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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; Ago ltr 29 Apr 1980	

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683211

5 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 212th
Combat Support Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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
Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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1 Incl
as

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212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 212TH COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
"WINGS OF FREEDOM"
APO 96337

AVGM-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 July 1968, PCS CSFOR - 65 (RI)

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1. (C) Section 1: Operations: Significant Activities.

- a. There were no changes or additions to the mission of the 212th OSAB.
- b. There were no additions or deletions to the organizational chart during the quarter. An organization chart and station list of all units assigned to the battalion is at inclosure 1.
- c. Personnel changes of command and principal staff positions within the battalion for the reporting period are at inclosure 2.
- d. The 212th CSAB and its subordinate units' authorized and present for duty strength as of 31 July 1968 are at inclosure 3.
- e. The type aircraft which were authorized and on hand for the battalion and its subordinate units are at inclosure 4.
- f. The results of the quarter's operations by subordinate units in sorties flown, troops lifted, cargo transported, enemy KBA, sampans and structures destroyed, and aircraft lost or damaged are at inclosure 5.
- g. During this reporting period the 212th CSAB engaged in operations against the enemy on 92 consecutive days, flying a total of 33,081 sorties.
- h. There were no tactical nor administrative movements made during the quarter.
- i. Events of historical significance.

FOR OT RD
683211

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(1) The following attacks on friendly installations took place during the reporting period:

(a) On 20 May 1968 at 0125 hours the Marble Mountain Airfield received approximately 31 82mm mortar rounds. The U.S. Army area of MMAF received a total of four rounds. The attack lasted 10 minutes and resulted in light damage to one O-1. No casualties resulted from this attack.

(b) On 22 May 1968 at 0200 hours the Marble Mountain Airfield received approximately 20 82mm mortar rounds. The U.S. Army area of MMAF received only one 82mm round. The attack lasted approximately 10 minutes and resulted in moderated damage to one OV-1C and minor damage to one OV-1C. No casualties resulted.

(c) On 26 May 1968 at 0230 hours the Hue Phu Bai Airfield was attacked. Approximately 87 60mm mortars were received. Of those, approximately 11 60mm mortars were received within areas occupied by U.S. Army elements under this command. The attack lasted for approximately 30 minutes and resulted in the following damage.

(1) U-21 - Minor damage	(2) OV-1B - Heavy damage
(1) U-6A - Heavy damage	(1) OV-1C - Light damage
(3) OV-1A - Light damage	

There were no casualties as a result of this attack.

(d) On 27 June 1968 at 0119 hours the Marble Mountain Airfield received approximately eight 122mm rockets. The U.S. Army area of this command received two 122mm rockets. The attack lasted approximately 5 minutes and caused no damage to aircraft. Casualties were one KHA three WHA hospitalized and 21 personnel who received minor cuts, abrasions and etc.

(e) On 3 July 1968 at 2213 hours the Marble Mountain Airfield received approximately nine 122mm rockets. The U.S. Army area of MMAF received a total of two 122mm rockets. The attack lasted approximately 5 minutes and resulted in no aircraft damage or personnel casualties.

(f) On 23 July 1968 at 0230 hours the Quang Ngai Airfield received two 82mm mortar rounds in the U.S. Army area occupied by elements of this command. This attack resulted in light damage to two O-1 aircraft and produced negative friendly casualties.

(g) On 28 July 1968 at 2045 hours the Quang Ngai Airfield received eight mortar rounds which resulted in two O-1 aircraft receiving very light damage. The aircraft were still in flyable condition after the attack. No casualties resulted from this attack.

(2) The following are significant activities which occurred during flying missions:

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(a) The loss of 245th OV-1: At 1930 hours on 8 Jun 68, an OV-1C of the 245th Surveillance Airplane Company on a reconnaissance mission received an unknown number of hits of 50 caliber fire in the vicinity of YB 9692. The crew bailed out and the aircraft was destroyed. The crew was picked up at 0830 9 Jun 68.

(b) The loss of 131st OV-1: At 1000 hours 15 Jul 68 an OV-1A of the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company was on a visual reconnaissance mission when it received one hit of 37mm fire and subsequently crashed. The crew bailed out and was picked up. The aircraft was a total loss.

