

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD393074

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 01 AUG 1968.
Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20301.

AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**Best
Available
Copy**

**GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE**

**IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11052**

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



AD393074

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (4 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683201 10 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th
Battalion, 60th Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. Stanfield

**C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General**

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
 - US Continental Army Command
 - US Army Combat Developments Command
- Commandants
 - US Army Command and General Staff College
 - US Army Armor School
 - US Army Artillery and Missile School
 - US Army Aviation School
 - US Army Infantry School
 - US Army Missile and Munitions School
 - US Army Ordnance School

D D C
RECEIVED
OCT 12 1968
RECEIVED

Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title, 18, U. S. C., Section 795 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

2

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Engineers

Chief of Research and Development

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

Defense Documentation Center

Hudson Institute

Commanding Generals

US Army Materiel Command

US Army Weapons Command

Commanding Officers

US Army Limited War Laboratory

US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery

CONFIDENTIAL

3
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION (AW)(SP), 60TH ARTILLERY
APO 96294

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RGS GS 65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I (C) Significant organization or unit activities.

a. General

- (1) The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP) 60th Artillery with attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery, remained assigned to I Field Force Vietnam and fully attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.
- (2) The Battalion, with attachments, continues to operate at widely separated locations in support of maneuver and artillery elements of the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone and portions of the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- (3) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery remained attached to I Field Force Artillery and was located at Camp Townes, Qui Nhon area, at the beginning of the reporting period. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery relocated at Camp Radloff, An Khe, effective 20 June. Battery A remained assigned to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. Operational control of its 1st AW platoon was exercised by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery in the Phan Thiet area. Operational control of the 2nd AW platoon was exercised by the 6th Battalion, 32nd Artillery in support of its units in the Tuy Hoa/Ninh Hoa area. Battery B remained assigned to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. Elements of the 1st AW platoon were located on LZs from the Qui Nhon area to Mang Giang Pass (west of An Khe along highway 19D). Operational control of the 110, 120, and 140 sections was exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery; Operational control of the 130 section was exercised by 41st Artillery Group. The 2nd AW platoon remained located in the Dak To/Kontum area with operational control of 210, 220, and 230 sections exercised by the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (4th Division Artillery). Operational control of the 240 section was exercised by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery (4th Division Artillery). Battery C remained assigned to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. The 110 and 130 sections of the 1st

1. See Incl 1
FOR OT RD
683201

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

4

AVFA-AT-4WOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (R1)

AW platoon remained temporarily attached to the 1st Air Cavalry Division with operational control exercised by the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (1st Cavalry Division Artillery) located in the Quang Tri area of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Operational control of the 120 and 140 sections and the 2nd AW platoon was exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery supporting elements of the 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery (173rd ABN Brigade) and the 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (41st Artillery Group). These two sections and the entire 2nd AW platoon were deployed in the Bong Son plains area. Battery D remained assigned to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery. Operational control of the D110 section, D121, D132, and D141 squads was exercised by the 4th Battalion, 42nd Artillery (4th Division Artillery), in the Ban Me Thuot area. Operational control of the D122, D131, and D142 squads was exercised by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery (4th Division Artillery) at LZ Oasis, southwest of Pleiku. Operational control of the 210 section at Ban Me Thuot was exercised by the 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery, (52nd Artillery Group.) Operational control of the 320 section at Fold Djerong (west of Pleiku) was exercised by the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, (52nd Artillery Group.) Operational control of the D241 and D231 squads were directly exercised by the 4th Division Artillery at Pleiku. D142 and D122 were under the operational control of the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery in support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry operating in the plains west of Pleiku.

(4) Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery remained attached to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery. The six machine gun sections remained further attached to batteries of the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery, with operational control exercised as follows: Section A attached to Battery A with operational control of the 1st and 2nd squads exercised by the Tuy Hoa Sub-area Command; and the 3rd and 4th squads by the 173rd Airborne Brigade supporting the Tuy Hoa Sub-Area Command; section B attached to Battery C and further attached temporarily to the 1st Air Cavalry Division has operational control exercised by the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery) in the Quang Tri area of I Corps Tactical Zone. Section C attached to Battery C had operational control exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery in the Bong Son area supporting elements of the 41st Artillery Group and 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery (173rd Airborne Brigade). Section D attached to Battery D had operational control of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th squads exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery, supporting the 4th Division Artillery near Pleiku, and operational control of the 1st squad exercised by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery at Kontum. Section E attached to Battery A had operational control exercised by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery in the Phan Thiet area. Section E attached to Battery B had operational control of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th squads exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery supporting the 4th Division Military Police on highway 19E from Pleiku to Dak To. Operational control

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

5

AVFA-AT-AWOP

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Arty, Battery E (MB); 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS GS 65 (B1)

of the 2nd squad was exercised by the 41st Artillery Group at Phu Cat AFB.

(5) Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery, remained attached to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd searchlight platoons were attached to Batteries B, C, and A respectively. Operational control of the platoons was exercised as follows: 1st platoon, less two searchlights by 4th Division Artillery elements in the Dak To/Pleiku area; with the remaining two searchlights controlled by the 52nd Artillery Group; the 2nd platoon, minus four searchlights, by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Artillery supporting various United States and Republic of Korea Forces located in the Bong Son/Qui Nhon areas. The four searchlights remaining were temporarily Province to the 1st Air Cavalry Division located in the Quang Tri attached, I Corps Tactical Zone; and the 3rd platoon controlled by various United States and Republic of Korea Forces located on the coastal plains from the junction of highways 1 and 6b south to Phan Thiet.

(6) Commitments requiring AW assets in excess of the 64 M42A1's and 24 M55's authorized by TO & E were reduced during the reporting period to only one. Non-committed excess assets were turned in for closed loop maintenance (retrograde). Currently one M55 manned by Headquarters Battery is employed at Ky Son Mountain Fire Base supporting Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery (41st Artillery Group).

