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AUTHORITY

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(1) 361

MACJ42-SU (8 Sep 66)

SUBJECT: After Action Report - 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Operation Fillmore (RCS:MACV J3-32)

TO: ACofS, J3

FROM: ACofS, J4

DATE: 21 OCT 66 CMT 2
MAJ Ferguson/rw/60396

AD 394022

1. The attached report has been reviewed and matters of interest to J4 have been noted.

⑥ Operation FILLMORE. Headquarters 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division [U] ⑤

2. Although no significant logistical problems developed during the operation, two items, dry cell batteries and grease, were reported as being difficult to obtain or as being in short supply (para 2a(2) & (3), Incl 4). There are no known or reported shortages of these items at the present time. No shortages of these items which would affect combat operations are anticipated.

⑨ Combat operations after action report.

3. The report contained a recommendation that medical evacuation helicopters be provided a reliable winch or hoist capability for extraction of casualties where landing zones are not available (para 16). Twenty litter devices, used in conjunction with the UH1D helicopter equipped with a hoist, are now being evaluated in-country by ACTIV. If proved satisfactory, this will provide a capability for extracting casualties where no landing zone is available.

⑪ 17 Aug 66

⑫ 26p.

4. The report also contained a statement that PE 75 generators should be replaced (para 3, Incl 6). PE 75 generators are being replaced as a part of the generator standardization program. The replacement generator is the 3 Kw 60 cycle mil std generator. None of these generators are in stock. Thirteen hundred are programmed in, however, no anticipated delivery date is available at this time. This quantity includes requirements for the replacement program, maintenance float and depot stock.

⑬ OACSFOR

5. These comments relative to reported logistical problems and equipment recommendations have been provided as a matter of information.

⑭ OT-RD-66X098

1 Incl

no
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

R. B. Lamb, Col
JOHN S. CLARK
COL, GS
Acting ACofS, J4

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ACSFOR - RD File

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DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-13)

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE

MACJ343

SUBJECT

After Action Report - 1st Brigade
101st Airborne Division

TO

MACPD *RP*

J4

In Turn

FROM

ACofS, J3

DATE

0 8 St

CMT 1

LTC Grezaffi/ejc/40882

1. The attached after action report is forwarded for action deemed appropriate. Your attention is invited to paragraph 16 of the report.

2. Request J4 return the attached report to J34 for file.

1 Incl
as



JOHN C.F. TILLSON III
Maj Gen, USA
ACofS, J3

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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

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DA FORM 2496
1 FEB 62

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE
ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 65 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

PPC-Japan

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RTV

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO SF 96347

AVBD-C: ✓

17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
(RCS: MACV 33-32)

THRU: ~~Commanding General~~
~~I Field Force Vietnam~~
~~US Forces 96240~~ 22

1932

TO: Commanding General USARV
~~US Military Assistance Command Vietnam~~
ATTN: ~~333~~ GS
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FILLMORE.
2. (U) Date of Operation: 25 March - 21 July 1966. The entire Brigade was involved in Phase I of the Operation covering the period 25 March through 8 April. Beginning 7 April, the Brigade (-) was withdrawn from the operation and TF 2/327 Infantry continued on Operation FILLMORE under the operational control of I MACOV. This report covers the period 25 March through 8 April 1966.
3. (U) Location: PRU XEM Province, Vietnam.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (C) Task Organization:

<u>1/327 Inf</u>	<u>Ede Troops</u>
Tn, 3d RRU	A 2/17 Cav
	A 325 Engr (-)
<u>2/327 Inf</u>	6th Sec, 2d Flt, B 29 Arty (SLT)
Demo Tn, A 326 Engr	Ede HHC (-)
	MF Flt (-)
<u>2/502 Inf</u>	Scty Flt
2 Demo Tns, A 326 Engr	20 Cml Det
Tn, 3d RRU	161 MI Det
	3 RRU (-)
<u>2/320 Arty</u>	LRRF
	HE-1, 245 Psy Ops Co
	Ede Avn Sec
B 1/30 Arty (CPCOM)	
<u>5/27 Arty (-)</u>	

