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Code 9: DTIC Classified Users Only. Controlling DoD Organization: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20330. 1 Jun 1967.

AUTHORITY

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

① 14 Feb 67 ② 45 p.

① RUC

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (23 May 67) FOR OT

1 June 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ - Lessons Learned, <sup>Headquarters</sup> II Field Force  
Vietnam Artillery (U) <sup>4</sup> <sup>5</sup>

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⑨ Operational rpt for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

① 8 OACSFOR

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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
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S-332...

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96266**

14 FEB 1967



**OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
QUARTERLY FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)**

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S-332-67

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Section I - Significant Organization Activities.

A. (FOUO) Administration/Personnel.

1. Strength.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery is organized under TOE 6-501E with an authorized and assigned strength as of 31 January as follows:

<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
34	2	159	38	2	174*

\* The indicated overstrength is due to transient personnel during a rotational period.

2. Gains and Losses.

<u>GAINS</u>			<u>LOSSES</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
7	0	27	5	0	28

3. Casualties during the period include:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in action	0
Died of battle wounds	0
Wounded in action	0
Missing in action	0
Non-battle deaths	0
Non-battle casualties	0

4. Personnel Management.

HQ, II FFORCEV Artillery S1 Section continued to perform administrative functions for the headquarters and to monitor personnel

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actions for the headquarters battery. The 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery was placed under the operational command of this headquarters. This action slightly increased the administrative duties of the section. Initial orientation and assistance was given to the battalion in the areas of publications, R&R, awards and decorations, special services and other activities. Casualty reports and efficiency ratings from the battalion are now channeled through this section.

### 5. Rest and Recuperation Program.

The following out of country R&R trips were taken by members of this headquarters:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Bangkok	2	4	10
Hong Kong	1	2	2
Tokyo	1	2	0
Taipei	1	0	0
Penang	0	2	0
Hawaii	1	2	5

This headquarters' R&R program operates within the allocations given to II FFORCEV.

### 6. Morale.

The morale of the organization continues to be outstanding.

### 7. Awards and Decorations.

The following awards and decorations were presented during the period.

Bronze Star Medal	3
Air Medal	1
Army Commendation Medal	3
Good Conduct Medal	4

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### 8. Discipline, Law and Order.

The following judicial and non-judicial actions were conducted during this reporting period:

Article 15	2
Summary Court-Martial	0
Special Court-Martial	2
General Court-Martial	0

### 9. Safety.

The battery sustained three vehicle accidents during this period, all of which were minor.

### 10. Civil Affairs.

During this reporting period the Staff Chemical Officer continued to perform additional duties as the S5. The unit civic action program continued, with additional food and clothing distributed to the school and orphanage at the nearby hamlet of HONAI VAN COI. Recently, the headquarters, in conjunction with attached units, began sponsoring classes in spoken English in the hamlet. All units furnished instructors conducting one hour classes in the hamlet daily. Many of these classes, which have met with considerable enthusiasm from the citizens of HONAI VAN COI, have been given thus far and are attended daily by approximately 250 Vietnamese. The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), initiated by this headquarters in September 1966, continued during this reporting period. The program consists of twice-weekly visits to HONAI VAN COI by medically qualified personnel to provide necessary medical care to Vietnamese civilians. A total of eighteen visits have been conducted and an average of 150 patients are treated at each visit. Both groups under operational command of this headquarters have established and support an energetic program basically in the area of MEDCAP, furnishing material for self-help programs, community relations, English-Vietnamese and Vietnamese-English language classes and supporting schools and orphanages in their areas. In addition the 23d Artillery Group has an active program in the construction of a refugee village.

### 11. Public Information Program.

Public information activities continue under the direction of the S1 Section. During this period several articles submitted by this headquarters appeared in various civilian and military periodicals

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published in Vietnam. Additionally, the Cannoneer, a newspaper published at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, published several articles concerning the activities of II FFORCEV Artillery.

## 12. Change of Command.

Brigadier General W. D. Crittenberger, Jr., who had been transferred to the American Embassy in SAIGON for a special assignment, returned to II FFORCEV Artillery and assumed command on 10 January. Colonel George R. Allin, Jr., who commanded since 7 September 1966, became the Deputy Commander.

### B. (S) Operations/Intelligence.

#### 1. (C) General.

Operations and intelligence activities of the headquarters during this period included many of the same projects reported in the previous Operational Report as well as initiation of several new projects. The plan for stationing of II FFORCEV Artillery units was revised in light of changes in the troop program and the tactical situation. Refinements were made in the headquarters' aerial visual reconnaissance program. Assistance to ARVN in artillery employment continued to command much of the headquarters' attention.

#### 2. (S) Plan for Stationing of Artillery Units.

a. During this reporting period the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) became operational, with its base camp located at LONG BINH. The 9th Infantry Division established base camps at BEAR CAT, and at DONG TAM in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. A major US maneuver unit was stationed at DAU TIENG for the first time when the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division displaced to that location from BEAR CAT. As additional maneuver units arrived, and new artillery units came to II FFORCEV Artillery, the stationing plan of II FFORCEV Artillery was revised. The current plan is at Inclosure 1. Range capabilities of 175mm units disposed in accordance with the stationing plan are shown at Inclosure 2. Unit locations referred to are depicted on the map at Inclosure 2.

b. During this reporting period four additional artillery battalions became operational under II FFORCEV Artillery.

(1) After completing staging at PHU LOI, the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (7/9th Arty) (105mm F) moved to a base camp at BEAR CAT, closing and becoming operational on 13 November. One or more of its firing batteries have been on operational missions out of

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base camp ever since that date. The battalion was assigned to the 54th Artillery Group.

(2) All personnel of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (1/83d Arty) (8" SP) arrived in country by 1 November; however, the battalion's equipment did not arrive until 1 December. During November the personnel were located in a staging area at LONG BINH, although a portion of the battalion moved to NUI DAT, near BA RIA, on 22 November to prepare a base camp. Shortly after the equipment was unloaded, half of the 8" howitzers were converted to 175mm guns, forming a composite 8"/175mm battalion. The battalion, which was assigned to the 54th Artillery Group, became operational on 12-16 December at three locations, with the headquarters and one firing battery at NUI DAT, one firing battery at BEAR CAT and one firing battery at XUAN LOC.

(3) The advance party of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (2/11th Arty) (155mm T) arrived by air on 30 November, while the main body arrived at VUNG TAU by ship on 15 December. The battalion was staged at PHU LOI, becoming operational on 27 December under the 23d Artillery Group. One firing battery relocated on that date to GO DAU HA. On 2 January one firing battery moved to a base camp at DAU TIENG.

