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AFTER ACTION REPORT

4-16 APRIL 68

TF WASHINGTON

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AGAM-P (M) (16 Jul 68) FOR OT-RD-68DQ13

30 July 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report - **TASK FORCE** Washington, 4-16 April 1968 (U).

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1. The attached inclosure is forwarded for information. It is a narrative account of the operation of Task Force Washington which was assigned the mission of restoring and maintaining law and order in Washington, D.C. during the civil disorders arising out of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on 4 April 1968.

2. Subject report does not promulgate Department of the Army doctrine. However, the lessons cited and implied may be adapted for use in developing training material and in evaluating current or proposed doctrine. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, provides doctrinal guidance and should be consulted by all active Army and Reserve component organizations assigned civil disturbance control missions or required to conduct training or planning in that subject area.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

TASK FORCE WASHINGTON

4 - 16 April 1968

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PREFACE

This is a narrative account of the operation of Task Force Washington which was assigned the mission of restoring and maintaining law and order in Washington, D.C. during the civil disorders arising out of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on 4 April 1968.

Information sources included journal entries of Task Force Washington and the Army Operations Center as well as Department of the Army and subordinate level civil disturbance operations plans and data bases.

All times are Eastern Standard Time.

Task Force Washington was operational from 051545 April to 161615 April 1968.

I

EVENTS LEADING TO THE USE OF TROOPS

The shooting of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee early Thursday evening, 4 April 1968, resulted in violence in that city and in 36 other cities in the United States, including Washington, D.C.

As in other cities, reaction among citizens of the Federal City was not long in making itself manifest. The mood of a crowd that had gathered in a drug store near 14th and U Street, N.W. was one of shock and dismay. Shortly after the announcement was made, Stokely Carmichael, President, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, accompanied by 10 to 15 young males, entered the drug store and announced that this store and others were going to be closed out of respect for Dr. King. Carmichael, and his followers then urged business establishments along 14th Street near U and Wallach Place, N.W. to close their stores, and there was apparently willing compliance. After the group, led by Carmichael, moved to a theater in the 1300 block of U Street, N.W. they became intermingled with people coming out of the theater, and the size of the group with Carmichael increased. The mood of the crowd initially was nonviolent.

Notwithstanding, Mayor-Commissioner Walter E. Washington and his advisors decided at the outset that they should alert the police department.

After a stop at the corner of 14th and Chapin Street, N.W., Carmichael began walking south on 14th Street and the crowd (by now about 200 persons) which had been with him moved off in various directions. About 2130 hours a store window was smashed and the crowd began looting that store. This incident triggered further looting along 14th Street from U Street at least as far north as Chapin Street. The tempo increased sharply. By midnight heavy looting and arson were taking place on 14th Street from U Street to Monroe Street and along the 1100 - 1700 blocks of 7th Street, N. W. The mood of the crowd then was curiously mixed. On the one hand the air of violence was evident -- on the other hand something of a carnival atmosphere prevailed. The policemen who responded believed themselves to be too heavily outnumbered to attempt direct action against the rioters and, thus, elected to seal off the troubled area pending arrival of reinforcements. Reinforcements were slow in coming and those policemen on the scene were soon subjected to harassment, verbal abuse and rock throwing. As a result the area could not be brought under control until about 050400. By dawn it appeared evident that the police would have to cope with an obviously explosive situation.

Although Friday morning, 5 April was comparatively calm, it became highly questionable in the early afternoon whether even a fully

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mobilized police force could control the disorder. Arsonists set fires along 14th Street from Rhode Island Avenue as far north as Park Road, and looting by men, women and children again began to spread. Policemen, concentrating on the protection of firemen, worked under difficulties imposed by the disorderly crowds. By early afternoon the disorder erupted again on 7th Street, N.W., with looting and arson occurring from New York Avenue to Florida Avenue; and on H Street, N.W. from 4th Street to 15th Street. Several groups of disorderly youths looted stores only a few blocks from the White House.

It thus became increasingly clear that the District of Columbia police would require outside assistance; that their total resources would be inadequate to the task at hand.

In the expectation that troops would be used, General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, was alerted to the mission of restoring order in the Washington area. He directed the establishment of his headquarters in the District Building adjacent to the Metropolitan Police Headquarters. This facility was established at 051545.

At approximately 051500, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher, accompanied by D.C. Director of Public Safety Patrick V. Murphy and General Haines, toured the city to make a first hand appraisal of the situation and telephoned their report to the President, recommending federalization of the D.C. National Guard and intervention by Federal forces. A short while later the Mayor requested Federal assistance by military forces and this was so directed by the President after first proclaiming to the dissident elements "to disperse and retire peaceably".

The Presidential proclamation was issued at 051602, followed shortly thereafter by an Executive Order authorizing intervention with military force and charging such troops "to restore law and order and to protect the property, personnel and functions of the Federal Government and of foreign governments and international organizations in the Washington area." (Copies of the proclamation and executive order are at Appendix A.)

Thus, the way was clear to use Federal troops to aid in restoring law and order in Metropolitan Washington, D.C.

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II

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF HEADQUARTERS, TASK
FORCE WASHINGTON

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The Secretary of the Army is executive agent for the Secretary of Defense in planning for military support to civil authorities in civil disturbances. Operations plans for such contingencies have been in existence for several years. Following the civil disturbance in Detroit in July 1967, a Department of the Army study group was formed to review Army preparedness in civil disturbance matters. The stated objective of the study group "was to get things done as we proceeded rather than develop requirements and present for approval one neat package of recommendations." Accordingly, as the group pursued its study, it developed a Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan, nicknamed GARDEN PLOT, which provided DA guidance for military operations in civil disturbance situations. This plan was issued on 1 February 1968. Subsequently a family of civil disturbance plans was issued at appropriate levels within the Army -- to complete a broad matrix. These plans provide for guidance on the employment of Federal forces in most of the major cities in the United States and direct advance coordination between military forces and such municipal, county and state officials as might be involved. Over the years the Army Staff had prepared various plans relating to the use of Federal troops for special missions in the nation's capital. For example, the Commanding General, Military District of Washington had an operations plan, nicknamed CABIN GUARD, outlining a plan for the employment of Federal forces under his command in a civil disturbance situation. These forces included selected tactical units physically located at military installations within a hundred-mile radius of Washington. Once committed, these units would be under the operational control of the Commanding General, Military District of Washington and would constitute Task Force Inside.

During the development of the DA Civil Disturbance Plan, it became apparent that augmentation of the forces available to the Commanding General of the Military District of Washington would be necessary. Thus, forces on the order of 25,000 were included in the concept of operations for intervention in the Washington area. With the concurrence of the Commanding General of the United States Continental Army Command/CINCARSTRIKE, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps was named to the command of Task Force Washington (the task force in which all Washington committed troops would be integrated) and other ARSTRIKE/CONARC forces were assigned. (See Appendix B for Task Organization of Task Force Washington.)

Accordingly, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps prepared an Operations Plan for military support to civil authorities in the event of civil disturbances in the Washington area. This plan was entitled DRAGON WING. It provided for command and control of Task Force Inside as well as other task forces which might be required; for example, Task Force 82 from the 82d Airborne Division and Task

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Force 5 from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) if those task forces were committed in the Washington area.

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However, because of the rapid escalation of civil disorders on Friday, 5 April and the proximity of Headquarters, Department of the Army to Washington, D.C., it was decided to activate a Task Force Washington commander and staff from resources locally available within the Headquarters rather than to wait for Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps to deploy from Fort Bragg. Thus, as has been mentioned, General Ralph E. Haines, Jr. was placed in command of the force. At 051500 General Haines, who had been in close touch with the developing situation, ordered Brigadier General Harris W. Hollis, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, to set up a staff at Washington Metropolitan Police Headquarters to provide command and control for Task Force Washington. As a staff nucleus, General Hollis alerted members of two Army Civil Disturbance Liaison Teams previously organized under the Army's civil disturbance plan. On these teams were representatives of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Office of the Chief of Information, the Office of The Judge Advocate General, the Office of The Provost Marshal General, and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics. As the operation progressed these teams were later augmented.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Harold K. Johnson, issued a letter of instructions to General Haines at 052039. General Haines' mission, received orally at the outset and confirmed in this letter (a copy is at Appendix C), was "to restore and maintain law and order in the Washington metropolitan area." Under terms of this letter of instructions he was to be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army with authority to communicate directly with commanders of Army, Air Force and Navy installations in his area of operational interest. Later, when the situation had stabilized sufficiently to permit General Haines to attend to other urgent duties, on 12 April, Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, replaced him as Commander of this Task Force.

General Hollis served as Chief of Staff for Task Force Washington until about midnight, 6 April when he returned to his regular duties at the Pentagon. He was replaced at that time by Brigadier Generals W. R. Desobry and W. K. Bennett, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, each of whom worked 12-hour shifts so as to provide 24-hour general officer cognizance of the task force staff during those periods when General Haines was out of the command post. General Desobry remained with the staff until the end of the operation, whereas Brigadier General W. D. Quirey, Office of the Chief of Staff, replaced General Bennett on 13 April. This staff, numbering only 29, was an austere team. It functioned quite smoothly, although it was definitely short-handed at the busiest periods.

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The facilities used by the Task Force Washington staff consisted of a large conference room and two offices in the same fifth-floor wing of the Municipal Building at 300 Indiana Avenue, N.W. that houses the office of the Chief of Police and his principal assistants. Proximity of the police officials simplified liaison, specifically the release of information and exchange of intelligence, and made for congenial working relationships. It also made possible a quick response to mutual requests for assistance.

Communications-Electronics support for Task Force Washington consisted of telephone and radio facilities which had been previously installed in anticipation of possible requirements. Direct telephone lines were provided to the White House; Department of Justice; Headquarters, Military District of Washington (Task Force Inside); the Army Operations Center at the Pentagon; and the Armory command post of the District of Columbia National Guard. There were also special telephone lines for communication with the command posts of subordinate units.

The primary actions handled by the logistics representative concerned movement of forces and temporary billeting arrangements. The Baltimore District of the Corps of Engineers furnished a real estate liaison representative who arranged for the use of District of Columbia school facilities for the troops deployed in the various precincts. Generally, the troops were housed in public buildings or schools in the precincts to which they were assigned which permitted reserve elements or personnel off duty to respond rapidly to any situation. Use of school gymnasiums and adjoining locker rooms for sleeping accommodations, and in some cases, cafeterias for meals, improved the comfort and morale of the troops and enabled them to enjoy a degree of privacy they would not have had in tent camps. Company or battalion headquarters concerned were located either at precinct police stations or with the troops billets, in which case liaison representatives were on duty in the stations.

The information officer coordinated with the Public Affairs Officer of the Metropolitan Police Department and representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs on all matters of interest to news media. The policy was to keep publicity on Army participation at a low key by reporting troop presence factually, by discouraging interviews, and by explaining the Army role and insuring that administrative matters affecting the civilian community were well understood by the news media representatives.

The Provost Marshal officer was tasked with collecting and portraying all incident, arrest, prisoner, fire and injury data for the District from 051730 until 121600. Although some of the data were obtained from subordinate units, the majority were only obtainable from the municipal authorities. Raw data were received from the police and fire departments

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and refined to assist the task force commander in evaluating the effectiveness of military intervention in support of civil authorities.

The intelligence officer maintained the intelligence situation and summary by coordinating the reports from the subordinate task forces, the local unit of U.S. Army Intelligence Command, and the Metropolitan Police Department.

The Judge Advocate General officer's primary function was to provide legal advice to the commander, staff and subordinate commands. No significant legal problems developed.

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III

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

The purpose of this section is to provide a brief summary of the operations of Task Force Washington during the period 4 - 16 April 1968 when it was called upon to quell the civil disorder in that Federal city. A detailed chronology of events is set out at Appendix D.

Task Force Washington assumed operational control of military forces in the metropolitan area at 051545 April 1968, and provided command and control of these forces, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, Army at the Army Operations Center (AOC) in the Pentagon. Evaluating the information fed to it by intelligence gathering agencies CONUS-wide, the AOC directed the deployment of military forces to the areas of the US where civil disturbance situations indicated Federal military assistance to civil authorities would be necessary.

Task Force Inside provided the headquarters organization for command and control of active Army units and DCNG troops to quell the initial disturbances in the city. The troops employed first were: the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Infantry (Reinforced) from Ft. Myer, the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment from Ft. Meade, the 91st Engineer Battalion from Ft. Belvoir, the Marine Student Battalion (Provisional) from Quantico Marine Base, and the DC National Guard. Active Army units were alerted early on 5 April and ordered to move to predesignated assembly areas on the outskirts of the metropolitan area. Selected units of the DCNG were alerted at 051220 and the entire contingent was federalized at 051700 April 1968.

Immediately following the President's signing of the Executive Order, he called the Chief of Staff, Army and authorized the employment of military forces if kept in "low key." This provided the general policy for the assistance provided for the restoration of law and order in the metropolitan area.

From the time of the authorization of Federal intervention until the forces available to TFW reached a total of 15,530, troops were moving toward the city and employed as they became available to provide whatever assistance would be required. The TFW Task Organization, 4 - 16 April, is at Appendix E and the build-up and phasedown of TFW forces is depicted graphically at Appendix F.

During the first night some units arriving in the city were deployed directly to the streets and stayed there until daylight, when they were moved into their bivouac areas for rest and feeding. During the early

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phases the troops found the streets filled with rioters moving at will, looting and burning, with the police unable to mass enough strength to contain the disorder. Firemen were being kept from fighting fires. The mayor had decreed a curfew, thereby providing the legal basis for clearing the streets, and the soldiers concentrated on crowd control tactics to accomplish this. The primary mission during that hectic first night was to break up the crowds, discourage them from re-forming and urge them to return to their residences, to permit firemen to extinguish the fires and the police to establish control of the area. The use of CS riot control agent was delegated to platoon and squad level and proved to be an extremely effective means of exercising crowd control. The liberal use of CS during the first night greatly assisted in restoring order without resorting to the use of firepower.

