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

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25th INFANTRY DIVISION

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

ON LESSONS LEARNED

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1 JAN 66 - 30 APR 66

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This Operational Report on Lessons Learned is the first submitted by the 25th Infantry Division (-) since the Division arrived in the Republic of Vietnam.

It has been prepared in accordance with AR 525-24 as modified by USARV Circular 870-1. Significant aspects of the Division's deployment to the Republic of Vietnam are included.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



THOMAS W. MELLEN
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED

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25th INFANTRY DIVISION are as follows:

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② Operational rept. for period ending 30 Apr 66

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⑥ Lessons Learned, HEADQUARTERS,
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION L(1).
APO, San Francisco, 96225

I. Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RGS-OSGPO-28 (R1))

Period: 1 January 1966 - 30 April 1966

Location: Vic Cu Chi (XT647153), RVN

Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division

Reporting Officer: Major General Fred C. Weyand, USA

⑩ ~~George J. Martin~~, CO, 18th

Military History Detachment

Division Organization: Appendix 1

Key Personnel: Appendix 2

⑪ 30 Apr 66

II. Narrative.

⑫ OACSFOR

a. Movement to the Republic of Vietnam.

⑬ 215 p.

(1) Deployment.

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(a) (S) In late fall 1965, the 25th Infantry Division was alerted to deploy one brigade for operations in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter this was changed to include all elements of the 25th Infantry Division less the nuclear elements (2/21st Artillery, DC and ADM Company). On 24 December 1965 the Division Advance Planning Group arrived in Vietnam. It consisted of representatives of G1, G2, G3, and G4, headed by the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, Brigadier General Glen D. Walker. Its main mission was to act as liaison between the Division and higher headquarters and to direct all activities to assist the quick establishment of the Division in Vietnam. The 3d Brigade Task Force was directed to Pleiku while the 2d Brigade and the remainder of the Division established a base at Cu Chi. The 3d Brigade Advance Party began to deploy on 23 December 1965, the main body on 27 December 1965, with two Infantry Battalions (1/35th and 2/35th Infantry) being airlifted and the 1/14th Infantry Battalion going by sealift. The 3d Brigade Task Force closed Pleiku on 27 January 1966.

(b) (S) On 2-3 January 1966 the 2d Brigade Advance Party was airlifted to Bien Hoa, RVN. On 4 January two cavalry troops departed by sealift for Okinawa where they married up with M48A3 tanks and M113 Personnel Carriers. On 5 January USARPAC LO - 01-09 provided the authority for movement of dependents of the 25th Infantry Division (-). On the same day USARPAC was requested to fill the aviation shortages (95 pilots, 57 aircraft) of the Division. On 8 January a request was sent to USARPAC to issue an alert or warning order

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citing a readiness date for deployment of the Division base (-) and to initiate action to fill personnel and equipment shortages. The emergency requisition was for 1555 EM which revised inward the 15 December and 30 December 1965 requisitions. A new base deployment date of 31 March was used. On 10 January 1966 a USARPAC movement directive was received directing preparation of the 1st Bn, 69th Armor to move by surface lift to USARYSIS (Okinawa) for new equipment (M48A3 tanks and M113 PC's).

(c) (S) On 10 January 1966 the Division issued a warning order to the 1st Bn, 69th Armor. On 11 January USARPAC issued a final movement directive authorizing movement of 1/69th Armor with a readiness date of 13 January 1966 for equipment and 18 January for personnel.⁽¹⁾ Also on 13 January 1966 the Division received a message from USARPAC which was a warning order for movement of Division Base (-). On 15 January, Division issued a message to subordinate commands on the availability date of Division (-) (less 2d and 3d Brigade Task Force, 1/69th Armor, and 2/21st Arty).⁽²⁾ On 29 January the division issued planning dates for deployment to subordinate commands.⁽³⁾ On 30 January, 4/9th and 4/23d Infantry arrived at Pearl Harbor and were billeted at Schofield Barracks under the control of 1st Brigade. On 1 February the Division told USARPAC that the latest date 3/4 Cavalry could leave Hawaii to arrive at Okinawa and then proceed to RVN to arrive by 15 March was 25 February 1966.⁽⁴⁾ On 3 February, the Commanding General sent a recommendation to CINC USARPAC on the disposition of the 2/21st Artillery and other nuclear elements under the Division.⁽⁵⁾ On 1 February 1966, Operation Plan HOLOKAI XIII (MOONLIGHT) was issued. It involved the movement of the Division (-), less 2d and 3d Brigade Task Force, in four phases. Phase I, Preparation and Dispatch of Advance Parties. Phase II, Deployment in accordance with schedule put out in separate message. Phase III, Base Area Development, and Phase IV, Tactical Employment. This concerned the movement of over 7,000 men. On 5 February the Division issued planning guidance for the movement of the Division (-) (less 1/69th Armor, 3/4 Cavalry and 1st Brigade).⁽⁶⁾ On 6 February, 1/69th Armor arrived in Okinawa. On 12 February CINC USARPAC issued a movement directive to Division which put as a closing date for 1st Brigade Task Force, 30 April 1966.⁽⁷⁾ On 15 February, 1st Brigade Task Force readiness date was changed from 30 March to 10 April 1966.⁽⁸⁾ On 16 February USARPAC directed the port call of 3/4 Cavalry (-) as 231600 February.⁽⁹⁾ On 16 February, the Division requested the planning dates for deployment of the 1/69th Armor to Vietnam.⁽¹⁰⁾ Also the Division issued instructions to subordinate units of readiness and RVN arrival dates.⁽¹¹⁾ On 17 February MACV concurred with the movement of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) to Cu Chi and a company to Pleiku.⁽¹²⁾ On 18 February the Division directed the movement time of the Division Base (-) and

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allocated the vessels to be used,^(u) in addition, guidelines were established on the size and composition of advance party elements. On 19 February, instructions were issued on the breakdown and issuing of M16 rifles within the Division.^(u) On 22 February, the Division requested that Troop D, 3d Sqn, 4th Cavalry be trained in RVN rather than in Hawaii as previously planned.^(u) On 22 February the movement directive sending Troop D, 3d Sqn, 4th Cavalry to Pleiku was received from USARPAC.^(u) On the same day the movement directive was received on 1/69th Armor.^(u) The battalion was to arrive in RVN on 15 March 1966. On 21 February 1966, in-country clearance for the 25th Infantry Division was granted.^(u) Separate clearance would be granted for 1st Bn, 69th Armor. On 28 February, the Division submitted the status of radio equipment which impaired the ability of the Division to perform its mission.^(u) On 26 February, elements of Division Headquarters, 25th Admin Co, 125th Signal Battalion, and 65th Engineer Battalion departed by sealift (USNS POPE). Units closed RVN on 13 March 1966. On 17 March, the Division Base (-) departed on the USNS GORDON and arrived in RVN 31 March 1966. The Commanding General and Division Command Group departed Hawaii by air on 26 March. Major General Weyand assumed command of all 25th Infantry Division units (less 3d Brigade Task Force at Pleiku) on 26 March 1966. On 15 April the 1st Brigade Task Force departed Hawaii and arrived RVN on 29 April 1966.

(2) (FOUO) Intelligence Activities (1 Jan - 28 Mar). Upon notification in late December that the 2d and 3d Brigades of the Division were being deployed to South Vietnam with a strong possibility that the remainder of the Division would follow in early spring, the G2 Section reevaluated its intelligence effort. The most significant activities undertaken subsequent to 1 January are briefly described below:

(a) Liaison with the USARPAC Intelligence Community was increased to daily visits to insure that all available intelligence of the proposed area of operation was obtained for dissemination to the major subordinate commands and interested staff sections of the Division.

(b) A daily intelligence briefing was conducted in conjunction with the Commanding General's Staff Meeting, utilizing MACV Daily and Periodic Intelligence Reports as well as intelligence reports submitted by the 2d and 3d Brigades after arrival in-country.

(c) The Division Language School was closed and an accelerated program in the Vietnamese language was initiated on 10 January 1966. The new course, tailored to the immediate needs of the Division, was 3 months in duration. Phase I of ten weeks (440 hours) was designed to qualify personnel to the R-2/S-2 level of Vietnamese language proficiency. Phase II was a period of two weeks (88 hours) designed to broaden the student's language base through the acquisition of military vocabulary and idiom. Phase II was conducted by

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Vietnamese Army Officers who were previously assigned as instructors with the Division Language School and who were retained when the school disbanded. A total of seven classes with 48 graduates were completed during the period 10 Jan - 2 Apr 66, significantly improving the capability of the Division to communicate with the Vietnamese civilian and military community.

(d) The movement to Vietnam caused a review of the Division's basic load of maps, resulting in the elimination of 55 tons of maps which had been held for other contingency areas. Continuous coordination with Support Command, 25th Infantry Division, assured that basic map loads were issued in appropriate quantities to all elements on a timely basis for deployment. In order to facilitate base area development, organization of perimeter defense and planning of patrol activities the USARPAC Mapping and Intelligence Center was requested to produce 1:12,500 map coverage of the Division TAOR and contiguous areas. This request was approved by G2 USARPAC and the initial 4 sheet coverage of the Cu Chi vicinity was later expanded to a total of 22 sheets covering the entire TAOR. These maps have proven invaluable for the purpose intended.

(e) Prior to deployment of the 2d and 3d Brigades, the Order of Battle Section under operational control of the G2 Section prepared Viet Cong OB summaries which were disseminated to the S2 Sections of all subordinate units. These summaries allowed unit S2's to become familiar with the enemy situation in South Vietnam and provided a basis for their OB files and workbooks. After the deployment of the Division, dissemination of the OB summaries continued in order to keep unit S2's informed of the current OB situation.

(f) On 5 March 1966, a 25th Infantry Division Weapons Identification Handbook was prepared by the OB Section, published by Division AG and disseminated to all Division elements. The purpose of the handbook is to familiarize division personnel with the weapons and material currently possessed by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. This handbook has facilitated the accurate identification and reporting of the numerous weapons which have been captured during recent combat operations.

(g) In the month of February an Air Observer course was conducted at Schofield Barracks by Division Artillery under the staff supervision of the G2 Section, resulting in the graduation of twenty officers and enlisted men. The training received by this class provided the Division with the necessary depth of qualified personnel to assist in the collection of intelligence data by visual reconnaissance and to perform adjustment of artillery fire.

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(h) The Counterintelligence Branch of the G2 Section officially suspended all personnel security operations on 27 February 1966 upon departure of the main body. Rear detachment personnel handled minor administrative matters which arose subsequent to that date. ACOFS, G2, USARHAW, continued to grant security clearances to division personnel until 11 March 1966, when all such matters were forwarded to ACOFS G2, U.S. Army, Vietnam.

(1) Also in February, prior to departure of the main body, the ACOFS G2, MI Detachment Commander and Order of Battle Officer were sent by the Division Commander to Vietnam for the purpose of compiling and analyzing all available information on our operational area and establishing liaison with the various intelligence agencies in the country. Their efforts facilitated the transition of intelligence operations from Hawaii to Vietnam.

(3) (U) Administration. On 3 January 1966, plans were completed for alert processing, and administrative instructions were issued to 2d and 3d Brigades. An AG personnel support team was attached to both 2d and 3d Brigades. Subsequently, the same service was provided the 1st Brigade Task Force and Division (-). On 15 January, APO 96353 was activated to serve the 2d Brigade Task Force. Upon deployment of the 2d and 3d Brigade Task Force, a judge advocate office was attached to each. A dependent's assistance center was established in December 1965 to aid in the quick and orderly processing of dependents. A total of 2,299 families were processed and 2,250 actually departed Hawaii prior to the center closing on 28 April 1966. There were approximately 200 families who indicated they wish to depart in June. This function was assumed by United States Army, Hawaii, when the Division center was closed.

(4) (U) Logistics. A special Operational Report on Lessons Learned will be submitted by 30 June 1966 on the Logistical and Organizational Activities of Support Command during the deployment of the Division.

(5) (U) Civic Action. In the early part of February Major General Fred C. Weyand initiated "Operation Helping Hand". Operation Helping Hand was started in response to the question from many residents of the state of Hawaii "What can we do to help the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division?". The response of the people of Hawaii was overwhelming. Governor John Burns; Honolulu's Mayor Neal Blaisdell; Chinn Ho, Hawaiian Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, and numerous other officials from Oahu and the surrounding

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islands of the state of Hawaii, immediately pledged aid and assistance in collecting materials for Helping Hand. Over 350 tons of material to be used in civic action projects were collected which included clothing, health and sanitation items, basic work items, children's items, and miscellaneous items such as milk and canned goods. On 2 March 1966, Senator Hiram Fong, Senator from the state of Hawaii, spoke in the Senate about the response of the people of Hawaii.⁽²⁾ On 5 March, a parade in appreciation of those who assisted in Helping Hand was held at Fort DeRussey, Hawaii. All items collected for Helping Hand are to be used in civic action projects within the 25th Infantry Division area of operations. The use of such materials is governed by 25th Infantry Division Circular 551-1 (Civic Action Helping Hand Material) dated 23 April 1966.

(6) (U) Signal Activities. On 13 January 1966, the Assistant Division Signal Officer departed for Vietnam to join the Division Advance Planning Group. On 21 February the 25th Infantry Division Forward became operational under the command of Brigadier General Edward H. deSaussure, creating an immediate requirement for installation and operation of a communications system normally established in support of division headquarters. Neither the Advance Planning Group nor the Advance Command Group arrived in Vietnam with the proper type of communications equipment for the support required. Minimum communications requirements were met by pooling all available sources, and borrowing equipment from other divisional units in the area. Proper communications support was not available until the arrival of the men and equipment of the 125th Signal Battalion on 18 March 1966.

(7) (U) Training.

(a) Training Areas. The training areas available to the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii provided an ideal setting for training units for operations in SE Asia. The terrain is rugged, covered with jungle growth and the frequent rains in the Koolau mountains areas created realistic restrictions on personnel and vehicular movement. Training programs at all levels were designed to exploit this unique opportunity to train for the division's most likely areas of commitment. The natural terrain facilities were enhanced by the construction of 12 SE Asia type "villages" located throughout the training area. These villages were used by units during counterinsurgency training exercises from company through brigade level. Village search techniques, civic action and community relations activities received equal consideration with combat operations in the planning of major unit exercises.

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(b) Training for Operations in SE Asia.

1. The 25th Infantry Division stressed preparation for deployment to SE Asia in all phases of training. To enhance training in special significant areas, the Division established the Special Warfare Training and Orientation Center (SAWTOC) in the East Range training area. The center included the Jungle and Guerilla Warfare Training Center, the small unit counterinsurgency and civic action training facility (Kara Village) and the Code of Conduct Training Station. Principles learned during training at SAWTOC were applied during subsequent unit field exercises.

2. The Division Language School presented instruction in Asian and SE Asian languages including Vietnamese, Thai, Chinese Mandarin and Indonesian. In-country TDY practical training followed the classroom instruction. Upon completion of training, students returned to their assigned organizations thus giving a language capability at unit level.

3. Command Post Exercises were used as a vehicle to familiarize officers and key enlisted personnel with likely areas of deployment. The local CPX's were set in either Vietnam or Thailand. CPX Tropic Lightning II conducted 7-9 December 1965 was set in the same general area in which the Division is currently operating.

4. Every opportunity to give division personnel practical experience in Vietnam was exploited. Most notable was the Division's participation in the Army Concept Team in Vietnam program and the Shotgun Program. The latter involved training serial doorgunners for deployment to Vietnam for 90 days TDY assigned to Army Aviation units. These men, all volunteers, provided the Division with personnel who were familiar with the terrain, the enemy and airmobile operations in Vietnam. More than 2145 officers and men participated in the program.

(c) Pre-embarkation Training.

1. The Division was alerted for deployment to Vietnam in December 1965. The 3d Brigade Task Force departed Hawaii in December 1965 and the 2d Brigade in January 1966. Prior to departure each brigade completed an accelerated training program with emphasis on tactics and techniques particular to the type of enemy to be encountered in Vietnam. The Jungle and Guerilla Warfare Training Center expanded to accommodate all deploying personnel in the short space of time available. Priority for the use of ranges and training areas was assigned to the units scheduled for earliest departure. Several special courses of instruction were established. These included:

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a. A special mines and booby traps course presented by the 65th Engineer Battalion. Students from every combat squad in the Division attended.

b. A squad and platoon combat course was established and all small units completed the course prior to deployment. Combat orders, fire control, employment of supporting weapons, battle drill, arm and hand signals and communications were stressed.

c. DS artillery battalions conducted intensive training for artillery and mortar forward observers. Illumination missions, night adjustment of artillery fire and direct fire were stressed.

d. A live fire combined arms exercise was conducted for each rifle company of the 1st Brigade Task Force. All supporting weapons available to the division were employed.

e. All units conducted gas chamber and CBR proficiency course refresher training.

2. The receipt of several new items of equipment required operator and maintenance training for selected personnel. New equipment training teams, augmented with division and USARHAW instructors, conducted separate, organizational maintenance and direct support maintenance training on the VRC-12 series radios and M109 Self Propelled 155mm Howitzer.

3. Training of the 1st Brigade Task Force.

a. Two new infantry battalions, the 3th Bn, 9th Infantry, and the 4th Bn, 23rd Infantry, were assigned to the Division from Alaska on 30 January 1966. The battalions arrived at almost TOE strength. They did not, however, have the 106mm RR sections or the ground surveillance radar sections or equipment authorized by TO&E. An eight weeks training program was established for the new battalions. Objectives of the new program included acclimatization of personnel, individual and crew served weapons qualification, physical conditioning, training in jungle tactics and techniques, achievement of proficiency in small unit tactics and orientation on the area of operations. The morale of the battalions was exceptionally high and proficiency in the above areas improved rapidly. Intensive field training assisted in adjusting the troops to the drastic change in climate. The moderate climate of Hawaii provided an ideal intermediate staging area for the battalions.

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b. Training of the 2d Bn, 14th Infantry. The decision was made to deploy the 2d and 3d Brigades at full TO&E strength. When replacements did not arrive in time to complete the fill, personnel were transferred from the 2d Bn, 14th Infantry to fill vacancies in departing units. Sufficient replacements arrived in late January to bring the battalion to full strength. Because of the personnel turnover, extensive retraining was required. The battalion followed the same training program as the two battalions from Alaska.

c. The 1st Brigade Task Force completed their final training program 9 April 1966 and began preparation for deployment by sea. The main body embarked on 15 April and arrived Cu Chi, RVN on 30 April 1966.

b. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities Since Arrival in Vietnam.

(1) (S) Mission. The mission of the 25th Infantry Division (-) is to:

(a) Conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces and base camps in TAOR.

(b) Conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces and base camps outside of assigned TAOR in accordance with operational schedules now in effect and to be put into effect by IIFORCEV.

(c) Conduct clearing operations and reserve reaction operations in support of III Corps GVN Revolutionary Development Program with emphasis on the national priority areas in Hau Nghia Province in coordination with CG, 25th ARVN Division, and through him, the Hau Nghia Province Chief. Provide support for the GVN Revolutionary Development Program through military operations which will include artillery support on an area basis, intelligence support and coordination of civic action and psychological operations.

(d) Provide support through ground combat, artillery support, air support and limited training, if necessary, to the Regional and Popular forces within the 25th Division's tactical area of responsibility.

(e) Be prepared to provide one reinforced infantry battalion for deployment within 12 hours notice. In the event this battalion size force is committed be prepared to release the remainder of a brigade size force twelve hours thereafter.

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(f) Defend base area and conduct security operations in areas contiguous to base camp.

(g) Maintain and secure, as necessary, land lines of communications.

(h) Be prepared to participate in the defense of US bases at Vung Tau, Bien Hoa and others which may be established.

(i) Be prepared to support continuing plans issued by Hq, IIFORCEV.

(2) Operations.

(a) (C) General. During the period 26 March to 30 April 1966, the Division secured 161 convoys along National Route 1 from Saigon northwest to Cu Chi. Six major and over 500 small unit actions (ambushes, patrols, Co S & D operations etc.) were conducted. There were over 7,000 aviation sorties and 350 air sorties in the period. Over 25,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired in the same period.

(b) (U) Major Operations.

- (1) CIRCLE PINES (TAB A, Appendix 4).
- (2) KAHUKA (TAB B, Appendix 4).
- (3) MAKAHA (TAB C, Appendix 4).
- (4) KAENA (TAB C, Appendix 4).
- (5) KAHALA (TAB D, Appendix 4).
- (6) MAILI

(c) (C) CIRCLE PINES (30 Mar - 4 Apr 66) Opn Circle Pines was a search and destroy operation in conjunction with III ARVN Corps to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps in the FILHOL plantation (XT660200). This was a four battalion operation (1st Bn, 69th Armor, 1st Bn, (Mech) 5th Infantry, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry) which utilized the mobility and firepower of tanks and mechanized infantry as well as airmobile operations by an infantry battalion. Extensive VC supply and ammunition caches were destroyed. This was the first large use of US armor elements in RVN in a combined arms operation. During this operation Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry repelled a major attack by a VC Bn during the early morning of 5 April. The results of the operation were VC 157 KIA (BQ), 303 KIA (poss), 13 VC MIA, 8 VCS, 7 VCS, numerous explosives

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mines and ammunition captured; 142 tunnels destroyed; 57.8 tons of rice destroyed; and 78 structures damaged. Significant U.S. losses were 32 KIA, 195 WIA, 14 APC's, 12 tanks, 3 UH1B, 1 VTR damaged; 2 APC's destroyed. (See appendix 5 for Combat Operations After Action Report and Appendix 6 for Special Summary of Action of Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (Opn Circle Pines).)

(d) (C) KAHUKA (7-8 Apr 66). This was a battalion search and destroy operation in the vicinity of XT 553164 which was based on accurate intelligence and executed vigorously by a mechanized battalion task force. (1/5th Infantry (Mech), Co C, 1st Bn, 69th Armor, Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry, and Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry). The task force with three companies abreast advanced against enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire, clearing the area and destroying tunnels and a VC base camp. Two additional companies occupying blocking positions and armed helicopters guarding the rice paddies, were utilized to seal off escape routes. The sweep of the area was completed by 1545 hours and the 49th ARVN Regiment assumed responsibility for final clearance of the area. The armor protection of the M113 PC effectively minimized casualties (8 WIA) from booby traps and AP mines, yet the mobility and firepower of this task force inflicted heavy casualties upon a stubborn and determined enemy (29 KIA (BC), 22 KIA (poss), 1 VCS). (See Appendix 7 for Combat Operations After Action Report.)

(e) (C) MAKANA (11-14 Apr 66). This was a brigade search and destroy operation in the vicinity XT565165. Task Force 2/27 (2d Bn, 27th Infantry, Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor, and Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry) departed base camp and swept south toward XT542161. Co B and Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry were helilifted to XT535154 and began search and destroy operations toward an objective in the vicinity XT550150. The Brigade moved through light sniper fire and booby trapped areas to a defensive position XT563168. Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry moved to the west of the objective area to secure the exposed northern and western flanks. At night all units placed out ambushes. On 12 April the Brigade continued search and destroy operations north and south of Route 1 vicinity XT545175. Light resistance was encountered. On 13 April all elements except Co C, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry continued the sweep until they reached base camp at Cu Chi. Co C set up a patrol base vic XT580295, until 14 April when the company returned to base camp. It had light enemy contact. The results of this operation were VC 21 KIA (BC), 27 KIA (poss), 4 VCC, 43 VCS. U.S., 1 KIA, 18 WIA; 1 wheel vehicle, 1 APC, 1 VTR damaged. (See Appendix 8 for Combat Operations After Action Report.)

(f) (C) KAENA (13-14 Apr 66) This was a battalion search and destroy operation to locate and destroy

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operation to locate and destroy VC forces and installations in the vicinity XT660200. The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry (-), Co C, 1st Bn, 69th Armor and a platoon of Engineers encountered tunnel complexes and bunker systems (68 tunnels and 41 bunkers). It was in this operation that a tank was hit for the first time by a RPG-2, a weapon which completely penetrated the hull of the vehicle to the right of the driver. Results of the operation were VC 9 KIA (BC), 15 KIA (poss). U.S.: 6 KIA, 23 WIA, 1 APO and 1 tank damaged. (See Appendix 9 for Combat Operations After Action Report.)

(g) (C) KAHALA (16-21 Apr 66). This was a brigade operation utilizing 2 Airmobile Task Forces and a Mechanized Task Force. The area of operation was XT4829, XT6020, XT4820. Task Force 1/27 and Task Force 2/27 made an airmobile move to their objective while Task Force 1/5 set up a blocking position on the west side of the objective. Tunnels, bunkers, spider holes, booby traps and mines and sporadic resistance were encountered by all elements during the first day. After establishing night defensive perimeters, all units established ambushes and patrols. Task Force 1/27 had an ambush sprung by a VC patrol (3 VC KIA (BC)). The leader of the patrol was a woman who was killed in the fire fight. Task Force 1/5 sprung an ambush resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 3 KIA (poss). The operation continued with sporadic VC contact. On 20 April Phase II of the operation commenced. The schedule of maneuver was that two infantry battalions would be airlifted to the vic XT5116 to move east, a cavalry troop would block the north vic XT5116 and a mechanized battalion would block the east vic XT5314. The operation proceeded as planned with numerous VC suspects being encountered. The results of the operation were 47 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KBA, 44 KIA (poss), 8 VCC, 119 VCS and numerous small arms captured. Subsequently 22 suspects were identified as VC and 60 suspects remain in GVN custody. Also captured were 16.2 tons of rice and 700 lbs of peanuts. (See Appendix 10 for Combat Operations After Action Report.)

(h) (C) MAILI (27 Apr -). On 27 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry Task Force commenced operation MAILI. The Task Force established an operational base northeast of BAO TRAT (XT5204). From this base, the battalion conducted thorough search and destroy operations in conjunction with ARVN and Popular Force units. This operation is a determined effort to pacify an area using an American infantry battalion in conjunction with Vietnamese forces over a two-three week period. Initial results have been gratifying in that many of the local populace is returning to the villages. As part of this operation, Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry was airlifted on 29 April to vic AP DUONG NIA (XT4306) where they are to interdict VC movement of supplies and personnel along the Oriental River. This operation is presently continuing.

(3) Intelligence (FOUO).

(a) (FOUO) General. Shortly after the Division

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Headquarters closed in Cu Chi, and with the experience acquired as a result of several combat operations, it was decided to establish a Military Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC). This center centralized the four specialized intelligence capabilities of the MI Detachment at one location with the Order of Battle Section as the focal point. The center as presently organized consists of representatives from Counterintelligence, Order of Battle, Imagery Interpretation and an Exploitation Section which includes the Interrogation and Translation Section and a Captured Materials Section. The mission of the MIOC is to expeditiously transmit to the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTCOC) all tactical intelligence information derived from various sources and agencies after this information has been processed, collated and interpreted. Additionally, the MIOC furnishes the G2 a list of potential artillery and air strike targets daily, based primarily on acquired Imagery Interpretation and Order of Battle information. The MIOC has proven to be beneficial in that all intelligence information obtained through any of the MI Detachment efforts is properly evaluated and related prior to its being acted upon.

(b) (FOUO). The G2 Air Branch took the necessary steps to effect 24 hours operational capability and providing preplanned surveillance and reconnaissance missions in support of all elements of the Division. Employment of SLAR, infra-red and photographic interpretation has provided numerous indications of enemy movements and positions. A targeting procedure has been established in coordination with MIOC which provides target intelligence for Artillery Fire and Tactical Air Strikes. Currently the G2 Air Branch plans aerial reconnaissance and surveillance for the Division, processing requests to higher headquarters for SLAR, infra-red and photographic support and receives and interprets photography.

(c) (FOUO). Organization of the G2 Operations Section for combat operations in South Vietnam did not require a radical departure from the operational procedures used on Hawaii in training for counterinsurgency operations. Personnel requirements were reevaluated and incorporated into an MTOE submitted for approval. Intelligence reporting procedures were altered in accordance with the standard operating procedures of higher headquarters.

(d) (FOUO) Viet Cong Activity.

(1) During the month of March, VC activity was limited to incidents involving units of platoon size or smaller. There were no major VC contacts during the period. Due to friendly operations in former VC controlled areas, the VC were forced to abandon base camps and redoubt areas. Movement of VC units continued to be constant in order to avoid contact with friendly forces and supporting tactical air and artillery. Road interdiction, to include mines and roadblocks, remained constant. There was no increase in any specific type of VC activity.

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2. Combat operations during March, directed against the VC resulted in the following losses:

VC KIA (BC)	151	VC KIA (poss)	294
VGC	17	VCS	52
Rice Captured (Tons)	58.8	Weapons Captured	32

3. During the month of April, Viet Cong activity has been characterized by acts of harassment and sabotage directed against friendly operations, the Cu Chi base perimeter and movement on National Route 1. The majority of VC activity involved forces of platoon or smaller size. An exception to this occurred on 5 April when A/2/27 was attacked by the 1st Bn/165A Regiment in the Ho Bo Woods. Friendly operations restricted Viet Cong activities and forced them to abandon redoubt areas, supply points, and rest areas. Movement along supply and liaison routes by the VC was hampered by friendly patrol action.

4. Combat operations directed against the VC during April resulted in the following VC losses:

VC KIA (BC)	153	VC KIA (poss)	587
VGC	10	VCS	241
Rice Captured (Tons)	27.75	Weapons Captured	79

(4) Administration.

(a) (U) General. The ACoFS G1 arrived at Cu Chi on 28 March 1966, with the Division Command Group. Since arrival, the division has authority to hire 900 temporary hire personnel on a daily basis. The average number of indigenous personnel hired during March was 688 and during April 585.

(b) (U) On 20 April 1966, General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff addressed all available division officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

(c) (U) The division PX commenced operations on 13 April 1966. The facility was established as a warehouse with sub-exchanges being established in subordinate units. During the period 13-30 April, the PX received \$224,276.44 in merchandise and sold \$90,661.40.

(d) (U) On 24 April 1966, the shotgun volunteers (machinegunners for helicopters) from various division units were transferred to the 25th Aviation Bn and Troop D, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry. All were former members of the shotgun program in Hawaii. The Division Aviation Battalion received 31 and Troop D, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry 11.

