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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (4 Dec 67) FOR OT 67X067 11 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report Lessons Learned
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Operation HOOD RIVER, Headquarters,

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

18 OACSFOR

11 Sep 67, 12 23p.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a report, subject as above.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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19 OT-RD-67X067

1 Incl
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Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVTO C

11 September 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (MACV/RCS/
J3/32)

TERU: Commanding General
Task Force OREGON
APO 96374

Commanding Officer
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO 96602

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation HOOD RIVER
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 020800H August 1967 through 130730H August 1967.
3. (U) Location: QUANG NGAI Province.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (U) Task Organizations:

1-327 Inf Engr L2 Clearing Tms FAC Tm	<u>Bde Control</u> HHC Bde A/2-17 Cav A/326 Engr (-) IRRP Plat MP Plat 1-101 Avn Sec 20th Cml Det HB Tm, 244th Payops Co 406 RRD 101 MI Det TACP (-) 42d Inf Plat, Sct Dog (-) D/326 Medic Co
2-327 Inf 5th SF Mike Force Co (DS) Engr L2 Clearing Tms 2 Sct Dog Tms FAC Tm	
2-502 Inf 5th SF Mike Force Co (DS) Engr L2 Clearing Tms 2 Sct Dog Tms FAC Tm	
2-320 Arty (DS)	
7. (C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. 2-320 Artillery: Employed in a direct support role.
 - b. C/2-11 Artillery (105 Towed): Provided reinforcing fires.

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11 September 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (MACV/RCS/
J3/32)

c. 3/18 Artillery (155 Towed, 8"-175 SP): Provided general support reinforcing fires.

d. Marine Provisional Battery (8"-155 Gun): Provided general support.

e. 176th Assault Aviation Company: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

f. CIDG Camp, HA THANH: Provided two CIDG companies in direct support of Brigade operations.

g. 5th Special Forces: Provided two Mike Force companies in direct support of Brigade operations.

h. 244th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

i. QUANG NGAI Province: Provided one platoon of National Police Field Forces in direct support.

j. 7th US Air Force: Flew tactical fighter missions totaling 75 sorties. Five of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 25 minutes. In addition, 27 Combat Skyspot sorties, 3 flareship (AC-47) sorties and 59 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flew 65 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

k. Two infantry battalions from the 2d ARVN Division and two ARVN Ranger battalions operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation to the southeast of the Brigade AO.

l. Two battalions of ROK Marines operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation to the northeast of the Brigade AO.

m. 1st Logistical Command: Provided logistical support.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) MISSION: Headquarters, Task Force Oregon directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in VEGHEL AO (western portion of Base Area 121) in coordination with ARVN, ROK and CIDG forces. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation HOOD RIVER consisted of a four pronged allied attack converging on Base Area 121. Two battalions of the 2d ARVN Division conducted an overland assault from QUANG NGAI west across the lowlands; two battalions of ARVN Rangers conducted airmobile assaults into the high ground south of the base area and commenced search and destroy operations north; two battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade conducted an overland assault southwest toward the base area from positions northwest of QUANG NGAI; two battalions of the Brigade conducted airmobile assaults into the high ground west of the base area and commenced search and destroy operations to the east. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations 10 kilometers south of the base area concentrating on likely avenues of enemy egress from it. Two CIDG companies from HA THANH CIDG Camp provided direct support to the Brigade by blocking to the south in the southeastern portion of the Brigade AO.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation HOOD RIVER was characterized by small unit actions and sporadic contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night ambushes and night movement. The terrain over which operations were conducted consisted of mountainous jungle and cultivated lowlands.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (MACV/RC3/
19/32)

11 September 1967

Operation HOOD RIVER was initiated immediately upon the completion of Operation MURHEUR. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was conducting search and destroy operations in the northern portion of ZON AO (MALHEUR). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were at CARENTAN Base (the Brigade base camp west of DUC PHO). On 30 July one battery from the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted an overland move from CARENTAN Base to QUANG NGAI in preparation for the assault. Additionally, C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery conducted an airmobile displacement from firing positions in ZON AO to MA THANH CIDG Camp from which it provided general support, reinforcing the fires of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery for the duration of the operation. On 31 July, a second battery of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery moved overland to QUANG NGAI. On 1 August, the Brigade established a TAC CP at NUI THIEN AN, a monastery northeast of QUANG NGAI, where both the 2d ARVN Division and the ROK Marine Brigade also established TAC CP's. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted airmobile displacements from DUC PHO to staging areas at QUANG NGAI Airfield. Operation HOOD RIVER commenced at 020000H August 1967 with the airmobile assaults of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, each with one Mike Force Company in direct support, into the western portions of their respective AO's. Landing zones were prepared by both artillery and tactical air. Fire was also placed on known and suspected enemy locations and on suspected routes of enemy movement toward the landing zones. Concurrently the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented to the north and commenced screening along likely enemy egress routes south from VEGHEL AO. One light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in the capture of 9 individual weapons. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 5 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual and 6 crew served weapons. On 3 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 individual weapons. On 4 August one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in the capture of 1 wounded detainee. The Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry observed and called in artillery fire on an unknown size VC force resulting in 10 VC KIA (C). One other contact by the battalion resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in the apprehension of 11 detainees. On 5 August two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 11 detainees and 5 individual weapons. Four contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, capture of 56 detainees and 1 individual weapon. On 6 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 US WHA and 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had seven contacts resulting in 8 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons. On 7 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C), capture of 2 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 9 detainees and 2 individual weapons. Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 8 detainees and 2 individual weapons. On 8 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) while seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 5 detainees and 3 individual weapons. On 9 August one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 3 detainees and 5 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had six contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 6 detainees. On 10 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The battalion subsequently conducted airmobile extractions to QUANG NGAI and an overland displacement to CHU LAI in preparation for future operations. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 9 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had three contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees.

