

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD392027

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: secret

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Critical Technology; 22 MAY 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO DA ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO DA ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

**Best
Available
Copy**

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (23 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682330

13 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th
Artillery Group (AD), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

AD392027

SEE DISTRIBUTION

This document contains information affecting the National
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 793 and 794.
Its transmission or its revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
 - US Continental Army Command
 - US Army Combat Developments Command
- Commandants
 - US Army Air Defense School
 - US Army Artillery and Missile School
 - US Army Ordnance School

Copies furnished:

- Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Engineers
- Chief of Research and Development
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS BY AUTHORITY OF
CO 97TH ARTY GP (AD) ON
22 May 1968

Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

SECRET

SECRET
AUG 26 1968
SECRET

In addition to the requirements which must be met, this document is to be controlled by the controls and each transmittal to be made only with prior approval of ACSFOR (FOR-OT-RD) WASH. 7C 20310

Copies furnished (Cont'd):

OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Defense Documentation Center

Commanding Generals

US STRIKE Command

US Army Southern Command

Commanding Officers

US Army Limited War Laboratory

US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

97th Artillery Group (AD)

2

3
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 97TH ARTILLERY GROUP (AD)
APO San Francisco 96309

AVGC-C

22 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO US Forces 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO US Forces 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Forces Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (S/NOFORN) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During the reporting period 1 February - 30 April 1968, the 97th Artillery Group (AD) remained assigned to US Army Vietnam and under operational control of the 7th US Air Force. Task organization is listed in Inclosure 1. The Group headquarters continued to exercise command and administration of attached HAWK battalions and support detachments. The HAWK battalions fulfilled their assigned missions of providing air defense of the TAM SON NHUT/BIEN HOA and CAM RANH BAY/NHA TRANG areas. In addition, the Group continued to exercise command and administration, less operational control, of the assigned Field Artillery Detachments (RADAR-COUNTER MORTAR) and Infantry Detachment (GROUND SURVEILLANCE).

b. The 79th Ordnance Detachment (MGCS) (HAWK) continued its mission of providing a general support supply and maintenance facility for the two HAWK battalions.

c. The 459th Signal Detachment continued its mission of providing VHF radio support for the 97th Artillery Group (AD).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS BY AUTHORITY OF
CO 97TH ARTY GP (AD) ON
22 May 1968

SECRET

2809344

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

FOR OTR
682330

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U) 4

d. The assigned Field Artillery Detachments (RADAR) and Infantry Detachment (GROUND SURVEILLANCE), further attached to Hq Battery, 97th Arty Gp (AD) and the 6th Bn, 56th Arty, remained under operational control of the Capital Military District and Dong Nai Sensitive Area, respectively.

e. All assigned and attached units were engaged in training and operations during the 90 day reporting period.

f. Upon notification of Red Alert at 310400H January 1968, the 97th Arty Gp (AD) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) initiated 24 hour operation and was fully manned on a continuous basis until 10 February 1968. The TOC maintained constant communications with the two battalions operations centers at Bien Hoa and Cam Ranh Bay, the Tan Son Nhut Control and Reporting Center, the Hon Tre Island Control and Reporting Post, USARV headquarters via land line and EAC circuits, the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC) via radio and landlines, the MACV annex reaction force (SECTOR C) (TASK FORCE CHARLIE) and monitored the Military Police Net. The TOC was able to maintain an up-to-date status on ground and air defense conditions, equipment readiness and situation maps of the BLEN HQ/SAIGON/TAN SON NHUT/CAM RANH BAY/NHA TRANG area as inputs were received from local and outlying units and agencies.

(2) Support provided by this headquarters.

(a) Personnel:

1. On initiation of hostilities, this headquarters provided four officers to the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area Joint Defense Operation Center (TSN-JDOC) to assist in 24 hour a day operation of this facility. The officers involved performed their duties on a shift basis during the period 31 January - 14 February 1968.

2. On 31 January, a sixteen man security force was organized and deployed to reinforce the southern perimeter of MACV ANNEX. Duration - 10 days.

3. On 31 January, this headquarters organized and deployed a twelve man security force to the west end of the MACV ANNEX perimeter. This force was tasked with providing security for the MACV enlisted billets. Duration - 4 days.

4. On 31 January, a 27 man reserve platoon was organized and equipped to reinforce Task Force Charlie. On 2 February this platoon was increased to one officer and thirty six enlisted men, attached to Task Force Charlie and relieved the 34th General Support Group on line so this unit could return to their critical mission of helicopter maintenance. On 5 February this platoon was returned to Task Force reserve and so remained until this headquarters assumed control of Task Force Peter (renamed from Charlie) on 7 March 1968.

SECRET

SECRET

5
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

5. On 31 January, the 79th Ord Det and Btry C, 6th Bn, 56th Arty organized and equipped a security platoon of 1 officer and 24 enlisted men to assist the 2d Svc Bn (ARVN) in the defense of the 058 Gate, Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area. This platoon served as a quick reaction force during daylight hours and physically manned the perimeter at the 058 gate during the hours of darkness. This commitment was terminated on 10 February when the platoon was relieved by an armored cavalry unit.

6. On 7 February 1968, 1st LCG CMD OFLAN 16-67 was implemented. The 6th Bn, 56th Arty was tasked to provide 50 drivers to assist in clearing supplies from the Saigon port facilities. On 19 February this commitment was increased to 110 drivers and continued until 16 March.

(b) Transportation:

On 1 February, this headquarters mobilized the organic transport capability, augmented this force with additional vehicles from the 79th Ord Det and the 6th Bn, 56th Arty, and provided thirty-five 2½ ton trucks to the JDOC on an on-call as needed basis. During the period 2 - 20 February these vehicles were used to support a task force composed of elements of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 101st Airborne Division deployed in the Saigon/Bien Hoa area.

(c) Logistics Support:

During the period concerned, this headquarters furnished limited Class I, III, and V support to local units in need out of on-hand assets. These items were primarily "C" rations, MORGAS and individual/crew served weapons ammunition.

g. Personnel Activities:

(1) The Group was overstrength by 10% at the beginning of the reporting period, due primarily to assignment of personnel with unauthorized MOS. To alleviate this problem, 150 personnel were transferred to the 48th Transportation Group. To further reduce the strengths to authorized levels, a program was instituted in April whereby excess personnel are reported to USARV for reassignment. It is anticipated that this program will maintain strength near the authorized level.

