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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (26 June 68)

FOR OT RD 682012

3 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-0

12 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,
APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) The operational report for this headquarters for the quarterly
period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded in accordance with USARV
Regulation 525-15.


KENNETH F. LANGLAND
Colonel, TC
Commanding

TEL: CRB 2820

FOROTRD
682012

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SECTION I: OPERATIONS--SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Command Group.

a. Secretary of the General Staff: The command continued to conduct normal operations , engaging in combat service support for 90 days during the reporting period.

b. Protocol: Visitors to the command were limited during the early part of the period due to the Tet Offensive; however, the volume increased to normal during the latter part of the period. A list of visitors is included in Inclosure 1.

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2. (U) ACoFS, Personnel

a. Command: Colonel Kenneth F. Langland commanded from 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68; total days commanded - 90 days.

b. Arrival and departure of key individuals for the period 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68.

(1) Arrivals:

LTC Applebee	18 Mar 68	Fin Off, 92d Fin Det
LTC Olliff	20 Mar 68	Dir Retro & Disp
MAJ Bentley	6 Feb 68	Asst Staff Chaplain
MAJ Calderon	17 Feb 68	Intell Off (SP&O)
MAJ Frost	6 Feb 68	Asst IG
MAJ Green	19 Apr 68	Dep Dir of Trans
MAJ Higgins	19 Apr 68	Civil Affairs Off
MAJ Rowles	12 Feb 68	Dep ACoFS, Pers

(2) Departures:

LTC Hendry	19 Apr 68	Fin Off, 92d Fin Det
MAJ Goldberg	17 Feb 68	Intell Off (SP&O)
MAJ Oliver	5 Apr 68	Dir of Retro & Disp
MAJ Schaffer	19 Apr 68	Dep Dir of Trans
MAJ Ward	2 Apr 68	Dep Area Engineer

c. The following units of the USASUPCOM-CRB were gained, lost, or deactivated during the period 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68:

(1) Gains: 46th APU and 498th Trans Det:

(2) Losses: 26th Gen Spt Gp
29th Engr Det
56th Supply Co
57th Trans Bn
63d Maint Bn
88th Fin Det
129th Maint Co
205th Ord Plt
403d Trans Co
458th Trans Co
515th Trans Co
516th PSC
565th Trans Co
575th APU
578th LEM Co

(3) Deactivated: 159th Trans Det
347th Trans Co
410th Trans Co

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d. Personnel Management: (1) The USARPAC Manpower Survey Team surveyed this headquarters during Feb 68. The team recognized the current staffing structure and recommended the following staffings: 83 officers, 4 warrant officers, 203 enlisted personnel, 13 Department of the Army civilians, and 10 local nationals. This represents an increase of 38 spaces. TDA documents to be prepared based upon this survey will finally establish a firm authorization for personnel to staff this headquarters.

(2) Local National Direct Hire authorization: This command has received the 4th Quarter FY 68 Civilian Employment Voucher from HQ, USARV, reducing the authorized DHLN spaces from 1435 to 1085, a decrease of 350 spaces. A reclama was submitted, justifying the need for 351 additional spaces for the Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa Subarea Commands. The fluctuation of DHLN authorizations adversely affects the confidence in the program to employ local national personnel to support/augment military operations. While increases are constantly requested, the functional utilization of local national employees tends toward less constructive employment which does not truly prepare the local citizen to become a useful contributor to the economic stability of his nation. This situation is a direct result of constant decreases of authorized LNDH strength. DHLN personnel tend to be utilized in functional areas where their release will not seriously affect the operation of their assigned units. Total and complete employment of DHLN's is a slow process which should not be subject to fluctuation of authorizations; thus over a period of years these employees will graduate from unskilled to semi-skilled and then into technical areas where they would evolve into highly productive employees.

e. Civil Affairs: (1) During this quarter, a total of 36 units of this command participated in 104 military civic action projects; 24 of these projects were completed with the majority of the remainder being of a continuous nature. The Communist TET Offensive had a deleterious effect on many activities that were already in progress.

(2) Two projects are now in the final stages of planning that will form the basis for new and self-sustaining industries in the greater Cam Ranh City area. The Pork Production Program, as a civic action, will provide edible garbage for approximately 4,500 pigs in this area, alleviating a critical feed shortage and increasing pork production, ultimately to 10,000 head. As a long range program, the second project will create a truck farm to provide Cam Ranh Bay with locally grown fresh vegetables. Starting as a civic action, it should result in a major means of livelihood for much of the local population.

(3) As a direct result of the TET Offensive, General Westmoreland established the TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP). Money was donated by military personnel for the immediate relief of victims of the VC aggression. USASUPCOM-CRB units donated a total of \$6,216.98.

(4) A conversational English program for local national employees was approved to commence at Cam Ranh Bay on 8 April 1968. The majority of the students will be administrative/clerical employees. If successful, the program will be expanded to include other skills and will serve as a prototype for future programs at Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa.

(5) During this quarter, USARV through 1st Logistical Command instituted a new program for Civil Affairs. The plan has been implemented by classified message to the field. Briefly, the new program tasks company size (and larger) units with mandatory civic action responsibilities, placing direct civic action responsibility on Subarea Commanders. It also establishes clear coordinating channels and defines reporting responsibilities. In addition, the new program brings certain USARV units into this command's civil affairs program.

f. Personnel Services: (1) On 23 Feb 68, a Department of Army Civilian, GS-12, was assigned duties as USASUPCOM-CRB Education Director.

(2) In Feb 68 the US Army Mortuary, Saigon, began operating a direct exchange facility for human remains pouches, personal property bags and litters. The mortuary will issue new or cleaned items to escorts to match the number of those items utilized in his individual mission. Escorts will be permitted to carry up to six litters and remains pouches with them on their return flights. Due to the recent TET attacks, experience indicates the need for a stand-by mortuary in the Republic of Vietnam. The 1st Logistical Command in coordination with a representative from the Office, Chief of Support Services Company will occupy and maintain this facility. It has been directed by HQ, USARV that clothing and personal property not be separated from human remains in the channel of evacuation in order to facilitate the identification of the remains. The remains of 163 US Armed Forces personnel and 97 Free World Military Assistance Forces Personnel were processed through USASUPCOM-CRB collecting points during the period 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68.

(3) On 29 Feb 68 the Phan Rang Central Post Fund was dissolved. The uncommitted net worth of the Phan Rang Central Post Fund was equally divided between the Central Post Funds at Cam Ranh Bay and Tuy Hoa. USASUPCOM-CRB units in Phan Rang receive their dividends from the Cam Ranh Bay Central Post Fund. On 12 March 1968, approval was received from 1st Logistical Command to establish the Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command Vietnamese Labor Fund. The fund will provide a central focal point to administer and control personal hire employees on the Cam Ranh Bay peninsula. The fund will be fully operational on or about 28 May 1968.

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3. (C) ACoS, Security, Plans, and Operations

a. Security, Plans, and Operations

(1) During the reporting period personnel security actions were completed by the Security and Intelligence Division as reported below:

- (a) Number of clearances validated: 209
- (b) Number of requests for National Agency Checks processed: 28
- (c) Number of Investigative Repository Records Checks submitted: 53
- (d) Number of requests for Background Investigations processed: 3
- (e) Number of Confidential clearances granted: 7
- (f) Number of local files checks performed: 28
- (g) Number of debriefings performed: 14

(2) Recent changes in USARV regulations and requirements have significantly modified the personnel security for the commands. Since Investigative Records Repository Checks are no longer necessary for a considerable number of clearances, as reflected in the above statistics, validations can be accomplished following a favorable local files check and returned to the units with little delay. This is a vast improvement of a process that did take in excess of 60 days to accomplish. All TOP SECRET clearances still require an Investigative Records Repository Check as do certain SECRET clearances, but in total the entire personnel security program is now more efficient.

(3) During this quarter attempts were made to establish better control of the more than 15,000 indigenous labor force employed on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. A centralized facility for control, identification, accountability and clearing of the indigenous labor force was established at the western approach to the Dragon Lake Bridge which spans Cam Ranh Bay vicinity and grid coordinates CP 054250. At this check point are representatives from; Allied Police, Air Force Security Police, Military Police, Vietnamese National Police, Vietnamese Government Labor Office, US Civic Action personnel and Military Security Service (MSS). With the use of indigenous personnel as checkers at this point one US Supervisor is provided for every five checkers to insure proper checks are made. All personnel are given a complete search at the check point. All indigenous personnel entering the Cam Ranh Bay Installation at points other than the Cam Ranh Bay Check point must have in their possession either a USARV Form 361 or 362 indicating a current clearance by MSS. In addition, all services, Army, Navy, Air Force will now use the USARV 361 and 362 forms for standardized control and identification.

(4) a. A new problem has been presented by increasing enemy threats and capability to interdict and sabotage friendly shipping. On 31 January 1968 Cam Ranh Bay witnessed its first act of aggression when a North Vietnamese

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swimmer placed a satchel charge on the Norweigan Petroleum tanker, the Pelikan, anchored in the harbor. Two swimmers were apprehended but, the charge detonated blowing a diamond shaped hole above the waterline of the vessel. Interrogation of the swimmers indicated an additional 28 swimmers were located in a base camp some 15 miles to the west of the bay and were targeted for shipping at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay. To further complicate the problem, a Soviet limpet (magnetic) mine was found by Republic of Korea forces sweeping west of Cam Ranh Bay.

b. With this new more sophisticated threat a detailed coordinated study was made for port security. US Navy representatives recommended illumination of the water line of all ships in the harbor. This created another problem as very few commercial vessels are equipped with such lighting. Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) is currently conducting a study on the problem and will attempt to rectify it. In addition to lighting, guards are recommended to observe and detect possible swimmers and explosive devices around each vessel and pier. US Army personnel assets preclude placing guards on each ship while maintaining the primary logistical mission. However, MSTS is arranged for guards of merchantmen on those vessels anchored in the harbor while US guards are placed on the pier and on those ships at the piers. During periods of increased alert guard commitments are increased. At all times the US Navy and Military Police patrol the harbor in waterborne craft and Navy divers perform hull checks on all vessels in the harbor.