Assignment of sectors of responsibility to the troop units was by precinct, although during the first night some battalion size units were necessarily fragmented among several precincts. With the arrival of the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, the 544th S&S Battalion and the 716th Transportation Battalion during the early morning of 6 April, company sized units initially employed in precincts rejoined their parent units and turned over the precinct to newly arrived battalions. The command element of the 82d Airborne Division, accompanied by the 2d Brigade, arrived later that day to form TF 82, thereby providing the second task force subordinate to TFW. This progression of troop commitment is portrayed in the maps at Appendix G showing sectors of responsibility as of 052400, 062400, and, finally, 072400, after which there was no appreciable change until withdrawal of forces began on 12 April.

Immediately upon arrival in a precinct, the troop units established contact with the police, either by collocating the unit command post in the precinct station or stationing a liaison officer there. The police made arrests, either while accompanying the soldiers or upon call, while the troops detained the lawbreakers. After the arrival of the 503d Military Police Battalion on the evening of 6 April, mobile patrols were initiated to make maximum use of the mobility of the MPs. The metropolitan policemen joined the military policemen on mobile patrols to cover the incipient trouble areas and provide a quick reaction force to respond to calls for assistance. The results were considered effective and the concept was extended to other units. The chart at Appendix H depicts graphically the build-up of forces and the dramatic decline in incidents and fires.

The major actions taken the night of 6 April were concerned with enforcement of the curfew. Crowds, on several occasions, did attempt to congregate, but were dispersed or arrested by the police. Looters were a constant source of trouble, but by this time confined most of

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their activities to already partially looted businesses and generally avoided those places heretofore undamaged. Beginning on 7 April, the troop effort was concentrated on foot and motorized patrols to keep the areas under surveillance and make the law enforcement effort ever present before the populace..

The situation remained calm after 7 April with primary troop activities relating to curfew violations. Although calm prevailed, there were significant reasons to cause apprehension about release of the troops. Dr. King's funeral and memorial service were planned for 9 April and Easter school vacations would start with the close of schools on 11 April. The mayor continued a curfew and TFW continuously planned for immediate reaction to possible recurrences of violence. By 11 April, calm had prevailed long enough that troop phasedown was started. The first to leave was the reserve brigade that had never been committed to the streets, the 2d Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Ft. Carson, Colo. This unit loaded on aircraft at Andrews AFB and was directed by the AOC to move to home station beginning at 112400 hours.

During the afternoon of the 11th, Commander, TFW, and Mayor Washington conducted a press tour of the city and visited the troop units. The press treatment of Army performance and troop behavior was highly favorable and this mood was shared by the public in general.

With the phasedown of troops being considered, a memorandum of agreement was coordinated between the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the Director of Public Safety and the Commander TFW, outlining unit strengths and times of departures that all signed. It was then dispatched to the White House for the President's approval. The first agreement was approved on the 12th of April and some units departed, with the understanding that the situation would be reassessed at a later time for the final release of the remaining 5,601 personnel. The second agreement was approved on the 16th and TFW headquarters closed at 161615 April. TFI closed its operations at 1800 hours while the DCNG was released from Federal service at 162400 April.

At the termination of this mission, the President forwarded a message of appreciation to the Secretary of Defense (Appendix I). Commanders of subordinate units of TFW had high praise for the conduct of their troops in restoring law and order. They recognized the necessity for their presence and willingly performed their mission, as example commanders' comments attest at Appendix J.

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IV

LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons learned during the April 1968 civil disturbances in Washington are based on general observations, comments of participating personnel and examination of pertinent journal entries.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

A reduction in the lead time currently involved in arriving at the decision to employ Federal forces is considered essential. The immediacy of the need for early augmentation of law enforcement officials when faced with the dynamics of a riot or near-riot are such that the earliest possible commitment of troops is necessary to prevent widespread destruction of property. An early decision to intervene is a must if looting, arson and violence are to be contained. While the political and psychological nuances of each situation should be fully considered in the decision to intervene at the next higher level, it would seem that early alert and certain advance positioning of military forces to cut reaction time should be accomplished.

Both police and Army personnel demonstrated an admirable degree of restraint in dealing with dissident elements. However, it is considered fair to say that while this restraint should remain a basic element of our policy, we must come to grips with the fact that a part of the mission is the restoration and maintenance of law and order. This means that we must adopt firm measures to stop looting when it is observed. Failure to do so is a failure to recognize the additional requirement to protect property in the objective area.

The detailed advance planning against the possibility of riots in the Washington area, started in the aftermath of Detroit and kept up to date, paid handsome dividends; however, there is still much to be done in refining our plans. Lessons learned in Washington, Baltimore and Chicago will provide us with information on which to base the refinements to existing concepts and plans.

PERSONNEL.

"Battle dress" is the most appropriate uniform for civil disturbance operations, and troops should not be required to move to the civil disturbance area with the Army Green and khaki uniforms.

There is a requirement for maintaining two sets of strength figures in civil disturbance operations. Personnel strength data which reflect the numbers of troops moved to an area of operation are required for strength accounting and logistics purposes. Operations strength data are required to determine the number of troops committed in each area and to determine the capability of the force.

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All units should deploy from home station with an organic medical capability of a minimum of one medical officer per battalion and two aidmen per company.

INTELLIGENCE.

A technique of reporting sniping, looting, arson, deaths, serious injuries and discharging of fire arms should be devised for use by civil authorities to improve accuracy of reporting and to permit an accurate evaluation of the situation.

The immediate dispatch of military intelligence personnel to each police precinct headquarters and area of violence with appropriate communications equipment will assist in obtaining reliable information and eliminating distorted and erroneous reports.

OPERATIONS.

The Task Force Washington command and control headquarters must be in being and prepared for an immediate response when the decision is made to employ Federal troops. Headquarters XVIII Abn Corps stationed at Ft. Bragg, N.C., cannot meet this immediate requirement unless sufficient prior alert can be given to preposition the headquarters.

There is a requirement for more detailed planning to establish the actions that can be taken by Task Force Washington assuming that a civil disturbance starting in the District of Columbia spreads to suburban communities in Virginia and Maryland.

The CS riot control chemical agent was used liberally and proved to be extremely effective without the heretofore public reaction to the use of "gas".

CS crystals and CS baseball grenades were used successfully to seed stores and keep looters from entering and continuing their destruction. However, the cannister-shaped M7A3 grenade should not be used inside a building because it may start a fire.

Easily recognized passes and procedures for allocating these passes should be developed to permit the passing of essential civilian personnel during periods of curfew.

The deployment of troops during hours of darkness to areas of potential trouble has a positive psychological effect on potential trouble makers.

The mission-type order with decentralized operational control proved to be highly successful in fluid civil disturbance situations.

Reaction times for National Guard units can be reduced by requiring each man to maintain one uniform and necessary toilet articles at his

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23 designated assembly point and by periodically broadcasting assembly instructions over local radio and television stations.

Military Police units are ideally suited for employment as a highly mobile, rapid reaction and anti-looter force to saturate the most troublesome areas and to apprehend looters. Mobile anti-looter patrols composed of military police elements should be constituted early in the operation. Employment of these patrols will reduce the number of looting incidents in a short period of time.

In civil disturbance training, more emphasis should be placed on static security, foot and mobile patrolling, use of riot control munitions, apprehension and detention of suspects, traffic control and convoy discipline.

Tables of allowances for units designated for civil disturbance operations should be reviewed and consideration should be given to providing more portable battery-operated megaphones and hand-held 5-cell flashlights to each company.

Basic loads of the M7A3 and M25A2 CS grenades should be reviewed with a view to increasing allocations to permit the application of a heavy CS concentration upon initial contact.

LOGISTICS.

Some commercially procured masks in the hands of police and firemen do not protect against the CS riot control agent.

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APPENDIX A

Presidential Documents

Incl 1. Presidential Proclamation #3840

Incl 2. Executive Order #11403

Presidential Documents

Title 3—THE PRESIDENT

Proclamation 3840

LAW AND ORDER IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

WHEREAS I have been informed that conditions of domestic violence and disorder exist in the District of Columbia and threaten the Washington metropolitan area, endangering life and property and obstructing execution of the laws, and that local police forces are unable to bring about the prompt cessation of such acts of violence and restoration of law and order; and

WHEREAS I have been requested to use such units of the National Guard and of the Armed Forces of the United States as may be necessary for those purposes; and

WHEREAS in such circumstances it is also my duty as Chief Executive to take care that the property, personnel and functions of the Federal Government, of embassies of foreign governments, and of international organizations in the Washington metropolitan area are protected against violence or other interference:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do command all persons engaged in such acts of violence to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-second.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
4:02 P.M.

Friday, April 5, 1968.

[F.R. Doc. 68-4250; Filed, Apr. 5, 1968; 5:30 p.m.]

Incl 1 to Appendix A

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Order 11403

28

PROVIDING FOR THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA

WHEREAS I have today issued Proclamation No. 3840, calling upon persons engaged in acts of violence and disorder in the Washington metropolitan area to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith; and

WHEREAS the conditions of domestic violence and disorder described therein continue, and the persons engaging in such acts of violence have not dispersed:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and by virtue of the authority vested in me as commander-in-chief of the militia of the District of Columbia by the Act of March 1, 1889, as amended (D.C. Code, Title 39), it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to disperse all persons engaged in the acts of violence described in the proclamation, to restore law and order, and to see that the property, personnel and functions of the Federal Government, of embassies of foreign governments, and of international organizations in the Washington metropolitan area are protected against violence or other interference.

SEC. 2. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Armed Forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

SEC. 3. (a) The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized and directed to call into the active military service of the United States, as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, units or members of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. Units or members may be relieved subject to recall at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use units and members called or recalled into the active military service of the United States pursuant to this section.

(b) In addition, in carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to exercise any of the powers vested in me by law as commander-in-chief of the militia of the District of Columbia, during such time as any units or members of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard of the District shall not have been called into the active military service of the United States.

SEC. 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to one or more of the Secretaries of the military Departments any of the authority conferred upon him by this order.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
4:03 P.M.

Friday, April 5, 1968

[F.R. Doc. 68-4257; Filed, Apr. 5, 1968; 5:31 p.m.]

Incl 2 to Appendix A

UNCLASSIFIED
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29

TASK FORCE WASHINGTON OPLAN 563-1 (DRAGON WING) (U) HQS XVIII ABN CORPS
TASK ORGANIZATION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH*</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
Command and Control Gp, HQ XVIII Abn Corps	(150)	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Task Force INSIDE (TFI)	(7000)	
1st Bn (Reinf), 3d Inf		Ft. Myer, Va
Marine Corps School Bn		Quantico, Va
6th Armd Cav Regt.		Ft. Meade, Md
91st Engr Bn (Aug)		Ft. Belvoir, Va
544th S&S Bn		Ft. Lee, Va
714th Trans Bn		Ft. Eustis, Va
503d MP Bn		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
182d Avn Co (Air Mbl Lt)		
Avn Det (DUSAA)		Ft. Belvoir, Va
Armed Forces Police Det		Wash., D. C.
Signal Support Unit (MDW)		Military District of Washington
Prov Trans Trk Co,		Ft. Meade, Md
Prov Ambl Co		Ft. Meade, Md
Ft. Belvoir Engr Equip Elm		Ft. Belvoir, Va
Prov Med Spt Team,		Ft. Myer, Md
Loudspeaker Det,		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Task Force GOBLET GLASS (Elms D. C. Air and Army NG - Approximately 1700 men) HHD, State Det (Assigned to TFI for operational command)		
Task Force 82 (TF 82)	(11,500)	
HQ Elm 82d Abn Div		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
1st Bde 82d Abn Div		Ft. Bragg, N. C.

APPENDIX B

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
2d Bde 82d Abn Div		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
194th Armd Bde, 16th Armd Gp		Ft. Knox, Ky
Support Command (-)		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Prov Bde, 3d Corps Arty		Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
Prov Bde JFK (2 Bns)		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Prov Bde XVIII Abn Corps Arty		Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Task Force 5 (TF5)	(11,400)	
HQ Elm 5th Inf Div (Mech)		Ft. Carson, Colo.
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div		Ft. Carson, Colo.
3d Bde, 5th Inf Div		Ft. Carson, Colo.
Support Command (-)		Ft. Carson, Colo.
Prov Bde, 5th Inf Div Arty		Ft. Carson, Colo.
Prov Bde, 46th Arty Gp		Ft. Carson, Colo.
197th Inf Bde		Ft. Benning, Ga.

*For planning purposes

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMM DIVISION
DISPATCHED 01 (Z) TIME**CONFIDENTIAL**

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

M

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

INFO

IMMEDIATE

DTG

1000 APR 6 01 39Z

FROM: DA

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: GEN RALPH E. HAINES, JR.
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
METROPOLITAN POLICE HQ
WASH, D. C. - COURIER

INFO: CNO - COURIER
CSAF - COURIER
CGUSCONARC
CINCAFSTRIKE
CGUSAONE FT MEADE, MD
CGUSATHREE FT MCPHERSON
CGUSAFIVE FT SHERIDAN
CGUSASIX SFRAN CALIF
CG XVIII ABN CORPS FT BRAGG, N.C.
CG III CORPS FT HOOD, TEX.
CG MDW WASH D. C. - COURIER
CINCSTRIKE
CGUSAMC
CGUSACDC
CGUSASA
CGUSAINTC FT HOLABIRD MD.
CGUSASTRATCOM FT HUACHUCA ARIZ.
CG DC NG DC ARMORY WASH D. C. - COURIER

DISTR:
ARSTAF
Plus:
SECDEF
OSA
CLL
TIG
CINFO
USCONARC LNO
USAINTC LNO
NMCC

CONFIDENTIAL 0A858668 From GEN Harold K. Johnson, Chief
of Staff, United States Army

1. (C) For immediate action by TF WASHINGTON Commander.
2. (C) This letter of instruction is effective at once.
3. (C) You are designated Commander of TF WASHINGTON. Your mission is to restore and maintain law and order in Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Initial Army units for TF WASHINGTON are 1/3 Inf,

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
Apr	68
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	7

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE
50441x252

SIGNATURE

ROBERT G. WOOLEYHAN
LTC, GS
OPS, OD AOC

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TYPED (or PRINTED) NAME AND TITLE

JOHN J.