(2) A possible morale problem caused by lack of promotions due to excess personnel has been somewhat alleviated by the above actions together with the promotion during March of all E-4s on the E-5 promotion list. During the period, 32 allocations to E-4 were received, however, some 250 personnel are eligible for promotion to E-4.

(3) Group officer strength was at authorized strength during February, however, the levy of a Captain and a Lieutenant for MACV and a Captain for Provisional Corps Vietnam plus the fact that officer requisitions for April

SECRET
3

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) ⁶
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

were not validated, has resulted in a shortage of Lieutenants, which will exist until June.

(4) There were 120 extensions of foreign service.

(5) The following decorations were awarded:

(a) Bronze Star - 21

(b) Purple Heart - 1

(c) Army Commendation Medal - 34

h. Operations Activities

(1) During the period, efforts were directed toward improving tactical operations, contingency planning for possible new missions and conduct of special air defense studies.

(2) Improving Tactical Operations

(a) Manual Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP): The AADCP, under construction during the previous reporting period, became operational on 21 February and fully manned 24 hours a day on 11 March. It serves as an alternate AADCP and as a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for the Group. Equipment includes status of equipment boards, status of alert boards, tactical action boards, air and ground defense condition information boards with appropriate detailed weapons and necessary telephone and radios for communications. During normal duty hours, it is manned by the Air Defense Operations Officer (ADOO) and a crew of 3 EM. (1 crew chief; 1 plotter; 1 recorder/teller). After duty hours, the ADOO is relieved by the Group Staff Duty Officer (SDO). The manual AADCP/TOC provide the Group Commander a location from which he can monitor and/or control both the air defense and ground defense operations as required by the tactical situation.

(b) Artillery Plotting: Headquarters 97th Artillery Group personnel continued to assist Air Force personnel at the 7th Air Force Control and Reporting Center (CRC) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, and at the 7th Air Force Control and Reporting Post (CRP) on Hon Tre Island in plotting friendly artillery fires for the safe passage and protection of friendly aircraft. A total of 13,486 friendly artillery plots were recorded (February 4567; March 5037; April 3882). This was an increase of 6000 plots over the previous reporting period and two men per shift, required to accomplish the plotting.

(c) Systems Unknown: During the reporting period, a total of 49 aircraft penetrating the Vietnam Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) were classified as Systems Unknown, requiring selected HAWK batteries to come to

SECRET

7
SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

"Battle Stations" (17 in February; 24 in March; 8 in April). All aircraft were subsequently identified friendly. Total "Battle Stations" time was 5 hours and 6 minutes.

(d) Air Defense Exercises: During April, this headquarters instituted no-notice, scored, air defense exercises known as "HAWK RUN". These exercises, conducted at CRC/CRP level by 97th Artillery Group (AD) operations personnel, evaluate the reaction time of the State I and II HAWK batteries against USAF F102 interceptors and targets of opportunity. Selected courses are flown against the HAWK batteries to simulate actual engagements. A total of 32 exercises have been conducted and have proven to be an ideal training aide for improving team work, reaction time, target correlation and reporting procedures.

(e) Unit Readiness Program:

1 Based on current Equipment Serviceability Criteria (ESC) contained in AR 220-1, as changed by Msg DCSLOG/MED #DA825800 effective 21 Sep 67, Green - Amber - Red availability for the period was as follows:

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>%QTR</u>	<u>TOTAL HOURS EACH STATUS</u>
GREEN	92.70	20021:00
AMBER	3.95	854:19
RED	3.35	724:41

2 Breakdown of Non-Green Availability Time:

a Amber Non-Availability by major item of equipment:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>% OF AMBER</u>	<u>NO. ITEMS INVOLVED</u>	<u>NO. HOURS</u>
HIPIR	33.48	15	286:07
OC	32.20	2	275:07
PAR	22.48	6	192:22
CDG	8.89	4	76:27
IFF	2.95	5	24:16

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) ⁸
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U).

b Red Non-Availability time by major item of equipment:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>% OF RED TIME</u>	<u>NO. ITEM INVOLVED</u>	<u>NO. HOURS</u>
RCR	54.14	8	392:30
CMAR	40.60	8	294:37
BCC	5.26	6	37:34

(f) Annual Service Practice:

1 During this reporting period, the proposed site for HAKK Annual Service Practice (ASP) was changed from Cam Ranh Bay (Btry A, 6th Bn, 71st Arty) to Hon Tre Island (D-ty C, 6th Bn, 71st Arty). This change was predicated on the disapproval of the request for waiver of surface danger zone, submitted by this headquarters on 5 January 1968.

2 A request for waiver of surface danger zone was submitted by this headquarters for the Hon Tre Island site on 21 March. Verbal concurrence and approval was received from USARV on or about 30 March.

3 On 28 March, this headquarters appointed a field grade ASP project officer and coordination with other services and agencies was initiated.

4 A request for interservice agreements was submitted to USARV on 22 March to obtain the following services:

a A helicopter for drone recovery.

b Engineer support for construction of drone launcher pads, range tower and viewing stands.

c Air transportation for personnel involved in Annual Service Practice (ASP).

d Landing Craft Utility (LCU) to move personnel and equipment from the mainland to Hon Tre Island.

e Aircraft for range sweep prior to each missile firing.

f Aircraft for aerial observation and target drone location upon completion of missile firing and for calibration runs prior to each firing.

g Surface missile range patrol to assure safety during firing phases.

h Surface vessel sweep of range prior to firing.

SECRET

SECRET

9
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

5 This request was approved and direct liaison was authorized with the services involved. Personal contact with each agency involved in the support of ASP was accomplished during this period.

6 During the period 17 - 21 April, two representatives from this headquarters visited the HAWK firing site at Taiwan to resolve major problems as to the installation of Ryan Aeronautical Company Firebee/Towbee equipment at Hon Tre Island. Plans for drone launch pads and orientation were obtained and upon return to parent organization, coordination with the USARV Engineer and the 18th Engineer Brigade was accomplished for construction of the drone facilities.