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(e) (C) Strengths. Division (-) as of 30

April 1966:

	OFF	VO	EM	AGG
Authorized	592	194	8172	8958
Assigned	653	84	9148	9885
Present for Duty	636	81	8829	9546

(f) (C) Casualties. Division (-) (1 Jan-30

April 1966).

KIA	91
WIA	914
MIA	0
DOW	17
Non-Battle Injury (Serious)	15
Non-Battle Dead	12
TOTAL	1,049

(g) (U) Total replacements received during the reporting period was 1400, 1387 EM and 13 Officers.

(h) (U) Awards and decorations processed for 25th Infantry Division personnel (less 3d Brigade): MH-1, DSC-2, SS-16, LM-1, BSM w/V Device-27, BSM for Meritorious Service-8, AM w/V Device-8, AM-41, ARCOM-11, PH-721.

(i) (U) Military Police Support.

1 Upon arrival in Vietnam on 13 March 1966, the Military Police Company was employed as an intergal unit at the Division Base Camp Area, less one Military Police Platoon attached to the 3d Brigade, and immediately began performing duties in support of the 25th Infantry Division to include: motor patrols within base camp area and surrounding villages for enforcement of discipline, law and order and traffic regulations; searching and processing indigenous laborers; escorting military convoys and operations of traffic control points; custody, control and processing of VCS and VCC; registering animals and pets; operation of a military police station on a 24 hour basis; providing security for the Commanding General and the DTCC; and providing military police support for tactical operations as required.

2. Establishment of PW Enclosure. Frequent tactical operations and capture of VCS and VCC necessitated the immediate construction of a temporary prisoner of war collection point at division level for the custody, processing and subsequent evacuation to ARVN officials. Initially, a three strand concertina wire enclosure with eight individual interior compounds capable of housing a maximum of 150 persons was established. During this reporting period a total of 173 VCS and 19 VCC have

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been processed and subsequently released to ARVN officials. As material becomes available the temporary construction is being replaced with semi-permanent facilities.

(3) Processing of Indigenous Personnel. Approximately 700 indigenous personnel are processed in and out of the base camp area daily except Sundays. Other indigenous personnel desiring entrance into the area to conduct business with units or staff sections are receipted for by US military personnel at the main gate and remain under their supervision while inside the cantonment area.

(4) Convoy Escorts. During the reporting period military police have escorted 167 convoys, consisting of 8,303 vehicles for a total of 176,422 vehicle miles in support of division deployment and resupply operations. No significant problem areas were encountered other than those normally expected and provided for in current military police doctrine.

(5) CID Activities. Prior to deployment to Vietnam, the criminal investigation capability of the 25th Military Police Company was increased by an MTOE change which added three assistant criminal investigators to the PM Section. This increase will provide for the attachment of a criminal investigator to each independent brigade task force without seriously jeopardizing the investigative support required by the Division (-). Routine criminal investigations involving division personnel were conducted with no serious incidents or unusual problems.

(6) Tactical Operations. During the period 1 January - 23 March, one Military Police Platoon was attached to the 2d Brigade Task Force for deployment to South Vietnam and provided military police support during tactical operations to include traffic control, processing of prisoners of war and escorting military convoys. On 26 March 1966, after the arrival of the 25th Infantry Division (-) this platoon rejoined the 25th Military Police Company and has subsequently participated in one brigade size tactical operation.

(7) Discipline, Law and Order. Since the arrival of the 25th Infantry Division (-) in Vietnam a total of 13 Class I and 45 Class II offenses have been reported resulting in the initiation of 5 Class I and 7 Class II criminal investigations with 41 offenders being identified. A total of 23 motor vehicle accidents have occurred resulting in property damage of \$1540.00. There were no traffic fatalities. Other routine investigations involving division personnel were conducted with no serious incidents or unusual problems.

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(5) (U) Logistics. A Special Operational Report on Lessons Learned will be submitted by 30 June 1966, on the Logistical and Organizational Activities of Support Command during the deployment of the division. (See Appendix 15.)

(6) (U) Civic Action/Psychological Operations.

(a) Civic Action. Civic Action programs have been expanded to include CA by all major commands under this headquarters. Specific CA responsibility was assigned to subordinate units in areas contiguous to the division base camp. CA programs were undertaken on Operations; CIRCLE PINES, MAKAHA, and MAILI. MEDCAP II's were conducted in twenty four (24) hamlets during operations. MEDCAP's were conducted on a weekly basis in all assigned areas contiguous to the base camp less the villages of PHUOC HIEP (XT5617) and TAN PHU TRUNG (XT6810) assigned to 2d Brigade. 2d Brigade conducted the majority of their CA program on the above named operations and these two villages are still to be developed for CA programs. During the month of March the Helping Hand warehouse was opened and subordinate units have already started using Helping Hand material on CA projects. Operation Helping Hand was the campaign conducted in the state of Hawaii to provide civic action material for use by the division in Vietnam. The project accumulated 350 tons of clothing, health and sanitation items, basic work items, and miscellaneous items such as milk and canned goods. Approximately 11 tons of Helping Hand material were shipped to 3d Brigade in Pleiku.

(b) Psychological Operations.

1. Psychological operations have been increasingly effective. During the month of March twenty ground loudspeaker missions and seven airborne loudspeaker missions, utilizing CHIEU HOI appeals and harassing tapes, have been conducted. Approximately 250,000 leaflets, to include introductory, 969, denial of safe haven, CHIEU HOI, and safe conduct passes, were dropped during the month. The results of the PSY/OPS program are becoming more evident with the increased number of ralliers and the response obtained during operations. Information available to this headquarters indicates that the HAU NGHIA Province has had the largest number of ralliers in any III Corps Province thus far in 1966.

2. Psychological operations during April were primarily in support of 2d Brigade activities. The division PSYOP Section was established during the second week of April. Division psychological operations during the month have included the dropping of over 500,000 leaflets to both enemy and civilian targets, and approximately 27 hours of airborne loudspeaker time. 10,000 leaflets were disseminated by hand to indigenous civilians, both during and between operations. Enemy propaganda target

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themes stressed the CHIEU HOI program, and massive Allied-ARVN military power, while civilian themes stressed morale building and civic action. Three large 1,000 watt loudspeakers were obtained in mid-April. These loudspeakers were designed primarily for mounting on H-23 rotary wing aircraft. An alternate use is for enemy harassment in areas contiguous to the division base camp perimeter, and for vehicular use in tactical operations.

3. Experience indicates the need for a PSYOP company to support a division. Present doctrine is to assign a PSYOP company to support a field army area. However, the requirement of "Wars of Liberation" definitely involves greater propaganda support than previous wars, due to increased themes and popular targets.

(7) (U) Signal Activities.

a. Radio Systems.

1. The following permanent VHF telephone systems were installed on the dates indicated:

Army - 25th Inf Div, 11 March 1966.
 IIFORCEV, 25th Inf Div, 16 March 1966.
 Danger Main - 25th Inf Div, 23 Jan 1966.
 Danger North - 25th Inf Div, 23 Jan 1966.

2. Following temporary VHF telephone systems are installed to units outside the 25th Infantry Division

25th Inf Div - 25th ARVN Div (Duc Hoa), 16 April 1966. Equipment and personnel provided by III Corps.

25th Inf Div - Moonlight Control Headquarter (Tan Son Nhut), 25 April 1966.

3. During the months of March and April the following temporary VHF telephone systems were installed in support of 25th Infantry Division units out on operations:

Div Main - 2d Bde Bwd, Trung Lap.
 Div Main - 2d Bde Bwd, Trung Lap.
 Div Main - 1/27th Inf TF, Duc Lap.

4. One AN/GRC-460 was provided to supported unit for RATT Net during operations indicated in paragraph 3 above.

5. On 21 March 1966, RATT Net with 1st Infantry Division was closed down and an RATT Net to IIFORCEV was installed on a permanent basis.

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6. The "no front" combat situation does not lend itself to maximum usage of the area communications doctrine. Due to the fact there is no separate trains area, the Forward Area Signal Center (FASC) Platoon may provide communications for the Bde/Bn forward areas and then the entire platoon is not needed. Thus with the Forward Command Terminal Section (under area communications concept FCTS terminates VHF at Bde forward CP) not being utilized and portions of the FASC platoons not utilized, more men and equipment are available to support several forward CP's, as the situation may warrant. The one drawback of this breakdown of a TO & E structure is that the platoon or section leader will not be able to be at each site that his platoon supports.

7. In the event a Bde CP is not collocated with the Division CP, more than one 12 channel VHF system will be required to provide communications between the two CP's. This can be foreseen by virtue of the telephone (wire) requirements of the Bde when located at the Division Base Camp. This requirement of more than one VHF system to the Bde is different from the concept practiced during exercises in Hawaii.

(b) SOI Preparation.

1. Due to the limited availability of all old family radio frequencies in Vietnam, the method of assigning frequencies to Division units had to be cutback and revised. As the division receives the new family of radios, more frequencies will be available for allocation to subordinate units. Presently at the platoon level, only platoons in the line units are assigned frequencies.

2. In a movement such as the 25th Infantry Division made from Hawaii to Vietnam, close coordination with the Signal Office of the higher headquarters is essential in the preparation of SOI's as policies and requirements are different. For example, the SOI used in this country requires a completely new master sheet (Supplement 33 ACP 110) for the assignment of call signs.

3. A single suffix system (SOI item #23-()) for radio call signs was implemented during the month of April. This new system authorizes the mixing of call signs between nets and eliminates the time consuming process of trying to identify a party using lengthy lists of randomly selected suffixes.

(c) Wire Communications.

1. The Division Signal Officer and 125th Signal Battalion had the task of engineering and installing a Fixed Plant Telephone Communications System (FPTCS). Numerous

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problems were encountered during the accomplishment of the above task, primarily because the 25th Infantry Division TO & E is not designed for the installation of an FPTCS.

2. Some of the problems, such as the availability of only tactical field wire and cable and the non-availability of 18 foot poles for overheading of wire and cable, were eliminated by obtaining support from the 267th Cable Construction Company.

3. Plans for the FPTCS were submitted by the ADSO to USARV on 25 January 1966. After USARV approval, 2d Signal Group procured the necessary equipment and material to partially install the FPTCS. Equipment and material consisted of: permanent cement poles; 5, 25, 100 and 200 pair non-tactical cable; terminal boxes; and an MTC-1 switchboard (200 line capability). 2d Signal Group tasked the 267th Cable Construction Company of the 39th Signal Battalion with the requirement of installing the 25th Division FPTCS.

4. The 25th Division FPTCS, to date, provides 450 circuits and services 25 units in the base camp. Installation has been accomplished in four (4) major projects:

a. Project #1, 8-11 March 1966, consisted of installing cable in the 2d Brigade base area. 12 permanent (cement) poles, 1600 feet of 25 pair cable, 400 feet of 5 pair cable and 5 terminal boxes were utilized on this project.

b. Project #2, 14-20 March 1966, involved the installation of cable along Hawaii, Schofield and Taro Roads and to Division Headquarters. The installation of this portion of the FPTCS provided circuits to: 2/27th Inf Bn, "B" and "C" Btry, 3/13th Artillery Bn, "C" Btry, 7/11th Artillery on Hawaii Road, 2d Bde, 15th RRU and "A" Btry, 3/13th Artillery Bn on Taro Road. The material expended in this project consisted of 122 permanent (cement) poles, 1000 feet of 100 pair cable, 14,000 feet of 25 pair cable and 7 terminal boxes.

c. Project #3, 12-16 April 1966, consisted of installing cable along Molokai, Oahu, Taro and Kauai Road. This portion of the FPTCS provided circuits to: 25th Avn Bn on Molokai Road, 2/32d Artillery Bn and SUPCOM on Taro Road, 1st Bde, 2d Air Mobile Company and Division Artillery on Oahu Road and POW Camp, 3/4 Cavalry, 69th Armor, and 65th Engineer Bn on Kauai Road. 45 permanent (cement) poles, 15,200 feet of 25 pair cable and 9 terminal boxes were installed on this project.

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4. Project #4, 19-20 April 1966, involved the alternate routing of cable to Division Headquarters. By using the existing poles along Schofield Road, this project incorporated, 2000 feet of 200 pair cable and 3 terminal cans into the FPTCS.

(8) (U) Medical.

(a) Medical Evacuation.

1. Upon moving into Cu Chi the 2d Brigade experienced and witnessed the 1st Division advanced aid section in a new concept of evacuation. This was total use of helicopters even in the base camp area leaving the 3/4 ton ambulances idle. This same technique was used by our 2d Brigade until minimum security was obtained. Evacuation of base camp units to Delta Company, 25th Medical Battalion then resumed use of the 3/4 ton ambulances.

2. Air Evacuation. Evacuation of patients during operations has been and will continue to be by use of helicopters. At first units were directly requesting helicopter ambulances to fly into insecure areas for evacuation. This problem was partially remedied by the Brigade Surgeon who established the policy that all requests would be routed through the medical company which had direct contact with the Aeromedical Evacuation unit. This plan provided the necessary control over indiscriminate requests, and routed the requests through operational channels which gave rapid clearance from Air Force and Artillery elements. However, the problem of medical evacuation helicopters being called into insecure areas for pickup still exists. To date six (6) medical evacuation helicopters have been damaged and two pilots seriously wounded evacuating 2d Brigade personnel.

3. Ground Evacuation. Ground evacuation during operations is and always will be hazardous. Front line evacuation is by litter teams to a partially secure area where choppers are called in. Front line ambulances are of little use because of sniper fire and mines. The 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry, 5th Infantry (Mech) and 69th Armor have experienced tremendous success with the use of APC's in evacuating casualties to more secure areas for helicopter pickup.

4. Destination of Evacuees. It was learned very early that with the speed of the helicopter in evacuation, most patients could reach a hospital from the place injured in approximately 20 minutes of flying time. However, a problem in stabilizing the patient at the point of injury was incurred. Therefore, a policy was established that all patients would be evacuated to Delta Company Clearing Station for stabilization prior to further evacuation. This has proven most successful by the fact that only two patients have died in flight to either hospital used for this purpose.

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(b) Field Sanitation.

1. Field sanitation to be successful at Cu Nha requires perseverance and ingenuity. Several factors blend together to form barriers to routine field expedients and sanitary devices:

- a. The hot and humid climate.
- b. The dry and wet monsoon seasons.
- c. The relatively non-porous topsoil.
- d. Flat table with poor drainage.
- e. Quality of nonpotable water.

2. Significantly, there has been only 1 case of malaria. This is explained by the sparsity of mosquitoes due to the present dry season and lack of suitable breeding areas i.e., stagnant water. With the onset of the southwest monsoon season, mosquito breeding will increase as well as the cases of malaria. No fly-borne diseases are apparent although their population seems to be increasing. An entomology survey has been completed by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit, but official recommendations have not been received. We are anticipating that the recommendations will include aerial spraying of the base camp. At the present time, larviciding is accomplished at the unit level with residual insecticide on a weekly basis. Anopheles larvae have been found within the base camp; as adults they are the vector of malaria. The only other needs for the spread of malaria are a reservoir of susceptible individuals. We expect that 95% of our cases of malaria will be the P. falciparum type since it is somewhat resistant to the antimalarial (Chloroquine-Primaquine) tablet.

3. A small outbreak of bacillary dysentery occurred within the 1st Bn, 5th Infantry (Mach), and should be classified as from a filth-borne source. Whether from water, nonpotable ice, or a food handler was not confirmed. No confirmed cases of amebic dysentery have been detected.

4. The concept of the unit field sanitation team has not been actively assimilated into the sanitary functions of the company sized units. Hopefully the upcoming field sanitation team course will remedy this problem. There is command interest in unit sanitation as attested to by the high caliber of personnel who are being assigned to attend the course.

5. Each battery or separate company unit reports on its status of field sanitation in the monthly Command Health Report (Div Reg 40-15). This report is written by a medical officer who inspects all unit sanitation facilities and submits necessary recommendations for any needed corrections through command channels.

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6. The sanitary devices such as latrines, urinals, soakage pits, grease traps, etc., are all being rehabilitated. The latrines frequently did not have fly-tight boxes, self closing lids or hand washing facilities. Urinals too often had improper soakage pits constructed; however, several units had constructed well-functioning urinoil devices. Soakage pits were constructed so that the surface runoff would not flood them and make them non-functional.

7. Mess halls have the appearance of adequacy. Many discrepancies of minor nature occur upon close inspection. PSP was used for flooring. This allowed food to drop through and become a source of attraction for rodents. The screening of the mess tents was frequently not used because of the heat and need for ventilation.

8. Trash and garbage is being taken to a sanitary fill which is satisfactory as long as the area is handled as a sanitary fill. Also, the burn-out of human wastes collected in the half drums using diesel fuel has not proven totally satisfactory as some residue always remains and the disposal of this residue has created some problems.

9. Since the shower points, laundry and several other facilities require the use of large quantities of water, nonpotable water is used to support these activities. Nonpotable wells have been bacteriologically cultured and have been found to be contaminated with coliform organisms, i.e., suggestive of fecal contamination. Therefore, a system of batch chlorination (Div Cir 40-7) has been inaugurated to up-grade the quality of nonpotable water supplies. The results of this program will be determined by future studies.

(9) (U) Base Area Development. A large problem after a base area has been secured is base area development. Though this division had prepared plans prior to its deployment, only after on site inspection could the plans be put in final form. At first, base development had growing pains in the system of orderly and logical establishment of the base camp. A Base Camp Development Committee was established. The Assistant Division Commander for Support, Brigadier General Edward H. deSaussure was appointed chairman of the committee. The committee consisted of the Chief of Staff, ACofS G4, Division Engineer, Division Signal Officer and members designated by: CO, Division Artillery, CO, SUPCOM, CO, 1st Bde, CO, 2d Bde, CO, 1/69th Armor, CO, 3/4 Cavalry, and CO 25th Aviation Battalion. The Commanding General advised the committee that first priority would be clearing fields of fire and the perimeter wire and bunker system.

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The committee's first action was to establish a final base plan which established in final form road systems, telephone line systems, and battalion areas. (See Inclosure 11) It is only through the strenuous efforts of the Engineer Battalion that this camp has been established to a Class II configuration in less than 45 days. (See Inclosure 12). Prior to the division's departure from Hawaii, arrangements were made with USARHAW, who fabricated precut tent and latrine kits for the units of this division. This added immeasurably in establishing the living areas prior to the arrival of the monsoon season. The buildings for Division Headquarters were initially tents and within 30 days were prefabricated buildings for the general staff offices. Presently, concrete has been poured for the foundations of the special staff buildings. (See Inclosure 13).

(10) (U) Training. The 2d Brigade closed in the Cu Chi, RVN area in late January 1966, and was immediately committed to combat operations to secure the base area. Experience and lessons learned during this initial combat phase formed the basis for the brigade program of refresher training and replacement training. Night patrolling and night ambush training was found to be a particular weak area and was accorded emphasis in the program of training. Many ambushes were conducted during the early part of April as training as well as security. The number of kills per ambush rose steadily as proficiency and confidence improved. Training with demolitions, tunnel clearance operations, use of riot control agents and VC booby trap techniques are other areas which received emphasis.

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III. Commanders Analysis/Recommendations.

a. Operations.

(1) (C) To be effective in accomplishing the pacification objective (assisting in Revolutionary Development), a U.S. infantry unit (normally a battalion) must establish a base camp in a well chosen location for a protracted period (3-4 weeks). Operations are coordinated with ARVN and Province officials and integrated with ARVN and local force units. Daily meetings should be held at Province headquarters, attended by the U.S. unit commander and his staff, the Vietnamese Province Chief and his staff and the U.S. Sector Advisor and his staff who will review the current day's operation and plan the next day's operation. Although the operations are not spectacular by the standard of VC body count, this combined effort is highly successful. In one such operation, a hamlet of ten families became one of thirty families. Such actions as this, disrupts and eventually destroys the VC infrastructure, while at the same time adds to the prestige and respect of all participants.

(2) (C) To date the tank (M4CA3) elements of the Division have proven most effective. The fire power and maneuverability of the tank has been used advantageously. These units have been most successful when cross attached with infantry or mechanized infantry units. Use of tanks, particularly in the brush and wooded areas, has materially reduced casualties to foot troops from mines and booby traps. The psychological effect of the tank on US and ARVN infantry has been beneficial.

(3) (C) The mechanized infantry battalion (APC, M113) has proved to be the most versatile combat unit in this division. With care and skill this unit has been able to traverse all but the swamps in the Division Tactical Area of Operation. The protection afforded against small arms and anti-personnel mines by the APC has facilitated rapid movement with few casualties. The local (Schofield Barracks) fabrication of armor shields for the hatch gunner has improved the effectiveness of organic firepower. The carrier, when used in the medical evacuation and command vehicle role, has proved invaluable in each case. Without question, the M113 Personnel Carrier is the ideal combat vehicle for this environment, the tactics employed, and enemy encountered. Results of a one day tank-mech infantry-ARVN engineer task force operation illustrates the effectiveness of the tank and personnel carrier in this environment: 27 KIA (BG), 19 KIA (poss).

(4) (C) Ambushes continue to be a most successful method of engaging the enemy both during major operations and while operating in the Division patrol sector. While on major operations, the VC tactic is normally to harass and hide during the day and probe at night. The use of night ambushes

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as a countermeasure for VC initiated probes has produced excellent results. The extensive use of ambushes in the Division patrol sector has successfully denied the VC passage through the area and access to the Division perimeter. Ambush statistics for one battalion for the last 3 months illustrates the effectiveness of the ambush when employed by trained, experienced troops:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMBUSHES EMPLOYED</u>	<u>ENEMY CONTACTS</u>	<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>	<u>AVERAGE KILL PER CONTACT</u>
FEB	108	32	32 (BC) 15 (poss)	1.0
MAR	111	11	22 (BC) 24 (poss)	2.0
APR	85	11	45 (BC) 20 (poss)	4.1
TOTALS	304	54	99 (BC) 59 (poss)	1.8

(a) The number of kills per contact improved with experience and training. A large number of ambushes were established during the month of February for training purposes.

(b) The number of kills per contact is especially significant since in the majority of instances, the size of the VC force ambushed was 3-5 men.

(c) The results of ambushes established during the latter part of April were highly significant in that for the majority of contacts a complete kill and capture of all weapons was accomplished.

(5) (C) A battalion must begin an operation with the idea in mind that the VC must be methodically dug out and ground to dust. This type of operation is characterized by tight battalion control and set-piece coordination.

(6) (C) The aviation battalion and air cavalry troop must be highly proficient in night operations. This technique furnishes the Division Commander a versatile tool whereby he can reinforce beleaguered elements, catch the enemy by surprise by moving in darkness, and allow enemy lines of retreat to be cut.

2. (FOUO) Target Acquisition. A degradation of the target acquisition capabilities of the Division was created by the deletion of the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon of the Aviation Battalion. This platoon with its associated aircraft and equipment, provided an organic capability for visual photographic, infra-red and radar surveillance of potential target areas for planning and operational purposes. The Division must now submit all of its requests for such surveillance and target acquisition through II FFORCE Vietnam to the 3d Direct Air Support Center which operated within the priorities established by J2 Air MACV.

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3. Deployment: This division encountered no difficulties or significant problems in its deployment to Vietnam. The division was well prepared for the move by virtue of its geographical location (Hawaii), mission (PACOM strategic reserve), and the frequent participation in training exercises by major divisional units to the island of Hawaii, Okinawa, Taiwan, and Thailand. Planning and conducting of sea and air lifts were normal activities for unit commanders and their staffs. At one point in time the Division was involved in the simultaneous air deployment of one brigade to Pleiku, one brigade by sea to Vung-Tau, and the receipt of two new infantry battalions from Alaska. The following items assisted in the orderly transition from Hawaii to Vietnam, and are cited as possible benefit to other units programmed for similar deployment.

a. Upon notification of alert, close and continuous liaison was established with agencies involved in the move (MSTS, US Army Hawaii, and the USAF).

b. An advance division planning headquarters was established at Hqs, USARV in Saigon. Each deploying unit deployed by air an advance planning group followed by an advance party. The advance planning group for a brigade task force consisted of 8-11 persons, and the advance party 150-200, the latter being self-sufficient.

c. Each major unit and separate battalion established (initially on a 24 hour basis) a Dependent's Assistance Center. Also established was a Division Center which worked with the Post Family Assistance Facility in arranging for clearance of quarters and transportation. Liaison officers and EM were stationed at the sea and aerial ports of debarkation (Travis AFB, San Francisco International Airport, and Oakland Army Terminal). Their activities to assist families were the most important and most successful aspect of the deployment.

d. There was established a Division Deployment Board consisting of the Surgeon, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, and a Brigade Commander that received all limited profiles, requests for medical or compassionate transfers, or deferment of deployment. This board was of material assistance to subordinate commanders.

e. Sea out-loading was scheduled so that troop ships arrived at least 24 hours prior to the unit's first cargo ship. Manifests were so marked that drivers, assistant drivers, and labor supervisors could be easily identified and segregated upon arrival. These individuals were moved to the port area for the unloading and movement of general cargo.

f. Pre-fabricated tent kits (GP, medium and GP, small) and latrine kits (bucket type) were packaged, banded, and shipped with unit cargo.

g. Once POM processing started strict adherence to schedules was required, and personnel, pay, medical and material inspection teams worked on an 18-24 hour basis.

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h. The first two brigades deployed in task force configuration with proportionate slices of all division combat and service support units and were self-sufficient.

i. A vehicle "bone yard" was established on the post where soldiers could dispose of their privately owned vehicles, with or without decals or papers.

j. Once the air flow started, a nightly call was made to the USAFV project officer providing details as to time, number of aircraft, and plane load composition.

k. All outstanding requisitions were changed to an O2 priority. On numerous occasions time did not permit receipt by a unit prior to deployment. Although undesirable, lateral transfer of equipment and personnel to the units deploying first was inevitable.

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IV. Lessons Learned.

a.. Tactics/Techniques. (C)

ARMOR OR MECHANIZED SWEEPS

Item: Mounted Armor/ Mechanized Sweeps

Discussion: Mounted sweeps will seldom turn up small enemy forces unless the initial sweep is used to blow mines and booby traps and followed immediately by a methodical dismounted infantry search.

Observation: To be effective, mounted sweeps must be immediately followed by a methodical dismounted infantry search.

ARTILLERY AIRCRAFT WARNING NET

Item: Artillery Aircraft Warning Net.

Discussion: A need exists for an Artillery Aircraft Warning Net. This net is operated by Division Artillery Operations Center to warn pilots where there is artillery fire. The pilot reports into the net and requests the information. The NCS then in coded grids gives the information.

Observation: Because of numerous army aircraft, an Artillery Aircraft Warning Net must be established.

VEHICLE RECOVERY

Item: Problems when cross attaching infantry with armor.

Discussion: When cross-reinforcing, consideration must be given to the recovery capabilities of the infantry battalion.

Observation: Plans must include the prepositioning of M88 Recovery Vehicles with an infantry battalion if tanks are to be utilized by them.

AMBUSHES

Item: Movement at an ambush site.

Discussion: Movement at an ambush site should be considered enemy. However, no one fires until given the order by the ambush leader.

Observation: There must be strict movement and fire discipline enforced on an ambush.

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AMBUSHES

Item: Use of Claymore mines.

Discussion: On ambushes there is a tendency to detonate Claymore mines prematurely before the enemy main force has entered the killing zone.

Observation: Troops must be willing to allow the VC point man to pass their position so maximum casualties can be inflicted on the main body by Claymore mines.

Item: Use of M113 Personnel Carriers.

Discussion: The secret of using M113's to establish an ambush is to have the ramps down. As the M113 approaches a location near an ambush site, the ambushers dismount while the vehicle is still moving. The vehicle then moves back to the base perimeter. There is one caution, don't establish a pattern. Sometimes put the ambushes out, other times just sweep through the area.

Observation: M113 personnel carriers can be used to establish an ambush.

LAND NAVIGATION

Item: Land navigation of tracked vehicles in heavy growth.

Discussion: Land navigation in heavy growth is a problem. The compass, magnetic pilot, FSN 6605-551-5167 was found to work very well when mounted in an M113. When mounting the compass however, care must be taken to prevent grounding. This was used successfully on a six day operation.

Observation: The above named compass is a good field expedient for mounting on M113's. This allows the vehicular commander to follow the proper azimuth in heavy growth.

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CLAYMORE MINES

Item: Identification of the back of Claymore mines at night.

Discussion: In order to observe that the Claymore mine is still facing in the proper direction prior to firing at night, place white tape on the rear of the mine before it is implaced. Prior to firing look for the white tape, if it cannot be seen, do not fire the mine.

Observation: Placing a piece of white tape on the rear of the Claymore mine will allow the firer to insure the mine is still facing in the proper direction.

CP LOCATIONS

Item: CP Locations.

Discussion: Small unit CP locations must be moved daily when on an operation to prevent the VC from spotting the control center of a base of operations.

Observation: CP locations of small units should be moved daily.

MARCH COLUMNS

Item: Track vehicular march columns.

Discussion: Track vehicular march columns are double columns. This allows quicker deployment and also allows for a faster reaction time when hit from the rear.

Observation: If possible, track march columns should be double columns.

RECOGNITION OF COMMAND VEHICLES

Item: Recognition of Command Vehicles.

Discussion: When using tactical vehicles, an observer in a helicopter must at times be able to recognise the command vehicle. Using different colored panels is not effective due to the normal altitude of the aircraft (2500'). At that altitude, the observer cannot distinguish between orange and red. The best method is to have panels only on command vehicles or ask the commander to throw smoke with the observer giving the color.

Observation: Recognition of command vehicles is a necessity at times for an air observer. Some method must be devised to allow quick identification.

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SUPPRESSIVE FIRE

Item: Use of 90mm Cannister.

Discussion: Snipers and infiltrators can be discouraged by use of 90mm cannister as a suppressive fire during hours of darkness. Have designated tanks fire on command at odd intervals during the night.