(4) The 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self-propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) (5/2d Arty), originally programmed for deployment in II CTZ, was diverted to II FFORCEV by COMUSMACV in SECRET message MACJ322, DTG 181425Z Nov 66, subject: 5th AW Bn (SP), 2d Arty (Reinf) (U). The unit's advance party, having arrived at QUI NHON in the II Corps Zone on 16 November, flew to BIEN HOA on 22 November. Unit equipment and personnel were diverted at sea to III CTZ and the main body arrived by ship at VUNG TAU on 27 November. The 54th Artillery Group sponsored the 5/2d Arty. The battalion became operational on 27 December under the operational command of II FFORCEV Artillery. Paragraph 3 below contains a discussion of the employment of the primary weapons of the 5/2d Arty.

c. Concerning the plan for future stationing of II FFORCEV Artillery units, Inclosure 1, the following points should be noted:

(1) A plan for stationing heavy artillery at BEN LUC was discussed in Section I, paragraph B2h of the previous Operational Report. Work on a position at BEN LUC has been delayed because of other commitments of engineer resources in III CTZ. It is hoped that the position at BEN LUC will be prepared for occupation in April. If so, it will be occupied temporarily by a battery from another location until more heavy artillery arrives.

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(2) Due to continuing operations of the 1st Infantry Division near QUAN LOI, in the extreme northern portion of III CTZ, a decision was made to station a heavy battery at that location to extend artillery coverage. Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SP) will displace to QUAN LOI in February.

(3) In order to extend artillery coverage into War Zone C, Btry B, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP) will move from LAI KHE in February to SUOI DA Special Forces Camp, 16 kilometers northeast of TAY NINH. The coverage from SUOI DA will still include the important MICHELIN Plantation area.

(4) The planned arrival of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (7/8th Arty) (8" SP) in June 1967 will permit extension of heavy artillery coverage in several directions. It is planned to convert the firing batteries of this battalion to three composite 8"/175mm batteries. In conjunction with restationing of current heavy batteries, new coverage will be provided at HAM TAN in the eastern portion of III CTZ, at DONG TAN, a brigade base camp of the 9th Infantry Division near MY THO in IV CTZ, and at BEN LUC.

### 3. (C) Air Defense Weapons in a Ground Support Role.

During this reporting period the 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self-propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) (5/2d Arty) began operations in III CTZ. The battalion is organized under TOE 44-85F. Upon activation at Fort Bliss, Texas, the battalion was reinforced by the attachment of Battery D, 71st Artillery, an M55 caliber .50 machine gun battery organized under TOE 44-85T. After arriving in RVN the 24 machine gun squads of the machine gun battery were attached to the four firing batteries of the 5/2d Arty; two sections each to Batteries A and B and one section each to Batteries C and D. Upon becoming operational, operational control of one firing battery was passed to the 1st Division and one to the 25th Division; later all four batteries participated in Operation CEDAR FALLS. Thus far the M42 twin 40mm and M55 caliber .50 machine gun sections have been employed both as maneuver elements and as fire support elements. Both weapons have been used extensively for convoy escort and security. The quad .50 has proved to be particularly effective in providing close-in defense of installations such as field CP's, artillery fire support bases and forward supply complexes. In numerous cases the quad .50 machine gun has been dismounted from its 2½ ton truck mount and helilifted into forward areas to provide additional support to front line infantry units. The mobility of the twin 40mm has been exploited by employing the weapon in missions such as road clearing and securing and using it to support mobile maneuver elements such as mechanized infantry and armored cavalry. Some

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commanders have used the weapon in the indirect fire role by integrating it into counter mortar programs and harassing and interdicting programs. Employment techniques will no doubt stabilize after these various techniques have been studied and analyzed. Several such studies are now being conducted. The conclusions should become available in the very near future. At this point, indications are that the 5/2d Arty can best be utilized in the ground support role by maintaining the firing batteries under operational control of or attached to the headquarters of the major maneuver elements.

4. (S) Aircraft for Artillery Units.

a. As pointed out in Section I, paragraph B3 and Section II, Part 2, paragraph B of the Operational Report for the period ending 31 October 1966, the need for aircraft to support artillery operations is urgent. During this period, there was little relief in this problem area; as a matter of fact the requirement became even greater due to the arrival of additional artillery units.

b. The 54th Artillery Group now has three operational battalions (1/23d Arty, 2/35th Arty and 7/9th Arty). Experience in Vietnam has shown that three O-1 type aircraft per group headquarters and two O-1's per artillery battalion are required to provide adequate aerial observation. This group and its battalions have no organic aircraft. The only observation aircraft support available is aircraft furnished from II BFORCIV Fixed Wing Companies on a mission basis. This group is short of the level of three O-1 aircraft per day, far short of the three O-1 aircraft required for a group with three battalions in Vietnam.

c. The 23d Artillery Group has nine O-1 aircraft, but requirements for these assets became greater when the group's fourth battalion (2/11th Arty) became operational without organic aircraft.

d. In addition to the two groups, two other units (HNB, 8th TAB/25th Arty and 5/2d Arty) are operational without aircraft. These units do not require observation aircraft, but cannot perform their missions properly in Vietnam without helicopter support.

e. The 23d Artillery Group has five OH-13 helicopters, with an average availability of three per day. This group is required by this headquarters to furnish one OH-13 daily, on a mission basis, to the 54th Artillery Group, leaving only two helicopters to perform the myriad command, control, reconnaissance, courier and logistical support functions of a group headquarters and four battalions.

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f. II FFORCEV normally furnishes two UH-1 helicopters each day on a mission basis to II FFORCEV Artillery. These two helicopters must be used to support a group headquarters with three artillery battalions, an automatic weapons battalion and the headquarters of a target acquisition battalion. This support is obviously inadequate, and results in a serious deterioration of the commanders' ability to influence the actions of the widespread units for which they are responsible as well as inadequate reconnaissance, delays in survey operations and unavoidable administrative and logistical problems.

g. This problem of adequate aviation support has been cited in all previous Operational Reports submitted by this headquarters; until adequate aircraft are provided fully effective artillery operations cannot be achieved. As stated previously, these requirements are as follows:

- (1) Force Artillery Headquarters (also supports separate battalions and batteries): Four UH-1's, three O-1's.
- (2) Group Headquarters: Three O-1's, two OH-13's and one U-6.
- (3) Artillery Battalion: Two O-1's and one OH-13 for each battalion.

5. (C) Visual Aerial Reconnaissance (VR).

a. Visual aerial reconnaissance continued to be the best method of gathering intelligence and locating targets of opportunity in Vietnam. Although the potential effectiveness of VR was not fully realized due to a critical shortage of aircraft, the II FFORCEV Artillery VR Program did obtain highly important results.

b. Under the II FFORCEV Visual Reconnaissance Program, II FFORCEV Artillery is assigned VR responsibility of areas within range of heavy artillery but outside the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) of US units. This assignment of VR missions gives II FFORCEV Artillery responsibility for some 13,000 square kilometers in III CFZ, compared to an average of 1,600 square kilometers for a division.

c. In executing the VR program, artillery groups are assigned VR responsibility for specific areas based on the base camp positions of their artillery and their aircraft assets. Groups further sub-divide their areas down to battalions.