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11 September 1967

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03/32)

On 11 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one contact resulting in capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 603d Infantry had three contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. On 12 August one light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in the apprehension of 7 detainees. Operation HOOD RIVER terminated 130730H August 1967 as the 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th and 902d Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from field locations to GOHR AO (Base Area 117), initiating Operation BENTON. During the conduct of Operation HOOD RIVER a Brigade TAC CP was established at CHU LAI for the purpose of controlling Operation BENTON.

c. During Operation HOOD RIVER Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had primary responsibility for the security of CARENTAN Base. The patrols and ambushes conducted by the Troop for the period resulted in capture of 5 detainees.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in VEGHEL AO.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 63 VC/NVA KIA (C), 4 VCC, 1 NVAC, 6 crew served weapons, 37 small arms, 21.3 tons rice and 3.2 tons of salt.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were: 2 US KIA and 24 US WHA.

13. (U) Administration Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 3.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4.

c. Civic Actions: See Inclosure 5.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: During Operation HOOD RIVER the Brigade established a TAC CP as part of an ARVN, ROK and US tripartite Command Post. The close proximity of all headquarters allowed maximum coordination to be accomplished in minimum time and contributed to the smooth functioning of all forces involved in the operation.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. In planning an operation, consideration must always be given to the evacuation of refugees. Although no effort was made to pick up large numbers of people, groups attached themselves to maneuver elements, asking to be taken to safe areas. As this occurred, airlift was diverted to the location to evacuate the refugees resulting in minimum delay to the movement of maneuver elements.

b. The time frame in which the operation was conducted precluded a thorough search of the AO. The maneuver elements concentrated their efforts along the high ground to the west during the first half of the operation and on the low-ground to the east during the latter half.

6 Inclosures

- 1 - Intelligence
- 2 - Operation Schematic
- 3 - Personnel and Administration
- 4 - Logistics
- 5 - Civil Affairs
- 6 - Artillery

J. H. Matheson
S. H. MATHESON *for*
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) Combat After Action Report Operation HOA D RIVER (U)

- 7
- (C) **TERRAIN:** The area is predominantly rugged mountainous terrain characterized by heavy vegetation in the west with a gradual change from evergreen forest to scattered brushwood in the east. To the east, the hills reduce in size and merge with the coastal plain. The main areas of contact were the SONG TRA KHUOC Valley and MUI CON, BS 369778, the valley having the greatest amount. The mountains afforded good cover and concealment but poor observation and fields of fire. The reverse was true for the river valley; paddy walls and low hills in the valley gave limited cover and concealment. The main avenues of approach are the SONG TRA KHUOC Valley (east-west), Route 5B (east-west) and a dirt surface road, running north-south from BS495784 to the SONG TRA KHUOC Valley. Numerous small trails and streams afford north-south movement in the western portion of the area.
2. (C) **WEATHER:** The prevailing weather for the period of Operation HOA D RIVER was partly cloudy skies except the period 9 to 11 August when the major portion of the rainfall was received. The total precipitation was .54 inches of which .51 inches fell during 9 to 11 August. The temperature averaged from a maximum of 94 degrees to a minimum of 79 degrees. Average relative humidity was 70 percent. The weather was generally favorable to military operations.
3. (C) **ANALYSIS:**
- Most of the contacts were with small units, the largest of which was 15 men. The weapons captured were varied but mostly semi automatic types such as carbines and very few automatic weapons. The forgoing items coupled with the lack of significant contact leads us to believe the area's enemy forces consists of guerrillas and local force units.
 - Base Area 118 possibly had been a base area but is apparently now abandoned and should be dropped from the active base area roster.
 - Base Area 121 limits should be moved more to the west than as outlined in the CIGV Base Area studies. The preponderance of facilities found were west of the stated area.
 - Communication Security: During HOA D RIVER, the Radio Research Detachment monitored 5,935 FM Radio Transmissions and 1,124 telephone transmissions. There were no violations observed.
4. (C) **LESSONS LEARNED:**
- The enemy continues to secure his base areas with Local Force units.
 - The enemy continues to utilize mutually supporting draws, characterized with a water supply and dense foliage, and fortified positions guarding accesses to base areas.
5. (C) **ENEMY LOSSES:**
- | <u>Personnel</u> | <u>For Operation</u> | <u>Total in Country</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Killed (Body Count) | 63 | 4,197 |
| Killed (Estimated) | 11 | 1,976 |
| Captured Viet Cong | 12 | 102* |