(7) Elements of the Battalion and attached units participated in the following major operations: MCARTHUR, WHITE HORSE 6, LAUNG HO 12, WALKER, COCHRAN, BOULDER, MCCLAIN and JEB STUART.

b. Intelligence

(1) Upon relocation of the Battalion Headquarters to Camp Radcliff at An Khe, a new intelligence gathering effort was initiated, with the objective being to receive timely intelligence information on the enemy's deployment, movement and probable courses of action throughout the II CTZ. The prior intelligence gathering effort was confined to the immediate vicinity of the Battalion Headquarters at Qui Nhon, which was inadequate for a unit with elements deployed throughout the II CTZ. During the first month after arrival at An Khe, units were contacted throughout II CTZ which submit intelligence summaries (INTSUMS) to IFFV HQ and arrangements were made to receive copies of their INTSUMS. Units from which INTSUMS are received are: G2, 4th Inf Div, Pleiku; S2, 52nd Arty GP, Pleiku; S2, CO B, 5 SF Group, Pleiku; S2, 5th Bn, 27th Arty, Phan Thiet; S2, 6th Bn 32nd Arty, Tuy Hoa; AOK Tiger Division, Qui Nhon; 27th Intel Team, Qui Nhon; and 22nd ARVN Div HQ, Qui Nhon. The S2 Officer currently spends three days per week on liaison visits to these HQs. Information continues to be gathered from the Qui Nhon area and daily Liaison is maintained with the 1st Bn, 503rd Inf and

2. See Incl 2

(3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (RL)

MACV HQ in An Khe. Further intelligence information regarding the II CTZ is received from Headquarters IFFV, in daily INTSUMS and weekly PERINTREPS.

(2) Area studies from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), were received in the early portion of the reporting period. An additional request for an enemy air capability study was honored prior to the end of the quarter. Further information will be requested to further develop and keep current the status of the enemy air threat, should the Battalion find it necessary to revert to an air defense role. Numerous studies from CICV regarding enemy tactics are on order presently to form the nucleus of a Battalion Intelligence Reading File.

(3) The Battalion received three AVN interpreters on 1 July 1968. One was assigned to C Battery in the Bong Son area, who have elements supporting AVN units, to bolster their liaison with these units. One was assigned to D Battery to aid them in a civic action program that they had begun in the Pleiku area. The third was retained at Battalion Headquarters to be utilized for civic action and intelligence activities.

(4) The Batteries during the reporting period continued to receive intelligence for their particular area of operations from daily briefings by supported and adjacent units. This intelligence, plus spot reports, is forwarded by the Batteries to the Battalion S2 for evaluation and inclusion in the Battalion's daily intelligence summary.

c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) All operational elements of the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery and attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery, and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery, were engaged in tactical operations during the 92 days of this reporting period. Operations which elements of the Battalion took part in were: continuations of MCA THUI, MCCLAIN, BOLLING, JEB STUART, VELVET HAMMER and PEGASUS, WHITE HORSE 6 and MAENG HO 12. Fire units primary employment continued to be perimeter defense with supplemental missions consisting of convoy escort; route, strongpoint, work-party, bridge and mine sweep security; and recon in force missions with mechanized maneuver elements. Supporting fire was provided by interdiction, counterfire, reconnaissance by fire, confirmed target engagement, and on call missions. Searchlights continued to be employed in support of critical installations, defensive perimeters, and sensitive areas. Missions were performed both in the visible and infrared modes on a scheduled and on-call basis. Types and numbers of supporting fires and searchlight missions accomplished during this reporting period are as follows:

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

7
CON. IDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Duster (M42A1)

<u>Mission Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Ammunition Expended (40mm)</u>
Interdiction	2973	101488
Counterfire	80	9146
Reconnaissance by Fire	666	19210
Confirmed Target	27	2692
Other (Training/On-Call)	82	5637
Total	3828	138173

Quad (M55)

<u>Mission Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Ammunition Expended (50 Cal)</u>
Interdiction	385	167510
Counterfire	33	34400
Reconnaissance by Fire	83	25700
Confirmed Target	13	5200
Other (Training/On-Call)	17	20500
Total	531	254310

Searchlight (4N/MSS-3)

<u>Mission Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Visible Mode</u>	
Interdiction	16346
On-Call	5724
<u>Infrared Mode</u>	
Interdiction	6297
On-Call	795
Total Missions	29162

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1968 8

AVFA-AT-4WOP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (NG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SMT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (RI)

(b) As a follow-up on activities of last quarter, the automatic weapons and searchlight employment letter which was forwarded last quarter through I Field Force Vietnam Artillery to the Commanding General I Field Force Vietnam (for approval, indorsement, and distribution to major commanders within I Field Force) is being redrafted at I Field Force Vietnam for signature and distribution to unit commanders within the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(c) During the reporting period, frequent movement of artillery units, and numerous short duration operations of maneuver elements again demonstrated the need for a flexible organization for combat. Fluid assets remained at a minimum and as a result the Battalion was unable to render requested support in several instances. Those assets that remained OPCON to the Battalion were employed in several short duration operations and were available and utilized for convoy escort and perimeter defense as needed. A prompt movement of AW assets to the HWY 19E area east of the Mng Giang Pass quite possibly forestalled an anticipated attack on small security sites in those locations. In order to continue to improve this response capability and achieve a better distributed and flexible posture in automatic weapons support, this headquarters again forwarded an automatic weapons/searchlight organization for combat to CG, IFFORCEV Arty. This recommendation takes into consideration the current unit deployment and places elements of the Battalion into either reinforcing or general support roles, based upon mission requirements in respective areas of operations. The recommendation is pending approval at this time.

(d) A chronological sequence of events occurring during this reporting period is present as inclosure 4.

(e) Significant Events

10 May: At approximately 0430 hours 10 May 1968 FSB 25 vicinity AR 883292 occupied by elements of the 1st Bn, 8th Infantry, was subjected to a well coordinated ground attack by an estimated NVA battalion. The crew of Quad E-24 reacted immediately and brought fire to bear. Within 5 minutes the enemy overran and occupied two bunkers fifteen meters in front of the Quad using the positions to put themselves in defilade. From these positions they threw hand grenades which wounded two cannoneers. The gunner, SP4 Biggerstaff, continued to fire until a grenade killed him. Then enemy then threw two more grenades to insure destruction of the Quad. The Quad was credited with eight NVA KIA.