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
(RCS: MICOV J3-32)

b. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general supporting fires during the operation.

c. B 1/30 Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

d. 6th Sec, 2d Plst, B 29 Arty (Searchlight) (OPCON): Provided effective on-call illumination from several locations during the operation.

e. 10th Army Avn Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lifts and combat service support lifts to maneuver and fire support units. OH-47 helicopters were provided on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

f. 7th Air Div, USAF: Flew 86 Tactical Air missions totalling 197 sorties. Of these missions, six were immediate strikes requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net. Average response time for immediate strikes was twenty minutes from the initial request until time over target. The total of the above missions accounted for 79 structures destroyed, 31 structures damaged and 11 secondary explosions. In all instances the Tactical Air Support rendered was responsive and accurately delivered.

g. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew one B-52 mission in support of the operation.

h. 496th Med Bde (Airmobile): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam directed that the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division secure and protect the rice harvest north and northwest of TUY HOA while continuing to locate, fix and destroy the remaining elements of the 95th NV. Regiment, 3d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment and local Viet Cong forces.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: The concept of the first phase of the operation was to have one battalion secure and protect the rice harvest, while two battalions conducted search and destroy operations in the area.

11. (C) Execution: Operation FILLMORE began without interruption, following the termination of Operation HARRISON. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area. The 1/327 Inf continued operations east of SONG HOA, while the 2/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf continued operations in the central TUY HOA rice area and in the mountains south of TUY HOA. On 26 March, one company from the 2/327 Inf and one battery from the 2/320 Arty conducted an airmobile assault over the mountains from the south. The 1/327 Inf moved by tactical motor march to TUY HOA South Airfield on 27 March and assumed a mission as the Brigade and I FFCRCEIV reserve. The 2/327 Inf continued saturation patrolling in the central rice area, and began exploitation of the B-52 strike in the southern mountains with one company (Company B, 2/327 Inf). The 2/502 Inf continued to operate in the mountains north of the B-52 strike, and remained prepared to assist in the exploitation. Company B, 2/327 Inf completed the exploitation operation on 30 March when it effected link-up with elements of the 2/502 Inf after having completely traversed the mountain range from south to north without enemy contact. The 2/502 Inf then began operations through the mountains south of TUY HOA with the aim of sweeping eastward to Highway 1. On 31 March, the 2/327 Inf moved north by tactical motor march on Highway 1

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17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
(RCS: LMGV J3-32)

to an operational area near TUY HO, north of TUY HOA, and began search and destroy operations. The 1/327 Inf began deployment from TUY HOA South Airfield to its next operational area near DONG TRE, with the air movement of one company by CV-2 aircraft during the night of 2 April. During the day, the 2/327 Inf moved by tactical motor march to an area north of TUY HO to commence patrolling and search and destroy operations to protect the rice harvest in that vicinity. The 2/502 Inf, after completing its sweep to Highway 1, conducted a tactical motor march to TUY HO. South Airfield where it assumed the mission of Brigade and I PARCEV reserve from the 1/327 Inf. A second company from the 1/327 Inf conducted a night air movement to DONG TRE by CV-2 aircraft on 3 April and immediately deployed to the south and east toward the mountainous plateau. On 4 April, the 2/327 Inf conducted an airmobile assault with one company, south of blocking positions occupied by elements of the 1/327 Inf and then swept toward the 1/327 Inf with no enemy contact. When one company from the 1/327 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company southeast of DONG TRE on 7 April, the remainder of the 1/327 Inf was committed to the scene of the engagement by helicopter assault in an attempt to encircle the Viet Cong force. The engagement lasted throughout the day until the Viet Cong force withdrew suffering heavy casualties. The Brigade, minus 2/327 Inf, deployed to FILL THIEP on 7 April and 8 April. On 9 April, the 2/327 Inf was detached from the Brigade and continued on Operation FILLMORE under the operational control of I PARCEV.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission to locate, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces in the TUY HOA area and was successful in protecting the rice harvest north of TUY HOA.