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d. To the extent possible, the same air observer flies the same area day after day. This has the obvious advantage of allowing the observer to become completely familiar with a specific area, and increases his ability to detect changes in movement patterns. Observers are briefed and debriefed for each mission. Areas where other intelligence sources indicate potential enemy activity are designated for particular attention. Spot reports on important sightings are made through intelligence channels and a complete VR report of all sightings for a 24-hour period is forwarded through intelligence channels to reach II FFORCEV G2 Air daily.

e. In December, which was the first month in which II FFORCEV Artillery had two groups and seven artillery battalions operational, a total of 616 intelligence sightings were reported by artillery observers and 192 of these were attacked with artillery as targets of opportunity.

## 6. (S) Requirements for Additional Countermortar Radar Sets.

a. In Section I, paragraph B4 of the previous Operational Report, the effective use of mortars by the VC and the limitation on effectiveness of the AN/MPQ-4A due to its narrow sector of scan were cited. Information was also furnished on a plan to provide adequate countermortar radar coverage by utilizing three sets at each critical location such as airfields, base camps and logistical complexes. Thirty-seven countermortar radar detachments were required to implement this program, and this requirement was included in the USARV Troop Program.

b. In November 1966, due to an action imposing a troop ceiling for Vietnam, the Department of the Army deleted these detachments from the Troop Program. They can be reinstated in the program only if spaces can be obtained by deleting other requirements.

c. A recent study has been made of mortar attacks on base camps where the AN/MPQ-4A was operational. In a total of 13 such attacks, the mortar positions were located and effective suppressive fire delivered in 8 instances. In the other 5 attacks, either the attack ended before the set was properly vectored, or a decision was made to fire a preplanned artillery countermortar program which completely saturated the radar scope, preventing further search.

d. The need for the countermortar radar detachments which were formerly in the Troop Program still exists. It does not appear proper to recommend the trade-off of essential artillery battalions to provide the spaces for these detachments. If the current review of the overall force structure should develop additional spaces, a high priority should be given to reinstating the required 37 countermortar radar detachments into the Troop Program. A total of 333 personnel are required for these detachments.

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### 7. (C) Assistance to ARVN.

Since becoming operational in RVN almost a year ago, this headquarters has maintained a continuing program designed to assist the Army of Vietnam in improving the employment of its artillery. During this reporting period several projects have been completed in furtherance of this program:

a. One of the more successful projects has been coordinating the use of artillery fire to support isolated outposts normally manned by Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) personnel. Assistance was provided by this headquarters at a number of outposts during this reporting period:

(1) Officers from this headquarters conducted classes on observed fire procedures for 42 RF/PF personnel representing various outposts in LONG KHANH during the period 4-6 December.

(2) From 8-12 January representatives of this headquarters provided instruction to RF/PF personnel manning outposts in three separate sub-sectors of LONG AN Province.

(3) Eventually this instruction will be offered throughout the sub-sectors in each of the provinces in III CTZ and will measurably increase the effectiveness of these outposts.

b. Section I, paragraph 5b(3) of the last Operational Report discussed II FFORCEV Artillery's assistance program in relation to the Capital Military District (CMD). The following additional assistance was provided the CMD during this period:

(1) Position area survey for most permanent ARVN artillery positions within the CMD was completed by US survey teams from the 23d Artillery Group. Survey control was also established at an alternate position for the countermortar radar located at TAN SON NHUT.

(2) At the request of the Senior Advisor, CMD, and the Provost Marshal, TAN SON NHUT Air Base, instruction was given in observed fire procedures to Air Police manning the watch towers at the Air Base.

(3) On six separate occasions units of II FFORCEV Artillery were deployed in the CMD to support ground operations and the defense of key installations.

c. This headquarters has consistently urged ARVN units to avail themselves of US artillery support. One of the most effective

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13 instances of such support occurred when a light and medium battery were deployed during the period 8 December - 12 January to support Operation DAN TAN 81 in the area of VO DAT and VO XU, providing security for a rice harvesting operation.

d. Paragraph 3a(3)(d) of the last report described the TDY assignment of an officer to CMD to act as an Artillery Advisor until such time as a permanent position could be authorized. During this reporting period, this headquarters continued to provide an officer in this capacity until 10 December when a permanent position was authorized and filled by USARV.

e. This headquarters continues to incorporate ARVN requests into its H&I program. As an example, during this period fire was delivered on the number of targets shown at the request of CMD and Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ):

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
CMD	14	62	83
RSSZ	198	109	161

f. Regular visits to ARVN Division and Corps headquarters were made by commanders and staff officers of this headquarters to keep abreast of employment of ARVN artillery, problems encountered and to offer assistance.

## Artillery Management and Interdiction (H&I) Program.

As a result of a study of VC activity in the areas where heavy artillery had been previously stationed confirmed the effectiveness of the H&I Program. When artillery was stationed in a new area, an analysis was made of VC activity, particularly trail use, new fortifications, radio intercepts, and aerial and aerial visual reconnaissance sightings. After the H&I program had been in position for a comparatively short time, VC activity within the range capability of the weapons decreased, and increased activity was observed just outside of maximum range.

In addition to providing evidence of the effectiveness of a well planned H&I program, these studies were used for other purposes. They were extremely useful in planning for the deployment of incoming artillery units. For immediate tactical use, when sufficient data was available to indicate considerable VC activity in a new area, artillery was temporarily displaced to positions where these new areas could be attacked with H&I fires.

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c. During this reporting period, the system of placing the major portion of the daily H&I Program on the areas of greatest VC activity was continued. While this method does not place fire on all areas of possible VC activity, it does exploit the full value of available intelligence by placing more fires on areas in which it is most probable the VC will be operating. 14

d. While it is often difficult to accurately assess the total casualties inflicted by H&I firing, there is little doubt of its overall effectiveness. Prisoners of War and personnel voluntarily returning to government control (Chieu Hoi's) frequently cite unexpected artillery fire and air strikes as what they fear most. The following two instances of casualties inflicted by H&I fires indicate how devastating such fires may be:

(1) On 7 January 1967, Capital Military District (CMD) requested that II FFORCEV Arty include a part of the PINEAPPLE Plantation, vicinity XS 6389, in our Harassing and Interdiction Program for that night. Nine suspect areas (bunkers, base camp, tunnel entrances) were selected and eighteen rounds of 175mm were fired by Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty. A VC who was captured 250900H Jan 67 vicinity XS 720048 revealed that 60 members of his company (4th Co, 6th Bn, 165 Regt) were killed on 7 Jan 67 vicinity XS 630908 by artillery fire.