(c) 282nd assault in the Khe Sanh area: On 25 Jul 68 the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion, supported the 1st ARVN Division in operation Lam Sam 241. The mission of the 282nd AHC was to lift troops into landing zone XD 923500 where the troops were to be used as a blocking force for a sweep conducted by U. S. Marines. At 1430 hours the nine ships began the initial lift. The flight encountered heavy automatic weapons fire with several ships sustaining battle damage. The lead ship of the second element received 18 hits, then was flown to LZ Stud, where it was considered unsafe to fly. Out of 560 troops to be lifted the 282nd AHC transported 460; 200 to the landing zone and 260 to LZ Stud. The remaining troops were lifted by Marine CH-46's. The lift ships additionally performed 10 medical evacuations, one U.S. and nine ARVN. Five lift ships accumulated 33 hits. The results of the operation were: Two friendly KIA, 10 friendly WIA and nine enemy KBA.

(3) Significant administrative activities

(a) During the reporting period the 212th CSAB received its I.G. Inspection. Results of the inspection were satisfactory in all areas. The date of inspection was 10-15 June 1968.

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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel

(1) Timely Replacement of Personnel

(a) Observation: There is an inadequate time overlap between arriving and departing personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel arriving in-country, particularly maintenance personnel, are not sufficiently trained or experienced to perform the duties as required in this environment. In most cases the replacement arrives as the incumbent departs. All too often the replacement arrives after the departure of his predecessor. This situation causes great strain on the individual's ability to perform and the efficiency of the unit. This strain could be eliminated if the replacement and incumbent had more time together. This would result in the transfer of duties and responsibilities with greater efficiency and without adversely affecting the unit's mission.

(c) Recommendations: Replacement personnel should arrive at the time that the incumbent becomes a twenty day loss. This overlap would enable OJT to be conducted and the transfer of duties to be accomplished in a more satisfactory manner.

b. Operations

(1) Gunships Tactics

(a) Observation: A 50 caliber machine gun can be attacked while minimizing exposure to its anti-aircraft potential.

(b) Evaluation: Through experience in operating in the most northern province of I Corps, it has been found that NVA weapons emplacements are usually built with a north-south axis. This being the case, the most effective fire will be north and south of this position. Avoiding these areas the effectiveness of the position will be minimized.

(c) Recommendation: Attacks on an eastward or westward heading. Lead ship maintains between 1000' - 1200' absolute. Wingship is approximately 400 meters to the rear and 200 meters to one side at 800' - 1000' absolute. Both ships begin the attack together. The lead ship will have a steep angle of attack; the wingship will have a shallow angle of attack. Both ships fire on the target together. Both ships break together. The wingship places mini-gun fire on the target throughout the break.

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(2) Firefly Mission

(a) Observation: The firefly cannot be operated effectively with the illumination of a full moon.

(b) Evaluation: The firefly is composed of a light fire team and a light ship. The light ship operates from 800' - 1000' absolute. The gunship which controls and navigates for the mission maintains 1500' absolute. The attacking gunship operates from 300' - 600' absolute and is blacked out. With the illumination of a full moon, the low ship is placed at a great disadvantage. The advantage gained by being blacked out is lost by the moon silhouetting the low ship. The low ship can not afford to be detected at this low altitude.

(c) Recommendation: On nights when a full moon exists the light ship should be replaced by a flare ship and daylight tactics employed by the fire team.

c. Training(1) Sea Survival and Jungle Survival Training

(a) Observation: Air crews flying over areas peculiar in their environmental survival characteristics, in particular flights over open waters and jungle terrain, are often not afforded the benefit of school training. Even when approved, the training often falls midway in the aviator's tour resulting in a period wherein if the aviator were faced with a survival situation in these circumstances, his chances of successfully mastering the surrounding elements and emerging alive would be severely reduced.

(b) Evaluation: The initial transition to in-country flying is a time when the aviator is least familiar with associated rescue procedures, rescue equipment utilized by the rescuing agencies, and the area in which he is operating. Therefore this becomes one of his most vulnerable times. Noting the programs of our sister services, the Air Force and Navy, where the aviator receives this vital training before entering Vietnam, the necessary course of action becomes apparent.