b. Losses inflicted on the enemy during Phase I of Operation FILLMORE included the following: 122 VC KIA (EO), 57 VC KIA (Est), 12 VC KIA (EO), 155 VCS, 15 VCC, 1 rallier, and 32 individual and crew served weapons captured. In addition, large amounts of supplies and equipment were captured or destroyed. (See Inclosure 2).

c. Friendly losses during the period included the following: 8 KIA, 69 MIA.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: In one battalion, each of the companies formed air-land teams. The air-land teams were composed of one company from the 1/327 Inf and one company from the 2/327 Inf. The air-land teams functioned well and executed air movements.

... Commander's Analysis:

A. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of slings and nets in helicopter resupply was effective and reduced the time the helicopter was required to spend on the ground.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
(RCS: MACV J3-32)

(2) Periodic spraying of the area with DDT, utilizing a modified M38A1C vehicle, was effective in suppressing insects.

b. Highlights of Operations:

(1) In an effort to obtain maximum effectiveness with Psychological Warfare, wounded NVN captives were given immediate medical attention. They were fed, given cigarettes and were well treated. Photographs were taken of the prisoners while they were receiving this treatment with the intention of distributing the photographs throughout the operational area and among the civilian populace. In addition, Psy-ecological Warfare tapes were developed using themes based on conversations and discussions with the captives. The photographs were never reproduced and still had not been delivered when the Brigade (-) departed TUY HO. The tapes were ineffective when finally broadcast because of the altitude of the broadcast aircraft and insufficient amplification. Psychological Warfare can be a powerful tool for the commander, but in order for its full potential to be realized, the Psy War detachment must be responsive to the Commander's requirements.

(2) In some areas units encountered extreme difficulty in extracting casualties because of a lack of suitable landing zones. Construction of landing zones was impractical in terrain where the jungle canopy frequently reached 100 feet or more in height. A solution, which met with success, was the use of USAF rescue helicopters which had a hoist capability. It was easier to locate or construct a gap in the jungle canopy, large enough to allow extraction with a hoist from a hovering helicopter, than it would have been to construct landing zones large enough to accommodate a UH-1B aircraft.

16. (U) Recommendations:

a. That medical evacuation helicopters be provided with a reliable winch or hoist capability to enable extraction of casualties from areas where landing zones are not available.

b. That the supporting Psychological Warfare Detachment be provided an increased capability in broadcasting and photograph reproduction equipment.

Willard Pearson
WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures:

- 1 - Personnel and Administration
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Operations Schematic
- 4 - Logistics
- 5 - Civic Action
- 6 - Communications
- 7 - Artillery

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AVBD-C 17 August 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
(RCS: MACV J3-32)

Distribution:

- 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
Washington DC 20310
- 1 - CG, USAREMAC (ATTN: GPOF-12)
- 1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J343)
- 1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
- 2 - CG, USARV
- 1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: MAC Historical Division)
- 2 - CG, I FPCOEV
- 2 - CG, 101st Abr Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
- 1 - CG
- 1 - J3
- 1 - J4
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- 1 - J6
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- 1 - J8
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- 1 - J10
- 1 - J11
- 1 - J12

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Inlosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

1. (C) Unit Strengths:

a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the start of Operation Fillmore were:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4490
Assigned	4805
Present for Duty	4293
Not Present for Duty	512
Airhead	3389
Base Camp	904

b. The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 89% of the augmented authorized strength.

c. Of the Not Present for Duty strength, 394 were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, ETS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in a hospitalized status, rifle company strengths were reduced during the period. Additional rifle company strength was obtained by the end of the operation by returning personnel assigned to provisional units to their parent units, reducing Base Camp strength to the minimum, and through receipt of replacement personnel.