7 Telemetering missile transmitters were shipped from Okinawa to the Hon Tre Island range and were installed in the missiles to be fired. Personnel assigned to the Direct Support Platoon (DSP), 6th Bn, 71st Arty, were assigned this mission. An AN/TSM-43 (Shop 4) van was transported from Cam Ranh Bay to Hon Tre Island to perform appropriate missile checks after installation of the telemetering transmitter.

8 The Annual Service Practice schedule has been published with the first HAWK Btry scheduled to commence the preparation phase on 26 May 68.

9 On 30 April 1968, LTC Towery, Hq, 30th Arty Bde (AD), APO 96331, and Mr. Michael T. Savino, Ryan Aeronautical Company representative, arrived in country to attend an ASP briefing at this headquarters and to visit the ASP site. The briefing, conducted by the ASP project officer on 30 April 68, was attended by LTC Spitzer, USARV G3 Arty Branch and members of the Group staff.

(g) Combat Readiness Evaluation: During the reporting period, a total of five 97th Arty Gp (AD) Combat Readiness Evaluations (CRE's) were conducted to determine the effectiveness of HAWK battery personnel and equipment. In addition, the results of 45 battalion-administered Combat Readiness Evaluations (CRE's) were analyzed. This led to the identification of training weaknesses which require continued command emphasis.

(h) BITE Modification Program: Two Raytheon company representatives arrived at this headquarters on 30 April 68 for the purpose of coordinating the installation of the Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) modification. This modification will be installed in the Battery Control Center, High Powered Illuminator Radar, selected chassis and test equipment.

(i) Other Actions:

1 97th Arty Gp (AD) Regulation 350-1 was revised and published on 8 April 1968. This regulation should greatly enhance training programs within the Group.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U) 10

2 This headquarters assigned a full-time Liaison Officer to USARV G3 on 8 April 1968 to insure timely coordination and exchange of information on all air defense matters.

3 This headquarters submitted a change to MTOE 44-237D on 19 March 1968 requesting four multiple caliber .50 machinegun squads for each HAWK battery. This change, approved by HQ USARV and HQ MACV, was returned without action on 10 April 1968 pending submission and approval of a concept plan. This plan was prepared and dispatched to USARV 22 April 1968.

4 This headquarters submitted a change to MTOE 44-12E on 5 March 1968. This change requested a deletion of 5 officers and 11 enlisted slots in addition to numerous changes in the grade structure within the MTOE. This change was reviewed, modified and forwarded by USARV to CINCUSARPAC on 22 April 1968. If implemented, this MTOE change will delete 5 officers, 1 warrant officer and 13 enlisted spaces from the MTOE with a resulting 130 spaces authorized.

(3) Contingency Planning for Possible New Missions

(a) Bangkok, Thailand

1 As previously reported, this headquarters completed an air defense study of the Bangkok area, dispatched officers to Bangkok for a series of conferences with representatives of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the American Embassy, JUSMAG/MACT, USARSUPHLI, and the 7/3 Air Force. These conferences resulted in agreements that the RTA would form committees to begin work on site selection and construction, visit RVN and Taiwan HAWK units, and that 97th Artillery Group (AD) representatives would return to Thailand to assist in site selection and construction. The 97th Arty Gp (AD) was informed that the HAWK battery for Thailand might be provided from the Group assets.

2 During this reporting period, two additional visits were made to Bangkok. During the period 26 February to 1 March, two Group staff officers visited Bangkok to assist the RTA in selection, design and layout of a HAWK site. A site drawing of a typical site was left with the RTA together with a fact sheet to help explain minimum and maximum separation distances.

3 During the period 26 - 28 March, the following personnel from Thailand visited the 97th Arty Gp (AD) to view and study the standard of construction of USA HAWK battery facilities in RVN. This was to provide a comparison with what had already been seen in Taiwan and to assist the RTA in finalizing their construction plans for HAWK facilities in Thailand.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Col George W. McIntyre	MACT J3
LTC Dale J. Crittenberger	MACT J3 Plans
Col Vibul Rowsathien	RTA, J3, Sup CMD HQ FORWARD
Col Seri Herabut	RTA, J4, " " " " "
Col Pavatawong Hutasevi	RTA, C/S AAA Div. RTA

4 During the period 7 April to 17 April, the Bangkok project officer, this headquarters, visited Thailand to assist the RTA in preparation of a TOE for the HAWK battery and to discuss a possible deployment date for a USA HAWK battery to Thailand.

5 Current status: The completed TOE is in draft form at present. It is estimated by Thailand that approximately three months will be required to acquire the necessary real estate and that an additional 6 to 9 months will be required for construction. JUSMAG/MACT feels this is an excessive amount of time. The indication here is that there could be a desire on the part of the Thais to delay the deployment. It is known that the Thais are deeply concerned with the effect of the deployment on the Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding.

(b) HAWK Redeployment and the PACAF Study:

1 As previously reported, the PACAF Study, dated 28 Sep 67, made numerous recommendations as to the deployment of air defense in RVN. One of the major recommendations was to improve the effectiveness of the air defense missile units in the Da Nang/Chu Lai area. On 24 Nov 67, the Commander 7th Air Force commented on the PACAF Study and strongly recommended that the two USA HAWK battalions in-country be redeployed to relieve the two USMC HAWK battalions deployed in the Da Nang/Chu Lai area. On 9 Jan 68, COMUSMACV, in a message to CINCPAC made the following comments concerning the 97th Arty Gp (AD):

a Due to the unlikelyhood of an air attack against Cam Ranh Bay or Saigon, USA HAWK units deployed in these areas could be redeployed elsewhere.

b Three courses of action were available to provide the best defenses at Da Nang and Chu Lai.

c Based on an analysis of the data contained in the PACAF Study, COMUSMACV recommended the course of action to redeploy the 97th Arty Gp (AD) and both battalions to the Da Nang/Chu Lai area and release the USMC units.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

12

2 Subsequent actions:

a CINCPAC MSG to JCS and COMUSMACV, dated 20 Jan 68, subject: Air Defense Study of South Vietnam (U) made the following comments concerning the 97th Arty Gp (AD):