Observation: Controlled firing at odd intervals of 90mm cannister at night is an effective means to suppress snipers and infiltrators.

b. Equipment (C).

HASTY RECOVERY AND REPAIR

Item: Repair parts carried on track vehicles.

Discussion: In order that the crew can make immediate repairs to a track vehicle, each M113 carries 6 extra track blocks, each M48A3 carries eight. All track vehicles carry two extra roadwheels.

Observation: Extra track and roadwheels must be carried on a tracked vehicle so that immediate repairs can be made.

RESUPPLY

Item: Resupply by wheel vehicles.

Discussion: Wheel vehicles are inadequate for supply from the battalion to company. Presently each mechanized, cavalry and tank company uses M113's for resupply. Track type resupply vehicles are needed, even if not armored, for they can traverse the terrain and vegetation found in this environment.

Observation: Track vehicles are needed for resupply from battalion to company level.

RADIOS IN TANKS

Item: New family radios in the M48A3 Tank.

Discussion: Because of the great heat in the turret of the tank (140 F) the new family of radios overheat and fail. A field expedient used was to attach the pressurized air filtering system to the radio to circulate the air. This was not too effective. Either a stronger fan system or a cooling system must be incorporated in the radio to solve this problem. An EIR has been submitted on this.

Observation: The fan in the new radios needs to be larger so a greater volume of air can keep the radio components operational.

M48A3 TANKS

Item: Road wheels.

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Discussion: The steel roadwheel has been found to be superior to the aluminum roadwheel. When a tank hits a mine, the steel wheel normally only shears the roadwheel bolts while the aluminum wheels crumble causing damage to the roadwheel arm spindle. It is an easier logistics problem to replace bolts than to replace the arm.

Observation: The steel roadwheel is superior to the aluminum roadwheel.

BLAST DEFLECTORS FOR THE M48A3 TANK

Item: Blast deflectors for the M48A3.

Discussion: There are two types of blast deflectors for the M48A3. One is square (used on later models) and one is triangular (received on tanks retrofitted at Red River Arsenal). The square one shows no wear from cannister but the triangular one, due to the greater distance from the muzzle to the blast deflector, allows damage to occur on the inside of the blast deflector from cannister and causes some pellets to go at right angles to the path of the projectile.

Observation: The square blast deflector should be used on the M48A3 tank.

M48A3 TANKS

Item: Bustle racks on the M48A3 tank.

Discussion: The bars which are part of the bustle rack have too great a separation and allows equipment to fall from the rack. A good field expedient is chicken wire in the rack.

Observation: Chicken wire placed in the bustle rack prevents equipment from being lost.

.50 CAL MG MOUNT

Item: .50 Cal machinegun mount on the M48A3.

Discussion: The .50 cal M2 MG mount is not satisfactory on the M48A3. There is too little available ammunition (50 rds) and the MG is too difficult to control. What is needed is the Chrysler mount.

Observation: The present machinegun mount on the M48A3 tank should be changed to the Chrysler mount of the M60 tank.

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c. Training. (C)

CASUALTIES

Item: Reducing casualties.

Discussion: When a personnel carrier hits a mine, no one dismounts until another vehicle has been used to secure the area and inspect the damage. Normally the VC have mined areas under fire and wait until the personnel leave the vehicle before firing.

Observation: Personnel in carriers must be instructed on the proper procedures to use when the vehicle is disabled by a mine.

RADAR SURVEILLANCE

Item: Training a Radar Operator.

Discussion: An inexperienced operator needs at least two days to become proficient. He must learn the sounds of an area in daylight and at night and then confirm his memory the second day and night. He must know the sound of wind through brush, a moving tin can or wire, rainfall, etc.

Observation: An inexperienced radar operator must learn the local sounds of the area.

Item: Most radar operators associate sound to tactical vehicles.

Discussion: A radar operator should learn to associate sounds with the type of tactical vehicles the VC use i.e., oxcarts, slow moving bicycles, moderate speed bicycles, and fast moving bicycles. A fast moving bicycle can sound like a track vehicle.

Observation: Radar operators must be trained to know the sounds of VC type tactical vehicles.

d. Medical. (C)

M170 FRONT LINE AMBULANCE

Item: Use of the M170 Front Line Ambulance.

Discussion: Because of terrain and area of operations the M170 is a poor evacuation vehicle for casualties. A better method is to use M113's under the battalion surgeon's control to evacuate casualties because of their greater mobility and armor protection.

Observation: The M170 is a poor evacuation vehicle in this environment. The M113 personnel carrier can be used to greater advantage, giving better protection to the casualties and allowing the casualties to be evacuated over difficult terrain.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORSUNITS

25TH DIVISION
 25TH SUPPORT COMMAND
 725TH MAINT BN
 25TH S & T
 25TH MED BN
 25TH DIV ARTY
 8TH FA
 9TH FA
 11TH FA
 13TH FA
 1ST BRIGADE
 2D BRIGADE
 3D BRIGADE
 1/5TH INF (MECH)
 2/14TH INF
 4/9TH INF
 4/23D INF
 1/27TH INF
 2/27TH INF
 4TH CAV SQDN
 69TH ARMOR
 65TH ENGR BN
 25TH AVN BN
 25TH MP CO
 125TH SIG BN
 AREA SIG CEN "A"
 AREA SIG CEN "B"
 AREA SIG CEN "C"
 16TH RVU
 1ST SPT PLAT
 2D SPT PLAT
 3D SPT PLAT

CODE NAMES

LIGHTNING
 LIBERTY
 LAMBASTE
 LUSTY
 LIAISON
 LOOKOUT
 LIFEGUARD
 LINEBACK
 LOBSTER
 LUCKY
 LANCER
 LOYAL
 LAVA
 LANDSLIDE
 LAWYER
 LOFTY
 LONGBOW
 LION
 LAYMAN
 LEAPFROG
 LEADER
 LUMBER
 LOBO
 LATERAL
 LOUDSPEAKER
 LIGHTNING ALFA
 LIGHTNING BRAVO
 LIGHTNING CHARLIE
 LASSO
 LASSO ALFA
 LASSO BRAVO
 LASSO CHARLIE

Appendix 3 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commanding General	Major General Fred C. Weyand
*Asst Division Commander/Maneuver	B/Gen Glen D. Walker
Asst Division Commander/Support	B/Gen Edward H. deSausseure
Chief of Staff	Col Thomas W. Mellen
ACofS, G1	Lt Col Duane W. Compton
ACofS, G2	Lt Col James W. Cannon
ACofS, G3	Lt Col Truman E. Boudinot
ACofS, G4	Lt Col James B. Saum (18Apr66)
	Lt Col William C. Davis
ACofS, G5	Lt Col Robert R. Hicks
CO, Support Command	Col Herbert S. Lowe
CO, Division Artillery	Col Daniel B. Williams
CO, 1st Brigade	Col William B. Sandlin
CO, 2d Brigade	Col Lynnwood M. Johnson Jr.
CO, 1/5th Infantry	Lt Col Thomas W. Greer
CO, 1/27th Infantry	Lt Col James A. Cawthra (7Apr66)
	Lt Col Harley F. Mooney
CO, 2/27th Infantry	Lt Col Harley F. Mooney (22Feb66)
	Lt Col Boyd T. Bashore
CO, 2/14th Infantry	Lt Col John M. Shultz
CO, 4/9th Infantry	Lt Col Shepherd H. Booth
CO, 4/23d Infantry	Lt Col Michael Barszoz
CO, 1/69th Armor	Lt Col Ronald J. Fairfield
CO, 3/4 Cavalry	Lt Col John R. Hendry
CO, 25th Aviation Battalion	Lt Col Samuel P. Kalegian (17Apr 66)
	Lt Col Edward P. Davis
CO, 65th Engineer Battalion	Lt Col Carrol D. Strider
CO, 125th Signal Battalion	Lt Col Thomas J. Ferguson
CO, 1/8th Artillery	Lt Col Robert D. Walker
CO, 3/13th Artillery	Lt Col Aaron E. Walker
CO, 7/11th Artillery	Lt Col William D. Brown
CO, 25th S & T Battalion	Lt Col Claud D. Mangum (16Mar66)
	Lt Col William S. Kittrell
CO, 25th Medical Battalion	Lt Col Jack Eskridge
CO, 725th Maint Battalion	Lt Col Robert J. Proudfoot

*Assumed command of 3d Brigade Task Force on 19 April 1966.

Appendix 2 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

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SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS

UNITS

25TH DIVISION
25TH SUPPORT COMMAND
725TH MAINT BN
25TH S & T
25TH MED BN
25TH DIV ARTY
8TH FA
9TH FA
11TH FA
13TH FA
1ST BRIGADE
2D BRIGADE
3D BRIGADE
1/5TH INF (MECH)
2/14TH INF
4/9TH INF
4/23D INF
1/27TH INF
2/27TH INF
4TH CAV SQDN
69TH ARMOR
65TH ENGR BN
25TH AVN BN
25TH MP CO
125TH SIG BN
AREA SIG CEN "A"
AREA SIG CEN "B"
AREA SIG CEN "C"
16TH RRU
1ST SPT PLAT
2D SPT PLAT
3D SPT PLAT

CODE NAMES

LIGHTNING
LIBERTY
LAMBASTE
LUSTY
LIAISON
LOOKOUT
LIFEGUARD
LINEBACK
LOBSTER
LUCKY
LANCER
LOYAL
LAVA
LANDSLIDE
LAWYER
LOFTY
LONGBOW
LION
LAYMAN
LEAPFROG
LEADER
LUMBER
LOBO
LATERAL
LOUDSPEAKER
LIGHTNING ALFA
LIGHTNING BRAVO
LIGHTNING CHARLIE
LASSO
LASSO ALFA
LASSO BRAVO
LASSO CHARLIE

Appendix 3 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

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2020 MARCH 18/2020

CH


OPERATION 10000 APR 1966

RESULTS

K/A (BC)	20
K/A (MSS)	21
VCS	1
SA	NO
NG	1
CONAN	1000 LBS
TUNNEL	1

PHASE I
 7 APRIL
 US-WEIGHT
 TANK CO
 CAV PLAT
 (MS AND DS)


PHASE II
 7-10 APRIL
 INF BN ARVN
 INF BN ARVN
 CAV TROOP
 BULL DOZERS



OPERATION

OPERATION MACKAY

11-14 APRIL



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CIRCLE DINES



COMBAT AFTER-ACTION
REPORT
2^D BDE, 25TH INF. DIV.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225

AVLEDB-T

30 April 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/J9/32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. OPORD 18-66 (Operation CIRCLE PINES).
2. 290700 March - 051815 April 1966.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div conducted search and destroy operations in BINH DUONG and HAU NGHIA Provinces in operational area bounded by coordinates XT6024, XT7020, XT6714, XT5717. OPORD 18-66 was issued 231200 March 1966. The operation was initially a three battalion sized operation employing an armored battalion (-) one company and two infantry battalions one being mechanized. This was the first operation in Vietnam in which an armored battalion was employed. All units moved overland to their assigned operational areas and conducted coordinated search and destroy operations in the Brigade TAOR, north of base camp.

Colonel L. H. JOHNSON, Jr is the reporting officer. Task Organization and commanders were as follows:

TF 1/5 (Lt Col Greer Cmdr) Bde Control

1/5 (M) (-)	1/27 Inf
Plat 1/69 Armor	1/8 Arty
Sqd B/65th Engr	2d Spt Bn
1 Helicopter	Co B (-) 65th Engr

TF 1/27 (Lt Col Cowthra Cmdr)

1/27 Inf (-)
Co (-) 1/69 Armor
Plat 1/5 (M)
Sqd B/65th Engr
1 Helicopter

TF 1/69th Armor (Lt Col Fairfield Cmdr)

1/69 Armor (-)
Co 1/27 Inf
A 3/4 Cav
2 Sqds B/65th Engr
1 Helicopter

FRAG ORD 1 and 2 to OPORD 18-66, Task Organization:

TF 1/5 (Lt Col Greer Cmdr) Bde Control

1/5 (M) (-)	1/27 Inf
A Trp 3/4 Cav	2/27 Inf
2 Sqds B/65th Engr	1/8 Arty
1 Helicopter	B/65th Engr (-)
	2d Spt Bn

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDI DIR 5200.10

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TF 1/69 Armor (Lt Col Fairfield Code)

1/69 Armor (-)
Co 1/5 (M)
2 Bde B/65th Engr
1 Helicopter

4. Intelligence:

a. Analysis of terrain in which operation was conducted:

The terrain was flat with an average elevation of less than ten meters. The vegetation consisted of rubber trees, underbrush, bamboo hedgerows, and tall trees with underbrush; all of which afforded the enemy good concealment for harassing operations and evasion. Tunnels, bunkers, and trenches afforded the VC an excellent network of defensive positions and evacuation routes. Soft and marshy soil affected the movement of tanks in the area. Vegetation did not significantly affect the use of APC's and tanks.

b. Intelligence prior to operation:

The VC had exercised complete control over the operational area. Recently, the 307th Bn of the 165 A Regt had been operating northeast of the PHU HOA DONG Plantation area. Additional units that had been operating in the HOBO WOODS area prior to the operation were the 305th and 306th Bns of the 165 A Regt.

c. Enemy situation during operation:

During the first phase of the operations in the PHU HOA DONG Plantation area, TF elements encountered platoon-sized VC units with an estimated 2 companies in the plantation area. The VC made extensive use of the tunnel network to evade the US elements. Booby traps, pressure type and command detonated AT mines were laid throughout the area. Two major battles developed near the end of the operation. On 4 Apr 66, an estimated VC company was observed and engaged by artillery and elements of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf. During the second engagement, an estimated VC battalion attacked Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. The rifle company withstood the attack through the effective use of artillery and organic fire power. An estimated 2 VC main force battalions were engaged in the HOBO WOODS during the second phase of the operation.

5. Mission: The 2d Bde Task Force was to conduct operations in the Brigade TAOR to locate and destroy VC forces and installations commencing 29 March 1966.

6. Concept of the Operation: The 2d Brigade Task Force conducted search and destroy operations in their TAOR with three Task Forces, TF 1st Bn, 69th Armor on the west, TF 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the center, and TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf on the east. The plan was to move rapidly and aggressively into areas, then conduct detailed searches and exploit VC contacts. Incl 1

a. According to FRAG ORD 1 to OPOD 18-66 TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry and TF 1st Bn, 69th Armor moved from their locations in the southern portion of the TAOR on 2 April, both Task Forces sweeping northeast to continue search and destroy operations in the northern portion of the Brigade TAOR. The 2d Bn, 27th Inf was alerted to be prepared to support and reinforce either Task Force. Incl 2

b. FRAG ORD 2 to OPOD 18-66 ordered TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf and 1st Bn, 69th Armor to swing southwest and then sweep southwest against blocking positions established by the 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) north of TRUNG LAP. Incl 3

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7. Executions:

D-Day (29 March 1966)

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

The Battalion crossed the LB at 0700 and swiftly established blocking positions on the southeastern portion of the Brigade TAOR in order to stop exfiltration of VC forces from the area of operations to the village of PHU HOA (XT7119). The battalion planned to link up with forces of the 7th ARVN Regt and systematically clear in the vicinity of PHU HOA. During the day only sporadic sniper fire was received. Nevertheless, two rice caches and miscellaneous small arms, ammunition, and equipment were found during the day. The battalion coiled in company size positions and established mine ambushes to increase the effectiveness of their blocking position. A total of ten VC were killed during the day and three VCC and six VCS apprehended.

1st Bn, 37th Infantry

A Company, 1st Bn, 69th Armor conducted a motor march under the operational control of CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor which moved along Hwy 1, then north to TRUNG LUP and made a stream crossing vicinity XT595221. The move was slowed by a weak bridge at the stream crossing site, and several AT mines which disabled two tanks along the route. After crossing the stream, the company moved south to establish a blocking position and provide flank security for the two infantry companies attacking abreast across the stream vicinity XT6316. The companies immediately received small arms fire upon initiating their crossing. The sniper fire ceased after mortar fire was placed on their positions. The Task Force encountered numerous booby traps and mines during the day as it conducted search and destroy operations from company bases, but no significant contacts were made. During the night 9 incoming mortar rounds were received.

1st Bn, 69th Armor

The Task Force moved from the base camp at 0700. Entry into the Brigade TAOR was delayed due to the extreme difficulty experienced by units in negotiating bridge by-pass at coord XT595221. An armored vehicle launch bridge was dispatched to assist in the crossing. A Trp, 3/4 Cav initially moved rapidly across the area of operations to establish a blocking position via XT664239. Its move was slowed, however, by disabled vehicles from VC mines and the position was occupied at 1745 hours. The remainder of the Task Force attacked west to east on two axes, methodically searching in zone. Co C was under continuous harassing small arms fire throughout the day. The Task Force had a successful day in accounting for 6 VC KIA (BC), 14 VC KIA (Possible), and 1 VCS, with 23 structures, 10 bunkers, 46 tunnels and 400 pounds of rice destroyed.

D+1 (30 March 1966)

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

The Battalion conducted extensive searches in the southeastern portion of the area of operations. Two large stores of ammunition, grenades, documents, training equipment, and a considerable amount of penicillin, heroin and miscellaneous medical supplies were found. Ten ambushes were established for the night, none had contact.

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1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The battalion was ordered to concentrate its search and destroy efforts in the southwestern portion of area of operations. During the day many tunnel complexes including an extensive two level tunnel complex via XT625190 and a four level complex via XT625186 were found. The area contained a rice cache vicinity XT629187. Two Russian 7.62 Mousin Nagant carbines and other weapons plus sizeable ammunition stores and medical supplies were located during the detailed search of the tunnels. VC activity during the day consisted primarily of harassing and evasive tactics. The battalion secured the same positions which had been occupied the previous night and established 6 ambushes.

1st Bn, 69th Armor

The battalion continued its sweep along the northern edge of the Brigade area of operations. Along the eastern boundary of the operational area, a platoon of tanks with a Coy platoon as escort linked-up with the Recon platoon from 1/5 Mech at 1000 hours. The group disrupted VC exfiltration from the area and moved east where it made contact with 7th ARVN representative operating to the east. 8500 lbs of rice and corn were discovered in a storage area via XT64226 and a tunnel complex including a mess hall and school were discovered at XT640220. The battalion experienced some difficulty in providing secure LZ's for helicopters; for example, at 1615, a resupply helicopter received fire vicinity XT648205 and the pilot and co-pilot were wounded.

D+2 (31 March 1966)

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

The battalion assumed responsibility for the northeastern portion of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf area of operations, commencing search and destroy operations early in the morning. Seven tunnels were destroyed, one M1 rifle and numerous documents captured, plus two VC KIA (BC). The battalion continued to use numerous ambushes for security during the hours of darkness.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The battalion continued search and destroy operations in its reduced area of operations. Small units of VC's were engaged with small arms and small group wounds, the latter being particularly effective. Once again, mines were encountered, and one tank and one APC were disabled by AT mines. Company A found fifty-five unmarked graves, some only a few days old, vicinity XT651137. M1 fires and night ambushes were successfully employed throughout the night for security.

1st Bn, 69th Armor

The battalion continued search and destroy operations and evacuated disabled vehicles to TRUNG LAP (XT5921). The TF destroyed three tunnels and one house and discovered 20,800 pounds of grain, one VC ammunition dump and a quantity of medical supplies.

FRAG ORD 1 to OPORD 18-66 was issued 310000 March 66. This FRAG ORD directed the TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf and the TF 1st Bn, 69th Armor to move from their present location on 2 Apr to continue operations in the northern portion of the Brigade AOR. TF 1st Bn, 27th Inf was ordered to return to base camp, commencing 021000 Apr 66 and at the same time to leave a stay behind force in their operational area to observe and report enemy activity. 2/27th Inf was ordered to support 1/27 Inf's return to base camp and to be prepared to send one company to the operational areas, with the bn (-) prepared to be airlifted on a 4 hour notice.

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D-4 (1 April 1966)
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry

On 1 Apr the TF moved their search and destroy operation to the western portion of their assigned area of operations. A tunnel complex via XT625773 was searched revealing evidence that the tunnel had been used as a small arms factory for repair and making of arms and home-made bombs. Equipment was evacuated from the tunnel prior to its destruction. A Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor was released to its parent unit for use in future operations. At 1530 A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was airlifted to base camp. During the day the battalion continued to encounter and destroy VC mines and booty traps. During the night rifle grenades, 60mm mortars and sniper rounds were incoming.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

On 1 Apr the Bn continued to occupy blocking positions in conjunction with the ARVN search of PHU HOA DONG which was completed that afternoon. In accordance with orders, the Bn moved to a new assembly area vicinity XT643213, in preparation for continued operations. The attachment of A Trp, 3/4 Cav was effected.

1st Bn 69th Armor

The TF made a return sweep of their operational area with the only contact being occasional sniper fire. The TF moved to position TIGER vicinity XT554216 to plan and prepare for movement into the northern portion of the Bde TAOR to continue search and destroy operations.

D-4 (2 Apr 1966)

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The battalion conducted local search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their battalion base during the morning hours. At 1330 B and the Battalion Command Group began foot move to base camp. A Co was airlifted to base camp. The battalion closed base camp by 1535 with the exception of the stay behind force which remained to monitor enemy activity.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

The Bn launched its attack into the northeastern sector of the Bde TAOR commencing 0730. The TF seized its objectives along the Saigon River with no contact, however enroute mines damaged three vehicles from A Trp, 3/4 Cav. A report of VC activity farther to the north was confirmed so Co A was dispatched to the area via XT628304. A VC force of two squads was engaged in the area resulting in six VC KIA (BC). One APC, however, was destroyed by a 175mm round rigged for command detonation. VC base areas discovered near the river were destroyed. The effectiveness of the Bn night ambushes was demonstrated when an ambush was sprung at 1955 hours resulting in 8 VC killed.

1st Bn, 69th Armor

The Bn attacked to the northeast on an axis parallel to the TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf commencing at 0950. The TF arrived at the objective by 1241. The right flank arrived at the objective and was bogged down in the rice paddies southeast of the objective vicinity XT660279. A cache of 2000 lbs of rice was discovered in the objective area. Co C was delayed in an assembly area via of TRUNG ME pending repair of disabled vehicles. Co C departed for operational area at 1200, moving to a blocking position vicinity XT641295 and then sweeping south toward XT655283.

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2d Bn. 27th Inf

At 0630 Co B crossed SP for motor move to vicinity of TRUNG LAP. By 0815 the Co had arrived in their operational area and had established company base vicinity XT530212 from which search and destroy operations were initiated. Beginning at 1315 the Company encountered light sniper fire. Upon arrival of a Dustoff, the VC opened fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and 60mm mortar fire. As a result, two air strikes and artillery were delivered on suspected VC positions and all VC activity immediately ceased. After a follow-up search the company coiled for the night, with no further VC activity. The battalion prepared to establish blocking positions and conduct Eagle flights as directed in support of brigade operations.

D-5 (3 April 1966)

At 1200 Bde FRAG ORD 2 to CPORE 18-66 was issued. This order specified the action to be taken during the third phase of operation CIRCLE PINE. TF 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf, and TF 1st Bn, 69th Armor were instructed to conduct a sweep to the southwest against blocking positions established by Companies A and B, 2d Bn, 27th Inf north of TRUNG LAP.

1st Bn. 27th Inf

The stay behind patrol continued to observe enemy activity in the southwestern portion of the rubber plantation vicinity XT625379. During the day, the patrol killed four VC and captured a Russian 7.62 mm Nagant carbine. The patrol called 4.2 and artillery fire on suspected VC positions throughout the day, returning to base camp by 1645 with no casualties.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

Bn conducted systematic searches in its area resulting in the capture of several weapons and a quantity of munitions, equipment, and documents. One track was destroyed by a mine which ruptured the gas tank. Final preparations were made and orders disseminated for the third phase of the operation.

1st Bn. 69th Armor

During clearance operations in their zone, the battalion, encountered mine fields, sniper fires, and assorted booby traps. One claymore hanging from a tree was combed detonated as an APC with hatch open passed beneath it, wounding six friendly. A tunnel complex via XT634286 contained mortar ammunition, 30 cal API res, and radio test equipment. The battalion made final preparations for phase three of the operation.

2d Bn. 27th Inf

The battalion (-) moved by motor convoy from base camp commencing 0630 and closed in the TRUNG LAP area by 1115. Progress was slow due to numerous road blocks constructed by the VC and congested civilian traffic. The lead tank in the convoy from 3/4 Cav, was disabled by a blown track. Co B was harassed throughout the day by sniper fire. Two air strikes flown in the area during the afternoon eliminated the VC airpore and activity in the area. At 1330 hours Co A conducted an airborne assault to XT605235 and initiated search and destroy operations in that area. Light contact was made, but the VC disengaged. Both Companies established bases for the night, B Co at XT572232, and A Co at XT600236.

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D+6 (4 April 1966)

2nd Bn. (Mech), 5th Inf.

Initially the battalion moved NW supported by artillery, gunships and tactical air. The Bn then swept southwest against the blocking position established by B Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. At approximately 1700 the battalion encountered heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Because of the delay as a result of this engagement and the discovery of a large rice cache, a flare ship was employed to assist the battalion in reaching its new assembly area south of TRUNG LAP. All elements closed the new assembly area by 2400. During the day 6 VC (30) and 15 VC (Poss) were killed and 4 tons of rice, a large amount of military equipment, munitions and arms were captured.

1st Bn, 69th Armor

The battalion swept southwest against blocking position established by Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. The battalion crossed the LD at 0840 with three companies abreast. By 1511 the battalion had closed their new assembly area via XT594215. The VC used evasive tactics during the day. At 1532 Co C was dispatched to clear reported ambush site via XT582198. The Bn then moved, on order, to base camp arriving by 1920.

2d Bn, 27th Inf

The battalion anticipated passage of its blocking positions vicinity XT604227 and XT561237 by late afternoon. Local search operations conducted during the morning hours revealed two large rice caches which were evacuated. Passage of blocking positions was accomplished with no significant complications. During the afternoon the two blocking force companies were ordered to establish company bases in their respective blocking positions. Each company established two ambushes in the vic of its positions.

D+7 (5 April 1966)

2d Bn, 27th Inf

At 0420 Co A received moderate small arms and mortar fire into their perimeter. This was the beginning of what proved to be the first coordinated full scale attack by an organized battalion-sized VC unit on an element of the 2d Bde Task Force. By 0430 Co A was under an all-out attack. The attack came from four directions, with the main assaults coming from the north and east. Artillery was immediately available and over 700 rds were fired in defense of the Company A positions. Fires were accurately and immediately delivered causing numerous casualties and considerable confusion and disorganization among the VC. At 0445 an artillery TOT was fired on VC mortar positions, silencing them. At 0540 the Bn Cnd Group with additional medics moved with three artillery APC's and the Reconnaissance platoon of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf to reinforce Co A and provide medical evacuation for the seriously wounded. By 0645 an airborne PAC and a flare ship were on station over the area. VC losses were thirty KIA (30) and forty KIA (Poss). Co B, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf arrived in the area at 1030 and conducted sweeps to the northeast where it established a blocking position. The company was placed under the OP/CON 2d Bn, 27th Inf for the remainder of the operation. Co B, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was airlifted to the area where they conducted a sweep 1000 meters to the front of Co A's positions. VC ammunition, magazines, knives, holsters, gas masks, and medical supplies were found. At 1130 Co A was airlifted to the base camp at CU CHI. Company B was extracted by air at 1400. The entire battalion closed base camp by 1700.

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1st Bn (Nech), 5th Inf.

The Reconnaissance Platoon and Co B were utilized as indicated earlier in securing the A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf area. All battalion elements were closed into base camp by 1621 hours.

8. Results:

Friendly Losses:

KIA: 30
WIA: 195

Enemy Losses:

KIA: 157 (BC), 323 (Poss)
VOC: 6
VCS: 6
Equipment Capt/
Destroyed: 78 tons rice, 150 lbs peanuts,
45 rifles, 3 pistols, 2 SMG, 2 RPG-2
rocket launchers, 1 81mm mortar bipod,
75 hand grenades, 49 rifle grenades, 33
VC claymore mines, 34 AT mines, 18 AP mines,
37 Chinese 75mm RR rds, 3 57mm RR rds, 1 -
175mm GB Mine, 1 - 155mm TD mine, 3 - 105mm
rds, 35 booby traps, 70 60mm mortar rds,
11 81mm mortar rds, 4 CW keys, 1 250 lb
aol, 25 pistol bolts, 3 55 gal drums of new
web equipment, 7 bicycles, 144 tunnels,
51 bunkers, 246 structures, 9 sampans,
11 bags documents, 11350 salt pills, 1mm
ammunition, 1 medicine and kit, 13 trucks.

9. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for contact:

- (a) 1st Bn 8th Artillery, GS 2d Bde TF.
- (b) Btry C (-) 3d Bn, 30th Arty, attached to 1st Bn
8th Arty.
- (c) 2d Bn, 32nd Artillery (-) GSR 1/8 Artillery.

(2) How and When Artillery Employed:

- (a) From 29 March through 1 April fire support base
was located at base camp.

1. Preparatory fires totaling 191 rds were fired
291030 March 1966.

2. Artillery supported the operations for next
three days with on-call and preplanned fires.

- (b) On 1 April 1st Bn, 8th Artillery (+) moved to
TRUNG LAP for support of operations in the northern portion of the
Brigade TAOR.

3. The battalion fired numerous on-call missions
on 2, 3, and 4 April which resulted in record number of 22 VC KIA (BC)
and 125 KIA (Poss) for the three day period.

4. Artillery was utilized to maximum advantage
during VC attack on Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. In excess of 700 rounds
of artillery were fired in defense of Company A's position.

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(3) Results of Artillery: During operation CIRCLE PINES Artillery was an invaluable asset. Timely and accurate use of artillery fires continued to keep the VC off balance and inflicted maximum casualties on his forces.

b. US Air Force.

(1) During operation CIRCLE PINES the USAF contributed immeasurably to the success of the operation through its flexibility and aggressiveness.

(a) 8 immediate strikes were requested and received.

(b) Three flare ships were requested, four received.

(2) Two preplanned air strikes were flown on D-Day vicinity XT636228 and XT664240 from 0715 to 0815 hours.