3b. Plans and Training Division

(1) Training

(a) In order to improve the Replacement Training Program, the site was relocated, and additional bleacher facilities were added to accommodate the increased number of replacements. The average monthly attendance at the Replacement Training classes has increased to 598. R&D, USASUPCOM-CRB was recently designated as the coordinating headquarters for this training.

(b) The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter:

<u>Course of Instruction</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Persons Trained</u>
Radiological Protection	25 Mar 68 - 5 Apr 68	1
NCA 500 Computer	12 Mar 68 - 5 Apr 68	21
Unit Armorer M-16A1	11 Apr 68 - 12 Apr 68	79
Heavy Equipment School		12

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(2) Force Development

(a) During the period the following moves were made among troop units of USASUPCOM-CRB.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MOVED FROM</u>	<u>MOVED TO</u>
29th Signal Det	CRB	* Thailand
39th Trans Bn (trk) HHD***	CRB	* DNG
56th Sup Co (hvy matrl)	CRB	* DNG
88th Finance Sec (disb)	CRB	* DNG
109th QM Co. (-) (Aer Del)	CRB	DNG
147th Fld Svc Co (1&2 GR plts)	CRB	DNG
148th S&S Co. (POL plt)	NHA	DNG
305th S&S Co.	CRB	* Thailand
458th Trans Co. (Lt Amphib)	CRB	SGN
558th S&S Bn HHD	CRB	* Thailand
566th Trans Co. (2d plt)	CRB	DNG
578th CS Co (Lt Equip Maint)	CRB	DNG

(b) During the period, the following units, previously moved on TDY basis, were transferred out of this command.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAINING COMMAND</u>
26th Gen Sup Gp HHC	USASUPCOM-QNH
29th Engr Det (wtr purif)	USASUPCOM-DNG
57th Trans Bn (trk) HHD	USASUPCOM-QNH
205th Ord Plt (ammo)	USASUPCOM-DNG
403d Trans Co (tml trf)	USASUPCOM-QNH
515th Trans Co (1t trk)	USASUPCOM-DNG
516th PSC Co (type C)	USASUPCOM-DNG
565th Trans Co (tml svc)	USASUPCOM-QNH
575th Army Postal Unit	USASUPCOM-QNH

(c) During the period following the unit was inactivated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE/INACTIVATION</u>
410th Trans Co (tml svc)	CRB	3 February 1968

(d) During the period the following unit scheduled for Cam Ranh Bay was cancelled: 31st Military History Detachment.

* Indicates PCS move (Note: All others TDY)

**Indicates rejoining parent from TDY

***Indicates unit is alerted for move.

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3c. Operations

a. The following operations were supported by USASUPCOM-CRB during the period of this report:

(1) Operation Mc Lain: A search and destroy operation in Binh Thuan Province by the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division commenced 20 January 1968 and continues. This operation is supported from Forward Support Area Phan Thiet with supply point distribution of Classes I, III, and V; laundry, bath, graves registration and back up direct support maintenance. Changes during the reporting period included the movement of HQ, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, and one platoon of B Company, 69th Armored into the Phan Thiet area in support of Operation Mc Lain. This Headquarters, in conjunction with tactical support assistance from HQ, I Field Forces Vietnam, began an intense effort to resupply the Phan Thiet FSA by land LOC as well as by sea, and in doing so has successfully achieved a significant logistical and psychological advantage in the area.

(2) Operation Bolling: A search and destroy operation in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces continues involving one battalion of the 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade with its supporting unit. This operation is supported by limited unit distribution of supplies to the Brigade Forward Support Element of the Phu Hiep and laundry, bath, graves registration services and back-up direct support maintenance from Tuy Hoa Subarea Command.

(3) Operation Mac Arthur: A search and destroy, reconnaissance and surveillance operation in Pleiku, Darlac, and Kontum Provinces by elements of the 4th Infantry Division continues. USASUPCOM-CRB provided unit distribution of Class I, III, and V supplies from Cam Ranh Air Base to Ban Me Thuot Airfield. A Liaison Team was established at Ban Me Thuot, from 9 January 1968 to 22 April 1968, to successfully support the 1/22 Infantry, 4th Infantry Division; two battalions of the 173rd Abn Infantry Brigade; and the 1/22 Infantry reinforced Task Force of the 4th Division operating in the Ban Me Thuot area. This Liaison Team assisted the units at destination with supply point distribution of Class I, IV, and V and provided extensive assistance in supply accountability and requesting procedures. In addition the Liaison Team provided material handling equipment with operators, transportation liaison, and graves registration services. Class III support was provided from the USASUPCOM-CRB Class III supply point at Ban Me Thuot.

(4) Americal Division: During the period of this report, this command served as the primary depot for Class V and Bulk Class IV supplies in the support of the Americal Division, although USASUPCOM-QNH retained managerial control of the support operations.

(5) Routine Republic of Korea Army operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (South) continues to be supported as required from the United States Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay or the nearest subarea command. Transportation assistance is also provided to isolated areas.

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(6) Air Drop: During the reporting period, the 109th Aerial Delivery Company, including a detachment at DaNang, air dropped 8955 short tons of supplies to tactical units in RVN, the bulk of which was delivered to Khe Sanh in I Corps Tactical Zone. This tonnage represents an amount significantly larger than the tonnage dropped during all of fiscal year 1967 by the same unit and breaks all previous records for tonnage dropped during a sustained period of similar length. The 623rd QM Parachute Maintenance and Depot Company expanded its operations during the same period to an around the clock basis to cope with the tremendous volume of air item recovery, classification, and repair imposed by the increase in tonnage dropped. Their efforts sustained the Aerial Delivery Company through the highly critical FEB-MAR Khe Sanh seige period and made possible the successful continuation of the mission in the face of a critical shortage of air items. During the Khe Sanh air drop mission, the command successfully employed the experimental Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) and Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES) delivery techniques, making possible pin point delivery on the air strip within the compound at Khe Sanh.

(7) During the TET Offensive, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command continued its ever increasing mission of providing back-up support for, and on several occasions, assumed the primary support missions of the other support commands. These missions involved all classes of supply support to tactical units stretching from ICTZ to IVCTZ. During the period of the TET Offensive, the Logistical Operations Control Center of the Command coordinated a daily average of 15 operating Combat Essential Missions, 4 Emergency Resupply Missions (ER's), 2 or more concurrent air drop missions including Khe Sanh and several intermittent Tactical Emergency Mission (TE). In spite of this unusually heavy load, and the resultant transportation and coordination difficulties, this command filled all requirements during the period and consistently met load times and supply requirements. In addition to the task of supporting tactical units in the field, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command also was acclaimed for its major accomplishments in support of Operation Recovery, a logistical resupply effort designed and implemented with the objective of assisting various LN aid projects such as refugee assistance and reconstruction. These programs proved highly successful in southern II CTZ during the reporting period.

(8) During the period 12 units varying from company to detachment in size moved from CRB to other support command areas of responsibility. All coordination and monitoring regarding unit moves were accomplished by the Logistical Operation Control Center.

(9) During the month of April three convoys were conducted on Highway QL #1 between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. This was the first time in over a year and a half that the road was safe for sustained logistical convoy activity. The LOCC was responsible for coordinating the convoy elements with the security elements. Land remains the backup line of communications (LOC) while sea remains the primary LOC.

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10. The following Frag Order was published during the period of this report. Frag Order 2-68 Support of I Corps Tactical Zone.

11. On 17 April 1968, a Tactical Airlift Liaison Officer was assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command from 834th Air Division, Tan Son Nhut. The assignment of this TALO has greatly enhanced the coordination between Air Force and Army elements in this Command's area of operation, and has significantly increased the overall mission capability of this command.

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4. (U) ACoS, Comptroller

a. Internal Review: On 16 April 1968, US Army Support Command Regulation 37-16, Internal Review was published establishing objectives of Internal Review as a control responsibility of every commander.

b. Review and Analysis: US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay Regulation 1-6, was published on 17 February 1968 establishing a command Quarterly Review and Analysis. Heretofore, Review and Analysis data was a Quarterly publication depicting command performance data. The new oral procedure will enable the commander to get a more comprehensive view of exceptional problem areas.

c. Terminal Tariff: The Terminal Tariff regulation for Cam Ranh Bay, establishing standard billing procedures, was revised on 26 March 1968 (USASUPCOM-CRB Regulation 56-6).

d. Management Improvement/Cost Reduction - MICOR Program: As an adjunct to the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay MICOR Program, Operation War On Waste "WOW" was initiated during the 3rd Quarter 1968. This program was implemented by USASUPCOM-CRB, Circular 11-2, dated 15 April 1968. The main purpose of Operation War On Waste is aimed at eliminating the needless everyday waste of government property through command emphasis down to first line supervisors and the individual soldier.