11-19 May: At 0730 May 1968, the 230 section of C Battery together with a Rifle Company (reinforced) of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry and a platoon of tanks from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor departed

3. See Incl 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

9

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1968

AVFA-AT-4WOP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, MCS CS 65 (ML)

LZ Uplift going south on Highway One to the northern end of Anuay. Vicinity BA 902675, the elements moved east through a number of villages. Crossing a hill, vicinity BA 9567, the elements found themselves confronted with a battalion size element guarding the 22nd NVA Regimental CP. When this was discovered, the mechanized force formed a tight defense. The Dusters were the first to open fire and stopped the NVA from over-running the mechanized elements. The enemy fired mortars and rockets; they also employed automatic weapons and small arms fire; they were heavily bunkered. Because the section had to engage the enemy immediately, they did not back their tracks into a firing position; this made resupply of ammunition difficult. During the encounter, 150 VC were KIA; 60 of these deaths were attributed to the Duster's fire. The second day, 12 May, the elements performed a search and clear operation, vicinity of BA 931684. There was no contact. On the third day, the mechanized force discovered some weapons, freshly dug graves, assorted web gear, tools, beds and the Regimental Commander's bunker with six bodies, a dining table complete with tablecloth, napkins, silverware, china and flowers vicinity of BA 9567. On the fourth day, the mechanized team performed a search and clear operation vicinity of BA 933683 to BA 941679. There were negative assessments. On the fifth day, the 230 section returned to LZ Uplift for maintenance. At this time, the 140 section replaced them in the field. On the sixth day and the seventh day, the same areas were again swept with negative results. On the night of the seventh day, the FOB received some rockets and mortars with negative damage. On the eighth day, the same area was once more swept with negative results. At 1715, the mechanized force returned to LZ Uplift. Six personnel were wounded during the initial action from Battery C and medevaced. They were replaced by clerks, drivers and MTOs from Battery Headquarters.

24-26 May: On 24 May 1968, C-211 and C-231 together with a reinforced company from 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry and a platoon from 1/69 Armor moved south from LZ Uplift and then west into an area approximate vicinity BA 8874. At this location, the mechanized force came upon a battalion sized NVA force armed with B-40 rockets, mortars and small arms. During this initial fire fight, the Duster Platoon Leader was wounded as he was firing the M-60 mounted on the turret. He was providing covering fire as the guns were being reloaded. He was medevaced approximately one hour later when they broke contact with the enemy. After regrouping, the force again entered the contact area this time receiving only small contacts. On the second day, the mechanized force moved further west along the valley again only making contact with small forces resulting in a short period of contact. On the third day the mechanized force turned east and swept back toward the highway returning to LZ Uplift late in the afternoon. Two other Duster personnel were wounded during the initial contact but were not medevaced. The Dusters were credited with twenty enemy KIA by bodycount as a result of the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

10

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (ALT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, ACS CS 65 (AL)

19 July: At 1400 hours, 19 July, 5 Dusters (D-111, D-112, D-141, D-121, D-132) from the 1st AW Platoon of D Battery deployed from LZ Oasis, west of Pleiku, and escorted a convoy consisting of elements of the 2nd Brigade, 4th Division and its' direct support battalion, 4th Battalion, 42nd Artillery to Ban Me Thuot. The Platoon Headquarters and two searchlights accompanied the move. Platoon elements closed into position at 0630 hours 20 July following a road march of 90 miles. These elements are currently performing perimeter security for the 2nd Brigade, tasked with the security of the Ban Me Thuot area.

(f) Operational Control

The Battalion's organic and attached elements continued to be deployed the length and breadth of the II Corps Tactical Zone, with elements temporarily attached to the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) continuing to operate in the Quang Tri area of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Problem areas in command and control, personnel actions and supply of major repair parts and end items, continue due to the large distances involved between the Battalion Headquarters and Battery elements. The most northern element is presently 210 air miles distant and the most southern is 265 air miles away. Relocation of the Battalion base camp to An Khe in June has for the bulk of the Battalion, provided a more centralized location for control purposes. Air Force flights are now available daily on a scheduled basis direct to Quang Tri. Air Force flights to Phan Thiet continue to be extremely time consuming taking, on an average, two days each way due to the numerous shuttle flights required for the trip. Fixed wing support from U.S. Army assets was not available during the reporting period. In general, aircraft support to the Phan Thiet area continues to be inadequate. Helicopter support from the 128th Helicopter Company at Phu Hiep has been very satisfactory. One helicopter, four days per week has proven adequate for accomplishment of coordination visits, and transportation of small repair parts. A total of 46 missions with a flight time of 191 hours were flown in support of the Battalion. Each Duster Battery had one flight per week scheduled in its' operational area. The Battalion continued to utilize AN/GMC-19 radios for the bulk of the reporting period. Upon receipt of 5 AN/GMC-106 radios in July and subsequent disposition to the most distant Battalion elements, direct radio communications between the Battalion Headquarters and all Battery and Platoon Headquarters was established for the first time.

(2) Training Activities

(a) The training requirements for the Battalion's personnel continued to be satisfied at squad and section level at the firing batteries by having the Section/Squad Leader conduct training, with supplemental instruction by the Platoon Leader. The current Battalion training regulation is under revision to allow a greater share of the training burden to be assumed at the Battalion level, thus reducing the Battery requirement to that which can be presented or closely supervised by Battery Officers.

(8) CONFIDENTIAL

//

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFM-AT-4WOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (R1)

(b) A total of seven newly arrived men possessing the MDS 45F20 (Turret Mechanic) attended a 30 day training course on the M42A1 and M55 conducted by the Battalion maintenance section. These personnel had been trained at Ft Sill as turret mechanics on field artillery equipment, i.e. 105mm and 155mm SP vehicles. See inclosure 5 for a resume of training given.

(c) Driver's training courses on track and wheel vehicles were initiated in early July at Battalion Base Camp. All Battalion personnel to be assigned as track or wheeled vehicle drivers are programmed to receive this course of instruction conducted by the Battalion maintenance section. A total of 45 personnel were trained as track vehicle drivers and 33 as wheeled vehicle drivers since the initiation of this course in July. A resume of the course of instruction is included as inclosure 6.