(3) A total of 57 strikes were requested and 57 received during the operation.

(4) Results of the air strikes were as follows: 82 structures destroyed, 64 structures damaged, 14 trenches destroyed, 7 roads cut, 1 secondary explosion, 2 gun positions destroyed, bunker complex destroyed, 7 KBA (UC), and 24 KBA (Poss).

(5) Ground fire was received and effectively suppressed on fifteen strikes.

c. Army Aviation.

(1) Six resupply aircraft, four command and control ships, and two to four light fire teams were maintained on a mission basis each day of the operation.

(2) A total of 512 sorties to include resupply, fire suppression, command and control, evacuation of KIA's, combat surveillance, and assault missions were flown during the operation.

(3) On 1 April Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry was airlifted to base camp and on 2 April Company C, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry made an airborne move to base camp.

(4) Armed helicopters were extremely valuable in providing escorts for Medical evacuation and resupply helicopters and in suppressing enemy fires during the operation.

(5) Ground fire was more intense during Opn CIRCLE PINES than on any previous operations of the Brigade. A total of 17 aircraft received hits from ground fire, none of which were extensively damaged.

10. Administration and Logistics.

a. The Brigade CP remained operational in the base camp area throughout the operation. A forward CP was operational at TRUNG LAP Ranger Camp during the period 1-5 April.

b. Casualty reporting:

(1) Confirmed casualty reports by name generally lag the actual occurrence of the incident by six to eight hours. Spot reports are generally accurate, but they often do not reflect those wounded who have returned to duty.

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(2) All casualty branch has the most accurate casualty reports, however, they are normally late as indicated above.

c. Mail was processed through rear detachments and flown to and from forward elements in resupply helicopters.

d. PW's were evacuated directly to the Division PW compound.

e. Supply:

(1) The 2d Support Bn (Prov) maintained normal operations in the base camp area during the operation. Units participating drew necessary supplies in base camp for dispatch to the forward area.

(2) All resupply of Class I, V, and water was affected by air except for one overland conveyer for 1st Bn, 8th Arty.

(3) A forward support operations center was not necessary due to the proximity of the operational area to base camp.

(4) Difficulty in water resupply was encountered, when the 5000 gallon tanker spotted at the resupply helipad had an inoperative pump. A new hose for the pump was installed upon the displacement to TRUNG LAP and it was possible to obtain water from the tanker utilizing a gravity feed system.

(5) Some difficulty was experienced in removing large quantities of loose rice from the operational area.

(6) The following combat damage to M48A3 tanks, M113 APC's, OH23 helicopters, and M-68 vehicle tank recovery vehicles was sustained:

(a) 1/5 (M) 1st

24 APC's damaged

1 APC's repaired in field

1 APC's total loss

12 APC's evacuated to base camp

(b) 1/69 1st

16 M48A3 tanks damaged

11 repaired in field

5 evacuated to base camp

2 MTR's damaged slightly

(c) 1/3/4 1st

5 M48A3 tanks damaged

1 M48A3 tanks repaired in field

1 M48A3 tanks hit twice and repaired

8 M-113 armored personnel carriers damaged

4 M-113 armored personnel carriers repaired in field

4 M-113 armored personnel carriers evacuated

to base camp

1 M-113 armored personnel carrier was hit twice and repaired

1 OH-23 helicopter damaged by small arms fire

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(7) POL Consumed by Units:

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf	7439 gal MOGAS 1749 gal Diesel
1st Bn, 69th Armor	1910 gal MOGAS 3730 Diesel
A Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav	Figures are included above

(8) Airlifts:

- (a) A total of 302 resupply sorties were flown, airlifting 147.5 tons of supplies.
- (b) The following is a break down of airlifted cargo by class of supply:

Class I-21.7 Tons	Class III-23.6 Tons
Class V-37.8 Tons	Misc-40.2 Tons
Water-29.7 Tons	

i. Civil Affairs:

- (1) Rice and peanuts extracted from the operational area were distributed as follows:

(a) 10 tons of rice and 150 lbs of peanuts to the District Chief at CU CHI. (XT6312).

(b) 100 kilo bag to family of Vietnamese National Policeman killed in the operation.

(c) 1.5 tons to the priest at BAC HA (XT6414).

(d) .5 ton to BIEN HOA Orphanage.

(e) All remaining captured rice to District Chief at PHU HOA (XT7118).

(2) Swamp II was held in TRUNG LAP by Brigade and 1/8 Artillery surgeons. 300 persons were treated.

(3) Pay War - Approximately 500,000 leaflets including 969, CHIEU HOI, and standard surrender policy leaflets were dropped in the operational area.

11. Commander's Analysis:

a. This operation was the Brigade's most successful to date in terms of Viet Cong killed and equipment and material captured or destroyed. It also marked the first employment in Vietnam of the 25th Division's armored battalion which very effectively combined with mechanized and regular infantry units plus a reconnaissance troop. The effective use of a combined arms task force will not only prevent friendly losses but will inflict maximum destruction on VC forces and fortifications.

b. Principal lessons learned are divided into two categories in view of the newness of armor employment in Vietnam.

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(1) Lessons particularly applicable to armored unit employment are:

(a) In operating against the Viet Cong, armor must disperse and cover maximum terrain during operations; not move in column.

(b) Tanks and mechanized vehicles must be used continuously to beat the bush, explode booby traps, and engage snipers. Tanks moving through heavy brush will assist in uncovering tunnel entrances.

(c) All well used trails and roads must be avoided by at least one hundred meters wherever possible.

(d) Command and Control ships are a must for movement control.

(e) When sniper fire, the mobility and shock action of armor must be immediately employed in order to run them down or cut them off from withdrawing through trenches. Infantry should immediately follow the armor, utilizing the cleared area made by the tanks.

(f) Snipers can be silenced during the night by using suppressive fire at irregular intervals. 90mm cannon is highly effective in this role as well as a volley of artillery fire.

(g) A centrally located and reasonably secure area is mandatory to effect repair of damaged vehicles. Protection when evacuating armor or such vehicles will always be a problem.

(h) The need for a vehicular mounted compass for armored units is a special requirement when operating in heavy vegetation.

(i) When mechanized and armored elements are cross attached, tank recovery capability becomes an important factor.

(j) Mechanized or armored units can clear a helipad for a single helicopter in lightly wooded areas in less than 15 minutes. This enhances the unit's flexibility in selecting assembly areas.

(2) Other lessons learned having general application are:

(a) Armored patrols must have radio and artillery frequencies and call signs in case they lose communications with their company.

(b) Patrols must know exact location of other patrols and elements of their company.

(c) VC trenches should not be used for defenses unless the complete trench system can be occupied; even then, units must habitually dig into the sides of the trench to be protected from enemy fire down the trench line.

(d) Units must always have a well planned and coordinated defense in depth in order to maintain flexibility.

(e) Platoon leaders who lose communications to their squad leaders, must move to their front lines in order to maintain control.

(f) Companies separated from their parent unit overnight must increase the number of registered artillery concentrations to insure that all sides of defensive perimeters are covered by artillery and mortar fire.

(g) Units must have an alert operator on the Brigade and Battalion command nets at all times.

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(h) Wheeled vehicles to include M7C front line ambulance, maintenance and cargo vehicles were practically useless during operations over the type of terrain encountered in this operation.

(i) There is conflict between accurate and timely casualty reporting. The Brigade S3 maintains an informal record of friendly casualties based on spot reports, however the Brigade S1 must serve as the official source. The most accurate reports are obtained from the Division AG casualty Branch, however, a six to eight hour time lag must be anticipated.

(j) Although in most cases PW's were evacuated directly to the Division PW compound in base camp, the attached MP platoon must establish a Brigade compound at the advance CP as it is often impracticable to evacuate PW's directly to Division.

(k) Continuous command emphasis on spot reports is a necessity. Unit spot reports were incomplete in many cases. SITREPS must include sufficient details for the preparation of the INSTUN and Brigade SITREP.

(l) When reporting to Brigade, all units must use the Brigade Brevity Code, not their own unit codes.

(m) Augmentation of personnel authorized for the Brigade S4 section is a consideration in view of the fact that control of resupply helicopters in the Base Camp area and control of the forward Brigade Trains area as well as S4 representation at the Forward CP is mandatory and there are insufficient TOE personnel to fulfill these requirements.

(n) Maneuver Battalions should carry empty rice bags with them during operations to facilitate evacuation of captured rice.

(o) When National Policemen or interpreters are attached to a unit for operational purposes, a rice supplement to their diet utilizing captured rice stocks, is recommended. In addition, units should share small sundry packet items with them and make other special efforts to have them feel welcome. The National Police have been of great assistance to our units in separating civilians from VC or VC suspects.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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GR K...
A. E. ELLIOTT, JR.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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


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


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HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(THE WOLFHOUNDS)
APO. US Forces, 96225

TLIBB-T

27 April 1966

SUBJECT: Special Summary of Action - Company A, 2d
Battalion, 27th Infantry, 5 April 1966
(Operation CIRCLE FINES)

TO: See Distribution

1. Introduction.

a. On the western fringes of the HO BO WOODS in VIETNAM, on the 5th day of April 1966, Company A, 2d Battalion, of the 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds" fought a battle far more important than the mere size of the elements involved might indicate to a student of conventional war. This was the first time the Viet Cong massed and risked a battalion in offensive combat against a maneuver element of any size of the 25th Infantry Division. Further, the attack itself was a classic example of the offensive tactics and techniques of a hard core Viet Cong unit. Clearly implied are the conditions under which the enemy is willing to risk decisive combat. Equally clear are the principles of war emphasized in the Viet Cong tactical battle of annihilation and his methods of implementing them. The Viet Cong obviously feel that in their base areas like the HO BO WOODS, where they can mass quickly units of at least battalion size, an infantry rifle company organized in a hasty defensive position offers a lucrative target against which to attempt to exploit Mao's axiom: "Fight only when victory is certain". The following principles of war were emphasized by the Viet Cong: OBJECTIVE, OFFENSIVE, MASS, MANEUVER, and SURPRISE. Their attack was well planned. It was professionally and aggressively executed.

b. That the Viet Cong failed to achieve their annihilation objective was due to the fighting qualities of the officers and men of Company A and the superb support of the 1st Battalion of the 8th Artillery and little else. The basic tactical deployment of the company was sound. One can not help but ask certain questions. Was the unit prepared? Within the specific set of circumstances imposed it was; as this special report will show. In fact the basic information herein will be used to support a nomination for the Valorous Unit Citation for Company A. Were the individual officers and men prepared? Again, they were and leadership and valor were prevalent. Nominations for two Distinguished

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Service Crosses, twenty-eight Silver Stars, and sixteen Bronze Stars have been made to recognize their valor. The splendid defense and aggressive reaction of the men against heavy odds turned what could have been the annihilation of a rifle company into a costly defeat for the enemy. Fierce hand to hand fighting took place and the usual fog of confusion of close-in combat existed. Mistakes were also made on both sides. From the point of view of the defense, there were few new lessons learned. Our current defensive doctrine and techniques are valid. Where this doctrine was violated, no matter for what reason, or how easily rationalized, the defense was weak. Where doctrine was followed, the defense was strong. Success and failure in battle are relative things, often difficult to evaluate objectively, and unavoidably tied to missions, combat power, resources, and emotions. Company A's defense was a tactical victory. Had Company A reacted differently, had the soldiers not fought in the highest traditions of infantrymen, had the "wolfhounds" not been supported in superb fashion, their forward observer, his radio-telephone operator and the artillery liaison officer of the 1st Battalion of the 8th Artillery, the ending of the Company A story well could have been different. A stinging defeat rather than a hard fought victory could have resulted.

c. This paper summarizes the fragmentary and situation reports received during the action, the findings of an on the ground investigation shortly after enemy contact was broken, and encompasses the testimony of all key personnel and many individual soldiers who were at various key locations during the battle. Included are statements, however, which are necessarily opinions or estimates. Some events are clouded by the fog of battle. Some witnesses are dead, others seriously wounded, and their testimony not available at this time. For these reasons, this paper cannot be considered a final historical report on all aspects of the battle. The conclusions listed in paragraph 6, however, are based on careful study and evaluation of the events before, during, and after the attack. A list of key leaders is attached at Inclosure 2.

2. Facts bearing on the Action.

a. The initial mission of Company A on 4 April was that of a linear blocking force across the axis of advance of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor sweeping south toward TRUNG LAP (XT 584199 - Map VIETNAM, 1:50,000). Company B, still out of supporting distance some 3500 meters West, was involved in a similar mission in coordination with the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry. It was envisioned that both the armored and mechanized units would pass through the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry elements and close in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP by mid-or late afternoon. Warning orders had been issued to both Companies A and B to be prepared to move by foot to an assembly area in the vicinity of the battalion command post located at TRUNG LAP.

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65 and then prepare for a village search operation in the vicinity of XT 5617 commencing at 1230 hours on 5 April. On the ground reconnaissance had been completed for the move and the majority of the bulk 81mm mortar ammunition had been relocated to the new assembly area. In fact, throughout the late afternoon the entire troop leading process of the battalion and companies had been directed at these future missions.

b. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor completed passage of the Company A lines at approximately 1600 hours; however, the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, to the north, found a number of caches that took additional time to investigate and extract. In late afternoon, the mechanized battalion made contact with a Viet Cong force of unknown strength approximately 4000 meters to the north and east of Company B. Two personnel carriers were knocked out, slowing this organization's progress even more. At approximately 1700 hours, when it became doubtful that the mechanized battalion would complete its sweep, the decision was made by brigade to abort future missions and to have Companies A and B establish defensive perimeters in the vicinity of their current positions. Battalion recommended that the companies be assembled in the vicinity of TRUNG LAI or that the units be brought within supporting distance of one another in a battalion perimeter or married up with elements of the mechanized battalion. As darkness fell, the units of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry continued to push on to their assembly area utilizing the illumination provided by a flare ship. Per orders, Company A had established a new and hasty defensive perimeter approximately 1000 meters south of the base it had occupied the night before. Company B again had established a perimeter approximately 3500 meters west. It is significant to note that this was the first night Company A occupied the base in this area. The assigned missions prevented the two companies of the battalion from being within supporting distance of each other.

c. Captain Willard E. Harrison Jr., the Commander of Company A, established a defensive perimeter (XT 6022) as depicted in Inclosure 1 (Blue Flip). The defense took advantage of a series of existing trench lines apparently dug by the Viet Cong which formed a rectangular perimeter. The company command post was located approximately in the middle east portion of the perimeter (XT 607227) in a farm house. A large storage hole existed within the building, as did the usual covered bomb shelter. The company was required by battalion order to establish two ambushes. Per SOP each consisted of one rifle squad, a light machine gun team, and a forward observer. The company commander decided that two platoons would each establish one ambush, and he further elected to locate the ambush sites close to his perimeter (XT 615228, XT 607230 - Blue Flip). An aid man accompanied the ambush

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patrol from the 1st Platoon. The Platoon Leader decided that the aid man could best accomplish his mission by remaining within the platoon defensive position. Normal 50% alert was maintained in the defensive positions. A stand-to was planned for 0515 hours 5 April.

d. The first sign of enemy activity in the Company A area occurred when the forward air controller flying in support of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry received automatic weapons fire at 1900 hours from XT 597225, approximately 900 meters west of the company position. Battalion directed that the company check this area out. At 1920 hours, the company commander dispatched Staff Sergeant Vincent Napier's ambush patrol, which was prepared to move out, giving it the additional mission of sweeping the area from which the forward air controller received fire. At 1945 hours, while on this sweep, the patrol leader reported seeing three unarmed Viet Cong suspects. One of them was captured. The captured man had attempted to escape when he saw a maneuver element of the patrol approaching, but was caught when he ran into one of the patrol's security elements. (This suspect was later killed when he attempted to escape just prior to the main Viet Cong attack on the company position.) The patrol then returned the suspect to the company, gave a negative report on finding any automatic weapon position, and continued on to the preplanned ambush site. (Dotted position, Blue Flip)

e. The second action in the Company A area before the Viet Cong main attack was at approximately 2110 hours. Three Viet Cong were seen in front of the eastern portion of the perimeter through a starlight device and one was killed by a rifle.

f. At approximately 2120 hours, Sergeant Napier's ambush patrol in the north, shortly after their arrival in the vicinity of the ambush position, observed four Viet Cong come toward them from the rear. They took the Viet Cong under fire. A check of the area revealed no bodies or weapons. The patrol received permission from Captain Harrison to shift approximately 100 to 150 meters west of the original site. (XT 606225 Solid Color Position, Blue Flip).

g. Shortly after the eastern ambush patrol, led by Staff Sergeant John P. Morgan, Jr., heard the firing from the northern ambush patrol, they spotted six men moving quickly to the east. When these suspected Viet Cong moved out into the rice paddies, they were engaged by fire. Some appeared to drop. Sergeant Morgan took two other men forward to investigate, found nothing, and proceeded across the open field to the next woodline to the east in hopes of making contact again. As this group approached the woodline they heard sounds of a large number of men moving through the woods. Sergeant Morgan engaged this movement briefly with fire, and fearing an ambush of his small group, withdrew to the established patrol position. He then brought artillery fire on the suspected enemy position.

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h. The next significant actions in the Company A area occurred early the next morning, at approximately 0410 hours. They occurred only a few minutes before the coordinated Viet Cong main attack was initiated, and happened simultaneously at both ambush sites. (All the remaining events occurred virtually together on all flanks and are depicted by the Red Flip.)

(1) At 0410 hours, Sergeant Napier's ambush patrol in the north sighted an estimated 100 Viet Cong moving in a column of two's from the north directly toward their position. Another estimated 100 Viet Cong in a column of three's were observed moving toward the patrol on a trail from the northwest. Smaller size Viet Cong units were also seen moving to the east and west. The enemy troops appeared to be wearing fatigues and helmet liners. Sergeant Napier and his men were able to make accurate estimates of the number of Viet Cong due to the bright moonlight, and because the Viet Cong were moving in column formations with little interval between men. The patrol opened fire with its machineguns and all other weapons at the two large groups. The ambush was a complete surprise and Viet Cong began falling faster than the patrol leader could count. The Viet Cong made a hasty withdrawal into what cover was available and returned fire. During a slight lull in the contact, the patrol leader observed 16 bodies in the open field to his front. The patrol then attempted to withdraw to the company perimeter, but Viet Cong fire was intense and began coming from all directions. The patrol continued to fire alternately north and south by jumping from one side of a rice paddy dike to the other. Although the patrol carried approximately a triple basic load of ammunition (36 magazines for each M14E2 rifle, 300 rounds for each M16 rifle, six hand grenades for each man, 2000 rounds for the M60 machinegun), ammunition ran low. Sergeant Napier attempted to contact the company commander, but had no success. Almost immediately after the patrol initiated their action, a heavy volume of firing was heard to their rear from the entire perimeter. The Viet Cong finally broke contact with the patrol and Sergeant Napier then moved his patrol approximately 50 meters to the south and took cover from grazing fire in several holes near a house. He could not contact the company command post and thought perhaps the company had been annihilated. Later around 0540 hours, after the Viet Cong broke the main contact Sergeant Napier's patrol observed about 60 Viet Cong withdrawing into what appeared to be an assembly area. The limited amount of M16 rifle ammunition remaining and the belief that they were the sole survivors of the company made the patrol members reluctant to open fire. They did fire their M79s and throw hand grenades, however, and the patrol leader called an artillery fire mission on and around the target area. From the beginning and throughout the action, the patrol heard the Viet Cong wounded screaming and moaning in their sector. After the

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Viet Cong withdrew, the patrol leader was finally able to contact the company commander. Sergeant Napier was advised he could return or remain where he was. He remained in his position until daylight rather than run the risk of being mistaken for Viet Cong and to keep his men under cover because of the heavy volume of artillery fire. During the action, one man in the patrol was killed. There were no other casualties.

(2) At 0410 hours, Sergeant Morgan's patrol on the east observed approximately 70 Viet Cong suddenly appear from the brush into the open area to the patrol's rear and move toward the company perimeter. The Viet Cong were located between the patrol and friendly front lines so the patrol was ordered not to fire for fear of hitting their own men in the perimeter. The Viet Cong were moving in a file from the south-east. They wore mixed uniforms. They appeared to know where the company was located, but were oblivious of the patrol. The patrol radioed back the information, but as they made contact on the radio, the Viet Cong attacked the perimeter. Artillery and mortar fire were called into the area and the patrol heard the Viet Cong scream and moan in the vicinity of where the rounds were falling.

3. The Main Attack.

a. 1st Platoon, Commanded by First Lieutenant Jim H. Brogan.

(1) The platoon occupied the northeast and half of the east oriented portion of the company perimeter (Blue Flip). Defensive positions occupied were a portion of the existing Viet Cong trench network. This platoon consisted of 40 men. A total of 25 were in the two squads occupying the trenches; Sergeant Morgan's reinforced squad made up the eastern ambush patrol approximately 275 meters to the front.

(2) Earlier in the evening at 2200 hours on 4 April, the platoon observed, with the starlight device, three men moving from south to north across the front. They were taken under fire. Possibly one Viet Cong was killed. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Brogan, looking back at this incident, feels these Viet Cong were probably a reconnaissance element or guides.

(3) At approximately 0410 hours on 5 April, four Viet Cong were observed to the east. These Viet Cong appeared to be indicating where they wanted others to deploy. In a few moments, between 20 and 40 Viet Cong appeared. Perhaps they were later reinforced. The platoon opened fire just as the Viet Cong deployed as skirmishers. Friendly fire was accurate and heavy and, initially, the Viet Cong advance was stopped about 15 meters short of the trench line. The Viet Cong employed 57mm recoilless rifle, machinegun, and mortar fire. Their

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fire was concentrated on the platoon machinegun position and the platoon command post. Many M79 rounds were also fired by the Viet Cong. A few of the enemy reached the trench and fired down its length and threw hand grenades. The attack was directed against the flanks of the platoon. Platoon to squad and platoon to company communications were solely wire. The only platoon radio was with the ambush patrol. The wire communications immediately went out, apparently cut by the many mortar rounds, M79 rounds, and grenades fired by the Viet Cong. It is significant to note that during the early moments of the battle, the Viet Cong assault consisted almost exclusively of grenades and mortar fire. The Viet Cong then followed up with an all out charge. The enemy obviously knew the defensive system well. Their assault finally carried them into the trench itself where the battle turned into individual hand to hand combat. One Viet Cong was observed with a machete attacking a wounded US soldier. The attacker was shot and killed. Lieutenant Brogdon ordered what few men were left to withdraw from the trench and establish a new line within his assigned sector about 25 meters from the trench. When this order was given, Lieutenant Brogdon could only account for five men. Others later drifted into this new defensive line as they realized the line had shifted. The platoon continued to fire until the Viet Cong broke contact. A bugle was sounded in the north at 0530 hours and the Viet Cong withdrew. The platoon remained in their hasty defensive positions until ordered to withdraw further to the rear to occupy a portion of a new and smaller company perimeter. The platoon suffered four killed and 12 wounded. Ten men in the defensive position were not casualties; seven of these were in the trenches. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant and medic were in the platoon command post.

b. 2d Platoon, Commanded by Second Lieutenant Robert Duffie.

(1) The platoon defended the northwest and upper west portion of the company defensive perimeter (Blue Flip). The fortifications occupied again consisted of an existing Viet Cong trench network. Sergeant Napier's reinforced squad from this platoon was occupying an ambush position about 150 meters to the north. The platoon strength in the defensive was twenty-five.

(2) At approximately 0420 hours on 5 April, the platoon came under attack from the north and west. The first position hit was the right flank where it tied in with the 1st Platoon. Here they were heavily grenaded and their position was soon overrun by Viet Cong who moved down the trench to the east. The platoon then started evacuating the wounded to the platoon command post. Simultaneously with the initial attack from the north, more Viet Cong launched an attack from the west, moving across the open paddy walking quickly in an upright position. This group employed at least one machinegun, but for the most part, fired rifle grenades or threw hand grenades.

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The platoon returned fire with its weapons, except its remaining machinegun which malfunctioned after firing three or four rounds. Several attempts to correct this stoppage were unsuccessful. Later analysis indicates this machinegun was put out of action by enemy fire. Much Viet Cong meaning could be heard during the lulls in firing. Lieutenant Duffie lost contact with his squads on the left and right and his patrol. Radio communications were spotty and the company command post was hard to contact. After the initial intense fire fight, the platoon leader feared that the company had been badly chewed up and that the small element with him was among the few men that were left. Much ammunition had been fired and attempts to get artillery fire on the west were delayed because of targets on the north, east and south portions of the perimeter. Reports from the company command post concerning the situation in other areas of the company were nonexistent. Lieutenant Duffie did not ask for 4.2 mortar fire because he assumed this would be called by his company commander in response to his request for fire. The northern portion of the platoon defense had been reduced to one single unwounded rifleman. The platoon leader held his position until finally informed by the company commander that the company was withdrawing and establishing a new perimeter. The 2d Platoon was ordered to man the eastern portion. The troops manning the trench line on the west of the original perimeter were simply to do an about face. This was done at approximately 0530. The platoon suffered three killed, including one man who was guarding a prisoner in the 1st Platoon area, and eight wounded. Its foxhole strength within the company after the battle was 14 men.

c. 3d Platoon, Commanded by Second Lieutenant Thomas Blevins.

(1) The platoon occupied the lower east and south-east portion of the company perimeter (Blue Flip). The fortifications occupied by the troops consisted of the existing Viet Cong trench network. Its strength was 36 men.

(2) At approximately 0420 hours on 5 April, the platoon came under heavy fire from its left flank, at the coordination point with the 1st Platoon. A machinegun was located in this position, which along with the other weapons in the position, returned fire. A hail of mortar and grenade fire quickly rendered all of the troops on that flank casualties. The machinegun was kept in constant action. With all men around him wounded or dead and only 70 rounds of ammunition left, the gunner made his way to the 1st Platoon command post where he was killed shortly after reaching that position. After checking his squads following the initial assault, Lieutenant Blevins was severely wounded by a hail of rifle grenades in the vicinity of the nearby company command post. Lieutenant Blevins later died of wounds. He had attempted to report his platoon's status and get further instructions. The Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant Luis Mejias, then took

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radio and moved from the platoon command post location to the defensive trench, establishing physical contact, and directing the defense by moving from man to man. The other machinegun organic to the platoon kept constant fire on the Viet Cong attacking from the south, who were supported by heavy 60mm mortar fire against the company command post, (Red Flip, southern portion). The Viet Cong also employed a 57mm recoilless rifle against this position, possibly the same weapon used against the 1st Platoon. A Viet Cong machinegun engaged the platoon's machinegun. The 3d Squad Leader, Sergeant Richard F. Ritch Jr., called artillery fire to his east and south close-in to the platoon position. The Viet Cong mortars were finally silenced by artillery fire. Many men recall hearing the Viet Cong shouting orders, moaning, weeping, and arguing after the artillery fire. The platoon never left the trench and apparently never received the order to withdraw. Viet Cong attempted to get into the trench from the south by way of an unoccupied continuation of the existing trench network. Constant friendly fire down this trench system halted them. A whistle was blown at approximately 0525 hours, which was followed in a few minutes by a bugle to the south. The platoon readied itself for what it thought would be a last defense against a human wave attack. What little ammunition remained was distributed. The Viet Cong started to break contact, however, shortly after the bugle was sounded. Artillery and the platoon's machinegun fire continued causing more Viet Cong casualties during their withdrawal to the south. Communications with the company command post again were almost nonexistent. Communications between the platoon and squads was accomplished by personal liaison by the platoon sergeant. No radio or wire was used. The platoon suffered one killed and 13 wounded, two of whom later died of wounds. After the attack, 24 men were not casualties.

d. 81mm Mortar Section, Commanded by First Lieutenant Wilburn L. Whitten.

The 81mm Mortar Section was located in the southern portion of the company perimeter. Because of minimum range limitations, the mortars were unable to fire close defensive fires or barrage data. On one occasion, they fired in support of an ambush patrol. Because of earlier plans to move into a battalion perimeter that evening, most of the bulk mortar ammunition had been taken out by helicopter. For the same reason, the mortar pits were very hastily dug. The mortars could not be manned during the attack because of the intense grazing fire coming into the 3d Platoon position from the south. The section occupied positions to the rear of the 3d Platoon and prepared to engage the enemy as infantry with their small arms fire if the Viet Cong broke through. When the company withdrew into the new perimeter, the section took its mortars to the new location. No casualties were suffered.

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e. Company, Battalion, and Brigade Command Posts.