- (1) CINCPAC had considered COMUSMACV recommendations.
- (2) CINCPAC considered that the more desirable alternative would be that of redeploying the 97th Arty Gp (AD) and one HAWK battalion to Chu Lai to relieve the 2d LAAM battalion (USMC).
- (3) CINCPAC approved the above listed alternative.
- (4) Relieved units (one USA HAWK battalion at Cam Ranh Bay/Nha Trang area and one USMC HAWK battalion at Chu Lai) would be withdrawn as directed by JCS and should be withdrawn to CONUS.
- (5) That the HAWK battery for Thailand could be provided from the released USA battalion.

b MACV message 02935 to CG USARV and CG III MAF dated 26 Jan 68 directed:

- (1) That USARV coordinate move of Hq 97th Arty Gp (AD) and one battalion to Chu Lai.
- (2) That coordination pertaining to Army ASP at Cam Ranh Bay be made.
- (3) That 97th Arty Gp (AD) be prepared to release one augmented battery to Thailand.
- (4) That plans be submitted to MACV.
- (5) That no units will be moved or inactivated until approved by MACV.

c On 7-8 March, the CO and key staff members, this headquarters, attended a planning conference at Chu Lai with members of the USMC and USAF. The purpose of the conference was to effect necessary interservice coordination concerning the possible relief of the 2d LAAM battalion (USMC) (HAWK) by a USA HAWK battalion. Areas discussed involved command and control, communications, non-HAWK peculiar supply activities, local security requirements, and a tentative plan for a relief in place with a minimum disruption in defense readiness.

d This headquarters was subsequently directed by USARV to prepare necessary plans to deploy one battalion to Chu Lai. OPLAN/ADMIN PLAN 20-68 (S), this headquarters, provides for the movement of the 6th Bn, 56th Arty (-) (HHB and three HAWK batteries) to relieve the USMC unit.

SECRET

SECRET

13

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

These plans were forwarded to USARV/MACV and 7th AF on 2 Apr 68.

e USARPAC message SM 4944 to CG USARV dated 2 Feb 68 requested following clarification concerning movement:

- (1) Will movement include the 79th Ord Det for GMS, and if so, where?
- (2) Is any reduction in personnel planned for either the 79th Ord Det or 97th Arty Gp (AD)?
- (3) Will the existing ISSA with the USMC HAWK units continue or be expanded?

f In a letter dated 16 Feb 68, subject: Preliminary Plans for Redeployment of HAWK Units (U), the CO 97th Arty Gp (AD) recommended the following to DCG USARV:

- (1) That the 6th Bn, 56th Arty be relieved from current air defense mission between 1-10 Mar 68.
- (2) That the 6th Bn, 56th Arty begin sealift from Saigon to Chu Lai between 20-30 Mar 68.
- (3) That the 6th Bn, 56th Arty relieve the 2d LAAM battalion during period 1-20 Mar 68.
- (4) That Btry C, 6th Bn, 56th Arty, be relieved from current air defense mission at least 30 days prior to desired arrival date in Bangkok.
- (5) That the 97th Arty Gp (AD), 459th Signal Detachment and 6th Bn, 71st Arty be relieved from air defense mission at least 30 days prior to embarkation dates for withdrawal from theater.
- (6) Providing withdrawal dates for the 6th Bn, 71st Arty is subsequent to 1 Jul 68, conduct Annual Service Practice (ASP) at Cam Ranh Bay for all USA HAWK units during May 68.
- (7) If the air defense of Cam Ranh Bay/Nha Trang is to be retained for an indefinite period beyond 1 Jun 68, redeploy the 97th Arty Gp (AD), 459th Sig Det and 79th Ord Det from Tan Son Nhut to Cam Ranh Bay starting Jun 68.

g USARPAC message GPCP-SW 7422 to CINCPAC dated 17 Feb 68 offered the following considerations:

- (1) Implementation of the MACV recommendation and CINCPAC decision will uncover large and vital Army assets in the Saigon, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and Nha Trang areas at a time when the potential air threat has not diminished and could conceivably increase on short notice.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) ¹⁴
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(2) The greater threat exists in Da Nang and Chu Lai which could well justify some shifting of HAWK units. However, it is not prudent to entirely uncover southern bases.

(3) The PACAF Study supports retaining HAWK at Cam Ranh Bay.

(4) That the decision to redeploy HAWK from Vietnam should be re-examined. HAWK posture should not be decreased.

(5) Should MACV decide not to release the HAWK battery for Thailand, it could better come from either DA or PACOM (Okinawa) resources.

h JCS message 1041 to CINCPAC, 14 Feb 68, stated that because of the recent enemy air threat in the vicinity of the SVN DMZ and the current situation in the Republic of Korea, no action was being taken by the JCS at that time on the CINCPAC recommendation. JCS further requested that CINCPAC review their recommendations and inform JCS if relocation of the two HAWK battalions to CONUS or elsewhere outside RVN was still desired. If the recommendation was still valid, then JCS requested, as a basis for further consideration, the date the elements would be available for shipment. In addition, JCS requested the composition of the USA HAWK battalion (-) if a HAWK battery and augmentation is retained in RVN for subsequent movement to Thailand, overall spaces generated and a study of desirability of releasing a USA HAWK battery in RVN for movement to Thailand.

i In answer to the JCS message of 14 Feb 68, and CINCPAC message 140015Z Apr 68, COMUSMACV secret message 11410, 230428Z Apr 68 had the following comments:

(1) Relief of 2d LAAM Bn at Chu Lai will be completed by the USA HAWK battalion in Saigon 50 days after receipt of orders.

(2) The 6th Bn, 71st Arty, intact, will be available for shipment within 30 days after receipt of orders.

(3) HHB, 97th Arty Gp (AD), 79th Ord Det (GMGS) (HAWK) and the 459th Sig Det should be phased out with the 6th Bn, 71st Arty.

(4) However, if the 6th Bn, 71st Arty, is retained in RVN for any appreciable time after the 6th Bn, 56th Arty deploys to Chu Lai, then HHB, 97th Arty Gp (AD) and 459th Sig Det should redeploy to Cam Ranh Bay/Nha Trang. The 79th Ord Det should stay in Saigon pending phase-out of 6th Bn, 71st Arty.

(5) The remaining USMC HAWK battalion at Da Nang will be augmented with personnel and float equipment from the relieved USMC battalion at Chu Lai.