Deputy

APPENDIX C

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DOD DIR 5200.10

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	
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INFO IMMEDIATE				PHONE 32	

1/6th ACR, 91st Engr, USMC Bn (SDT) (PROV), 544th Sup and Sv Bn (PROV) (Ft Lee), 714th Trans Bn (PROV) (Ft Eustis). Assume command of District of Columbia National Guard which has been federalized under Presidential authority. Be prepared to assume command of additional active Army units which may be ordered to the Washington, D.C. area.

a. In carrying out your duties, you will be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army. You will establish your command post initially at Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Station and report subsequent locations. You are authorized direct communication with Army, r Force and Navy installations commanders in the vicinity of your operation.

b. Minimum force, consistent with mission accomplishment, will be used by both military and civilian personnel. Moreover, commanders and their personnel will avoid appearing as an invading, alien force rather than a force whose purpose is to restore order with a minimum loss of life and property and due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement is purely accidental.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE

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ATION **IMMEDIATE**

INFO **IMMEDIATE**

CONFIDENTIAL

Personnel must be civil; the use of epithets and degrading language will not be tolerated.

c. The following options are provided as guidance for determining how your troops may be armed to accomplish your mission using the minimum force principle enumerated in the preceding paragraph.

OPTION	RIFLE	BAYONET SCABBARD	BAYONET	AMMUNITION MAGAZINE/ CLIP	CHAMBER
1.	At Sling	On Belt	In Scabbard	In Pouch on Belt	Empty
2.	At Port	On Belt	In Scabbard	In Pouch on Belt	Empty
3.	At Port	On Bayonet	Fixed	In Pouch on Belt	Empty
4.	At Port	On Belt	Fixed	In Pouch on Belt	Empty
5.	At Port	On Belt	Fixed	In the Weapon	Empty
6.	At Port	On Belt	Fixed	In the Weapon	Round Chambered

d. Military personnel will not load or fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer in person; when authorized in advance by an officer under certain specific conditions; or when required to save their lives.

e. Authority to order use of the riot control agents is delegated to you. You are authorized to delegate this authority to commissioned officers.

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at your discretion. Riot control agents should be used to accomplish your mission before live ammunition.

f. You are authorized to use force to prevent looting and to detain persons caught in the act of looting. The amount of force which may be used is that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Warning shots will not be fired; however, when shooting is necessary, shots will be aimed to wound rather than to kill. Looters present a particular problem since women and children may be involved and the articles looted may be of little value. The looter is not necessarily sympathetic toward the views of those who otherwise participate in the disturbance. There is no satisfactory predetermination as to when firearms should be employed to stop looting beyond continued emphasis on the absolute necessity of using minimum force and avoiding the use of firearms except as a last resort and under the rules established here and in paragraphs d and e above.

g. Snipers may also present a particular problem since the normal reflex actions of the well-trained combat soldier are to respond with an overwhelming mass of firepower. Experience indicates that in general this tactic endangers innocent people more than snipers and that the preferred tactic is to enter the building from which sniper fire originates. It also indicates that darkening the streets in order to gain protection from sniper fire is counterproductive. The following general approach should be emphasized in dealing with snipers:

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(1) Surround the building where sniper is concealed and gain access, using APC if necessary and available.

(2) Employ CS initially rather than small arms fire. If CS is not successfully employed, then use well-aimed fire by expert marksmen.

(3) Illuminate the area during darkness.

h. Be prepared to receive assistance from certain active Army forces specifically designated to provide tactical, administrative, and logistical support.

i. Department of Justice (DOJ) representative will be contacted as required for advice on matters of legal policy. DOJ point of contact, Mr. Thomas McTiernan, will be located at or near your CP (exact location to be announced).

j. Presidential representative on the scene is Mr. Cyrus Vance. You will be responsive to his instructions and inform the Chief of Staff, US Army, promptly of instructions received and actions taken in accordance therewith.

k. Should a situation arise necessitating the detention of civilian personnel, DOJ personnel, possibly in collaboration with civilian police, will operate and maintain or provide for detention facilities. Whenever possible, US Marshals (or civilian police) should take civilian personnel (ring leaders, violators) into custody. When it becomes necessary for

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ACTION IMMEDIATE			36
INFO IMMEDIATE			

Army personnel to take this action they will immediately seek a US Marshal (or civil policeman) to take over such custody on the spot or at a detention center. In the event the number of civilian personnel taken into custody exceeds the capability of DOJ (or civil police) to detain them, your forces will provide temporary detention facilities until DOJ (or civil police) can continue to receive them.

1. Searches of individuals or private property (including automobiles) may be conducted only after you have determined that such searches are reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of your mission. That determination must be based upon either a review of the evidence forming the basis of the request for the search or your own preliminary investigation. Searches should be conducted by the following personnel in the order indicated, if available;

- (1) Municipal law enforcement officials.
- (2) Representatives of the Department of Justice.
- (3) Task Force personnel.

m. You will cooperate with and assist municipal law enforcement officers to assume their normal roles. In this regard, you will not take orders from state or municipal civil authorities.

n. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics will be responsible for communications facilities between your CP location and the Army Operations Center, Washington, D.C. Direct communication with DA

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37. is authorized and directed.

p. You will ensure that DA is fully informed of operations through the submission of:

- (1) Interim telephonic reports on major changes or significant events which warrant the immediate attention of Headquarters, DA.
- (2) Written situation reports covering a 12 hour period, commencing 060001 hours Apr, local time.

4. (C) Future teletype correspondence on this operation will be prefaced by the words "Task Force WASHINGTON".

5. (U) Acknowledge receipt of this letter to Team Chief, Army Operations Center, Pentagon, Washington, D. C. (OX 50441x215).

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APPENDIX D

Chronology of Events
Task Force Washington
4 - 16 April 1968

- Incl 1. Summary of Conversation, CofSA - CGTFW
- Incl 2. Summary of Conversation, CofSA - CGTFW
- Incl 3. MFR - Assurance of Protection for Downtown Stores
- Incl 4. MFR - Record of Mayor Washington's decision on actions for 8 April 1968
- Incl 5. TFW Frag Order #3
- Incl 6. Summary of Conversation, CofSA - CGTFW
- Incl 7. TFW Frag Order #4
- Incl 8. TFW Frag Order #5
- Incl 9. Memorandum of Agreement
- Incl 10. Memorandum of Agreement

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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
TASK FORCE WASHINGTON
4-16 April 1968

NOTE 1: This sequence highlights the events that transpired and the command and staff actions incident to these events. In the interest of conciseness, no attempt has been made to treat the mass of details and coordinations that were involved in the transpiring events.

NOTE 2: See Appendix J for a list of persons mentioned in this sequence and their positions of responsibility.

TIME AND ACTION

041930 - GEN Hollis (at home) informed AOC that Dr. King had been shot. Instructed Duty Officer to alert principals. AOC notified Justice Dept. (Mr. Christopher), OSA (Mr. McGiffert), GEN CON (Mr. Jordan), OCOFSA (COL Kiefe), DCSOPS (GEN Lemley), OPS OD (GEN Hennessey) and AOC Chief (COL Hamilton).

041953 - GEN Hollis (at home) informed GEN Johnson (CofSA) that Dr. King had been shot.

042020 - GEN Shannon, NMCC Duty Officer, forwarded to AOC a report from FBI that Dr. Martin Luther King was dead. AOC notified CofSA, Mr. Jordan (GEN CON), GEN Lemley and GEN Hollis.

042020 - GEN Hollis arrived AOC. NOTE: GEN Hollis kept CofSA (in his office) informed of civil disturbance situation within CONUS. CofSA personally kept GEN Woolnough (CG USCONARC) informed of situation.

042030 - Mr. McGiffert arrived AOC conference room.

042040 - ACSI reported Dr. King taken to St. Joseph Hospital in Memphis. Time of death reported to be 042000.

042126 - CofSA arrived AOC Conference Room.

042232 - AOC requested information from STRICOM on the availability of aircraft.

042235 - Military District of Washington (MDW) reported that large gr of Negroes were assembling in the vicinity of 14th & U Streets and were breaking car windows.

042240 - The 1st Bn, 3d Inf at Ft Myer and Ft McNair was alerted for possible employment in Washington, D.C.

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042245 - GEN Hennessey directed Headquarters CONARC to place two battalions from Ft Bragg on a 6 hour alert status as soon as possible and report when battalions had attained this posture.

042245 - STRICOM notified AOC that fifteen C-130 aircraft were on 4 hour alert at Pope AFB.

042250 - GEN Hennessey ordered the AOC to be augmented. Augmentation team members notified.

042257 - CofSA called Chairman JCS and briefed him on growing CONUS civil disturbances.

042300 - CofSA informed GEN O'Malley (CG MDW) of situation and directed him to report to his CP and to activate MDW emergency operations center.

042302 - CofSA informed CG USCONARC that CG MDW had been alerted and was reporting to the CP. Further, that 1 Co, 3d Inf had been alerted for deployment on 30 minute notice.

042310 - CofSA returned to AOC Conference Room and called GEN Haines (VCoFA) to inform him of situation.

042315 - Report received of an explosion in the downtown area of Washington. 200 - 300 people had gathered and were breaking store windows.

042330 - AOC instructed members of the Army Civil Disturbance Committee to report to the AOC immediately to meet with GEN Hennessey.

042330 - ACSI reported that approximately 200 to 300 persons had gathered at 14th and U St. N.W. Persons were breaking windows and throwing bottles at passing cars.

042345 - GEN Haines arrived AOC Conference Room. ACSI reported civil disturbances in New York City; Monticello, N.Y.; Raleigh, N.C.; Memphis, Tenn.; and New Haven, Conn.

042400 - USCONARC was directed to place one sqdn of the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment (6th ACR) (Ft Meade, Md) on a standby alert with one company on a 1-hr alert.

042400 - Widespread looting was reported along 14th Street.

050010 - GEN Hennessey requested that Headquarters STRICOM provide information to the AOC on aircraft availability starting at 050800 and every 8 hours thereafter. STRICOM agreed to the request.

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050013 - CG MDW informed GEN Hollis that 2 companies of the 3d Inf at Ft Myer had been placed on a 1 hour alert and the 2d squadron of the 6th ACR at Ft Meade had been alerted with 1 troop ready to move in 1 hour.

050015 - GEN Southward (CG DCNG) requested permission to bring 1 company of the DCNG into the Armory. At that time Mr. Christopher and Mr. McGiffert decided against this action.

050028 - CofSA departed AOC Conference Room.

050048 - Crowds, size unknown, gathering and looting in the 10th and 13th Precincts, Washington, D.C.

050115 - MDW reported 3d Inf and elements of 6th ACR on ½ hr alert.

050120 - Firemen were stoned by demonstrators and prevented from putting out fires in vicinity of 14th and Fairmont, N.W., Washington, D.C. The firemen requested assistance from the police.

050150 - 6th ACR reported 2/6 ACR 80% assembled and estimated the sqdn would be ready at 050245.

050154 - MPD reported to AOC that all fires under control. Police at 14th & Monroe received orders to use tear gas.

050200 - AOC notified HQ, STRATCOM to be prepared on order to deploy communication teams.

050200 - A mob of about 300 moved north from the 1300 block of 7th Street, breaking windows and setting fires. Police in the area were stoned by the mob.

050200 - VCofSA talked by telephone to CG DCNG who stated that he had not received a request for assistance from the Metropolitan Police Department. He further stated that he had one NG company that could be assembled in two hours. VCofSA, after conferring with Mr. Jordan told CG DCNG not to assemble the company at that time.

050245 - COL Chmar (G3 MDW) informed AOC that 1/6 ACR was placed on a 2 hour alert by MDW. (2/6 ACR already assembling at Ft Meade.)

050245 - Crowds were roaming in the streets in area of 7th Street and Florida Avenue, N.W. Police were stoned in vicinity of 14th Street, N.W.

050315 - Meeting held in AOC Conference Room attended by VCofSA; Mr. Patrick Murphy, Director of Safety, D.C.; Mr. McTiernan, Dept of Justice; Mr. Jordan, Army General Counsel; CG DCNG; GEN Hollis and GEN Hennessey, OPS OD.

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Mr. Murphy expressed confidence at this meeting that the situation in D.C. was under control but was concerned that the police would be unable to cope with the situation that could develop on the night of 5-6 April 68. CG DCNG stated that if the DCNG was to be used on the night of 5-6 April he should be informed by 1200 hours to provide sufficient time to assemble the troops. The procedures and legal aspects of calling the DCNG to duty were discussed. The meeting ended at 050400 with the understanding that each participant would discuss the situation and procedures with his superior and that a second meeting would be held at 050900 Apr 68.

050420 - ACSI advised that DC authorities report limited disturbance activity with some looting and minor incidents.

050410 - VCofSA departed AOC.

050620 - G3, MDW, reported to AOC 6th ACR and 3d Inf units have been ordered to "stand down" as of 050600.

050736 - VCofSA arrived AOC.

050738 - CofSA arrived at the AOC Conference Room. The situation in Washington and the alert status of troops was reviewed. The status of the aircraft capability to move Army forces was discussed and the availability of MAC aircraft determined. CofSA gave instructions to insure that civil authorities, to include Mayor Washington, were informed of the procedures and requirements of the law for committing Federal troops and that CG DCNG should plan on having the DCNG assembled by 1800 hours.

050807 - VCofSA left the AOC Conference Room for his office.

050822 - DCNG reported that Mr. Murphy had been briefed on the authority, responsibility and procedures for calling the NG to a militia and Federal status. The NG had not been called to state militia status but was maintaining duty officers at each unit.

050900 - Mayor Washington requested 6 ambulances with drivers and aidmen, DCNG had only one ambulance available.

050909 - CG and G3 MDW started a briefing on the status of TF Inside Forces (OPLAN CABIN GUARD). The group was joined by Mr. Resor and the meeting was continued. The MDW plan presented at that time was as follows:

- 1/3 Inf 0600-1800 hrs
 - 1 Co ready to move 1 1/2 hrs. Bn (-) 2 hrs.
- After 1800 hrs
 - 1 Co ready to move in 1/2 hr. Bn (-) 2 hrs.
- 2/6 ACR 0600-1800 hrs
 - 1 Trp 1 hr. Sqdn (-) 2 hrs.
- After 1800 hrs
 - 1 Trp 1/2 hr. Sqdn (-) 1 hr.