(2) On 28 January 1967, the 3d Bn, 34th Arty conducted an H&I program vicinity XS 3447. On 5 February 1967, an ARVN element at DIANG TUONG reported that a wounded VC PW led ARVN elements to the bodies of 30 VC vicinity XS 343476. The PW stated that the VC were at a meeting in a hut on 28 January 1967 when artillery fell on them.

## 9. (C) Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.

II FFORCEV Artillery programs to increase the accuracy of artillery discussed in Section I, paragraph B7 of the previous Operational Report continued during this period. These programs continued to be concerned primarily with meteorology, survey and calibration.

### a. Artillery Ballistic Meteorology (Metro).

A comparative metro analysis among the base camps at CU CHI, TAY NINH, GO DAU HA and DAU TIENG was conducted during this period to determine the need for metro stations at all these locations. Data provided by the stations at CU CHI and TAY NINH proved to be incompatible; however, data provided at GO DAU HA and DAU TIENG were compatible. Therefore, it was decided to maintain stations at TAY

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NINH, DAU TIENG and-GU CHI.

## b. Calibration of Artillery Pieces.

During this reporting period 198 of 426 US and 24 of 136 ARVN artillery pieces were calibrated. The increased tempo of combat operations has created a need for more frequent calibration of artillery pieces.

## c. Survey.

During this reporting period considerable further progress has been made in the program of extending artillery control in the Corps area. The map at Inclosure 3 illustrates the survey control now established in III CTZ. Third-order control has been established at BEAR CAT, XUAN LOC, and LONG GIAO by the 66th Engr Co (Topo) (Corps). Third and fourth-order control has been established in PHUOC TUY Sector by 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF) at PHU MY, BA RIA, VUNG TAU, and DUC THANH and additional survey control points (SCP) have been established at intermediate points between these locations in the course of the traverses. Fourth-order control has been established by 8th TAB/25th Arty at PHUOC VINH, BINH THANH, BINH LONG, TAN AN, QUAN LOI, HON QUAN, HAM TAN, GO DAU HA, DAU TIENG, PEN KHO, VO DAT, TANH LINH, PHUONG LAM, DINH QUAN, TUC TRUNG, GIA RAY, TAN HIEP, TRAI BI, SUOI DA, BAO TRAI, BAO DON, LONG BINH and TRUNG LAP. Additional fourth-order control has been established at DI AN by the 1st Infantry Division Artillery and at TRUNG LAP by the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Survey control is now available at all base camps; thus, the first objective of placing all heavy artillery batteries on a common grid has been accomplished. US/PVMAF medium and light artillery positioned at any of the locations to which survey control has been extended may fire on the same grid. Survey control has been extended to the near vicinity of 14 medium and 34 light ARVN artillery platoons. A plan has been developed and coordinated whereby the ARVN artillery battalions will revitalize their fifth-order survey capability and tie their platoons into the grid. Extension of control to the near vicinity of four medium and 26 light ARVN artillery platoons should be accomplished by June 1967. A continuing goal is to saturate the corps zone with survey control points which would be readily available to units on operation.

## 10. (C) Application of Photogrammetry to Survey.

a. As stated in Section I, paragraph 9c above, there has been considerable progress in establishing artillery survey control to

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base camp position areas. The major survey problem areas remain a lack of control points both for position areas on operations and target area control. Obstacles to satisfying these requirements are the inadequacy of good starting control, lack of good ground observation, frequent displacements, and the necessity of utilizing large forces to provide security for survey operations. 16

b. The USARV Engineer has proposed a test be made of the feasibility of using the photogrammetric process to provide the necessary basic control. In essence, this process involves using recent reconnaissance photography, comparing it to the very accurate map photography of the same area, and selecting points which are identifiable both on the reconnaissance photos and on the ground for which coordinates can be furnished. The engineers believe they can furnish the coordinates to these points to approximately fourth-order accuracy, and not less than fifth-order accuracy. It is evident that if a large density of such points can be made available in a planned area of operations that the artillery survey problem can be greatly reduced. Using selected points near position areas, the position area survey can be completed by a short traverse. Other identifiable points can be used for registration points.

c. The test of this concept will be made in February 1967. Reconnaissance photography of a planned area of operation has been obtained, control points selected, and the engineers have furnished photogrammetrically computed coordinates of these points. Prior to the actual operation, the accuracy of some of these points will be verified by conventional survey methods, and registrations and transfers will be fired. If these preliminary tests prove successful, the entire concept will be fully tested on a major operation.

### 11. (C) Safeguarding Aircraft from Friendly Artillery Fires.

a. Section I, paragraph 9d of the previous Operational Report presented a discussion of a proposed II FFORCEV regulation concerning the protection of aircraft from friendly artillery fires. The proposed regulation was published on 18 November 1966 as II FFORCEV Regulation 385-2, subject: "Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires", a copy of which is attached at Inclosure 4. Basically, the regulation serves to replace the old air corridor system with a network of Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) which broadcast advisories on artillery fires to aircraft upon request. Change 1 to this regulation was published in December and clarifies certain responsibilities of the AWCC's. A copy of the change is also at Inclosure 4.

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b. Following an announcement by the Federal Aviation Agency in early January that there would be a large volume of aircraft flying daily in an air corridor between a control tower located in XUAN LOC and the BIEN HOA and TAN SON NHUT Air Bases, this headquarters conducted a study to determine whether additional measures were necessary to protect these aircraft from friendly artillery. As a result of the study, the following proposals were published on 30 January as Change 2 to II FFORCEV Regulation 385-2, (Inclosure 4):

(1) The BIEN HOA air corridor will be extended eastward to a distance of ten nautical miles. Artillery units firing into this corridor will clear with DONG HAI Sensitive Area AWCC which in turn will coordinate with Air Traffic Control at BIEN HOA Air Base.

(2) Additional air corridors with a width of four nautical miles will be established between XUAN LOC and the end of the BIEN HOA air corridor and between the end of the BIEN HOA air corridor and the boundary of the Capital Military District. All artillery fires in these corridors which reach an altitude of 7,000 feet or higher must be reported to Paris Control at TAN SON NHUT. Paris Control is charged with further coordination to insure a proper notification is broadcast.

12. (C) Deadline of Artillery Weapons.

The following chart depicts the average daily deadline rates for the various artillery weapons of II FFORCEV Artillery during this reporting period:

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
M107 (175mm SP)	6%	10%	7%
M109 (155mm SP)	18%	5%	4%
M110 (8" SP)	15%	9%	9%
M114A1 (155mm T)	--	3%	10%

a. The deadline rate for the M107 is considered to be within tolerable limits. During December several weapons were deadlined for short periods due to numerous traversing and elevating final drive failures.

b. The high deadline rate for the M109 howitzer in the month of November is attributed to one battery which returned to OPCON II FFORCEV Artillery after a 31 day attachment to a major maneuver unit.

