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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (12 June 68) FOR OT RD 67X208 18 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, Period 5-26 January 1967 (U)

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1. Subject report is comprised of all available reports concerning Operation CEDAR FALLS.

2. This report has been compiled to facilitate research and study of a major operation.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

8 Incl
1. 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)
2. II Field Force Vietnam
3. 1st Infantry Division
4. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
5. 1st Engineer Battalion (formerly published as CAAR 67X005)
6. 25th Infantry Division (formerly published as CAAR 67X004)
7. 196th Light Infantry Brigade
8. 1st Logistical Command

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
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173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP)

IRON TRIANGLE OPERATION

NIAGARA - CEDAR FALLS

5-25 Jan 67



Incl 1
FOR OT RD
67X208

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INCL	REPORTING UNIT	PAGE
Incl 1	CAAR, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)	1
Incl 2	CAAR, 1st Infantry Division	88
Incl 3	CAAR, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	176
Incl 4	CAAR, 1st Engineer Battalion	196
Incl 5	CAAR, 25th Infantry Division	218
Incl 6	Extract, ORLL, 196th Inf Bde (Jan 67)	231
Incl 7	CAAR, 1st Logistical Command	232
Foldout #1	173d Abn Bde AO Op NIAGARA	239
Foldout #2	173d Abn Bde AO Op CEDAR FALLS	240
Foldout #3	1st Infantry Division Op CEDAR FALLS	241

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

Tab A - Combat Operations After Action Report

1. General
2. Name of Operation
3. References
4. Type of Operation
5. Date of Operation
6. Location
7. Command Headquarters
8. Reporting Officer
9. Task Force Organization
10. Supporting Forces
    a. USAF
    b. Army Aviation
    c. Artillery
    d. E/17th Cavalry
    e. Company D/16th Armor
    f. 173d Engineer Company
    g. 173d Military Police
    h. 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog
    i. 51st Chemical Detachment
11. Intelligence
12. Mission
13. Concept of Operation
14. Execution
15. Revolutionary Development
16. Logistics/Administrative Activities
17. Special Equipment/Techniques
18. Results of Operation
19. Commander's Analysis & Lessons Learned

~~Tab B - Maps of Area of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, 5 - 25 Jan 67~~ - See fold-outs

Tab C - Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

~~Introduction~~ - Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
Day Time Activities
Night Ambush (LRRP) 16 Jan 67
Night Ambush (LRRP) 17 Jan 67
Results

Tab D - Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

Night Ambush - 9 Jan 67
Night Ambush - 15 Jan 67

Tab E - Annexes to Tab C & D

Tab F - Tunnel Complex Drawings

~~Tab G - Photographs of Chieu Hoi Ralliers and Psy Ops Leaflets/Ops NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS~~
Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

9

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

TO: Commanding General
II FFORCEV
ATTN: G3 O & T
APO San Francisco 96227

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive Number 335-8.

1. General: The wide spread terrorism in the SAIGON-CHOLON Area perpetrated the conception of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, one of the largest, most complex and one of the most effective operations in the VIETNAM WAR. Intelligence reports fed to MACJ2 indicated that the source of these terrorist activities, along with the location of the Viet Cong Military Region IV Headquarters was in fact located in the heretofore impenetrable IRON TRIANGLE north of SAIGON. The mission of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS: to seal off the Triangle and anihilate the enemy within, destroying his fortifications and generally crushing the power of the MR IV Headquarters.

The Operation was the first planned multi-division Operation in VIETNAM, employing the 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, the 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, the 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE, the 5TH ARVN DIVISION, elements of the 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, the 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE, and the 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE).

This marks the second time the Brigade has operated in the IRON TRIANGLE (OPORD 25-65, 8 - 14 October 1965). The task given to the 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE) was to conduct a deception or feint from a staging area near PHU LOI in the CAU DINH JUNGLE, an island of dense forest, north of a Rubber Plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and the THI TINH RIVER.

The IRON TRIANGLE was named in early 1963 by UPI writer Peter Arnett, a native of NEW ZEALAND and a veteran news correspondent, who noticed a basic similiarity in enemy concentration between this area and the IRON TRIANGLE of the KOREAN CONFLICT. Both areas seemed virtually impenetrable owing to their difficult terrain. The people of VIETNAM refer to the area as "AN SON NORTH" meaning "new hamlet". The area has been a center of Viet Cong activity since early 1950. It is a transit area for VC moving from the north through the western edge, while local units move through the eastern edge. It was infected with local base camps, medical complexes and tunnel communication liaison areas. From the Triangle, the VC have been able to operate on HIGHWAY 13 to the east as well as conduct mortar and claymore mine attacks against friendly forces.

TAB A to
Incl 1

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AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

2. Name of Operation: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS

3. References: Map Sheets, VIETNAM, Series L - 7011, Sheets 6330 I, IV 6331 I, II, & IV, 6231 I, II, 6230 I.

4. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy

5. Date of Operation: 5 January 1967 to 25 January 1967

6. Location: BINH DUONG PROVINCE, THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE, and IRON TRIANGLE west of BEN CAT and the CAU DINH JUNGLE.

7. Command Headquarters: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

8. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr.

9. Task Force Organization:

Operation NIAGARA FALLS

Task Force ALPHA

1/503d Inf
1 Engr Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms
B/2/34th Armor
C/3/319th Arty (Dir Spt)
Tnk Plt/1/4th Cav - OPCON

35th Ranger Bn (ARVN) supported the Operation

Operation CEDAR FALLS

Task Force DEANE

1/503d Inf - LTC BROWNLEE

1 Tnk Plt - 2/11th ACR
A/5/2d Arty (-M)
1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms

2/503d Inf - LTC SICHOLTZ

1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Teams

A/503d Inf - LTC HEALY

D/16th Armor
1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms

11th ACR (-) - COL COBB

2/11th ACR
3/11th ACR
1 MP Sqd

1/4th Cav, (1st Inf Div) - LTC FIFE

C/5/2d Arty (-M)

35th Ranger Bn (ARVN)

AVFF-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Fire Control

1 Rifle Co - A/5/7th Inf
E/17th Cav
3/319th Arty (+ 2d & 3d How Btry/11th ACR)
173d Engr Co (-)
335th AMCL
173d MP Plt (+ 2/A/72d MP Bn)
HHC (-)

10. Supporting Forces:

a. USAF

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 7th Air Force

1. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing
2. 12th Tactical Fighter Wing
3. 31st Tactical Fighter Wing
4. 8th Tactical Fighter Wing
5. 35th Tactical Fighter Wing

(b) The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron of the 504th Tactical Control Group

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) TAC Sorties:

3d TFW	77
12th TFW	7
31st TFW	47
8th TFW	11
35th TFW	62
TOTAL SORTIES	174

(b) FAC Sorties:

19th TASS	25
(c) VNAF Sorties	2
(d) Tons of Ordnance	206
(e) Visual Reconnaissance	35
(f) Escort Missions	9

AVDE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Bomb Damage Assessments were limited due to smoke and foliage in the AO. No reports were made of ground assessments, however, numerous Viet Cong bodies were found in the areas subjected to airstrikes. Airstrikes also uncovered previously hidden VC installations.

(4) Timeliness: All sorties provided arrived within a usable time frame and most were effectively employed. Two flights were released because of ground action at the time of their arrival precluded their use. Two additional flights were released owing to the use of artillery fire also being employed in the target area.

(5) FAC (Forward Air Control) Pilots:

(a) LTC Henry W. Burrow

(b) CPT James T. Callaghan

(c) CPT Eric E. Miller

(d) CPT Arthur Roberts

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Size of Force:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Brigade was supported by the following aviation units:

(a) 11th Aviation Battalion

(b) 145th Aviation Battalion

(c) 335th Aviation Company (Air Mobile Light)

(d) Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon)

(2) How and When Employed:

Mission	Sorties
Aerial Observer	51
Armed Helicopter	1,010
Command and Liaison	752
Medical Evacuation	9
Aerial Reconnaissance	485
Resupply	2,956
Troop Combat Assault	2,000
Miscellaneous	2,622
TOTAL	9,717

(3) Aviation rendered normal support to the Brigade during Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. The highlight of the Operation was the employment of the Sky Cavalry concept as developed by the Brigade. This concept involves movement of small units (12 men) in the checkerboard fashion with the AO.

15

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(4) A total of 2,245 hours were flown in support of the Operation. Aircraft flew an average of 112 hours per day.

(5) A total of 15,853 passengers were carried during the Operation.

(6) A total of 682 tons of cargo was moved during the Operation for a daily average of 34 tons.

(7) Results and Effectiveness:

(a) The Aero Scouts proved to be highly effective in spotting enemy positions, personnel and rice caches and structures.

(b) The Aero Scout section captured 2 VC on two separate occasions.

(c) The team of scouts, gunships and slicks used in the Sky Cavalry operations proved to be very flexible and the configuration of the light elements may be tailored to fit any requirement.

(8) Timeliness: In no case did the aviation elements fail to respond rapidly to meet a new or changing situation.

e. Artillery

(1) Size of Force:

Btry A, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
Btry B, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
Btry C, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
How Btry, 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR (6 105mm SP) OPCON
How Btry, 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR (6 105mm SP) OPCON
Btry C, 2d Bn, 35th Arty (155mm SP) GSR (17 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67)
Btry A, 2d Bn, 35th Arty, (155mm SP) GSR (8 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67)
Additional Artillery from Div Arty, 1st Inf Div (8", 155mm & 175mm) also utilized throughout the operation.

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) On call missions were fired daily throughout the Operation by both ground and air observers. The air observer was used for registrations and missions as requested by ground elements. The ground observer attached to the infantry company fired contact missions and defensive concentrations in support of their units.

(b) H & I fires were planned daily by forward observers, battalion liaison officers and the battalion S3.

(c) Preparation of Landing Zones:

LZ #5 - 091051 to 091100H January 1967
LZ #6 - 091211 to 091231H January 1967
XT 719271, XT 716276, XT 721280, XT 717277, XT 720279 - 130730 to 130746H January and 130820 to 120830H January 1967.

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

XT 692246 to XT 711250 - 150930 to 151002H January 1967
XT 737256 to XT 738254 - 160805 to 160903H January 1967
XT 721260 to XT 729260 - 180725 to 180906H January 1967
LZ #2 - 181645 to 181743H January 1967
LZ #3 - 181645 to 181700H January 1967
LZ #4 - 181705 to 181736H January 1967
LZ MIKE - 200700 to 200835H January 1967
LZ BOB - 200700 to 200835H January 1967
LZ TOM - 200700 to 200730H January 1967
Preparation for route of advance 200915 to 201040H Jan 67

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Preparatory fires on landing zones and routes of advance were very effective. Numerous secondary explosions were observed during the preparations of landing zones and routes indicated destruction of enemy mines and boobytraps. Enemy resistance was generally light and consisted mainly of harassing actions. Artillery support was therefore characterized by numerous missions of brief duration which were intended to seal off the enemy route of escape or to reduce small fortified points of resistance. H & I fires were active by day and night, restricted only by the amount of terrain not occupied by friendly elements. The effectiveness of this program is indicated by the numerous bodies with shrapnel wounds found during the operation.

(4) Timeliness:

Coordination between Artillery, TAC Air and gunships was very effective. On call fire missions were processed quickly, delays occuring only when several adjacent units were required to approve missions in the operational area to insure troop safety through verification of unit locations.

(5) Missions and Rounds Fired:

(a) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery

Missions - 789
Rounds Expended - 28,593

(b) Operational Control Units

1. Howitzer Battery/2/11th ACR

Missions-190
Rounds Expended - 7,528

2. Howitzer Battery/3/11th ACR

Missions - 210
Rounds Expended - 7,815

4. E Troop, 17th Cavalry

(1) Size of Force:

3 Cavalry Platoons (Can be employed as Aero Rifle Platoons)
1 LRRP Platoon
1 Aero Scout Section (Less OH-13's and Pilots)

15

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) The unit's mission was to conduct air mobile search and destroy operations in the rice paddies in the southwestern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, along the SAIGON RIVER.

(b) The area of operations was confined to the rice paddies and adjacent areas along the SAIGON RIVER. Weather throughout the operation was relatively cool and dry. The terrain was characterized by inundated rice paddies cut by many deep tree lined canals varying in width from 3 to 40 feet. None of this area was considered trafficable for the surface type vehicles organic to the Cavalry Troop. Numerous straw thatched huts containing log and mud or (occasionally) concrete bunkers were located in the canal tree lines.

(c) The unit used none of its organic vehicles during the operation and organized each armored cavalry platoon into three (3) 12-man squads for airmobile operations. Each squad was normally armed with one (1) M-60 machine-gun, one (1) M-79 grenade launcher, and ten (10) M-16 rifles. Each man carried both smoke (colored) and M-26 fragmentary grenades. Aircraft for the operation were attached for varying lengths of time on a day to day basis. The number and type of aircraft varied but the normal organization was as follows:

2 - OH-13 Aero Scouts
2 - UH-1B Gun Ships
4 - UH-1D Slicks
1 - Command and Control Aircraft (UH-1B)

(d) The enemy encountered was at no time larger than squad size and normally consisted of 2 to 3 man elements. Initially, (1st and 2d day) the enemy encountered were primarily small work parties of about 3-man sized who were living along the tree lined canals with the probable mission of harvesting as much rice as possible from the surrounded rice paddies. As the main force closed in on the IRON TRIANGLE, the enemy encountered were transient groups attempting to infiltrate or exfiltrate the TRIANGLE area along the canals and through the rice paddies. Few weapons were captured and where possible, the enemy fled without a prolonged fire fight. Contact seldom lasted more than 2 to 5 minutes.

(e) The basic scheme of maneuver was as follows:

1. During the day time, 2 platoons were placed on the ground to search selected tree lines and move from one to another by helicopter as deemed necessary. The 3d platoon was held as a quick reaction force with one 12-man team (2 A/C) airborne near or over the area of operations. The armed helicopters were used to support the ground elements as follows:

a. The OH-13 Scouts performed low and slow armed recon of the area to select and mark landing sites and to detect any enemy who might be attempting to flee from the ground elements.

b. The gun ships provided fire support for the UH-1D troop carriers while they were landing and taking off by firing suppressive fire when the situation permitted or by being ready to return enemy fire during this critical period. They also supported the movement of the ground elements and destroyed targets of opportunity with their quickly responsive fire power.

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

c. During the hours of darkness, 12-man stay behind ambush patrols were placed in selected locations with preplanned artillery support to deny enemy freedom of movement and inflict maximum casualties.

d. All orders for the operation were verbal and Frag orders were frequently used.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: See Tab C, page 16 & 17

(4) Timeliness: N/A

e. Company D, 16th Armor

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 3 APC Platoons (4 APC's per platoon)

(b) 1 Mortar Platoon (4 4.42" mortar tracks, one (1) FDC APC)

(c) 1 Command APC

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) The mission for this unit on 9 January was to provide a screen. On 11 through 24 January 1967, the mission was to sieze and hold OBJECTIVE 5 and OBJECTIVE 6.

(b) This unit was under the operational control of the 4/503d Infantry Battalion throughout the duration of the operation. Supporting units consisted mainly of artillery batteries, to include 3/319th Artillery. Army Aviation (335th ASL), organic to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), USAF, and the 4.2" mortar platoon also provided necessary support. Reaction forces were at all times available if operational requirements had made it necessary to call on them, and on one occasion, it was necessary to call on elements of the 11th ACR to aid this unit in its mission.

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Operation CEDAR FALLS was an excellent operation as far as the use and deployment of this company's armored capabilities are concerned. On all occasions, maximum use of shock-action and fire power of the APC were utilized. The company was also used in perimeter defense, however, due to the close proximity of the other units, the caliber .50 machinegun could not be used, this reducing the effectiveness of the company's basic weapon/vehicle, the M113 APC. The company reacted well to all types of enemy contact, and where engaged, the volume of fire returned was timely and well controlled.

(4) Timeliness: N/A

f. 173d Engineer Company

(1) Size of Force:

Two (2) Line Platoons (Combat Engineers)
One (1) Bridge Platoon (Boats)
One (1) Maintenance Platoon

AVRE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(2) How and When Employed: The 17[illegible] Engineer Company deployed on Operation CEDAR FALLS with the company (-) attached to three Infantry battalions. The Engineers supported the Brigade with "Tunnel Rat" Teams, demolition teams, road reconnaissance and repair, mine clearing and water point operations in addition to aiding in the securing of the northwest portion of the Brigade's perimeter. A day by day outline of the Engineer Company's activities follows:

(a) 7 - 13 January 1967:

Conducted river patrolling, river traffic control and resupply operations for the 1/503d Infantry.

(b) 8 - 10 January 1967:

1. Arrived at Penitium NED and established perimeter security. A water point was established in the vicinity of XT 745336.

2. Cleared TOC area, insuring that it was free of mines, booby-traps, etc.

3. Constructed TOC Command bunker

4. Conducted river reconnaissance with pneumatic assault boats, vicinity XT 738328.

5. Constructed a Refugee Center (100 meters x 150 meters) vicinity XT 733323.

(c) 11 January 1967:

1. Repaired road leading to the Refugee Center.

2. Hauled, turned and graded laterite

(d) 12 January 1967:

1. Deployed as Infantry - sent out night ambush patrol, having negative results.

2. Destroyed a quantity of VC ammunition and grenades whose location was supplied by the 172d MI Detachment.

(e) 14 January 1967:

1. Cleared fields of fire for the 1/503d Infantry with heavy equipment.

2. Cleared laterite pit of mines at Penitium NED.

3. Supported the repair of ARVN Bulldozers

4. Sent out a night ambush patrol having negative results.

(f) 15 January 1967:

Cleared a 1,500 meter section of HIGHWAY 14.

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(g) 16 January 1967:

Engaged in light enemy contact on perimeter resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US WIA.

(h) 14 - 21 January 1967:

1. Constructed a floating mine barrier on river vicinity of bridge XT 737332. See Special Equipment/Techniques.

2. Picked up eight (8) Chieu Hoi detainees, vicinity XT 682275.

3. Picked up three (3) Chieu Hoi detainees, vicinity XT 677290.

(i) 22 January 1967:

Discovered 30 tons of paddy rice which was evacuated to the BSO.

(j) 23 January 1967:

Conducted Civic Action Projects, vicinity of HEN CAT.

(k) 8 - 23 January 1967:

1. Explored, mapped, and destroyed 9,000 meters of VC tunnel network, 200 separate bunkers, and 500 meters of trench in the IRON TRIANGLE.

2. Produced and distributed 139,000 gallons of potable water to units in the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), 1st Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS found the 173d Engineer Company expending most of its effort on tunnel exploration, mapping and destruction of tunnels. By using small caliber pistols and flashlights, and by maintaining communication by wire at all times at all times, the "Tunnel Rat" Teams were able to move quickly with confidence while relaying information to other teammates. (See Tab F - Tunnel Complex Drawings)

g. 173d Military Police Platoon

(1) Size of Force: The 173d Military Police Platoon consists of 1 Officer and 50 enlisted men. During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the men were employed as follows:

Brigade CP	1 Officer, 2? EM
1/503d Inf	7 EM
2/503d Inf	7 EM
4/503d Inf	7 EM

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) To provide necessary traffic control points for movement of the Brigade to and from the tactical area of operations.

(b) To establish, operate and secure a Refugee Collection Point, vicinity of HEM CAT, RVN.

(c) Secured two bridges, vicinity of HEM CAT and provided defile control during daylight hours.

(d) Provided escort and security for daily Brigade resupply convoys to and from BIEN HOA.

(e) Maintained a PWCP (Prisoner of War Collection Point) at the Brigade Forward Base Camp.

(f) Performed other missions as required.

h. 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 3 squads of six (6) dog teams per squad

(b) HQ section with Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant and a Veterinary Animal Specialist.

(2) How and When Employed:

The Scout Dog is trained to detect and give silent warning of the presence of any strange individual or group. He will prove especially useful in warning of ambushes and attempts at infiltration. The scout dog is worked by one (1) man, the handler, who has been especially trained in this type of work. The dog works on a short or long leash most of the time, however, being off the leash entirely. The dogs work in daylight or darkness, in any kind of weather and in jungle or open country. The scout dogs were employed in the following manner:

(a) Reconnaissance Patrols

(b) Combat Patrols - Search and Destroy

(c) Outposts, Listening and Observation

(d) Night Attacks

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the scout dog teams attached to the Infantry units were instrumental in detecting VC positions, tunnels, base camps, rice and supply caches. There were twelve (12) teams deployed on the operation, participating in eighty (80) patrols. During the Operation, one dog was lost which has not been recovered.

i. 51st Chemical Detachment:

(1) Size of Force: 1 Officer and 4 Enlisted Men

(2) How and When Employed: The 51st Chemical Detachment employed an 18 HP BUFFALO TURBINE (See Special Equipment/Techniques) mounted either on an APC or on a sling load of a UH-1D helicopter to aid in the exploration of VC tunnels. The turbine weighs 800 pounds and is capable of displacing 8,500 cubic feet per minute of air, smoke or CS into a tunnel entrance. For a complete analysis of the employment of this turbine, see page 41.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The BUFFALO TURBINE proved to be highly effective in the following missions:

(a) Flushing VC from tunnels by pumping smoke into the shaft.

(b) Locating tunnel entrances and ventilation holes and thus tracing the configuration of the tunnel by blowing smoke into known entrances, while aerial observers mark the various exits of the smoke.

(c) Flushing smoke and Riot Control Agent (RCA) vapors from a tunnel to enable entrance of tunnel exploration teams.

(d) Furnishes fresh air in badly ventilated tunnels to aid the exploration parties.

(4) Timeliness: Few delays were experienced due to easy transportability of the equipment by helicopter or APC.

11. Intelligence

a. Operation NIAGARA FALLS - 5 January to 7 January 1967

(1) Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of Operation NIAGARA FALLS, in an area consisting of the southern tip of the IRON TRIANGLE, the PHU LOI Viet Cong Local Force Battalion and the C-63d Viet Cong Companies were believed to be operating in addition to the 2d and 3d Viet Cong Main Force Battalions of the 165/A VC Main Force Regiment. The enemy's morale was believed to have been lowered by poor living conditions coupled with friendly artillery and air strikes. The enemy was attributed with the capability of:

(a) Initiating harassing attacks in the Brigade's AO and interdicting ROUTE 13 at his choosing.

(b) Reinforcing guerrilla elements with elements of the PHU LOI Local Force Battalion and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 165/A Regiment.

(c) Defense in a limited area for a short period of time.

(d) Withdrawing from or avoiding contact at anytime and place of his choosing.

(2) Enemy Situation During Operation: During Operation NIAGARA FALLS, elements of the Brigade failed to make contact with enemy forces larger than five (5) men. One small base camp was found and a few small food and equipment caches were discovered, none of which indicated that a large size unit had used the area recently. It was believed, however, that when US of ARVN troops are not present, the VC will continue to infiltrate both men and supplies through the area.

(3) Area of Operations:

(a) Weather and Climate: The northeast monsoon influenced the weather during Operation NIAGARA FALLS. Precipitation during the operation was light and was normal for the season. There was no morning fog. The weather did not appear to aid the enemy in any specific manner.

(b) Terrain: The AO was characterized by flat land with minor changes in elevation. The highest point of elevation in the AO is a gentle slope, 28 meters in height, located vicinity XT 801232. The SONG SAIGON and the SONG THI TINH form the major drainage pattern for the AO. There are numerous small streams, tributaries, and intermittant streams interlaced throughout the entire area. The RACH ONG MARC (XT 766191 to XT 770175) provided an irrigation channel for the extensive rice fields located in the southwestern portion of the AO. The two large rivers formed major obstacles to the west and portions of the south. A relatively large number of rubber plantations were centered at XT 785210. Small islands of dense forest were located throughout the AO. The largest of these dense forests was located north of a rubber plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and SONG THI TINH.

b. Operation CEDAR FALLS - 8 January to 25 January 1967

(1) Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 272d VC Main Force Regiment, the 7th Battalion of the 165th/A Regiment, the PMU LOI Battalion, the local force companies C61, C62 and C63 were believed to be operating within the areas of operation and interest. The 2d and 3d VC Main Force Battalions of the 165/A Regiment were believed to be within the area surrounding the Triangle, but the exact location was not known. The enemy's morale had been lowered by TAC airstrikes and intensive artillery preparations. The enemy was attributed with the following capabilities:

(a) Initiating harassing attacks within the AO and interdicting ROUTE 13 at his choosing.

(b) Reinforcing guerrilla elements with the PMU LOI Battalion and/or the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 165/A Regiment.

(c) Conducting a limited defense at his choosing.

(d) Withdrawing from or avoiding contact with US Forces.

(2) Enemy Situation During Operation: From 8 January to 25 January 1967, elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) maintained daily contact with the enemy. The sporadic contacts were usually initiated by friendly forces and terminated by VC withdrawal. The largest contact was on 16 January by C/4/503d Infantry with a VC platoon. Numerous VC base camps, rice caches, and tunnel systems were destroyed. The large amount of rice extracted from the operational area has reduced the VC logistical abilities. The quartered carcass of an animal which had been dead for four days was found in the operational area. This was an indication of the effects of the operation on the enemy logistical base. The enemy's low morale was reflected by the large number of ralliers who surrendered after US Forces entered the IRON TRIANGLE. Prisoners were taken from the following units: C61 LF Company, 2d Company of the PMU LOI Battalion, Group 83 (Rear Services of the MR IV), and I-4 (subordinate committee of the MR IV). An estimated 25,000 documents were captured

during the operation. The majority of these have not been fully exploited for intelligence value since only the initial tactical screening was conducted. On several occasions, Chieu Hoi's lead friendly troops to previously undiscovered tunnels, weapons caches and rice caches. Without their assistance, these installations probably would not have been found.

(3) Area of Operations:

(a) Weather and Climate: The Northeastern Monsoon was in effect during the operation. The weather was predominantly clear, cool and dry. Two thunderstorms occurred but these did not interfere with tactical operations. A combination of gusty winds and lower nocturnal temperatures produced noticeable cold spells during one week of the operation. The weather hindered no tactical operation during the period.

(b) Terrain: The area of operations, commonly called the IRON TRIANGLE was bounded by the SONG SAIGON on the west and the SONG THI TINH on the east. The highest point of elevation in the AO was a 28 meter hill located at XT 801232. A relatively large rubber plantation was located at XT 785-210. A large dense forest area was located north of a rubber plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and the SONG THI TINH. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 was the main route in the area. The operational area was found to contain numerous underground tunnels and dwellings. The majority of these were destroyed.

e. Sources of Intelligence:

(1) General: Attached to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) is a Military Intelligence Section (172d Military Intelligence), which works under the supervision of the Brigade S2 Section, and provides an Order of Battle Section, an Imagery Interpretation Section, an Interrogation Section and a Counterintelligence Section.

(2) During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment contributed significantly to the overall success enjoyed by the Brigade. As the operation developed, it became apparent that a large percentage of the caches and installations discovered were a direct result of intelligence gained through agent reports, reconnaissance and interrogation. Of particular interest during the operation was the co-location of the 541st Military Intelligence Detachment (11th ACR) with the 172d. This resulted in improved coordination between the units and a larger pool of IPW teams and CI personnel which kept the backlog of prisoners in the VCCCP to a minimum. Further it enabled the cross utilization of information. Also of significance was the number of refugees screened. In the clearing of the AO, hundreds of families were evacuated from their homes. The detachment had the responsibility of screening these people to determine those that were VC or active VC sympathizers. In total, 1,000 families were processed including 950 women, 870 children and 55 men. Through the screening process, 16 VC, 11 civil defendants, and 9 ralliers were uncovered. The civil defendants were released to the National Police and the VC ralliers were sent to the VCCCP for further exploitation. During the six days that this point was in operation, much valuable information was gained concerning VC activities in the AO. Additionally, refugees that would have ordinarily been overlooked were screened and found to be VC or ralliers. This discovery was only through the efforts of trained interrogation personnel.

23

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(a) Imagery Interpretation Section

1. Imagery Interpretation support for Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS consisted of preparation of immediate, detailed and route reconnaissance reports. Mosaics, weather and aerial reconnaissance and photography support were also furnished. The detail and scope of the Imagery Interpretation effort was greater on this operation than any previous operation primarily because of the relatively long lead time available. This time allowed for necessary planning which permitted both greater accuracy and wider coverage. Extensive photo support was obtained from the ASTA Platoon of the 1st Infantry Division which covered the entire operational area, including all primary access routes. The photo support obtained from the 1st Division was prompt and the photography was of uniformly high quality. A larger number of targets were discovered through aerial photography on this operation.

2. Aerial reconnaissance support was flown by both Army and Air Force Aircraft. During the second week of the operation, the recon area became quite limited due to heavy artillery and air strike activity. Although there were no enemy personnel sighted on any of the recons, numerous installations such as bunkers, tunnels, foxholes, etc. were reported. FAC aircraft were used extensively in providing recon support for Operation CEDAR FALLS.

2. Imagery Interpretation support for Operation CEDAR FALLS consisted of the following items:

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE	MISSIONS	HOURS
Army (UH-1B)	45	67
Air Force (L-19)	31	71

Mosaics Completed 12

Photo Interpretation Reports

Immediate	13
Detailed	2
Route Recon	2

(b) Counterintelligence:

During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the Counterintelligence efforts were greatly enhanced by the co-location of the CI team with the IPW team. This co-location enabled immediate CI response to information obtained in the interrogation of prisoners, refugees, and Chieu Hoi returnees. Close CI liaison with counterpart elements of other units participating in the operation resulted in the acquisition and subsequent exploitation of considerably valuable target information not available through other channels. The immediate liaison efforts of the USAEV Augmentation Team resulted in timely and accurate intelligence available for quick combat response.

(c) Interrogation: A statistical summary of personnel, documents and material processed during Operation CEDAR FALLS follows:

Detainees:

VC 90

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Civilians	118
Civil Defendants	2
Chieu Hoi	69
TOTAL	279

Documents	20,000
Weapons	187
Mortars	3
Ammunition	9,000 rnds
Mines	34
Grenades	189
Clothing	205 lbs
Web Gear/uniforms	140 lbs
Medical Supplies	105 lbs

Radio Equipment

PRC/10	5
MT-1 Walkie Talkies	4
Homemade Radios	2

12. Mission: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS

The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during this operation was two fold as follows:

a. The Brigade CP deployed directly from Operation CANARY/DUCK, a road security operation astride HIGHWAY 15 to PHU LOI on 4 January 1967. The Brigade passed from the Operational Control of II FFORCEV to the 1st Infantry Division. On 5 January, the Brigade deployed the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry on Operation NIAGARA FALLS. The mission was to conduct a deceptive feint into the CAU DINH Jungle and conduct search and destroy operations in preparation for the larger scale, multi-division Operation CEDAR FALLS.

b. Operation CEDAR FALLS (8 January to 25 January 1967) had the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of the THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE and in the IRON TRIANGLE, to kill or capture military and/or political elements of the VC Military Region IV Headquarters, Local Force Infrastructure and VC/NVA Forces. In addition, the Brigade was assigned the task of clearing the area of inhabitants, cutting belts across the IRON TRIANGLE and clearing selected LZ's within the Area of Operation. The Brigade's Task Force (TF DEANE) was under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS.

13. Concept of Operation: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS in five (5) phases as follows:

a. PHASE I: Operation NIAGARA FALLS - D - 3 to D - 1 (5 to 7 January 1967)

TF 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Abn), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730 hours under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Task Force searched for the enemy in the CAU DINH JUNGLE and the THI TINH RIVER to HIGHWAY 13 Area. When Operation NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500 hours, 7 January, the 1/503d Infantry and the 35th Ranger Battalion were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. The Operation produced light enemy contact, but its significance lies in the fact that a deceptive feint had been achieved.

b. PHASE II - Pre-Positioning of Forces - D Day (8 January 1967)

(1) 1/503d Infantry and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) remained in position from Operation NIAGARA FALLS to serve as a blocking force at the confluence of the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVER.

(2) 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry road marched to PHU LOI and were helilifted to Position BLUE, vicinity XT 8328.

(3) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment road marched to the vicinity of the CAU DINH JUNGLE (XT 7823).

(4) The 1/4th Cavalry (-) moved from their AO of Operation NIAGARA FALLS to the vicinity of BEN CAT.

c. PHASE III - Attack into the IRON TRIANGLE and the THANH DIEM FOREST RESERVE - D + 1, D + 2, 9 through 10 January 1967.

(1) The 1/503d Infantry remained in its present position

(2) 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry conducted heliborne assaults into LZ's 4 and 6 in the THANH DIEM FOREST RESERVE.

(3) The 11th ACR initiated attacks across BEN CAT Bridge west into the IRON TRIANGLE.

(4) 1/4th Cavalry conducted screening of NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13.

d. PHASE IV-Attack South into IRON TRIANGLE - D + 3 through D + 16 11 January through 24 January 1967.

(1) During this Phase, the 1/503d Infantry:

(a) Served as a blocking and reserve force in position.

(b) Conducted thorough Search and Destroy Operations in the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(c) Conducted platoon sized Eagle Flights in AO.

(2) The 2/503d Infantry attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE on the west side including airmobile assault on suspected enemy locations.

(3) The 4/503d Infantry with B/16th Armor under its OPCON attacked south into the southeastern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(4) During this phase, the 11th ACR (-):

(a) Attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE along the west flank, and then conducted search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the AO. This was conducted by 3/11th ACR.

(b) The 2/11th ACR continued security missions along the northern edge of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(c) The 2/11th ACR and 3/11th ACR linked up in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

AVEC-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

e. PHASE V - Extraction of elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) from the AO of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

(1) The 11th ACR (-) with the 2/503d Infantry OPCON left the AO of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS by road march on 24 January 1967, with a major portion of the 173d Engineer Company.

(2) The remaining elements of the Brigade departed the operational area and closed at BIEN HOA on 25 January 1967.

14. Execution: This Combat After Action Report will be handled day by day with an accompanying map (located in TAB B) to show the major unit movements of maneuver elements during the period. Additionally, changes in the basic Task Force will be included on the days that change occurred.

a. D - 1 (5 January 1967) - Operation NIAGARA FALLS

Task Force Organization: See page 2, Paragraph 9

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0607 hours in the CAU DINH JUNGLE. The 1/503d Infantry conducted a heliborne assault from its assembly area at PHU LOI to LZ LOIS (XT 774237) with Company A and elements of the Battalion's HQ. The remainder of the Battalion followed, closing at 0852 hours. Team BRAVO and Team ARMOR, consisting of B/2/34th Armor (-) and recon platoon conducted search and destroy operations in the CAU DINH AO (vic XT 7723). The Battalion CP and Company C displaced from LZ LOIS at 1100 hours and proceeded to their proposed CP area at XT 773224. B/2/34th Armor was released OPCON 1/503d Infantry at 1700 hours.

The 1/4th Cavalry (-) moved by road at 0700 hours with A/5-2d Arty (AW) and secured blocking positions along HIGHWAY 13 from XT 798227 to the road junction at XT 801223. B/1/4th Cavalry conducted Search and Destroy operations in the CAU DINH JUNGLE.

The 1st Engineer Battalion made the only contact of the day at 0925 hours, killing 4 VC (EC).

b. D - 2 (6 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: no changes

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued to operate in the CAU DINH JUNGLE in preparation for Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1/503d Infantry continued its search and destroy operations in the AO.

The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) maintained blocking positions at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH RIVERS. The 1/4th Cavalry continued to block along HIGHWAY 13 and secure the 1st Division Engineers work parties who were clearing areas in the jungle.

There were no engagements on this day with the enemy.

c. D - 1 (7 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: no change

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Operational Summary: Operation NIAGARA FALLS was terminated at 0900 hours with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) moving with OPCON units into position for Operation CEDAR FALLS.

The 1/503d Infantry established blocking positions along the THI TINH RIVER with Company A in the north, Company B in the center and Company C in the south. A/5-2d Artillery, equipped with automatic weapons, were also positioned to command the river escape routes.

At 0930 hours, 1/4th Cav (-) was released of OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and returned to PHU LOI. The 35th Ranger Battalion maintained its blocking position at the confluence of the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVERS.

d. D - Day (8 January 1967) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Task Force Organization: see page 2, paragraph 9. The Serial March into the AO was conducted as follows:

SERIAL #1	SERIAL #2	SERIAL #3
HHC (-)	E/17th Cav (-) D/16th Armor Co/L/503d Inf 3/319th Arty (-) 173d Engr Co	2/503d Inf 4/503d Inf (-)
SERIAL #4	**SERIAL #5**	
173d BSOC	Plt/E/17th Cav C/3/319th Arty	

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and OPCON units initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS by conducting movement to the vicinity of BEN CAT and PHU LOI by road convoy, helilift and Air Force Cargo aircraft. The Brigade positioned its forces for the coordinated attack (3 battalion) on D + 1. The Brigade's Task Force DEANE became OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division at 0800 hours.

The Brigade Headquarters elements began a motor march from PHU LOI to Position RED (See overlay, D - Day), using HIGHWAY 13, closing at 0915 hours. The 1/503d Infantry remained in its blocking position assumed during Operation NIAGARA FALLS.

The 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry departed BIEN HOA at 1000 hours and were flown by Air Force Aircraft to PHU LOI, closing at 1138 hours. At 1300 hours, the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry began a helilift to Position BLUE (See Overlay). The 2/503d Infantry closed at 1333 hours. At 1700 hours the Recon Platoon of the 2d Battalion engaged 2 VC at XT 818282, wounding one before they fled south. The troops of the Recon Platoon followed the blood trail, discovering 2 more VC in the process. The VC fired 8 - 10 rounds of semi-automatic fire, fired 1 rifle grenade and threw 1 hand grenade. The Recon Platoon returned fire with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties.

At 1410 hours, the 4/503d Infantry closed at the assembly area at Position BLUE. At the same time, the 3/319th Artillery "B" and "C" Batteries arrived at Position WHITE from PHU LOI. The E/17th Cavalry had the responsibility of securing Position WHITE. Alpha Battery, 3/319th Artillery was stationed at the Brigade CP Area, Position RED. They arrived at the CP at 1210 hours.

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) remained at their blocking position held during Operation NIAGARA FALLS. The 1/4th Cavalry of the 1st Infantry Division assumed a screening mission along HIGHWAY 13 at 0800 hours. They made negative contact until 1330 hours when they killed 1 VC (BC) at XT 856226.

e. D + 1 (9 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/4/503d Inf became OPCON to 3/14th ACR

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade's TF DRANG attacked suspected VC formation and installation areas in the IRON TRIANGLE and the THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE. At 0800 hours, the 11th ACR (-) attacked west from BEN CAT and secured the bridge located at XT 738738. The Regiment then pushed further west siezing Objectives 1 (at 0912 hours), 1-A (at 0950 hours) and Objective 2 (at 1105 hours). The Regiment also provided security for elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion (of the 1st Infantry Division) who were clearing the road west from BEN CAT to Objective 2, and Engineer elements clearing the area of Objective 1 and LZ 6 (See Overlay - D + 1).

At 0804 hours, Company D/16th Armor, reinforced with one rifle Company from 4/503d Infantry screened the area northwest of BEN CAT from XT 708533 to XT 685244.

The 2/503d Infantry initiated a heliborne assault into LZ 4 from Position BLUE beginning at 1055 hours (XT 670365). The assault was completed at 1115 hours and the 2/503d Infantry linked up with the 1st Division elements to the north approximately 1/2-hour later.

At 1215 hours, the 4/503d Infantry (-) departed Position BLUE by helicopter and at 1235 hours, they assaulted LZ 6 (XT 680350). One hour and ten minutes later, the 4th Battalion and the 2d Battalion linked together and at 1430 hours, D/16th Armor (+) became under the Operational Control of the 4th Battalion. The 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry established blocking positions in their respective LZ's and conducted limited search and destroy operations in their zones. At 2105 hours, elements of C/2/503d Infantry engaged 5 VC moving east at XT 662367. Two more VC were engaged in the same area shortly thereafter. The action resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 Chicom Carbines captured. There were no Friendly casualties, (see overlay D + 1).

The 1/503d Infantry and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) with elements of the 1/4th Cavalry remained in their blocking positions, held since the termination of Operation NIAGARA FALLS. There were no significant contacts during the day.

f. D + 2 (10 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 1/4th Cav went OPCON to 11th ACR (-)
A/5/7 Arty (AW) went OPCON to 2/14th ACR

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division continued its sweep of the area north of the IRON TRIANGLE, west of BEN CAT. The 1/503d Infantry maintained their blocking position and conducted Search and Destroy operations in the area. The 1/4th Cavalry was relieved of its screening mission along HIGHWAY 13, south of BEN CAT at 1540 hours by the 1/7th ARVN Regiment (working in conjunction with II FFORCEV), and the 2/8th ARVN Regiment. The 1/4th Cavalry then motor marched to

a blocking position vicinity of LZ 4 and LZ 6, thereby relieving the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry (-) in that area. At 1400 hours, the 1/4th Cavalry (-) went under the Operational Control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-).

At 0823 hours, C/2/503d Infantry engaged 2 VC at XT 662370. This contact took place near to the ambush site employed on the night of the 9th of January. Four (4) Americans received wounds resulting from this action with VC casualties unknown. Later that day, after being relieved from by the 1/4th Cav, the 2/503d Infantry began to move into harbor positions (night defense) in preparation for an attack south into the IRON TRIANGLE. This was accomplished by 1645 hours.

The 4/503d Infantry moved into its staging area after it was relieved while Company D/16th Armor returned to the Brigade CP (Position RED) to aid in its defense.

The 11th ACR continued Search and Destroy in addition to Security missions in AO HOTEL and the immediate vicinity. At 1900 hours, a tank of B/1/4th Cavalry struck a mine at XT 669359 resulting in 1 trooper being wounded and 4 road wheels being blown off the tank (Location 2, Overlay D + 2).

g. D + 3 (11 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: On this day, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) TF DEANE commenced its attack south into the IRON TRIANGLE at 0900 hours. The 2/503d Infantry initiated search and destroy operations in the western portion of the Triangle while the 4th Battalion crossed into the AO on the east, also conducting search and destroy operations while moving to the south. At 15C hours, A/4/503d Infantry discovered a boobytrapped base camp at XT 724304. The camp measured 100 meters by 200 meters and contained 40 bunkers with overhead cover. Surrounding the area was a horse shoe trench measuring 2' wide by 2' deep. Company A found nine boobytraps in the compound which were all detonated in place (Location 1). D/16th Armor attacked along the western portion toward Objective 5.

The 3/11th ACR attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE moving down the western edge along HIGHWAY 14. In addition to clearing the road, they also seized Objectives 1 (XT 715240), 2 (XT 723240), 3 (XT 743240), and 4 (XT 744218), while simultaneously conducting search and destroy operations along the Route. All objectives were secured by 1645 hours.

Early in the morning before the attack was initiated, M/3/11th ACR engaged 5 VC at XT 702296 (Location 2). The VC fled without returning fire. The skirmish resulted in one (1) VC WIA being captured. He was subsequently evacuated to the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment for interrogation. At 1930 hours, M/3/11th ACR engaged 3 VC at XT 750231. The contact resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 US Carbine being captured (Location 3).

1/503d Infantry Battalion was relieved of its original blocking mission by the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) at 1200 hours. The Battalion then deployed to the Brigade CP at Position RED.

The 2/11th and the 1/4th Cavalry continued security and screening missions north of the IRON TRIANGLE under the OPCON of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-).

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation KIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

h. D + 4 (12 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR & 1/4th Cav became OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div

Operational Summary: TF DEANE continued search and destroy operations in the IRON TRIANGLE with its strength being expanded now that the 1/503d Infantry was relieved of its blocking position and could now function with the Brigade.

The 1/503d Infantry (-) moved by road from Position RED to the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE at 0735 hours. The mission was to make a thorough search of the area along HIGHWAY 14. At this time, Company A/503d Infantry remained at Position RED to secure the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base.

At 1010 hours, the Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry killed 2 Viet Cong at XT 677296 (Location 1). The weapons belonging to the VC were lost in the river, however, one (1) M-26 grenade and two (2) Chicom grenades were captured. At 1525 hours at XT 682235 (Location 2) the Recon Platoon of the 1st Battalion found 3 VC, one of whom had been wounded, in a bunker. Shortly thereafter, at the same location, they found 4 dead VC and 1 Chicom Carbine.

Throughout the day, the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry continued a detailed search of their AO's with no significant contact. D/16th Armor, reinforced with Company C/4/503d Infantry, moved by APC to the vicinity of Objective 5 under the OPCON of 4/503d Infantry. At 1605 hours, the remainder of Company C joined D/16th Armor, via helilift.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) continued its search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE with the 3d Squadron. At 1120 hours, an element of 3/11th ACR pursued 5 VC at XT 746234. The VC led them into a claymore ambush which resulted in 3 US WIA and 4 US KIA. The VC fled before a retaliatory act could be executed, (Location 3). At 1635 hours, K/3/11th ACR received heavy semi-automatic and automatic fire from an ambush at XT 703253 (Location 4). The VC, who were estimated to be at platoon strength, damaged 1 APC with 3 rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle fire. There were no US casualties and enemy losses were unknown. At 2040 hours, M/3/11th ACR observed a VC attempting to tamper with one of their claymore mines. The claymore was detonated, killing the VC (XT 748230).

The 2/11th ACR and the 1/4th Cavalry were released to the Operational Control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at 0700 hours.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry secured the Fire Support Base at Position WHITE and conducted Air Cavalry Operations under the OPCON of the 1/503d Infantry in the southern portion of the AO.

i. D + 5 (13 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR reverts OPCON 11th ACR (-)

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and OPCON units continued to comb the IRON TRIANGLE destroying VC, their installations and supplies. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 503d Infantry continued their detailed search of the Operational Area, making no significant contact.

31

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

At 1640 hours, PFC Duane Simpson, a member of the 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog, and working with C/4/503d Infantry, alerted his patrol to the presence of an unknown number of VC at XT 725269. Simpson's Scout Dog in fact gave the silent warning. Immediately after the warning was spread, heavy automatic fire commenced. Simpson quickly returned the fire to gain superiority, killing one (1) VC. The remainder of the patrol then moved up to engage the enemy. The contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 weapon being captured, thanks only to the quick action of the attached scout dog team.

At 1400 hours, A/4/503d Infantry received 30 to 40 rounds of semi-automatic fire at XT 728268 (Location 5 - D + 4, D + 5 Overlay). Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) with no US casualties.

The 11th ACR (-) continued to search its AO. At 1800 hours, the 2d Squadron reverted back to the control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

On this day, E Troop, 17th Cavalry had the mission of securing artillery elements at Position WHITE in addition to conducting Air Mobile Cavalry Operations. The Cavalry killed 10 VC in a series of actions throughout the day. At 1043 hours, at XT 714212 (Location 7) they contacted and killed 2 VC. Fifteen minutes later, another element killed 1 VC at XT 688230 (Location 8). At 1320 hours, they killed 2 VC and captured 1 VC WIA at XT 710233, also capturing one (1) US carbine and a .45 caliber pistol. Throughout the day, various elements of E/17th Cav killed 5 more of the enemy throughout their AO, in addition to discovering large quantities of rice and several sampans.

The 173d Engineer Company provided Tunnel Exploration Teams "Tunnel Rats" throughout the Operational Area for tunnel search and destruction.

j. D + 6 (14 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: The Brigade's Task Force DEANE continued a detailed search of the IRON TRIANGLE, destroying VC and Viet Cong Installations and supplies throughout the day.

The 1/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the northern portion of the Triangle, west of HIGHWAY 14. At the same time, elements of E Troop, 17th Cavalry were working with the 1st Battalion in that area. The Battalion's activities were highly successful on this day for they discovered and destroyed 30.5 tons of Paddy Rice, 300 pounds of Chicom explosives and 36 anti-personnel mines.

In the meantime, the Cavalry Troop killed a total of 12 VC in a series of small contacts. In addition, they captured 3 VC, destroyed 61.7 tons of paddy rice, evacuated an additional 11 tons of rice, destroyed 10 sampans and several huts, (See Tab C, Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry).

The 2/503d Infantry, while conducting search and destroy operations in the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE found and destroyed several small bunkers, tunnels and a base camp area. Within the camp, a hand grenade shop was found and 25 grenades were confiscated.

The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted a thorough search of the eastern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1000 hours, Company C/4/503d Infantry discovered a 100 meter tunnel, 6 feet below the surface at XT 727265 (Location 5).

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

A search of the tunnel revealed 3 rooms, 5 feet by 8 feet with wooden floors. In addition, 45 tons of paddy rice, 3.4 tons of salt, 16 rifle grenades, 22 60mm mortar rounds and 2,300 feet of electrical wire were found within. At 1415 hours, an element of C/4/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor made contact with an estimated VC squad. The VC fired 150 - 200 rounds of semi-automatic and automatic fire. The engagement was characterized by the troopers as being extremely heated, owing not only to the enemy fire, but also the large numbers of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines encountered. The action resulted in 14 US WIA with unknown VC casualties (XT 737259 - Location 6).

The 2/11th ACR and 3/11th ACR conducted search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. Throughout the day's activities, they discovered and destroyed 17 tunnels, one trench system and 18 bunkers. In addition, 500 pounds of polished rice was found and evacuated.

The 173d Engineer Company "Tunnel Rat" teams explored a total of 1,300 meters of tunnel within the AO. A total of 2,500 meters of tunnel were destroyed leaving an untold number of VC trapped within.

k. D + 7 (15 January 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: No Changes

Operational Summary: TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting methodical search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE AO. Moving behind a massive TAC Air preparation consisting of 14 sorties dropping a total of 19,000 pounds of High Explosives, the 1/503d Infantry located and extracted a medical cache at XT 672281 containing 300 tablets of Penicillin, 10 bottles of powdered Penicillin, one bottle of alchohol, 20 bottles of Intercain and 5 bottles of sterile water. At 1210 hours, elements of the 1/503d Infantry killed 3 VC (BC) at 672281 (Location 7) and captured one (1) US carbine, ammunition, documents and several maps. They also located 1 grenade, 10 bunkers, 3 sampans, 3 huts, 1 tunnel, 1 AT mine and 100-pound bomb during the day's activities.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry moved south through the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. Boobytraps at XT 693263 and XT 688266 wounded 4-men on the days operations. The Battalion located and destroyed 11 huts and 4 bunkers. At 1210 hours, Bravo Company engaged 2 VC who were busy emplacing a mine in the road at XT 712247 (Location 9). The men fired at the enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US M-2 carbine being captured.

During their search of the eastern portion of the Triangle, the 2/503d Infantry (-) came across a triangular shaped base camp, 100 meters on each side, 35 bunkers were located on the perimeter and an additional 20 were found within the encampment. All of the bunkers were interconnected with trenches. Warm coals in the cooking fires indicated recent habitation by an estimated VC Platoon.

The 11th ACR (-) with Company D/1/503d Infantry under their Operational Control searched the southern area of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1149 hours, an element of D/1/503d Infantry engaged 3 VC at XT 736217 (Location 10). One of the VC was killed and the remaining 2 escaped into a tunnel after firing approximately 10 rounds. One (1) sub-machinegun, 2 carbines and one (1) DH-10 claymore mine was captured. Friendly casualties were: 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1310 hours, an APC from E Troop/2/11th ACR struck a mine at XT 736218 (Location 11) resulting in 6 US WIA. At 1530 hours, seven (7) personnel from M/3/11th ACR were wounded in action and 2 APCs were damaged by two (2) command detonated mines at XT 731231 (Location 12).

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

E Troop/17th Cavalry was fired on by Viet Cong snipers at XT 695218 (Location 13) resulting in 2 US WIA. 40 minutes later, at XT 695218, a VC wearing black pajamas was killed at XT 095219. In addition, 6 bunkers, 6 punji pits, 1 hut, 6 sampans and 3.75 tons of rice were destroyed.

1. D + 8 (16 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/4/503d Infantry released OPCON of 11th ACR (-) returning 4/503d Inf

Operational Summary:

Task Force DEANS continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE with 1/503d Infantry (-) in the western sector, 2/503d Infantry in the center and 4/503d Infantry in the east. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) was operating in the southern tip of the Triangle.

The 1st Battalion 503d Infantry in the western sector of the Triangle conducted search and destroy operations to the south. Company C and Company B were located on east and the west side of HIGHWAY 14 respectively. At 0843 hours, at XT 683255, Bravo Company made contact with 2 VC who immediately fled to the west. Shortly thereafter, B/1/503d Infantry captured one VC at XT 685255. The VC was subsequently evacuated. At XT 681278, the 1st Battalion's Recon Platoon located and destroyed a tunnel complex, 4 huts, an 8 foot sampan dock and a bunker. At 1015 hours, Bravo Company received 5 - 7 rounds of automatic weapons fire at XT 685255. Three (3) Viet Cong were captured after a brief exchange of fire, with 2 - 3 VC escaping to the south. Five minutes later, Company C located two (2) machinegun mounts, one bunker and 4 CBU's employed as boobytraps. All was destroyed with the exception of the machinegun mounts which were evacuated. Bravo Company sustained 5 casualties at 1335 hours as a direct result of an activated boobytrap at XT 685255. Four of these casualties required litters for evacuation. Shortly before this occurred, Charlie Company had discovered an extensive tunnel complex, showing signs of having been used as a hospital. One company of the 1st Battalion was employed in the security of the Brigade CP at Position RED.

The companies of the 2d Battalion 503d Infantry continued to conduct search and destroy missions, sweeping to the southeast. Company B encountered one (1) VC at XT 698262, shortly after 1100 hours. Company B suffered one KIA and 1 WIA as a result of the contact, with the VC escaping to the northeast. The Dust-off helicopter received semi-automatic ground fire during the evacuation, resulting in one of the medical personnel being wounded. Company C killed one (1) VC at 1200 hours while operating in the area XT 702246. The VC was found in a tunnel. The 2d Battalion's Recon Platoon operating in conjunction with elements of E/17th Cavalry, captured one (1) VC at XT 692237. The POW was extracted to the S2 for questioning. At 1330 hours, Charlie Company returned to the tunnel where it had previously killed one VC. At this time, a second VC was killed in the same vicinity. During the night, the Recon Platoon established ambush patrols around the Brigade TOC (vicinity 696307). At 2100 hours, they ambushed and killed one (1) VC, capturing one Canadian pistol.

At 0715 hours, Airstrikes commenced on targets XT 735260, XT 740260, XT 736255 and XT 740254 in preparation for the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry's search and destroy mission. Company A and Company B operated in the area XT 720285 to XT 734265. C/4/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor (-) OPCON screened the AO in the vicinity of Objective 5. At 1055 hours, Bravo Company located what appeared

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

to be a claymore mine factory at XT 723272. Search of the factory revealed large quantities of metal and canisters for WP rounds. An hour and a half later, Bravo Company located a tunnel with several rooms capable of standing in. The rooms contained 500 pounds of rice and a rusted .38 caliber pistol. At 1245 hours, Company D reported one (1) WIA and called for a Dustoff. The casualty, SGT Mario Ramirez, died enroute to the hospital. 45 minutes later, Bravo Company made contact with an estimated reinforced platoon at XT 725268. Artillery was called in on the position and contact was broken 15 minutes later. The results of this action are as follows: 5 VC KIA, 10 VC WIA (possibly 15). US casualties were: two (2) US KIA (SP4 Arthur Wilkie and PFC Frank Smith) and eleven (11) US WIA, nine of whom were evacuated by helicopter. At 1435 hours, an element of D/16th Armor hit a mine at XT 734265 resulting in six (6) WIA.

The 11th ACR (-), operating in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, located and marked for destruction one tunnel at XT 740218. They also destroyed one (1) DH-10 claymore mine at the same location. At 1245 hours, an APC struck a mine at XT 725262 resulting in one (1) US WIA. Two hours later, M/3/11th received approximately 20 rounds of semi-automatic fire from a tunnel at XT 740-221. Two (2) US personnel pursued the enemy into the tunnel resulting in the death of one and the injury of the other. In contacts that took place at 1530 and 1605 hours, the 11th ACR (-) killed 2 VC (BC) and 1 possibly in addition to capturing 1 US carbine, one (1) .45 caliber pistol and one (1) Russian automatic weapon.

m. D + 9 (17 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR returned to 11th ACR (-) & 173d Abn Bde (Sep) OPCON
2/11th ACR was released from 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div

D/4/503d Inf attached to 11th ACR
E/17th Cav OPCON 1/503d Inf

Operational Summary: Task Force DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1/503d Infantry (working in conjunction with E/17th Cav) conducted operations in the western Triangle near the SAIGON RIVER. The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 4th Battalion (-) with D/16th Armor (OPCON) operated in the center and east respectively. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) with Company D/4/503d Infantry attached were in the southern sector of the AO.

The 1/503d Infantry secured the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base at Position RED with Alpha Company. The remainder of the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations within the AO. At XT 695245 (Location 1) one (1) VC exchanged fire with 1st Battalion elements, wounding 2 paratroopers. At 1910 hours, B/1/503d Infantry engaged 3 Viet Cong at XT 688247 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC) and an additional VC KIA (possible). The dead VC was in a green shirt, black trousers and a bush hat. There was one (1) US KIA and 3 WIA as a result of this contact.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry engaged three (3) Viet Cong at 1330 hours killing 2 of the enemy (BC) and capturing the third at XT 671244. During a night ambush patrol, the Cavalry troopers engaged 6 VC at XT 672245 (Location 15). The action resulted in 2 VC killed and 2 weapons captured. The contact took place at 2010 hours.

35

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry located a tunnel complex at XT 708-242 containing two (2) Chicom Carbines and one (1) US Carbine. At 1120 hours, Bravo Company engaged two (2) Viet Cong at XT 713253 (Location 16) killing one of the enemy. A trench 1,800 meters in length was later located running from XT 688-247 to 695241.

Elements of the 4/503d Infantry received 1 WIA from a sniper at XT 725267. Later that day, the Battalion discovered a large weapons cache at XT 727-269. The cache contained 2 Russian Rifles, one (1) 60mm mortar, two (2) M60 machineguns, two (2) US M-1 rifles, 24 Chicom rifles two (2) US Browning Automatic rifles, 2 French machineguns, and three (3) .45 caliber sub-machineguns.

At 0900 hours, the 3/11th ACR reported killing one (1) VC when he detonated a friendly boobytrap at XT 740221. The trap was set by elements of M Troop, 3/11th ACR. At 1030 hours, an M48-A3 tank of K Troop/3/11th ACR lost four (4) road wheels as a result of having struck a pressure type land mine at XT 739-216. Other Regimental units made no significant contact during the day.

a. D + 10 (18 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 1/11th Cav was released from 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div OPCON & became OPCON to TF DEANE

Operational Summary: TF DEANE continued to conduct a detailed search and destroy operation within the AO of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1/503d Infantry with E Troop, 17th Cavalry was given the responsibility of maintaining security of Position WHITE. At 1725 hours, B/1/503d Infantry engaged 2 VC at XT 693245 (Location 1). One (1) VC was killed (BC) and one (1) AK-47 rifle was captured. The VC were a light green uniform and a pistol belt. At 1938 hours, Bravo Company again made contact with 2 Viet Cong at XT 693244 (Location 1), resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and an additional VC possibly killed. The dead VC were a light blue uniform and was armed with a bolt action rifle. In the early morning hours, elements of E/17th Cavalry were probed by an unknown number of Viet Cong at XT 716227. The Cavalry Troop opened fire on the enemy resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry continued its search in their assigned AO, progressing toward the eastern area of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1145 hours, C/2/503d Infantry discovered an old .45 caliber pistol (US) at XT 726258 (Location 3). During the search of the area, three (3) paratroopers were wounded by an enemy boobytrap.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to search in their AO during the day, however, their first contact was at 0330 hours in the morning. Battalion elements received several rounds of small arms fire at XT 736268 (Location 4). Artillery was called in on the enemy. Following the artillery barrage, patrols were sent forth to acquire an estimate of damage done by Artillery. It was reported that two (2) VC were killed and one (1) M-1 rifle and one (1) homemade shotgun were captured. Activities during the day consisted primarily of the discovery/destruction of numerous tunnel complexes. Exploration of two of these tunnels revealed a sizeable weapons cache. One tunnel yielded one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, one (1) flare pistol, one (1) 60mm mortar bipod and base plate, eight (8) Chicom rifles, one (1) M-1 rifle and several rounds of assorted ammunition. This tunnel was located at XT 724267. Another tunnel/cache at XT 727269 contained two (2) US Carbines, three (3) M-1 rifles, four (4) Thompson machineguns, one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, 41 bolt action weapons and one (1) M-3 sub-machinegun.

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

The 11th ACR (-) continued operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE and secured the engineer work parties to the north. At 1330 hours they were released of the security responsibility by 1/4th Cavalry. The 1/4th Cavalry became OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) at this time.

e. D + 11 (19 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade's Task Force DEANE continued operations throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion's Company A continued to secure Position RED while the rest of the Battalion conducted screening operations in the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1/503d Infantry met with little contact, however, 21 plastic type anti-personnel mines were destroyed at XT 688243. At 1005 hours, a Chieu Hoi returnee pointed out a 100 meter trench to elements of the 1/503d Infantry at XT 694249. The trench and connecting tunnel with room were destroyed by Bravo Company. Throughout the morning, B/1/503d Infantry located several caches of rice totalling approximately 10 to 12 tons. At 1300 hours, four (4) VC (3 of whom were carrying Chieu Hoi passes) were captured by the Commo Platoon south of the Brigade CP. That afternoon, the Battalion CP was displaced by foot to XT 703244 and closed at 1605 hours.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry searched the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE progressing eastward. At 1530 hours, 4 VC were detained by elements of the 2d Battalion, one of whom died of a heart attack. The capture of these VC occurred at XT 733252. The Recon Platoon set ambushes that night at two sites, XT 743258 and XT 744256. On two separate occasions, each ambush killed one VC, however, no weapons were captured.

The 4th Battalion with Company D/16th Armor (OPCON) conducted a sweep in the eastern portion of the Triangle. At 0950 hours, B/4/503d Infantry engaged 3 Viet Cong in a tunnel at XT 724261. One of the enemy was killed, however, the other two managed to escape. The Battalion located and extracted one (1) Thompson sub-machinegun, one (1) US carbine and one (1) Mauser rifle from a tunnel at XT 726-203.

I/3/11th ACR, while conducting search and destroy operations in the southern sector of the IRON TRIANGLE, killed two (2) VC in a tunnel which was constructed of reinforced concrete at XT 725225.

The 1/4th Cavalry continued to secure the northern portion of the Brigade's Area of Operation. At 0725 hours, a damaged APC, being towed, struck a pressure type mine at XT 696343 and burned, resulting in the total loss of the vehicle and 3 US WIA. At 0855 hours, an Aero Scout team found 1 VC (BC) at XT 671356. In the process of confirming the KIA, the team made contact with 3 VC. The action resulted in one of the hostiles being killed (BC). At 1345 hours, B/1/4th Cavalry contacted a Viet Cong Squad at XT 643328. The enemy returned semi-automatic and automatic fire on the friendly troops. Two VC were killed and two were wounded as a result of this action. The VC were light green shirts and black trousers. One Chicom carbine was captured.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry conducted Aero Rifle Platoon Operations in the southwestern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 2130 hours, they killed 3 VC at XT 679239 in addition to capturing 1 US carbine and 1 Russian carbine.

37

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

p. D + 12 (20 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: H 2/11th ACR became OPCON 4/503d Inf

Operation Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation CEDAR FALLS within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, having completed sweeping the west flank, moved to the southern portion of the AO. Alpha Company was relieved of the Brigade base security/reaction force mission and joined the Battalion at their CP location at 1025 hours. The heavy mortar platoon however, remained at Position RED. At 0930 hours, A/1/503d Infantry located and destroyed a 200-pound bomb at XT 711244. Charlie Company, at XT 703244, located 19 - 20 tons of rice. The majority of this rice was destroyed in place, however, 15,800 pounds were evacuated. Throughout the day, the paratroopers of the 1st Battalion made numerous discoveries of rice, bunkers, bicycles, tunnels and medical supplies. At 2040 hours, Company A killed one (1) VC at XT 709228.

At 0815 hours, Companies A and B/2/503d Infantry conducted a helicborne assault employing eight (8) helicopters to an LZ vicinity XT 699270. Company C remained at the Battalion CP (XT 7352.8). After completing the lift, Companies A and B/2/503d Infantry conducted local saturation in the vicinity of the LZ. Company A encountered three (3) VC at 1350 hours, killing one (XT 698272). Shortly after 1800 hours, the two companies were helilifted to the Battalion CP, closing at 1845 hours.

The 4th Battalion (-) with D/16th Armor and H/2/11th ACR OPCON moved northwest to seize Objective MIKE (XT 700273). The attack was preceded by TAC Air and Artillery preparations. The Battalion and attached units made no significant contact during the day.

The 1/4th Cavalry (1st Infantry Division) (-) attacked south from their AO to Objective TOM (XT 695277). The position was reported secure at 0909 hours. Due to the absence of significant contact, the 1st Squadron returned to its AO in the northern sector of the IRON TRIANGLE and continued to conduct search and destroy operations in addition to providing security for Engineer work parties in the area. At 0805 hours, B/1/4th Cavalry encountered 19 Chieu Hoi Ralliers at XT 679285 (Location 2). The ex-VC were promoted to rally by recent air strikes and artillery fire, coupled with hunger and generally poor living conditions. At 0953 hours, A/1/4th Cavalry killed one (1) VC at 683313 (Location 3).

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. K/3/11th ACR assumed responsibility for the security of the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base at Position RED.

Troop E/17th Cavalry continued their primary mission of securing Position WHITE in addition to conducting Aero Rifle Platoon operations. At 0039 hours, elements of the Cavalry Troop killed 2 VC in a sampan at XT 689223 (Location 4). Eleven minutes later, they contacted and killed a second VC in the same vicinity. The troopers accounted for two (2) more enemy KIA before daybreak.

q. D + 13 (21 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Changes

AVFB-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Operational Summary: TF DRANG continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting intensive search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued to conduct operations in the southwest portion of the AO between the SAIGON RIVER and HIGHWAY 1, employing road patrols and platoon sized Eagle Flights. The Battalion also initiated helibrne assaults on small LZ's used as short range patrol bases. At 2118 hours, A/1/503d Infantry engaged 15 Viet Cong at XT 586242 (Location 1). The VC returned the fire before fleeing southwest. The action resulted in one (1) US KIA with unknown enemy casualties.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry continued its operations in the east/central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, west of the THI TINH RIVER. At 2010 hours, A/2/503d Infantry spotted 3 VC at XT 742253 (Location 2). The enemy fired 10 - 12 rounds of semi-automatic fire. The VC subsequently fled and the pursuit was taken up by elements of Alpha Company. One (1) US paratrooper was killed in the process. The Dustoff ship that was summoned to the scene also received fire during its departure.

The A/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor and H/2/11th ACR OPCON continued search and destroy operations through the heart of the IRON TRIANGLE, linking up with 2/503d Infantry 6 kilometers south of BEN CAT. At 1130 hours, C/A/503d Infantry contacted 3 - 5 VC at XT 732207 (Location 3). Two of the hostiles dropped when fired upon. One body was observed being dragged away. The other VC was confirmed KIA (BC). At 1500 hours, B/A/503d Infantry contacted two enemy personnel at XT 683257 (Location 4). The VC managed to escape after wounding one (1) US trooper.

The 11th ACR (-) conducted operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE at the confluence of the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVERS. At 1215 hours, L/3/11th ACR detained 3 Viet Cong who stated that they were influenced into surrender. They added that the Psy War speaker mission flown on the 20th of January near XT 723238 (Location 5) convinced them to rally. F Troop, 2/11th ACR killed two (2) VC on two separate occasions on this day at 1300 hours and at 1600 hours. All four hostiles killed were clad in black pajamas.

The 1/4th Cavalry patrolled the rubber plantation and jungle area west of BEN CAT, thereby blocking the northern escape path of those enemy elements trapped within the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, the 1/4th Cavalry provided security for the Engineer work parties operating in the northern sector of the AO. Between 1150 and 1200 hours, C/1/4th Cavalry captured 19 detainees in the vicinity of XT 731312 and XT 735315.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry conducted platoon sized Aero Rifle Operations along the west bank of the SONG THI TINH being free of intra-Task Force boundaries.

Of special interest were the Psychological Operations conducted in the Area of Operations. As a result of the leaflet drop on 21 January, six (6) Viet Cong rallied. The circumstances behind this are as follows: on the 19th of January, two VC rallied to the GVN cause. On the following day, they were photographed together and gave the names of six of their friends among the VC ranks. The two men, who happened to be brothers, composed a message aimed directly to their six friends. On the same day, the leaflets were dropped. Shortly thereafter, the six Viet Cong rallied, following the good advice of their comrades. In addition, a woman refugee was permitted at her own request to broadcast a message to her husband and brother. Three hours after her plea, both men turned themselves in under the Chieu Hoi Program. See TAB G for leaflet mentioned above and photographs of Psy Ops.

39

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations [illegible] (Operation CEDAR FALLS)

e. [illegible] (25 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: [illegible] OPCON to 25th A/R Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (-) TF DRAKE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry began moving north along the west flank of the Triangle. Search and destroy operations were conducted with the three rifle companies deployed abreast of one another. Company A was on the west flank, Company C on the east flank and Company B was located in the center. At 0915 hours, at XT 7 [illegible], Charlie Company located and destroyed a small tunnel containing explosives and detonating devices. Later that day, Alpha Company located and destroyed a [illegible] bomb at AT 6872[illegible]. During the day, the Battalion discovered a total of [illegible], a large quantity of galvanized metal and miscellaneous weapons and ammo. Four (4) Viet Cong [illegible] were also discovered by [illegible] during the day's [illegible]. Contact results for the day's operations were negative.

Commencing at 0700 hours, the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry became under the Operational Control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-). There were no contacts made with [illegible] Infantry however, several [illegible] sized bunker complexes were located during the day's [illegible]. Most of these emplacements showed indication of recent use. The Cavalry Troops served primarily as blocking forces for the Infantry maneuvers.

The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry [illegible] primarily with the destruction of tunnels within their area of operations. At [illegible] hours, Companies C and B began blowing tunnels. At 1045 hours, Company A reported that two men had entered a tunnel after it was considered to contain no [illegible] of danger. The men then became overcome by [illegible] and one of the two [illegible] was unable to escape. At 1630 hours, PFC Hunsucker, [illegible] was recovered from the underground tomb. He died enroute to the hospital. It should be mentioned here that the infantrymen who enter these tunnels are strictly volunteers.

The 11th Cavalry continued to secure engineer work parties [illegible] operating west of HAU CAT and [illegible] HIGHWAY 14. In addition, they continued to block the VC escape route at the northern [illegible] of the IRON TRIANGLE. At [illegible] hours, B/1/4th Cavalry [illegible] at AT 6[illegible] location [illegible]. Nine (9) of the hostiles were captured, [illegible] of whom were evacuated to the 173d Military Intelligence Detachment, the other three receiving medical attention.

g. [illegible] (27 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: [illegible] OPCON until [illegible] to 25th Div
[illegible] 4th Battalion 9th [illegible] OPCON 1/5 Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continues Operation CEDAR FALLS within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion conducts search and destroy operations in the west flank of the Triangle astride INTERPROVINCIAL HIGHWAY 14. At 1200 hours, Charlie Company located and destroyed a 200 meter tunnel at XT 685275. The Battalion CP began displacement at 1130 hours, closing at XT 677278 at 1515 hours without incident.

31

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIB-GC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry released H/2/11th ACR from Operational control at 0700 hours. The Battalion then swept north to the east of the Triangle. At 0940 hours, Company A located in a tunnel (vicinity XT 729270) one (1) sniper rifle, three (3) pistols, one (1) Chicom carbine, ten (10) French bolt action rifles, six (6) cans of tar and fourteen (14) rolls of roofing tin. The Battalion made no significant contact during the day and were primarily concerned with the evacuation and destruction of rice caches.

The 11th ACR (-) with 2/503d Infantry OPCON continued mechanized and foot operations in the southern tip of the IRON TRIANGLE. They explored tunnels, conducted patrolling along lines of communication and secured the Engineer work parties who were clearing the area.

The 1/4th Cavalry with elements of E/17th Cavalry patrolled the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE meeting with no significant contact with the enemy. Those units were situated west of BEN CAT blocking escape routes and securing Engineer work parties in the area.

t. D + 16 (24 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: B/1/503d Inf became OPCON to 1/4th Cav

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne's Task Force DEANE continued to conduct Search and Destroy Operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and began to redeploy its forces to Base Camp in preparation for the termination of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued operations on the west flank of the IRON TRIANGLE proceeding northward. At 1057 hours at XT 670274, the Recon Platoon of 1/503d Infantry located and destroyed 3 tons of paddy rice. Shortly thereafter, they discovered a dead VC at XT 667302. The unit continued its movement and at XT 671271 they located and destroyed 25 additional tons of paddy rice and four (4) huts. Bravo Company was released from the Operational Control of the 1/4th Cavalry and returned to the Battalion CP at 1730 hours.

The 4th Battalion with D/10th Armor (OPCON) continued to conduct search and destroy operations to the north from XT 714289 to XT 720320. The Battalion CP and D/4/503d Infantry moved by track vehicle with D/16th Armor beginning at 0805 hours. At 1243 hours, Company D/16th Armor and two (2) platoons of D/4/503d Infantry were released from Brigade OPCON.

The 11th ACR (-) and 2/503d Infantry departed the Area of Operation at 0930 hours, clearing the IRON TRIANGLE at 1229 hours. The elements then proceeded to their respective base camps at XUAN LOC and BIEN HOA.

The 1/4th Cavalry continued its screening mission along the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE with B/1/503d Infantry OPCON. At 1300 hours, B/1/503d Infantry and 1/4th Cavalry contacted an estimated Viet Cong Squad at XT 669-32? (Location 1). The skirmish resulted in 6 VC KIA (BC) and 3 enemy WIA who were captured. Two (2) .38 caliber pistols were confiscated. At 1410 hours, as a direct result of this action, three (3) additional Viet Cong were captured at XT 669 ?.

u. D + 17 (25 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: Serials employed during redeployment of Brigade follows:

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

SERIAL #1	SERIAL #2	SERIAL #3
LTC HEALY - Cmdr	MAJ WINDSOR - Cmdr	LTC NORDIN - Cmdr
1/503d Inf	D/16th Armor	E/17th Cav
4/503d Inf	HHC (-)	B & C Btry
HQ & A Btry/3/319th Arty	1 Plt Engr	3/319th Arty
	BSOC	

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) terminated Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS at 0700 hours when it was released from the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Brigade returned to Base Camp in three Serials, clearing the CEDAR FALLS AO at 0945 hours. The final elements of the Brigade closed at BIEN HOA at 1327 hours. The movement was executed without incident.

15. Revolutionary Development

a. Civic Action Activities:

(1) Construction of Refugee Center (100 meters x 150 meters at location XT 733323, BEN CAT).

(a) A double concertina wire protective barrier was erected around the perimeter.

(b) Erected four (4) ea tents, GP large.

(c) Constructed two (2) ea latrines, slit trench, 8 hole

(2) Constructed a Boy Scout Den/Schoolroom, 16' x 24' using logs, 1" planking and corrugated metal roof.

(3) Constructed 1 ea Soccer Field, 100 meters x 40 meters.

(4) Constructed 3 ea Volley Ball courts.

(5) Installed 36' of 24" corrugated metal culvert under access road leading to church vicinity XT 740329, BEN CAT.

(6) Distributed to BEN CAT District Advisor the following:

(a) 450' of chicken wire.

(b) 45' - 50' miscellaneous corrugated metal culvert.

(7) The above items were accomplished by the 173d Engineer Company.

b. Brigade S5 Activities:

(1) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the S5 Section centered its activities in the BEN CAT DISTRICT, BINH DUONG PROVINCE. The following are totals of various S5 Activities:

(a) MEDCAP and DENTCAP

43

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

DATE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	MEDCAP	DENTCAP
6 Jan 67	XOM RACH MAI	XT 777185	67	18
9 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	22	6
10 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	157	65
11 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	154	34
12 Jan 67	MUONG CIAO	XT 730340	84	20
12 Jan 67	CHU MUI	XT 745335	15	5
13 Jan 67	MUONG CIAO	XT 730340	55	15
13 Jan 67	XOM XOAI	XT 755320	50	25
16 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 741330	143	38
17 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 741330	198	44
18 Jan 67	MY THANH	XT 765304	117	31
18 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 745328	56	33
19 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 740329	52	18
19 Jan 67	MUONG DAY	XT 750325	67	12
20 Jan 67	LO THANH	XT 734334	82	21
20 Jan 67	CHU MUI	XT 745336	28	18
21 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 733329	62	16
23 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	87	12
		TOTAL	1,496	430

(b) Psychological Operations:

1. Speaker and Leaflet Missions:

DATE	MISSION	THEME	TIME/AMOUNT
9 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
10 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	8 Hrs
11 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
12 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	7 Hrs
13 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
14 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	7 Hrs
16 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	1½ Hrs
16 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendars 1967"	210
17 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	95,000
17 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	½ Hr
17 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendar 1967"	210
18 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	1 Hr
18 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendar 1967"	210
19 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP"	1½ Hrs
20 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	150,000
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Chieu Hoi Special"	1½ Hrs
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Why You Should Rally"	2 Hrs
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Chieu Hoi/Rally Now"	5½ Hrs
21 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	79,000
21 Jan 67	Speaker	"Rally Instructions"	1 Hr
22 Jan 67	Leaflet	"173d Good Guy"	120,000
22 Jan 67	Speaker	"173d Power"	1 Hr

TOTAL Leaflets Dropped - 424,000
TOTAL Air Speaker Hours - 4.25 Hrs
TOTAL Air Missions Flown - 5
TOTAL Ground Speaker Hours - 51.75 Hrs
TOTAL Handouts (Calendars) - 630

AVIF-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

2. Most noticeable Psychological Operations occurred on 19 January, when two Vietnamese brothers were united in the Chieu Hoi Compound. In an effort to get other VC to rally, they wrote a message on a leaflet that also had their picture on it and the names of six of the members of their militia squad. This leaflet was printed that night and dropped the next morning. That day, the 6 members listed on the leaflet turned themselves in as ralliers. See TAB H for leaflet.

1. In addition, 18 VC arrived at the Chieu Hoi Center with serial numbered Safe Conduct Passes that were dropped by the 173d Airborne Brigade's Psy Ops Team during this operation.

4. The following distributions were made during Operation CEDAR FALLS:

Rice (100 lb Bags)	2,081 bags
Bubble Bath	120 boxes
Cooking Oil	18 cans
Koem Drink	108 bottles
Milk, Dry	36 boxes
Bulgar Wheat (100 lb Bags)	6 bags
C-Rations (Surplus)	2 large boxes
Ammo Boxes (Empty)	235 boxes

5. Imprest Fund purchases in the amount of 6,030 $VN were made to support Civic Action projects during Operation CEDAR FALLS.

6. A refugee collection point was operated by the Brigade S5 Section at BEN CAT, BINH DUONG PROVINCE. Refugees from the IRON TRIANGLE were processed through this point to enable them to consolidate their personal belongings, livestock and travel to the main refugee collection point at PHU CONG in family groups. 2,740 refugees were processed by the Brigade S5.

7. During the final days of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the refugee collection point at BEN CAT was converted into an athletic field containing a soccer field, a volleyball court and a Boy Scout Hut. This was named "Sky Soldier Field" and the facility built there was dedicated for the use of the children of the BEN CAT District.

8. On Saturday, 21 January, a Rice Passing Festival was held at the BEN CAT District Headquarters. During this event, captured VC rice was distributed to 1,128 families in the BEN CAT area.

9. Ammunition boxes from the 3/319th Artillery Battalion were taken daily to the 3 permanent refugee housing areas that encompass the village of BEN CAT. These boxes were used by the Vietnamese families for floors in their homes and for firewood.

e. Summary: Civil Affairs activities in Operation CEDAR FALLS were the most productive of any operation conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) to date.

45

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

16. Logistics/Administrative Activities:

a. General: To support Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS a Brigade Supply Office forward element was established at PHU LOI for Operation NIAGARA FALLS, and at Position NUD (HEN CAT) for CEDAR FALLS along with a Brigade Supply Operations Center (BSOC).

b. Supply and Transportation: Resupply of the Brigade was accomplished daily by road convoy from BIEN HOA. This was supplemented by drawing from the 1st Logistical Command stocks of Class V and Class III from LIA KHE. Thirty (30) 2½-ton trucks of the 48th Transportation Group moved elements of the Brigade to positions at PHU LOI from the AO of Operation CANARY/DUCK. Sixty (60) more 2½-ton trucks were employed to move the remainder of the maneuver elements to PHU LOI for airlift into an assembly area. A total of 90 2½-ton trucks from the 48th Group were used to extract the maneuver elements from the operational area at the termination of the operation. A total of 1,322.2 short tons of supplies were handled during the operation. Of this amount, 74 short tons were used for Operation NIAGARA FALLS and 1,248.2 short tons for Operation CEDAR FALLS. A breakdown by Class of Supply for each operation follows:

NIAGARA FALLS

Class I	19.3 ST
Class II & IV	.5 ST
Class III	.2 ST
Class V	54.0 ST
TOTAL	74.0 ST

CEDAR FALLS
Bien Hoa

Class I	260.07 ST
Class II & IV	52.75 ST
Class III	574.69 ST
Class V	164.79 ST
TOTAL	1,052.30 ST

CEDAR FALLS
Lai Khe

Class III	8.1 ST
Class V	187.9 ST
TOTAL	195.9 ST

A total of 739 UH-1D and 5 CH-47 resupply sorties were flown from the BSOC to forward elements of the Brigade.

AVFE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

c. Maintenance: A maintenance contact team consisting of two officers and twenty enlisted men from Company "D" (Maintenance), 173d Support Battalion was located forward at Position RED and provided direct support maintenance to Brigade elements. Back up support and resupply of repair parts was accomplished daily by road convoy. A breakdown of support provided follows:

SECTION	JOBS RECEIVED	JOBS COMPLETED	JOBS UNCOMPLETED
Mechanical Maintenance	37	37	0
Armament	141	140	1
Signal	92	92	0
Engineer	9	9	0
Service & Evacuation	17	17	0

A noticeable improvement in organizational maintenance was observed.

d. Medical: Company "B" (Medical), 173d Support Battalion, provided medical support employing four officers and thirty-five enlisted men, offering full surgical, medical and dental support. The clearing station served as the primary evacuation facility for casualties. Dustoff coverage was provided through the 1st Division Clearing Station. Daily routine evacuation was accomplished via 3/4-ton ambulance by road convoy and LCC helicopters returning to BIEN HOA for the night. A total of 382 patients were treated. Casualty and patient breakdown follows (KIA, WIA and Non-Battle Injuries will be covered in Operation Results).

PUO	31
Dermatological	44
ENT	14
Eye	4
Cardio Respiratory	4
Gastro Intestinal	23
Genitourinary	77
Neuro Psychiatric	0
Other Medical	9
Dental	48
Viet Cong Medical	8

e. Communications:

(1) The Brigade CP moved directly from Operation CANARY/DUCK astride ROUTE 15 to PHU LOI on 4 January 1967. The Brigade then passed from OPCON II FFORCEV (Hurricane) to the 1st Infantry Division (Danger). UHF communications were established from the Brigade CP at PHU LOI to DANGER FORWARD at LAI KHE. The Brigade at this time entered the 1st Division voice secure FM Radio Net. This Net was used to pass classified traffic throughout Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. Heaviest usage was mostly in the early evening when plans for the next day's operations were being coordinated. This was the first time the Brigade made use of the FM Voice Secure Radio Equipment and the employment of this equipment continued on a day to day basis. On 8 January 1967, the CP moved from PHU LOI to a location due east of BEN CAT for the commencement of Operation CEDAR FALLS. VHF was quickly established to the 1st Infantry Division Forward at LAI KHE. Although operational communications as planned were adequate between the 1st Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), some problems developed in circuit routing for telephone communication between BRIGADE FORWARD and BRIGADE REAR. Circuits from PARACHUTE to BIEN HOA ARMY switchboard were routed from BEN CAT to LAI KHE to HURRICANE. The

leg from LIA KHE to PHU LOI was over an Army (USARV) system and problems developed in coordination and reation times. Several days later, the circuits were placed on a 1st Division system from LAI KHE to PHU LOI and this improved circuit stability and quality considerably.

(2) Communications within the Brigade were primarily by FM voice radio. Those units within or on the perimeter were fed into PARACHUTE switchboard by wire. Arrangements had been made to provide 4-channel VHF system to the 11th ACR which had been placed OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) on Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 11th ACR (-) placed its main tactical CP at BEN CAT with the Brigade CP. The plan was to displace from there if necessary. With this in mind, the 4-channel VHF system (AN/MRC-112) was established with the BEN CAT perimeter. It should be noted that it took 2½ days to get this 100 yard shot working due to problems in frequency interference. During this, wire line was employed between the two CP's. Once established, the AN MRC-112 system proved to be quite stable and was utilized between the 173d Brigade CP and the 11th ACR (-) for the duration of the operation.

(3) It was during this operation that the concept of commanding from the air was fully employed. Upon direction of the CG, action was initiated to provide five command and control (C & C) helicopters at any one time. Upon examination of the Brigade resources, it was determined that five FM Radios, one UHF radio, one AN/ASC-6 modified to provide 2 FM radios each. All the above consoles are designed to provide inter-communications between the commander and the pilot. In line with this program, arrangements were made to install an external FM radio antenna on each of the six (6) OH-13 helicopters in Casper Platoon. This would facilitate the enabling of passengers to board the aircraft with their own AM/PRC-25 and connect it to the installed antenna, by using a vehicle-type headset and H-138 handset. This system proved quite workable.

f. Public Information Office:

(1) On 8 January 1967, the PIO commenced operation of a Field Press Center at the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at Position RED, vicinity of BEN CAT. The center assisted 9 newsmen on the first day of Operation CEDAR FALLS. These men were:

Mr. John Linsel, Associated Press

Mr. Bruce Morton, and two man crew, CBS

Mr. George Page, NBC

Mr. Jim Eury, NBC

Mr. Hans Peshke, NBC

Mr. Jim Compare, United Press International

Mr. Ron Gallager, a free lance writer/photographer

(2) The reporters covered various aspects of the Operation such as the operations of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), refugee evacuation, and tunnel exploration. General Deane was interviewed by Newsmen Page, Eury and Peshke. Other news correspondents who covered the Brigade's operation were:

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Miss Henny Schante, representing Dutch media

Mr. Gerald Forken, Stars and Stripes

Mr. Phil Stit, Stars and Stripes

Mr. Carl Purnell, representing Pennsylvania Papers

Mr. John Sach, Esquire Magazine

Mr. Everett Manning, Newsweek Magazine

Mr. Leon Daniels, and his crew, United Press International

SFC William Labus, Armed Forces Radio and Television

17. Special Equipment/Techniques:

The unique and revolutionary characteristics of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS as a multi-force operation led to the use of many pieces of special equipment in addition to the new techiques employed by infantry and Support elements within the Brigade. The following techniques/equipment are considered to be the most significant.

a. Aero Cavalry Operations (Sky Cavalry Concept): In later September 1966, the E Troop, 17th Cavalry Commander and the Aviation Officer of the Brigade flew to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for a first hand evaluation of the limits and capabilities of employing airmobile tactics. They returned highly enthusiastic that such a mission could greatly improve the combat flexibility of the Brigade.

The aero rifle platoon concept was adopted in October 1966 with the approval and support of the Commanding General. Extensive classes and training were given to each platoon of the Troop E/17th Cavalry. Senior NCO's from each of the Cav's platoon were sent to AN KHE for first hand experience on the employment of Aero Scout techniques.

In order to initiate this concept, several principal guidelines were established. The personnel comprising the Aero Rifle squad and observers for the Aero Scouts, along with the platoon headquarters element come from the resources of the Cavalry Troop. Personnel were available within the Recon Platoon of E/17th Cavalry to form 3 - 12 man squads in addition to the platoon Headquarters element, usually consisting of three men.

In addition, the Aero Scout section was reorganized utilizing enlisted scout observers from the Troop who had already undergone extensive training in these techniques. The concept was first employed on Operation ATTLEBORO, as a reaction force for a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol team. The mission was successful, however, not until Operation CANARY/DUCK was the Aero Cavalry concept proven. During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, this concept was used extensively by almost all Infantry elements within the Cavalry Troop.

The techniques employed are as follows. The Aero Scout Section (employing CH-13's) fly over a predesignated area in pairs (lead and chase ships) looking for trails, canals, or recently used campsites and enemy activity. After the scouts have made a significant discovery, a call is sent back to the stand by Aero Rifle

49

platoon and they are issued forth to a suitable landing position near the location by armed helicopter. The area is suppressed before the landing is initiated so that friendly troops do not run head on into hostile elements. For further analysis of this technique, see Small Unit Actions (E/17th Cav - Operation CEDAR FALLS).

b. Tunnel Rat Teams: The Tunnel Rat Team consists of six to ten men including one OIC or NCOIC. The individual in charge has the responsibility of drawing the sketch of the underground complex from the information relayed from the team within. The lead elements of the Tunnel Rat Team is armed with a .22 caliber pistol equipped with a silencer, a TA-1 telephone or skull mike, a flashlight, compass and probe. An azimuth is taken, paces are counted off and the information is relayed to administrative elements above.

The major problem encountered during tunnel exploration is one of communications. The skull mike apparatus (consisting of a transmitter strapped to the back of the skull) often becomes inoperative after a short period of time necessitating repair. In addition, WD-1 wire had to be employed in lieu of light weight Canadian Assault Wire, which had become scarce. The heavier wire added a considerable amount of weight and bulk to the Tunnel Rat Team.

c. Mine Detecting Operations: The mine detector (Aural Indicating) was the primary piece of equipment employed in this type of operation. This detector will pick up any metallic object within its area of sensitivity. It can detect objects as small as one strand of comm wire up to four feet below the surface of the ground. However, this capability also proves to be a deterrant to mine detecting operations since the machine will pick up tin foil, empty shell cases, nails or any other thing containing metal as well as mines.

d. River Patrols: River Patrols employed during Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS consisted of 15 men, two of them being Engineers, with the remainder being Infantrymen. The craft utilized were 15-man pneumatic assault boats. One of the Engineers on board was a motor operator while the second was in charge of holding the boat to the shore during loading and unloading and also casting the boat off shore. The actual patrol was assigned the task of checking all Vietnamese river traffic. The boats were additionally employed in the ferrying of supplies to outposts along the river.

e. Floating Mine Barrier Techniques: Floating mine barriers proved to be the answer to the problem of tidal effect on inland waterways. Cables are stretched across the river and are allowed to sag below the water level. The bridging timbers are then attached to these cables so that they float. When the river is under tidal influence, the floating barrier rises and falls with the tide. Barriers often had to be constructed on both sides of the bridge since the tide often causes the waterway to flow in both directions.

f. Efficiency of AN/PRC-25: The AN/PRC radio with long antenna was employed on a command and liaison helicopter as a radio relay for the Battalion operations. It proved to be an extremely effective link between the CP and the front line companies.

g. Infra-Red: APC's with their organic Infra-red periscopes provided augmentation to the use of Starlight Scopes on night perimeter defense.

h. Bulldozers: Bulldozers furnished by the 1st Infantry Division Engineers were of great assistance in providing new avenues of approach to areas where the Viet Cong had heavily mined existing approaches. They were also of invaluable assistance in preparing defensive positions when they cleared LZ and fields of fire for Infantry elements.

AVDS-GC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

i. Employment of the Armor Vehicle Launched Bridge: An Armor Vehicle Launched Bridge was employed to span a section of bridge that had collapsed at BEN CAT, making it possible to recommence road movement, and hence, normal operations, with minimum delay.

j. Weapons Used at River Blocking Positions: Twin 40mm anti-aircraft weapons were used in blocking positions along the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVERS during the operation. Quad .50 caliber machineguns were also used in similar positions and were mounted on Engineer Boats to block the river exits utilized by the enemy.

k. The following is a chronological sequence of the employment of Special Tunnel Clearing Equipment (8,500 c.f.m. BUFFALO TURBINE) on Operation CEDAR FALLS.

(1) 14 January 1967: Elements of Company M, 3/11th ACR had earlier located a tunnel entrance within their operational area, the first tunnel discovered by a Brigade element. The Turbine was helilifted by UH-1D helicopter from the Brigade CP at Position RED with the operator crew of the 51st Chemical Detachment (Airborne) to vicinity XT 746230. The machine was mounted inside an APC of Mike Company and was utilized to ventilate the tunnel shaft for the 173d Engineer Company's "Tunnel Rat" search party. Several tunnel entrances were discovered by the party and the APC was displaced several times following their progress from entrance to entrance. The turbine and crew remained overnight with Company M.