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5. (C) Director of Ammunition:

a. Class V Stockage Objectives and Quantities on hand at beginning and end of period in short tons:

(1) General:

	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>Beginning of Period</u>	<u>End of Period</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	Stockage Objective	250	395
	On Hand Balance	488	551
Tuy Hoa ASP	Stockage Objective	8,280	6,064
	On Hand Balance	8,717	4,911
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	Stockage Objective	80,220	52,667
	On Hand Balance	68,628	47,288

(2) Discussion:

A significant operational change occurred during this period due to the activation of the Da Nang Support Command (Provisional). As a result of the activation, the primary resupply mission for the Da Nang and Chu Lai ASP's no longer is the responsibility of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command. The stockage objectives at the end of the period are based on weapons densities, required supply rates, and usage factor. As a matter of interest, it includes 34 days of the 60 day requirement for the I Corps Tactical Zone. The stockage objectives at Tuy Hoa and Cam Ranh Bay were previously based on a straight percentage of the Logistical Command total stockage objective. The reduction in the on hand balance at Cam Ranh Bay is due to comparatively low receipts and an increase in shipments to the I Corps Tactical Zone. The reduction in the on hand balance at Tuy Hoa is due to the planned reconstruction of the storage facilities. The on hand balance has been held at less than the stockage objective to permit easier reconstruction; however, tactical requirements may dictate an increase.

b. Total storage capabilities at beginning and end of period in short tons:

(1) General:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>Beginning of Period</u>	<u>End of Period</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	1,550	960
Phan Rang ASA	410	410
Tuy Hoa ASP	17,720	15,438
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	90,591	89,782

(2) Discussion: The capabilities at the beginning of the period are based on a planning factor of 11 sq. ft. per short ton. The capabilities at the end of the period are determined by the approved plan on safety distance safety standards and net explosive weight. Ammunition is not being stored at Phan Rang although the storage area is being maintained. Self-help reconstruction is continuing in ASA "Y" at Cam Ranh Bay. A multitude of critical quantity distance safety violations have been rectified and handling operations enhanced.

c. Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

(1) General:

	<u>FEB</u>		<u>MAR</u>		<u>APR</u>	
	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	760	1,015	693	544	672	611
Tuy Hoa ASP	2,832	4,695	1,364	3,754	2,510	2,638
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	21,981	23,576	20,037	29,527	14,436	26,215

(2) Discussion: The comparatively low receipts at Cam Ranh Bay ASD were due to vessel diversions to other Support Commands. The mission of the Cam Ranh Bay ASD as a strategic backup for the other Support Commands is apparent in that over one half of the total tonnage shipped during the quarter was to the other Support Commands.

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6. (U) Director of Food

a. General. The Directorate of Food was established on 26 January 1968. During the reporting period, the directorate was responsible for supervising the food supply system to supported forces within the USASUPCOM-CRB area of responsibility to include requisitioning, receiving, recouping, storing and distribution of all food items in support of military operations. The directorate also exercises staff responsibility for support services pertaining to bakery, iceplant and food service matters. Class I support was provided to Support Command customers and those tactical operations designated by the 1st Logistical Command. This directorate also provided back-up support to other Support Commands in RVN.

b. Class I.

(1) During the reporting period, redistribution action was completed on fifty-eight (58) 1600 cubic feet prefabricated refrigerated boxes. Thirty-three (33) boxes were distributed within the Support Command area of responsibility while twenty-five (25) boxes were transferred to support other 1st Logistical Command requirements. Redistribution of assets was made possible by the completion and full utilization of the fourth refrigerated warehouse at Cam Ranh Bay Depot.

(2) Command emphasis continues to be placed on an aggressive recoup program at Depot and supply points in order to minimize the impact of less than desirable storage conditions and to reduce losses caused by deterioration of products.

(3) Deliveries of perishable subsistence via Sea/Land refrigerated vans continued to be excellent during the period. Vans of six-way beef, eggs and fresh fruits and vegetables continue to be line hauled to supply points with outstanding results.

(4) Delivery of dairy products in sufficient quantities to meet demands was given increased emphasis during the period. Limited prime mover assets available to haul refrigerated vans continues as the key factor in distribution. However, increased utilization of a refrigerated barge has released more van and tractor assets to be committed to delivery of dairy products.

(5) An accelerated program for the integration of excess non-perishable line items into the cyclic menu continues with favorable results. Effective commodity management procedures continue to be stressed in order to achieve a balanced stock position within assigned objectives.

(6) Significant quantities of perishable and non-perishable subsistence were transferred to DaNang Support Command (PROV) as part of the build up in I Corps Tactical Zone.

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(7) Perishable subsistence is now airlifted via C-123 three (3) times a week to Phan Thiet FSA from Phan Rang Logistical Support Activity. Bread and ice continue to be airlifted daily. Additionally, Phan Rang LSA assumed the Class I support mission for all units operating in the Dalat area with shipments being made on a scheduled basis three (3) times a week via air LOC. A 3.6 ton ice plant was delivered to Phan Thiet FSA and is expected to be installed during the next reporting period thereby reducing the ice airlift requirement at Phan Rang.

(8) During the period, Class I support, using unit distribution was provided units participating in Operation Mac Arthur. Supply Point distribution was provided to units of Operation Bolling and Mc Lain.

(9) All three (3) Subarea Commands (Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay) and the Logistical Support Activity at Phan Rang continue to maintain a sufficient level of subsistence supplies to meet all demands. This is due to daily utilization of Highway QL-1, which has remained open. A secure line of communication, open daily, allows resupply of required subsistence items to proceed on a routine basis.

(10) Over 50,000 cases of meal, combat, individual were released for rigging and aerial delivery to Khe Sanh during the reporting period.

(11) Non-perishable canned meats, non-fat dry milk and canned fruits and vegetables were shipped to CORDS-MACV representatives in Phan Thiet, Dalat and Bao Loc in support of Operation Recovery, a civilian disaster relief program resulting from the TET offensive. Class I support was also provided the RVN National Police Field Forces during the period.

c. Food Service.

(1) During the reporting period a survey of on-hand Cantonment Mess Equipment items was conducted in 66 Korean messes located in the following areas:

- (a) 23 - 100th Log Spt Comd at ROK Valley, North Nha Trang.
- (b) 1 - 100th Log Spt Comd messes at Nha Trang City.
- (c) 2 - 100th Log Spt Comd messes at Camp Mc Dermott, Nha Trang.
- (d) 4 - 100th Log Spt Comd messes at Ninh Hoa.
- (e) 7 - 12th Log Spt Bn messes at Tuy Hoa.
- (f) 1 - 9th ROKA MASH mess at Tuy Hoa.
- (g) 1 - 112th ROKA ASP mess at Tuy Hoa.

- (h) 22 - 28th RCT messes at Tuy Hoa.
- (i) 1 - 966th Fld Arty Btry mess at Tuy Hoa.
- (j) 4 - 30th Arty Pn messes at Tuy Hoa.

(2) Purpose of survey was to ascertain amount of Cantonment Mess Equipment items actually on-hand in Korean messhalls as authorized by USARV Reg 30-10. It is intended to aid and assist the Koreans in procurement of authorized items of equipment. The survey disclosed there was a critical shortage of equipment on-hand. Procedures for updating messhalls, to include installation of liquid propane gas and diesel/electric accessories was explained to Korean officers.

(3) It was recommended that some of the messes be consolidated by virtue of construction of permanent type facilities in those areas where temporary messes existed. This construction is now underway in the 12th Log Spt Bn area at Tuy Hoa, which will result in a substantial saving to the US Government.

(4) Messes under the control of the 9th ROK Div located at Ninh Hoa and Phan Rang will be surveyed during the current reporting period.

(5) Training Program for ROKA Forces mess personnel. Recent inward emphasis on Korean military personnel preparing food according to the US Army 28 Day Cyclic Menu has resulted in the necessity to initiate a training program for cooks. The training program consists of assigning Korean mess personnel in pairs to an American Military messhall for a period not less than 28 days in order to go through a complete cycle of the menu. The trainees not only are exposed to food preparation but also to operation and maintenance of equipment such as field ranges. The program commenced 26 April with 2 Koreans assigned to HHD, USASUPCOM-CRB messhall and 2 assigned to HHC, USATC messhall. The program will continue until sufficient Koreans are trained and returned to their units. They will serve as a training base from which other Korean mess personnel will be trained.

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7. (C) Director of General Supply

a. Reports of Survey functions e.g., administrative processing and editing, were turned-over to the ACofS, Comptroller Office on 20 March 1968.

b. On 1 April 1968 repair parts staff functions were turned-over to the Directorate of General Supply with the mission of monitoring, establishing policy, and assisting DSU's and GSU's in tech supply operations. During April a repair parts officer was assigned to the directorate. He is currently attending the NCR 500 Supervisors Course in Long Binh. He is also scheduled to attend the NRC 500 Operators Course. More emphasis has been placed on more training of NCR 500 operators within this command.

c. In preparation for the forthcoming 3SVN System at the 504th Depot, an orientation briefing was given to the principle staff officers at this headquarters on 27 March 1968. The system is scheduled to be implemented at the Cam Ranh Bay Depot on 19 June 1968. Experience factors acquired from the 3SVN system at Saigon have been received at this headquarters and are being utilized at the CRB Depot in allowing for a smooth transition. Buildings to house the system have been constructed. Considering that the system is not basically designed to have retail customers deal directly with the Depot for support, a fully operational DSU has been established at the Tuy Hoa Subarea Command to accommodate customers in that area. Emphasis is also being placed on this in the Nha Trang Subarea Command.

d. A study on the revision of Class II and IV retail customers service from the Cam Ranh Bay Depot has been completed and is currently being staffed. If approved and if a separate DSU is established under the operational control of Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command, the Cam Ranh Bay Depot will be relieved from processing approximately 35,000 requisitions monthly for approximately 300 non-MILSTRIP customers.

e. On 11 April 1968 a liaison trip was made to Phan Rang by a representative from the Directorate of General Supply, to assist the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the turn-in of all installation property belonging to the brigade. After arrangements were made, equipment was consolidated in a centralized area and back-hauling of property was accomplished, in the amount of 17 S&P loads, to Cam Ranh Bay Depot. Movement was completed on 25 April 1968.