(6) The 6th Bn, 56th Arty (-) will consist of 729 personnel and

SECRET

SECRET

15
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

include a HHB and 3 HAWK batteries organized under present MTOE. This battalion (-) is adequate to relieve the 2d LAAM Bn at Chu Lai.

(7) USMC spaces generated will be 449.

(8) Total out-country redeployment (CONUS and Thailand battery of 131 personnel) will generate 1235 Army spaces.

(9) In-country redeployment plans will involve 37 space augmentations to the 6th Bn, 56th Arty (-) for additional staff and liaison functions as well as a general support maintenance element.

(10) Battery C, 6th Bn, 56th Arty will require 30 days preparation for shipment to Thailand.

3 Current Status: CINCPAC reconsideration and recommendations have been forwarded to JCS. Awaiting JCS action.

(c) Air Defense of Hue/Phu Bai

1 In a letter, 30 Jan 68, subject: Air Defense of the Hue/Phu Bai Area (S) (ADOTHA), this headquarters submitted an air defense study at the request of the War Plans Division, 7th Air Force. The requirement was generated by an inquiry from General Abrams to General Momeyer in light of the organization and deployment of MACV Forward. The employment of HAWK and automatic weapons (M42 and M55) were considered to provide a composite defense due to radar masking. The defense design was an overnight effort to recommend a minimal air defense for the Hue/Phu Bai air base and MACV Forward vital area.

2 Conclusions: That two HAWK batteries with four M55 machinegun squads per battery and one M42 AW battery could be deployed immediately to provide this requested minimal air defense.

(1.) Special Air Defense Studies:

(a) MACV Vietnamese Air Defense Study: This MACV J53 special air defense study, started in February 1968, was conducted to determine what equipment would be needed in terms of aircraft, missiles and automatic weapons to adequately protect four vital areas: Tan Son Nhut/Bien Hoa air bases, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. This headquarters provided a representative to this joint study group. The study assumptions were that a cessation of hostilities existed, US forces had withdrawn, all territory adjacent to vital areas are secure, and the GVN would provide personnel to man the resulting air defense structure. On 3 March 1968, a HAWK missile and gun defense study was completed by this headquarters as an input to the overall study. A defense analysis utilizing 1:250,000 maps was conducted for each vital area. Based on MACV guidance, an austere defense was developed. The following recommendations were made:

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) ¹⁶
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

1 That a three-battery Hawk defense be considered for each of the Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay vital areas.

2 That a four-battery Hawk defense be considered for the Saigon/Bien Hoa area.

3 That an ADA AW M42 battery of 16 fire units be considered to augment each of the Hawk vital area defenses in the following order of priority: Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Saigon/Bien Hoa. This study is still in progress and numerous changes in guidance have occurred, but the above listed recommendations are still valid.

(b) The Army Air Defense Requirements Plan, FY 1969 - 1978 (AADP FY 69 - 78) (U), HQ DA dated February 1968.

1 On 12 April 1968, this headquarters was tasked by USARV to review and comment on the above-mentioned requirements plan. Comments were to include, but not be limited to, the following:

a RVN air defense requirements compared to the AADP FY 69 - 78 (U), HQ DA.

b The number and type Allied Air Defense Forces in RVN and their general deployment areas, missions, tie in with US air defense plans and new units planned.

c Sufficient discussion, to include air defense priorities which support RVN requirements, to allow evaluation.

2 USARV also requested air defense plans from this headquarters, 7th AF and MACV that pertain to Army air defense,

3 In order to accomplish this task, this headquarters conducted an air defense requirements study which included;

a A review of threat potentials and plausible tactical scenarios.

b Postulation of air defense priorities.

c Summary of air defense materiel capabilities and limitations.

d Evaluation of interservice air defense capability trade-offs.

e Documentation of air defense level materiel (two-phase: Phase I FY 69 - 72, Phase II FY 73 - 78).

1/ The Army Air Defense Requirements Plan, the Republic of Vietnam, FY 1969 - 1978 (U), Headquarters 97th Artillery Group (AD), dated 7 May 1968.

SECRET

SECRET

17 AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

f Synopsis of current air defense and related studies. These included the Pacific Air Force South Vietnam Air Defense Study (U) (PACAF Study) and the Air Defense in Vietnam (U) Study previously conducted by this headquarters.

4 The 97th Artillery Group (AD) Requirements Plan was completed and forwarded to USARV on 7 May 1968.

i. Training Activities:

(1) During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on operational readiness training to include AN/TPQ-21 simulator training, missileman qualification and preparation for Annual Service Practice.

(2) A total of 368 personnel were qualified as HAWK missilemen during the period. These were personnel who had expired qualification or who achieved higher degrees of qualification. The breakdown of the personnel qualified, by degree of qualification is as follows:

Second Class Missilemen: 221

First Class Missilemen 143

Expert Missilemen 4

j. Intelligence Activities.

(1) Intelligence activities during the reporting period were primarily devoted to obtaining and maintaining current intelligence data, insuring the adequacy of physical security and the ground defense posture, and continuing the normal task of obtaining and validating security clearances.

(2) Coordination with Capital Military District (CMD) resulted in additional intelligence data being available through briefings held at CMD headquarters each Sunday morning. This headquarters was also placed on the distribution list for the CMD Daily Intelligence Summary.

(3) Emphasis continued on review and inventory of classified documents. A total of 1700 Confidential, 56 Secrets and 2 Top Secret documents were processed. A semi-annual inventory of all Secret and Top Secret documents was conducted in April. As a result of the inventory, 240 Secret and 2 Top Secret documents were destroyed.

(4) 97th Artillery Group Regulation 380-5, Safeguarding Defense Information, was revised in order to implement the provisions of USARV Regulation 380-5. In addition, this headquarters published a new regulation 604-5, Personnel Security Clearances.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

18

(5) Coordination with the 18th Military Police Brigade resulted in a system whereby the 6th Battalion, 71st Artillery, can pick up and turn in sentry dogs from the 981st MF Company (Sentry Dog) at Cam Ranh Bay. This eliminates the requirement and expense of shipping dogs between Tan Son Nhut and Cam Ranh Bay.