The company command post was located center east within the company perimeter (Blue Flip). The battalion and brigade command post were collocated in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP approximately 2000 meters to the southwest of the company perimeter. At approximately 0420 hours on 5 April, Captain Harrison, the company commander, reported to the battalion command post that he was being probed, had two men lightly wounded and requested illumination. Immediate approval was granted and the 4.2 inch mortars began firing the illumination mission. A flare ship was also requested by battalion and approved by brigade. The company was so informed. This report, as were all earlier contacts and all subsequent reports to the battalion command post, was relayed immediately to the brigade command post. At 0430 hours, the company commander reported the tempo of the enemy small arms and mortar fire increasing. Artillery was asked by battalion to turn the counter-mortar radar vector in support of the company. The company commander was advised to keep constant artillery falling around his perimeter. No estimate of the size of the enemy force could be given. At approximately 0435 hours, Captain Harrison reported that he apparently had many wounded, but no one was known to have been killed. Captain Harrison further reported that he and his artillery forward observer, Staff Sergeant John McNickol, were wounded, that being the reason for a momentary loss of contact on both the artillery fire direction and battalion command nets. He requested personnel carriers to evacuate his seriously wounded. Brigade approved the use of three personnel carriers available from the supporting artillery and action was begun to assemble them. At 0500 hours, the company commander reported he was again under attack. The battalion commander in effect had no reserve other than artillery due to the disposition of the two companies out of supporting distance. Thus he recommended to the brigade commander that the brigade reserve be alerted and also requested that the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry accompany the three personnel carriers for protection and an immediate reaction force. Battalion was unable to get an accurate estimate of the situation, the size of the enemy force, or how the defense was holding. At approximately 0515 hours, Captain Harrison reported he had many men wounded and some killed. At 0525 hours, Company B was ordered by battalion to be prepared to assist Company A on order. Brigade informed the battalion that the reconnaissance platoon would be ready to go at first light. At 0530 hours, the company commander reported that the main attack had ceased and that he was receiving only sporadic small arms and mortar fire. Captain Harrison also informed battalion that he was regrouping into a smaller perimeter and he needed the personnel carriers for medical evacuation, as a landing zone for aerial evacuation could not be secured at that time. At 0545 hours, a report was received

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from brigade that the flare ship was on station and a forward air controller was airborne. The company commander was then instructed to turn the company over to his executive officer, First Lieutenant James T. Goff, so that he could receive medical attention. At approximately 0550 hours, the forward air controller reported receiving fire from the area northeast of Company A's position. Battalion requested and received an artillery mission on this location. At approximately 0535 hours, battalion directed the company to keep firing artillery all around the perimeter and on likely avenues of escape for the Viet Cong. Also, several likely areas were selected and fire missions called by the battalion artillery liaison officer. At 0600 hours, the reconnaissance platoon and the three personnel carriers departed for the Company A area with the battalion S3 and five aid men. The battalion commander went airborne in an OH-23 at 0600 hours to guide the column in the growing light. The battalion surgeon was directed to establish an emergency aid station at the airstrip at TRUNG LAP. At 0650 hours, the reconnaissance platoon with the personnel carriers arrived in the Company A location. The reconnaissance platoon immediately conducted a sweep through the company position without Viet Cong contact and established a blocking position approximately 300 meters to the east of the company perimeter. The landing zone was secured by Company A at approximately 0630 hours and Dustoff medical evacuation commenced at 0700 hours, supplemented by other helicopters in support of brigade. Company A had nine killed and 45 wounded in the battle. Three men, including the 3d Platoon Leader, later died of wounds. The company was occupying the positions to which they had withdrawn after the main attack. Both patrols were still in the vicinity of their respective ambush sites. During this period, the wounded were treated and evacuated. The dead were placed in one of the personnel carriers. Battalion ordered the remaining men back to the vicinity of their original perimeter to police the battlefield of both US and Viet Cong bodies, equipment, and documents. Leaders researched and attempted to reconstruct the battle on the ground for the benefit of the brigade and battalion commanders. Airborne observers searched with negative results for any signs of the withdrawing Viet Cong force and artillery fire missions were fired on likely avenues of escape to the north and east. At 1050 hours, Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry arrived in the area and was attached upon arrival to the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry. The mechanized company was instructed to sweep east and north in search of the Viet Cong. The search was conducted with negative contact. Large pools of blood and discarded bandages were found in many areas. Upon completion of the sweep, the mechanized company occupied a blocking position to the north in the vicinity of XT 604240. Company A reported all personnel accounted for and all machineguns on hand, but the status of other small arms was doubtful at the time and an accurate report could not be made. At approximately 1100 hours, Company B was airlifted to the area and occupied the original perimeter. Company B then

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conducted a detailed search of the battle area covering approximately 1000 meters at the front of all positions. Company A was extracted by helicopter at approximately 1130 hours and returned to the base area at OU CHI. At 1200 hours, the reconnaissance platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry was detached on brigade order and returned to TRUNG LAP. The personnel carriers also returned carrying the US dead and Viet Cong and US equipment. Time prohibited Company B from completing the search detail. This company was airlifted to the base area commencing at 1400 hours. Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry secured the loading zone for the extraction of this battalion's Company B and then reverted to brigade control. The battalion commander and S3 returned to base area in an OH-23 after the last lift of Company B was airborne. At approximately 1500 hours, the battalion vehicular elements returned in a brigade controlled convoy to the base area.

4. Comments on the Viet Cong.

a. Viet Cong Units. An analysis of captured documents reveals the enemy which conducted the attack against Company A probably was the 1st Battalion, 165 A (Main Force) Regiment. Prior to the action, Order of Battle information on this battalion indicated that it consisted of three companies with an estimated strength of 400. The unit was estimated armed with the following weapons and equipment:

	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
(1)	60mm Mortars	5
(2)	81mm Mortars	3
(3)	50 cal Machineguns	2
(4)	50 cal Antiaircraft Guns	5
(5)	12.7mm Machineguns	4
(6)	30 cal Machineguns	4
(7)	Submachine Guns	10
(8)	57mm Recoilless Rifles	7
(9)	Grenade Launchers	3
(10)	PRC-10 Radios	3

The mixture of uniforms worn by the attacking force indicate perhaps the unit was reinforced for the attack with a local guerrilla force and/or elements of the 2d Battalion, 165 A Regiment which had reportedly operated in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 165 A Regiment on other occasions.

b. Viet Cong Casualties. The search located 30 Viet Cong bodies. It is difficult to estimate the number of Viet Cong that were actually killed or seriously wounded. Many pools of blood, bloodstained bandages, and pieces of bodies were found in virtually all the areas around the perimeter. Unusually heavy Viet Cong casualties were indicated in the areas

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in front of the 1st Platoon position on the east and the killing zone of the 2d Platoon ambush patrol in the north. Significantly, no bodies were found in the vicinity of the ambush patrol, but tell-tale signs such as brains and internal organs indicated that many Viet Cong were serious casualties. Trails in the dirt showed where bodies had been dragged away. Artillery fire on likely Viet Cong withdrawal routes beyond the search area undoubtedly increased their casualties. In addition to the 30 VC bodies found, an estimate of 40 more KIA was made. We believe though, that VC casualties were two or three times that number.

c. Viet Cong Arms and Equipment. Spent shell piles indicated that machineguns were used in the Viet Cong attack on all sides of the perimeter. Linked ammunition and drum magazines demonstrated that both US and Chinese machineguns were probably used. Spent shell casings indicated that 57mm recoilless rifles were used in the attacks from the east and south. A pile of Chinese 60mm mortar ammunition verified the location of the mortar observed and destroyed by artillery fire during the battle. Two Viet Cong bodies lay nearby without weapons. One of these Viet Cong was laden with M79 ammunition and had a metal whistle on a chain lying next to him. Both had been killed by indirect fire. Magazines and ammunition recovered from Viet Cong dead indicated that they had a great deal of ammunition and were armed with M79s, M1 rifles, 7.62 weapons, .31 cal weapons, .30 cal carbines, BARs, and Russian rifles. Chinese hand grenade and rifle grenade duds were found in abundance on all sides of the perimeter. In addition to the 57mm recoilless rifles and 60mm mortars, Chinese rocket launchers were used. The Viet Cong were in mixed uniforms and web gear. Some were in fatigue-type uniforms, others in the peasant's "calico noir". Some wore helmets, others soft caps. Many documents and identification cards were recovered. The Viet Cong suffered additional casualties while extracting their dead, wounded and weapons. Viet Cong machetes, entrenching tools, ponchos, hammocks, medical items, gas masks, sandals, clothing, and knives were among the items also recovered.

d. Viet Cong Control Measures. The Viet Cong apparently used guides in much the same way we do in a night attack. They move in a tight column to release points which have been marked earlier by advance scouts. At these release points the Viet Cong appeared to deploy under the direction of a guide who directed the movement by hand and arm signals. In several instances, trees were marked with white bandages in what appeared to be the location to mount a machinegun. Smoke and red hand fired flares were used in breaking contact, but the exact significance of these signals was not determined. A whistle was blown just a few minutes before bugles were sounded both in the north and south. The bugles obviously were a signal to break contact and withdraw. Both were heard at approximately 0520 hours.

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5. Commanders Analysis.

a. The Viet Cong attack was the first major offensive operation conducted against any element of the 25th Inf Division. It was a deliberate, well planned, and coordinated battalion-size attack against an isolated company with the objective of annihilating that unit. The Viet Cong timetable seemed to call for them to break contact and withdraw prior to daylight, before available reaction maneuver forces could be deployed and the full effects of supporting weapons and tactical air could be brought to bear on these forces. The Viet Cong knew the approximate strength of the friendly unit and the relative locations of other units in the vicinity. They knew the area and trench systems well and were familiar with the location of the Company A defensive positions, and apparently guessed the location of the company command post. The Viet Cong were not familiar with the location of the ambush patrols and probed earlier to determine their location. The shift of Sgt Napier's ambush patrol in the north 100 to 150 meters west after an early probe was a surprise to the Viet Cong and considerably blunted the attack from this direction before it got started. Probing action against the ambush patrol on the east did not readily identify that patrol's location; however, an opportunity for this patrol to inflict considerable damage on the Viet Cong attack force approaching from the southeast between the patrol and the defensive perimeter was never exploited. Communications from platoon to squad, platoon to platoon, company to ambush patrol, and company to battalion was poor resulting in a void of information. Platoon leaders were not informed as to the overall situation. Information as to what was happening throughout the company failed to reach the company commander. Consequently, once the battle was joined there was a general lack of responsiveness at company level. The platoons virtually fought separate battles in their own areas. This made difficult an analysis of the situation and orders by leaders at all levels. Further, it caused a void at battalion level which made it difficult for the battalion commander to make the necessary decisions which would influence battle. While nearly 700 artillery rounds were fired in support of the company's defense, the 4.2 inch mortars went virtually unused. 4.2 inch mortar illumination missions were fired and then ceased at the request of the company commander. The 81mm Mortar Section could not provide close-in defensive fires from any location within the perimeter, they were not dug in properly to maintain fire while under attack, and sufficient ammunition was not on hand to provide the volume of fire necessary to be effective in an all out defense. Most company size perimeters will be too small to be supported by 81mm mortars if they are within the perimeter. The trench line occupied by the defending forces was well known by the Viet Cong and they attacked the salients, the traditional weakest

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points. The company did not take steps to dig firing pits into the trench system that would have provided an extra measure of defense against the Viet Cong firing down the trench line. A single rifle company cannot afford the loss of foxhole strength to provide reinforced squad-size ambush patrols. This is another reason why a company is not the ideal unit for an independent perimeter. The patrol requirement is one of the main reasons a company must be reinforced on such missions. In this case, this lack of foxhole strength was somewhat balanced by the springing of a devastating ambush to the north; however, the opportunity to spring an equally successful ambush in the east came and went without exploitation. As a general rule, a company should be sufficiently reinforced with one or two platoons to provide these necessary ambushes and a company reserve without biting into organic company strength when it is established in an isolated 360 degree perimeter. Generally, battalions rather than separate companies should operate in such areas. The determination by brigade that required the company to coil in a defensive perimeter was made after the company had been issued a warning order by battalion that it would move back into a battalion perimeter. The order to assume a perimeter defense in their present location was issued very late in the afternoon, at approximately 1700 hours, on 4 April, and allowed little time for proper reconnaissance and establishment of the best possible defense positions. The decision to place an independent company in a perimeter must be made in time for proper troop leading procedures to take place at all subordinate echelons. Timing will vary with each situation, however, a five or six hour reaction time should be allowed battalions. While the company fought the battle with more than its normal basic load of ammunition, additional bulk ammunition had been moved out to the vicinity of the new area in anticipation of the move the company would make. Reaction time did not permit its return. Battalion has established an SOP resupply package for night defense that heavily increases the number of Claymore mines, machinegun ammunition, and grenades on hand for the company. Items such as additional LAVs, flamethrowers, trip flares, radios, and 81mm mortar ammunition also will be delivered for night defense. All these items are to be repacked and picked up again in the morning.

b. Brigade should always have a ready reaction force that has been designated by fragmentary order with a "be prepared" mission to assist or support units in the operational area on very short notice. The tenacity and combat experience of Company A resulted in a constant heavy volume of fire placed on Viet Cong assault elements all around the perimeter and prevented the company from being overrun by a determined, well armed force of superior strength. While the Viet Cong breached the line in several areas by systematically reducing the defenders, it is interesting to note that they were unable to exploit these penetrations. This probably was primarily a result of well directed

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artillery fire and the superior small arms fire that plugged the gaps. The company commander, in spite of the difficulties, remained calm and kept his command group well organized and functional. Many fragmentary orders were issued by direct contact with representatives from the platoons. Captain Harrison provided for alternates to assume the duties of calling for and adjusting fire in the event the forward observers became casualties, as they indeed did. This resulted in constant artillery support which probably tipped the scales.

6. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

a. Evacuation of wounded during the attack must be delayed. There is little more that can be done for these casualties at the platoon or company command post that cannot be done in their firing positions. Every available man must be kept on the perimeter shooting. This includes individuals who are lightly wounded. In addition, evacuating the wounded tends to confuse men along the line who feel they missed getting the word about a withdrawal.

b. A night defense supplemental package brought in when the unit stops to defend and taken out in the early morning is a must. However, the decision must be made early enough so that this package can be brought in before darkness. This battalion has established an SOP package consisting of the following items:

- 20,000 rounds 5.56mm for M16 rifles.
- 6,000 rounds 7.62mm for M14E2 rifles.
- 12,000 rounds 7.62 MLB for M60 machine guns (2000 rounds per machinegun).
- 1 .50 caliber machine gun and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.
- 500 hand grenades.
- 400 40mm rounds for M79 grenade launchers.
- 50 rounds of 81mm HE per mortar.
- 25 Claymore mines.
- 30 LAVs.
- 30 trip flares.
- 2 flame throwers.
- Extra radios.

c. Defensive fires must be well planned for all indirect fire weapons. One technique is to plan priority fires for the artillery to the front of one platoon, 4.2 inch mortar to another, and 81mm mortar for the remaining platoon. This should insure accurate and responsive fire in all sectors. The flexibility of massing or shifting any combination of these fires to support any one platoon is still a reality.

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d. The battalion SOP for shifting an ambush position after any contact with the Viet Cong was proven valid. The ambush patrol in the north was shifted west and later caught the Viet Cong by surprise. The Viet Cong appeared to avoid the patrol's original location where contact had been made earlier.

e. The occupation of existing fortifications and trench networks dug by the Viet Cong invites trouble. They are familiar with them and know the weak spots well. When limited time requires that Viet Cong fortifications to be used as hasty shelters, hasty firing pits should be cut into the trench to lessen the vulnerability from fire down the trench lines. Claymore mines should be set up in the trenches to cover areas which cannot be physically occupied. Units cannot "hunker down" and stop digging after dark, but must take the calculated risk of the noise involved and continue their defensive preparations, covered by outposts.

f. The employment of a rifle company without reinforcements in an isolated defensive perimeter invites Viet Cong attacks. Its validity is suspect. Actually this may have potential as a good way to "bait" a sizeable Viet Cong force, but reaction forces must be predesignated by higher headquarters and have coordinated plans to respond immediately. The reaction force must be capable of being effectively deployed and fighting in the hours of darkness, during the first hour after engagement. It cannot wait until first light because the Viet Cong base their attack on the assumption that such a force will wait.

g. It is appropriate to emphasize another point here. The concept of inviting the elusive Viet Cong to attack the "bait" of a smaller unit in a good defensive position is not new. In the Indochina war the French tactics, and finally their strategy, degenerated into essentially the use of that doctrine against the Viet Minh. The concept became known as "The Illusion of Vinh Xinh", in which the French waited for a set piece Viet Minh attack against strong defensive positions. The French chose the place to fight, "hunkered down" and had all the tactical advantages of the defender. The initiative remained with the guerilla, however, who chose to give or refuse battle still on his own terms. In reality this technique was an overt confession of the French inability to apply the principle of the OFFENSIVE and find and fix the enemy by any other techniques. It failed to be decisive. After a few stinging defeats, the Viet Minh reaction generally consisted of either one of two courses of action:

(1) The Viet Minh would not take the "bait", refused combat, but instead invariably attacked the lines of communications to the strong point, and "nickle and dimed" the logisticians and their security elements to death. Often more French elements were involved in keeping the lines of communications open than were involved in the defensive perimeter itself. Today with helicopters, this line of communications problem is lessened

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somewhat, but the Viet Cong reaction would well be essentially the same, only more difficult for them to accomplish.

(2) The Viet Minh possessed sufficient combat power to accomplish their objective and annihilate the defensive position. (The battle of Dien Bien Phu was an example of this on the strategic level.)

h. Personnel carriers attached to an isolated company defensive perimeter greatly enhances the unit's ability to react. The OCM machineguns augment the company's firepower. Further, a vehicle is available to move casualties, equipment or ammunition, as may be required.

i. Machinegun positions must be especially well prepared and protected. They become the prime targets of Viet Cong small arms and grenades.

j. Land marks such as buildings should be avoided as command post locations. They are usually well known by the enemy and easy to identify as targets for accurate fire.

k. Platoon sergeants and squad leaders must be familiar with the frequencies for the company and battalion command nets and the artillery fire direction net. In a matter of minutes, one of these leaders may be the platoon leader.

l. There exists a definite need for the radio communications from platoon to squad in the defense. Even the unreliable AN/PRC-6 is better than no communications. Extra AN/PRC-10 radios could be brought in for use by the squads during the night.

m. A company can employ all the Claymore mines it can get in the defense. They can be employed in depth with the majority being placed right next to the defensive foxholes. As mentioned above, they also would be useful to place in Viet Cong trenches leading into the position which cannot be covered adequately or occupied.

n. All patrol leaders should be given the battalion command net frequency in case the company command net ceases to function. Battalion can advise the patrol of the situation and provide indirect fire support, as may be required.

o. Squad leaders must be brutal in their insistence that positions are well prepared and improvements are continually made. When the situation demands, such improvements may be continued after dark covered by patrols and outposts. A calculated risk must be taken between the noise and lack of security involved, and the need of an adequate defensive position.

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p. It is unlikely that patrols will be able to withdraw back to friendly lines when the Viet Cong are conducting a major attack. Adequate ammunition must be on hand to sustain the patrols in such situations. These patrols become a ready reserve for the company commander and can be used as maneuver elements to ambush withdrawing Viet Cong units if alerted by the company command post. They also can be maneuvered into positions which would place the Viet Cong in a devastating cross fire.

q. Early probing action may be a prelude to a major attack and cannot be taken lightly, particularly, if Viet Cong are encountered at about the same time in several areas in the vicinity of the defensive perimeter.

r. 0400 hours appears to be a good "stand-to" time for defending units.

s. Time permitting, companies should prepare hasty supplementary positions. In any event, the company defense order should include the location of secondary positions that platoons will withdraw to in the event withdrawal becomes necessary.

t. The value of indirect fire cannot be overstated. Commanders should fire artillery and mortars on all suspected avenues of approach or escape and likely assembly areas during and after the attack.

u. The bayonet for the M16 rifle should be issued as soon as possible. One more attack by Viet Cong and, due to a shortage of ammunition, the bayonet would have become Company A's primary weapon.

v. Plans to attack the withdrawing enemy must be aggressively executed. Aggressive follow up by major units of a brigade task force to find and fix the enemy is a necessity. After a major action, the Viet Cong force can be assumed to be low on ammunition and faced with immense problems of reorganization, evacuating dead and wounded, and hiding from a fresh pursuing force. All other plans should be altered to take advantage of this unique opportunity. This appears to be an excellent time to employ armor and mechanized infantry in conjunction with widely scattered Eagle flights of reinforced platoon size with ready airmobile reaction forces on standby. This reaction force must be capable of attacking and fighting in the darkness, that the Viet Cong invariably uses to cover his withdrawal. Tanks and personnel carriers with starlight driving devices, or even with lights on, should be considered.

w. In conjunction with the above, adequate time must be allowed for a detailed battlefield search in the general vicinity of the action. Valuable documents, weapons, and equipment can be obtained. This is not the time for haste.

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x. Consideration should be given to leaving a sizable stay behind force in an ambush position. Airlift extraction could be feined.

s. The Viet Cong employ unarmed grenadiers whose sole mission appears to be that of hurling grenades and recovering weapons. There exists a potential in utilizing 106mm recoilless rifle personnel in the same role for a defending US unit.

aa. Small pressure mines placed on the ground approximately 25 meters from friendly positions will assist in the night defense. They can be recovered in the morning without danger if no attack occurs.

7. Recommendation. That the contents of this summary be brought to the attention of all units and commanders and personnel as appropriate.



BOYD T. BASHORE
Lt Col, Infantry
Commanding

2 Incls
as

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15 - Hq 2d Bde
25 - Hq 25th Inf Div

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
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VC X. GUN NHI (2)

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606 BUSH

VC TRENCH
1801 1 to Special Summary
of Action A/2/27, 5 Apr 66

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SCALE APPROX

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KEY PERSONNEL

Company Headquarters

Captain Willard E. Harrison Jr.
1st Lieutenant James T. Goff
PSC Willard F. Walter
SGT Harley B. York Jr.
SSG John McMichael
PFC Keith R. Morris

SGT Charles E. Petersen
PFC Woodrow Butler

SP5 Keith W. Kauffman

Position

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
First Sergeant
Commo Sergeant
Artillery Forward Observer
Artillery Radio-Telephone
Operator
4.2 Forward Observer
4.2 Radio-Telephone
Operator
Senior Aid Man

1st Platoon

1st Lieutenant Jim H. Brogdon
SSG Robert T. Ferguson
SGT John E. Harris
SSG John P. Morgan
SGT Chris J. Heil
SSG James E. Hatcher Jr.

Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
1st Squad Leader
2d Squad Leader
3d Squad Leader
Weapons Squad Leader

2d Platoon

2d Lieutenant Robert Duffie
PSC Johnny R. Holland
SSG John Rivera
SSG Vincent Napier
SGT Rodman L. Barnes
SSG Bernard L. Hoopli

Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
1st Squad Leader
2d Squad Leader
3d Squad Leader
Weapons Squad Leader

3d Platoon

2d Lieutenant Thomas Blevins
SSG Luis Mejias
SSG Ignacio Durand
SSG Margarito Davila
SGT Richard F. Ritch Jr.
SP4 Russell J. Webb

Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
1st Squad Leader
2d Squad Leader
3d Squad Leader
Weapons Squad Leader

Weapons Platoon

1st Lieutenant Wilburn L. Whitten
MSG Jimmy L. Baxter
SSG William Dudley
SSG Harry A. Smith

Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
81 Section Leader
106 Section Leader

Inclosure 2 to Special Summary of Action, A/2/27, 5 Apr 66

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225

AVIZED-T

1 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report, Operation KANUKU

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

Attached, herewith, is Combat After Action Report, Operation KANUKU,
1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A. R. KNIGHT JR.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE.

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HEADQUARTERS

1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225

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TIMAA-0

29 April 1966

SUBJECT: Commanding Officer
2d Bde Task Force
25th Infantry Division
APO U.S. Forces 96225

1. Operation KAH/KU, search and destroy.
2. Date: 7 April 1966.
3. General: The operation was conducted in Phuoc Vinh Ninh (XT 6814). The Bn OPORD 16-66 was issued 261400ZAPR66. The operation was conducted with elements of the 2d Bde Task Force. Lt Col Greer is the reporting officer. Task organization and commanders were as follows:

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf: Lt Col T. U. Greer, commanding.
Co A: Capt J. A. Renner, commanding.
B Trp, 3/4 Cav: Capt C. R. Quickwire, commanding.
Co C, 1/69th Armored: Capt P. C. Gutzman, commanding.
2d Platoon, Co B, 1/5th Mech: 1/Lt T. Jagose, Platoon Ldr.
Hvy Mort Platoon: 1/Lt J. E. McQuinn, Platoon Ldr.
Attachments and Detachments: Incl 1.

4. Intelligence.

a. One platoon of local guerrillas had been reported in the area of operations. Exact location of the VC platoon was not known. It was believed that when the VC determined a major U.S. attack was underway they would attempt to withdraw to safe areas vicinity Tan Hoa (XT 695145) and/or Dong Sao (XT 700105). It was suspected that the same general harassing and delaying tactics—sniper fire and boobytraps—would be employed by the VC. The VC were known to have several NG's and automatic weapons.

b. During the operation no platoon size force was encountered at any one time. The primary mission of the TF was to seal off all routes of escape with platoon size elements while the main force conducted search and destroy operations throughout the entire area of operations. The mission was accomplished, but only four- and five-man VC groups were encountered by our forces. Upon deploying into the AO, small groups of VC were engaged and killed in trenches, bunkers and spider holes.

c. The terrain consisted primarily of dry rice paddies, moderate to thickly vegetated woods and scattered marshy streambeds. Observation and fields of fire were both restricted by the numerous hedgerows in the objective area. The only obstacle to tracked movement was the low marshy stream areas, but these posed no obstacle to dismounted personnel. The weather caused no change in the course of action.

5. Mission: TF GREER attacks 070700ZAPR to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area of operations (Incl 1).

6. Concept of Operations: The Task Force established platoon size blocking positions on CP 6 (XT 690128) and CP 7 (XT 669132) to prevent VC movement in or out of Phuoc Vinh Ninh and attacked rapidly to conduct search and destroy operations in Phuoc Vinh Ninh.

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39 April 1966

SUBJ: After-Action Report

7. Execution: The Task Force crossed the LD on time with the 2d Plt, Co B, 1/5th Mech moving rapidly to establish the blocking position on CP 7 and the 1st Plt, B Trp, 3/4 Cav establishing a blocking position on CP 6. The TF moved rapidly into the area and at 0730 Co C, 1/69th, operating the center of the area, received small arms fire from vic XT 676134. Automatic weapons fire was returned and contact broken but no results could be determined. At 0807 2d Plt, Co B, 1/5th Mech secured and established the blocking position vic XT 669132 without enemy contact. At 0811, B Trp, 3/4 Cav spotted nine civilians moving into a hole on the right of PL BOG (XT 686117). A small element was left to apprehend the civilians and the unit continued on its search and destroy mission. At the same time, Co A, 1/5th Mech sustained two WIA's from small arms fire from XT 675123. The casualties were minor and after treatment remained with the unit. At 0812, Co C, 1/69th Armored saw nine people moving into a hole vic XT 676118 and detached an element to apprehend the civilians. The civilians captured by B Trp, 3/4 Cav and Co C, 1/69th Armored were later turned over to the National Police. At 0813, Co A, 1/5th Mech received small arms fire and contact was broken. By 0817 all units had crossed PL CANDY (XT 678119). At the same time, the Bn Cmd Gp, which was to the rear of the forward elements, spotted five VC's getting out of a trench on PL CANDY vic XT 678119 with a MG and automatic weapons to engage the rear of the TF. The Bn Cmd Gp moved back and opened fire on the VC's who retreated into a trench with the machinegun. The VC's were pursued and killed and their MG and three carbines captured. Documents on one of the VC's disclosed that he was a squad leader of the C 306 Bn, Local Force, Cu Chi. Two WIA's were sustained by the Bn Cmd Gp. Co C, 1/69th Armored destroyed an enemy area with demolitions at 0841 and sustained one WIA from a falling tree vic XT 684127. At the same time, the 1st Plt, B Trp, 3/4 Cav seized and established the blocking position vic XT 690128. At 0851, Co C, 1/69th Armored spotted five VC's in a trench. The unit maneuvered and engaged the VC's with automatic weapons and small arms fire, killing three (confirmed) and wounding one who died shortly thereafter. Intelligence received from the 2d Bde indicated that a VC company with a strength of 110 men with automatic weapons capability was in the operations area. At 0855 the Bn Cmdr aborted the Co C, 1/5th Mech planned mission in another area and committed Co C to assist in Operation KAHUKU. At 0902 a helicopter in support of Operation KAHUKU was hit by fire and forced down vicinity XT 695115. The pilot sustained serious wounds by burns and there were three ambulatory casualties. The WIA's were evacuated by Dust Off and the equipment was extracted by ground troops in the area. At 0909 another helicopter received fire and had to return to Cu Chi. No casualties were sustained. At 0922, B Trp, 3/4 Cav found a VC base camp area vicinity XT 684123. A detailed search of the area disclosed no weapons or equipment and the area was destroyed. At 0925 a VC PW in the area stated that the VC's had moved out and were in the Bao Cap area and artillery fires were placed throughout the Bao Cap area. At 0933, Co A, 1/27th Inf was dispatched forward to augment the effectiveness of the blocking position vic XT 669-132. By 0937 TF GREER had swept through the entire objective area and received the order to return to PL BOG and make another sweep through the area. At 0950, Co C, 1/5th Mech arrived in the objective area and was given the mission of conducting a detailed search of the area north of the LD up to PL CANDY attacking from west to east between CP 13 (XT 675120) and CP 17 (XT 677118). At 1000, Hvy Mortar Platoon, unable to fire due to the employment of friendly troops throughout the objective area, received orders to displace and establish a blocking position to the southwest, vic CP 3 (XT 677112). At 1027, Co C, 1/69th Armored reported the killing of nine VC's in a trench on PL BUNNY (XT 691124) and captured several documents and weapons. Co A, 1/5th Mech also killed two VC's in a tunnel at 1052 on CP 4 (XT 677124) and gave chase to a third who escaped with an automatic weapon. B Trp,

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FINAA-C

29 April 1966

SUBJECT: After-Action Report

3/4 Cav located a house vicinity XT 677122 that was boobytrapped and destroyed the structure. By 1115 all units had returned to PL BQG and immediately started the return search of the area. The search progressed slowly and without contact and at 1132 Co C, 1/5th Mech found a 250 lb bomb that was rigged for command detonation vicinity XT 68125. The bomb was destroyed and the unit continued its search and at 1146 found an undetermined number of AP mines in a house via XT 677118. A further search of the area revealed a cache of small arms ammunition. No enemy could be found and all munitions and VC structures were destroyed. At 1152, Co C, 1/5th Mech found a large cache of military equipment and documents in another house via XT 677188. A check of the cache revealed that it was boobytrapped with CBU bombs. The house and the cache were destroyed. At 1201, B Trp, 3/4 Cav killed one VC and captured and destroyed an undetermined number of grenades on PL BASKET vicinity XT 693124. At 1215, J Trp, 3/4 Cav found a dead VC, female, in a tunnel in the same area. There were several boobytraps and hand grenades found with the body. The boobytraps and grenades were destroyed. Between 1216 and 1430 sporadic and ineffective sniper fire was received from the southwestern section of PL BQG via XT 658116 and at 1430 Co A and Co C, 1/5th Mech received the order to conduct a two-company sweep through the Ap Dung Sao area (XT 700105). Both units made a NW-SE sweep through the entire area finding and destroying three boobytraps; however, no enemy contact was made and the units made a return sweep through the area and closed into base camp at 1620. The 49th ARVN Regt assumed the responsibility of the mop-up operation and moved in with dozers as the TF started a homeward sweep toward base camp. B Trp, 3/4 Cav sustained two minor WIA's from small arms fire from via XT 689118 and killed one VC via XT 689117 who was attempting to depart the area of operations. At 1613, B Trp killed another VC in a trench vicinity XT 689116. By 1800 all elements had closed to base camp with the exception of B Trp, 3/4 Cav, which was providing security for the downed helicopter.