(d) Replacement training was conducted for 194 enlisted personnel following their arrival at Battalion Base Camp. Starting the end of May, formal training was conducted which satisfied mandatory annual training requirements plus additional Vietnam oriented instruction. This training deviated from last quarters' replacement training by virtue of additional instruction hours being added. A resume of the training program is included as inclosure 7.

(e) A two day training program for radio operators and communications chiefs was conducted in mid-July on the AN/GAC-106 radio. Emphasis was placed upon correct procedures for energizing and tuning the amplifier AM-3349 to preclude damage. A synopsis of the training program is present as inclosure 8.

(f) A replacement training program for newly assigned Officers that are not automatic weapons qualified has been recently established. The program is presented over a one week period which includes a three day visit to a fire base where the Officer can gain practical first hand knowledge of automatic weapons and their employment. The other four days are utilized for classes on maintenance, small arms and crew served weapons, tactics, the current tactical situation and supervisory responsibilities. A resume of the Officer replacement training program is included as inclosure 9.

(g) In preparation for the IFFV-ARTY Command Inspection of the Battalion in September, the Battalion Headquarters conducted a Command Inspection of all batteries, assigned or attached, during the month of July. Checklists extracted from IFFV Regulation 20-1 were utilized. Continuations of these inspections are scheduled to be conducted during the month of August.

(h) On 30 May a monthly operations and training newsletter, "Sharp Toc", was inaugurated. The purpose was to bring items of

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1968

12

AVFA-AT-APOP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (A.D)(SF), 60th Arty, Battery E (MF), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RGS CS 65 (NL)

significant interest to the assigned and attached units of this Battalion. Items are presented in an informal and humorous format with emphasis on items the troops can understand, identify with and need to know. Distribution is made down to squad level. Topics have included rules of engagement, Firecracker duds, safety precautions, maintenance hints, use of spot reports and congratulations to personnel and units for jobs well done.

d. Logistics

(1) Support: Effective 20 June 1968, the Battalion Base Camp was relocated from Qui Nhon to An Khe, requiring an almost complete change in supporting logistical agencies. Logistical support of all classes of supplies was maintained by the Battalion S-4 for organic and attached units located at An Khe. Quarters, and Class I, III and V supplies for Battalion maneuver elements are provided by the supported or CGCOM unit. TO & E and TA 50-901 items are provided to all personnel of the Battalion by S-4. Supplies not available through major subordinate commands are also supplied by this Battalion's S-4 to insure that a combat-ready posture is maintained by all elements.

(a) Support following the relocation of the Battalion Base Camp was rendered by the agencies listed at inclosure 11.

(b) Support rendered in Class I and II supply categories, provided by the 58th Field Depot in Qui Nhon, was considered satisfactory during this reporting period, with the exception of the following vehicles:

<u>Vehicle</u>	<u>Amt</u>	<u>Date Req</u>	<u>Status</u>
Truck, Cargo, 2½ ton	2	8136	
	1	8133	
	1	8135	
	1	8147	
	1	8152	
	1	8155	
	1	8185	
	Truck, Utility, ¼ ton	1	8135
1		8148	

(2) PLL: A training program for AW Battery PLL clerks was conducted at this Headquarters during 27 April to 4 May 1968. During this period, the students constructed their units PLL, indexes, record of demand cards, visible files, and prepared their initial requisitions. On 5 May, the

CONFIDENTIAL

13
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (RL)

PLL clerks returned to their respective units and submitted their listing and initial requisitions to the nearest DSU. On 28 June 1968, the Battalion PLL Section was transferred from the S-4 to the Maintenance Section to effect direct coordination between our weapons system and 2nd/3rd echelon maintenance.

(3) Maintenance

(a) During the reporting period, liaison visits were made by the Battalion MTO to the Forward Support Detachment, 135th HEM Company at Phan Thiet, and the 129th LEM Company at Quang Tri in an effort to obtain adequate support for Battalion elements in those locations. In addition, a platoon maintenance activity was established at each location consisting of one 63C20 (track mechanic), one 63B20 (wheeled vehicle mechanic) and one 76Y20 (PLL clerk). A PLL has been initiated at each of these locations in an effort to reduce deadline time.

(b) A total of 6 rebuilt M42A1's were in-processed during the period of which 4 were used to fill combat losses and the others used for retrograde. A total of 5 M-55's were similarly in-processed of which two were used to fill shortages due to combat losses.

(c) Maintenance activities performed included the following: replacement of 35 M42A1 engines and 8 M42A1 transmissions; a technical inspection of each unit's PLL and TAERS; and 10% of the assigned vehicles were inspected during the Command Inspection conducted by the Battalion.

(d) A listing of repetitive parts causing M42A1 and M-55 deadlines is at inclosure 12.

(4) Supply: Major items of equipment turned in, received and due in during the period 1 May to 31 July 1968 are listed at inclosure 13.

(5) Ammunition: Rounds expended by the Battalion during the reporting period:

<u>Type Ammunition</u>	<u>Total</u>
40mm	138,173
Caliber .50	254,310

(11)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Army, Battery B (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (RI)

(6) Base Camp Development

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period the Headquarters Battery, Headquarters Sections of Battery E, 41st Artillery and Battery B, 29th Artillery remained on 48 hour reaction notice pending receipt of a movement order to An Khe. On 16 May a movement order was received ordering those elements to move from Camp Townes to An Khe on 20 May. This order was subsequently suspended pending establishment of security responsibility for Camp Townes upon the units departure, and release of the real estate to a new tenant. Following a determination that the real property at Camp Townes would be returned to the Republic of Vietnam, coordination was effected with Qui Nhon Sub-Area Command Engineers and the ARVN authorities for transfer of the property. Upon completion of this coordination, the unit was re-scheduled to move the Battalion Base Camp to An Khe commencing 15 June with a completion date no later than 30 June. The movement was scheduled for initiation of 15 June with a completion date of 23 June. The move started on schedule and was completed on 20 June, 3 days ahead of schedule. Over 400,000 lbs. of material were transported with no vehicle accidents and only one minor personal injury (no lost time).