(2) 15 January 1967: The turbine was displaced from the base area of M/3/11th ACR by helicopter to support an Engineer Platoon of the 173d Engineer Company searching a tunnel in the 1/503d Infantry area of operation. The UH-1 sling loaded turbine was set down into the bed of an Engineer Dump Truck and was moved by truck to tunnel entrance vicinity XT 683271. Tunnel smoke tracing operations were begun at 1100 hours and continued until 1430 hours. M5, 30-pound smoke pots were used as a smoke source and were introduced into the tunnel entrance with air from the turbine forcing the smoke down the shaft. A recon patrol of E/17th Cavalry was airborne in a helicopter for aerial observation of emitted smoke while engineer elements on the ground moved to and marked the smoke exits. A total of eight (8) additional surface openings were located during the operation both north and south of the original location. The Engineer platoon returned the following day and collapsed the tunnel openings. The evening of the 15th, the turbine and crew returned to the Brigade CP with the Engineer Platoon's dump truck.

(3) 16 January 1967: The turbine and crew returned to the 1/503d Infantry area (XT 683271) still mounted on the dump truck and was further transported by road to the Squadron CP of 2/11th ACR vicinity XT 726248. Movement was delayed due to mine clearing operations on ROUTE 14 between the 1/503d Infantry and the 2/11th ACR. The machine was scheduled for work at a tunnel opening vicinity XT 736250 but did not arrive in time to be placed in operation and remained overnight at the Squadron CP.

(4) 17 January 1967: During the previous afternoon (16 January) a tunnel search party of Company M, 11th ACR sustaining 1 KIA and 1 WIA from VC automatic weapons fire while proceeding down a tunnel shaft vicinity XT 740216. On the morning of 17 January, the turbine and crew was airlifted by vehicle from 2/11th ACR to the 3/11th ACR area and loaded into an APC attached to Company M of the 1st Squadron. The turbine was utilized for smoke tracing at the above opening. Eight additional tunnel openings were identified by smoke emissions from XT 740218 - XT 740221 - XT 738222 - XT 737221. An Engineer Platoon from the 173d Engineer Company collapsed all openings with demolition charges and detonated C5-1

into the shafts connecting the entrances. A Recon Patrol of E/17th Cavalry again spotted from the air, smoke emission, however, no VC were observed to exit during smoke operations. The crew and turbine remained with Company M overnight.

(5) 18 January 1967: The turbine was moved by vehicle from 3/11th ACR to 2/11th ACR and conducted smoke tracing operations from 1400 hours to 1445 hours. They continued to pump fresh air from 1530 to 1700 hours for an engineer tunnel search party from the 173d Engineer Company. At 1800 hours, the turbine and crew were displaced by UH-1 sling load to 4/503d Infantry's CP area and were mounted on an APC of D/16th Armor (OPCON 4/503d Inf) in preparation for support of Company A/4/503d Infantry. Elements of Company A while on security saw a movement and located a trap door covering a tunnel opening at the vicinity of XT 728265. Members of the 3d Platoon entered the tunnel and encountered VC a short distance from the tunnel opening. PFC Pendergist, SGT Spencer, SP4 Sprague and PFC Walden were repeatedly opposed by VC for the remainder of the afternoon and although they engaged the VC with M-79's, .38 and .45 caliber pistols, the VC continued to contest the tunnel. In the late afternoon, burning type CS grenades were thrown into the shaft of the tunnel to flush the VC. The 4/503d Infantry troopers continued to hear VC activity and could hear sounds believed to have been respiration of individuals wearing VC expedient "gas masks".

(6) 19 January 1967: On the morning of 19 January, the turbine was moved to the tunnel entrance by APC and conducted smoke flushing operations from 1050 hours to 1145 hours. At 1130 hours, 7 VC (3 males, 4 females) exited a tunnel opening at vicinity XT 721259 in Bravo Company, 2/503d Infantry's AO and were immediately apprehended. All 7 VC were suffering effects of smoke inhalation and experienced difficulty in breathing. Two of the females subsequently expired from unknown causes. The turbine continued operation from 1145 to 1245 hours flushing the smoke with fresh air. At 1300 hours, a tunnel search team of A/4/503d Infantry entered the opening. Smoke was not encountered, however, a concentration of CS gas (from the previous day's attempt to flush out VC) effused from the walls of the tunnel whenever the turbine was shut down. The concentration was sufficient to require search personnel to remain masked. From 1300 hours to 1530 hours, the search team negotiated the tunnel, identified 5 separate shafts, capturing 3 individual weapons, and exited the tunnel in the B/2/503d Infantry's area. They were informed by members of that unit of the capture of 7 VC. At no time was VC opposition encountered. In addition, several tunnel entrances were identified by spotting smoke 300 meters north of the original entrance.

(7) 20 January 1967: The turbine remained in the 4/503d Infantry area. An element of Company B escorted the equipment to the location of the previous day's operation and smoke operations were again resumed. HC smoke was continuously pumped into the tunnel from 1130 - 1430 hours, expending a total of 12 30-lb smoke pots with the turbine running at maximum capacity. Smoke was observed at locations much more distand and in greater volume than the previous day, largely as a result of greatly extended operating time. This is attributed to the fact that an extensive network will require a long period of sustained operation to displace a sufficient volume of air to fill the network and build pressure sufficient to force the smoke out exits in volume sufficient to be observed from the air. During the two days of operation, a total of 15 VC harboring inside the tunnel were captured while exiting or apprehended by search parties underground, all being taken by Company B/2/503d Infantry. Most VCC were attributed to smoke flushing operations in the 4/503d Infantry area and all at least partially so.

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(8) 20 January - 22 January 1967: The BUFFALO TURBINE and crew remained with 4/503d Infantry and was utilized to provide fresh air for search parties from Company B. On 22 January, the equipment was helilifted back to the Brigade CP at Position RED. See TAB F for drawings of VC tunnel complexes.

18. Results of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS:

a. Friendly Losses

Casualties sustained by the 173d Airborne Brigade and OPCON Units, 11th ACR (-), 1/4th Cav of the 1st Infantry Division:

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) Casualties:

	1st Bn	2d Bn	4th Bn	3/319th Arty	E/17th Cav	D/16th Armor	173d Engr	39th Inf SD	HHC (-)	335th AML	TOTAL
KIA	3	3	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
WIA*	27	23	48	1	8	7	1	1	2	0	118
MIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NBD[1]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NBI[2]	1	0	2	4	0	0	3	0	1	1	12

*Two (2) WIA accounted for above died later in the hospital as a result of wounds received in action. These men were, SP4 Collins of E/17th Cavalry and SP4 Lonnie Floyd of C/4/503d Infantry.

[1]NBD = Non-Battle Dead

[2]NBI = Non-Battle Injured

Of the 118 WIA received by the Brigade during the Operation, 21 were returned to duty, 103 had minor injuries and 6 had serious injuries.

Equipment Lost and/or Damaged - None

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) Casualties:

KIA 8

WIA 57

MIA 0

Non-Battle Dead 0

Non-Battle Injured 0

Equipment Damaged - 11th ACR (-)

APCs 8

Tanks 4

Wheeled Vehicles 4

Equipment Destroyed - 11th ACR (-)

APC's 2

Tank 1

1/4th Cavalry (-) Casualties:

KIA 2

WIA 35

MIA 0

Non-Battle Dead 0

Non-Battle Injured 0

Equipment Destroyed - 1/4th Cavalry (-)

Tank Recovery Vehicle 1

Tanks 1

APC's 3

M42 1

b. Enemy Losses: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS - TF DEANE

Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

KIA (BC) 185

KIA (poss) 10

Detainees 146

Ralliers 72

VCC 65

Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of 11th ACR (-)

KIA (BC) 26

KIA (poss) 13

Detainees 74

VCC 8

Ralliers 12

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of 1/4 Cavalry

KIA	37
VCC	65
Detainees	26
Ralliers	38

Weapons Captured by Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

60mm Mortars	2
3.5" Rocket Launcher	2
B-40 Rocket Launcher	1
M-60 Machineguns	2
Browning Automatic Rifles	8
French Machineguns	2
Thompson SMG	7
.45 Caliber SMG's	5
Russian AW	1
Russian Carbines	17
Russian Rifles	3
SKS Rifle	1
Chicom SMG	1
Chicom Bolt Action Rifles	65
Chicom Rifles	6
Chicom Carbines	14
Mossin Nagart Rifles	4
AK-47 Rifles	5
US M-1 Rifles	7
US M-1 Carbines	18
US M-2 Grease Gun	1
US M-3 SMG	1
US Springfield Rifles	1

55

1917 Eddystone Rifle	1
US .45 Caliber Pistols	6
German Mauser Rifles	2
French Mas Rifles	3
British Infield Rifles	1
Bolt Action Rifles	12
Carbines (unk type)	2
Rifles (unk type)	2
Shotguns	3
.38 Caliber Pistols	2
P38 Pistol	1
Browning Automatic Pistol	1
Homemade Pistols	3
Homemade cal .45 Pistol	1
Pistols (Unk Type)	4
Weapons Parts:	
Rifle Barrels	2
Rifle Stock	1
Mortar Aiming Stakes	4
Magazines	5
Grenade Launchers	24
M-60 Barrels	2
AA Gun Mount	1
60mm Bipod & Base Plate	1
Sub-Machinegun Magazines	2
.30 Caliber MG Barrel	1
Bayonet	1

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Ammunition:

175mm Rounds	2
155mm Rounds	2
105mm Rounds	38
81mm Rounds	8
60mm Rounds	50
40mm Rounds	1
Illuminating Mortar Rounds	1
3.5" Rocket Launcher Rounds	1
B-40 Rounds	1
RPG-2 Rounds	2
57mm Rounds	3
20mm Round	1
10mm Round	1
M-79 Rounds	9
7.92 Rounds	1300
7.62 Rounds	114
5.56mm Rounds	500
Crimped Cartridges	185
Assorted SA Rounds	5030
.50 cal Rounds	100
.45 cal Rounds	700
.30 cal Rounds	6070
Grenades	282
Chicom Grenades	264
Homemade Grenades	127
M-26 Grenades	6
Rifle Grenades	18

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

WP Grenades	2
Grenade Casings	300
Grenade Fuses	240
Mines:	
Pressure Type Mines	2
Plastic AP Mines	21
AP Mines	68
AT Mines	45
DM-10 Claymore Mines	1
Other Claymore Mines	10
VC Claymore Mines	4
Homemade Mines	1
Mines (Unk Type)	5
Demolitions:	
500 pound Bombs	3
250 pound Bombs	9
USAF Rockets	2
CBU Bombs	76
Plastic Bombs	1
Shaped Charge	1
Blasting Caps	42
C4	27.5 pounds
Detonating Cord	24 feet
TNT	7 pounds
Carbide	55 gallons
Chicom Explosives	300 pounds
Detonator	1
Transportation:	

AVIE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Boats	6
Canoe	1
Motor Bikes	2
Bicycles	48
Sampans	78
Installations:	
Foxholes	217
Tunnels	293
Bunkers	313
Huts	147
Base Camps	17
Bombshelters	13
Punji Pits	90
Food:	
Rice	1,307.5 tons
Salt	3.5 tons
Documents	20,000 estimated

Miscellaneous: 200 pieces of galvanized metal, 25 gauze bandages, 12 bottles of serum, 10 hypodermic needles, assorted medical supplies, medical kit, 1 lighter, 1 carbon lamp, 2 gold rings, 1 fuse, 3 typewriters, 10 pounds of typing paper, 1 French map, assorted clothing, 55 gallons of heavy oil, 85 gallons of gasoline, 6 gallons of tar, 2 trip flares, 32 washpans, 144 eight inch bolts, 2 cameras, 13 rucksacks, 12 pistol belts, 20 pair VN jung'le boots, 1 oil skin map, 2 mosquito nets, 1 diary, 1 drafting set, 1 sewing machine, 1 300-gallon fuel tank, 6 rolls of barbed wire, 1 lantern, 1 US bunkbed, 759 - 4.5 volt batteries, 1 flare pistol, 20 flashlights, 1 reloading press, 100 pneumatic pillows, 1 bottle of kerosine, 950 pounds of nitrogen fertilizer, 8,050 feet electrical wire, 7 outboard motors, 1 ammo pouch, 300 pounds of cement, 1 entrenching tool, 4 pack harnesses.

19. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. Commander's Analysis

Operation NIAGARA FALLS:

Although no major contact was made with enemy elements, it was believed that the Viet Cong are using trails throughout the AO and the waterways to infiltrate small numbers of personnel and to transport food. Friendly operations in the AO have also assisted in reducing the effectiveness of the Local VC infrastructure and disclosed areas of operations which can be denied the enemy by a

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

program of patrols and artillery harassing and interdiction. It is recommended that throughout the AO from time to time, forces be introduced to harass the VC and to preclude movement of troops and supplies through the area.

Operation CEDAR FALLS:

Judged by all standards, Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS was a major success. The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and OPCON units was search and destroy. This was exactly what was done with a degree of thoroughness heretofore not achieved. The keys to this accomplishment were the saturation of the IRON TRIANGLE which US and Vietnamese Forces executed effectively owing to large amount of time made available to these combat units. The presence of highly specialized support troops and equipment provided assistance essential to the combat battalions in accomplishing their mission. This technical assistance included the employment of bulldozers (many of them with Rome plows), CS turbines, demolition teams, tunnel exploration teams, mechanized flame throwers, tank-dozers and acetylene.

Coupled with the river patrols, the Aero Cavalry, the anti-aircraft artillery, the blocking forces, and the air and artillery strikes, the Infantry and Armor on the ground applied tremendous pressure on VC hiding in the IRON TRIANGLE Area. The 185 VC who fell during the days of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS give mute testimony to the effectiveness of this pressure. The shock of relentless attack and continuing military defeat resulted in the rapid deterioration of VC morale. Psychological Operations were employed to exploit every tactical and psychological advantage with a highly effective program of speaker missions, leaflet drops, and the delivery of personal messages urging surrender. Both hard core and Local Force VC were persuaded to come out of hiding and either surrender to US Forces or rally to the Government of Viet Nam. Seventy-two (72) POW's and sixty-five (65) Chieu Hoi Ralliers taken is as significant an achievement as the VC body count. A growing trend of dissatisfaction with VC practices and VC life in general was evident in the statements of the Ralliers. A wealth of pertinent intelligence information was derived from the interrogation of these VC and much of it was exploited by units on the ground.

The IRON TRIANGLE had provided the VC with more than a military base area where he could hide, train, store supplies and equipment and stage attacks on Allied Forces and installations. The area was also a VC political entity, independent of any government of Vietnam, where the enemy had complete control of the lives of the civilian populace. The VC grip on this area had to be broken before any further military operation in the area could be considered successful.

To this end, an ambitious program of evacuating all of the Vietnamese people, their livestock and possessions from the area was undertaken in conjunction with the Search and Destroy operations. In coordination with the 1st Infantry Division, 2,740 refugees were moved with all they owned by river assault group boats, helicopters and by road march to a Refugee Village at PHU CONG which the 173d Engineer Company in coordination with the Brigade S5 helped to construct. The refugees were screened by the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment to insure that no VC had infiltrated among the civilians.

The Viet Cong contributed to this program by providing 1,302 tons of captured rice. When the rice was uncovered by the combat units in the field, it was evacuated (polished rice only) for the use of the refugees. Unpolished (Paddy) rice, however, was destroyed in place to prevent its use by the VC. This was a time

consuming process but through the use of APC's and helicopters, the refugees were supplied with large quantities of the grain. It is ironic that the rice was probably grown by the refugees in the first place.

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) inflicted a serious defeat on the Viet Cong in the IRON TRIANGLE. Their hold on this political and economic base has been greatly weakened if not broken. They have lost any semblance of security that this former sanctuary may have once offered. Over 300 VC will never fight again. However, the VC are still in the area, and the defeat remains less than total.

The stage has been set for the future. VC "sanctuaries" will continue to be the target of ever increasing detailed seal, search and destroy operations in the CEDAR FALLS mold. Thus, the concept of operations as employed is perhaps the most significant feature in terms of the overall security of VIET NAM. The continued use of this type operation will reduce the power of the Viet Cong to the point where the government of this country can again assume the responsibility for its own security.

b. Lessons Learned:

Item: LZ Assaults

Discussion: During the massive helicborne troop movements of 9 January involving two (2) Battalions of the 503d Infantry (173d Abn Bde (Sep)), and major elements of the 1st Infantry Division, problems were caused by LZ's being in too close proximity. Pilots became disoriented in addition to the artillery preparation mission some LZ's and landing on other LZ's already occupied by US Forces. The assault echelons came in so fast that the first troop on the ground could not manuever before the next elements were on top of them.

Observation: During massive assaults, LZ's should be no closer than 500 meters apart. All preparation should finish prior to any landing on LZ's, to insure the safety of the Infantry elements and aircraft employed in the assault.

Item: Coordination of Units

Discussion: During all operations, coordination between units is mandatory. This should be accomplished at a predesignated, easily recognizeable point. Smoke grenades, flare and aerial directions can aid in the location of the coordination point. Fire must be controlled as well as the movement of troops near the AO boundaries separating units. Rapid link up of units after a helicopter assault is essential and should be made prior to moving out to a final position. When moving into a blocking position, gaps should be covered, especially near coordination points. This may preclude the use of unit perimeters and a "Combat Outpost Line" system can be employed with proper coordination for flank and rear security. The distance covered will be less than "Buck" frontages because of terrain limitations and the lack of barriers.

Item: Unit Boundary Coordination

Discussion: In order to completely cover the territory involved in this operation, all units were given smaller than usual AO's. Units were at first unable to manuever or patrol accustomed sized AO's and would run into adjacent unit's areas. There also arose the problem of "hot pursuit" when VC were discovered in the Brigade AO and attempted to escape into the 25th Division AO along the SAIGON RIVER.

AVDF-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Observation: To properly sweep an AO clean, it must be a small area. Units must intensively patrol their own area instead of sending patrols on long range but less intensive clearing missions. Units must also take the time to closely coordinate fire and maneuver plans to preclude accidental engagements with friendly troops.

Item: Battalion CP Locations

Discussion: The AO of each Battalion on this operation was small enough so that companies could be effectively controlled from a stationary CP. The Battalion CP could be co-located with another unit thereby freeing all its combat elements of security requirements thus increasing the actual strength of the unit.

Observation: Battalion Command Posts should be located where they will have organic security as long as control is maintained.

Item: Route Reconnaissance

Discussion: A route reconnaissance should be conducted by Military Police and Engineers at least 3 - 5 days in advance of the Brigade load march, and again 1 day prior, if possible. When routes were properly reconned, no last minute route changes developed, whereas, when a route reconnaissance wasn't made, time and again routes were found to be inadequate for certain vehicles and had to be changed at the last minute.

Observation: A route reconnaissance conducted in advance of deployment tends to cut down on delays which are often encountered along Highways. It also aids in insuring the safety of vehicles, equipment and personnel who are often subjected to sabotage while enroute.

Item: Attached Units

Discussion: When having units attached, it is necessary to have the particular unit attached at least 2 - 3 days in advance of the particular operation. This allows ample time for the unit being attached to familiarize themselves with another unit's method of operation, SOI's and particularities that they may not be familiar with in their own unit. This period of time, when properly used, is well worth it and both units function better together.

Observation: Ideally, attached units should be attached in sufficient time to enable them to go on route reconnaissance with the unit to which they will be attached. This gives them a better picture of what they have in store and ideas of their own may be incorporated so that both units will be able to cope with any problems that may arise.

Item: First Aid

Discussion: Existing Dustoff procedures provide timely medical evacuation allowing combat casualties to receive hospitalization with minimum delay. Once patients were evacuated, their treatment and care was excellent. In many instances, the initial treatment of casualties is performed by Infantrymen who, on more occasions than one, saved the lives of their wounded comrades. During Operation CEDAR FALLS, platoon medics again became swamped with casualties for a short period of time. Also, Medics were themselves wounded or killed. In addition, squad sized elements often operated alone without medics on their patrols.

AVEF-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Observation: Training in First Aid provided to all individuals proved valuable on at least one occasion when medical aid had to administered to combat casualties without help of a medical corpsman.

Item: VC Boobytraps

Discussion: VC Boobytraps in the AO were designed to impede friendly attacks into enemy bases. They were of the "no-delay" explosive type placed on the perifery of the bases so as to give early warning as well as inflict casualties. The VC did not appear as concerned over boobytrapping foot avenues of approach as they did in impeding vehicular traffic. These approaches were trapped with command detonated mines and boobytrapped artillery shells. The enemy also boobytrapped areas which they did not use with CBU's and grenades. Some of these areas were marked with a skull and crossbone warning sign.

Observation: Personnel are warned to be always on the alert for VC boobytraps and claymore mines when travelling on or off main routes. These ambuscades accounted for the major portion of friendly casualties. When moving into an area of suspected mining and boobytraps, maximum use should be made of TAC Air, Artillery and recon by fire. Also, when possible, the roads and trails should be avoided, and new trails cut. Culverts and tunnels beneath a roadway are prime locations for large AT mines, and in this respect, a bunker or foxhole next to a roadway should be investigated as an access to a mined tunnel beneath the road. On one occasion, a sheet of tin foil was found buried at a depth of several inches, probably to confuse the mine sweeping team. At a greater depth in the same location, an AT mine was found.

Item: Interrogation Methods

Discussion: NGUYEN VAN THIET was captured by the 2/503d Infantry on 19 January 1967 at XT 732259. Interrogation was initially aimed at gaining his confidence and realigning his allegiance to the GVN. He was persuaded that he must help to win his country away from communist domination. He was led to reveal information by initially questioning concerning the activities of other POW's and then information concerning Viet Cong Units. Once he started to talk, questions of tactical significance were answered along with information regarding his life and background until he had completely revealed his association and activity with the VC. His information concerning rice caches was proven to be 100% reliable. He stated that the VC were afraid to surrender because of reprisals by the VC and because they were told that the allies would not accept any surrender of VC. He also gave information concerning the CO of the PHU LOI Battalion and activities of the C-61 Company.

Observation: The questioning of VCC and Chieu Hoi Ralliers is perhaps the most effective means of acquiring information directly relating to enemy activity. The willingness of captives to reveal this information can be obtained only when they are confident of the good intentions of Allied Forces.

Item: VC Population Control

Discussion: Prior to Operation CEDAR FALLS the VC had complete control over the people of the IRON TRIANGLE Area. Friendly forces encountered people who were completely indifferent towards the Republic of VIET NAM and they supported the VC as directed.

65

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Observation: Once the VC were forced to flee the area, the population was left unguarded and was relocated by friendly agencies. However, the people are still under the influence of the VC infrastructure.

Item: VC Tunnel Clearing Operations - Destruction and Exploration

Discussion: The CEDAR FALLS experience illustrates that patience is a primary weapon against VC hiding in tunnels. It is necessary to remain in a heavily fortified VC Area for an extended period of time to force the enemy to come out of their tunnels as their food is depleted and morale deteriorates. To cover these areas, a series of mechanized patrols should be used to apprehend the enemy when it becomes necessary for him to go in search of food etc.

Observation: Operations in VC tunnel areas should be prolonged over a period of 2 to 4 weeks to increase the likelihood of surrender of a hungry demoralized enemy.

Discussion: There were several instances during Operation CEDAR FALLS when Engineer Company elements were sent to destroy tunnels that had been explored by the Infantry. The infantry in most cases kept no record or map of the tunnels they had explored. Before the Engineers could destroy the tunnel, the complex had to be re-explored. Much valuable time was lost due to this re-exploration.

Observation: When extensive tunnel systems are found, Engineer "Tunnel Rat" teams should be called to explore, map and destroy the system.

Discussion: One unit was in the process of destroying a tunnel they had explored when a serious incident occurred. Immediately after a charge was set off, a man was sent back into the tunnel to check out the damage. He was immediately overcome by toxic fumes from the explosive and a rescue team had to be sent after him. There was a demolition expert in the area that could have prevented this had he not been sent on another mission.

Observation: No one should be allowed to handle explosives except trained demolition men and they should determine when the tunnel is safe for exploration.

Discussion: On several occasions, tunnel exploration was carried on by units in the Brigade without the use of any type of communication. To state an example, two individuals were found coming out of a tunnel by an element of the Engineer Company. After questioning them, it was discovered that they did not know where they were or where their unit was located. There were other cases where two exploration teams were in a tunnel at the same time with neither team knowing of the others presence. Luckily, there was no one shot by mistake in the tunnels.

Observation: It is recommended that no one be allowed to enter a tunnel more than 50 meters without proper comm, tunnel exploration equipment and knowledge of tunnel exploration techniques.

Item: Disrupting Enemy Use of Base Areas

Discussion: Brigade Operations i the CAU DINH JUNGLE and the IRON TRIANGLE disclosed that friendly activities in enemy base areas can be efficient in disrupting the VC plan of action. This was accomplished by intermittent interdiction by artillery fire and air strikes. The use of LRRP's can measure the

effectiveness of these fires, direct fire and air strikes, and make US presence felt without necessitating the introduction of a large force.

Observation: LRRP's should be introduced periodically into recently "cleared" areas to survey the effectiveness of H & I fires and to report on VC activities resulting from previous US presence.

Item: Coordination of Ground Troops and Bulldozers

Discussion: On occasion, bulldozers, which can cut through jungle much faster than infantry elements, found themselves 300 meters to the front of the troops assigned to clear and secure their work area.

Observation: Either the bulldozers need to wait for their Infantry security, or the Infantry should be mounted on APC's to keep up with the Bulldozers.

Item: Night Vision Devices

Discussion: Starlight Scopes and Infra-Red equipment organic to the Armor Company's APC's proved to be extremely effective on perimeter defense during hours of darkness. Infra-red equipment, however, was limited by the need to "crank" APC's to charge the batteries essential to the night vision device.

Item: Additional Training for Scout Dogs

Discussion: Recent Operations have indicated certain weaknesses in the training of Scout Dogs which must be overcome to increase effectiveness.

Observation: The following are several weaknesses that should be overcome:

a. Dogs must be trained to work in spite of the noises of artillery and airstrikes.

b. Dogs have to be able to work behind a point man when terrain is such that the SD team cannot maneuver at the point.

c. Dogs must be trained to further reduce the noises they occasionally make. Noisey dogs hamper operations.

d. Dogs and handlers must be prepared to be able to work on extended operations with resupply of dog rations and equipment for short periods.

e. Handlers must have complete control of their animals.

Item: Dustoff Support

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS the Brigade experienced occasional delays by not having a Dustoff helicopter attached to the Brigade on a standby basis. This also caused some discrepancies in request procedures.

Observation: The Brigade should have its own Dustoff helimbulance during the day while on combat operations.

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Item: Generator Maintenance

Discussion: General maintenance of generators suffered due to two oversights: They were placed too deeply in the ground causing improper ventilation and making access for maintenance difficult. In addition, units were not prepared to perform 1st and 2d Echelon maintenance, owing to a lack of preparation while in base camp.

Observation: Generator positions should allow 2 feet of clearance on all sides for ventilation and servicing. Unit must be prepared to maintain their generators to prevent breakdowns.

Item: Evacuation of Armored Personnel Carriers

Discussion: APC's, in many instances, were disabled by VC mines. This requires evacuation for repair which is, to say the least, a time consuming affair. In one case, the Armor Company was delayed 24 hours from seizing their objective due to the evacuation of disabled vehicles.

Observation: APC's can be rapidly stripped of equipment and totally destroyed on the spot if the tactical situation prohibits a lengthy evacuation process. This destruction can be executed with thermite grenades, demolitions etc. Therefore it is advisable to dispose of a vehicle that is already destroyed, rather than taking time to evacuate it.

Item: Aero Cavalry Concept

Discussion: E Troop, 17th Cavalry deployed its forces as Infantry mounted in helicopters (see Special Equipment/Techniques and Small Unit Actions, E/17th Cav). When a target was exposed, the Aero Rifle Platoons landed and attacked the VC objective. Certain requirements became apparent and procedures were developed as follows:

Observations:

1. Aircraft must be under the control of the Cavalry Troop Commander for the duration of the operations.

2. The following aircraft must be allocated for effective operations:

Two (2) OH-13 Helicopters (Aero Scouts)
Two (2) UH-1B Helicopters (Light Fire Team Ships)
Six (6) UH-1D Helicopters (Aero Rifle Platoon Ships)
One (1) UH-1B or OH-13 Helicopter (Command and Control Ship)

3. The Aero Rifle Platoon must be on constant Airborne Alert

4. Occasionally remove all aircraft from the AO to dupe the VC into a false sense of safety.

5. Organize ground elements into 6 man helicopter loads.

6. Ground elements must be equipped for fast movement and carry no excess equipment such as helmets or flack jackets.

The following is a list of equipment proven to be essential:

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

a. Ropes for canal and river crossing

b. Steel Probe Rods

c. Marking Panels

d. Smoke Grenades

8. Operations must continue into the hours of darkness employing the Stay Behind Patrols and Ambush Patrols of the Cavalry Troop.

9. Troop helicopter landing should never be accomplished without proper preparation of the LZ by gunships.

Item: Aerial Observers

Discussion: Continuous air observer coverage of maneuver elements requires the alternating use of two aircraft.

Observation: This requirement may be satisfied by either two OI-E fixed wing aircraft or one OI-E and one OH-13. The later combination is preferred if the fixed wing aircraft are not able to land near the fire support base. Complete and detailed briefing of observers prior to artillery preparations or major changes in operational plans greatly facilitate accomplishment of the mission and reduce the possibility of errors incurred by incomplete understanding of the mission by the observer.

Item: Operational Control/Artillery

Discussion: Control of more than five firing batteries exceeds the personnel and equipment resources of a direct support artillery battalion. If more than five batteries (Organic, Attached or under OPCON) are placed in support of the Brigade Operations it is also necessary that a suitable headquarters be provided to control the additional firing elements.

Observation: The span of Operational Control which can effectively be exercised by a direct support artillery battalion headquarters is limited to five firing batteries.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. Robertson

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

67

AVHE-SC 24 February 1967

INTRODUCTION

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

The information below was obtained through combat interviews conducted at E/17th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry. This report was constructed in coordination with the visit of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, 27 January - 1 February 1967. The material relates to isolated small unit patrol activities and ambush techniques used specifically in Operation CEDAR FALLS.

E TROOP, 17TH CAVALRY

Initially, E Troop, 17th Cavalry was given the mission of securing Position WHITE in support of artillery elements in the AO of Operation Cedar Falls. E/17 Cav arrived at Position WHITE on 8 January (approximately 8 kilometers southeast of BEN CAT), and remained there throughout the Operation.

On 11 January 1967, the Troop Commander, Major Bryan Sutton, received a warning order from higher headquarters to conduct air-cavalry activities in the western portion of the AO. This area is primarily rice paddies, criss-crossed with canals and bounded on the west by the SAIGON RIVER.

Major Sutton employed two (2) OH-13 Aero Scout helicopters, code named "Hot Stuff" to conduct visual reconnaissance missions in the northwest portion of the AO. The "Hot Stuff" choppers flew at tree top level, relaying intelligent information to the Troop CP. An augmented rifle squad was kept in the air at all times possible, serving as a quick reaction force to the "Hot Stuff" reconnaissance aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

On the ground, two squads were generally employed consisting of 9 and 12 men, two RTO's and a lieutenant. The subscribed ammunition load for riflemen was 11 magazines, however, some men carried as many as 25 full magazines. In addition, riflemen were armed with four (4) fragmentary grenades and one (1) smoke grenade per man. M-60 machine gunners carried 800 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. Each squad was equipped with either 3 claymore mines or a demolition kit.

Aside from the ammunition loads carried by members of the Troop, several other items were employed. Identification tags and sandbags were utilized in the identification and separation of all enemy documents confiscated during the Operation. The men also carried snap links and ropes to facilitate the crossing of the numerous canals encountered.

During Operation CANARY/DUCK, the Cavalry conducted controlled experiments on the use of camouflaged soft caps in relation to the previously used steel helmet. It was discovered that soft caps enable the man to move much faster and are less fatiguing than steel pots. In addition, hearing capabilities are increased. In the jungle, sound is most often the sole means of detecting enemy movement. Consequently, soft caps have become SOP during the hours of darkness and were utilized during this Operation.

On the morning of 12 January 1967, two Aero Scout helicopters were dispatched to reconnoiter the area around the tributaries and rice paddies adjacent to the SONG SAIGON. The procedure employed by "Hot Stuff" is as follows:

a. CH-13 helicopters are employed in pairs, designated as Lead and Chase Aircraft.

b. CH-13's fly at tree-top level at all times at a speed of 20 knots, approximately 200 meters apart.

c. If the lead ship is fired upon, the chase helicopter has the following three missions:

(1) Deliver suppressive fire

(2) Issue red smoke grenades for subsequent Infantry elements

(3) Plot the coordinates of the fire and relay this information to the Troop Commander or person responsible for initiating air assaults.

At 0757 hours, "Hot Stuff" Aero Scouts received ground fire at XT 687248. Major Sutton issued two squads of the 1st Platoon to 678264. 1LT Horace L. Rektorik, a native of Corpus Christi, Texas was in command of the Platoon (-). After being helilifted to the area, Lieutenant Rektorik placed one squad on each side of the tributary from which fire was previously received. The terrain in this area was extremely difficult and the gnarled roots and vegetation along the tributary bank were such that a sampan could be completely obscured with no difficulty. Huts were constructed directly over the water, being supported by stilts.

Almost immediately after movement was initiated by the two squads, Sergeant Carl Hobson, of Manhattan Beach, California, observed two men approximately 30 meters to his front moving out on a tree limb over the water. Before effective fire could be placed, they dove into the tributary. These individuals were assaulted with grenade fire, with negative results. They had apparently heard the movement and made good their escape.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBC-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

The two men had come from a straw hut with a tin roof adjacent to the water's edge. Search of the dwelling revealed a small quantity of 7.62mm ammunition, black pajamas and assorted rifle slings. LT Rektorik directed the destruction of the hut and continued patrolling along the tributery.

At 0847 hours at XT 672282, a sampan on the opposite side of the tributary was discovered and subsequently destroyed. Further search revealed a 55-gallon drum of CS previously sited by an OH-13 helicopter and another sampan.

Thorough screening of the canal area was continued, with the Cavalry troopers keeping a sharp eye for anything out of the ordinary. The search at this time was directed to a paddy area, then sweeping back to the canal. During the sweep, PVT John A. Fischer noticed what at first appeared to be a bundle wrapped in a poncho. Suddenly, two black heads popped out from behind the bundle. The 20 year old RTO informed LT Rektorik of his sighting of the 2 VC who were now approximately 5 meters from the bundle heading towards the woodline. The Lieutenant directed fire on the VC. The men fired some 20 rounds and threw grenades. When the firing had ceased, they advanced and confirmed the death of one Viet Cong. The bundle previously used for concealment contained a rucksack with miscellaneous documents which were forwarded to the Brigade S2 Section.

Stephen Miller, a Specialist 4th Class from Sonora, California, and a member of E/17th Cavalry's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol found numerous pot holes in the banks of rice paddies and dikes throughout the AO. In many instances, these pot holes lead to subterranean tunnel complexes. It was believed that the second VC escaped in this manner. These potholes are destroyed by grenades whenever encountered. Later in the operation, SP4 Velmon D. Phillips, another member of the LRRP, heard noises in the same area, however no movement could be detected and no VC were sited. He suspected that the noises were in fact coming from a subterranean labyrinths below the rice paddies. Tunnel entrances were almost invariably found near huts, and in rice paddy dikes throughout the IRON TRIANGLE.

Lieutenant Rektorik's platoon was extracted from their area of operation and flown to Position WHITE shortly after this last contact.

The second Platoon was conducting patrolling operations simultaneously in another AO. The Troop Commander, Major Sutton, decided earlier to place the platoon in an area where Falcon gun ships had previously received fire. The area was prepared by a bombing strike conducted by Air Force F-100 jet fighters.

1LT Juris Jaunitis, a 26 year old graduate of the University of Nebraska was the commander of the 24 man strong 2d Platoon. His unit became airborne at 1028 hours and was dropped approximately 100 - 200 meters southwest of the F-100 strike zone. The terrain in this area was characterized by dense bamboo. All dwellings were built underground and connected to one another and the surface by a vast network of tunnels. Patrolling in this area was difficult since the men were forced to remain within 6 to 8 feet of one another owing to the thickness of the vegetation. If the troopers became separated by more than ten feet, they lost visual contact with one another. The bamboo shoots grew in thick bunches approximately 12" in diameter. Screening of the area revealed numerous underground dwellings or bootches, however, only about half of these showed signs of recent use. There were no bootches whatsoever built above the ground.

Several documents were uncovered, yet only a few had any military or strategic value. A large roll of overlay paper was the only significant find indicative of VC activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

70

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEL-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

Major Sutton, who was then at Position WHITE, was anxious for the 2d Platoon to speed up their movement. LT Jaunitis reported back to the Troop Commander that this was impossible, since the tunnels to be searched were numerous and the bamboo vegetation was so thick that movement was brought to a near standstill.

With this information, Major Sutton became concerned that the 2d Platoon might encounter an enemy force too large to handle effectively. Also, the rear security of this screening operation was inadequate. He therefore directed the men to a clearing, 100 feet to their front and at 1510 hours, the 2d Platoon was extracted.

At 1430 hours, the 1st Platoon, E/17th Cavalry was helilifted to the vicinity of grid coordinates XT 677234. The area of concern was a tributary near the SAIGON RIVER. A "Hot Stuff" OH-13 Observation Helicopter previously spotted a woman and a hut near this area. Upon landing, the two fire teams, "A" and "B" moved approximately 150 - 200 meters conducting patrolling activities on both banks of the tributary. Staff Sergeant Charles E. Park, "B" fire team leader, directed his unit to cross the water. Shortly thereafter, CPL Emanuel Andrews, a native of Cincinnatti, Ohio had visual contact with one VC attempting to escape through the waters of the tributary, which was less than 30 meters wide at this point. At this time, SGT Thomas W. Mirick also observed the Viet Cong and followed him to a bunker type shelter. A "Hot Stuff" recon chopper flew over the bunker and pointed to it indicating that there were VC inside. SGT Mirick climbed to the top of the shelter, however he observed nothing. The M-79 man, SP4 Fullhart was soon on the scene, having already drawn his .45 caliber pistol. He observed two arms in the darkness and motioned to SGT Mirick above. The two man called for the Viet Cong to come out ("Lai Da") and upon the introduction of the muzzle of a 12 guage shotgun, two men scurried out with their hands up.

The two GI's motioned to the prisoners that they were about to destroy the fortification with grenades. With this, one of the prisoners shouted in the direction of the bunker and almost immediately, a third prisoner jumped from his place of concealment and surrendered.

The first prisoner to come out was apparently suffering from some type of skin disease for his skin was scaly and sickly. The second prisoner was relatively healthy and the third, a boy of about 16 years, had a fresh wound in his hip. Through an interpreter, it was learned that the wound was inflicted by an OH-13 helicopter machinegun. It was further determined that the man, along with approximately 15 others was caught in a B-52 strike, killing half of the estimated party.

SGT Park directed two men to guard the prisoners while he and three other men searched the west side of the tributary. SP4 John Hutchik, one of the men accompanying SGT Park and CPL Andrews spotted a VC with both feet already in the water attempting to escape. Effective M-16 fire was placed before the VC had a chance to escape. As they advanced to confirm the KIA, SP4 Hutchik observed another VC on a bunker located in the middle part of the tributary. Andrews and Hutchik received permission to check out the site from SGT Park. When at close enough range, the men threw fragmentary grenades into the bunker.

One VC was immediately catapulted out into the open. The two men confirmed the KIA and then CPL Andrews entered the bunker alone, thinking perhaps more VC bodies were within. Inside, he could vaguely distinguish the figure of a man on the floor. When he touched the man's arm, he sprang to his feet to defend himself. The two men struggled for only a short time before Andrews succeeded in pushing the VC's head out of the door. SP4 Hutchik took aim and fired his weapon and "blew his brains out". After this incident, Andrews and Hutchik discovered a third VC body, resulting from the grenades thrown earlier.

71

AVEE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

Shortly thereafter, another bunker was sighted in a rice paddy. Recon by M-79 fire was employed with negative results. The subsequent extraction of the 1st Platoon marked the end of the day's activities.

On the following day, 13 January, all three platoons were employed in search and destroy operations east of the SAIGON RIVER. At 0842 hours, the 2d Platoon was dropped on a canal from which fire had previously been received. LT Jannitis directed his two reinforced squads to patrol the banks of the canal, utilizing a squad on each bank. At 0850 hours, a camouflaged rice cache was located and destroyed. The platoon moved and estimated 200 meters down stream when a hootch built over the canal was discovered. The point man, PFC William J. Lewis observed movement in the vicinity of the hut. At this time, the order was given to throw grenades at the structure. Inside, unknown to the men of the 2d Platoon, were 2 women and 3 children. Luckily, the grenades only caused minor injuries and LT Jannitis immediately requested a Dustoff helicopter. Nothing else was found within the hut.

In the meantime, CPL Van Hook, a 22 year old squad leader, observed red smoke on the opposite side of the canal. He and his squad preceded to ford the stream and discovered the location of another hootch. CPL Van Hook set up a fire support base and prepared to issue an assault. Suddenly, a VC was observed making an attempt to hide within the dwelling, however, he soon realized the futility of this maneuver and willingly surrendered.

The squad with their prisoner recrossed the waist deep stream and continued movement along the bank, resulting in the discovery of two additional crude waterside dwellings and an outboard powered sampan. The river craft contained fire wood and some 500 eggs. Shortly after the destruction of the hootches and sampans, the prisoner was evacuated and the squad continued to patrol the bank of the stream.

At 1103 hours, a UH-1B helicopter reported seeing several VC in black pajamas in the vicinity of XT 698[illegible]. LT Rektorik with the 1st squad of his platoon were airborne at this time and were directed by the Troop Commander to initiate search and destroy operations in this area. This platoon landed shortly thereafter. Upon landing, the squad was immediately separated into two fire teams, one on each side of a small tributary of the SONG SAIGON. The Headquarters element, consisting of two RTO's, a Medic and LT Rektorik, spotted a bunker at the junction of the tributary and a small stream. The Lieutenant summoned anyone who might be within to come out. Receiving no response, the four men entered the bunker, finding a wounded VC. He had been wounded in the back and appeared to be totally paralyzed.

At this time, SPL Selbon of the Headquarters element commenced firing at a hootch 75 meters to his front. Selbon had spotted a VC attempting to seek refuge within the hut. Lieutenant Rektorik with the first squad following moved in the direction of the sighting. When at close range, the VC bolted from the hootch heading towards the heavily foliated area covering the bank. The subsequent open fire produced negative results however, further search of the area was successful. LT Rektorik found him hiding in the underbrush and then shot him. Search of the VC's personal items revealed several documents and small arms ammunition.

Subsequently, the building was destroyed and the squad continued screening to the south. At this time, an over zealous VC, who had apparently just witnessed the previous incident, stepped into the open gladly surrendering.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

The 3d Platoon, which had remained at Position WHITE until now, was lifted to XT 706212 on the SONG SAIGON. The Platoon was divided into three elements, two moving north along the canal and a third squad approximately 700 meters north serving as a blocking force.

The platoon had not moved far before noises were heard by the point man, SP4 Harry J. Holmes. The alerted squad proceeded forward with caution since the foliage along the canal was well suited for enemy concealment. A VC then darted out of the underbrush, surrendering. The troopers advanced to check out the VC's place of concealment. From the brush, another VC sped away before contact could be made, however, 1 Chicom P-34 machinegun, miscellaneous documents and equipment were found wrapped in a poncho.

The captured VC commenced to call his comrades into the open and surrender. One did come out, however, another VC chose to run. His choice proved to be fatal as he was killed by SP4 Donald Brown, the TC for the fire team on the opposite side of the canal.

At this time, a curious incident occurred. Floating nonchalantly down the canal came a rather large clump of matted grass. The men of the 3d Platoon observed this for quite some distance. It passed right between the two fire teams. SP4 Donald Underwood noticed something suspicious and fired M-79's into the mass. As one would expect, a dead Viet Cong floated up from beneath the brush.

SFC Allen, the 3d Platoon leader, suspecting more VC were either hiding or attempting to escape, intensified the saturation of this immediate area. The search revealed a crude bunker containing several maps. Further along the woodline, SP4 Richard Albertson discovered a hootch with a sizeable quantity of rice a few meters away. The rear security element of Albertson's team entered the hootch discovering a .45 caliber pistol, pistol belt and one magazine.

After the hootch and rice were destroyed, the fire team pushed on towards the adjacent rice paddies. They had moved approximately 100 meters when a hut with attached bunker was found very near a dike. Subsequent search of the dwelling revealed nothing, however, a catwalk crossing the canal was spotted. The fire team set up security and three men, SP4 McDonald, PFC Gardner and PFC Chester volunteered to check out the catwalk.

They crossed the canal cautiously and found 3 trails issuing from the water crossing. As SP4 McDonald probed one of the trails, he spotted a sniper's nest 6 feet above the water. The site showed signs of recent use, for a bowl of rice was found which had been prepared approximately 2 days previous to the platoon's entry. Just a few feet further down the trail, an American made 12 guage shotgun was resting in the fork of a tree. SP4 McDonald, fearing the weapon may be booby-trapped, proceeded with extreme caution. After thorough examination, McDonald found that the weapon was placed there only through the negligence of some VC and was not booby-trapped in any way. The three men then rejoined with the rear security element on the other side of the canal. Upon their return, it was discovered that the immediate area just screened was highly booby-trapped indicating that these trails were heavily used by the Viet Cong.

SGT Albert Engli h was at this time in charge of the 2d Squad of the 3d Platoon. He was given the mission of searching the wooded area adjacent to the rice paddies. The two point men of the squad, SP4 James A. Thrasher and PFC Gary De Garmo being the first to enter the area, sited a camouflaged hatch, unobservable

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

from the air. As the point men approached the hootch from the left side, they observed wires running along the length of the roof and terminating a few meters from the bamboo and straw structure. The men pulled back and informed their squad leader. SFC English then threw a hand grenade resulting in an initial and secondary explosion, confirming their suspicion that the hut was boobytrapped. The explosion blew off the roof of the hut completely off and formed a hole five feet in diameter in the floor.

Investigation of the gutted hootch revealed that it was apparently a squad sized CP or supply station. A container, housing several documents and booby-trapped with a fragmentary grenade was found and disarmed. Buried in the mud behind the hut, several claymore mines and assorted hand grenades were also found.

At 1128 hours, two UH-1D helicopters were flying an extraction mission from XT 700226 to 716212. One of the two helicopters noticed a sampan in the canal below. The airship veered sharply to make a pass at the sampan, however the ship flared out too sharply and crashed on its side. Luckily, injuries were restricted to minor cuts and bruises. The crew quickly stripped the ship of its guns and they were soon evacuated.

At 1315 hours, one "Hot Stuff" and one "Falcon" gunship sited 3 VC at XT 710-322. The Falcon ship fired on the VC killing two of the enemy. The third VC waved his hands desparately, indicating his desire to surrender. He was picked up shortly thereafter by a Command and Control helicopter. The two VC KIA were armed with .45 caliber pistols at the time of their death. The prisoner was subsequently escorted to Military Intelligence and shortly after his interrogation was completed, he managed to steal a weapon and shot his ARVN guard. He then bolted from his place of captivity only to be shot and killed by a trooper of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

In the meantime, elements of the 1st Platoon were given the task of securing the previously wrecked helicopter. This was accomplished successfully and the aircraft was evacuated by CH-47 at 1350 hours. Five minutes later, the 1st Platoon was also picked up and returned to Position WHITE.

A "Hot Stuff" reconnaissance helicopter reported seeing enemy movement at XT 708228. SGT Samuel Haynes of Sanford, North Carolina and SGT McLaurea deployed to this area with a twelve man squad and drooped approximately 100 meters from a canal. The men proceeded south on the east side of the canal. After having gone 150 meters, movement was detected in the grass. A camouflaged VC was crawling through the rice paddy, however, he was out of range of small arms fire. When the squad had finally manoeuvered to a position where fire could be effectively placed, the depth of the rice paddy offered the VC adequate cover. The squad's RTO radioed to a near-by gunship which subsequently suppressed the area. The squad advanced finding documents, and the VC's weapon, however, no body was found.

The squad's point man, PFC Ronny D. Wagner then crossed the canal, having observed a hootch on the other side. Two transistor-type radios were found in the hut, but aside from this, nothing of value was discovered, so the search of the canal was continued. The sharp vision of the Point Man paid off again as he spotted a head pop out momentarily from the water of the canal. He fired one round at the submerged man, plunged into the water and dragged out his captive. The squad had an interpreter with them who interrogated the frightened POW. He was asked if there were other VC in the area and replied that his comrades had all fled to the west. A gunship was immediately called into the area in question. The POW's information was quite true as the gunships from the 335th Aviation Company soon spotted and killed 3 VC. The KIA were later verified by a C & C ship.

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

It was now approximately 1400 hours and the squad departed from the area where the VC was captured. They moved south and then west, once again crossing the woodline searching out any remaining VC. PFC Wagner proved himself once more to be an excellent point man. 75 meters to his front, he observed the movement of three VC approaching a hootch near the woodline. Wagner alerted the squad and fire was directed on the enemy targets. The squad advanced forward to find 3 VC KIA. Subsequent search of the huts revealed several North Vietnamese flags indicating the allegiance of the inhabitants.

The 335th Aviation Company, who provided helicopter support for the E/17th Cavalry, was suffering from a shortage of aircraft and it was imperative that all ships be free by 1600 hours. With this in mind, the Cav made preparations for the extraction of all elements. The squads began to convene on the predetermined points of extraction.

On the opposite side of the canal, Squad Leader SGT Carnes was located on a dike, scanning a rice paddy to see if the area was safe for extraction. He thought he detected movement to his front. The RTO, PFC Warren Archibald, provided security by jumping into the canal so that he could observe activity to the front and cover the advancement of SGT Carnes. The NCO fired in the direction of the movement and then proceeded to check out the results: one dead camouflaged VC. The squad was almost immediately extracted after this incident and returned to Position WHITE.

The final incident of the day occurred when elements led by SGT Welch and SGT Allen encountered several dwellings and sampans along the canal on which their operations were centered. The area was subsequently searched and both sampans and huts were destroyed. SGT Allen's team then crossed the canal since several more hootches were spotted there. One VC was killed when he attempted to escape this area by the fire team crossing the canal.

Shortly after the team arrived on the opposite side, SPC Holmes, the point man for the team, heard movement as he approached one dwelling. He hesitated outside, then entered emptying one full magazine inside the hootch. As it turned out, two VC were hiding within and were killed by Specialist Holmes' assault.

In another hootch, 20 meters away, noises were again heard. The people inside were summoned to come out by SGT Allen. This they did, all eight of them consisting of an old woman, a ten year old girl and six men. The VC suspects were all evacuated with the fire team shortly thereafter, terminating the days activities.

At 0752 hours, 14 January, OH-13 Aero Scouts once again went airborne to recon an area where a tributary bridge was sited on the previous day's activities (XT 715228). At 0801 hours, the 2d Platoon under the command of 1LT Jaunitis was dropped at XT 719221. The third squad acted as a blocking force northwest of the bridge. The first and second squads were placed on the west and east side of the tributary respectively.

SGT Carnes, squad leader of the 2d Squad, first observed red smoke 15 meters from the point they were dropped. The red smoke was placed by OH-13's denoting that "Charlie" had been sited in the area. The squad was 30 meters from the woodline when they received 4 - 5 rounds of small arms fire. They returned approximately 15 rounds, however, caution in firing was observed since the 1st squad was operating on the west side of the tributary. As the second squad moved towards the woodline, SGT Wright observed one VC hiding in the water holding on to one of

15

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

the gnarled roots along the bank. When at a 5 meter range, Wright fired his M-16 at the enemy. As he and SGT Carnes advanced to confirm the KIA, they found another dead VC hanging in a tree. The VC, who was shot in the face, was armed with a Russian 7.62mm carbine. Also in his possession was a plastic bag containing clothing, ammunition and an inner tube for floating in the water. A crude bunker was found near the scene. Strangely enough, no one could accept credit for the second KIA, since he was apparently struck by a wild round during the landing skirmish.

On the west side of the stream, 1LT Jaunitis and the 1st squad received several rounds of small arms fire resulting in the first casualty of the Cavalry Troop since the beginning of Operation CEDAR FALLS. Twenty year old SP4 Patrick L. Sirmuir was wounded in action while moving along a dike shortly after landing. He observed the fire coming from the woodline and quickly got down into firing position, however, he then noticed a strange sensation in his leg. He looked down to discover that a bullet was lodged below his kneecap. A Dustoff ship was immediately summoned and Sirmuir was evacuated only 10 minutes after sustaining the wound.

The 1st squad continued movement after the Dustoff was accomplished. As they searched along the woodline, the last man in the column, PFC Larry E. Smith of Parsons, Kansas, spotted an arm and a leg wrapped around a tree trunk. The contrast of the light skin against the murky water caught his eye for the undergrowth was thick along the water's edge. He fired 5 rounds at the semi-submerged figure. SGT Carnes, who was on the east side of the tributary, confirmed the KIA.

As the 1st and 2d Squads moved further north towards the bridge and location of the 3d Squad, a corpse was found floating in the stream. PFC Archibald, being a strong swimmer, volunteered to check out the body. He fought his way through the muddy stream and tangled underbrush until he reached the opposite bank where the body was lodged. Archibald determined, as best he could, that this VC had been killed recently, probably by an CH-13 helicopter. The danger involved in this type of mission is great, since the waterways in this region are clogged with treacherous vines and roots, in addition to the strong tidal effect on the tributaries.

The two squads pushed on opposite sides of the tributary, destroying several sampans, huts and uncovering a 10,000 pound, well camouflaged rice cache. The men found that the destruction of such large quantities of rice is highly time consuming.

After several hours of search, the men approached the bridge. It was evident that it was not a temporary structure as is often the case. The bridge was thirty feet long and solidly constructed with logs 12" in diameter. Major Sattem made the decision at this time not to destroy the structure and directed that the bridge remain in tact since it presented an excellent ambush site for future night patrols. (See Night Ambush, 16 - 17 January 1967, page 70 to 73).

The 3d Squad blocking force, which was until now situated 100 meters north of the bridge, rejoined the 1st and 2d squads preparing for subsequent extraction. In order to accomplish this, several of the troopers had to cross the river. Two non-swimmers accidently dropped their weapons in the process. The M-16's would be a fine prize for the VC, therefore, Sergeants Carnes and Wright dove into the murky water at no small risk to their own safety. A moment or two later, the two men returned to the surface having successfully retrieved the two weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

The 3d Platoon, E/17th Cavalry was operating not far from the 2d Platoon. The 1st Squad was on the northeast bank of a stream and the 3d squad (led by SFC Allen) served as a blocking force approximately 1,000 meters from the 1st squad. The 2d squad was on the opposite side of the stream, thereby employing the same tactic of two squads moving parallel towards their 3d Squad blocking force.

As the 2d Squad moved north, SGT James Russel broke his unit into two fire teams. SPL George Carrillo, the pointman on the left side of the canal, moved along the dike and spotted almost directly in front of him, the hand and arm of a VC concealed in a pot hole. Carrillo opened fire, however, his weapon malfunctioned after a few rounds were expended. The wounded VC jumped out and surrendered before the point man could clear his weapon.

Shortly thereafter, Carrillo's weapon redeemed itself. The point man along with PFC Radburn had just completed the search of a nearby hut when Carrillo spotted the head of a VC in a canal some 200 meters away. He fired several rounds at the minute target. SGT Edward Armstrong reported back that the VC was hit several times in the head. The M-16 once again had proven to be a highly effective weapon.

After confirming this KIA, SGT Armstrong checked out another bootch in the same vicinity, discovering 3,000 pounds of bagged paddy rice. The rice was subsequently destroyed by cutting the bags and throwing it into the canal, making later retrievement impossible.

At this time, Major Sutton directed the platoon to back track the area just screened since it is a characteristic of the Viet Cong to return to an area immediately after American troops and helicopters depart.

This proved to be a wise tactic, for as soon as they returned to the area, two VC were spotted with their heads above the water by point man SPL Holmes. A call was made for the men to surrender, yet they refused and attempted to reach a clump of brush on the bank of the stream. Holmes fired and the VC ducked underneath the water. He then threw a grenade to interrupt their escape. PFC Earl Westmark joined Holmes in the search for the "Charlies". Holmes, who was now a few feet off shore, searched the bank of the stream for the enemy, only to have one of them swim directly between his legs, the VC having having apparently lost his sense of direction. The surprised Holmes fired at the figure at point blank range with obvious results. PFC Westmark discovered the second body shortly thereafter.

A search of the immediate area was continued for approximately 30 minutes. Westmark and Holmes found a PE-4 sub-machinegun, pistol belt and various personal items belonging to the two men previously killed. The equipment was located in the hollow of a tree on the water's edge. It was believed that the VC were trying to reach this point at the time fire was placed upon them.

At this time, SGT Welch received an intelligence report from "Hot Stuff" that a sampan was traveling in their direction. The "D" flex team was dispatched to check the movement of the river craft, however, on the way they discovered 2 [illegible] hiding along the water's edge. SPL Albertson, the team leader first heard movement in the area. The team immediately set up a perimeter security and advanced around the bend in the stream. ISGT Roy Haynes then heard a noise in the brush. He observed a small opening in the undergrowth leading toward the canal which he followed to the water's edge. His vision was still obstructed so he waded approximately 7 - 8 feet into the stream. The vegetation was so thick that SGT Haynes could not see the team leader who was only a few meters away at this time. Suddenly, he spotted a VC in the water nearby. Haynes placed several rounds on the

77

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

enemy target. Then, as he moved through the water to confirm the KIA, he spotted a second VC, 10 meters away. Again SGT Haynes placed effective fire bringing his total to two VC.

The sampan previously reported was located not far from the scene of the previous action. SP4 Holmes made use of the craft in crossing the stream for although the stream was narrow at this point, the water was still quite deep. Holmes encountered some difficulty in the execution of this manouver since the sampan was 18' long and the stream was only 15' wide. During the process, he heard the sounds of a man running on the far side of the stream. Holmes did not fire however, since the Cav's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was operating on that side of the stream. It was later learned that the LRRP collected the KIA.

The squad regrouped shortly thereafter and the unit was extracted at 1355 hours, owing to the shortage of helicopters.

The 1st Platoon had no actual close contact with the enemy on this day, however, the search and destroy operations were not without significance. Three squads of the platoon were lifted from Position WHITE to a canal (vicinity XT 676234) at 0940 hours. Upon arrival in the AO, 1LT Raktorik directed 2 squads along the canal banks, one on each side moving parallel. A third squad was working nearby and soon discovered a hut containing a sizeable amount of M-1 ammunition. The Platoon encountered several hootches with large quantities of rice, all of which were destroyed.

They had moved approximately 600 meters north when they began to receive sporatic small arms fire. The source, however, could not be determined. Therefore, 1LT Raktorik was anxious to move out of the area since there were friendly troops operating nearby. In fact, he felt that the fire might have come from the friendly forces engaging in a fire fight. The Lieutenant decided to establish a blocking force and continue movement.

At 1008 hours, the elements on the southeast side of the canal discovered a camouflaged storage cache containing 69 - 100 pound bags of rice, M-26 hand grenades and a hootch, all of which was destroyed in place. At 1047 hours, 151-100 pound bags of fertiliser were discovered.

Throughout the day, the 1st Platoon continued to uncover VC storage caches yielding 75 M-1 rounds, 4 sticks of TNT, 800 more pounds of rice, 1 Chicom rifle and 1 Chicom grenade.

Shortly after noon, the 1st Platoon started receiving fire from 600 - 700 meters across a rice paddy. LT Raktorik called in a Falcon gun ship who suppressed the area so that extraction could be initiated. By 1330 hours, the platoon had returned by helicopter to Position WHITE.

LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL - E/17TH CAVALRY

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of E/17th Cavalry consists of 41 crack paratroopers whose mission is to scout 15 to 20 kilometers forward of the CP, thereby obtaining and relaying intelligent information concerning terrain, enemy strength etc. to the commanders. Nearly all LRRP's are made up of graduates of either MACV School, Ranger School or Recondo School and are highly skilled in the techniques of jungle survival and guerrilla warfare.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBF-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - K/17th Cavalry

The Patrol is commanded by CPT Allan B. Phillips, a graduate of West Point Military Academy and a native of North Berwick, Maine. The men, while on patrol wear camouflaged fatigues and soft hats. They are armed with M-16's and M-3 grease guns equipped with home-made silencers. They also carry a blood expansion unit as all the men have had 1st Aid experience and training.

The Patrols themselves are made up of 6 man teams consisting of 1 patrol leader, an assistant patrol leader, 1 RTO, 1 senior scout and 2 additional scouts. They rely almost solely on helicopters for deployment since they are usually placed in areas of unknown VC strength. These small well rounded patrolling/reconnaissance units perform an invaluable service to the Cavalry Troop and the Brigade as a whole in supplying information necessary for the introduction of larger infantry elements.

During the first part of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the LRRP remained airborne almost constantly, making bomb strike assessments. On the 12th and 13th they were involved in tunnel search missions. CPT Phillips asked for and was subsequently granted permission to rejoin the Cavalry Troop. They conducted operations with the Cav on the 14th of January, this time, however, their mission was the same as the other platoons.

At 1029 hours, the LRRP was dropped at XT 680321 with the mission of searching along the canal heading northeast. One element of the LRRP moved in from the northwest and commenced patrolling along the canal bank. They soon ran across three elderly men (50 - 60 years of age). The men displayed their ID cards and bowed respectfully. SP4 Edmond D. Smith had them evacuated immediately and movement was continued down the canal. The 11th ACR was working on the opposite side at this time.

Along the way, SP4 Smith's element observed a Vietnamese off to their left working in a rice paddy. They called out to the man just as he dove into the rice paddy. The moment fire was placed on him, a secondary explosion occurred. It appeared as though the VC were about to toss the grenade into the midst of the patrol, however, his attempt was aborted. The scouts entered the rice field to confirm the KIA. The water in the paddy was chest deep in some places and made navigation extremely difficult. The search was then directed to the woodline. Shortly thereafter, the patrol linked up with another LRRP element at XT 693238 which reported negative contact, however, they did discover one VC body, who had apparently been killed a day or two earlier.

At 1041 hours, a twelve man patrol at XT 721222 found an extremely large cache of polished rice while moving north along a canal. After the destruction was completed, they moved 460 meters toward the SONG SAIGON. "Hot Stuff" had reported seeing a 55 gallon drum in this area. The drum was easily found, along with a hooten built on stilts over the canal, a rice cache, a 30' sampan with an inboard diesel engine and 3 smaller sampans. It took 30 minutes to destroy the 225 - 100 pound bags of paddy rice and the 40 - 100 pound bags of polished rice.

At 1256 hours, the patrol became airborne to coordinates XT 715213. A "Hot Stuff" report perpetrated this movement, yet nothing was discovered in the immediate area. The patrol then crossed two canals and at XT 712213 they discovered 15 sampans, an outboard motor and a half dozen hootches, all of which were destroyed. The patrols were all extracted by 1647 hours completing the day's activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

79

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

On 15 January, the LRRP worked with the Chemical Detachments in tunnel search and destruction. The following day, Major Sutton received the order to conduct both day time search and destroy operations in addition to night time ambush patrols. On the nights of the 16th and 17th of January, the Cav's LRRP set ambush patrols near the bridge encountered two days previously by the 2d Platoon (XT 715-228).

NIGHT AMBUSH - 16 JANUARY 1967

At 1430 hours, a twelve man patrol led by SGT Michael J. Howard infiltrated the area (XT 715228) where a heavily used footbridge was located. The ambush was set up in such a manner that both the trail and the canal could be covered thoroughly. The patrol was armed with claymore mines, M-60 machineguns, M-16 rifles and hand grenades. The ambush site itself stretched over a one hundred meter area (see Annex 1 for ambush positions).

By 1500 hours, the ambush was ready. The men therefore lay motionless, observing strict silence while waiting for nightfall. At 1919 hours, a VC was seen approaching the bridge from the northwest. All was still until the man walked into the killing zone and the squad opened up, killing the VC instantly.

At 2015 hours, another VC approached the ambush using the same route as his unfortunate predecessor, however, owing to the darkness, he was undetected until he was in the center of the killing zone. Several rounds rang out at the VC but with negative effect. He then brandished a fragmentary grenade, but before he could through it, another burst of fire rang out. The VC dropped out of sight moaning in pain. His pain ceased when his own grenade exploded beneath him.

Between the first and second encounter, several lights were observed flashing on and off, apparently some sort of signal. This second VC was more than likely a scout sent to check out the situation at the bridge, implying that perhaps a larger force was anxious to use the crossing.

It was not long after the second VC was killed than noises were heard followed by heavy enemy fire, seemingly from all directions. An estimated 15 VC were involved in the fire fight. They had seemingly infiltrated through the same route across the bridge.

At this time, SPt. Collins, on the southern side of the canal, was hit by enemy fire. All patrol members were virtually pinned down to their positions and the brush was too thick to move without being detected. Grenades were thrown to hamper the enemy fire temporarily so that SPt. Phillips and SPt. Moye could regroup in order to reach the wounded man. As their ammunition was beginning to run seriously low, the fire died down and communication was made to the elements on the north side of the canal informing them of the casualty. SGT Howard crossed the canal to give assistance to the two men as fire ceased altogether on the other side.

When he reached Phillips and Moye, he gave them a pocket-type flashlight to aid the wounded Collins. He then radioed back to SGT Bolen that two men were needed for security while First Aid was being administered. SPt. Taylor and SPt. Curtis immediately crossed the canal.

Initially, Phillips detected only one small wound in SPt. Collin's cheek, yet he appeared to be in shock. The wounded man was lifted onto the dike where Phillips performed mouth to mouth resuscitation until the Dusteff ship arrived 10 minutes later. A trip flare was employed to guide the evacuation ship into the area. SGT

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

Howard and Specialists Curtis and Phillips carried the wounded man across the rice paddy to the waiting helicopter. The chest high mud, the darkness and wet made the task near impossible yet they managed to maneuver to the ship and the wounded man was evacuated.

The men then returned to their positions where all was quiet until 2237 hours when 2 VC wandered directly in front of SP4 McDonald's M-60 machinegun. Detecting something wrong, the two VC stopped and exchanged a few words before McDonald fired but the weapon jammed. SGT Howard, a few meters away, immediately fired his M-16 however, it too malfunctioned due to the mud acquired during the evacuation of SP4 Collins. Seeing this, SGT Bolen opened up with his M-16 killing one VC instantly. The second VC was wounded and tried to escape over the dike, down the canal. SGT Bolen left his position and pursued the enemy to the brush at the water's edge and completed the job. The VC were armed with one carbine and one Chicom sub-machinegun. After this, there were no more contacts, however movement was heard until around 0400 hours. Five hours later, the platoon was extracted without incident.

SP4 Collins died in the hospital 7 days later. The bullet he received pierced his cheek and lodged in his brain. The 19 year old native of Houston, Texas had spent the last 19 months in Vietnam.

NIGHT AMBUSH - 17 JANUARY 1967

A 12-man ambush patrol led by SGT Harold Kaisma of Honolulu, Hawaii, infiltrated to XT 717227 at 1848 hours on 17 January. SGT Kaisma positioned his unit north of a bridge on the west side of the canal. This was essentially the same site employed in the previous night's ambush, however, on the night of the sixteenth, the ambush was located south and west of the bridge, with a security element across the canal to the south.

On the ambush of the 17th of January, there was a misunderstanding between SGT Kaisma and assistant team leader SSG Vigo. Sergeant Vigo was under the misconception that he, along with SP4 Smith (M-16) and SP4 Wilkinson (M-16) were to be positioned south of the bridge. Once the ambush was set, no corrective action could be taken since strict silence measures had to be observed. Claymore mines were employed to the southwest and north of their position owing to the lack of rear security (see Annex 2).

All was still until 2030 hours when SP4 Smith on the left flank security spotted 7 VC, 20 to 30 meters from the bridge. When the VC reached the bank, SGT Vigo and SP4 Smith opened fire on the unsuspecting enemy. The VC were unable to determine the direction of fire and in the confusion, one VC was killed and a second was wounded, falling from the dike out of sight.

Later that night, SGT Kaisma, utilizing a starlight scope, spotted 2 VC approximately 10 meters from SP4 Miller's light machinegun position. He radioed the information to the gunner, who immediately opened fire. The results were undetermined at this time due to the darkness, however, two VC KIA were found while searching the area the next morning.

The last incident occurred between 1920 and 2000 hours when SGT Kaisma again spotted an undetermined number of people to his front with the starlight scope. SP4 Rosson and SP4 Dapelle fired 6 volleys of M-79's toward the people, the sighting being provided by SGT Kaisma. In the morning, 4 VC dead were found in the area of fire.

61

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

25 February 1967

The ambush patrol met with no opposition throughout the night. One M-79 or possibly a 60mm mortar round was received at one time, however, it produced negative results. The ambush patrol was highly successful, having a total of 5 VC KIA (BC) and an estimated 2 more KIA with friendly forces sustaining no casualties. The patrol was extracted from this position at 1000 hours, 18 January.

RESULTS OF OPERATION CEDAR FALLS - E/17th CAVALRY

12 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	6
VC Captured	3
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	4
Sampans Destroyed	2
Weapons Captured	1
Ammo Captured (sm arms)	53 rnds
Rice Destroyed	1500 lbs

13 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	17
VC Captured	33
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	1
Weapons Captured	5
Ammo Captured (sm arms)	150 rnds
Rice Destroyed	900 lbs
Claymores Captured	3
Grenades Captured	1
Rucksacks Captured	7
Medical Supplies Captured	5 lbs
Weapons Captured	4

14 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	12
VC Captured	9
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	6
Sampans Destroyed	22
Weapons Captured	2
Ammo Captured	150 rnds
Rice Destroyed	41.5 tons
Sampan Outboard motors	4
Rucksacks Captured	8
Grenades Captured	2
TNT Captured	15 lbs
Fertilizer Destroyed	1150 lbs
Documents	Many

15 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	1
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	16
Sampans Destroyed	11
Sampan Motors Captured	1
Rice Destroyed	7½ tons
Rucksacks Captured	1
Claymores Captured	8
Gasoline Destroyed	50 gal

16 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	9
VC Captured	2
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	3
Sampans Destroyed	6
Sampan Motors Captured	2
Rucksacks Captured	1
Rice Destroyed	5 tons
Medical Supplies Captured	5 lbs

17 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	12
VC Captured	2
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	5
Sampans Destroyed	3
Weapons Captured	5
Sampan Motors Captured	1
Rice Destroyed	5700 lbs
Medical Supplies Captured	15 lbs
Rucksacks Captured	2
TNT Captured	25 lbs
Base Camp (Sqd Size)	1

72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry

18 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	8
VC KIA by Arty Called by E/17th	5
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	2
Sampans Destroyed	6
Weapons Captured	2
Ammo Captured (sm arms)	25 rnds

19 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	9
VC Captured	4
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	2
Weapons Captured	2
Rice Destroyed	1200 lbs

20 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	9
Sampans Destroyed	1
Weapons Captured	2
Ammo Captured (sm arms)	200 rnds
Grenades Captured	2

21 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count	1
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed	24
Sampans Destroyed	6
Weapons Captured	1
Claymores Captured	1
TNT Captured	15 lbs
Documents	Many

TOTALS

VC KIA: E/17th Cavalry & Supporting Aircraft

Aero Scouts	5
Gun Ships	5
Ground Elements	63
TOTAL	73
Enemy Captured	25
Suspects Detained	13
Weapons Captured	21
Sampans Destroyed	22
Huts Destroyed	38
Rice Destroyed	132 tons (approx)
Documents	40 lbs (approx)
Sampan Engines	9

83

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

"C" COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 503D INFANTRY

On 8 January 1967, the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry was deployed from Camp Zinn at the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) base camp at BIEN HOA to a staging area at PHU LOI. From this point, the Battalion was lifted to the forward assembly area at Point BLUE (XT 828829) employing 30 helicopters. They remained there until [illegible] hours on 9 January 1967. The troops were given a general orientation as to their mission prior to their departing BIEN HOA.

On 9 January, the Battalion landed at two LZ's (XT 6737 & XT 6736) and the separate companies were arranged as shown in Annex 3. The Companies were given the mission of patrolling, forming blocking positions and setting up night ambushes.

Logistically, Company "C" was armed as follows: each rifleman was armed with an M-16 rifle with 400 rounds of ammunition as a basic load, 2 smoke grenades and 2 fragmentary grenades. There were two M-60 machineguns per platoon, each gunner carrying a total of 1,500 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. In addition, each squad had 2 M-79's with 45 rounds per grenadier and generally 2 claymore mines, depending upon the mission. The company as a whole was equipped with three (3) 81mm mortars with 30 rounds per mortar. Each individual carried three C-Ration meals while on operations.

At 1115 hours, 9 January, Company C landed at the LZ and immediately established a blocking position. Captain Thomas P. Carney, Company Commander, moved to the right flank to make coordination with the CO of B/1/16th Infantry which was operating to the north. After this was completed, the 3 platoons established defense positions along an ox cart road west of the SONG THI TIEM. The AO was primarily jungle with the exception of an area which had been defoliated within the last year. B/1/16th Infantry, located 200 meters to the north of the coordination point, had established a defense perimeter, whereas C/2/503d Infantry was on a line defense. CPT Carney and CPT Wilson (B/1/16th Infantry CO) decided that ambush patrols would be placed on the overgrown trail in the western portion of the 2d Battalion AO. See Annex 3.

Shortly after the 3 platoons had established a defense perimeter, patrols were sent out to search the immediate area for signs of the VC and likely ambush sites. The 3d Platoon soon discovered a hut with a small tunnel/bomb shelter attached. The hootch had been inhabited very recently, for freshly cooked rice was found. Further search of the area revealed a hole containing 12 bicycles and a concrete platform with 200 pounds of polished rice. Everything was destroyed, with the exception of the bicycles which now provide transportation to the men of "Charlie" Company while in base camp.

The weapons platoon, consisting of 33 men, screened the rear of the Company CP finding nothing save one small hootch. After it was destroyed, the platoon moved further east towards the THI TIEM River, running into an unfordable stream. They then returned to the company base area.

In addition, each of the 3 platoons sent out squad sized patrols to reconnoiter the front of the perimeter since there was a 100 meter gap between platoons. The Companies also employed three man observation posts during the hours of darkness.

SGT Nathaniel King, of Hartford, Connecticut, was in charge of the patrol from the 1st Platoon. When they returned to the CP, SGT King reported finding 2 foxholes showing no signs of recent use. He also reported finding a footpath running parallel to the overgrown trail in the western portion of the AO. Although the trail displayed no signs of recent use, the small foot path to the right was heavily traveled, probably because it could not be observed from the air. SGT King's patrol

TAB D
TO
Incl 1

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

followed the path back to the CP where he relayed this information.

All patrols returned to the CP by 1630 hours. A-Rations and a .50 caliber machinegun were brought in at this time and the company settled down to warm chow. At 1500 hours, 1LT Phillip Hayden was told to conduct a night ambush 300 meters south of the Company's position. SGT Julius Brown was to be in charge of the patrol.

At approximately 1940 hours, an outpost located between the 2d and 3d platoon positions made enemy contact. SGT Frank Bothwell, SP4 Walter Johnson and PFC Joseph Russo were the three men at the post. They moved into position shortly after nightfall, situating themselves 3 meters from one another in a triangular position, thereby facilitating easy communication in addition to 360° observation. The terrain was flat, consisting of elephant grass and bamboo.

The men lay quietly in the prone position, until they detected movement 50 meters to their front right flank, seemingly approaching the OP. Their vision was obstructed by the elephant grass and being in the prone position, they could not move without being detected. SGT Bothwell could not get to his M-16 since he was in a position that any movement whatsoever could be fatal. He therefore prepared to throw a fragmentary grenade in the direction of the approaching VC.

SP4 Johnson was in such position to observe the VC, however he knew that he must come to a sitting position to fire, thereby exposing himself. The SOP for the outpost was not to fire unless absolutely necessary. As the enemy came closer, Johnson realized that there could be no time more necessary than now.

He darted up into a sitting position and fired approximately 5 rounds before his weapon jammed. As he applied immediate action, a grenade exploded and Johnson took a fragment in the neck. At this time, SGT Bothwell let loose with his grenade, which he had been holding with the pin out for 3 seconds, causing the grenade would explode upon impact. Unfortunately, the grenade went off while in flight, raining fragments back to the OP. PFC Russo caught a fragment in the hand and was unable to fire his M-79. Bothwell radioed back to the CP informing them of the casualties, then covered the area with M-16 fire and made a rapid retreat aiding Johnson and Russo.

Upon returning to the CP, the two wounded men were evacuated at the advice of the Company Medic. The wound in Johnson's neck, although not serious, was very close to the jugular vein. The Dustoff ship arrived and picked up the men 25 minutes later.

By this time, the ambush patrol was in position. CPT Carney had received reports from A/2/503d Infantry and B/1/16th Infantry that movement was detected near their Company CP's. With this in mind, he warned SGT Brown's ambush to keep on the alert for infiltrating Viet Cong.

The ambush patrol had left the CP at 1400 hours and moved south along the foot path. They passed their ambush site and backtracked to it, thereby confusing any enemy element that might be following their trail. The site was chosen because of the cover available and the indications that the path was frequently traveled at this point. There were nine men on the patrol, 6 armed with M-16's, 2 armed with M-79's and one (1) M-60 machinegun (see Annex J). The patrol maintained radio silence, however, a predesignated break speech system was employed as follows: 1 break - negative contact, 2 breaks - involved in action, 3 breaks - enemy casualties, 4 breaks - friendly casualties, 5 breaks - numerous VC in the area.

AVBE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

At 1945 hours, the patrol heard fire issuing from SGT Bothwell's OP previously mentioned. Another warning was issued shortly thereafter. The patrol, on full alert, lay in anticipation of enemy movement.

At 2045 hours, several sounds of movement were heart to the northeast of the ambush site. PFC Gary Gaura became anxious when hearing the movement and crawled to SGT Brown's position a few meters away to ask him what should be done. SGT Brown told him to do nothing and be still. When Baura crawled back to his position, he coughed, and the enemy movement, which was now only 15 meters away, halted sharply. The VC remained motionless for approximately 10 minutes, and then moved on around the patrol's killing zone. PFC Baura counted 15 silhouettes. They crossed the trail, avoiding the ambush, yet they still remained in the immediate area.

At 2230 hours, the column of men moved further to the west, out of range and sight. 15 minutes later, machinegun fire was heard; apparently B/1/16th Infantry elements had encountered the VC. At 2300 hours, a straggler wandered directly into the ambush site. Again someone coughed, alerting the VC. This time however, there was no chance for escape. PFC Michael Farmer, an M-16 man on the southeast portion of the ambush observed the silhouette and cut loose with 5 rounds, wounding the VC. He lay on the ground moaning and shrieking in pain.

At this time, another Viet Cong straggler wandered into the ambush. He took one look at his wounded comrade and decided he wanted no part of him. As he turned to leave, the wounded man cried out once again. The other VC decided to be a good samaritan and turned about (almost tripping over an M-60 machinegun) returning to the wounded man. He then sprayed the area with AK-47 fire, having a negative effect on the patrol.

The VC then leaned over his wounded comrade and lit a candle which brilliantly illuminated both men. Immediately after this was done, PFC Michael Hill cut loose with his M-60, however, the machinegun malfunctioned. Simultaneously, PFC Martin C. Herman bore down on the two VC with his M-16. The candle went out and all was quiet.

Silence was maintained until the morning when the two KIA were confirmed. Two AK-47 weapons were found with the bodies, and among their personal items was found a document containing the crypto for the Military Region 4 Headquarters. This document proved to be extremely important and directly led to the capture of a high official in the MR-4. The second VC was obviously a courier whose job was to transport important documents.

At 0630 hours, the ambush patrol moved out of the area and proceeded by foot to the Company CP. The documents captured from the Viet Cong courier turned out to be one of the most significant finds of the Operation.

NIGHT AMBUSH - 1ST PLATOON - B/2/503D INFANTRY - 15 JANUARY 1967

1LT Ronald B. Fordham, the 1st Platoon Leader received a mission from the Company Commander, CPT Ken Kaplaf, to establish 2 ambush sites along HIGHWAY 14 on the night of 15 January 1967. After due consideration was made to likely ambush sites, Lieutenant Fordham decided to place the two ambushes at XT 706251 and XT 712248. He then divided his 31 man platoon into two groups of 16 and 15 men. The ambushes will be covered separately and will be denoted as SITE I and SITE II.

AVFE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

SITE I

Staff Sergeant J. Marlow was the NCO in charge of the first ambush which went into position 500 - 600 meters from the Battalion CP along HIGHWAY 14. There were four fighting positions in the patrol (See Annex A).

The first position was located furthest north and was equipped with an M-60 machinegun. SGT Mark Peterson was in charge of this team which consited of himself, PFC Melvin Tomlin (Machinegunner) and PFC Raymond S. Cassidy. There was also a radio at this point.

The second position was located 30 - 40 meters southeast of the first position and consisted of 4 men, 3 or them being armed with M-16's and 1 man armed with an M-79. SP4 Bly was in charge of this position.

The third position consisted of 5 men, located approximately 40 meters southeast of the second position. SGT Marlow was in charge of this group and was armed with an M-16 rifle. The RTO for the patrol, PFC Fred Scerola was also at this point in addition to SGT Clarence Blackshear (M-16), PFC Tommy Amos (M-16 and Starlight Scope) and the M-79 grenadier, SP4 Thomas Hatcher. The 4th Position was located 40 meters southeast of the 3d position, very near the junction of HIGHWAY 14 and a small heavily traveled footpath.

The patrol was in position by 1920 hours, observing strict silence. Each fighting position remained on full alert throught the night. On several occasions, the men thought they heard voices, however, it was hard to distinguish whether or not it was in fact voices or the wind, which was blowing at 20 to 30 knots. There was no actual contact until early the next morning.

At 0630 hours, SGT Routt, at Position 4, spotted 3 VC at the trail/road junction, beginning to cross the Highway. It was still quite dark at this time and visibility was poor, so rather than fire immediately at the indistinct figures, SGT Routt blew his claymore mine which was located at the base of the trail. Then, the entire patrol fired at the VC employing every weapon available. As it turned out, the VC were not detected earlier since the trip flare placed across the trail failed to function.

As it was now becoming light, the patrol members took up the pursuit of the VC, following the trail on the east side of HIGHWAY 14. The search disclosed one Chicom B-40, 3.5" rocket launcher and 2 hand grenades. The VC were not found, however, a significant blood trail was observed from the point of fire to 150 meters down the path where it vanished in a field of high grass. The patrol had by now ventured into a dense area, therefore it was decided to return to the Battalion CP rather than continue the pursuit.

The patrol met with only this one contact owing to the fact the H & I fires were landing within 200 meters of the site throughout the night, keeping enemy elements out of the area.

SITE II

Ambush Site II was located approximately 1100 meters south of Site I along HIGHWAY 14, directly north of the junction of the Highway and a small road running at a right angle (See Annex A). Around 1900 hours, while enroute to the ambush site, the patrol noticed several people darting across the highway. Later they

AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/503d Infantry

found an anti-tank mine which they disarmed on the spot. Shortly thereafter, a hole was discovered off to the side of the Highway where someone had made preparations for another AT mine. All indications were that the hole had been abandoned only minutes earlier, for the earth was freshly dug and an entrenching tool was left behind.

The patrol passed their predetermined ambush site, and then backtracked to the position as is often done to waylay the enemy into an ambush killing zone. They established 4 fighting positions and one Administrative position to the rear where Lieutenant Feedham, the Platoon Sergeant, Harold B. Rowell, a medic, Spc Ernest Hoover and PFC John Hayward, the RTO were located. A second radio was located at Position 1.

Between 2115 and 2130 hours, SP4 Leamon Perry and SP4 Joseph Carusso at Position 1 observed 2 VC heading in their direction. When inside the killing zone, Specialist Perry gave the word to open fire. Three minutes after the fire had ceased, a party of three volunteers, consisting of SGT Thompson, SP4 Carusso and PVT Williams advanced to check out the results.

They found no bodies on the Highway where they expected, so they elected to search the clearing on the other side of the road. The three men had covered approximately 50 meters when from out of the brush, one of the VC jumped out to assault. All three troopers opened fire at almost point blank range, killing the enemy instantly.

The VC's body was dragged onto the road where it could serve as a decoy for any others who might happen by. The three men then continued the search of the area where the VC were originally fired upon, discovering 8 bundles of personal items and several documents. They also found a .45 caliber pistol and an M3 type sub-machinegun.

There were no further contacts during the night, however, on one occasion, 3 or 4 hand grenades were received. The fire was returned with apparent negative results and no friendly casualties.


In the morning, the ambush patrols from both SITE I and SITE II linked up and conducted a search of the area. They discovered numerous bundles of personal items indicative that a great number of either Viet Cong or Refugees were moving through this area before the introduction of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry.

[redacted]

89

ANNEX 1


NIGHT AMBUSH -16 JAN 67
E/17th CAV



Annex 1
to
TAB E to Incl 1

ANNEX 2

NIGHT AMBUSH - 17 JAN 67
E/17th CAV




Annex 2


ANNEX 3

POSITIONING OF 2/503 INF

B/1/16TH INF.



AMBUSH POSITIONS
9 JANUARY 67
C/2/503D BIVOUAC




ANNEX 3

ANNEX 4

AMBUSH JANUARY 1968

SITE 1



SITE 2

POSITION 1

SP4 LOFTON PERRY - TM LDR - M16
SP4 JOSEPH CARVER - M60
PFC J.B. LINDSEY - M79
SSG THOMPSON - M16

POSITION 2

PFC JAMES LONG - M16
PVT WILLIE L. WILLIAMS - M16
PVT ERNEST THOMPSON - M79

POSITION 3


SP4 JAMES TODD - TM LDR - M16
PFC JEROME B. JERFESS - M60
PFC RAYMOND DAUGHERTY - M16

POSITION 4

SGT BILLY LATHAM - M16
PFC TERRY ROYBAL - M79
PFC RICHARD CUNNINGHAM - M16

ADMIN PSN

SP FREEMAN - PLT LDR
SSG HAROLD B. ROSWELL - PLT SGT
PFC JOHN HAYWARD - RTO




ANNEX 4

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TUNNEL COMPLEX

SIDE VIEW




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TUNNEL COMPLEX

TOP VIEW




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TUNNEL COMPLEX


TYPICAL VILLAGE ESCAPE TUNNELS



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
TUNNEL COMPLEX
TYPICAL VILLAGE ESCAPE TUNNELS




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
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FALSE FLOOR.
FREQUENTLY BOOBY TRAPPED.
WASH PANS FILLED WITH DIRT,
MOSTLY MADE OF WOOD.



PLUG. MADE FROM
WEED, OR TREE STUMP
MADE TO FIT TIGHTLY
IN HOLE. ROPE ON END
IS TO PULL IT OUT.



PLUG IN SIDE OF
TUNNEL GENERALLY LEADS
TO ANOTHER TUNNEL OR
STORAGE ROOM.

CONFIDENTIAL

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99

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-D&T

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967.

3. (U) LOCATION: IRON TRIANGLE - center of mass XT7030.

4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV.

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, Commanding General, II FFORCEV.

6. (C) MAJOR US SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:

a. Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

b. Major General William E. Depuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

c. Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, Commanding General, 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).

d. Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr., Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).

e. Colonel Marshal B. Garth, Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

f. Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

g. Colonel George H. Allin, Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery. Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., assumed command on 10 January 1967.

h. Colonel Raymond P. Campbell Jr., Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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7. (C) ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM COMMANDERS:

a. Brigadier General Pham Quoc Thuan, Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (ARVN).

b. Lieutenant Colonel Ho Trung Hau, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Task Force.

c. Major Nguyen Thu Luong, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Battalion.

d. Major Nguyen Ba Trooc, Commanding Officer, 7th Airborne Battalion.

e. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chuyen, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regiment.

f. Major Tom Van Luong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.

g. Major Tran Van Man, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.

h. Captain Trung Luan, Commanding Officer, 1st Troop, 1st Cavalry Squadron.

i. Captain Nguyen Ky Suong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

j. Major Ly Duc Quan, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

k. Major Nguyen Van Son, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

l. Captain Ho Van Hoa, Commanding Officer, 39th Ranger Battalion.

8. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 1st Infantry Division:

(1) 1734 Abn Bde (Sep) OPCON.

(2) 11th Armd Cav Regt (-) OPCON.

(3) Attached 4th Bn, 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) effective D-1.

(4) Detached Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor effective D-1.

(5) 168th Combat Engr Bn, 79th Engr Group (DS effective D-1).

b. 25th Infantry Division:

(1) Attached 196th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt).

(2) Attached 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div.

(3) 2d Bn, 34th Armor OPCON effective D-1.

(4) 4th Inf Bn, 7th Regt, 5th Inf Div (ARVN) DS effective D+2.

c. 5th Infantry Division (ARVN):

(1) Attached 1st Abn TF:

(a) 1st Abn Bn.

(b) 7th Abn Bn.

(2) 8th Infantry Regiment:

(a) 4th Bn, 7th Inf OPCON.

(b) 2d Bn, 8th Inf.

(c) 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

(d) 4th Bn, 8th Inf.

(e) 1st Tank Troop, 1st Cav Sqdn OPCON.

(f) 35th Ranger Bn OPCON.

9. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. 7th Air Force (Logistical Support).

b. 1st Logistical Command (Logistical Support).

c. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (Close Air Support).

d. II FFORCEV Arty (GS)

(1) 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (-) (155mm SP) Attached 1st Inf Div.

(2) 2d Bn, 32d Artillery (-) (8"/175mm SP) GSR.

(3) A Btry, 6th Bn, 77th Artillery (175mm SP) GSR.

(4) 5th Bn, 7d Artillery (ARVN) Attached.

e. 12th Combat Aviation Group (Army Aviation Support).

f. 79th Engr Group (GS).

g. ARVN

(1) 2d Riverine Co (Navy).

(2) 30th River Assault Group (Navy).

(3) 29th Boat Co (Regional Force).

(4) 28th Boat Co (Regional Force).

(5) 35th Boat Co (Regional Force).

h. Narrative

(1) Logistical support furnished by 7th Air Force provided both troop lift and resupply. Support was highly effective and timely throughout the operation.

(2) Logistical support furnished by 1st Logistical Command provided continual resupply of participating combat battalions. Daily convoys were conducted from SAIGON to CU CHI and LAI KHE to relieve airlift requirements.

(3) Close air support was provided by 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. Both preplanned and immediate air support were furnished thru the Direct Air Request Net. Immediate air requests were met with a minimum of delay by carefully scheduling, and strikes to provide constant air coverage. Assisting flare penetration aircraft were particularly effective.

(4) II Field Force Vietnam Artillery provided general support artillery for 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division. The 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (Abn) provided direct support for both divisions. Very effective results were achieved by use of the twin 40mm guns and the quad .50 cal machine guns in a direct support role.

(5) The 7th Engineer Group [illegible] participated in clearing landing zones, fire lanes and roadways plus the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and villages throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, engineer support from the 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) was utilized to prepare the refugee village at THU CUONG to accommodate approximately six thousand additional refugees. The 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) erected tents for the village.

(6) The [illegible] were used to [illegible] patrolling and searching the waterways within the [illegible]. The firepower of the armed boats enabled the refugees to be evacuated and resettled without interference.

10. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Estimate of Situation Prior to Operation:

(1) Prior to the initiation of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the

enemy order of battle in the area of operations included the headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region IV. The destruction of the headquarters was a principle objective of the operation. Large numbers of main force troops were not expected to be encountered nor was a large VC KIA body count expected.

(2) In addition to political and military affairs committees of Military Region IV which were believed to be at separate locations within the operational area, the principle VC units were believed to be limited to the 272d Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV, the Phu Loi Local Force Battalion plus three local force companies. Numerous reports indicated the THANH DIEN FOREST and IRON TRIANGLE to be a major base area as well as the location of Military Region IV. The area was known to contain strongly fortified positions with the routes of approach mined and booby trapped. The suspected location of the 272d Regiment presented a threat during the initial stages of the operation but as the operation progressed the regiment displaced from the area of operations to the north. Further, it was believed that the area of operations included the BINH DUONG (THU DAU MOT) VC Provincial Committee and the BEN CAT VC District Committee. Headquarters Military Region IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of available information, it appeared that the Headquarters of Military Region IV and the political committee generally operated in an area bounded by XT6437, XT6637, XT6733 and XT6433 and probably would be located in grid square XT6634. The military affairs committee generally operated in the area bounded by XT6432, XT6038, XT6928 and XT6225 and probably [illegible].

b. Estimate of Disposition Prior to Operation:

(1) Based on an analysis of intelligence summaries, reports, and the location of captured VC documents, it is believed that portions of the military sections, political party sections and the rear service elements of Military Region IV, BINH DUONG Province, BEN CAT District and CU CHI District were certainly disrupted, if not destroyed. These sections, which are a component part of the VC infrastructure, as well as

the military units [illegible] the sighting the area as follows: Military Region IV sections on both sides of the SAIGON River vicinity XT6528; BINH DUONG Provincial section near BEN SUC Village (XT5834); BEN CAT District elements in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE vicinity XT7027; and the CU CHI District elements in the vicinity of BEN CO (XT7091).