# CONFIDENTIAL

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During those 51 days the battery fired over 12,000 rounds, moved over 300 miles and displaced 16 times in the last 17 days of its attachment.

c. The daily deadline rate for the M110 during this reporting period remained at about 1.1 weapons per day. During November II FFORCEV Artillery had eight weapons while in December and January sixteen weapons were considered. The higher rate in November is therefore attributable to a lower density.

d. The II FFORCEV Artillery's first 155mm towed battalion became operational on 27 December. Therefore the deadline rate for the M114A1 for that month represents only a four day period. The high deadline rate for January was caused by spindle and spindle plug failures, recoil seals and firing jacks. These weapons were issued to this battalion directly from depot after an extended period of storage. It is possible that this storage led to the high deadline rate. Repair parts for the M114A1 were rapidly obtained, however, and the deadline problem on the weapon proved to be only a temporary one.

## 13. (C) Communications.

a. The II FFORCEV Artillery Communications Section continued its mission of supplying units with required VHF, AM and FM communications. VHF continues to be the most important communications link between this and subordinate units as well as to ARVN headquarters located in III CTZ. This means of communication has proven to be the most dependable when instant communication is required. All communication is utilized for the transmission of most classified information between this headquarters and the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups. FM communication is used primarily as back-up since VHF has proven to be highly reliable.

b. Communications security and economy of communications resources were stressed during this period. To economize on communications resources, electrical transmissions were held to the minimum during the period and brevity of messages was stressed.

c. Direct maintenance support for the AN/GRC-46 radio equipment improved considerably during this reporting period. The deadline rate had been averaging between 30% and 35% weekly. Recently this deadline rate has shown a gradual improvement. As this reporting period closes, the deadline rate is approximately 15%, representing the lowest deadline rate achieved at this headquarters in the past eight months.

d. During this reporting period, approximately three thousand documents (SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and

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UNCLASSIFIED) were processed by this headquarters' Message Center. This represents an increase of 25% over the number of messages processed during the preceding three month period. The increase is attributed primarily to the addition of several new units to II FFORCEV Artillery and to the increased tempo of combat operations.

Section II, Part 1 - Observation/Lessons Learned.

### Meteorological Supplies

Item: Supply of spare parts and expendables for meteorological sections.

Discussion: The supply situation in the area of artillery meteorological equipment is now very good in the III Corps area. However, it has required the supply system from 60 to 90 days to catch up to the needs of the increasing number of meteorological sections deployed in the Corps Zone. In the interim period a slight shortage of both electronic repair parts and expendables was experienced. Items such as drive motors, scanner parts, relays and drive belts were most difficult to obtain.

Observation: Meteorological sections deploying to RVN should insure that the section's authorized stockage of spare parts is complete before departing CONUS. The authorized stockage is normally sufficient to carry the section through the 60-90 day period required by the supply system to catch up to the section's needs.

### FM Frequencies

Item: Availability of FM frequencies within the III Corps Tactical Zone.

Discussion: Almost all FM frequencies are issued on a shared basis within the III Corps Tactical Zone. This is due to the shortage of FM frequencies available to the US in this zone. As many as seven or eight units sometimes share the same frequency resulting in a great deal of interference. By thorough coordination it is often possible to reduce the problem by trading assigned frequencies with units operating outside transmitting range. Occasionally units can reduce interference by using alternate frequencies. In cases where sharing of frequencies cannot be avoided, strict radio discipline is essential.

Lesson Learned: By trading assigned frequencies and using assigned alternate frequencies, the sharing of FM frequencies by several units can be minimized. In cases where sharing of frequencies cannot be avoided, interference can be held within acceptable limits by practicing strict radio discipline.

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Section II, Part 2 - Recommendations.

A. (U) KY-8 Installation Kits.

Installation kits for the KY-8 scrambler device designed for use with the AN/VRC-12 radio have not been issued to this or subordinate artillery units. Requisitions have been submitted and validated but there are no installation kits in-country. The use of the KY-8 would greatly increase the speed with which targeting data could be processed since information up to and including SECRET could be transmitted utilizing FM communications.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the installation kits for the KY-8 scrambler device be made available to units in Vietnam as a matter of priority.

B. (S) Countermortar Radar Sets.

In Section I, paragraph 6, the need for 37 countermortar radar detachments was explained. These detachments were previously approved and included in the USAHV Troop Program, but have recently been deleted because of the troop ceiling imposed on military personnel in RVN. A total of 333 personnel are required for these detachments.

RECOMMENDATION:

That if the current review of the overall force structure should develop additional spaces, a high priority should be given to reinstating the required 37 countermortar radar detachments into the troop program.

C. (S) Aircraft for Artillery Units.

In Section I, paragraph 4, the critical need for additional aircraft for II FFORCEV Artillery was cited. The full potential of the artillery in III CTZ will not be realized until adequate aircraft support is provided.

RECOMMENDATION:

That, as a matter of high priority, all reasonable efforts be made to provide II FFORCEV Artillery with aircraft on the following basis:

- (1) Force Artillery Headquarters: Four UH-1's, three O-1's.

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(2) Group Headquarters: Three O-1's, two OH-13's and one U-6.

(3) Artillery Battalion: Two O-1's and one OH-13.

D. (U) Schooling of Newly - Commissioned Officers.

In Section II, Part 2, paragraph A of the last Operational Report it was recommended that all newly-commissioned officers, with the exception of OCS graduates, attend a basic field artillery course prior to assignment to field artillery units. This recommendation is reiterated and is considered more important in view of new field artillery techniques being devised in Vietnam. In addition to schooling in artillery procedures common to conventional warfare, it is important that techniques peculiar to counter guerrilla warfare be taught.

RECOMMENDATION:

That procedures unique to or habitually practiced in Vietnam be stressed in the Artillery Officers Basic Course. In particular, the method of employment of the 6400 mil firing chart and all attendant FDC/EB procedures should be presented as the usual situation in gunnery courses.

E. (U) 155mm Howitzer Firing Pedestals.

In Vietnam a 6400 mil capability must be maintained by the artillery at all times. Due to the weight of the 155mm towed howitzer, problems have sometimes been experienced in meeting timely support requirements. Most 155mm towed units have devised a firing pedestal which permits rapid shifting of the piece in any direction and hence makes easier the task of delivering timely fire. A firing pedestal device was depicted in the January 1967 issue of Artillery Trends. The use of the firing pedestal has increased the overall effectiveness of the 155mm towed units significantly.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a type firing pedestal for the 155mm howitzer be devised and issued to all 155mm howitzer battalions before deployment from COMUS to RVN. Units should be permitted sufficient time to train adequately on using the device.