The Brigade received 6 ARVN NCO interpreters during the period; 20 interpreters and 2 LNO's were also attached to the Brigade.

2. (C) Casualties:

Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
1/327th	2	25
2/327th	3	29
2/502d	2	11
2/320th		2
A/326th		2
NHC	1	
TOTAL	8	69

3. (U) Personnel Program: Various personnel programs were initiated during this operation.

a. Safety Program. "Stay Alert And Stay Alive" Messages were disseminated to all units summarizing each accident in the Brigade. The purpose of the program is to reduce loss of lives and materiel damage.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd)

caused by carelessness. Each message contains a "lesson learned". These messages are widely disseminated and are discussed at commanders conferences. Units involved with the accident are designated in the message. The messages are distributed in CWK format to gain attention.

b. Pay Program: A letter was published and disseminated on "Monthly Pay". The intent was to encourage the use of savings bonds and savings allotments by Brigade personnel. This program was intended not only to provide an added service to the troops (by saving the cost of money orders and speeding delivery of the funds) but also was designed to remove surplus funds from the forward area, thereby reducing the possibilities of loss, theft, etc. Commanders were requested to encourage all personnel to use this service. This program coincided with the Savings Bond Drive.

c. Personnel Services: To provide necessary personnel services to troops in the field, SI teams continued to periodically visit units - normally just after payday - to sell money orders, rectify pay discrepancies, provide legal assistance, and to keep personnel records current. Red Cross representatives also accompanied the SI teams to offer assistance in personal matters. In addition, a "Personnel Services Center" was established in the forward area on a permanent basis to provide services throughout the month.

d. Immediate Recognition for Valor: A program of citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat progressed during the period. Purpose of this program is to provide immediate recognition of valorous acts, thereby boosting morale and providing greater incentive. Copies of these orders are provided to individuals, placed in their official files, and serve as a check list on the subsequent submission of awards. The program was well received by the unit commanders.

4. (U) Personnel Planning. Planning was initiated during the period in the following areas:

a. Centralized administration of officers' and noncommissioned officers' messes at the Base Camp area under the supervision of the Deputy Installation Coordinator.

b. Establishment of a formalized program of activities to be conducted by the three newly arrived Red Cross girls. Program will include crafts and hobbies activities and visits to units for distribution of literature.

c. Comprehensive water safety program.

d. Compilation of a Command Statistics Book which indicates, by month, statistical data covering various areas of personnel interest such as savings program, IG complaints, criminal offenses, AWOLs, courts martial, reenlistments, malaria, etc.

e. Personal letters to be sent to the next of kin of all newly assigned personnel within the first seven days of arrival. These letters will be signed by the commanding general and include a picture of each man.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd).

f. Personal letters from the commanding general to be sent to personnel of the command wounded in action.

5. (U) Problem Areas. Problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Recommendations for awards of the Purple Heart submitted as long ago as October 1965 have not been acted upon. Awards files have been screened and the necessary data provided to USARV. To overcome this difficulty in the future, the Brigade requested and obtained authority to award the Purple Heart.

b. Receipt of orders on personnel evacuated through medical channels are seldom received promptly. As a result, personnel continued to be maintained on Brigade rosters after departure from Vietnam. USARV apprised of problem and it is under review.

c. (U) Morale. Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

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17 August 1966

Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation FILLMORE.

1. (C) Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations consisted of heavily jungled mountains in the west around DONG TRE, and flat paddy land and sandy beaches along the coast. Numerous LZ's were available throughout the area. Observation and fields of fire were generally limited or non-existent in the mountainous jungle, but ranged from fair to good throughout the remainder of the area. Cover and concealment varied from good to excellent in the mountains, but only from poor to fair elsewhere. Principal avenues of approach were the KHELO River from the northwest, the CAI River and Highway 1 from the north. In general, the predominately open terrain prevented the enemy from passing and restricted his movement during daylight hours. Vehicular movement was possible only in the flat lands and was further restricted to the existing road net. Foot movement was possible in all areas but was restricted by the jungle and the flooded paddy.