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1/6th ACR 1800 hrs
2 hrs

6 ACR (-) 1800 hrs
Ready to move on order after 2/6 ACR moved to D.C. area.

91st Engr Bn 0600 hrs
1 Co ready to move in 1 hr. Bn (-) 2 hrs.

051115 - CofSA directed TFI to have USMC Bn ready by 1800 hrs as follows:
1 co to move in ½ hr, Bn (-) ready to move in 1 hr.

051200 - Mr. Christopher, Mr. Murphy, Mr. McGiffert and Mr. Temple discussed the Washington situation at the White House.

051205 - Crowds gathered in the vicinity of 14th and S Streets, N.W. were breaking windows and looting stores.

051220 - Mr. Murphy arrived at the AOC conference room and a meeting was held with the following persons participating; Mr. Resor, Mr. Murphy, Chief of Police Layton, Mr. Vincent (Dept. of Justice), VCofSA, CG DCNG, and CG MDW. As a result of this meeting it was decided that the DCNG should be assembled and CG DCNG was ordered to place the 260th MP Group (2 Bns), 104th Light Maintenance Co and the Headquarters Detachment, DCARNG on a drill status. Units to close in D.C by 1600 hours.

051245 - The police used tear gas to disperse crowds and looters along 14th Street, N.W.

051315 - 116th MI Grp reported to the AOC at 14th St and "S" St. N.W., Wash, D.C., a group, number unknown, are in the area and reported to be breaking windows and looting.

051320 - USAINTC reported to AOC - 900 people located between 1100 and 1500 block 7th St. Wash, D.C. An unknown number are located at 900 to 1000 block of E St.

051330 - ACSI reported at 051105 hours in Precinct #2 three stores are on fire in 1100 block 7th St. A crowd of 300 persons are breaking and entering and looting at 7th and L St.

051331 - VCofSA directed that TFI place all of 3d Inf on 30 minute alert immediately.

051335 - ACSI reported at 7th and E St. N.W. a large group of people roaming. Assistance was requested by MPD from their own headquarters. Fire reported at 700 block E. St.

051340 - ACSI reported various precincts and U St. out of control because of rioting. Several fires reported on 13th and 14th St. Fires are also

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reported at 7th and H St. where firemen are helpless. Large groups of juveniles are moving north on 7th St. in 1600 block breaking window glasses and looting.

051405 - Mr. Christopher requested the designation of a senior general officer to report to the White House to meet Mr. Christopher and to accompany him on an inspection tour of the disturbance areas. VCofSA was designated and notified.

051425 - 91st Engr Bn at Ft Belvoir, Va. was placed on 1 hour alert.

051427 - Large crowds were reported roaming throughout the city. Looting was prevalent along 14th St., N.W. and 7th and S Strs., N.W. where stores were being looted then destroyed.

051435 - VCofSA departed for the White House after changing to civilian clothes as requested.

051445 - 051630 - VCofSA, Mr. Christopher and Mr. Murphy toured the disturbance area.

051500 - VCofSA ordered GEN Hollis to establish a staff at Metropolitan Police Station, District Building.

051510 - CofSA ordered 2 Sqdn, 6th ACR to move from Ft Meade to D.C. immediately to assemble at US Soldiers' Home.

051510 - CofSA authorized the move of the 91st Engr Bn from Ft Belvoir. Unit to close in predetermined assembly area on outskirts of D.C.

051520 - Mayor Washington called CG DCNG and expressed concern. He stated that there were serious problems and asked that NG troops be made available. He was informed that troops were not immediately available but would be assembled at NG Armory by 1800 hours.

051530 - AOC confirmed with TFI that 3d Inf was on 30 minute alert. AOC to receive 3d Inf status report every 15 minutes.

051530 - TFI advised AOC that 3d Squadron of 6th ACR alerted.

051545 - GEN Hollis reported that TF Washington (TFW) CP operational at District Building.

051545 - AOC directed TFI to order 3d Inf to load on transportation and to be prepared to move out.

051550 - CofSA instructed GEN Hollis (CofS, TFW) to determine where troops are required in D.C., and to inform TFI to move all of TFI forces to assembly areas in and around D.C., less provisional battalions at Ft Lee and Ft Eustis and the MP Bn at Ft Bragg.

051600 - Mayor Washington requested intervention of Federal troops to assist in restoring law and order.

051600 - Widespread fires and looting occurred throughout the city, particularly

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in the downtown NW section. Incidents of disorder also occurred in the NE and SW sections.

051602 - The President signed the proclamation ordering the citizens of Washington, D.C. to cease and desist from their disturbance activities.

051603 - The President signed the Executive Order authorizing the intervention of Federal forces in Washington, D.C.

051604 - PRES Johnson informed CofSA that he had just signed Executive Order. PRES Johnson ordered CofSA to get troops moving. CofSA informed the President that he had ordered 3,800 troops to move to assigned areas in and around the city, PRES Johnson concurred in movement to assembly areas if kept in "low key" and urged movement of the "1,000" to D.C. (assumed to mean 3d Infantry units).

051605 - CofS, TFW called from TFW Hq and stated that Chief Layton gave following appraisal of situation in 11 critical areas, not in order of priority: 1-14th St. N.W. to Belmont to Monroe Sts. 2-7th St. from L to S Sts. 3-H St. N.E. from 1st to 15th Sts. 4-White House and Capitol areas. Chief Layton recommended employment of Federal forces as follows: 1st Priority - H St. N.E. from 1st to 15th Sts.; 2d priority - vicinity of White House and Capitol for protection only and show of presence. (TFI Journal)

051606 - VCofSA informed by AOC that CofSA had ordered all TF Inside units to their assembly areas and that the 3d Inf was mounted up and ready to go.

051615 - CofSA instructed CG TFI to commit 3d Infantry units to the White House, Capitol and disturbance area vicinity 14th Street.

051615 - TFI ordered Marines to load and move to Anacostia. (First elements departed Quantico at 1800 hours.)

051625 - TFW instructed TFI to commit the 3d Inf unit only to the White House and the Capitol.

051630 - 2/6th ACR arrived US Soldiers' Home.

051635 - Mayor Washington announced a city-wide curfew from 051730 to 060630.

051644 - G3, TFI informed CofSA that 3d Inf units were mounting on trucks and preparing to move momentarily.

051645 - VCofSA arrived at Metropolitan Police Hq (Hq, TFW).

051645 - Fires and looting were reported along Bladensburg Road in the NE section.

051650 - VCofSA made tentative assignment of areas of responsibility: 3d Inf, 1st and 2d Precincts; 6th ACR, 9th, 10th and 13th Precincts.

051650 - In conversation with Mr. Califano, CofSA clarified status of his authorized troop commitment within D.C. as follows: authorized to commit 500 men of the 3d Inf and permission granted to move additional troops to D.C. if kept in a "low key." CofSA requested permission to commit 1 sqdn of 6th ACR (approx. 750 men).

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051700 - 503d MP Bn alerted for movement from Ft Bragg to D.C. area.

051700 - CG DCNG reported to VCofSA that he expected to have NG troops in the Armory and ready to deploy by 1800 hours.

051700 - DCNG was Federalized.

051702 - CofSA informed VCofSA that he was designated as commander of TFW. CG TFW told CofSA that the DCNG would be at 70% strength at the D.C Armory by 1800, and would operate that night from the Armory. CGTFW also told CofSA that the Secret Service wanted to make certain that the three companies of the 3d Regiment assigned to protect the White House were not committed to other duties but preserved for use at the White House (AOC Log).

051715 - 3d Sqdn, 6th ACR ordered to move to D.C. area and assemble at U.S. Soldiers' Home.

051720 - COL Richardson, D.C. Guard Army Advisor reported to AOC that 163d and 171st MP Bns have been held at Armory with mission to be prepared to relieve 6th ACR. Assembled strength for both units was 17 officers and 250 EM. Camp Simms and D.C. Armory secured.

051720 - 716th TC Gp at Ft Eustis and 544th Sup and Svc Bn at Ft Lee ordered to move to the D.C. area.

051720 - Troops from the 1st Bn, 3d Inf were committed to the White House and Capitol Building.

051745 - TFI reported to AOC that as of 051715: 3/6th ACR had departed Ft Meade enroute to US Soldiers' Home; 716th Trans Gp at Ft Eustis alerted by First Army at 151720; 91st Engrs ordered to move to East Potomac Park at 151600; 3d Inf has deployed one Co to White House (closed 051730); another Co to Capitol (closed 051740); 503d MP Bn from Ft Bragg has been placed on 2 hour alert by CONARC.

051753 - Elements of 2/6th ACR committed to Precincts 9, 10 and 13.

051820 - TFI reported to AOC: Troops deployed in Washington -

1/3 Inf - 2 Cos (150 men each)
6th ACR - 3 Troops (185 men each)
Troops in reserve:
1/3 Inf - 4 Cos (150 men each)
6th ACR - 1 Troop (185 men)
91st Engr Bn (850 men)
3d Sqdn, 6th ACR enroute (750 men)

051835 - Four deaths and hundreds of arrests were reported by the D.C. police department. Rioting continued out of control in many parts of the city.

051845 - DCNG strength as of 051800: 106 Off, 621 EM, total 727 - 40% assigned strength. No unit deployed (DCNG Journal).

051850 - 1st Sqdn, 6th ACR ordered to deploy from Ft Meade to US Soldiers' Home (TFI Journal).

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051900 - CG TFW departed CP, helicopter overflight of city w/Mr. Vance.

051900 - TF Inside reported that the 544th Bn from Ft Lee was ready to move.

051910 - Curfew imposed by Mayor Washington was not effective in the 10th Precinct. Disorders continued there unchecked.

051915 - First serial of Marine SDT Bn closed Anacostia Naval Station (TFI Journal).

051920 - CG, TFW and Mr. Vance received briefing at TF Inside Hq, covering strengths and troop dispositions.

052000 - CG, TFW and Mr. Vance returned to CP.

052000 - Fonecon CG TFW to CofSA - The first aircraft transporting elements of the 82d Abn Div would be ready to lift off at 052100 but the decision to move had to come from Mr. Vance. CG, TFW advised that Mr. Vance already said they could be committed. CofSA told CG, TFW to have Mr. Vance call Mr. McGiffert. CG, TFW indicated that he wanted the 503d to come up because of their mobility, training and communications capability (AOC log).

052030 - CG, TFW visited 1st Precinct - 1 Co, 3d Inf.

052039 - Letter of Instructions dispatched from CofSA to CG, TFW (DA Msg 858668). (For LOI, see appendix C.)

052043 - AOC to CONARC, STRICOM and AFCEP requesting that first aircraft with Bde of 82d Abn Div be launched at 052100 Apr.

052045 - Fonecon CG, TFW to G3 TFI: CG, TFW wants some troops to the west of 6th Street and at least one company east of 6th Street to assist the police and make a show of force. G3 TFI replied that there was a company on the way to each location. (AOC Log)

052050 - 200 people were reportedly gathered at the Anacostia Naval Air Station gate. Marines were dispatched to investigate.

052100 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct, 1/3 Inf (-).

052107 - CG, TFW to AOC: Report on the 1st Precinct. A company of the 3d Inf is in place at the White House. The company that is at the Capitol is starting to fan out west of 6th Street. A Marine company is moving in and will fan out into the area east of 6th Street. The coordination with the 1st Precinct appears to be good. Report on the 2d Precinct: The 3d Inf less four companies is in the Precinct and the Bn Commander is with the Precinct Captain. They are moving toward Thomas Circle. Troops are moving in platoon formation and are doing a good job. There are quite a few fires unattended along 7th Street. Much of 14th Street is burned out. The liaison with the precinct is well tied down.

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052125 - CG, TFW visited 13th Precinct, 3/6th Cav.

052130 - Fonecon, GEN Hennessey to GEN Walker, CONARC, GEN Hennessey directed that a second brigade TF of the 82d Abn Div be prepared to follow immediately behind the initial brigade moving to Washington.

052131 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6th Cav.

052211 - CG TFW to AOC - Report of 13th Precinct - Visited LNO at Precinct Hq and Bn Exec Off. Bn Commander was out with Precinct Captain. Three companies deployed and spread throughout that part of the area not gutted and doing a good job. Fourth company just coming in. Since this will be over a weekend, we should be able to use schoolhouses for billeting. Take action to coordinate with the Mayor for the use of schoolhouses so the troops can get some rest, clean up, and have a central location for their kitchen trucks.

052225 - 116th MI reported to AOC - 10th Precinct situation. Condition serious, extensive fire sweeping south on Georgia Avenue from Park Road. One NG company due in area at 2240 hours. One troop of 2/6 ACR is in Precinct.

052228 - CG, TFW to AOC - Report on 10th Precinct. COL Myer, 3d Sqdn, 6th Cav and the Precinct Captain are here. I find that units in this area are one troop of the 2d Sqdn and a NG Co. Both companies are on Georgia Avenue. Most of 14th Street is gone but there are many businesses on Georgia Avenue which can be saved. When the 2d Sqdn troop is relieved it should revert back to its parent squadron's control in the 9th Precinct. The 3d Sqdn will operate out of the US Soldiers' Home initially and will deploy into the area at about 2240 hours.

052235 - CG, TFW, cruising, H Street blocked by numerous fires, debris in street.

052249 - Third Army to AOC - 1st elements 1st Bde 82d Abn Div depart Ft Bragg.

052250 - CG, TFW reports from 9th Precinct: 2/6 Cav, less one troop. Extensive damage on H St., N.E. from 2d Street to 15th Street occurred this afternoon. Many stores gutted by fire and some buildings have toppled into the streets. All fires under control except where gas main is broken, and utility personnel working on that. 2d Sqdn has a good commander, and the troops are doing a fine job, but they do need a home base. The CO is talking with the officials of Gallaudet College about that now. The Sqdn received a report that seven rounds of fire were heard three blocks north of H Street and Bladensburg Rd. This is first report received as to any firing.

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052320 - CG, TFW reported from 5th Precinct: No troops here - Mobs are looting along 8th Street, S.E. and at Pennsylvania at 11th Street, S.E. LTC Mooney, CO, Marine Bn, given instructions to put some troops into the 5th Precinct from Anacostia, because they can move soonest.

052325 - CG, TFW directed that on arrival, the 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div is to move to assembly area at Bolling AFB and prepare for commitment in the 11th and 14th Precincts.