F. (U) Maintenance of Distance Measuring Equipment MC-8.

The electronic Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) MC-8 is authorized for issue on the basis of six instruments per headquarters

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and headquarters battery of the division artilleries and the target acquisition battalion (TAB). Only minimum operator maintenance is authorized for these instruments. Instruments with serious deficiencies must be turned in for repair to direct support maintenance facilities. It has been found that in-country direct support and depot maintenance facilities do not have the capability to repair the more serious failures that may occur in this equipment. The alternative in the past has been evacuation out of country to Okinawa or CONUS, but the lost time involved has varied from three to eleven months until the equipment is returned. It has also been found that the tellurometer, a similar type of electronic DME issued to a TAB unit in lieu of four MC-8's, appears to be more rugged and less prone to serious failures.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

In order to solve this problem the following steps should be taken:

1. The direct support and depot maintenance facilities in country should be expanded to include the capability for repair of electronic DME in terms of trained personnel, adequate repair parts and test equipment.
2. A float should be established that would permit immediate exchange of defective instruments. In the interim, a rapid method of evacuation should be established directly to the factory or maintenance facility in CONUS that has the capability to repair these instruments in a timely manner.
3. Consideration should be given to replacement of the MC-8 with the tellurometer as a temporary solution.

**G. (U) Need for Heliotrope.**

The heliotrope is a mirror device used by topographic engineer companies with a third-order accuracy capability to observe angular measurements over long distances by reflecting brilliant flashes of sunlight from a distant station. The common experience of artillery fourth-order survey units in III CTZ to date has been to make observations in excess of fifteen kilometers, the limit of the optical power of their organic angle-measuring T2 Theodolites when sighting on a distant station marked by a tripod-supported colored panel. Artillery survey units are not authorized the heliotrope in their TOE. However, field expedient heliotropes have been fabricated from 9x7 inch shaving mirrors with great effectiveness. Angle measurements have been made over distances up to seventy kilometers by this means.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****RECOMMENDATION:**

The heliotrop<sup>y</sup> should be an item of issue to artillery survey units in Vietnam on the basis of three instruments per survey section.

H. (U) Surveying Towers.

In a great portion of III CTZ the terrain is flat and lines of sight are interrupted by dense tropical vegetation. Neither fourth-order artillery survey units nor the third-order topographic engineer company are authorized the Tower Erection Set, Topographic, a surveying tower one hundred three feet high which would considerably enhance their capability to extend survey control in delta and plain terrain.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Tower Erection Set, Topographic should be issued to artillery survey sections of division artillery and target acquisition battalion headquarters batteries and to the topographic engineer company on the basis of three towers per section.

I. (C) Limitations of the M42 Twin 40mm.

The terrain in III CTZ and the techniques of maneuver employed in Vietnam create a uniquely limiting environment for the utilization of the M42. Because of the heavy jungle canopy and undergrowth in many parts of III CTZ, not only the movement but the firing capability of the M42 is seriously impaired. Since the round employed is point detonating, it cannot be fired through foliage close to the gun without extreme crew safety hazard, and cannot have substantial effect on any target screened by foliage. When clear fields of fire are available, supported tactical commanders are sometimes reluctant to allow the M42 to fire because the convergent schemes of maneuver habitually practiced in Vietnam, coupled with the flat trajectory and long range of the M42, will often place friendly troops in the field of fire.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That a 40mm round be developed for the M42 which is capable of penetrating dense foliage. In the absence of development of such a round, serious consideration must be given to the limitations of the M42 prior to further deployment of the weapon in Vietnam.

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LOCATION	AS OF 1 NOV 66	AS OF 31 JAN 67	PLANNED AS OF 30 JUN 67 (Arrival month of incoming units in parentheses)
HEAR CAT	Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SP)	7/9th Arty (105mm T)	7/9th Arty (105mm T)
		Btry B, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	HQB, Svc, 1 FB, 7/8th Arty (8"/175mm SP) (Jun 67)
			1 FB, 3/16th Arty (155mm T) (Jun 67)
BEN LUC	NONE	NONE	1 FB, 7/8th Arty (8"/175mm SP) (Jun 67)
	NONE	Btry C, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)	HQB, Svc, 1 FB, 3/16th Arty (155mm T) (Jun 67)
CU CHI	HQB, Svc, 1 Plt, Btry C, 2/32d Arty (175mm SP)	HQB, Svc, Btry A, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	HQB, Svc, 2/32d Arty
	NONE	Btry B, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)	1 FB, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)

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LOCATION	AS OF 1 NOV 66	AS OF 31 JAN 67	PLANNED AS OF 30 JUN 67 (Arrival month of incoming units in parentheses)
DONG TAN	NONE	NONE	1 PB, 7/4th Arty (8"/175mm SP) (Jun 67)
GO DAU HA	NONE	Btry C, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)	1 PB, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)
			1 PB, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)
HAN TAN	NONE	NONE	1 PB, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SP)
LAI KHE	Btry B, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	Btry B, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	1 PB, 1/27th Arty (155mm SP) (Apr 67)
		Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SP) ( See Note )	
LONG BINH	Svc Btry, 6/27th Arty	Svc Btry, 6/27th Arty	Svc Btry, 6/27th Arty
	Svc Btry, 2/35th Arty	Svc Btry, 2/35th Arty	Svc Btry, 2/35th Arty
	HQB, 8/25th TAB	HQB, 8/25th TAB	HQB, 8/25th TAB
			1 PB, 3/16th Arty (155mm T) (Jun 67)

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LOCATION	AS OF 1 NOV 66	AS OF 31 JAN 67	PLANNED AS OF 30 JUN 67 (Arrival month of incoming units in parentheses)
NUI DAT	Btry A, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)	Btry A, 2/35th Arty (155mm SF)	1 FB, 2/35th Arty (155mm SF)
		HQB, Svc, Btry A, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SF)	HQB, Svc, 1 FB, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SF)
PHU LOI	HQB, 23d Arty Gp	HQB, 23d Arty Gp	HQB, 23d Arty Gp
	2/13th Arty (105mm T)	2/13th Arty (105mm T)	2/13th Arty (105mm T)
		HQB, Svc, Btry A, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)	HQB, Svc, 1 FB, 1/27th Arty (155mm SF) (Apr 67)
PHUOC VINH	HQB, Btry C, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SF)	HQB, Btry C, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SF)	HQB, 1 FB, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SF)
			1 FB, 1/27th Arty (155mm SF) (Apr 67)
QUAT LOI	NONE	NONE	1 FB, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SF)

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LOCATION	AS OF 1 NOV 66	AS OF 31 DEC 67	PLANNED TO BE 30 FEB 67 (Arrived with 1st of incoming units in parentheses)
SUOI DA	NONE	NONE	1 FB, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)
TAY NINH	Btry C (-), 2/32d Arty (175mm SP)	Btry C, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	1 FB, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP) HHB, Svc, 1 FB, 2/11th Arty (155mm T)
XUAN LOC	HHB, 54th Arty Gp	HHB, 54th Arty Gp	HHB, 54th Arty Gp
	Btry A, 2/32d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	Btry C, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SP)	1 FB, 1/83d Arty (8"/175mm SP)
	HHB, Btrys B & C, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)	HHB, Btry B, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)	HHB, 2 FBs, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)

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NOTE:

Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8"/175mm SP) is moving from BEAR CAT to QUAN LOI.