(b) As mentioned in the preceding ORIL, coordination was established at Camp Radcliff prior to the move with Pacific Architectural and Engineering Company, the Installation Coordinator, 86th Engineer Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and logistical support agencies at An Khe. A forward element of the Battalion Headquarters was present at An Khe to coordinate construction and remodeling of facilities. The projects completed by PA & E and the 86th Engineers in preparation for tenancy by the Battalion are listed at inclosure 15.

(c) Following the closing of Battalion elements at An Khe on 20 June an aggressive plan was placed in effect to develop the Battalion area. A planning committee was organized with the Battalion Executive Officer as chairman, the Battalion Staff and Battery Commanders of Battery B, 29th Artillery, Battery E, 41st Artillery and Headquarters Battery as members. A list of projects according to priority was formulated for completion by troop labor. A listing of accomplishments is at inclosure 16.

e. Civic Action. During the past quarter, the civic action program was substantially reduced due to the relocation of the Battalion Headquarters and the preparation of a new base camp.

5. See Incl 14

(12)

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-4T-4WOr

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (R1)

(1) Prior to departure from Camp Tomes the Battalion Medical Section treated 116 medical patients. Participation in the MEDCAP program within Tay Phuoc sub-sector continued until departure to An Khe.

(2) Upon arrival in An Khe, an orphanage was discovered in the city proper which was without support from FWMAF elements. The Battalion has donated left-over food stuffs on a daily basis and numerous personnel within the Battalion have requested donations of clothing, and other articles from their families and charitable organizations at home. A clothing drive has been initiated by the Ft. Bliss Boy Scouts with the approval of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Center, Ft. Bliss, Texas.

(3) D Battery elements located at LZ Oasis, west of Plei Mu, participated in a local civic action program for a village neighboring the firebase, but were forced to end the project when the platoon moved to Ban Ma Thuot.

f. Personnel

(1) The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery authorized and assigned strengths as of 31 July were as follows:

	<u>Authorized</u>				<u>Assigned</u>			
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>SM</u>
4th Bn, 60th Arty	37	3	145	513	37	3	100	665
Btry E, 41st Arty	2	0	28	87	2	0	9	114
Btry B, 29th Arty	7	0	32	112	4	0	37	122
Totals	46	3	205	712	43	3	146	901
AGG Total	----- 966 -----				----- 1093 -----			

CONFIDENTIAL

16

~~SECRET~~ AFEAT-4WOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (MLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS OS 65 (RI)

(2) Gains and Losses:

	<u>Gains</u>		<u>Losses</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
4th Bn, 60th Arty	9	176	10	143
Btry E, 41st Arty	1	11	0	11
Btry B, 29th Arty	<u>1</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>25</u>
Totals	11	234	10	179
AGG Total	-----	245 -----	-----	189 -----

(3) The Battalion was overstrength 127 personnel as of the last day of the reporting period. Those individuals are replacements for the 234 men that rotate the next reporting period. This advanced fill will reduce the effects of rotational humps which peak in the next two reporting periods.

(4) As of 31 July, this Battalion was short three lieutenants.

(5) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1968, of the 9 Officers who were received, 67% were not AW trained. All enlisted personnel received as replacements for MOS 13F were AW trained.

(6) A shortage of middle grade NCO personnel continues to be a problem with 39 E-6 and 89 E-5 authorized and only 8 E-6 and 33 E-5 assigned in MOS 13F40. No relief for this problem is anticipated in the near future. Solution to the problem thus far has been the use of best qualified lower grade personnel as acting sergeants.

(7) The Battalion is currently authorized six Battery Motor Sergeants with five assigned as of 31 July 1968. Projected losses indicate that only a total of two will be assigned as of 31 October 1968. A review of assigned mechanics has not revealed anyone with the necessary qualifications for training as Motor Sergeants.

(8) The Battalion has submitted a roster to EFFORCEV for infusion of 50 EM with January 1969 DEROS in an effort to reduce the January

(14)

CONFIDENTIAL

17

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SF), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RGS CS 65 (RI)

rotational hump to the authorized 137 EM. Present projected losses for that period total 193. No reply has been received from IFFORCEV.

(9) The Battalion completed the relocation of finance support to disbursing sections in closer proximity to the respective batteries. The finance records for personnel assigned to Battery A were transferred to the 22 FDS. One clerk was attached to handle these records. The records for the Batteries D and B were transferred to the 126th FDS, Camp Schmidt, Pleiku. Two clerks were attached. The finance records for HHB, 4th Bn, 60th Arty; Btry E, 41st Arty; and Btry B, 29th Arty were transferred to the 13th FDS, Qui Nhon. Two clerks were attached to handle these records. An agreement was reached with the 89th FDS, An Khe, to handle inprocessing for all newly assigned personnel. Two clerks were provided the 89th FDS to perform this function. It is felt that these locations will greatly improve finance service.

(10) The following awards and decorations were recommended and/or presented during the reporting period:

Non-Completed Awards From May - July

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>Number</u>
ACM	8
AFI	7
AS	2
BS "V"	1
BS	4
ACM "V"	<u>15</u>
Total	32

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18

AVFA-AT-AWOP

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65 (RI)

Completed Awards From May - July

<u>Award</u>	<u>Number</u>
BS	6
PH	13
BS "V"	5
USARV Certificate of Achievement	3
SS	1
ACM	<u>4</u>
Total	32

(11) The following judicial and non-judicial actions were taken during the reporting period:

Article 15	38
SCM	1
S	0
GCM	<u>0</u>
Total	39

(12) Casualties during the reporting period were:

<u>Type</u>	<u>4/60</u>	<u>5/41</u>	<u>6/29</u>
Killed by Hostile Action	0	1	0
Died of Battle Wounds	0	0	0
Wounded By Hostile Action	21	6	0
Missing in Action	0	0	0
Non-Battle	8	1	1

CONFIDENTIAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-4T-4WOP
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(Ar), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, ROS CG 65 (R1) 1 August 1968

(13) Rest and Recuperation:

Location	May		June		July	
	Royd	Used	Royd	Used	Royd	Used
Australia	7	7	6	6	5	5
Bangkok	8	8	7	7	7	7
Hawaii	16	16	17	17	13	13
Hong Kong	8	5	6	5	6	6
Kuala Lumpur	0	0	1	1	0	0
Manila	1	1	2	2	1	1
Penang	1	0	1	1	0	0
Singapore	1	1	2	1	1	1
Taipei	6	4	5	5	4	4
Tokyo	4	2	6	3	4	4
Total	52	(89%)46	53	(91%)48	41	(100%)41

(14) The morale of the Battalion's and attached Batteries' personnel continued to be excellent.