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f. On 16 February 1968 a new Cam Ranh Bay Self Service Supply Center was opened. The new facility allows for more storage space and better control of property. 26

g. During the period 23 April through 3 May 1968 the Cam Ranh Bay Depot conducted a 100% location survey. Many line items were located as a result of the survey. In assisting in the location of items stocked in the depot, that are carried at zero balance on the ABC listing, this directorate has instituted a policy of physically checking stocks when emergency request for items are received at this office. Approximately 60% of the items checked are located. The location and quantity found information is passed to stock control commodity managers for inclusion on stock record cards.

h. During the reporting period this directorate assisted in the movement of six (6) units (148th POL Platoon, 458th Trans Co, 46th APU, 478th Maint Co (LEM), HHC, 39th Trans Bn and the 516th PCS Co.). All units moved at a TOE equipment strength of not less than 85%.

i. On 16 April 1968, CRB Reg 735-2 was published to define procedures for property accountability and property transfers

j. On 28 March 1968, a procedures letter was distributed to all major subordinate commands giving guidance, for further dissemination, on how to obtain replacement items for combat losses. It was noted that supported units (non-1st Log units) were following guidance put out by their next higher headquarters which was not congruent with USARV Reg 735-3 and 1LC Reg 735-3. This problem has been brought under control.

k. On 26 April 1968, a study was made of cold storage facilities available for dry cell batteries. It was found that 193,620 cu. ft. of space is available at Cam Ranh Bay Depot for cold storage. 193,515 cu. ft. is currently being used for storage of 84 days of Class I supplies. MACV space allocations for storage of dry cell batteries is 17,385 cu. ft. This far exceeds the cold storage space available to this command. Dry cell batteries are currently being stored in a 220' x 40' warehouse which is uncooled. This continues to be a problem area within this command.

l. The Closed Loop Support Program was expanded during the reporting period to include the MCS Recovery Vehicle, Project Code LGB and Gun, Antiaircraft, SP, Project Code LGA. During the reporting period 2349 closed loop items were distributed and 884 items were retrograded.

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m. Class II and IV support was rendered to TASK FORCE WERNERT through Ban Me Thuot. See inclosure 2 and 3 for items shipped.

n. Major subordinate commands reported receipt of convoy shipments without material release orders (MRO). Ten loaded convoy vehicles were spot checked prior to departure to home station to insure that drivers had valid TCMD's in their possession and each piece of cargo was checked to see if an MRO was attached to each item. No discrepancies were found. Systematic check of this type will continue to insure proper documenting of items shipped. On 28 March 1968, a liaison trip was made to the 14th Aerial Port at Ban Me Thuot to check the validity of complaints that cargo shipped did not arrive, or arrived without documentation, and further, to establish the fact that representatives from the TASK FORCE met all incoming aircraft as stated. The aircraft was not met by representatives from the TASK FORCE. The consignee or other units, selected and loaded any equipment desired. The TASK FORCE commander was advised to correct this situation.

o. Great improvements were made in the overall support of Psychological Program. Psychological supported units prepared up-dated PLL's furnished them to appropriate DSU's who in-turn prepare their ASL's and forward them to depot. Requisitions that cannot be filled by DSU's are air mailed or hand-carried to the Customer Assistance Office at USAD for special handling. This system is working well in effecting timely response on PSYOPS requisitions.

p. Assistance was requested by the Area Engineer personnel in securing a large quantity of repair parts for generators under the responsibility of PA&E. A meeting was held with PA&E representatives and it was discovered that red ball channels were not being utilized for deadlined equipment. Further, PA&E personnel had never requested authority for an AT (Activity Address Code) which would entitle them to use direct red ball channels. The anticipated approval of requested Activity Address Codes for all PA&E activities will contribute to the improvement of deadline equipment rate within this command.

q. During the TET Offensive, Construction and Barrier Materials stocks went to a critical supply position. Due to increased demands from outside of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command support area, there was a shortage of materials for normal customers. Through intensified management, the demands of the customers were filled based on combat essential requirements. No operation was hindered for the lack of Construction and Barrier Materials.

r. On 11 through 14 April 1968, the first of a series of staff supply assistance visits began to assigned and attached units. These visits are designed to assist units in correcting common deficiencies, to discuss policy and to assist units with supply problems.

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8. (U) Directorate of Maintenance

a. General:

(1) The 63d Main Support Company, APO 96240 and the 136th Light Maintenance Company, APO 96316 were assigned to US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 for further assignment to the 69th Maintenance Battalion, APO 96312. Assignment was effective 15 February 1968, duty stations remained the same.

(2) The 578th Light Equipment Maintenance (LEM) Company (SS) completed its deployment north on 21 April 1968. The 128th Signal Company (Depot) assumed the signal mission previously performed by the 578th, and the 557th Light Maintenance Company assumed the remaining missions of the 578th.

(3) The Purchase Request and Commitment for renewal of VMAF Corporation Contract (Operation of Fixed Field Maintenance Station at Cam Ranh Bay, RVN) for the period 1 July 1968 thru 30 June 1969 completed on 10 April 1968.

b. Selected equipment density and deadline at the end of the period.

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>% DEADLINE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Trk Cargo 2½ Ton	580	9.13	21
Trk, Other 2½ Ton	104	6.73	20
Trk, Cargo 5 Ton	209	9.51	10
Trk, Tractor 5 Ton	298	8.05	10
Trk, Dump 5 Ton	12	16.80	10
Trailer 12 Ton	275	4.56	20
Trailer 5000 Gal	84	4.71	20
Forklifts R/T	190	9.48	10
MHE	303	9.25	10
Gen Under 15 KW	302	15.30	10
Gen 15 KW and Over	17	41.20	20

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>% DEADLINE</u>	<u>% TOLERANCE</u>
Trk and Crwl Cranes	71	7.04	20
Crwl Over 20 Ton	5	40.00	20
Trk MTD 20 Ton	48	6.25	20
Crane Other	18	0	20
Reefer Van 7½ Ton	29	6.90	10
Laundry Dryer	8	0	10
Laundry Washer	6	0	10
Water Purif Unit	8	0	0
Bakery Plants	5	0	0
Bath Units	15	13.30	20
Bulldozer F/T	23	8.80	20
Crane Floating	3	0	20
LARC V's	70	10.0	20
LCM-8's	1	0	20
LCU's	11	36.40	20
Barge Pol	2	0	20
Tug Boats	6	16.70	20
Radio AN/VRC-12	155	15.40	15
Radio AN/GRC-26	1	0	15
Radio AN/GRC-46	20	35.00	15
Radio AN/PRC-25	34	5.88	15
Teletype	30	6.67	15
M88	2	0	15
Laundry Unit Combination	37	18.90	15

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>% DEADLINE</u>	<u>% TOLERANCE</u>
Truck, 5 Ton Other	40	20.00	10
Pump, 350 GPM	10	0	10
Pump, 6" 2 stages	8	0	10
Pump, 6" 1 stage	5	0	10
Pump, 50 GPM	6	33.30	10
Grader MTZD	2	0	20
Scoop Loaders	3	33.30	20
Scraper Towed	1	0	20
Tractor, 10 Ton	2	0	10

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9. (C) Director of Petroleum

a. Stockage Objectives, Storage Capacities, and Safety Levels in Thousands of Gallons.

<u>CAM RANH BAY</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY STG CAP</u>	<u>SAFETY LEVEL</u>
JP-4	7000	8610	3500
Avgas	990	1218	495
Mogas	1600	1932	800
Diesel	3290	4032	1645
<u>NHA TRANG</u>			
JP-4	800	966	400
Avgas	780	966	390
Mogas	450	546	225
Diesel	460	546	230
<u>TUY HOA</u>			
JP-4	2100	2940	1680
Avgas	170	210	100
Mogas	260	412	208
Diesel	590	882	472
<u>PHAN RANG</u>			
JP-4	1260	2520	1088
Avgas	340	840	200
Mogas	90	126	96
Diesel	100	126	96

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<u>BAN ME THUOT</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY STG CAP</u>	<u>SAFETY LEVEL</u>
JP-4	210	160	88
Avgas	22	40	20
Mogas	22	60	20
Diesel	22	60	20
<u>PHAN THIET</u>			
JP-4	150	294	136
Avgas	10	21	12
Mogas	25	50	20
Diesel	30	65	20
<u>DALAT</u>			
JP-4	13	20	10
Avgas	1	10	1
Mogas	25	30	34
Diesel	37	50	22
<u>BAD LOC</u>			
JP-4	37	30	
Avgas	7	10	6
Mogas	10		8
Diesel	7		6

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b. Period Summary:

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<u>CAM RANH BAY</u>	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>PRODUCT HANDLED</u>
JP-4	39,976,000	35,172,000	75,148,000
Avgas	4,088,000	3,644,700	7,752,000
Mogas	3,357,000	3,924,000	7,281,000
Diesel	6,561,000	7,170,000	13,731,000
<u>NHA TRANG</u>			
JP-4	2,874,800	3,553,500	6,428,300
Avgas	2,523,100	2,105,200	4,628,300
Mogas	2,917,700	1,210,400	4,128,100
Diesel	2,055,800	1,823,800	3,879,600
<u>TUY HOA</u>			
JP-4	14,613,100	15,903,700	30,516,800
Avgas	140,800	225,000	365,800
Mogas	989,300	1,467,000	2,456,300
Diesel	1,665,400	2,664,600	4,330,000
<u>PHAN RANG</u>			
JP-4	17,166,300	16,508,400	33,674,700
Avgas	1,068,000	1,688,000	2,756,000
Mogas	728,000	775,000	1,503,000
Diesel	1,516,500	1,555,200	3,071,700
<u>BAN ME THUOT</u>			
JP-4	1,034,300	903,100	1,937,400
Avgas	170,900	143,900	314,800
Mogas	206,600	192,400	399,000
Diesel	289,500	273,400	562,900

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<u>PHAN THIET</u>	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>PRODUCTS HANDLED</u>
JP-4	918,000	910,500	1,823,500
Avgas	90,300	63,700	154,000
Mogas	172,800	135,500	351,300
Diesel	199,000	178,500	377,500
<u>BAO LOC</u>			
JP-4	78,600	135,600	214,200
Avgas	22,200	35,700	57,900
Mogas	28,000	20,500	48,500
Diesel	13,000	11,100	24,100
<u>GIA NGHIA</u>			
JP-4	49,000	41,200	90,200
Avgas	21,300	20,000	41,300
Mogas	19,900	17,500	37,400
Diesel	26,100	16,000	42,100
<u>DALAT</u>			
JP-4	87,300	106,500	193,800
Avgas	18,800	19,700	38,500
Mogas	112,700	85,100	197,800
Diesel	201,900	169,000	370,900
<u>CHEO REO</u>			
JP-4	80,600	116,500	197,100
Avgas	20,800	22,900	43,700
Mogas	27,500	26,100	53,600
Diesel	24,900	35,000	59,900

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<u>GIA NGHIA</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY STG CAP</u>	<u>SAFETY LEVEL</u>
JP-4	9	20	7
Avgas	3	10	2
Mogas	4		3
Diesel	3		2
<u>CHFO REQ</u>			
JP-4	16	30	13
Avgas	3		2
Mogas	4	10	3
Diesel	3	10	2

Some locations do not have capability of bulk storage on various products. These locations store and issue from 55 gallon drums and 500 gallon collapsible bladders.