(2) As was expected, main force elements were not contacted in large numbers. The 1st, 7th and 9th [illegible] Military Region IV did not conduct [illegible]. Apparently they had been directed to [illegible]. A section of the 2d Battalion (BEN CAT District [illegible]) was contacted briefly on 8 and 9 January in the [illegible]. The 1st and 5th Battalions [illegible] through some documents concerning the 1st Battalion [illegible] in the western portion of the operational area.

(3) A comprehensive [illegible] was certainly disrupted or destroyed as attested to by the [illegible], medical supplies, weapons, ammunition, [illegible], and building supplies [illegible]. The majority of these supplies probably had been [illegible] by the Region or Province since only a few elements of the Service Group [illegible] were identified from documents, IWs, or ralliers [illegible] in the area.

(4) A review of the interrogation reports from the ralliers, prisoners and detainees resulting from the operation indicated the majority were from VC infrastructure in and around the area. Two of the 832 ralliers and [illegible] were [illegible] approximately [illegible] of the [illegible] District. Personnel from [illegible] laborers account for the second largest category, about [illegible]%. Only a few top level cadre were identified in interrogation reports. These significant personalities were an executive officer of TAY NINH Military School, a captain from Military Region IV Political Staff Section, a lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two NVA political cadre. These

personnel were evacuated to the Combined Military Intelligence Center or were hospitalized. A listing of the various catagories of ralliers and PWs follows:

	Rallier	PW 1st Inf Div	PW 25th Inf Div	Total
Propaganda - Education	24	17	1	42
Finance	11	10	0	21
Youth Associations	23	4	0	27
Rear Services	33	13	0	46
Guerillas	70	85	17	372
Farmers Associations	9	9	2	100
Laborers	70	27	5	102
Medical	16	5	4	25
Commo-Liaison	5	3	0	8
Miscellaneous	57	20	10	87
TOTAL	646	197	39	832

(5) Based primarily on a study of the location of captured documents, the following VC installations or units have been identified as having operated in or, at least, were located in the area during the course of the operation:

COSVN

Three communication-liaison stations

C139 Procurement/Transportation Company of 331 Rear Service Group.

Military Region IV

M 1 Military Staff Section Elements

M 2 Military Intelligence Section

M 7 Signal Section

Political Staff Section Elements

Political Cadre Section Office

Elements of Security Section

Military Region IV Units

J-12 Medical Supply Unit

J-13 QM/Ordnance Supply Unit

G-20 Reconnaissance Company

G-50 Signal Company

Elements of 1st Battalion, Military Region IV

Headquarters Elements 67A Sapper Battalion

BINH DUONG (THU DAU MOT) Province

Current Affairs Office

Party Section Office

NFLSVN Front Section

Rear Service Staff

Civil Health Section/Hospital

BEN CAT District

Military Affairs Committee

District Party Headquarters

C 61 Local Force Unit

CU CHI District

District Headquarters

TAY NINH Province

Security Section Elements

(6) Enemy Installations.

In preparation for this operation, all major unit headquarters utilized a number of ADP machine run "print outs" of VC base camps, fortifications, supply depots and other installations within the area of interest based on reports from a wide variety of sources. These data summaries were compiled by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division and contained extensive information. The value of [illegible] amplified by the experience of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. This unit encountered a total of 177 reported facilities which ranged from foxholes to bunkers and tunnel complexes to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with previously known intelligence information showed that 156, or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a recorded installation. The average distance was about 200 meters. The value of such a list is apparent and should be used

as a starting point in the search of any area.

c. Terrain and Weather.

(1) Terrain:

Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provided the most favorable conditions for military operations. It was a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement was canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement were very sensitive to precipitation. The terrain was carefully analyzed in preparation for the operation. This information was found to be substantially correct and is not duplicated here as it is included in the intelligence annex to the CEDAR FALLS Operation order.

(2) Weather:

(a) General.

During January, the northeast monsoon develops to its fullest extent. Most cloudiness was along the east coast with the interior regions of the III CTZ having relatively clear skies and little precipitation. During this period, at a minimum, ceilings were generally nonexistent and visibilities were good except in periods of early morning fog.

(b) Cloudiness, Visibilities and Precipitation.

During the first ten days of this operation a light to moderate northeasterly flow of dry stable air prevailed over the area. Sky conditions were generally partly cloudy with surface visibilities unrestricted. No precipitation was reported. During the last ten days of the operation [illegible] moist air prevailed over the area causing some partly cloudy to mostly cloudy skies. Occasional light rain occurred with 3000 foot ceilings on a few days. A few afternoon and evening rainshowers also occurred on a few days causing some 3000 foot ceilings. Patchy area of early morning ground fog occurred during this last ten day period. Minimum visibilities were one to three miles in ground fog improving by 0900H to ten miles.

(c) Temperatures.

The daily maximum temperatures varied from 80 to 95 degrees. The daily minimum temperatures varied from 59 to 70 degrees.

(d) Soil Conditions.

Soil conditions were relatively dry during the first ten days of the operations. During the last ten days of the operation the soil conditions varied from dry to wet in accordance with local rainfall.

(e) Effects on Friendly Forces.

During the first ten days of the operation the weather had no adverse effect on friendly forces. During the last ten days, the main effect of weather conditions was to hinder early morning air operations due to the existence of early morning ground fog. The fog normally lifted by [illegible] and the visibilities were then unrestricted.

d. An evaluation of the population of the CEDAR FALLS area concluded the people were either VC controlled civilians or low level VC cadre and guerillas who occupied positions within the hamlet and village infrastructures. Within the VC civilian element the predominant attitude was one of apathy toward the VC cause and anxiety to escape the hazards inherent in living in a VC controlled area. These civilians later proved cooperative during interrogation and responded with timely information. Most of the ralliers had some knowledge of the Chieu Hoi program, and they expressed discontent with the hardships of VC life and a desire to return to their families. In the past most low level guerillas preferred to remain silent and be grouped as refugees. However, these guerillas were no longer [illegible] propaganda appeals from the VC [illegible] and kind of treatment accorded Hoi Chi Chi. Most ralliers were visibly affected by the loss of their homes but after a short time were calm and cooperative.

e. There were no RVNAF engaged in the operation other than US forces; however, US forces were supported by eight ARVN infantry battalions, one ARVN tank troop, two VNN boat units and three Regional Force boat companies.

11. (c) MISSION: II FORCE attacks the THAN DIEN Forestry

Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to destroy enemy forces, infrastructure, installations and Military Region IV Headquarters; evacuates civilian population and establishes the IRON TRIANGLE as a specified strike zone to preclude its future use as a support base for Viet Cong operation.

12. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: a. II FFORCEV attacks with two US infantry divisions (reinforced) with ARVN units in support to seal the IRON TRIANGLE, trap enemy forces, and destroy Viet Cong installations.

b. The operation was conducted in two phases:

(1) Phase I (5 Jan - 8 Jan 67) - Deceptive deployment of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations on the flanks of the IRON TRIANGLE. On D-day (8 Jan) an air assault to seal and search BEN SUC (XT5833). Further positioning of forces in blocking positions and in staging areas around the IRON TRIANGLE.

(2) Phase II (9 Jan - 26 Jan 67) - On 9 Jan, an armored attack west from BEN CAT (XT7433) to cut the IRON TRIANGLE in half, simultaneous air assaults in an arc around the THANH DIEN Forest from BEN CAT to BEN SUC to complete the northern half of the encirclement of the objective. All forces attacking 9 Jan to search and destroy south through entire objective to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers (XT7520). All civilians to be interrogated and evacuated from the area. Area to be cleared with Rome plows and tunnel destruction stressed. Phase II to last two to three weeks.

13. (C) EXECUTION: a. Planning. The jungle at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers (center at XT7030) had long been considered by II FFORCEV as a possible target for a major operation. The area had been developed by the enemy because of its location 25 kilometers north of SAIGON as the headquarters of Military Region IV and a base of operations against the capital. Nicknamed the IRON TRIANGLE, it had last been penetrated in October 1965 by the 173d Airborne Brigade. That operation had resulted in hard fighting as strong enemy forces had defended their base. Intelligence since then

had confirmed the TRIANGLE's continued use as headquarters of Military Region IV. 1st Infantry Division operations along Highway 13 on the eastern flank of the IRON TRIANGLE had frequently made contact. Similarly, 25th Infantry Division on the western flank often had operated in the FIL HOL Plantation (XT6719) and HO DO Woods (XT6129). Here, too, enemy forces were contacted repeatedly. The IRON TRIANGLE, characterized as "a dagger pointed at SAIGON", was clearly an important enemy center for controlling and supporting guerilla and terrorist operations. It was a target to be attacked decisively and in force in order to tear apart and neutralize the enemy control structure. As II FFORCEV troop strength built up in the latter half of 1966, planning was begun for a powerful strike into the IRON TRIANGLE. At a planning meeting in September, CG, II FFORCEV discussed the possibility of operations into the TRIANGLE with COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV suggested a coordinated operation [illegible] on both sides of the SAIGON River. He envisioned troops moving into positions on one side of the river to form an anvil and then a rapid move on the other side to hammer the enemy against the anvil. COMUSMACV also discussed the need for extensive engineer clearing, using Rome plows to strip the area and deprive the enemy of concealment. In November 1966, CG, II FFORCEV directed that planning begin for a massive offensive into the IRON TRIANGLE. Operation Plan ORLANDO was drawn up and intelligence collection from the objective area continued. In early December 1966, after a conference with J2, MACV, CG, II FFORCEV furnished further planning guidance: The TRIANGLE was to be attacked violently and decisively in January 1967 with all forces available [illegible] operations would jeopardize the forces. The anvil would be positioned first, and the hammer then swung through the IRON TRIANGLE. The objective area was to be sealed tightly throughout the operation to prevent enemy escape. The TRIANGLE itself was to be secured for enemy installations, cleared of all civilians, stripped of concealment, and declared a specified strike zone. This multidivision offensive was to be the first operation planned and controlled by II FFORCEV as a corps

operation. OPLAN 93-66 (Operation CEDAR FALLS), embodying these concepts, was published on 12 December 1966.

b. Security and Deception. From the first planning conference, strict security measures were enforced to prevent disclosure of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The planning group was held to a minimum within II FFORCEV Headquarters, and wherever possible, preparations were made without specifically identifying them with CEDAR FALLS. For example, all commanders were instructed on 19 December 1966 to minimize helicopter operations during the Christmas - New Year periods in order to increase availability for operations during January. Even the unprecedented mass evacuation of civilians from the area was not disclosed before the operation. Planning for the transportation and housing of refugees was coordinated only with Mr. John Vann, Director of Region III, Office of Civilian Operations. Although supplies were earmarked for shipment to a refugee center at PHU CUONG, no construction or prestocking was started until CEDAR FALLS had commenced. CG, II FFORCEV personally briefed CG, III Corps (ARVN) on 6 January 1967. ARVN troop participation was approved at that time with the mission to support US blocking forces, to secure and transport civilian evacuees, and to support US security forces in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. CG, III Corps (ARVN) assisted in maintaining security by restricting dissemination of information on CEDAR FALLS. Deception was achieved by deploying troops within striking distance of the IRON TRIANGLE under the guise of small scale, local operations. Both 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division began deceptive deployment on 5 January [illegible] DEANE (1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), [illegible], 4th Cavalry (-); and 35th Ranger Bn (ARVN)) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730H under 1st Division control. The task force searched for the enemy in the CAU DINH Jungle (XT7823) between Highway 13 and the THI TINH River. When NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500H, 7 January, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. 25th Infantry Division deployed 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt) from TAY NINH to the HO BO

Woods as part of Operation PITCHBURG. PITCHFORK has been a continuing operation in the TAY NINH area, but on 5 January the Brigade CP and trains moved to TRUNG LAP (XT5900), southwest of the IRON TRIANGLE. In the next two days, the brigade shifted forces out of TAY NINH and deployed four battalions into the HO BO Woods. These battalions, close to the west bank of the SAIGON River, were in position by 7 January to support CEDAR FALLS. Both PITCHBURG and NIAGARA FALLS made light enemy contacts, but their significance lay in the initial deceptive deployment of components of the anvil, or blocking forces for CEDAR FALLS. This deployment was to be completed on 8 January.

c. 8 January (Day). IT PROVIDE Tactical Command Post for Operation CEDAR FALLS opened at [illegible] at LONG BINH (YT0511). Twenty battalions organized in five brigades under 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions deployed around the IRON TRIANGLE during the day, completing the anvil and positioning the hammer and encirclement forces. 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved first, landing Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry by air assault at 0645H. The company assaulted into the rice fields at the junction of the VAM CO and THI TINH Rivers (XT738199) and immediately came under small arms fire in the landing zone, suffering light casualties. The landing zone was quickly secured. Simultaneously, Company C was making an air assault one kilometer to the south. These landings anchored the southeastern flank of the 25th Infantry Division. To the west of this action, 2d Brigade's other two battalions, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 34th Armor (-), searched northeast out of CU CHI through the FIL HOL Plantation. By nightfall, these battalions [illegible] to five hundred meters south of the SAIGON River. Northwest of 2d Brigade, 196th Brigade continued searching the HO BO Woods. All battalions of the 2d and 196th Brigades made light contact resulting in the discovery of small stores of enemy rice and munitions. By nightfall of 8 January, the 25th Infantry Division anvil was in place along the SAIGON River from the river junction (XT7500) northwest through the FIL HOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods. To the northwest of the HO BO Woods,

2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division launched 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry by air assault to seal the village of BEN SUC (XT5833). The entire battalion landed within the village in one and one half minutes and achieved complete surprise. No preparation fires were used, and the light small arms fire that was received was quickly suppressed. As the battalion began to move out of the village, artillery and air strikes were called in on suspected enemy positions. The 1st Division Task Force Revolutionary Development (TFRD) and 3d Bn, 8th Infantry (ARVN) landed north and south of the village. By 0847H the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry had completely sealed off BEN SUC and the search by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) began. 2d Brigade operations killed forty VC during the day and found large stores of rice, uniforms, and cloth in and around BEN SUC. TFRD, with ARVN assistance, began screening the population and preparing them for evacuation. The brigade CP was established at BEN SUC at 1030H. The 1st Bn, 18th Infantry remained at DAU TIENG. 3d Brigade, 1st Division and TF DEANE (-), the hammer force for CEDAR FALLS, moved into staging areas at DAU TIENG, LAI KHE, BEN CAT and PHU LOI. From these bases, they prepared to swing into the TRIANGLE on 9 January. 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Abn), 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, remained in their blocking positions east of the TRIANGLE along the THI TINH and SAIGON Rivers. By the end of 8 January, II FFORCEV had completed the anvil and readied the hammer. The smash into the headquarters base of Military Region IV started on 9 January.

4. 9 January (D+1). The hammer forces of 1st Division struck at 0800H with simultaneous attacks in the center and north of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 11th Armored Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, drove west out of BEN CAT across the center of the TRIANGLE cutting a belt from the THI TINH River at BEN CAT to the SAIGON River at RACH BAP (XT6630). The regiment seized a base for artillery (XT6731) north of RACH BAP, searched the surrounding area, and secured engineer clearing operations in the TRIANGLE. In the north, four battalions of 3d Brigade, 1st Division air assaulted into landing zones around the north and

northwest edges of THANH DIEN Forest Reserve, the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The initial battalion (1st Battalion, 2d Infantry) touched down at 0800H, with the other three landing in succession. All the landings were unopposed. The battalions linked up and commenced search operations from blocking positions in the vicinity of the landing zones. They immediately began to uncover enemy supplies, the most important being 75 tons of loose rice found in a tunnel by 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 709 hand grenades in barrels discovered by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. Only two small contacts (3 to 4 men each) were made during the day's search. TF DEANE air assaulted 2d and 4th Battalions (Abn), 503d Infantry into the eastern edge of the THANH DIEN Forest in a southern extension of the of the 3d Brigade landings. The two battalions linked up with 3d Brigade at 1140H, established blocking positions, and searched into the forest. To the south and east of their positions, Company D, 16th Armor (reinforced with one rifle company) established a screen along the edge of the forest to prevent enemy escape. These forces made no contact during the day nor did the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) or the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) in the blocking positions along the THI TINH River. Around BEN SUC, TFRD and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) continued to search and screen the population. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attempted an air assault east of the village at 1605H but was diverted to land at BEN SUC when mines were found in their primary landing zone. The 25th Infantry Division searched actively along the west bank of the SAIGON River. Both the 2d Brigade and the 196th Brigade made light contacts with small, scattered groups of enemy. Company B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor made the largest kill at 1645 hours. A raft with fifteen VC was sighted on the SAIGON River and all were killed with 90mm gun fire. Light contact continued after dark as the 25th Division anvil forces blocked enemy movements from the IRON TRIANGLE. The operations of 9 January had tightly sealed the IRON TRIANGLE. The hammer forces of II FFORCEV started their swing into the objective area that would smash the enemy base.

e. 10 January (D+2). II FFORCEV units continued to search out and kill small groups of the enemy, finding increasingly large amounts of supplies. 3d Brigade, 1st Division in the THANH DIEN Forest was reinforced by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, and by an engineer clearing task force. 2d Brigade in BEN SUC was supported by a thirty truck convoy from LAI KHE that arrived at BEN SUC to transport refugees out of the village via BEN CAT. ARVN 30th River Assault Group (RAG) landed at BEN SUC in the afternoon with 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) aboard. The airborne troops were to relieve the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry of the seal mission and assist in securing and screening the population of BEN SUC and the nearby villages while the RAG boats were to transport refugees to the camp at PHU CUONG. The search forces of 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and TF DEANE found more rice and 118 small arms in several caches. Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day. Similarly, 25th Division had light contact during the day and into the night. Small enemy supply points were uncovered and many bunkers and tunnels were destroyed. 2d Bn, 7th Infantry (ARVN) supported 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division along the SAIGON River. By 1200H, 10 January, 8th Regiment (ARVN) forces relieved 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry of its blocking mission east of the TRI TIEN River. The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) became OPCON to the 8th Regiment. By the end of 10 January, II FFORCEV was well into the IRON TRIANGLE and operations were going according to plan. The enemy had lost 161 KIA (BC), 29 captured and 272 detained. US losses were 17 KIA and 98 WIA. Captured enemy bases contained 217 weapons, quantities of ammunition, 210 tons of rice, 6,800 uniforms and miscellaneous supplies of all types from fish sauce to printing presses. At 1700H, 10 January, the first news reports on CEDAR FALLS were released.

f. 11 - 26 Jan 67. On the morning of 11 January, CG, II FFORCEV sent a message to the Commanding Generals of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions congratulating them on achieving initial surprise and on the encouraging results of Operation CEDAR FALLS. He concluded by saying, "...I want a thorough search to be made of areas of

responsibility... ...I particularly desire that the IRON TRIANGLE be completely covered." It was in the spirit of this message that CEDAR FALLS was carried out for the next sixteen days. Both divisions searched meticulously, uncovering increasing amounts of supplies and stripping the IRON TRIANGLE area of its value to the enemy. Enemy defenses were weak and disorganized and had evidently been shattered by the mass and surprise of the attack. Mines, booby traps, and snipers were encountered but there were no organized defenses or counterattacks by enemy forces. The enemy had evidently ordered units to disperse and try to escape. Because of the tight seal around the TRIANGLE, this was difficult. As the operation continued, the number of ralliers grew well beyond previous totals. PSYOP field teams effectively exploited these ralliers by printing rapid reaction leaflets containing surrender appeals from the ralliers to their VC friends. Five hundred eighteen ralliers and two hundred thirteen PW were taken. These figures totaled 731; more than the 720 VC body count. This indicated that the enemy was defeated, trapped and demoralized in his own base area. The evacuation of all civilians from BEN SUC and other villages in the IRON TRIANGLE continued through 16 January. The ARVN Airborne Battalions and River Assault Groups were most valuable during the civilian evacuation operations. The refugees, with their livestock and most of their personal possessions, were evacuated to PHU CUONG by military transportation. Approximately 3,000 were transported by truck convoys through BEN CAT while another 3,000 were either flown out in CH47s or transported down the SAIGON River in the boats of the River Assault Groups. This unprecedented mass evacuation, executed on short notice due to security restriction, required a tremendous effort by US and ARVN military and civilian agencies. It resulted in a humane and efficient evacuation that deprived the enemy of a major resource in the IRON TRIANGLE. 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) relieved 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry of the BEN SUC seal missions. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was then committed to a search of the IRON TRIANGLE thus raising the 1st Division search

force to nine infantry battalions and three armored cavalry squadrons. This large force combed the enemy sanctuary day after day, finding huge quantities of rice and hundreds of documents, destroying enemy tunnels and bunkers and stripping trees and underbrush along roads and trails. 1st Division forces began gradually withdrawing from CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. By 18 January, the 2d and 3d Brigades had withdrawn from the IRON TRIANGLE. TF DEANE continued the search with three infantry battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons and engineer forces until 24 January when it departed for its base camps. 1st Infantry Division continued tunnel exploration, demolitions and clearing in the TRIANGLE with TF FIVE, a composite force of armored cavalry, engineers and infantry. 25th Infantry Division continued to search the enemy base areas in the HO BO Woods and FIL HOL Plantation while blocking enemy escape routes out of the IRON TRIANGLE. Company B, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mech) engaged an enemy platoon on 13 January and Company C, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry destroyed a sampan with thirteen VC aboard on 16 January. However, most contacts were with small scattered groups attempting to escape. Buddy operations, employing US troops and the 5th River Assault Group (ARVN), patrolled both banks of the SAIGON River to help seal off the TRIANGLE. Saturating the area with nine maneuver battalions (including 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, ARVN), the 25th Infantry Division destroyed many enemy supplies and fortifications. The division's operations proved so profitable that the 2d Brigade continued to search the area as part of Operation ALA MOANA after the termination of CEDAR FALLS on 26 January 1967. In nineteen days, TF Field Force Vietnam converted the IRON TRIANGLE from a safe haven to a deathtrap, and then to a military desert. Years of work spent tunnelling and hoarding supplies were nullified. The vital civilian population was removed, thus making any enemy efforts to rebuild doubly difficult. Concealment, particularly along lines of communications, was stripped away, baring the area to future surveillance. Finally, the area was designated a specified strike zone so that it could be interdicted with ease should the enemy attempt to

rebuild. In Operation CEDAR FALLS, a strategic enemy base was decisively engaged and destroyed.

14. (C) RESULTS:

a. US LOSSES: 72 KIA, 327 WIA.

Damaged: 9 APC's, 2 - ¼ ton trucks, 2 LOH, 3 tanks, 1 tank dozer.

Destroyed: 3 APC's, 1 tank.

b. ARVN LOSSES:

(1) ARVN: 11 KIA, 8 WIA, 3 Individual weapons lost.

(2) CP/PFL: None.

(3) Navy: None.

c. VC LOSSES: 770 KIA (BC), 213 PW's, 518 ralliers, 51 detainees, 5967 returnees, 83 crew served weapons, 555 individual weapons, 474 artillery and mortar rounds, 1960 grenades, 60,323 rounds small arms ammunition, 391 assorted mines, 1111 bunkers, 424 tunnels, 509 structures, 3702 tons rice, more than 500,000 pages of assorted documents.

d. Not all air strikes and B-52 strikes were followed up by ground forces; however, visual reconnaissance was conducted in all cases.

e. Credited to the 5th Inf Div (ARVN) are 18 VC KIA, 70 PW's, 25 ralliers and 31 weapons captured. (These figures not included in C, above).

15. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. a. Supply:

(1) Ammunition management. Effective control over ammunition under ASR can be maintained only when accurate issue data is reported. In the course of this operation, it became apparent that the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) at LAI KHE was not receiving ASR ammunition transactions and that sizable issues had been made but not debited against any allocations. During a liaison visit to LAI KHE to determine the cause of the problem, the OIC of the Ammunition Point stated that he had not been instructed to report issue of all ASR ammunition. In future operations employing FSA prior coordination must be effected to determine required reports and reporting channels. It should be noted that most units lived within the ASR on controlled ammunition. Only 105mm HE and illumination ASR of the major caliber items were exceeded.

(2) Water for Evacuees and Refugees. Prior to the operation, a request was received from II FFORCEV G5 for water trailers to supply cooking and drinking water for 6,000 refugees from the area of operations. The G4 office established an initial requirement for two 5,000 gallon simi-trailers, six 400 gallon tankers and six 400 gallon trailers for water delivery. As the refugee population began to expand into thousands, it became apparent that this would not be adequate. A message was dispatched to USARV the night of 12 January requesting an additional 5,000 gallon tanker. At 0730H the following morning, it was determined that there were none in the supply depot and that the tanker would have to be obtained from some unit on a loan basis. The tanker was obtained from 64th QM Bn and transported from BEN CAT to PHU LOI and placed in service. 1st Infantry Division also obtained nine additional 400 gallon trailers to support the operations.

(3) Transportation. Airlift of personnel, equipment and supplies functioned well. Demands placed on US Army Support Command, Saigon, were met. USAID requested the use of trucks for 7 days beginning 9 January 1967 to assist in the establishment of the refugee center. Ten trucks were provided for the period requested; however, the requirement for trucks continued until 2 February 1967.

(4) Maintenance. There were no significant or unique maintenance problems called to the attention of this headquarters during the operation. The maintenance problems that were encountered prevailed due to the composition and location of the supported forces. The support elements, limited in the number of support teams they could provide, found it difficult to provide on-site maintenance at all locations with respect to manpower and repair parts. Equipment downtime was further prolonged due to insecure road nets used for delivery of repair parts or replacement of end items.

16. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: a. ARVN Navy and RF boat companies were utilized for evacuation of captured equipment and resettling of refugees. The boats provided their own security during

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river convoys. In addition, during the latter stage of the exercise, the 25th Division used the boats for detailed search by US troops of canals and streams leading into the main river system. This proved extremely effective in locating VC bodies killed by air and artillery strikes in inaccessible areas.

b. The engineer task force of 54 bulldozers and 4 Rome plows performed an essential role in the success of the operation. Part of the overall mission was to destroy bunkers and tunnels and to cut road ways and landing zones for future operations in the IRON TRIANGLE. The engineer task force followed the 11th ACR into the battle area on D+1 when the 11th ACR attacked west from BEN CAT.

c. Tunnel destruction was very effective on large tunnel complexes. This was accomplished by first sealing the tunnels then stringing demolition charges throughout the tunnel system. This was followed by injecting acetylene into the complex and detonating the charges.

d. Quad .50 cal machine guns from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery were mounted on Vietnamese River Assault Boats and used to control the junction of the SAIGON and THI TINH rivers. The fire power of these weapons plus the mobility of the assault boats proved an effective deterrent to VC use of the waterway.

e. Armor was effectively employed in a blocking role by the 25th Division west of the SAIGON River and by the 1st Division in employment of the 11th ACR in both screening and search and destroy operations.

17. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: a. Surprise. Security in planning and deception in deployment resulted in complete surprise. The light initial contact and the lack of a well coordinated defense indicated that not only did the enemy not expect our attack but was unable to react when it came. The final casualty figures show that he had been in the IRON TRIANGLE in considerable strength, despite his weak defense.

b. Mass. II FFORCEV quickly and effectively sealed and thoroughly searched the objective area by using a higher troop density than has been possible before. This greatly improved the effectiveness of the cordon and the search as indicated by the very high proportion of ralliers.

These men could neither hide nor escape; their choice was to surrender. The price paid for massing II FFORCEV was acceptable. There was no loss of security in other areas because of the troop concentration for CEDAR FALLS. Further, the density of troops reduced the total time required for the search operation.

c. Cooperation. Cooperation between US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies was excellent. This was particularly true in the evacuation of the civilian population. Both the ARVN airborne units and the River Assault Groups provided invaluable assistance in securing and transporting the refugees. Civilian and military personnel of both nations worked in close harmony to organize and build the PHU CUONG refugee camp on very short notice. On the purely military side, ARVN units contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the cordon. The ARVN River Assault Groups made a unique contribution by their patrolling along the river lines.

d. Psychological Operations. In spite of the security limitations placed on preparations, psychological operations rapidly exploited the initial success of CEDAR FALLS. They were particularly effective in bringing to the trapped enemy the hopelessness of his situation. The CHIEU HOI program provided him with an acceptable alternative at a great reduction in friendly losses.

e. Effects on Enemy. (1) A major portion of the enemy's base and control center for operations against the Capital Military District has been destroyed. This represents the loss of an investment of twenty years. Enemy facilities and fortifications were destroyed, [illegible] killed, 555 individual weapons and 23 crew served weapons captured.

(2) Over 3700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. This is enough to feed five fully manned regiments for a year. More significant than the loss itself is the resultant diversion of manpower to reconstitute his stores.

(3) All of the civilian inhabitants of the area, some 6000, plus their livestock were evacuated. This will deny the enemy food, manpower, revenue, transportation and intelligence.

(4) The capture of over 500,000 separate pages of documents, including crypto material, has given us valuable intelligence. The enemy's security programs have been compromised to include records continuity.

(5) The enemy's offensive capability against the Capital Military District has been reduced by loss of personnel, equipment and facilities.

(6) Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in North Vietnam, COSVN and the VC dominated populace will have a serious psychological impact. They must reevaluate the relative capabilities of their forces as opposed to ours.

JONATHAN O. SEAMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

123

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II FFORCEV
A-1450-66

HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
LONG BINH (YT052111) RVN
121800H Dec 66
OR

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, sheets 6231 I, II; 6230 I; 6331 III, IV and 6330 IV.
b. OPLAN 16-66 (Op UNIONTOWN) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 101200H Jun 66.
c. OPLAN 52-66 (Op FAIRFAX) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 181200H Nov 66.

1. (C) (~~S-NF~~) SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence.
   b. Friendly Forces:
      (1) See current II FFORCEV SITREPS.
      (2) 7th Air Force provides logistical support.
      (3) 1st Log Cmd provides logistical support.
      (4) USAECV (P) provides engineer support.
   c. Assumptions:
      (1) That enemy activity during Op CEDAR FALLS will permit US base camps and installations to be secured with minimum forces as follows:
         (a) CU CHI - 1 bn.
         (b) PHUOC VINH - 1 bn.
         (c) LAI KHE - 1 bn.
         (d) BIEN HOA/LONG BINH - 1 bn (Op UNIONTOWN).
         (e) LONG GIAO - 1 sqdn.
         (f) TAY NINH - 1 bn.
         (g) DAU TIENG - 1 bn.
      (2) That MACV will release 173d Abn Bde (Sep) from the General Reserve for participation in this operation.

2. (C) (~~S-NF~~) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operations vic THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. (C) (~~S-NF~~) EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations:
      (1) This operation employs elements of two US div (reinf) to conduct S&D operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and THANH DINH Forestry Reserve area and to block the escape of VC from the area.
      (2) The operation will be conducted in two phases:
         (a) Phase I (D-Day) - limited positioning of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations in HO BO Woods, FIL HOL Plantation, and vic BEN CAT.
         (b) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) - an airmobile assault in the northern portion of the area of operation and simultaneous positioning of a blocking force along the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers on D+1. Following the assault, S&D operations will be conducted by the assault force south to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers. Blocking forces will be positioned by foot and/or vehicle on D+1. Mechanized/armor forces will be used to block VC escape routes on the southeastern and southwestern flanks of the assault force. Particular attention will be devoted to searching built up areas, suspected location of

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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, and thorough interrogation of personnel found therein. Tunnel destruction and clearing of areas using Rome Plows and bulldozers will be stressed. All inhabitants of area to be searched will be interrogated and, depending on their legal status, processed through VN or US military channels. It is anticipated that this phase will last from two to three weeks.

b. 1st Inf Div:
   (1) Attachments and Detachments:
      (a) 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON effective D-Day.
      (b) 11th ACR (- one sqdn). OPCON effective D-1.
      (c) One combat engr bn, 79th Engr Gp. Direct support effective D-1.
      (d) Attached. One bn, 199th Lt Inf Bde, effective D-1.
      (e) Detached. Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
   (2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operations.
   (3) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) (See Annex B):
      (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking force will be positioned along east bank of THI TINH River from vic XT6835 to vic XT7620 to seal AO (Pan ZULU).
      (b) Conduct airmobile assault into northern position of AO (Pan XRAY).
      (c) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
      (d) Conduct S&D operations to the south in zone to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers.
      (e) The LOC to BEN CAT and LAI KHE will be secured and opened daily for log support.
      (f) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (g) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).

c. 9th Inf Div:
   (1) Continue current mission.
   (2) Be prepared to deploy one bn anywhere in II FFORCEV area.

d. 25th Inf Div:
   (1) Attachments and Detachments. OPCON 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
   (2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operation.
   (3) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) (See Annex B):
      (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking forces will be positioned along west bank of SAIGON River from vic XT5633 to vic XT7520 to seal AO (Pan YANKEE).
      (b) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
      (c) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (d) Continue Op FAIRFAX and Op LANIKAL.
      (e) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (f) Provide and maintain one inf bde as II FFORCEV Reserve.

e. 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-Day.

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

f. 196th Lt Inf Bde (Sep):
   (1) Assume Op UNIONTOWN on D-1.
   (2) Provide one bn to 1st Inf Div to secure PHUOC VINH on D-1.
   (3) Continue current mission.

g. 11th ACR:
   (1) Regiment minus one sqdn OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-1.
   (2) One sqdn continue current mission vic LONG GIAO.

h. 1st ATF. Continue current mission.

i. 2d Bn, 34th Armor. OPCON 25th Inf Div effective D-1.

j. II FFORCEV Arty. Within capabilities support 1st Inf Div and 25th Inf Div. (See Annex C - Fire Support)

k. 12th Avn Gp:
   (1) Provide maximum airlift capability on D+1 to position up to two bde TF on northern boundary of 1st Inf Div zone.
   (2) Provide support as required (see Coordinating Instructions).

l. 79th Engr Gp. Provide one engr bn direct support to 1st Inf Div for support during search operations. It is anticipated primary tasks will include tunnel search/destruction and jungle clearing operations.

m. II FFORCEV Reserve:
   (1) Bde, 25th Inf Div.
   (2) Bn, 9th Inf Div.

n. Coordinating Instructions:
   (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
   (2) Requests for air support to be submitted to this HQ, ATTN: G3 Air.
   (3) Boundaries - see Annex B.
   (4) Coordination with Vietnamese nationals or US advisors will NOT be made prior to D-1.
   (5) The search area will be declared a free fire zone upon completion of operation.
   (6) All noncombatants in the area of operations east of the SAIGON River and west of the THI TINH River will be evacuated. Noncombatants released following interrogation will be turned over to the appropriate district chief for resettlement. When feasible, the personal belongings and livestock of noncombatants should be evacuated with the personnel.
   (7) Unit commanders will provide assistance to the district chief to care for noncombatants until USAID is able to assume this function.
   (8) Units will conduct tactical PSYOP commencing D+1. Themes and target audiences will be identified as the tactical situation develops. Rapid reaction leaflets will be [illegible] priority. Leaflets designed for [illegible] will not be requested or printed prior to D-Day. Maximum use will be made of standard leaflets during the operation.
   (9) Handling and classifying PW and detainees. All innocent civilians, returnees, PW and civil defendants apprehended or in US custody will be handled and classified IAW MACV Dir 190-3, dated 29 Oct 66 and MACV Dir 20-5, dated 21 Sep 66.
   (10) Control of traffic on THI TINH River is the responsibility of the 1st Inf Div.
   (11) Control of traffic on the SAIGON River is the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

   a. Admin O 4-66, HQ, USASC, dtd 25 Oct 66 in effect.

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

b. Requests for log support beyond own capability are to be submitted to 1st Log Cmd, info this HQ, ATTN: G4.

c. ASR is in effect.

5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL.

a. Signal. Current SOI remains in effect.

b. Command. II FFORCEV CP - no change.

Acknowledge.

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ANNEXES:

A - Intelligence

~~B - Concept of Operations (Overlay)~~ withdrawn, Hqs, DA

C - Fire Support Plan

DISTRIBUTION: X plus

3 - 9th Inf Div
3 - 199th Lt Inf Bde (Sep)
3 - 79th Engr Gp
1 - MACJ2
1 - 525th MI Gp
1 - 1st MI Bn (ASA)

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. OPLAN 58-66
b. Map, Vietnam, Series 1.7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets 6231 I, II; 6230 I; 6331 III, IV; 6330 IV.
c. II FFORCEV Intelligence Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ.

(C) 1. (CONF) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Area of Interest. The area of interest is generally bounded by the following coordinates: XT 5040, XT 8040, XT 8015, XT 6315. Contained within this area is the Iron Triangle, Filhol Plantation, Thanh Dien Forest Reserve, and portions of the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods. The Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers dissect the area and present major obstacles to ground forces. See Appendix 4 for complete details on the terrain, helicopter landing zones, and status of LOC's. The Iron Triangle and Thanh Dien Forest areas have not been penetrated by large scale US/FWMAF operations in the last year. Frequent operations have been conducted in the Ho Bo, Boi Loi, and adjacent areas on the eastern side of the Saigon River. Almost invariably these operations encounter numerous mines, boobytraps, extensive tunnel and bunker systems. Additionally the enemy withdraws from these areas and reoccupies them following the exit of friendly forces. It can be assumed that the enemy will follow this same general pattern in the future. The Iron Triangle has long been a major VC stronghold and base area. Numerous agent reports and visual reconnaissance reveal that the Iron Triangle is a major base area. Of primary concern in the area is the presence of elements of the headquarters of VC Military Region IV. This headquarters controls the activities of the VC 165A Regiment, all other forces and is the political organization for VC Military Region IV, which encompasses all of Gia Dinh Province and parts of Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. (See II FFORCEV Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ for boundaries of MR IV). The destruction of this organization is vital as it is responsible for the numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism which occur in and around Gia Dinh Province. These acts of sabotage, terrorism, and the attacking of isolated outposts and installations constitutes the greatest enemy threat in III CTZ at the present time. The continuance of these acts will seriously affect the confidence of the populace in the GVN and provides the VC with extremely valuable propaganda.

b. Order of Battle. See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

c. Known and Reported VC Installations. See Appendix 2 to this Annex.

d. Organization and Personalities of VC Military Region IV. See Appendix 3 to this Annex.

(C) 2. (CONF) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (OIR).

a. EEI:

(1) Where are the major elements of VC Military Region IV located?

(2) What elements and persons of VC Military Region IV are located in Saigon? In Gia Dinh Province? Where are they located? What are their names, descriptions, and place of birth?

[redacted]

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116

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Annex A (Intelligence) to CINCPAC OPLAN 38-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

(3) Who are the members of the infrastructure in the area of interest? Where are they located? What are their names, description and places of birth?

(4) Does the Liberation News Agency (LNA) operate a radio propaganda station in this area? Does the LNA operate any other propaganda activities in this area?

b. OIR:

(1) Where are the major VC supply installations, hospitals, and dispensaries? How are they supplied?

(2) What are the crossing points used by the VC on the Saigon River?

(3) What is the attitude of the local populace toward the GVN? Toward the VC?

(4) Does the local populace activily support the VC with food, intelligence, and money?

(c)

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

a. Order to Subordinates:

(1) Report on EEI and OIR as obtained.

(2) Report information as acquired in response to the following SICR:

(a) U-UPE-U0751 - US, RVN and FWMAF Prisoners of War (U)
(b) U-UPE-U0641 - NVA/VC Tunnel Systems (U)
(c) U-UPE-U0671 - VC Order of Battle Gia Dinh Province (U)
(d) U-UPE-U0609 - VC Liberation Press Agency and Liberation Radio (U)
(e) U-UPE-U0609 - Rendezvous (U)
(f) U-UPE-U0586 - VC Guerrillas (U)
(g) U-UPE-U0502 - 165A Regiment (U)
(h) U-UPE-U0393 - Captured USAID Materials (U)

(3) Devote particular attention to the satisfaction of the requirements of SICR U-UPE-U0609 - Rendezvous and II FORCEV OPORD 32-66 (OP Rendezvous) (U)

(4) Advise this HQ NLT 25 Dec 66, requirements for interrogation and interpreter personnel in excess of organic assets.

(5) 1st Infantry Division. Request this HQ and all major participating units be furnished a copy of ADP showing VC installations in the area of interest.

(6) 25th Infantry Division is requested to provide all participating units and this HQ a copy of ADP on personalities on current black list in area of operations.

b. Request to higher and adjacent units:

(1) MACV J2:

(a) Request that additional interrogation teams and interpreters be made available as requested.

(b) Request confirmation of movement of the 272d VC Regiment into the area of operations be furnished this headquarters.

(2) 525th MI Group: Request all available information on the personalities and locations of the various committee members of VC Military Region IV be furnished this headquarters on a priority basis.

(3) DSA III Corps: Request a priority intelligence effort be made to rapidly interrogate ralliers and prisoners knowledgeable of the activities of MR IV.

(4) Detachment A, 1st MI Bn (ARS): Request this headquarters be advised of the status and availability of aerial photo coverage in the area of interest.

Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

4. (U) TERRAIN AND WEATHER:
   a. Terrain: See Appendix 4 to this Annex.
   b. Weather: See II FFORCEV January 1967 Climatic Summary for III CTZ.
5. MISCELLANEOUS:
   a. To accomplish the mission of destroying VC Military Region IV, a complete detailed interrogation and through classification must be made on all detainees. Further, all personnel in the area must be detained and classified.
   b. The procedure for classification of detainees and their disposition is contained in Confidential Message, AVFBB, 120528, HQ II FFORCEV, 160145Z Dec 66, Subject: Processing, Accounting, and Making Reference to VC Detainees and Prisoners of War (U).

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Acknowledge

Appendices:
1. Order of Battle
2. Known and Reported VC Installations
3. Organization and personalities of MR IV.
4. Terrain

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131

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Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C) The following list shows the current probable locations of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of interest:

UNIT	LOCATION
272d VC Regt	Vic XT 6643
1st Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6225
7th Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6422
C320 Local Force Bn	Vic XT 5233
C81 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C64 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C61 Local Force Co	Vic XT 7427
Z41 Arty Bn, U80 Arty Regt	Unlocated, possibly in Long Nguyen Secret Zone
Military Affairs Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5
Political Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5

An ARVN MI agent reported that on 24 Nov 66, an unknown VC unit was ordered to turn on a generator to recharge batteries for a large signal unit in Boi Loi Forest (XT 5035). This signal unit was reportedly located deep underground in that area. Members of this unit were involved in radio intercept, telephone wire tapping, code breaking, and were fluent in many languages. The VC stated that because of this unit they had advance warning of GVN and Allied Operations. (Information unevaluated and supposedly obtained from a VC platoon leader.)

2. (C) The following units are available for reinforcements within 24-36 hours:

UNIT	LOCATION
Phu Loi Bn	Vic XT 8440
2d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 8307
3d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 9213

Elements of the 9th VC Division (-272d Regt) could re-inforce in battalion or regimental strength within 48 hours.

3. (C) Recent reported enemy movements:

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	DATE
XT 838387	Phu Loi Bn	10 Oct 66
XT 892398	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	6 Nov 66
XT 811376	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	14 Nov 66
XT 976363	C2 Co, 800 Bn	1 Nov 66
XT 974372	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	9 Nov 66
XT 937457	100 VC	12 Nov 66
XT 966421	VC Bn	[illegible]

4. (C) a. The suspected location [illegible] during the initial stages of [illegible]. A decisive engagement with this regiment could hinder the initial progress of the operation. As the operation progresses the regiment could attack friendly forces from the rear.

b. It can be assumed the enemy will defend his supply, base and headquarters areas with the security forces currently available. In this respect, it is anticipated that these positions will be well fortified, and the approach routes mined and booby-trapped.

c. Due to the lack of friendly operations in the Iron Triangle since October 65, very little hard intelligence is available in this area. Since this has

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152

Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

long been a VC stronghold, it can be assumed that extensive fortification and tunnel systems are present throughout the area.

5. (C) HQ MR IV and it's major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of all available information it appears that the HQ of MR IV and the Political Committee generally operate in an area bounded by XT 6437, XT 6637, XT 6733, XT 6433, and will most likely be located in grid square XT 6434. The Military Affairs Committee operates generally in an area bounded by XT 6432, XT 6934, XT 6928, XT 6225, and will be most likely located in grid square XT 6527.

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Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities (MR IV)) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (CP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C) GENERAL. The VC Military Region IV, MR IV(TI) also known as the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh-Special Zone (SCGDSZ) is a well organized military and political headquarters. This organization is responsible for and controls all VC actions within the boundaries of MR IV. See II FFORCEV Estimate #2 of the situation in III CTZ for the boundaries of MR IV. The headquarters and elements of the various committees, sections and subsections are known to be in the area of interest.

2. (C) LOCATIONS. It is highly unlikely that the HQ of MR IV and its major military and political committee will be found in one specific area. All indications show that the Military Affairs Committee and the Political Committee are normally seperated. The HQ and the majority of the following committees and sections are believed to be in the area of operations: HQ MR IV (SCGDSZ Party Committee), Military Party Committee, Current Affairs Committee, Military Affairs Committee, Forward Supply Council, Finance and Economy Section, Postal, Transportation and Communication Section, Base Section and the Security Section. The various proselyting sections, and the civil health section must by the nature of the duties and objectives be located through out VC MR IV. Certain representatives of these sections are possibly located in the area of operation. The areas in and around Phu An (XT 7222) and An Dien (XT 7027) are frequently mentioned in numerous agent reports as meeting areas, stop over points and committee and section headquarters areas.

3. (C) ORGANIZATION. Military Region IV is well organized and possesses all the major military and political committees and sections found in the other Military Region HQ. This organization is duplicated for the most part at the district, village and hamlet level throught MR IV. All sections are active in those areas which the VC control and provide the semblance of a legal government. These sections operate covertly in those areas under GVN control in MR IV. See inclosure 1 to this appendix for a diagram of the organization of MR IV. Inclosure 2 provided the names of key members of the infrastructure as known to this HQ. CICV Research and Analysis Study ST67-012, dated 4 Sep 66 provides a wealth of data on the organization, structure and personalities of MR IV.

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Inclosures:
1-Organization of MR IV
2-Personalities of MR IV

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
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Inclosure 1 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (Op CED-8 [illegible])

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MILITARY REGION IV STRUCTURE



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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 250-66 (OPERATION PAUL) (U)

PERSONALITIES OF MR IV

The following list of personalities has been compiled by the CI Section of this headquarters based upon; MACJ2 VC Political OB, Agent Reports, interrogation of ralliers and PW's.

1. Military Affairs Committee: (Cover Number Ano-0301)
   - Chief: Colonel Hai Thung (Chief of Staff MR 4)
   - Field Cadre: Nam Thu
   - Political Officer: Dang Quang
   - Members: Tran Ba Tien
   - a. Military Staff:
     - Chief of Staff: Major Bay Nam
     - Deputy Chief of Staff: Nam (in charge of militia)
     - (1) Correspondence (Section) Military Staff
       - Chief: Lieutenant Tran Hung Ky (captured)
       - Assistant: Muoi Hai
       - Administrative Clerk: Nguyen Van Xuan
     - (2) Operations and Training Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Bay Ung
       - Assistant: Bay Son (Senior-Captain)
       - Assistant: Ba Hai
       - Assistant: Aspirant Tu Tien
     - (3) Artillery Combat Support Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Senior Captain Nam Ha
     - (4) Signal Staff Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Tu Quan
     - (5) Combat Operations Staff Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Captain Hai Son
     - (6) Reception Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Muoi Hung
       - Cadre: Ba Phien
     - (7) Sapper and Engineer Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Tam Hanh
       - Assistant: Ban
     - (8) Militia Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Captain Muoi Duyen
       - Cadre: Nam Cai
     - (9) Military Personnel Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: [illegible]
       - Assistant: Senior Lieutenant Tu Tien
     - (10) Military Intelligence Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Senior Captain Tu Minh
       - Assistant: Sau Huynh or Huynh
       - Captain Tam Thanh
       - Captain Nam Duc
     - (11) Crypto Section/Military Staff
       - Chief: Lieutenant Bay The
       - Members: Hai Son, Truong, Phu, Thanh, Duc

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123

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 38-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Chief of Crypto Element: Lieutenant Tu Huan
Radio Operators: Hung, Toan, Phia
Members: Hiep, Mat, Danh, Khac, Kiet

(12) Map Cell/Military Staff
Cell Leader: Long
Member: On, Nghe, Hai Nhe

(13) Recruit Training School/Military Staff
Director: Captain Nam Binh
Deputy: Senior Lieutenant Ba Quang, aka Ba Nhuong
Political Officer: Ut Minh
Instructors: Tam Dot, So Viet
Nam Dung (Sapper; returned from regroupment to North Vietnam)
Ba Phuoc (Sapper)
Ba Quoc (Infantry)
Tu Du, Ut Trieu, aka Luu Do
Sau Kieu, Tam Hoa
Ba Soan, aka Luu Do
Chief of Administrative Section: Tu Tien
Members: Ut Tam, Tu Manh, Ba Duong

b. Political Staff/Military Affairs Committee
Chief: Major Tu Quy
Assistant: Tam Phong
Bay Nuyen (in charge of training)
Tu Minh (in charge of Information and Press)

(1) Administrative Staff/Political Staff
Chief: Sau Ky

(2) (Staff) Assistant for Emulation/Political Staff
Captain Tu Hai

(3) (Staff) Assistant for Party Affairs and Labor Youth/Political Staff)
Captain Hai Thuan

(4) Enemy Proselyting Section/Political Staff
Assistant: Bay Hoa

(5) Security Section/Political Staff
Chief: Bay Duong
Senior Lieutenant: Ba Viet

(6) Cadre Section/Political Staff
Bay Tung
Senior Captain: Hai Thanh

(7) Organization Section/Political Staff
Assistant Captain Tam Hong (in charge of Work Emulation)

(8) Propaganda and Training Section/Political Staff
Chief: Tu Dat

c. Rear Service Staff/Military Affairs Committee
Chief: Hai Thanh
Assistant for Planning: Tu Long
Sau Tinh

Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 5[illegible] (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

(1) Ordnance Section Worksite K.11-151/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Ba Mai

(2) Medical Section K.12 - 152/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Doctor Tu Vu

(3) Quartermaster Section K.13 - 153/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Tu Phe
Assistant: Nam Non
Military Provision Cell (Leader): Nam Gia
Financial Affairs Cell (Leader): Nam Non and Tu Minh

2. Administrative Staff/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Ding Cong Det (captured)
Assistant:
Members: Ba Hoa (administrative clerk)
Chin Nghiem (administrative clerk in charge of finance)
Ba Phuong (typist)
Nam Quang (typist)
Tam Kiet (typist)
Thi Anh (typist)
Thi Xuan (typist)
Thi Huong (typist)
Ut Tien (liaison (agent))

3. Information and Propaganda/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Rau (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in the rural areas)
Cadre: Sau Duc (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in cities)
Old man Chin Linh (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on current events)
Members: Bay Phu (making copies of the bulletins)
Nam Rau
Tu Minh
The Information and Propaganda Section is composed of two branches:
Chief of Rural Area Branch: Lu Lan
Cadre: Ba Phat, Ba Thuc, Nam Da, Ba Ho (liaison (agents))
Chief of City Branch: Tu Tan
Cadre: Hai Vo, Thanh Thuong, Nam Nen (female)
a. Urban School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Hai Lan (also Assistant Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)
Assistant: Tu An (instructor)
Cadre: Bay Van (female; instructor)
b. Rural School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Bay An (also Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)

Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 5d-66(OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Assistant:	Tu Duong (instructor)
Cadre:	Tu Hon (instructor)

4. Writer and Artist (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: Truong Binh Tong, aka Tu Truong (musician)
   - Cadre: Hai Phuong, aka Vien Phuong (play writer) (in charge of urban area)
     Nam Trieu, aka Ha Trieu (composer of theatrical works)
     Sau Vinh (in charge of rural area)
     Hoai Hung
5. (Paywar) Entertainment (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: Hoai Hung
   - Assistant: Nam Thanh
   - Members: Ut Hai (in charge of administration)
     Thi Hang (actress and singer of modern music)
     Tri Vinh (singer of modern music and dancer)
     Thi Lai (singer of traditional music)
     Thi Hong (singer of traditional music)
6. Urban Commo-Liaison (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: Tan Phoi
   - Member: Sau Si (Security Guard)
7. Urban Propaganda Network/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: Ba Quang (killed on 16 Dec 64 in Cu Chi)
   - Assistant: Ba Rau (in charge of an element operating within the capital)
   - Cadre: [illegible], Bay Hien, Dinh Cong Det (captured)
8. Painting and Sculpture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: [illegible] (It is reported that this man is a professor of the Gia Dinh Fine Arts School)
   - Members: Tu Hoa (painter)
     Sau Thanh, Ut Du, Chin Chot
9. Motion Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
   - Chief: Doan Bay
   - Members: Ba Thanh, Nam Nho, Bay Tuan, Nam Dat, Sau Nghia
10. Radio (Communication) and Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
    - Chief: Bay Hoang
    - Specialists: [illegible]
11. Metal Type Printing [illegible]
    - Cadre: [illegible]
    - Specialists: [illegible]
12. Mimeograph House/Propaganda and Training Section
    - Chief: Nam Nam
    - Member: Hai Lan, Nam Nho
13. Supply and Liaison Sub-Section/Propaganda and Training Section
    - Chief: Bay Mot
    - Assistant: Sau Dong

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

14. Youth Proselyting Section/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Chief: Sau Tham

15. Organization Section - Cover number A74 - D. 303/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Chief: Anh Mot, alias Ut Mot
    - Assistant: Hai Thanh
    - Cadre: Huynh, Kiet
      Pa Tu (transferred from the military proselyting section)
      Tu Cu (administrative staff)

16. Security Section, Cover number A. 71 - D. 304/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Chief: Nam Tan
    - Assistant:
    - Members: Tam Phong (in charge of rural security)
      Ba Long (in charge of urban security)

17. Military Proselyting Section, Cover number A. 69 - D. 305/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Chief: Tam Tay (member) Current Affairs Committee of Special) Region (Party) Committee)
    - Cadre: Ba Tu (in charge of Rural Military Proselyting)
      Tam Trieu (in charge of Urban Military Proselyting)
      Ba Do, alias Ba Tu, Ba Ha, Bay Dat, alias Dat, Nam Mat Kien

18. Economy and Finance Section, Cover number A70-D. 306/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Chief: Ba Dat
    - Cadre: Chin Ha
      Hai Anh (Rural economy and finance)
      Tu Nuoc (Rural economy and finance)
      Hai Den (Rural economy and finance)
      Ong Muoi A (Rural economy and finance)
      Tam Gia (in charge of Capital Economy - Finance)
      Ong Ba, Tu Son

19. Comme-Liaison Section, Cover number D. 307/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Cadre: [illegible]
      Sau Tri
      Ut Thanh

20. Base Security (Guard) Section, Cover number A. 77-D. 308/Special Region (Party) Committee
    - Section Chief: Tu Hung (concurrently Commander of Area "A")
    - Cadre: Bay Hoang, Tu Mau
    - Consist of two areas: (Strength: 120 men)
    - Commander of Area "A": Tu Hung

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Enclosure 2 to [illegible] Identities and Personalities of MR IV to Annex A (Intelligence) to [illegible] VN 65-66 (OPERATIONAL PLANS) (U) (Cont'd)

Assistant:	Tu Dac
Commander of Area [illegible]	Muoi Phuoc

21. Postal Transportation and Communication Section Cover number A. 75-[illegible] Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	Tai Binh
Aides:	Tu Dac

22. Front/Civilian Proselyting Section Cover number A. 77-D. 309/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	Sau Hieu (In Charge of Current Affairs of Saigon (Party) Committee)
Assistant:	Ba Hoa
a. Youth Branch:	
Cadre:	[illegible] (Captured in Oct 61)
	[illegible], Thao
b. Women's Branch:	[illegible]
Cadre:	[illegible] (Viet) 7 An, Chi (Hon)
c. Farmer's Branch:	[illegible]
Cadre:	[illegible]
d. Students and Intellectuals:	
Cadre:	[illegible]

23. Operational Intelligence [illegible] Cover number A. 73/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	[illegible]

24. Propaganda-Culture and Information Section/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief:	[illegible], cover name Vo Tang [illegible] Chairman of Saigon Municipal Peoples Liberation Committee

25. Saigon-Gia Dinh [illegible] Committee/Special Region (Party) Committee:

Chief:	
Cadre in charge of [illegible]:	[illegible] Cong, aka Dinh
Cadre in charge of Contact-Liaison:	Nguyen Van Cu, aka Chin Cu
Leader of Liberation Cell:	Le Van Hoa, aka Nam Hang
	Van Cong My
	Nguyen Van Suu
Members:	Ha Xuan, Nguyen Binh, Nhuyen An, Nguyen Van Khoe
Leader of Propaganda Cell:	Nguyen Tro
Members:	Le Van Xuoi
	Tran Thi Duong, aka Chin
	Tu Thi Co

Member in charge [illegible] Liaison with Tay Ninh Province

26. "R" Detached Security Section

Chief:	Hai Thi

27. (Party) Civil Affairs Committee [illegible] Element/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief:	Vuoi Phat
Assistant:	Nam Om

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 88-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

a. Administrative Staff/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Chin Tiet
   - Clerk: Tran Van Dung
   - Typist: Thi Yen
   - Commo-Liaison: Tu Nho
   - Security Guard: Tam Rac, Chung

b. Military Affairs Sub-Committee/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Ba Te, aka Ba Liem (captured in Jun 66)
   - Cadre: Tu Ngoc Anh, Ba Den, Sau Nguyen

c. Propaganda Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
   - Cadre: Sau Nam, Hai Cut, Ket

d. Base and Commo-Liaison Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Tu Long

e. Training, Education Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
   - Cadre: Muoi Dong, Mot Chuan, aka Sau Gia
   - Commo-Liaison Agent: Ba Thong

25. AC. 2053 Section / Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Chief: Bay Tien
   - Cadre: Lam Son II (concurrently Representative Gia - Dinh Region (Party) Committee)
   - Commo-Liaison Agent: Chi Hai

29. Worker Proselyting (Liberation Workers Association of Saigon-Gia Dinh Area
   - Chief: [illegible] (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)
   - Assistant: Tu Nam (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)
   - (Committee) Member: Tam Thiet (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)

30. Youths, School Children and Students Association Cover number A. 531 Saigon - Gia Dinh Area Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Command Cadre: Bay Binh (Asst Secretary of Region (Party) Committee
   - Nam Thuc

31. Chinese Proselyting, Cover number A. 533/Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Chief: Sau Lam
   - Cadre: Hai Ly (in charge of Information)
   - Sau , Ba

32. Bourgeois Front Cover number [illegible] (Party) Committee
   - Chief: [illegible]
   - Cadre: Bay Viet

33. City Central Area
   a. I and II Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 535
      - Secretary: Sau Tan (Region(Party) Committee Member)
      - Assistant: Muoi Phai
      - Cadre: Muoi Trung (in charge of Propaganda-Cultrue and Indoctrination)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

b. II and IV Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A.536

Secretary:	Tu Hiep (alternate member of Region (Party) Committee)
Assistant:	Sau Hoang (Female)
Cadre:	Tu A (Female)

Copy No _____ of 67 cys
HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
LONG BINH (YT 052111) RVN
181200H Dec 66
OR

Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C~~NF~~) PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:
   a. Purpose. This study is to be used as part of the intelligence annex to operations PLAN 58-60. Study area is confined to the operational area contained in the operations plan.
   b. Limitations. Information presented is based on data obtained from maps, intelligence documents, various terrain studies and aerial reconnaissance. Ground reconnaissance was not made.
2. (C~~NF~~) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provides the most favorable conditions for military operations. It is a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement is canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement are very sensitive to precipitation.
   b. Topography.
      (1) Relief is predominantly low and flat. There are two small hills, vicinity XT 715255 and XT 684330, which rise 32 and 38 meters above sea level.
      (2) Drainage. There are two rivers of importance in the operational area, the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Both of these rivers are navigable all year by sampans, river barges, LCM's and LCT-LCU's. The Song Saigon is approximately 100-150 meters wide and 2.4 meters deep at mean water. At mean water the current ranges from 0.5-1.8 meters per second. The Song Thi Tinh varies 20 to 50 meters width and is 2.5 meters deep at low water. The river bottom of both rivers is clay and silt. This area is affected by tidal action, but to what extent is unknown.
      (3) Vegetation. The operational area consists of three general types of vegetation: (1) Broadleaf Evergreen secondary forest, (2) Rubber Plantations, (3) Wetland Rice. The secondary forest consists of Broadleaf Evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bamboo and vines. In the rubber plantations the trees are spaced on 15-20 foot centers and the undergrowth is sparse, consisting of grasses and shrubs. The wetland rice will have been harvested and the fields drained, leaving flat land with approximately six inches of stuble.
      (4) Surface material. There are generally three types of soil found within the area.
         (a) Hydromorphic clays and silts. This type soil is found in north and central sections of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and Song Thi Tinh. It is composed mostly of silty clays (CL) or clayey silts (ML) and is several meters deep.
         (b) Peat Soils. This type soil is found in the southern section of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Peat soils consists of from one to several

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

meters of predominantly organic material (PT) underlain by highly compressible clay (CH).

(c) Red clayey silt. This soil covers the majority of the area. When dried out a hard surface crust forms and it is very dusty. This soil is more favorable for tunnel construction than either of the above mentioned types. The crusting ability and dusty characteristics provide special problems in tunnel destruction. Extensive and complex tunnel systems have been found in this soil type in other locations.

(5) Manmade features. The significant manmade features in the area of interest include routes LTL 14 on the west and an unnumbered route on the eastern border. Route LTL 14 has numerous curves between XT 670283 and XT 715244. Access into the area is restricted by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers on the west south and east. Only one bridge crosses the Thi Tinh River at Ben Cat (XT 715244). It is a class 12 Eiffel, Type II Bridge. There are no bridges accross the Saigon River. Data for each on routes are contained on inclosure 2 and 3. Enemy fortifications in the area include the following:

(a) Trench System XT 695240
(b) Trench System XT 684257
(c) Trench System XT 690211
(d) Trench System XT 695267
(e) Trench System and 5 AA/AW Positions XT 694243
(f) Bunker System XT 672305
(g) Foxholes XT 695248
(h) Trench and AW Positions XT 735274
(i) 12 AA AW Positions XT 733280
(j) Trench System XT 718279
(k) AA/AW Positions XT 7332 0
(l) AA/AW Positions XT 747241
(m) Bunker System XT 707316
(n) Foxholes XT 723317
(o) Foxholes XT 723324
(p) In addition to the above fortifications, entrances to underground installations are located at:
XT 719240 XT 710284 XT 717285
XT 738216 XT 702297
(q) There are no towns in this area, however the roads are lined with hamlets and light cover.
(r) The airfield at Lai Khe (XT 773339) is the only facility capable of handling C-130 aircraft. At the present time this field is closed for rehabilitation. The estimated date of reopening is 31 December. Helicopter landing areas extend from 500 to 3000 meters on each side of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. This area is covered by rice paddies which are expected to be dry during the next 90 days and suitable for helicopter landing zones.

3. (C/NF) MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

a. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Observation. Observation throughout the area depends entirely

Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 5H-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

upon the vegetation. In the wetland rice areas the observation will be very good. In the secondary forest regions the observation will be poor, both ground and aerial, due to the dense undergrowth. The rubber plantations will afford poor to fair observation, depending on the density of the undergrowth.

(2) Fields of fire. Fields of fire are extremely limited in these areas of dense forests and heavy undergrowth. The wetland rice areas offer the best fields of fire.

(3) Cover. The principal cover for both units and installations is afforded by bunkers and trench systems found in the operational area.

(4) Concealment. All forested areas and plantations offer good concealment from both air and ground observation. The villages and hamlets located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units. The wetland rice areas offer no concealment.

(5) Obstacles.

(a) Song Saigon flows generally from the northwest to the southeast across the area with widths of 100-150 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.

(b) Song Thi Tinh flows generally from the north to the south across the area with a width of 20-50 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.

(c) The dense forest which dominates the center section of the operational area constitutes a major obstacle to movement of any sort.

(d) Protective friendly minefields are at the following locations of types and quantity indicated:

1.	XT 910310	M-16	800Ea
2.	XT 856216	M-16	264Ea
3.	XT 828268	M-16	280Ea
4.	XT 815290	M-16	800Ea
5.	XT 798425	M-16	60Ea
6.	XT 744330	M-16	253Ea
7.	XT 765295	M-16	280Ea
8.	XT 776263	M-16	380Ea
9.	XT 713188	M-16	119Ea
10.	XT 575342	M-16	250Ea
11.	XT 667173	AT	Quantity Unknown
12.	XT 435472	Type and Quantity Unknown	
13.	XT 440348	Type and Quantity Unknown	

(6) Movement. Cross country movement, within the operational area, is effected to varying degrees by vegetation, soil conditions, relief, hydrography and urbanization (See Inclosure 1).

(7) Key Terrain Features. The area of interest consists of level plains with local relief being less than 35 meters with slopes less than 3%. There are no prominent terrain features in this area.

(8) Avenues of approach. The existing route shown on Inclosures 2 and 3 provide the best routes of movement into the objective area. Movement to and around the area is possible via the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers both of which will accomodate LCM and LCU landing craft. Cross country movement around the

Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

edges of the objective area is hampered and highly compartmented by soft rice paddy lands. Conditions for APC's, tanks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks is fair to poor during the period of the operation. In the center of the area the dense jungle creates conditons that are unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops. Inclosure 1 contains details on cross country movement conditions.

Acknowledge.

3 Incl
1. Lines of Communication
2. Lines of Communication
3. Cross Country Movement

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147

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II FFORCEV 5-14/0-66

HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
LONG BINH (YT052111) RVN
181200H Dec 66
OR

Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (U) SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence to OPLAN 58-66.
   b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 58-66.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. No change from basic plan.
2. (S-NF) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operation vic THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.
3. (S-NF) EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 58-66.
   b. Air Support. TAC air support available through II FFORCEV TOC, priority of air support to 1st Inf Div.
   c. Artillery Support.
      (1) Field arty.
         (a) 23d Arty Gp:
            1 Attach one 105mm towed bn (- one btry) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
            2 One 105mm towed btry remains attached to 1st Inf Div.
            3 Attach two 155mm towed btry to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
            4 Provide one 155mm towed bn (- two btry). GSR 1st Inf Div Arty from position vic PHU LOI.
            5 Provide one [illegible] at LAI KHE o/a D-1 with mission of reinforcing 1st Inf Div Arty.
            6 Provide one 175mm btry at PHU LOI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 1st and 25th Inf Div Arty, priority of fires to 1st Inf Div.
            7 Provide one 8"/175mm btry at CU CHI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 25th Inf Div Arty.
            8 Remaining units - no change from present mission.
         (b) 54th Arty Gp:
            1 Atch one 105mm btry to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
            2 Provide one 105mm btry with mission of GSR 10th ARVN Div Arty.
            3 Atch one 155mm bn (SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
            4 Remaining units - No change from present missions.

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      (2) Air defense arty.
         II FFORCEV Arty:
            (a) Atch two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
            (b) Atch two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
   d. Coordinating Instructions:
      (1) Arty fire plans prepared by divisions and separate brigades.
      (2) Direct coordination authorized between divisions and 23d and 54th Arty Gp.

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135

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN [illegible] (EAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS. OPLAN 5066.
5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL.
   a. Signal. Current SOI/SSI in effect.
   b. Command. OPLAN 5066.
Acknowledge.

[illegible]
[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as basic plan

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149

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1st INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

13 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (U) Name and type of Operation: CEDAR FALLS was a seal and search/search and destroy/jungle clearing operation. References: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, sheets: 6231 II, 6331 III, 6230 I, 6330 IV.

2. (U) Dates of Operation: Initiated 080730 January 1967, terminated 262400 January 1967.

3. (C) General: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a II FFV controlled operation involving units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. The 173d Airborne Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were placed under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The operation was aimed at the destruction of HQ, Military Region IV and its associated base camps and supply areas within the Iron Triangle and THANH DIEU Forestry Reserve. The 1st Division was employed as the search force and conducted extensive search and destroy, tunnel and base camp destruction and jungle clearing operations throughout the area. This operation proved to be one of the most successful undertaken by the BIG RED ONE. Of particular significance was the large amount of jungle cleared and the unusually high number of ralliers that turned themselves in to GVN authorities as a result of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The general area of operation is at Annex B.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, II FFV. 1st Division forces were controlled from a forward command post located at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown, as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

TF DEANE (173d Abn Bde, Sep)	2d Bde
1-503 Inf	1-26 Inf
2-503 Inf	2-18 Inf
4-503 Inf	1-7 Arty (-) DS
1-4 Cav (-) (OPCON)	
11th ACR (-1 sqdn)(OPCON)	Div Arty
A & B Btry (Reinf) 3-2 Arty (AMEF)	6-6 Arty GSR 2-33 Arty
3-319 Arty DS	B-2-32 Arty Reinf 6-6 Arty
Hew Berye, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR	2-35 Arty (-) GSR 2-33 Arty
3d Bde	Div Trps
1-2 Inf	1st Avn Bn
1-16 Inf	1st Engr Bn
1-28 Inf	121st Sig Bn
2-28 Inf	D-1-4 Cav
2-33 Inf	

Incl 3

137

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4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Intelligence prior to operation. The Iron Triangle and southern LONG NGUYEN (THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve) had not been deeply penetrated by US or ARVN forces in over a year. The area had long been a major Viet Cong controlled area and contained numerous base camps, supply installations, and production and medical facilities. Viet Cong political and military units were known to be based in the area. Current indications were that the majority of Military Region IV (known as the SAIGON-CHOLON-DIA DINH Special Committee), the BINH DUONG Provincial Committee, and the South BEN CAT District Committee were located in the operational area. The significance of these elements was that they controlled all of the military and political activities of their respective areas. Experience gained in previous operations in the nearby BOI LOI and HO BO Woods indicated that the base camps and supply installations were well protected by extensive bunker systems and tunnel complexes. It was expected that the Viet Cong would make extensive use of mines and booby traps in defending critical zones.

b. No major contact was made by the 1st Infantry Division units during the operation. The entire operation was characterized by small unit actions contacting VC elements of platoon size or smaller. As expected, the VC units did not defend their base areas in force, but elected to flee, leaving behind token resistance in the form of snipers, booby traps, and mines. During the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from MR IV rallied. In addition many local guerrillas were captured trying to infiltrate through friendly lines. Others went underground in an effort to escape capture.

c. Terrain and weather

(1) Cross country movement in the area was affected to varying degrees by heavy jungle and soil conditions. The area was void of prominent terrain features and consisted of level plains with relief varying less than 35 meters in elevation. Cross country movement around the edges of the objective area was hampered by soft rice paddy lands. In the center of the area the dense jungle created conditions that were unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops.

(2) January is a northeast monsoon or dry month over all the III Corps Tactical Zone. The northeast air flow produces the best overall weather of the year in this area. Cloud cover was at its annual minimum and had no adverse effects on the operation. Early morning fog was prevalent between the hours of 0400 and 0900, but this did not hamper airmobile operations or close air support.

d. Base camps uncovered were extensive in size and construction. Foxholes and fighting positions were usually connected by either tunnels or trenches. Most of the fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 4 inches in diameter covered with hard soil approximately 6 inches in thickness. One fortified village was discovered by the 2nd Brigade vicinity XT 5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. Major means of destruction were airstrikes after the inhabitants had been evacuated. Extensive tunnel systems were found throughout the area, with the largest tunnel complex located at the village of BEN SUC. Tunnel rats were utilized to explore tunnels prior to their destruction with explosive or acetylene destructive devices augmented with explosives (See para 11 C).

a. Civil affairs/Psychological operations

(1) All civilians in the operational area were presumed to be either members of VC families or VC laborers working under VC control. The concept of operation provided for the orderly evacuation of all civilians.

(2) At 080600 Jan 67, the seal forces landed by helicopter in BEN SUC. A loudspeaker helicopter orbited the town telling the people not to run but to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The people followed the instructions, and only one civilian was wounded during the sealing operation. After the town was sealed, the 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Regt was landed under operational control of the 1st Division's Revolutionary Development Task Force. The airborne loudspeakers broadcast a message directing the populace to congregate at the school in the center of the town. When the people were assembled, they were screened, and all males from 15 to 45 years of age were evacuated to the interrogation center at PHU CUONG for further screening. When the initial search of the village was completed, the people were allowed to return to their homes, and they were directed to assemble their belongings in preparation to be moved. On the 9th and 10th of Jan, the search of the village continued, and the people from the area surrounding BEN SUC were assembled in the village with their belongings in preparation for the move to PHU CUONG. VNN river boats arrived on 10 Jan, bringing two battalions of ARVN paratroops who assumed responsibility for the security of BEN SUC and assisted the people in the move. Starting on the 11th, the people were evacuated by riverboat and CH 47 helicopter. The people took all their belongings to include livestock.

(3) On 9 Jan, the 11th ACR attacked across the north side of the Iron Triangle. The attack was preceded by the loudspeaker helicopter which cautioned the people not to run and to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The cavalry crossed the area without injuring any civilians. A loudspeaker message was broadcast and leaflets were dropped which advised the people to assemble their belongings. It had been assumed that some people would move without waiting for assistance, and a refugee collecting point had been established at BEN CAT by the 173d Airborne Bde. Unfortunately, some ill-informed troops of the 11th ACR started evicting the people in RACH BAP and then started burning homes. This caused the people in the area to stream into BEN CAT without their possessions. By mid-afternoon, over 1,000 people were assembled at the refugee collecting point at BEN CAT. These people had to be sent back to their homes to collect their belongings. It had been planned to evacuate the people between BEN SUC and BEN CAT in an orderly manner with ARVN assistance after the BEN SUC evacuation was well under way. However, the premature destruction of homes necessitated immediate action. Under RDTF control, seventy trucks were assembled on 10 Jan and the people were moved with their belongings to PHU CUONG on 10, 11, and 12 Jan. Livestock and oxcarts were driven overland to PHU CUONG.

(4) The people were moved to a temporary refugee relocation center at PHU CUONG which was to have been set up and operated by provincial officials assisted by CCO. By Tuesday the 10th, it became obvious that the civilian agencies were not able to establish the refugee center quickly enough to receive the number of people that were enroute. This was true due to a lack of adequate responsive assets and underestimation of the problem. To provide for the refugees, the Division established a control and coordination center at the refugee camp. Military assets were assembled and the camp was set up in time to house the refugees. After the camp was set up, the civilian agencies were able to operate it, and the military support was phased out. At the close of the operation, 6,108 people had been moved to the refugee center. There were 608 men, 1,672 women, and 3,828 children.

(5) PsyOps. During the first two days of the operation, the airborne loudspeaker broadcast standard CHIEU HOI appeals in between the messages used to control the civilians. In addition, stock CHIEU HOI leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped over the area. On the second day of the operation, an unprecedented flow of ralliers from the area of operations started to turn themselves in to both US units and GVN representatives. Additional PsyWar intelligence and propaganda writing support was requested from II FFV. A team with two interpreters and two interrogators/leaflet writers was received from the 246th PsyOps Co. The team was located at the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center under the control of a G-5 officer. Special leaflets and tape recorded appeals were prepared daily. Appeals were directed toward specific groups and individuals that ralliers knew were still in the area of operations. In addition, some wives among the refugees went to their husbands' hiding places and persuaded them to rally. During the operations, four million leaflets were dropped of which approximately half were special appeals developed during the operation. The airborne loudspeaker broadcast an average of eight hours each day. As a result of these efforts, 471 ralliers came in during the operation. The large influx of ralliers overloaded the CHIEU HOI Center. To help handle the ralliers, the Division provided tents, cots, and food to the Center. In addition, supporting engineers dug two new wells in the Center.

5. (C) Mission: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations vicinity THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and Iron Triangle to kill or capture Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; clears area of inhabitants; cuts belts across Iron Triangle and clears selected LZ's within the AO.

6. (C) Concept of Operation: The seal of the Iron Triangle was to be executed in conjunction with an airmobile assault on the village of BEN SUC (XT5883) on 8 January 1967. The 25th Infantry Division was to occupy blocking positions along the west bank of the SAIGON River from vicinity XT5434 to vicinity XT7418. A cavalry squadron and 2 battalions of infantry were to occupy blocking positions along the east bank of the THI TINH River from TAN AN XA (XT7433) to BEN CAT (XT7333). On 9 January, 4 infantry battalions were to conduct airmobile assaults into landing zones north and west of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. Two additional battalions would be airlifted into landing zones along the THI TINH River east of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The armored cavalry regiment, accompanied by supporting engineers, would conduct a thrust westward from BEN CAT, cutting through the Iron Triangle. On 11 January, 2 ARVN battalions would assume the mission of evacuating the inhabitants of BEN SUC to PHU CUONG.

7. (C) Execution:

8 January — The 2d Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0730 hrs by conducting a seal and search of BEN SUC (XT580335). The 1-26 Inf, reinforced with A/2-18 Inf conducted the assault in 60 UH-1D helicopters, encountering sporadic sniper fire in the LZ's. During the day, the battalion killed 20 VC (BC) and captured 6 PW's. The Revolutionary Development Task Force searching BEN SUC accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), 5 PW's, and 150 detainees. TF DEANE joined Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0800 by moving into staging areas and blocking positions. Bde HQ moved to a position in the vicinity of XT7532 at 0915. The 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf helilifted to a staging area in the vicinity of XT8228 at 1410 hrs. The 1-503 Inf remained in a blocking position in the CAN DINH jungle (XT7723). The 35th ARVN Ranger Bn occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of XT765185.

9 January — Changes in Task Organization (see narrative)

The 1-26 Inf continued the seal and search of BEN SUC. A/2-18 Inf was detached at 1600 hrs. At 1600 hrs the 2-18 Inf became OPCON 3d Bde and commenced air assault vic XT612342. Landing was aborted due to a mined landing zone. The battalion landed an BEN SUC and reverted to OPCON 2d Bde.

The 3d Bde entered Operation CEDAR FALLS with a 4 battalion assault north of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-2 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 1 (XT637389) at 0800 hrs. No hostile fire was received during the landing. The Bn found 80 tons of rice during the day. The 1-16 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 2 (XT661383) at 0840 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 2-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 3 (XT607365) at 0920 hrs. No hostile fire was received. During the day, the battalion captured 28 tons of rice , 725 Chicom grenades and 14 weapons. The 1-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from DAU TIENG to LZ 5 (XT622384) at 1155 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

TF DEANE attacked west from BEN CAT at 0800 hrs with the 11th ACR (-) seizing obj 1 (XT678298) and obj 2 (XT665300) and securing engineer work parties clearing the road west from BEN CAT to obj 2. The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 4 (XT670365) at 1115 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 4-503 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 6 (XT680350) at 1235 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

10 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf (0800)
1st ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
7th ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf (0800)

At 0845 hrs a River Assault Group boat convoy departed LAI THIEU with the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns on board. Both battalions became OPCON 2d Bde upon closing BEN SUC and prepared to evacuate refugees from the village. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 1-28 Inf, and 2-28 Inf located a total of 262 tons of rice vic XT6035 and captured 135 weapons during the day. The 2-18 Inf moved by road to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT 624330. The 1-4 Cav was relieved of its security mission along the THI THINH River by 4-9 ARVN Bn and 2-8 ARVN Bn. At 1440 hrs, 1-4 Cav became OPCON 11th ACR and relieved the 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf in blocking positions.

11 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf
1st ARVN Abn Bn
7th ARVN Abn Bn
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
TF DEANE : 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
11th ACR (-)
1-4 Cav

154

The 1-26 Inf was relieved of the BEN SUC seal at 1224 hrs by the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and moved north of BEN SUC to conduct search and destroy operations. The first river convoy of refugees departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG at 1225 hrs with 872 personnel and their belongings and two LCM's of cattle. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-28 Inf continued search and destroy operations in sector. Numerous tunnels, base camps, rice caches and small arms were found throughout the day. Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered. The 2-503 Inf, and the 4-503 Inf entered the Iron Triangle from the north, conducting search and destroy operations sweeping southward. The 3-11 ACR screened the Brigade's west flank along Hwy 14.

12 January — Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (0800)
2-11 ACR (0800)

By this time in the operation it had become fairly apparent that there would be no large scale enemy contact. However, VC supplies and equipment continued to be captured in large quantities. 1,800 tons of rice had been discovered to date plus 189 small arms and 971 grenades. Even more remarkable were the 85 ralliers who turned themselves in. The 2d RAG convoy departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG carrying 849 Vietnamese with all of their personal belongings. The 1-2 Inf located a 100 bed underground hospital with blankets and equipment vicinity XT612387. The 2-18 Inf located 180 tons of rice vicinity XT618354. TF DEANE continued search and destroy operations in sector.

13 January — Changes in Task Organization

TF DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
1-4 Cav (1700)
11 ACR (-)
A & B Btrys, 5-2 Arty (AMSP)

The 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations north of BEN SUC with no significant contact. The 2-28 Inf located 160 tons of rice in their AO vicinity XT597373. Evacuation of BEN SUC continued with 408 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows being transported to PHU CUONG. 103 refugees, 165,000 lbs rice and 35 cmarts were helilifted by CH-47 to PHU CUONG. The 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns continued to seal and evacuate BEN SUC.

The 1-2 Inf helilifted into an LZ vicinity XT619327 and commenced search and destroy operations along the southeast edge of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT635355. The 1-28 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT619373. The 1-4 Cav screened southeast of the 3d Bde AO vicinity XT692312, and the 2-11 ACR screened the southern edge of the AO. At 1700 hrs the squadron returned OPCON TF DEANE. The TF continued search and destroy operations in sector.

14 January — The 2-28 Inf located an extensive base camp vicinity XT594346 containing rifles, mines, grenades and ammunition. The 1-28 Inf helilifted to LAI KHE at 1445 hrs. The 2d RAG convoy moved to PHU CUONG. The 1-503 Inf destroyed a mine factory vicinity XT673283.

15 January — The 2d Bde, employing the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and the 1st Division Engineers, commenced destruction of BEN SUC. All other units continued search and destroy operations in sector with sporadic enemy contact.

16 January — Elements of the division participating in Operation CEDAR FALLS met sporadic sniper fire throughout the day as they continued to locate and destroy VC stores and equipment within the Iron Triangle. The 2-28 Inf located a fresh grave site containing 20 VC bodies vicinity XT599350. The 1-16 Inf terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0859 hrs and helilifted to LAI KHE at 1130 hrs. The CHIEU HOI results continued to rise with 199 the total to date.

17 January — Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
2-28 Inf (1600)
2-11 ACR

The 2d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. CP units returned to DI AN, closing at 1707 hrs. The 2-28 Inf helilifted from BEN SUC to LAI KHE at 1600 hrs. The last elements leaving BEN SUC activated the timing device on 5 tons of demolitions planted in the area. The purpose of the explosives was to destroy remaining tunnels and any VC who returned to the area after US forces departed. The detonation occurred at 1954 hrs, leaving a large crater in the center of the razed village. The 3d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1-2 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-4 Cav remained in the Iron Triangle area with scattered enemy contact. The 1-26 Inf acted as BHF at LAI KHE.

TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, the 2-503 Inf, the 4-503 Inf and E/11th ACR operating in the Iron Triangle. Scattered contact accounted for 17 VC KIA (BC), 1 PW, and 164 tons of rice.

The 1-7 Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base II. to DI AN; the 6th Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base V to PHU LOI; and B/2-32 Arty displaced from Arty Base V to LAI KHE.

18 January — Changes in Task Organization

1-2 Inf to 1st Bde (1730)
2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-18 Inf (1310)

The 1-2 Inf helilifted from Operation CEDAR FALLS AO to PHUOC VINH, closing at 1730 hrs. The 2-18 Inf departed Operation CEDAR FALLS AO by convoy and arrived at DI AN at 1310 hrs. The 3d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, 2-503 Inf, 4-503 Inf, 11th ACR, and the 1-4 Cav (-). Sporadic enemy contact continued throughout the day.

19-24 January — Activities during this period consisted of limited search and destroy activities by TF DEANE and engineer jungle clearing and tunnel destruction by 1st Division engineers. General locations of security forces and engineer parties were as follows:

156

1-503 Inf - southwest portion of the Iron Triangle between the SAIGON River and Hwy 14
2-503 Inf - central portion of the Iron Triangle
4-503 Inf and A/2-11 ACR - roadrunner patrols throughout the Iron Triangle
11 ACR (-) - security operations near the confluence of the SAIGON and THI THINH Rivers
1-4 Cav - screening west of BEN CAT along route 13

25 January — Changes in task organization

3d Bde: 1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-28 Inf
1-4 Cav

TF DEANE terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS and reverted to OPCON II FFV at 0700 hrs. TF FIFE, consisting of 1-4 Cav (-), C/2-2 Inf, B/2-28 Inf and 1st Engineer Bn (-), continued jungle clearing, tunnel destruction and security operations in the Iron Triangle. As a result of tunnel clearing operations during the day, TF FIFE captured 20 VC.

26 January — Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated 262400 Jan 1967. C/2-2 Inf and B/2-28 Inf returned to their units. The 1-4 Cav continued road security in the Iron Triangle for departing engineer work parties.

8. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: See Annex F.

b. Signal: See Annex C.

c. US Army Aviation.

(1) For the initial airmobile assaults in Operation CEDAR FALLS, sixty UH-1D's were made available to the division. Although the majority of aircraft was provided by non-organic aviation battalions, the 1st Aviation Battalion played a major role in planning, coordinating, and executing lift operations. All airlifts were controlled by either the 1st AVN Bn or 11th AVN Bn. The movement of six infantry battalions on 9 February was marked with precise timing by the aviation, infantry, and artillery units participating. The schedule of airlifts on 8 & 9 February is shown below:

UNIT	NR of A/C	Stage from	LZ	Landing Time	Control
*1-26 Inf (+)	60	DAU TIENG	BEN SUC	0800	1st AVN Bn
1-2 Inf	60	LAI KHE	1	0800	11th AVN Bn
1-16 Inf	60	LAI KHE	2	0840	1st AVN Bn
2-28 Inf	60	LAI KHE	3	0920	11th AVN Bn
2-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	4	1115	1st AVN Bn
1-28 Inf	60	DAU TIENG	5	1155	11th AVN Bn
4-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	6	1235	1st AVN Bn

* conducted on 8 Jan; all others on 9 Jan.

(2) After 9 February the average daily aviation support to the division was 27 aircraft per day. These aircraft were used mainly for small unit moves and resupply. Aircraft from the organic aviation battalion flew a total of 431 sorties (UH-1D), transporting 3,682 personnel during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Average aircraft availability during the period was 63.7%.

d. US Air Force Close Air Support

(1) The mission of tactical air was as follows:

(a) Neutralization of enemy forces

(b) Destruction of enemy forces in contact with division units.

(c) Destruction of enemy base camps and tunnel complexes.

(d) Interdiction of enemy liaison/communication routes.

(2) Control. All air strikes were controlled by Forward Air Controllers using O-1 type aircraft.

(3) The 7th Air Force flew a total of 747 sorties in support of 1st Infantry Division elements during the operation. A total of 910 tons of ordnance was delivered. Requests for immediate TAC support were answered with a minimum of delay.

(4) Effectiveness. TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The 7th Air Force support contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire and conducting Landing Zone preparations. Clearance procedures prior to delivery of strikes were simplified through the use of PsyOps messages. Vietnamese in the area were instructed to move to designated areas where they would be safe from US bombings. All personnel remaining in jungle areas would be considered Viet Cong and engaged accordingly. This measure precluded the large number of civilians in the area being injured by supporting fires.

e. Engineer. Engineer support was provided to the division from assets of the 79th Engineer Group. A total of 40 bulldozers and Rome plows was made available to the 1st Engineer Task Force. During the operation the task force cleared 2,233 acres or approximately 9 square kilometers of jungle. Dozer teams consisted of two tank dozers and six dozers. The tank dozers preceded the dozers and cut through the jungle exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The following dozers cut swaths through the jungle along the infantry routes of march. The use of the dozers to open jungles as part of combat operations was a unique and challenging task. Since the Iron Triangle contained well over 100 square kilometers of heavy jungle and large rubber trees, a mass clearance-type operation was abandoned as impractical. Therefore, to open up the jungle for future operations, it was felt that cutting swaths across the jungle together with working dozer teams directly in support of the advancing infantry would provide the best results.

f. B-52 Strikes. A total of ten B-52 strikes was delivered in support of 1st Division operations. The strikes were based on intelligence and were delivered against heavily fortified areas. The strikes were particularly effective in destroying bunkers, collapsing tunnels and uncovering VC supply bases.

9. (C) Results:

a. Friendly losses:

KHA	32
WHA	181

Equipment damaged: 2 CH-13, 4 APC, 1 M151, 3 M-8A1
Equipment destroyed: none

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC)	389
PW	180
CHIEU HOI	471
Detainees	365

(2) Weapons and ammunition:

Small arms	429
Machine guns	18
Mortars	6
Recoilless rifles	2
Grenade launchers	3
Small arms ammo	49,593
Mortar rounds	219
Grenades	1,496
Arty rounds	28
Mines	188
CBU's	142

(3) Foodstuffs:

Rice (tons)	3,347
Peanuts (lbs)	3,550
Salt (lbs)	7,600
Tea (lbs)	40

(4) Supplies:

Uniforms	7,622
Bags, nylon cloth	6
Rolls poncho material	100
6 hp engine	1
Outboard motors	5
Sewing machines	3
Bolts cloth	554
Typewriters	3
Sheets Roofing Tin	700
Kerosene	189
Gasoline (gallons)	1,520
TNT (lbs)	928
Motor oil (gallons)	845
Jungle boots (pairs)	20

(5) Installations:

Huts	169
Bunkers	207
Punji pits	85
Tunnels	173

159

10. Administrative Matters:

a. The administrative planning for Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be adequate, and the logistical support was able to answer effectively to the demands placed on it throughout the operation. All logistical support was provided from base areas outside of the Iron Triangle at established base areas at DAU TIENG, QUAN LOI, LAI KHE, and PHU LOI. The evacuation of refugees from the operational area was a problem which became of major logistical concern. Prior planning programmed the evacuation of refugees by civilian agencies; however, the large number of refugees to be evacuated from the area necessitated US military support. LAI KHE was established as a Forward Logistics Base, using the normally assigned combat service support elements of the base camp. Additional augmentation from Support Command units was extremely limited. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a Forward Ammunition Supply Point and trailer transfer point. Considerable improvement of the ASP area was made. PHU LOI became a logistical base with the establishment of a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area handling Class I and III supplies. The Support Command Forward CP was established at LAI KHE in the Division Headquarters (Forward). The CP was co-located with the AC of S, G-4 element in the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) expandable van. The LOC functions were: to supervise and coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate, and transmit to Div Log Base in DI AN all requests for supply and service support for appropriate action; to coordinate demands exceeding the capabilities of the Support Command with the Logistical Command; and through aggressive follow up action, to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The element also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of all Cl I, II & IV, III and V supplies such as consumption, receipts, on hand, and due in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer.

b. Supply

(1) LAI KHE

(a) The 3d Forward Supply Section of the battalion at LAI KHE, augmented with selected personnel, was the mainstay of supply support to the tactical units participating in the operation. All classes of supply (less Class V) were provided from LAI KHE as well as GR services. Of particular note were the POL Jump Teams dispatched to provide refueling services to infantry and engineer units operating in locations where normal fueling by tank trucks was either impractical or altogether impossible. Petroleum equipment operators, together with dispensing equipment and 500-gallon collapsible drums, were airlifted to provide this service

(b) Bath and Laundry service was provided by the Bath and Laundry Section, 624th Quartermaster Co, 29th Group, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) PHU LOI

(a) As a result of various tactical units staging through PHU LOI during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the supply support provided by the 4th Forward Supply of the 1st S & T Bn increased by approximately 25%. No particular problems were experienced. Shower and laundry facilities were provided by the 1st Logistical Command.

160

(b) The 4th Forward Supply Section provided all class III support (diesel fuel and lubricants) to the RAG-boat and LCM flotilla operating on the SAIGON River during the refugee re-settlement phase of the operation at the river landing in PHU CUONG.

(3) QUIN LOI

The 9th Forward Supply Section of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion at QUAN LOI played no major role in the support of Operation CEDAR FALLS, but was fully geared to provide class I and III support on a major scale if needed.

(4) DAU TIENG

A POL team was dispatched to this location on 4 January 1967 and remained operational until 10 January for the refueling of helicopters participating in diversionary maneuvers at the outset of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

5. Experience Factors

A. Class I: Figures in parentheses represent stockage.

Objectives: Issue is stockage objective

for A rations.

1. Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances

a. LAI KHE

DATE	A Rations (9,100) Issues	A Rations (9,100) O/H End	B Rations (163,900) Issues	B Rations (163,900) O/H End	C Rations (54,900) Issues	C Rations (54,900) O/H End
8	9,100	11,900	0	209,940	1,996	32,720
9	9,700	2,200	67,900	142,040	3,938	28,782
10	10,475	525	0	153,920	3,104	25,678
11	11,055	20	1,327	152,593	3,796	21,882
12	8,410	1,710	2,490	197,443	2,320	39,562
13	10,516	0	2,745	209,602	2,980	46,582
14	10,925	8,475	0	211,602	3,302	43,000
15	10,325	7,150	0	211,602	3,458	40,612
16	9,195	21,385	36,780	174,822	4,800	35,812
17	9,050	30,335	0	174,822	696	35,116
18	9,015	30,920	0	174,822	1,392	33,724
19	7,800	23,120	0	174,822	1,548	32,176
20	7,800	15,320	28,840	145,982	4,400	27,776
21	7,635	17,585	0	156,482	2,040	25,736
22	7,635	19,647	0	156,482	2,084	23,652
23	7,060	22,582	49,420	107,062	10,340	13,312
24	6,350	23,757	0	107,062	553	12,954
25	6,175	31,612	0	107,062	848	12,106
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:	8,675		20,267		2,486	
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:	11,055		67,900		10,340	
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	127%		334%		411%	
TOTAL ISSUES:	198,221		189,547		52,610	
AVERAGE O/H FOR PERIOD:	15,191		164,098		2,922	

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 +1,390 -1,690

AVERAGE HOLDOVER: 8,790

TOTAL SHORTAGE ISSUED: 758

DATE (Jan)	A Rations Issues	A Rations O/H End	B Rations (87,000) Issues	B Rations (87,000) O/H End	C Rations (29,000) Issues	C Rations (29,000) O/H End
8	6,600	6,600	0	100,200	0	29,409
9	6,600	6,600	42,805	57,395	230	29,179
10	5,800	7,400	0	57,395	0	29,179
11	5,700	12,700	0	57,395	100	29,079
12	5,800	13,700	0	57,395	0	29,079
13	6,250	14,050	300	57,095	1,100	29,975
14	6,300	14,350	1,200	55,895	0	27,975
15	6,000	14,950	0	55,895	0	27,975
16	6,000	14,750	43,715	12,180	0	27,975
17	6,000	8,750	500	11,680	1,740	26,235
18	6,000	6,616	0	11,680	276	25,959
19	3,866	2,750	1,933	9,747	400	25,559
20	6,200	4,859	0	99,747	2,100	23,459
21	4,132	19,318	0	99,747	928	22,531
22	11,630	19,318	0	99,747	0	22,531
23	0	21,318	462	53,547	0	22,531
24	12,920	8,209	3,150	50,397	220	28,144
25	616	7,702	4,100	46,297	1,416	40,775

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE:

5,497 3,208 866

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUE:

12,920 43,715 2,100

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

235% 1,092% 242%

TOTAL ISSUED:

106,384 98,191 8,510

AVERAGE ON HAND PER PERIOD:

11,344 55,191 27,390

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 -21,907 -1,690

163

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 5,913

TOTAL SURETIES ISSUED: 159

a. QUIK LOI

DATE	A Rations Issue	A Rations O/H End	B Rations (13,500) Issue	B Rations (13,500) O/H End	C Rations (4,500) Issue	C Rations (4,500) O/H End
8	250	4,450	750	5,070	400	2,498
9	550	3,900	0	5,070	400	2,098
10	250	3,650	0	5,070	400	1,698
11	250	3,400	750	4,320	450	1,298
12	250	3,150	0	4,320	800	3,510
13	250	2,900	0	4,320	900	2,610
14	750	2,650	750	3,570	904	4,534
15	250	2,400	0	3,570	428	4,106
16	1,450	1,700	0	3,570	280	3,826
17	750	1,250	2,250	5,820	120	3,706
18	800	3,393	0	5,820	0	3,706
19	750	2,643	0	5,820	384	3,322
20	677	1,923	900	4,920	0	3,322
21	993	2,751	0	6,756	0	9,972
22	750	3,633	0	8,750	0	9,972
23	950	5,572	552	9,302	0	9,972
24	950	4,572	0	19,302	500	9,472
25	950	4,572	0	19,302	0	10,944
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:	637		237		297	
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:	1,450		2,250		904	
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	228%		949%		304%	
TOTAL ISSUES:	11,777		6,200		5,944	
AVERAGE ON HAND FOR PERIOD:	3,244		8,179		5,032	
AVERAGE VENTILATION FROM O/H:	0		-5,322		4511	
AVERAGE RETENTION:	654					
TOTAL SURETIES ISSUED:	23					

164

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. [illegible]:

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy
8	3,400	11.2	0	0	0	0	12,222	0	33.0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	8,000	10.0	0	11,300	0	16.5	0	0	0
11	10,550	12.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	10,100	13.0	0	47,340	0	70.1	20,000	0	73.0
13	6,006	6.0	0	14,934	0	22.3	10,000	0	73.0
14	19,400	15.9	0	2,000	0	1.5	0	0	0
15	9,000	15.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	23,430	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	10,000	20.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	9,600	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	9,900	2.2	0	10,500	0	15.7	0	0	0
22	9,000	7.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	10,000	12.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	95.0
25	16,700	72.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTALS:								
	172,994	216.1	0	86,624	0	126.1	48,621	0	221.0

b. [illegible]

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	6,600	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	11,000	0	14.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	6,600	0	7.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	6,600	0	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	6,600	0	11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	5,000	0	13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	3,066	0	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	8,320	0	11.5	90,000	0	135.0	0	0	0
21	10,600	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	11,500	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	2,000	0	4.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	95.0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,147	0	21.5
	TOTALS:								
	100,766	0	134.3	90,000	0	135.0	20,480	0	126.5

165

e. QUAN LOI: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE	A Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	B Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	C Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy
21	1,778	5.2	0	1,846	2.7	0	6,650	23.2	0
22	1607	2.6	0	1,984	2.7	0	0	0	0
23	2,914	2.6	0	11,520	40.0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	950	2.2	0	0	0	0	1,476	28.3	0
TOTALS:									
	7,249	12.6	0	15,350	46.0	0	8,126	28.3	0

REMARKS: No Class I receipts 8 - 20 January 1967 at QUAN LOI.

d. PHU CUONG Refugee camps:

The following items were issued during the period 11-15 Jan

Powdered Milk (cs)	-	80
Beef and Gravy (cs)	-	45
Noodles, Chow Mein (cs)	-	30
Luncheon Meat (meal)	-	120,000
Pork Sausage (meal)	-	113,000
Frankfurters (meal)	-	192,000
Eggs, Dehydrated (meal)	-	205,000
Milk, Chocolate, canned (meal)	-	29,000

B. Class III:

(1) Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances:

(a) LAI KHE:

DATE	UP - A Issues	(60,000) O/H End	AVGAS Issue	(10,000) O/H End	MOGAS Issue	(4,000) O/H End	Diesel Issue	(4,000) O/H End
8		63,000		12,000		35,000		31,000
9	28,000	50,000	1,000	12,000	10,000	40,000	6,000	35,000
10	10,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	5,000	90,000	2,000	55,000
11	10,000	75,000	0	16,000	7,000	43,000	11,000	44,000
12	10,000	65,000	3,000	13,000	8,000	45,000	9,000	45,000
13	16,000	75,000	1,000	12,000	5,000	44,000	3,000	45,000
14	17,500	62,000	3,000	9,000	13,000	36,000	18,000	29,000
15	12,000	50,000	1,000	9,000	13,000	25,000	12,000	18,000
16	13,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	2,000	50,000	2,000	46,000
17	14,000	70,000	3,000	14,000	7,000	46,000	10,000	40,000
18	15,000	85,000	0	14,000	7,000	49,000	5,000	45,000
19	13,000	72,000	1,000	13,000	1,000	48,000	5,000	40,000
20	28,000	74,000	1,000	17,000	8,000	10,000	5,000	35,000
21	2,000	72,000	0	17,000	10,000	30,000	8,000	37,000
22	1,000	71,000	0	17,000	2,000	43,000	2,000	60,000
23	3,000	68,000	0	17,000	8,000	50,000	10,000	50,000
24	8,000	60,000	2,000	15,000	10,000	40,000	5,000	45,000
25	7,000	53,000	0	15,000	4,000	36,000	3,000	42,000

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AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE:				
10,600	970	5,133	7,250	
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUE:				
23,000	3,000	13,000	12,000	
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:				
264%	526%	253%	249%	
TOTAL ISSUE:				
207,910	17,000	120,000	116,000	
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:				
69,166	12,000	40,000	41,222	
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM A/O:				
49,160	-7,112		41,222	

b. PER LOT:

DATE	JP - 4 (75,000) Issues	JP - 4 (75,000) O/H End	JP - 5 (15,000) Issues	JP - 5 (15,000) O/H End	JP - 6 (25,000) Issues	JP - 6 (25,000) O/H End	JP - 7 (30,000) Issues	JP - 7 (30,000) O/H End
8		43,000		14,000		16,375		23,375
9	21,000	45,300	4,000	10,300	5,075	21,000	4,075	39,000
10	5,300	60,000	3,000	12,000	9,000	22,000	10,000	26,700
11	15,000	60,000	2,300	9,625	5,000	26,960	1,300	37,200
12	25,000	54,150	1,600	8,000	4,200	26,960	12,450	29,750
13	19,150	55,000	0	12,000	3,000	23,160	3,500	36,250
14	15,000	65,000	2,200	16,000	3,160	20,000	16,250	25,000
15	49,700	25,300	0	16,000	5,000	22,000	7,600	17,400
16	22,000	43,300	4,000	12,000	4,000	26,000	7,200	20,200
17	12,600	45,700	1,000	16,000	2,000	29,000	5,000	24,400
18	19,700	46,000	4,000	17,000	5,000	29,000	4,400	30,000
19	12,200	42,000	2,000	15,000	7,600	26,400	7,900	27,500
20	14,000	38,000	4,000	11,000	5,400	22,000	7,900	20,000
21	13,400	59,600	1,200	9,000	5,000	23,000	5,000	20,000
22	2,600	62,000	0	14,000	2,000	26,000	2,000	23,000
23	12,000	70,000	0	14,000	2,000	29,000	5,500	22,500
24	20,000	70,000	0	19,000	3,000	36,000	5,000	22,000
25	20,000	55,000	3,000	16,000	8,000	33,000	12,000	25,000

	JP-4	AVGAS	MOGAS	DIESEL
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:	10,030	1,307	4,942	6,366
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:	47,000	4,000	9,000	16,250
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	469%	305%	182%	255%
TOTAL ISSUES:	354,000	33,000	00,375	110,075
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:	52,413	13,021	24,042	26,443
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/O:	-22,527	-1,119	-95[illegible]	-3,557

a. QUAN LOI

DATE	JP-4 (40,000) Issues	JP-4 (40,000) O/H End	AVGAS (20,000) Issues	AVGAS (20,000) O/H End	MOGAS (5,000) Issues	MOGAS (5,000) O/H End	DIESEL (2,000) Issues	DIESEL (2,000) O/H End
8		115,527		24,630		5,900		55,675
9	300	115,227	0	24,630	300	50,600	0	55,675
10	400	114,827	0	24,630	5,090	45,510	200	55,475
11	2,800	112,027	0	24,630	1,200	44,310	0	55,475
12	300	111,727	0	24,600	575	43,735	145	55,330
13	2,500	109,227	1,100	23,500	300	43,435	0	55,330
14	450	108,777	190	23,310	400	43,[illegible]35	100	55,230
15	750	108,027	100	23,210	400	42,635	100	55,130
16	3,700	104,327	220	22,[illegible]90	500	42,135	200	54,930
17	6,827	97,500	1,230	21,160	500	41,635	100	54,830
18	2,700	94,800	0	21,160	300	41,335	500	54,700
19	1,000	93,800	0	21,160	400	40,935	100	54,600
20	2,000	91,800	0	21,160	600	40,335	200	54,400
21	600	91,200	0	21,160	1,960	38,375	90	54,430
22	900	90,000	50	21,110	350	38,025	440	54,090
23	2,300	88,000	100	21,110	600	37,425	450	53,500
24	1,240	85,760	50	20,960	400	36,625	20	53,150
25	300	86,460	0	20,960	200	36,625	20	53,130
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:	1,390		152		574		111	

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	JP-4	[illegible]	[illegible]	DIESEL
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUE:	6,027	1,230	5,090	111
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	500%	000%	000%	411%
TOTAL ISSUE:	29,067	3,570	14,275	2,565
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:	101,127	22,520	42,120	54,741
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:	+61,127	+2,520	+37,120	+34,741

d. DAILY TRANS

DATE	JP-4 Issues	JP-4 O/H End	[illegible] Issues	[illegible] O/H End	[illegible] Issues	[illegible] O/H End	DIESEL Issues	DIESEL O/H End
7	0	30,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	2,777	27,223	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. BY AIR:

DATE	JP-4 Gallons	JP-4 a/c Air	JP-4 a/c Day	[illegible] Gallons	[illegible] a/c Air	[illegible] a/c Day	[illegible] Gallons	[illegible] a/c Air	[illegible] a/c Day	DIESEL Gallons	DIESEL a/c Air	DIESEL a/c Day
8	0,000	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	10,000	0	30
10	40,000	0	120	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45	22,000	6	60
11	5,000	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	20,000	15	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
13	6,000	18	0	0	0	0	4,000	12	0	3,000	9	0
14	16,500	13.5	0	0	0	0	5,000	15	0	2,000	6	0
15	0	0	0	1,000	3	0	2,000	6	0	1,000	3	0
16	43,000	9	120	3,000	9	15	27,000	7	75	3,000	9	90
17	4,000	12	0	1,000	3	0	3,000	9	0	4,000	12	0
18	30,000	0	90	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	30,000	0	90	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	25,000	0	75
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL:

JP-4			[illegible]			[illegible]			DIESEL		
217,500	124.5	510	20,000	15	45	121,000	42	315	100,000	36	345

b. FUEL LOT

DATE	JP-4 Gallons	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	[illegible] Gallons	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	DIESEL Gallons	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	DIESEL Gallons	a/t Air	a/t Hwy
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	15,000	0	45
10	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0
11	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
12	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
13	20,000	0	60	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
14	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	0	0	0
16	55,000	0	165	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
17	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
18	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
19	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
20	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	3,500	0	10.5	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
22	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
23	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
24	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
25	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45
TOTAL:	290,500	0	895.5	35,000	0	105	105,000	0	315	115,000	0	330

c. OIL LOT and DAY TANK

No receipts during the operation.

3. JP - 4 Consumption Experience During Assault Airlift of Infantry Battalions.

a. During this operation some airlifts were monitored by personnel at the refueling points and aircraft crewmen. The following is the results, which appear to contain variables which preclude t[illegible] those figures for detailed planning.

See Next Page

AR - A CONFIGURATION — ASSAULT LIFT OF INFANTRY BATTALION

UNIT	NR A/C	TOTAL G'L	AV/AC	STR. LIGHT LINE DIST to LZ	SIZE UNIT	DATE
[illegible]	10	1700	170	9 MI	One Inf Bn	9 Jan
[illegible]	10	1610	161			
[illegible]	10	1850	185	19 MI	One Inf Bn	
[illegible]	10	1900	190			
[illegible]	10	1850	185	12 MI	One Inf Bn	
[illegible]	10	1890	189			
[illegible]	10	1340	134	29 MI	One Inf Bn	15 Jan
[illegible]	10	1340	134			
[illegible]	6	(84	134			
TOTAL	36 A/C	13,524	1,322	[illegible] MI	4 Bn	
AVERAGE	9.6 A/C Per Bol Co	1,522.7 Per Bol Co	136.5 Per A/C	[illegible].2 Per A/C	1 Bn	

b. The following planning factors are used by Combat Aviation Battalions for planning purposes, and have proven reliable.

(1) An Assault Helicopter Company has 10 or HU-1D's.
(2) To lift one Infantry Company it requires 20 HU-1D's.
(3) To lift one Infantry Battalion it requires 60 HU-1D's.
(4) The difference between the straight line distance to the LZ and the descriptive flight route is 15% more distance.
(5) For combat assaults, HU-1D's carry 1400 lbs of fuel, or 233.4 gals each.
(6) Fuel consumption of the HU-1D is 12 lbs, or 1.9 gals, per minut. at 30 knots speed.
(7) "Slicks" will fly 2 hrs on a fuel load, Gunships will fly 1.5 hours.
(8) One "Slick" will use 550 lbs, or 85.8 gals per flying hour.
(9) Most Infantry Battalion lifts use 2 Assault Helicopter Companies making 3 sorties per company (total of 6) sorties).
(10) JP-4 weights 6.42 lbs per gal. To convert lbs to gals multiply by 0.156.
(11) The more aircraft used in a lift, the greater the fuel consumption rate will be.

C. Class II - IV

1. All Cl II & IV support for operation CHEAH FALLS was provided by the 3rd FSC, LAI ARVN. A breakdown of issues of fast moving items follows.

Paper Plates (ea)	-	59,500
Paper Cups (ea)	-	67,000
Plastic Knives (ea)	-	74,000
Plastic Forks (ea)	-	75,000
Plastic Spoons (ea)	-	74,000
Battery BA 386 (ea)	-	900
Battery BA 30 (ea)	-	12,550
Water Cans, 5 gal (ea)	-	150
Spray, aerosol, insect repellent (ea)	-	1,366
Soap, GI (lbs)	-	60
Individual clothing pack (ea)	-	6

2. The following Cl II & IV items were furnished in support of refugee and CHIEU HOI resettlement:

Tent, GP - Med	-	44
Tent, Hexagonal	-	150
55 - gal drums	-	926*
Field Kitchen fire units	-	6
Field Kitchen cooking utensils	-	29
Field Kitchen stove cabinets	-	2
Shower Unit	-	1
Water Can, 5 gal	-	2,125*
Water Trailers, 400 gal	-	15
Water Trailers, 5000 gal	-	2
Gasoline Tank truck, 5000 gal	-	1
Pump, 55 GPM	-	1
Light set	-	1
Generator, 10 KW	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	2
Barbed wire, rolls	-	34*
Concertina, Rolls	-	13*
Lumber, BF, ea	-	9*

NOTE: Items with asterisk (*) were outright issues, all others were furnished on a loan basis.

3. Total tonnage of Cl II & IV items issued:

a. TOTAL Cl II & IV tonnage: 45 s/t
b. Barrier Material only: 30 s/t

B. Class V:

1. LAI KHE ASP stockage objectives:

The following stockage objectives were maintained initially at the LAI KHE ASP. During the latter part of the operation these objectives were adjusted downward:

ITEM	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE
175mm HE	417 rds
8" HE	1200 rds
105mm HE	32400 rds
4.2" HE	792 rds
81mm HE	3960 rds
60mm HE	1000 rds
4.2mm HE	3200 rds
Mine, AT	3000
90mm HE (TK)	620 rds
90mm Comm (TK)	960 rds

Items not listed were stocked in accordance with USARPAC Reg 710-15.

2. Ammunition Tonnages:

Approximately 7934.03 tons of ammunition were shipped from the LONG BINH Area Depot in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. This quantity is broken down as follows:

	AMMUNITION	SMALL ARMS
Land LOC:	6375.25	436.99
Air LOC:	1146.27	4.52
TOTALS:	7522.22 s/t	411.51 s/t

3. Class V Consumption (Issue) Data

	Tonnage issued (all Land LOC)
Small Arms:	64.303 s/t
Artillery:	5018.439 s/t

4. Expenditure data (Artillery)

WEAPON	Avg Rds Fired per Msn (All Msns)	Total Rds Fired
4.2" Mortar	17 Rds/Tube/Day	1692
105mm How	199 Rds/Tube/Day	51915
155mm How	100 Rds/Tube/Day	30043
175mm Gun	32 Rds/Tube/Day	1006
8" How	60 Rds/Tube/Day	3940

(e) Services:

(1) Graves Registration - remains processed

(a) LAI KHE 30

(b) PHU LOI 13

(c) QUAN LOI 0

(2) Showers provided (1st Log Cmd)

(a) LAI KHE 3,523

(b) PHU LOI 5,205

(c) QUAN LOI 2,227

(3) Lbs of Laundry Processed (1st Log Cmd)

(a) LAI KHE 16,136

(b) PHU LOI 15,490

(c) QUAN LOI 6,188

e. Maintenance

(1) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Due to the limits of the area of operations, the service rendered to the division did not differ greatly from the normal day-to-day support operations. Other than usual technical assistance visits, no special maintenance teams were organized for the operations. The back-up support units for the division remained the same. The main repair parts re-supply source was HQ and A company, DI AN, which in turn supplied the forward support companies: B (DI AN), C (LAI KHE), and D (PHUOC VINH). Of the latter, C Company was involved to a greater degree due to its close proximity to the Iron Triangle. On occasion, contact teams were sent by the company in support of their customers.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 701st Maintenance Battalion experienced the following workload:

Job orders received	3,268
Job orders completed	3,455
Demands	16,465
Issues	12,014
Total Transactions	27,816
Average ASL on hand	60%
Average demand accomodation	73%
Tons moved to Forward Support Companies	253
Technical Assistance Visits	299

(3) The following data lists the important major end items involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. In all cases, the number of items supported represents an average figure due to the shifting of tactical units to and from other concurrent operations. The number of major assemblies replaced represents the type of work done on these major end items.

174

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	AVERAGE NR SUPPORTED	REPAIR/REPLACEMENTS
M113	75	5 Transmissions 7 Engines 2 Sprockets 5 Road Wheel Arms 1 Transfer 80 Road Wheels
M113A1	61	1 Transmission 3 Engines 5 Road Wheel Arms
M48A3	30	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 26 Track Blocks 20 Road Wheels 3 Road Wheel Arms
M132A1	6	22 Sprockets
M577A1	13	1 Engine
M578	5	30 Road Wheels 151 Track Pads
M88	5	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 1 Engine 1 Road Wheel Arm
105 How	5f	2 Tubes 3 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Sight
155 How	20	6 Tubes 6 Recoil Mechanisms 5 Obturator Spindles
8" How	5	2 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Obturator Spindles 3 Sights 1 Counter Recoil Mechanism 1 Mount 1 Cradle

(4) If any comparison can be drawn between Operation CEDAR FALLS and earlier operations, it may be said that consumption rates of repair parts and maintenance effort expended were at lower levels for Operation CEDAR FALLS than previously experienced. This is probably due to the better maintenance posture of the division at the present time.

d. Medical

(1) The operation was primarily supported by Company B, located at LAI KHE base camp. Company A, 8 Jan through 11 Jan, and Company C, 11 Jan through 17 Jan, medically supported Operation LAN SON throughout the operation. All other elements of the battalion supported the operation from their base camps by being ready to reinforce the forward companies or to send out a treatment section as required. Two

air ambulances were located at LAI KHE in general support. These air ambulances were controlled by Company B. 1st Medical Battalion also supported the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the operation.

(2) (C) Total number of patients treated:

(a)	DRHA	41
(b)	IRHA	263
(c)	NBI & DIS	1,087
(d)	Vietnamese civilians	412
(e)	ARVN	29
(f)	Viet Cong	52
(g)	Viet Cong Suspects	4
(h)	American civilians	1

(3) (U) Medical services rendered:

The 1st Medical Battalion rendered the normal services to all elements of the Division and units we were directed to support. The normal services are hospitalization, treatment, evacuation, dental care, psychiatric care, and medical re-supply.

(4) (C) Air evacuations:

Battle casualties in urgent and priority categories were evacuated to the 3d Surgical, 3d Field, 93d Evacuation and 12th Evacuation Hospitals according to the type wound or disease and the tactical situation at the time of evacuation. Dust-offs made 161 field patient pick-ups from the operational area in the vicinity of LAI KHE and on two occasions two additional helicopters were requested to assist in evacuation. On 13 Jan a CH-47 Chinook was used to assist in evacuating 23 patients from the clearing station at LAI KHE to Army hospitals.

(5) (C) Medical Supplies:

During the operation 33,300 pounds of medical supplies were shipped to units involved in the support of the operation. In addition, 5,500 pounds of medical supplies were furnished for the refugee camp at PHU CUONG. All medical re-supply was accomplished by dust-off aircraft. Normal supply support was accomplished without any major problems. Prior planning to increase our stock levels by 25% made it possible to fill 90% of all requisitions immediately and the remainder within a 24 hour period.

(6) (C) Whole Blood:

A total of 229 units of whole blood was shipped to units in support of the operation.

e. Transportation

(1) Division Transportation Officer:

(a) During Operation CEDAR FALLS the Division Transportation Office was divided into two main elements, one functioning at DI AN and one at LAI KHE. The DI AN element was composed of personnel to operate the airstrip and the traffic control center. Airstrip operations included controlling all cargo loading of aircraft. The prompt movement of replacement personnel to and from the forward area was also accomplished by airstrip control personnel.

(b) The traffic control center was responsible for road clearances in and around the DI AN area to include SAIGON. They further coordinated all convoy movements in the division TAOR with the DTO element in the forward area.

(c) The Division Transportation Officer and the Assistant Division Transportation Officer operated the DTO section of the Logistics Operation Control Center. From here, all fixed-wing traffic in the division was controlled along with all convoy movement. Requests for aircraft were received, processed and passed on to II FFV headquarters. Allocations were then made requesting units. Requests for convoy clearances were submitted to the DTO element at LAI KHE as well as to the TCC at DI AN. Assistance was also given to the Military Police in lining up convoys departing the LAI KHE area and assisting in their control as they departed.

(d) All convoy scheduling for route 13 was done in LAI KHE. The procuring of trucks for various re-supply missions was done by the LAI KHE DTO element.

(e) Support to the division was rendered by the 48th Transportation Group. In addition to the vehicles supplied for the evacuation of refugees from BEN SUC to PHU LOI.

(2) Transportation Data:

(a) Division Transportation Office:

(1) Convoy Data:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS 18 re-supply convoys were run to LAI KHE. Included in these were 2,000 re-supply vehicles carrying approximately 14,000 tons of supply, mostly class V.

(2) Airlift Data (Logistical):

The following sorties were flown in logistical support:

1. LAI KHE: 34 sorties C 123; 16 sorties C7A
2. PHUOC VINH: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
3. QUAN LOI: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
4. MINH THANH: 2 sorties C7A
5. DU HEP: 1 sortie C7A

TOTAL SORTIES: 86 C 123
45 C7A
TOTAL: 131

(b) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

Convoys DI AN to LAI KHE:

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I s/t	CL II & IV s/t	CL III (BULK) s/t	CL III (PKG) s/t
8	8	4	4	0	0
9	9	0	0	0	0
10	22	2	5	15	0
11	24	15	2	7	0
12	24	15	2	7	0
13	12	7	2	0	1

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I s/t	CL II & IV s/t	CL III (BULK) s/t	CL III (PKG) s/t
14	3	2	1	0	0
15	3	2	1	0	0
16	27	0	5	20	2
17	2	0	2	0	0
18	8	0	0	8	0
19	2	1	1	0	0
20	12	0	1	11	0
21	5	5	0	0	1
22	10	0	0	9	1
23	6	0	2	2	1
TOTAL	153	40 s/t	26 s/t	80 s/t	7 s/t

NOTE: All vehicles carrying bulk CL III were dispatched by the 64th QM BN

f. Communications

(1) Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF system was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to: the training classes the battalion conducted prior to the operation; and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

(2) FM Radio:

(a) Greater range was realized by the infantry battalions by having them erect 60 foot masts with multiple heads where feasible.

(b) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the infantry battalion commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The battalion R & D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AN/PRC 25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnel utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further, no additional radios are required other than what the commander has in his possession. In other words, the commander brings his own organic radios (AN/PRC 25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from an authorized dry cell battery.

(3) VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequencies as the tactical FM net and frequencies must be carefully selected.

178

(4) TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expidited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the CIC and NCO supervisors.

(5) The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of 120 foot AB216 Tower the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuits.

g. Personnel

(1) U.S. losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 32 KHA and 181 WHA.

(2) Enemy losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 389 VC KIA (BC), 180 VC PW, 471 CHIEU HOI, and 365 detainees.

11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. An engineer, artillery navy was innovated to seal the confluence of the SAIGON and the THI TINH Rivers at the southern tip of the Iron Triangle. The engineers used two M4T6 floats as rafts, powered by a 27 foot utility boat. A quad .50 cal and 6 ea. .30 cal machine guns were mounted on the vessel. Two of these craft were constructed and proved very effective at controlling river traffic and searching inlets.

b. The use of bulldozers to open jungle as a part of combat operations was initiated during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Fifty-two bulldozers took part in the operation. A dozer-infantry concept was employed with dozer teams consisting of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. The tank dozers preceded the bulldozers and cut through the jungle, exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The dozers that followed cut paths through the jungle along the infantry route of march. The concept proved very practical and effective. 2,233 acres of jungle in the Iron Triangle were dozed away. Numerous roads and LZ's were cut throughout the area.

c. Acetylene was used for destruction of almost 10 kilometers of tunnels. Generators were used to pump acetylene into the tunnels, where it was ignited. Acetylene was found excellent for destruction of tunnels with not more than 7 foot overburden. Later experiments using HE and acetylene together proved most successful for tunnels as deep as 15-20 feet below the surface.

d. The 11th ACR employed the XENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter. The device proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 ft or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night aerial surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

e. The 2d Bde employed flame throwers to assist in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. The flame throwers reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and produced an adverse psychological effect on the VC.

179

12. (C) Commander's Analysis: Operation CEDAR FALLS was long overdue. The Iron Triangle and nearby village of BEN SUC had been lucrative targets for some time. However, this was the first time sufficient forces and equipment were available to properly execute such an undertaking.

The Tiangle had been a notorious VC haven. From its confines attacks were launched on the surrounding area, and VC control over such areas was unchecked. Ralliers confirmed that the Triangle contained numerous tunnels and bunkers and huge stores of foodstuffs and equipment. Continual bombing and artillery fires certainly disrupted VC activity, but civilian occupants in the area hampered free-fire activities. Additionally, B-52 strikes and artillery bombardment could not be exploited with ground troops. There were simply no access routes, air or ground, into the heart of the Triangle. The few existing cmart roads and foot trails were heavily mined and booby trapped. The 100 square kilometers of the Iron Triangle provided a secure jungle haven which no one division could seal, search and destroy.

BEN SUC, northwest of the Triangle, was VC dominated. It served as a major tax collection headquarters for the heavy traffic moving up and down the SAIGON River between DAU TIENG and SAIGON. It was also a logistical headquarters. VC supplies were brought in by road and boat and transported through BEN [illegible] to the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle. If BEN SUC was threatened by US or ARVN forces, the VC retreated into their nearby jungle base camps. . . .

We had no idea at the beginning that Operation CEDAR FALLS would turn out to be the most significant operation thus far conducted by the 1st Infantry Division. It is most significant in many respects. First of all, it was aimed at the headquarters, Military Region IV. This headquarters is responsible for operations in and around SAIGON. The headquarters directed attacks on TAN SON NHUT and on US troop billets in SAIGON itself.

Because the 25th Division started two days earlier than we did, the bulk of the personnel of Military Region IV came across the river to the north, in the operation area of the 1st Division.

Although the 1st Division killed twice as many VC in Operation EL PASO and ATTLEBORO, the number of VC who were captured and who surrendered in Operation CEDAR FALLS, when added to the killed, brings the grand total to the largest achieved in any single operation in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The US forces involved captured, mostly in tunnels and caves, the vast majority of the records and plans of Military Region IV. Over 235,000 pages of MR IV documents have been processed by MACV documents section. Some of these documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966, and their intelligence value is tremendous. These contain the strengths of VC units, the names of their members, the towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

In the course of the Operation, 7,000 refugees were resettled from the area. These refugees, who were mostly VC families, provided the labor corps and the logistic support for VC units throughout the entire area. The medical facility discovered by the 1st Battalion 28th Infantry contained medical supplies in a depot on which all the main forces regiments in the III Corps area drew for their principal support.

For the first time in the history of the war in Vietnam, infantry-engineer bulldozer teams cut their way through the jungle, finding and destroying base camps, creating landing zones, pushing back the jungle from roads which can now be used for rapid repenetration of the area. One entire jungle area was completely eliminated. All in all, the engineers cut down 9 square kilometers of solid jungle. This is a technique which will be used again in the penetration of other VC war zones and base areas--a technique pioneered by the 1st Division. Everyone who worked with the engineers recognizes the tremendous contribution they made to the success of the operation.

In addition to the destruction of the base area of Military Region IV, the most significant and unexpected result was the surrender, as of 26 January, of 471 Viet Cong. This has never happened before in the war in Vietnam, and in this area at least, is a reflection of the complete breakdown in confidence and morale on the part of the VC.

Although I do not expect the war to end quickly, I believe this has been a decisive turning-point in the III Corps area; a tremendous boost to the morale of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be one of the more successful operations of the 1st Infantry Division and may be a major turning point in the III Corps Tactical Area. The operation significantly eliminated VC supply bases and staging areas. The enemy's fighting strength was reduced by over 1,000 (KIA, PW, and ralliers), and his available labor force, in the form of the six thousand inhabitants, was removed from his control. The removal of this labor force and agricultural resources has significantly reduced the Iron Triangle's value as a logistics and headquarters base. The enemy-initiated incidents decreased dramatically during the latter part of January and February. This decrease is probably due to Operation CEDAR FALLS. The use of engineer-infantry teams in jungle clearing operations was very effective. The removal of jungle growth is the only sure means of denying unobserved use of the area by VC forces.

b. Lessons Learned:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, bulldozers required refueling in as many as six locations daily. Normally, field refueling is performed by a POL team of two men with a 50 GPM pump transported in a CH-47 with bladders slung underneath. Refueling in this manner would have required two CH-47 teams all day. A more efficient method was developed during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Units accomplished their own refueling by having a dozer dig itself into a trench deeper than ground level. 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel were placed on the edge of the trench and gravity-fed into the fuel tank. The same method will be used if similar operations are conducted in the future.

Present TO&E personnel are insufficient to operate battery and battalion fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis. However, there is a continual requirement to operate both fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis since batteries are very frequently separated from the battalion by great distances and must always be prepared to operate independently. Recent investigation of artillery incidents indicated that extremely long duty hours of fire direction center personnel is a contributing factor to the incident. TO&E personnel authorizations must be increased to insure competent, accurate fire direction procedures.

LZ construction is a continual problem in jungle terrain. The ball chain demolition and bangalore torpedo have proved very effective against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. Positive control is increased if the demolitions are fired electrically.

The dozer team of two tank dozers and six bulldozers proved very effective during Operation CEDAR FALLS, particularly when working in a joint effort with infantry. Infantry provided security, whenever the infantry stopped, dozers cleared resupply LZ's. The dozers destroyed tunnels, fortifications and base camps as they were discovered. This technique is recommended for use in future operations. One or two APC's or a VTR should be attached to each team for maintenance support.

Quad 50's were helilifted by CH-47 into ambush positions inaccessible to track and wheel vehicles. The results were excellent. Positions were secured by infantry, and, if necessary, platforms were constructed. Due to site selection the machine guns were able to engage target at all ranges.

The GVN has established the CHIEU HOI program to provide a means for the VC to return to government control. Due to the relatively limited assets and shortage of trained leaders available to GVN, it is essential that US military units assist the GVN in making the program work. Experience shows that the following are required:

(1) VC troops must be informed so they will honor previous radio.

(2) Command interest is required to obtain universal support.

(3) Division representatives must be assigned to CHIEU HOI centers to assist in the operation of the center and to keep the Division informed.

(4) Psyhop efforts must support the program.

(5) Aid in job placement of defectors after release from the centers is necessary.

Defectors have a detailed knowledge of VC methods and beliefs. Knowing how the VC think, they are able to prepare excellent propaganda material. As a living example of the benefits of defecting, they are the best face-to-face salesmen for the GVN program. They are also an excellent intelligence source.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS it became apparent that VC combat units move regularly and do not have time to dig tunnels. They rely on foxholes, trenches and bunkers for protection. Tunnels are dug and inhabited by relatively permanent VC elements. Therefore, although most prisoners can frequently reveal the general location of tunnels, efforts to precisely locate tunnels should be focused on local cadre and rear service personnel.

The 7,000 refugees resettled during Operation CEDAR FALLS caused major problems in transportation, site clearing, shelter erection, provision of water and food and caring for livestock. The military has the necessary assets to take care of massive initial problems encountered. Experience has shown that the GVN assisted by the Office of Civilian Operations can assume full responsibility for refugees after a camp is established. Military units must plan to handle the initial phase of any sizable refugee relocation.

Experience has shown the value of the pictorial supplement and the use of low oblique photographs by the 1st Aviation Battalion. The battalion briefs all flight leaders prior to any mission with these graphic aids. Therefore, the actual reconnaissance can be accomplished in one pass over the objective area, thus insuring the probability of the reconnaissance flights giving away an impending operation. The flight leaders in turn by use of the photographs are able to better brief their separate flights giving each member of the flight a vivid tool in picking out the assigned LZ.

In the event of low level air assaults on an objective, it is mandatory that each flight leader is able to positively identify his assigned LZ, i.e., "LZ 1 will be marked with yellow smoke, LZ 2 with green smoke, etc".

To keep to a minimum time spent on the ground by gunships, re-arming points must be planned for with sufficient personnel to prepare the ammunition and assist the crews in re-arming the aircraft. Rearming points and refueling points should be in close proximity to each other. This insures the objective area with continuous coverage during the initial stages of the air assault.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. J. HEADOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ENCLOSURES:

1 — ~~List of Commanders~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
2 — ~~Operations Overlay~~ See fold-outs
C — 2d Bde After Action Report
D — 3d Bde After Action Report
E — ~~11th Avn Bn After Action Report~~ Distributed separately.
F — Division Artillery After Action Report
G — 12th Cbt Avn Bn After Action Report
H — ~~17th Avn Gp After Action Report~~ (Distributed Separately)
I — ~~Psy Ops Materials~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

183

AVIB-CMP

14 February 1967

Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report (AMCV/ACS/J3/32

Thru: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVIB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

To: Commanding General
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO U.S. Forces 96243

1. (U) Name and Type of Operation: Operation CLEAR FALLS: an airmobile assault to seal and search the village of BAU SUC, the preparation for and the evacuation of the inhabitants of BAU SUC in conjunction and cooperation with ARVN and GVN, and search and destroy operations in area.

2. (U) Dates of Operation: 080725H Jan 1967 to 171700H Jan 1967.

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation CLEAR FALLS was initiated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Plan 30-66 dated 301200H December 1966. The Bde T.C CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AN at 070650H by road to BIEN HOA airfield then airlifted to DAU TIENG (XT495474) closing at 0855H in preparation for Operation CLEAR FALLS. The 2/16 and 1/18 Inf continued operations PAUNAN and LAI KHE respectively and became OPCON 1st Bde at 070700H Jan 1967. The 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VINH at 070945H closing DAU TIENG at 1109H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) was attached to 1/7 Arty (-). 1/7 (-) was airlifted by CH-47 at 0805H closing Arty Base IV at 1424H. The operation commenced at 080725H with the conduct of an airmobile assault by the 1/26 Inf (+) to seal the village of BAU SUC. The next two days the Bde prepared for and commenced the evacuation of the inhabitants of BAU SUC combined with a thorough search of the village. S&D operations were also conducted to the N of the village. 2/18 Inf remained RAF until becoming OPCON 3d Bde at 100730H. 2/28 Inf became OPCON 2d Bde at 110800H conducting S&D operations to NE of BAU SUC. Bde received 1st Div Frag O 1-67 dated 071850H Jan and prepared for and executed the following missions: 1. Be prepared to assist in the opening of the road from BAU SUC to BEN CAT; 2. On order provide one rifle company to reinforce and escort TF Brown; 3. Be prepared for OPCON ARVN ABN Task Force; 4. after arrival ARVN ABN TF,1/26 Inf in BAU SUC in readiness for employment as Div reserve (1 hour alert); 5. Secure RAG Route via BAU SUC. The evacuation of all inhabitants with personal belongings, the destruction of BAU SUC and S&D ops in area continued until the completion of the operation on 17 Jan 1967.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel James A. Grimsley, Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

b. Task Organization:

(1) 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry: LTC Col Honig

(2) 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry: LTC Col Alvar D. Pendelton

(3) 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry: LTC Col L. B. Beerum

(4) Co B, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry: Captain Edward L C...

(5) HHC, 2d Brigade, 1st Inf Div: Captain Sherwood Goldberg

(6) 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery: LTC Col George L. MacFadden

(7) Division Tunnel Team: LT Charles Barber, Tm Leader

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

ANNEX C
TO
Incl 2

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operations: All intelligence concerning the operation was received from the Division G-2. Units and organizations that were reported to be in the area were the 7th Bn, 165th Regiment, C61 Local Force Company, the headquarters and security elements of Military Region 4 Committee, the BINH DUONG Province Committee, and local guerrillas in and around BEN SUC (XT587335). General locations were known but none of the units were reported in the brigade Area of Operations. There was no estimate of the strength of these units.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: There was no contact made with an organized unit following the insertion of the Brigade in the operational area. Contact was made on a daily basis with small groups of VC in and around BEN SUC. These were apparently VC elements guarding caches and local guerrillas.

Following the arrest of BEN SUC on 6 January 1967, 126 individuals were detained. Of these twenty-eight were classified as Viet Cong. Most of those were local VC who were of little intelligence value and had virtually no information. On 12 Jan the Platoon Leader of B2 Platoon C139 Group 83 was captured. This platoon transported rice in the area of and BEN SUC. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicated that this area was designated Base Zone C by the VC and Rear Service Unit Group 83 was the major unit normally stationed in the area.

c. Terrain and Weather: Weather was excellent during the operation. Days were clear and relatively cool. There was no precipitation or fog. Terrain in the operational area was flat along the SAIGON River with dried rice paddies extending inland 500 to 1,000 meters. Observation and fields of fire were excellent in this area. Cover and concealment were provided by the dikes between rice fields. To the north of the SAIGON River vegetation consisted of old rubber plantations and dense jungle. Concealment in the jungle was excellent, however, fields of fire were restricted. The SONG SAIGON could be crossed by boat. The RUT HO Stream via XT602341 could be forded by track vehicles and foot troops. A ford or bridge would have to be constructed for wheeled vehicles.

d. Fortifications: Ten base camps were located (see Annex 1 and 2). Also one fortified village was located via XT5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. The town was still occupied. Approximately 335 bunkers were located and destroyed, the majority of which were used for protection from airstrikes and artillery. Major means of destruction used to destroy these fortifications was to fill in air-strikes and artillery following the evacuation of the area.

One major tunnel complex was found in the town of BEN SUC (see Annex 3). Tunnel rats were used to explore and destroy this complex.

The major discovery made by the Brigade was the location of 618 tons of rice. Caches were located along the RUT HO Stream from XT602345 to XT603380. The rice was stored on platforms with thin roofs over them and the four walls open. Fifty tons of rice were found in the village of BEN SUC. Following the evacuation of the inhabitants of BEN SUC, bulldozers started destruction and uncovered underground caches. These were holes lined with woven matting, one to two feet below the surface and filled with loose rice (See Annex 4 for installations and caches located on Operation CEDAR FALLS).

e. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare Operations:

(1) Civic Action: Medical Civic Action programs during the operation were limited to one which was held on the first day of the operation in the village of BEN SUC by the 2/MED MEDCAP team. A total of 357 personnel were screened, examined, and treated. RVN personnel also served a meal to 3,612 personnel on the same day. The civic action/civil affairs functions performed during the remainder of the operation were confined to evacuation of the populace and their belongings to include oxen/cattle and rice, burning of rice found in numerous caches under houses, and destruction of houses, fruit trees, and rice which could not be evacuated. All of these activities were undertaken jointly by 2/MED and 2d Bde S-5 section. Amounts of personnel, animals and material evacuated were as follows:

185

	BOLT			CH-47			
Date	Personnel	Rice	Oxen/Cattle	Personnel	Rice	Carts	Pigs
11 Jan	872	unk	11	315	none	None	19
12 Jan	555	unk	113	398	98,000#	70	8
13 Jan	308	unk	232	195	149,000#	45	none
14 Jan	181	140,000#	76	none	none	5	none
15 Jan	No lift this date			No lift this date			
16 Jan	0	140,000		No lift this date			
Sub Totals	1,916	280,000#	432	899	247,000#	120	27
Totals	2,815	527,000#	432	899		120	27

In addition to the amounts of rice indicated above, each family which was evacuated took a small amount of rice along. No figures are available as to how much rice was taken on board boats during the first three days of the evacuation, but estimates of more than fifty (50) tons have been made.

When first informed of the evacuation, the populace became extremely concerned, and while not openly hostile, were definitely unfriendly. Once the Province Chief, Col Ly Tony Ba, had spoken to the citizens, and had informed them that the evacuation would take place, and that no alternatives would be entertained, all personnel seemed to accept the fact, and seemed eager to leave. It is interesting to note that in not one case did the citizens make any attempt whatsoever to take with them the rice which was later found in caches underground. In all instances these caches were left undisturbed by the inhabitants of the houses and were discovered by demolitions or bulldozer operators during the destruction phase. Masonry houses were destroyed by bulldozer operations, thatch houses were destroyed largely by fire. Fruit trees were cut down by personnel, or uprooted by bulldozers. Those rice caches which could not be salvaged or barged for evacuation due to time limitations were soaked with diesel fuel and left in place. In some cases, rice was dumped down wells or burned inside houses.

(2) Psychological Operations: Because of the nature of this mission, Psy War activities by 3d Bde Sub Section were limited to the first day of the operation. During the conduct of operations on 8 January, three missions were flown for a total of seven hours loudspeaker broadcast time. The first mission was conducted over the village of BEN SUC during the current to inform the villagers that the village was surrounded by Allied Forces, that they should remain in their houses and wait for instructions, and that they would not be harmed. The second mission was flown to inform the populace of the evacuation, and instruct them to gather in the center of the village at the school house. The third mission was flown along the highway to the East of BEN SUC, informing all personnel there that the area was to be evacuated, and that they were to gather all their possessions and move to the school house in BEN SUC.

These missions were highly successful in that all instructions given were followed by the populace rapidly and to the letter. No incidents occurred in which the explanation that "I did not understand" was given. Rules of engagement were plain, and were understood. Personnel from outside the immediate environs of the village followed instructions and came into BEN SUC within a very short time.

(a) Conclusions:

1. That messages used were timely, well-phrased and easily understood.

2. That the use of Psy Ops aircraft materially assisted in the success of the cordon and search, and in the subsequent search and in the subsequent evacuation of the community.

(b) Recommendations:

1. That Psy Ops missions continue to be used in such future operations.

2. That commanders at all levels consider plans for future operations to determine the advisability of including Psy Ops activities.

186

Annex 1 to Par 4 (Intelligence) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base camp located at XT576347.

a. The base camp was discovered by C 1/26 Inf on 12 Jan 67 and was reentered 131320H with demolition teams and tunnel rats to explore then destroy the complex. Only one (#4) bunker of the four was damaged by indirect fire and air strikes both of which were very extensive. The base camp had one well-used trail entering from the west and the thick natural undergrowth was such that the camp could not be seen from the air.

b. Building #1 was approximately 9' wide by 18' long and 10' below the surface of the ground. The building had cement on all four sides and flooring about 5" thick. The only overhead protection was afforded by sheets of tin. On the NW corner was a bunker with no overhead protection. Beds and tables were on the floor.

Building #2 was approximately 9' wide by 12' long and 10' below the surface. It had concrete identical to Building #1. Overhead cover over one-half of the structure was consisted of 5" logs and 3' packed dirt. There were no fighting positions located near the building and beds were located on the 1st floor and on top of the overhead protection. Buildings #3 and #4 were exactly identical to building #1.


c. Bunker #5 located north of the camp and connected by tunnel to building #3 had overhead protection of 5" logs and 3 foot of packed dirt. There were four firing apertures, each 2" high and 4-6" wide and each could cover an area over 100m wide to the front.

d. The second level tunnel going north was made so that at every 10-15m it came to a dead end; and a trap door on the floor connected with a tunnel which went down-around and back up to the other side and on the same level with the fake dead end. There were two small holes in the dead end permitting one man to observe and fire through the tunnel.


e. It is estimated that the four bunkers/buildings are 100% destroyed and the tunnel system 75% destroyed connecting the buildings. It is thought that this complex possibly could have been a safe haven for high ranking VC passing through. (See Appendix 1 for Diagram).

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Annex 3 to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS



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5
5-BUNKER
40M
40M
40M
8
10M
1
10K
4

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
Annex 2 to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base Camp located at XT566370.

a. West Camp: The four buildings were all 10' x 10'. Building #1 was only 4' below surface and was used only for sleeping apparently. Buildings 2 & 3 were 7' below surface and had overhead cover of about 1 foot of dirt and 1 foot of logs. The kitchen was above ground and had a tin roof above it. Building #2 had a large amount of photographic material and is assumed to be the location where film was developed. None of the buildings were burned and the tunnels were left untouched.

b. East Camp: This camp, which might consist of more buildings than indicated, was assumed to be the headquarters of a propaganda unit (LAW 664/3865A). The buildings were very large, 12' x 35' and 6-7' below the surface. All buildings had overhead cover consisting of one foot of log and 1 foot of dirt. In building #4 there were three large tables and at least 10 lbs of loose paper, the type used to make small envelopes and letters. Due to the limited time the area was not searched properly. The buildings were burned to the ground (See Appendix 2 - Diagram).

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WESTCHAM
CHARLIE
MOON
EASTCHAM
N

A1

Annex A to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Hard installations and caches found on Operation CEDAR FALLS:

XT585334 - tunnel
XT582333 - tunnel
XT610367 - bunkers - airstrike
XT656359 - bunkers - airstrike
XT560362 - foxholes - airstrike
XT613345 - foxholes & trenches
XT596335 - base camp
XT576332 - tunnel
XT585242 - tunnel
XT577337 - tunnel
XT587336 - tunnel (destroyed)
XT589336 - tunnel
XT579313 - bunker (destroyed)
XT579342 - bunker (destroyed)
XT579312 - bunker (destroyed)
XT584337 - tunnel
XT582345 - tunnel
XT566341 - bunker (destroyed)
XT587333 - tunnel
XT559363 - base camp
XT605349 - AW position
XT561384-572309 - trenches & tunnels
XT575397 - possible base camp
XT575335 - tunnel
XT581336 - tunnel
XT563353 - tunnel
XT584339 - tunnel
XT559363 - bunkers
XT569343 - bunkers
XT566357 - trench
XT559363 - bunkers
XT605364 - bunker
XT601363 - base camp
XT541378 - bunkers
XT566357 - trench
XT565364 - 3 bunkers (destroyed)
XT585305 - foxholes
XT585334 - tunnel
XT577334 - tunnel
XT576347 - base camp 3 huts/bers
XT576347 - 3 concrete bunkers; 3-4 story tunnel
XT555365 - bunkers, trench partially destroyed
XT552362 - 1 bunker (destroyed)
XT576347 - 2 bunkers (destroyed)
XT558413 - 8 bunkers (destroyed)
XT582361 - 6 bunkers (destroyed)
XT585347 - 4 bunkers (destroyed)
XT600352 - 1 large concrete tunnel
XT552367 - 10 bunkers
XT583332 - tunnel
XT626437 - base camp
XT647403 - base camp
XT566368 - base camp, 7 huts
XT557364 - tunnel

XT596346 - tunnel complex
XT603348 - 3 foxholes
XT550368 - 1 concrete bunker (destroyed
XT599345 - 2 bunkers
XT550360 - 5 bunkers (destroyed)
XT582336 - bunkers & tunnels
XT566365 - tunnel
XT595348 - base camp, 9 huts
XT583337 - foxholes
XT584313 - tunnel
XT566370 - base camp (photo equipment)
XT570355 - 3 bunkers
XT551368 - 3 huts, 40 bunkers
XT599347 - base camp (9 huts, 3 bunkers,
XT596335 - rice cache
XT597335 - rice cache
XT593345 - rice cache
XT569350 - ammo cache
XT581312 - rice & medicine
XT574324 - rice
XT589314 - medicine
XT582316 - rice
XT577338 - ammo (mines)
XT569336 - medicine
XT580314 - rice
XT584311 - rice
XT577331 - ammo (mines)
XT582345 - arms & ammo
XT582354 - rice and bike parts
XT572326 - rice
XT605364 - ammo
XT604301 - rice
XT601362 - ammo
XT604364 - ammo
XT601362 - rice
XT599359 - rice
XT596359 - rice
XT601379 - weapons and uniforms
XT603366 - rice
XT601371 - ammo
XT597356 - rice
XT600366 - rice
XT594356 - rice
XT594346 - rice
XT574347 - ammo
XT594361 - rice
XT590373 - rice
XT584313 - ammo
XT583332 - weapons, ammo, & uniforms
XT592355 - rice
XT596367 - rice
XT582334 - rice
XT567355 - rice
XT568354 - rice
XT596359 - rice
XT594346 - weapons & ammo

192

5. (C) MISSION: H-Hour, D-Day 2d Bde conducts airmobile assault from DAU TIENG (DETROIT) to seal and search village of BAU SUC (BALTIMORE); prepares to evacuate village inhabitants on D+1; conducts S&D operation in area; clears and secures Arty Base II vic BALTIMORE; in conjunction with US AID and GVN Forces, prepares to commence evacuation of inhabitants of BALTIMORE by R&G boats on D+1; and prepares to detach one battalion to 3d Bde on order on or after D+1.

6. (C) EXECUTION:

Chronology:

7 Jan 67 (Prepositioning of Forces) - The Bde TAC CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AN at 0654H by road to BIEN HOA airfield then airlifted to DAU TIENG (XT495474) closing at 0855H in preparation for Opn CEDAR FALLS, 2/16 Inf and 1/18 Inf were detached at 0700H and placed OPCON 1st Bde. 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VINH at 0945H closing DAU TIENG at 1109H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. 1/7 Arty with Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) attached moved by road and CH-47 closing Arty Base IV (XT527278) at 1426H.

8 Jan 67 - 2d Bde initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS remaining at DETROIT as Bde RAP. Co A was attached to 1/26 Inf. At 080725H 1/26 Inf (+) conducted simultaneous air assaults into multiple LZ's and sealed the northern sector of the village of BAU SUC. Sixty helicopters touched down and off-loaded the 1/26 Inf within 45 seconds. Elements of 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations north and west of the village with A 2/18 Inf attached. At 0805H vic XT562339 C 1/26 Inf apprehended 8 detainees. B 1/26 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT576331 at 0815H. C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 booby traps at 0830H vic XT562357. At 0833H vic LZ CHARLIE, A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee on bicycle. At 0830H A 2/18 touched down at LZ HOTEL and received sporadic small arms fire from the west with neg casualties. At 0856H B 1/26 received SA sniper fire vic XT576332 and returned fire killing 1 VC. At 0858H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 5 VC mines at XT583340. At 0900H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 booby traps vic west end of LZ CHARLIE. B 1/26 captured 3 unarmed Vietnamese vic XT576331 at 0903H. At 0907H vic XT564330 A 2/18 searched a series of huts and apprehended 17 detainees who were evacuated to HELPER. At 0910H B 1/26 apprehended 2 detainees vic XT576338. At 0925H A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 15 detainees. At 0930H 1/26 killed 8 VC in coordination with DAGGER 78 who engaged by helicopter, VC flushed into the Saigon River. At 0927H A 1/26 moved to search area vic XT569331 where several VC had been observed in bunkers. At 0945H vic XT578330 A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 4 detainees. At 1020H A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee across the river vic XT569330. At 1025H A 2/18 vic XT564330 evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1025H C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 mine vic XT583357. At 1053H vic XT574338 D 1/26 located and destroyed 12 sampans. At 1056H vic XT578340 C 1/26 located and destroyed 8 VC mines. Elements of C 1/26 observed 6 VC with weapons and immediately engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1057H Recon 1/26 was alerted for S&D mission where VC were observed vic XT5003l3. A 1/26 found a VC body vic XT589331 at 1113H/ At 1115H vic XT583339, Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 8 booby traps. At 1124H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 VC mines vic XT578340. Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans vic XT562317. At 1140H A 2/18 found VC bag with documents, wallet and ID card vic XT589333. At 1151H vic XT576340 A 1/26 received small arms fire; fire was returned by mortars and artillery with unknown results. At 1314H vic XT581316 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 sampan. B 1/26 captured 1 VC with weapon vic XT576331 at 1315H, VC was evacuated for interrogation. Vic XT585341, A 1/26 captured 3 VC attempting to escape across river at 1336H. B 1/26 found 1 AK rifle vic XT576332 at 1335 H. At 1340H vic XT576332 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3,400 lbs of rice. In addition Recon 1/26 found at XT581315 2 sampans containing 6,815 uniforms, 2 rolls of assorted color cloth, 6 bags nylon cord, and 7 bags of nylon netting. Sampans were destroyed and other items evacuated. At 1426H A 1/26 requested evacuation of 1 detainee, 2 VC KIA, 2 VCC, and 1 VC WIA from vic XT585340. At 1429H vic XT574333 D 1/26 located and destroyed 14 sampans and 200 lbs rice. At 1[illegible] vic XT586342 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm rd. At 1543H Recon 1/26 located a bunker containing 3 waterproof packs containing misc clothing, documents, diary, and several rds of Russian 7.62 ammo. At 1630H Recon 1/26 was airlifted to Base II to secure Arty Base adjacent to LZ HOTEL. A 1/26 vic XT589332 found 4 small sampans and 3 large sampans with cabins and outboard motors. The sampans were destroyed and not re evacuated at 1630H. At 1651H vic XT586342 C 1/26 blew a bunker which yielded 1 VC claymore and several RA 30 batteries. At 1733H vic Base II, Recon 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1800H 1/26 assumed night defensive posture. At 1835H vic XT588333, A 1/26 located 2 VC KIA in tunnel

which A 1/26 had contaminated earlier with CS gas. At 1855H vic XT586242, C 1/26 located and destroyed 4 VC mines. B 1/26 received small arms, M-79 and 50 caliber fire from vic XT5733342 at 1659H and fire was countered with mortars, artillery and M-79 with unknown results. At 1905H vic XT565342 C 1/26 received ineffective carbine fire from vic XT571342, fire was not returned. C 1/26 at 1920H received 4 mortar rds from the north vic XT535345, counter mortar fire was placed in the area, there were neg friendly casualties. At 1930H vic XT565342 C 1/26 discovered and evacuated pack with wallet containing pictures and documents. At 1930H a flare ship was called on station for continuous illumination throughout the night. At 2006H vic XT590340 A 1/26 engaged 3 VC moving toward their position, capturing 1 female VC with pack and 1 VC male. At 2008H 2/18 Inf engaged and killed one VC that set off trip flare vic XT584327. At 2012H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties vic XT590341. At 2025H vic XT584326 A 2/18 killed 1 VC with weapon and web gear. At 2045H vic XT581331 Recon 1/26 was fired on by 6 VC and fire was returned with unk results. At 2150H vic XT572333 A 1/26 received AW fire and carbine fire. At the same time vic XT577328 A 2/18 received SA fire. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on suspected area. At 2152H vic XT 584339 C 1/26 received several hand grenades and immediately engaged suspected location with M-79 and mortar fire. At 2157H A 2/18 received AW fire from vic XT575325. The area was illuminated and artillery fires called in. At 2236H vic XT584340 C 1/26 received one hand grenade. The night passed without further contact. D Trp 1/4 Cav conducted Eagle Flights in S portion of BALDHOCK. At 0646H, Trp reported circular trenches vic XT605350. No fire was received and artillery was called in the area. At 0830H Trp engaged 1 VC fleeing on a bicycle vic XT589391 resulting in 1 VC KIA. (BC). At 1055H vic XT573324, a rice cache was located and at 1059H vic XT581313 another rice cache was located. Three VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. (BC) and 4 weapons captured. Area was exploited by Recon 1/26 Inf in the afternoon. At 1150H another rice cache was located vic XT574324. Trp was released to CO, 2d Bde at 1200H. 2/2 Inf (Mech) remained at Arty Base IV. The 3d Bde TAC CP airlifted from DUC PHUOC closing BALTIMORE at 1030H. TFNO with 3/8 AHV began search of BALTIMORE at 0945H. At 1245H search forces located a tunnel vic XT565334 containing 8 VC resulting 3 VC KIA (BC) and 5 VC PW's (3 of which were wounded). A search of the village resulted in 106 detainees being evacuated to IBC CHUC and 16 to LAI KIA. S-5 Psy Ops ship broadcasting over BALTIMORE engaged 3 VC vic XT663255 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). Airstrikes vic XT610317 resulted in 2 VC KIA and extensive bunker destruction.

9 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Ops CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) continued Ops CEDAR FALLS remaining at DUC HOI as Div RAP. At 1345H the Bn was placed OPCON 3d Bde and reverted to Co 2d Bde at 1630H. The Bn HQ'd vic BALTIMORE (XT595343). Co D 2/2 Inf (Mech) continued to secure Arty Base IV until 1305H at which time it unmovingly road to LAI KIA at 1715H reverting OPCON 3d Bde. 1/25 Inf with A 2/18 Inf attached continued mission of scaling JED SUC, conducting S&D operations in AO's CHUCK, IKE, and DICK; provided security for Arty Base II and conducted S&D operations vic LZ DUC VO. At 0950H vic XT585328 A 2/18 engaged 5 VC vic XT589229 with unknown results. At 0950H vic XT583320 A 2/18 engaged sampan on river with 2 VC aboard resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 sampan destroyed. At 0705H A 2/18 vic XT584327 reported 1 carbine, 4 VC bodies, and 1 wounded VC female with carbine. At 0737H A 2/18 reported 1 VC KIA vic XT583327. Recon 1/26 reported 1 VC KIA with pistol belt and ammo pouch vic XT582334 at 0757H. At 0822H element of B 1/26 received SA and M-79 fire vic XT573335. The sniper was engaged with M-79 and mortar fire with unk results. At 0840H A 2/18 captured one VC with transistor radio hiding in water hole vic XT586328. At 0852H vic XT585323, A 2/18 located and destroyed 1 hut and 2 sampans. At 0924H C 1/26 vic XT579341 located and destroyed 2 VC mines. At 0930H vic XT592327, A 1/26 engaged with grenades, 1 VC in a sampan. The VC was in the river and the sampan was captured together with 6 uniforms, 1 pair books and assorted dishes. At 0938H 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT581344. The VC had a carbine, 25 rds of ammo, cards and a triangular type flag. At 0942H A 2/18 located and destroyed 2 sampans vic XT586329/ At 1000H vic XT577330, B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 mines. At 1017H vic XT573339 B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 sampans. At 1020H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker, 1 can motor oil, 1 bag of bicycle parts, and 1 pack of rice vic XT579343. At 1028H C 1/26 located a bunker vic XT579342. At 1035H vic XT579341, C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 butterfly bombs. At 1105H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,300 lbs rice vic XT572339. At 1117H B 1/26 apprehended 1 individual hiding under straw vic XT591337, they also discovered 1 VC pack, 1 protective mask, 1 mosquito net, 1 uniform, and several documents.

At 1115H vic XT578342 B 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans, 16 mines, and 3 CSU booklets. At 1224H vic XT583339 C 1/26 located extensive tunnel system. Tunnel rats were requested to search tunnel complex. The search yielded a large amount of NVA currency and documents, 5 unusor rifles; 450 rds 30 caliber ammo, 50 rds unusor ammo, 1 mine, 1 bomb fuse, 200 rds 7.62 ammo, and 8 rifle bolts (for unusors). All items were evacuated. At 1314H vic XT591313 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of rice. At 1342H vic XT593338 A 1/26 located 2 hammock mines, 3 sampans, several 50 caliber rds, large carbide lamp and fishing equipment. Mines and sampans were destroyed, other items evacuated. At 1340H B 1/26 located and destroyed 14 M-16 mines vic XT575340. At 1353H 1/26 vic XT574316 located and evacuated 2 sandbags of cocoa wine, 7-3' by 75' bolts of cloth and 6-100 lb bags of white paper. At 1452H vic XT586342 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 15 small sampans. At 1509H Recon 1/26 closed Base II and assumed A 2/18 area of responsibility. A 2/18 was detached from 1/26 effective 1600H. At 1610H vic XT590241 A 1/26 had a claymore detonated against an OP with 2 friendly WIA, and 1 friendly KIA. Blocking fires were called in and WIA's and KIA evacuated. 1/26 closed nighttime positions by 1800H. At 1846H vic XT586341 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker position. At 2000H vic XT576339 a claymore was detonated against B 1/26 with neg friendly casualties. The area was placed under surveillance with a starlight scope. At 2010H vic XT577339 C 1/26 observed 1 VC and engaged with hand grenades with unk results. At 2041H vic XT587343, LP of A 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with claymores, mortar fire was placed in the suspected area with results unknown. At 2046H A VC were observed near the same location through starlight scope and the VC were again engaged with claymores and mortar fire with unk results. At 2047H vic XT576344 C 1/26 detected an undetimed number of VC and engaged them with artillery with unk results. At 2116H vic XT578342 C 1/26 detected undetermined number of VC moving toward his location, artillery was placed on the area and movement ceased. At XT575335 B 1/26 engaged and destroyed a sampan with M-79 at 2153H. At 2156H C 1/26 had light probe by VC and engaged with SA fire vic XT576344. Movement ceased. At 2346H vic XT574333 undetermined number of VC were detected between B 1/26 line and an LP. VC were engaged with hand grenades with unk results. TAOD continued to search villages of [redacted] and coordinate Formation Centr l Center. At 0410H 2 [redacted] were apprehended vic XT579335. At 1010H vic XT590336 search forces located 9-5 gal drums of medical supplies and documents. Two VC with hand grenades were apprehended at 1010H vic XT576335; 200 lbs of rice was also located. At 1055H vic XT580341, 2 VC POW's were apprehended and 3 personnel detained. Two more detainees were apprehended at 1224H vic XT580340. At 1125H vic XT584337, a tunnel was located containing numerous blankets, sandals and medical supplies. Two VC were apprehended in the tunnel. At 1410H vic XT 577337, another tunnel was located which contained 1 French 30 cal MG. Search f rces made contact with 1 VC at 1555H vic XT589336. VC fled and a search uncovered 1 Russian carbine. At 1710H vic XT578332 contact was made with 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC and 2 VC POW'S.

10 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Ops CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf continued Ops CEDAR FALLS becoming OPCON 3d Bde at 0730H. At 1000H B 1/26 engaged a sampan with M-79 fire with unk results vic XT575335. At 0017H C 1/26 received incoming grenade from VC vic XT575333. The area was illuminated and 1 VC was observed and engaged with SA and artillery. At 0024H C 1/26 observed and engaged with artillery 3 VC moving toward their location vic XT583340 with unk results. At 0344H vic XT575335 B 1/26 observed and engaged 5-7 VC attempting to exfiltrate from village resulting in 2 VC WIA. Vic XT582339 C 1/26 received heavy mortar attack at 0410H. Counter mortar fires and artillery was initiated and enemy mortars were silenced without casualty. The creator analysis at first light confirmed that at least 46 60mm rds and 2-82mm rds were received. At 0424H 1/26 fired defensive mortar concentrations which produced a secondary explosion in A 1/26 area vic XT580346. At 0423H A 1/26 observed 2 VC fleeing east to west and engaged with SA with unk results. At 0507H a flare ship was called on station for constant illumination and defensive fires were increased to disrupt and prevent attack. At 0526H vic XT585342, A 1/26 observed 15-20 VC wearing camouflage helmets and received 10-20 rds SA fire. LP was pulled back - 1/26 prepared for possible attack. At 0546H A 1/26 reported 15-20 VC to their front vic XT586342. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 0655H 1/26 initiated a sweep to the front of their positions. At 0745H vic XT575335 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 [redacted], who later was confirmed as a VC. At 0800H vic XT587343 A 1/26 had two personnel slightly wounded by an AP mine during sweep of the area. A minesweeper team was called in to check area. At 0943H vic XT587334 B 1/26 captured and evacuated 3 VC with documents. At 0945H vic XT585342 C 1/26 located and evacuated 1 commercial transistor radio found in a hut. At 0951H vic

XT5636342 A 1/26 located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 pistol belt, 1 pair sandals. At 1033H vic XT573345 C 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to [illegible] 2 detainees. At 1042H vic XT574376 B 1/26 located 3 sampans filled with 25 bolts cloth, 26-70' cargo straps, 1 pack, 5,[illegible] feet silk rope, 80 spools of thread, 2 bags of buttons, 25 rds [illegible] ammo, 18 rifle grenades, 155 rolls waterproof cloth, 100 rolls poncho material, 470 shirts, 335 bolts nylon, 25 bundles cotton flannel. Samples of the materials were evacuated, the remainder destroyed. At 1044H vic XT[illegible]39 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 tunnel complex running northwest and southeast. At 1137H vic XT5603339 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 shape charges. At 1201H vic XT567354 C 1/26 located a hut containing 6,000 lbs of rice, 20 bicycle tires and 10 rims. Items were destroyed. At 1224H vic XT569352 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 large sampan. At 1234H vic XT569326, A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 24' sampan. At 1335H vic XT577376 B 1/26 located and destroyed 2,500 lbs of rice. At 1213H vic XT569376 B 1/26 located and destroyed 100 lbs rock salt and 1 mine. At 1410H vic XT564376 C 1/26 located and destroyed a tunnel complex. At 1424H vic XT590326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1-40' sampan with inboard motor; and 1-40' sampan containing 3 tons of black and blue cloth. At 1435H vic XT574373 B 1/26 engaged and wounded 1 VC who fled leaving his medical pack. At 1445H vic XT576334 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 detainee. 1/26 elements closed perimeter by 1630H and ARVN personnel arrived and tied in with A and B 1/26 by 1730H. At 1846H vic XT563321 C 1/26 received 12-60mm mortar rds with neg casualties. Mortars and artillery fired counter mortar fires on suspected locations. At 1955H gunships were also on station. At 1958H flare ships arrived on station. At 2020H a gunship vic XT574351 spotted light flashes along river and adjusted artillery on area extinguishing the lights. At 1940H a flare ship began illuminating 1/26 area. At 2025H vic XT574335 Co of B 1/26 engaged 3 VC with M-79 fire with unk results. At 2057H vic XT575334, 10-15 VC tried to break out of town, attempting to break seal in B 1/26 sector at two locations along the perimeter. The VC drove cattle ahead of them while throwing grenades and firing their weapons. They were engaged with claymores, small arms and M-79 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, 5 VCC, 3 M-79's and 1 carbine captured. The wounded and captured VC were evacuated for treatment and interrogation. Maximum illumination was called in and the area kept under surveillance. At 2130H vic XT[illegible]2 C 1/26 detonated a claymore against 3 VC with unk results. At 2105H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties. Counter mortar fires were placed on suspected areas. At 2204H C 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with mortars and artillery vic XT561343 with unk results. TFRU continued population control. Search forces at 0900H located a tunnel vic XT561336. At 1015H a detainee was apprehended in a tunnel vic XT562335. At XT[illegible]337 a boat motor and Russian carbine were located. At 1040H [illegible] flashlight batteries were located vic XT577331. One POW was captured at 1140H vic XT576332 along with a carbine, 15 magazines of ammo, 500 [illegible] wire, sugar, clothing, documents, medicine, and batteries. Ten VC were captured in a tunnel at 1515H vic XT577333 and at 1645H vic XT566334 two more detainees were apprehended with documents and a .45 cal pistol.

11 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Opn CEDAR FALLS. TFRU continued population control and began evacuating refugees. 672 persons were evacuated by [illegible] boat and another 315 by CH-47 (9 lifts). ARVN TF in cooperation and conjunction with 2d Bde relieved 1/26 Inf at 1224H and assumed mission of maintaining a cordon of BALTIMORE. 1/26 was relieved from the seal mission BALTIMORE by ARVN, and initiated S&D operations to the north. At 0011H vic XT591284, A 1/26 engaged and wounded 2 VC who attempted to flee from village. VC were evacuated for interrogation. At 0012H vic XT575335, B 1/26 engaged an undetermined number of VC with SA and M-79 fire with unk results. At 0711H vic XT581331 Recon 1/26 detained one VC who surrendered with a safe conduct pass in his possession. Rallier was evacuated. At 0715H vic XT575335 B 1/26 had 2 VC surrender with safe conduct passes. At 0845H B 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC who attempted to flee when challenged. At 1245H relief of 1/26 by [illegible] was completed. At 1745H A 1/26 commenced attack north in AO ALPHA. At 1250H vic XT584344 the lead elements of A 1/26 received SA fire resulting in one US slightly wounded. Artillery was immediately called in on the area. At 1330H 1/26 S-3 while airborne located a trench extending 300-500 meters north to northeast which ended underground vic XT566-357, also located were bunkers or storage areas extending 200 meters east and west. At 1430H vic XT569343 a fire team size point element of A 1/26 moved into the fringe of a heavily fortified VC area containing elaborate tunnel and trench systems. The area was heavily mined with AP mines and booby traps. Grenades hanging from trees ringed the area, and claymores were set up to protect the perimeter of the fortified positions. As the element

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99

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-D&T

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967.

3. (U) LOCATION: IRON TRIANGLE - center of mass XT7030.

4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV.

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, Commanding General, II FFORCEV.

6. (C) MAJOR US SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:

a. Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

b. Major General William E. Depuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

c. Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, Commanding General, 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).

d. Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr., Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).

e. Colonel Marshal B. Garth, Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

f. Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

g. Colonel George R. Allin, Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery. Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., assumed command on 10 January 1967.

h. Colonel Raymond P. Campbell Jr., Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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7. (C) ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM COMMANDERS:

a. Brigadier General Phan Quoc Thuan, Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (ARVN).

b. Lieutenant Colonel Ho Trung Hau, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Task Force.

c. Major Nguyen Thu Luong, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Battalion.

d. Major Nguyen Ba Trace, Commanding Officer, 7th Airborne Battalion.

e. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chuyen, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regiment.

f. Major Tom Van Luong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.

g. Major Tram Van Man, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.

h. Captain Trung Luan, Commanding Officer, 1st Troop, 1st Cavalry Squadron.

i. Captain Nguyen Ky Suong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

j. Major Ly Duc Quan, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

k. Major Nguyen Van Sau, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

l. Captain Ho Van Hoa, Commanding Officer, 35th Ranger Battalion.

8. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 1st Infantry Division:

(1) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) OPCON.

(2) 11th Armd Cav Regt (-) OPCON.

(3) Attached 4th Bn, 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) effective D-1.

(4) Detached Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor effective D-1.

(5) 168th Combat Engr Bn, 79th Engr Group (DS effective D-1).

b. 25th Infantry Division:

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(1) Attached 196th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt).

(2) Attached 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div.

(3) 2d Bn, 34th Armor OPCON effective D-1.

(4) 4th Inf Bn, 7th Regt, 5th Inf Div (ARVN) DS effective D+2.

c. 5th Infantry Division (ARVN):

(1) Attached 1st Abn TF:

(a) 1st Abn Bn.

(b) 7th Abn Bn.

(2) 8th Infantry Regiment:

(a) 4th Bn, 7th Inf OPCON.

(b) 2d Bn, 8th Inf.

(c) 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

(d) 4th Bn, 8th Inf.

(e) 1st Tank Troop, 1st Cav Sqdn OPCON.

(f) 35th Ranger Bn OPCON.

9. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. 7th Air Force (Logistical Support).

b. 1st Logistical Command (Logistical Support).

c. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (Close Air Support).

d. II FFORCEV Arty (GS)

(1) 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (-) (155mm SP) Attached 1st Inf Div.

(2) 2d Bn, 32d Artillery (-) (8"/175mm SP) GSR.

(3) A Btry, 6th Bn, 77th Artillery (175mm SP) GSR.

(4) 5th Bn, 2d Artillery (AWTP) Attached.

e. 12th Combat Aviation Group (Army Aviation Support).

f. 79th Engr Group (GS).

g. ARVN

(1) 2d Riverine Co (Navy).

(2) 30th River Assault Group (Navy).

(3) 29th Boat Co (Regional Force).

(4) 28th Boat Co (Regional Force).

(5) 35th Boat Co (Regional Force).

h. Narrative

90

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(1) Logistical support furnished by 7th Air Force provided both troop lift and resupply. Support was highly effective and timely throughout the operation.

(2) Logistical support furnished by 1st Logistical Command provided continual resupply of participating combat battalions. Daily convoys were conducted from SAIGON to CU CHI and LAI KHE to relieve airlift requirements.

(3) Close air support was provided by 2d Tactical Fighter Wing. Both preplanned and immediate air requests were furnished thru the Direct Air Request Net. Immediate air requests were met with a minimum of delay by carefully scheduling, prepositioning strikes to provide constant air coverage. Flareship illumination were particularly effective.

(4) II Field Force Vietnam Artillery provided general support artillery for 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division. The 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (ARVN) provided direct support for both divisions. Very effective results were achieved by use of the twin 40mm guns and the quad .50 cal machine guns in a direct support role.

(5) The 7th Engineer Group [illegible] participated in clearing landing zones, fire lanes and roadways plus the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and villages throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, engineer support from the 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) was utilized to prepare the refugee village at THU DUONG to accommodate approximately six thousand additional refugees. The 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) erected tents for the village.

(6) The [illegible] were used to provide and evacuate the troops [illegible] plus patrolling and searching the waterways within the [illegible]. The firepower of the armed boats enabled the refugees to be evacuated and resettled without interference.

10. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Estimate of Situation Prior to Operation:

(1) Prior to the initiation of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the

enemy order of battle in the area of operations included the headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region IV. The destruction of the headquarters was a principle objective of the operation. Large numbers of main force troops were not expected to be encountered nor was a large VC KIA body count expected.

(2) In addition to political and military affairs committees of Military Region IV which were believed to be at separate locations within the operational area, the principle VC units were believed to be limited to the 272d Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV, the Phu Loi Local Force Battalion plus three local force companies. Numerous reports indicated the THANH DIEN FOREST and IRON TRIANGLE to be a major base area as well as the location of Military Region IV. The area was known to contain strongly fortified positions with the routes of approach mined and booby trapped. The suspected location of the 272d Regiment presented a threat during the initial stages of the operation but as the operation progressed the regiment displaced from the area of operations to the north. Further, it was believed that the area of operations included the BINH DUONG (THU DAU MOT) VC Provincial Committee and the BEN CAT VC District Committee. Headquarters Military Region IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of available information, it appeared that the Headquarters of Military Region IV and the political committee generally operated in an area bounded by XT6437, XT6637, XT6733 and XT6433 and probably would be located in grid square XT6434. The military affairs committee generally operated in the area bounded by XT6432, XT6634, XT6928 and XT6225 and probably [illegible].

b. Estimate of Disposition Prior to Operation:

(1) Based on an analysis of intelligence summaries, reports, and the location of captured VC documents, it is believed that portions of the military sections, political party sections and the rear service elements of Military Region IV, BINH DUONG Province, BEN CAT District and CU CHI District were certainly disrupted, if not destroyed. These sections, which are a component part of the VC infrastructure, as well as

the military units [illegible] about the area as follows: Military Region IV sections on both sides of the SAIGON River vicinity XT6528; BINH DUONG Provincial section near BEN SUC Village (XT5834); BEN CAT District elements in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE vicinity XT7027; and the CU CHI District elements in the vicinity of BEN CO (XT7091).

(2) As was expected, [illegible] were not contacted in large numbers. The 1st, [illegible] Military Region IV did not commit [illegible]. Apparently they had been directed [illegible]. A portion of the 2d Battalion (BEN CAT District) [illegible] were contacted heavily on 8 and 9 January in the [illegible]. The 1st and 8th Battalions [illegible] documents concerning the 1st Battalion [illegible] in the western portion of the operational area.

(3) A comprehensive [illegible] was certainly disrupted or destroyed as attested to by the [illegible], medical supplies, weapons, ammunition, [illegible], and building supplies [illegible]. The majority of these supplies probably had been [illegible] by the Region or Province since only a few elements of the Service Group [illegible] were identified from documents, IWs, or ralliers [illegible] in the area.

(4) A review of the interrogation reports from the ralliers, prisoners and detainees resulting from the operation indicated the majority were from VC infrastructure [illegible]. Of the 832 ralliers and [illegible] were identified as [illegible] District. Personnel from [illegible] laborers account for the second largest category, about [illegible]. Only a few top level cadre were identified in interrogation reports. These significant personalities were an executive officer of TAY NINH Military School, a captain from Military Region IV Political Staff Section, a lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two NVA political cadre. These

personnel were evacuated to the Combined Military Intelligence Center or were hospitalized. A listing of the various categories of ralliers and PWs follows:

	Rallier	PW 1st Inf Div	PW 25th Inf Div	Total
Propaganda - Education	24	17	1	42
Finance	11	10	0	21
Youth Associations	23	4	0	27
Rear Services	33	13	0	46
Guerillas	170	85	17	372
Farmers Associations	9	9	2	102
Laborers	76	21	5	102
Medical	16	5	4	25
Comm-Liaison	5	3	0	8
Miscellaneous	57	20	10	87
TOTAL	666	187	39	832

(5) Based primarily on a study of the location of captured documents, the following VC installations or units have been identified as having operated in or, at least, were located in the area during the course of the operation:

COSVN

Three communication-liaison stations

C139 Procurement/Transportation Company of 831 Rear Service Group.

Military Region IV

M 1 Military Staff Section Elements

M 2 Military Intelligence Section

M 7 Signal Section

Political Staff Section Elements

Political Cadre Section Office

Elements of Security Section

Military Region IV Units

J-12 Medical Supply Unit

J-13 QM/Ordnance Supply Unit

G-20 Reconnaissance Company

G-50 Signal Company

Elements of 1st Battalion, Military Region IV

Headquarters Elements 67A Sapper Battalion

BINH DUONG (THU DAU MOT) Province

Current Affairs Office

Party Section Office

NFLSVN Front Section

Rear Service Staff

Civil Health Section/Hospital

BEN CAT District

Military Affairs Committee

District Party Headquarters

C 61 Local Force Unit

CU CHI District

District Headquarters

TAY NINH Province

Security Section Elements

(6) Enemy Installations.

In preparation for this operation, all major unit headquarters utilized a number of AOP machine run "print outs" of VC base camps, fortifications, supply depots and other installations within the area of interest based on reports from a wide variety of sources. These data summaries were compiled by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division and contained extensive information. The value of [illegible] was amplified by the experience of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. This unit encountered a total of 177 reported facilities which ranged from foxholes to bunkers and tunnel complexes to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with previously known intelligence information showed that 156, or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average distance was about 200 meters. The value of such a list is apparent and should be used

as a starting point in the search of any area.

c. Terrain and Weather.

(1) Terrain:

Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provided the most favorable conditions for military operations. It was a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement was canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement were very sensitive to precipitation. The terrain was carefully analyzed in preparation for the operation. This information was found to be substantially correct and is not duplicated here as it is included in the intelligence annex to the CEDAR FALLS Operation order.

(2) Weather:

(a) General.

During January, the northeast monsoon develops to its fullest extent. Most cloudiness was along the east coast with the interior regions of the III CTZ having relatively clear skies and little precipitation. During this period, at a minimum, ceilings were generally nonexistent and visibilities were good except in periods of early morning fog.

(b) Cloudiness, Visibilities and Precipitation.

During the first ten days of this operation a light to moderate northeasterly flow of dry stable air prevailed over the area. Sky conditions were generally partly cloudy with surface visibilities unrestricted. No precipitation was reported. During the last ten days of the operation [illegible] moist air prevailed over the area resulting in partly cloudy to mostly cloudy skies. Occasional light rain occurred with 3000 foot ceilings on a few days. A few afternoon and evening rainshowers also occurred on a few days causing some 3000 foot ceilings. Patchy area of early morning ground fog occurred during this last ten day period. Minimum visibilities were one to three miles in ground fog improving by 0900H to ten miles.

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(c) Temperatures:

The daily maximum temperatures varied from 80 to 95 degrees. The daily minimum temperatures varied from 59 to 70 degrees.

(d) Soil Conditions.

Soil conditions were relatively dry during the first ten days of the operations. During the last ten days of the operation the soil conditions varied from dry to wet in accordance with local rainfall.

(e) Effects on friendly forces.

During the first ten days of the operation the weather had no adverse effect on friendly forces. During the last ten days, the only effect of weather conditions was to hinder early morning air operations due to the sudden onset of early morning ground fog. The fog normally lifted by 0830H and the visibilities were then unrestricted.

d. An evaluation of the population of the CEDAR FALLS area concluded the people were either VC controlled civilians or low level VC cadre and guerillas who remained in villages within the hamlet and village infrastructure. Within the VC civilian group the predominant attitude was one of apathy toward the VC cause and anxiety to escape the hazards inherent in living in a VC controlled area. These civilians later proved cooperative during interrogation and responded with timely information. Most of the ralliers had some knowledge of the Chieu Hoi program, and they expressed discontent with the hardships of VC life and a desire to return to their families. In the past most low level guerillas preferred to remain silent and be grouped as refugees. However, these guerillas were no longer afraid to [illegible] propaganda appears to [illegible] the VC treatment and kind of treatment accorded Hoi Chanh. Most refugees were emotionally affected by the loss of their homes but after a short time remained calm and cooperative.

e. There were no RAAF employed in the operation other than US forces; however, US forces were supported by eight ARVN infantry battalions, one ARVN tank troop, two VNN boat units and three Regional Force boat companies.

11. (C) MISSION: II FIELD FORCE attacks the IRON DIKE Forestry

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Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to destroy enemy forces, infrastructure, installations and Military Region IV Headquarters; evacuates civilian population and establishes the IRON TRIANGLE as a specified strike zone to preclude its future use as a support base for Viet Cong operation.

12. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: a. II FFORCEV attacks with two US infantry divisions (reinforced) with ARVN units in support to seal the IRON TRIANGLE, trap enemy forces, and destroy Viet Cong installations.

b. The operation was conducted in two phases:

(1) Phase I (5 Jan - 8 Jan 67) - Deceptive deployment of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations on the flanks of the IRON TRIANGLE. On D-day (8 Jan) an air assault to seal and search BEN SUC (XT5833). Further positioning of forces in blocking positions and in staging areas around the IRON TRIANGLE.

(2) Phase II (9 Jan - 26 Jan 67) - On 9 Jan, an armored attack west from BEN CAT (XT7433) to cut the IRON TRIANGLE in half, simultaneous air assaults in an arc around the THANH DIEN Forest from BEN CAT to BEN SUC to complete the northern half of the encirclement of the objective. All forces attacking 9 Jan to search and destroy south through entire objective to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers (XT7520). All civilians to be interrogated and evacuated from the area. Area to be cleared with Rome plows and tunnel destruction stressed. Phase II to last two to three weeks.