(c) Recommendations: Pro-Vietnam training should be given the aviators reporting for assignment in-country, either in conjunction with schools established and operated by the Navy and Air Force or in an Army sponsored program of similar type.

(2) Observer Training

(a) Observation: There is a need for better trained observers.

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(b) Evaluation: Aerial observers in O-1 aircraft frequently are sent out to fly reconnaissance missions with little idea of what is expected of them. Not unusual is the G2 or S2 clerk who is picked at random and notified to report to the flight line for a mission a short time before departure. In this way the supported unit "meets their requirement" to the supporting aviation company. The use of a large number of observers regardless of qualifications, is likewise detrimental to the success of the mission. Employing a number of observers does not allow one or two observers to become intimately familiar with a particular area. As the quality of the observer decreases the burden upon the aviator increases and flight safety is endangered.

(c) Recommendation: Observers should be trained formally, scheduled well in advance, supplied with data on the area to be covered and limited in number so they can become fully qualified in a specific sector or sectors.

(4) More Experience for O-1 Aviators.

(a) Observations: There is a definite need for all aviators arriving in RVN and being assigned to O-1 units to have more experience with the O-1. All aviators are extremely weak on landing where a cross wind or gusting wind condition exists. The lack of pilot proficiency is further compounded by the O-1G which the pilot flies, it is normally operated at a well over gross weight condition and has an aft CG which tends to increase the probability of an incurred ground loop.

(b) Evaluation: A high incident of ground loops within this command has been directly attributed to the lack of aviator experience, especially concerning cross wind techniques. The implementation of the MWO incorporating the castoring gear, while reducing the number and severity of incurred ground loops, still does not supplant the desired aviator experience level.

(c) Recommendations: The USAARVNS should allocate additional time for training in the O-1. If this is not possible, more time should be allocated to the transition stage with additional emphasis placed on landings in cross wind and gusting wind conditions.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Pilot and Observer Debriefings

(a) Observation: In instances where the observer and pilot of the O-1 aircraft are from separate commands, there is often not a coordinated debriefing of both pilot and observer by the same facility.

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(b) Evaluation: The supported agencies are missing a source of vital information whenever the pilot is not included in a coordinated debriefing in conjunction with the observer. Usually the pilot represents more flying time and familiarity with the area of operation than the observer. He knows the intricacies of aerial observation and is therefore a supplement and an augmentation to the information provided by the observer.

(c) Recommendations: That the G-2 section of each supported unit furnish a person to debrief both pilot and observer immediately after each mission. Valuable information can be obtained from two sources instead of one, while it is still fresh in the minds of the personnel.

c. Logistics

(1) Generator Set C-26, Self Propelled.

(a) Observation: The TO&E auxiliary Power unit FSN 6115-99-5935 Generator 7.5, KW, 28 volt, DC does not provide ample power to ground check the OV-1 sensor equipment.

(b) Evaluation: The power requirements of the SLAR and IR systems in the OV-1 aircraft approach 7.5 KW. By taxing the APU to its maximum, the DC current becomes unsteady with a resultant "ripple" in the applied power. This "ripple" current surge causes the circuit breakers to trip. When using the TO&E APU, the only way to prevent the ripple surge is to leave the aircraft battery connected in the circuit to provide a reservoir guarding against surges. This however is an UNAPPROVED and UNAUTHORIZED procedure not utilized because of the possible damage to both battery and APU. A request for issue of a generator set with a minimum output of 10 KW was initiated but it was not available in the Army inventory. An ENSURE request is now pending to obtain adequate US Air Force generator sets, the C-26.

(c) Recommendation: Since the OV-1 sensor systems have to be checked prior to each flight, besides trouble shooting in the event of a malfunction or routine maintenance, all OV-1 units should be authorized by TO&E, generator sets from 10 KW to 30 KW with a pure ripple filter, 28.5 volt output, and a portable capability.

(2) T-53, L-7 Engines on the OV-1

(a) Observation: Unnecessary delays have been encountered in receiving the proper determination that is necessary to replace a T-53, L-7 engine on the OV-1 Mohawk.

