LESSONS LEARNED, HEADQUARTERS, PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM
Abstract
From the beginning of the 1965 US military buildup of forces in support of the Republic of Vietnam, the vulnerability of the northern provinces was apparent. These provinces comprise the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). The common borders with North Vietnam and Laos serve to shorten the enemy's difficult, but efficient, supply line and make infiltration of North Vietnam Army (NVA) units into South Vietnam comparatively easy. The defense of this portion of South Vietnam was strengthened when the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) was established at Da Nang in May 1965. The Commanding General, III MAF, serves concurrently as Senior Advisor to the I CTZ Commander and as Senior US Military Commander in the northern corps. By mid-1967, US, Vietnamese and Republic of Korea forces were operational in the combat zone. Thus, enemy plans for large scale offensive operations were continuously disrupted throughout the Northern I CTZ (NICTZ) until the latter part of 1967. However, in December of that year a major enemy buildup began which culminated in the attack on Khe Sanh. With the increasing enemy threat in the north, COMUSMACV directed that DCG, USARV, establish a corps headquarters for the northern two provinces of I CTZ. While this action was being taken, the enemy continued to build large forces around Khe Sanh and along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 04, 1968
- Accession Number
- AD0392732
Entities
Organizations
- Adjutant General's Corps