8. Supporting forces. Co C, 1/5th Mech, Capt J. G. Andross, commanding, responded rapidly and greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the search and destruction of VC's and VC structures in the area of operations. The 3de reaction force, Co A, 1/27th Inf, Capt L. J. Mayone, commanding, was committed into the area of operations by the 3de CO to strengthen the blocking position on CF #7 via XT 669132. Light fire team, UH1D armed helicopters supported the TF.

9. Results:

a. VC's killed (confirmed and estimated).

- (1) 26 VC's killed (body count).
- (2) 19 VC's killed (estimated).
- (3) 18 civilians detained and turned over to National Police.

b. Destroyed:

- (1) 17 bunkers.
- (2) 5 tunnels.
- (3) 20 buildings.
- (4) 18 boobytraps.
- (5) 30 hand grenades.

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(6) 8 CDU bombs (boobytrapped).

(7) 1 250 lb bomb (boobytrapped).

c. Captured:

(1) Miscellaneous papers and documents.

(2) 4 Russian carbines, 7.62mm.

(3) 1 U.S. carbine, M2.

(4) 2 U.S. BAR's.

(5) 2 Chicom 7.62mm assault rifles.

(6) 1 Russian MG 34, 7.92mm LMG.

(7) 1 Chicom 7.62mm carbine.

10. Administrative Matters:

a. Supplies: Operation KAHUKU was a one day operation and no resupply was necessary.

b. Maintenance: During the course of the operation the TF had several tanks and APC's wired; however, all were extracted and no major maintenance problem occurred during the operation as all vehicles returned to base camp under their own power.

c. Transportation: The TF vehicles consumed approximately one-half the fuel in their tanks during the operation and no refuelling was necessary during the operation.

d. Medical: Casualty list, Incl 2.

e. Communications: No communications problems were encountered during the operation.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

12. Commander's Analysis: The commitment of Co C, 1/5th Mech into the area of operations was necessitated by the large number of tunnels, bunkers and buildings in the area which required a thorough search. The Tank Co and Cav Troop were not capable of nor prepared for conducting detailed ground or underground searches.

13. Conclusions and Lessons Learned: The success of the operation can be attributed to the following:

a. The speed and violence of the attack prevented most of the VC from escaping.

b. No air or artillery preparations were fired to forewarn the VC of an impending attack. Extensive preparations are habitually employed by both ARVN and U.S. Forces prior to any attack. Supporting fires were preplanned and on call for this operation.

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c. The coordinated use of blocking positions and armed helicopters to seal off the area was very effective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
as

Bill Hammond
BILL J. HAMMONDS
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

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Task Organisation:

Team BENNETT

Co A (-) 1/5th Mech
3d Plat, C/1/69th Armored
Demo Tn B/65th Engr

Bn Control


Hvy Mort Plat (Gs)
Scty Plat

Team GUTZMAN

Co C (-) 1/69th Armored
3d Plat, A/1/5th Mech
Demo Tn B/65th Engr

B Troop, 3/4 Cav

Demo Tn C/65th Engr



Inclosure 1 (Overlay) to After-Action Report, Operation KAHU

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CASUALTIES SUSTAINED DURING OPERATION KAHUKU

NAME	RANK	UNIT	DISPOSITION	WOUNDS	MOS
JORDAN, Herman	MAJ	HHO 1/5	Duty	S/in eye	1542
DOE, Delbert	PFC	HHO 1/5	93rd Evac	S/in wrist, R hand, elbow, back	11D10
CROWLEY, Morris	SQT	Co A 1/5	Duty	S (L) face	11D40
FRANKS, Mack H.	PFC	Co A 1/5	93rd Evac	S/in chest	11D10
JEROLDS, James R.	SSG	Co A 1/5	93rd Evac	S/left shoulder	11D40
POHMAN, Thomas G.	PFC	Co A 1/5	93rd Evac	Out (L) eye	11H10
MICHAJAK, Stanley	PFC	D Trp, 3/4 Cav	93rd Evac	S/(R) arm	11E10
ROBINSON, William F.	PVT K2	D Trp, 3/4 Cav	3rd Field	S/neck	11D20


Inclosure 2 (Casualty List) to After-Action Report, Operation KAHUKU

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OPERATION MAKAHA



COMBAT AFTER ACTION
REPORT

2D BDE, 25th INF DIV



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225

AVTLEDB-T

5 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (NCS: MACV J3-32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLOP
APO US Forces 96225

1. OPERATION MAKHA (OPORD 19-66).
2. 110730 - 161515 April 1966.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division, conducted search and destroy operations in HAU NGHIA Province astride Highway 1 from vicinity XT6312 to XT5318. The operation was a two battalion sized operation employing two infantry battalions reinforced with an armor company and a cavalry troop.
4. Control Headquarters: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel L. N. Johnson, Jr.
6. Task Organization and commanders were as follows:

<u>1/27 Inf (-) (Lt Col Mooney Cmdg)</u>	<u>Bde Control</u>
Co A (-) 1/69	1/5 Inf (-) Bde Reaction Force
2 Sqs B/65	Co C 1/4 Inf Rear Area Security
Helicopter	Co A 2/27 Inf Rear Area Security
	B 3/4 Cav
<u>2/27 Inf (-) (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg)</u>	1/8 Arty (-) GS
2 Plats Co A 1/69	
2 Sqs B/65	
Helicopter	

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for combat.

(a) 1/8 Arty:

1 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2d Bde.

2 C 1/8 Arty GS 25th Inf Div.

(b) 3/13 Arty:

1 3/13 Arty (-) GS 25th Inf Div.

2 C 1/8 Arty OSR 1/8 Arty (-).

(c) 2/32 Arty:

1 Plat C 2/32 Arty GS 25th Inf Div Arty.

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2 Feb 0 2/32 Arty GSR 1/8 Arty (-).

(2) How and when Artillery employed:

(a) 1/8 Arty (-) initially established a fire support base via XT600147.

(b) A 15 minute (on call) preparation was available on LZ's.

(c) On 12 April fire support bases were established with A Battery via XT640157, and B Battery via XT651163.

(d) The entire operation was supported with preplanned and on-call artillery fires.

(e) The forward observers with the maneuver battalions fired 38 will-adjust missions, expending 1383 rounds.

(3) Results of Artillery: Artillery fires were well coordinated and extremely effective, especially the close in support fires which were timely and accurate. Artillery fires on heavily wooded areas and sniper positions soften the areas, and in all cases during the operation, sniper fires were silenced, thereby greatly reducing friendly casualties. There were 33 VC KIA (Poss) as a result of artillery during the operation. H&I fires succeeded in denying the VC freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

b. Air Force fighter bombers and flare ships were on continuous alert, however there were no missions flown during the operation.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Four resupply aircraft, and three light fire teams were maintained on mission basis throughout the operation.

(2) 20 UH1D's were provided by 145th Avn Battalion for air-mobile assault's by 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) on 11 April 1966.

(a) Helicopters initially lifted 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) to LZ via XT535154. Lifts were completed by 0840.

(b) Co B (-) 2d Bn, 27th Infantry was lifted to LZ's via XT574180 and XT602172. Lifts were completed by 0900.

(3) The airmobile operations were smoothly and efficiently conducted. Army Aviation support was excellent throughout the operation.

8. Intelligence.

a. Analysis of terrain in area of operations: Terrain in the area of operations was generally low and flat with the highest elevation being 7 meters. The entire operational area was composed of rice paddies, clear forest and numerous hamlets with hedgerows separating the homes. Hedgerows provided excellent cover and concealment for the enemy. There were no obstacles or critical terrain features in the area of operations. Observation was excellent except in hamlets surrounded by hedgerows.

b. Intelligence prior to operation: VC activity in the area of operations has been continuous since the beginning of the year. VC actions have included attacks, ambushes, sniper and mortar fires, laying of mines and booby traps and construction of road blocks along Highway 1. Most of the VC incidents have occurred along Highway 1 from PHUOC MY (XT5915) to TRUNG BANG (XT68150). A total of 40 incidents were recorded along this

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portion of the highway since 1 Jan 66. Another hot spot of VC incidents has been between coord XT5418-5817-5814-5414. A VC rest area was reportedly located at PHUOC HIEP (XT5517) and utilized daily by the VC forces. The only significant activity within the area of operations has been by the 4th and 5th Quayet Chien Platoons.

c. Intelligence during the operation: Task force elements were constantly harassed by sniper fires, AT and AP mines and booby traps. Throughout the operation, US forces encountered estimated VC squad sized elements without any significant contacts. Elements encountered were believed to be local guerilla forces of the 4th and 5th Quayet Chien Platoons.

d. Weather during the operation was dry, hot and humid.

e. Initially, the villagers of PHUOC HIEP (XT5517) were hesitant and cautious of US forces but became openly friendly after commencement of MDCAP.

9. Mission: The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division was to conduct operations along Highway 1 (coord XT591505417) to locate, encircle and destroy VC forces in the area commencing 11 April and returning to base camp on order.

10. Concept of the Operation: On 11 April, the 2d Brigade Task Force moved from CU CHI to conduct detailed search and destroy operations in AO APPLE (XT5418, XT5414, XT5714, XT5718). The operation was conducted in five phases.

Phase I: An encirclement of AO APPLE by airmobile elements of 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and a ground screen by B Trp, 3/4 Cavalry was initiated. Concurrently, 2d Bn, 27th Infantry Task Force conducted a ground move to AO APPLE, searching and destroying during their move.

Phase II: The 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) Reinf and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) Reinf conducted a systematic search of AO APPLE, coordinated to entrap the VC in Obj 4 (XT550175, XT550160, XT570160, XT570173). B Trp, 3/4 Cav secured the northern flank of AO APPLE to prevent VC exfiltration from the area.

Phase III: Units conducted detailed and methodical searches in their respective portion of Obj 4.

Phase IV: The Brigade Task Force returned to base camp on 13 April conducting search and destroy operations in their respective zones adjacent to Highway 1.

Phase V: Company C (+) 1st Bn, 27th Infantry established a company base vicinity XT580195 on 13 April. The company conducted patrols and ambushes from their base and returned to base camp on 16 April.

11. Execution: 2d Bde received OPORD 4-66, 25th Inf Div, 100130 April 1966.

D-Day (11 April 1966)

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0700 Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor moved overland to a blocking position via XT543158 northwest of Obj 3. By 0745 Companies A and B, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry had begun their airmobile assault into LZ (XT535154) west of Obj 3. Automatic weapons fire was received during assault, however gunships on station quickly suppressed the fires and killed 1 VC (BO). By 0840 all elements had arrived at the LZ and companies A and B initiated their search and destroy operations moving abreast to the east. The Battalion Task Force had completed their operations in Obj 3 by 1355 and had begun their move toward Obj 4 (XT5617). In Obj 3 no significant resistance was encountered.

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However, 5 VCs were captured and one killed (BO). By 1525 the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry Task Force in conjunction with the 2d Bn, 27th Infantry Task Force had begun to tighten the noose around Obj 4. At 1605 3 VCs were apprehended in the area and evacuated for further questioning. The Battalion established their TF vic XT557164 for the night and dispatched four squad sized ambushes.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0700 Co B (-) reinforced with the Battalion security platoon, and one platoon Co A, 68th Armor began their sweep north of Highway 1 to Obj 1 (XT5617). Company C and the Battalion Command Group began their move at 0705 to position vic XT563168. Company B was harassed by VC snipers using evasive tactics during the morning. At 0855 the remaining elements of Company B were airlifted to blocking positions at XT574178 and XT603172. By 0925 Company B had linked up with its elements at the blocking positions and continued its sweep through Obj 1. At the same time Company C was clearing Obj 2 (XT538158) and conducting thorough search of the village of PHUOC MY (XT5615). The search was completed without resistance. However, at 1110 a tank was hit by a command detonated mine and approximately a squad of VC opened up with small arms on the infantry in the area. The VC were immediately pursued, but they withdrew. 13 suspects were apprehended during the day and turned over to the National Police. At 1630 all units had completed their search and destroy operations and had joined the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry in the encirclement of Obj 4. The Battalion forward CP was located at XT563168. During the night the Battalion occupied a rather unconventional defense. Since the Bn perimeter was in the village of PHUOC HIEP it was necessary to have security oriented both inward and outward to prevent attack and detain suspected VC.

D+1 (12 April 66)
1st Bn, 27th Infantry

One ambush was sprung during the night vic XT563160 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BO), 3 KIA (POSS). The Battalion Task Force conducted a thorough and detailed search and destroy operation in the southern portion of Obj 4 throughout the day. Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor swept west and south-west of Obj 4. Gunships were highly useful in suppressing enemy fires during the day, accounting for 10 VC KIA (POSS). The Battalion coiled for the night vic XT558163.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry (Troop B (-) 3/4 Cav)

At day break, Troop B (-) 3/4 Cav occupied blocking positions around Obj 4. Companies B and C commenced a house to house search of PHUOC HIEP (XT5617). The search was completed by 0745 and a return sweep was conducted. There was no contact. In accordance with FRAG ORD 1 to OPORD 19-66, Headquarters 2d Bde, the Battalion TF moved north to clear AO SHORE and establish a battalion base in vicinity of Position ED (XT5719). Sporadic small arms fire was received throughout the day. Four tunnels vic XT549190 were explored with negative results and destroyed. Mines in the area disabled an APC, a VTR, and a front line ambulance. The Battalion 83 was killed, another infantryman injured as a result of the mines. Extensive sweeps were conducted by companies B and C in the wooded areas vic XT574183. Night defenses were established in Position ED. At 2030 one VC was killed while attempting to mine the road vic XT574183.

D+2 (13 April 1966)
1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion Task Force had the mission of conducting search and destroy operations north of and parallel to Highway 1 during the return to base camp. The area of operation is habitually mined and booby trapped, with command detonated mines throughout the area being covered by small arms fire. As expected, the Battalion encountered these obstacles during their sweep. Tanks were utilized to destroy booby traps in the area and artillery was employed against VC snipers. The effective use of the com-

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lined arms team minimized casualties and accounted for 3 VC KIA (POSS) and 5 VCS captured. The Task Force closed base camp by 1159.

A second mission assigned to the Battalion was to establish a reinforced company base in the vicinity of XT580200 from which combat patrols and ambushes could be dispatched over a period of several days. Company C, which had been manning the Battalion perimeter in base camp, was assigned this mission. The Company departed base camp at 0725 conducting a motor march to their assigned base area. One vehicle was damaged during the move by a booby trapped CBU. Upon arrival in their area the company immediately conducted local search and destroy operations to clear the area. Defensive positions were prepared, artillery and mortar concentrations registered, and plans formulated for the night's operations. The company was reinforced by a heavy section of tanks at 1505. Three ambush sites were established during the night, none having contact.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion Task Force was given the mission of conducting coordinated search and destroy operations moving abreast of the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry Task Force on return to base camp. The Battalion Task Force used tank infantry teams supported with mortars and artillery while moving through this sniper and booby trap infested area. At 1140 Company C made maximum use of its combined arms capability when the company was engaged by automatic weapons fire. Small arms fire was immediately returned, tanks instantaneously rushed the suspected VC positions, and 4.2 fires were directed on the VC. The action resulted in 3 VC KIA (50% 2 KIA (POSS) and one M16E2 rifle captured. Sporadic sniper fire was received throughout the day. Artillery and mortars were used to suppress the VC. Three tanks were bogged down in the terrain and had to be extracted by VT. The Battalion Task Force closed base camp by 1400 with the exception of the tanks and a security force. The tanks with security were returned by 1625.

D-4-D+6 (14-16 April 1966)

Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The company continued to operate in the vicinity of their base area conducting search and destroy operations during the day and establishing ambushes at night. The first VC contact occurred at 1500 on 14 April. During the sweep, the company (-) engaged VC snipers via XT589186. Attached tanks fired cannister but VC casualties were unknown. One VCS was apprehended on the same day via XT581191. During the day, the company was resupplied by air. Three night ambushes were established. On 15 April the company was reinforced with a tank platoon which relieved the heavy section that had been in support of the company. There was no VC contact during the day. On 16 April the company (+) returned to base camp closing by 1515. The company (+) conducted a foot march to base camp destroying 30 tunnels and killing 2 VC by mortar fire during the move. The unit's impedimenta was returned by motorized convey.

12. Results:

Friendly Losses:

KIA: 1
WIA: 31

Enemy Losses:

KIA (BC): 21
KIA (POSS): 27
VCC: 4
VCS: 43
Equipment Captured/
Destroyed: 1 M16E2 rifle, 30 rds cal
30, 37 tunnels, 55 structures
1 bag of documents.

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The following is a recapitulation of damaged vehicles and tanks.

Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor:

2 Tanks damaged; both repaired in the field.
1 APC damaged; repaired in the field.

B Troop, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry:

1 APC was damaged and evacuated.
1 VTR was damaged and evacuated.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry:

1 M-170 1 1/4 ton damaged and repaired in the field.

13. Administrative matters:**a. Supply:**

- (1) All resupply of Class I, V and water was effected by air.
- (2) A forward support operations center was not used due to the proximity of the operational area to base camp.
- (3) Support Command positioned one 5000 gal and one 1200 gal JP-4 tanker, and one 5000 gal water tanker at the resupply helipad.
- (4) POL consumption was as follows:

Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor:

1610 gallons DIESEL
500 gallons MOGAS

Troop B, 3/4 Cav:

500 gallons DIESEL
1000 gallons MOGAS

- (5) A total of 82 resupply sorties were flown, airlifting 52.2 tons of supply. The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

Class I - 8.4 tons	POL - 7.5 tons
Class V - 10.6 tons	Misc - 12.4 tons
Water - 13.3 tons	

- b. Combat loads - Upon departing from base camp personnel carried two cartons of water, two C-Ration meals. Ammunition loads were as follows:

M14-200 rds; M16-300 rds; M14E2-300 rds; M60-1500 rds;
M79-36 rds; 5 LAW's per platoon; 4 claymores per platoon;
2 hand grenades per man; 2 CS/CN grenades per fire team.

- c. Normal maintenance was conducted throughout the operation.

- d. Dustoff's were utilized for emergency evacuations; resupply ships for extraction of minor casualties.

14. Special equipment and techniques:

- a. Starlight devices were carried and utilized on patrols and night defenses.

- b. 1st Bn, 27th Infantry airlifted tactical wire and sand bags to their operational area to strengthen night defenses.

- c. 2d Bn, 27th Infantry devised an "overnight resupply package"

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to supplement the night defense. The package which was delivered by air to the area selected for night defense consisted of 20,000 rds 5.56mm, 6000 rds 7.62, 12,000 rds 7.62 M16, 400 40mm rds, 30 LAW's, 25 claymore mines, 25 M-16 mines, 500 hand grenades, 50 81mm HE rds per mortar, trip flares, and two flamethrowers.

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. When Armor is employed with infantry, the tank must always precede the infantry by a minimum of twenty-five meters. This procedure permits the tanks to destroy AP mines and booby traps ahead of the friendly troops and also gives them freedom to fire their main armament. Tanks are excellent for use on selective destructive type missions where you want to protect innocent civilians in the area.

b. Units must plan to begin preparations for the night defense between 1500 to 1600 hours. This allows sufficient time for issuance of necessary orders, reconnaissance, aerial resupply, to include night time defensive packets, and proper preparations of defensive positions.

c. Troops must be constantly on the lookout for punji pits, trenches, and concealed bunkers along bamboo hodgeprows.

d. National Police proved to be ineffective in controlling traffic in PHUOC HIEP. Many civilians (VCS) were permitted to leave the area by simply boarding a bus beside the National Police. US Forces must strengthen these posts and supervise the National Police in the screening and search of civilian traffic and personnel.

e. A rifle company was deployed about 500 meters from where another Brigade rifle company defensive perimeter was attacked by a VC battalion about 10 days earlier. This attempt to "bait" the enemy into an attack did not work during the period D+4 to D+6 as contact was very light. It may have been that the company's defenses were obviously strong as tanks were attached.

16. Recommendations:


a. Combined arms task forces should always be utilized whenever possible in order to afford the infantryman protection and provide rapid reaction capability.



b. Whenever National Police are utilized to screen and search civilians, US Military representatives should be present to insure that the mission is being accomplished in a satisfactory manner.

c. Units should not be given large areas for detailed search missions, unless sufficient forces are provided to encircle the area.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225

ATTN: C

7 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report, Operation KAFIA.

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. Attached, herewith, is Combat After Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.
2. This operation was designated "Operation KAFIA" by your headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
A. R. K...
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225

AVTISBA-C

6 May 1966

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO

TO: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade
25th Infantry Division
APO U.S. Forces 96225

1. Operation KALAMAZOO, search and destroy.
2. Date: ~~130600~~APR66-141830APR66.
3. General: The 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Infantry, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, conducted search and destroy operations in TAOR (Incl 1). The Bn OPORD No 17-66 was issued at 121400APR66. Lt Col T. U. Greer is the reporting officer. Task organization and commanders were as follows:

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf (Lt Col T. U. Greer, commanding).

Tm RENIER (Capt J. A. Renner, commanding), Co A, 1/5th Mech; 2/C/1/69th Armored; 1 demo tm.
Tm GUTZMAN (Capt P. C. Gutzman, commanding), Co C (-), 1/69th Armored; 3/A/1/5th Mech; 1/B/1/5th Mech; 1 demo tm.
Tm VICKERY (Capt E. B. Vickery, commanding), Co B (-), 1/5th Mech; 3/C/1/69th Armored; 1 demo tm.
Recon Platoon (1/Lt D. T. Schou).
Hvy Mort Plat (1/Lt J. E. McQuinn).

4. Intelligence.

a. The 305th Battalion of the 165th A Regiment had established bases in the Filhol Plantation and continues to conduct harassing type activities within the plantation and the outlying areas. During the hours of darkness, radar has detected vehicular movement along the roads and trails running through the plantation area. The last reported location of the 305th Bn was in the vic coord XT 650208 on 9 Apr 66. Documents captured at this location revealed that personnel from the 1st and 4th Companies of the 305th were involved in the action. It was also believed that elements of the 305th Bn took part in the attack on A/2/27th on 5 April. The 307th Bn was believed to be operating in the Ho Bo Woods area with the last reported location on 11 April in the vic XT 614255, XT 614268 and XT 634267. As a result of recent combat operations, the 305th Bn was not considered to be at full strength.

b. During the operation no major enemy force of significant size was engaged by this unit. Several ambushes were employed; however, no night contact was made. Elements of the TF received automatic weapons fire from approximately 15-20 VC. This was the largest enemy contact during the entire operation. It was expected that once the VC determined a major U.S. effort was launched the VC would exfiltrate north to the Ho Bo Woods.

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c. The terrain was primarily dense to sparsely populated rubber trees and rice paddies. There were scattered, thickly wooded areas which considerably limited visibility. There were no natural obstacles to tracked movement; however, all roads, trails and trafficable areas were mined. The weather caused no change in plans or courses of action.

5. Mission: TF GREER conducts search and destroy operations in the TACR, commencing 1300G, establishes TF base vicinity Pan VICKY (XT 647207) and prepared for operations into the Ho Do Woods on order.

6. Concept of Operations: TF GREER attacks with Tm VICKERY, Tm GUTZMAN and Tm RENNER to seize VICKY, GRACE and ROSE, respectively. Each team conducts search and destroy operations in AO and continues the attack on order (Incl 1).

7. Execution: TF GREER departed base camp at 0600 and all elements crossed the LD by 0630 hours. Tm VICKERY arrived on the edge of Pan VICKY at 0700 and by 0718 the pan was seized and occupied without enemy resistance. Tm GUTZMAN seized and secured Pan GRACE at 0722. As Tm VICKERY and Tm GUTZMAN commenced the search in their AO, Tm RENNER seized and secured Pan ROSE at 0800 and immediately started a detailed search of the AO. The search progressed methodically and at 0811 one APC from Co C, 1/69th hit an AT mine vic XT 655176. No casualties were sustained; however, the vehicle could not be repaired in place and was evacuated. By 0905 Tm VICKERY was occupying Pan VIOLET and preparing to move to Pan VERA. Meanwhile, Tm GUTZMAN, enroute to Pan GLORIA, had three APC's throw tracks due to dense vegetation. Forward progress was temporarily impeded; however, the vehicles were repaired in place and continued with the advance to Pan GLORIA. One APC from Tm RENNER hit an AT mine 200 meters east of Pan ROSE. No casualties were sustained; however, the vehicle had to be evacuated due to the extent of damage. Personnel from Tm RENNER found and destroyed a box of grenades in the vicinity of the downed APC. At 0950 Tm GUTZMAN arrived on Pan GLORIA and began searching operations. Tm RENNER received automatic weapons fire from the SE of Pan ROSE at 0958 and quickly maneuvered elements in an attempt to run down the VC. At 0950 gunships reported receiving heavy automatic fire from XT 632238 (Area ZULU) and Tm VICKERY was diverted into the area. Arty fires were adjusted throughout Area ZULU as Tm VICKERY moved rapidly into the area with the mission of sweeping the area around the creek vic XT 643233. Co A, 1/5th Mech reported one man slightly wounded by rifle grenade fragments while chasing a small VC element vic Pan VICKY at 1030. Helicopters reported receiving ground fire from XT 627175 at 1110 and Tm GUTZMAN was instructed to move to that vicinity and develop the situation. A med evac truck of Tm RENNER hit an AT mine on Pan ROSE at 1120 that blew one track off and damaged the road wheel. No casualties were sustained and the vehicle was evacuated. Tm GUTZMAN, working in the southern edge of Pan GLORIA, received mortar fire at 1123 and elements were maneuvered in the direction of the fire in an attempt to suppress it. One tank of Tm GUTZMAN was hit by a round from an AT weapon at 1140 that penetrated the tank and wounded one man. The tank was slightly damaged and continued the movement. The AT weapon was later identified as an HFG-2, when the fin assembly was found. Co A received rifle grenade fire on Pan ROSE at 1157 from an estimated reinforced rifle squad. The unit returned 81mm mortar fire on the enemy as troops were maneuvered against the enemy, but the enemy broke contact. During the engagement, Tm RENNER sustained five MIA's from rifle grenade shrapnel. At 1210, Tm VICKERY arrived in Area ZULU where the helicopter received fire (XT 627175) and began a systematic search of the area and at 1212 an airborne observer spotted approximately 10 VC breaking out into the open 200 meters in front of Tm VICKERY's elements who quickly pushed in that direction while

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4.2" mortar fire was adjusted into the target area. A systematic search of tunnels and bunkers in the area revealed a rice cache but no VC and the search was continued. At 1216 hours the lead tank hit an AT mine that blew one track off and damaged the road wheel. Two APC's from Tm RENNER hit AT mines at 1230 while searching Pm ROBE, causing moderate damage to the APC's and three minor WIA's, who were treated and remained with the unit. At 1255 the Bn Cdr in a C & O helicopter spotted 10 VC who were flushed in the open by Tm VICKERY via XT 64172238. 4.2" mortar fire was delivered on the VC and two VC kills were estimated. Tm VICKERY continued to search Area ZULU and at 1302 the unit sustained two KIA's and one WIA from small arms fire from spider holes via XT 638236. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was returned. Recon Platoon found a rice cache of approximately 1000 lbs at 1348 via XT 678222. Two VC were seen entering a house in the 6117 grid square by gunships at 1402. An airstrike was delivered on the house at 1419 and a secondary explosion occurred. At 1415 Tm RENNER found and destroyed a small ammunition cache via XT 646229. Tm VICKERY sustained two KIA's and six WIA's from a heavy volume of accurate rifle grenades and small arms fire from XT 635235 at 1442. The unit immediately engaged the VC by fire and maneuver, but the VC broke contact. The search was continued and at 1510 the crew chief of a resupply helicopter, diverted to the area for evacuation of Co B's WIA's, was wounded. At 1520, the TF VTR hit an AT mine via XT 640223, causing moderate damage to the track; however, no casualties were sustained. Recon Platoon found 40 graves at 1620 hours via XT 654223. An inspection of the grave sites disclosed that the headstones were engraved with VC flags and carbines engraved under the flag. The graves were determined to be one month old. One APC from Co A, 1/5th Mech hit an AT mine via XT 640227. Extensive damage was done to the right track; however, no casualties were sustained. Tm GUTZMAN spotted a VC who was getting into a wall. The unit gave chase as the VC moved down into the wall and into a tunnel entrance that branched off from the wall. A thorough search of the wall and tunnel disclosed no VC or equipment. The wall and all tunnel entrances were destroyed. Another APC from Tm RENNER hit an AT mine via XT 666225 at 1825, causing minor damage to the track. The vehicle was repaired and placed into action. A tank of Tm GUTZMAN, while towing a damaged tank, hit an AT mine at 1833, causing minor damage to the track. Tm RENNER killed one VC at 1834 who emerged from a hole and threw a grenade at an APC via XT 639217. At 1840 a tank crew with a stuck vehicle via XT 628229 shot and killed three VC who were attempting to emplace a machinegun approximately 100 meters from the mired tank. By 1857 Tm RENNER, Tm GUTZMAN, and Recon Platoon closed into the Bn area and were preparing defenses for the night. At the same time a flare ship was requested for the personnel extracting three tanks which had become mired in Tm VICKERY's area during the afternoon. The vehicles were finally extracted and closed into Tm VICKERY's area at 2325 hours. Between 2330 and 0200 no enemy contact was made. Tm VICKERY received an undetermined number of rifle grenades into their position via XT 632235 at 0205 causing one casualty (minor) who was treated and remained with the unit until 0750. Tm RENNER departed the Bn perimeter at 0645 enroute to check the area bordered by roads from XT 641221 to XT 644214 to XT 670235 to XT 667238. At the same time Tm GUTZMAN moved out to check the sector bordered by roads from XT 644214 to XT 648207 to XT 677225 to XT 673231 with a NE direction of attack. The teams had the additional mission of checking the trench area vicinity Pm VICKY and VERA. By 0743, Tm RENNER had completed searching the first portion of their objective area and immediately moved to check the remainder of its sector. At 0750 one APC hit an AT mine. No damage was done to the track; however, two minor WIA's were sustained and, after treatment, remained with the unit. Two command detonated mines were set off against one of Tm RENNER's APC's via XT 643219 at 0803 hours. No damage was done to the track and the unit commenced a chase attempting to

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overrun the VC. Tm VICKERY received automatic weapons fire at 0846 from the streamline vic XT 628223. Arty fire was adjusted on the area and the enemy broke contact. No results could be determined. The Bn SMAJ, traveling with one tank and one APC, received fire at 0915 from an estimated 15-20 VC vic XT 628223. Arty fire was immediately adjusted on the enemy. Three VC kills were estimated. Tm VICKERY began a sweeping search of their area at 0950 and immediately started to receive light small arms fire. Automatic and small arms fire was returned and in the ensuing fire fight, one WIA was sustained before the enemy broke contact. Tm VICKERY pursued in the direction of the fleeing VC and at 1107 spotted one VC getting into a hole. As the VC moved into the hole, five AT mines were set off around the hole. Elements of Tm VICKERY moved up to the hole and a check disclosed that three more AT mines were around the hole and that the VC was inside. The VC was killed and the mines destroyed and the team was instructed to complete its mission and return to the Bn CP. On its way back, Co D, 1/5th Mech was given the mission of checking the area where a secondary explosion was observed on 13 Apr vic XT 636253. Tm RENNER located a rice cache at 1535 vic XT 645215. In the process of checking the rice cache it was found to be boobytrapped and the unit sustained one KIA and two WIA's. A Dust Off helicopter received automatic weapons fire from vic XT 640225 and could not land. Gunships and Arty took the automatic weapons under attack. Operation KALAMAZOO was terminated at 1707 and by 1900 all elements of TF GREER had returned to base camp.