2. (C) Weather: The weather in the area of operations was characterized by the transition from the NE to SE monsoons. There was very little precipitation, and cloud cover occurred only during early morning and late evening. Weather had little or no effect on enemy operations. The relatively clear weather favored the use of helicopters and visual aerial reconnaissance.

3. (C) Enemy Dispositions: Initially the third Inter-Province Headquarters and the 6th Bn, 95th NVA Regt were located west of TUY AN and two (2) unidentified, unconfirmed battalions were reported to be in the vicinity of DONG TRE. The 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95th NVA Regiment were reported to be located in the H. ROI M. areas south of TUY HOA. No significant enemy displacement was noted as a result of US operations around the DONG TRE, TUY AN and H. ROI M. mountain areas.

4. (C) Results:

a. Order of Battle:

(1) Units identified by COMUSMACV:

18th Co Sig Co, 95th NVA Regt.
19th Co Engr Co, 95th NVA Regt.
21st Co Recon Co, 95th NVA Regt.
377th Bn, AK 277 Co, 85th Provincial Bn.
DKG Bn A. K. DKG Co, 25th Provincial Bn.
"Tiger" Plt, Son Hoa Dist.
Bn Co, Son Hoa Dist.

(2) No new units were identified by documents during Operation FILLMORE.

(3) VCC reported that the 95th NVA Regiment was at approximately 50% strength with very few morale.

(4) One squad of SON HOA District local guerrillas surrendered with weapons.

b. VC equipment losses:

(1) Weapons Captured:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
(a) United States Manufactured:	
Shotgun, 12 gauge	1
Rifle, US, M16, cal .30-06	1
Carbine, US, M1, cal .30	1
Submachine gun, M3, cal .45	2
Rifle, US, M1, Garand, cal .30-06	2
Submachine gun, Thompson, cal .45	2
Mistol, US, M1911, cal .45	1

Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation FILLMORE.

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
(b) German Manufactured:	
Rifle, Mauser 98, cal 7.92mm	20
(c) French Manufactured:	
Rifle, MAS 1926, cal 7.5mm	2
(2) Food:	
Rice destroyed	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Corn destroyed	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton
(3) Camps or Buildings Destroyed (unless noted):	
Structures	69
Structures damaged	17
(4) Signal Equipment (damaged beyond repair):	
HT-1	3
HTC-6	1
Loudspeaker	3
(5) Munitions and Equipment:	
Grenades (various types)	800
Grenade launcher	2
(6) Miscellaneous:	
Bicycles	22
Sewing machines	3
Blankets	30
Small quantities:	Medical supplies
	Uniforms
	Documents

5. (C) Significant VC Incidents and Losses:

- a. 270810H Mar via C0144265 - captured 3 wounded VC. One VC was from 19th Regt Co, 95th NVA Bn, who indicated that the 4th and 5th Bns had merged due to battle losses.
- b. 281335H Mar at C0990668 - LRR team made contact with estimated VC Co resulting in 12 VC KIA during extraction.
- c. 291905H Mar via DG 937722 - LRR team made contact with estimated VC Co resulting in 3 VC KIA (2C) prior to extraction.
- d. 020500H Apr at B0998697 - 1/327 Inf patrol made contact with 15-20 VC, was forced to extract.
- e. 071202H - 071830H Apr at C0025635 - 1/327 Inf engaged VC Co (later identified as the 3rd Co, B1-6 Bn) resulting in 35 VC KIA (2C), 4 weapons and 800 grenades captured.