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10. (U) Directorate of Retrograde & Disposal

a. RETROGRADE DIVISION:

During the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968, the total short tons of retrograde material processed by USASUPCOM-CRB units were as shown below:

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>ON HAND BEGINNING OF QUARTER</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>SHIPPED</u>	<u>ON HAND END OF QUARTER</u>
Station Returns	0	40	40	0
Depot Excess	0	3678	3678	0
Repairables (Less Marine)	4080	4518	7793	805
Unserviceable & Excess Ammo	2003	1664	1197	2470
Reuseable Ammo				
Components	323	1326	948	701
Marine Repairables	53	734	597	190
TOTAL (Short Tons)	<u>6459</u>	<u>11960</u>	<u>14253</u>	<u>4166</u>

b. PROPERTY DISPOSAL DIVISION:

During the period 1 February to 30 April 1968 the two Property Disposal Yards within the Command processed 733 short tons of useable property, and 2,551 short tons of scrap. Approximately 378 short tons of property were reissued to various units within the Command while remaining property was listed for sale. All scrap on hand at the Disposal Yard, with the exception of rubber goods and textiles, will be the property of Stainless Steel Processing Co., Chicago, Ill., as soon as the financial arrangements have been completed with the Foreign Excess Sales Office, Saigon. The contractor has already begun sorting and segregating property in the Yard, and it is anticipated that he will begin removing property from the Disposal Yards within thirty (30) days.

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11. (U) Directorate of Transportation

a. Terminal Operations.

(1) The Sea-Land container ship program continued to demonstrate its effectiveness in expediting cargo handling, local delivery and vessel turn around. A total of 6 C-4 vessels called at Cam Ranh Bay during the quarter.

(2) The Seatrain Ohio discharged three narrow gauge locomotives and ten hopper cars on 16 April 1968 in the third phase of Operation Casey Jones. This was part of a continuing operation to increase the rolling stock and motive power of the Vietnam National Railway in this area. The railcars and locomotives were moved by highway to Ba Ngoi and placed on the tracks with the assistance of Sea-Land, Inc. and Vinnel, Inc.

(3) The Lam Brothers stevedores, under a Vietnamese contract, continued to perform in a highly satisfactory manner, performing an important role in the establishment of new port tonnage records, as shown in Inclosures 4 and 5.

b. Highway Operations:

(1) Highway QL 1 continued to show improvement as the result of extensive upgrading by various engineer units. Transit times between Phan Rang and Nha Trang continued to improve.

(2) Ten Kenworth tractors and ten Eidel trailers were sent TDY to ICTZ in February 1968. This reduced the number operated by Vinnel, Inc. in Cam Ranh Bay to twenty tractors and twenty trailers. This has resulted in a reduction in commercial port and beach clearance, as shown in inclosure 6.

(3) The 39th Transportation Battalion headquarters was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay from Phan Rang to replace the 27th Transportation Battalion headquarters, which was sent PCS to ICTZ. The resulting reorganization of highway assets, as well as the present terminal organization, is shown in Inclosure 2.

(4) On 17 April 1968, a new bridge between the Cam Ranh peninsula and the mainland was opened, replacing the pontoon bridge previously used. The new bridge is capable of handling two-way traffic and can accept up to Class 100 loads. In addition to the highway portion, one section of the bridge is intended for use by a proposed rail line from the Vietnam National Railway mainline to the peninsula.

(5) The following tonnage records were established during the quarter.

Tonnage Outshipped

Old record: Jan 68, 79,741 S/T
 New record: Mar 68, 86,406 S/T

Air shipments from
 Cam Ranh Bay

Old record: Jan 67, 5,218 S/T
 New records: Feb 68, 6,487 S/T
 Mar 68, 7,036 S/T
 Apr 68, 9,463 S/T

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39 12. (C) Adjutant General's Section

a. Awards and decorations: During the previous quarter the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement which are approved at this headquarters.

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Legion of Merit	3	5	8
Soldiers Medal	0	2	0
Bronze Star	53	41	47
Air Medal	0	1	1
Army Commendation Medal	40	42	49
Certificate of Achievement	34	36	44
Purple Heart	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	132	127	149

b. Strength of the Command:

(1) 1 Feb 68: 12,271 (OFF: 642, WO: 162, EM: 11,467)

(2) 30 Apr 68: 10,275 (OFF: 578, WO: 141, EM: 9,556)

Gains and Losses:	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Gains	1689	1580	1270
Losses	1460	1509	1746

c. Reenlistments:

SEE INCLOSURE: 8

d. Testing Status: The following figures show the Army Personnel Testing Program for the past quarter.

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. Pers. Scheduled</u>	<u>No. Pers. Tested</u>	<u>No. Pers. Rescheduled</u>	<u>No Shows</u>
FEB	224	173	7	51
MAR	80	55	8	25
APR	<u>68</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	372	266	19	102

REMARKS: No shows due to military commitments.

SEE INCLOSURE 9 for unit personnel testing chart.

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e. Congressional Inquires: Congressional Inquires received within the Command by month.

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Received	24	32	22
Finalized	26	20	14
Interim Replies	16	13	14

f. Casualty Report: SEE INCLOSURE 10

g. Promotions:

	<u>FEB</u>		<u>MAR</u>		<u>APR</u>	
	ALLOCATED	AWARDED	ALLOCATED	AWARDED	ALLOCATED	AWARDED
E-4	543	542	632	631	253	253
E-5	375	297	194	185	174	174
E-6	5	5	3	3	9	9
E-7	3	3	17	17	2	2
E-8	2	2	12	12	0	0
E-9	0	0	2	2	1	1

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13. (U) Inspector General.

a. The number of complaints, justified and unjustified, received and processed was:

(1) Command:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Justified	0	0	0	0
Unjustified	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	3	1	1	5

(2) No non-1st Logistical Command complaints were received during the reporting period.

b. The number of requests for assistance processed was:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Command	31	40	47	118
Non-1st Log	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>39</u>
Total	45	57	55	157

c. Investigations: One Inspector General Investigation was conducted during the reporting period.

d. Inquiries: There were two Inspector General Inquiries conducted during the reporting period.

e. Annual General Inspections, Pre-Annual General Inspections, and Special Inspections:

(1) Annual General Inspections.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE INSPECTED</u>
HHD, 262d Quartermaster Battalion	20-21 Feb 68
525th Quartermaster Company	23 Feb 68
524th Quartermaster Company	24 Feb 68
HHD, 36th Transportation Command	12-13 Mar 68
442d Transportation Company	14 Mar 68
607th Transportation Company	15 Mar 68
HHC, US Army Transportation Command	9-11 Apr 68

(2) Pre-Annual General Inspections.

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UNIT

DATE INSPECTED

Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command
HHD, US Army Depot
59th Field Service Company

4-5 Mar 68

(3) Special Inspections.

UNIT

DATE INSPECTED

HHD, 57th Transportation Battalion
403d Transportation Company (TT)
129th Main Support Company
HQ, 532d Supply and Service Battalion
565th Transportation Company
575th AG Postal Unit
578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company
56th General Supply Company
516th Personnel Service Company
458th Transportation Company
HHD, 39th Transportation Battalion

27 Jan 68
29 Jan 68
30 Jan 68
31 Jan 68
1 Feb 68
3 Feb 68
6 Feb 68
9 Feb 68
12 Feb 68
1 Apr 68
23 Apr 68

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14. (U) Area Engineer

a. Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the operations of the Area Engineer were directed toward supervision of the R&U Contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc.; supervision of Engineer Utilities Detachments; to include R&U, Fire Fighting, and Water Supply; control of issue of equipment-in-place such as installation generators; and staff supervision of laundry and bath operations. Further, liaison was maintained with engineer troop units engaged in construction operations in the Support Command area.

(2) The 570th Engineer Detachment (Util) assumed its TOE role during the TET offensive when all PA&E civilians were ordered out of the Ban Me Thuot area. The 570th operated generators and the water plant, repaired security lighting, maintained installation power generators, and repaired other battle damage as necessary.

(3) Four lieutenants were assigned to be Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) at Phan Thiet, Ban Me Thuot, North Nha Trang, and Ninh Hoa. They underwent an OJT period at either Cam Ranh or Nha Trang Subarea Command Engineer Office prior to being assigned to their respective posts. This results in a COR at each major installation.

(4) The bulk rotation of fire and water personnel has begun to show by reduction in effectiveness of fire fighting and water treatment capability. Within thirty days of the close of this reporting period, fire and water detachments will be down to less than fifty percent (50%) effectiveness. Replacements are not being received prior to DEROS of assigned personnel.