8. Supporting Forces: Btry C, 1/8th Arty (US); 1/8th Arty (-) (GS); 3/13th Arty (GS); Lt Fire Tm (UNID); Tac Air.

9. Results:

a. VC killed (confirmed and estimated).

- (1) 9 VC killed (body count).
- (2) 15 VC killed (estimated).
- (3) 15 VC suspects detained.

b. Destroyed:

- (1) 69 hand grenades.
- (2) 68 tunnels (short).
- (3) 12 CDU bombs.
- (4) 4 rifle grenades.
- (5) 15 AT mines.
- (6) 3 60mm duds.
- (7) 9 105mm duds.
- (8) 1 8" dud.
- (9) 1 M72 L&M.
- (10) 7 20mm rounds.
- (11) 20 .50 cal rounds.

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- (12) 13 1/4 lb blocks of dynamite.
- (13) 350 rounds 7.62mm linked ammo.
- (14) 41 bunkers.
- (15) 36 buildings.
- (16) 3 trenches.
- (17) 50 boobytraps.
- (18) 2,600 lbs of rice (boobytrapped).
- (19) 1 Russian MG.
- (20) 300 M1 rounds.

c. Captured:

- (1) Miscellaneous papers and documents.
- (2) 1 rifle, U.S., M1.
- (3) 2 HFG rounds.
- (4) 2 RPG charges.
- (5) 1 large Chinese grenade.

d. U.S. Equipment Damaged:

- (1) 8 APC's - AT mines.
- (2) 1 VTR - AT mine.
- (3) 2 tanks - AT weapons.
- (4) 1 tank - AT mine.

10. Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel: 484 personnel started the operation and 452 completed, three of whom were KIA's who had returned to duty. There were seven KIA's and 27 WIA's (Incl 2).

b. Supplies: Resupply was accomplished by helicopter from base camp. At times the unit had three helicopters working and at other times only one. Bde made all necessary helicopter support available. Due to experience gained in previous operations the resupply use of helicopters was more efficient. The previous average per lift was 935 lbs. During Operation KALAMAZOO, the average per lift was 1125 lbs. 5,700 lbs of water, 5,880 lbs Class I, 8,270 lbs Class V and 1910 lbs Class II and IV were lifted. It was not necessary to affect resupply of Class III. The bn expended 600 rounds of 5.56mm, 1000 rounds of 7.62mm, 900 rounds of .50 cal, 45 rounds of 40mm, 106 rounds of 4.2" mortar HE (16 VT fused and 20 WP), 132 hand grenades, 5 CS-1 grenades, 31 smoke grenades and 100 lbs of TNT.

c. Maintenance. One M88 and eight M113's became inoperable. The M88 and five M113's were disabled due to a combination of mines and

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REPORT-6

6 May 1966

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO

mechanical failure. The M55 and five of the M113's were returned to duty during the operation. All three of the M113's not returned to duty were disabled due to combat damage.

d. Transportation. The Bn consumed 2968 gallons of MOWAS.

e. Communications. No communication problems were encountered during the operation.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

12. Commander's Analysis:

a. The area in the vicinity of Obj ROSE was laced with mines and the VC were continuously laying them throughout the operation. It is a difficult area to traverse without hitting mines, as there are only a few areas traversable without difficulty by track vehicles.

b. It was surprising that there were so many unblown tunnels in the Obj ROSE area, since the area has been worked before by this division.

c. The area north of Bach Son Creek between XT 645232 and XT 653255 has never been worked by this division. It is believed that this area is well tunneled and well used by the VC.

13. Conclusions and Lessons Learned: No new lessons learned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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B. C. J. Hammond
BILLY J. HAMMONDS
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

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Inlosure 1 (Overlay) to After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO

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CASUALTIES SUSTAINED DURING OPERATION KALAMAZOO

NAME	RANK	UNIT	DISPOSITION	TYPE WOUNDS	MOB
SCOTT, Jimmy L.	SP5 E5	HHC	3rd Fld	CSW in head	9B20
COMBAT, Richard A.	SGT E5	Co A	Rtn to Duty	S/ in arm	1B40
MATHALLER, Kenneth L.	SP4 E4	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel in chest	1B20
SULLIVAN, Donald L.	PVT E2	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel in (l) leg	1B10
BROWN, Gerald R.	PFC E3	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel in neck	1B10
SKATES, Dale E.	PFC E3	Co C	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel (lax) hand	1B10
SCOTT, William Jr.	PFC E3	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel (r) leg	1B10
RODRIGUEZ, Rodolfo	SSG E6	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) forearm	1B40
WILLIAMS, Walter J.	SP4 E4	Co A	3rd Fld	Shrapnel (l) shoulder and (r) foot	1B20
CLISTEMAN, Rickey D.	PFC E3	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Rupt both ear drums	1B10
RHODES, James Jr.	PFC E3	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) shoulder	9B20
LOVE, John E. L.	SP4 E4	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Rupt ear drum	1B20
SHAFER, Paul E.	SPC E7	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (r) arm	1B40
SEWELL, Bernard	SSG E6	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel (l) thigh, (r) hand	1B40
SELDON, Melvin B.	SP4 E4	Co A	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel (l) face	1B20
MOLIERE, Larry J. Jr.	PFC E3	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) arm, chest	1B10
LANTIER, Warren M.	SGT E5	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) arm	1B40
HARRIS, Elton O.	SSG E6	Co A	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) eyelid, hand & side of head	1B40
THOMAS, Lewis M.	PFC E3	Co A	KIA	Mult S/W over body	1B10
WALDROP, Winford P.	SSG E6	Co B	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel (l) arm	1B40
MCCULLION, Joseph R.	PVT E2	Co B	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel in neck	1B10
ESPER, James V.	SPC E6	Co B	93rd Evac	Shrapnel (l) knee	1B40
HACKETT, Robert W.	SP4 E4	Co B	25th Med Bn	Shrapnel (l) leg	1B20
FURCELL, Joan M.	SGT E5	Co B	93rd Evac	Shrapnel (l) hand, (l) thigh	1B40
ROTHERING, Howard F. Jr.	PFC E3	Co B	KIA	CSW in chest	1B10
STEEVER, Frank E.	SGT E5	Co B	93rd Evac	CSW (r) thigh	1B40
D'AMICO, Frank A.	1ST LT	Co B	KIA	CSW thru neck	1B42
PACARELL, Clenton B.	SGT E5	Co B	KIA	CSW in head	1B40
TAYLOR, James R.	PVT E2	Co B	KIA	CSW in abdomen	1B10

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>	<u>TYPE WOUNDS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
LAMAR, Phillip	SP4 E4	Co B	KIA	GSM in head	11B20
CHEWING, Leroy R.	SP4 E4	Co B	93rd Evac	Shrapnel (1) head	11B20
COMLEY, Green	SP4 E4	Co B	KIA	GSM in head	11B20
HARRIS, David K.	SP4 E4	Co B	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel in abdomen	11B20
BENNETT, Robert	SGT E5	Co B	Rtn to Duty	Shrapnel in cheek	11B40


Page 2 to Inclosure 2 (Casualty List) to After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO

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KAHJALA OPERATION



COMBAT - AFTER-ACTION
REPORT

2D BDE, 25TH INF. DIV.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US Forces 96225

AVTLEDB-T

14 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. (Operation KAHALA) OPORD 21-66.
2. 160700 April - 211910 April 66.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted search and destroy operations in the northwestern portion of Hau Nghia Province in area bounded by coordinates XT4430, XT5012, XT5712, XT6028. The operation was a three battalion sized operation reinforced with an Armored company and a Cavalry troop.
4. Control Headquarters: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel L. M. Johnson, Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders were as follows:

Phase I and II: (16-19 April)

TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Mooney Cmdg)

1/27 Inf (-)
B Trp (-) 3/4 Cav
1 Sqd B/65

Bde Control

1/8 Arty (-)
Plat (-) B/65
MP Plat
Plat B Trp 3/4 Cav

TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg)

2/27 Inf (-)
A Co (-) 69th Armor
1 Sqd B/65

TF 1/5 (M) Inf (Lt Col Greer Cmdg)

1/5 (M) Inf (-)
Plat A 1/69 Armor
1 Sqd B/65

Phase III: (20-21 April)

TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Mooney Cmdg)

1/27 Inf (-)
Plat A 1/69 Armor
1 Sqd B/65

Bde Control

A Co (-) 1/69 Armor
Trp B 3/4 Cav
Plat (-) B/65
MP Plat

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD Dir 5200.10

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TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg)

2/27 Inf (-)
Plat A 1/65 Armor
1 Sqd B/65

TF 1/5 (M) Inf (Lt Col Greer Cmdg)

1/5 (M) (-)
1 Sqd B/65

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for Combat.

(a) 1/8 Arty:

1 1/8 Arty (-): GS 2d Bde
2 B 1/8 Arty: GS 25th Inf Div

(b) 3/13 Arty:

1 3/13 Arty (-): GS 25th Inf Div
2 B 3/13 Arty: GSR 1/8 Arty (-)
3 Plat (8" How) D 3/13: GSR 1/8 Arty (-)

(2) How and when artillery employed:

(a) Artillery supported from two locations during the operation. 16-19 April Artillery base was located vic XT585215. 20-21 April Artillery base was located vic XT577181.

(b) Fires were utilized primarily to suppress sniper fire and soften areas in front of advancing infantrymen.

(c) During Phase III of the operation preplanned artillery fires (832 HE rds) were placed on the objective area.

(d) Artillery was used to maximum advantage in protection of downed CH-47 on 20 April.

(e) On-call artillery fires were available throughout the operation.

(f) A total 747 missions using 3797 105rds were fired in support of the operation.

(3) Results, Effectiveness, and Timeliness:

(a) As a result of artillery fire there were 21 VC KIA (BG), 11 POSS, 7 structures destroyed, 11 damaged.

(b) Reinforcing fire provided by elements of 3/13 Artillery enabled the Brigade to employ fire power on targets at greater ranges, and, in addition, increased the effectiveness of artillery fires on close in targets.

(c) Both 155mm and 8" proved to be very effective during preparation fires on heavily wooded areas.

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(d) Fires placed on the objective during Phase III of the operation were both accurate and timely.

(e) H & I fires again denied the VC freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

b. US Air Force:

(1) Four airstrikes were flown in support of the operation. One was immediate; three were preplanned.

(a) Reaction time for the immediate strike was twenty-five minutes.

(b) All air strikes were requested by telephone (Hot Line) through 25th Infantry Division G3.

(c) A napalm strike was placed in vicinity of LZ's at 201220 April. The strike proved to be effective in suppressing VC sniper fire.

(2) Results of Air Strikes:

(a) An immediate strike effectively suppressed heavy mortar fires being placed on 2d Bn, 27th Infantry 201700 April and also destroyed 10 structures in the area.

(b) There were 6 KBA (BC), 18 (POSS), 4 structures destroyed, 2 damaged as a result of air strikes.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation flew a total of 520 sorties and moved 160 tons of supplies during the operation.

(2) 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Aviation Section provided CH23 supplies during the operation.

(3) On 160900 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted by 40 UH1D's and 4 CH47's from the Avn Bn to LZ's vic XT500228 and XT505265.

(4) On 201240 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted to LZ's vic XT498157 and XT503145 by 20 UH1D's and 4 CH47's from the 11 Avn Bn.

(5) All lifts were conducted as planned with no significant problems except as follows:

(a) Initial loading zone in base camp was not large enough to adequately unload 40 UH1D's and CH47's simultaneously.

(b) On 20 April one CH 47 was disabled by heavy ground fire and forced to land vic XT540216 during lift of 2d Bn, 27th Infantry.

8. Intelligence:

a. Analysis of Terrain In Which Operation Was Conducted.

The terrain in the area of operations was generally flat to very gently rolling with very few relief features or high ground. Ground cover and vegetation varied from extensive rice paddies and small crop fields to various types of scrub. Also interspersed among the agricultural fields were small areas of woodland both natural and cultivated. Numerous dikes and ditches crisscrossed the cultivated portion of the area. Cross-country movement for tracked vehicles was fair to good in the dry paddies.

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and woodland areas and fair to impossible in the wet paddies, swamps, and marshes. Movement for foot troops was fair to good in most areas traversed. Tanks encountered difficulty in crossing streams and marshy areas.

b. Intelligence Prior to Operation.

VC activity within the operational area had been light. The VC incidents were concentrated along LOC's. A Red Haze mission flown on 12 April disclosed 14 emissions from the area coord XT510285 to XT550270. The VC units operating in the area included one Local Force Company and one guerrilla platoon. The Trang Bang Company, with a strength of 70, was unlocated but it usually operated within a radius of approximately 5 kilometers north of Trang Bang. The Quyet Chien Platoon #5 with an attached squad had been reported in the vic of coord XT575230 on 8 April 1966.

c. Enemy Situation During Operation.

As the Brigade Task Force moved into the operational area, the VC dispersed into hiding areas and exfiltrated from the area. Enemy activity consisted mainly of sniper and mortar fires, booby traps, AT and AP mines (command detonated and pressure types). Although enemy contact was not intense, a successful search of the operational area disclosed caches of rice, documents, and a medical training area.

9. Mission: The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division was to conduct search and destroy operations commencing 16 April in Trang Bang District vic XTH430, XT5012, XT5712, XT6028, to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps.

10. Concept of the Operation: The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted airmobile and ground move to AO commencing 160700 April to conduct search and destroy operations. The operation was conducted in four phases.

Phase I: (16-18 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry moved to AO GREEN employing airmobile and ground elements to conduct search and destroy operations. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations along their axis of advance and established blocking pens along PL NASH.

Phase II: (18-20 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in their respective AO's. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry continued to block and conduct search and destroy ops along PL NASH.

Phase III: (20-21 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry conducted airmobile move to LZ's vic XTH98157 and XT503145 respectively. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry, Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor, Trp B 3/4 Cavalry moved overland to establish blocking pens around objective. Subsequently all units conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned areas.

Phase IV: (21 April) All units returned to base camp on order. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry and Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor conducted sweeps outside Highway 1 on return to base camp.

11. Execution: 2d Brigade received OPORD 6-66 131415 April 1966.

D-Day (16 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

At 0645 the Battalion minus Company B, and reinforced with a platoon of tanks began their move to AO BLUE. The Bn TF swept north, then due west along three axes; Company C on the east, the reconnaissance platoon reinforced with tanks in the center, and Co A on the west. The units established blocking portions east of PL NASH. Several booby-trapped rice caches were located during the day. A 2000 lb cache vic XT599253 and 20 100 kilo

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bag cache in the same area. The rice was extracted by helicopter. Two AP mines were detonated by APC's. The APC's were not damaged. However, 1 friendly KIA, and 2 WIA were sustained vic XT601266, when an APC hit a mine. No significant contact was made during the day. At dusk, the Bn TF established blocking pens east of PL NASH vic XT568248. Four ambushes were established with no contact. MEDCAP was conducted during the day for approximately 20 women and children in the vicinity of the Battalion CP.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry (Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav)

At 0752, Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav with the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry land tail moved to vic XT505252 where the Battalion CP was established. Several dirt road blocks were bypassed during the move. By 0850 Companies A and B had begun their airmobile move to AO GREEN. The airmobile and ground forces linked up at 1015. Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav screened the western edge of the AO while Companies A and B moved abreast to the east conducting thorough search and destroy operations. Company B apprehended 11 VCS vic XT505258. At 1533 Company B engaged a VC squad vic XT524246 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), two US carbines, and one Chicom 7.62 rifle captured. Airborne gunships were utilized against VC during the engagement. The TF, minus Co B, established a perimeter around the Bn CP vic XT515259. Company B coiled vic XT521245. At 2048, Company B was attacked from three sides by approximately 20 VC. At the same time two of the Company's ambushes were sprung. As a result of the attack there were four VC KIA (BC) including a woman squad leader armed with a 7.92 Mauser rifle. The company continued to receive harassing sniper fire throughout the night. MEDCAP was conducted for 20 civilians at the village of X Rung Cay (XT5026) during the day.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

Companies B and C conducted airmobile assaults into LZ IRON (XT500226) and LZ GOLD (XT500243) at 0930 hours. The Battalion Command Group and land tail moved overland arriving in the AO by 1055. Companies B and C attacked east conducting search and destroy operations in zone. Light VC sniper fire was encountered during the morning hours but was suppressed by tanks and artillery. A large peanut and rice cache was located vic XT509248. In addition an extensive tunnel system was located in the area and destroyed. The Bn TF continued to receive sniper fire. At 1315 Company C captured a wounded VC with a weapon vic XT508220. Company C continued to maneuver against the VC and upon overrunning the area found 3 VC KIA (BC) and captured two VC. At 1500, while continuing to search the area, another fire fight ensued resulting in an additional 3 VC KIA (BC). Later, at 1630, Co B apprehended six VCS vic XT510247. The Bn Task Force established a perimeter vic XT500226 for the night. Three ambushes were established, none having contact.

D+1 (17 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed search and destroy operations along PL NASH. Co. moved south, XT575235 - XT580228. Co C with one tank platoon attached moved north XT575255 - XT575283. What appeared to be a VC rest area was located vic XT574235. The hut contained many pictures, signs, and directional arrows pointing at the various trails in the area. At 1330 Co C (+) made initial contact vic XT580287 with a reinforced VC squad utilizing MG's, 57RR, and automatic weapons vic XT580287. One tank and one APC were damaged in the area by AT mines. The vehicles were repaired on site, however, and returned to action. Artillery and mortar fires were called on suspected VC locations. There were 4 VC KIA (POSS) during the action. At 2233 the ambush vic XT568278 was sprung killing five VC (BC) and estimating 3 KIA.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0130 the Company A ambush vic XT512265 engaged several VC result-

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Aug 11 3 40 PM (20). At 0700 the Battalion CP continued their methodical and detailed search of their AO. The Battalion Surgeon conducted MEDCAP at the village of Ap Cha Ray (XT5125) for seventeen civilians. Large caches of rice were lifted to Trung Bang for redistribution. At 1330 Co B located and destroyed four tunnels via XT512249. At 1407 Trp B, 3/4 Cav apprehended 2 VCS via XT525242. The Task Force coiled for the night via XT523253.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion continued to move east conducting detailed search and destroy operations with Company C on the north and Co B on the south. The Battalion Command Group received sniper fire during the morning. One Command and Control ship received several hits, but remained operational. At 0843 an exact hit a mine vicinity of XT505228. At 1135 the Battalion Command Group began its displacement. At 1138 the third vehicle in the convoy, a tank, was severely damaged by a command detonated mine. Two friendly WIA were sustained and the tank was declared a total loss. A 3/4 ton truck dispatched to assist the injured personnel in the disabled vehicle struck a land mine. At the same time small arms fire was placed on the convoy from the woodland to the west of the road. This fire was returned by small arms, machineguns, tanks firing cannister and mortar fires. A VC mortar harassing Company C was silenced by gunships in the area. As the convoy displacing the Battalion CP continued, it was engaged with small arms via XT527207. A brief fire fight resulted in one VC KIA (DC), two KIA (POSS). The new CP became operational at 1840 in vicinity of XT538217. Several mortar rds were fired into the Battalion perimeter during the night. One WIA was sustained. Counter mortar fires were immediately called, silencing the VC mortars.

D-2 (18 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion TF continued to blocking pan along PL NASH. Company A established a series of squad sized blocking positions along that line. One squad vicinity XT574237 captured a VCS who revealed after interrogation that he was a VC messenger and worked in conjunction with three other VC's. He also reported five VC's with carbines were located hiding in a tunnel vicinity XT575236. No VC's were found in this location, however. Co C continued to conduct search and destroy operations and screen the northern portion of PL NASH. A small rice cache located vicinity XT584296 proved to be booby trapped. The cache was destroyed. In addition, a medical training area was located in the same general area. The training center contained text books and documents, some with publication dates as late as 20 March 1966. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon operated in grid squares XT5626 and XT5627. 10 bunkers, 10 tunnels, and 15 freshly built shelters were located and destroyed in the area. Also the platoon found twenty copies of the "Tropic Lightning News" dated 15 April 1966 in a house vicinity XT567277. The Battalion AO was enlarged as shown in inclosure 1. The Battalion then moved to new location via XT547257 where a perimeter was established.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed and thorough searches of their AO via XT5027, XT5023, XT5323, XT5527. Numerous rice caches were discovered. Large caches were found at XT526246, XT525248, XT525245. At 1300 Company D found a group of fortifications with VC emplacements and an underground room 6' by 6' by 4 1/2' at XT509245. Defensive positions for the night were centered around XT523257. The Battalion defensive pans were probed by small VC units throughout the night. Company B killed one VC probing the perimeter via XT525747.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0745 Companies B and C and Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor commenced

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119 search and destroy operations with emphasis on a methodical search of their
117 40. Co B apprehended one VCS in the vicinity of the Battalion perimeter
XT532220. Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor dispersed several VC snipers vic
XT539200 with cannister. Also several trenches and tunnels in the vicinity
of XT534195 were destroyed. Throughout the morning Company C engaged VC
who used harassing and evasive tactics. Four VC were flushed and fired upon
vic XT530196, with unknown results. One tank hit a mine at XT533189 causing
minor damage. All units continued their operations returning to the battalion
perimeter by 1600. During the afternoon twenty civilians in the area were
treated during MEDCAP. During the evening mortar fire was placed on suspec-
ted VC positions throughout the area.

D+3 (19 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion began its move to new area of operations to search the
village in vicinity of XT570176. The heavy mortar platoon, Recon Platoon,
and company weapons platoon established blocks around the village. A total
of 9 VCS and no VCC were apprehended during the search. Also a cache con-
taining three 155 duds, one 75 lb bomb and seven steel helmets was located
vicinity XT576173. The duds were blown in place, the helmets recovered. The
thorough search was terminated at 1733 and a battalion perimeter was estab-
lished vic XT563187. Nine ambushes were established in the area to prevent
VC mining the road and establishing ambushes along it.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

During the night, the Battalion perimeter was probed periodically by
small numbers of VC. VC were engaged with small arms, M-79's and mortars
with unknown results. Numerous trench and bunker complexes were located
and destroyed during the day's searches. A tunnel vicinity XT519241 was
approximately 30 meters long with a room large enough to accommodate four
to six people. An active civil affairs program was continued in the
Battalion 40. "Helping Hand" items of soap, toothbrushes, and toothpaste
were distributed to the villagers of X Rung Gay (XT5026). Preparations were
made for the following day's airmobile operations. At 2215 a claymore
killed one VC vic XT523251. Also at 2300 Co B's ambush vicinity XT517244
was sprung killing 2 VC.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

During the morning Companies B (+) and C (+) conducted search and
destroy operations south of the Battalion CP to the vicinity of Highway 1.
Cannisters were effectively employed to neutralize VC snipers in the area.
Company C evacuated 1500 lbs of rice from the area and apprehended 11 VCS
during the sweep. In the afternoon hours the Battalion Reconnaissance and
Security platoons conducted search and destroy operation southeast of the
Battalion CP. No contact was made. At 1915 automatic weapons fire was
received in the Battalion perimeter from XT532215. Fire was immediately re-
turned and tanks aggressively searched the area with no results.

D+4 (20 April 1966)

Phase III of the operation was initiated and in accordance with
FM 7-21.1 to OPORD 21-66 an airmobile and ground assault consisting of
mechanized, armored, and cavalry units was launched into 40 PINK. At
1220 a napalm strike was placed vic XT505158 to suppress VC fire on the
L2's. At 1220 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry and Trp B, 3/4 Cav crossed High-
way 1 to establish blocking positions and prevent VC exfiltration from the
area. Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor followed these units, moving to Objective
D to conduct search and destroy operations.

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion moved quickly to establish blocking pans along PL YELLOW.

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120 The block had been established by 1300. At 1400 Company A initiated search and destroy operation in Objective C moving from north to south. Company C moved abreast of Company A searching the western portion of the objective. 12. Three civilians who had been wounded by a VC AT mine were evacuated from the area. At 1520 the company killed a VC sniper via XT524443 and captured his carbino. The search of Objective C was completed by 1540 and the search of Objective E was subsequently initiated. A thorough search of Objective E was terminated at 1815 without contact. Company A was ordered to return to base camp upon completion of the search in Objective E. The Company (+) closed base camp at 1915. Company C remained in Objective C, and established numerous night ambushes. The ambush located at XT523147 was sprung at 1945 killing 5 VC. A team of tracks dispatched to reinforce the ambush engaged and killed another VC and captured his carbino.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0200 approximately 13 rounds of 81 and 82mm mortar rounds were received in the Battalion perimeter resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 WIA. Immediate countermortar fire were placed on the VC position and the mortars were silenced. At 1240 the Battalion (-) conducted a airmobile assault into LZ via XT500108. Co B established a blocking position along the western edge of Objective A. Trp B, 3/4 Cav maintained their blocking positions north of Objective A. At the same time Co A conducted a slow methodical search of the objective. 22 VCS were apprehended during the search. 34 structures and three tunnels were destroyed in the area. No VC contacts were made during the night.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

At 1232 the Battalion Task Force commenced their airmobile assault into LZ via XT506146. While making an approach into the landing zone via XT540216, one CH-47 was disabled by ground fire. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon remained with the disabled aircraft as security. In addition an OH-23 carrying the Battalion sergeant major on a reconnaissance was fired on by VC snipers. The pilot was hit but managed to land the helicopter safely. He was immediately evacuated. Throughout the day, Companies B and C conducted detailed search and destroy operations in Objective B, moving from west to east. 20 VCS were detained in the operational area. In addition approximately 120 women and children were detained for further disposition. Concurrently, the platoon securing the Chinook was brought under small arms and mortar fire. Gunships and artillery were used in an attempt to disrupt VC fire. The Battalion Commander's command and control ship was utilized to evacuate wounded from the area and in addition moved elements of the command group to the new operational area. At 1750 an airstrike was flown to suppress VC fire being placed on the downed Chinook and its security force. Finally at 1920 the CH-47 was repaired and departed the area. The Reconnaissance platoon was immediately evacuated from the area. The Battalion (-) coiled in Objective B for the night. At 2040 a Co B ambush killed 2 VC and captured a Chinese carbino in the vicinity of XT506145. Also a VCS was apprehended in the area at 2215.

D+5 (21 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

During the morning the Battalion (-) swept through Objective C again. 86 women and children were evacuated from the area and relocated in the Thai My New Life hamlet (XT5314). One VCS apprehended was turned over to the National Police. Based on an intelligence report of VC tax collecting activities in a village via XT585155, the Battalion (-) sealed off the village and conducted a thorough search of the area. No evidence of VC activities could be found. Company C and the Battalion CP returned to base camp by 1345. The Battalion reconnaissance platoon remained in the AO to secure the civilians until evacuation had been completed. By 1212, evacuation was complete and the reconnaissance platoon commenced move to base

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121 camp. The platoon had two contacts during their return, killing 2 VC vicinity XT553153. One platoon from Company A provided security for a VTR returning a disabled 1st Bn, 27th Infantry vehicle. All elements of the Battalion closed base camp by 1800.

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1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion continued their aggressive search of Objective A. Emphasis was placed on maximum destruction of tunnels and trenches in the area. At 1200 Companies A and B commenced their airlift to base camp utilizing three UH1D's. The land tail departed the operational area at 1436. At XT497172 the convoy was engaged with sniper fire. Troops immediately dismounted, and deployed against suspected VC positions. VC mortars fired into the area resulting in 6 friendly WIA's and damage to one 2 1/2 ton truck. The truck was towed back to base camp. By 1710 all Task Force elements had closed base camp.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

Search and destroy operations continued in Objective B with emphasis on destruction of VC tunnels and fortifications in the area. Upon completion of operations, Companies B and C marched to vic XT553166, where trucks returned the units to base camp by 1800. The Battalion CP was airlifted to base camp.