(b) Evaluation: AR 750-23 requires General Support Commanders to perform diagnostic checks and validate the necessity for premature removal of certain installed aircraft engines which fail, or operate marginally, prior to completing their established time between overhaul (TBO). Lack of General Support facilities frequently results in excessive delays, or completely precludes obtaining required General Support validation. This problem appears to be caused by nonavailability of personnel at General Support Units, and the absence of any firm SOP implementing the provision of AR 750-23.

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(c) Recommendations: The responsible General Support Unit should provide the required team within twelve (12) hours. If a team cannot be provided, they should so annotate DA Form 2407, Maintenance Request and give the Direct Support Unit authority to validate removal. This would permit the Direct Support Unit to request a replacement engine utilizing an EDP priority and prevent excessive aircraft nonoperational time. Engine removals validated by the Direct Support Unit would be turned in to the appropriate DSU facility for forwarding to the General Support Unit. Upon receipt by the General Support Unit, the engine could be placed on an engine test stand for a determination as to serviceability. Engines tested serviceable would be repaired if within the capability of the General Support Unit, or forwarded to the appropriate overhaul facility.

(3) Radar Set AN/APN-22

(a) Observation: The radar set AN/APN-22 is a radar altimeter that measures absolute altitude above the terrain. Units utilizing this piece of equipment were experiencing excessive maintenance and operational difficulties with this equipment.

(b) Evaluation: After an analysis of the characteristics of the equipment and the associated operating procedures, it was found that the primary cause of difficulties was the operation of the set while on the ground, causing the frequency modulated signal to reflect excessively when taxiing on plain steel planking or aluminum planking, thus burning out elements of the receiver transmitter RT-160 APN-22 and electronic control amplifier AM-291/AP-22. The prior standard operation procedures involved the turning on of the set while airborne but failed to include the shut-down procedures until on the ground. By confining the accomplishment of both operations only while the aircraft is airborne, a significant increase in the operational life of the system and a reduction in the associated maintenance problems resulted.

(c) Recommendation: All OV-1 units be informed of this change in operational procedures.

(4) Kodak Plus - X Aerial Film Type 3041 FSN 6750-042-9863.

(a) Observation: The III Marine Amphibious Force suggested this unit test a thin base film, Kodak Plus - X Aerial Film Type 3041, in the KA-30 camera. This would nearly double the film capacity for large area coverages and offer a substitute in the event of inadequate supply of the regularly used film.

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(b) Evaluation: A thin based film, Kodak Plus - X Aerial Film Type 3041 FSN 6750-042-9863 nearly double the film capacity when used in the KA-30 camera cassettes which helped greatly when the unit was assigned areas to be photographed which required two rolls of regular base film. The film appeared to work well in the camera and no adjustment to the camera lens was necessary. The problem in employment of this film lies with processing. This film is processed in ES-38's employed by this unit. The ES-38 processing equipment is all automatic to include the drying of the film. When this thin based film is run through the processor at normal speed the film processing through the dry box isn't dried completely and becomes tacky. The film is wound on a roll and the emulsion sticks to the film base. When unwinding the film, bits and pieces of varying sizes are torn out of the emulsion. The likely alternate solution to this problem is to slow down the drying time. This doesn't succeed because slowing down the drying time will also slow down the processing time. This will cause the film to be over processed. The negative will be too dense or dark, because the entire process from developing time to drying time is regulated by one control. Raising the temperature in the box has not solved the problem of drying the film, there are even indications that this problem of tacky film emulsion is also influenced by the humidity in the air.

(c) Recommendation: That all OV-1 units be advised of these problems utilizing thin base film and they only use it if they have a means to use separate controls to separate the processing and drying times.

(5) OV-1 Signal Items

(a) Observations: Repair of recoverable items is a major problem area since most Mohawk peculiar items must be returned to CONUS for repair.

(b) Evaluation: The Signal Platoon has many outstanding work orders for recoverable items. All items were evacuated to CONUS. To requisition a like item Signal Supply uses the work order number for the item evacuated to CONUS. AMMC in Saigon will not honor the work order number until notified by the DSU that the item was evacuated. Excessive lapsed time has occurred on notification which causes a great deal of lag between turnin for repair and issue of a like item.