(5) Contract laundry operations in the Support Command increased considerably due to the expansion of facilities at the Nha Trang plant, effectively doubling the contractors capability. Cam Ranh was added to the contract which reduced the load on the field laundry at Cam Ranh. The contractor is now hauling to Nha Trang from Cam Ranh.

(6) On 1 April 1968 this command transferred the real estate responsibility for Southern II Corps area to USA Engineer Construction Agency Vietnam. This resulted in the direct transfer of 1 officer space, 1 EM space and, three LN spaces from the Area Engineer staff to USAECAV.

b. Base Development and Planning

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(1) During the reporting period, the completed USARV Ad Hoc Study Group report for Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang was returned to this command for action. This command began a complete review of the requested MCA projects that are in the current program that exceed the deficiency scope authorized by the Ad Hoc Study. Subordinate commanders have been asked to review their operational requirements and if they still feel their mission accomplishment is dependent on construction not recognized by the Ad Hoc Study, they are to submit a rebuttal with complete justification. This program is still in progress with a complete roster of all current MCA project requests scheduled for completion on 15 May 1968.

(2) The funding limitation placed by Hq, 1st Log on minor new construction has forced commanders to carefully evaluate their construction needs. It has also caused the base planning boards to become more active and effective forces in evaluating the need for all types of new construction. The work order review boards established in each major subarea also further the control over new construction. There has been a significant decrease in unauthorized and unneeded construction within the reporting period.

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15. (U) Staff Judge Advocate

a. During the reporting period a total of 41 Special and 17 Summary Court-Martial cases were received and administratively checked prior to being forwarded to higher headquarters. In addition, 598 Article 15 Punishments were checked for legal sufficiency. A total of 36 Claims were received and 16 of these were paid for a total of \$3,286.86 claimed and \$2,649.64 actually paid.

b. Legal assistance in the Cam Ranh Bay Area continued with a total of 850 cases handled by this office in the following categories:

Domestic Relations	150
Adoption, change of name	15
Citizenship, Immigration	37
Non-support	4
Personal Finances, Debts	82
Personal Property	29
Powers of Attorney	196
Real Property	19
Taxation	112
Torts	7
Wills and Estates	23
Miscellaneous	176

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16. (U) Signal Office

a. On 25 Feb during an attack on Phan Thiet FSA, the radio teletype equipment supporting the FSA was destroyed by fire. Losses amounted to 2 ea AN/GRC-46 and 2 ea 3 KW 28VDC Motor Generators. These were reported as combat losses. Replacement AN/GRC-46 equipment was issued on 10 Mar and shipped to Phan Thiet on 25 Mar. By field expedient use of 1.5KW replacement generators (discussed in Sect. 2) the equipment was placed in operation 27 Mar.

b. On 10 Mar, the CRB Support Command station in the 1st Log single-sideband radio phone patch net was activated. This net has proven to be reliable supplementary communication and provides relief from the restrictions of the presently overburdened common-user telephone system.

c. On 1 Mar, the signal office assumed responsibility for the operation of the Cam Ranh Army Airfield Control Tower, VOCO, on a temporary basis until responsibility could be formally assigned on a more permanent basis. CRBSAC was delegated responsibility for the airfield and CO #65 transferred 2 spaces from the signal office to CRBSAC for control tower operation. Change of operational control for this function took place on 29 Apr.

d. Radio traffic studies continued through this quarterly period. Initial analysis permitted a change in operating hours, permitting better maintenance, and freeing personnel for the additional functions described in b. and c. above. This manpower savings was reported under the telecommunications management portion of the Cost Reduction Report for the quarter.

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17. (U) Information Office

1. During the months of February, March, and April 1968 the CRB IO sent out 2,773 Army Home Town News Releases; 129 Regular News Releases; 121 Photo News Releases; 75 USARV Daily News Summaries; and hosted 16 News Correspondents.

2. Major Project - contacting, arranging and conducting DOD and DA motion pictorial coverage of the 109th QM Co (AD) on aerial resupply missions to the Marines under seige at Khe Sanh.

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18. (U) Chaplain

a. Chaplain (MAJ) Frank E. Bentley Deputy Staff Chaplain USASUPCOM-CRB, arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 6 February 1968.

b. Chaplain Orientation was introduced into the 7 Day Replacement Training Program on 9 March 1968, and will be continued each Saturday.

c. Ecumenical Memorial Service was held at the Main Post Chapel for Dr. Martin Luther King on Monday, 8 April 1968 at 1300 hours. The chapel was crowded.

d. Upon recommendation of the Manpower Survey Board, the custody of the Consolidated Chaplain's Fund was assumed by the USASUPCOM-CRB Chaplain's Office from the CRBSAC Chaplain's Office.

e. A film on Narcotics entitled "Pit of Despair" was purchased for showing to the troops in connection with a special lecture on narcotics. The special lecture has been received from USARV and distributed to all major units within the Support Command.

f. Protestant Chaplain coverage was extended to 87th Engineer Battalion since the moving of the Engineer Group Headquarters left the battalion without a Protestant Chaplain.

h. This office discovered that an "AA" Group is meeting at the Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base.

i. Thirty-four (34) Missionaries were evacuated to Cam Ranh Bay due to the TET offensive. They were housed and fed until they could be cared for by their own mission groups. A number of Chaplains and other military personnel assisted in this work.

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SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

(U) ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations

a. Item: Liaison Team

(1) Observation: This Command sent a Liaison Team to Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province, in support of a battalion sized task force operating in the vicinity. The responsibilities of the team were to assist the task force in receiving and monitoring air and truck cargo; to assist the minimal number of Forward Support Element (FSE) troops from the tactical elements in accounting and requesting Class I and V; to provide truck, material handling, and graves registration services.

(2) Evaluation: In-as-much as the tactical elements were unable to field a FSE, it was essential that an "extension of the depot" be moved to the support area to converse with the support command and with tactical troops. Although doctrine states that logistical personnel should not be utilized piecemeal for retail operation, it is imperative to have technical assistance on the spot, particularly in undeveloped areas in support of tactical operations. The concept appears to be basically sound in that it provides assistance when and where needed. It also provides a base upon which a larger support effort can be built in case of an increase in the number of tactical troops.

(3) Recommendation: This command continues to use the liaison team concept under the following conditions.

a. The supported elements are between battalion task force and brigade task force in size.

b. That FSE personnel are inadequate in number and/or training to completely satisfy troop support requirements.

c. That the area of operation is quite remote from established supply points.

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(U) Director of Ammunition

a. Item: Vessel Loading Manifests (Class V)

(1) Observation: Ammunition laden vessels (deep draft) continue to arrive without loading manifests.

(2) Evaluations: Vessels arriving without a loading manifest, or in some instances before receipt of a manifest, cause discharge problems for the facilities and storage problems for the ammunition storage facilities. A manifest is absolutely necessary to permit prior planning for an orderly discharge and correct storage.

(3) Recommendation: Recommend that a loading manifest be provided to ALL RVN deep draft ports for ALL ammunition vessels arriving from CONUS or off shore reserve locations. In addition to permitting orderly discharge and storage, the discharge and storage problems caused by vessel diversions will be eliminated.

b. Item: Dedicated Aircraft.

(1) Observation: During this reporting period this Command supported an operation at Ban Me Thuot that was resupplied primarily by air.

(2) Evaluation: Normal resupply for Class V was scheduled on a 1 to 3 day period. Due to an apparent non-availability of aircraft, numerous Class V items were not shipped until at least 15 days after the required delivery date. As a result, combat essential missions were common.

(3) Recommendation: Recommend that future planning for operations requiring normal resupply by air include provisions for dedicated aircraft.

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(C) Director of Food

a. Item: Use of dedicated air support to isolated areas.

(1) Observation: Dedicated air support should be made available to the maximum extent practical in support of MACV Advisory Teams, Engineer, Signal and other isolated units located in areas accessible only via air LOC.

(2) Evaluation: During the reporting period dedicated air support was made available to support a battalion task force operating in the Ban Me Thuot area as part of operation Mac Arthur. Support to isolated units at Gia Nghia, Bao Loc and Ban Me Thuot continued to be supported by opportune air lift on an unscheduled basis. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to maintain proper ration balance in accordance with cyclic menu requirements.

(3) Recommendation: That USASUPCOM-CRB be placed on the dedicated user list for C7A Aircraft and that these aircraft be made available on a scheduled basis consistent with existing priorities and mission requirements.

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(U) Director of General Supply

a. Item: Combat Losses:

(1) Observation: USARV Reg 753-3 and JIC Reg 735-2 requires that replacement items (controlled items) for combat losses must be requested by the major subordinate command and that combat losses must be reported within 5 days after loss. Units that are dislocated from base stations and MACV Teams are experiencing difficulty in getting details of loss to major subordinate commands. The major subordinate commands must, in turn, acquire MISTRIP information from the supporting DSU.

(2) Recommendation: That the unit or detachment experiencing the loss be permitted to acquire MISTRIP information from the supporting DSU and transmit an electrical message directly to 1st Log Command with information copies being forwarded to intermediate higher headquarters. This procedure should take one day as opposed to five or six which is presently being experienced.

b. Item: PCS of Assigned or Attached Units.

(1) Observation: Units which are designated for movement are not being given requirements simultaneously with alert notification. Many units and the supply elements at battalion and SUPCOM levels are frequently attempting to bring the selected unit up to 100% TOE strength. After exertion of efforts in attempting to accomplish this, notification is often less than 100%.

(2) Recommendation: That alert notification be made citing equipment requirements in consonance with the newly configured mission. A firm and reasonable departure date should be given, when possible, to allow for adequate preparations for movement and acquisition of TOE shortages.

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(U) Directorate of Maintenance

a. Item: 5 Ton Tractors

(1) Observation: Many five ton tractor frames are cracking through the fifth wheel formed mounting hole.