13. (C) EXECUTION: a. Planning. The jungle at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers (center at XT7030) had long been considered by II FFORCEV as a possible target for a major operation. The area had been developed by the enemy because of its location 25 kilometers north of SAIGON as the headquarters of Military Region IV and a base of operations against the capital. Nicknamed the IRON TRIANGLE, it had last been penetrated in October 1965 by the 173d Airborne Brigade. That operation had resulted in hard fighting as strong enemy forces had defended their base. Intelligence since then

had confirmed the TRIANGLE's continued use as headquarters of Military Region IV. 1st Infantry Division operations along Highway 13 on the eastern flank of the IRON TRIANGLE had frequently made contact. Similarly, 25th Infantry Division on the western flank often had operated in the FIL HOL Plantation (XT6719) and HO DO Woods (XT6129). Here, too, enemy forces were contacted repeatedly. The IRON TRIANGLE, characterized as "a danger pointed at SAIGON", was clearly an important enemy center for control and supporting guerilla and terrorist operations. It was a target to be attacked decisively and in force in order to tear apart and neutralize the enemy control structure. As II FFORCEV troop strength built up in the latter half of 1966, planning was begun for a powerful strike into the IRON TRIANGLE. At a planning meeting in September, CG, II FFORCEV discussed the possibility of operations into the TRIANGLE with COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV suggested a coordinated operation with forces on both sides of the SAIGON River. He envisioned troops moving into positions on one side of the river to form an anvil and then a rapid move on the other side to hammer the enemy against the anvil. COMUSMACV also discussed the need for extensive engineer clearing, using Rome plows to strip the area and deprive the enemy of concealment. In November 1966, CG, II FFORCEV directed that planning begin for a massive offensive into the IRON TRIANGLE. Operation Plan ORLANDO was drawn up and intelligence collection from the objective area continued. In early December 1966, after a conference with J2, MACV, CG, II FFORCEV furnished further planning guidance: The TRIANGLE was to be attacked violently and decisively in January 1967 with all forces available [illegible] operations would jeopardize the [illegible]. The anvil would be positioned first, and the hammer then swung through the IRON TRIANGLE. The objective area was to be sealed tightly throughout the operation to prevent enemy escape. The TRIANGLE itself was to be secured for enemy installations, cleared of all civilians, stripped of concealment, and declared a specified strike zone. This multidivision offensive was to be the first operation planned and controlled by II FFORCEV as a corps

operation. OPLAN 53-66 (Operation CEDAR FALLS), embodying these concepts, was published on 12 December 1966.

b. Security and Deception. From the first planning conference, strict security measures were enforced to prevent disclosure of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The planning group was held to a minimum within II FFORCEV Headquarters, and wherever possible, preparations were made without specifically identifying them with CEDAR FALLS. For example, all commanders were instructed on 19 December 1966 to minimize helicopter operations during the Christmas - New Year periods in order to increase availability for operations during January. Even the unprecedented mass evacuation of civilians from the area was not disclosed before the operation. Planning for the transportation and housing of refugees was coordinated only with Mr. John Vann, Director of Region III, Office of Civilian Operations. Although supplies were earmarked for shipment to a refugee center at PHU CUONG, no construction or prestocking was started until CEDAR FALLS had commenced. CG, II FFORCEV personally briefed CG, III Corps (ARVN) on 6 January 1967. ARVN troop participation was approved at that time with the mission to support US blocking forces, to secure and transport civilian evacuees, and to support US security forces in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. CG, III Corps (ARVN) assisted in maintaining security by restricting dissemination of information on CEDAR FALLS. Deception was achieved by deploying troops within striking distance of the IRON TRIANGLE under the guise of small scale, local operations. Both 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division began deceptive deployment on 5 January. TF DEARE (1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-); and 3d Ranger Bn (ARVN)) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730H under 1st Division control. The task force searched for the enemy in the CAU DINH Jungle (XT7823) between Highway 13 and the THI TINH River. When NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500H, 7 January, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 39th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. 25th Infantry Division deployed 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt) from TAY NINH to the HO BO

Woods as part of Operation FITCHBURG. FITCHBURG has been a continuing operation in the TAY NINH area, but on 5 January the Brigade CP and trains moved to TRUNG LAP (XT5920), southwest of the IRON TRIANGLE. In the next two days, the brigade shifted forces out of TAY NINH and deployed four battalions into the HO BO Woods. These battalions, close to the west bank of the SAIGON River, were in position by 7 January to support CEDAR FALLS. Both FITCHBURG and NIAGARA FALLS made light enemy contacts, but their significance lay in the initial deceptive deployment of components of the anvil, or blocking forces for CEDAR FALLS. This deployment was to be completed on 8 January.

c. 8 January (Friday). II FRANKV Tactical Command Post for Operation CEDAR FALLS opened at 0700H at LONG BINH (YT0511). Twenty battalions organized in five brigades under 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions deployed around the IRON TRIANGLE during the day, completing the anvil and positioning the hammer and encirclement forces. 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved first, landing Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry by air assault at 0645H. The company assaulted into the rice fields at the junction of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers (XT738199) and immediately came under small arms fire in the landing zone, suffering light casualties. The landing zone was quickly secured. Simultaneously, Company C was making an air assault one kilometer to the south. These landings anchored the southeastern flank of the 25th Infantry Division. To the west of this action, 2d Brigade's other two battalions, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (-), searched northeast out of CU CHI through the FIL MOL Plantation. By nightfall, these battalions were operating in the area from five hundred meters south of the THI TINH River, Northeast of 2d Brigade, 196th Brigade continued searching the HO BO Woods. All battalions of the 2d and 196th Brigades made light contact resulting in the discovery of small stores of enemy rice and munitions. By nightfall of 8 January, the 25th Infantry Division anvil was in place along the SAIGON River from the river junction (XT7520) northwest through the FIL MOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods. To the northwest of the HO BO Woods,

2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division launched 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry by air assault to seal the village of BEN SUC (XT5833). The entire battalion landed within the village in one and one half minutes and achieved complete surprise. No preparation fires were used, and the light small arms fire that was received was quickly suppressed. As the battalion began to move out of the village, artillery and air strikes were called in on suspected enemy positions. The 1st Division Task Force Revolutionary Development (TFRD) and 3d Bn, 8th Infantry (ARVN) landed north and south of the village. By 0947H the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry had completely sealed off BEN SUC and the search by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) began. 2d Brigade operations killed forty VC during the day and found large stores of rice, uniforms, and cloth in and around BEN SUC. TFRD, with ARVN assistance, began screening the population and preparing them for evacuation. The brigade CP was established at BEN SUC at 1030H. The 1st Bn, 18th Infantry remained at DAU TIENG. 3d Brigade, 1st Division and TF DEANE (-), the hammer force for CEDAR FALLS, moved into staging areas at DAU TIENG, LAI KHE, BEN CAT and PHU LOI. From these bases, they prepared to swing into the TRIANGLE on 9 January. 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Abn), 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, remained in their blocking positions east of the TRIANGLE along the THI TINH and SAIGON Rivers. By the end of 8 January, II FFORCEV had completed the anvil and readied the hammer. The smash into the headquarters base of Military Region IV started on 9 January.

d. 9 January (D+1). The hammer forces of 1st Division struck at 0800H with simultaneous attacks in the center and north of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 11th Armored Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, drove west out of BEN CAT across the center of the TRIANGLE cutting a belt from the THI TINH River at BEN CAT to the SAIGON River at RACH BAP (XT6630). The regiment seized a base for artillery (XT6731) north of RACH BAP, searched the surrounding area, and secured engineer clearing operations in the TRIANGLE. In the north, four battalions of 3d Brigade, 1st Division air assaulted into landing zones around the north and

northwest edges of THANH DIEN Forest Reserve, the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The initial battalion (1st Battalion, 2d Infantry) touched down at 0800H, with the other three landing in succession. All the landings were unopposed. The battalions linked up and commenced search operations from blocking positions in the vicinity of the landing zones. They immediately began to uncover enemy supplies, the most important being 75 tons of loose rice found in a tunnel by 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 709 hand grenades in barrels discovered by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. Only two small contacts (3 to 4 men each) were made during the day's search. TF DEANE air assaulted 2d and 4th Battalions (Abn), 503d Infantry into the eastern edge of the THANH DIEN Forest in a southern extension of the of the 3d Brigade landings. The two battalions linked up with 3d Brigade at 1140H, established blocking positions, and searched into the forest. To the south and east of their positions, Company D, 16th Armor (reinforced with one rifle company) established a screen along the edge of the forest to prevent enemy escape. These forces made no contact during the day nor did the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, the 31th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) or the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) in the blocking positions along the THI TINH River. Around BEN SUC, TFRD and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) continued to search and screen the population. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attempted an air assault east of the village at 1605H but was diverted to land at BEN SUC when mines were found in their primary landing zone. The 25th Infantry Division searched actively along the west bank of the SAIGON River. Both the 2d Brigade and the 196th Brigade made light contacts with small, scattered groups of enemy. Company B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor made the largest kill at 1645 hours. A raft with fifteen VC was sighted on the SAIGON River and all were killed with 90mm gun fire. Light contact continued after dark as the 25th Division anvil forces blocked enemy movements from the IRON TRIANGLE. The operations of 9 January had tightly sealed the IRON TRIANGLE. The hammer forces of II FFORCEV started their swing into the objective area that would smash the enemy base.

e. 10 January (D+2). II FFORCEV units continued to search out and kill small groups of the enemy, finding increasingly large amounts of supplies. 3d Brigade, 1st Division in the THANH DIEN Forest was reinforced by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, and by an engineer clearing task force. 2d Brigade in BEN SUC was supported by a thirty truck convoy from LAI KHE that arrived at BEN SUC to transport refugees out of the village via BEN CAT. ARVN 30th River Assault Group (RAG) landed at BEN SUC in the afternoon with 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) aboard. The airborne troops were to relieve the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry of the seal mission and assist in securing and screening the population of BEN SUC and the nearby villages while the RAG boats were to transport refugees to the camp at PHU CUONG. The search forces of 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and TF DEANE found more rice and 118 small arms in several caches. Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day. Similarly, 25th Division had light contact during the day and into the night. Small enemy supply points were uncovered and many bunkers and tunnels were destroyed. 2d Bn, 7th Infantry (ARVN) supported 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division along the SAIGON River. By 1200H, 10 January, 8th Regiment (ARVN) forces relieved 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry of its blocking mission east of the THI TINH River. The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) became OPCON to the 8th Regiment. By the end of 10 January, II FFORCEV was well into the IRON TRIANGLE and operations were going according to plan. The enemy had lost 161 KIA (BC), 29 captured and 272 detained. US losses were 17 KIA and 98 WIA. Captured enemy bases contained 217 weapons, quantities of ammunition, 210 tons of rice, 6,800 uniforms and miscellaneous supplies of all types from fish sauce to printing presses. At 1700H, 10 January, the first news reports on CEDAR FALLS were released.

f. 11 - 26 Jan 67. On the morning of 11 January, CG, II FFORCEV sent a message to the Commanding Generals of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions congratulating them on achieving initial surprise and on the encouraging results of Operation CEDAR FALLS. He concluded by saying, "...I want a thorough search to be made of areas of

responsibility... ...I particularly desire that the IRON TRIANGLE be completely covered." It was in the spirit of this message that CEDAR FALLS was carried out for the next sixteen days. Both divisions searched meticulously, uncovering increasing amounts of supplies and stripping the IRON TRIANGLE area of its value to the enemy. Enemy defenses were weak and disorganized and had evidently been shattered by the mass and surprise of the attack. Mines, booby traps, and snipers were encountered but there were no organized defenses or counterattacks by enemy forces. The enemy had evidently ordered units to disperse and try to escape. Because of the tight seal around the TRIANGLE, this was difficult. As the operation continued, the number of ralliers grew well beyond previous totals. PSYOP field teams effectively exploited these ralliers by printing rapid reaction leaflets containing surrender appeals from the ralliers to their VC friends. Five hundred eighteen ralliers and two hundred thirteen PW were taken. These figures totaled 731; more than the 720 VC body count. This indicated that the enemy was defeated, trapped and demoralized in his own base area. The evacuation of all civilians from BEN SUC and other villages in the IRON TRIANGLE continued through 16 January. The ARVN Airborne Battalions and River Assault Groups were most valuable during the civilian evacuation operations. The refugees, with their livestock and most of their personal possessions, were evacuated to PHU CUONG by military transportation. Approximately 3,000 were transported by truck convoys through BEN CAT while another 3,000 were either flown out in CH47s or transported down the SAIGON River in the boats of the River Assault Groups. This unprecedented mass evacuation, executed on short notice due to security restriction, required a tremendous effort by US and ARVN military and civilian agencies. It resulted in a humane and efficient evacuation that deprived the enemy of a major resource in the IRON TRIANGLE. 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) relieved 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry of the BEN SUC seal missions. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was then committed to a search of the IRON TRIANGLE thus raising the 1st Division search

force to nine infantry battalions and three armored cavalry squadrons. This large force combed the enemy sanctuary day after day, finding huge quantities of rice and hundreds of documents, destroying enemy tunnels and bunkers and stripping trees and underbrush along roads and trails. 1st Division forces began gradually withdrawing from CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. By 18 January, the 2d and 3d Brigades had withdrawn from the IRON TRIANGLE. TF DEANE continued the search with three infantry battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons and engineer forces until 24 January when it departed for its base camps. 1st Infantry Division continued tunnel exploration, demolitions and clearing in the TRIANGLE with TF FIFE, a composite force of armored cavalry, engineers and infantry. 25th Infantry Division continued to search the enemy base areas in the HO BO Woods and FIL HOL Plantation while blocking enemy escape routes out of the IRON TRIANGLE. Company B, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mech) engaged an enemy platoon on 13 January and Company C, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry destroyed a sampan with thirteen VC aboard on 16 January. However, most contacts were with small scattered groups attempting to escape. Buddy operations, employing US troops and the 5th River Assault Group (ARVN), patrolled both banks of the SAIGON River to help seal off the TRIANGLE. Saturating the area with nine maneuver battalions (including 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, ARVN), the 25th Infantry Division destroyed many enemy supplies and fortifications. The division's operations proved so profitable that the 2d Brigade continued to search the area as part of Operation ALA MOANA after the termination of CEDAR FALLS on 26 January 1967. In nineteen days, TF Field Force Vietnam converted the IRON TRIANGLE from a safe haven to a deathtrap, and then to a military desert. Years of work spent tunnelling and hoarding supplies were nullified. The vital civilian population was removed, thus making any enemy efforts to rebuild doubly difficult. Concealment, particularly along lines of communications, was stripped away, baring the area to future surveillance. Finally, the area was designated a specified strike zone so that it could be interdicted with ease should the enemy attempt to

rebuild. In Operation CEDAR FALLS, a strategic enemy base was decisively engaged and destroyed.

14. (C) RESULTS:

a. US LOSSES: 72 KIA, 337 WIA.

Damaged: 9 APC's, 2 - ¼ ton trucks, 2 LOH, 3 tanks, 1 tank dozer.

Destroyed: 3 APC's, 1 tank.

b. ARVN LOSSES:

(1) ARVN: 11 KIA, 8 WIA, 3 Individual weapons lost.

(2) CF/RFL: None.

(3) Navy: None.

c. VC LOSSES: 720 KIA (BC), 213 PW's, 518 ralliers, 51 detainees, 5967 returnees, 23 crew served weapons, 555 individual weapons, 474 artillery and mortar rounds, 1960 grenades, 60,203 rounds small arms ammunition, 391 assorted mines, 1111 bunkers, 424 tunnels, 509 structures, 3702 tons rice, more than 500,000 pages of assorted documents.

d. Not all air strikes and B-52 strikes were followed up by ground forces; however, visual reconnaissance was conducted in all cases.

e. Credited to the 5th Inf Div (ARVN) are 18 VC KIA, 70 PW's, 25 ralliers and 31 weapons captured. (These figures not included in C, above).

15. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. a. Supply:

(1) Ammunition management. Effective control over ammunition under ASR can be maintained only when accurate issue data is reported. In the course of this operation, it became apparent that the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (rear) at LAI KHE was not reporting ASR ammunition transactions and that sizable issues had been made but not debited against any allocations. During a liaison visit to LAI KHE to determine the cause of the problem, the OIC of the Ammunition Point stated that he had not been instructed to report issue of all ASR ammunition. In future operations employing FSA prior coordination must be effected to determine required reports and reporting channels. It should be noted that most units lived within the ASR on controlled attrition. Only 105mm HE and illumination ASR of the major caliber items were exceeded.

(2) Water for Evacuees and Refugees. Prior to the operation, a request was received from II FFORCEV G5 for water trailers to supply cooking and drinking water for 6,000 refugees from the area of operations. The G4 office established an initial requirement for two 5,000 gallon simi-trailers, six 400 gallon tankers and six 400 gallon trailers for water delivery. As the refugee population began to expand into thousands, it became apparent that this would not be adequate. A message was dispatched to USARV the night of 12 January requesting an additional 5,000 gallon tanker. At 0730H the following morning, it was determined that there were none in the supply depot and that the tanker would have to be obtained from some unit on a loan basis. The tanker was obtained from 64th QM Bn and transported from BEN CAT to PHU LOI and placed in service. 1st Infantry Division also obtained nine additional 400 gallon trailers to support the operations.

(3) Transportation. Airlift of personnel, equipment and supplies functioned well. Demands placed on US Army Support Command, Saigon, were met. USAID requested the use of trucks for 7 days beginning 9 January 1967 to assist in the establishment of the refugee center. Ten trucks were provided for the period requested; however, the requirement for trucks continued until 2 February 1967.

(4) Maintenance. There were no significant or unique maintenance problems called to the attention of this headquarters during the operation. The maintenance problems that were encountered prevailed due to the composition and location of the supported forces. The support elements, limited in the number of support teams they could provide, found it difficult to provide on-site maintenance at all locations with respect to manpower and repair parts. Equipment downtime was further prolonged due to insecure road nets used for delivery of repair parts or replacement of end items.

16. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: a. ARVN Navy and RF boat companies were utilized for evacuation of captured equipment and resettling of refugees. The boats provided their own security during

river convoys. In addition, during the latter stage of the exercise, the 25th Division used the boats for detailed search by US troops of canals and streams leading into the main river system. This proved extremely effective in locating VC bodies killed by air and artillery strikes in inaccessible areas.

b. The engineer task force of 5h bulldozers and 4 Rome plows performed an essential role in the success of the operation. Part of the overall mission was to destroy bunkers and tunnels and to cut road ways and landing zones for future operations in the IRON TRIANGLE. The engineer task force followed the 11th ACR into the battle area on D+1 when the 11th ACR attacked west from BEN CAT.

c. Tunnel destruction was very effective on large tunnel complexes. This was accomplished by first sealing the tunnels then stringing demolition charges throughout the tunnel system. This was followed by injecting acetylene into the complex and detonating the charges.

d. Quad .50 cal machine guns from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery were mounted on Vietnamese River Assault Boats and used to control the junction of the SAIGON and THI TINH rivers. The fire power of these weapons plus the mobility of the assault boats proved an effective deterrent to VC use of the waterway.

e. Armor was effectively employed in a blocking role by the 25th Division west of the SAIGON River and by the 1st Division in employment of the 11th ACR in both screening and search and destroy operations.

17. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: a. Surprise. Security in planning and deception in deployment resulted in [illegible]. The light initial contact and the lack of a well coordinated defense indicated that not only did the enemy not expect our attack but was unable to react when it came. The final casualty figures show that he had been in the IRON TRIANGLE in considerable strength, despite his weak defense.

b. Mass. II FFORCEV quickly and effectively sealed and thoroughly searched the objective area by using a higher troop density than has been possible before. This greatly improved the effectiveness of the cordon and the search as indicated by the very high proportion of ralliers.

These men could neither hide nor escape; their choice was to surrender. The price paid for massing II FFORCEV was acceptable. There was no loss of security in other areas because of the troop concentration for CEDAR FALLS. Further, the density of troops reduced the total time required for the search operation.

c. Cooperation. Cooperation between US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies was excellent. This was particularly true in the evacuation of the civilian population. Both the ARVN airborne units and the River Assault Groups provided invaluable assistance in securing and transporting the refugees. Civilian and military personnel of both nations worked in close harmony to organize and build the PHU CUONG refugee camp on very short notice. On the purely military side, ARVN units contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the cordon. The ARVN River Assault Groups made a unique contribution by their patrolling along the river lines.

d. Psychological Operations. In spite of the security limitations placed on preparations, psychological operations rapidly exploited the initial success of CEDAR FALLS. They were particularly effective in bringing to the trapped enemy the hopelessness of his situation. The CHIEU HOI program provided him with an acceptable alternative at a great reduction in friendly losses.

e. Effects on Enemy. (1) A major portion of the enemy's base and control center for operations against the Capital Military District has been destroyed. This represents the loss of an investment of twenty years. Enemy facilities and fortifications were destroyed, [illegible] killed, 595 individual weapons and 23 crew served weapons captured.

(2) Over 3700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. This is enough to feed five fully manned regiments for a year. More significant than the loss itself is the resultant diversion of manpower to reconstitute his stores.

(3) All of the civilian inhabitants of the area, some 6000, plus their livestock were evacuated. This will deny the enemy food, manpower, revenue, transportation and intelligence.

(4) The capture of over 500,000 separate pages of documents, including crypto material, has given us valuable intelligence. The enemy's security programs have been compromised to include records continuity.

(5) The enemy's offensive capability against the Capital Military District has been reduced by loss of personnel, equipment and facilities.

(6) Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in North Vietnam, COSVN and the VC dominated populace will have a serious psychological impact. They must reevaluate the relative capabilities of their forces as opposed to ours.

JONATHAN O. SEAMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

123

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II FFORCEV
A-1450-66

HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
LONG BINH (YT052111) RVN
121800H Dec 66
OR

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)
References: a. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, sheets 6231 I, II; 6230 I; 6331 III, IV and 6330 IV.
b. OPLAN 16-66 (Op UNIONTOWN) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 101200H Jun 66.
c. OPLAN 52-66 (Op FAIRFAX) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 181200H Nov 66.

1. (C) (S-NF) SITUATION.
a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence.
b. Friendly Forces:
(1) See current II FFORCEV SITREPS.
(2) 7th Air Force provides logistical support.
(3) 1st Log Cmd provides logistical support.
(4) USAECV (P) provides engineer support.
c. Assumptions:
(1) That enemy activity during Op CEDAR FALLS will permit US base camps and installations to be secured with minimum forces as follows:
(a) CU CHI - 1 bn.
(b) PHUOC VINH - 1 bn.
(c) LAI KHE - 1 bn.
(d) BIEN HOA/LONG BINH - 1 bn (Op UNIONTOWN).
(e) LONG GIAO - 1 sqdn.
(f) TAY NINH - 1 bn.
(g) DAU TIENG - 1 bn.
(2) That MACV will release 173d Abn Bde (Sep) from the General Reserve for participation in this operation.

2. (C) (S-NF) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operations vic THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. (C) (S-NF) EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations:
(1) This operation employs elements of two US div (reinf) to conduct S&D operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and THANH DINH Forestry Reserve area and to block the escape of VC from the area.
(2) The operation will be conducted in two phases:
(a) Phase I (D-Day) - limited positioning of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations in HO BO Woods, FIL HOL Plantation, and vic BEN CAT.
(b) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) - an airmobile assault in the northern portion of the area of operation and simultaneous positioning of a blocking force along the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers on D+1. Following the assault, S&D operations will be conducted by the assault force south to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers. Blocking forces will be positioned by foot and/or vehicle on D+1. Mechanized/armor forces will be used to block VC escape routes on the southeastern and southwestern flanks of the assault force. Particular attention will be devoted to searching built up areas, suspected location of

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112

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, and thorough interrogation of personnel found therein. Tunnel destruction and clearing of areas using Rome Plows and bulldozers will be stressed. All inhabitants of area to be searched will be interrogated and, depending on their legal status, processed through VN or US military channels. It is anticipated that this phase will last from two to three weeks.

b. 1st Inf Div:
   (1) Attachments and Detachments:
      (a) 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON effective D-Day.
      (b) 11th ACR (- one sqdn). OPCON effective D-1.
      (c) One combat engr bn, 79th Engr Gp. Direct support effective D-1.
      (d) Attached. One bn, 199th Lt Inf Bde, effective D-1.
      (e) Detached. Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
   (2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operations.
   (3) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) (See Annex B):
      (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking force will be positioned along east bank of THI TINH River from vic XT5835 to vic XT7620 to seal AO (Pen ZULU).
      (b) Conduct airmobile assault into northern position of AO (Pen XRAY).
      (c) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
      (d) Conduct S&D operations to the south in zone to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers.
      (e) The LOC to BEN CAT and LAI KHE will be secured and opened daily for log support.
      (f) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (g) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).

c. 9th Inf Div:
   (1) Continue current mission.
   (2) Be prepared to deploy one bn anywhere in II FFORCEV area.

d. 25th Inf Div:
   (1) Attachments and Detachments. OPCON 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
   (2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operation.
   (3) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) (See Annex B):
      (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking forces will be positioned along west bank of SAIGON River from vic XT5633 to vic XT7520 to seal AO (Pen YANKEE).
      (b) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
      (c) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (d) Continue Op FAIRFAX and Op LANIKAI.
      (e) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).
      (f) Provide and maintain one inf bde as II FFORCEV Reserve.

e. 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-Day.

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

f. 196th Lt Inf Bde (Sep):
   (1) Assume Op UNIONTOWN on D-1.
   (2) Provide one bn to 1st Inf Div to secure PHUOC VINH on D-1.
   (3) Continue current mission.

g. 11th ACR:
   (1) Regiment minus one sqdn OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-1.
   (2) One sqdn continue current mission vic LONG GIAO.

h. 1st ATF. Continue current mission.

i. 2d Bn, 34th Armor. OPCON 25th Inf Div effective D-1.

j. II FFORCEV Arty. Within capabilities support 1st Inf Div and 25th Inf Div. (See Annex C - Fire Support)

k. 12th Avn Gp:
   (1) Provide maximum airlift capability on D-1 to position up to two bde TF on northern boundary of 1st Inf Div zone.
   (2) Provide support as required (see Coordinating Instructions).

l. 79th Engr Gp. Provide one engr bn direct support to 1st Inf Div for support during search operations. It is anticipated primary tasks will include tunnel search/destruction and jungle clearing operations.

m. II FFORCEV Reserve:
   (1) Bde, 25th Inf Div.
   (2) Bn, 9th Inf Div.

n. Coordinating Instructions:
   (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
   (2) Requests for air support to be submitted to this HQ, ATTN: G3 Air.
   (3) Boundaries - see Annex B.
   (4) Coordination with Vietnamese nationals or US advisors will NOT be made prior to D-1.
   (5) The search area will be declared a free fire zone upon completion of operation.
   (6) All noncombatants in the area of operations east of the SAIGON River and west of the THI TINH River will be evacuated. Noncombatants released following interrogation will be turned over to the appropriate district chief for resettlement. When feasible, the personal belongings and livestock of noncombatants should be evacuated with the personnel.
   (7) Unit commanders will provide assistance to the district chief to care for noncombatants until USAID is able to assume this function.
   (8) Units will conduct tactical PSYOP commencing D-1. Themes and target audiences will be identified as the tactical situation develops. Rapid reaction leaflets will be [illegible] priority. Leaflets designed for [illegible] will not be requested or printed prior to D-Day. Maximum use will be made of standard leaflets during the operation.
   (9) Handling and classifying PW and detainees. All innocent civilians, returnees, PW and civil defendants apprehended or in US custody will be handled and classified IAW MACV Dir 190-3, dated 29 Oct 66 and MACV Dir 20-5, dated 21 Sep 66.
   (10) Control of traffic on THI TINH River is the responsibility of the 1st Inf Div.
   (11) Control of traffic on the SAIGON River is the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

   a. Admin O 4-66, HQ, USASC, dtd 25 Oct 66 in effect.

10C

OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

b. Requests for log support beyond own capability are to be submitted to 1st Log Cmd, info this HQ, ATTN: G4.

c. ASR is in effect.

5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL.

a. Signal. Current SOI remains in effect.

b. Command. II FFORCEV CP - no change.

Acknowledge.

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LTG

ANNEXES:

A - Intelligence

~~B - Concept of Operations (Overlay)~~ withdrawn, Hqs, DA

C - Fire Support Plan

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3 - 9th Inf Div

3 - 199th Lt Inf Bde (Sep)

3 - 79th Engr Gp

1 - MACJ2

1 - 525th MI Gp

1 - 1st MI Bn (ASA)

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127

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)
References: a. OPLAN 58-66
b. Map, Vietnam, Series 1.7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets 6231 I, II; 6230 I; 6331 III, IV; 6330 IV.
c. II FFORCEV Intelligence Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ.

(C) 1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Area of Interest. The area of interest is generally bounded by the following coordinates: XT 5040, XT 8040, XT 8015, XT 6315. Contained within this area is the Iron Triangle, Fihol Plantation, Thanh Dien Forest Reserve, and portions of the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods. The Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers dissect the area and present major obstacles to ground forces. See Appendix 4 for complete details on the terrain, helicopter landing zones, and status of LOC's. The Iron Triangle and Thanh Dien Forest areas have not been penetrated by large scale US/FWMAF operations in the last year. Frequent operations have been conducted in the Ho Bo, Boi Loi, and adjacent areas on the eastern side of the Saigon River. Almost invariably these operations encounter numerous mines, boobytraps, extensive tunnel and bunker systems. Additionally the enemy withdraws from these areas and reoccupies them following the exit of friendly forces. It can be assumed that the enemy will follow this same general pattern in the future. The Iron Triangle has long been a major VC stronghold and base area. Numerous agent reports and visual reconnaissance reveal that the Iron Triangle is a major base area. Of primary concern in the area is the presence of elements of the headquarters of VC Military Region IV. This headquarters controls the activities of the VC 165A Regiment, all other forces and is the political organization for VC Military Region IV, which encompasses all of Gia Dinh Province and parts of Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. (See II FFORCEV Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ for boundaries of MR IV). The destruction of this organization is vital as it is responsible for the numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism which occur in and around Gia Dinh Province. These acts of sabotage, terrorism, and the attacking of isolated outposts and installations constitutes the greatest enemy threat in III CTZ at the present time. The continuance of these acts will seriously affect the confidence of the populace in the GVN and provides the VC with extremely valuable propaganda.

b. Order of Battle. See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

c. Known and Reported VC Installations. See Appendix 2 to this Annex.

d. Organization and Personalities of VC Military Region IV. See Appendix 3 to this Annex.

(C) 2. (C) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (OIR).

a. EEI:

(1) Where are the major elements of VC Military Region IV located?

(2) What elements and persons of VC Military Region IV are located in Saigon? In Gia Dinh Province? Where are they located? What are their names, descriptions, and place of birth?

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116

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Annex A (Intelligence) to CI-FAN 88-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

(3) Who are the members of the infrastructure in the area of interest? Where are they located? What are their names, description and places of birth?

(4) Does the Liberation News Agency (LNA) operate a radio propaganda station in this area? Does the LNA operate any other propaganda activities in this area?

b. OIR:

(1) Where are the major VC supply installations, hospitals, and dispensaries? How are they supplied?

(2) What are the crossing points used by the VC on the Saigon River?

(3) What is the attitude of the local populace toward the GVN? Toward the VC?

(4) Does the local populace activily support the VC with food, intelligence, and money?

(c)

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

a. Order to Subordinates:

(1) Report on EEI and OIR as obtained.

(2) Report information as acquired in response to the following SICR:

(a) U-UPE-U0751 - US, RVN and FWMAF Prisoners of War (U)
(b) U-UPE-U0741 - NVA/VC Tunnel Systems (U)
(c) U-UPE-U0671 - VC Order of Battle Gia Dinh Province (U)
(d) U-UPE-U0609 - VC Liberation Press Agency and Liberation Radio (U)
(e) U-UPE-U0609 - Rendezvous (U)
(f) U-UPE-U0586 - VC Guerrillas (U)
(g) U-UPE-U0502 - 165A Regiment (U)
(h) U-UPE-U0393 - Captured USAID Materials (U)

(3) Devote particular attention to the satisfaction of the requirements of SICR U-UPE-U0609 - Rendezvous and II FFORCEV OPORD 32-66 (OP Rendezvous) (U)

(4) Advise this HQ NLT 25 Dec 66, requirements for interrogation and interpreter personnel in excess of organic assets.

(5) 1st Infantry Division. Request this HQ and all major participating units be furnished a copy of ADP showing VC installations in the area of interest.

(6) 25th Infantry Division is requested to provide all participating units and this HQ a copy of ADP on personalities on current black list in area of operations.

b. Request to higher and adjacent units:

(1) MACV J2:

(a) Request that additional interrogation teams and interpreters be made available as required.

(b) Request that notification of movement of the 272d VC Regiment into the area of operations be furnished this headquarters.

(2) 525th MI Group: Request all available information on the personalities and locations of the various committee members of VC Military Region IV be furnished this headquarters on a priority basis.

(3) DSA III Corps: Request a priority intelligence effort be made to rapidly interrogate ralliers and prisoners knowledgeable of the activities of MR IV.

(4) Detachment A, 1st MI Bn (ARS): Request this headquarters be advised of the status and availability of aerial photo coverage in the area of interest.

129

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

4. (U) TERRAIN AND WEATHER:
   a. Terrain: See Appendix 4 to this Annex.
   b. Weather: See II FFORCEV January 1967 Climatic Summary for III CTZ.
5. MISCELLANEOUS:
   a. To accomplish the mission of destroying VC Military Region IV, a complete detailed interrogation and through classification must be made on all detainees. Further, all personnel in the area must be detained and classified.
   b. The procedure for classification of detainees and their disposition is contained in Confidential Message, AVFBB, 120528, HQ II FFORCEV, 160145Z Dec 66, Subject: Processing, Accounting, and Making Reference to VC Detainees and Prisoners of War (U).

SEAMAN
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Acknowledge

Appendices:
1. Order of Battle
2. Known and Reported VC Installations
3. Organization and personalities of MR IV.
4. Terrain

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131

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Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C) The following list shows the current probable locations of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of interest:

UNIT	LOCATION
272d VC Regt	Vic XT 6643
1st Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6225
7th Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6422
C320 Local Force Bn	Vic XT 5233
C81 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C64 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C61 Local Force Co	Vic XT 7427
Z41 Arty Bn, U80 Arty Regt	Unlocated, possibly in Long Nguyen Secret Zone
Military Affairs Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5
Political Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5

An ARVN MI Agent reported that on 24 Nov 66, an unknown VC unit was ordered to turn on a generator to recharge batteries for a large signal unit in Boi Loi Forest (XT 5035). This signal unit was reportedly located deep underground in that area. Members of this unit were involved in radio intercept, telephone wire tapping, code breaking, and were fluent in many languages. The VC stated that because of this unit they had advance warning of GVN and Allied Operations. (Information unevaluated and supposedly obtained from a VC platoon leader.)

2. (C) The following units are available for reinforcements within 24-36 hours:

UNIT	LOCATION
Phu Loi Bn	Vic XT 8440
2d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 8307
3d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 9213

Elements of the 9th VC Division (-272d Regt) could re-inforce in battalion or regimental strength within 48 hours.

3. (C) Recent reported enemy movements:

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	DATE
XT 838387	Phu Loi Bn	10 Oct 66
XT 892398	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	6 Nov 66
XT 811376	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	14 Nov 66
XT 976363	C2 Co, 800 Bn	1 Nov 66
XT 974372	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	9 Nov 66
XT 937457	100 VC	12 Nov 66
XT 966421	VC Bn	

4. (C) a. The suspected location of the 272d VC Regt [illegible] threat during the initial stages of the operation. A decisive engagement with this regiment could hinder the initial success of the operation. As the operation progresses the regiment could attack friendly forces from the rear.

b. It can be assumed the enemy will defend his supply, base and headquarters areas with the security forces currently available. In this respect, it is anticipated that these positions will be well fortified, and the approach routes mined and booby-trapped.

c. Due to the lack of friendly operations in the Iron Triangle since October 65, very little hard intelligence is available in this area. Since this has

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119

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132

Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

long been a VC stronghold, it can be assumed that extensive fortification and tunnel systems are present throughout the area.

5. (C) HQ MR IV and it's major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of all available information it appears that the HQ of MR IV and the Political Committee generally operate in an area bounded by XT 6437, XT 6637, XT 6733, XT 6633, and will most likely be located in grid square XT 6434. The Military Affairs Committee operates generally in an area bounded by XT 6442, XT 6934, XT 6928, XT 6225, and will be most likely located in grid square XT 6527.

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Appendix 1 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OPERATION [illegible]) (U)

1. (C) GENERAL. The VC Military Region IV, MR IV(T1) also known as the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh-Special Zone (SCGDSZ) is a well organized military and political headquarters. This organization is responsible for and controls all VC actions within the boundaries of MR IV. See II FFORCEV Estimate #2 of the situation in III CTZ for the boundaries of MR IV. The headquarters and elements of the various committees, sections and subsections are known to be in the area of interest.

2. (C) LOCATIONS. It is highly unlikely that the HQ of MR IV and its major military and political committee will be found in one specific area. All indications show that the Military Affairs Committee and the Political Committee are normally seperated. The HQ and the majority of the following committees and sections are believed to be in the area of operations: HQ MR IV (SCGDSZ Party Committee), Military Party Committee, Current Affairs Committee, Military Affairs Committee, Forward Supply Council, Finance and Economy Section, Postal, Transportation and Communication Section, Base Section and the Security Section. The various proselyting sections, and the civil health section must by the nature of the duties and objectives be located through out VC MR IV. Certain representatives of these sections are possibly located in the area of operation. The areas in and around Phu An (XT 7222) and An Dien (XT 7027) are frequently mentioned in numerous agent reports as meeting areas, stop over points and committee and section headquarters areas.

3. (C) ORGANIZATION. Military Region IV is well organized and possesses all the major military and political committees and sections found in the other Military Region HQ. This organization is duplicated for the most part at the district, village and hamlet level throught MR IV. All sections are active in those areas which the VC control and provide the semblance of a legal government. These sections operate covertly in those areas under GVN control in MR IV. See inclosure 1 to this appendix for a diagram of the organization of MR IV. Inclosure 2 provided the names of key members of the infrastructure as known to this HQ. CICV Research and Analysis Study ST67-012, dated 4 Sep 66 provides a wealth of data on the organization, structure and personalities of MR IV.

Acknowledge.

SEAMAN
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Inclosures:
1-Organization of MR IV
2-Personalities of MR IV

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
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121

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MILITARY REGION IV STRUCTURE



122

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to CICAMPS 68-66 (OPERATION FALLS) (U)

PERSONALITIES OF MR IV

The following list of personalities has been compiled by the CI Section of this headquarters based upon: MAC JJ VC Political OB, Agent Reports, interrogation of ralliers and PW's.

1. **Military Affairs Committee: (Cover Number A66-0301)**

Chief:	**Colonel Hai Phong; (Chief of Staff MR 4)**
Field Cadre:	**Nam Thu**
Political Officer:	**Dong Chong**
Members:	**Chin, Ba Tien**

a. **Military Staff:**

Chief of Staff:	**Major Bay Nam**
Deputy Chief of Staff:	**Nam (in charge of militia)**

(1) **Correspondence (Section) Military Staff**

Chief:	**Lieutenant Tran Hoag Ky (captured)**
Assistant:	**Muoi Hai**
Administrative Clerk:	**Nguyen Van Xuan**

(2) **Operations and Training Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Bay Ung**
Assistant:	**Bay Son (Senior-Captain)**
Assistant:	**Ba Hai**
Assistant:	**Aspirant Tu Tien**

(3) **Artillery Combat Support Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Senior Captain Ham Hia**

(4) **Signal Staff Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Tu Quan**

(5) **Combat Operations Staff Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Captain Hai Son**

(6) **Reception Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Phuoi Hung**
Cadre:	**Ba Khien**

(7) **Sapper and Engineer Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Tam Hanh**
Assistant:	**Ban**

(8) **Militia Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Captain Muoi Duyen**
Cadre:	**Nam Cai**

(9) **Military Personnel Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	[illegible]
Assistant:	**Senior Lieutenant Ba Tien**

(10) **Military Intelligence Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Senior Captain Tu Minh**
Assistant:	**Sau Huyah or Huynh**
	Captain Tam Thanh
	Captain Nam Duc

(11) **Crypto Section/Military Staff**

Chief:	**Lieutenant Bay The**
Members:	**Hai Son, Truong, Phu, Thanh, Duc**

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123

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Chief of Crypto Element: Lieutenant Tu Huan
Radio Operators: Hung, Toan, Phia
Members: Hiep, Mat, Danh, Khac, Kiet

(12) Map Cell/Military Staff
Cell Leader: Long
Member: Ou, Nghe, Hai Nho

(13) Recruit Training School/Military Staff
Director: Captain Nam Binh
Deputy: Senior Lieutenant Ba Quang, aka Ba Nhuong
Political Officer: Ut Minh
Instructors: Tam Dot, So Viet
Nam Dung (Sapper: returned from regroupment to North Vietnam)
Ba Phuoc (Sapper)
Ba Quoc (Infantry)
Tu Du, Ut Trieu, aka Lau Do
Sau Kieu, Tam Hoa
Ba Soan, aka Lau Do
Chief of Administrative Section: Tu Tien
Members: Ut Tam, Tu Manh, Ba Duong

b. Political Staff/Military Affairs Committee
Chief: Major Tu Quy
Assistant: Tam Phong
Bay Nuyen (in charge of training)
Tu Minh (in charge of Information and Press)

(1) Administrative Staff/Political Staff
Chief: Sau Ky

(2) (Staff) Assistant for Emulation/Political Staff
Captain Tu Hai

(3) (Staff) Assistant for Party Affairs and Labor Youth/Political Staff)
Captain Hai Thuan

(4) Enemy Proselyting Section/Political Staff
Assistant: Bay Hoa

(5) Security Section/Political Staff
Chief: Bay Duong
Senior Lieutenant: Ba Viet

(6) Cadre Section/Political Staff
Bay Tung
Senior Captain: Tu Thanh

(7) Organization Section/Political Staff
Assistant Captain Tam Hong (in charge of Work Emulation)

(8) Propaganda and Training Section/Political Staff
Chief: Tu Dat

c. Rear Service Staff/Military Affairs Committee
Chief: Hai Thanh
Assistant for Planning: Tu Long
Sau Tinh

Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN [illegible] (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

(1) Ordnance Section Work Site K.11-151/Rear Service Staff
Chief: BA Mai

(2) Medical Section K.12 - 152/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Doctor Tu Vu

(3) Quartermaster Section K.13 - 153/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Tu Phe
Assistant: Nam Non
Military Provision Cell (Leader): Nam Gia
Financial Affairs Cell (Leader): Nam Non and Tu Minh

2. Administrative Staff/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Ding Cong Det (captured)
Assistant:
Members: Ba Hoa (administrative clerk)
Chin Nghiem (administrative clerk in charge of finance)
Ba Phuong (typist)
Nam Oanh (typist)
Tam Kiet (typist)
Thi Anh (typist)
Thi Xuan (typist)
Thi Huong (typist)
Ut Tien (liaison (agent))

3. Information and Propaganda/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Rau (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in the rural areas)
Cadre: Sau Duc (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in cities)
Old man Chin Linh (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on current events)
Members: Bay Phu (making copies of the bulletins)
Nam Rau
Tu Minh
The Information and Propaganda Section is composed of two branches:
Chief of Rural Area Branch: Ba Lan
Cadre: Ba Phat, Ba Thuc, Nam Da, Ba Ke (liaison (agents))
Chief of City Branch: Tu Tan
Cadre: Hai Vo, Thanh Thuy, Nam Nec (female)
a. Urban School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Hai Tan (also Assistant Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)
Assistant: Tu An (instructor)
Cadre: Bay Van (female; instructor)
b. Rural School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Bay An (also Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)

Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to CINCPAC Operation Order CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Assistant:	Tu Duong (instructor)
Cadre:	Tu Hon (instructor)

4. Writer and Artist (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Truong Binh Tong, aka Tu Truong (musician)
Cadre:	Hai Phuong, aka Vien Phuong (play writer) (in charge of urban area)
	Nam Trieu, aka Ho Trieu (composer of theatrical works)
	Sau Vinh (in charge of rural area)
	Thuy Hung

5. (Psywar) Entertainment (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Thuy Hung
Assistant:	Nam Thanh
Members:	Ut Hai (in charge of administration)
	Thi Hang (actress and singer of modern music)
	Thi Vinh (singer of modern music and dancer)
	Thi Lai (singer of traditional music)
	Thi Dung (singer of traditional music)

6. Urban Commo-Liaison (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Sau Thoi
Member:	Sau Si (Security Guard)

7. Urban Propaganda Network/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Ba Quang (killed on 16 Dec 64 in Cu Chi)
Assistant:	Ba Ran (in charge of an element operating within the capital)
Cadre:	[illegible] Bay Tien, Dinh Cong Bet (captured)

8. Painting and Sculpture Section/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	[illegible] (it is reported that this man is a professor of the Gia Dinh Fine Arts School)
Members:	Tu Hoa (painter)
	Sau Tich, Ut Du, Chin Chot

9. Motion Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Doan Bay
Members:	Ba Thanh, Nam Nho, Bay Tuan, Nam Dat, Sau Nghia

10. Radio (Communication) and Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Bay Hoang
Specialists:	[illegible]

11. Metal Type Printing [illegible]

Cadre:	[illegible]
Specialists:	[illegible]

12. Mimeograph House../Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Nam Xuan
Member:	Hai Lan, Nam Nho

13. Supply and Liaison Sub-Section/Propaganda and Training Section

Chief:	Bay Mot
Assistant:	Sau Dong

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

14. Youth Proselyting Section/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Chief: Sau Tham
15. Organization Section - Cover number A74 - D.303/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Chief: Anh Mot, a.k.a Ut Mot
    Assistant: Hai Thanh
    Cadre: Huynh, Kiet
    Ba Tu (transferred from the military proselyting section)
    Tu Cu (administrative staff)
16. Security Section, Cover number A.71 - D. 304/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Chief: Nam Tan
    Assistant:
    Members: Tam Phong (in charge of rural security)
    Ba Lang (in charge of urban security)
17. Military Proselyting Section, Cover number A.69 - D. 305/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Chief: Nam Thu, (member) Current Affairs Committee of Special) Region (Party) Committee)
    Cadre: Ba Tu (in charge of Rural Military Proselyting)
    Tam Trieu (in charge of Urban Military Proselyting)
    Ba Do, aka Ba Tu, Ba Ho, Bay Dat, a.k.a Dat, Nam Mat Kien
18. Economy and Finance Section, Cover number A70-D. 306/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Chief: Ba Dai
    Cadre: Chin Ha
    Hai Anh (Rural economy and finance)
    Tu Nuoc (Rural economy and finance)
    Hai Den (Rural economy and finance)
    Ong Muoi A (Rural economy and finance)
    Tam Gia (in charge of Capital Economy - Finance)
    Ong Ba, Tu Son
19. Comme-Liaison Section, Cover number D. 307/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Cadre: [illegible]
    Sau Tri
    Ut Thanh
20. Base Security (Guard) Section, Cover number A. 77-D. 308/Special Region (Party) Committee
    Section Chief: Tu Hung (concurrently Commander of Area "A")
    Cadre: Bay Hoang, Tu Mau
    Consist of two areas: (Strength: 120 men)
    Commander of Area "A" Tu Hung

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Reference Organizational Structure and Personalities of MR IV to Annex A attached to [illegible] (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Assistant:	Tu Dac
Commander of Area [illegible]:	Muoi Phuoc

21. Postal Transportation and Communication Section Cover number A.75-D.309/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	Hai Binh
Cadre:	Tu Deo

22. Front/Civilian Proselyting Section Cover number A.75-D.309/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	Sau Hieu (In Charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)
Assistant:	Be Ba
a. Women's Branch:	
Cadre:	[illegible] returned in Oct 6[illegible]
	[illegible] Tai
b. Women's Branch:	[illegible]
Cadre:	[illegible] (Died) 7 Au. Chi (Bon)
c. Farmer's Branch:	
Cadre:	[illegible]
d. Students and Youth:	
Cadre:	[illegible]

23. Operational Unit Section Cover number A.73/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief:	[illegible]

24. Propaganda Office and Radio Transmission Section/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief:	[illegible], cover name Ba Tang [illegible] Chairman of Saigon Democratic Journalists Association

25. Saigon-Gia Dinh [illegible]

Chief:	
Cadre in charge of [illegible]:	[illegible] Hong Gong, aka Dung
Cadre in charge of Communications:	Nguyen Van Cu, aka Chin Cu
Leader of Liberation Cell:	Le Van Hanh, aka Nam Hang
	Van Cong My
	Nguyen Van Suu
Members:	Ha Xuan, Nguyen Binh, Nhuyen An, Nguyen Van Khoe
Leader of Propaganda Cell:	Nguyen Tro
Members:	Le Van Xuoi
	Tran Thi Huong, aka Chin
	Tu Thi Co
Member in charge [illegible]:	[illegible] Le Ba Phuong

26. [illegible] Detached Security Platoon

Chief:	Hai Thi

27. (Party) Civil Affairs Committee [illegible] Element/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief:	Muoi Phat
Assistant:	Nara Om

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

a. Administrative Staff/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Chin Tiet
   - Clerk: Tran Van Dung
   - Typist: Thi Yen
   - Commo-Liaison: Tu Nho
   - Security Guard: Tam Rac, Chung

b. Military Affairs Sub-Committee/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Ba Te, aka Ba Liem (captured in Jun 64)
   - Cadre: Tu Ngoc Anh, Ba Den, Sau Nguyen

c. Propaganda Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
   - Cadre: Sau Nam, Hai Cut, Ket

d. Base and Commo-Liaison Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Tu Tong

e. Training, Education Section/(Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
   - Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
   - Cadre: Muoi Dong, Mot Chuan, aka Sau Gia
   - Commo-Liaison Agent: Ba Thong

28. AC. 2053 Section / Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Chief: Bay Tan
   - Cadre: Tam Son II (concurrently Representative Gia - Dinh Region (Party) Committee)
   - Commo-Liaison Agent: Chi Hai

29. Worker Proselyting (Liberation Workers Association of Saigon-Gia Dinh Area
   - Chief: [illegible] (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)
   - Assistant: Tu Nam (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)
   - (Committee) Member: Tam Thiet (in charge of Current Affairs of Region (Party) Committee)

30. Youths, School Children and Students Association Cover number A. 531 Saigon - Gia Dinh Area Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Command Cadre: Bay Binh (Asst Secretary of Region (Party) Committee
   - Nam Thuc

31. Chinese Proselyting, Cover number A. 533/Special Region (Party) Committee
   - Chief: Sau Lam
   - Cadre: Hai Ly (in charge of Information)
   - Sau , Ba

32. Bourgeois Front Cover number [illegible] (Party) Committee
   - Chief: [illegible]
   - Cadre: Bay Viet

33. City Central Area
   a. I and II Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 535
      - Secretary: Sau Tan (Region(Party) Committee Member)
      - Assistant: Muoi Phai
      - Cadre: Muoi Trung (in charge of Propaganda-Cultrue and Indoctrination)

142

Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

b. II and IV Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 536

Secretary:	Tu Hiep (alternate member of Region (Party) Committee)
Assistant:	Sau Hoang (Female)
Cadre:	Tu A (Female)

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C NF) PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Purpose. This study is to be used as part of the intelligence annex to operations PLAN 58-60. Study area is confined to the operational area contained in the operations plan.

b. Limitations. Information presented is based on data obtained from maps, intelligence documents, various terrain studies and aerial reconnaissance. Ground reconnaissance was not made.

2. (C NF) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRAIN:

a. Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provides the most favorable conditions for military operations. It is a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement is canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement are very sensitive to precipitation.

b. Topography.

(1) Relief is predominantly low and flat. There are two small hills, vicinity XT 715255 and XT 684330, which rise 32 and 38 meters above sea level.

(2) Drainage. There are two rivers of importance in the operational area, the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Both of these rivers are navigable all year by sampans, river barges, LCM's and LCT-LCU's. The Song Saigon is approximately 100-150 meters wide and 2.4 meters deep at mean water. At mean water the current ranges from 0.5-1.8 meters per second. The Song Thi Tinh varies 20 to 50 meters width and is 2.5 meters deep at low water. The river bottom of both rivers is clay and silt. This area is affected by tidal action, but to what extent is unknown.

(3) Vegetation. The operational area consists of three general types of vegetation: (1) Broadleaf Evergreen secondary forest, (2) Rubber Plantations, (3) Wetland Rice. The secondary forest consists of Broadleaf Evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bamboo and vines. In the rubber plantations the trees are spaced on 15-20 foot centers and the undergrowth is sparse, consisting of grasses and shrubs. The wetland rice will have been harvested and the fields drained, leaving flat land with approximately six inches of stubble.

(4) Surface material. There are generally three types of soil found within the area.

(a) Hydromorphic clays and silts. This type soil is found in north and central sections of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and Song Thi Tinh. It is composed mostly of silty clays (CL) or clayey silts (ML) and is several meters deep.

(b) Peat Soils. This type soil is found in the southern section of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Peat soils consists of from one to several

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

meters of predominantly organic material (PT) underlain by highly compressible clay (CH).

(c) Red clayey silt. This soil covers the majority of the area. When dried out a hard surface crust forms and it is very dusty. This soil is more favorable for tunnel construction than either of the above mentioned types. The crusting ability and dusty characteristics provide special problems in tunnel destruction. Extensive and complex tunnel systems have been found in this soil type in other locations.

(5) Manmade features. The significant manmade features in the area of this report include routes LTL 14 on the west and an unnumbered route on the eastern border. Route LTL 14 has numerous cuts between XT 670243 and XT 715244. Access into the area is restricted by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers on the west south and east. Only one bridge crosses the Thi Tinh River at Ben Cat (XT 715244). It is a class 12 Eiffel, Type B Bridge. There are no bridges accross the Saigon River. Data for cuts on routes are contained on inclosure 2 and 3. Enemy fortifications in the area include the following:

(a) Trench System XT 699240
(b) Trench System XT 684257
(c) Trench System XT 699211
(d) Trench System XT 694247
(e) Trench System and 5 AA/AW Positions XT 694243
(f) Bunker System XT 672307
(g) Foxholes XT 693483
(h) Trench and AW Positions XT 736274
(i) 12 AA AW Positions XT 733280
(j) Trench System XT 718279
(k) AA/AW Positions XT 734276
(l) AA/AW Positions XT 747241
(m) Bunker System XT 707316
(n) Foxholes XT 723317
(o) Foxholes XT 723324
(p) In addition to the above fortifications, entrances to underground installations are located at:
XT 719240 XT 710284 XT 717285
XT 738216 XT 702297
(q) There are no towns in this area, however the roads are lined with hamlets and built up areas.
(r) The airfield at Loc Ninh (XT 775930) is the only facility capable of handling C-130 aircraft. At the present time this field is closed for rehabilitation. The estimated date of reopening is 31 December. Helicopter landing areas extend from 500 to 3000 meters on each side of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. This area is covered by rice paddies which are expected to be dry during the next 90 days and suitable for helicopter landing zones.

3. (CNF) MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

a. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Observation. Observation throughout the area depends entirely

Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 5N-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

upon the vegetation. In the wetland rice areas the observation will be very good. In the secondary forest regions the observation will be poor, both ground and aerial, due to the dense undergrowth. The rubber plantations will afford poor to fair observation, depending on the density of the undergrowth.

(2) Fields of fire. Fields of fire are extremely limited in these areas of dense forests and heavy undergrowth. The wetland rice areas offer the best fields of fire.

(3) Cover. The principal cover for both units and installations is afforded by bunkers and trench systems found in the operational area.

(4) Concealment. All forested areas and plantations offer good concealment from both air and ground observation. The villages and hamlets located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units. The wetland rice areas offer no concealment.

(5) Obstacles.

(a) Song Saigon flows generally from the northwest to the southeast across the area with widths of 100-150 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.

(b) Song Thi Tinh flows generally from the north to the south across the area with a width of 20-50 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.

(c) The dense forest which dominates the center section of the operational area constitutes a major obstacle to movement of any sort.

(d) Protective friendly minefields are at the following locations of types and quantity indicated:

1.	XT 910310	M-16	800Ea
2.	XT 856216	M-16	264Ea
3.	XT 828268	M-16	280Ea
4.	XT 815290	M-16	800Ea
5.	XT 798425	M-16	60Ea
6.	XT 744330	M-16	255Ea
7.	XT 765295	M-16	280Ea
8.	XT 776263	M-16	380Ea
9.	XT 713188	M-16	119Ea
10.	XT 575342	M-16	250Ea
11.	XT 667173	AT	Quantity Unknown
12.	XT 435472	Type and Quantity Unknown	
13.	XT 440348	Type and Quantity Unknown	

(6) Movement. Cross country movement, within the operational area, is effected to varying degrees by vegetation, soil conditions, relief, hydrography and urbanization (See Inclosure 1).

(7) Key Terrain Features. The area of interest consists of level plains with local relief being less than 35 meters with slopes less than 3%. There are no prominent terrain features in this area.

(8) Avenues of approach. The existing route shown on inclosures 2 and 3 provide the best routes of movement into the objective area. Movement to and around the area is passable via the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers both of which will accomodate LCM and LCU landing craft. Cross country movement around the

Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

edges of the objective area is hampered and highly compartmented by soft rice paddy lands. Conditions for APC's, tanks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks is fair to poor during the period of the operation. In the center of the area the dense jungle creates conditons that are unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops. Inclosure 1 contains details on cross country movement conditions.

Acknowledge.

3 Incl
1. Lines of Communication
2. Lines of Communication
3. Cross Country Movement

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149

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (U) SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence to OPLAN 58-66.
   b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 58-66.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. No change from basic plan.
2. (S-NF) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operation vic THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.
3. (S-NF) EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 58-66.
   b. Air Support. TAC air support available through II FFORCEV TOC, priority of air support to 1st Inf Div.
   c. Artillery Support.
      (1) Field arty.
         (a) 23d Arty Gp:
            1 Attach one 105mm towed bn (- one btry) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
            2 One 105mm towed btry remains attached to 1st Inf Div.
            3 Attach two 155mm towed btry to 25th Inf Div o/a D-L.
            4 Provide one 155mm towed bn (- two btry). GSR 1st Inf Div Arty from position vic PHU LOI.
            5 Provide one btry (-) at LAI KHE o/a D-1 with mission of reinforcing 1st Inf Div Arty.
            6 Provide one 175mm btry at PHU LOI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 1st and 25th Inf Div Arty, priority of fires to 1st Inf Div.
            7 Provide one 8"/175mm btry at CU CHI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 25th Inf Div Arty.
            8 Remaining units - no change from present mission.
         (b) 54th Arty Gp:
            1 Atch one 105mm btry to 1st Inf Div o/a D-L.
            2 Provide one 105mm btry with mission of GSR 10th ARVN Div Arty.
            3 Atch one 155mm bn (SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-L.
            4 Remaining units - No change from present missions.

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      (2) Air defense arty.
         II FFORCEV Arty:
            (a) Atch two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-L.
            (b) Atch two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
   d. Coordinating Instructions:
      (1) Arty fire plans prepared by divisions and separate brigades.
      (2) Direct coordination authorized between divisions and 23d and 54th Arty Gp.

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135

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN [illegible] (CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)
4. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS: OPLAN 34-66.
5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL:
   a. Signal. Current SOI/SSI in effect.
   b. Command. OPLAN 34-66.
Acknowledge.

[illegible]
LTC

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as basic plan

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119

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1st INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

13 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (U) Name and type of Operation: CEDAR FALLS was a seal and search/search and destroy/jungle clearing operation. Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, sheets: 6231 II, 6331 III, 6230 I, 6330 IV.

2. (U) Dates of Operation: Initiated 080730 January 1967, terminated 262400 January 1967.

3. (C) General: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a II FFV controlled operation involving units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. The 173d Airborne Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were placed under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The operation was aimed at the destruction of HQ, Military Region IV and its associated base camps and supply areas within the Iron Triangle and THANH DIEU Forestry Reserve. The 1st Division was employed as the search force and conducted extensive search and destroy, tunnel and base camp destruction and jungle clearing operations throughout the area. This operation proved to be one of the most successful undertaken by the BIG RED ONE. Of particular significance was the large amount of jungle cleared and the unusually high number of ralliers that turned themselves in to GVN authorities as a result of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The general area of operation is at Annex B.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, II FFV. 1st Division forces were controlled from a forward command post located at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown, as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

TF DEANE (173d Abn Bde, Sep)	2d Bde
1-503 Inf	1-26 Inf
2-503 Inf	2-18 Inf
4-503 Inf	1-7 Arty (-) DS
1-4 Cav (-) (OPCON)	
11th ACR (-1 sqdn)(OPCON)	Div Arty
A & B Btry (Reinf) 3-2 Arty (AMEF)	8-6 Arty GSR 2-33 Arty
3-319 Arty DS	B-2-32 Arty Reinf 8-6 Arty
Btry, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR	2-35 Arty (-) GSR 2-33 Arty
3d Bde	Div Trps
1-2 Inf	1st Avn Bn
1-16 Inf	1st Engr Bn
1-28 Inf	121st Sig Bn
2-28 Inf	D-1-4 Cav
2-33 Inf	

Incl 3

137

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4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Intelligence prior to operation. The Iron Triangle and southern LONG NGUYEN (THUNG DIEN Forestry Reserve) had not been deeply penetrated by US or ARVN forces in over a year. The area had long been a major Viet Cong controlled area and contained numerous base camps, supply installations, and production and medical facilities. Viet Cong political and military units were known to be based in the area. Current indications were that the majority of Military Region IV (known as the SAIGON-CHOLON-DIA DINH Special Committee), the BINH DUONG Provincial Committee, and the South BEN CAT District Committee were located in the operational area. The significance of these elements was that they controlled all of the military and political activities of their respective areas. Experience gained in previous operations in the nearby BOI LOI and HO BO Woods indicated that the base camps and supply installations were well protected by extensive bunker systems and tunnel complexes. It was expected that the Viet Cong would make extensive use of mines and booby traps in defending critical zones.

b. No major contact was made by the 1st Infantry Division units during the operation. The entire operation was characterized by small unit actions contacting VC elements of platoon size or smaller. As expected, the VC units did not defend their base areas in force, but elected to flee, leaving behind token resistance in the form of snipers, booby traps, and mines. During the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from MR IV rallied. In addition many local guerrillas were captured trying to infiltrate through friendly lines. Others went underground in an effort to escape capture.

c. Terrain and weather

(1) Cross country movement in the area was affected to varying degrees by heavy jungle and soil conditions. The area was void of prominent terrain features and consisted of level plains with relief varying less than 35 meters in elevation. Cross country movement around the edges of the objective area was hampered by soft rice paddy lands. In the center of the area the dense jungle created conditions that were unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops.

(2) January is a northeast monsoon or dry month over all the III Corps Tactical Zone. The northeast air flow produces the best overall weather of the year in this area. Cloud cover was at its annual minimum and had no adverse effects on the operation. Early morning fog was prevalent between the hours of 0400 and 0900, but this did not hamper airmobile operations or close air support.

d. Base camps uncovered were extensive in size and construction. Foxholes and fighting positions were usually connected by either tunnels or trenches. Most of the fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 4 inches in diameter covered with hard soil approximately 6 inches in thickness. One fortified village was discovered by the 2nd Brigade vicinity XT 5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. Major means of destruction were airstrikes after the inhabitants had been evacuated. Extensive tunnel systems were found throughout the area, with the largest tunnel complex located at the village of BEN SUC. Tunnel rats were utilized to explore tunnels prior to their destruction with explosive or incytelene destructive devices augmented with explosives (See para 11 C).

e. Civil affairs/Psychological operations

(1) All civilians in the operational area were presumed to be either members of VC families or VC laborers working under VC control. The concept of operation provided for the orderly evacuation of all civilians.

(2) At 080600 Jan 67, the seal forces landed by helicopter in BEN SUC. A loudspeaker helicopter orbited the town telling the people not to run but to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The people followed the instructions, and only one civilian was wounded during the sealing operation. After the town was sealed, the 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Regt was landed under operational control of the 1st Division's Revolutionary Development Task Force. The airborne loudspeaker broadcast a message directing the populace to congregate at the school in the center of the town. When the people were assembled, they were screened, and all males from 15 to 45 years of age were evacuated to the interrogation center at PHU CUONG for further screening. When the initial search of the village was completed, the people were allowed to return to their homes, and they were directed to assemble their belongings in preparation to be moved. On the 9th and 10th of Jan, the search of the village continued, and the people from the area surrounding BEN SUC were assembled in the village with their belongings in preparation for the move to PHU CUONG. VNN river boats arrived on 10 Jan, bringing two battalions of ARVN paratroops who assumed responsibility for the security of BEN SUC and assisted the people in the move. Starting on the 11th, the people were evacuated by riverboat and CH 47 helicopter. The people took all their belongings to include livestock.

(3) On 9 Jan, the 11th ACR attacked across the north side of the Iron Triangle. The attack was preceded by the loudspeaker helicopter which cautioned the people not to run and to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The cavalry crossed the area without injuring any civilians. A loudspeaker message was broadcast and leaflets were dropped which advised the people to assemble their belongings. It had been assumed that some people would move without waiting for assistance, and a refugee collecting point had been established at BEN CAT by the 173d Airborne Bde. Unfortunately, some ill-informed troops of the 11th ACR started evicting the people in RACH BAP and then started burning homes. This caused the people in the area to stream into BEN CAT without their possessions. By mid-afternoon, over 1,000 people were assembled at the refugee collecting point at BEN CAT. These people had to be sent back to their homes to collect their belongings. It had been planned to evacuate the people between BEN SUC and BEN CAT in an orderly manner with ARVN assistance after the BEN SUC evacuation was well under way. However, the premature destruction of homes necessitated immediate action. Under RDTF control, seventy trucks were assembled on 10 Jan and the people were moved with their belongings to PHU CUONG on 10, 11, and 12 Jan. Livestock and oxcarts were driven overland to PHU CUONG.

(4) The people were moved to a temporary refugee relocation center at PHU CUONG which was to have been set up and operated by provincial officials assisted by CCO. By Tuesday the 10th, it became obvious that the civilian agencies were not able to establish the refugee center quickly enough to receive the number of people that were enroute. This was true due to a lack of adequate responsive assets and underestimation of the problem. To provide for the refugees, the Division established a control and coordination center at the refugee camp. Military assets were assembled and the camp was set up in time to house the refugees. After the camp was set up, the civilian agencies were able to operate it, and the military support was phased out. At the close of the operation, 6,108 people had been moved to the refugee center. There were 608 men, 1,672 women, and 3,828 children.

(5) PsyOps. During the first two days of the operation, the airborne loudspeaker broadcast standard CHIEU HOI appeals in between the messages used to control the civilians. In addition, stock CHIEU HOI leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped over the area. On the second day of the operation, an unprecedented flow of ralliers from the area of operations started to turn themselves in to both US units and GVN representatives. Additional PsyWar intelligence and propaganda writing support was requested from II FFV. A team with two interpreters and two interrogators/leaflet writers was received from the 246th PsyOps Co. The team was located at the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center under the control of a G-5 officer. Special leaflets and tape recorded appeals were prepared daily. Appeals were directed toward specific groups and individuals that ralliers knew were still in the area of operations. In addition, some wives among the refugees went to their husbands' hiding places and persuaded them to rally. During the operations, four million leaflets were dropped of which approximately half were special appeals developed during the operation. The airborne loudspeaker broadcast an average of eight hours each day. As a result of these efforts, 47% ralliers came in during the operation. The large influx of ralliers overloaded the CHIEU HOI Center. To help handle the ralliers, the Division provided tents, cots, and food to the Center. In addition, supporting engineers dug two new wells in the Center.

5. (C) Mission: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations vicinity THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and Iron Triangle to kill or capture military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; clears area of inhabitants; cuts belts across Iron Triangle and clears selected LZ's within the AO.

6. (C) Concept of Operation: The seal of the Iron Triangle was to be executed in conjunction with an airmobile assault on the village of BEN SUC (XT5883) on 8 January 1967. The 25th Infantry Division was to occupy blocking positions along the west bank of the SAIGON River from vicinity XT5434 to vicinity XT7418. A cavalry squadron and 2 battalions of infantry were to occupy blocking positions along the east bank of the THI TINH River from TAN AN XA (XT7433) to BEN CAT (XT7433). On 9 January, 4 infantry battalions were to conduct airmobile assaults into landing zones north and west of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. Two additional battalions would be airlifted into landing zones along the THI TINH River east of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The armored cavalry regiment, accompanied by supporting engineers, would conduct a thrust westward from BEN CAT, cutting through the Iron Triangle. On 11 January, 2 ARVN battalions would assume the mission of evacuating the inhabitants of BEN SUC to PHU CUONG.

7. (C) Execution:

8 January — The 2d Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0730 hrs by conducting a seal and search of BEN SUC (XT580335). The 1-26 Inf, reinforced with A/2-18 Inf conducted the assault in 60 UH-1D helicopters, encountering sporadic sniper fire in the LZ's. During the day, the battalion killed 20 VC (BC) and captured 6 PW's. The Revolutionary Development Task Force searching BEN SUC accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), 5 PW's, and 150 detainees. TF DEANE joined Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0800 by moving into staging areas and blocking positions. Bde HQ moved to a position in the vicinity of XT7532 at 0915. The 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf helilifted to a staging area in the vicinity of XT8228 at 1410 hrs. The 1-503 Inf remained in a blocking position in the CAN DINH jungle (XT7723). The 35th ARVN Ranger Bn. occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of XT765185.

9 January — Changes in Task Organization (see narrative)

The 1-26 Inf continued the sealed and search of BEN SUC. A/2-18 Inf was detached at 1600 hrs. At 1600 hrs the 2-18 Inf became OPCON 3d Bde and commenced air assault vic XT612342. Landing was aborted due to a mined landing zone. The battalion landed an BEN SUC and reverted to OPCON 2d Bde.

The 3d Bde entered Operation CEDAR FALLS with a 4 battalion assault north of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-2 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 1 (XT637389) at 0800 hrs. No hostile fire was received during the landing. The Bn found 80 tons of rice during the day. The 1-16 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 2 (XT661383) at 0840 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 2-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 3 (XT607365) at 0920 hrs. No hostile fire was received. During the day, the battalion captured 28 tons of rice , 725 Chicom grenades and 14 weapons. The 1-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from DAU TIENG to LZ 5 (XT622384) at 1155 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

TF DEANE attacked west from BEN CAT at 0800 hrs with the 11th ACR (-) seizing obj 1 (XT678298) and obj 2 (XT665300) and securing engineer work parties clearing the road west from BEN CAT to obj 2. The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 4 (XT670365) at 1115 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 4-503 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 6 (XT680350) at 1235 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

10 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf (0800)
1st ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
7th ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf (0800)

At 0845 hrs a River Assault Group boat convoy departed LAI THIEU with the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns on board. Both battalions became OPCON 2d Bde upon closing BEN SUC and prepared to evacuate refugees from the village. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 1-28 Inf, and 2-28 Inf located a total of 262 tons of rice vic XT6035 and captured 135 weapons during the day. The 2-18 Inf moved by road to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT 624330. The 1-4 Cav was relieved of its security mission along the THI THINH River by 4-9 ARVN Bn and 2-8 ARVN Bn. At 1440 hrs, 1-4 Cav became OPCON 11th ACR and relieved the 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf in blocking positions.

11 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf
1st ARVN Abn Bn
7th ARVN Abn Bn
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
TF DEANE : 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
11th ACR (-)
1-4 Cav

154

The 1-26 Inf was relieved of the BEN SUC seal at 1224 hrs by the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and moved north of BEN SUC to conduct search and destroy operations. The first river convoy of refugees departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG at 1225 hrs with 872 personnel and their belongings and two LCM's of cattle. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-28 Inf continued search and destroy operations in sector. Numerous tunnels, base camps, rice caches and small arms were found throughout the day. Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered. The 2-503 Inf, and the 4-503 Inf entered the Iron Triangle from the north, conducting search and destroy operations sweeping southward. The 3-11 ACR screened the Brigade's west flank along Hwy 14.

12 January -- Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (0800)
2-11 ACR (0800)

By this time in the operation it had become fairly apparent that there would be no large scale enemy contact. However, VC supplies and equipment continued to be captured in large quantities. 1,800 tons of rice had been discovered to date plus 189 small arms and 971 grenades. Even more remarkable were the 85 ralliers who turned themselves in. The 2d RAG convoy departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG carrying 849 Vietnamese with all of their personal belongings. The 1-2 Inf located a 100 bed underground hospital with blankets and equipment vicinity XT612387. The 2-18 Inf located 180 tons of rice vicinity XT618354. TF DEANE continued search and destroy operations in sector.

13 January -- Changes in Task Organization

TF DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
1-4 Cav (1700)
11 ACR (-)
A & B Btrys, 5-2 Arty (AMSP)

The 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations north of BEN SUC with no significant contact. The 2-28 Inf located 160 tons of rice in their AO vicinity XT597373. Evacuation of BEN SUC continued with 408 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows being transported to PHU CUONG. 103 refugees, 165,000 lbs rice and 35 sampans were helilifted by CH-47 to PHU CUONG. The 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns continued to seal and evacuate BEN SUC.

The 1-2 Inf helilifted into an LZ vicinity XT619327 and commenced search and destroy operations along the southeast edge of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT635355. The 1-28 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT619373. The 1-4 Cav screened southwest of the 3d Bde AO vicinity XT692312, and the 2-11 ACR screened the southern edge of the AO. At 1700 hrs the squadron returned OPCON TF DEANE. The TF continued search and destroy operations in sector.

14 January -- The 2-28 Inf located an extensive base camp vicinity XT594346 containing rifles, mines, grenades and ammunition. The 1-28 Inf helilifted to LAI KHE at 1445 hrs. The 3d RAG convoy moved to PHU CUONG. The 1-503 Inf destroyed a mine factory vicinity XT673283.

15 January — The 2d Bde, employing the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and the 1st Division Engineers, commenced destruction of BEN SUC. All other units continued search and destroy operations in sector with sporadic enemy contact.

16 January — Elements of the division participating in Operation CEDAR FALLS met sporadic sniper fire throughout the day as they continued to locate and destroy VC stores and equipment within the Iron Triangle. The 2-20 Inf located a fresh grave site containing 20 VC bodies vicinity XT599350. The 1-16 Inf terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0858 hrs and helilifted to LAI KHE at 1130 hrs. The CHIEU HOI results continued to rise with 199 the total to date.

17 January — Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
2-28 Inf (1600)
2-11 ACR

The 2d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. CP units returned to DI AN, closing at 1707 hrs. The 2-28 Inf helilifted from BEN SUC to LAI KHE at 1600 hrs. The last elements leaving BEN SUC activated the timing device on 5 tons of demolitions planted in the area. The purpose of the explosives was to destroy remaining tunnels and any VC who returned to the area after US forces departed. The detonation occurred at 1954 hrs, leaving a large crater in the center of the razed village. The 3d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1-2 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-4 Cav remained in the Iron Triangle area with scattered enemy contact. The 1-26 Inf acted as RMP at LAI KHE.

TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, the 2-503 Inf, the 4-503 Inf and E/11th ACR operating in the Iron Triangle. Scattered contact accounted for 17 VC KIA (BC), 1 PW, and 164 tons of rice.

The 1-7 Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base XT. to DI AN; the 6th Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base V to PHU LOI; and B/2-32 Arty displaced from Arty Base V to LAI KHE.

18 January — Changes in Task Organization

1-2 Inf to 1st Bde (1730)
2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-18 Inf (1310)

The 1-2 Inf helilifted from Operation CEDAR FALLS AO to PHUOC VINH, closing at 1730 hrs. The 2-18 Inf departed Operation CEDAR FALLS AO by convoy and arrived at DI AN at 1310 hrs. The 3d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, 2-503 Inf, 4-503 Inf, 11th ACR, and the 1-4 Cav (-). Sporadic enemy contact continued throughout the day.

19-24 January — Activities during this period consisted of limited search and destroy activities by TF DEANE and engineer jungle clearing and tunnel destruction by 1st Division engineers. General locations of security forces and engineer parties were as follows:

158

1-503 Inf - southwest portion of the Iron Triangle between the SAIGON River and Hwy 14
2-503 Inf - central portion of the Iron Triangle
4-503 Inf and A/2-11 ACR - roadrunner patrols throughout the Iron Triangle
11 ACR (-) - security operations near the confluence of the SAIGON and THI THINH Rivers
1-4 Cav - screening west of BEN CAT along route 13

25 January — Changes in task organization

3d Bde: 1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-28 Inf
1-4 Cav

TF DEANE terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS and reverted to OPCON II FFV at 0700 hrs. TF FIFE, consisting of 1-4 Cav (-), C/2-2 Inf, B/2-28 Inf and 1st Engineer Bn (-), continued jungle clearing, tunnel destruction and security operations in the Iron Triangle. As a result of tunnel clearing operations during the day, TF FIFE captured 20 VC.

26 January — Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated 262400 Jan 1967. C/2-2 Inf and B/2-28 Inf returned to their units. The 1-4 Cav continued road security in the Iron Triangle for departing engineer work parties.

8. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: See Annex F.

b. Signal: See Annex C.

c. US Army Aviation.

(1) For the initial airmobile assaults in Operation CEDAR FALLS, sixty UH-1D's were made available to the division. Although the majority of aircraft was provided by non-organic aviation battalions, the 1st Aviation Battalion played a major role in planning, coordinating, and executing lift operations. All airlifts were controlled by either the 1st AVN Bn or 11th AVN Bn. The movement of six infantry battalions on 9 February was marked with precise timing by the aviation, infantry, and artillery units participating. The schedule of airlifts on 8 & 9 February is shown below:

UNIT	NR of A/C	Stage from	LZ	Landing Time	Control
*1-26 Inf (+)	60	DAU TIENG	BEN SUC	0800	1st AVN Bn
1-2 Inf	60	LAI KHE	1	0800	11th AVN Bn
1-16 Inf	60	LAI KHE	2	0840	1st AVN Bn
2-28 Inf	60	LAI KHE	3	0920	11th AVN Bn
2-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	4	1115	1st AVN Bn
1-23 Inf	60	DAU TIENG	5	1155	11th AVN Bn
4-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	6	1235	1st AVN Bn

* conducted on 8 Jan; all others on 9 Jan.

(2) After 9 February the average daily aviation support to the division was 27 aircraft per day. These aircraft were used mainly for small unit moves and resupply. Aircraft from the organic aviation battalion flew a total of 431 sorties (UH-1D), transporting 3,682 personnel during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Average aircraft availability during the period was 63.7%.

d. US Air Force Close Air Support

(1) The mission of tactical air was as follows:

(a) Neutralization of enemy forces

(b) Destruction of enemy forces in contact with division units.

(c) Destruction of enemy base camps and tunnel complexes.

(d) Interdiction of enemy liaison/communication routes.

(2) Control. All air strikes were controlled by Forward Air Controllers using O-1 type aircraft.

(3) The 7th Air Force flew a total of 747 sorties in support of 1st Infantry Division elements during the operation. A total of 910 tons of ordnance was delivered. Requests for immediate TAC support were answered with a minimum of delay.

(4) Effectiveness. TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The 7th Air Force support contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire and conducting Landing Zone preparations. Clearance procedures prior to delivery of strikes were simplified through the use of PsyOps messages. Vietnamese in the area were instructed to move to designated areas where they would be safe from US bombings. All personnel remaining in jungle areas would be considered Viet Cong and engaged accordingly. This measure precluded the large number of civilians in the area being injured by supporting fires.

e. Engineer. Engineer support was provided to the division from assets of the 79th Engineer Group. A total of 40 bulldozers and Rome plows was made available to the 1st Engineer Task Force. During the operation the task force cleared 2,233 acres of approximately 9 square kilometers of jungle. Dozer teams consisted of two tank dozers and six dozers. The tank dozers preceded the dozers and cut through the jungle exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The following dozers cut swaths through the jungle along the infantry routes of march. The use of the dozers to open jungles as part of combat operations was a unique and challenging task. Since the Iron Triangle contained well over 100 square kilometers of heavy jungle and large rubber trees, a mass clearance-type operation was abandoned as impractical. Therefore, to open up the jungle for future operations, it was felt that cutting swaths across the jungle together with working dozer teams directly in support of the advancing infantry would provide the best results.

f. B-52 Strikes. A total of ten B-52 strikes was delivered in support of 1st Division operations. The strikes were based on intelligence and were delivered against heavily fortified areas. The strikes were particularly effective in destroying bunkers, collapsing tunnels and uncovering VC supply bases.

9. (C) Results:

a. Friendly losses:

KHA	32
WHA	181

Equipment damaged: 2 CH-13, 4 APC, 1 M151, 3 M48A1
Equipment destroyed: none

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC)	389
PW	180
CHIEU HOI	471
Detainees	365

(2) Weapons and ammunition:

Small arms	429
Machine guns	18
Mortars	6
Recoilless rifles	2
Grenade launchers	3
Small arms ammo	49,593
Mortar rounds	219
Grenades	1,496
Arty rounds	28
Mines	186
CBU's	142

(3) Foodstuffs:

Rice (tons)	3,367
Peanuts (lbs)	3,550
Salt (lbs)	7,600
Tea (lbs)	40

(4) Supplies:

Uniforms	7,622
Bags, nylon cloth	6
Rolls poncho material	100
6 hp engine	1
Outboard motors	5
Sewing machines	3
Bolts cloth	554
Typewriters	3
Sheets Roofing Tin	700
Sampans	189
Gasoline (gallons)	1,520
TNT (lbs)	928
Motor oil (gallons)	845
Jungle boots (pairs)	20

(5) Installations:

Huts	169
Bunkers	207
Punji pits	85
Tunnels	173

159

10. Administrative Matters:

a. The administrative planning for Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be adequate, and the logistical support was able to answer effectively to the demands placed on it throughout the operation. All logistical support was provided from base areas outside of the Iron Triangle at established base areas at DAU TIENG, QUAN LOI, LAI KHE, and PHU LOI. The evacuation of refugees from the operational area was a problem which became of major logistical concern. Prior planning programmed the evacuation of refugees by civilian agencies; however, the large number of refugees to be evacuated from the area necessitated US military support. LAI KHE was established as a Forward Logistics Base, using the normally assigned combat service support elements of the base camp. Additional augmentation from Support Command units was extremely limited. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a Forward Ammunition Supply Point and trailer transfer point. Considerable improvement of the ASP area was made. PHU LOI became a logistical base with the establishment of a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area handling Class I and III supplies. The Support Command Forward CP was established at LAI KHE in the Division Headquarters (Forward). The CP was co-located with the AC of S, G-4 element in the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) expandable van. The LOC functions were: to supervise and coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate, and transmit to Div Log Base in DI AN all requests for supply and service support for appropriate action; to coordinate demands exceeding the capabilities of the Support Command with the Logistical Command; and through aggressive follow up action, to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The element also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of all Cl I, II & IV, III and V supplies such as consumption, receipts, on hand, and due in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer.

b. Supply

(1) LAI KHE

(a) The 3d Forward Supply Section of the battalion at LAI KHE, augmented with selected personnel, was the mainstay of supply support to the tactical units participating in the operation. All classes of supply (less Class V) were provided from LAI KHE as well as GS services. Of particular note were the POL Jump Teams dispatched to provide refueling services to infantry and engineer units operating in locations where normal fueling by tank trucks was either impractical or altogether impossible. Petroleum equipment operators, together with dispensing equipment and 500-gallon collapsible drums, were airlifted to provide this service

(b) Bath and Laundry service was provided by the Bath and Laundry Section, 624th Quartermaster Co, 29th Group, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) PHU LOI

(a) As a result of various tactical units staging through PHU LOI during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the supply support provided by the 4th Forward Supply of the 1st S & T Bn increased by approximately 25%. No particular problems were experienced. Shower and Laundry facilities were provided by the 1st Logistical Command.

160

(b) The 4th Forward Supply Section provided all class III support (diesel fuel and lubricants) to the RAG-boat and LCM flotilla operating on the SAIGON River during the refugee re-settlement phase of the operation at the river landing in PHU CUONG.

(3) QUAN LOI

The 5th Forward Supply Section of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion at QUAN LOI played no major role in the support of Operation CEDAR FALLS, but was fully geared to provide class I and III support on a major scale if needed.

(4) DAU TIENG

A POL team was dispatched to this location on 4 January 1967 and remained operational until 10 January for the refueling of helicopters participating in diversionary maneuvers at the outset of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

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5. Experience Factors

A. Class I: Figures in parentheses represent stockage Objectives: Issue is stockage objective for A rations.

1. Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances

a. LAI KHZ

DATE	A Rations (15,000) Issues	A Rations (15,000) O/H End	B Rations (163,500) Issues	B Rations (163,500) O/H End	C Rations (54,500) Issues	C Rations (54,500) O/H End
8	9,100	11,900	0	209,940	1,996	32,720
9	9,700	2,200	67,900	142,040	3,938	28,782
10	10,475	525	0	153,920	3,104	25,678
11	11,055	20	1,327	152,593	3,796	21,882
12	8,410	1,710	2,490	197,443	2,320	39,562
13	10,516	0	2,745	209,602	2,980	46,582
14	10,925	8,475	0	211,602	3,302	43,000
15	10,325	7,150	0	211,602	3,458	40,612
16	9,195	21,385	36,700	174,822	4,800	35,812
17	9,050	30,335	0	174,822	696	35,116
18	9,015	30,920	0	174,822	1,392	33,724
19	7,800	23,120	0	174,822	1,548	32,176
20	7,800	15,320	28,840	145,982	4,400	27,776
21	7,635	17,585	0	156,482	2,040	25,736
22	7,535	19,647	0	156,482	2,064	23,652
23	7,060	22,582	49,420	107,062	10,340	13,312
24	6,350	23,757	0	107,062	553	12,954
25	6,175	31,612	0	107,062	848	12,106
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:	8,675		20,267		2,486	
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:	11,055		67,900		10,340	
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	127%		334%		415%	
TOTAL ISSUES:	138,221		189,547		52,610	
AVERAGE O/H FOR PERIOD:	15,191		164,898		2,922	

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182

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/H:

0 +1,390 -1,890

AVERAGE REQUIRED: 8,790

TOTAL SHORTAGES ISSUED: 758

b. l

DATE (Jan)	A Rations: Issues	A Rations: O/H End	B Rations (87,000) Issues	B Rations (87,000) O/H End	C Rations (29,000) Issues	C Rations (29,000) O/H End
8	6,600	6,600	0	100,200	0	29,409
9	6,600	6,600	42,805	57,395	230	29,179
10	5,800	7,400	0	57,395	0	29,179
11	5,700	12,700	0	57,395	100	29,079
12	5,800	17,700	0	57,395	0	29,079
13	6,250	14,050	300	57,095	1,100	29,975
14	6,300	14,350	1,200	55,895	0	27,975
15	6,000	14,950	0	55,895	0	27,975
16	6,000	14,750	43,715	12,180	0	27,975
17	6,000	8,750	500	11,680	1,740	26,235
18	6,033	4,616	0	11,680	276	25,959
19	3,866	2,750	1,933	9,747	400	25,559
20	6,200	4,822	0	99,747	2,100	23,459
21	4,132	19,318	0	99,747	928	22,531
22	11,600	19,318	0	99,747	0	22,531
23	0	21,318	462	53,547	0	22,531
24	12,920	8,209	3,150	50,397	720	28,144
25	616	7,702	4,100	46,297	1,416	40,775

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

5,497 3,208 866

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

12,920 43,715 2,100

HIGHEST OF AVERAGE:

235% 1,052% 242%

TOTAL ISSUES:

106,384 98,192 8,510

AVERAGE ON HAND PER PERIOD:

11,344 53,191 27,390

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/H:

0 -31,907 -1,690

163

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 5,914

TOTAL STRIKERS ISSUED: 159

e. [illegible] LOT

DATE	A Rations Issue	A Rations O/H End	B Rations (13,900) Issue	B Rations (13,900) O/H End	C Rations (4,500) Issue	C Rations (4,500) O/H End
8	250	4,450	750	5,070	400	2,490
9	550	3,900	0	5,070	400	2,098
10	250	3,650	0	5,070	400	1,698
11	250	3,400	750	4,320	400	1,298
12	250	3,150	0	4,320	800	3,510
13	250	2,900	0	4,320	900	2,610
14	750	2,650	750	3,570	900	4,534
15	250	2,400	0	3,070	428	4,106
16	1,450	1,700	0	3,070	280	3,826
17	750	1,250	2,250	5,020	120	3,706
18	800	3,350	0	5,020	0	3,706
19	750	2,600	0	5,020	384	3,322
20	677	1,923	900	4,920	0	3,322
21	950	2,751	0	6,766	0	9,972
22	750	3,600	0	8,750	0	9,972
23	950	5,572	588	9,302	0	9,972
24	950	4,572	0	19,302	500	9,472
25	950	4,572	0	19,302	0	10,944
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:						
	677		237		297	
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:						
	1,450		2,250		904	
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:						
	230%		949%		304%	
TOTAL ISSUED:						
	11,777		6,220		5,944	
AVERAGE ON HAND FOR PERIOD:						
	3,244		8,179		5,011	
AVERAGE UTILIZATION PER A/D:						
	0		-5,321		+531	

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 654

TOTAL STRIKERS ISSUED: 23

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. [illegible]

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy
8	3,400	11.2	0	0	0	0	12,222	0	33.0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	8,600	10.0	0	11,300	0	16.5	0	0	0
11	10,590	12.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	10,100	10.0	0	47,340	0	70.1	20,000	0	73.0
13	6,036	6.0	0	14,934	0	22.3	10,000	0	73.0
14	19,400	15.9	0	2,000	0	1.5	0	0	0
15	9,000	15.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	23,430	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	18,000	20.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	9,600	8.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	9,900	2.2	0	10,500	0	15.7	0	0	0
22	9,300	7.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	10,000	12.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	25.0
25	16,700	75.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTALS:								
	172,594	216.1	0	86,624	0	126.1	48,621	0	220.0

b. PHU LOI

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy	Rations	s/t Air	s/t Hwy
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	6,600	0	8.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	11,000	0	14.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	6,600	0	7.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	6,600	0	8.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	6,600	0	11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	5,000	0	10.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	3,066	0	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	8,320	0	11.5	90,000	0	135.0	0	0	0
21	10,600	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	11,500	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	2,000	0	4.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	25.0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,147	0	21.5
	TOTALS:								
	120,766	0	134.3	90,000	0	135.0	20,480	0	126.5

165

c. QUAN LOI: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE	A Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	B Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy	C Rations	a/t Air	a/t Hwy
21	1,778	5.2	0	1,846	2.7	0	6,650	23.2	0
22	1607	2.6	0	1,984	2.7	0	0	0	0
23	2,914	2.6	0	11,520	40.0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	950	2.2	0	0	0	0	1,476	28.3	0
	TOTALS:								
	7,249	12.6	0	15,350	46.0	0	8,126	28.3	0

*NOTE: No Class I receipts 8 - 20 January 1967 at QUAN LOI.

d. PHU CUONG Refugee camps:

The following items were issued during the period 11-15 Jan

Powdered Milk (cs)	-	80
Beef and Gravy (cs)	-	45
Noodles, Chow Mein (cs)	-	30
Luncheon Meat (meal)	-	120,000
Pork Sausage (meal)	-	113,000
Frankfurters (meal)	-	192,000
Eggs, Dehydrated (meal)	-	205,000
Milk, Chocolate, canned (meal)	-	29,000

B. Class III:

(1) Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances:

(a) LAI KHE:

DATE	UP - A Issues	(60,000) O/H End	AVGAS Issue	(10,000) O/H End	MOGAS Issue	(4,000) O/H End	Diesel Issue	(4,000) O/H End
8		63,000		12,000		35,000		31,000
9	28,000	50,000	1,000	12,000	10,000	40,000	6,000	35,000
10	10,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	5,000	90,000	2,000	55,000
11	10,000	75,000	0	16,000	7,000	43,000	11,000	44,000
12	10,000	85,000	3,000	13,000	8,000	45,000	9,000	45,000
13	16,000	75,000	1,000	12,000	5,000	44,000	3,000	45,000
14	17,500	62,000	3,000	9,000	13,000	36,000	18,000	29,000
15	12,000	50,000	1,000	9,000	13,000	25,000	12,000	18,000
16	13,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	2,000	50,000	2,000	46,000
17	14,000	70,000	3,000	14,000	7,000	46,000	10,000	40,000
18	15,000	85,000	0	14,000	7,000	49,000	5,000	45,000
19	13,000	72,000	1,000	13,000	1,000	48,000	5,000	40,000
20	28,000	74,000	1,000	17,000	8,000	10,000	5,000	35,000
21	2,000	72,000	0	17,000	10,000	30,000	8,000	37,000
22	1,000	71,000	0	17,000	2,000	43,000	2,000	60,000
23	3,000	66,000	0	17,000	8,000	50,000	10,000	50,000
24	8,000	60,000	2,000	15,000	10,000	40,000	5,000	45,000
25	7,000	53,000	0	15,000	4,000	36,000	3,000	42,000

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AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE:			
10,600	973	5,133	7,290
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUE:			
23,000	3,000	13,000	12,000
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:			
264%	526%	253%	249%
TOTAL ISSUE:			
207,300	17,000	120,000	116,000
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:			
69,166	12,000	40,000	41,222
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/H:			
49,160	-7,112		41,222

b. PER CENT:

DATE	JP - 4 (75,000) Issues	JP - 4 (75,000) O/H End	JP - 5 (15,000) Issues	JP - 5 (15,000) O/H End	JP - 6 (25,000) Issues	JP - 6 (25,000) O/H End	JP - 7 (30,000) Issues	JP - 7 (30,000) O/H End
8		41,000		14,000		16,375		23,375
9	21,000	45,300	4,000	10,000	5,375	21,000	4,375	34,000
10	5,300	60,000	3,000	12,000	9,000	22,000	10,000	25,720
11	15,000	60,000	2,300	9,625	5,240	20,960	1,500	37,220
12	25,050	54,150	1,600	8,000	4,200	26,960	12,450	29,750
13	19,150	55,000	0	12,000	3,000	23,160	3,500	36,250
14	15,000	65,000	2,220	16,000	3,160	20,000	16,250	25,000
15	49,700	25,300	0	16,000	5,000	25,000	7,600	17,400
16	22,000	43,300	4,000	12,000	4,000	26,000	7,200	20,200
17	12,600	45,700	1,000	16,000	2,000	29,000	5,000	24,400
18	19,700	46,000	4,000	17,000	5,000	29,000	4,400	30,000
19	12,200	42,000	2,000	15,000	7,600	26,400	7,500	27,500
20	14,000	30,000	4,000	11,000	5,400	18,000	7,500	20,000
21	13,400	59,600	1,200	9,000	5,200	23,000	5,000	20,000
22	2,600	62,000	0	14,000	2,000	26,000	2,000	23,000
23	12,000	70,000	0	14,000	2,000	29,000	5,500	22,500
24	20,000	70,000	0	19,000	3,000	36,000	5,500	22,000
25	20,000	55,000	3,000	16,000	0,000	33,000	12,000	25,000

	JP-4	AVGAS	JPGAS	DIESEL
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:				
	10,038	1,307	4,942	6,366
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:				
	47,000	4,000	9,000	16,250
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:				
	468%	305%	182%	255%
TOTAL ISSUES:				
	354,000	33,000	82,375	110,375
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:				
	52,413	13,021	24,042	26,443
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/O:				
	-22,587	-1,119	-958	-3,557

a. CHILE LOT

DATE	JP-4 (40,000) Issues	JP-4 (40,000) O/H End	AVGAS (20,000) Issues	AVGAS (20,000) O/H End	JPGAS (5,000) Issues	JPGAS (5,000) O/H End	DIESEL (2,000) Issues	DIESEL (2,000) O/H End
8		115,527		24,630		51,900		55,675
9	300	115,227	0	24,630	300	50,600	0	55,675
10	400	114,827	0	24,630	5,090	45,510	200	55,475
11	2,200	112,627	0	24,630	1,200	44,310	0	55,475
12	300	112,327	0	24,600	575	43,735	145	55,330
13	2,500	109,827	1,100	23,500	300	43,435	0	55,330
14	450	109,377	190	23,310	400	43,035	100	55,230
15	750	108,627	100	23,210	400	42,635	100	55,130
16	3,700	104,927	980	22,230	500	42,135	200	54,930
17	6,927	97,500	1,230	21,160	500	41,635	100	54,830
18	2,700	94,800	0	21,160	300	41,335	500	54,700
19	1,300	93,500	0	21,160	400	40,935	100	54,600
20	2,000	91,500	0	21,160	600	40,335	200	54,400
21	600	91,200	0	21,160	1,960	38,375	90	54,430
22	900	90,000	50	21,110	350	38,025	440	54,090
23	2,300	88,000	100	21,010	600	37,425	450	53,580
24	1,240	85,760	50	20,960	600	36,825	20	53,150
25	300	85,460	0	20,960	200	36,625	20	53,130
AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:								
	1,990		152		574		111	

	JP-4	[illegible]	[illegible]	Diesel
HIGHEST DAILY ISSUE:	6,027	1,230	5,090	111
PERCENT OF AVERAGE:	900%	000%	000%	411%
TOTAL ISSUE:	29,067	3,570	14,275	2,565
AVERAGE DAILY O/H:	101,127	22,520	42,130	54,741
AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:	+61,127	+2,520	+37,130	+34,741

d. Bulk Items

Date	JP-4 Issues	JP-4 O/H End	[illegible] Issues	[illegible] O/H End	[illegible] Issues	[illegible] O/H End	Diesel Issues	Diesel O/H End
7	0	30,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	2,777	27,223	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. Bulk Items

Date	JP-4 Gallons	JP-4 a/c Air	JP-4 a/c Day	[illegible] Gallons	[illegible] a/c Air	[illegible] a/c Day	[illegible] Gallons	[illegible] a/c Air	[illegible] a/c Day	Diesel Gallons	Diesel a/c Air	Diesel a/c Day
8	8,000	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	10,000	0	30
10	40,000	0	120	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45	22,000	6	66
11	5,000	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	20,000	15	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
13	6,000	18	0	0	0	0	4,000	12	0	3,000	9	0
14	16,900	13.5	0	0	0	0	5,100	15	0	2,000	6	0
15	0	0	0	1,000	3	0	2,000	6	0	1,000	3	0
16	43,000	9	120	3,000	9	15	27,000	7	75	3,000	0	90
17	4,000	12	0	1,000	3	0	3,000	9	0	4,000	12	0
18	30,000	0	90	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	30,000	0	90	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	25,000	0	75
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,200	0	45	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:	JP-4 217,500	136.5	510	[illegible] 20,000	15	45	[illegible] 121,200	43	315	Diesel 100,000	36	345

b. POL LOI

DATE	JP-4			GASOLINE			MOGAS			DIESEL		
	Gallons	a/c Air	a/c Hwy	Gallons	a/c Air	a/c Hwy	Gallons	a/c Air	a/c Hwy	Gallons	a/c Air	a/c Hwy
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	15,000	0	45
10	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0
11	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
12	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
13	20,000	0	60	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
14	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	0	0	0
16	55,000	0	165	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
17	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
18	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
19	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
20	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	3,500	0	10.5	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
22	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
23	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
24	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
25	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45
TOTAL:	290,500	0	895.5	35,000	0	105	105,000	0	315	115,000	0	330

c. OIL LOI and DAY TIME

No receipts during the operation.