(c) Recommendation: 2nd Plt AVEL NORTH should initiate a more expeditious means of notification.

(6) Use of 1:100,000 maps for Visual/Racon, Photo and Infrared Missions.

(a) Observation: Pilots will fly two or more V/R, Photo and Infrared missions on one sortie. This means that for each mission flown the pilot carries map coverage of the area. Usually this means separate map coverage for each mission and normally there are two or more map sheets to be joined to cover a mission. The pilot is faced with bulky map sheets; however, the use of 1:100,000 map sheets will reduce the bulk considerably.

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(b) Evaluation: Many times pilots will cover a number of missions on one sortie. This requires a map for each mission and results in as many as four maps being carried on a sortie. This problem is compounded especially where two or more map sheets must be put together to cover a mission. The use of 1:100,000 maps will substantially reduce the number of map sheets which must be carried on a sortie. The 1:100,000 maps are a new and special series; each sheet replaces four 1:50,000 map sheets and it carries the same detail as the older 1:50,000 map sheets. This doesn't necessarily mean that the 1:100,000 map series replaces the 1:50,000 series. The 1:50,000 map sheets are still needed by interpreters to plot the coverage of photo and infrared missions.

(c) Recommendation: That all OV-1 units be made cognizant of the adequacy of this logistical substitution.

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

3. (U) Section III, Department of the Army Survey Information: None

5 Incl


1.-Organizational-Chart-----

2.-Personnel-Changes-----

3.-Present-for-Duty-Strength-----

4.-Aircraft-Status-----

5. Quarterly Statistics.


BERNARD W BRUNS

LTC, EN

Commanding

-----Withdrawn, HQ, DA

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AVGH-00 (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOL 65 (RI) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96337

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVLA-MH, APO 96384

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic report and concurs with the content except as noted below. Certain additional remarks have been added for clarity.
2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commanders's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
 - a. Page 4, para 2a Non-oc cur. A proper infusion program will spread rotational losses so that qualified personnel are available to properly supervise and train those replacements whose skills are marginal.
 - b. Page 4, para 2b. Although this practice may be peculiar to enemy units in the area indicated, this information is being disseminated to all assigned units.
 - c. Page 7, para 2e(1) The C-25 self propelled generator set was disapproved under the INSURE Program. Action has been initiated to provide an acceptable substitute for the present 7.5 KW Generator. (V-1 units cannot afford damage to vital equipment caused by improper field expedient procedures.
 - d. Page 7, para 2e(2) Local GSU procedures now authorize DS level units to determine the serviceability of installed aircraft engines. Engines may be removed and immediate requisition of replacement engine is authorized. The faulty engine is then evaluated at the DSU level to determine the maintenance level required for appropriate repairs. Unit has been notified.

William C. Tyrrell

WILLIAM C. TYRRELL
COLONEL, CE
Commanding

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AVBA-C (Undated) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOL-65 (R1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 SEP 13 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-CT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except as follows:

Paragraph 2a, page 4. Nonconcur. A twenty day overlap as recommended would result in an overstrength of approximately 1,000 personnel per day in the 1st Aviation Brigade.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2c(1), page 5. A primary objective of sending personnel to the Sea and Jungle Survival Schools is to provide trained personnel in each unit, thus giving the unit the capability of establishing a training program for air crew members who have not had the benefit of a formal survival school. UP paragraph 5c, 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 95-2, units down to company level are required to appoint an Escape and Evasion (E & E) Officer on orders. The E & E Officer's duties are to advise the Commander on training requirements and maintain an effective survival, escape and evasion training program. A request to Headquarters, USAFV to have all air crew members receive survival training prior to or enroute to assignments in RVN has been submitted by this headquarters.

b. Paragraph 2e(1), page 7. A generator of sufficient output to accomplish the mission has always been a problem area. This headquarters advised the 16th Combat Aviation Group that if the 7.5 KW generator is unsatisfactory for the company's needs, the company should submit an EIR in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4, TM 38-750. The ENSURE request referred to was forwarded to USARV on 29 August 1968 by the 1st Indorsement to 245th Surveillance Airplane Company letter dated 13 August 1968, subject: Adequate Generator Set for Use with the AN/TKQ-2. Recommend favorable action be taken on the ENSURE project to make available a suitable 10KW generator to this and similar units.