12. Results:

Friendly Losses

KIA: 3
WIA: 45

Enemy Losses

VC KIA (BC)	47
VC KIA (POSS)	44
VC KBA (BC)	6
VC KBA (POSS)	18
VCC	22
VCS	105
Rice:	1.1 ton destroyed
	15.1 ton evacuated
Peanuts	700 lbs evacuated
S/A	16 evacuated
Hvy Wpns	1 mortar destroyed
Documents	15 lbs evacuated
Bldgs	125 destroyed
Tunnels	4 destroyed
Bunkers	51 destroyed
Booby Traps	40 destroyed
Mines	5 destroyed
Steel Helmets	7 evacuated
Medical Supplies	1 box evacuated
Tape Recorder	1 evacuated
Radio	1 evacuated
Bombs and Duds	75 lb - destroyed
	250 lb - destroyed
	500 lb - destroyed
	175 lb - destroyed

The following is a recapitulation of combat damage to vehicles and aircraft.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

1 2 1/2 ton truck damaged and evacuated.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

2 3/4 ton trucks damaged; one evacuated, one repaired in the field.

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1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

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4 APC's damaged and repaired in the field.

Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry

5 tanks damaged, three evacuated, 2 repaired in the field.

Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

4 tanks damaged; 2 repaired in the field, 2 evacuated (one beyond repair).

HHC, 2d Brigade

1 helicopter damaged and evacuated.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:

(1) All resupply of Class I, V and water was effected by air except for two overland convoys in support of the artillery at Trung Lap.

(2) A forward trains element was located at Trung Lap within the 1st Bn, 8th Artillery area. The following comprised this element:

(a) Maintenance and POL personnel

(b) Selected vehicles - VTR's, wreckers and a service unit for flame APC's.

(c) 5,000 gallon water tanker, 5,000 gallon Mogas tanker, and 5,000 gallon diesel tanker.

(d) A contact maintenance team from Support Command.

(3) Support Command spotted a 5,000 gallon water tanker, and a drum stockage of 30 diesel, 30 Mogas, and 20 Avgas drums at the resupply pad in base camp.

(4) POL consumption by units is as follows:

1st Bn, (M), 5th Infantry

Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

3610 gallons Mogas
810 gallons Diesel

450 gallons Mogas
1980 gallons Diesel

Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry

1450 gallons Mogas
2600 gallons Diesel

(5) A total of 359 resupply missions were flown airlifting 160 tons. The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

Class I - 30.6 tons
Class V - 37.2 tons
Water - 33.0 tons

POL - 22.2 tons
Misc - 38.0 tons.

b. Combat loads: Upon departing base camp personnel carried two canteens of water and two C-Rations meals. Ammunition loads were as follows:

M-14 - 200 rds; M-16 - 300 rds; M14E2 - 300 rds; M60 - 1500 rds; M79 - 36 rds;
5 AW's per platoon; 4 claymores per platoon; 2 hand grenades per man; 2 CS/CN
grenades per fire team.

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c. Maintenance:

(1) A Maintenance Contact Team was established as indicated previously.

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(2) 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry had twenty-one vehicles inoperative because of mechanical failure. Only four APC's had to be returned to base camp for these deficiencies; all of these on the last day of the operation.

(3) Maintenance was stressed throughout the operation. Maintenance inspections were conducted by unit commanders upon return to base camp.

d. Treatment of casualties and evacuation.

(1) Battalion aid stations accompanied the Battalion Forward Command Posts.

(2) The Brigade Surgeon remained at the Brigade Forward CP.

(3) Resupply and Command and Control ships were used whenever possible, depending on the seriousness of the casualty, for medical evacuation.

e. Communications.

(1) Types utilized.

(a) FM radio

(b) AM radio

1 Point to point (Hot Line) telephone.

2 Switchboard to switchboard (common user telephone).

3 Teletype (on line crypto)

(c) Courier (liaison officers)

(d) Wire.

(2) Because of initial overlap on the Brigade Command Net 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry had to switch to the alternate frequency.

(3) Courier remains the fastest, simplest method of transmitting classified, time deadline reports over short distances. These reports include the INTSUM and the SITREP.

(4) Incorporation and use of the new family of radios in the Brigade Command Net was accomplished satisfactorily.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

Starlight devices were carried by all units and utilized during night operations.

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. TACR boundaries must not be planned too close to the actual area of operation. When such is the case and targets are outside the TACR, the delay necessitated by fire coordination results in the loss of the quick reaction of supporting fires.

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b. Too many vehicles were taken by the 2d Bn, 27th Infantry, thus causing movement problems.

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c. When tanks cannot be utilized by units due to terrain, they should be returned to Brigade Control as soon as possible.

d. Units must thoroughly and quickly clear their base defensive perimeter. This will prevent VC from emplacing claymores and launching surprise attacks. In the daytime, smaller ambushes or outposts must be used to prevent sniping at choppers coming in to land. Once fire is received, aggressive action must be initiated to suppress fires.

e. Different routes must be used when leaving areas. Suspected routes of movement are always mined and booby trapped.

f. Units should anticipate VC mortar fire at any time. Dispersion must always be maintained to prevent unnecessary losses. Night defensive positions should include overhead cover whenever possible. Spoil or sand bags should be placed so as to provide the individual with maximum cover from the flanks as well as the front and rear.

g. In VC infested areas double or mutually supporting ambushes should be employed. This technique may prove to be better than a large platoon sized ambush. When ambushes mutually support one another, they must be a minimum of 200 yards apart in order to effectively employ claymore mines in all directions. When small ambushes are employed consideration should be given to employing claymore mines in depth i.e., 40 meters, 20 meters.

h. Just prior to an airmobile extraction, a sweep around the landing zone should be conducted. This will not eliminate the need for basic security throughout the extraction, but will assist in elimination of some of the snipers in nearby areas.

i. Whenever an area is to be destroyed, arrangements must be made to accommodate civilians and refugees, even though none may be expected. Women and children can create a big problem. ARVN assistance with the civilians is a must. Arrangements should be made to have a standby team from the Province in which operations are conducted so that the team can be airlifted into the area very quickly when needed.

j. The tailend of a march column, whether foot mobile or motorized, must be especially watchful since the VC will habitually fire at the last troops leaving an area. Instant reaction is a must.

k. When selecting assembly areas, consideration should be given to including roads if they are in the area, and if the area is in an open field remaining in the center of it.

l. Numerous strong ambushes must be located surrounding defensive positions, particularly on the first night of occupation since results obtained have been excellent.

m. Continuous reconnaissance must be made to locate routes which heavy vehicles may use to avoid wet areas and linkup with infantry.

n. Units must emphasize shell reps when VC's mortar our positions.

o. Before moving on a highway, units must insure that both sides of the highway have been cleared.

p. Although fire must be returned immediately, indiscriminate firing into villages must cease.

q. Unless it is an operational necessity, no cross attachments should be made at night.

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r. During the third phase of the operation, Trang Bang officials should have been brought up to date soon enough for them to effectively halt civilians leaving the operational area.

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s. A vigorous Civil Affairs Program was conducted throughout operation KAHALA.

(1) Approximately 200 civilians were treated during MEDCAP.

(2) Helping Hand supplies were distributed throughout the operational area. Demonstrations were given on the proper use of the health items distributed.

(3) 12 tons of rice were evacuated from the operational area. The rice was turned over to the Trang Bang sub-sector advisor to be given to needy families.

(4) 89 civilians were evacuated from VC controlled areas during the third phase of the operation to the Duc Ha #2 New Life Hamlet (XT6413).

(5) A Psy/ops loudspeaker mission was flown over the village of X Rung Cay to exploit the VC mortar attack on that village the previous day.

t. VC will mine the sides of roads adjacent to road blocks. Therefore bypassing road blocks, units must thoroughly check the area for mines.

u. According to reliable reports, Trung Lap is used as a refuge for the VC during operations in that area.

v. Landing zones should be planned closer to objectives.

w. Plans for operations must be rigidly adhered to.

x. Only necessary traffic should be transmitted over radios. All radio operators should know exactly what they are going to say prior to transmitting.

y. In general, all units participating in Operation KAHALA performed in a outstanding manner throughout the exercise. The final phase of the operation was particularly complex due to the numerous elements and agencies involved. Nevertheless, each element executed its movements and mission exactly as planned. Consequently, 119 valid VCS were apprehended, 14 of which were confirmed VC and the remainder primarily draft dodgers.

16. Recommendations:

a. Division should place a "Recovery Reaction Force" on a 30 minute standby at Base Camp to respond to evacuation and recovery missions on a mission basis only.

(1) Composition - Equipment

2 VTR's 1 Lowboy
1 Wrecker 1 Escort Platoon

(2) Composition - Personnel

Maintenance Warrant Officer
Necessary drivers
Recovery personnel.

(3) Procedures.

(a) Brigade S-4 contacts G-4 outlining mission and requirements.

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
(b) G-4 contacts Support Command which tailors the basic standby element to accomplish the mission.

(c) Vehicles and Escort report to Division formation area and meet with the Brigade Representative who issues frequency and call sign.

b. Prior planning should provide for evacuation of civilians at the earliest possible time in order to release those combat troops used to control the civilians.


FOR THE COMMANDER:


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LOVETT L. BRIGGS
Captain, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

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


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
65TH ENGR BN


25TH DIVISION
LAYOUT


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
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
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1. CINCUSARPAC msg GPOP-OP 600 dtd 11 Jan 66, "Final Movement Directive (U)"
2. 25th Inf Div TLC - 1-57 "Availability Date (U)" dtd 13 Jan 66
3. 25th Inf Div TLC - 1-83 "Warning Order (U)" dtd 29 Jan 66
4. 25th Inf Div TLC - 1-95 "Deployment of the 25th Inf Div (S)" dtd 1 Feb 66
5. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-102 "Disposition of Nuclear Elements (U)" dtd 3 Feb 66
6. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 2568 "Advance Movement Directive (U)" dtd 3 Feb 66
7. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 3017 "Movement Directive (U)" dtd 12 Feb 66
8. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 3158 "Amendment to Movement Directive (U)" dtd 15 Feb 66
9. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-137 "Cavalry Troop Departure (U)" dtd 16 Feb 66
10. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-124 "Deployment Planning (U)" dtd 16 Feb 66
11. 25th Inf Div TLC 2-123 "Deployment of Div (-) (U)" dtd 16 Feb 66
12. MACJ3 Secret 05073 "1/69th Armor (U)" dtd 17 Feb 66
13. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-135 "Movement Order (U)" dtd 18 Feb 66
14. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-141 "Advance Party (U)" dtd 8 Feb 66
15. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-143 "Dist of M-16 Rifles (U)" dtd 19 Feb 66
16. 25th Inf Div TLC - 2-149 "25th Inf Div Organic Aviation (U)" dtd 22 Feb 66
17. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 3694 "Final Movement Directive (U)" dtd 22 Feb 66
18. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 3691 "Movement Directive (U)" dtd 22 Feb 66
19. MACJ312 Secret 05948 "Country Clearance for 25th Inf Div (-) (C)" dtd 24 Feb 66

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Appendix 14 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

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Bibliography of Messages (Con't)

20. 25th Inf Div TLO - 2-149 "25th Inf Div Communications Equipment Requirements (U)" dtd 28 Feb 66
21. Congressional Record, Vol 112, pp4471-4472

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LOGISTICS (1 Jan - 30 Apr 66)

1. Supply.

a. Two major tracked vehicle weapons systems were incorporated into the division during the period. The 155mm towed howitzer was replaced by the self-propelled 155mm howitzer (M109) and the medium tank model M48A2 and the light tank M41A1 was replaced by the model M48A3. In addition, the authorized tracked recon vehicle, the M114, was replaced by the M113 APC in all applicable units of the division. Six M132 tracked vehicle flamethrowers were issued to the division's engineer battalion for deployment.

b. During the period, division completed the conversion of 1/4 ton utility trucks (jeeps) from the M38A1 series to the M151 and M151A10 series. One hundred percent of the old model 2 1/2 ton cargo trucks were replaced by the new M35A1 multi-fuel series.

c. Two of the division's brigade task forces, the 2d and the 3d, underwent a conversion of communications equipment upon arrival in RVN. The new family radio series sets were shipped in specially prepared packages from COMUS to RVN for rapid conversion. All infantry battalions, the cavalry sqdn, and the armored battalion were issued the new M-16, 5.56mm rifle as a replacement for the rifle, 7.62mm, M-14.

d. Prior to departure from Hawaii, Department of the Army authorized six major WABTOC items of supply, they were:

- (1) Tent, GP, medium which was to be utilized for troop living, mess, supply and administration.
- (2) Refrigerators, walk-in, 65 cu ft.
- (3) Ice machine plants, one per battalion.
- (4) Generator sets, 10KW, 60 cycle, one per company sized unit plus one per battalion.
- (5) Ice chests, 400 lb capacity. One per company sized unit.
- (6) Folding cots.

e. The division submitted appropriate requisitions for the above items plus many other items of special equipment authorized by special messages. A major item which was not available for issue to division units was generators in sufficient quantities.

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f. Headquarters USARPAC allowed units to deploy with many items of post, camp and station property. Major items included file cabinets, desks, chairs, tables, safes, tools, tentage, communications equipment and MHE. All of these items proved to be invaluable upon arrival in-country.

g. Elements of the 3/4 Cavalry and 69th Armor were deployed through Okinawa. USARVSI provided many items of V.BTCO equipment from on-hand depot stocks. This issue enabled these units to arrive RVN well prepared for quick establishment of excellent living facilities.

h. The division received sufficient quantities of fortification materials to accomplish construction of all fortification construction objectives. Additional quantities were available for operational requirements in the future.

1. The AGCS, G4 continued to process all reports of survey emanating in division units for submission to the Division Commander for final action. The Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, was appointed installation commander.

2. Maintenance.

a. On 14 January 1966, a recommendation was received by Avn Section, Division Artillery, to fabricate metal seats for the OH23G. These seats offer greater protection to pilot and passenger. Work orders were given to G4 USARMA and 33 seats were constructed to equip all OH23G's within the division.

b. On 2 February 1966, a letter was sent to 1st Brigade recommending that benches be constructed to fit within the cargo space of the 2 1/2 ton cargo truck - construction of benches so troops would be seated back to back facing out to offer greater security while in convoy or movements. 22 April - Generator classes started in 725th Maintenance Battalion. Classes were completed by 91 operators. 30 April - The metal protection fabricated for the gunner of the M113 has proved of great value - many lives have been saved because of this fabrication adapted in December 1965.

3. Deployment and Plans.

a. During the period the G4 plans officer wrote and coordinated six (6) movement orders, five of which concerned movement of division elements from Hawaii to RVN, and one which ordered movement of a division element within RVN. Close coordination was maintained with SUPCOM on execution of all moves,

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however, direct supervision was not exercised of the embarkation as the Division Transportation Officer was transferred to SUPCOM in December 1965.

b. The G4 Section coordinated and directly supervised embarkation and movement of all division elements to base camps in RVN. A special report of the division deployment is to be completed on closing of all elements in RVN. As of 30 April, cargo from the SUPCOM and 1st Brigade was still being off-loaded in Saigon. During embarkation of the 2d and 3d Brigades, Lt Colonel Davis, G4 representative on the Division Advance Planning Group, coordinated embarkation at VUNG TAU, SAIGON and QUI NHON. Embarkation of the remaining division elements were coordinated by officers of the G4 Section stationed at each critical location- VUNG TAU for personnel off-loading, SAIGON PORT for cargo off-loading, and at Cu Chi, to coordinate reception of incoming personnel and cargo. No major difficulties were encountered in any of the embarkations.

c. During this period the G4 Plans Office wrote and assembled Administrative Order 1-66, published 22 April 1966, to provide for administrative and logistical support of division operations conducted with Cu Chi as the logistical base. Convey control procedures were published on 9 March 1966 by the G4 Section to adapt the Division Tactical SOP to conditions encountered in RVN.

d. A liaison visit was conducted by the Plans Officer to the 1st Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade. These visits proved extremely valuable by providing an opportunity to obtain logistical experience data for ground and air supported operations. This data has since been corroborated by division experience in brigade-size operations.

4. Installations and Projects.

a. Plans to develop and produce a wood tent frame and floor which began in October 1965 was executed with considerable success. A plan was devised that would provide a frame for tents, GP Medium, improving the working and living conditions of division personnel in the event of deployment. The Assistant Division Engineer was requested to formulate the plans and bill of materials for this tent frame. The plans contained in TM 5-302 for tent frames was modified to include rafters, thereby eliminating the need for upright and ridge poles. A design to provide frames for the tents, GP large and small was also devised.

b. In December 1965, after the division was alerted to deploy a two brigade task force to RVN, a request was submitted to CG, USAF to precut and prepackage tent kits for 14 tents, GP large; 984 Tents, GP medium and 83 tents, GP small. Approval was received and the kits were precut and prepackaged by the Schofield Barracks Area Engineer.

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c. In January 1966 an additional requirement was requested to provide additional tent kits for the remainder of the division. The following breakdown of tent kits ordered, preout, packaged and shipped to RVN for the 25th Infantry Division.

	<u>GP SMALL</u>	<u>GP MEDIUM</u>	<u>GP LARGE</u>	<u>GP MED MOD</u>
Holokai XI	39	464	7	0
Holokai XII	39	459	7	0
69th Armor	5	61	0	0
Division (-)	<u>194</u>	<u>890</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>21</u>
Totals	277	1,874	32	21

d. The requirements for tent kits GP medium was computed as follows:

- (1) 1 kit per 12 persons - quarters.
- (2) 1 kit per TOE kitchen.
- (3) 2 kits per company for admin - storage.
- (4) 1 kit per TOE authorized tent.

e. While the above requirements have generally proved adequate, shortages have developed as a result of unforeseen unit attachments, division wide over-strength, and administrative requirements and as shelters for PX's, Civic Action material, barber shops and laundries.



General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, walks with Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, from the helipad as he arrives at the Division Base Camp at Cu Chi, for a tour of the area and briefings. Behind them is Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, II Field Forces Commander, Vietnam. 20 Apr 66.

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Colonel Lynnwood M. Johnson, CO, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, is shown by a member of the 1st 2/27th Infantry, where heavy sniper fire originated during Operation MAKAPA, 12 Apr 66.

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Co, CO B, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division calling in an after action report. The CO is holding one of the captured weapons, another is on the ground. 8 Apr 66.

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Colonel Lynnwood M. Johnson, Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, gets briefing from 1/5th Infantry (Mech) officers on how well Operation KAHALA is progressing at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 21 Apr 66.

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Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General,
25th Infantry Division, demonstrated a land mine
detanator during the visit of the honorable
Cyrus R. Vance At Ou Chi, Vietnam, 6 Apr 66.

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A camouflaged Viet Cong tunnel which was uncovered by Co A, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division, during Operation RAEMA, 14 Apr 66.

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One of the tunnels that was uncovered during the search for suspected Viet Cong in the village of Vinh-Cu, Hau Nghia Province, Vietnam, by Co A, 1/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, 2 Apr 66.

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A member of Co B, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 23th Infantry Division, explains tunnel network to his platoon leader after successful ambush patrol on the outskirts of Cu Chi, Vietnam, 8 Apr 66.

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A Viet Cong tunnel found by Co A, 1/5th Infantry
(Mech) during Operation Kaena, 14 Apr 66.

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
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One of the new tunnels leading from a trench found after an ambush patrol by the 1/5th Mech Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. This tunnel contained the bodies of two dead Viet Cong. 8 Apr 66.

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Viet Cong tunnels discovered and destroyed by
Co B, 1/5th (Mech) Infantry, 23th Infantry
Division, at Cu Chi, Viet Nam, 8 Apr 66.

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A portion of the tunnel complex found after an ambush patrol by the 1/5th Infantry (Mech), near the outskirts of Cu Chi, Vietnam, on the ground are two Viet Cong killed during the engagement. 8 Apr 66.

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


Part of the 1/5th Infantry, 29th Infantry
Division, in Ho Do Woods area during operations
conducted on the outskirts of Cu Chi, Vietnam,
3 Apr 66.

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A soldier of B Co, 1/3rd Infantry (Mech), 29th Infantry Division, move along a jungle area during Operation KAENA, 16 Apr 66.

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
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An Assault Personnel Carrier of the 9th Infantry (Mech), moves across a clearing in Ho Bo Woods 3 miles north of Cu Chi, Vietnam, 26 Apr 66.

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A column of APC's of B Co, 1/5th Infantry (Mech),
25th Infantry Division, move across a rice paddy
during Operation KALAMAZOO, (KAENA), near Cu Chi,
Vietnam, 16 Apr 66.

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
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Members of Co C, 1/5th Infantry (Mech, 25th Infantry
Division, search an area around Viet Cong Base,
During Operation Kahaia, Ou Chi, Vietnam, 21 Apr 66.

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Members of Co C, 1/5th Infantry (Mech)
25th Infantry Division, move out on line
in a search and destroy mission during
Operation KAMLA, Cu Chi, Vietnam, 21 Apr 66.

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
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An APC of Co B, 1/34th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division, going through a rubber plantation on the outskirts of Cu Chi, Vietnam, 8 Apr 64.

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Members of Co B, 1/9th Infantry (Mech),
23rd Infantry Division, takes a last minute break
before leaving on an ambush patrol at Cu Chi,
Vietnam, 8 Apr 66.

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
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Members of Co B, 1/9th Inf (Mech), 29th Infantry
Division, load their personal carriers in
preparation for an ambush patrol at Cu Chi, Vietnam
8 Apr 66.

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Security elements of the 2/27th Infantry,
23rd Infantry Division, with artillery
saturnate a sniper woodland near Phuoc My,
Vietnam, 12 Apr 66.

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Men of the 8th Artillery, 6th Howitzer
Section Btry A, 25th Infantry Division
prepare to fire into Viet Cong positions
at Cu Chi, Vietnam. 29 Mar 66.

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Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division presents prizes and diplomas to youngsters at Minh Tan School, Bas Ma, Vietnam, during graduation ceremonies, 3 Apr 66.

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Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, speaks at graduation exercises at Minh Tan School, 3 Apr 66.

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


Sick call in the village of Phuoc-My, Vietnam, 12 Apr 66.

162

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


Members of the 25th Division Artillery unload sandbags to repair the village Police Defense Area at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 9 Apr 66.

163

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


The medical unit of the 2/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, make a door to door sick call in the village of Phuoc-Hy, Vietnam, during Operation MAHANA, 12 Apr 66

164

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General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division view the helping hand operations center during the generals visit to Cu Chi, Vietnam, 20 Apr 66.

165

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General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, looks over some Helping Hand articles with the 25th Infantry Division ACoF3, G5, 20 Apr 66.

166

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Surgeon, 3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division extends medical assistance to the villagers of Bao Ha, Vietnam, 27 Apr 66.

167

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CO, Division Artillery passes a package of pens, pencils and school books to a Vietnamese student at Tan An Hoi School, 27 Apr 66.

168

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


Surgeon, 3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division, extends medical assistance to the villagers of Bee Ha, Vietnam, 27 Apr 66.

168A

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Major Bull, Sub-sector U.S. Advisor to Tan An Hoi, distributes Helping Hand items to vietnamese youngsters at Tan An Hoi school, 27 Apr 66.

169

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
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A buddy lights a cigarette for PFC Edward Drury of Co B, 1/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, after he was wounded by sniper fire 3 miles northwest of Cu Chi, Vietnam, during Operation MAKANA, 11 Apr 66.

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
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A column of APC's head up the east side of Ho Bo Woods
during Operation KAKHA, 16 Apr 66.

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


The Original DUSTOFF. A medical evacuation helicopter of the 23th Infantry Division, takes off on a return rescue mission during operation MAKANA, near Phuoc-My, Vietnam, 12 Apr 66.

132

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Medics help a wounded soldier of the 2/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, onto a evacuation helicopter near Phuoc-My, Vietnam, during Operation MAKANA, 12 Apr 66.

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


Members of the 2/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, place a wounded soldier aboard a medical evacuation helicopter near Phuoc-Ny, Vietnam, during Operation MAKAHA, 12 Apr 66.

174

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


Members of the 25th Medical Bn are fast to move to the ambulance helicopter to evacuate the wounded at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 1 Apr 65.

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An injured soldier of the 25th Infantry Division
being evacuated by the personnel of the 25th Medical
Bn at Cu Chi, Field Hospital, Vietnam, 29 Mar 66.

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



Photo of the 25th Medical Bn, 25th Infantry Division
Field Hospital at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 1 Apr 66

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Rushing through the mud and water members of the 25th Medical Bn, 25th Infantry Division, carry a wounded soldier to the 25th Medical Battalion Field Hospital at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 1 Apr 66.

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
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Miss Vikki Carr talks with SP4 Early Alexander of the 25th Infantry Division Military Police Company during her visit to the field hospital of the 25th Infantry Division, Cu Chi, Vietnam, 17 Apr 66.

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


The burning of waste is one of the sanitary precautions
at the 25th Infantry Division, Cu Chi, Vietnam, 30 Mar 66.

180

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A tank that belongs to Co A, 69th Armor, 25th Infantry Division was destroyed by a 750 lb bomb that had been converted into an anti-tank mine, and set off electrically near Cu Chi, Vietnam, 20 Apr 66.

181

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A tank of the 69th Armor that hit a land mine during
Operation KATNA in the Ho Bo Woods at Chu Chi, Vietnam,
16 Apr 66.

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Members of the 69th Armor Bn haul back their tank that was blown by a Viet Cong mine during Operation KATANA in the Ho Bo Woods, Cu Chi, Vietnam, 16 Apr 66.

183

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Survival repair being put to use on a Med-Evac APC during Operation KAENA, 14 Apr 66.

184

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Members of the 69th Armor Bn, haul back the track of their tank that was blown by a Viet Cong mine in the Ho Bo Woods near Cu Chi, Vietnam, 15 Apr 66.

185

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A fleet of UH-1D helicopters leave the 25th Infantry Division helipad, Su Chi, Vietnam, to transport troops in Operation KAHALA, 11 Apr 66.

186

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Members of the 1/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division loading
on UH-1D helicopters for movement in Operation KAHALA, 11 Apr 66.

187

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Infantrymen of the 1/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division,
load on a UH-1D helicopter in Operation KAHALA, 11 Apr 66.

188

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


A fleet of UH-1D helicopters leave the 25th Infantry Division helipad at Cu Chi, transporting troops for Operation KAHALA, 11 Apr 66.

189

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Helicopters take off for a heliborne assault on a suspected Viet Cong village during Operation MAKANA, 11 Apr 66.

190

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Airborne members of the 1/27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, on the way to a search and destroy mission on a suspected Viet Cong village during Operation MAKAHA, 11 Apr 66.

191

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


Army helicopters supporting operations of the 2/27th Infantry,
25th Infantry Division, near Phuoc-My, Vietnam, 16 Apr 66.

192

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


Members of the 69th Armor, 25th Infantry Division, load ammunition to re-supply their troops in the field at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 2 Apr 66.

193

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Men of Co C, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division,
loading C Rations at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 30 Mar 66.

194

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Rounds are ready to go for the 175mm Artillery piece at
Cu Chi, Vietnam, 24 Mar 66.

195

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


Drainage pumps of the 23th Infantry Division drain out some of the flood waters after the first rains at Cu Ohi, Vietnam, 1 Apr 66.

196

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


A helicopter of the 118th Avn Bn, being loaded with supplies
for men of the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi, Vietnam,
3 Apr 66.

197

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
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The light weight flexible POL tanks are quickly filled to service the 25th Infantry Division vehicles, 24 Mar 66.

198

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
Quartermaster showers at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 23 March 1966.

199

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Master of Co C, 125th Signal Battalion, Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii, in preparation for debarkation for
the Republic of Vietnam. 28 Feb 66.

200

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


Last roll call at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, before members of Co C, 125th Signal Bn depart for Vietnam. 28 Feb 66.

201

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


A member of Co C, 125th Signal Bn, loads his duffel bag on the bus that will take the 125th Signal Bn to the ship bound for the Republic of Vietnam, 28 Feb 66.

202

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Members of the 25th Infantry Division debarking
from the USNS Pope into landing crafts after a 12
day voyage from Hawaii. 13 March 1966.

203

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


Members of the 25th Aviation Bn, 25th Infantry Division,
arrive at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 2 Apr 66.

204

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Construction of DTOC at the 23th Infantry
Division Headquarters at Cu Chi, Vietnam.
The trees in the foreground were planted to
give it a tropical look. 19 Mar 66.

205

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
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Co C, 125th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry
Division, puts tents over the prefab tent kits,
at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 30 March 1966.

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


Members of the 25th Infantry Division assembling
tent kits for the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters
area, 19 Mar 66.

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


Rains that have caused muddy conditions of the
125th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry Division
at Ou Chi, Vietnam, 29 Mar 66.

208

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


Construction on the DROC (Division Tactical Operations Center) area in the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters at Cu Chi, Vietnam, 19 March 1966.

209

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
A crude lantern made by the Viet Cong for use in tunnels which was captured after a successful ambush patrol by Co. B, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division, on the outskirts of Cu Chi, Vietnam, 9 Apr 66.

210

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A cluster of Viet Cong booby trapped V. P. bombs uncovered by Co A, 1/5th Infantry (Mech) during Operation KAENA, 14 Apr 66.

211

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2.5mm rocket and mortar trails made by the Viet Cong found in a tunnel discovered by Co A, 1/5th Infantry (Mech), during Operation KAENA, 14 Apr 66.

212

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


A member of the DA Photographic Team cuts open a rice sack worn by the Viet Cong after an ambush patrol by the 1/5th Infantry (Mech), 25th Infantry Division, 8 Apr 66.

213

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
Rice cache found in a warehouse during a search and destroy mission by the 25th Infantry Division on Operation MAKANA, 11 Apr 66.

214

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
Members of Co B, 1/5th Infantry (Mech) and 125th Signal Battalion (Photo Section), search the body of a Viet Cong after an ambush patrol near Cu Chi, Vietnam, 8 Apr 66.

215

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Viet Cong food, clothing and equipment captured by Co. B,
1/5th Infantry (Pach), 25th Infantry Division, at Cu Chi,
Vietnam, 8 Apr 66.

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