3. JP - 4 Consumption Experience During Assault Airlift of Infantry Battalions.

a. During this operation some airlifts were monitored by personnel at the refueling points and aircraft crewmen. The following is the results, which appear to contain variables which preclude t
these figures for detailed planning.

See Next Page

AP-4 CONSOLIDATION — ASSAULT HELICOPTER BATTALIONS

UNIT	HH-1D A/C	TOTAL GAL	AV/LC	STRAIGHT LINE DIST to LZ	SIZE UNIT	DATE
ROBIN HOOD	10	1700	170	9 MI	One Inf Bn	9 Jan
[illegible]	10	1610	161			
TOP TIGERS	10	1650	165	19 MI	One Inf Bn	
[illegible]	10	1900	190			
VULTURES	10	1250	125	12 MI	One Inf Bn	
COBRAS	10	1090	109			
TOP TIGERS	10	1240	124	29 MI	One Inf Bn	15 Jan
ROBIN HOOD	10	1040	104			
[illegible]	6	624	104			
TOTAL	86 A/C	13,524	1,532	[illegible]	4 Bn	
AVERAGE	9.6 A/C Per Hel Co	1,502.7 Per Hel Co	156.5 Per A/C	[illegible] Per A/C	1 Bn	

b. The following planning factors are used by Combat Aviation Battalions for planning purposes, and have proven reliable.

(1) An Assault Helicopter Company has 10 ea HH-1D's.
(2) To lift one Infantry Company it requires 20 HH-1D's.
(3) To lift one Infantry Battalion it requires 60 HH-1D's.
(4) The difference between the straight line distance to the LZ and the deceptive flight route is 15% more distance.
(5) For combat assaults, HH-1D's carry 1400 lbs of fuel, or 212.4 gals each.
(6) Fuel consumption of the HH-1D is 12 lbs, or 1.9 gals, per minute, at 90 knots speed.
(7) "Slicks" will fly 2 hrs on a fuel load, Gunships will fly 1.5 hours.
(8) One "Slick" will use 550 lbs, or 85.8 gals per flying hour.
(9) Most Infantry Battalion lifts use 2 Assault Helicopter Companies making 3 sorties per company (total of 60 sorties).
(10) JP-4 weights 6.42 lbs per gal. To convert lbs to gals multiply by 0.156.
(11) The more aircraft used in a lift, the greater the fuel consumption rate will be.

C. Class II - IV

1. All Cl II & IV support for operation CHEIN FILLE was provided by the 3rd FSC, LAI KHE. A breakdown of issues of fast moving items follows.

Paper Plates (ea)	-	99,500
Paper Cups (ea)	-	67,000
Plastic Knives (ea)	-	74,000
Plastic Forks (ea)	-	75,000
Plastic Spoons (ea)	-	74,000
Battery BA 300 (ea)	-	900
Battery BA 30 (ea)	-	12,550
Water Cans, 5 gal (ea)	-	150
Spray, aerosol, insect repellent (ea)	-	1,366
Soap, GI (lbs)	-	60
In Size clothing pack (ea)	-	6

2. The following Cl II & IV items were furnished in support of refugee and CHIEU HOI resettlement:

Tent, GP - Med	-	44
Tent, Hamgonal	-	150
55 - gal drums	-	926*
Field Kitchen fire units	-	6
Field Kitchen cooking utensils	-	29
Field Kitchen stove cabinets	-	2
Shower Unit	-	1
Water Can, 5 gal	-	1,125*
Water Trailers, 400 gal	-	15
Water Trailers, 5000 gal	-	2
Gasoline Tank truck, 5000 gal	-	1
Pump, 55 GPM	-	1
Light set	-	1
Generator, 10 KW	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	2
Barbed wire, rolls	-	54*
Concertina, Rolls	-	13*
Blanket, GI, WOL	-	5*

NOTE: Items with asterisk (*) were outright issues, all others were furnished on a loan basis.

3. Total tonnage of Cl II & IV items issued:

a. TOTAL Cl II & IV tonnage: 45 s/t
b. Barrier Material only: 30 s/t

B. Class V:

1. LAI KHE ASP stockage objectives:

The following stockage objectives were maintained initially at the LAI KHE ASP. During the latter part of the operation these objectives were adjusted downward:

ITEM:		STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE
175mm	HE	817 rds
8"	HE	1200 rds
105mm	HE	32400 rds
4.2"	HE	792 rds
81mm	HE	3960 rds
60mm	HE	1200 rds
4.2mm	HE	3220 rds
Mine,	AP:1	3000
90mm	HE (TK)	600 rds
90mm	Canx (TK)	960 rds

Items not listed were stocked in accordance with USARPAC Reg 710-15.

2. Ammunition Tonnages:

Approximately 7934.03 tons of ammunition were shipped from the LONG BINH Ammo Depot in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. This quantity is broken down as follows:

	AMMUNITION	SMALL ARMS
Land LOC:	6370.25	436.99
Air LOC:	1146.27	4.52
TOTALS:	7522.22 s/t	411.51 s/t

3. Class V Consumption (Issue) Data

	Tonnage issued (all Land LOC)
Small Arms:	64.303 s/t
Artillery:	3010.439 s/t

4. Expenditure data (Artillery)

WEAPON	Avg Rds Fired/Tube/Day (HE)	Total Rds Fired
4.2" Mortar	17 Rds/Tube/Day	1658
105mm How	199 Rds/Tube/Day	51915
155mm How	100 Rds/Tube/Day	30343
175mm Gun	32 Rds/Tube/Day	1026
8" How	60 Rds/Tube/Day	3940

175

(e) Services:

(1) Graves Registration - remains processed

(a) LAI KHE 30

(b) PHU LOI 13

(c) QUAN LOI 0

(2) Showers provided (1st Log Cmd)

(a) LAI KHE 3,523

(b) PHU LOI 5,2?5

(c) QUAN LOI 2,227

(3) Lbs of Laundry Processed (1st Log Cmd)

(a) LAI KHE 16,136

(b) PHU LOI 15,490

(c) QUAN LOI 6,188

e. Maintenance

(1) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Due to the limits of the area of operations, the service rendered to the division did not differ greatly from the normal day-to-day support operations. Other than usual technical assistance visits, no special maintenance teams were organized for the operations. The back-up support units for the division remained the same. The main repair parts re-supply source was HQ and A company, DI AN, which in turn supplied the forward support companies: B (DI AN), C (LAI KHE), and D (PHUOC VINH). Of the latter, C Company was involved to a greater degree due to its close proximity to the Iron Triangle. On occasion, contact teams were sent by the company in support of their customers.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 701st Maintenance Battalion experienced the following workload:

Job orders received	3,268
Job orders completed	3,455
Requests	16,465
Issues	12,014
Total Transactions	27,816
Average ASL on hand	60%
Average demand accomodation	73%
Tons moved to Forward Support Companies	253
Technical Assistance Visits	299

(3) The following data lists the important major end items involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. In all cases, the number of items supported represents an *average* figure due to the shifting of tactical units to and from other concurrent operations. The number of major assemblies replaced represents the type of work done on these major end items.

174

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	AVERAGE NR SUPPORTED	REPAIR/REPLACEMENTS
M113	75	5 Transmissions 7 Engines 2 Sprockets 5 Road Wheel Arms 1 Transfer 80 Road Wheels
M113A1	61	1 Transmission 3 Engines 5 Road Wheel Arms
M48A3	30	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 26 Track Blocks 20 Road Wheels 3 Road Wheel Arms
M132A1	6	22 Sprockets
M577A1	13	1 Engine
M578	5	30 Road Wheels 151 Track Pads
M88	5	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 1 Engine 1 Road Wheel Arm
105 How	5f	2 Tubes 3 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Sight
155 How	20	6 Tubes 6 Recoil Mechanisms 5 Obturator Spindles
8" How	5	2 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Obturator Spindles 3 Sights 1 Counter Recoil Mechanism 1 Mount 1 Computer

(4) If any comparison can be drawn between Operation CEDAR FALLS and earlier operations, it may be said that consumption rates of repair parts and maintenance effort expended were at lower levels for Operation CEDAR FALLS than previously experienced. This is probably due to the better maintenance posture of the division at the present time.

d. Medical

(1) The operation was primarily supported by Company B, located at LAI KHE base camp. Company A, 8 Jan through 11 Jan, and Company C, 11 Jan through 17 Jan, medically supported Operation LAM SON throughout the operation. All other elements of the battalion supported the operation from their base camps by being ready to reinforce the forward companies or to send out a treatment section as required. Two

air ambulances were located at LAI KHE in general support. These air ambulances were controlled by Company B. 1st Medical Battalion also supported the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the operation.

(2) (C) Total number of patients treated:

(a)	DRHA	41
(b)	IRHA	263
(c)	NBI & DIS	1,087
(d)	Vietnamese civilians	412
(e)	ARVN	29
(f)	Viet Cong	52
(g)	Viet Cong Suspects	4
(h)	American civilians	1

(3) (U) Medical services rendered:

The 1st Medical Battalion rendered the normal services to all elements of the Division and units we were directed to support. The normal services are hospitalization, treatment, evacuation, dental care, psychiatric care, and medical re-supply.

(4) (C) Air evacuations:

Battle casualties in urgent and priority categories were evacuated to the 3d Surgical, 3d Field, 93d Evacuation and 12th Evacuation Hospitals according to the type wound or disease and the tactical situation at the time of evacuation. Dust-offs made 161 field patient pick-ups from the operational area in the vicinity of LAI KHE and on two occasions two additional helicopters were requested to assist in evacuation. On 13 Jan a CH-47 Chinook was used to assist in evacuating 23 patients from the clearing station at LAI KHE to Army hospitals.

(5) (C) Medical Supplies:

During the operation 99,300 pounds of medical supplies were shipped to units involved in the support of the operation. In addition, 5,500 pounds of medical supplies were furnished for the refugee camp at PHU CUONG. All medical re-supply was accomplished by dust-off aircraft. Normal supply support was accomplished without any major problems. Prior planning to increase our stock levels by 25% made it possible to fill 90% of all requisitions immediately and the remainder within a 24 hour period.

(6) (C) Whole Blood:

A total of 229 units of whole blood was shipped to units in support of the operation.

e. Transportation

(1) Division Transportation Officer:

(a) During Operation CEDAR FALLS the Division Transportation Office was divided into two main elements, one functioning at DI AN and one at LAI KHE. The DI AN element was composed of personnel to operate the airstrip and the traffic control center. Airstrip operations included controlling all cargo loading of aircraft. The prompt movement of replacement personnel to and from the forward area was also accomplished by airstrip control personnel.

(b) The traffic control center was responsible for road clearances in and around the DI AN area to include SAIGON. They further coordinated all convoy movements in the division TAOR with the DTO element in the forward area.

(c) The Division Transportation Officer and the Assistant Division Transportation Officer operated the DTO section of the Logistics Operation Control Center. From here, all fixed-wing traffic in the division was controlled along with all convoy movement. Requests for aircraft were received, processed and passed on to II FFV headquarters. Allocations were then made requesting units. Requests for convoy clearances were submitted to the DTO element at LAI KHE as well as to the TCC at DI AN. Assistance was also given to the Military Police in lining up convoys departing the LAI KHE area and assisting in their control as they departed.

(d) All convoy scheduling for route 13 was done in LAI KHE. The procuring of trucks for various re-supply missions was done by the LAI KHE DTO element.

(e) Support to the division was rendered by the 48th Transportation Group. In addition to the vehicles supplied for the evacuation of refugees from BEN SUC to PHU LOI.

(2) Transportation Data:

(a) Division Transportation Office:

(1) Convoy Data:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS 18 re-supply convoys were run to LAI KHE. Included in these were 2,000 re-supply vehicles carrying approximately 14,000 tons of supply, mostly class V.

(2) Airlift Data (Logistical):

The following sorties were flown in logistical support:

1. LAI KHE: 34 sorties C 123; 16 sorties C7A
2. PHUOC VINH: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
3. QUAN LOI: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
4. MINH THANH: 2 sorties C7A
5. DU DEP: 1 sortie C7A

TOTAL SORTIES: 86 C 123
45 C7A
TOTAL: 131

(b) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

Convoys DI AN to LAI KHE:

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I s/A	CL II & IV s/A	CL III (BULK) s/A	CL III (PKG) s/A
8	8	4	4	0	0
9	9	0	0	0	0
10	22	2	5	15	0
11	24	15	2	7	0
12	24	15	2	7	0
13	12	7	2	0	1

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I s/t	CL II & IV s/t	CL III (BULK) s/t	CL III (PKG) s/t
14	3	2	1	0	0
15	3	2	1	0	0
16	27	0	5	20	2
17	2	0	2	0	0
18	8	0	0	8	0
19	2	1	1	0	0
20	12	0	1	11	0
21	5	5	0	0	1
22	10	0	0	9	1
23	6	0	2	2	1
TOTAL	153	40 s/t	26 s/t	80 s/t	7 s/t

NOTE: All vehicles carrying bulk Cl III were dispatched by the 64th QM BN

f. Communications

(1) Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF system was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to: the training classes the battalion conducted prior to the operation; and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

(2) FM Radio:

(a) Greater range was realized by the infantry battalions by having them erect 60 foot masts with multiple heads where feasible.

(b) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the infantry battalion commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The battalion R & D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AN/PRC 25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnal utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further, no additional radios are required other than what the commander has in his possession. In other words, the commander brings his own organic radios (AN/PRC 25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from an authorized dry cell battery.

(3) VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequencies as the tactical FM set and frequencies must be carefully selected.

(4) TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expidited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the OIC and NCO supervisors.

(5) The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of 120 foot AB216 Tower the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuts.

g. Personnel

(1) U.S. losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 32 KHA and 181 WHA.

(2) Enemy losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 389 VC KIA (BC), 180 VC PW, 471 CHIEU HOI, and 365 detainees.

11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. An engineer, artillery navy was innovated to seal the confluence of the SAIGON and the THI THINH Rivers at the southern tip of the Iron Triangle. The engineers used two MAT6 floats as rafts. powered by a 27 foot utility boat. A quad .50 cal and 6 ea. .30 cal machine guns were mounted on the Vessel . Two of those craft were constructed and proved very effecive at controlling river traffic and searching inlets.

b. The use of bulldozers to open jungle as a part of combat operations was initiated during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Fifty-two bulldozers took part in the operation. A dozer-infantry concept was employed with dozer teams consisting of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. The tank dozers preceded the bulldozers and cut through the jungle, exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The dozers that followed cut swaths through the jungle along the infantry route of march. The concept proved very practical and effective. 2,233 acres of jungle in the Iron Triangle were dozed away. Numerous roads and LZ's were cut throughout the area.

c. Acetylene was used for destruction of almost 10 Kilometers of tunnels. Generators were used to pump acetylene into the tunnels, where it was ignited. Acetylene was found excellent for destruction of tunnels with not more than 7 foot overburden. Later experiments using ME and acetylene together proved most successful for tunnels as deep as 15-20 feet below the surface.

d. The 19th ACR employed the XENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter. The device proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 ft or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night aerial surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

e. The 2d Bde employed flame throwers to assist in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. The flame throwers reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and produced an adverse psychological effect on the VC.

12. (U) Commander's Analysis: Operation CEDAR FALLS was long overdue. The Iron Triangle and nearby village of BEN SUC had been lucrative targets for some time. However, this was the first time sufficient forces and equipment were available to properly execute such an undertaking.

The Tiangle had been a notorious VC haven. From its confines attacks were launched on the surrounding area, and VC control over such areas was uncontested. Ralliers confirmed that the Triangle contained numerous tunnels and bunkers and huge stores of foodstuffs and equipment. Continual bombing and artillery fires certainly disrupted VC activity, but civilian occupants in the area hampered free-fire activities. Additionally, B-52 strikes and artillery bombardment could not be exploited with ground troops. There were simply no access routes, air or ground, into the heart of the Triangle. The few existing smart roads and foot trails were heavily mined and booby trapped. The 100 square kilometers of the Iron Triangle provided a secure jungle haven which no one division could seal, search and destroy.

BEN SUC, northeast of the Triangle, was VC dominated. It served as a major tax collection headquarters for the heavy traffic moving up and down the SAIGON River between DAU TIENG and SAIGON. It was also a logistical headquarters. VC supplies were brought in by road and boat and transported through BEN [illegible] to the THANH DIEM Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle. If BEN SUC was threatened by US or ARVN forces, the VC retreated into their nearby jungle base camps. . . .

We had no idea at the beginning that Operation CEDAR FALLS would turn out to be the most significant operation thus far conducted by the 1st Infantry Division. It is most significant in many respects. First of all, it was aimed at the headquarters, Military Region IV. This headquarters is responsible for operations in and around SAIGON. The headquarters directed attacks on TAN SON NHUT and on US troop billets in SAIGON itself.

Because the 25th Division started two days earlier than we did, the bulk of the personnel of Military Region IV came across the river to the north, in the operation area of the 1st Division.

Although the 1st Division killed twice as many VC in Operation EL PASO and ATTLEBORO, the number of VC who were captured and who surrendered in Operation CEDAR FALLS, when added to the killed, brings the grand total to the largest achieved in any single operation in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The US forces involved captured, mostly in tunnels and caves, the vast majority of the records and plans of Military Region IV. Over 235,000 pages of MR IV documents have been processed by MACV documents section. Some of these documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966, and their intelligence value is tremendous. These contain the strengths of VC units, the names of their members, the towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

In the course of the Operation, 7,000 refugees were resettled from the area. These refugees, who were mostly VC families, provided the labor corps and the logistic support for VC units throughout the entire area. The medical facility discovered by the 1st Battalion 28th Infantry contained medical supplies in a depot on which all the main force regiments in the III Corps area drew for their principal support.

For the first time in the history of the war in Vietnam, infantry-engineer bulldozer teams cut their way through the jungle, finding and destroying base camps, creating landing zones, pushing back the jungle from roads which can now be used for rapid repenetration of the area. One entire jungle area was completely eliminated. All in all, the engineers cut down 9 square kilometers of solid jungle. This is a technique which will be used again in the penetration of other VC war zones and base areas--a technique pioneered by the 1st Division. Everyone who worked with the engineers recognizes the tremendous contribution they made to the success of the operation.

In addition to the destruction of the base area of Military Region IV, the most significant and unexpected result was the surrender, as of 26 January, of 471 Viet Cong. This has never happened before in the war in Vietnam, and in this area at least, is a reflection of the complete breakdown in confidence and morale on the part of the VC.

Although I do not expect the war to end quickly, I believe this has been a decisive turning-point in the III Corps area; a tremendous boost to the morale of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be one of the more successful operations of the 1st Infantry Division and may be a major turning point in the III Corps Tactical Area. The operation significantly eliminated VC supply bases and staging areas. The enemy's fighting strength was reduced by over 1,000 (KIA, PW, and ralliers), and his available labor force, in the form of the six thousand inhabitants, was removed from his control. The removal of this labor force and agricultural resources has significantly reduced the Iron Triangle's value as a logistics and headquarters base. The enemy-initiated incidents decreased dramatically during the latter part of January and February. This decrease is probably due to Operation CEDAR FALLS. The use of engineer-infantry teams in jungle clearing operations was very effective. The removal of jungle growth is the only sure means of denying unobserved use of the area by VC forces.

b. Lessons Learned:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, bulldozers required refueling in as many as six locations daily. Normally, field refueling is performed by a POL team of two men with a 50 GPM pump transported in a CH-47 with bladders slung underneath. Refueling in this manner would have required two CH-47 teams all day. A more efficient method was developed during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Units accomplished their own refueling by having a dozer dig itself into a trench deeper than ground level. 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel were placed on the edge of the trench and gravity-fed into the fuel tank. The same method will be used if similar operations are conducted in the future.

Present TO&E personnel are insufficient to operate battery and battalion fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis. However, there is a continual requirement to operate both fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis since batteries are very frequently separated from the battalion by great distances and must always be prepared to operate independently. Recent investigation of artillery incidents indicated that extremely long duty hours of fire direction center personnel is a contributing factor to the incident. TO&E personnel authorizations must be increased to insure competent, accurate fire direction procedures.

LZ construction is a continual problem in jungle terrain. The D-7 chain demolition and bangalore torpedo have proved very effective against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. Positive control is increased if the demolitions are fired electrically.

The dozer team of two tank dozers and six bulldozers proved very effective during Operation CEDAR FALLS, particularly when working in a joint effort with infantry. Infantry provided security, whenever the infantry stopped, dozers cleared resupply LZ's. The dozers destroyed tunnels, fortifications and base camps as they were discovered. This technique is recommended for use in future operations. One or two APC's or a VTR should be attached to each team for maintenance support.

Quad 50's were helilifted by CH-47 into ambush positions inaccessible to track and wheel vehicles. The results were excellent. Positions were secured by infantry, and, if necessary, platforms were constructed. Due to elevation the machine guns were able to engage targets at all ranges.

The GVN has established the CHIEU HOI program to provide a means for the VC to return to government control. Due to the relatively limited assets and shortage of trained leaders available to GVN, it is essential that U.S. military units assist the GVN in making the program work. Experience shows that the following are required:

(1) VC troops must be informed so they will honor promises made.

(2) Command interest is required to obtain universal support.

(3) Division representatives must be assigned to CHIEU HOI centers to assist in the operation of the center and to keep the Division informed.

(4) Psywar efforts must support the program.

(5) Aid in job placement of defectors after release from the centers is necessary.

Defectors have a detailed knowledge of VC methods and beliefs. Knowing how the VC think, they are able to prepare excellent propaganda material. As a living example of the benefits of defecting, they are the best face-to-face salesmen for the GVN program. They are also an excellent intelligence source.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS it became apparent that VC combat units move regularly and do not have time to dig tunnels. They rely on foxholes, trenches and bunkers for protection. Tunnels are dug and inhabited by relatively permanent VC elements. Therefore, although most prisoners can frequently reveal the general location of tunnels, efforts to precisely locate tunnels should be focused on local cadre and rear service personnel.

The 7,000 refugees resettled during Operation CEDAR FALLS caused major problems in transportation, site clearing, shelter erection, provision of water and food and caring for livestock. The military has the necessary assets to take care of massive initial problems encountered. Experience has shown that the GVN assisted by the Office of Civilian Operations can assume full responsibility for refugees after a camp is established. Military units must plan to handle the initial phase of any sizable refugee relocation.

182

Experience has shown the value of the pictorial supplement and the use of low oblique photographs by the 1st Aviation Battalion. The battalion briefs all flight leaders prior to any mission with these graphic aids. Therefore, the actual reconnaissance can be accomplished in one pass over the objective area, thus minimizing the probability of the reconnaissance flights giving away an impending operation. The flight leaders in turn by use of the photographs are able, to better brief their separate flights giving each member of the flight a vivid tool in picking out the assigned LZ.

In the event of low level air assaults on an objective, it is mandatory that each flight leader is able to positively identify his assigned LZ, i.e., "LZ 1 will be marked with yellow smoke, LZ 2 with green smoke, etc".

To keep to a minimum time spent on the ground by gunships, re-arming points must be planned far with sufficient personnel to prepare the ammunition and assist the crews in re-arming the aircraft. Rearming points and refueling points should be in close proximity to each other. This insures the objective area with continuous coverage during the initial stages of the air assault.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. J. HITCOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ENCLOSURE:

~~1 — Division Commanders~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
~~2 — Operation Overlays~~ See fold-outs
C — 2d Bde After Action Report
D — 3d Bde After Action Report
~~E — 11th Avn Bn Combined Report~~ Distributed separately.
F — Division Artillery After Action Report
G — 1Plat Sig Bn After Action Report
~~H — 17th Med Bn After Action Report~~ (Distributed Separately)
~~I — Psy Ops Materials~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

183

AVIB-CO 14 February 1967

Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS/ACS/J3/32

Thru: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVIB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

To: Commanding General
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO U.S. Forces 92243

1. (U) Name and Type of Operation: Operation CEDAR FALLS: an airmobile assault to seal and search the village of BEN SUC, the preparation for and the evacuation of the inhabitants of BEN SUC in conjunction and cooperation with IVSD and GVN, and search and destroy operations in area.

2. (U) Dates of Operation: 080725H Jan 1967 to 171700H Jan 1967.

3. (C) CONCEPT: Operation CEDAR FALLS was initiated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Plan 30-66 dated 301200H December 1966. The Bde T.C CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AN at 070650H by road to BIEN HOA airfield then airlifted to DAU TIENG (XT495474) closing at 0855H in preparation for Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 2/16 and 1/18 Inf continued operations FAIRFAX and LAI KHE respectively and became OPCON 1st Bde at 070700H Jan 1967. The 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VINH at 070945H closing DAU TIENG at 1105H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) was attached to 1/7 Arty (-). 1/7 (-) was airlifted by CH-47 at 0605H closing Arty Base IV at 1126H. The operation commenced at 080725H with the conduct of an airmobile assault by the 1/26 Inf (+) to seal the village of BEN SUC. The next two days the Bde prepared for and commenced the evacuation of the inhabitants of BEN SUC combined with a thorough search of the village. S&D operations were also conducted to the N of the village. 2/18 Inf remained RON until becoming OPCON 3d Bde at 100730H. 2/28 Inf became OPCON 2d Bde at 110800H conducting S&D operations to NE of BEN SUC. Bde received 1st Div Frag O 1-67 dated 071850H Jan and prepared for and executed the following missions: 1. Be prepared to assist in the opening of the road from BEN SUC to BEN CAT; 2. On order provide one rifle company to reinforce and escort TF Brown; 3. Be prepared for OPCON ARVN 4DN Task Force; 4. After arrival ARVN 4BN TF,1/26 Inf in BEN SUC in readiness for employment as Div reserve (1 hour alert); 5. Secure R&G Route via BEN SUC. The evacuation of all inhabitants with personal belongings, the destruction of BEN SUC and S&D ops in area continued until the completion of the operation on 17 Jan 1967.

4. Reporting Officer: Colonel James H. Grimsley, Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

b. Task Organization:

(1) 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry: Lt Col [illegible]

(2) 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry: Lt Col Elmer D. Pendelton

(3) 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry: Lt Col L. R. Bowman

(4) Co B, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry: Captain Edward L C[illegible]

(5) HHC, 2d Brigade, 1st Inf Div: Captain Sherwood Goldberg

(6) 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery: Lt Col George L. McFadden

(7) Division Tunnel Team: Lt Charles Barber, Tm Leader

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

ANNEX C
TO
Incl 2

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4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operations: All intelligence concerning the operation was received from the Division G-2. Units and organizations that were reported to be in the area were the 7th Bn, 165A Regiment, C61 Local Force Company, the headquarters and security elements of Military Region 4 Committee, the BINH DUONG Province Committee, and local guerrillas in and around BEN SUC (XT587335). General locations were known but none of the units were reported in the Brigade Area of Operations. There was no estimate of the strength of these units.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: There was no contact made with an organized unit following the insertion of the Brigade in the operational area. Contact was made on a daily basis with small groups of VC in and around BEN SUC. These were apparently VC elements guarding caches and local guerrillas.

Following the seal of BEN SUC on 8 January 1967, 106 individuals were detained. Of these twenty-eight were classified as Viet Cong. Most of these were local VC who were of little intelligence value and had virtually no information. On 12 Jan the Platoon leader of B2 Platoon C139 Group 83 was captured. This platoon transported rice in the area of and BEN SUC. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicated that this area was designated Base Zone C by the VC and Rear Service Unit Group 83 was the major unit normally stationed in the area.

c. Terrain and Weather: Weather was excellent during the operation. Days were clear and relatively cool. There was no precipitation of any. Terrain in the operational area was flat along the SAIGON River with dried rice paddies extending inland 500 to 1,000 meters. Observation and fields of fire were excellent in this area. Cover and concealment were provided by the dikes between rice fields. To the north of the SAIGON River vegetation consisted of old rubber plantations and dense jungle. Concealment in the jungle was excellent, however, fields of fire were restricted. The SONG SAIGON could be crossed by boat. The RUY HO Stream via XT602341 could be forded by truck vehicles and foot troops. A ford or bridge would have to be constructed for tracked vehicles.

d. Fortifications: Two base camps were located (see Annex 1 and 2). Also one fortified village was located via XT5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. The town was still occupied. Approximately 335 bunkers were located and destroyed, the majority of which were used for protection from airstrikes and artillery. Major means of destruction used to destroy these fortifications was to still in air-strikes and artillery following the evacuation of the area.

One major tunnel complex was found in the town of BEN SUC (see Annex 3). Tunnel rats were used to explore and destroy this complex.

The major discovery made by the Brigade was the location of 618 tons of rice. Caches were located along the RUY HO Stream from XT602345 to XT603360. The rice was stored on platforms with tin roofs over them and the four walls open. Fifty tons of rice was found in the village of BEN SUC. Following the evacuation of the inhabitants of BEN SUC, bulldozers started destruction and uncovered underground caches. These were found lined with woven matting, one to two feet below the surface and filled with loose rice (See Annex 4 for installations and caches located on Operation CEDAR FALLS).

e. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare Operations:

(1) Civic Action: Medical Civic Action programs during the operation were limited to one which was held on the first day of the operation in the village of BEN SUC by the 2ND MEDCAP team. A total of 337 personnel were screened, examined, and treated. TWO personnel also served a meal to 3,612 personnel on the same day. The civic action/civil affairs functions performed during the remainder of the operation were confined to evacuation of the populace and their belongings to include oxen/cattle and rice, bagging of rice found in numerous caches under houses, and destruction of houses, fruit trees, and rice which could not be evacuated. All of these activities were undertaken jointly by 2ND MED and 2d Bde S-5 section. Amounts of personnel, animals and material evacuated were as follows:

195

	BOLT			CH-47			
Date	Personnel	Rice	Oxen/Cattle	Personnel	Rice	Carts	Pigs
11 Jan	872	unk	11	315	none	None	19
12 Jan	555	unk	113	398	98,000#	70	8
13 Jan	308	unk	232	195	149,000#	45	none
14 Jan	181	140,000#	76	none	none	5	none
15 Jan	No lift this date			No lift this date			
16 Jan	0	140,000		No lift this date			
Sub Totals	1,916	280,000#	432	899	247,000#	120	27
Totals	2,815	527,000#	432	899		120	27

In addition to the amounts of rice indicated above, each family which was evacuated took a small amount of rice along. No figures are available as to how much rice was taken on board boats during the first three days of the evacuation, but estimates of more than fifty (50) tons have been made.

When first informed of the evacuation, the populace became extremely concerned, and while not openly hostile, were definitely unfriendly. Once the Province Chief, Col Ly Tony Ba, had spoken to the citizens, and had informed them that the evacuation would take place, and that no alternatives would be entertained, all personnel seemed to accept the fact, and seemed eager to leave. It is interesting to note that in not one case did the citizens make any attempt whatsoever to take with them the rice which was later found in caches underground. In all instances these caches were left undisturbed by the inhabitants of the houses and were discovered by demolitions or bulldozer operators during the destruction phase. Masonry houses were destroyed by bulldozer operations, thatch houses were destroyed largely by fire. Fruit trees were cut down by personnel, or uprooted by bulldozers. These rice caches which could not be salvaged or barged for evacuation due to time limitations were soaked with diesel fuel and left in place. In some cases, rice was dumped down wells or burned inside houses.

(2) Psychological Operations: Because of the nature of this mission, Psy War activities by [illegible] section were limited to the first day of the operation. During the conduct of operations on 8 January, three missions were flown for a total of seven hours loudspeaker broadcast time. The first mission was conducted over the village of [illegible] SUC during the cordon to inform the villagers that the village was surrounded by Allied Forces, that they should remain in their houses and wait for instructions, and that they would not be harmed. The second mission was flown to inform the populace of the evacuation, and instruct them to gather in the center of the village at the school house. The third mission was flown along the highway to the East of BEN SUC, informing all personnel there that the area was to be evacuated, and that they were to gather all their possessions and move to the school house in BEN SUC.

These missions were highly successful in that all instructions given were followed by the populace rapidly and to the letter. No incidents occurred in which the explanation that "I did not understand" was given. Rules of engagement were plain, and were understood. Personnel from outside the immediate environs of the village followed instructions and came into BEN SUC within a very short time.

(a) Conclusions:

1. That messages used were timely, well-phrased and easily understood.

2. That the use of Psy Ops aircraft materially assisted in the success of the cordon and search, and in the subsequent search and in the subsequent evacuation of the community.

(b) Recommendations:

1. That Psy Ops missions continue to be used in such future operations.

2. That commanders at all levels urgedne plans for future operations to determine the advisability of including Psy Ops activities.

186

Annex 1 to Par 4 (Intelligence) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base camp located at XT376347.

a. The base camp was discovered by C 1/26 Inf on 12 Jan 67 and was reentered 131320H with demolition teams and tunnel rats to explore then destroy the complex. Only one (#4) bunker of the four was damaged by indirect fire and air strikes both of which were very extensive. The base camp had one well-used trail entering from the west and the thick natural undergrowth was such that the camp could not be seen from the air.

b. Building #1 was approximately 9' wide by 18' long and 10' below the surface of the ground. The building had cement on all four sides and flooring about 5" thick. The only overhead protection was afforded by sheets of tin. On the NW corner was a bunker with no overhead protection. Beds and tables were on the floor.

Building #2 was approximately 9' wide by 12' long and 10' below the surface. It had concrete identical to Building #1. Overhead cover over one-half of the structure are consisted of 5" logs and 3' packed dirt. There were no fighting positions located near the building and beds were located on the 1st floor and on top of the overhead protection. Buildings #3 and #4 were exactly identical to building #2.


c. Bunker #5 located north of the camp and connected by tunnel to building #3 had overhead protection of 5" logs and 3 feet of packed dirt. There were four firing apertures, each 2" high and 4-6" wide and each could cover an area over 100m wide to the front.

d. The second level tunnel going north was made so that at every 10-15m it came to a dead end; and a trap door on the floor connected with a tunnel which went down-around and back up to the other side and on the same level with the fake dead end. There were two small holes in the dead end permitting one man to observe and fire through the tunnel.


e. It is estimated that the four bunkers/buildings are 100% destroyed and the tunnel system 75% destroyed connecting the buildings. It is thought that this complex possibly could have been a safe haven for high ranking VC passing through. (See Appendix 1 for Diagram).

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Annex 3 to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS



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5
1.5-BUNKER
15M
30M
40M
8
10M
1
20K
4


187

Annex 2 to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base Camp located at XT566370.

a. West Camp: The four buildings were all 10' x 10'. Building #1 was only 4' below surface and was used only for sleeping apparently. Buildings 2 & 3 were 7' below surface and had overhead cover of about 1 foot of dirt and 1 foot of logs. The kitchen was above ground and had a tin roof above it. Building #2 had a large amount of photographic material and is assumed to be the location where film was developed. None of the buildings were burned and the tunnels were left untouched.

b. East Camp: This camp, which might consist of more buildings than indicated, was assumed to be the headquarters of a propaganda unit (LDY 864/3865A). The buildings were very large, 12' x 35' and 6-7' below the surface. All buildings had overhead cover consisting of one foot of log and 1 foot of dirt. In building #4 there were three large tables and at least 10 lbs of loose paper, the type used to make small envelopes and letters. Due to the limited time the area was not searched properly. The buildings were burned to the ground (See Appendix 2 - Diagram).


WESTCAMP
EASTCAMP
N

A1

Annex A to Par 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Hard installations and caches found on Operation CEDAR FALLS:

XT585334 - tunnel
XT588333 - tunnel
XT610367 - bunkers - airstrike
XT558359 - bunkers - airstrike
XT560362 - foxholes - airstrike
XT613345 - foxholes & trenches
XT598335 - base camp
XT576332 - tunnel
XT585242 - tunnel
XT577327 - tunnel
XT587336 - tunnel (destroyed)
XT589336 - tunnel
XT579313 - bunker (destroyed)
XT579342 - bunker (destroyed)
XT579312 - bunker (destroyed)
XT584337 - tunnel
XT582345 - tunnel
XT566341 - bunker (destroyed)
XT567333 - tunnel
XT559363 - base camp
XT605349 - AW position
XT561384-572309 - trenches & tunnels
XT575397 - possible base camp
XT575335 - tunnel
XT581336 - tunnel
XT583353 - tunnel
XT584339 - tunnel
XT559363 - bunkers
XT569343 - bunkers
XT566357 - trench
XT559363 - bunkers
XT605364 - bunker
XT601363 - base camp
XT541378 - bunkers
XT566357 - trench
XT565364 - 3 bunkers (destroyed)
XT585305 - foxholes
XT585334 - tunnel
XT577334 - tunnel
XT576347 - base camp 3 huts/bern
XT576347 - 3 concrete bunkers; 3-4 story tunnel
XT555365 - bunkers, trench partially destroyed
XT552362 - 1 bunker (destroyed)
XT576347 - 2 bunkers (destroyed)
XT558413 - 8 bunkers (destroyed)
XT582361 - 6 bunkers (destroyed)
XT585347 - 4 bunkers (destroyed)
XT600352 - 1 large concrete tunnel
XT552367 - 10 bunkers
XT583332 - tunnel
XT626427 - base camp
XT647403 - base camp
XT566368 - base camp, 7 huts
XT557364 - tunnel

XT596346 - tunnel complex
XT603348 - 3 foxholes
XT550368 - 1 concrete bunker (destroyed
XT599345 - 2 bunkers
XT550360 - 5 bunkers (destroyed)
XT562336 - bunkers & tunnels
XT566365 - tunnel
XT595348 - base camp, 9 huts
XT582337 - foxholes
XT584313 - tunnel
XT566370 - base camp (photo equipment)
XT570355 - 3 bunkers
XT551366 - 3 huts, 40 bunkers
XT599347 - base camp (9 huts, 3 bunkers)
XT596335 - rice cache
XT597335 - rice cache
XT593345 - rice cache
XT569350 - ammo cache
XT581312 - rice & medicine
XT574324 - rice
XT589314 - medicine
XT582316 - rice
XT577338 - ammo (mines)
XT569336 - medicine
XT580314 - rice
XT564311 - rice
XT577331 - ammo (mines)
XT582345 - arms & ammo
XT562354 - rice and bike parts
XT572326 - rice
XT605364 - ammo
XT604361 - rice
XT601362 - ammo
XT604364 - ammo
XT601362 - rice
XT599359 - rice
XT598359 - rice
XT601379 - weapons and uniforms
XT603366 - rice
XT601371 - ammo
XT597356 - rice
XT600366 - rice
XT594356 - rice
XT594346 - rice
XT574347 - ammo
XT594361 - rice
XT590373 - rice
XT594313 - ammo
XT563332 - weapons, ammo, & uniforms
XT592355 - rice
XT596367 - rice
XT582334 - rice
XT567355 - rice
XT568354 - rice
XT596359 - rice
XT594346 - weapons & ammo

192

5. (C) MISSION: H-Hour, D-Day 2d Bde conducts airmobile assault from DAU TIENG (DETROIT) to seal and search village of BAU SUC (BALTIMORE); prepares to evacuate village inhabitants on D+1; conducts S&D operation in area; clears and secures Arty Base II vic BALTIMORE; in conjunction with US ARVN and GVN Forces, prepares to commence evacuation of inhabitants of BALTIMORE by RVN boats on D+1; and prepares to detach one battalion to 3d Bde on order on or after D+1.

6. (C) EXECUTION:

Chronology:

7 Jan 67 (Prepositioning of Forces) - The Bde TAC CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AN at 0654H by road to DIAN HOA airfield then airlifted to DAU TIENG (XT495474) closing at 0655H in preparation for Opn CEDAR FALLS. 2/16 Inf and 1/18 Inf were detached at 0700H and placed OPCON 1st Bde. 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VINH at 0945H closing DAU TIENG at 1109H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. 1/7 Arty with Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) attached moved by road and CH-47 closing Arty Base IV (XT527278) at 1426H.

8 Jan 67 - 2d Bde initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS remaining at DETROIT as Bde RAF. Co A was attached to 1/26 Inf. At 080725H 1/26 Inf (+) conducted simultaneous air assaults into multiple LZ's and sealed the northern sector of the village of BAU SUC. Sixty helicopters touched down and off-loaded the 1/26 Inf within 45 seconds. Elements of 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations north and west of the village with A 2/18 Inf attached. At 0805H vic XT562339 C 1/26 Inf apprehended 8 detainees. B 1/26 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT576331 at 0815H. C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 booby traps at 0830H vic XT562357. At 0835H vic LZ CHARLIE, A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee on bicycle. At 0830H A 2/18 touched down at LZ HOTEL and received sporadic small arms fire from the west with neg casualties. At 0856H B 1/26 received SA sniper fire vic XT576332 and returned fire killing 1 VC. At 0858H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 5 VC mines at XT583340. At 0900H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 booby traps vic west end of LZ BALTIMORE. D 1/26 captured 3 wounded VC detainees vic XT576331 at 0903H. At 0907H vic XT584330 A 2/18 searched a series of huts and apprehended 17 detainees who were evacuated to HELPER. At 0910H A 1/26 apprehended 2 detainees vic XT576338. At 0925H A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 15 detainees. At 0930H 1/26 killed 8 VC in coordination with BLUEGILL 78 who engaged by helicopter, VC flushed into the Saigon River. At 0927H A 1/26 moved to search area vic XT569331 where several VC had been observed in bunkers. At 0945H vic XT576330 A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 4 detainees. At 1020H A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee across the river vic XT569330. At 1025H A 2/18 vic XT564330 evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1025H C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 mine vic XT583357. At 1053H vic XT574338 D 1/26 located and destroyed 12 sampans. At 1056H vic XT578340 C 1/26 located and destroyed 8 VC mines. Elements of C 1/26 observed 6 VC with weapons and immediately engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1057H Recon 1/26 was alerted for S&D mission where VC were observed vic XT569313. A 1/26 found a VC body vic XT589331 at 1113H. At 1115H vic XT583339, Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 8 booby traps. At 1124H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 VC mines vic XT578340. Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans vic XT582317. At 1140H A 2/18 found VC bag with documents, wallet and ID card vic XT589333. At 1151H vic XT576340 A 1/26 received small arms fire; fire was returned by mortars and artillery with unknown results. At 1314H vic XT581316 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 sampan. D 1/26 captured 1 VC with weapon vic XT576331 at 1315H, VC was evacuated for interrogation. Vic XT585341, A 1/26 captured 3 VC attempting to escape across river at 1326H. B 1/26 found 1 AK rifle vic XT576332 at 1335 H. At 1340H vic XT576332 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3,400 lbs of rice. In addition Recon 1/26 found at XT581315 2 sampans containing 6,815 uniforms, 2 rolls of assorted color cloth, 6 bags nylon cord, and 7 bags of nylon netting. Sampans were destroyed and other items evacuated. At 1426H A 1/26 requested evacuation of 1 detainee, 2 VC KIA, 2 VCC, and 1 VC WIA from vic XT585340. At 1429H vic XT574333 D 1/26 located and destroyed 14 sampans and 200 lbs rice. At 1[illegible] vic XT586342 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm rd. At 1543H Recon 1/26 located a bunker containing 3 waterproof packs containing misc clothing, documents, diary, and several rds of Russian 7.62 ammo. At 1620H Recon 1/26 was airlifted to Base II to secure Arty Base adjacent to LZ HOTEL. A 1/26 vic XT589332 found 4 small sampans and 3 large sampans with cabins and outboard motors. The sampans were destroyed and not re evacuated at 1630H. At 1651H vic XT586342 C 1/26 blew a bunker which yielded 1 VC claymore and several RA 30 batteries. At 1733H vic Base II, Recon 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1800H 1/26 assumed night defensive posture. At 1835H vic XT568333, A 1/26 located 2 VC KIA in tunnel

which A 1/26 had contaminated earlier with CS gas. At 1855H vic XT586242, C 1/26 located and destroyed 4 VC mines. B 1/26 received small arms, M-79 and 50 caliber fire from vic XT573342 at 1659H and fire was countered with mortars, artillery and M-79 with unknown results. At 1905H vic XT565342 C 1/26 received ineffective carbine fire from vic XT571342, fire was not returned. C 1/26 at 1920H received 4 mortar rds from the north vic XT535345, counter mortar fire was placed in the area, there were neg friendly casualties. At 1930H vic XT565342 C 1/26 discovered and evacuated pack with wallet containing pictures and documents. At 1930H a flare ship was called on station for continuous illumination throughout the night. At 2006H vic XT590340 A 1/26 engaged 3 VC moving toward their position, capturing 1 female VC with pack and 1 VC male. At 2008H 2/18 Inf engaged and killed one VC that set off trip flare vic XT584327. At 2012H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties vic XT590341. At 2025H vic XT564326 A 2/18 killed 1 VC with weapon and web gear. At 2045H vic XT581331 Recon 1/26 was fired on by 6 VC and fire was returned with unk results. At 2150H vic XT572333 A 1/26 received AW fire and carbine fire. At the same time vic XT577326 A 2/18 received SA fire. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on suspected area. At 2152H vic XT 584339 C 1/26 received several hand grenades and immediately engaged suspected location with M-79 and mortar fire. At 2157H A 2/18 received AW fire from vic XT575325. The area was illuminated and artillery fires called in. At 2236H vic XT564340 C 1/26 received one hand grenade. The night passed without further contact. D Trp 1/4 Cav conducted Eagle Flights in S portion of BdlDMNTS. At 0646H, Trp reported circular trenches vic XT605350. No fire was received and artillery was called in the area. At 0630H Trp engaged 1 VC fleeing on a bicycle vic XT559391 resulting in 1 VC KIA. (BC). At 1055H vic XT573324, a rice cache was located and at 1059H vic XT581313 another rice cache was located. Three VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. (BC) and 4 weapons captured. Area was exploited by Recon 1/26 Inf in the afternoon. At 1150H another rice cache was located vic XT574324. Trp was released to CO, 2d Bde at 1200H. A 2/2 Inf (Mech) remained at Arty Base IV. The 3d Bde C&C CP airlifted from BENTWIT closing BALTIMORE at 1030H. TFHD with 3/8 AHV began search of BALTIMORE at 0945H. At 1240H search forces located a tunnel vic XT565334 containing 6 VC resulting 3 VC KIA (BC) and 5 VC PW's (3 of which were wounded). A search of the village result ed in 106 detainees being evacuated to CHU CHI and 16 to LAI KHE. S-5 Psy Ops ship broadcasting over BALTIMORE engaged 3 VC vic XT663255 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). Airstrikes vic XT610317 resulted in 2 VC KIA and extensive bunker destruction.

9 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) continued Ops CEDAR FALLS remaining at BENTWIT as Div RRF. At 1340H the TM was placed OPCON 3d Bde and reverted to Div 2d Bde at 1630H. The Bn HQ'd vic BALTIMORE (XT595343). Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) continued to secure Arty Base IV until 1305H at which time it moved by road to LAI KHE at 1715H reverting OPCON 3d Bde. 1/25 Inf with A 2/18 Inf attached continued mission of sealing JER SUC, conducting S&D operations in AO's CHUCK, DON, and DICK; provided security for Arty Base II and conducted S&D operations vic LZ DAVID. At 0950H vic XT585328 A 2/18 engaged 5 VC vic XT569329 with unknown results. At 0950H vic XT583320 A 2/18 engaged sampan on river with 2 VC aboard resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 sampan destroyed. At 0705H A 2/18 vic XT584327 reported 1 carbine, 4 VC bodies, and 1 wounded VC female with carbine. At 0737H A 2/18 reported 1 VC KIA vic XT583327. Recon 1/26 reported 1 VC KIA with pistol belt and ammo pouch vic XT582334 at 0757H. At 0822H element of D 1/26 received SA and M-79 fire vic XT573335. The sniper was engaged with M-79 and mortar fire with unk results. At 0840H A 2/18 captured one VC with transistor radio hiding in water hole vic XT586328. At 0852H vic XT585323, A 2/18 located and destroyed 1 hut and 2 sampans. At 0924H C 1/26 vic XT579341 located and destroyed 2 VC mines. At 0930H vic XT592327, A 1/26 engaged with grenades, 1 VC in a sampan. The VC were in the river and the sampan was captured together with 6 uniforms, personal books and assorted dishes. At 0938H 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT581344. The VC had a carbine, 25 rds of ammo, cards and a triangular type flag. At 0948H A 2/18 located and destroyed 2 sampans vic XT586329/ At 1000H vic XT577330, D 1/26 located and destroyed 10 mines. At 1017H vic XT573339 B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 sampans. At 1020H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 [illegible] 1 bunker, 1 container oil, 1 bag of bicycle parts, and 1 pack of rice vic XT579343. At 1028H C 1/26 located a bunker vic XT579342. At 1035H vic XT579341, C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 butterfly bombs. At 1105H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,300 lbs rice vic XT572339. At 1117H D 1/26 apprehended 1 individual hiding under straw vic XT591337, they also discovered 1 VC pack, 1 protective mask, 1 mosquito net, 1 uniform, and several documents.

At 1115H vic XT578342 B 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans, 16 mines, and 3 CBU bomblets. At 1224H vic XT583339 C 1/26 located extensive tunnel system. Tunnel rats were requested to search tunnel complex. The search yielded a large amount of NVN currency and documents, 5 mauser rifles; 459 rds 30 caliber ammo, 50 rds mauser ammo, 1 mine, 1 bomb fuse, 200 rds 7.62 ammo, and 8 rifle bolts (for mausers). All items were evacuated. At 1314H vic XT591313 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of rice. At 1342H vic XT593338 A 1/26 located 2 homemade mines, 3 sampans, several 50 caliber rds, large carbide lamp and fishing equipment. Mines and ammo were destroyed, other items evacuated. At 1340H B 1/26 located and destroyed 14 M-16 mines vic XT575340. At 1353H 1/26 vic XT574316 located and evacuated 2 bandages of comm wire, 7-3' by 75' bolts of cloth and 6-100 lb bags of white paper. At 1452H vic XT586342 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 15 small sampans. At 1509H Recon 1/26 closed Base II and assumed A 2/18 area of responsibility. A 2/18 was detached from 1/26 effective 1600H. At 1610H vic XT590241 A 1/26 had a claymore detonated against an OP with 2 friendly WIA, and 1 friendly KIA. Blocking fires were called in and WIA's and KIA evacuated. 1/26 closed nighttime positions by 1800H. At 1846H vic XT586341 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker position. At 2000H vic XT576339 a claymore was detonated against B 1/26 with neg friendly casualties. The area was placed under surveillance with a starlight scope. At 2010H vic XT577339 C 1/26 observed 1 VC and engaged with hand grenades with unk results. At 2041H vic XT587343, LP of A 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with claymores, mortar fire was placed in the suspected area with results unknown. At 2046H A VC were observed near the same location through starlight scope and the VC were again engaged with claymores and mortar fire with unk results. At 2047H vic XT578344 C 1/26 detected an undertimed number of VC and engaged them with artillery with unk results. At 2116H vic XT578342 C 1/26 detected undetermined number of VC moving toward his location, artillery was placed on the area and movement ceased. At XT575335 B 1/26 engaged and destroyed a sampan with M-79 at 2153H. At 2156H C 1/26 had light probe by VC and engaged with SA fire vic XT578344. Movement ceased. At 2346H vic XT574333 undetermined number of VC were detected between B 1/26 line and an LP. VC were engaged with hand grenades with unk results. TF40 continued to search villages of [illegible] and coordinate Population Contr l Center. At 0410H 2 [illegible] were apprehended vic XT579335. At 1010H vic XT593336 search forces located 9-5 gal drums of medical supplies and documents. Two VC with hand grenades were apprehended at 1010H vic XT578335; 200 lbs of rice was also located. At 1055H vic XT584341, 2 VC IO's were apprehended and 3 persons detained. Two were detainees were apprehended at 1240H vic XT586340. At 1125H vic XT584337, a tunnel was located containing numerous blankets, sandals and medical supplies. Two VC were apprehended in the tunnel. At 1410H vic XT 577337, another tunnel was located containing 1 French 30 cal MG. Search f rces unk contact with 1 VC at 1555H vic XT589336. VC fled and a search uncovered 1 Russian carbine. At 1710H vic XT578332 contact was made with 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C and 2 VC POW'S.

10 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Ops CEDAR FALLS. 2/16 Inf continued Ops CEDAR FALLS becoming OPCON 3d Bde at 0730H. At 1000H B 1/26 engaged a sampan with M-79 fire with unk results vic XT575335. At 0017H C 1/26 received incoming grenade from VC vic XT575333. The area was illuminated and 1 VC was observed and engaged with SA and artillery. At 0018H C 1/26 observed and engaged with artillery 3 VC moving toward their location vic XT583340 with unk results. At 0344H vic XT575335 B 1/26 observed and engaged 5-7 VC attempting to exfiltrate from village resulting in 2 VC WIA. Vic XT582339 C 1/26 received heavy mortar attack at 0410H. Counter mortar fires and artillery was initiated and enemy mortars were silenced without casualty. The enemy analysis at first light confirmed that at least 44 60mm rds and 2-82mm rds were received. At 0424H 1/26 fired defensive mortar concentrations which produced a secondary explosion in A 1/26 area vic XT580336. At 0429H A 1/26 observed 2 VC fleeing west to west and engaged with SA with unk results. At 0507H a flare ship was called on station for sustained illumination and defensive fires were increased to disrupt and prevent attack. At 0520H vic XT585342, A 1/26 observed 15-20 VC wearing camouflaged helmets and received 10-20 rds SA fire. LP was pulled back - 1/26 prepared for possible attack. At 0546H A 1/26 reported 15-20 VC to their front vic XT586342. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA (EC). At 0655H 1/26 initiated a sweep to the front of their positions. At 0745H vic XT575335 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to HOLTEN 1 detainee, who later was confirmed as VC. At 0800H vic XT577345 A 1/26 had two personnel slightly wounded by an AP mine during sweep of the area. A minesweeper team was called in to check area. At 0943H vic XT577334 B 1/26 captured and evacuated 3 VC with documents. At 0945H vic XT585342 C 1/26 located and evacuated 1 commercial transistor radio found in a hut. At 0951H vic

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XT5C6342 A 1/26 located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 pistol belt, 1 pair sandals. At 1033H vic XT573345 C 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to [illegible] 2 detainees. At 1042H vic XT574376 B 1/26 located 3 sampans filled with 25 bolts cloth, 26-20' cargo straps, 1 pack, 5,000 feet silk rope, 80 spools of thread, 2 bags of buttons, 25 rds SA ammo, 18 rifle grenades, 155 rolls waterproof cloth, 100 rolls poncho material, 400 shirts, 335 bolts nylon, 25 bundles cotton flannel. Samples of the materials were evacuated, the remainder destroyed. At 1044H vic XT[illegible]00 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 tunnel complex running northwest and southeast. At 1057H vic XT563339 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 shape charges. At 1201H vic XT567354 C 1/26 located hut containing 6,000 lbs of rice, 20 bicycle tires and 10 tires. Items were destroyed. At 1224H vic XT569352 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 large sampan. At 1304H vic XT569326, A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 24' sampan. At 1335H vic XT577326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 2,500 lbs of rice. At 1513H vic XT569326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 100 lbs rock salt and 1 mine. At 1416H vic XT564326 C 1/26 located and destroyed a tunnel complex. At 1424H vic XT590326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1-40' sampan with inboard motor; and 1-40' sampan containing 3 tons of black and blue cloth. At 1435H vic XT574323 B 1/26 engaged and wounded 1 VC who fled leaving his medical pack. At 1445H vic XT576334 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 detainee. 1/26 elements closed perimeter by 1620H and ARVN personnel arrived and tied in with A and B 1/26 by 1730H. At 1846H vic XT563341 C 1/26 received 12-60mm mortar rds with neg casualties. Mortars and artillery fired counter mortar fires on suspected locations. At 1655 gunships were also on station. At 1858H flare ships arrived on station. At 1920H a gunship vic XT574351 spotted light flashes along river and adjusted artillery on area extinguishing the lights. At 1940H a flare ship began illuminating 1/26 area. At 2025H vic XT574333 LZ of B 1/26 engaged 3 VC with M-79 fire with unk results. At 2057H vic XT575334 10 15 VC tried to break out of town, attempting to break seal in B 1/26 sector at two locations along the perimeter. The VC drove cattle ahead of them while throwing grenades and firing their weapons. They were engaged with claymores, small arms and M-79 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, 5 VCC, 3 M-79's and 1 carbine captured. The wounded and captured VC were evacuated for treatment and interrogation. Maximum illumination was called in and the area kept under surveillance. At 2134H vic XT[illegible]42 C 1/26 detonated a claymore against 3 VC with unk results. At 2140H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties. Counter mortar fires were placed on suspected areas. At 2204H C 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with mortars and artillery vic XT561343 with unk results. TFRD continued population control. Search forces at 0901H located a tunnel vic XT561336. At 1015H a detainee was apprehended in a tunnel vic XT56[illegible]. At XT[illegible]333 a boat motor and Russian carbine were located. At 1040H 100 flashlight batteries were located vic XT57[illegible]. One POW was captured at 1140H vic XT[illegible] along with a carbine, 15 magazines of ammo, 500 yds wire, sugar, clothing, documents, medicine, and batteries. Two VC were captured in a tunnel at 1515H vic XT567333 and at 1645H vic XT56[illegible] two more detainees were apprehended with documents and a 45 cal pistol.

11 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Opn CEDAR FALLS. TFRD continued population control and began evacuating refugees. 672 persons were evacuated by [illegible] boat and another 315 by CH-[illegible] (9 lifts). ARVN TF in cooperation and conjunction with 2d Bde relieved 1/26 Inf at 1224H and assumed mission of maintaining a cordon of BALTIMORE. 1/26 was relieved from the seal mission BALTIMORE by ARVN, and initiated S&D operations to the north. At 0011H vic XT59[illegible]. A 1/26 engaged and wounded 2 VC who attempted to flee from village. VC were evacuated for interrogation. At 0312H vic XT575335, B 1/26 engaged an undetermined number of VC with SA and M-79 fire with unk results. At 0714H vic XT561331 Recon 1/26 detained one VC who surrendered with a safe conduct pass in his possession. Rallier was evacuated. At 0715H vic XT575335 B 1/26 had 2 VC surrender with safe conduct passes. At 0845H B 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC who attempted to flee when challenged. At 1245H relief of 1/26 by [illegible] was completed. At 1245H A 1/26 commenced attack north in AO ALPHA. At 1250H vic XT564344 the lead elements of A 1/26 received SA fire resulting in one US slightly wounded. Artillery was immediately called in on the area. At 1330H 1/26 S-3 while airborne located a trench extending 300-500 meters north to northeast which ended underground vic XT566-357, also located were bunkers or storage areas extending 200 meters east and west. At 1430H vic XT569343 a fire team size point element of A 1/26 moved into the fringe of a heavily fortified VC area containing elaborate tunnel and trench systems. The area was heavily mined with AP mines and by by trapd. Grenades hanging from grenaderings the area, and claymores were set up to protect the perimeter of the fortified positions. As the element

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moved into the area they received heavy SA and AW fire resulting in 1 US KIA. As the element began to return fire, claymores and cos and detonated mines were detonated against them resulting in 1 US K, and 3 US WIA. Massive artillery fires were brought in to form a protective umbrella of fire to silence the VC weapons and cover the extraction of wounded US personnel. At 1443H the element was extracted and artillery began saturating the area of contact. Artillery fires were lifted and integrated into airstrikes brought in, blasting the area with 750 lb bombs, and napalm resulting in 10 VC KIA. At 1415H vic XT572345 B 1/26 located 2 suitcases containing 8 uniforms and medical supplies. At 1456H B 1/26 vic XT573356 located a trench system and booby trapped area. At 1600H units of 1/26 began movement to nightime locations. At 1600H vic XT574347 B 1/26 located a bunker system containing 250 bunkers, 32,600 lbs of rice, 23 huts, 20 lbs beans, 30 lbs salt, 30 lbs peanuts, 50 lbs flour, 1 RVN flag, documents and pictures, 24 butterfly bombs and 25 rds carbine ammo, All were destroyed. 1/26 closed nightime location vic XT573342 at 1704H. The night passed with no contact. 2/26 Inf continued to conduct combat reconnaissance patrolling vic XT6037 located several VC rice and munition caches. The battalion came under OPCON 2d Bde at 1100CH. Co A conducted combat reconnaissance patrols to the Southwest of the NDP locating several large rice caches and munition caches. At 1108HH Co A patrol located footprints of at least four personnel freshly made vic XT601361. Co A also located a freshly occupied base area containing 2,200-100 lb bags of rice (unmilled), two 12 guage shotguns, 51 rolls of new blue claymore wire (100 ft each) six packets of opium powder, 22 rolls of corrugated tin sheeting (50 lb each - 3' x 12'), seven 40 lb sets TNT, nine 20 lb blocks of TNT and misc supplies, cook ware and printed materials. At 1113CH three personnel from Co A were wounded by a booby trapped hand grenade vic XT601363. None of the casualties required medical evacuation. At 1112SCH Co A reported that during the B-52strike, air and artillery TOT, the VC moved into vic XT603363, removed old booby trapped devices previously located by elements of Co A and placed new booby trapped devices in the area. At 1113SH Co A located 1,750-100 lb bags of milled and unmilled rice, 55 rolls of aluminum sheeting, three five gallon cans of tar and 6,750 empty rice bags vic XT601362. At 1342H Co A located 500-100 lb bags of milled and unmilled rice vic XT599359. At 1350H Co A located 700-100 lb bags of unmilled rice vic XT596347. At 1535H Co A located two unmilled rice caches in bins 12' x 6' vic XT603366. The 1st Infantry Division and 2d Brigade chemical teams destroyed the rice on 12 Jan 1967. Co A also located and destroyed eight booby trapped CHICOM grenades vic XT603366 during the day. Co B conducted combat reconnaissance to the West of the NDP. At 0900H Co B located a bunker vic XT605346 containing 21-25 lb US manufactured shape charges, one claymore and 150 blasting caps and three boxes of TNT. At 1030H Co B located a VC ox cart, a small amount of penicillin and other medical supplies vic XT604350. At 1250H Co B located 5D-61mm MB mortar rds vic XT604346. All munitions were evacuated. Co C conducted combat reconnaissance to the Northwest of the NDP. At 0940H Co C located a hut vic XT606372 with fresh rice in it (recently cooked), and other indications of recent use. A thorough check of the area revealed nothing further. At 1535H Co C located an arms and uniform cache in a concrete bunker vic XT601379. The cache consisted of two sewing machines, six 7.9D bolt action rifles, 450 pr trousers, and 350 coats (dark CD) and printed materials. All items were evacuated. The uniforms were not completely sewn together The Recon platoon provided security and conducted local patrolling vic the CP. The Recon platoon located and destroyed one 55 gallon drum of US manufactured oil vic XT606370.

12 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. TMRD continued population control. 555 refugees were evacuated by LCG boats another 389 by CH-47. 1/5th Abn TF continued to maintain the local area of BEN SUC and conducted a search of the village resulting in 7 VC IDs. 1/26 conducted S&D operations in AO's IRON HAND and IRON. At 0713H A 1/26 had 1 US KIA by an AP mine vic XT573391. At 0720H C 1/26 received sniper fire vic XT597345, mortar fire was placed on the suspected area with unk results. At 0800H preplanned artillery and airstrikes saturated the operational area. Upon completion of airstrikes, artillery fires were kept on the area ahead of friendly troops. At 0950H C 1/26 began attacking north to AO 3R.VO. At 1123H B 1/26 conducted an air assault onto LZ JOE with neg contact. LZ was secured by B 1/26 and A 1/26 and TAC CP closed LZ at 1155H. At 1156H B 1/26 located bunkers and newly constructed entrenchments vic XT596351. At 1218H vic XT567317, while conducting S&D operations the 1st platoon of C 1/26 entered the fringe of a VC base camp area. Three huts were located and an element of the platoon began destruction operations. As the first hut began burning, the VC poured heavy MG, AW, and carbine fire into their midst, killing the lead soldier.

The fire was quickly returned and artillery called for. Two claymores were detonated against the small element as the rest of the platoon was maneuvered into maximum firepower to bear. Massive artillery fires began hammering away at VC targets as CO 1/26 went airborne to assist. CO 1/26 observed VC outside of bunkers in an extensive bunker and trench complex outside the base camp area, and adjusted artillery resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 10 probable VC KIA. At 1330H following an airstrike, artillery fires were adjusted to form a protective curtain of steel around the base camp area as C 1/26 moved in to search. The base camp contained an elaborate concrete bunker system containing 3 sub-levels, separated by trap doors and with tunnel systems connecting adjoining bunkers. The perimeter of the base camp area was protected by an elaborate wire system, extensive booby traps, a protective shield of claymores and a VC force with machineguns and automatic weapons. Search of the area revealed 10 VC bodies and 5 fresh blood trails. Examination of the bunker system revealed that because of the massive construction they could not be blown with explosives on hand. At 1430H as search teams began exploring the bunkers, one US personnel was wounded by SA fire when he entered the trap door entrance to the third level of the system. CS and fragmentation grenades were thrown into the tunnel with unk results. Results of the search included documents, containing 1966 letter box numbers, 1 carbine, and 1 AK 47 magazine, All of which was evacuated. The following items were destroyed: 3-14" claymores, 50 hand grenades, 28 butterfly bombs, 32-M79 rds, 4 sets of black pajamas, and 8 booby trapped 105mm rds. At 1522H C 1/26 had 1 US killed as result of a booby trap. At 1610H C 1/26 withdrew from the base camp and moved to PZ for extraction to 1/26 CP location, closing nightime position at 1715H. All units closed PHOOL location by 1715H and had occupied LP's and OP's by 1935H. At 2059H vic XT563362 B 1/26 received mortar or rifle grenade with new friendly casualties. At 2103H vic XT572366, B 1/26 received SA fire. Mortar fires were placed on suspected areas. Situation for the remainder of the night was neg. 2/28 Inf continued to conduct combat reconnaissance patrols in AO locating additional rice caches and maintaining light enemy contact. Co A entr 1 sighted four or more VC vic XT605565 at 0055H. The VC were engaged with SA fire with unk results. At 0907H Co A located a two ? day old grave containing a decayed body vic XT598357. At 0911H Co A located a hut with medical supplies and documents vic XT598364. At 1025H Co A located 1,800-100 lb bags of rice and 15 rolls of corrugated tin vic XT594396. At 1440H Co A reported that the battalion S-3 was seriously wounded in the head by a sniper vic XT603365. The battalion S-3 died at 1705H while undergoing surgery. At 1512H Co A sighted a VC vic XT598368 while searching the area of the sniper fire and engaged the VC with SA with unk results. At 1520H Co A located one freshly dug grave with a 25 year old male body killed by artillery vic XT595364. Co A and the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Team destroyed approximately 450 tons of rice which Co A located on 11 and 12 January 1967. Co B patrolled to the west of the LDP. At 0847H vic XT600371 Co B located 30 shape charges, 15-25 lb bangal torpedoes and five CHICOM claymores. Co B continued to search to the west. At 1445H Co B sighted five or more VC vic XT598368. Co B pursued the VC, trapped two in a tunnel and wounded one running through a VC base camp. The action resulted in two VC KIA (BC) and one VCC (PW). The VCC was evacuated. Co C conducted combat reconnaissance patrols to the Northwest of AO locating several old VC base areas that had not been used recently.

13 January 1967 - 2d Bde retained Operation CEDAR FALLS. T/RD continued population control and refugee evacuation. 406 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows were evacuated by R&G boat. 103 persons, 165,000 lbs of rice, and 35 ox carts were airlifted by CH-47 (20 lifts). At 0925H a R&G boat vic XT634319 apprehended a VC who was wounded. ARVN Abn TF continued its cordon of B LTDJ E and conducted S&D operations to the E of the village. At 0916H 4 detainees were apprehended in a tunnel vic XT582-332. At 0950H vic XT576336, 25 lbs of documents were located and evacuated and at 1015H vic XT566339, 30 lbs of medical supplies were located and evacuated. At 1410H, search forces located 2-50 kilo antishin mines in a tunnel vic XT564333. Another tunnel was located at 1811H vic XT583332 containing 3 rifle grenades, 100 rds SA ammo, and 5 sets of uniforms. Four VC were captured at 1900H vic XT589331. 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations in AO's Lil Ha and IRON. At 0700H artillery and airstrikes began hammering the previously located base camp. After extensive preparation, B 1/26 and C 1/26 moved out on S&D operations toward the operational area. At 1105H vic XT556362, B 1/26 located freshly dug foxholes. At 1219H vic XT573347, C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker. At 1221H vic XT575347 as C 1/26 lead elements approached the base camp area, they received ineffective SA fire. Artillery was increased and the S&D teams began moving into the bunker complex. At 1319H vic XT574347, C 1/26 located and destroyed 7 bunkers

and 7 butterfly bombs. At 1344H elements of C 1/26 secured the base camp while S&D teams began their work. At 1500H vic XT575347 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 gas mask, web gear, 10 sleeping mats, and documents in a tunnel complex. At 1602H tunnel rats completed search of the sub level bunker system and planted entering charges for destruction. At 1645H destruction of the bunker complex was completed, and C 1/26 began to move back to the CP area. At 1649H vic XT551369, CO 1/26 from an LOH observed a rice cache. The area was marked for the following days operation. At 1307H vic XT550353 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans. At 1600H 1/26 received 10-12 rds AW sniper fire. Fire was returned with M-79, SL, mortar, and artillery fire with unk results. CO 1/26 observed 3 VC vic XT570360 and adjusted artillery in with unk results. 1/26 elements closed night defensive positions by 1715H. At 1840H vic XT562362, A 1/26 received heavy AW fire from three locations to their front. An extended column of VC was observed moving through the wooded and massive artillery was called in, a light fire team was called on station and a fire ship alerted. A sweep of the area on 14 January by Recon 1/26 indicated that the VC force suffered heavy casualties. Six battered bicycles were found in a 105mm crater indicating a direct hit. Remnants of clothing hung from trees and littered the area. Numerous blood trails were found and paths where personnel had been dragged from the area were observed. There were 12 VC KIA and evidence of at least 20 VC WIA. At 2032H vic XT561354 a force of 4 VC moved north along a road leading from the river and was ambushed by 3 1/26 from the rear. The ambush revealed its position and engaged the VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The VC had no weapons, but were wearing web gear with hand grenades and ammo. At 2039H AP observed 5-10 VC moving away from their position and engaged with unk results. VC flares and mortars were called in on them. An illumination command, the AP reported 3 VC hiding behind treelines and engaged with unk results. At 2205H movement was detected at several locations along the 1/26 perimeter and defensive fires were increased, airstrikes were plotted and placed on call and gunships were alerted as 1/26 prepared itself for possible attack, however, the night passed without further contact. 2/28 Inf continued to conduct S&D operations in AO locating a large amount of rice and additional evidence of the large VC logistical base in the AO. Co A conducted S&D operations in AO reporting the RDF at 0755H. At 1155H Co A located 45-5 gallon cans of tar in a small VC base area vic XT599364 which they destroyed. At 1535H Co A located an older base area in which the bunker contained medicine, documents, chalk and a 12 gauge Chester shotgun. At 1635H Co A located several boxes of clothing in Vietnamese duffel bags and assorted printed and written materials vic XT596356. At 1700H Co A patrol triggered a booby trapped device wounding three US personnel vic XT595354. Co A was also the target of two enemy claymore and SA fire, however, no one was injured. The SA fire was returned with unk results. During the medevac, turbulence from the helicopter detonated two additional booby trapped devices resulting in six additional casualties. Seven of the nine WIA were evacuated. Artillery and air was employed in the vic of the booby traps and enemy fire. This fire uncovered a concrete bunker with four separate entrances, several other bunkers and trenches and produced a secondary explosion. Co A patrolled to the South and West of the LDF. At 0935H Co B located a small enemy rest area vic XT593372 that had been recently occupied by two or more individuals who left behind a warm bowl of rice. At 0945H Co B located one 82mm mortar round and a tree with a pull wire vic XT591-372. At 0945H Co A located one booby trapped hand grenade vic XT592373, both booby trapped devices were destroyed. At 1200H Co A located one ton of loose polished rice vic XT590373 which they destroyed. At 1620H Co B located 15 tons of rice in bags vic XT593363. The rice was destroyed in place. Co C patrolled to the North and South of the defensive perimeter. Co C also secured an area vic XT594358 allowing engineers to move to cut an LZ. From 1225H to 1615H Co C located 161 tons of both polished and unpolished rice, the majority of which was in bags. Co C located 103 tons vic XT594361 and an additional 58 tons vic XT592355. Co C closed the battalion RDF at 1700H. Co C LT sighted movement of an undetermined number of individuals with weapons vic XT593356. M-79 fires were directed at the area with unknown results. The Recon platoon and Headquarter Co moved from the LDF on 12-13 January to LDF and LZ vic XT594368 without incident.

14 January 1967 - 2/ Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. TYRD continued population control and refugee evacuation. 161 persons, 63 water buffalo, 13 oxen, and 140,000 lbs of rice were evacuated by RAG boat. At 1310H vic XT602358, a R.G boat received sniper fire. Fire was returned with unk results. At 1400H TF continued its portion of CEDAR FALLS and conducted S&D operations. At 1010H, search forces made contact with 4 VC vic

XT564328 resulting in one VC KIA (DC). One detainee was apprehended at 1205H in village of BUTLAN. Another suspect was apprehended in a tunnel at 1536H vic XT562336. A Russian rifle was located at 1725H vic XT568333. At 2038H contact was made with 2 VC vic XT561336 with unk results. 1/26 Inf continued S&D operations in AO UNK, AO LIK, and AO ISH. At 0745H airstrikes and artillery began preparation of the AO's and at 0845H C 1/26 located and destroyed 5,600 lbs rice and 400 lbs peanuts vic XT567355. At 0940H vic XT567358 C 1/26 located a network of partially covered bunkers with connecting trenches. The bunkers were freshly dug and were oriented northeast running for approximately 150 meters. At 0950H vic XT553362 while sweeping south to the north, B 1/26 located freshly dug positions, and at XT553362 located and evacuated a claymore set up for firing. Evidence confirmed that the VC had prepared an ambush against 1/26 as they moved north. Sweep was continued. At 0955H one US received GSW to 3 1/26 was injured by an AP mine vic XT 552361. At 1045H vic XT552361 B 1/26 had 1 more US wounded by an AP mine. As B 1/26 continued to sweep north, their lead element found a village containing an elaborate protective complex including booby traps, mines, and reinforced concrete bunkers 2½ inches thick with concrete floors. At 1100H B 1/26 received SA fire from northwest of the village and artillery and air were called in silencing the fire. At 1415H vic XT557364 B 1/26 apprehended 2 detainees, ages 30, one having a large amount of Vietnamese currency, and evacuated them for interrogation. At 1437H B 1/26 located VC hidden in a well who was killed by grenades. At 1430H C 1/26 located buried ammo box containing claymore wire, clothing, and documents; they also located a VC briefing room with blackboard and benches. The briefing room was surrounded by bunkers and a trench system. At 1450H vic XT553358, B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 Vietnamese male who was found hiding in a tunnel in the village. At 1500H B 1/26 apprehended an additional 5 Vietnamese males who were evacuated for interrogation. B 1/26 withdrew from village and began moving back to nightime location after completing their search and closing at 1645H. At 1045H C 1/26 located a bunker system running southeast to northeast vic XT560358. The complex extended approximately 100 meters. At 1130H airstrikes and massive artillery barrage at the base camp area vic XT570370, destroying bunkers and tunnel systems and resulting in 4 VC KIA. At 1145H elements of A 1/26 vic XT565369 located 7 unoccupied huts, and observed 2 VC who fled north. A 1/26 engaged them with unk results. A search of the huts revealed documents and individual gear. At 1255H vic XT574354 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 C-U barblet canisters. At 1321H vic XT565363 B 1/26 located 20 bunkers which had been occupied the previous night. The area contained blood trails and 1 additional VC body was found. At 1605H vic XT566365 A 1/26 located 9 huts and 1 bunker which appeared to be the outpost of a larger size base camp. A search of the huts yielded 1 pistol belt, documents and 500 lbs of polished rice. All 1/26 elements closed nightime positions by 1730H. At 2212H vic XT559357 one LP using a starlight scope observed 8-12 VC to their south. At 2216H the group disappeared with 5 in view at first, 2 then C 1/26 located and 3 others remaining at the same location. Illumination and mortars were called in. The LP reported VC stumbling and staggering through the artillery as the first volley fell approximately 50 meters from them. The action resulted in 2 VC WIA. At 2320H vic XT564358 as C 1/26 detected 2 VC moving away from the ambush site. Mortars and M-79's were fired in an effort to drive them into the ambush site. The VC moved to within 75 meters of ambush site and the area was illuminated, however, contact with VC was lost. 2/28 Inf moved from its LDP of 13-14 January conducting search and destroy operations to the south. Co A and Co C preceded the movement of Co B and Headquarters Co. The battalion closed vic XT569339 at 142330H. Co A conducted search and destroy operations to the South. At 0830H Co A located two booby trapped grenades vic XT595358 and at 0850H 35 bags of unpolished rice vic XT596356. All items were destroyed. At 0915H Co A entered an unoccupied VC vic XT597357 with unk results. The patrol located and evacuated one CHICOM claymore. At 1087H Co A located 350 bags of rice in 100 lb bags vic XT599367 which they destroyed in place. At 1645H Co A located five fresh foxholes vic XT601351 with the sticks still in the holes. Co A closed the NDP without further incident. Co B conducted a short reconnaissance patrolling to the South. At 1700H Co B was engaged by five or more VC snipers who withdrew into a bunker-tunnel complex vic XT595346. The VC were engaged with small arms, grenades and flame-throwers. The VC threw several hand grenades from the bunker-tunnel complex resulting in five US WIA, who were evacuated. The action resulted in one VC KIA (DC) and one VC (POW). The action terminated at 1900H. Co B closed the NDP at 2030H. Co C conducted search and destroy patrolling to the South of the NDP locating ammunition and weapons cache in a heavily booby trapped area. At 1506H Co C located five fresh foxholes along a North-South trail vic XT595348. At 1633H Co C

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C located an ammunition and weapons cache in a heavily booby trapped area vic XT996347. The cache included eight bolt action rifles (with bolts removed) 30 "Bouncing Betty" mines, 50-20mm WP shells, 3-10" claymores, two 12 " claymores, seven 60mm and five 81mm mortar rds, 30 blasting caps, three stick fragmentation grenades, eight homemade concussion grenades, one CHICOM AT mine, three blocks of TNT, three VC rifle grenades with US rifle adapters, one M-17 (Bouncing Betty) mine, four Thompson SMG clips and one can of soy bean salad oil. All items were destroyed in place. Co C also provided route security for Co B and Headquarters elements to the NDP. The Battalion CO located three fresh graves, vic XT994340 at 1745H. None of the graves had been covered and one body was in what appeared to be a full dress uniform. The Battalion S-3 was wounded by a flying wood missile resulting from an explosion when personnel were attempting to destroy rice nearby. The Bn S-3 was evacuated.

15 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Operation CROW FIELD. TF 1 assisted ARVN units in beating rice and evacuation of ox carts by C 1-47. ARVN Bn TF continued to search the village. At 1407H A Co (+) conducted an air assault onto an LZ vic XT991312 while another Co (+) conducted a sea assault vic XT995319. At 1430H vic XT993317 contact was made with 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC R/R. The R/R had 2 hand grenades on his person. At 1445H contact was made resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and an AK 50 weapon captured vic XT993313. At 1527H in the same area, contact was made with 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and one Russian carbine and 1 Browning 45 cal pistol captured. At 0935H, 1st Pl of A 1/26 observed 3 VC through the starlight scope and artillery was called in. VC fled back into the woodline. At 0715H AP 1 of A 1/26 observed 4 VC with weapons moving from the southwest. The AP engaged with small arms and machineguns and observed 2 VC falling while one fled screaming. A sweep of the area at first light revealed blood trails and rafts where 2 bodies had been dragged from the area. At 0112H the AP reported 1 body near AP 1 location. At 0117H the AP conducted an unknown number of VC in woodline to their front and fired artillery with unk results. At 0955H B 1/26 received heavy SA fire vic XT991351, from 3-5 VC. VC were engaged with SA and mortars. At 0913H an airstrike covered the area of contact and artillery followed by gunships saturated the area. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA's, no weapons were located however, numerous blood trails were found. At 1021H the point man of the second platoon of A 1/26 was killed by AK and carbine fire vic XT997351. The platoon engaged with SA and mortars. Artillery was called in as VC fled toward a trench line. A sweep of the area was made and 2 VC KIA and 1 VC wounded were confirmed. At 1540H vic XT990359 C 1/2 located a bunker complex of 40 bunkers with connecting trenches and tunnels. Due to the late hour C 1/26 withdrew and proceeded to nighttime location closing at 1623H. At 1230H A 1/26 located what was ascertained to be a VC propaganda complex. vic XT995369. The following items were located and destroyed or evacuated: 2 huts, one with false flooring which yielded mosquito netting, misc clothing and blanket material; medical supplies, a portable darkroom, misc camera parts, 20 packs 35mm film, 7 rools movie film, 150mm camera lens, assorted documents, 2 bicycles, 25 rds assorted SA ammo, 2 booby trapped grenades, 5 large cooking pots, 5 crocks of salted fish, and 450 lbs of polished rice. Five of the huts were recently constructed and are used in assembly line fashion. At 1633H A 1/26 withdrew and moved to nighttime locations closing at 1715H. At 1305H while conducting S&D operations, 2 1/26 located and destroyed a large rice cache vic XT994368 containing 22 tons unpolished rice. Vic XT989369 B 1/26 located a base camp area B 1/26 located and destroyed 3 caches of rice totaling over 102 tons. The rice was stored in bins 30' long, 20' wide, and 10' deep. At 1640H C 1/26 began moving to nighttime positions closing at 1645H. 1/26 secured all nighttime positions by 1800H. 2/26 Inf conducted local security operations and care and maintenance of equipment and personal care and cleaning. Co A conducted one platoon size and three reinforced squad size combat reconnaissance patrols to the East of the defensive perimeter. At 0020H Co A patrol located one bunker with overhead cover and one dead male approximately 40 years of age. The man was dressed in a black uniform. The body was located at a previously swept landing site vic XT994347. Co B and Co C defended in sector vic XT969-992 and prepared for future operations. The Battalion S-3 Air received AK fire at 1420H vic XT996348 while conducting an aerial reconnaissance.

188
126

CONFIDENTIAL

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16 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Opn CEDAR FALLS. TF D continued to evacuate rice from the village of DALTIMORE. ARVN Abn TF continued to secure the village of DALTIMORE without contact. At 0540H elements of 1/26 conducted sweeps with negative contact. At 0800H 1/26 began preparation for extraction. A PZ was selected and staked out and artillery was adjusted around the PZ to form a protective curtain. Airstrikes were called in on suspected VC targets and gunships raked the area with machine-gun and rockets. At 0940H C 1/26 moved forward behind a screen of artillery to search and secure the PZ area. At 0930H C 1/26 received automatic weapons and sniper fire vic XT565655. The company engaged with fire. Porters & artillery were called in and the company continued to receive sporadic fire. At 0940H vic XT 567353 element of C 1/26 received heavy automatic weapons and sniper fire from undetermined number of VC resulting in 1 US KIA. The VC were engaged with 3A and M-79's. As artillery was shifted to the area of contact, 7 VC with weapons were observed fleeing, and artillery was called in to saturate the area. As a result the PZ was relocated 100 meters south to XT565357 to provide greater protection. By 1140H C 1/26 had withdrawn from the area of contact and formed a protective curtain around the new PZ. At 1155H as artillery fires encircles the PZ, extraction of 1/26 to Base II commenced with 1/26 closing Base II at 1223H. At 1231H 1/26 was airlifted from Base II closing LAI KHE at 1440H and coming under OPCON of 2d Bde at 1500H. 2/20 Inf conducted search and destroy operations to the Northeast of its defensive perimeter destroying enemy installations and materials. Co A defended vic XT 569339 and conducted local security patrolling to the East of the perimeter. Co A also continued to destroy the structures in TEN SUC. Co D conducted a company size search and destroy operation vic XT5934 grid square to the Northeast of the perimeter. Co D departed at 0745H locating a total of seven bunker-tunnel complexes in a VC base area vic XT599347. The bunkers had three or four tunnels each which extended into the ground. The tunnels were investigated but produced nothing of value. The bunkers had been constructed within the week. Co D located a total of three new bicycles in the vic of the base area. Co D also located a second and similar base area already heavily bombed out vic XT600349. At 1015H an aerial observer, when marking unit locations for Co D, noted a violet smoke that was not thrown by Co D elements. The Co D Commander believed the smoke to be thrown by the VC to confuse the AC. At 1100H Co D located and destroyed five tons of loose unmilled rice in a ground level rice cache vic XT599340. At 1105H Co B located the second base area containing the bunker-tunnel complex and several huts. The tunnels were investigated and found to contain a VC poncho, newspapers and bloodied bandages. The bloodied bandages were found in the same bunker-tunnel in which Co D engaged at least five VC on 14 January 1967. The blood on the bandages was one to two days old. The bandages were found vic XT595340. At 1207H Co D located five "Bouncing Betty" mines in the tunnel vic XT593340. The mines were destroyed. At 1227H Co D reported movement in the same tunnel. A check of the tunnel failed to produce anything of significance. At 1325H Co D located a small amount of medical supplies in a tunnel vic XT595352. At 1327H Co D located a burial site vic XT599350 10' x 15' with numerous bodies 3-4 feet deep. Although no bodies were uncovered in the fresh graves, the stench at the grave site indicated the presence of decaying bodies. Co D also located two freshly dug empty graves at the same location. At 1503H Co D located 500 lbs of polished rice vic XT594347 which was destroyed. Co D closed at 1530H without further incident. Co C conducted search and destroy operations W of Co D. At 0315H Co C threw a hand grenade at one or more individuals vic XT590341 who were moving outside the perimeter. A search of the area was made with no results. At 0937H Co C departed the perimeter. At 1005H Co C destroyed 200 lbs of unmilled rice vic XT596344. At 1040H Co C located a sign warning of DANGER vic XT600345. At 1240H Co C CO, conducting an aerial reconnaissance, reported receiving several rds of sniper fire from vic XT593350. Fire was not returned. At 1311H Co C located two 55 gallon drums of kerosene vic XT600345 which was destroyed. At 1505H Co C located and destroyed 300 lbs of polished rice vic XT597346 and at 1515H 2.5 tons of rice vic XT595343.

17 January 1967 - 2d Bde terminated its portion of Opn CEDAR FALLS. Bde CP and attachments sealifted from DALTIMORE at 1155H closing PHU CAM at 1640H then motor marched to LE AN Base Camp closing at 1711H. TF D airlifted from DALTIMORE at 1000H to PHU LOI. ARVN Abn TF was relieved of AO portion of DALTIMORE at 0755H by 2/20 Inf and sealifted to PHU CAM MO at 1155H. 2/20 Inf terminated its participation in Opn CEDAR FALLS closing LAI KHE at 1710H. Co A defended in sector vic TEN SUC assuming responsibility for a portion of the ARVN sector at 0001H. Co A continued to secure the area for the departure of ARVN and 2d Bde CP during the day/ Co A closed LAI KHE at 1640H. Co D defended in sector vic TEN SUC assuming responsibility for a portion of the ARVN and 2d Bde CP during the day. At 1502H Co D patrol

located one dead VC vic XT59331 in the SAIGON River. The VC was wearing black pajamas and HO CHI MINH sandals, and was killed by artillery shrapnel. Co C closed at 1750H. Co C provided security for engineer elements who linked up with 1/2 Inf. Co C continued to destroy existing structures and crops vic XT6[illegible] SUC. At 1230H Co C located 5[illegible] lbs of rice vic XT67[illegible] which was destroyed in place. Co C closed LZ KHE at 1710H.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: 1st Bn, 7th Artillery (-) and one platoon of attached 4.2" mortars were in Direct Support of the 2d Bde throughout the operation. Artillery fires were extremely effective and were credited with twenty-eight (28) VC (KC), one rice cache destroyed, one hut destroyed, and an estimated forty-five VC KIA.

MISSIONS	No Rds Expended
8 Artillery Destruction Programs	849
297 H&I	2554
1 SEAL Mission	20
140 missions in support of troops	8960
25 Preparations	9607
20 Registrations	275
33 Suspected Locations	604
6 Material Targets	515
	23,384

b. Air Force:

(1) TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The Brigade ALO and S-3 Air processed all airstrikes, requesting an average of 12.3 strikes daily of which an average [illegible] strikes were received daily. The actual effects of TAC Air was hard to gauge as troops usually did not enter all target areas to obtain Bomb Damage Assessment.

(2) Skyspots were used on known VC assembly areas and base camps. The high degree of accuracy inherent in the Skyspot bombing system made this an effective weapon providing additional fire power to infantry battalions when in night defensive positions deep within enemy held territory. Targets were engaged as close as 1,000 meters from friendly positions.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army aviation was used extensively to conduct tactical troop moves, artillery aircraft, Eagle Flights, resupply, command and control and medical evacuation and it was effectively executed.

(2) The 11th Aviation Battalion provided two pathfinders to each maneuver battalion with radios and equipment for the entire operation. This aid proved invaluable to all parties concerned.

d. (C) Results:

a. US Losses: 7 KIA, 32 WIA, 3-M16 rifles, serial numbers 177[illegible]2, 168[illegible]4, and 165[illegible]9; and one M-79 serial number 2C[illegible]2

b. VC Losses: 170 KIA (BC), 28 WIA, 169 detainees, 30 PWs, 5 ralliers, 1 AK 47 rifle, 1 French 30 cal SMG, 7 German mauser rifles, 3 Russian carbines, 2 CHICOM carbines, 6-7.98 rifles, 4 French rifles, 2 US Winchester rifles, 6 carbines, 1 Russian rifle, 2 US M-79's, 2-45 cal pistols, 2-12 gauge shotguns, 24 rifle grenades, 7 CHICOM hand grenades, 54 frag grenades, 8 homemade concussion grenades, 142 AP mines, 1 CHICOM AT mine, 2-50 Kilo anti-ship mines, 32-M79 rds, 30 claymores, 13 bangalore torpedoes, 2 booby trapped 105mm rds, 1-81mm booby trapped mortar rd, 1 booby trapped hand grenade, 81mm HE rds, 7-60mm rds, 21-50mm rds, 50-20mm WP rds, 62-12 gauge shotgun (?) 30 rds 7.68 ammo, 430 rds SA ammo, 15 mags ammo, 3 US rifle grenade adapters, 4 Thompson SMG magazines, 3 boxes TNT, 920 lbs TNT, 1 bomb fuze, 51 sampo charges, 180 blasting caps, 33 huts, 333 bunkers, 18 tunnels, 8 females, 35 sampans (4 with motors), 3 boats (1 with inboard motor), 1 boat motor, 793 tons of rice, 430 lbs of peanuts, 20 lbs beans, 30 lbs salt, 50 lbs flour, 6,824 black uniforms, 450 pr trousers, 350 coats, 230 black shirts, 40 rolls cloth, 100 rolls of poncho material, 25 bolts cotton flannel, 129 bolts nylon,

203

155 rolls water proof cloth, 130 bolts black poplin, 2 bags buttons, 5 bags thread, 12 bags nylon cloth, 7 bags mosquito nets, 1 water proof pack, 2 GS protective masks, 2 WC protective masks, 170 flashlight batteries, 12 BA 30 batteries, 51 rolls of claymore wire, blankets, sandals, 9-5 gal cans medical supplies, radio with commercial receiver, 20 bicycle tires, 1 wheel rims, 20-20' cargo straps, 20 rolls wire screen, 5,000' silk rope, 600 yds wire, mirror, 6 pkgs of opium, 37 rolls of corrugated tin, 55 rolls of sheet aluminum, 3-5 gal cans of tar, 5,750 empty bags rice, 2 sewing machines, 5 gal cans, 10 sleeping mats, deck playing cards, 2 sets web gear, punji pits, portable darkroom, camera parts, 1-.150mm lens, 20 rolls 35mm film, movie film, 5 crocks salted fish, 15-5 liter cooking pots,, female clothes, medical training circulars and manuals, 2-55 gal drums kerosene, bicycles, 1 AWW flags

9. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel Strength: The assigned strength of the Bde as of the beginning of the period was 176 Officers, 12 Warrant Officers, and 2,926 Enlisted Men. Strength of the Bde at the end of the period was 172 Officers, 12 Warrant Officers, and 2,992 Enlisted Men, as opposed to an authorized strength of 171 Officers, 15 Warrant Officers, and 2,913 Enlisted Men.

b. Replacements: The Bde received 257 personnel replacements, and lost twenty-four during this period. The status of training of replacements was excellent.

c. Military Discipline: Military discipline during the period was excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order. The 2d Platoon, 1st Military Police Company did an outstanding job in conjunction with the TMD with regards to Civilian Defense Control at the village of TAM SUC.

d. Logistics:

(1) The logistical support base for Operation CEDAR FALLS was located at LAI KHE for supply point distribution.

(2) Units supported on a continuing basis were HHC, 2d Bde and 1/26 Inf. For the first two days of the operation, support was furnished by the 2/16 Inf. All supplies were delivered to the forward elements by aircraft. 54,000 sandbags were provided TF 30 at TAM SUC.