6. (C) Committed and Reinforcing Viet Cong Units in the Area of Operations:

- a. Committed and reinforcing Viet Cong units in the area south of east-west grid line 80 and north of east-west grid line 60 consisted of approximately 2,500 personnel organized into a total of one Main Force battalion, one NVA battalion, two Regional Force battalions, ten separate companies and ten separate platoons.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to: Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation LINORB.

b. Viet Cong unconfirmed reinforcing capability consisted of two Region Force battalions with a total strength of 750 personnel.


c. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Confirmed):

<u>IDHT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
6th Bn, 95th NVA Regt	OC019641	21 Mar 66	300(Orig)	4-32 mort, 2-DK2 57 RR, 1-LMG
85th Bn	OC001755	26 Mar 66	400(Orig)	1-60 mort, 1-LMG, 1-IRG
4th Bn, 95th NVA Regt	Vic OC01631	21 Mar 66	460(Combined)	12-IR, Unknown

d. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Unconfirmed, possible):

<u>IDHT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
304th Bn, 1st MF Regt	DC091666	22 Mar 66	350	3-60 mort, 2-81 mort, 3-DK2 57 RR, 5-IRG
U/I Co	DC090795	27 Mar 66	75-100	Unknown
U/I Co	DC022784	23 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	DC0289765	"	"	"
U/I Co	DC0270002	"	"	"
U/I Co	DC0290000	25 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	OC0071712	12 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	DC0256002	11 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	OC165773	19 Mar 66	"	"
2 U/I Co's	OC0110337	21 Mar 66	175-200	"
U/I Platoon	OC0289729	23 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Platoon	OC029721	13 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Platoon	DC022772	27 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Platoon	DC022050	12 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Platoon	OC0255821	20 Mar 66	35	"
U/I Platoon	OC113760	19 Mar 66	40	"
U/I Platoon	DC0202647	23 Mar 66	25	"
2 U/I Platoon's	DC025538	22 Mar 66	50	"
U/I Platoon	OC095799	18 Mar 66	25	"

Enclosure 3 (Operation Overlay) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation TILLMORE



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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation FILLMORE

1. (C) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion.

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into a command, operations, communications, and movements control section.

(2) Supply Detachment: It was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a parachute rigging section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive and signal equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and a contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment, NVA TRUNG Support Command: Provided area logistics support for all units participating in FILLMORE. This element was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) 135th Aviation Company: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area.

(3) 147th Aviation Company (Innobile) provided three CH-47 helicopters.

(4) 496th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply: Forward Support Detachment, NVA TRUNG Support Command provided supply point distribution to Support Battalion, which in turn, provided supply point distribution to Brigade units.

(1) Class I: "B" ration meals and Meal, Combat, Individual were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "B" ration, consisting of fresh meat, bread, and some vegetables were issued daily. A five day stock level of Meal, Combat, Individual was maintained by the NVA TRUNG Forward Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point. There were 202 short tons of "B" rations and 37 short tons of Meal, Combat, Individual issued.

(2) Class II & IV: The Support Battalion (Rear), PHAN RANG provided class II & IV items. 15 short tons were issued during the operation. Certain dry cell batteries remained difficult to obtain.

(3) Class III: The NVA TRUNG Forward Support Detachment provided all types of class III items. 90 short tons of POL were issued during the operation, to include 13,000 gallons AVIATION, 5,535 gallons DIESEL, and 21,225 gallons WONS. Oils were plentiful; grease was in short supply, but did not affect brigade operations.

(4) Class V: 232 short tons were issued. The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. The Forward Support Detachment, NVA TRUNG Support Command, maintained a 15 day stock level. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support Detachment, NVA TRUNG Support Command received, stored, and issued all ammunition. The

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation FILLMORE

entire basic load for one infantry battalion and one artillery battery was banded and palletized in the Brigade Class 7 supply point for immediate deployment with the Brigade reserve.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point via TUY HOA.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 27 automotive, 67 signal, 77 armament, 37 instrument, and 25 engineer job orders. All but 4 automotive, 3 signal, 1 instrument, and 1 engineer job were completed.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: The 2½ ton trucks of Support Battalion were used on 181 missions.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing: The two CV-2's supporting the Brigade flew 113 sorties and carried a total of 926 PAX and 107 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing: (Helicopter resupply)

1 UH-1H helicopters were used extensively to resupply committed forces.

2 Use of slings and nets was a particularly effective method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for loading and off loading to a minimum.