052400 - CG, TFW visited 11th Precinct, 91st Engr Bn (-).

060001 - 1st Aircraft arrived with COL Roop, Brigade Cmdr and staff at Andrews at 0001 hours 6 April 1968. Visit with GEN O'Malley at 060130 hours at TFI EOC (TFI Journal).

060010 - CG, TFW to AOC - Report on 11th Precinct: Two companies from the 91st Engr Bn are here; one organic and the 77th Port Construction Co. There are several fires in the area. Mississippi Avenue and Wheeler Shopping Center is destroyed. One looter was killed at Nichols and South Capitol, a 20 year old, and another wounded. Have suggested to CO, 91st Eng Bn, that he move a third company here. He had three companies at Hains Point. It should get moving by 0030 and arrive here about 0100. Looking into the possibility of transferring the 91st Engineers' base of operations over here from Hains Point. It may be that we'll have to use the other two companies in the 14th Precinct. If so that will provide the CO a more centralized point for control.

060010 - USMC Bn Commander was directed to deploy one company to the area of Pennsylvania Avenue between H & M Streets.

060030 - CG, TFW visited 14th Precinct, 171 MP (-) (NG).

060055 - First aircraft arrived Andrews AFB with elements of 1st Bn, 504th Abn Inf, 1st Bde 82d Abn Div.

060130 - TFI to AOC - 544th S&S Bn closed Ft Myer.

060200 - Numerous incidents of unchecked looting were continuing in the 14th Precinct.

060250 - TFW to AOC - 1st Bde, 82d directed to assume responsibility for Precincts 11 and 14 by 0700 6 April 68. Troop deployment by precincts:

#1-Co 1/3 Inf; 1 Co 544 S&S Bn; 1 Marine Co
#2-Prov Bn; 2 Cos 3d Inf
#3-3 Cos 91st Engr
#4-& 5-Marine Bn
#6-1 Trp 6 ACR
#7&8-No troops-544th S&S will provide if required
#9-2/6 ACR

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#10-1/6 ACR (How Btry)
#11-2/504 (1st Bde, 82d Abn Div)
#12-How Btry ACR
#13-3/6 Sqdn
#14-1/504 Abn Inf (1st Bde, 82d Abn Div)

060420 - TFI to AOC - 1/504 Abn Inf closed Andrews AFB.

060615 - 1/504 Abn Inf committed in 11th Precinct.

060700 - TFW to AOC - 2/504 Abn Inf committed in 14th Precinct.

060749 - Fonecon - CG, TFW to Mr. Vance: There was a shooting incident by the police in Precinct 14 and a small crowd was reported gathering at the scene, but MPD headquarters was checking this out. Other than that, there were no untoward incidents to report. The 1st Bde of the 82d Abn Div was getting into position with a battalion in the 11th Precinct and a second battalion coming into the 14th Precinct. The 503d MP Bn had not yet closed, as they are bringing up the rear of the brigade.

060750 - TFI to AOC - 1st aircraft of 2/508 Abn Inf landed at Andrews AFB.

060800 - Fires and looting began anew with lifting of the curfew in the NW, NE & SE Sections of the city.

060855 - Last aircraft landed at Andrews AFB with elements of 1st Bde, 82d Abn from Pope, AFB.

060856 - By fonecon, CG, TFW gave a situation report to CofSA. SITREP included a discussion of damage, threat the troop deployments by precinct, and the necessity for increasing troop strength in the city. (For complete SITREP see Incl 1).

060930 - TFW to AOC - Situation by Precinct:

#6-troops deployed; no incidents.
#9-activity picking up; increased looting; crowds gathering
(3 Trps committed).
#10-increase in isolated looting.
#12-no incidents reported.
#13-increase in looting.

061005-- By fonecon, GEN Knowles (AOC) to GEN Walker (CONARC) - directed 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div to move to Wash, D.C.

061100 - CG, TFW toured Washington by UH-1D w/Mr. Vance and Mayor Washington. Returned to Police Hq at 1145.

061200 - 2/508th Abn Inf closed Bolling AFB.

061200 - CG, TFW visited 1st Precinct, 716th TC Bn, w/Mr. Vance, Mayor Washington, Councilman Hechinger and Deputy Chief of Police Hughes.

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061230 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct, 1/3 Inf.

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061310 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6 Cav. Left tour group to investigate lack of ammunition report. Interviews COL Gompf, CO, 6th Cav. Police masks will not stop CS.

061327 - SEN Russell called the President. He stated that some Marines at the Capitol said that they did not have ammunition. Also, SEN Russell stated that some rumors were that soldiers were standing around watching looting and doing nothing. CofSA directed CG, TFW to check this out and report back.

061330 - GEN Hollis, acting on instructions from CofSA, instructed the following:

1. Instructed every CO of individual units to verify that all soldiers, including Marines, had ammunition pouched on their belts.
2. That all soldiers, including Marines, knew what to do about looters.
3. Requested positive verification that it had been done.

061400 - 4,000 CS Grenades had been delivered by helicopter to Ft Myer for delivery to Washington, D.C. Police Department.

061415 - Mayor Washington imposed 1600 to 0630 curfew in Washington, D.C.

061420 - Unruly crowd had gathered at 4th and M St., SW. USMC Bn was directed to prepare to send one company if needed.

061430 - TFW to AOC - announced that a curfew has been established for the period 061600 to 070630.

061435 - CG, TFW - interviews at Capitol about ammunition issue to USMC (School Troops, Quantico). Co Cmdr, Bn Cmdr showed persuasive evidence ammunition had been issued. Both went to see Senator Russell.

061445 - CG, TFW to Mr. Califano on ammunition problem concerning Senator Russell. Men got flak vests and two magazines of ammunition at Anacostia before being deployed to the Capitol. This Company Commander was noted as being quite conscientious about ammunition issue, as even three soldiers driving trucks for the Marines had been issued ammunition. CG, TFW reiterated that there was no shortage of ammunition at any level, and no soldier or Marine had been wounded. There had been three cases of small arms fire reported, but none directed at troops.

061454 - Fonecon - CG, TFW reported to CofSA on the ammunition problem and current situation in city. (Complete report at Incl 2.)

061550 - CG, TFI directed that Co A, 171 MP Bn & Co B, 163d MP Bn be relieved and returned to D.C. Armory.

061630 - First aircraft departed Pope AFB with elements of 2d Bde, 82d Abn enroute to Andrews AFB.

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061645 - Situation continued to deteriorate, especially in 4th and 11th Precincts. FBI reports pointed to 7th and 8th Precincts as potential trouble areas.

061700 - Civil disorders were on the increase in Washington, D.C., particularly in the 4th and 11th Precincts. Fires were more numerous. Sporadic gunfire continued (not confirmed) in affected areas.

061730 - Reports indicated that Negroes would attempt to extend disturbance activities from Washington, D.C., into Virginia during the night of 6 - 7 April. One possible specific target was Shirlington, Virginia.

061730 - TFW to AOC - TFI is establishing road blocks at: 1) P Street and Canal; 2) P Street and Half; 3) P Street and South Capitol.

061810 - TFW to AOC - 503d MP Bn closed Andrews AFB.

061950 - Hq TF 82d closed Ft McNair. ETA first bn TF 82 062000. ETA second bn TF 82 062200. ETA third bn TF 82 062400.

062005 - TFW to AOC - TFW assigned following responsibilities: TF 82 responsible for 4, 5, 9 and 12 Precincts effective 070700; 503d MP remains attached TFI as mobile force; 2/508 Abn Inf is reserve at Bolling.

062015 - CG, TFW to AOC - Commissioner Spellman, Prince Georges County called. She stated that she understood the Army had coordinated with GEN Gelston, Maryland NG, concerning the area between D.C boundary and the Beltway. Commissioner Spellman had been told by GEN Gelston that the Army assumed responsibility to the Beltway. Further, if assistance is needed, she is to come to the Army. CG, TFW replied that we have plans to go to the Beltway in "hot pursuit" situations on a case-by-case basis, but we have a battalion-size unit in the 14th Precinct and this precinct has been quieter than many of the other precincts.

062022 - Police radio reported that snipers were firing at military units from buildings at 724 and 626 3rd Street, N.W. (Never confirmed.)

062100 - TFI to AOC - One company of 544th S&S Bn at Ft Myer being sent to 7th Precinct. A two-company TF from the NG is prepared to reinforce.

062115 - CG, TFW visited 11th Precinct - 1/504th Abn Inf.

062135 - CG, TFW visited 14th Precinct - 2/504th Abn Inf.

062200 - CG, TFW visited 9th Precinct - 2/6th Cav.

062215 - CG, TFW visited 6th Precinct, Battery 3/6 Cav (How Btry).

062230 - CG, TFW visited 12th Precinct, 2/6 Cav.

062230 - Snipers were reported in the 700 Block of 3rd Street, N.W. in Washington. (Never confirmed.)

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062244 - Larry White, HW Troop, 1st Sqdn, 6th ACR was the first Army casualty. He was found unconscious in rear of 2130 Queens Chapel Road, N.E. It appeared that he had been struck on the neck by an unknown object.

062245 - TFI to AOC - 3d Bn, 325th Abn Inf, 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div closed Bolling AFB. Estimated close time of 2d Bde is 062400 Apr.

062306 - CG, TFW to AOC - Visited the 11th and 14th Precincts and both are outstanding. The troops looked superb. They are billeted in school-houses. Met Congressman Mathias and he was laudatory about the troops. Roadblocks have been established everywhere, picking up pedestrian and vehicular curfew violators. Then went to the 9th Precinct and reported Eighth Street pretty well burned out, however passable. There were a couple of old fires which had started again but no new fires. There was also a report of what sounded like a couple of shots fired but the source was unidentifiable. Everything looked good in the 9th Precinct. In the 12th Precinct, the 503d is operational as well as the Howitzer Battery of the 6th Armored Cavalry. There were a couple of fires but there was no looting to speak of. Have received no known returns from our experiment with the 503d but the precinct captain was very pleased with the operation.

Broad impression based on current observations is the curfew is working well and the situation is much quieter. The troops and police are aggressive, well tied in and have established roadblocks which are funneling and increasing control of traffic. As a result of the curfew, traffic is being checked coming in and out of Maryland. Greatly assured by tonight's observations.

062315 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6 Cav. First verified sniper incident on Fillmore Street. (Later proven not verified.)

062345 - CG, TFW visited 13th Precinct - No liaison officer present.

062400 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct, 1/3 Inf.

070100 - TF 82 to AOC - Last aircraft of 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div closed Andrews AFB.

070720 - OJAG advised TFW that use of federal troops for "hot pursuit" into Md would be permissible, but beyond such immediate action, they should await request from Governor of Md to the President.

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070730 - Disorders in Washington, D.C. had subsided; however, sporadic incidents of firebombing, looting, & gunfire continued to occur.

070800 - Looting began anew in the vicinity of 7th & 14th Sts NE.

070800 - TFI to AOC - Total arrests in Washington - 4,186.

070817 - First aircraft transporting XVIII Abn Corps Arty Bde departed Pope AFB, N.C. for Andrews AFB.

070900 - AOC to Justice Dept - Federal troops committed to civil disturbance - 21,595; Federal troops deployed:

Chicago - 5,376

Washington - 16,219 (composed of TFI inside - 10,419, DCNG - 1,754 and TF82-4046)

070945 - TFW to AOC - Hq XVIII Abn Corps Arty (100 personnel) and 4/73 Arty Bn - (600 personnel) closed at Andrews AFB.

071006 - 116 MI to AOC - 10th Precinct reported fire rekindled at 14th and Girard Streets and break-in at 307 - 7th Street.

071030 - CG, TFW made helicopter overflight.

071100 - CG. TFW at briefing at Hq, 6th Cav (U.S. Soldiers' Home).

071150 - CG. TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6 Cav.

071210 - CG, TFW visited 13th Precinct, 2/6th Cav. Some members 503d MP had clips in weapons. Corrected on spot.

071235 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct. Streets cordoned off from 7th through 10th for cleanup and control. One new fire and one apparently rekindled both on 7th Street.

071240 - Looting incidents continued in the 9th, 10th and 13th Precincts.

071405 - TFW to AOC - XVIII Abn Corps Arty closed Andrews AFB.

071420 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct w/Mr. Vance and Deputy Chief of Police Donahue.

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071530 - AOC to STRICOM - STRICOM and ARSTRIKE directed to initiate movement of 197th Bde from Ft Benning to Andrews AFB.

071645 - Memo for Record by CG, TFW concerning assurances provided Mayor Washington regards military protection of downtown stores on 8 April 1968 (copy of M/R at Incl 3).

071700 - Memo for Record concerning decision by Mayor Washington relating to the degree of operation of schools, businesses and Federal and District offices on 8 April, and on the curfew (copy of M/R is at Incl 4).

071700 - Frag Order No. 3 published by TFW requiring TF 82, TFI and Davison Army Airfield to prepare contingency plans for employment of troops in selected areas of Prince Georges and Montgomery County (Frag Order at Incl 5).

071821 - AOC to TFW - Directed movement of XVIII Abn Corps Arty Bde to Baltimore.

071824 - CofS, TFW to AOC - Operational control of XVIII Abn Corps Arty Bde passes to AOC.

071830 - Washington, D.C. large groups of Negroes were roaming through the downtown areas of the city. During the period between 1100 and 1500 hrs, 154 incidents were reported including 55 fires (two of which were still in progress). Later news media reports reflected a lessening of riot activity in the city.

071900 - CG, TFW visited 12th Precinct, 2/325th Abn Inf.

071915 - CG, TFW visited 2/325th Abn Inf bivouac, McKinley School.

072010 - CG, TFW visited 9th Precinct, 3/325th Abn Inf.

072100 - CG, TFW visited 5th Precinct, USMC, 1 Company. More troops required in this area.

072125 - CG, TFW visited 4th Precinct, USMC, 1 Company. Grossly inadequate living conditions. Liquor store in 5th Precinct needs protection.

072138 - SITREP, CG, TFW to CofSA. The report concerned over-reporting by Military Intelligence, Military-Police relationships, deployments, troop conduct and physical conditions (complete report at Incl 6).