(3) Medical support was provided by Co B, 1st Medical Bn in LAI KHE. An Aid Station was provided in the forward CP area by Co C, 1st Medical Bn.

(4) The only problems encountered was an insufficient stockage of demolitions in the forward Ammunition Supply Point to meet the desires of the attached Division Tunnel Rats. In future operations where the mission requires destruction of base camps, entrenchments, and tunnel systems, stockage level of demolitions should be sufficient to meet the requirements.

(5) The attachment of a pathfinder team from the 11th AVN Bn, especially during night resupply, provided excellent coordination between ground and aircraft personnel as well as providing needed equipment to the forward logistics team. The future use of the pathfinder teams is highly recommended to facilitate such operations.

(6) Equipment that is rotated between the forward and rear area on a continuing basis should be clearly tagged describing the requirement for care in handling, i.e., flame throwers should be in at night and be returned the next morning to facilitate their use. If the item is unserviceable, it should be tagged by the operator indicating the nature of the failure so that immediate reaction can be taken by the repair services.

(7) The supported units experienced several instances when the M-6 hand grenade did not detonate. The M-26 hand grenade is recommended as standard fragmentation grenade to be carried by the individual soldier.

10. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The employment of the flame throwers was highly effective in assisting in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. For the most part, they proved more effective than hand grenades or machine fire. The flame thrower reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and caused adverse psychological effect upon the VC.

b. The cratering charge and the shape charge (primarily M-18) were used extensively in destroying tunnels and bunkers. The battalions were supplied with the proper demolitions in the built up area with munitions being brought in by helicopter to a LZ or with a sling load.

c. Both the cratering charges and flame throwers were used in the destruction of rice.

d. The principle techniques contributing to the effectiveness of the [redacted] SOC seal included:

(1) The use of multiple landing zones which permitted the rapid deployment of assault troops to curtail exit and control key locations in and around the town.

(2) Detailed, coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander which insured complete controllability of lands and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors.

(3) Insistance by ground commanders on high intensity, short duration preparatory fires between the first and second lifts which completely disorganized defending forces in the jungle area south of the town while preserving maximum surprise. No preparatory fires beyond 3 minute gunship runs were made prior to the initial "touchdowns."

(4) Thorough and detailed planning for movement from the secure area to PZ to include the formations at PZ for both troops and aircraft (movement of troops and positioning of lifts were accomplished during the hours of darkness); rehearsals include sand table studies by all participating ground forces down to and including the individual riflemen.

(5) The massive employment of supporting fires including mortar, artillery, and air to the extent that efforts by VC forces external to the seal, to rupture the cordon were repeatedly frustrated.

(6) The allocation of adequate time (72 hours) to hold the seal and follow-up and exploit the numerous caches and tunnel complexes within and surrounding [redacted] SOC. The VC who originally sought refuge in the countless tunnels within the town became increasingly restive as the duration of the seal continued.

11. (C) Commander's Analysis: The 2d Bde's participation in Operation [redacted] was characterized by rapidity of movement, detailed and precise planning under a veil of unusual secrecy, massive and accurate fire control of both air and artillery and the employment of adequate helicopter lift capabilities. The detailed coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander and ground commanders concerning the capability of lands and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors were significant factors in the success of this operation. The outstanding performance of the Task Force for Revolutionary Development staff in the evacuation of the inhabitants of [redacted] SOC is particularly worthy of mention. As the operation progressed, it became increasingly evident that [redacted] SOC served as an important link in the Viet Cong logistical system. The total destruction of this facility will greatly hinder the efforts of the Viet Cong in the operational area for some time to come.

12. (C) Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. Conclusions: The 2d Bde participated in its most successful operations in several months. The Bde located and evacuated or destroyed a significant amount of the overall weapons, supplies and rice located on Operation [redacted]. The numerous base camps found and destroyed and the ultimate destruction of the sprawling VC logistical transfer complex of [redacted] SOC will impair VC efforts in the operational area for some time to come.

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b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The employment of multiple landing zones is a principle worthy of special consideration in airmobile seal operations. The utilization of 5-1 ship LZ's combined with adequate initial lift (6 UH-1s) permitted the simultaneous touch down of rifle elements in platoon packages throughout the seal area. This factor insured a prompt and effective seal within moments of touch down.

(2) As the operation progressed and additional battalions were committed to the operation, coordination of air and artillery became increasingly more difficult. Detailed prior planning was required to insure that preplanned airstrikes were not permitted to block essential supporting artillery fires for units adjacent to those benefitting from the airstrikes. The placement of multiple artillery bases prior to an operation can do much to alleviate this problem and provide additional flexibility.

(3) Detailed coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander is vital to the success of an airmobile operation to insure complete compatibility of loads and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors.

(4) The weapons and munitions caches the battalion elements located were stored in bunkers resembling the ant hills that are frequently found in the jungle. The bunkers had two entrances which were located within 50 to 75 meters of a trail large enough to allow an ox cart to pass. The weapons caches in the bunkers were booby trapped.

(5) The combined effect of the CS grenade, the flame thrower and the white phosphorous (WP) grenades were effective in assisting in the capture of VC located in tunnels.

(6) Fire support, delineation of boundaries and location of units must be coordinated with adjacent units, supporting indirect fire units and higher headquarters.

(7) A unit moving into a base camp area must do so with a definite plan. The plan must include a minimum force to locate the base, a security element and a force to react to an enemy in the base camp.

(8) The "clover-leafing" technique again proved invaluable in searching a densely vegetated area as proved by the weapon, munitions, rice and supply caches the battalion elements located.

(9) The VC employ various techniques in employing booby trapped devices. The rifle elements located numerous "Bounding Betty" mines in the minefields encountered. The mine was located as near as possible to the base of a bush or tree. A pull wire was well camouflaged by leaves, or was buried in the ground.

FOR THE CDR AFTER:

CHARLES F. DAMPIER IV
Major Infantry
Adjutant

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291

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND LAI KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-HB-C 10 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operations After Actions Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US FORCES 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US FORCES 96345

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS, Search and destroy.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 090800 January - 181305 January 1967 and 250700 to 262400 January 1967.

3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters - II Field Force Vietnam. 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPORD 1-67 (Operation CEDAR FALLS) dated 051530 January 1967 was used initially. The operation continued under daily operations schedules distributed by 1st Infantry Division. Operation CEDAR FALLS was conducted in the BINH DUONG Province throughout the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 3rd Brigade operated North of the IRON TRIANGLE, while elements of other II Field Force Vietnam units operated West, South, and East. The plan was to conduct cloverleaf patrolling around Battalion and Company field locations to search for and destroy VC equipment and personnel.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel SIDNEY N MARKS
b. Task Organization:

Headquarters 3rd Brigade, Colonel Sidney N Marks, CO
1/2 Infantry, LT/Col William C Simpson, CO
1/16 Infantry, Lt/Col Rufus C Lazzell, CO
1/26 Infantry, Lt/Col Jack C Whitted, CO
2/18 Infantry, Lt/Col Lewis R Beaman, CO
2/28 Infantry, Lt/Col Elmer P Pendleton, CO
1/4 Cavalry, Lt/Col Thomas W Fife, CO
2/11 Cavalry, Lt/Col Kibbey Herne, CO
2/33 Artillery, Lt/Col Charles D Daniel, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to the operation: G2 CO listed the area of operation as the site for HQ NVAF. The main objective of the operation was to destroy the NVAF infrastructure. Additionally the area was thought to be an important VC supply base and hospital area. All units thought to be in the area were listed as unidentified base caretaker elements and headquarters defense units. Indications were that base camps and supply installations would be protected by extensive well-constructed bunkers, tunnels and trenches combined with extensive use of mines and booby traps.

b. No major contact was made during the operation. The largest VC units contacted were of platoon size. The VC did not defend their base camp areas, but elected to make token resistance employing snipers, booby traps, and mines. During the conduct of the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from NVAF radios. Many others were captured while trying to

ANNEX D to INCL 3

escape through friendly lines. The VC within the area were tactically surprised by the 3rd Brigade due to diversionary operation by another friendly elements. This resulted in creating a state confusion within the VC ranks, destroying all VC cover and unity. Many important documents were captured. Significant amounts of rice, color fatigue suits, new uniforms, weapons, and ammunition components were captured. Additionally, several underground complexes were captured, intact, with large quantities of medicines, drugs, bandages, and surgical instruments. The VC river communications system was virtually destroyed in the area with the destruction of numerous VC sampans. Intelligence information contained to be received indicating that many VC were seriously hurt by the operation.

c. Terrain in the area of operations was flat to gently rolling, with dense undergrowth. Streams in the area were forded with some difficulty. The terrain did not cause any change in plans. Movement was greatly facilitated by the use of bulldozers. Weather did not affect operations. There was a period of rain each there early morning fog. Temperatures ranged as low as 60 degrees Fahrenheit during early morning hours.

d. Base camp defenses were extensive in construction. Foxholes and fighting positions were usually connected by either communication trenches. Most fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 6 inches in diameter covered with heavy oil up realistically 6 inches in thickness. The use of bulldozers in country fortifications was extremely effective. All VC base installations were located in such a manner as to be convenient to roads, trails, or water ways. G2 base installation listings proved to be very accurate.

e. All civilians encountered in the area were either VC families or VC laborers living under VC control. All of these people were evacuated and resettled under government control.

5. MISSION: 3rd Brigade executes airmobile assault from LZ1 ANE and LZ2 TIEKO into THANH LIEN Forestry Reserve; executes search and destroy operations in AO to kill or capture enemy forces and to destroy enemy installations; evacuate all inhabitants within AO.

6. Concept of Operations: 3rd Brigade executes an air assault on the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve landing four battalions in four colocated landing zones to conduct search and destroy operations in four AO's to kill or capture VC/NVA personnel, to destroy his installations and to evacuate all inhabitants from the AO.

7. EXECUTION: The Operations Order, OPORD 1-67 (Cedar Falls) was issued to the participating battalions on 5 January 1967 and 6-8 January 1967 were used for planning and preparations. The 2/33 artillery moved from LZ1 ANE to artillery base I via XT727344, on 8 January 1967.

9 January - at 0733 hrs an extensive air and artillery preparation began on LZ1 via XT613386. Operation CEDAR FALLS was initiated at 0830 hrs when 1/2 Inf touched down on LZ1. The air assault was executed with 60 helicopters and the whole battalion was on the ground in less than 5 minutes. The artillery and air shifted immediately from post preping LZ1 to preparation of LZ2 via XT660382. At 0840 1/16 Inf touched down on LZ2 and the artillery began to prepare LZ3 via XT607366. At 0910 A 1/2 received 4 rounds of small arms fire via XT633390 with negative casualties. At 0920 2/28 Inf touched on LZ3 and almost immediately began to find signs of very recent occupation on the edge of the LZ. At 0940 hrs A 2/28 Inf found an 8'x 10'x 15' tunnel with one pot of hot rice and a bunker via XT607367, B 2/28 Inf found several fresh dug foxholes and recent aircraft tracks just off LZ3, C 2/28 Inf destroyed a 30 KG (66lb) mine via XT607368, and Recon 2/28 destroyed a 55 gallon drum of diesel fuel. At 1005 hrs A 2/28 Inf located 4 chicom claymore, 18 blasting caps, 12 (Chicom) mortar rounds, 11 M26 hand grenades, and 600 rounds of 7.62 ammo via XT609367. At 1015 hrs C 2/28 Inf located a new base camp via XT610369. At 1020 hrs 1/16 Inf LCH with the Battalion CO received several rounds of sniper fire from XT644367 with negative result At 1030 hrs B 2/28 Inf discovered several pieces of uniform clothing via XT604368. At 1047 hrs A 2/28 Inf received several rounds of sniper fire from huts via XT610365, and B 2/28 Inf located 10 rolls of communication wire via XT602369. At 1050 hrs C 2/28 Inf located several huts and fighting positions via XT610368. At 1110 hrs 1/2 Inf LCH received 3 hits from ground fire via XT640377 negative casualties, but has to be evacuated. At the same time 1/16 Inf LCH was hit by 2 rounds via XT644367 and had to be evacuated. At 1115 hrs C 2/28 Inf found 70lb land grenades in barrels, AKA ammunition 2 AP mines, and a booby trapped tunnel entrance via XT610367. At 1130 hrs Recon 1/2 Inf detonated a booby trapped grenade via XT637391 resulting in 2 WIA. At 1135 hrs 1/28 Inf touched down on LZ3 via XT622343 and began to S & D the area. At 1156 A 2/28 Inf received more sniper fire via XT610365 and saw an unknown number of VC escaping south on bicycles. At 1200 hrs B 2/28 Inf captured 2 57mm recoilless rifles and 1 60mm mortar via XT600368 in a base camp. Further searching revealed 135 Russian rifle

In the same area A 2/28 Infantry located 1 ton of loose polished rice, 5 rifle grenades, and 24 VC gas masks. At 1340H C 1/2 Infantry located ½ tons of salt and 75 tons of rice, vic XT642362. The rice and salt were destroyed by the Division Chemical Section. At 1350H 2/18 Infantry became OPCON to 3rd Brigade and prepared for movement into operational area. C 1/28 Infantry found an old base camp vic XT6[illegible] consisting of bunkers and spider holes and 1 booby-trapped grenade, taken in turn. C 2/28 Infantry found and evacuated 28 rounds of 60MM mortar ammo, vic XT6[illegible]. RECON 2/28 Infantry located 70 huts, 45 bunkers, and 2 bicycles vic XT603356. At 1415H RECON 2/28 Infantry made contact with an unknown number of VC vic XT604356, when the VC detonated a claymore mine on the patrol. The incident resulted in 1 US KIA, 1 VC KIA, and 1 carbine captured. At 1513H the 3rd Brigade set up a forward command post for communications at BEN SUC vic XT5833. At 1630H, as the first lift of 2/18 Infantry was going into an LZ vic XT614337, two claymores were detonated on the LZ. The 2/18 Infantry then went into an LZ vic XT611332 with negative contact, while artillery and air were called into the hot LZ. At 1655H B 1/2 Infantry made contact with 2 VC vic XT640388. Fire was exchanged with unknown results. At 1735H A 1/16 Infantry suffered 1 WIA from sniper fire vic XT6[illegible]383. At 1810H C 1/2 Infantry found a booby-trapped base camp containing 6 bunkers and had prolonged contact with 2 VC vic XT643390. The results of the contact were: 1 VC KIA, 1 billfold and several documents captured. At 1820H A 2/28 Infantry reinforced 60 personnel vic XT610399 and evacuated them to the refugee camp at BEN CAT. At 2200H B 2/28 Infantry received 2 mortar rounds inside the perimeter vic XT606358 resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. The remainder of 9 January passed with considerable movement around all NDP's, but with negative further contact.

10 January - At 0700H 3rd Brigade CP began movement from LAI KHE to Artillery Base III, vic XT667313. The Forward CP closed at 0915H and took over operational control of CHAU PHUS at 0930H. At 0715H 2/33 Artillery began moving from Artillery Base I vic XT647348 to Artillery Base III vic XT667313, closing at 1315H. At 0730H, as a RECON 1/2 Infantry patrol was returning to the perimeter vic XT648383, contact was made with VC scouts resulting in 5 US WIA, 1 VC KIA. At 0800H B 1/16 Infantry found 2 VC KIA with CHICOM carbines vic XT643775 that had been killed during the night as a result of ranger claymore ambush. At 0830H A 2/18 Infantry received 2 CHIEU HOI'S vic XT601341, and C 2/18 Infantry received 1 CHIEU HOI vic XT614337. At 0900H C 1/28 Infantry found the first 84.5 tons of polished and unpolished rice vic XT614350. A 2/28 Infantry located 4 bicycles and several documents vic XT612351 and detonated a booby trapped claymore vic XT612347 resulting in 5 US WIA. All battalions began to search and destroy in area. 1/28 Infantry found a VC mess hall and classroom vic XT624389. A 1/26 Infantry located and destroyed 20 tons of rice vic XT612371. At 1030H A 1/16 located and destroyed 25 tons of rice vic XT650378. A 2/28 Infantry located 110 pounds of 20MM ammo and 700 lbs of rice vic XT613348. At 1050H RECON 2/28 Infantry found the first of 170 tons of rice vic XT602353. At 1115H B 2/28 Infantry found a total of 31 machine guns, automatic rifles, carbines, grenade launchers, and rifles vic XT603364. At 1150H B 2/28 Infantry, vic XT601351, found a bin 10'X12'X30' filled with milled rice and 104 more machine guns and small arms. At 1215H B 1/2 Infantry engaged 4 VC and killed two, capturing an AK rifle also vic XT631390. At 1230H B 1/28 Infantry located an extensive base camp vic XT613379 and were engaged by an unknown number of VC resulting in 4 US KIA and 4 US WIA. At 1315H C 1/2 Infantry located a concrete bunker vic XT637378 and killed 3 VC inside. At 1402H A 1/28 located 15 tons of rice vic XT616372 in a base camp and planned artillery and airstrikes in the area. A large secondary explosion was observed when the airstrikes were put in. At 1515H C 2/16 Infantry received 3 more CHIEU HOI's vic XT621367. At 1915H 6 more CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in at 2/18 CP vic XT615336. The remainder of 10 January passed with numerous sightings, movements, incoming fire, and general noises There were no more casualties throughout the night.

11 January - At 0705H A 2/18 Infantry received 8 CHIEU HOI's at their CP. At 0800H 2/28 Infantry became OPCON to the 3rd Brigade. At 0815H an Air Force FAC started putting airstrikes into the base camp found the day before by B 1/28 Infantry vic XT619379. A total of 12 secondary explosions were observed during the strikes. At 0850H B 1/2 Infantry fired on 1 VC with unknown results. At 0945H A 1/16 Infantry located and destroyed 45 tons of rice vic XT627378. Throughout the day bulldozers were used to clear paths through the jungle, destroy rice and bunkers, and expand landing zones. At 0945H a large cache of unpolished rice, found the day before by 1/28 Infantry, was extracted by CH47 helicopters. A total of 70 tons were extracted from XT619372. At 1010H C 1/2 Infantry destroyed 5 CHICOM grenades vic XT637389. At 1021H C 1/2 Infantry moved into a large base camp vic XT636393 and destroyed 11 claymore mines, 7 CHI's, and numerous rations. At 1025H the Engineers working with 1/28 Infantry located and destroyed 28 tons of

rice. At 1125H C 1/28 Infantry found 25 tons of rice vic XT624375. By 1700H A 2/18 Infantry found the first of a total of 122 tons of rice vic XT611353 which was destroyed with bulldozers. At 1200H B 1/28 located an extensive tunnel complex vic XT619373 that contained surgical books, surgical instruments, [illegible] of medicine which was made available. The remainder of the afternoon was [illegible] continued to search for and destroy numerous base camps in their respective areas. At 1830H A 1/16 sustained 2 WIA from rice chetting; small arms fire on the remainder of 11 January passed without incident.

12 January - At 0900H A 2/18 Infantry located the first of 242 tons of rice vic XT614356. At 1005H B 1/2 Infantry captured 2 VC, one who was [illegible] vic XT615366. The wounded VC had a transistor radio, VC pistol, and numerous documents. At 1041H A 1/28 Infantry found the first of a total of 65 tons of rice, vic XT617370. At 1055H C 1/2 Infantry located and destroyed 25 tons of rice vic XT624375. At 1100 hrs A 1/4 CAV located 1 ton of rice, fresh blood trails, and several C.A.'s vic XT663374 and 2 tons of rice, 1 pistol, and 1 rifle vic XT671371. At 1200H C 1/16 Infantry captured 8 wounded VC vic XT656356. At 1315H extraction was begun on some of the rice captured. A total of 725,100 lb bags of polished rice were extracted from the caches vic XT619372 and XT614355. At 1320H A 1/16 found a large underground tunnel complex vic XT632394. At 1530H B 1/2 Infantry a reinforced platoon [illegible] vic XT612[illegible]. The battalions continued to search and destroy in sector and then closed into their NDP's. At 1650H A 1/16 Infantry captured 1 VC WIA, vic XT 6371. At 1956H A 1/2 Infantry ambush patrol received 2 incoming grenades resulting in 2 US KIA vic XT620385. At 2115H A 1/2 Infantry detected a claymore resulting in 2 VC KIA vic XT618384. The remainder of 12 January was marked by numerous claymore, mortar, and small arms fire directed toward the battalions and considerable movement around their positions. At 2345H A 1/28 Infantry sustained 1 WIA from incoming mortar rounds, but 12 January passed with out any further incidents or casualties.

13 January - At 0700H 10 CHIEU HOI's turned themselves into A 2/11 CAV vic XT619327. By 0819H an LZ vic XT61 427 was secured by B 2/11 CAV and at 0900H 1/2 Infantry was airlifted to the LZ to begin search and destroy in the area. 1/2 Infantry closed the LZ at 1025H. At 0930H A 1/2 Infantry received 2 CHIEU HOI's in the area of the LZ vic XT619327. At 1010H A 1/16 patrol was hit by two vic XT656367 resulting in 2 WIA. The battalions continued to search and destroy in zone throughout the day discovering numerous caches and entrenchments found earlier. At 1215H A 1/2 Infantry was struck by a claymore vic XT633421 resulting in 1 KIA, 25 WIA, and 1 scout dog KIA. At 1300H A 2/18 Infantry took 7 VC under fire vic XT635355 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 45 cal pistol, several documents and SVN currency captured. At 1525H A 2/18 Infantry engaged 3 VC vic XT625342 resulting in 1 VC WIA, 2 Russian carbines, 2 bicycles,
At 1530H A 1/28 Infantry received 18 rounds of US artillery vic XT633341, resulting in 9 US KIA and 44 US WIA. The battalions closed their NDP's on 13 January passed without incident.

14 January - At 0725H 6 CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in to 1/2 Infantry CP vic XT621328. The battalions continued to search and destroy in zone throughout the day. At 1410H 1/28 Infantry began extraction from a PZ vic XT610[illegible], closing LAI AHE at 1445H. At 1430H A 1/4 CAV apprehended 1 CHIEU HOI with a Swedish carbine vic XT639368. At 1545H A 5/2 Artillery apprehended 1 VC and 2 VC suspects vic XT671304, the remainder of 14 January passed without further significant incident or discovery.

15 January - At 0515 hrs A 1/16 Infantry ambush patrol heard movement vic XT671357 and detonated a claymore resulting in 1 VC KIA with a pistol and several documents captured. The battalions continued to S & D in zone finding numerous base camps with small amounts of foodstuff and equipment and one unexploded round, several snipers. At 1100 hrs B 2/2 Infantry attached to the 1/2 Infantry killed 1 VC vic XT623322. At 1205 C 1/16 extracted 4 women and 6 children from XT[illegible] to LAI AHE. At 1310 C 1/16 Infantry received several rounds of sniper fire with negative casualties, artillery was placed in the area resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1420 hrs C 1/2 Infantry captured 1 VC WIA vic XT631336. The battalions closed int. their NDP's without further significant find. At 2045 hrs B 1/2 Infantry had a claymore detonated against their perimeter resulting in 3 WIA [illegible]. The remainder of 15 January passed without incident.

16 January - At 0718 hrs 8 Chieu Hoi's turned themselves in to C 1/2 Infantry vic XT623329. At 0900 hrs 1/16 began extraction from PZ vic XT677349 closing LAI AHE at 1000hrs. At 1025 hrs A 5/2 artillery received 4 Chieu Hoi vic XT677309. The battalions continued to S & D in zone throughout the day finding and destroying

several bunkers with miscellaneous equipment in them. At 1125 C 1/4 Cav found 1 VC KIA vic XT674351. At 1405 A 5/2 Artillery captured 5 VC and 2 VN detainees vic XT679308. At 1433 A 1/2 Infantry found 1 VC KIA vic XT619316. The remainder of 16 January passed without further incident.

17 January - At 0745 4 Chieu Hoi turned themselves in to C 1/2 Infantry vic XT623329. At 1013 A 1/2 Infantry captured 1 VC WIA vic XT623327. The battalions continued to find and destroy bunkers and installations in their areas throughout the day. At 1153 B 2/2 Infantry attached to 1/2 Infantry found 3 Russian carbines at the bottom of a well vic XT689328. At 1325 C 2/18 Infantry engaged 1 VC vic XT687345 swimming across a stream resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1555 1/4 Cav apprehended 2 Chieu Hois and 4 VN detainees. At 1645 headquarters 1/2 Infantry received 1 Chieu Hoi vic XT623329. At 2105 C 2/18 Infantry patrol detonated a claymore against a VC sapper vic XT678346 with unknown results. The remainder of 17 January passed without incident.

18 January - The 3d Brigade suspended operation CEDAR FALLS and moved out of the operational area. The Brigade CP began displacing at 0700 hrs. At 0800 2/18 Infantry began road march to DI AN closing at 1305 hrs. At 0933 1/2 Inf was airlifted from their NDP closing LAI KHE at 1020 hrs. The Brigade CP and 2/33 Artillery began road march from Artillery base III closing LAI KHE at 1230 hrs. The operation was suspended with the closure of 2/18 Infantry into DI AN at 1305 hrs.

25 January - Operation CEDAR FALLS was reinitiated at 0700 hrs when 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of 1/4 Cav (-) and C 2/2 Infantry operating in the Iron Triangle. The Cav continued to find bunkers, tunnels, and supply caches which were destroyed by attached engineers. At 1135 hrs C 2/2 Infantry captured 3 VC vic XT687260 along with 1 carbine. At 1230 hrs C 2/2 Infantry captured 2 more VC and 1 carbine vic XT687260. At 1300 hrs C 2/2 Infantry found 1 VC KIA in a fresh grave vic XT695245. At 1415 B 1/4 Cav APC hit a mine vic XT651324 resulting in 3 US WIA. At 1430 B 2/28 Infantry moved to Iron Triangle and became OPCON 1/4 Cav (-). At 1900 hrs B 1/4 Cav captured 5 VC vic XT653321. At 1515 hrs C 2/2 Infantry destroyed 4 tons of polished rice vic XT687357. The major elements pulled back to NEW CAT to NDP for the night leaving numerous small ambush patrols along the west side of the triangle. At 2055H, vic XT684263, a C 2/2 Infantry patrol engaged 20 VC moving North, by artillery, with unknown results. At 2145H vic XT672295, a B 2/28 Infantry patrol engaged 2 VC swimming the river with unknown results. At 2155H vic XT651314, an A 1/4 CAV patrol fired artillery on 10 VC near the river resulting in 4 VC KIA. The remainder of 25 January passed without incident.

26 January - At 0145H C 2/2 Infantry sustained 1 WIA from M & I fires that landed too close vic XT678253. At 0300H a C 2/2 Infantry patrol observed several VC moving North vic XT685257. Throughout the day the units continued to find and destroy bunkers tunnels and material. At 1035H B 1/4 CAV suffered 2 WIA from an anti-personnel mine vic XT692342. At 1200H C 2/2 Infantry reported 6 VC KIA in 6 fresh graves vic XT683254. At 1240H vic XT680254, C 2/2 Infantry located 45 tons of rice and 1 VC KIA 2-3 days old. At 1300H C 2/2 Infantry found a heavily booby trapped base camp vic XT683253 and suffered 1 WIA from a booby-trapped grenade. At 1415H B 1/4 CAV received several rounds of sniper fire vic XT650325 resulting in 2 WIA. The remainder of the day passed with several insignificant incidents of snipers and movement and Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated at 262400 January 1967.

6. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 3rd Brigade units were supported on Operation CEDAR FALLS by 2/33 Artillery (105), 8/6 Artillery (155), 1/7 Artillery (105), 2/32 Artillery (8", 175), and 2/35 Artillery (155SP). Although 2/33 Artillery supported unit with long range fires from LAI KHE, the majority of the fires came from advanced artillery bases I (XT727348) II (XT680335), and III (XT667326). Again, as always, the artillery accounted for a large number of the VC KIA. A number of the CHIEU HOI reported that artillery and airstrikes were some of the deciding factors in their surrender. The 2/33 Artillery, in direct support of the 3rd Brigade, fired 21,047 rounds of 105MM during the Operation CEDAR FALLS.

b. Air Force: The Air Force contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire, and conducting LZ preparations with tactical air support. A total of 256 close air support sorties were flown, which included 9 immediate sorties used to suppress enemy ground fire. The known results of the air support were: 6 VC KIA, 228 bunkers and 1605 meters of trench uncovered or destroyed, and 19 huts, 74 bicycles, 2 tunnels destroyed. The sorties were flown as listed below:

(5)

b. Air Force: Cont'd (from page 5)

212

9 January	55
10 January	36
11 January	28
12 January	17
13 January	24
14 January	22
15 January	12
16 January	13
17 January	10
18 January	15
25 January	7
26 January	17
Total	256

9. RESULTS:

a. Personnel Losses:

	US	VC
KIA	17	46
KBA	—	6
WIA	117	8
VCC	—	22
VND	—	18
CHIEU HOI	—	55
REFUGEES	—	70

b. Equipment Losses:

(1) US Losses:

(a) Weapons:

1	Machine guns		total 15
	a Light	6	
	b Heavy	1	
	c SMG	8	
2	Automatic rifles		total 18
1	Recoilless rifles (57MM)		2
2	Rifles		127
2	Shotguns		2
1	Grenade Launcher (M79)		1
1	Mortars (60MM)		1
2	Pistols		4
10	Mines		21
10	CDU		62

(b) Ammunition:

1	Bombs (250 to 750 lb)		total 5
1	Artillery (105-175MM)		total 4
1	Mortar		total 70
1	Grenades		total 740
	hand	735	
	rifle	5	
2	Cannon (20MM)		total 110
5	Small arms (assorted)		total 31,000

(c) Demolition Materials:

1	Shape-charges		total 6
1	Blasting caps		total 22
1	Detonating wire (feet)		total 56,000
1	Batteries		total 226
1	Galvanometer		total 1

(d)

1	rice (tons)		total 1446
	destroyed (tons)	1330	
	extracted (tons)	116	
2	Grain (pounds)		total 800
2	Peanuts (pounds)		total 900

(2)

4	Tea (pounds)	total	40
5	Cucumbers (pounds)	total	30
6	Fish (gallons)	total	160
7	Pepper (bottles)	total	1

(e) Medical Supplies:

1 Penecillin - A total of 130 boxes of bottles containing 500,000 units each
2 Syrettes of assorted medicine - 140 boxes
3 Assorted pills and capsules - 100 bottles
4 Assorted antibiotics - 100,000 ampules
5 Assorted vitamins - 625,000 ampules
6 Vitamin B12 & C - 400 pounds
7 Dextrose - 1,000 bottles
8 Glucose - 100 bottles
9 Saline - 100 bottles
10 Instruments - 4 large bundles containing examination, treatment, and surgical instruments.
11 Books & documents - 9 large bundles of books, journals, and records
12 Miscellaneous medicines, salves, powders and bandages.

(f) Miscellaneous:

1	bicycles		83
2	oxcarts		3
3	Sampans & boats		47
4	rifle stocks		135
5	VC gas masks		36
6	cutuard motors		6
7	corrugated tin (sheets)		560
8	stoves		3
9	POL (gallons)		
	gasoline	110	
	kerosene	15	
	diesel oil	2000	
	lubricating oil	10	
10	Animals		
	chickens	116	
	cats	1	
	dogs	2	
	ducks	106	
	pigs	15	
	water buffalo	12	
11	Tools		
	saws	10	
	axes	17	
	pick and mattocs	6	
	shovels	5	
	hoe	1	
	cutting tools	18	
	miscellaneous wrenches and screwdrivers, ETC.		

12 Clothing and living Material:
Several miscellaneous items including: uniforms, ponchos, wrist watches, cloth, female undergarments, hammocks, blankets, cooking utensils, and furniture.

13 Installations:
Great quantities of installations were found and destroyed throughout the area of operation to include: base camps, hospitals, mess halls, class rooms, bunkers, tunnels, huts, wells, punji pits, and booby traps.

14 Documents:
A large amount of printed and written material was found and extracted including: books, journals, records, photographs, letters, and leaflets.

e. Ground Reconnaissance:

Whenever possible ground troops followed up airstrikes to determine the extent of damage done and to search for enemy material. Due to the terrain and tactical plan, however, it was not always possible to conduct a ground follow-up.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Administrative plans were considered adequate throughout the operation.

(1.) Supply

3rd Brigade remained at LAI KHE and 1st Infantry Division Support Command located the Division Logistical Base at LAI KHE. First Log Command operated an ASP at LAI KHE and supplied all Class V items. The 3rd Brigade water point operated on a twenty-four (24) hour basis to meet the increased demand. Resupply was made by both road and air. Stationary units with secure accesses were resupplied by road. Infantry Battalions were resupplied exclusively by helicopter. During one phase of the operation the IRON BRIGADE supported 5 Infantry Battalions, 1 Armored Cavalry Squadron, and 1 artillery Battalion. Prior to the beginning of the operation, the IRON BRIGADE Resupply Pad was organized into four lanes with five (5) landing pads per lane. The lanes were colored with PSP and four units could be resupplied simultaneously with a total of twenty (20) helicopters. The majority of the support was from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company and the cooperation and personal interest demonstrated by the pilots was outstanding in materially enhancing the resupply operations. The major problems encountered were caused by late and timely requests for resupply on the part of the battalions. Also a marked increase in the number of sorties required for resupply was noticed. This was caused by a failure to assure that only the necessary material was sent to the field. The equipment sent to the field should be held to a minimum for both logistical and tactical reasons.

(2) Maintenance:

No major problems arose with maintenance during the operation.

(3) Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization:

The evacuation of casualties continued to be excellent using the "Dustoff" helicopters. On one or two occasions, due to the large number of casualties, resupply helicopters and command and control helicopters were used for evacuation to speed the process.

(4) Transportation:

Traffic congestion became a problem as more units and convoys closed LAI KHE Base. In order to alleviate this problem in the future schedules of arriving and departing convoys and the complement of convoys should be furnished the Brigade S-4, Military Police, and other offices concerned.

(5) Communication:

At the initiation of the operation communications were excellent. As the operation continued on 9 January, however, it became increasingly difficult to communicate with all the Infantry Battalions. The reason for this was not exactly determined, but the Brigade was ordered to displace to the operational area at 091513 January. A forward Brigade TAC CP was established the afternoon of 9 January at BEN SUC vic XT5803 and they provided a manual relay throughout the night. On 10 January the Brigade CP displaced to Artillery Base III vic XT667313 and no further communications problems were encountered.

b. Personnel Analysis:

Only the minimum number of personnel remained behind at base camps to secure personal equipment. The 3rd Brigade TOC at LAI KHE was manned by the administrative and logistical personnel remaining behind.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

For the first time in Vietnam, Engineer bulldozers were used extensively in the very middle of the thick tropical jungle. The results were overwhelming. Considering the dry season as a necessity, the bulldozers, secured by maneuver and security elements cut their own paths into the jungle to destroy bunkers, grind large rice caches into the ground, and enlarge landing zones and pick up zones. In one particular instance, the bulldozers could be credited with saving lives of several wounded men. On 13 January, when a 1-28 Infantry was hit with friendly artillery, the bulldozers present immediately began enlarging a landing zone for extraction of wounded and carrying other wounded to a nearby larger landing zone for extraction. The use of bulldozers is definitely a very valuable asset to S & D operations.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

Although operation CEDAR FALLS was planned on a large scale and large fire were anticipated, the operation far exceeded the expected results. The operation was the most successful yet for the IRON BRIGADE in every category except VC killed. This one item was more than offset, however, by the largest number of CHIEU HOI's ever surrendering to the Brigade.

215

The length of the operation, the use of bulldozers to destroy the hiding places and material of the VC, and the quantity of material destroyed together created a very noticeable decline in the morale of the VC in the area.

The IRON BRIGADE has dealt the VC a staggering blow from which he will be a long time recovering.

13. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

Operation CEDAR FALLS was the most successful operation conducted to date by the IRON BRIGADE. The largest quantity of rice captured on a single operation coupled with the number of CHIEU HOI's, indicate that the VC will continue to have increasing serious morale problems.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of Engineer bulldozers and tank dozers is extremely desireable during the dry season for operating in thick jungle areas. They proved invaluable in the destruction of rice, bunkers, and hard installations, as well as flattening the jungle and clearing LZ's and PZ's.

(2) Sufficient quantities of ammunition should be supplied to allow random firing of all weapons, including claymores, around FDP's at night.

(3) Units should remain in lucrative areas for long periods of time. This has a psychological impact on the enemy, allows CHIEU HOI's to reach our lines, and facilitates a thorough search.

(4) A more effective operation is possible using small battalion areas of operation and thoroughly searching them, and taking time to evacuate material found and destroying emplacements discovered, than using large AO's and requiring a battalion to move relatively far in a short time, searching and destroying on a hit or miss basis.

(5) The weapons and munitions caches located generally were stored in bunkers resembling the ant hills frequently found in the jungle. The bunkers had two (2) entrances, were not booby trapped, and were located within 75 meters of a trail large enough to allow an ox cart to pass.

(6) The combined use of CS and WP grenades along with the portable flame thrower was effective in assisting in the capture of VC located in tunnels.

(7) The throwing of a colored smoke grenade in conjunction with the use of WP grenades will preclude possible confusion by aerial observers in ascertaining targets and location of friendly elements.

(8) The VC employed a new technique with the "bouncing betty" booby trap. The mine was located as near as possible to the base of a bush or tree. A pull-wire was well camouflaged by leaves or buried in the ground.

SIDNEY H. MARKS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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217

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US FORCES 96345

AVDB-RAT 20 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) Operation CEDAR FALLS

2. (U) 8 Jan 67 - 28 Jan 67

3. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION

a. Organization for combat 080600 Jan 67

1st Inf Div Arty

1/5 Arty (-) DS 1st Bde
A/1/5
B/1/5
C/2/40 (atch)
LRTC (atch)
1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7
2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde
D/1/5 (atch)
B/1/7 (atch)
8/6 Arty GS-Reinf 2/33 Arty
LRTC (atch)
B/2/32 Arty Reinf 8/6 Arty
2/35 Arty (-) GS-Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35
A/6/27 Arty GS-Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty
3/319 Arty DS 173rd Abn Bde
How Btries, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR

b. Deployment: Artillery was prepositioned as much as possible on D-1 and D days. A number of artillery bases were developed to support operations of the division and attached units (see Annex C). Support was provided by the assignment of standard artillery missions to artillery units assigned and attached to the division. The 1st Bde was largely responsible for base camp security while the remainder of the division was involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. Thus, their supporting artillery, 1/5 Arty, was not actively involved in artillery deployment in the Iron Triangle and vicinity.

The 5/2 Arty (MW) was largely attached to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to provide convoy and perimeter security. Four M42's were attached to 8/6 Arty for security purposes. A detailed listing of the major moves in support of the operation, missions assigned, and a map showing the

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ANNEX F
to
INCL 3

main artillery bases and area of operations are attached as annexes.

The highlights of artillery deployment follow:

8 Jan - 1/7 Arty (-B) moved from Arty Base IV to Arty Base II, after Dan Sue was secured in one of the classic airmobile operations of the VietNamese conflict. Elements of the 2nd Bde secured the Arty Base and artillery of 25th Inf Div Arty provided artillery support during occupation of position. B/6 Arty, 2/33 Arty, 2/35 Arty (-A), and B/2/32 Arty occupied Arty Base I to support a 3rd Bde assault into the Iron Triangle on 9 February. Two missions were fired by AO's in which 16 VC (3C) were WIA.

9 Jan - Six 1st Inf Div Bns landed in the Iron Triangle following massive preparations utilizing as many as 14 artillery batteries. Programs of fires were programmed to support operations. One alone, Program RIDGEWOOD, expended 2546 rounds of all calibers. A/2/5 and B/8/6 were given missions of DS to 2/28 Inf and 1/28 Inf, respectively.

10 Jan - A heavy VC concentration was being built up in the western part of theIron Triangle. 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-) moved to Arty Base III to support infantry maneuvers.

11 Jan - C/2/40 was released from Div Arty control and reverted to control of parent unit.

12 Jan - 2nd Bde continued operations North of BEN SUC. Arty Base I was closed, units moving to Arty Base V, in order to provide medium and heavy fire support to all committed brigades.

13 Jan - Fourteen CNIEU HOI personnel turned themselves in to B/6 Arty, bringing 9 water buffalo with them. An unfortunate artillery incident occured at approximately 1530 hours. A/8/6, due to a transposition of coordinates, fired out on a 2/33 TOT. Intending to fire a coords 633375 a transposition caused them to fire at 633359. Friendly troops were occupying this area and were not posted on the FDC's map. This error of some 3600 meters caused the rounds to land on 1/28 Inf, killing 9 men and wounding 39.

14 Jan - 1/26 Inf uncovered 12 fresh VC graves that they credited artillery with killing the night before.

15-26 Jan - Artillery supported engineer task teams and infantry search and destroy operations. Infantry units uncovered a vast amount of intelligence documents and supplies. Movement of artillery units into base camps was accomplished during this time.

c. Fire Support Coordination: Boundaries between AO's were designated as Fire Coordination Lines. Div Arty FSE was colocated with the Division TOC (Fwd). Liaison officers were sent to adjacent US units, ARVN units and to the normal maneuver elements to aid in this coordination.

d. Army Aviation Support:

(1) The Div Arty Aviation Section, with 10 assigned aircraft, flew 425 hours in support of the operation. The average daily availability of aircraft was 65%, and the primary mission was command and control.

(2) The aerial observer section flew 340 hours in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 18th Aviation Company provided a daily average of four O-1's. Aerial observers were utilized in firing TOT's, Registrations, blocking fires, targets of opportunity, visual reconnaissance, and assisting forward observers in firing defensive concentrations and map-spotting friendly elements. Observers were instrumental in firing successful preparations on Landing Zones, when they adjusted the fires of four to six batteries with great success.

e. Artillery warning to aircraft: Artillery advisory was coordinated and supervised by the Div Arty aviation section and was handled at LAI KHE by NIGHTHAWK Control and in the BEN SUC area by TROOPER Control.

f. Metro: Electronic metro messages were rebroadcast on Division Artillery Operations Net (FM) from the data obtained by II FFV artillery stations in CU CHI, LONG BINH, and PHUOC VINH.

g. Survey Operations: Division artillery survey section brought 4th order survey control to artillery BASE I, RED and WHITE from the survey control points located in the vicinity of DEN CAT.

4. (C) COMMANDERS DURING OPERATION:

1st Inf Div Arty - Col Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr.
1/5 Arty - Lt Col Thomas A. Minnis
1/7 Arty - Lt Col George L. McFadden, Jr
2/33 Arty - Lt Col Charles D. Daniel, Jr
6/6 Arty - Lt Col Benjamin A. Safar

5. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Participating Strength:

	Start of Operation	End of Operation	Casualties
Div Arty (-)	74	31	0
1/7 Arty	200	228	1 WIA
6/6 Arty	669	723	0
2/33 Arty	538	538	0

b. Awards and Decorations: *

	Bronze Star	ACM	PH
Div Arty (-)	11	35	0
1/7 Arty	21	52	1
6/6 Arty	5	2	0
2/33 Arty	10	50	0

* Figures do not include the 1/5 Arty as they were not directly involved with Operation CEDAR FALLS.

6. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: The Iron Triangle was a well-known VC administrative and supply center. Populated areas were known to support VC units with intelligence information and labor. Intelligence studies supplied by higher headquarters were used in artillery fire planning.

b. During operation: Division G2 continued to disseminate available intelligence and information in the form of spot reports and intelligence summaries. These reports were exploited for artillery targeting. Division artillery air observers were on a constant lookout for indications of enemy movement in the area of operation. Targets of opportunity were engaged without delay

7. (C) COMMUNICATIONS:

a. FM voice radio: Prior to the operation, it was anticipated that forward observers and their parties would experience difficulty in maintaining communications with their respective fire

direction centers with radio set AN/PRC-25 due to heavy jungle in the area of operations. To combat this, two solutions were offered. First, observers were instructed to use Division Artillery retransmission system. This was used in several isolated instances. Secondly, an airborne radio relay system was arranged, to use if required.

b. Scrambler equipment was used on the Division Artillery operations net for reporting locations of friendly units. Initially, excessive equipment failure was experienced and the full potential of this communications means was not exploited during Operation CEDAR FALLS.

c. Continuous reliable FM voice communications were maintained with all echelons. The retransmission station was utilized extensively to maintain communications with battalions located at a great distance from division artillery.

d. Some difficulty was experienced in sharing of frequencies. The Division Signal Officer was notified and the problem quickly rectified in all instances.

e. AM Radio Teletype: Equipment failure was experienced by two battalions. Since the units were colocated, a set from Hq, Div Arty was sent to the area for their common usage. FSE and Div Arty were likewise colocated and these two elements used the RTT belonging to Div Arty. Motor courier service was utilized between Div Arty and FSE.

2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty have only one teletypewriter AN/GAC-46 on hand. Equipment failure could seriously hamper operations. The additional set, authorized by TOE, has been requisitioned by both units, but has not been received to date.

f. Wire-VHF Communications: Division signal battalion established and maintained TM-122, 4 channel VHF between Div Arty Hq and established artillery bases. Continuous, reliable communications were maintained throughout this operation.

8. (U) MEDICAL: Outpatient: During the operation, the Div Arty medical section in the forward area treated a total of 14 patients as follows:

a.	URI	4
b.	Gastro Intestinal	2
c.	ENT	3
d.	Injuries	2
e.	Others	3

Of the injuries, one was the result of hostile action. One person required medical evacuation to the 93rd Evac Hospital for acute gouty arthritis.

9. (C) AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES:

105 mm	155 mm	175 mm	8 in	4.2 in mortar
51,915	30,043	1086	3940	1652

Units of Div Arty and GSR units to Div Arty fired a total of 88,636 rounds of artillery. Figures do not include howitzers batteries

of the 11th ACR or 173rd Abn Bde artillery, which were under OPCON, 1st Inf Div Arty.

10. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Fire planning on a Div Arty wide scale was accomplished during CEDAR FALLS. Series of fires were planned throughout the area of operations to be executed on order. On the night of 8 January, over 1000 rounds were expended in 11 pre-planned Div Arty TOT's. Once the air landings had been made, and "clover-leafing" by maneuver elements had begun, however, Div Arty control of fires became too complicated by the problem of locating moving units and coordinating massive fires close to them. Control was best exercised in these instances by the DS battalions working closely with LNO's and FO's. Air observers controlled massed close in fires when this was required. Massed pre-planned fires were useful for on call missions when proximity of friendly elements did not over complicate the fire clearance problem.

b. Tables of Organization and Equipment did not provide for a sufficient number of FDC personnel. A battalion could adequately supply personnel to man all battery FDC's on a 24 hour bases; it could also supply personnel to man a battalion FDC on a 24 hour bases. However, they could not man both battery and battalion FDC's on a sustained, day in and day out, 24 hour basis and maintain high gunnery standards.

c. Serious artillery incidents must be completely eliminated. In addition to the tragic and needless loss of life, morale of maneuver units is seriously hampered when friendly artillery strikes them. A double system of checks must be in force at all times, without exception. To deviate from this, even the slightest bit, is to invite a serious incident which can negate much or all of the success of a particular operation.

d. Liaison must be established prior to the start of an operation between organic ordnance units and the ordnance units of attached artillery units, if the type weapon is different from those organic to the division. In particular, attached 155 mm howitzers (SP) of 2/35 Arty had difficulty during the operation and organic 1st Division ordnance units were unfamiliar with their equipment and did not have spare parts. It is imperative th t an arrangement for spare parts and PLL be settled before the operation.

e. Ammunition Supply was enhanced by the use of stake platform trailers to bring ammunition directly to using units at a great savings in time and effort.

f. The M-1 collimator, when employed with the towed 155 mm howitzer, was best emplaced directly to the rear of the piece. This placement reduced to a minimum the displacement that needed to be taken up and eliminated frequent relay of the piece due to excessive collimator displacement. No loss of accuracy resulted from such emplacement.

g. During an airmobile operation, large quantities of 105 howitzer shell casings, empty 55 gallon drums, and metal waste accumulated in the battalion forward position. The battalion logistical base should have had on hand a minimum of 6 large cargo nets to forward to the artillery base for extraction of metal residue.

h. The nylon straps used by the CH-47 to lift the water trailer and AN/GRC-46 became heated and weakened when placed over the

sharp corner of the item lifted. Removing the fender of the water trailer prior to airlift reduced the danger of strap overheating and eliminated the sharp bends in the strap. Using the longer 20 feet, 4-leg, 20,000 lb strap, sufficient strength was available to adequately lift the A4/TEC-46.

FOR THE COMMANDER

3 Incl
1. ANNEX A: Artillery missions
2. ANNEX B: Artillery moves
3. ANNEX C: Schematic diagram of area of operations.

DAVID R. CARTER
Captain, Artillery
Adjutant

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223

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ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)

8 Jan — 1/5 Arty (-) DS 1st Bde
A/1/5
B/1/5
C/2/40 (atch)
A/7/9 (atch)
LHAAC (atch)

1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7

2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde
D/1/5 (atch)
B/1/7 (atch)

1/319 Arty DS 173rd Abn Bde

How btries, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR

C/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
LHAAA (atch)

B/2/32 Arty Reinf C/6 Arty

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty

9 Jan — C/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
C/B/6
D/C/6
LHAAA (atch)

A/C/6 Arty DS 2/28 Inf

B/C/6 Arty DS 1/28 Inf

C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 3/319 Arty

All others, no change.

10 Jan — A/1/7 Arty DS 2/18 Inf

B/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
LHAAA (atch)

All others, no change.

11 Jan — C/2/40 Arty detached from 2/33 Arty released Div Arty 1145

C/B/6 Arty GS Reinf 3/319th Arty

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35

All others, no change

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ANNEX F

ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS) (continued)

12 Jan — No changes

13 Jan — 8/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33
LHAAB (atch)

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf C/6 Arty
B/2/35

C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 3/319th Arty

All others, no change.

14 Jan — 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
C/1/7
LHAAB (atch)

8/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty

All others, no change.

15 Jan — A/8/6 Arty GS Reinf 1/5 Arty

All others, no change.

16 Jan — 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7
LHAAB (atch)

All others, no change.

17 Jan — 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7

8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/11 Arty, Base defense, Phu Loi
B/8/6
C/8/6
D/8/6
LHAAB (atch)
LHAAB (atch)

B/2/32 Arty GS Reinf 3/319 Arty

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty

All others, no change.

18 Jan — 1/7 Arty DS 2nd Bde

2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 3/319 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35

All others, no change.

225

ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS) (continued)

19 Jan 1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
LHAAC (atch) A/7/9 released from Div Arty 0730

All others, no change.

20 Jan 3/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
B/3/6
C/3/6
D/3/6
LHAAL (atch)
LHAAB (atch)

HQ & B/2/35 Arty released from Div Arty 1117

C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 3/319 Arty

C/2/13 Arty Reinf 1/7 Arty

All others, no change.

21 Jan 1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
LHAAB (atch)
LHAAC (atch)

2/33 Arty (-) DS 3rd Bde
A/2/33
B/2/33

C/2/33 Arty Reinf 1/5 Arty

8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
B/8/6
C/8/6
D/8/6
LHAAA (atch)

All others, no change.

22 Jan 8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
C/8/6
D/8/6
LHAAA (atch)

B/8/6 Arty DS RDTF

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty

All others, no change.

23 Jan 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
B/1/7

C/1/7 Arty Reinf 2/33 Arty (-)

8/6 Arty (-) GS
B/8/6
C/8/6

D/8/6
LSAAA (atch)

All others, no change.

24 Jan — No change

25 Jan — 3/6 Arty (-) GS
C/3/6
D/3/6
IHAAA (atch)

B/6/6 Arty Reinf 2/33 Arty

B/2/32 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 1/5 Arty

C/2/35 Arty released from Div Arty 0924

All others, no change.

26 Jan — No change

ANNEX B - Artillery moves in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS to After Action Report to Operation CEDAR FALLS

8 Jan - Locations of organic, attached and supporting units as of 0600 hrs:

1st Inf Div Arty TAC CP	Lai Khe	XT 762372
1/5 Arty		
HQ	Phuoc Vinh	XT 967407
A	Quan Loi	XT 809833030 (3 tubes)
		XT 81359057 (3 tubes)
B	Phu Loi	XT 86852586
D	Lai Khe	XT 77093752
8/6 Arty		
HQ	Phu Loi	XT 85331731
A	Lai Khe	XT 75043648
B	Phu Loi	XT 846149
C	Phu Loi	XT 866156
D	Phu Loi	XT 85331731
1/7 Arty		
HQ	Arty Base IV	XT 53182836
A	Arty Base IV	XT 53162843
B	Di An	XT 911069
C	Arty Base IV	XT 53192834
2/32 Arty		
HQ	Lai Khe	XT 762365
A	Lai Khe	XT 768378
B	Lai Khe	XT 75943701
C	Lai Khe	XT 75903650
LRRA		
A	Phu Loi	XT 85611699
B	Phu Loi	XT 85621699
C	Quan Loi	XT 81359056
A/7/9 Arty	Thu Duc	XS 96699864
C/2/40 Arty	Phuoc Vinh	XT 95694967
2/35 Arty		
HQ	Lai Khe	XT 774360
B	Lai Khe	XT 771377
C	Lai Khe	XT 771378
A/2/32	Cu Chi	XT 643149
B/2/32	Lai Khe	XT 75733716
A/6/27	Lai Khe	XT 75863633

8 Jan - D/1/5 occupied new position in Lai Khe, closing at XT 75953701. 8/6 Arty moved by road to Artillery Base I, vic XT 725352. HQ, A and C/1/7 moved by CH 47 to Arty Base II, vic 580331. B/1/7 moved by road to Lai Khe. B/2/32, 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-A) all moved by road to Arty Base I, vic XT 726350.

9 Jan - No moves

INCL # 2 to ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX 3 - Artillery moves in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS to After Action Report to Operation CEDAR FALLS (continued)

10 Jan - 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-) moved by road to Arty Base III, vic XT 659326.

11 Jan - D/1/5 moved by C-130 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 958549?5.

12 Jan - 8/6 Arty, B/2/32 moved by road to Arty Base V, vic XT 659310.

13 Jan - A/7/9 moved by road to Phu Loi, vic XT 852175. A/1/5 moved by road to XT 867874 and then to Quan Loi vic XT 812903.

14 Jan - D/1/5 moved by road to Lai Khe, vic XT 752370.

15 Jan - B/1/5 moved by CH-47 to Blast II, XT 849336. D/1/5 moved by road through Phuoc Hoa, XT 916430 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 95034939. A/7/6 moved by road to Lai Khe, XT 75023690.

16 Jan - D/8/6 moved by road to Phu Loi, XT 85331731. C/1/7 moved by C 47 and road to Di An, XT 906407?2.

17 Jan - HQ/1/5 moved by CH-47 and UH-1D to Blast II, XT 849335. HQ, B, and C/8/6 moved by road to Phu Loi, vic XT850150. HQ and A/1/7 moved by CH-47 and road to Di An, vic XT 906307?2. B/2/32 moved by road to Lai Khe, XT 75733716.

18 Jan - B/1/7 moved by road to Di An, XT 911407?3. 2/33 Arty moved by road to Lai Khe. HQ, B and C/2/35 moved by road to CAMP WHITE, XT 78972400.

19 Jan - HHB, 1st Inf Div Arty (- TAC CP) moved by road to Phu Loi.

20 Jan - HQ/1/5 moved by CH-47 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 956493. 1/7 Arty moved by road to Phu Loi.

21 Jan - HQ/1/5 by road and B/1/5 (-) by CH-47 to Blast I, XT 915429. Three tubes of B/1/5 moved to Phuoc Vinh by road. D/1/5 moved to Blast I, vic XT 916430 by road.

22 Jan - No moves

23 Jan - 1/7 Arty (-C) moved by road to Di An, XT 906070.

24 Jan - No moves

25 Jan - B/8/6 moved by road vic Ben Cat, XT 725318. A and B/2/33 moved by road vic Ben Cat, XT 727319.

26 Jan - No moves


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221

ANNEX C

AREA OF OPERATIONS
(NOT TO SCALE)

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

INCL # 3
to
ANNEX F

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231

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION
APO 96345

26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type Operation:

NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS, a search and destroy operation.

2. (U) Dates of Operation:

2 January 1967 - 26 January 1967

3. (C) Location:

IRON TRIANGLE, vicinity of BEN SUC.

4. (U) Command Headquarters:

121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division

5. (C) Unit Commanders:

LTC James M. Rockwell	Battalion Commander
CPT Pierce A. Rushton	CO, Company A
CPT Gary Hawley	CO, Company B
CPT Allen R. Wild	CO, Company C
1LT Arpad De Kovacsy	Plt Ldr, 1st Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Dale M. Carlsen	Plt Ldr, 2d Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Richard D. Mohlere	Plt Ldr, 3d Fwd Sig Plt

ANNEX G to INCL 2

CONFIDENTIAL

26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

6. (U) Intelligence:

No enemy electronic warfare was noted during operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS.

7. (C) Mission:

To provide VHF, AM and FM radio, and secure on line teletype to all advanced elements of Division Forward. Provide all three Infantry Brigades with a VHF link into the Division Communications System.

8. (C) Concept of Operation:

Extensive planning preceded the start of operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS, allowing all elements of the Battalion to be prepositioned and become operational before the Division actually moved. The Division Fwd TOC was established in the same location as during the previous operation, allowing the CP and communication equipment to be set up with very little difficulty.

a. Company "A" was given the mission to support Division Main and all supporting elements at Di An Base Camp.

b. Company "B" was tasked to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a VHF link into the Division Communication System for each of the Division Brigades.

c. Company "C" was tasked to provide VHF, AM, and FM radio communication for Division Forward.

9. (C) Execution:

a. Company "A" was given the mission of providing communications support for Division Main at Di An Base Camp. Additionally, Company "A" provided a supervisor for the single sideband radio nets at Division Forward, and a PA set and team for the Lam Son Refugee Camp. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/GRC-69	~~6~~	Provide 144 VHF channels for elements of Division base camp.
AN/GRC-46	2	Provide AM RTT communication for Division net #1.

CONFIDENTIAL

AN/VRC-46	4	Provide FM Radio in support of Division RAI and Division Command Net.
AN/MTC-1	2	Provide local and trunk switching for all elements at Di An.
SB-675	1	Provide patching and test position for all VHF circuits.

b. Company "B" was given the mission of providing communication support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Received warning order on 1 Jan 67. All communication equipment required was checked along with personnel equipment. On 3 Jan 67, personnel and equipment convoyed from Phouc Vinh to Brigade Forward location and established necessary communications. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/TRC-34½	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Brigade Forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure radio, teletype communication and back up for com center teletype.

(2) 2d Platoon: Received warning order on 5 Jan 67 and began to prepare personnel and equipment for deployment. On 8 Jan 67 airlifted one 34½ and one AN/GRC-46 into BEN SUC to support forward elements of 2d Brigade. Additional communications equipment and personnel were convoyed to 2d Brigade trains location to be pre-positioned for deployment. Major items of equipment utilized were:

28 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/VRC-34	1	Provide VHF radio for 2d Brigade forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide HF communications in Division Net #1 and back up for teletype.
AN/VRC-69	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
AN/MCC-17	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
SB-611	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
AN/VRC-46	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.

(3) 3d Platoon: Platoon received warning order on 10 Jan 67 and convoyed to field location on 11 Jan 67 to support forward elements of 3d Brigade. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/VRC-34	1	Provide VHF radio link between Brigade Forward and Danger Forward.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide HF radio in Division Net #1.

(4) Company Headquarters: Received warning order 3 Jan 67. Mission was to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and establish VHF radio system 5455 and relay for 5573D. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/VRC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Division Forward and Phu Loi.

AN/ARC-112	2	Provide 4 channel VHF radio link between Parachute Forward and Blackhorse.
AN/ARC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Phu Loi and Lai Khe.

c. Company "C" was given the mission of providing personnel and equipment to support the Division Forward CP. Adequate time was afforded to prepare personnel and equipment. All of the communications equipment was convoyed to Forward CP two days prior to the start of operation and pre-positioned. As a result of adequate prior planning and pre-positioning of communication equipment and personnel, the change over of the command elements from Division Rear to Division Forward was accomplished very efficiently. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/ARC-69	5	Provide VHF radio links from Division Forward to the following: Division Main, Division Artillery, Brigades Forward.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure teletype and back-up for communications center teletype.
AN/GRC-26	1	Provide secure teletype for III Corp Net.
SB-611	1	Providing patching and test facilities for all VHF circuits.
AN/ARC-128	2	Provide FM communication for Divisional and Brigade Nets.
AN/ARC-112	2	Provide 4-Ch VHF radio link between Drumfire FWD and FWD Artillery Base.

AVDT-SI-3
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

10. (C) Results:

a. The Battalion provided simultaneous communication for 10 different elements of the division plus one non divisional unit.

(1) Division Main

(2) Division Forward

(3) Division Artillery

(4) Devil

(5) Devil Forward

(6) Dagger

(7) Dagger Forward

(8) Duty

(9) Duty Forward

(10) Quan Loi

(11) Parachute Forward

b. Telephone Circuits Provided:

(1) Sole User Circuits at:

(a) Danger Forward	45
(b) Danger Main	12
(c) Phu Loi	11
(d) Devil (Phouc Vinh)	4
(e) Devil Forward	5
(f) Dagger (Di An)	2
(g) Dagger Forward	8
(h) Duty (Lai Khe)	9

(i)	Duty Forward	6
(j)	Quan Loi	1
(k)	Parachute Forward	4

(2) Common User Telephone Service:

(a)	Danger Main - Danger Fwd	10
(b)	Danger Main - Danger North	6
(c)	Danger Main - Devil	4
(d)	Danger Main - Dagger	4
(e)	Danger Main - Duty	4
(f)	Danger Main - Quan Loi	1
(g)	Danger Forward - Danger North	2
(h)	Danger Forward - Devil	2
(i)	Danger Forward - Dagger	1
(j)	Danger Forward - Duty	3
(k)	Danger Forward - Quan Loi	1
(l)	Danger Forward - Devil Fwd	2
(m)	Danger Forward - Dagger Fwd	2
(n)	Danger Forward - Duty	2
(o)	Danger Forward - Parachute Fwd	2
(p)	Danger Forward - Lightning	1
(q)	Danger Forward - Hurricane	4
(r)	Danger Forward - Saigon LD	2

26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation ATTLEBORO FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

11. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Forward elements received Administrative Support from the headquarters with which they were deployed.

b. The Battalion continues to receive poor maintenance support on deadlined signal items at Forward Platoon Locations. A new program was initiated by the Forward Platoons in order to correct this problem. Where possible, defective signal items are evacuated to "B" Company Maintenance at Phu Loi where they are repaired and returned to the platoons. Defective items beyond the capability of "B" Company are evacuated to Battalion Maintenance at Di An. The length of time that equipment is deadlined has been reduced considerably. In addition, greater sense of urgency exists when the defective item remains within company maintenance channels.

12. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF System was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to the training classes the Battalion conducted prior to the operation and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

b. FM Radio:

(1) Greater range was realized by the Infantry Battalions by having them erect 60 foot mast with multiple heads where feasible.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the Infantry Battalion Commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D Helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The Battalion R&D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AN/PRC-25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the Commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnel utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further no additional radios are required other than what the Commander has in his possession. In other words, the Commander brings his own organic radios (AN/PRC-25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can

239

26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from the authorized dry cell battery.

c. VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequency as the tactical FM set and frequencies must be carefully selected.

d. TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expedited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the OIC and NCO supervisors.

e. The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of a 120 foot AB216 Tower near the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuits.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


Steven P. Stahl

STEVEN P. STAHL
CPT, SigC
Adjutant

3 Incls
1. VHF System Diagram
2. Telephone Traffic Diagram
3. VHF Radio Diagram

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TACTICAL VHF DIAGRAM



Enclosure 21 to ANNEX G


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225

241

CONFIDENTIAL

TYPICAL TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM




Enclosure #2 to ANNEX G

CONFIDENTIAL

2 of 2

HF RADIO DIAGRAM



243

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]
[illegible]
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) Name or Identity of Operation:

Operation [illegible]; search and destroy operation.

2. (U) Dates of Operation:

8 January to 24 January 1967.

3. (U) Location:

The IRON TRIANGLE vicinity of BEN CAT, Republic of Vietnam.

4. (C) Command or Control Headquarters:

The 173rd Airborne Brigade was the controlling headquarters for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

5. (C) Reporting Officer:

Reporting Officer for this report is Colonel William [illegible]. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Kibbey L. Torrs
3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Arthur F. Coelsen
37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais
919th Armored Engineer Company - CPT Donald J. Crocker
409th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee W. Gentry
5/61st Military Intelligence Detachment - MAJ Cornelius L. Grey
17th Public Information Detachment - CPT Owen W. Mitchfield

6. (C) Task Organization:

With the exception of attachments and detachments of units on a day to day basis, the Task Organization was as follows:

Regimental Control:

Air Cavalry Troop (-)
919th Engineer Company (-2nd [illegible] Platoons)
409th Radio Research Detachment (-)
5/61st Military Intelligence Detachment (-)
37th Medical Company (-)
188th Maintenance Battalion (-) DS
1 MP Squad

TF 2-11:

2nd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
2nd Platoon 919th Engineer Company
Contact Team 188th Maintenance Battalion DS

TF 3-11:

3rd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
Contact Team 188th Maintenance Battalion

INCL 4

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: All artillery fires were controlled by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and will not be covered in this report.

b. USAF Support: The fact that the Regiment was OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the operation required close coordination between the Air Liaison Officers of the two units. During planning sessions between the ALO's from the two units the relatively small size of the areas of operation of subordinate units together with the close proximity of the ground troops was taken into consideration. It was decided by the two ALO's that due to these factors a joint Forward Air Controller schedule, co-ordinated by the Tactical Air Control Party attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade would be the responsive system in filling the FAC requirements of both units. The soundness of this plan was demonstrated as the operation progressed.

The FAC's were airborne over the AO's during all daylight hours of the operation and were standing by on ground alert status during all night hours. Had either unit TACP attempted individually to cover only their individual units, this constant coverage would not have been possible, because of the limited amount of aircraft and pilots available to each TACP.

Both the FAC and Tactical Air coverage provided during the operation were of the highest quality and contributed to the overall success of the mission.

FAC and fighter/bomber sorties flown and/or directed by the 11th Armored Cavalry Forward Air Controller.

(1) Total O-1 Sorties - 63

(a) Forward Air Control - 18

(b) Visual Reconnaissance - 36

(c) Escort (Convoy) - 9

(2) Fighter Support:

(a) Total strike aircraft missions - 22

(c) Immediate Missions - 7 (18 sorties)

(d) Preplanned missions - 15 (44 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of forces:

(a) Immediate missions - by flight

1 2 F-5 (CBU, napalm, bombs, 20mm)
2 3 F-5 (20mm)
3 2 357 (Napalm, bombs)
4 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
5 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
6 2 F-100 (Rockets, bombs)
7 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)

(b) Preplanned Missions:

1 3 F-5 (bombs)
2 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
3 3 F-4C (Napalm, bombs)
4 3 F-100 (Napalm)
5 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
6 2 F-100 (bombs)
7 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
8 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
9 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs)
10 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
11 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
12 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
13 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)

245

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Employment and results: Of the total of twenty-two Tactical Air Support missions listed above, [illegible] were employed in a close support role against enemy troops and the remaining against ground targets such as fortifications and tunnels, or at positions where hard targets were suspected.

One close air support mission controlled by a FAC from the 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party and flown for elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade resulted in four VC KIA (BC). Additional results were thirteen bunkers uncovered or destroyed, 239 meters of trench uncovered or destroyed, forty-two fox holes uncovered or destroyed, and three small structures destroyed.

e. Engineer Support: The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided direct engineer support to the Regiment as follows:

(1) Bridging: After the failure of a Class 60 Bailey Bridge in the area of operations elements of the company cleared the rubble of the old span and prepared the site to enable the 1st Engineer Battalion to employ a temporary AVLB span.

(2) Road Clearing: Extensive mine clearing operations were conducted by utilizing mine detecting equipment in suspected mine locations in the Regimental AO.

(3) Demolition: Extensive demolition operations were required to neutralize enemy bunkers, tunnels, booby traps and mines. Over four kilometers of enemy tunnel complexes were reconnoitered and/or destroyed.

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Armed Helicopter Support: Preplanned and Immediate missions were run on a daily basis. Preplanned missions included convoy escort and reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. Immediate missions included escort of UH-1D DUST-OFF aircraft and on-call supporting fires provided to units in contact. The basic fighting and maneuvering element was the Light Fire Team consisting of (2) two UH-1C armed helicopters. Other missions flown in support of the operation included ambush reaction force, convoy escort, reconnaissance by fire, and river patrol flights. Timely support was achieved by stationing the armed helicopters at the Regimental Forward and/or Squadron Command Posts as appropriate.

(2) Administrative Helicopter Support: Combat and road reconnaissance, logistic troop and cargo lift, command and control, and MEDEVAC missions were flown during the operation. A total of 706 missions entailing 513 flying hours were flown. Fifty-one tons of cargo and 1,320 passengers were carried.

(3) DUST-OFF Helicopter Support: DUST-OFF's were flown on an "on-call" basis and the reaction time was good. In many cases inflight aircraft were called to perform the evacuation, thus cutting reaction time to a minimum. Twelve individuals were evacuated by the 11th Armored Cavalry elements, fifteen by other DUST-OFF aircraft. Evacuation was to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, and the 12th Evacuation Hospital. All wounded or injured personnel evacuated from the field were taken by DUST-OFF.

(4) Special Techniques: The "Fire-Fly" or "Lightning Bug" missions proved to be unsuccessful. The XENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 feet or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Anticipated enemy situation:

No VC Main Force units were known to be located in the IRON TRIANGLE. However, Main Force units had previously been located in and had operated throughout the area, and it was considered possible that contact with VC Main Force units would be made.

The IRON TRIANGLE area had long been under VC domination and had the local population under firm control. It was expected, therefore, that contact with local

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force units from squad to company size could be made. Enemy emplacement of mines and booby traps was expected throughout the area, and enemy sniper, harrassing, and mortar attacks were anticipated. It was believed that the VC would defend valuable stores cached throughout the [redacted] until the materiel could be evacuated or concealed. It was anticipated that the VC would then withdraw to prevent destruction of their units by US forces.

b. Actual Enemy Situation.

The intelligence estimate proved to be quite accurate. No Main Force VC units were contacted during the operation. Small unit actions predominated during the operation. In only one instance was even a platoon engaged. The expected mines, booby traps, snipers, and harassing mortar attacks materialized as anticipated.

"A total of 177 separate facilities were found which ranged from foxholes and trenches to bunkers and tunnel complexes, and to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously available intelligence information, principally the VC installations list, shows that 156 or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average error for these 156 installations was 1,957 (E-W) by 1,477 (N-S) or an average radial error of slightly over 200 meters. Thus the values of utilizing the VC Installation list, normally published as a P.S to the Intelligence Annex, (of an OPORD) is readily apparent. Such lists should be considered as a starting point for a search of any area." (11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Intelligence Bulletin 38, dated 29 January 1967) The list of enemy installations is included as TAB A.

c. Sources of Information:

The VC installation list in the Operation CEDAR FALLS OPORD reflected such diverse intelligence sources as [redacted] and US divisions, III Corps, IFFV III Corps, LNO's, PC's, and FAC's.

d. Terrain Analysis:

(1) General: The area of interest for Operation CEDAR FALLS, known as the [redacted], lies east of the SAIGON river, south of east-west gridline XT 37, west of National Highway 13, and north of east-west gridline XT 20.

(2) Observation in the [redacted] is dependent on the type of vegetation in the immediate area. Wetlands and rice areas offer good observation both on the ground and in the air. Observation in rubber plantation areas is fair, though dependent on the thickness of the undergrowth in the immediate area. All streams and rivers are lined with trees which limit ground observation. The jungle area in the central portion of the [redacted] severly limited observation.

(3) Fields of Fire:

Fields of fire are good in rubber tree areas, wetlands, and rice paddies. Fields of fire are limited in the dense jungle areas.

(4) Cover:

The major cover available to the enemy is in the form of bunkers and tunnels.

(5) Concealment:

All forested areas offer good concealment. Small, dismounted elements receive excellent concealment in villages and hamlets in the area. The rice paddies offer no concealment.

(6) Obstacles:

The SAIGON River flows from northwest to southeast on the western boundary of the area and varies in width from 100 to 150 meters. The THI TINH River flows generally from the north to the south through the area varying in width from twenty to fifty meters. Both rivers have low and gently sloping banks.

The dense forest which dominates the center of the [illegible] constitutes a major obstacle to cross country movement. The marsh area adjacent to the [illegible] Stream (XT 722325-XT 712286-XT 712275) also severely restricts vehicular movement in the area.

(7) Movement and Avenues of Approach:

Movement is generally channelized to roads and trails in areas of dense growth. Cross country mobility is limited in rice paddies and marshlands. Existing trails and roads offer the best avenues of approach.

(8) Key Terrain Features:

The area is generally a level plain with no prominent or commanding terrain features.

9(C) Mission: The mission of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was to attack west from [illegible] to cut the [illegible] destroying a VC Base Camp (Objective 1), seizing and securing an artillery base (Objective 11) and to destroy a VC [illegible] (Objective 2). The Regiment then was to link-up with heliborne forces and to screen along the eastern edge of the Area of Operations to prevent enemy withdrawal to the east. The Regiment was under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn passed OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the operation.

10. (C) Concept of Operations:

The concept of the operation was to break the operation into two Phases. Phase I was initiated and completed on 8 January. During this phase the Regiment (-1st Sqdn) conducted a night road march from the Regimental Base Camp (Regimental Headquarters, 3rd and Provisional Squadrons) and from [illegible] Base Camp (2nd Squadron) to forward assembly areas, XT 8515. Phase II began on 9 January. The Regiment attacked west from [illegible] and seized Objective 1 and Objective 11. From Objective 1, elements of the Regiment attacked northeast to establish a link-up of heliborne forces in LANDING ZONE 5. Other Regimental elements attacked west from Objective 1 to destroy a VC [illegible] (Objective 2). The Regiment then established a screen along [illegible] and secured engineer bases and work parties. The Regimental maneuver elements then prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors.

11. (C) Execution:

8 January:

At 1200H the Regiment came under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn placed the Blackhorse under the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Regimental Command Post, escorted by [illegible] and the 3rd Squadron Howitzer Battery, initiated (1200H) a road march from the base camp to forward assembly areas north of [illegible] (XT 857162) arriving at 1617H. The Regimental Trains (Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 919th Engineer Company (-) and field trains) with escorts provided by Troop K departed the base camp at 1951H closing at [illegible] (XT 7921) at 2322H.

2nd Squadron:

The 2nd Squadron was located at [illegible], the location of a recently completed operation (Operation CAMAN/DUCK). The first element to move was its Howitzer Battery escorted by an armored cavalry platoon. Crossing the starting point (SP) at 1330H it cleared its release point (RP) at 1627H. The remainder of the squadron departed at 1900H closing in a forward assembly area at 2222H.

3rd Squadron:

The 3rd Squadron (-) made a night move from the Regimental Base Camp at [illegible] to a forward assembly area vicinity XT 7820 closing at 2315H. During the move a ¼ ton truck from Company H was hit by a claymore mine resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. Shortly after the mining incident traffic control elements from the 720th Military Police Battalion received small arms fire and grenades vicinity XT 937069 with negative results. At 2159H, Company M also received one recoilless rifle round (XT 937069) with negative results.

9 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex A - [illegible])

2nd Squadron: At 0015H Troop F, secured Position [illegible] (XT 7232), Troop E moved through Position [illegible] to seize Objective 14, at 0900H, and Troop F then established a screen from XT 652117 to XT 663130. Company H relieved Troop F of the security of Position [illegible] at 1100H. Troop G secured a company from the 1st Engineer Battalion, located at XT 7031, at 1537H. An M.V from Troop G hit a small mine at XT 695315 resulting in a broken track and damaged road wheel. Troop F received an unknown number of small arms rounds at XT 733318 with negative casualties resulting. Company H discovered and evacuated 2200 pounds of rice from XT 703310, and Troop F found 1500 pounds of rice at XT 662307, which later was turned over to the National Police.

3rd Squadron:

At 0912H, Troop I seized Objective 1 at XT 6730. At 1000H, Troop I seized Objective 2 at XT 6630. Troop L initiated search and destroy operations at XT 6628. Beginning at 1300H, Troop L and Company M screened Engineer Base 2 at XT 7031, while Troops I and K moved to secure Engineer Base 3 at XT 6630 and were in position at 1715. During operations on 9 January, Troop K detonated a booby trap with an M-7 at XT 721717, and located twenty foxholes two feet deep and five feet wide at XT 686208. Troop L received ten rounds of sniper fire at XT 650304, and captured 2.2 tons of rice at XT 665302. Troop L observed and fired on two armed VC at XT 684272 with negative results. At 1510H, one trooper from Troop I was wounded by sniper fire, at XT 662306.

10 January: The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was placed OPCON to the Regiment. At 2000H, a 5 ton truck from the Regimental Scout Platoon was hit by a claymore mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage and one US WIA.

2nd Squadron: On 10 January, Troop E secured Engineer TF [illegible] operating along Highway 1A. Troop F screened from XT 634321 to XT 733324. Company H secured an Engineer Base at XT 725318. Troop G escorted Engineer TF [illegible] to 173rd Airborne Brigade boundary at XT 662375. At 1115H Troop G found a hut containing ten tons of rice and three grenades, both of which were booby trapped. The hut and grenades were destroyed, the rice was secured for evacuation.

3rd Squadron: Engineer Bases at XT 671302 and XT 701310 were secured by squadron elements, as was Engineer TF DELTA operating between XT 677306, and XT 671325. Troops I, K, and L conducted search and destroy operations in the assigned AO. During these operations Troop I found a squad sized base camp at YT 660310, in which was found one M26 US grenade, M-16 ammunition, and an unidentified part of a large caliber weapon. Troop I captured one VCS the camp out of a tunnel and surrendered at XT 662305. Troop I received four rounds of small arms fire at XT 675305, with negative casualties resulting. Troop L found and destroyed numerous punji stakes in the vicinity of XT 707315, and a Company M dozer tank hit an AT mine with negative casualties. A wheeled vehicle from Troop L was hit by a claymore mine at 2007H in the vicinity of XT 722236 resulting in one US WIA and light vehicle damage. At 1015H Company M discovered and destroyed an extensive tunnel system under buildings at XT 700312, and at 1153H uncovered a base camp. The camp, located at XT 699314 had an extensive tunnel and bunker system which was reinforced by logs. 1 VC was captured during a search of the camp, assorted radio equipment, documents, Rice, C Rations and medical supplies. Some of the tunnels were booby trapped.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry: Squadron elements established a screen from XT 682313 to XT 662373. At 1900H, a tank from Troop B hit a mine in the vicinity of XT 659359 blowing off a track and four road wheels and wounding one individual. At 2215H Troop K received ten rounds of small arms fire with negative casualties.

11 January:

The Regiment remained under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery [illegible] OPCON to the Regiment at 0700H. (See Annex B - FIELD ORDER 2 OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

2nd Squadron:

Troop D secured Engineer and Artillery Base 3 at XT 725318 while Troop G secured an Engineer Base at XT 701[illegible]. Company E secured the bridgehead at Position GIDEON. Troop F continued its screening mission from XT 634321 to XT 682343. Troop G found a platoon sized base camp at XT 654325. Troop E received two CHICOM RPG at XT 671302. An M113 from Troop F ran over a 105mm shell rigged as a mine, but detonated only the fuse.

3rd Squadron:

Company C, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached effective 0700H. The squadron attacked south along Axis CAT at 0900H, from XT 6730 along Route 14 to seize objectives at XT 715238, XT 725243, XT 744238, and XT 744237, and to clear Area X-RAY (XT 6925) while enroute. Troop K conducted search and destroy operations in Area X-RAY. Troop I secured Objective 1 at 1055H; Company M secured Objective 2 at 1306H, and Objective 3 at 1545H; Troop L secured Objective 4 at 1640H. Troop I found 2 VC KIA (BC) at XT 708244 and detained nineteen persons at XT 671302. Interrogation revealed that they had been hiding for two days; two individuals also had large sums of money on them. Troop K discovered an undetermined amount of rice in a village at XT 668300 which was evacuated by the 1st Infantry Division. The Troop engaged 1 VC at XT 704242 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1132H, the troop received small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 725324, and at 1251H, an M113 hit a mine at XT 708254. Neither incident resulted in casualties or vehicular damage. At 1500H, the troop evacuated 700 pounds of rice from XT 746218. Troop L detained one person at XT 695302 at 0430H. At 1430H, thirty to fifty small arms rounds were fired at the troops. A search of the area (XT 699260) from which the fire came disclosed 2 CHICOM AT mines, 5 CHICOM grenades, 2 rounds RPG-2 ammunition, a siren, 150 rounds of Caliber .30 ammunition and 1½ tons of rice, all of which were evacuated. At 1545H, the troop uncovered another twenty-five tons of rice, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing, and ten bicycles in the vicinity of XT 695247. All material and foodstuffs were evacuated. Company F received light small arms fire twice during the day without casualties. At 1030H the company found and destroyed one mine in the road at XT 695257. At 1145H, one of its tanks hit a mine at XT 698250 with negative casualties or damage. At 1147H, the company received three mortar rounds which fell short at XT 697256. Another tank hit an AP mine at XT 693257, disabling the tank without causing any casualties. A 105mm artillery shell rigged as a command detonated mine was discovered emplaced at XT 747226. Five minutes later a AP round also rigged as a mine was found at XT 748227. Both rounds were blown in place. As the mines were being blown, elements of the company observed men dressed in black pajamas who appeared to be mining the road at XT 767213. The men scattered as a tank went to investigate. At 1930H, seven VC were spotted and taken under fire resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one US M1 carbine captured.

1st Squadron 4th Cavalry:

Elements of the squadron blocked from XT 663373 to XT 682343. At 1308H, an M113 from Troop A hit a pressure mine at XT 685344 with no casualties or damage resulting from the incident. The Troop located and burned 5000 pounds of rice at XT 662370.

12 January:

The Regiment continued to remain OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. 2nd Squadron became OPCON to 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at 0700H, as did the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery (-). At 1720H, two Regimental Light Fire Teams located one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations in areas O, P, and Q. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached. At 0620H, Troop I spotted movement in front of their perimeter, and fired into the area resulting in the capture of one wounded VC at XT 722236. Troop I discovered and destroyed two 100 pound AP bombs at XT 722230. Forty-five minutes later, at 1000H, the troop found a bunker and tunnel (XT 720228) with a booby-trapped grenade and parts of an unknown type of fixed wing aircraft. The troop also uncovered and evacuated a cache of 5.5 tons of rice in the vicinity of XT 722722. An hour earlier, at 1100H, six tons of

rice and a sampan was found at XT 724270. The sampan was destroyed and the rice evacuated. The troop discovered 1200 pounds of rice at XT 731237. The rice, found at 1525H, was evacuated. At 1555H, the troop found an abandoned hut with four booby-trapped grenades and a dugout with a tunnel that appeared to be a small workshop for making mines, as tools were found in the tunnel. The complex and material were destroyed at XT 733227. Troop H found three tons of rice at XT 735219 which was evacuated. At 1010H, the troop located a five by six foot cave at XT 722233, containing ten pounds of clothing. Ten minutes later a large tunnel was found at XT 731228. The tunnel was searched with negative results. At 1039H, a hut containing 300 pounds of rice was discovered and destroyed. Just nine minutes later two huts were found at XT 718234 which contained twenty tons of rice, all of which was evacuated. At noon the troop had two VC WIA hit by command detonated mines in the vicinity of XT 736218 damaging road wheels on both vehicles, resulting in vegetive casualties. Two hours later the troop received fire from a command detonated mine which resulted in one individual WIA, and slight damage to the M113. At 1535H, the troop engaged in a fire fight with a VC unit of unknown size. A heavy volume of automatic and small arms fire was received as well as three rounds of recoilless rifle fire. One APC was damaged in the fight, but there were no friendly casualties. Troop L spotted five VC in the vicinity of XT 716234 at 1120H. A patrol chasing the VC was hit by two claymore mines resulting in four US KIA and three US WIA. Company H found a 105mm round wired for command detonation at XT 718234 and destroyed it in place. At 1130H, the company found a bunker at XT 715230 containing one 155mm round rigged as a command detonated mine. The bunker and mine were blown in place. Five minutes later an AT mine surrounded by five AP mines was found and destroyed at XT 718233. At 1130H, the company had received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire at XT 717232, resulting in one US WIA. Fifteen minutes later the company found an AT mine at XT 717232 and blew it in place. At 1210H, the company found three CHICOM grenades at XT 715233 and destroyed them in place. A well constructed tunnel in the vicinity of XT 717232 was found at 1430H, and was constructed to a depth of 250 meters. Documents and a diagram were found in the tunnel. The underground complex was marked for future operations. At 1625H, the company found a tunnel, freshly occupied, containing five pounds of documents, overlays, technical manuals, 2 CHICOM grenades and 120 rounds of 7.62mm rounds. The tunnel (at XT 714244) was destroyed. At 2040H, the company observed 2 VC attempting to turn a claymore mine toward friendly positions. The claymore was detonated, resulting in one VC KIA (BC).

13 January:

2nd Squadron reverted to logistical control at 1657H. The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Troop G discovered and exploded in place a 155mm round equipped for command detonation at XT 693335. At 1405H, a small base camp with ten huts was found in the vicinity of XT 691314. A 60mm mortar round found in the camp was blown in place. A second base camp was discovered at XT 6933.

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, remained attached. Troop I found fifteen 100 pound bags of rice in the vicinity of XT 722227. At 1230H, a tunnel containing two booby-trapped grenades which were destroyed, was located at XT 717243. A hidden complex of huts was located at 1234H, at XT 718242, which contained one pound of documents. The huts were destroyed and the documents evacuated. At 1400H, fifteen CBU bomblets rigged as booby traps were found in and around trails at XT 733225. One US was WIA, and the booby traps were destroyed. At 1359H, thirty to forty rounds of small arms fire was received by the troop with no casualties resulting. The fire was returned at XT 733224, with unknown results. At 1436H, a 100 pound bomb rigged as a pressure mine was found surrounded by punji stakes at XT 719245. The bomb was destroyed and the punji stakes were buried. A trench three to four feet deep was found running northeast for an undetermined distance beginning at XT 713247. Troop K found a tunnel complex at XT 743219 at 1030H. The tunnel had three branches and was destroyed. More tunnels were found in the vicinity of XT 716224 containing documents and clothing. The tunnels, discovered at 1140H, were destroyed, and the documents evacuated. A tunnel and cave complex with compartments was discovered at XT 734232, and destroyed at 1215H. Forty booby-trapped grenades were found at

XT 720240, and destroyed at 1231H. A small base camp at XT 734226, was found containing three small tunnels and one AP mine. The camp was destroyed at 1250H. Twenty minutes later a sampan was sighted and destroyed at XT 746223. Five pressure fuses found at XT 712223, were destroyed at 1430H. At 1440H, an ACAV hit two AT mines at XT 702252, causing slight damage. At 1500H, another ACAV was slightly damaged by an AT mine. Neither incident produced any casualties. At 1520H, a 250 pound bomb was found at XT 742216, and destroyed in place. Thirty-two bags of rice, each weighing 100 pounds, were found at XT 746218. A booby trap under a bed was found in a hut at XT 746218, and destroyed. Troop L tripped a booby-trapped grenade hanging in a tree resulting in three US WIA. At 1209H, an ACAV track was blown off by a mine at XT 720240, however, there were no casualties. A 250 pound bomb wired for detonation was found at XT 720240 and destroyed at 1220H. A Company D tank struck a mine at XT 716245 resulting in the track being blown off. The incident occurred at 0715H. At 1020H, a tunnel complex with six entrances was found at XT 745234. Only the northern portion of the tunnel had been sealed by the VC. The search continued to the next day. Howitzer Battery killed one armed VC PDF attempting to escape at 1425H in the vicinity of XT 752328 with the 525st Military Intelligence Detachment assisting. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry found a booby trap igniter at XT 747218 and destroyed it at 1220H. At 1540H, it destroyed a sampan at XT 730214 and two tons of rice found in the vicinity of XT 730214.

14 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex C - ATTACHED AND OPCON UNITS (OVERLAY)

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron continued to provide security for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troops E and F, and Company B conducted search and destroy operations northeast of Route 14 from XT 7325 to XT 7523. An ACAV from Troop E received moderate damage from an AT mine at XT 711248 detonated at 0830H, resulting in 2 US WIA in the incident. Mine sweeping in the area resulted in the discovery of a forty pound CHICOM mine. At 1030H, the troop located two hand grenade mines at XT 712247, and destroyed them in place. The troop received ten rounds of automatic weapons fire at 1415H with no casualties resulting. A CBU bomblet located by the troop was destroyed in place at 1650H. An ACAV of Troop F detonated an AP mine in the vicinity of XT 693259 at 1045H with no casualties or damage experienced. A tank from Company B, received moderate damage at 0830H in the area of XT 711248, from a pressure type AT mine.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached to the squadron as elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the area from XT 7241 to XT 7124. Troop I engaged a VC squad at XT 728219 at 1210H with no casualties on either side. Troop H found one CHICOM carbine in a tunnel at XT 739216. Search operations for 14 January resulted in the capture of eleven pounds of documents, one pound of medical supplies, and thirty-three tons of rice. Destroyed were eleven tunnels, one base camp, six structures, twenty-six pounds of small arms ammunition, four 60mm mortar rounds, two 105mm artillery rounds, one 155mm artillery round, twenty-three CBU bomblets, two 100 pound bombs, one 250 pound bomb, three mines, three grenades and 1.85 tons of rice.

15 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop G continued security operations for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. At 0806H, Troop F sustained one US WIA from a command detonated claymore mine and small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 731254. The fire was returned with unknown results. Thirty minutes later a tank attached to the troop from Company B, detonated two claymore mines at the same location. There were no casualties and no damage sustained from the action. At 1115H, the troop sustained one US WIA, after receiving ten rounds of small arms fire from

XT 733219. At 1310H, a booby trap detonated at XT 736218 causing six US WIA from the troop. Search operations resulted in the squadron capturing and evacuating [illegible]-two tons of rice and two half pound sets of documents. Thirteen grenades, two huts, two claymore mines, one 155mm round, one CBU bomblet, and fifteen 81mm mortar rounds were also destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the squadron. Elements of the squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop L sustained 2 US KIA from the explosion of a booby-trapped grenade at XT 716245 at 1020H. Five minutes later one grenade and automatic weapons fire were received; fire was returned with unknown results, and there were no casualties to the troop. An ACAV hit a mine at 1040H, in the same location sustaining light damage to the vehicle. At 1100H, Company D engaged a VC force of unknown size and killed one VC (DC). During a DUSTOFF, in support of Company D, two US were WIA and one KIA from sniper fire. Two VC VCs from Company H were destroyed by two large command detonated mines at XT 733219. Seven US were WIA, and one KIA. Squadron operations for 15 January netted the capture of 5.5 pounds of documents, one-half pound of medical supplies, two CHICOM carbines, two US carbines, one US submachinegun, and 27.8 tons of rice. In addition two tunnels, one base camp, seven structures, five CBU bomblets, six mines, and seven tons of rice were destroyed.

16 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Troop G continued to secure engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troop F encountered light small arms fire at XT 726246. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1125H, a Company A tank detonated an unknown type of booby trap killing one individual from the company. At 0300H, two CHIEU HOI surrendered to a patrol from the company at XT 716245. At 1559H, Troop E found one CHICOM type 56 carbine and one US caliber .30 rifle. Operations for 16 January resulted in the capture of 21.4 tons of rice, one CHICOM carbine, and one US rifle evacuated, and the destruction of three 105mm artillery rounds, one 81mm mortar round, one 60mm mortar round and 1.5 tons of polished rice.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry was detached at 0732H. Troop K found one Russian Mosin rifle in a tunnel at XT 739216. At 1430H, elements of the troop observed one VC entering a tunnel at XT 734222; the VC was pursued resulting in one VC killed and the capture of one M1 Carbine. An hour and a half later the troop killed two VC(DC) and captured one caliber .45 pistol and one type 43 CHICOM submachinegun at XT 712236. Elements of Company H searching a tunnel received automatic weapons fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA, at XT 741221. Operations for the day terminated with the squadron capturing (in addition to the items noted above) 16.5 pounds of documents, ten pounds of clothing, one rifle, one carbine, one grenade, and 100 rounds of CHICOM small arms ammunition. Three mines, and three grenades were also destroyed.