3 Helicopters lifted a total of 112 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade. Attached as Inclosure 1 is the daily helicopter resupply tonnage by class of supply.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit via TUY HOA.

(3) Laundry: 148th Quartermaster Company provided laundry service.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Unit areas were sprayed with a mixture of DDT by M38A1C vehicles, converted for spray purposes, to suppress insects.

b. Patients treated:

(1) MIA	61
(2) Non-Battle Injury	95
(3) Disease	457 (33 malaria)
Total Treated	613
(4) POW	1

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
COMBAT OPERATIONS

(5) Returned to duty	412
(6) Evacuated to hospital	194
(7) Remain in holding	6

The hospitalized personnel are categorized by wounds
as follows:

(1) Head	5
(2) Chest	7
(3) Abdomen	2
(4) Upper extremities	21
(5) Lower extremities	21
(6) Back	5

(C) SUMMARY: No significant logistical problems developed during the operation. The Forward Support Detachment, 18th TRAWG, Support Command provided excellent support.

(C) CONCLUSION: Slings and nets provide the best and most rapid method of aerial resupply.

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Inclosure 5 (Civic Action) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation
FILLMORE

1. (U) In the category of Health and Sanitation a total of 1,910 Vietnamese were treated by Brigade medical personnel. The conduct of the 1st Brigade during the two prior operations seemed to convince the people that we were there to help them, and explains the large attendance at Brigade sponsored sick calls.

2. (U) Repairing roads and bridges turned out to be the major project during the operation. A total of 88 kilometers were repaired along National Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 7 by Co A/326 Engr.

3. (U) Transportation continued to be provided for the rice harvest. Along with transporting workers to and from the harvest, the 1/327 Inf gave food and medical treatment to approximately 100 refugees and assisted in their relocation to the District Headquarters.

4. (U) In the "Back to the Village" campaign, designed to return refugees back to their former homes after clearing the area of Viet Cong, the 1st Brigade assisted by repairing roads and bridges, and by providing security for the movement of the refugees.

5. (U) On 7 April, thirty-two US weapons, captured from the Viet Cong and restored, were presented to the province Chief for use in RF/FF units.

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Inlosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation WILMORE

1. (C) Background:

The Brigade Signal elements had the mission of providing internal communications in support of Brigade tactical operations. The signal elements installed, operated, and maintained the Brigade Communication Center, FM and AM Net Control Stations, and the Brigade Switch Board and wire system. Voice circuits were installed, when possible, to subordinate units within the Brigade, primarily to the Infantry Battalions train areas.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Provided 4 telephone circuits to the 2/320 TAC CP and 1 telephone circuits to the 2/327 TAC CP, tying these lines in with both the Brigade Headquarters, and the Brigade Area System.

b. Communications Center Section - Terminated one secure teletype circuit from I FPMOLV and handled all messages received by supporting HF radioteletype terminals. Provided air courier service to the TAC CPs.

c. Switchboard and Wire Section - Provided area support including lines to both the battalion forward and rear elements, all subordinate supporting, and adjacent units. The switchboard terminated 47 common user subscribers.

d. AM Radio Section - Operated automatic retransmission relay station on Hill 391 for Brigade Operations Intelligence Net and Brigade Administration Logistics Net. There were no difficulties encountered.

e. Maintenance Section - PE-75 Generators required considerable maintenance.

3. (U) Lesson Learned:

Need replacements for PE-75 Generators.