(6) There were no enemy ground attacks directed against units of this command during the reporting period, however, four standoff rocket/mortar attacks were conducted. Details as to these attacks are as follows:

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
270530 Feb 68	HHB 97th Arty Gp (AD)	1 round 122mm rkt	Negative casualties, minor damage to one building (senior enlisted quarters).
101925 Mar 68	Btry D, 6th Bn 71st Arty	12 rounds 60 and 82mm mortar	Negative casualties, data cable destroyed, moderate damage to one building, minor damage to VHF van and 3 radars.
010140 Apr 68	Btry B, 6th Bn 71st Arty	2 rounds 122mm rkt	Negative casualties and damage.
270315 Apr 68	79th Ord Det	2 rounds 122mm rkt	Negative casualties, minor damage to one building with destruction of \$23,000 worth of repair parts.

(7) As previously reported, this headquarters initiated an extensive fortification and hardening program in October 1967. This was a major effort to protect personnel and equipment from direct air and ground attack as well as "stand off" rocket/mortar attack. This project, completed prior to the TET offensive, was considered adequate and subsequently proved its worth during the TET offensive and recent "stand off" rocket/mortar attacks. However, this project will be a continual effort as new ideas develop and existing fortifications deteriorate.

k. Logistics Activities.

(1) General: The TET offensive caused logistical problems in several areas. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery, was isolated for the first three weeks of the period, requiring helicopter resupply of rations, water, ammunition, and POL. A shortage of rations existed in the 79th Ordnance Detachment for several days during the same period.

(2) Supply Activities:

SECRET

SECRET

19
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(a) Class I: Enemy activity hindered the road resupply of rations to most units during the height of the TET offensive.

(b) Class II and IV:

1 Shortages of 3/4 ton trucks are being filled from in-country stockage. However, 1/4 ton trucks remain in short supply because no new vehicles have been received by this command during the calendar year. At present, the Group is short 12 of 79 authorized 1/4 ton vehicles. These shortages result from the turn-in of unserviceable M151 vehicles and USAFV directed transfer of vehicles to higher priority units.

2 The Group is still short one of eight scooploaders (Battery C, 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery).

3 As indicated in the previous report, this command continues to be short the AN/VRC-12 series radio which were taken to fill combat essential requirements of higher priority units. Following is the current status:

<u>RADIO SET</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
AN/GRC-106	27	21	6
AN/GRC-5	14	11	3
AN/VRC-46	41	38	3

4 During the last few days of this period, most flack jackets on requisition were received and issued to the troops.

(c) Class V: Generally, Class V supplies were available in adequate quantities. Hand-held parachute flares remained in short supply.

(3) Field Fortifications Program: Field fortifications generally were adequate. However, sand bags were difficult to obtain during and immediately following the TET offensive.

(4) Assistance to other units:

(a) During the TET offensive, the following supplies were provided units indicated:

1 Class III: 110 gallons of MORGAS to Co C, 716th Military Police battalion for emergency operations.

2 Class V:

a 15 each LAW to JGS compound advisors.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD) ²⁰
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RPS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

- b 840 rds 7.62mm to USMC.
- c 1,680 rds 7.62mm to 34th Gen Svb Gp. ..
- d 16,680 rds 7.62mm to JDCG Sr Advisor, LTC Garred.
- e 5,600 rds 7.62mm (linked) to JDCG Sr Advisor LTC Garred.
- f 72 rds 40mm HE grenades JDCG Sr Advisor LTC Garred.

(5) 79th Ordnance Detachment (Guided Missile General Support) (HAWK) activities:

(a) This unit is responsible for a sector of the defense of the Tan Son Nhut Air Base; therefore, it was mandatory that this responsibility be implemented 24 hours a day, thus causing this unit's mission to be halted during the initial surge of the TET offensive. From 31 January to 9 February, no shipments were received from COMUS, nor were any shipments evacuated to COMUS. The only repair parts that were issued were for dead-lined equipment as the supported units could not safely travel the roads. Likewise, the daily courier flight to CRB for support of the 6th Bn, 71st Arty was halted.

(b) Generators 30KW 60 cycle. This unit received two military standard 30KW 60 cycle generators during this period. The addition of these two generators provides the HAWK units with 100% fill (25 authorized, 25 on hand) for 60 cycle tactical power.

(c) Mechanized Stock Accounting. The conversion to the NCR 500 mechanized stock accounting system has been fully implemented. The Automatic Data Field System Command, DSU/GSU Assistance Team Pacific conducted an inspection of the procedures and application of the system on 16 and 17 March 1968. A satisfactory rating was received in all areas,

(d) Excess Repair Parts. The initial phase of the program to eliminate excess repair parts, outlined in the previous ORLL, has been implemented. During this reporting period, the HAWK battalion Direct Support Platoons (DSP) evacuated \$992,347.18 worth of repair parts (DSP, 6th Bn, 56th Arty - \$531,991.08; DSP, 6th Bn, 71st Arty - \$460,356.10) to the 79th Ord Det which were picked up on the supply records. In conjunction with the 79th Ord Det purification of their ASL, the total excess identified as of 15 April 1968 represented a value of \$2,515,588.37. This overall value breaks down as follows:

ASL	\$1,784,877.37 (representing 3,564 lines)
Fringe	<u>730,711.00</u> (representing 5,480 lines)
TOTAL	\$2,515,588.37

SECRET

21
SECRET

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

FTE Cards (customer excess reports) were mailed to the HAWK Project Office in early May. The HAWK Project Office, in conjunction with USAMICOM NICP will furnish the 79th Ord Det with supply directives to ship to other users as necessary. At the completion of filling the supply directives, and remaining excess will be evacuated to CONUS. The target date for completion of the program is 30 Jun 68.

(e) Supply activity.

1. At the close of the reporting period, the 79th carried an authorized stockage list (ASL) of 13,707 separate lines items. In addition to the ASL, the number of separate lines being stocked was 6,838.

2. 6,294 requisitions were received from the direct support platoon and 4,601 of these requisitions were filled from available stock on hand.

3. At the close of the reporting period 1,569 lines were at a zero balance. This quantity represents 11.5% of the ASL.

(f) Shipments.

163.2 tons were received from CONUS and 28.3 tons of unserviceables were evacuated to CONUS.

