Negotiations and Vietnam: A Case Study of the 1954 Geneva Conference
Abstract
An analysis is made of (1) U.S. policy and diplomacy during the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, (2) the objectives of the participants in the conference, (3) the tactics used during the negotiations, and (4) the implications of those tactics for the present conflict. Although Vietnamese unity was not a priority objective of China or the Soviet Union, neither power may have expected a South Vietnamese regime to survive until the national elections. The U.S. goal, among others, was to maximize the Saigon government's chances of posing an authentic challenge in the elections of 1956. In terms of the present conflict, additional Communist participation might complicate rather than strengthen Hanoi's position by increasing the opportunity for division on issues of troop withdrawal and political settlement. Saigon's influence could be reduced if the United States were to limit South Vietnam's role to talks with the Viet Cong. In the realm of tactics, Geneva indicates, first, that an ambiguous commitment on the part of the United States to a negotiated settlement can have far greater value than an obvious disposition to accept terms; second, that the threat of a use of force hitherto restrained can be more valuable to the U.S. bargaining position than force already applied.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 1968
- Accession Number
- AD0391846
Entities
People
- Melvin Gurtov
Organizations
- RAND Corporation