(15) Religious Activities. Both Protestant and Catholic services in the Battalion Chapel were conducted weekly following movement of the Battalion Base Camp to An Khe. Previously only Protestant services were available. The total attendance for services during the quarter was 860. 53 Protestant services were conducted by the Chaplain at various locations throughout the I and II Corps Tactical Zones during the quarter. A comprehensive character guidance program was initiated in May with a mimeographed supplement of the topic for the month instituted to insure that the Battalion's wide deployment and irregularities in transportation would not deprive personnel of this instruction.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20

AVFA-AT-AWO.

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, CS 65 (R1)

(16) Medical:

(a) During the reporting period, the Battalion Surgeon visited the following locations and administered inoculations:

Artillery Hill	33
Camp Enari	18
Ninh Hoa	17
Cung Son	14
Dong Tre	18
Uplift	1
Hill 881	0
Po Lei Kleng	12
Dak To	6
Bridge 25	2
LZ Tom	8
LZ English	11
LZ Tony	26
Ben Me Thuot	2
Oasis	1
Polei Djarang	0
LZ Sharon	38
LZ Betty	8
Fhu Cat	16
Ky Son	0
<u>Base Camp</u>	<u>743</u>
Total	974

CONFIDENTIAL

21

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1968

AVFA-AT-AWOP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(Sr), 60th Arty, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (MLT), 29th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RGS GS 05 (RI)

(b) Base Camp Totals Included:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Out Patient Visits	313	455	452	1220
Quartered Patients	6	11	15	32
Hospital Admissions	56	49	36	141
Immunizations	358	150	466	974
Inspections	13	13	12	38

(c) Other Patients Seen:

Vietnamese Treated	87	33	9	129
<u>ROKS Treated</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	88	35	10	133

(d) Health and Disease Disorders:

Malaria Losses	5	4	7	16
Foot Disorder Losses	0	0	0	0
Infectious Mononucleosis Losses	1	0	1	2

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

23 a. PERSONNEL. None

b. OPERATIONS.

(1) OVERHEAD COVER

(a) Observation. Operations with cavalry and armor units have disclosed the need for M42A1 crewmen to be able to construct their individual night positions quickly, including overhead cover.

(b) Evaluation: It is a cardinal rule that M42A1 crewmen have overhead cover while in night positions. Armored cavalry and armor units do not need extensive preparation for night positions and consequently allow little time for their preparation prior to darkness. Little more than slit trenches can be prepared in the time available.

(c) Recommendation. That half sections of 30" diameter metal culvert be available to M42A1 crews. The half sections of metal culvert are placed over a slit trench. Sandbags are filled with the dirt removed from the slit trench and with approximately 20 sandbags on top of the culvert, a secure and comfortable individual shelter results. For transport the culvert sections can be stacked compactly beside the turret on the Dusters and behind the driver's seat on the Quads.

(2) USE OF FLASH SUPPRESSORS

(a) Observation. On Recon in Force operations when operating in dense underbrush, flash suppressors on the M42A1 continually become fouled in vines and brush.

(b) Evaluation. Flash suppressors are of little tactical value when providing fire support to maneuvering elements. When removed, however, the tubes remained free from entanglement.

(c) Recommendation. That unit SOP's include the removal of flash suppressors prior to commencement of operations requiring travel through dense underbrush.

(3) USE OF DECOY QUAD 50

(a) Observation. Rough, inaccessible terrain and limited assets often prevents the employment of an adequate number of automatic weapons on isolated fire bases, and those assets are vulnerable to B-40 RL or recoilless rifle fire due to limited camouflage and restricted mobility.

(b) Evaluation. One of our units was given the mission of providing assets for an isolated fire base, LZ Mile High, and found themselves confronted with this problem. Only one Quad 50 (M55) was available, and it was airlifted into the fire base. The Quad moved periodically around the perimeter but could not cover the entire area. The firebase did not offer much in the way of concealed areas and the Quad was difficult to camouflage making it susceptible to B-40 RL fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Recommendation. That a decoy Quad be constructed of available material (wood, canvas, pipe, rubber hose and ammo cans) and airlifted into the fire base. The deception is only effective when there is a Quad operating in the area and firing. The deception will be enhanced if the positions of the Quad and decoy are switched periodically. At best, the impression of additional firepower may forestall an attack; At worst, the odds of the Quad being hit are reduced 50%. 24

(4) PROTECTION OF COMBAT VEHICLE CREWMAN (CVC) HELMETS

(a) Observation. A continuing problem encountered in the communications system of the M42L1 is maintaining the CVC helmets in an operational condition.

(b) Evaluation. With the adverse weather conditions found in Vietnam, the CVC helmets seem to incur most of their trouble from rain and dust getting inside of them, thus rendering them inoperative.

(c) Recommendation. That when not in use, CVC helmets be kept in plastic bags. Experience has shown that the problem of moisture and dirt making the helmet inoperative had been sharply reduced.

(5) EMPLOYMENT OF QUADS FOR CONVOY ESCORT

(a) Observation. The 2½ ton truck used as the prime mover for the Quad 50 mount (M55) requires constant maintenance, because of the heavy load carried.

(b) Evaluation. During a thirty day period, four clutches had to be replaced in 2½ ton prime movers used for convoy escort on a daily basis. Experience has shown that a marked decrease in downtime is noted when one day of maintenance is pulled for every two days of use. Using this principle for thirty days, it was noted that no clutch replacement was necessary nor was any other deadline time logged. Adjustments by mechanics can be performed and minor problems corrected before they become major.

(c) Recommendation. That Quad 50's used for convoy escort be employed in groups of three or multiples thereof. This allows the "one for two" maintenance required to keep the prime mover operational.