072200 - TFI to AOC - Total arrests - 4,806
Total in custody - 583
Total injuries - 997

072210 - CG, TFW visited CP, TF 82 (MG Seitz). May put 1 battalion from 82d in 1st Precinct; adjustments in 4th and 5th Precincts discussed.

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080110 - CG, DCNG reported the status of 171st MP Bn changed to 60 minutes with 1st priority to Montgomery County and 2d priority to Precincts 7 and 8. Co B, 171st MP Bn on 30 minute alert. No ammunition expended. A total of 1802 troops on duty.

080300 - TFW to AOC - Meeting with Deputy Chief Hartnett, GEN Desobry, COL Roach, MAJ Tensley (503d MP Bn), LT Frye (Police), Inspector Williams (Police) 080300 April.

Described method of possible apprehension of Carmichael at 2208 - 14th Street at 080530. MAJ Tensley with three jeeps of the MPs will be back-up for police. Carmichael is supposed to leave address at 0530. Police will advise he is in violation of curfew. If he does not return to building he will be apprehended. May have 10-15 or more people with him. No information on guns. Movie camera will be used. Police will make arrest. MAJ Tensley will have radio contact with an officer at precinct Hq.

080310 - TF 82 reported to TFW two incidents of expended ammo as a result of sniper fire. In both instances, fire was placed only on street lights as requested by the civilian policemen accompanying the units.

Incidents:

- a. 072210 - Vicinity of Central and Southern NE
two rounds (M16), A/2/504. Precinct 14.
- b. 072212 - Vicinity of Benning Rd and G St N.E.
two rounds (M16), two rounds Cal. 45 pistol,
C/2/504. Precinct 9.

Note: Civilian police were at both locations and asked the soldiers to fire at the street lights. No fire was returned on the snipers.

080800 - TFI has expended 4,433 CS grenades (all types), no M79 rounds, and no ball ammunition since commencing operations (TFI Journal).

080930 - Last aircraft of III Corps Arty Bde departed Sheppard AFB enroute to Andrews AFB.

080945 - CG, TFW cruising w/Rep L. Mendel Rivers, Ch, HASC; BG Russ Blanford, Chief Counsel, HASC.

081005 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6th Cav. Discussions with police intelligence, ammo loading procedures.

081030 - CofSA Courtesy Patrol (2 officers) each Precinct briefed at TFI Hq and are now enroute to Precincts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 13. Subordinate TFs advised (TFI Journal).

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081040 - CG, TFW visited 9th Precinct, 3/325th Inf.

081055 - Washington, D.C.: The situation remained calm, with no new activity reported. Much of the city had returned to normal.

081245 - III Corps Arty reported to TFW that it closed at 1200 with 1966 personnel and 198 vehicles.

081315 - CG, TFW advised by GEN Bennett per his request for info that expected closure time 2d Bde, 5th Div at Andrews is 090232 Apr. (Mr. Vance and GEN Haines agreed that there was no objection to releasing the III Corps Arty to Baltimore provided TF 5 is expected to close prior to daylight on 9 Apr.)

081330 - CG, TFW visited D.C. Army National Guard. Missions given two MP battalions not very good. Should use more roving patrols.

081710 - Frag Order #4 issued. Order released 171st MP Bn from OPCON TFI and assigned OPCON TF 82. (Copy of order at Incl 7).

081800 - CG, TFW made overflight by helicopter w/Mr. Vance, Mr. Murphy, D.C. Director of Public Safety. All quiet except too much vehicle movement in 9th Precinct.

082024 - CofSA informed CG TFW that he was not responsible for outlying areas in Virginia. However, since it was difficult to make fine line distinction, he should have a contingency plan for flying a company to a troubled area, but do not employ it without CofSA approval.

082130 - CG, TFW visited 3d Precinct, 91st Engrs. Tight operation.

082130 - Frag Order #5 issued. Order directs TFI and TF 82 to be prepared to assume OPCON of elements of TF 2/5th Mech. Directs TF 2/5th Mech to prepare contingency plans for Fairfax and Arlington Counties within boundary established by Capitol Beltway. (Frag Order at Incl 8).

082200 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct, 1/3 Inf. Too many troops being used as station guards at school.

082205 - III Corps Arty was placed on 2-hr alert at Andrews AFB.

082215 - CG, TFW visited 13th Precinct, 3/6th Cav.

082300 - CG, TFW visited 5th Precinct, USMC, 2 companies. Gas grenade thrown through precinct house window during visit. First learned of burning at Harris School, 53d and C St. S.E.

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- 082330 - CG, TFW visited 11th Precinct, 1/504th Inf, 82d Abn Div.
- 082400 - Washington, D.C.: No significant activities were reported since 081600. The situation remained calm throughout the city.
- 090730 - CG, TFW made overflight by helicopter w/Chairman Rivers, BG Blanford.
- 090800 - CG, TFW visited, 1/325th Inf, 82d AB at Spingarn School bivouac.
- 090830 - CG, TFW visited DC ARNG.
- 091045 - TFW was directed to have 2d Bn, 61st Inf, 2d Bde, 5th Mech Div strip down on equipment in order to be prepared to move by air to Pittsburgh.
- 091200 - AOC directed TFW to load 2/61 Inf (2d Bde, 5th Mech Div) on aircraft at Andrews commencing 091330, to be on 1 hr. alert for Pittsburgh.
- 091500 - CG, TFW gave briefing for Secretary of the Army Resor and Under Secretary of the Army McGiffert.
- 091545 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct, 1/3d Inf.
- 091615 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6th Cav.
- 091710 - CG, TFW visited 9th Precinct, 1/325th Inf.
- 091730 - CG, TFW made helicopter overflight ending at Pentagon.
- 100900 - CG, TFW - Commanders Conference
- 101420 - CG, TFW made overflight stadium area.
- 101430 - CG, TFW visited 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div.
- 101500 - CG, TFW visited 11th Precinct, 1/504th Inf.
- 101530 - CG, TFW visited billets, 1/504th Inf.
- 101600 - CG, TFW visited 14th Precinct, 2/504th Inf.
- 101630 - CG, TFW visited billets, 2/504th Inf.
- 101800 - The police and fire departments in Washington, D.C., resumed normal duty hours.
- 101910 - CG, TFW visited 1st Precinct, 716th Trans Bn.

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101937 - CG, TFW to GEN Johnson - Conversation concerned withdrawal of troops for D.C. area. GEN Johnson told GEN Haines that 2d Bde, 5th Mech was to be released tonight and to get continuous use of air. 2/5 Mech Div to get priority as they are partially loaded. 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div to be quick reaction force east of, and northeast of Mississippi. GEN Haines wanted to hold 503d in D.C. area. GEN Haines' plan is to move units whose home station is farthest away from the D.C. area first. GEN Johnson questioned GEN Haines about timing of withdrawal, now that he and GEN Haines had agreed on withdrawal priorities. GEN Haines commented that USMC units be released and move early, and that day after tomorrow one brigade of the 82d could move overland by buses. GEN Johnson emphasized to GEN Haines that he did not have authority to release units from D.C. yet. GEN Haines noted that many units had made arrangements for troop activities (ballgame tickets purchased, etc.) and he would like to wait until Friday to withdraw units. GEN Johnson answered some to go Thursday and some Friday.

102000 - CG, TFW visited CP, billets, 716th Trans Bn.

102050 - From AOC - 2d Bde, 5th Mech Div to be released, effective 2400 hrs to return to Fort Carson.

110040 - First aircraft transporting 2/5 Mech departed Andrews AFB.

110455 - Washington, D.C.: The city remained calm for more than 24 hours. With the exception of one minor looting incident and one possible firebombing, there were no significant incidents.

111000 - CG, TFW - Commanders Conference.

111230 - First elements 544th S&S Bn departed enroute Ft. Lee, Va.

111300 - CG, TFW - start briefing for press.

111330 - CG, TFW left Municipal Police Department (MPD).

111420 - CG, TFW, arrived Precinct #2.

111455 - Mayor Washington announced curfew 112400 to 120400.

111530 - CG, TFW arrived U.S. Soldiers Home, Hq 6th Cav.

111600 - CG, TFW arrived Spingarn School; briefing and tour.

111645 - CG, TFW arrived 503d MP Bn, East Potomac Park.

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111710 - CG, TFW returned to CP and ended press tour.

111745 - From TFI to AOC - Demonstration planned for Sat, 13 April 1968 at 1400 hours by Arthur Wascow, Dick Gregory and Michael James at Georgetown Playground location at 33d Street and Volta St. N.W. Reason to discuss the "why" and the "what next" in relation to area riots. No Easter weekend problems seen otherwise. (DCNG Journal)

111900 - CG, TFW - Visited Mayor Washington.

120600 - Operational control of 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div passed to TFI.

120815 - CG, TFW visited Precinct 3, 504th Inf.

120835 - CG, TFW visited 7th Precinct, 163 MP Bn (NG) (-).

120930 - CG, TFW visited 8th Precinct, Plt C, 163d MP Bn (NG).

121010 - CG, TFW visited 6th Precinct, 2/6th Cav - Band and Show at Coolidge High School.

121040 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct, 1/6th Cav.

121330 - President approved troop withdrawal plan which provided for withdrawal of 3726 personnel on 12 April and 2740 on 13 April. Remaining force of 5601 will remain at least until 16 April. (Withdrawal plan at Incl 9).

121330 - USMC Bn commenced move to Quantico, Va.

121400 - 716th Trans Gp commenced move to Ft. Eustis.

121440 - Hq TF 82 and 1st Bde 82d Abn Div commenced move to Ft. Bragg.

121500 - CG, TFW (GEN Haines) relinquished command to LTG Collins. LTG Collins becomes CG, TFW.

121515 - GEN Haines departs Municipal Building.

121555 - CG, TFW visited TF Inside.

121900 - 91st Engr Bn commenced move to Ft. Belvoir.

122100 - CG, TFW visited 11th Precinct.

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122215 - CG, TFW visited 10th Precinct.

130930 - CG, TFW visited 1st Precinct.

130945 - CG, TFW visited 2d Precinct - discussed relief of 3d Inf sometime after 1900.

131000 - 6th ACR commenced move to Ft. Meade.

131015 - CG, TFW visited 9th Precinct.

131045 - CG, TFW visited Hq 2/82 Abn Div.

131115 - CG, TFW visited National Guard Hq - briefing by GEN Southward.

131215 - CG, TFW visited 14th Precinct.

131455 - CG, TFW observed Georgetown Rally.

131615 - CG, TFW returned to CP. Discussed phasedown of forces.

140600 - CG, TFW visited 503d MP Bn.

140630 - CG, TFW visited National Guard Hq.

140650 - 3d Inf commenced move to Ft. Myer.

140700 - CG, TFW visited 2/325th Inf Bn.

140730 - CG, TFW visited 3/325th Inf Bn.

140800 - CG, TFW visited 163d MP Bn.

140830 - CG, TFW visited 171st MP Bn.

140900 - CG, TFW returned to TF Washington Hq.

150600 - The 163d MP Bn, DCARNG was released from security detail with the fire department at McMillan Reservoir and returned to the DC Armory.

150840 - CG, TFW discussed withdrawal of troops with Director of Public Safety, Mr. Murphy and Chief of Police Layton.

151600 - CG, TFW discussed memorandum of agreement on phasedown of troops with Mayor Washington, Mr. Murphy and Chief of Police Layton providing for withdrawal of all troops by 161200 April 28. (Copy of Memorandum at Incl 10).

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- 151700 - 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div withdrawn from city to Bolling AFB.
- 160600 - 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div released from TFW.
- 160830 - CG, TFW departed for Mayor Washington's office.
- 161035 - CG, TFW - Conference call with TFI (COL Chmar) AOC (GEN Hennessey) and GEN Desobry on phasedown.
- 161200 - TFW ceased operations, terminating Federal military assistance in maintaining law and order.
- 161200 - 1st Bn 3d Inf, 1 Co USMC, and Armed Forces Police were released from TFI control.
- 161400 - CG, TFW departed CP for Pentagon.
- 161430 - 2d Bde, 82d Abn Div commenced move to Ft. Bragg.
- 161505 - DCNC will be defederalized effective 162400 April. (TFW Journal.)
- 161615 - TFW CP CLOSED.

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Summary of telephonic Situation Report, GEN Haines to GEN Johnson
060856 Apr 68
(From AOC Log)

General Johnson (and Mr. McGiffert) to General Haines (and Mr. Vance)

General Haines noted that the 91st Engineer Bn had served in an area of incipient trouble, Precinct 11, and was being relieved by a lead battalion of the 82d for recommitment in Precinct 3. He noted that Precinct 14 is largely residential, and had less damage than other areas. The Safeway stores were not even hit. However, Chief Layton asked that troops be put in there and he had honored the request with an MP company of DCNG. GEN Haines commented that there was no real danger at this time of putting squads or halvesquads in as deterrence to looters. Reports of shooting this morning were exaggerated. A report of a death sent by MI proved to be only a wounding incident, and when the MI reported a crowd gathering the Met Pol Dept investigated and found only four women at the scene who were favoring the policeman in the matter. He remarked that the two precincts east of the river were large and could pose problems if targeted by determined looters. Of the people apprehended last night three or four proved to be out-of-staters, some from as far away as Alabama, and that evidently they had come to DC to stir up trouble. He noted that he commanded the brigade of the 82d directly, and had two battalions east of the Anacostia River, while GEN O'Malley was in command west of the river, with his units precisely as the OPLAN for TF Inside called for. GEN Johnson asked for the total number of troops, and the answer was 8253 on the ground, with a total of 9403 when forces enroute arrived. GEN Haines remarked that targets last night were commercial, to include food stores in the troubled areas, as well as clothing and liquor stores, but there had been no problems with residences, and it seemed as if there was intentional avoidance of damage to residential areas. He also noted that, apparently, government buildings and embassies were not targeted. When asked if embassies and government buildings were secured, he stated there had been no calls for help from Met Pol Dept concerning those type buildings. The targeting of the looters, he indicated, seemed to be a reflection of vindictiveness against store owners who normally do business in the Negro neighborhoods, and there was no spillover into 16th Street or white business areas. No increase in the incident rate at this time, No troops hurt, ammunition was still being carried in the belt, and bayonets were sheathed, although there was a great deal of gas used. When GEN Johnson asked if he needed any more troops, he replied "I don't think we need the next brigade," indicating that he felt that there would be enough troops when the 503rd MP Battalion came in. There were battalions in all the precincts seriously threatened, and companies in the precincts not seriously threatened, that

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is, Precincts 6 and 12. GEN Johnson remarked that with Saturday night approaching, and any ringleaders having had time to plan, he would prefer to see troop strengths fat instead of thin. He then indicated that the second brigade from the 82d could be employed and GEN Haines replied with a request that if the other brigade did come in that a command element from division come, and control the two brigades of the 82d. In this way the number of subordinate headquarters would not increase, adding that he could make use of the additional brigade. The hardest hit precincts yesterday were: 2, 13, 10, and 9. Less damage in 1, 5 and 11. 14th Precinct even less, while Precincts 4, 3, 6 and 12, showed negligible damage.