(2) Evaluation: The unusually severe road conditions in this command's area of operations has caused the upper flange of many 5 ton tractors to crack through the fifth wheel mounting bolt hole. In many cases, the cracks have extended past the point of repairability before they are discovered. As a result, many tractors must be eliminated from the Army inventory because they are uneconomically repairable.

(3) Recommendation: In the interest of supply economy, it has been suggested in an Equipment Improvement Report that the frames of 5 ton tractors destined for Vietnam be reinforced with gusset plates in the wheel mounting area. This action should appreciably extend the life of these vehicles in this theater.

b. Item: Prevention of Rupturing Hulls, Landing Craft Utility (1466 Class)

(1) Observation: One of the major causes to the rupturing of the hulls of LCU's has been the extreme heavy seas and the associated whipping effect on the vessel bottoms during the winter months.

(2) Evaluation: Since mid December 1967, the Direct Support marine maintenance unit at Cam Ranh Bay, Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (MMAV), has been modifying all LCU's which have utilized their dry dock facilities. The vessels receive additional mid section support by the welding of a $\frac{1}{4}$ inch metal double plate to the bottom, between frame 28 and 24, and ten (10) additional longitudinals.

(3) Recommendations: This modification will eventually be on all LCU's of this command and is anticipated to preclude the occurrence of ruptured hulls caused by heavy seas.

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(U) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM

a. Item: Damage to Submarine Pipelines.

Discussion: The submarine sealines at Nha Trang, Vung Ro Bay and Phan Rang have all required repairs during this period. In many instances the sections requiring replacement appear to have been damaged by kinks caused by improper movement of the sea hose.

Observation: The operators of the LARC's handling the sea hose tend to follow the same direction each time the hose is extended and retracted. This action causes the hose to kink. The areas using submarine sealines, for the receipt of petroleum products, have been instructed to extend the hose in one direction (clockwise) and recover in the opposite direction (counter clockwise).

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(U) Engineer

a. Item: Engineer Utility Detachments

(1) Observation: Enemy action may cause evacuation of civilian contractor personnel for a period of time, leaving the Repair and Utilities functions to the Engineer Detachments.

(2) Evaluation: The Engineer Utility Detachment have no in-house power generation or water treatment capability. They must be reinforced with trained personnel to operate and maintain station power and water purification equipment.

(3) Recommendation: That the Engineer Power Generation Detachments be retained to augment the Utilities Detachment in active areas; and that adequate water purification personnel be assigned to allow augmentation of Utilities Detachments when required.

b. Item: Use of M8A1 Matting for Ammunition Storage Pads

(1) Observation: Recently completed ammunition storage pads at Cam Ranh Bay have been built using M8A1 steel aircraft matting. The matting is placed on a compacted and graded sand base. It appears to be structurally adequate under load, however, the exposed lips of the matting are subject to hooking by MHE equipment and this in turn causes tearing of the matting. The matting is laid with the overlapping lip towards the front of the pad. The MHE equipment is also operated from the front to the rear of the pad. Also during heavy rains the matting allows certain amounts of water to go through it causing erosion of the base under the pad. The voids caused by erosion make the pads uneven and lessens their load bearing capability.

(2) Evaluation: The matting would be subject to less tearing if the matting was laid with the exposed lip to the rear, and a waterproof seal under the matting would prevent local erosion under the pads.

(3) Recommendation: That future ammunition pads built of M8A1 matting be laid over an impervious base (penepreme or plastic sheeting) and that the matting be laid with the open lip towards the rear of the pad offering less exposure to tearing by MHE equipment.

(U) Signal Outage

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a. Item: 3KW 28VDC Motor Generator Opn

(1) Observation: This type generator, when used to power communications equipment, is normally employed in pairs. Continuous power is made available by alternating between the two generators. Due to heat and dirt inherent in the environment, optimum running time between change-overs is no more than four hours. If one of the pair becomes non-operational the tendency is to keep the other generator running continuously until repair or replacement of the first.

(2) Evaluation: A better technique appears to be to shut down after four hours, for a period of two hours. Although this results in 8 hours of outage in every 24 hour period, experience in using this technique indicates that operations can continue for days, if necessary. This in the long run, will result in much greater circuit availability by avoiding total station outage.

(3) Recommendations: That this technique be considered by units employing this type of generator equipment.

b. Item: Field Expedient Substitute for 3KW 28 VDC Motor Gen.

(1) Observation: This type of generator is a command controlled item and is normally in short supply. 1.5 KW generators are more readily available, but the normal current drain of equipment which calls for 3 KW input will stall the motor on the 1.5 KW unit when the equipment is turned on. Using a 5 ton truck battery, which can absorb the current drain, in conjunction with the 1.5 KW unit provides an acceptable power source for radio operation.

(2) Evaluation: This technique has been in use only a limited amount of time during the last quarter, but this limited experience indicates that if a normal 9 to 1 receive to transmit ratio is used, and good operator maintenance is performed on the generator and battery the equipment will operate for an indefinite period of time. Radio equipment used, in this case, was the AN/GRC-46.

(3) Recommendations: That this technique be considered by units employing this type of generator equipment

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AVCA GO-O (12 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 31 MAY 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.
2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:
 - a. Reference Section I, paragraph 2d(1). The total staffing for Cam Ranh Bay Support Command as recommended by the USARPAC Manpower Survey Team is 85 officers, 4 warrant officers, 204 enlisted personnel, 13 Department of the Army Civilians, and 19 local nationals.
 - b. Reference Section I, paragraph 2d(2). The reduction in local national space authorizations came about as a result of a review of space requests and justifications. These requests and justifications were developed by the units which utilize local national employees and submitted to HQ, USARV for validation. The reductions were based on inadequate justification and requests for local nationals for "nice-to-have" rather than mission essential type positions. Future changes in authorization will be based on the assignment of units into and out of the Cam Ranh Bay Area and on changes in mission and function of presently assigned units.
 - c. Reference Section I, paragraph 5b(2). Storage capabilities should be computed using 14 square feet per short ton in compliance with MACV standards.
 - d. Reference Section I, paragraph 6c(2). The utilization of TOE messing equipment, while awaiting installation of cantonment mess equipment, should not be alluded to as a critical situation. The shortage of cantonment type equipment in ROK messes is due to the supporting engineers not being consulted before requisitions were submitted for this equipment. This is now being accomplished and equipment will be issued upon approval by the engineers.
 - e. Reference Section II, page 42 paragraph a. Concur in principle. The multiple port manifest system is presently in effect for all ammunition vessels arriving in RVN. On numerous occasions loading manifests have not arrived or have arrived too late. This is

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVCA GO-O (12 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

especially significant when ship diversion is contemplated and the loading manifests are necessary to make the decision. A message is being sent by this headquarters to MTMTS requesting their assistance in obtaining loading manifests in a timely manner.

f. Reference Section II, page 42, paragraph b and page 43, paragraph a. Nonconcur. Dedicated aircraft limits US Air Force flexibility to respond to emergency situations. Priority 01 Special Mission air has proven satisfactory under normal conditions. The following actions should be taken when resupply operations are to be primarily supported by Air-LOC:

(1) Planning of support requirements must be accomplished well in advance.

(2) Cargo must be booked for shipment with region Traffic Management Authority sufficiently in advance to allow the US Air Force time to respond.

(3) Close coordination must be effected with the Traffic Management Authority and the Airlift Control Center to assure requests are expedited.

(4) US Air Force representatives must be included in future planning conferences for Air-LOC operations.

g. Reference, page 44, paragraph a. Concur. If the team or detachment can expect better results by obtaining the MILSTRIP document number and sending the loss direct, at a substantial time savings, the procedure should be adopted and the regulation changed accordingly.

h. Reference Section II, page 44, paragraph b. Nonconcur. Units are being given full requirements at time of alert notification whenever possible. However, as much as this command is rendering combat service support to units actively engaged in combat, exigencies may require changes in unit configuration subsequent to alert notification.

i. Reference Section II, page 45, paragraph a. Information concerning the installation of a gussett plate was included in Change 3 to TB 9-2300-247-40 and in USATACOM unclassified message 5-11876, DTG 091300Z May 1968, which has been passed to all support commands.

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AVCA GO-O (12 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

j. Reference Section II, page 45, paragraph b. Concur. However, the extra strength and rigidity is likely to cause stress and cracking in weaker areas since the vessel is not designed to withstand heavy seas for prolonged periods. The US Army Marine Maintenance Activity will closely monitor the field expedient modification and submit an EIR if the "fix" precludes cracking and does not adversely affect other hull sections or components. No action required by higher headquarters at this time.

k. Reference Section II, page 46, paragraph a. Action taken will correct the situation. No action required by higher headquarters.

l. Reference Section II, page 47, paragraph a. Nonconcur. The retention of a power plant operating detachment to provide support in case of contractor incapacitation cannot be justified. Power equipment operators required for emergency situations must be provided from assets available from local military units. Contingency plans must identify power plant operators available and provide for their use at critical power plants during emergency situations. Water purification personnel available from detachments and engineer battalions provide adequate assets to meet emergency requirements to operate essential water purification equipment.

m. Reference Section II, page 47, paragraph b. Concur with the recommendation. Future pads should be constructed in the manner indicated. Consideration should also be given to the application of an asphaltic compound between the matting seams on pads already built. This will serve to reduce erosion under the pads.

n. Reference Section II, page 48, paragraph a. Concur. No action is required by higher headquarters.

o. Reference Section II, page 48, paragraph b. Concur. However, this field expedient should only be used as an emergency measure and not for prolonged operation. No action required by higher headquarters.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate except that the unit did not follow the format specified in USARV Reg 525-15 in the following instances:

a. Letter of transmittal should not be included.

b. Table of contents and title pages should not be included.