(6) SUSTAINED FIREPOWER FOR THE M42L1

(a) Observation. Once the first sixteen rounds have been fired from the automatic loader of the M42L1 Duster, it is difficult in a minimum manning situation for one man to keep the loaders fed using the present storage facilities.

(b) Evaluation. During periods of minimum manning Dusters are sometimes required to operate with only one cannoneer in addition to the gunner. Once firing has begun, the automatic loader is emptied before

CONFIDENTIAL

25 stand-by personnel can man the other cannoneer position. The present ammunition storage facilities are not located such that one man can reload both automatic loaders as quickly as necessary to maintain the fire superiority.

(o) Recommendation. That a ready rack as shown at Inclosure 17 be constructed and installed for Dusters subject to minimum manning situations to enable one cannoneer to maintain the all important fire superiority until stand-by personnel can man the positions.

(7) M42A1 WORKING WITH CAVALRY UNITS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

(a) Observation. It has been observed during recent operations that Dusters encounter frequent difficulty in crossing streams during Recon in Force operations.

(b). Evaluation. Many river and stream banks in an area of operation are likely to be unsafe for Duster crossing due to the danger of miring in soft banks, or getting in streams with drop offs deeper than the Duster's fording depth.

(c) Recommendations. That an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier be used to test the bank and check fording depth. This will lessen the possibility of sinking a Duster. The M113 can be more easily extracted if mired and has a better fording capability.

(8) POSITION OF THE TRACK COMMANDER

(a) Observation. In order to obtain a better view the track commanders often stand on the sandbagged floor inside commander compartment leaving them vulnerable to injury from mine explosions.

(b) Evaluation. The track commander is probably the most vulnerable of all crew members to injury from the force of a mine explosion because of his curbside location and stance with his weight on his feet. Standing on the sandbagged floor of the vehicle allows the force of a mine explosion to be transmitted directly to his legs.

(c) Recommendation. That the track commanders seat must always be used. The seat can be raised to maximum limit and additional height can be obtained, and additional protection gained by placing salvaged flak jackets or other material on the seat. If material is not readily available and additional height is needed it is better to stand on the seat.

(9) POLAROID CAMERA, AID TO RSOP

(a) Observation. During RSOP, the Platoon Leader needs a method to quickly record detailed information concerning river crossings, detours, danger areas and positions to be occupied at the destination for later dissemination

(b) Evaluation. Time available for reconnaissance is normally limited and detailed sketches and notes are difficult to obtain. Also less detailed or accurate than a photograph. A Polaroid camera can be of invaluable assistance to the Platoon Leader in his RSOP if either air or ground reconnaissance is employed. Detailed information can be collected and disseminated quickly and efficiently in this manner. Usually there are several Polaroid cameras within a platoon, and cost of film is minimal.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Recommendation. That a Peimoid canora be taken along on RSOP, if available. 26

(10) REFUELING M42A1 WHILE ON RECON IN FORCE OPERATIONS

(a) Observation. A problem in obtaining gasoline for Dusters during recon in force operations has been experienced by elements of this command.

(b) Evaluation. It is a fact that Dusters travel more than 6 times the actual distance from one point to another because of obstacles such as rivers and streams. Cavalry or armor units have equipment with diesel engines and do not normally have tankers available to transport gasoline. Thus, the responsibility rests with the Duster battery to transport fuel. The Battery has a tanker capability but often due to maintenance problems or other commitments cannot meet the refueling requirements.

(c) Recommendation. That a 500 gallon tank be procured for such eventualities. The tank can be mounted on one of the Duster Battery's 1 1/2 ton trailers. It can be left at the permanent lag or site for periodic refueling by the Duster Battery tanker or towed to the ROL facility by a diesel tanker or ordinary 2 1/2 ton truck of the supported mechanized unit.

(11) POSITION OF M42A1 IN A STATIC DEFENSE

(a) Observation. When in a static defense, if the M42A1 Duster is driven forward into the firing position, crew members are exposed to hostile fire while transferring ammunition from the driver's compartment to the turret.

(b) Evaluation. Ammunition stored within the Duster must be passed out through the front hatches to the turret. When the Duster is driven forward into the firing position, it is necessary that the ammunition be further handled along the side of the vehicle before it can be passed to the cannoners. This situation exposes the ammo handlers to incoming fire for an extended duration.

(c) Recommendation. That the Duster be backed into the firing position with the engine compartment toward the direction of fire, ammunition can be handed up to the cannoners directly from the front hatch. The bulk of the Duster shields the ammo handlers from small arms fire, and ammunition transfer is faster due to the shorter distance involved. However, care must be taken to protect the rear deck phone from muzzle blast from the guns. This is a small price to pay for added crew safety.

c. TRAINING.

(1) Observation. Because of the wide dispersion of Battery elements, only limited training can be effectively conducted at Battery level.

(2) Evaluation. Mandatory training required for all personnel includes nine subjects annually, two subjects monthly and one subject weekly for a total of 85 hours per year. Batteries are not able to effectively conduct all formal training required because of mission commitments and wide dispersion of elements.

27

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Recommendation. That annual mandatory training requirements can be handled at Battalion level during replacement training as indicated at inclosure 7. Monthly and weekly subjects can be thoroughly covered by the Battery Commander, the Platoon Leaders, and Platoon Sergeants as they make their normal visits to each fire element.

d. INTELLIGENCE. None.

e. LOGISTICS.

(1) COMBAT LOSS REPLACEMENT FOR 2½ TON TRUCKS

(a) Observation. A critical problem area for this unit has been the difficulty of obtaining replacements for 2½ tone truck combat losses utilized as gun platforms for M-55 Quad .50 cal machine guns.

(b) Evaluation. At the present time the machine gun battery attached to this Battalion is short four 2½ tone trucks that were combat losses. The Battalion has been unable to supply replacements for these because of its own critical shortages. Consequently, the Quads must be ground mounted until replacements can be obtained.

(c) Recommendation. That truck, cargo, 2½ tone that are utilized as prime movers for the M-55 Quad .50 cal machine gun be placed on the list of command and control items by the 1st Logistical Command. A recommendation to this effect has been forwarded to the CG, IFFV-ARTY.

f. ORGANIZATION. None.

g. OTHER.