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*POSTED 4 FEB 67 APC*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96266

CHANGE 2  
REGULATION  
NUMBER 385-2

30 January 1967

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES

Regulation Number 385-2, this headquarters, dated 18 November 1960, is changed as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

5. PROCEDURES:

a. Artillery.

(5) (Added) To further protect aircraft in the BIEN HOA and TAN SON NHUT areas from friendly artillery fire, the following air corridor is hereby established:

Leg 1:

(a) Coordinates: The area bounded by XT880150, XT880110, YT100150, YT100110, YT200167, and YT200093.

(b) Restriction: DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC will coordinate all artillery fire within leg 1 of the air corridor with Air Traffic Control, BIEN HOA Air Base. Artillery units desiring to fire into, through, or out of leg 1 at any maximum ordinate will first obtain clearance to fire from the DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC.

Leg 2:

(a) Coordinates: The area bounded by YT200167, YT200093, YT460167, and YT460093.

(b) Restriction: Artillery fire is not restricted in leg 2 of the air corridor when the maximum ordinate of the trajectory

*Incl 4*

II FFA  
LOG NO. *S-347-67*  
Copy No. *2* of *30*

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is below seven thousand (7000) feet. All artillery fired into, through, or out of leg 2, with a maximum ordinate of seven thousand (7000) feet or above within the corridor will be reported to Paris Control TAN SON NHUT Air Base by the fastest means available prior to firing using the prescribed format in para 6k, below.

Leg 3:

(a) Coordinates: The area bounded on the southwest by the CMD boundary and on the northwest, northeast, and southeast by a line joining XT937045, YT108109, YT27709 and YT02702

(b) Restriction: Same as leg 2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL.

JAMES H. DYSON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff



VERNON R. RIDER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 6 - COMUSMACV
- 15 - CG, 7th Air Force
- 10 - CG, USARV
- 15 - CG, I FFORCEV
- 25 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 25 - CG, 9th Inf Div
- 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div
- 35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF
- 25 - CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp
- 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp

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Ch 2, Reg No 335-2, 11 FFORCEV APO (San Francisco, 96342), dtd 30 Jan 67 (cont)

- 15 - CO, 54th Artv Gp
- 15 - CO, 11th ACR
- 25 - DSA, III Corps
- 5 - SA, IV Corps
- 2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn
- 10 - CO, 615th Air Commando Wing
- 5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company

11 FFORCEV

- 1 - SGS
- 2 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 2 - G4
- 2 - G5
- 3 - AG
- 2 - Engr
- 2 - Sig
- 2 - Surg
- 4 - Avn Det (Prov)
- 10 - Arty

*ASSTD 22 Dec 66*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96266

CHANGE I  
REGULATION  
NUMBER 385-2

19 December 1966

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES

Regulation Number 385-2, this headquarters, dated 18 November 1966,  
is changed as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

5. PROCEDURES:

a. Artillery.

(4) (Added) Fires originating in an AWCC area of responsibility which pass through or impact in another AWCC area of responsibility will be broadcast by all Artillery Warning Control Centers concerned. It is the responsibility of the AWCC in whose area the fires originate to provide advisories to those Artillery Warning Control Centers affected so that they may include the information in their advisories to aircraft. Artillery information will be passed in accordance with the format shown in para 5a(1), above.

\* \* \* \* \*

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:

j. (Deleted)

\* \* \* \* \*


Inclosure 1, II FFORCEV Reg 385-2 (Change): Extend the western boundary of the XUAN LOC AWCC area of responsibility further west to a line between YT3209 and YS3276.

Change 1 Reg No 385-2, HQ, II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266,  
(Cont)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JAMES H. DYSON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

  
VERNON R. RIDER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 6 - COMUSMACV
- 15 - CG, 7th Air Force
- 10 - CG, USARV
- 15 - CG, I FFORCEV
- 25 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div
- 35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF
- 25 - CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp
- 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp
- 15 - CO, 54th Arty Gp
- 15 - CO, 11th ACR
- 25 - DSA, III Corps
- 5 - SA, IV Corps
- 2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn
- 10 - CO, 315th Air Commando Wing
- 5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company

II FFORCEV

- |         |                    |
|---------|--------------------|
| 1 - SGS | 2 - Engr           |
| 2 - G2  | 2 - Sig            |
| 6 - G3  | 2 - Surg           |
| 2 - G4  | 4 - Avn Det (Prov) |
| 2 - G5  | 30 - Arty          |
| 3 - AC  |                    |

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96266

REGULATION  
NUMBER 385-2\*

18 November 1966

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES

1. REFERENCE:

- a. Secret message, HQUSMACV, 03604, 040859Z Feb 66,  
subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Heavy Artillery Fires (U).
- b. Unclassified message, HQUSMACV, 43921, 020638Z Oct 66,  
subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire.

2. PURPOSE: This directive establishes procedures to be followed by elements of this command to minimize the hazard to aircraft from friendly artillery in III Corps Tactical Zone.

3. GENERAL:

- a. The objective of the procedures prescribed herein is to provide aviators with immediate, accurate information concerning all artillery firing which might endanger aircraft.
- b. For purposes of this directive, the term "Artillery" includes mortars.
- c. The procedures, frequencies and call signs prescribed by this directive are unclassified.

\* This regulation supersedes II FFORCEV Reg 385-2, 23 July 66.

4. CONCEPT: This directive establishes Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) which aircraft may contact for current information regarding artillery fires. The AWCC are located at frequently visited places in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) and maintain data on artillery firing of US, ARVN, and FWMAF units. Artillery units will notify the appropriate AWCC of any fires affecting that agency's area of responsibility using procedures prescribed by this directive.

5. PROCEDURES:

a. Artillery.

(1) Artillery information will be reported to the appropriate AWCC as soon as practicable. Artillery Warning Control Centers established by major subordinate units will serve as sources of US, ARVN, and FWMAF artillery information for specific areas of responsibility (Inclosure 1) and/or areas of operations (AO). Artillery units will report all artillery firings to the appropriate AWCC in the following format:

"CORSAIR CONTROL Artillery firing from vicinity (nearest town) on azimuth (azimuth of fire in degrees) maximum ordinate \_\_\_\_\_ feet. Range \_\_\_\_\_ (to nearest mile)."

The above information will not be passed in the clear to the AWCC in excess of fifteen minutes prior to actual firing.