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ACVA-C (Undated) 2d Ind

SEP 13 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1966, PCS CSFOP-65 (R1)

c. Paragraph 2e(2), page 7. Most DS or GS companies supporting 1st Aviation Brigade units do not require the validation of a CS unit prior to removal and turn-in of an aircraft engine as specified by AR 750-23. Recommend specific guidance be published by USAFV, giving the DS company or DS detachment commander the authority to validate the necessity for premature removal. This Headquarters has no jurisdiction to implement changes to maintenance policies governing the operation of the DS companies.

3. (U) Report arrived at this headquarters with 5 inclosures as stated in the report and not with inclosures 2 and 3 withdrawn as indicated on the first indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J. D. SEGAL

RC, AGC

ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

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AVHGC-DST (Undated) 3d Ind (C) MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

30 SEP 1968

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning sea survival and jungle survival training, page 5, paragraph 2c(1); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur. This headquarters is preparing a recommendation to DA, ACSFOR that, as a minimum, all fixed wing aviators enroute to RVN complete a formal survival course.

b. Reference item concerning more experience for O-1 aviators, page 6, paragraph 2c(4): Concur. This problem was discussed with the Director of Instruction, USAAVNS, during his visit to RVN in July. In early 1968 initial entry fixed wing students began receiving an additional five hours in the O-1 during "D" phase of the fixed wing program.

c. Reference item concerning Generator Set C-26, self propelled, page 7, paragraph e(1). The problem discussed in this item is currently under review for submission of an ENSURE request. Based upon that review the type generator considered necessary to meet the requirement will be submitted under ENSURE procedures if a standard item is not determined to be suitable.

d. Reference item concerning T-53, L-7 engines on the OV-1, page 7, paragraph 2e(2); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Nonconcur. The controls imposed by AR 750-23 are necessary to preclude premature removal and replacement of engines. When specific exceptions are necessary to preclude excessive aircraft downtime, general support units may delegate their authority to direct support units which have qualified personnel assigned to determine necessity for engine removal. Blanket authority and the imposition of specific time limits

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AVHGC-DST (Undated) 3d Ind (C)

80 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

are not applicable. This information is being forwarded to all aircraft
maintenance units in this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. Arntz
W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 212th Avn Bn

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GPOP-DT (undtd) 4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 212th Cbt Spt Avn Bn for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C.A. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

212th CSAB Operational Statistics
QTR Ending 31 July 1968

Subordinate Units	Sorties Flown	Troops Lifted	Cargo Lifted (Tons)	Enemy KIA	Structures Dam	Structures Dest	Sampans Dam	Sampans Dest	*Aircraft Confirmed Loss	*Aircraft Damaged
21st RAC	4,024	0	0	137	815	1,144	68	46	2	7
131st SAC	1,195	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5
220th RAC	6,693	0	0	351	402	719	0	0	0	2
245th SAC	1,309	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
282nd AHC	13,141	24,408	176	399	8	82	12	207	0	18
Corps Avn Co (Prov)	6,719	15,493	66	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
HHC 212th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
212th CSAB	33,081	39,901	242	887	1,225	1,945	80	253	6	39

*21st RAC	Aircraft Lost: 2 O-1	Aircraft Damaged: 7 O-1
131st SAC	Aircraft Lost: 2 OV-1 1 U-6A	Aircraft Damaged: 5 OV-1
220th RAC	None	Aircraft Damaged: 2 O-1
245th SAC	Aircraft Lost: 1 OV-1	Aircraft Damaged: 3 OV-1
282nd AHC	None	Aircraft Damaged: 9 UH-1B
Corps Avn Co	None	Aircraft Damaged: 2 UH-1H
(Prov)		1 U-21
HHC 212th CSAB	None	Aircraft Damaged: 1 OH-6A

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UNCLASSIFIED

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
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		2b. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 212th Combat Support Aviation Bn (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion		
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13. ABSTRACT		

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1 NOV 65

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2) The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

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ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

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PAGE # _____

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** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

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