1. Organization: On 27 Mar 68, the 6th and 9th Field Artillery Detachments (RAD) were assigned to this headquarters. These detachments, organized and trained in CONUS, were deployed to the Tan Son Nhut and Dong Nai Sensitive Areas respectively. With the arrival of the 6th FA Det in the TSN area, the 248th FA Det was redeployed to Bien Hoa to balance the number of fully operational detachments in the above-mentioned Sensitive Areas.

m. Other Activities:

(1) On 7 Mar 68, this headquarters was tasked by CG, USAHAC to assume command of TASK FORCE PETER. This is a 120 man reaction force with a mission of defending Sector C of the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area perimeter. This task force is composed of a task force headquarters (1 Off and 3 EM) and three platoons, one of which is provided by Headquarters Battery, 97th Artillery Group (AD). During the period 7 Mar - 30 Apr, an officer from this headquarters has been involved in the operation of this task force on a 24 hour-a-day basis. In addition, from eight to thirty-five enlisted personnel a day have been detailed from this headquarters as a contribution to the task force 24 hour-a-day manning requirement.

(2) During March and April, this headquarters conducted a comprehensive combined Command - Command Maintenance Management Inspection of the 6th Bn, 56th Arty; 6th Bn, 71st Arty and the 79th Ord Det. All units received a rating of satisfactory. This round of inspections was completed on 4 May when Hq Btry 97th Arty Gp (AD) and the 459th Sig Det were inspected.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

23

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

Excess Personnel

(1) OBSERVATION. Excess personnel hamper the efficient operation of an organization due to the inability to properly utilize the personnel in their MOS.

(2) EVALUATION. As of 30 Apr, this command had 258 excess personnel of which 196 possessed the following unauthorized PMOS: 03C, 13A, 13E, 13D, 13L, 15L, 16B, 16C, 22G, 22L, 22K, 57H, and 76I. These personnel had to be retrained with the resulting loss of many productive man hours. In addition these excess personnel created a morale problem in that this overstrength reduced promotion allocations received by this command.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel with an MOS not authorized by this command be assigned to other commands for proper utilization.

b. Operations.

(1) Unforeseen Contingencies during the TET Offensive.

(a) OBSERVATION. This headquarters was called upon and able to provide personnel, materiel and equipment on a no-notice basis to other units and agencies involved in the defense of the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area and Saigon during the VC/NVA Lunar New Year (TET) Offensive.

(b) EVALUATION. Existing plans did not include provisions to meet the various contingencies that arose during the TET offensive. It is unlikely that plans to meet all the possible contingencies of future actions could be developed. However, selected plans for mobilization of reaction forces, transport capability, and redistribution of supplies should be prepared.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That due to the possibility of future contingencies and resulting requests to provide varied types of services and assistance immediate steps be taken to:

1. Mobilize available transport capability and be ready to respond during periods of emergency.

2. Organize all available personnel into properly equipped reaction forces to assist in the defense of the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

23

AVGHC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for the Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(2) Insufficient FM Communications Equipment-HHB, 97th Arty Gp (AD).

(a) OBSERVATION: In attempting to coordinate and control the transportation element, resupply actions and additional reaction forces during the TET offensive, the FM radio equipment organic to this headquarters was over-extended.

(b) EVALUATION: This headquarters is authorized 5 AN/VRC-46 and 3 AN/VRC-49 radio sets. Only 4 AN/VRC-46 and 2 AN/VRC-49 are presently on hand. As a result this headquarters could not enter and/or monitor all of the required nets simultaneously to effect necessary command, control and coordination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this headquarters be issued the remaining organic radios.

(3) Insufficient FM Communications Equipment - 79th Ord Det

(a) OBSERVATION: The 79th Ordnance Detachment is located on the perimeter of the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area. The only means of communications, available to the detachment, with this headquarters and other units within the 97th Artillery Group (AD) is VHF radio. This equipment is operated by the 459th Signal Detachment. The TOE authorizes one AN/VRC-25. This radio is committed, on a full time basis, to the Sensitive Area defense net.

(b) EVALUATION: This detachment lacks a backup communications capability if the VHF equipment becomes non-operative or damaged by enemy action. In addition the detachment lacks any capability to communicate with quick reaction forces deployed outside of the detachment perimeter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 79th Ordnance Detachment be authorized two additional radio sets, AN/VRC-25. These radios would be used as a backup to the VHF radio communications and the Sensitive Area defense net as well as primary communication when a quick reaction force is deployed.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence:

Protection against stand off rocket/mortar attacks.

(1) OBSERVATION: A 122mm rocket round impacted 20 meters from the Hq, 97th Arty Gp (AD) NCO Bldg on 27 Feb 68. Numerous pieces of shrapnel penetrated the building, some passing completely through the building. However, there were no penetrations below the level of 55 gallon drums filled with dirt which were used torevet billets. As a result no casualties were suffered.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1966, ACS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

24

(2) EVALUATION: 55 gallon drums, filled with dirt, afford excellent protection against rocket/mortar attacks to single story personnel billets.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That 55 gallon drums filled with dirt be used torevet single story billets, administrative buildings, offices and all facilities where personnel assemble.

e. Logistics:

(1) Inadequate fire fighting equipment - 79th Ord Det

(a) OBSERVATION: A 122mm rocket round impacted in the 79th Ordnance Detachment compound warehouse storage area on 020316H April 68. A fire resulted and available fire fighting equipment (2 1/2 gallon hand pump fire extinguishers, sand and water buckets) was inadequate in attempting to extinguish the fire. The fire, later brought under control by an Air Force fire fighting unit, resulted in the loss of \$23,000 worth of repair parts.

(b) EVALUATION: The fire damage resulting from mortar/rocket attacks could be greatly reduced if more fire fighting equipment were issued or readily available to the 79th Ord Det.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional fire fighting equipment be provided to protect the multi-million dollar inventory maintained by the 79th Ord Det. A request for fire hydrants and sufficient fire hose was submitted. Upon completion of a survey by the local R & U personnel, the installation of one fire hydrant was approved. However, installation of the fire hydrant has not been started.