(1) EXTENDED RANGE FOR FM RADIOS

(a) Observation. The limited range of FM radios have caused communications problems within the Battalion because Battalion elements are often separated by distances in excess of the radio's nominal range.

(b) Evaluation. Many stations often are on the periphery of reception by using RC-292 antennae. Sufficient radios to provide a retransmission capability are usually not available. If a few extra miles of range were able to be generated, communications could be established.

(c) Recommendation. That an antenna matching unit MX-2799/VRC with base antenna support AB-719/VRC and conventional 10' whip antenna be mounted on top of either a telephone pole or a TRC-24 mast. RF and match unit cables can be locally manufactured to any length necessary. By using the match unit/whip combination, greater forward power can be produced with less reflected power, thus increasing the range.

(24)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28

(2) LOCATION OF HEALTH AND DENTAL RECORDS

(a) Observation. The problem of the advisability of maintaining health and dental records at Battery level rather than at the Battalion aid station was recently aired by this Battalion.

(b) Evaluation. The health and dental records were recently released to two of the Batteries for maintenance and the balance remained at the Battalion Aid Station. It was found that a significant number of records were lost by these batteries whereas very few records belonging to the batteries which were maintained at Battalion were lost during this period. Members of the Armed Forces are never denied emergency care because they do not have their medical or dental records. Neither are records ordinarily needed for routine care. The medical facility treating the person merely records their findings and sends them to be filed in the person's permanent record. When these records are needed for the treatment of chronic illnesses, non-emergency dental care, or identification of bodies, the records are at a known location and can be readily signed out without a loss of control of the records. Another factor to be considered is that the Battalion Surgeon has the responsibility for immunizations, review of records for the administration of profiles, and giving a professional opinion in many psychiatric and disciplinary cases within the command. This would be a near impossibility without immediate access to the medical records.

(c) Recommendation. That health and dental records be permanently maintained at the Battalion Aid Station by the Battalion Surgeon.

~~17 Incl~~ Incl 1-16 Withdrawn,
~~as~~ Available at Hq, DA

Paul E. Schultz
PAUL E. SCHULTZ
LTC, ARTY
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

2-CINCUSARPAC

ATTN: GPOP-PT

3-USARV

ATTN: AVHGC (DST)

5-CG, IFFORCEV

ATTN: AVFA-AT-D

1-CG FORT BLISS, TEXAS 79916

ATTN: G-3 TNG-DIV

1-CG, UNITED STATES ARMY TNG CENTER

ATTN: 1ST TNG BDE

FORT BLISS, TEXAS 79916

1-UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL

ATTN: LOW ALTITUDE MISSILE DEPARTMENT

FORWARD AREA WEAPONS DIVISION

FORT BLISS, TEXAS 79916

1-1ST BN, 44TH ARTY

1-5TH BN, 44TH ARTY

1-EA S&E SECTION, 4TH BN, 60TH ARTY

1-EA BATT, 1ST BN, 60TH ARTY

(25)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29

AVFA-AT-D (1 Aug 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW) (SP), 60th Artillery, Battery E, (HG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Arty for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)


DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350 25 AUG 1968

TO: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report and concurs with all recommendations with the following comments:

- a. Reference paragraph 1d (1)(b), page 10; Trucks, utility, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton are command controlled items and are only issued upon approval of USAICOV.
- b. Reference paragraph 2b (6)(c), page 22, Sustained Firepower for the M42A1. Concur. Recommend that this field expedient be evaluated by appropriate agency.
- c. Reference paragraph 2e (1)(c), page 24, Combat Loss Replacement for 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks. Unit recommendation is pending approval of CG, IFFORCEV Arty.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GERALD G. GOULD
LTC, Artillery
Adjutant

26

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

30


AVFA-GC-OT (1 Aug 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery,
Battery E, (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th
Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 29 AUG 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding in-
dorsements and concurs making the following comment. Reference para-
graph 2e(1)(c) page 24, Command and Control Items List: Unit's recom-
mendation that 2 1/2 ton trucks, prime movers for M-55 Quad .50 Cal MG
be placed on the list of command and control items by 1st Logistical
Command is being considered by this headquarters. Recommendations for
control of this item will be made to Headquarters, USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ROBERT C. GABBARD
1LT, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
CG, I FFORCEV Arty

CONFIDENTIAL

31

AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)

MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Arty,
Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th
Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS 65. (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

5 SEP 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968, from Headquarters, 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, with attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery, and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery, and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
ILT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ I FFV
HQ 6/40 Arty

32

GPOP-DT (1 Aug 68) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Bn (AW)(SP), 60th Arty, Btry E (MG), 41st Arty and Btry B (SLT), 29th Arty for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 SEP 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.I. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG




33

READY RACK FOR M-42 (DUSTERS)

1. This ready rack is designed primarily to aid the cannoneer in loading. It also enables the track to safely carry an additional six clips of ammunition. To design one that would hold more clips would hinder the use of the hand operating lever.

2. The rack is supported in the rear by hooks that hook over the edge of the turret. The front of the rack rests on the cartridge deflector brackets until the guns reach an elevation of 15 degrees. The rack is then supported by a leg built of 1" and 3/4" pipe. The 3/4" pipe slides inside the 1" pipe and a metal stop is welded on the 3/4" pipe in order to support the front of the rack after the guns are raised above 15 degrees. A bracket must also be welded to the floor of the turret to keep the leg from sliding. The bottom, sides and forward ends can be constructed from 1" by 4" or 1" by 6" lumber. Three .30 caliber ammunition boxes with the tops removed can be cut in half and fastened to the rear portion of the rack against the turret to hold the 6 clips of 40mm ammunition in position.

3. Due to the limited allowance in elevation (55°), the ready rack is designed primarily for ground targets.



Designed By Donald W. Schauda

(2)

37

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		Confidential	
		2b. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 4th Bn (AW)(SP), 60th Arty (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
1 August 1968		32	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.		683201	
c. N/A		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

39

The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____

** FOR OT RD # _____

***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

40

- - FOLD - -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

STAPLE

DA Label 18, 1 APR 59

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE.

- - FOLD - -

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.