17 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in an area immediately to the northeast of Highway 14. Troop G provided security for two engineer work parties (XT 725318 and XT 701311). A tank/ACAV team from Troop E, while searching an area from which a Blackhorse UH-1D received fire, uncovered several bunkers. During search and destroy operations both Troop E and F discovered large caches of rice and numerous bunkers and tunnel complexes; one of which was a

hospital complex at XT 734247, con[illegible] a mess area, trenches, and foxholes. A tunnel with a stone plug was found at XT 734255. At XT 734255, at XT 736250 a tunnel was discovered and searched for approximately 400 meters. A total of 45 tons of rice was also evacuated and five AK's, five C RGD-5 grenades, and twenty-seven tons of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I discovered one US type M2 carbine and found a tunnel complex at XT 733223. The troop also found and destroyed a 500 pound bomb in the same area. A company M tank hit a pressure type mine at XT 739216 resulting in only light vehicle damage. At 0900H, and again at 1115H, Company M killed a VC (BC) by a booby trap. In addition to the two VC KIA (BC), one US type M1 carbine was captured. Besides the above mentioned items, twenty-one pounds of documents, one camera, and one bundle of clothing were captured and evacuated.

18 January:

The Regiment remained under operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector adjacent to Highway 14. Troop E discovered a tunnel at XT 726254, and found and recovered eight tons of rice from a bunker at XT 732245. Troop F discovered and evacuated six rolls of barbed wire from XT 730244. The troop also found a battalion size complex of bunkers and tunnels at XT741239 containing a Soviet flag and ten pounds of documents. A company sized base camp at XT 746241 was located containing ten tons of rice which was evacuated.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I found a mechanism mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun which was constructed of US, non-US and VC fabricated parts. A tunnel containing six VC was found and the tunnel was destroyed by acetylene gas, resulting in six VC KIA (POSS), at XT 733224. A large tunnel complex consisting of numerous long branches was found at XT 732222. Troop K found two tunnels and five bunkers at XT 736218. Nine tons of rice was evacuated from the bunkers. 100 feet of tunnel was demolished at XT 742215. A patrol from the troop killed one VC (BC) at XT 723232 at 1900H. An APC in Company M detonated a small mine at XT 735224 with no casualties or damage resulting. A base camp containing fourteen tons of rice was found at XT 743222. A tunnel entrance at XT 743224 was booby-trapped. Operations for the day resulted in four US grenades, and one AT mine captured in addition, three tunnels and three grenades were destroyed.

19 January:

The Regiment continued operations under control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued to search and clear operations northeast of Highway 14. Company M was relieved of the security of engineer work parties at two locations by elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Troop E discovered fifteen tons of booby-trapped rice at XT 735236. After disarming the booby trap, the rice was evacuated. In the same area the troop discovered and destroyed one ton of spoiled rice. An additional twenty-five tons of rice was evacuated at XT 745233. A twenty pound claymore was located and destroyed at XT 735234. Troop F destroyed forty pounds of rice found in a bunker that had been searched the day before. A booby trap emplaced the day before had been triggered, but there was no sign of blood in the area. The troop discovered and evacuated 20 tons of rice from XT 742237.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned

sector. Company K became OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry at 0700H, with one platoon returning to squadron control at 1800H. Though the squadron experienced only slight VC contact during the day, five tons of rice were captured and five bunkers, two tunnels, fifty pounds of ammonium nitrate, one 57mm recoilless rifle round, and one CHICOM booblet were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector and in additional dispatched sniper patrols into selected areas. Troop E remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I discovered one CHICOM type 53 carbine, a British Enfield rifle, and four pounds of documents at XT 728227. The tunnel was destroyed, and when the destruction charge was triggered two secondary explosions occurred with grey and white smoke appearing. Troop L destroyed a tunnel in which a CHICOM type 53 carbine had been found at XT 717233. Four tons of rice were destroyed at XT 745224 by the troop. Company K found a bunker with seventeen pounds of composition C-4 utilising part of the explosive to destroy the bunker. The company destroyed two concrete and steel reinforced bunkers at XT 737221.

21 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector while Company K (-) remained OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry. Though there was no significant contact with the enemy, Troop G found two fresh graves containing two VC at XT 748238, and destroyed one small base camp and one tunnel.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. One eighteen foot was destroyed by Troop I, as were two US 2.75" aerial rockets, two hits, and one tunnel. Troop L netted four CHICOM MOL's during the day. A patrol killed one VC (DC) at XT 740215. Company M destroyed a squad size base camp and discovered and evacuated fourteen tons of rice from XT 738223.

22 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex D FRAGORD 12 OPERATIONS OVERLAY). At 0705H, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron, less detached units, conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company M (-), remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Troop E became OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry. There was no significant contact with the enemy during the day's operations. However, one French 8mm M1916 rifle, one type 98 7.92mm rifle and one US rifle were captured as was a VC constructed caliber .30 rifle. 2 huts, 2 grenades, 4 tunnels and one half ton of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector of operations. Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry was attached effective 0800H, for operations. Although enemy contact was negligible, operations netted 3000 CHWN Piasters, ten tons of rice, fifty rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and one type 53 CHICOM carbine.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies within their assigned sector. No significant enemy contact was reported. However, Company B, did find one VC KIA (DC) in the THI TINH River at XT 764215, and received one CHICOM WIA at XT 735256.

Operations for the day resulted in the capture of 1.5 tons of rice, one pound of documents, one bicycle, and forty-six rounds of small arms ammunition. 500 pounds of rice, one grenade, four sampans, ten huts, and one small base camp were destroyed.

23 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the squadron while Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I found 2 dead VC (BC) who appeared to have been dead two to four days. A sniper patrol from Troop L accounted for one VC KIA (BC) at XT 722232. The operations during the day resulted in the destruction of one 200 pound bomb, three tunnels, three huts and one ton of rice.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies in its sector. Operations for the day accounted for 900 pounds of rice, five huts, three sampans, five bunkers, and one hand grenade destroyed.

24 January:

Operation CEDAR FALLS was terminated and the Regiment was released from the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at 1710H. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the Regiment and was integrated into the tactical road march of the 2nd Squadron. The battalion was released to its parent unit upon arrival at BIEN HOA.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from BEN CAT (XT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp closing with the main body at 1710H. Trail elements closed at 2310H without incident.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from BEN CAT (XT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp. The main body closed at 1455H, and the trail party closed at 2240H. There were no incidents during the march.

12. (C) Results:

a. Personnel:

26 VC KIA (BC) and 13 VC KIA (POSS). Seventy-four individuals were detained, and eight VC were captured. Twelve VC turned themselves in as CHIEU HOI'S.

b. Fortifications and Buildings:

Sixty tunnels or tunnel complexes were found and all were partially or completely destroyed. Six base camps, fifteen bunkers and forty-seven huts were also destroyed.

c. Material:

Twenty-nine small arms were captured, along with 1100 rounds of ammunition. 174 mines were captured or destroyed as were 108 artillery or mortar shells. Thirteen rounds of medicine, six rolls of barbed wire, 150 burlap bags, one machine-gun tripod and seventeen pounds of C-4 explosive were captured.

d. Miscellaneous Items and Foodstuffs:

479.5 tons of rice was captured of which only 79.5 tons had to be destroyed. The remaining 400 tons were returned to the CVN. One camera, fourteen bicycles, one 300 gallon fuel tank, CVN 53000, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing and one siren as well as one gross of eight inch bolts were captured. Twenty sampans were destroyed.

e. Friendly Losses:

Friendly losses included eight US KIA, fifty-one US lightly WIA, six seriously WIA. Material losses were eight ACAV's, four tanks and four wheeled vehicles damaged. Two ACAV's and one tank were destroyed.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

Administrative plans for the operation proved to be adequate, and logistical support kept pace with combat requirements throughout the operation. Classes I, III, and IIIA were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) at FSB LOI. Class V and VI and some Class IIIA were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command FSA located at LAI KHE. Maintenance Support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. Regimental and Squadron Trains operated from a central location at the FSB LOI Base Camp under the direction of the Regimental S4 and the Regimental Logistical Control Center.

a. Resupply:

Land lines of communications and daily resupply convoys were the primary methods of resupply for the operation. Organic transportation was the only transportation used except for Chinook helicopter air lift of water, rations, POL, and ammunition to the 3rd Squadron.

b. Maintenance:

The maintenance support furnished by the 188th Maintenance Battalion was outstanding, and at times approached "Instant Maintenance". Items declined as the result of combat action one day were, in the majority of cases, ready for action the next day.

c. POL Statistics:

Issue of the following types of POL products was accomplished during the operation: JP4-18,400 gallons, MOGAS-3805 gallons, MOGAS-55200 gallons, Diesel-34,000 gallons.

d. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties:

Although there were many lightly wounded casualties not requiring treatment, there were forty-six injuries as a result of hostile action treated during the operation. In addition, twenty-two individuals received treatment from non-hostile injuries. Of this total, nineteen DUSTOFF's and twenty-two individuals injured by other than hostile action were evacuated. All individuals evacuated were air-lifted by DUST-OFF to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, the 12th Evacuation Hospital, or the 3rd Surgical Hospital.

e. Communications:

Communications to the Regimental Base Camp and to higher headquarters was maintained by a multitude of communications methods as listed below.

(1) FM Nets:

11th Armored Cavalry entered the 173rd Airborne Brigade Command Net and the 173rd Admin/Intel Net with no difficulties encountered.

(2) Telephone Circuits:

(a) A Sole User (Point to Point) circuit was established between the 11th Armored Cavalry TOC and the 173rd Airborne Brigade TOC with excellent results.

257

(b) Common User circuits were established between the 173rd Forward Switchboard and the Blackhorse Forward Switchboard providing access to the Army Telephone System.

(3) Teletypewriter:

A common user circuit from Blackhorse Forward through the 173rd Airborne Brigade Forward and into the Army System was utilized.

(4) Regimental Trains Telephone:

Four common user circuits were established to the 1st Infantry Division Switchboard and into the Army System.

(5) Radio Teletype to Base Camp:

An AN/RITT Net was established to the Regimental Base Camp from the Regimental Field location by using an AN/GRC-26D at the Base Camp.

(6) Telephone to Base Camp:

Point to point circuits were established from Blackhorse Forward to Blackhorse Rear.

(7) Teletypewriter to Base Camp:

The circuit to base camp was operated from Blackhorse Forward through 173rd Airborne Brigade and II Force V circuits.

(8) FM to Base Camp:

An FM Administrative Net was operated by use of tactical radios on an intermittent basis as needed.

f. Administration:

Routine administration continued to operate smoothly in spite of the great distance between the field location and the administrative center at the Regimental Base Camp. This was accomplished by a daily run to the field location by the S-1. Replacements were sent to the field by a Caribou aircraft flown by the Air Force on a daily basis. The same aircraft was used to transport R&R personnel to and from [illegible] SOC TRUT Air Force Base. During the month the R&R program was greatly enlarged, and proved to be extremely beneficial to the morale of the troops on the operation.

14. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques:

The major innovation in military techniques employed during the operation is covered in paragraph 7,b, and paragraph 7,d,4.

15. (U) Commander's Analysis:

The operation, combining an initial rapid maneuver phase, a search and destroy phase, and screening, blocking and security missions demonstrated the great flexibility of the Blackhorse Regiment. The initial night move to assembly areas was rapid and smooth. The attack on successive objectives, the linkup with heliborne forces and establishment of screen and blocking positions demonstrated that the Regiment is capable of moving fast and arriving at its destination in excellent fighting trim.

The unique quality of the operation that the 11th Armored Cavalry demonstrated its ability to conduct comprehensive, thorough and effective search and destroy operations. The discovery and destruction of sixty tunnel complexes and discovery and evacuation of well over 470 tons of rice are effective testimony to that fact.

The search and destroy portion of Operation CUT R [illegible]US was the final combat test of the modified TOE designed to tailor the Regiment's organization to the requirements of counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam.

The search and destroy operations, plus the allied saturation and sniper patrols, and tunnel search operations proved the validity of the MTOE. There proved to be sufficient personnel in the basic maneuver element - the Armored Cavalry Platoon - to allow for required dismounted tunnel and patrolling operations while maintaining sufficient crew members on the ACAV's to maintain the platoon's mounted combat capabilities.

15. (C) Recommendations: (Lessons Learned)

a. Operations:

(1) Item:

Discussion:

Saturation patrolling is the technique of placing many small patrols in areas of expected enemy activity.

The technique is best employed along definite and linear terrain features such as stream beds, trails, canals, and any probable enemy avenues of approach.

Three to four man patrols are situated all along the terrain feature, and lay in wait for the enemy.

Should an enemy force approach, one, two, or all of the patrols in the area can engage the force.

Saturation patrolling proved effective on Operation CEDAR FALLS.

Observation: Saturation patrolling can be effectively employed in armored cavalry search and destroy operations.

(2) Item: Sniper Patrols

Discussion:

The sniper patrol is a smaller version of the night ambush patrol.

Each patrol is equipped with an M-79 grenade launcher, 3 M-16 rifles, and a radio.

The patrols are positioned near known or suspected rice caches and tunnel entrances.

It was discovered that the patrols proved to be a valuable source of information on VC daylight activities.

Observation: Like saturation patrolling, sniper patrolling was proven to be a valuable adjunct to armored cavalry operations.

(3) Item: Discovery of rice caches.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS it was observed that anytime a large cache of rice had been discovered, a flock of small birds had been frightened away by the approach of friendly troops. Accordingly, any time a flock of birds was noticed, a search for a rice cache was made in the area.

Observation: Flocks of birds should be watched to assist in locating rice caches.

(4) Item: Indications provided by intense booby-trapping.

Discussion: It was learned on Operation CEDAR FALLS that intense booby-trapping of a particular area was a good indication that valuable stores were hidden nearby.

Observation: Analysis of the disposition of booby traps in an area can lead to the discovery of valuable VC stores and materiel.

(5) Item: MLI fires along trails.

Discussion:

The effective use of MLI air bursts along trails prevented the VC from thoroughly emplacing mines, thus permitting easy detection by friendly forces.

One squadron uncovered nine poorly emplaced mines in an area that had received air burst MLI fires the night before.

Observation: Expeditious use of air burst MLI fires may prevent the enemy from properly emplacing mines.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Item: Centralized Interrogation and Document Exploitation.

Discussion: All available Military Intelligence personnel at the centrally located center have the following advantages over scattered MI Detachments located with Battalion size units:

Readily accessable to the commander.

Man hours saved in collaborating PW statements.

Rapid association between documents and PWs.

Rapid dissemination of information to all subordinate, adjacent, and higher elements.

Controlled work load, i.e., the CIC is able to interrogate PWs and exploit documents on a timely basis whereas in separate units one MI Detachment may have an overload while another is idle.

Availability of technical experts.

Economy of space, time, and resources.

Observations: Recommend that centralized interrogation and document exploitation teams be utilized during future multi-unit operations.

(2) Item: Use of Military Police in handling PCWs.

Discussion: This was the first opportunity the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had to use TOE Military Police units during operations, and it was found that Military Police possess the following advantages over unit police:

Specifically trained in the various techniques used in handling PCWs.

Frees combat personnel from a responsibility they are not especially trained for.

Insures the rapid and efficient handling of PCWs.

Releases interrogator personnel from the additional requirement of supervising the handling of PCWs.

Observations: Military Police personnel, when available, greatly facilitate the processing and safeguarding of PCWs during combat operations.

(3) Item: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of detainees, PWs, and Chieu Hoi's.

Discussion: During this operation detainees, PWs, and Chieu Hoi's were evacuated by the fastest means available (generally by air) to the centralized interrogation point. At this location a rapid evaluation of the individual was made. Those personnel who had knowledge of storage locations or fortifications were quickly dispatched to interested units where they could be used as guides. Those Chieu Hoi's who knew or suspected the whereabouts of other possible Chieu Hoi's, were placed in a speaker aircraft and attempted to talk their cohorts into rallying.

Observations: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of VCs and soldiers successful in the majority of cases. Recommend this tactic be continued in future operations.

c. Civil Affairs:

Item: Evacuation of captured rice from the battlefield.

Discussion:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment captured a considerable quantity of rice from widely dispersed caches in the [illegible]. Since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment could not evacuate the rice due to its combat mission, all possible forms of evacuation were considered. Consideration was given to the use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies. However, at the time there was insufficient transportation available to move the rice. Efforts were made to have the rice transported by the trucks organic to the 18th ARVN Division, and although the request was not denied outright, the Division set a pick up date so far in the future as to be unacceptable. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment then appealed to Provincs, and after considerable pressure had been applied through advisory channels, the rice was partially extracted from the centralized collection point in the vicinity of [illegible].

Observation:

The difficulties in evacuation of foodstuffs by transportation organic to combat units in a combat situation are numerous and complex. The extensive logistical demands of attacking units, coupled with the highly mobile nature of combat operations, made the use of organic transportation impractical.

The use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies offers a possible solution, but in a guerilla warfare environment adequate security would be essential for the vehicles, even when operating well behind the zone of contact. Often such security forces will not be available.

The most practical and logical means of foodstuff evacuation in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment TAOR is by ARVN's organic transportation units. They have the vehicles necessary for such missions as well as the manpower to provide their own security and labor to load and unload the rice. Such a mission is appropriate to ARVN, with its assigned mission of following up and consolidating VC gains as well as participation in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Another solution is to give the mission to Province Headquarters, and have them coordinate the transportation needed through such agencies as public works or RF units, both of which have organic transportation. This type of mission would give either ARVN or RF units an excellent chance for a worthwhile Civic Action Program. To gain GVN cooperation, the US unit should notify the Vietnamese there rice has been captured and consolidated, the amount of rice allocated to them, and give the Vietnamese a reasonable length of time to pick it up. If they fail to pick up the rice within this time and have no valid excuse, the rice or other foodstuffs should be destroyed. That quantity of rice, or its dollar equivalent should be deducted from the provincial food or money allocation for the next month. If the Vietnamese were willing to fulfill their responsibility to their own people, much of the present destruction of rice in Vietnam would be unnecessary. Experience with the Vietnamese has demonstrated that as long as they feel the US will do a task for them, they have little incentive to help themselves. It is felt that the above proposal would provide this much needed incentive.

d. [illegible]:

Item: Use of loudspeakers on UH-1D helicopters to get VC to Chieu Hoi.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS, 30 Chieu Hoi's rallied as the direct result of messages they heard from 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment UH-1D helicopter loudspeaker ships. The speaker ship would fly over areas where the VC were hiding and tell them to give up or they would die. As soon as one VC gave up he was taken up in the speaker ship and he would tell his comrades that they too should give up. It was found that some of them wanted to give up,

but were afraid they would be shot as they came in because they had no safe conduct passes. So they were told to take off their shirts and wave them over their heads. This worked well and resulted in a group of nineteen coming in all at one time.

Observation: Airborne loudspeaker ships should be used to the maximum during operations to get VC to give up. They are most effective after about two weeks in which the enemy has received continual bombardment from both air and artillery. Using a Hoi Chanh (Returnee) to talk on the speaker mission is more effective than the unit interpretor.

e. Logistics and Maintenance:

(1) Item: Equipment losses.

Discussions:

Primary equipment losses during the operation were caused by anti-tank mines. The mines destroyed or damaged road wheels, road wheel arms, hubs, bearings, and track, more than any other parts of the vehicles hit.

Observation: Stockage of armored vehicle suspension parts should be increased.

(2) Item: POL consumption factors.

Discussion: The POL consumption factors listed in FM 101-10 or factors based on training and European experience are not valid for search and clear operations in Vietnam owing to the lack of vehicular movement and considerable dismounted action.

Observation: Planning for POL consumption based on FM 101-10 should be modified in accordance with Vietnam counter-insurgency operations experience.

(3) Item: Logistical and Maintenance Support for the Regiment.

Discussion:

During the operation, logistical support was provided to the Regiment on a temporary basis from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area at PHU LOI and at an Ammunition Supply Point at LAI KHE. Maintenance support was provided by the 183th Maintenance Battalion. Logistical and Maintenance Support were adequate only because of the short turn around distances.

Transportation to effect unit distribution of supplies does not exist above squadron level. The Regiment was able to resupply the subordinate units only by using organic vehicles form the squadrons which was possible only because of the short turn around distances and augmentation by Chinook helicopters when they were available.

Observation:

The Regiment needs a Support Command with the necessary assets to support it wherever it may be employed.

The Regiment needs a Direct Support Maintenance unit assigned or attached to provide maintenance support.

f. Signal:

(1) Item: AM Radio Range

Discussion:

AM radio contact is necessary between the Regimental Base Compound and the Regimental Headquarters at all times, even when the two are separated by great distances as they were on Operation CEDAR FALLS. The Interim Mit AN/GRA-4, attached to organic AM radios would provide the necessary increased range.

Observation: The Antenna Kit [illegible] should be issued on the basis of two per squadron and three to Regimental Headquarters.

(2) Item: Overheating of radios.

Discussion:

Twenty-four hour operation of the equipment mounted in the M-577 tracked vehicles and the resultant overheating of radios resulted in many radio breakdowns.

The use of fans blowing directly on the radios will tend to overcome this problem.

Placing the transmitter in STANDBY position will help alleviate this problem in the AN/VRC-29 radio.

Observation: Use of fans blowing on radios in the M-577 vehicle and use of the STANDBY capability of the AN/VRC-29 will help overcome radio overheating problems.

63

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 96345

AVDB-CE-3 2 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO 96307

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation Cedar Falls.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 080700 Jan 67 to 262400 Jan 67.

3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the Engineer portion of Operation Cedar Falls was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, acting in accordance with 1st Infantry OPORD 30-66 dated 31810CH Dec 66 and 1st Engineer OPORD 1-67 dated 5 Jan 67. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided combat engineer support to the 1st Infantry Division, 173rd Brigade (ABN) and the 11th ACR during their Search and Destroy operations in the Iron Triangle. The primary missions accomplished were tunnel and base camp destruction, clearing with subsequent opening of VC dominated areas, construction of landing zones, road repair to include the construction of a 160' D.S. Bailey Bridge, and water-borne seal of the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC J.M. HIERNAN, JR.
Commanding Officer
1st Engineer Battalion

Incl 1

b. Task Organization:

HQ's, 1st Engr Bn - LTC KIERNAN

(1) Company A - WAYNE L. LUCAS, CPT, CE

(2) Company B - ROBERT C. LEE, CPT, CE

(3) Company C (-) - LARRY A. BLAIR, CPT, CE

(4) Company D - ROGER M. MILLAR, CPT, CE

(5) Company E - ROBERT R. OLSON, CPT, CE

HQ's, 168th Engr Bn - LTC PELOSKY

(1) Company B - DUANE LEE, CPT, CE

(2) 1st Platoon, Co C - SHELFORD E. WILSON, 1LT, CE

(3) Dozer Team #1 - MSG WILLIAM POLLACK

(4) Dozer Team #2 - LT JOSEPH DURUSAU

(5) Dozer Team #3 - LT ROBERT STONECIPHER

(6) Dozer Team #4 - LT DWAYNE KLETH

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation:

(1) Numerous base camp, supply installations, and medical facilities in area.

(2) Supply points protected by extensive, well constructed bunkers.

(3) Indications that portions of MR4 located in area.

(4) 2 VC battalions can reinforce immediately.

(5) 3 VC battalions can reinforce within 24-36 hours.

(6) Complex tunnel system in area (one possibly 8 kms long).

AVDB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Operation After Action Report

b. Intelligence During Operation: From an intelligence viewpoint, Operation Cedar Falls was without exception the most successful operation of the war. Intelligence reports, which under most circumstances would be regarded as important, were overshadowed. As indicated by paragraphs 8d and 8e (4), the 1st Engineers definitely performed more than its share of intelligence collection. The most important find of the whole operation was the discovery of the Intelligence Section Military Region IV by the 1st Engineers. Slick loads of documents, records, and plans were found, and forwarded to G2, 1st Infantry Division. The discovery was of such value that the operation was extended for three days. The documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966. They contained strength of VC units, names of their members, towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

5. MISSION: The 1st Engineer Battalion reinforced with elements of the 79th Engineer Group clears jungle, conducts road repairs, construct LZ's and destroys base camps and tunnel complexes in support of the 1st Infantry Division, 173rd Brigade, and 11th ACR operations.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion prepares for Operation Cedar Falls by constructing a D.S. Bailey Bridge over the Thi Tinh River west of Ben Cat. E Company constructs pile bent and constructs bridge. D Company 1st Engineer Battalion improves bridge approaches on East and West side of river. E Company constructs 2 "gun floats" at Phu Cuong, positions floats at confluence of Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers, and conducts waterborne patrols. A Company, 1st Engineers, provides one dozer team in D.S. 1/28 Infantry Battalion to assist in their search and destroy operations in the north-eastern sector of the Iron Triangle and clears jungle, opens and improves the east-west road through the Triangle from its intersection with Rt 14 east. B Company 1st Engineers provides one dozer team in D.S. of 1/18 Infantry Battalion, clears jungle, opens and improves route 14 north to Ben Suc with dozer and demolitions. D Company provides a dozer team in D.S. 1/503 Inf, 173rd Bde. to assist in their search and destroy operation in the southern portion of the triangle, and clears jungle, opens and repairs east-west road from Ben Cat west. B Company, 168th Engineer Battalion clears jungle, opens and improves Rt 14 south from the intersection of the East-West Road.

AVDB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

7. EXECUTION:

21 Dec: 1st Platoon, E Company departed Di An at 0930 for Lai Kho with pile driving crane from A Company, 169th Engineer Battalion attached. Forward C.P. established at Lai Kho at 1226 hours.

22 Dec: E Company, 1st Platoon, constructed four float raft at XT 736331. Construction completed at 1400 hours and pile driving crane positioned on raft at 1425 hours. D Company demo men began to break up the remains of the concrete bridge resting on the west bank of the river.

23 Dec: Blasting of concrete bridge was completed and D Company started construction of headwall on east bank. Steel piling (14H73) arrived on site from Di An at 1430 hours for the construction of an 8 pile intermediate support for the two 80' D.S. Baileys.

24 Dec: Pile driving commenced at 1000 hours. At 1230 hours pile number 1 had been driven with a capacity of 19 tons being obtained. Breakdown of crane precluded further work. 1st Platoon flown to Di An for Christmas.

25 Dec: Christmas.

26 Dec: Skeleton pile driving crew airlifted to bridge sight at 0700 hours to resume pile driving operations. Pile number 5 was driven; capacity of 21 tons obtained. Crane deadlined at 1100 hours because of broken hammer cable. Cable was replaced by 1600 hours.

27 Dec: Two piles, numbers 2 and 6, were driven with capacities of 16 tons and 19 tons, respectively.

28 Dec: File 3 and 4 driven with 21 ton and 18 ton capacities. Two trucks borrowed from C Company, 86th Engr Bn, hauled 28 loads of laterite to west abutment. Ben Cat sector advisors picked up a VC suspect who appeared to be measuring the existing Eiffel bridge by pacing.

29 Dec: Final piles, 7 and 8 were driven with 17 and 18 ton capacities. Welders began cutting piles to final grade in preparation for placing caps. Bailey Bridge arrived at Lai Kho at 1600 hours.

267

AVLB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

30 Dec: Cutting of piles to final grade completed at 1300 hours. Raft was removed from bridge site and crane off-loaded to drive posts for headwall on east bank.

31 Dec: Pile driving crane loaded on lowbed and returned to Lai Khe at 1030 hours. Using a wrecker positioned on the Eiffel bridge, the caps, corbels, and common caps were placed. At 1100 hours, site layout was initiated on east bank. Construction of panel bridge commenced at 1400 hours.

1 Jan: Construction of bridge was completed, and launched with assistance of TD15 on east bank. The 160' bridge was then broken in the middle and partially jacked down.

2 Jan: Bridge completely jacked down and E Company personnel disassembled and loaded M4T6 raft. Pile driver and panel bridge trucks were returned to their home station. Welders started welding "X" bracing on the pier at low tide.

3 Jan: E Company personnel returned to Di An with exception of 2 boat operators, welder, and supervisor. Twenty more loads of laterite were hauled by C Company, 1st Engineers, and placed on the approaches. At 1500 hours E Company was directed to load up materials for two each 2-float M4T6 rafts which were to be mounted with Quad 50 machine guns. The rafts would be pushed up the Saigon River to the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers were they would be positioned as a blocking force against VC fleeing west from Tan An area during Niagara Falls and south from the Iron Triangle during Cedar Falls.

4 Jan: 2nd Platoon of E Company moved to the Vietnamese Engineer School at Phu Cuong to construct M4T6 floats. One officer and 8 EM from the 2/5th Artillery arrived at Phu Cuong at 1030 hours. The two rafts were completed and the quad 50's mounted at 1645 hours.

5 Jan: At 0730 hours, with Dichard 6 overhead, the flotilla moved up the Saigon River. In the vicinity of XT 748190, the lead elements experienced sniper fire which was immediately countered with fire from the rafts and the helicopter, accounting for 4 VC (BC). By nightfall the rafts were in position at the confluence with one raft being tied off at the east bank and the other anchored in mid-stream. Meanwhile the Bailey bridge was 100% complete, with the final welding being accomplished on this date.

AVDU-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

6 Jan: A Company reinforced with dozer team #4, departed Di An at 0845 and established a CP at XT 785725 at 1030 hours. Work was immediately initiated on clearing fields of fire around the perimeter, constructing defensive positions and clearing the Cau Dinh Jungle on both sides of Rt 13. Speed trials were held on the river by E Company and the quad 50's were test fired. Limited patrolling was conducted with one sampan being sunk in a small cove.

7 Jan: A Company continued to clear Cau Dinh jungle and began to clear jungle around four selected sites along Thi Tinh River for Quad 50 and Twin 40mm gun positions. At 1130 hours Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Headquarters, 168th Engineer Battalion, B Company and D Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, B Company, 168th Engineer Battalion and dozer teams 1,2 and 3, departed Di An for XT 785225. All elements closed at 1330 hours. Defensive positions were prepared, fields of fire around the perimeter were cleared, and jungle clearing was begun. Tunnel destruction personnel explored and destroyed a tunnel at XT 789161. This tunnel was 135 meters long with 7ft of overburden and was destroyed by the acetylene method.

8 Jan: All units were employed in clearing and windrowing Cau Dinh jungle. A total of 330 acres of jungle was cleared. At 1600 hours the heavy maintenance support section moved via Route 13 to Lai Khe to set up base of operation. Aerial recons were flown over the Iron Triangle. At 1800 hours dozers were loaded in preparation for the move to the Iron Triangle. E Company, following air strikes at XT 754198 ferried 2 platoons of 1/503rd Inf. into village at XT 750200. River patrols made negative contact.

9 Jan: Bivouac area was struck and convoy departed for Cedar Falls Operational area at 0915. Dozer team #4 was placed in D.S. of 1/4 Cav to prepare six additional firing positions along the east bank of the Thi Tinh river for Quad 50's and Twin 40's. All units closed their respective bivouac areas at 1400 hours. Three Engineer camps were set up south of the east-west road cutting through the Triangle, at XT 672303 (B Co, 1st Engr Bn), XT 699307 (HQ's, 1st Engr Bn and 168th Engr Bn, A Co, 1st Engr Bn, and B Co, 168th Engr Bn) and XT 727318 (D Co, 1st Engr Bn). All units began clearing fields of fire and constructing defensive positions.

A Company - Began clearing a swath through the rubber trees along the road leading to Artillery Base III from XT 671328 to XT 664324. At 1500 hours Task Force Alpha, consisting of 30 Bn, one officer, 2 tank dozers, and 6 bulldozers, linked up with Cav security at XT 695311, cut through the jungle to XT 687342, and then moved along the road cutting a swath on both sides to XT 676350.

AVDB -CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

269

B Company - 1st Platoon repaired 2 kilometers of road north of their RON position, cleared and windrowed 50 meters of jungle on each side of Route 14 from XT 668304 to XT 656320.

D Company - At approximately 1500 hours a VTR from the 11th ACR, pulling a disabled M48 tank out of the Iron Triangle, crashed through the western span of the Bailey Bridge, stopping all traffic. This emergency bridge repair was assigned to D Company, which was rapidly organized to remove the vehicles from the Thi Tinh River and replace the Bailey Bridge span temporarily with an AVLB. When the bridge collapsed, it also damaged the Eiffel Bridge next to it. The Eiffel Bridge was reinforced and opened to class 16 traffic at 1630 hours. The damaged Bailey span had to be removed immediately from the pile bent in the middle of the river and disassembled to preclude obstructing the AVLB launching. This work was tedious and time consuming. Using a second VTR with several block and tackle combinations the broken span was pulled from the pile bent without causing additional damage to the pier. The western approach was extended 20' to permit an AVLB to span the shorter (60') gap. Earth work combined with the use of damaged Bailey parts to bolster the fill was completed by 100515 Jan. By 0600 hours an AVLB was successfully launched to the center pier and by daybreak the completed bridge was opened to traffic.

E Company - Limited patrolling with negative contact.

10 Jan:

A Company - Clearing of rubber trees was continued around Artillery Base III (XT 664324). Task Force Alpha moved across country from XT 676350 to XT 639368 cutting a swath 50 feet wide and 2,000 meters long, and a 100 meter resupply LZ at XT 639368.

B Company - Constructed a 4 kilometer by-pass on Route 14 in grid square XT 6432. 2nd Platoon, relocated to XT 613337 and RON with 1/4 Cav.

AVDS-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

C Company - At 1240 hours the 1st Platoon was lifted by CH47 to XT 619372 to cut a resupply LZ for the 1/28 Infantry. The CH47 hovered over the LZ area for 20 minutes allowing all personnel to descend the 70' ladder. At 1430 hours the LZ was ready to receive UH-1 aircraft. The platoon remained with the 1/28 Infantry until 11 Jan, clearing access roads to rice caches and enlarging LZ to accomodate 4 UH-1's.

D Company - Evacuated damaged Bailey Bridge parts to Lai Khe, and continued to improve the western bridge approach by placing 17 loads of laterite. The road was remained for 1.5 KM west of the Bailey Bridge.

E Company - Limited patrolling with negative contact.

B Company, 168th - The road between XT 695311 and XT 713317 was shaped, graded, and ditched, and the jungle on both sides of the road was cleared for 100 meters from XT 695311 to XT 697313.

11 Jan:

A Company - Using Rome Plows, bulldozers, chainsaws, demolitions and axes, a 200 meter wide strip was cleared of rubber trees between XT 708315 and XT 724315. A 400 meter by 200 meter area was also cleared at XT 706315. 2nd Platoon leveled and then burned 50 houses vicinity XT 705315. Task Force Alpha cleared a 50 foot swath in moving from XT 639367 to XT 626378 to XT 621372 to XT 620374 (total of 2900 meters), and cleared a 100 meter by 200 meter LZ at XT620374. During the day they also destroyed 40,000 lbs of rice at XT 622374, and a five bunker base camp and hospital complex containing one trillion units of antibiotics at XT 621371.

B Company - 1st Platoon improved existing ford enroute to Ben Suc at XT 605346, and constructed both approaches making it passable to wheeled vehicles. Chain saws and demolitions were employed by 1st Platoon to fell rubber trees along road to Artillery Base III. Task Force Bravo in D... of 2/10th Infantry penetrated the jungle cutting a 50' wide swath and destroying a base camp and 30 tons of rice at XT 613367.

D Company - Performed road maintenance on East-West road through the Triangle from XT 730322 to XT 738327. Thirty loads of laterite were hauled and used to shape the road. Task Force Delta in D.S. of the 4/503rd Infantry cleared a 50' swath from XT 712317 to XT 724296 and a 75 meter by 75 meter LZ at XT 722302.

E Company - Returned to Phu Cuong at 1045, disassembled rafts and returned to Di An.

B Company, 168th - Performed road maintenance and cleared jungle on both sides of the road from XT699311 to XT730322. At 1230 hours the S-2 section, 168th Engr Bn, apprehended 3 VC ralliers vic XT 679285.

12 Jan:

A Company - 20,000 square meters of jungle were cleared vic XT 716317 and XT 693312. Task Force Alpha was split into two segments; one cutting a swath, and one destroying a total of 50 tons of rice at coordinates XT 619371, XT 619369 and XT 620373. A 40' swath was cut from XT 620373 to XT 618371 where an expedient LZ was cut. The Zippo Platoon from the 1/4 Cav burned four windrows, each 50 meters in length, using 2600 gallons of diesel, 1500 gallons of mogas and 1500 lbs of chemicals.

B Company - 2nd Platoon linked up with the main body of Bravo proceeding North on Route 14 to ford site for RCN. Under OPCON of Dagger, elements of 1st and 2nd Platoon arrived at Ben Suc. Task Force Bravo slashed through the jungle cutting a 50' path from XT 613357 to XT 625352. A 150 meter by 100 meter LZ was cut, and 3 huts and 4 bunkers were destroyed at XT 625352.

C Company - At 1320 hours, the 3rd Platoon lifted off at Lai Khe by CH47 and descended via 70' ladder into thick jungle at XT 595370 to cut a resupply LZ for 2/28th Infantry. All Engineers were on the ground at 1350 hours, and the LZ was ready at 1715 hours.

D Company - An area adjacent to the bridge site was cleared for the water point section to set up. Fields of fire were improved around the bivouac site. Task Force Delta cleared a 50 foot swath to XT 715290, and destroyed a base camp at XT 725300.

B Company, 168th - While clearing jungle along Route 14, a base camp was discovered at XT 679289. Tunnel Rats were called to investigate the tunnel complex. While convoying south on Route 14, B Company was ambushed at XT 694250. The ambush was sprung by a command detonated mine, and small arms fire followed. Three VC were sighted, and fire was returned with unknown results. Another mine was located at XT 722242 and blown in place. At 1635 hours dozer team #3, working with B Company, was involved in a fire fight at XT 694242. Gunships were called to suppress the fire. Engagement ended at 1717 hours with no casualties or damages to friendly units. Although harrassed all day, B Company managed to repair 5½ kilometers of Route 14 from XT 682273 to XT 736231.

13 Jan:

A Company - Employing all available means, all platoons continued to clear jungle with the 1st Platoon clearing a 300 meter by 100 meter swath from XT 699312 to XT 671303, the 2nd Platoon clearing a 100 meter by 900 meter swath vic XT 671303, and the 3rd Platoon clearing a 150 meter by 50 meter swath vic XT 695325. Task Force Alpha proceeded to XT 617367 where they discovered and destroyed 40 tons of rice. The team then continued to XT 636359 where the "Big Red One" LZ was cut. A report was received that A Co, 1/28th Infantry was receiving incoming artillery rounds at XT 634360. One tank dozer and one bulldozer were immediately dispatched to construct an emergency LZ. The LZ was constructed in 15 minutes, and approximately 30 severely wounded infantrymen were evacuated. In the process of cutting this life saving LZ, the HD-16 bulldozer broke a fuel line and caught fire. The burning dozer was further destroyed by firing 3 HEAT rounds from the tank dozer. The destroyed dozer was then buried near the "Big Red One" LZ.

B Company - 1st Platoon supported B troop, 1/4 Cav, and cleared jungle around their base camp. The 2nd Platoon started their destruction of Ben Suc, and captured 4 VC in the process. Task Force Bravo cut a swath through the jungle from XT 625352 to XT 635345, stopping at XT 629347 to cut the "Iron Cross" LZ, and a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at their final destination.

C Company - The 1st Platoon lifted off at Lai Khe at 1300 hours by CH47 to cut an LZ at XT 594360. Descending via the ladder at 1330 hours, the LZ was completed at 1715 hours.

D Company - Continued to clear jungle around their perimeter. Task Force Delta slashed through the jungle from XT 715290 to XT 722286, leaving a 50' path, and constructed a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at XT 722286 in order to extract 35 tons of rice.

B Company, 168th - Road repair and jungle clearing was continued on Route 14. A base camp with tunnel complex was discovered at XT 719284, and the tunnel rats from the 168th Engineer Battalion were sent to investigate. Twenty tons of rice was found in the base camp and evacuated. The base camp was destroyed by dozers.

2.72

AVDB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

14 Jan:

A Company - Clearing was begun on Route 14 south of the East-West road splitting the Triangle. The jungle was cleared for 100 meters on each side of the road for a distance of 2.5 kilometers. Task Force Alpha, having an uneventful day, slashed through the jungle to XT 678345.

B Company - Jungle clearing in support of B Troop, 1/4 Cav continued, as did the destruction of houses and trees in Ben Suc. Task Force Bravo cut a 50' swath through grid square XT 6434 and cut a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at XT 650347.

D Company - Moved out of their bivouac area at 0930 hours and relocated to 1st Engr CP at XT 699307, moving into positions vacated by B Company, 168th Engr Bn. Immediately after opening their CP at 1100 hours, they began clearing jungle from XT 722286 to XT 728290. Task Force Delta proceeded from XT 732277 to XT 725279 destroying 5 tons of rice at the latter location.

B Company, 168th - Departed their bivouac area at XT 699307 at 0800 hours and moved south along Route 14 with elements of the 11th ACR. Three mines ranging in size from 40 to 200 lbs were found by the mine sweepers at XT 698289. All mines were blown in place. After closing their new CP at 1305 hours, clearing of jungle around the perimeter was begun.

15 Jan:

A Company - Cleared trees and brush from XT 677294 to XT 677289, and cleared approximately 1180 rubber trees at XT 686336. Task Force Alpha broke out of the jungle at XT 676350 and moved south clearing jungle on both sides of the road.

B Company - The 2nd Platoon, working in Ben Suc, uncovered large quantities of rice which were subsequently, turned over to the ARVN Airborne task force and evacuated. Destruction of Ben Suc and support of B Troop, 1/4 Cav, continued.

D Company - Using 2400 pounds of demolition and 300 feet of det cord, rubber trees were cleared in the following locations, 50m X 100m area at XT 670303, 40m X 200m area at XT 675317, and a 50m X 150m area at XT 670306. Two dozers placed in D.S. of the 173rd Bde cut a path 8m wide and 2000m long in vic XT 724274.

AVII-C-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

B Company, 16[illegible]th - Cleared jungle on both sides of Route 14 from XT 709250 to XT 690260. A tunnel entrance was discovered at XT 709245, and investigated with negative results. The tunnel entrance was sealed using demolitions. The tunnel destruction team destroyed a tunnel 75 meters long, using 200 lbs of conventional demolitions in Ben Suc.

16 Jan:

A Company - Task Force Alpha emerged from the jungle at XT 710315 at 1000 hours. The five bulldozers and two tank dozers were sent to Lai Khe for maintenance. Jungle clearing on both sides of Route 14 was continued by 1st Platoon.

B Company - 1st Platoon relocated to Dichard CP at 1130 hours. Huts, rice, and trees, were still being leveled and destroyed by the 2nd Platoon in Ben Suc. Task Force Bravo, breaking out of the jungle, cut their final 50' swath from XT 660340 to XT 682343. At 1200 hours the bulldozers and task dozers were sent to Lai Khe for maintenance. The remaining elements of the task force RON at the Dichard CP.

D Company - In conjunction with B Company's move into Dichard CP, D Company moved out at 0930 hours to XT 725248. Route 14 was swept from XT 668303 to their new location at XT 725245.(8.5) kilometers). The remainder of the day was spent clearing the bivouac area and fields of fire. Task Force Delta cleared 4 LZ's, totaling 10 acres vic XT 726270. While clearing the last LZ, the task force was attacked by a squad size VC force. The squad was driven off with no injuries or damage to equipment.

B Company, 16[illegible]th - Continued to clear jungle on both sides of Route 14. At 1100 hours elements working on Route 14 received small arms fire at XT 708250. While clearing jungle from the road, 2 VC base camps were discovered at XT 698253 and XT 696258 and destroyed. The tunnel demolition team in Ben Suc destroyed 175 meters of tunnel expending 160 lbs of demolitions.

17 Jan:

A Company - 1st Platoon cleared secondary growth from coordinates XT 679296 to XT 686266, cutting a 2700 meter by 200 meter strip along Route 14. Using chain saws and demolitions. the 3rd Platoon downed 1200 rubber trees in an area 300 meters by 50 meters at XT 692322. The 2nd Platoon stood down for maintenance and held a two hour demolition class.

27½

AVDE-Co-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

B Company - 1st Platoon began clearing a 400 meter strip of jungle and rubber trees around the town of X U Tau. At the end of the day 40 acres had been cleared. In Ben Suc the 2nd Platoon dug a 30 foot deep hole with dozers. The hole was then filled with 10,000 lbs of demolitions and 1000 gallons of napalm. The hole was then backfilled with approximately 10 feet of overburden. Chemical fuzes were used to provide a 2½ hour delay. At 1730 hours the fuzes were actuated, and at 1953 hours detonation occured. The purpose of the exercise was to confine the explosion underground as much as possible in order to destroy any undiscovered tunnels in the area.

D Company - Transportation was furnished to the 11th ACR to haul captured rice out of the Iron Triangle. An 8 meter by 1250 meter swath was cut from XT 726270 to XT 732256, and the jungle was cleared for a distance of 175 meters, 50 meters on each side of the road vic XT 725248.

B Company, 168th - Cleared jungle along Route 14 vic XT 730235. While clearing, a base camp was found at XT 739216. Tunnel rats were called to investigate. The tunnel was destroyed after the tunnel rats had explored 250 meters with negative results.

18 Jan:

A Company - Working south on Route 14, 100 meters of jungle on each side of the road were cleared from XT 686263 to XT 691261. A small base camp was discovered and destroyed at XT 689263. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons blew and cut a total of 1600 rubber trees at XT 692318 and XT 689329 respectively.

B Company - Started road repairs on the east of the Triangle in addition to clearing the 400 meter strip around X U Tau. A 36 foot, 24 inch culvert was put in at XT 733324 by the 1st Platoon. The 2nd Platoon repaired the road south from X U Tau for one kilometer.

D Company - Transportation for evacuation of rice was again supplied to the 11th ACR. The jungle was cleared for 50 meters on each side of the road for 2000 meters vic XT 725248. Task Force Delta cut an eight acre LZ at XT 736254.

B Company, 168th - Clearing jungle from south to north on Route 14, a platoon size base camp was discovered at XT 698258. After investigation with negative results, the camp was destroyed. The tunnel rats searched a tunnel complex at XT 732222. After

approximately 2000 meters of tunnel, the rats exterminated five VC and pulled out. The tunnel demolition team arrived and destroyed the tunnel by the acetylene method. Approximately 2100 meters of tunnel was destroyed.

19 Jan:

A Company - 1st Platoon cleared jungle along Route 14 from XT 691261 to XT 694256. Eight VC were captured at XT 679284, interrogated initially by Diehard S-2 Section and then evacuated to 173rd Bde. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons stood down for maintenance.

B Company - Jungle clearing continued along the east road in the Triangle, and around X I Tau. 2nd Platoon started construction of the "1st Engineer Castle" at XT 6929. An 800 meter base was cut and the outline was completed. The cutting of the outline was supervised and directed from a helicopter hovering overhead. Communication was maintained between the helicopter and the tank dozer.

B Company, 16[illegible]th - Concentrated their jungle clearing efforts along the roads in the south western portion of the triangle. Dozers uncovered and subsequently destroyed a small base camp located vic XT 7124. Tunnel rats explored an extensive tunnel system discovered by elements of the 11th ACR. 1000 feet of tunnel were destroyed by the acetylene method.

20 Jan:

A Company - Finished clearing jungle along Route 14. The jungle was cleared for 300 meters to XT 6[illegible]7257. 2nd and 3rd Platoon continued to pull maintenance.

B Company - Continued to shape, grade and ditch the eastern road in the triangle. Jungle clearing along the road also continued. The 2nd platoon also continued cutting the jungle for the "Castle".

D Company - The jungle for 50 meters on each side of the road was cut from XT 725250 to XT 735255. The road between the coordinates was widened to two lanes, shaped, and ditched.

B Company, 16[illegible]th - Continued to clear jungle along roads in the southwestern portion of the Iron Triangle. At 1055 hours 11 VC suspects were apprehended at XT 690261, questioned by the Diehard interpreter and turned over to 173rd Bde. At 1100 hours elements clearing jungle made contact with a VC in a hut at XT 744255. The VC entered a tunnel when fired upon. The tunnel rats were called to search the tunnel. After searching 1100 meters, the tunnel rats were extracted, and the tunnel was destroyed using the acetylene method.

277

AVB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

21 Jan:

A Company - While the 2nd and 3rd Platoons stood down for maintenance, the 1st Platoon cut a 50 foot swath through the jungle from XT 699262 to XT 735265.

B Company - 3rd Platoon continued to cut the "1st Engineer Castle", and at 1400 hours work was stopped as an air strike was called into the vicinity of the castle.

D Company - Cleared jungle 25 meters on each side of the road and widened, shaped, and ditched the road between XT 735255 and XT 737247.

B Company, 168th - Cleared 25 meters of jungle on each side of the road in the extreme south-western sector of the Triangle from XT 735213 to XT 735233. At 0030 hours 8 VC suspects were apprehended on Route 14 at XT 699256. The VCS were brought to the Dichard CP and interrogated. One VC confessed knowledge of a tunnel complex he helped dig at XT 695242.

Headquarters, 1st Engr Bn - A patrol was organized from personnel from the staff sections and accompanied the VCS to the tunnel complex. The VCS led the patrol to the tunnel area and pointed out several air holes and firing ports. Further exploration of the area uncovered a base camp with several tunnel entrances. Due to the late hour, the tunnels were not investigated and the patrol returned to their ROK position.

22 Jan:

A Company - Cut another swath 25 meters wide from XT 699271 north to XT 684307. Work ceased at 1500 hours, the equipment was loaded, and they departed the Iron Triangel at 1630 hours to ROK at Ben Cat with 173rd Bde.

B Company - Completed clearing the inside of the castle and cut the "1" (1st Engineers) above the castle. Equipment and personnel were brought into the CP at 1600 hours in preparation for the next day's move.

D Company - Proceeded south clearing jungle and repairing the road between XT 737247 and XT 747226. At 1600 hours they closed into their CP to prepare for the following day's move.

B Company, 168th - Cleared jungle along the road in the south-west section of the Triangle, 50 meters wide from XT 733213 to XT 723225. The tunnel destruction team destroyed 400 meters of tunnel at XT 720740 using 240 lbs of carbide with the acetylene method.

Tunnels, 1st Engineer - The 1st Engineer "tunnel rats" moved out at 0800 hours to further investigate the tunnels found the day before. After posting security around the base camp, a thorough search was initiated. At first, results were negative. A breather hole was blown open revealing 600 meters of tunnel. Upon exploring the 600 meters, many documents were discovered. 1st Infantry Division tunnel rats were called to assist when CS gas was encountered approximately 600 meters into the tunnel. The documents were immediately evacuated to G2, 1st Division where they were evaluated. Because of the importance of these documents, G2 directed that the search be continued.

23 Jan: At 0900 hours, D Company departed their bivouac area and proceeded north on Route 14 to link up with the other 1st Engineer units. At 1030 hours link-up was completed and Headquarters, 1st Engr Bn, Headquarters, 168th Engrs Bn, and B Company departed the Iron Triangle. B Company, 168th Engrs remained behind to support the 11th ACR. The 1st Engr tunnel rats returned to the base camp with the tunnel rats from the 242nd Cml Platoon. After exploring 800 meters of tunnel, a trap door was located. The trap door was removed and the additional tunnel was explored with more documents being found. The documents were evacuated through a tunnel entrance approximately 1100 meters from the base camp. Investigation of the area around this newly found exit (XT 699253), revealed another base camp. After limited exploration of this new base camp the tunnel rats MOVED with Dragoon Bravo.

24 Jan: The tunnel rats departed Dragoon Bravo CP with security and traveled by APC to the tunnel complex and base camp discovered the day before. The tunnels were investigated, yielding more documents which were immediately evacuated to G2, 1st Infantry Division. While searching the tunnels, voices were heard, and a CS grenade was thrown. Five VC were captured as they emerged from the tunnel. The security elements discovered still another hospital base camp complex 300 meters north of the second base camp. Toward the end of the day preliminary investigation of this complex was begun. Tunnel exploration was stopped at 1630 hours and all personnel returned to Dragoon Bravo CP.

25 Jan: Departing Dragoon Bravo CP at 0700 hours, the tunnel rats returned to the hospital complex. Approximately 5 huts were discovered and investigated. All huts were dug in the ground so that the roofs were at ground level. Approximately 300 meters of the hospital complex were explored. Medical textbooks and notebooks, small quantities of medicine, and medical instruments were discovered. The Chemical Tunnel Rats returned to the second tunnel complex, where 5 VC were previously flushed out, hoping to investigate further. The presence of CS in the tunnel prevented any further exploration. No additional information was discovered in the hospital complex. Tunnel destruction personnel from 168th Engineers

279

AVDB-CS-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

married up with tunnel rats at the RON position.

26 Jan: At 0800 hours, tunnel destruction team departed for hospital complex, and the tunnel rats returned to the CS tunnel complex. The tunnel destruction team began setting up the conventional demolitions and the acetylene equipment. Meanwhile the tunnel rats explored the tunnel which contained CS gas. The hospital complex was destroyed at 1200 hours after receiving word that no additional information had been found by the tunnel rats. Results of the tunnel destruction were excellent; cracks could be seen on the surface for approximately 200 meters. The tunnel destruction team then proceeded to the second tunnel complex. Again using a combination of conventional demolitions and acetylene, the tunnels were destroyed. The results of this second tunnel complex were even better than the first one. (Cracks in the form of a room could be seen on the surface). After using claymore mines to close the entrance of the first tunnel explored, the tunnel rats and demolition team departed the Triangle.

8. RESULTS:

a. Personnel: 1st Engineer Battalion sustained 1 KIA and 7 WIA during the operation. Supporting Engineer units sustained 7 WIA during the same period.

b. Awards: 1st Engineer Battalion personnel received 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 6 Bronze Stars with "V", 36 Bronze Stars, 11 Army Commendation Medals with "V", and 132 Army Commendation Medals for their actions in Operation Cedar Falls. Supporting Engineers from the 79th Engineer Group received 6 Bronze Stars with "V", 40 Bronze Stars, 8 Army Commendation Medals with "V", and 50 Army Commendation Medals. These awards were personally presented by the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, the Assistant Division Commanders, the CO, 79th Engineer Group and the CO, 1st Engineer Battalion at two awards ceremonies held in the Iron Triangle on 20 Jan, and Di An Base Camp on 6 Feb. Many of the personnel were recommended for awards by the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

c. Equipment: One HD-16 medium dozer, combat loss.

d. Enemy Losses: 1st Engineer Battalion was credited for 27 VC KIA's (BC) and 38 PW/CHIEU HOIS.

e. Construction:

(1) Roads and Bridges

(a) Repaired and maintained 34 kilometers of road.

(b) Constructed a 4 kilometer by-pass on Route 14.

(c) Installed one 36 foot culvert.

(d) Constructed one ford.

(e) One 160 foot double single bailey constructed.

(f) 60 foot AVLB installed to replace one damage span of U.S. Bailey Bridge.

(2) Field fortification: Individual and command protective emplacements were constructed for several infantry units as well as those constructed for our own use.

(3) Landing Zone: Three Heliborne LZ's, and 31 Ground LZ's were constructed.

(4) Reduction of enemy obstacles:

(a) The following mines were discovered and destroyed:

1. 45 ea - Anti-tank mines.
2. 10 ea - Anti-personnel mines.
3. 19 ea - Claymore mines.

(b) The following ordnance items were discovered and destroyed:

1. 8 ea - 25-250 lb bombs.
2. 11 ea - 105-175 mm Artillery rounds.
3. 49 ea - Mortar rounds.
4. 24 ea - Grenades.
5. 103 ea - Butterfly bombs.

AVDE-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

(5) Denial Activities:

(a) 2711 acres/10.9 sq km of jungle cleared.

(b) 9445 meters of tunnel destroyed.

(c) 1 - town destroyed (Ben Suc).

(d) 6 - villages destroyed.

(e) 27 - base camps destroyed.

(f) 60 - miscellaneous bunkers destroyed.

(g) 4 - rubber factories destroyed.

(h) 1 - hospital and 1 dispensary destroyed.

(i) 10 - sampans destroyed.

(j) 672 tons of rice destroyed.

(6) Engineer Reconnaissance - Numerous aerial, ground, and waterborne recons were performed by 1st Engineer Battalion elements daily.

(7) Water Supply; Ben Cat: Approximately 18,000 gallons of water distributed daily for a total of 270,000 gallons. Water was trucked to bivouac areas where approximately 1200 men were showered daily.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Average strength in the field during the operation - 725.

b. Supply: Normal supply channels were used for resupply of units in the field with all units being resupplied by road convoys from Lai Khe. Emergency resupply was effected by air. One S4 representative was at the Battalion Forward location, and one was at Lai Khe.

c. Maintenance: Company maintenance personnel maintained and repaired vehicles and equipment in the field. They were assigned by the Battalion Maintenance Section which stayed with the Battalion Forward CP during the entire operation and provided technical advice and assistance, and assisted in obtaining repair parts. Non-organic heavy maintenance support was supplied by elements of the 79th Engr Group, who set up shop in Lai Khe. Maintenance problems which could

not be remedied quickly were sent into Lai Khe, where they worked on a 24 hour basis to repair the piece of equipment.

c. Transportation: With the exception of occasional low boy support from D.S. units, organic transportation was used.

e. Communications: TOE FM radios were principle means of communications.

f. Medical: The Battalion Aid Station was operational in the field with the aid station set up with Battalion Forward. The Battalion Surgeon and his medics conducted roving patrols to the work sites daily, both by air and ground, so as to be close to areas of possible trouble.

10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Jungle Clearing: During Operation Niagara and Cedar Falls an effective method for clearing jungle was developed. Clearing was done using a dozer task force consisting of tank dozers and bull dozers. A tank dozer led the way in order to detonate booby traps in the area. The bull dozers followed cutting swaths approximately 30 meters wide perpendicular to the road and extending the desired distance from the road, normally 100 meters. A similar swath was cut parallel to the initial swath approximately 100 meters away. The jungle between these two swaths was then cleared by operating the dozers from both swaths and parallel to the road. A windrow of cut material was pushed up midway between the two swaths. The windrow was doused with fuel and napalm and burned, thereby reducing its value as an ambush site.

b. Helibome LZ Missions: Electrically initiated demolitions were used in LZ construction, increasing positive control to reduce delays. Ml chain demolition blocks and bangalore torpedoes were used very effectively against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. The time required for placement of demolition is also reduced by using Ml chain. Also, absolute control and coordination must be constantly maintained with infantry security during use of demolitions to prevent injuries.

283

AVDB-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

c. Tunnel Destruction: The length of tunnel destroyed and extent of destruction was increased by using conventional demolitions in conjunction with acetylene. Thirty pound charges of TNT and forty pound cratering charges were placed at critical places (rooms, junctions, exits and entrances) in the tunnel complex. These charges were dual primed, connected in series by det cord and fired electrically. When detonated these conventional charges acted as a booster charge for the acetylene.

d. Dozer LZ Teams: During Operation Cedar Falls infantry battalions were given search and destroy missions. In order to successfully accomplish their missions, several problems had to be resolved: How would the infantry battalions be resupplied? How would they be reinforced? How would they destroy any fortifications and base camps they found? A dozer team in D.S. of each battalion provided the answers. The dozer team consisted of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. Secured by the infantry the dozers teams slashed through the jungle clearing swath as they moved. - When the infantry stopped, the dozers cleared resupply LZ's for present and future use and destroyed fortifications and base camps as they were found. Since a resupply LZ could be constructed in a matter of minutes, the infantry could continue their search and destroy operations until late afternoon. Faced with an emergency, the dozers cleared a dustoff LZ in 15 minutes evacuating 30 seriously wounded infantrymen, and saving several lives.

e. Gun Floats: The Quad 50's with platform were mounted on 2 float M4T6 rafts during Operation Cedar Falls. The floats were mounted with the Quad 50's and positioned at the intersection of the Thi Tinh and Saigon Rivers to control, search and seal the river traffic. The rafts were propelled by 27 foot erection boats and patrolled the rivers during daylight hours.

f. Refueling of Dozer Teams: Refueling of dozer teams was accomplished daily by CH-47. At first, 600 gallon pods with hand pumps were airlifted into the resupply LZ cut by the dozer team. Due to a lack of hand pumps, which had to be shuttled between dozer teams, it took 3 hours to refuel 4 dozer teams. A quicker process was needed. The solution was to gravity feed the fuel. The dozers cut a hole approximately 8 feet deep, and the CH-47 dropped the fuel next to the hole. A hose was connected from the fuel pod, and the dozer was refueled in the freshly dug hole. A futher improvement was the use of 55 gallon drums of diesel instead of the 600 gallon pod, thus eliminating the recovery problem.

5-84

AVDH-CE-3 2 Mar 67
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

11. COMMAND ANALYSIS:

Starting with the construction of the D.S. Bailey Bridge at Ben Cat on 21 Dec 66, and ending with the demolition of the tunnel complexes on 26 Jan 67, Operation Cedar Falls was without exception the most significant combat engineering operation of the war to date. New concepts of jungle warfare using dozers to open heretofore inviolable VC strongholds, the emergence of a new "Secret Weapon", the dozer-infantry teams, and combined acetylene and HE tunnel demolitions, all have proven unique, successful, and of tremendous value to future operations. Operations Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls introduced massive jungle clearing in conjunction with tactical infantry operation on a scale never attempted before. A total of 54 bulldozers were under the OPCON of the 1st Engineer Battalion. Senior Commanders including MG De Puy, LTG Seaman, and GEN Westmoreland have expressed the opinion that an entire new concept of warfare has been inaugurated. Additionally, the need for a greater number of bulldozers in divisional engineer battalions was dramatically shown. Indeed, the 1st Engineer Battalion lived up to its motto:

"ALWAYS FIRST"

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS E. BEAMES
CPT, CE
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT 10 MAR 67
OPERATION CEDAR FALLS

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a search and destroy and blocking operation along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, denying the use of the SAIGON River in the sector to VC/NVA forces. This operation was conducted in two phases.

Phase I: (D Day) 25th Inf Div under the guise of normal operations deploys the 196th Bde (reinf) by air and ground means to seize the critical ground overlooking the SAIGON River in the HO BO Woods and destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

Phase II:

a. (D+1 to D+9) 2d Bde deployed by ground means to blocking positions along the SAIGON River in sector. The 2d and 196th Bdes prevented VC/NVA exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and controlled the SAIGON River in their sectors to deny its use by VC/NVA forces.

b. Brigade blocking forces conducted detailed search of their sectors and destroyed VC/NVA forces and installations.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 - 26 January 1967.

3. LOCATION: Along the SAIGON River from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C Weyand, 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

25th Inf Div:

2d Bde, 25th Inf Div;

1st Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 34th Armor
1st Bn, 8th Arty (DS)
3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) (GS)
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (-)

DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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196th Inf Bde (LT)(SEP)

2d Bn, 1st Inf
1st Bn (M), 5th Inf
2d Bn (M), 22d Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
F Trp, 17th Cav
3d Bn, 82 Arty
A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty
175th Engr Co

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support.

During Phases I and II air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 409 sorties were flown in the area of operations from 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67. B-52 Strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operation. They are as follows:

DATE/TIME STRUCK	AREA COVERED
060200 Jan 67	XT626303 - XT634314 XT648282 - XT656296
070240 Jan 67	XT582312 - XT586303 XT612322 - XT616312
070200 Jan 67	XT649290 - XT660293 XT653270 - XT669274
061600 Jan 67	XT654248 - XT665270 XT660242 - XT672246
190400 Jan 67	XT570352 - XT601359 XT574340 - XT604347

b. Artillery Support:

(1) 5 January: A command and control element from HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty displaced from CU CHI Base Camp to vicinity TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" - 175mm), moved from CU CHI to TRUNG LAP and was GSR to the 25th Inf Div. A platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty (AWSP) were attached to 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) to provide security for the fire support base. The MPQ-4 Radar Section from 7th Bn, 11th Arty was attached to the 3d Bn, 13th Arty at TRUNG LAP.

(2) 6-7 January: No change in status or location of units.

(3) 8 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS commenced with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, located in CU CHI Base Camp, providing direct support to the 2d Bde. A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3d Bn, 82d Arty from its fire support base at TRUNG LAP. D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty

was in general support of the 25th Division from its location in CU CHI Base Camp.

(4) 9-12 January: No change in status or location of units.

(5) 13 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from base camp to vic XT74701464 to better support the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The 8" platoon of A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty displaced from TRUNG LAP to vic TON SON NHUT and an 8" platoon of D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty moved from CU CHI to the TRUNG LAP fire support base and was attached to A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty.

(6) 14 January: No change in status or location of units.

(7) 15 January: 8" platoon from A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty returned to TRUNG LAP and the 8" platoon from D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was detached from A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and returned to CU CHI Base Camp.

(8) 16-20 January: No change in status or location of units.

(9) 21 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from XT74701464 to CU CHI Base Camp.

(10) 22-24 January: No change in status or location of units.

(11) 26 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated. HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-); A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty and the platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty displaced by convoy from TRUNG LAP to CU CHI Base Camp.

(12) Special Equipment and Techniques. During the operation, Armor Infantry units established multiple base camps and forward positions in the FILHOL Plantation and HO BO and BOI LOI Woods. Up to this time there had been little or no target area survey because of the lack of high ground for a target area base and because of the requirement for an inordinate amount of security for isolated survey parties. Taking advantage of the security offered by the forward bases and by using DASE's with NUI BA DEN as a control base, the survey parties were able to establish control in areas that are frequently target areas.

(13) Commanders Analysis. With the artillery fire support originating from CU CHI Base Camp and TRUNG LAP, administrative and supply matters were greatly simplified. Supporting from the base camp enabled the firing batteries to improve defenses and living conditions.

(14) Total missions and rounds fired:

(a) Missions: Support 515, H&I 2,276.
(b) Ammunition expended: HE 14,644, WP 868, ILL 386
(c) Results: 12 VC KIA (BC), 40 VC KIA (poss), 6 bunkers, 25 sampans, 23 buildings destroyed and 27 buildings damaged.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: The area of operation for the 25th Inf Div during Operation CEDAR FALLS encompassed the area from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. The division positions were located along the SAIGON River in former VC safe havens in both the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. Enemy units operating in and around the AO included the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 8th Bns of the 165th A Regt, elements of the D 14 Local Forces Bn, elements of HR 4, and local guerrillas. The area contained many foxholes, trenches, tunnels, bunkers and underground fortifications. The VC utilized the SAIGON River to a great extent in moving supplies and equipment.

b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from broad, flat plains of wet rice land to scrub brush and forested areas with heavy canopy. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, and swamps was limited to road embankments and dikes. Concealment in the rice land was poor with fair to good concealment in the forests and high marsh grass area. Fields of fire were poor in the forests to generally good in the rice lands and marshes, however, fields of fire were limited by stream banks and vegetation. Obstacles to overland movement were the interconnecting streams, ditches, and dikes in the rice land marshes.

c. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally clear to partly cloudy with good visibility and light winds. The maximum temperature was 93 degrees and the minimum was 63 degrees with an average high of 86 degrees and low of 68 degrees. Total rainfall for the period was .2 inches.

d. Operations: Light enemy contact was made initially as friendly units moved to the occupied blocking positions in the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. In the extreme eastern portion of the division sector, heavy contact was made with forces of the 2d Bn, 165 A Regt on 5 January 1967. by elements of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The enemy encountered by 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew under the cover of darkness on the night of 8-9 January. Throughout the remainder of the operation no other heavy contact was made with the enemy forces and most of the body count resulted from contacts with small groups of VC. During hours of darkness, maximum use was made of ambushes along the SAIGON River and several VC were killed by ambush patrols as they sought to escape from the CEDAR FALLS Operational Area. Search and Destroy Operations accounted for most of the daylight activity of friendly forces. Through these S & D operations, several VC base camps along with large amounts of rice, equipment, ammunition and weapons were located. A large tunnel complex was discovered by the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf in the HO BO Woods on 21 Jan at coordinates XT650235. The tunnel is believed to have been the location of a VC headquarters unit. It was destroyed after it had been fully searched.

9. MISSION: To conduct S & D and blocking operations south and west along the SAIGON River to prevent infiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and to destroy VC base areas.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. 2d Bde: Attached: 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D Day.
B Co, 65th Engr Bn, effective 1900 H D Day.
MID detachment, effective 1900H D Day.
Attach: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf to 196th Bde, effective 1900 H D-1.

(1) Establish blocking positions in sector along SAIGON River early on D+1 to prevent VC/NVA exfiltration from the IRON TRIANGLE area.

(2) Maintain control of the SAIGON River to prevent its use by VC/NVA forces.

(3) Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

(4) Conduct BUDDY Operations in conjunction with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt to destroy VC/NVA infrastructure in PHU HOA DONG and expand government control over that village.

(5) Continue reorganization of 4th Bn, 23d Inf in base camp.

(6) Be prepared to release 4th Bn, 23d Inf to 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed.

b. 196th Inf Bde: Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, effective 1900 H D-1.
2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, effective 0600H D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D-1.

(1) Conduct airmobile operations on D Day to destroy VC/NVA forces in sector with priority of effort in objective ...

(2) On D+1 secure high ground overlooking SAIGON River in sector and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THAN DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE.

(3) Maintain control of SAIGON River in sector to deny its use to VC/NVA forces.

(4) Conduct detailed search of sector to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

(5) Upon shift of left limiting point from vic XT571349 to a point east of BEN SUC be prepared to release control of B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav to parent unit.

(6) Maintain security of base camp and retain responsibility of securing Route 26 in AP BLUE.

(7) Be prepared to release one battalion to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed. If this battalion is released, 196th Bde is relieved from responsibility for securing of Route 26.

11. EXECUTION:

a. General: On D-2 (6 Jan 67) the Div, under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Inf Bde reinforced. The 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf moved from DAU TIENG along the southern edge of the BOI LOI Woods to an overnight position. At the same time the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf with Trp B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav attached moved into the area north of the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center to initially open a route and secure artillery fire support bases. The 3d Bn, 21st Inf and supporting artillery consisting of the 3d Bn, 82d Arty and A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty was lifted into these bases. The 196th Inf Bde CP and elements of the 3d Bn, 13th Arty and 2d Bn, 32d Arty moved by convoy to TRUNG LAP. On D-1 the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf secured an LZ for the 2d Bn, 1st Inf. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the SAIGON River at the same time the 2d Brigade moved to blocking position along the SAIGON River north of the FILHOL Plantation and NHA VIEC. They deployed with TF 2d Bn, 34th Armor in the north, TF 2d Bn, 27th Inf in the center, along with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt and 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the south. During the nights a maximum amount of ambushes were emplaced along the river. During daylight hours minimum forces secured the river allowing extensive S & D operations in the VC base areas. Control of traffic on the SAIGON River was the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div while the 1st Inf Div was responsible for the control at the junction of the SAIGON-THI TINH Rivers. The 1st Inf Div with the 173d Abn Bde and 11th Armd Cav Regt blocked enemy escape routes east of the THI THAN River; executed an air-mobile assault north of the Iron Triangle and then executed S&D operations south through the area. Highlights of the operation were: (1) B-52 strikes exploited by ground followup and occupation; (2) the effective denial of VC escape routes and use of the SAIGON River as evidenced by the high casualty toll suffered by the VC through out the operation; (3) the discovery of a major VC HQ's tunnel complex by the 1/5 (M) Inf in the HOBO/BOI LOI Woods complex from which exploitation resulted in the recovery of important and timely intelligence; (4) the US and ARVN cooperation in the evacuation and relocation of personnel and live stock from the village of BEN SUC to a new Life Hamlet; (5) the use of a 3d Riverline RAG Task Force enabling the 196th Inf Bde and 2d Bde to search thoroughly along and beneath both sides of the SAIGON River resulting in the exploitation of several VC safe havens; (6) the destruction of numerous VC fortifications and structures along with the discovery of many VC cache sites and (7) the effective fire support provided by the supporting artillery from the forward fire support bases and CU CHI plus the integration by tactical air support greatly aided the success of the operation; (8) the utilization of bull dozers and engineer equipment on the out-skirts of PHU HOA DONG to isolate that village from the VC in the FILHOL Plantation.

b. Significant Actions:

(1) On 8 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, located 10 tons of rice, 1500 gals of fish sauce, 2 boats (one with motor), 12 CPU's and 3 Bicycles vic XT566323. All were destroyed except the rice and motor which were evacuated.

(2) On 8 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Ambush Patrol engaged an unknown number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT733197. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). One US Carbine and one Russian rifle were captured and evacuated.

(3) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 2 underground fortifications vic XT597324. In the same area 35.65 tons of rice were destroyed.

(4) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged 15 VC on a raft with 90mm fire vic XT683222. Results: 15 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).

(5) On 10 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 5 VC structures vic XT 563313. In the same area 100 tons of rice and 100 gals of tar were located and evacuated.

(6) On 10 January, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 30 underground fortifications vic XT744155 and 30 underground fortifications vic XT734184.

(7) On 11 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 1 Sampan, 1100 lbs of rice, 9 underground fortifications and 20 VC structures. B Co destroyed 61 underground fortifications and 1 Sampan vic XT7319.

(8) On 12 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, conducted an airmobile operation from the SAIGON River to vic XT747142 and conducted S&D Operations resulting in the capture of 4 tons of rice, 2,000 rds of SA, 2 Sampans, 1 underground fortification, 1 VC structure and 5500 lbs of rice destroyed.

(9) On 12 January, between 2000 and 2130, A Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 13 VC in Sampans vic XT715214 to XT716210. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 2 Sampans destroyed.

(10) On 13 January, C Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf engaged 4 VC in a Sampan vic XT673255. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 1 Sampan destroyed.

(11) On 13 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT569306 with SA and AW fire. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).

(12) On 15 January, B Trp, 2d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 1 underground fortification, 4 tunnels, 60 60mm rds, and 5 grenades vic XT592288.

(13) On 16 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf engaged 13 VC in a Sampan attempting to cross river vic XT673287. Results: 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS) and 1 Sampan destroyed. Miscellaneous documents were captured and evacuated from the same area.

(14) On 16 January, B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 2 underground fortifications and 1 tunnel vic XT615305. One shotgun, 1 cal .45 SMG, 2 CHICOM rifles, 1 pellet gun, 1 cal .25 rifle were captured and evacuated.

(15) On 17 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 14 tons of polished rice vic XT590306, which was evacuated. In the same location 12.5 tons of rice were destroyed.

(16) On 19 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf located 9 VC KIA (BC) vic XT664274 that were a result of operations conducted by the unit in the area. Five tons of rice were located and evacuated.

(17) On 20 January, Co C, 2nd Bn; 27th Inf, engaged 6 VC in a Sampan vic XT718213. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification), 1 VC PW and 1 cal .45 pistol captured and evacuated.

(18) On 20 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, with the assistance of a HOI CHANH located the following: 2 Springfield Rifles, 2 US SMG, 1 French Rifle 1 Mauser Rifle, 6 CHICOM Carbines, one Shotgun, and 700 rds SA ammo vic XT661281.

(19) On 21 January, A Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, located a tunnel complex consisting of a main tunnel 600 meters long and 10 branch tunnels vic XT650235. Sixty pounds of documents were evacuated.

(20) On 22 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, apprehended 3 VC PW's vic XT704210. VC PW's led the unit to XT704216 where the following items were destroyed: 3 hand grenades, 10 AT Mines, 4 homemade bangalore torpedoes, and two 155mm rds. Located and evacuated were: 2 commerical radios, miscellaneous web equipment, 1300 rds SA ammo, 4 CHICOM carbines, 1 Russian rifle and 1 Mauser rifle.

c. Revoluntonary Development Activities: MEDCAP Teams were used and helpd Hand items distributed in PHU HOA DONG. Mass evacuation and relocation of the villagers and livestock of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet was completed.

d. ARVN participation: The 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, conducted successful seal and search operations in PHU HOA DONG in coordination and conjunction with the 2d Bde. The 30th R&G of the 3d Riverine Zone provided boats to allow the banks of the SAIGON River to be checked for VC caches and sampans.

12. RESULTS:

a. US Losses:

(1) Personnel: 40 KIA, 156 WIA
(2) Equipment: 3 APC destroyed, 3 APC damaged (moderate), 2 APC's damaged (heavy), 1 tank dozer damaged (heavy), 1 tank destroyed, one ¼ ton truck damaged (heavy)

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Total Personnel Losses:

VC KIA (BC)	331
VC KIA (poss)	155
VC PW's	39
HOI CHANHS	147
Detainees	147

(2) Total Material Captured:

2-19

(a) Small Arms Weapons:

TYPE	QUANTITY
Rifle, Cal 30, M-1 US	7
Rifle, 7.92mm, Mauser	7
Rifle, AK-47, Soviet Assault	6
Rifle, U/I	5
Rifle, U/I, Soviet	2
Rifle, MAS-36, French	3
Rifle, Type 56, CHICOM	7
Rifle, Cal .25	1
Rifle, Enfield	1
Rifle, Springfield, (US)	2
Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14 (US)	1
Carbine, Cal .30 (US)	12
Carbine, Type 53 CHICOM	35
Carbine, 7.62mm, Soviet	3
SMG, Cal .45, (US)	4
SMG, 7.92mm	2
SMG, CHICOM	1
Pistol, Cal. 45, (US)	6
Pistol, Hanemade	8
Pistol, 9mm, P-38	4
Shotgun, U/I	2
Gun, Pellet	1

(b) Crew Served Weapons:

TYPE	QUANTITY
Launcher, RPG-2 Rocket	3
BAR, Cal .30, (US)	2
Rockets, U/I	3

(c) HE Rounds:

TYPE	QUANTITY
82mm Mortar	2 rds

(d) SA ammo — 7717 rds

(e) Rice — 253.85 tons

(f) Miscellaneous: NONE

(3) Total Material Destroyed:

(a) HE Rounds

TYPE	QUANTITY
155mm	10 rds
105mm	18 rds
90mm	1 rd
81mm	23 rds
60mm	117 rds

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Bombs	15
4.2 Inch	2 rds
82mm	1 rd
57mm	26 rds
RPG-2	2 rds
8 Inch	3 rds
75mm	3 rds
2.75	6 rockets
175mm	1 rd

(b) Mines and Grenades:

TYPE	QUANTITY
Bangalore Torpedos	4
CBU	135
Grenades	451
Shape Charge	1
AT Mines	101
AP Mines	59

(c) SA Ammo: 2013 rds

(d) Miscellaneous:

ITEM	QUANTITY
TNT	4 lbs
Salt	200 lbs
Outboard Motors	6
Bicycles	10
Sampans	11
Printers Ink	5 gals
Tar	5 gals
Cement	600 lbs
Documents	285 lbs
Books	Four 5 gal cans
CHICOM flashlight batteries	260
Roll of tin	1 roll (1000' X 3')
Gasoline	10 gals
Typewriters	2
Grenades	10
Medical Supplies	15 lbs
Mask, gas (VC)	121
Mask, protective, (US)	4
Sewing Machine	1
Batteries	24
Misc clothing and web equip	0
Civilian Radios	6
Camera	1
Tape Recorders	2

Sound Tapes	74
Forging Kit	1
Rolls of Wire	2
Fish Sauce	1500 gals
Outboard Motors	3
Boats	4
Trenches	14
Bicycles	9
Salt	1200 lbs
Sampans	145
Claymore Mines	7
Foxholes	129
TNT	292 lbs
Printing Press	1
Bridges	6
Kerosene	5 gals
Punji Pits	26
Tunnels	521
VC Structures	340
Rice	100.4 tons

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics. For a listing of logistic problems encountered see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 1).

b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 1).

c. Aviation. For Aviation Operations see 25th Aviation Bn After Action Report (App 1).

14. CIVIC ACTION:

a. 196th Bde:

(1) Conducted a total of 3 MEDCAPS at TRUNG LAP treating 301 patients.

(2) Provided 2,500 lbs of captured rice to ARVN dependents at TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center.

(3) Constructed 5,000 meters of road vicinity TRUNG LAP.

b. 2d Bde:

(1) Conducted a total of 10 MEDCAPS vicinity of PHU HOA DONG treating 2,123 patients.

(2) Distributed clothing to approximately 1,000 people at PHU HOA DONG

2-96

(3) Constructed a swing for school at PHU HOA DONG.

(4) Constructed playground at PHU HOA DONG.

(5) Delivered 4,000 lbs of captured rice (sour) to PF Compound at TAN PHU TRUNG to be used as hog feed.

c. Division:

(1) Provided clothing and commodities to 83 people evacuated from operational area.

(2) Provided 4,000 lbs of captured rice to KIM NGHIA Province Chief.

d. Civic Action by Divisional units was confined generally in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT5921) and PHU HOA DONG (XT7119) villages. The proximity of US forces has enabled units to increase civic action projects in those villages. The security provided by 2d Bde has enabled the district chief of PHU HOA DONG to reestablish the district office at PHU HOA DONG from PARIS TAN QUI. Evacuation of non-combatants was primarily handled by 1st Div units. 25th Div was involved in the evacuation of 83 non-combatants who were subsequently returned to GVN control at TRUNG LAP New Life Hamlet.

e. Psychological Operations:

(1) The task organization of the division had a HB, light Mobile (Loudspeaker Team) attached to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and an ARVN PSYOPS team attached to the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP program.

(2) The general attitude of the population toward the US forces was one of mistrust and concern. In the area in and around the village of PHU HOA DONG (XT7121), the population was extremely hostile as this had been a Viet Cong stronghold for many years.

(3) Psychological Operations were directed against enemy targets, emphasizing Allied Might and Introductory Themes. As the operation continued, emphasis was placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. For this purpose, CHIEU HOI and inevitable victory themes were used. Target areas were systematically covered to reach all intended target audiences. On D+1 the 246th PSYOP Company and brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Preplanned operations to D+5 were executed and then conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. Ground mounted loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted on a nightly basis at (XT7121) across the SAIGON River. There were 3 HOI CHANHS exploited with personalized leaflets and 4 with loudspeaker tapes. Altogether there were 976,265 leaflets dropped and 29 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation. Total aerial brodcast time was 10 hours and 40 minutes. Total ground broadcast time was 17 hours and 20 minutes. Approximately 70% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.

2 97 (4) The operation resulted in 37 HOI CHANHS who returned, 11 of them to US units. Those who were interviewed acknowledged seeing leaflets and hearing loudspeaker broadcasts, and admitted that they were to some extent influenced by the propaganda.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James D. Dethlefsen

JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

2 Incl
Appendix-1-- Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
Appendix-2--

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299

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFHO 7 March 1967
SUBJECT: Extract from ORLL, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

CEDAR FALLS (5-25 January 67)

The Brigade Task Force consisted of: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, 3/82 Arty, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 175th Engineers Company, 2/22 (M) Inf, 1/5 (M) Inf, B Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, 2/13 Arty (-) and A Btry 2/77 Arty. The mission of the Brigade was to locate and destroy key VC installations and fortifications, deny the VC the use of the area as a logistical base and headquarters and to establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration by the VC across the Saigon River. The operation began when the Brigade Command Post moved overland to TRUNG LAP. On 6 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved to secure LZ's vicinity FSB #2 (XT6023) and FSB #3 (XT5925) for an air mobile assault by companies A and B, 3/21 Inf. These two companies provided security for the FSB's and the eventual airlift by CH-47 of Btry B, Btry C and Btry A, 3/82 Arty to FSB #2 and FSB #3 respectively. Battery A, 3/82 Arty and A 2/77 Arty were located at FSB #3. Battery A,3/13 Arty was located at FSB #1 and secured by Company C,3/21 Inf. On 7 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved and secured LZ Victor for an airmobile assault by 2/1 Inf. The 2/22 (M) Inf attacked toward Obj C vicinity (XT5631). During the remainder of the operation, 3/21 Inf secured FSB #1, FSB #2 and FSB #3 and conducted company sized airmobile assaults to search and clear villages, acting mainly on information received from Returnees. F Troop, 17th Cavalry and 175th Engineers Company cleared and secured routes for necessary resupply convoys. The remaining Brigade elements conducted search and destroy operations in zone and established blocking positions along the Saigon River. The 175th Engr Co improved roads from TRUNG LAP and constructed new roads to FSB 2 and 3, permitting ground resupply. The occupation of blocking positions proved highly successful as large numers of VC were killed attempting to flee from the area North of the river and the Iron Triangle. Information from "Returnees" assisted the Brigade in locating cache sites and large tunnel complexes. It was in these tunnel complexes that the most valuable intelligence information was gained. Significant results achieved during Operation CEDAR FALLS by the Brigade included: 220 VC KIA (BC), 66 VC KIA (poss), 21 VC (PW), 357.1 tons of rice and 73 weapons captured, and numerous documents of vital interest to Army Intelligence, including key maps of the battle area, and VC After Action Battle Reports.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
Office of the ACofS for Security, Plans and Operations
APO 96307

AVCA GO-O

11 May 1967

Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (C) Operation CEDAR FALLS, a search and destroy operation, was conducted in the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and the IRON TRIANGLE (center of mass XT 7030) from 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967 by II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV). The II FFORCEV task organization included units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. Units began withdrawing from Operation CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. The operation terminated on 26 January.

2. (U) Tactical contact was sporadic throughout the operation.

3. (C) Support Operations: Logistical support for Operation CEDAR FALLS was provided by 1st Logistical Command's three major subordinate commands in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ): US Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM, Sgn); 44th Medical Brigade; and 4th Transportation Command.

a. USASUPCOM, Sgn established a Forward Support Area (FSA) at Phu Loi (XT 8516) to provide Cl I and Cl III support for the 11th ACR. A Cl V FSA was established at Lai Khe (XT7738) for support of 9 Inf Bns, 2 Armd Cav Sqdns (non-divisional), 1 Cav Sqdn (-), 16 Arty Btry's 105mm (96 tubes), 2 Arty Bn, 155mm (36 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8" (4 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8"/175mm (2 tubes ea) and 2 Arty Btrys (AWSP) Both FSAs became operational on 8 Jan 67. The Phu Loi FSA closed on 26 Jan 67. The Lai Khe Cl V FSA remained operational to support other 1st Inf Div operations. Throughout the operation unit distribution of Cl V was provided to the 25th Inf Div at its Cu Chi base camp (XT 6514) and fire support base (FSA) located vic Trung Lap (XT 5921). The evacuation of refugees from Ben Suc (XT 5833) and the IRON TRIANGLE and support of the Phu Cung Refugee Center (XT 8215) was a major logistical concern. Pre-operational planning envisioned civilian agencies evacuating refugees and in conjunction with provincial officials setting up and operating a temporary refugee center vic Phu Cuong. It was soon evident that military assistance and assets were required in transporting refugees and establishing and operating the refugee center. From 9 January until 2 February, trucks with drivers were provided daily to assist USAID at the refugee camp. A full-time liaison officer was provided to the 1st Infantry Division Control and Coordination Center at the refugee camp to insure that supplies and logistical services, which were above the civilian agency's and 1st Inf Div capability to provide were provided in an expeditious manner.

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

Examples of supplies furnished for use at the camp were: Two 5,000 gallon water trailers, 15 four-hundred gallon water trailers, 450 five man hex tents and 25 GP medium tents. Services provided included delivery of potable water and operation of a water point.

b. 44th Medical Brigade provided hospitalization, evacuation and medical regulating in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. There were 2 dustoff helicopters located at Lai Khe and 2 dustoff helicopters at Cu Chi for air evacuation. Back-up medical evacuation helicopters were located at Long Binh and Saigon. Medical regulating was provided by a team operating out of Lai Khe. Casualties were evacuated when appropriate to a surgical hospital at Bien Hoa; evacuation hospitals at Cu Chi, Long Binh and Vung Tau; and a field hospital at Saigon.

c. 4th Transportation Command provided medium boat support for Operation CEDAR FALLS. On 11 January three Landing Craft Mechanized Mark VIII (LCM-8's) sailed for Phu Cuong on the upper Saigon River, joining ARVN River Assualt Group (RAG) boats which had been in support of the operation since 8 January 1967. [illegible] ct operational control was assumed by the US Navy advisor to the RAG [illegible]ats committed to movement of refugees from Ben Suc to Phu Cuong. These US Army boats began operations with the RAG unit on 12 January 1967. 4 additional vessels were committed and sailed from Saigon on 13 January. From 14 January through 17 January all 7 LCM-8's participated in the movement of military personnel and cargo and evacuation of refugees, livestock, and personnel. On 18 January the vessels rejoined their parent organization.

d. Resupply to the Lai Khe and Phu Loi FSAs was accomplished by land line of communication (LOC) utilizing Route 13 from Saigon and Long Binh. Route security was provided by the 1st Infantry Division. Resupply to Cu Chi and the Trung Lap fire support base was by land LOC utilizing Route 1 from Saigon and Long Binh. Route security was provided by the 25th Inf Div.

e. Lessons Learned:

(1) CH47 (Chinook) helicopters were provided by II FFORCEV to evacuate large numbers of patients from hospitals in forward areas to Long Binh and Vung Tau on maximum of four hour notification.

(2) On 17 January, a CH47 helicopter loaded a landing craft with 62 tons of 105mm howitzer ammunition in 35 minutes, executing a 400 meter shuttle from the gun portion to the LCM in the stream. The operation was extremely smooth, and indicated an excellent technique for water/air resupply in areas where materials handling equipment and beaches limit over the shore discharge.

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303

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

(3) As the evacuation of refugees came to an end, the number of Vietnamese skilled in handling water buffalo decreased at Ban Suc. The result was an attempt by US troops to assist in handling these animals. Several of the buffalo "spooked" at the presence of strangers. One enlisted man was gored by a water buffalo. Use of civilian herdsmen who know the animals would speed up loading and reduce the danger of injury to US troops unfamiliar in the handling of water buffalo. After several trips, it was established that 70 head of water buffalo is the maximum safe capacity of an LCM-8.

4. (U) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

Operation CEDAR FALLS

a. Phu Loi FSA

	OIC	- 1 Officer
	Class I	- 12 EM
	Class III	- 8 EM
Total		21 Personnel

b. Lai Khe FSA

	OIC	- 1 Officer
	Class V	- 1 WO
		- 38 EM
	Maint	- 4 EM
	TTP*	- 8 EM
	Total	52 Personnel

*These personnel operated a Trailer Transfer Point for shuttle operations.

c. Landing Craft Operations

	OIC	- 1 Officer
	Crew	- 28 EM
	Total	29 Personnel

+ Map references: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, series L7014, sheets 6231 I & II; 6230 I; 6331 III & IV; and 6330 IV.

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Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

for Arthur K. Bakewell
WALLACE D. PARDUE LTC
Colonel, GS
ACofS, SP&O

Annex A - Logistical Support Data (Phu Loi) Operation CEDAR FALLS
Annex B - Logistical Support Data (Lai Khe) Operation CEDAR FALLS
Annex C - Logistical Support Data (Movement of Cargo by LCM-8) Operation CEDAR FALLS

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ANNEX A
Operation CEDAR FALLS (Phu Loi) PARENT UNIT: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment PERIOD COVERED FROM 7 Jan 67 TO 24 Jan 1967

TASK ORGANIZATION: 1 Regt Hq, 2 Armd Cav Sqdns, 1 Air Cav Trp (-)

COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD	SUPPLY O/H END OF PD	TOTAL RESUPPLY	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE DAILY RESUPPLY	AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION
CLASS I (RATIONS)	2,200	6,600	0	3,750	43,108	39,358	2,395	2,187
JP4 (GALLONS)	6,000	18,000	0	1,700	30,000	28,300	1,667	1,572
AVGAS (GALLONS)	1,000	3,000	800	600	5,000	5,200	278	289
MOGAS (GALLONS)	7,700	23,100	0	5,200	64,600	59,400	3,589	3,300
DIESEL (GALLONS)	9,400	28,200	0	22,000	54,600	32,600	3,033	1,811
TOTAL TONNAGE	92	276	3	116	690.5	577	38	32

NOTE: Cl V was provided by the Lai Khe FSA

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ANNEX B
OPERATION CEDAR FALLS (Lai Khe) PARENT UNIT: 1ST Inf Div PERIOD COVERED FROM 6 Jan TO 24 Jan 67

TASK ORGANIZATION: 9 Inf Bns, 2 Armd Cav Sqdns, 1 Cav Sqdn (-), 16 Arty Btrys 105mm (96 tubes), 2 Arty Bns 155mm (36 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8" (4 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8"/175mm (2tubes ea)

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COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD	SUPPLY O/H END OF PD	TOTAL RESUPPLY	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE DAILY RESUPPLY	AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION
CLASS V (S/T)	661	1,983	524	2,829	8,405	6,099	442	321
TOTAL TONNAGE	661	1,983	524	2,829	8,405	6,099	442	321

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306

307

ANNEX: C Logistical Support Data (Movement of Cargo by LCM-8)

OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS

Significant items of military and civilian cargo moved by LCM-8's were:

a. Bulk military cargo	98 tons
b. Pieces of military equipment	21
c. Passengers military	237
civilian	354
d. Sacked rice	383 tons
e. Livestock	
(1) Water buffalo	242 head
(2) Cattle	244 head
(3) Hogs	39 head
(4) Chickens	131
(5) Ducks	130
(6) Dogs	8
f. Miscellaneous	
(1) Trucks (civilian)	1
(2) Bicycles	25
(3) Sewing machines	2
(4) Lumber	700 bd ft
(5) Tin Roofing	425 lbs
(6) Hand Carried Packages	3 per refugee (est)

309



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
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
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




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

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