(2) Failure of Electronics/Communications Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Heat, humidity and extremely dusty conditions are a major contributing factor to the failure of electronics/communications equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: These conditions result in a decreased life expectancy of resistors capacitors and tubes, cause relays to stick and clog filters. Clogged filters in-turn cause blower motors to fail and result in equipment overheating. To counter these effects within the Group, radios and VHF equipment have been removed from vehicles and shelters and installed in semi-permanent buildings. Additional fans have been installed to rapidly dissipate heat and a more aggressive preventive maintenance program has been initiated. This has resulted in cleaner, less humid operating conditions with better cooling of the equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That, when possible, electronics/communications equipment be removed from vehicles and shelters and be installed in semi-permanent buildings in which fans have been installed to dissipate heat.

f. Organization:

Air defense artillery liaison officer at G3, USARV.

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to numerous requirements for coordination and exchange of information between the two headquarters on air defense matters, the requirement for a 97th Artillery Group (AD) representative at HQ, USARV, became apparent. The MTOE for this headquarters provides two liaison officers (CPT - 1776). A liaison officer was put on a TDY status to G3, USARV on 10 April 1968.

(2) EVALUATION: During the relatively brief evaluation period he has rendered very valuable service to both headquarters.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the headquarters be allowed to maintain a liaison officer at HQ, USARV.

g. Others: None

J. C. Fimiani

J. C. FIMIANI
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

27

AVHGC-DST (22 May 68) 1st Ind (C) CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
 for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 10 JUN 1968

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
 APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
 Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference comment pertaining to unforeseen contingencies, page 20, section 2, paragraph 2b: Concur.

(1) References:

(a) USAHAC operation plan 1-68 (Security of US Installations in Saigon/Cholon Area) (U) dated 25 April 1968.

(b) USARV OPLAN 71-67 (Security of US Installations in Saigon/Cholon Area) (U) dated March 1967.

(2) Reference 2b (1)(a) provides for necessary transportation resources to be made available to reaction forces providing security to US installations in the Saigon/Cholon area.

(3) Army forces in the Saigon/Cholon area are OPCON to CG, USAHAC in Phase 1 and 2 of operations for ground security of the Saigon/Cholon area. 97th Artillery Group and USAHAC are in the process of coordinating existing plans to preclude the possibility of confusion during future contingencies.

b. Reference comment pertaining to excess personnel, page 20, section 2, paragraph 2a: Concur. Surplus personnel are being reassigned to other commands for utilization in related skills or as the commander may direct. The surplus in missile and missile maintenance MOS resulted in quantitative fill of USARV requisitions. These surplus personnel were assigned to the 97th Artillery Group since it is the only unit in RVN that can utilize them in FMOS or an authorized substitution. Department of the Army has been advised of this problem and reduced fill is expected.

CONFIDENTIAL

24

2809344

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (22 May 68) 1st Ind (C) 28
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

c. Reference item concerning insufficient FM communication equipment, page 21, paragraph 2b (2): Concur. The comments are valid and the 97th Artillery Group had previously brought this matter to the attention of this headquarters. There is a shortage of AN/VRC-12 series radios. When available, radios will be issued.

d. Reference item concerning insufficient FM communications equipment 79th Ord Det, page 21, paragraph 2b (3). Annotated copy of MTOE 9-510T, P00168 was received from USARPAC on 3 May. This MTOE reflected one radio set AN/VRC-46 and one radio set AN/VRC-49. Approval date for this MTOE cannot be determined at this date, but a communications capability will be included in the approved MTOE.

e. Reference item concerning inadequate fire fighting equipment, 79th Ord Det, page 22, paragraph 2e (1). Concur with recommendation that additional fire fighting equipment be furnished the 79th Ord Det, provided said equipment is of the first-aid category, e.g., additional fire extinguishers, water barrels, and water buckets. Nonconcur in recommendation for a fire hydrant system for the detachment area. The following information is furnished:

(1) The 79th Ord Det is located on Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

(2) When the fire occurred on 2 Apr 68, the detachment notified the Air Force fire department which in turn notified the Army fire department, which was close enough to the 79th Ord Det to be on the scene in two to three minutes. The Army fire department responded to the call with one pumper, one 1,000 gallon tanker and one 500 gallon tanker.

(3) On 4 Apr 68, the 79th Ord Det submitted a Job Order Request (TSN-1858-68) to the Tan Son Nhut Post Engineer, requesting one (1) pressure pump and ten (10) fire hydrants. Following an on-site survey, the request was disapproved with the comment that fire fighting equipment was close enough to provide adequate protection to the 79th Ord Det.

(4) The Post Engineer further recommended that the 79th Ord Det revise their fire notification procedures and notify the Army fire fighting detachment.

f. Reference item concerning an Air Defense Artillery liaison officer at G3, USARV, page 23, paragraph 2f (1).

CONFIDENTIAL

29

AVHGC-DST (22 May 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(1) Concur. The Air Defense Artillery liaison officer provides assistance involving the technical and tactical aspects of Air Defense Artillery in RVN.

(2) The liaison officer should be attached to USARV, duty station Long Binh.

(3) The MOS shown for the liaison officer in Section II, paragraph 2f(1) is incorrect. The MOS is 1176 not 1776 as shown.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 97th Arty Gp (AD)

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (22 May 68) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 97th Arty Gp (AD) for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (RI)

30

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

31
Organizational structure (U)

1. Reporting Unit: Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
2. Organic elements included in this report:
 - a. Headquarters Battery, 97th Artillery Group (AD)
 - b. 79th Ordnance Detachment (GMGS) (KAWK)
 - c. 459th Signal Detachment
 - d. 6th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - e. 79th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - f. 231st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - g. 247th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - h. 249th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
3. Organic elements not included in this report:
 - a. 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery
 - (1) 9th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - (2) 67th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance)
 - (3) 76th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - (4) 246th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - (5) 248th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
 - b. 6th Battalion, 71st Artillery

28

Incl 1

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OAGSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET - NOFORN	
		2b. GROUP 4	
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 97th Arty Gp (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and Inclusive Dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb. - 30 Apr 68			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 97th Artillery Group (AD)			
6. REPORT DATE 22 May 1968		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 29	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 682330	
8c. PROJECT NO. N/A		9b. OTHER REPORT NO.(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
8d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OAGSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			