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AVCA GO-O (12 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

c. Paragraphs should be numbered consecutively, not broken down
according to directorates.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2684

Robert W. Munson
ROBERT W. MUNSON
201 AGC
ADM AG

Copy Furnished
USASUPCOM, CRB

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AVHGC-DST (12 May 68) 2d Ind (U) CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay as indorsed.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning vessel loading manifests (Class V), page 42, paragraph a, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2:

(1) Concur with the observation. Traffic Management Agency (TMA) MACV is the Central Control Agency for distribution of Ocean Cargo Manifest in RVN. At USARV's request, TMA placed the 4 major ports in RVN on distribution for all RVN bound ships cargo manifests in December 1967. This action was taken due to ship diversions.

(2) Nonconcur with the recommendation. Manifests for ships scheduled to discharge at off-shore reserve locations are not that frequent.

b. Reference item concerning dedicated aircraft, page 42, paragraph b; page 43, paragraph a; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur. When a support command is required to support an operation which can only be supported by air, it must be provided airlift from the CSAS. Rations and other supplies are predictable and are required on a regular basis. The required airlift at the required intervals should be provided. This problem should be submitted to MACV for further evaluation as they have control of the CSAS and policies related thereto.

c. Reference item concerning combat losses, page 44, paragraph a; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur. Recommended procedure should expedite the reporting and replacement of combat losses; action will be taken to make appropriate changes in USARV Regulation 735-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, USA Sup Cmd Cam Ranh Bay
HQ, 1st Log Cmd

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GPOP-DT (12 May 68) (U) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ US Army Spt Comd Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

18 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CAL SHORTI
JTT AGC
AG

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CLASS II SUPPORT FOR
TASK FORCE WERNERT

ITEM	AMOUNT	WEIGHT	DATE SHIPPED
Paper Plates 9"	4 cs	3,000	8 Feb
Water Purification Tablets	4 cs	200	8 Feb
Dishwashing Compound	15 ea	800	8 Feb
Weapons Cleaning Equipment		3,000	10 Feb
Mess Equipment		8,000	20 Feb
Mess Equipment		8,000	8 Mar
Mess Equipment		8,000	9 Mar
Mess Equipment		8,000	12 Mar
Jungle Fatigues		4,000	12 Mar
Mess and Cleaning Equipment		18,900	13 Mar
Towels and Wash Cloths			
Freon Gas			
Can, Ice Cream		6,000	19 Mar
Insecticides		1,812	23 Mar
Band and Cover Camouflage Helmet		1,100	24 Mar
		70,812	
		35.6 S/T	

Incl 2

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CLASS IV SUPPORT FOR
TASK FORCE WERNERT

ITEM	AMOUNT	WEIGHT	DATE SHIPPED
Sandbag	50,000 ea	7.2	29 Mar
Sandbag	50,000 ea	7.2	26 Mar
Picket 8'	2,000 ea	13.0	26 Mar
Barbed Wire	18 ro	1.0	26 Mar
Picket 6'	1,500 ea	8.4	16 Mar
Sandbag	50,000 ea	7.2	13 Mar
Sandbag	50,000 ea	9.1	5 Mar
Barbed Wire	36 ro	2.0	10 Apr
Barbed Wire	36 ro	2.0	5 Apr
Sandbag	108,000 ea	21.8	5 Apr
Sandbag	60,000 ea	9.2	14 Apr
Concertina	10 bdls	9.0	14 Apr
Picket 3'	400 ea	2.1	14 Apr
Picket 8'	400 ea	2.6	14 Apr
Concertina	504 ro	16.9	11 Apr
Sandbag	87,000 ea	10.2	29 Feb
Concertina	16 bdls	15.5	29 Feb
Barbed Wire	18 ro	1.0	29 Feb
Concertina	9 bdls	8.4	14 Feb
Concertina	9 bdls	8.4	13 Feb
Sandbag	50,000 ea	8.4	11 Feb
		166.0 S/T	

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Monthly Tonnage Summary

Port Operations

1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968

1. Port Performance

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
CRB Discharge	108,865	122,925	115,228
O/L	57,811	70,555	65,976
Handled	165,676	193,480	181,204
NHA Discharge	14,929	16,229	12,399
O/L	10,358	14,075	10,868
Handled	25,287	30,304	23,267
PRG Discharged	8,022	5,738	9,143
O/L	446	1,186	2,068
Handled	8,468	6,928	11,211
VRB Discharged	18,075	15,593	10,894
O/L	1,895	526	1,637
Handled	19,970	16,119	12,531

2. Deep and Shallow Draft Performance

a. LSTs Completed

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
CRB Discharged	20	13	3
O/L	31	33	19
Handled	51	46	22
NHA Discharged	4	3	5
O/L	3	7	5
Handled	7	10	10

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	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
PRG Discharged	1	1	0
O/L	2	4	5
Handled	3	5	5
VRB Discharge	6	3	2
O/L	5	3	5
Handled	11	6	7

b. Deep Draft Performance

CRB Discharged	102,530	118,632	107,844
O/L	26,931	37,119	32,937
Handled	129,461	155,751	140,781
NHA Discharge	11,699	14,219	10,067
O/L	444	546	714
Handled	12,143	14,765	10,781
PRG Discharge	0	0	0
O/L	0	0	0
Handled	0	0	0
VRB Discharge	11,701	12,565	5,338
O/L	905	0	306
Handled	12,606	12,565	5,644

c. Shallow Draft Performance

CRB Discharge	6,335	4,293	7,384
O/L	29,880	33,436	33,039
Handled	36,215	37,729	40,423
NHA Discharge	3,230	2,010	2,332
O/L	9,914	13,529	10,154
Handled	13,144	15,539	12,486

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	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
PRG Discharge	8,022	5,738	9,143
O/L	446	1,186	2,068
Handled	8,468	6,924	11,211
VRB Discharge	6,374	3,028	5,556
O/L	990	526	1,331
Handled	7,364	3,554	6,887

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Outbound Shipments

Cam Ranh Bay

1. Outbound Shipments

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
S/T Offered	60,963	87,751	67,852
S/T Shipped	66,574	86,406	79,175
S/T Remaining	31,846	33,191	21,868

2. Outbound Shipments by Mode

Air	6,487	7,036	9,463
Water	45,251	61,504	48,057
Rail	75	0	0
Highway	14,761	17,886	21,655
Total	66,574	86,406	79,175

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Outbound Shipments

Cam Ranh Bay

1. Outbound Shipments

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
S/T Offered	60,963	87,751	67,852
S/T Shipped	66,574	86,406	79,175
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Air	6,487	7,036	9,463
Water	45,251	61,504	48,057
Rail	75	0	0
Highway	14,761	17,886	21,655
Total	66,574	86,406	79,175

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Highway Performance

Cam Ranh Bay

Port and Beach Clearance

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
Military	36,638	48,426	43,325
Contractor	93,370	98,785	83,563
Total	130,008	147,211	126,888
Local Haul			
Military	35,009	12,493	16,802
Contractor	12,345	12,223	11,316
Total	47,354	24,716	28,118
Line Haul	21,918	22,919	26,595

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TRANSPORTATION ASSETS, US ARMY TRANS COMD (PROV) CRB

HIGHWAY ASSETS

36th Trans Bn
442nd Trans Co (Med Trk)
515th Trans Co (Lt Trk) (-)
564th Trans Co (Lt Trk) (-)
566th Trans Co (Med Trk)
670th Trans Co (Med Trk) (-)

39th Trans Bn
529th Trans Co (Lt Trk)
545th Trans Co (Lt Trk)
592nd Trans Co (Lt Trk)

Vung Ro Outport
24th Trans Co (Lt Trk)

TERMINAL ASSETS

Vung Ro Outport
119th Trans Co (TS)

10th Trans Bn
97th Trans Co (Hvy Boat)
116th Trans Co (TS)
123rd Trans Co (TS) (O Strength)
155th Trans Co (TS)
410th Trans Co (TS) (O Strength)
870th Trans Co (TS)

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REENLISTMENT STATUS

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
1ST TERM			
ELIGIBLE	7	12	12
REENLISTMENTS	3	9	6
PERCENTAGE	42.8%	75%	50%
CAREER			
ELIGIBLE	23	29	36
REENLISTMENTS	23	29	35
PERCENTAGE	100%	100%	97.2%
AUS			
ELIGIBLE	33	27	41
REENLISTED	2	1	0
PERCENTAGE	6.0%	3.7%	0.0%
ER & NG			
ELIGIBLE	0	0	0
REENLISTED	0	0	0
PERCENTAGE	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE			
ELIGIBLE	63	68	89
REENLISTED	28	39	41
PERCENTAGE	44.4%	57.3%	46.0%

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UNIT PERSONNEL TESTING CHART

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	ACB	OCT	FAST WOGB	RSDB	FAST OB	AIAT	TOTAL
Cam Ranh Bay	51	2	8	4	1	7	73
Nha Trang	19	4	5	3	1	15	47
Phan Rang	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
Tuy Hoa	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Da Nang	3	0	0	0	0	62	65
Phan Thiet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dong Be Thin	9	0	1	1	0	0	11
101st Abn Div	6	0	4	0	0	0	14
5th SFG	7	5	8	1	8	1	30
1 FFORCEV	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Pleiku	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>71</u>
TOTAL	100	11	27	9	17	153	317

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CASUALTIES

<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Non-hostile deaths	3	1	0	4
Hostile deaths	1	2	0	3
Seriously ill deaths	0	0	0	0
Non-hostile injuries	0	0	2	2
Hostile injuries	0	4	12	16
Seriously ill injuries	0	0	0	0
<u>COMMAND BREAKDOWN</u>				
HHD, USASUPCOM-CRB	0	0	0	0
CRBSAC	0	0	0	0
USAF	0	0	0	0
Trans Tml Comd	2	7	12	21
NTSAC and THSAC	2	0	2	4
PRLSAC	0	0	0	0
Phan Thiet	0	0	0	0

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