Instructions:

a. AO boundaries and attachments effective 130730H Feb 68 except Co B 4-12 effective on establishment of communication w/3-11 ACR from LZ area.

b. 4-12 Inf furnish PZ and movement data to Bde AVN NLT 122000H Feb 68 for Co B 4-12.

c. IIR's will be inserted upon establishment of night defensive positions and remain as stay behind elements.

d. Direct coordination between units making attachments is directed.

Acknowledge

DAVISON
Colonel

***** EXTRACT *****


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Appendix 1 to Annex 0 (Annex A, Operations Overlay to FRAGORD 6-68, 121800 February 1968)

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex C (Annex A, Operations Overlay to 8-1000 6-69, 121800 February 1969)

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107
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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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		2b. GROUP 4	
3. REPORT TITLE Combat After Action Report - LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign, Hqs, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 14 Jan - 19 Feb 1968			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep)			
6. REPORT DATE 15 April 1968		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 96	7b. NO. OF REFS
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13. ABSTRACT			

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NOV 66

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