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Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

1. (C) Background: The 2d Bn, 320th Artillery (105 mm) (Airborne), attached to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, provided direct support to the Bde in all phases of Operation FILLMORE. Reinforcing fires were furnished by Btry "B", 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155 mm towed).

2. (C) Summary of Operations:

a. Initial displacement in this operation was that of Btry "B" to area TORNADO, coord CQ166140, to furnish support to the 2/327 Inf Bn operating in area THUNDER and along axis GREEN. Btry "B" displaced to area TORNADO by CH-47 helicopter with movement commencing at 261500 hrs Mar 66 and closing at 273000 hrs Mar 66. The Bn (-) and Btry "B", 1/30 Arty remained in firing position via coord CQ0835 with the Bn Base camp at Tuy Hoa North Airfield coord CQ155083. On 29 Mar Btry "B" rejoined the Bn at coord CQ0835, again moving by CH-47 and closing 291745 hrs Mar 66.

b. While in the above positions the Bn fired extensive H&I fires nightly to assist in the psy war demoralization and surrender program conducted by the Brigade. A recapitulation of missions fired, ammunition expended, and results achieved is at Inclosure 2.

c. As the 2/502 Inf pushed east, Btry "C" was displaced to coord CQ199360, closing 311135 hrs Mar 66 to insure continuous support to the Infantry.

d. On 1 Apr Btry "A" displaced to Tuy Hoa North Airfield, coord CQ 153485 closing at 011515 hrs in preparation for movement by CV-2 a/c to Dong Tra, coord BQ919693, and closed there 021230 hrs Apr 66. From that position Btry "A" furnished direct support to 1/327 Inf Bn and CIDG Forces (Dong Tra) during joint S&D operations conducted in Dong Tra area.

e. On 2 Apr 66, the Bn (- Btry A) commenced displacement to firing positions via coord CQ105665, Tuy An. Btry "B" 2/320th Arty and 1 plt of Btry "C" 1/30 Arty furnished fire support for this road movement from firing positions via coord CQ136583. The Bn (- M&C) and Btry "B" 1/30 Arty were closed Tuy An area by 031350 hrs Apr 66 where continuous direct support was furnished to 2/327 Inf operating in area D.R.T.SOUTH and an extensive H&I program carried out. The attached searchlight section was emplaced via coord CQ135583 with Btry "C" but had very limited use due to lack of suitable targets.

f. On 7 Apr 66 the Bn commenced movement to close back in Tuy Hoa area in preparation for movement as per OPORD 84-66.

Inclosure 1 (Positions Occupied) to Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

POSITIONS OCCUPIED

Battery	Coordinates	Date
A	CG141543	27 Mar 66
B	CG166140	27 Mar 66
C	CG078347	27 Mar 66
B/1/30	CG078347	27 Mar 66
A	CG079347	28 Mar 66
B	CG077347	29 Mar 66
C	CG159360	31 Mar 66
A	CG153485	1 Apr 66
A	BQ919693	2 Apr 66
B	CG105685	2 Apr 66
C	CG135585	2 Apr 66
1 Plat B/1/30	CG105685	2 Apr 66
1 Plat B/1/30	CG136583	2 Apr 66
C	CG136583	3 Apr 66
B/1/30	CG105685	3 Apr 66
C	CG214416	7 Apr 66

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Inlosure 2 (Summary of Missions Fired) to Inlosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat
Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

MISSIONS FIRED

1. Total No of missions fired: 1314.
2. Total No of rounds expended: 9364.
3. Total No of registrations conducted: 33.
4. Total No of H&I missions fired: 1091.
5. Total No of rounds expended on H&I's: 5346.

Substance: 57 VC KIA (EC)
2 VC WIA
16 A/W or sniper silenced
1 Building destroyed
1 Village left burning
1 Secondary explosion

On 29 Mar 66 Major General Critz fired the En's 75,000 rd at "A" Btry
location.

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