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Summary of Telephonic Report on the Ammunition Problem

Concerning Senator Russell to GEN Johnson 061454 Apr - (From AOC log)

General Haines to General Johnson:

The conversation concerns the ammunition problem he had discussed with Mr. Califano. The Marine Captain involved was Captain B. J. Horan, and that he was a conscientious commander who ensured that all his troops had been issued ammunition and been checked to make certain that they had ammunition. GEN Johnson thought GEN Haines had done everything that could be done on the matter and then asked "How do things look over there?" GEN Haines replied that there was a threatening scene at a liquor store involving firemen and a crowd but that the situation was in hand. He remarked that Colonel Gompf of the 6th Cav was worried about spillover of trouble into virgin areas near the US Old Soldiers' Home. GEN Johnson inquired about TFW reserve and was told there were two battalions and one separate company. GEN Johnson remarked to make certain the troops had the "cards" and asked him to consider publishing an order on the same subject. GEN Haines reported the situation was, by then, manageable, and that any minor or major looting could be taken care of.

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
1645, 7 April 1968
68

HEADQUARTERS
Task Force Washington

7 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

In response to a request of the mayor for some assurance of protection of downtown stores during hours of operation tomorrow (8 April), I indicated that we would provide external protection through use of static guards and roving patrols. Subsequently, I assigned this mission to Task Force Inside (Colonel Sleeker), with the request that he use the 503d MP Battalion to reinforce the battalion which currently has responsibility for Precinct 1 (now the 716th TC Battalion) in the accomplishment of this mission. Coordination should be effected with store officials (detectives in the case of larger stores) in the provision of this protection.


RALPH E. HAINES, JR.
General, United States Army
Commanding

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1700, 7 April 1968

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
HEADQUARTERS
Task Force Washington

7 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

At a conference this date between Mayor Washington, Mr. Vance, General Haines, and Mr. Henkin, the mayor reached the following decisions:

- a. District schools will open tomorrow at the usual hours but close at 1230 hours.
- b. Federal and district employees will come to work at the usual hours but be turned loose on a staggered basis beginning at 1400 hours.
- c. Places of business will be permitted to open but will be required to close at 1600.
- d. Curfew for tomorrow (8 April) will be 1800 hours, subject to later confirmation.
- e. Schools will probably not be open on Tuesday, 9 April; places of business will probably not be permitted to open on that date either because of concern for reprisal. Exceptions may be made in the case of food stores. Final decision on this entire matter will be made and announced tomorrow (8 April).
- f. Every effort will be made to accommodate the minimum requirements of the troops for billeting within the school system. These requirements have been furnished to the mayor, and he is having an individual from his school board work out the details with the Operations Center (LTC Flemming, DCSLOG).


RALPH E. HAINES, JR.
General, United States Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE WASHINGTON

1700, 7 April 1968
70

FRAG ORDER - 3

Ø717ØØ April 1968

1. SITUATION:

Current Status Reports

2. MISSION:

Be prepared to provide assistance to Civil Authorities in maintaining law and order in Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties of Maryland.

3. EXECUTION:

a. TF 82 will develop contingency plans for employment of forces in Prince Georges County with primary areas of employment between the D.C. boundary and Highway 495 (Beltway).

b. TF INSIDE will develop contingency plans for employment of forces in Montgomery County with primary areas of employment between the D.C. boundary and Highway 495 (Beltway).

c. Davidson Army Airfield will be prepared to provide helicopter lift for 150 troops. Lift priority to TF 82. Direct coordination with DAF authorized.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Forces will not be committed except on order of this Headquarters under either of two conditions as follows:

(a) After receipt of a request from the Governor has been approved by the President:


(b) In an emergency.

(2) Task force planning will be based upon employment of forces now available; however, TF will also identify and report to TFW additional forces, in priority increments of battalion size, anticipated to be required with general concepts of employment.

4. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

No Change

BENNETT
BG


STRAUSS
G3

DISTRIBUTION:

TF 82

TF INSIDE

Davidson Army Airfield
Army Operations Center
Incl 5 to APPENDIX D

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71
Summary of Telephonic Situation Report, GEN Haines to GEN Johnson
072138 Apr 68
(From AOC Log)

General Haines to General Johnson:

The conversation initially concerned keeping Stokely Carmichael under surveillance, and over-reporting by Military Intelligence causing over-reaction. GEN Johnson asked about relationship between military and police, and was told there was no friction between military and police. GEN Haines stated that MG Southward no longer had a geographical responsibility, only functional responsibility, as his troops were patrolling. GEN Johnson asked if troops were getting adequate rest and was told the troops were tired last night, especially the 6th Cav who operated in a tough precinct. GEN Haines mentioned examples of troops eating C rations in public view, and that he had issued instructions for them to be out of sight when they ate. He also noted that good-hearted citizens were causing some problems in presenting the troops with coffee and cake and cited example of a soldier directing traffic with cup of coffee in hand. As of 0830 this morning the 82d was on the streets, but with three full battalions not yet committed, he intended to rotate the battalions into the precincts, and GEN Johnson commented that would be a "good practice". GEN Haines said that Mayor Washington was anxious to have the main streets clear, and that the military forces were helping to clear 7th and 14th Streets for traffic flow.

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE WASHINGTON

1710, 8 April 1968

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FRAG ORDER 4

081710 April 1968

1. SITUATION:

Current situation reports

2. MISSION:

No Change

3. EXECUTION:

a. TF 82

Assumes Operational Control of 171st MP Bn (ARNG) effective
081800 April 1968.

b. TF INSIDE


Releases Operational Control of 171st MP Bn (ARNG) effective
081800 April 1968.

c. CO 171st MP Bn (ARNG) establish immediate liaison with CG TF 82.

4. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

No Change

BENNETT
BG



STRAUSS
G3

DISTRIBUTION:

TF 82
TF INSIDE
HQ DC NG
171st MP Bn (ARNG)
ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER

Incl 7 to APPENDIX D

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TASK FORCE WASHINGTON

FRAG ORDER -5

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Ø8213ØAPR68

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1. SITUATION:

a. Dissident elements: Current Intelligence

b. Friendly: 2d Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) (TF5) closes Andrews AFB
Ø9Ø232 Apr68, OPCON TFW.

2. MISSION:

No Change

3. EXECUTION:

a. TFI & TF 82

Be prepared to assume OPCON by battalion increment of elms
2d Bde 5th Div (Mech) on order.

b. TF 2/5th MECH

(1) Be prepared to detach elements by Bn increment to OPCON
of TFI and TF82 on order of CG, TFW.

(2) Prepare contingency plans for employment of forces in
Fairfax and Arlington Counties and the Cities of Alexandria and Falls Church,
Virginia within the boundary established by Interstate Highway - I 495(Capitol
Beltway)

c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) TF5. One(1) Bn operational at Bolling AFB effective
091100Apr68 and placed one on alert to proceed to an assigned objective within
30 minutes of notification to move.

(2) TF5. One(1) Bn operational at Bolling AFB effective
091300Apr68 and placed on an alert to proceed to an assigned objective within
30minutes of notification to move.

(3) TF5(-). Operational at Bolling AFB. Time & alert
status to be announced.

(4) Priority of employment of TF5 to be established by CG,TFW.

(5) TF5. Direct coordination authorized with TFI and TF82.
Daylight reconaissance authorized in the District of Columbia. No reconaissance
authorized in Maryland and Virginia unless specifically authorized by CG,TFW.

4. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS:

CG, MDW tasked to provide necessary support.

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FRAG ORDER -5
Ø8213ØAPR68

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command Posts

- (1) TFW. MPD, 300 Indiana Ave N.W., Wash., D.C.
Telephone 641-5736; 641-5137; 641-5738; 641-5616
- (2) TFI. MDW EOC, Tempo B
Telephone OX-53815; OX-53921
- (3) TF82. Bldg 39, Ft McNair
Telephone 641-5645; 641-5777; 641-5732
- (4) TF5 Andrews AFB, Bldg 1211
Telephone 641-5764; 641-5765; 641-5766. Bolling
AFB, Bldg 204, Telephone to be announced.

b. Signal

- (1) Sig O, TFW will arrange for necessary communications less
organic TF communications.
- (2) Annex H(C-E) to TFW OPLAN 563-1 in effect.

BENNETT
BG


WOOLEYHAN
G3

DISTRIBUTION:
AOC
TF INSIDE
TF 82
TF 2/5th MECH

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
12 April 1968

We the undersigned are agreed on the following concept for the withdrawal of forces from the Washington area.

Strength as of 2400 hours, 11 April 1968: 12,067

Movements Friday, 12 April 1968:

HQ TF 82	243
1st Bde, 82d Abn	1945
716th TC Grp (+Attachments of spt)	763
91st Engr Bn (+Attachments of spt)	682
888th Med Det	14
Prov Trk Co	55
Med Det	19
Loudspeaker Det	5
TOTAL	<u>3,726</u>

Strength as of 1800 hours, 12 April 1968: 8,341


Movements Saturday, 13 April 1968:

6th Armd Cav Reg 2740


Strength as of 1800 hours, Saturday, 13 April 1968: 5,601
(Includes 1,848 DCNG)

This remaining force, consisting of 5,601 personnel, will remain until Tuesday, 16 April 1968. At that time a determination will be made as to further troop adjustments and the continuing participation of Task Force Washington in the maintenance of law and order in the District of Columbia.


WALTER E. WASHINGTON
Mayor-Commissioner


RALPH E. HAINES, JR.
General, United States Army
Commander, Task Force Washington


PATRICK V. MURPHY
Director of Public Safety


JOHN B. LAYTON
Chief of Police

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
April 1968

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We the undersigned are agreed on the following concept for the withdrawal of forces from the Washington area.

Strength as of 2400 hours, 14 April 1968: 5,601

Movements Monday 15 April 1968:

2d Bde, 82d Abn Div closes in Bolling AFB
1700, 15 Apr 68 1,843

Strength of TFW as of 2400, 15 Apr 68: 5,601

Movements Tuesday 16 April 1968:

2d Bde, 82d Abn Div released from TFW at 0600,
16 Apr 68 -- moves as directed by DA 1,843

Strength of TFW as of 0601, 16 Apr 68 3,758

503d MP bn departs Washington and closes Fort
Belvoir 1200, 16 Apr 68 654

DCNG closes DCNG Armory 1200, 16 Apr 68 and is
defederalized 2400, 16 Apr 68 1,848

Remaining units at Fort Myer, Va; Washington
Navy Yard and Marine Barracks as of 1200, 16
Apr 68 1,126

HQ, TFW closes CP 1200, 16 Apr 68 28

HQ, TFI closes CP 2400, 16 Apr 68 100


Forces committed to D.C. as of 1200, 16 Apr 68 0

Headquarters, Task Force Washington will be deactivated 1200 hours,
16 April 1968. Federal military assistance in maintaining law and order
ceases at 1200, 16 April 1968.



WALTER E. WASHINGTON
Mayor - Commissioner


A. S. COLLINS, JR
Lietutenant General
United States Army
Commander, Task Force Washington

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PATRICK V. MURPHY
Director of Public Safety

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JOHN B. LAYTON
Chief of Police

Incl 10 to
APPENDIX D

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TASK FORCE WASHINGTON TASK ORGANIZATION

(4-16 April 1968)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
Task Force Headquarters	28	Wash., D. C.
Task Force 82	(4,901)	
Task Force Headquarters	243	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
1st Bde, 82d Abn Div	1,945	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
2d Bde, 82d Abn Div	1,842	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
USMC (Spt) Bn (Prov)**	871	Quantico, Va
Task Force Inside	(6,689)	
Task Force Headquarters	100	Ft. McNair, Va
1st Bn, 3d Inf	994	Ft. Myer, Va
6th Armd Cav Regt	2,823	Ft. Meade, Va
91st Engr Bn	682	Ft. Belvoir, Va
716th Trans Bn	763	Ft. Eustis, Va
503d MP Bn	648	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
544th Supply & Service Bn	679	Ft. Lee, Va
Task Force 2/5		
2d Bde, 5th Mech Div	(2,064)	
Bde Headquarters	171	Ft. Carson, CO
1st Bn, 10 Inf	623	Ft. Carson, CO
2d Bn, 11th Inf	627	Ft. Carson, CO
2d Bn, 61st Inf	643	Ft. Carson, CO
D. C. National Guard	(1,848)	Wash., D. C.
Headquarters	70	Wash., D. C.
260th MP Gp	43	Wash., D. C.

APPENDIX E

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
171st MP Bn	484***	Wash., D. C.
163d MP Bn	588	Wash., D. C.
140th Eng Det	17	Wash., D. C.
104th Lt Maint Co	136	Wash., D. C.
115th Evac Hosp	257	Wash., D. C.
257th Army Band	27	Wash., D. C.
Air National Guard	226	Wash., D. C.
Task Force Total		
Active Army	13,682	
D. C. National Guard	<u>1,848</u>	
	15,530	

*101800 Apr was time of peak troop strength.


**Under the operational control of Task Force Inside until 070700 Apr 68.

***Under the operational control of Task Force 82 effective 081800 Apr 68.

Remainder of DCNG (1,364) under operational control of Task Force Inside.