(2) This procedure will permit the agencies to route aircraft, when necessary, around artillery fires occurring inside the agency's area of responsibility. When a pilot declares an emergency flight condition (i. e. "Med Evac", "May Day", etc.) and requests suspension of fires, the AWCC will direct suspension of those fires interfering with the flight.

(3) To better provide prompt artillery firing advisories and relieve radio traffic congestion at the primary AWCC, commanders, if they desire, may establish AWCC subcenters within the area of responsibility of the primary AWCC. The subcenters will broadcast advisories utilizing the call sign and frequency used by the primary AWCC. Subcenters will be further identified by the location in which they are established,

(4) ADDED. SEE CHANGE 1.

(5) ADDED. SEE <sup>34</sup> CHANGE 2.

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(i. e. Square Lobster, GO DAU HA).

b. Aviation.

(1) The Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) are established for use by aircraft to obtain information of artillery firings in the III CTZ affecting their flight plans. Aircraft operating in the vicinity of any one of the AWCC will contact it on the designated unclassified frequency for current artillery information in accordance with the format shown in paragraph 5a(1), above.

(2) The aviator entering an AWCC area of responsibility will request information of artillery firing and make known his intention to operate in the vicinity of a specific AWCC. Upon receiving the pilot's request, the AWCC will, if necessary, route the pilot around any artillery fires affecting his flight. Should the pilot declare an emergency flight condition, the ground station will, on request, take action to suspend those fires interfering with the flight.

(3) Capital Center will be provided with AWCC call signs and frequencies, and aviators may contact that agency for such information, if necessary.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The 1st US Infantry Division will establish Artillery Warning Control Centers at PHU LOI, PHUOC VINH, and LAI KHE. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for the 1st US Infantry Division's AWCC are set forth in Inclosure 1.

b. The 3d Brigade, 4th US Infantry Division, will establish an Artillery Warning Control Center at BEAR CAT. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within its area of responsibility. The area of responsibility, frequency, and call sign for the Brigade's AWCC is set forth in Inclosure 1.

c. The 25th US Infantry Division will establish Artillery Warning Control Centers at CU CHI and TAY NINH. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for the 25th US Infantry Division's AWCC are set forth in Inclosure 1.

d. The 1st Australian Task Force will establish an Artillery Warning Control Center in the vicinity of BA RIA. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within its area of responsibility. The area of responsibility, frequency, and call sign for the 1st Australian Task Force's AWCC is set forth in Inclosure 1.

e. The Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone, will establish Artillery Warning Control Centers at XUAN LOC, TAN AN, and BIEN HOA (DONG NAI Sensitive Area). The AWCC will establish communications with US, ARVN, and FWMAF artillery and will have information of artillery fires within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for XUAN LOC, TAN AN, and the DONG NAI Sensitive Area are set forth in Inclosure 1.

f. Artillery Warning Control Centers will furnish the following information and assistance to pilots upon request or when deemed necessary:

(1) Information concerning artillery fires in the AWCC's area of responsibility.

(2) Suspend fires interfering with any flight declared by the pilot as being flown under an emergency condition.

(3) Inform pilots of the establishment of AWCC subcenters in TAORs and/or AOs to include frequencies and call signs.

(4) In addition, DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC will provide artillery firing information to Air Traffic Control, BIEN HOA Air Force Base.

g. Each commander assigned an AO for a specific operation will designate an agency or element of his command to receive reports of artillery firings in the AO and provide notification to pilots utilizing the appropriate frequency and call sign of his primary area of artillery warning responsibility.

h. Incoming units assigned a TAOR or AO will establish an AWCC as soon as practicable to provide pertinent information as prescribed by this regulation. New AWCC, all changes in call signs and/or frequencies, and any other important information pertinent to AWCC will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: FSCE, by the most expeditious means. FSCE, this headquarters, will forward changes to 12th Avn Gp which will publish and forward NOTAMS to all aviation units in III CTZ as well as those agencies which have a "need to know" as determined by the Aviation Officer, II FFORCEV.

i. Subordinate commanders will thoroughly brief their pilots on the provisions set forth in this directive in order to minimize the hazard to aircraft from friendly artillery fires.

~~j. Commanders whose TAOR or AO contains landing fields for Air Force Aircraft will be equipped with UHF radios in addition to FM or will coordinate with the Tactical Air Control Party at such airfields to insure that artillery warnings are available to USAF aircraft.~~

DELETED  
SEE CHANGE:

k. An agency or element of each major unit headquarters will report to the Control and Reporting Center (CRC)(PARIS CONTROL) all preplanned 8" and 175mm fires of artillery units physically located in their TAORs or AOs. II FFORCEV Artillery will report those heavy artillery warnings connected with H&I programs scheduled by this headquarters. The report will include the effective times, locations of firing units, target locations, and maximum ordinates. All agencies will use the 1:250,000 UTM grid as a standard format when forwarding heavy artillery fire schedules to PARIS CONTROL. Sample format for reporting heavy artillery fires follows:

- "a. Effective 1600 to 1700 Local
- b. From XT1700 to XT1800
- c. Maximum ordinate 15,000 Feet"

FSCE this headquarters, will receive from subordinate units and transmit heavy artillery warning reports for all targets of an immediate nature when direct communications between the unit and PARIS CONTROL does not exist or are temporarily inoperative. Immediate warnings are those which result from the appearance of unexpected targets, and, as such, cannot be planned in advance. Warnings of this nature may not be transmitted in the clear more than 15 minutes prior to firing.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JAMES H. DYSON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff



VERNON R. RIDER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div

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- 35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF
- 25 - CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp
- 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp
- 15 - CO, 54th Arty Gp
- 15 - CO, 11th ACR
- 25 - DSA, III Corps
- 5 - SA, IV Corps
- 2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn
- 10 - CO, 315 Air Commando Wing
- 5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company

II FFORCEV

- 1 - SGS
- 2 - G2
- 6 - G3
- 2 - G4
- 2 - G5
- 3 - AG
- 2 - Engr
- 2 - Sig
- 2 - Surg
- 4 - Avn Det (Prov)
- 30 - Arty

II FORCEV  
S-332/1-67

RD

**SECRET**

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AVFBC-H (14 Feb 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 7 APR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending  
31 January 1967 submitted by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery is  
comprehensive, well prepared and contains valuable lessons; many of  
which are applicable throughout the theater.

2. This headquarters has thoroughly reviewed subject report and  
concurs with the comments and recommendations contained therein.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JAMES A. ULVENES  
Capt. AGC  
Asst. AG


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OVERLAP AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

MAP: VIETNAM, U.S. AIR OPERATIONS GRAPHIC (GROUND) 1:250,000, SHEETS NC 48-5, NC 48-6, NC 48-7 AND NC 48-8

NOTE: LINES ON OVERLAY DO NOT NECESSARILY SHOW MAXIMUM RANGE OF ARTILLERY WITHIN AMSG AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.