Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces
Abstract
During the reporting period Viet Cong forces did not initiate large scale assaults against any Special Forces camps, but numerous probes were launched against Forward Operating Bases. Rapid reaction by flareships, FAC, and airstrikes were decisive factors in our favor in most cases. The Viet Cong have shown great reluctance to become decisively engaged. Heavy losses have been inflicted on Viet Cong logistical bases. Tons of rice, medical supplies, arms and ammunition have been captured and destroyed during the last ninety days. These losses, coupled with the flexible reaction capability of airmobile US forces, have prevented the Viet Cong from massing large units. CIDG forces are cooperating with FWMAF forces in I, II, and III Corps. They provide blocking forces, screen the flanks of FWMAF units, and obtain intelligence through the technique of saturation patrolling. The platoon size patrol has proven to be the most effective size unit for medium and long range operations in search of the Viet Cong.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 10, 1966
- Accession Number
- AD0393836
Entities
Organizations
- Adjutant General's Corps