79

TASK FORCE WASHINGTON
TROOP STRENGTHS



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APPENDIX G

Troop Unit Dispositions


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Incl 3. As of 072400 Apr 68

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
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
TASK FORCE WASHINGTON

ASSIGNED SECTORS
OF
RESPONSIBILITY

AS OF 052400 APR 68



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INCL 1 to APPENDIX G

82

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AS OF 052400 APR 68




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


AS OF 062400 APR 68




LEGEND

SECTOR BOUNDARY




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
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


SECTOR BOUNDARY




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RESPONSIBILITY
AS OF 072400 APR 68




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TASK FORCE WASHINGTON
TROOP STRENGTH vs FIRE STARTS



TASK FORCE WASHINGTON
TROOP STRENGTH vs INCIDENTS



APPENDIX H

85

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91

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED E F T O				DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF COMM DIVISION DISPATCHED OCT (Z) TIME	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
		X			
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION	PRIORITY				
INFO	PRIORITY			DTG	
FROM: DA TO: CGUSCONARC INFO: CGUSAONE FT MEADE MD CGUSATHREE FT MCPHERSON GA CGUSAFOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TEX CGUSAFIVE FT SHERIDAN ILL CGUSASIX SAN FRANCISCO CALIF CGUSASA AHS VA CGUSAINTC FT HOLABIRD MD CGUSSTRATCOM CGMDW WASH DC CG FT BRAGG NC CG FT BENNING GA CG FT BELVOIR VA CG FT CARSON COLO CG FT HOOD TEX CG FT SILL OKLA CG FT KNOX KY CG FT EUSTIS VA CG FT LEE VA CG FT MEADE MD CG FT MYER VA UNCLASSIFIED EFTO DA883033 From: CofSA					
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 2FF-10 DISTRIBUTION: USCONARC LO ARMY STAFF ELECTAD CIVG B FE INFER, VA					
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May					
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1		PAGES 4			
DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	EDWARD F. CORCORAN, LTC, GS Assistant Secretary of the General Staff		74368	Harold K. Johnson	
REVIEWER	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
	HAROLD K. JOHNSON, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff		HAROLD K. JOHNSON, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		APPENDIX I		87	
UNCLASSIFIED EFTO				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

ABREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		92
PRIORITY	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE	
ACTION		EDWARD F. CORCORAN, LTC	74268	
INFO				

1. The following is the text of a letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense.

"Dear Secretary Clifford:

The people of our Nation share with me a great pride in the responsiveness, the restraint, and the superb discipline demonstrated by Federal and National Guard troops during the recent troubles in some of our cities.

By assisting civilian law enforcement officials to restore and maintain law and order, where necessary, the officers and men of the active and reserve forces fulfilled with distinction an assignment that was regrettable but unavoidable. Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces must be, and are, available to help civilian authorities meet emergencies, such as those which occurred following the tragic assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

During those days, military commanders and their superbly prepared men carried out their orders with calm professionalism. The orders, which were issued to each military man, emphasized the necessity to provide maximum support to civilian authorities in putting prompt end to lawlessness and disorder.

As the Commander-in-Chief, I am particularly proud of the expeditious manner in which this mission was accomplished. The effectiveness of this wise and restrained use of force is attested

CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	INITIALS
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REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
63 ACTION INFO	PRIORITY	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY EDWARD F. CORCORAN, LTC	PHONE 74268
	PRIORITY			
	PRIORITY			

by the fact that law and order were restored in each city without a single fatality caused by Federal and National Guard troops.

I ask that you communicate to all military personnel who participated in these operations the appreciation of our citizens and my personal gratitude for this splendid adherence to the highest principles of military readiness and service. Signed Lyndon B. Johnson, April 19, 1968."

2. The President's letter was indorsed as follows:

a. "I received today the attached communication from the President. I desire that you transmit it to all personnel who were involved in this superb performance of duty.

I join the President in praising all who participated in providing prompt and effective assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities in restoring and maintaining law and order. It was a job well done. Signed Clark M. Clifford, April 20, 1968."

b. "It is with a great deal of pleasure that I forward the attached correspondence pertaining to the performance of Army personnel involved in assisting civilian law enforcement agencies during the recent civil disturbances.

Would you please convey my appreciation, as well as that of the President and Secretary of Defense, to those units and

CONTROL NO.	TON/TOO	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	INITIALS
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				89	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

PREVIOUS EDITION JOINT MESSAGE FORM USE/67 CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
PRECEDENCE ACTION INFO	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY EDWARD F. CORCORAN, LTC	PHONE 74268

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individuals whose outstanding performance of duty under sensitive and demanding conditions resulted in this recognition. Signed Stanley R. Resor, 6 May 1968."

3. I wish to add my personal appreciation and thanks to all concerned for the magnificent performance of duty which prompted this recognition from the President.

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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			90	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

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APPENDIX J

Commanders' Statement Selected as Portraying Typical
Conditions Encountered on 5 - 6 April 1968 in Washington, D.C.

- Incl 1. TF 82 (CO 1st Bde 82d Abn Div)
- Incl 2. TFI (CO 2d Sqdn 6th ACR)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

22 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report, TFW

Commanding General
82d Airborne Division
ATTN: G3
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

1. Reference Memorandum for Record, subject as above dated 16 April 1968.
2. A brief summary of my observations covering commitment and employment of the 1st Brigade during recent CD operations in Washington, D.C. are as follows:
 - a. Prompt dispatch of troops from the arrival airfield to the assembly area would have expedited the assembly time of the units and their early commitment.
 - b. Lighting facilities at the Bolling Air Force Base Assembly Area would have minimized confusion in the assembly, organization, and initial commitment of troops into precincts.
 - c. The prompt employment of troops into designated precincts during darkness was most effective through affording the psychological impact of their presence on the streets by early daylight hours.
 - d. Firmness and speed of execution by my troops on the morning of 6 April in dispersing two separate groups of 200-300 people attempting to loot or destroy Safeway Food Stores discouraged further such activities during the entire period.
 - e. Use of helicopters is most effective for command, control, surveillance, reconnaissance, psychological impact and rapid employment of troops.
 - f. Stake and platform vehicles are an ineffective means of transportation except for large bodies of troops on main thoroughfares. Twenty-man busses (or similar vehicles) were found ideally suited for movement of troops and patrolling within precinct areas.

Incl i

g. Placing our CI and MI personnel in Police Precinct Headquarters with radio communications greatly enhanced our prompt receipt and dissemination of intelligence.

h. A valuable source of accurate intelligence was derived through allowing our troopers who were natives of the area to contact their families.

i. The terms "sniper and sniper fire" are used indiscriminately as opposed to a shooting incident and must be defined to preclude misleading information.

3. In my opinion, our success in preventing further disorder, looting, and senseless destruction of property, was founded on:

- a. Maximum presence in key places that had not been attacked.
- b. Control of troops.
- c. Appearance and attitude of troopers.
- d. Strict discipline.
- e. Speed of execution.
- f. Effective coordination and cooperation with civilian police.


WILLIAM B ROOP
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS 2D SQUADRON
6TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

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ACAV-D

17 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Observations, Precinct 9, Washington, D.C.
5-6 April 1968

1. (c) The following observations are intended to summarize:

a. Conditions which existed in the 9th Precinct upon the arrival of elements of the 2d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/6 ACR).

b. Measures considered most effective, in the early hours of employment, toward restoration of law and order.

2. (c) Conditions which prevailed in the 9th Precinct at 051700 April 1968:

a. People:

(1) General chaos prevailed throughout the area, vicinity of H Street, particularly in the eastern and between 6th and 15th Streets.

(2) An estimated 5,000 people were on the streets in the general area. These consisted of widely disparate groups ranging from 2 to 100 people actively breaking into, looting and setting fires to various stores.

(3) The attitude of the people was belligerent upon the entry of the military forces. Some carried clubs, rubble and debris was thrown at troops, verbal taunts and abuse was common.

(4) The civil populace on the streets was of all ages, male and female. A majority of those engaged in looting and burning were teenagers and young adults. Many appeared to be in a state of intoxication.

(5) Rioting elements were interfering with fire-fighting efforts. People attempted to block fire equipment from moving and abused the firemen by throwing rubble.

(6) The crowd psychology had progressed to the point of frenzied, indiscriminate looting. What one picked up did not appear important. People seemed obsessed with just having something.

(7) At this point, the civil police, greatly outnumbered, had withdrawn from an effective role in the area. They remained on the street in small groups, essentially at intersections crossing H Street, attempting to prevent civilian personnel from moving along or across H Street. Prime interest at this point appeared to be in protecting self and fire equipment.

Incl 2 to APPENDIX J

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b. The area:

(1) Large, uncontrolled fires burned along H Street between 6th and 15th Streets.

(2) Entire area within 2-3 blocks of H Street was filled with acrid smoke and gases from fires which, when combined with CS, made it difficult to operate without masks in some areas.

(3) H Street, cross-streets and alleys behind H Street, were becoming filled with rubble from the fires. Merchandise of all types could be found lying everywhere.

(4) Large quantities of civil fire fighting apparatus along H Street was parked at all angles with hoses everywhere restricting military vehicular traffic.

3(c) Riot control measures considered effective in restoring law and order:

a. Troops moved into the riot area with authority in being able to take the steps necessary to restore law and order. This contributed greatly to confidence at all levels.

b. Junior leaders were immediately confronted with need to employ CS. With ready authority, this step was taken on the spot at all points of contact.

c. Aggressive junior leadership combined with wide-spread, decentralized use of CS was the pivotal measure. All activity was quickly focused at the small unit level. This aggressive action immediately established the credibility of the military force available that could and would be employed.

d. Aggressive junior leadership initially elected to dispense rioters, looters and any dissident group. In the early stages, no effort was made to secure specific stores, areas, fire equipment, etc., thus fragmenting the force available. By dispersing the unlawful elements, the desired security was automatically imparted to critical points.

e. The authority to use his weapons combined with good leadership demonstrated early to the trooper that he could be successful despite the fact that he was outnumbered.

f. As the initial large groups were dispersed, the first military element in the area was informed that a reinforcing unit was arriving. This allowed the first unit commanders to begin to draw back, concentrate his force and begin a systematic search of stores and alleys for looters.

g. As the rioters and looters recovered from the initial contact, more units were moved into the area to provide greater troop density for fixed security posts. This was neither possible nor desirable in the initial stages of contact.

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h. 9th Precinct police officials responded rapidly to a request for police "arrest teams". These teams, initially 10 civil police per riot troop, moved quickly to work with the military. They endeavored to take all detainees off the hands of the trooper as soon as possible. Police walkie-talkie radios expedited dispatch of police vehicles. Troop elements were thus freed to move on to the next problems. Some 600 personnel detained the first night by the 2d Squadron were handled in this fashion.

i. By 0610001 April, bands of scavengers and looters had begun to become active again, along the H Street area and its immediate adjacent streets. One large crowd, approximately 500, assembled in a threatening attitude in the vicinity of a fire at 15th Street and D Street. All of this activity was met by tactics similar to those noted above. This met with the successes of the previous night. From 061500 April until the 2d Squadron left the 9th Precinct at 070720 April, there was no further significant problem.

4.(c) The situation described in para 2 above indicates a complete breakdown of law and order. The police, vastly inferior in number, had lost effective control of the situation. The mobs had the initiative and were able to move in pursuit of their purposes virtually at will. The actions noted in para 3 collectively served to disperse large groupings, to restrain people on the street, return the initiative to proper authorities within one hour and restored effective law and order within some three hours. The initial successes in this operation were achieved by two line troops.


CLYDE H. PATTERSON JR.
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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This appendix provides an alphabetical list of persons' names that appear in the after-action report and who warrant a more detailed identification.

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BENNETT, Warren K., Brigadier General, Deputy Director for International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, US Army; Chief of Staff Task Force Washington.

BLANDFORD, John R. (Russ), Brigadier General (Ret) Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee.

CALIFANO, Joseph, Special Assistant to the President; White House contact for Civil Disturbance matters.

CHRISTOPHER, Warren, Deputy Attorney General; Department of Justice.

CARMICHAEL, Stokely, President, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

CHMAR, Paul, Colonel, Operations and Training Officer, Headquarters, Military District of Washington.

COLLINS, Arthur S., Lieutenant General, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development; Commander of Task Force Washington vice General Haines.

DESOBRY, W. R., Brigadier General, Deputy Director for Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff, Task Force Washington.

FRYE, Joseph M., Lieutenant, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.

GELSTON, George M., Major General, The Adjutant General of the State of Maryland.

GOMPF, Clayton N, Colonel, C. O. 6th Armd Cav Regt., Ft Meade, Md.

JORDAN, Robert E., General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of the Army.

HAINES, Ralph E., Jr., General, Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Commander of Task Force Washington.

HENKIN, Daniel Z., Office Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Public Affairs Advisor to Task Force Washington.

HENNESSEY, John J., Brigadier General, Deputy Director of Operations (Readiness), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army.

HOLLIS, Harris W., Brigadier General, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff, Task Force Washington.

JOHNSON, Harold K., General, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

KING, Dr. Martin Luther, Jr., former leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

KNOWLES, R. T., Major General, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army.

LAYTON, John B., Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.

MATHIAS, Charles, United States Representative from 6th Congressional District, Md.

MCGIFFERT, David E., The Under-Secretary of the Army.

MCTIERNAN, Thomas, Department of the Justice Representative in Washington, D.C.

MURPHY, Patrick V., Director of Public Safety, Washington, D.C.

O'MALLEY, Charles S., Jr., Major General, Commanding General, Military District of Washington; Commanding General, Task Force Inside.

QUIREY, W. D., Brigadier General, Director of Studies, Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff Task Force Washington, Vice BG Bennett.

RESOR, Stanley R., Secretary of the Army.

RIVERS, L. Mendel, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee.

ROACH, H. K., Colonel, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army: G3, Task Force Washington.

RUSSELL, Richard B., United States Senator from the State of Georgia.

SOUTHWARD, Charles L., Major General, Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard.

STRAUSS, James P., Colonel, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army: G3, Task Force Washington.

TEMPLE, Larry E., Special Counsel to the President of the U. S.

VANCE, Cyrus R., Special Assistant to the President; Special Representative of the President in Washington, D.C.

VINSON, Fred M., Jr., Department of Justice; Special Representative of the President in Baltimore, Maryland.

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WALKER, Glenn D., Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

WASHINGTON, Walter E., Mayor of Washington, D.C.

WILLIAMS, John G., Inspector, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.

WILSON, Winston P., Major General, Chief, National Guard Bureau.

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