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) Combat After Action Report Operation
(HUDD RIVER) (cont'd)

Personnel	For Operation	Total in Country
Captured NVA	1	24*
Ho Chi Minh	1	38
Civilian Defendants	2	132*

NOTE: *Since 1 January 1967

b. Weapons: Individual - 37, Crew Served - 5

Carbines	6	7.62 Sub-machine gun	2
M-16	4	M-16	1
Mossberg	4	SKS	1
M-1	5	AK-47	1
Shotgun	3	PPSH 47	1
M-14	1	Thompson SMG	3
Mausier	5	Chatterault	5

c. Ammunition

57 millimeter recoilless rifle	9 rounds
M-72 L.W.	1 round
Small arms	250 rounds

d. Food Stuffs:

Rice	23 tons	Cooking oil	50 pounds
Salt	3 tons	Yeast	200 pounds
Canned milk	120 pounds		

e. Structures

Base areas complex	7
Hospital	2
Bunker complex	14

f. Miscellaneous Equipment:

Kerosene	73 gallons	Bicycles	100 each
Communication Wire - 1 mile		Penicillin	30 bottles
Miscellaneous radio tubes			

1 Inclosure

T.O. A - Order of Battle

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TABLE (Order of Battle) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to report operation
of action against (operation HOAD RIVER) (U)

1. (C) VC/NVA INITIAL ORDER OF BATTLE

a. NVA Units

- (1) Elements of the 1st VC Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, composed of the 40th, 60th, 70th & 90th Battalions, and supporting units were thought to be operating in the area from base 118. It was doubtful however, that the entire unit was located in the area.
- (2) The 1506th Main Force Engineer Battalion was reported to be operating in the area during the month of July, but its exact location was unknown. The unit provides engineer support to the NVA and Main Force Units in the area, and was not reported to have a combat mission. This unit normally operates in small groups which are widely dispersed and generally accompanied by laborers.
- (3) Elements of the 409th Main Force Sapper Battalion were reported to be operating within the tactical area of responsibility in possibly two or three company strength. The remaining companies were spreaded throughout QUANG NGAI/QUANG TIN Provinces.
- (4) The 120th Montagnard Main Force Battalion was believed to be operating throughout the tactical area of responsibility with a primary mission of transportation and logistical movements, and possessing a limited combat capability.

b. Base Areas: There are two base areas reported near or within the tactical area of responsibility base area 121, vicinity BS 4769, and base area 118, vicinity BS 4085. A base area is considered a safe and secure area in which to train, rest and regroup for combat.

2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE FINDINGS AND SUMMARY IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA

- a. Elements of the 1st VC Regiment and other Main Force Battalions were not contacted during this operation. Due to the lack of contact, Intelligence results were insignificant.
- b. Small resistance groups (Normally one to 10 personnel) were contacted within the tactical area of responsibility with insignificant Intelligence results.
- c. Final Disposition of VC/NVA Units.
 - (1) 1st VC Regiments, 2nd NVA Division
 - (a) Regiment Regimental Headquarters vicinity BT 0318
 - (b) 40th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0318
 - (c) 60th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0318
 - (d) 70th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 1223
 - (e) 90th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0318
 - (2) 1506th Engineer Battalion vicinity BS 4876

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
TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat
Operation After Action Report (Operation HOOD RIVER) (U)

- (3) 409th Main Force Sapper Battalion
 - (a) 20th Company (Headquarters Company) vicinity BS 6135
 - (b) 30th Company vicinity BS 6135
 - (c) 40th Company vicinity BS 3377
 - (d) 50th Company vicinity BS 6135
 - (e) 60th Company vicinity BS 2713
- (4) 120th Montagnard Main Force Battalion located vicinity BS 3548
- (5) See Tab B to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) Combat After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER for information pertaining to the organization and strength of the Main Force Battalion.
- d. Due to the short period of time in which Operation HOOD RIVER was conducted, little contact was made with the enemy. As a result of this limited contact, casualties could not be accurately assessed to the units. Prisoner of War interrogation reports and documents captured revealed little with regard to unit locations and strength. In general, intelligence gathered was insignificant.

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409TH MAIN FORCE SAPPER BATTALION



ALSO KNOWN AS

CONG TH
D-68
X-409
BACH SON WORKSITE
X-20
575TH BATTALION
A-58

LETTER BOX NUMBER

20.141GM
20.144GM
BAC HIEN
1291 KW
BA HOA
X 2424
BAC HIEN FORWARD

PERSONALITIES

COMMANDER NGUYEN TAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER: NGUYEN XU, N BINH
POLITICAL OFFICER QUYET

STRENGTH

595 mm, Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

LOCATION

20th Company	BS 6135
30th Company	BS 6135
40th Company	BS 3377
50th Company	BS 6135
60th Company	BS 6135
70th Company	BS 2713

BT 2713 Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967


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1506 MAIN FORCE ENGINEER BATTALION



ALSO KNOWN AS

571

LETTER BOX NUMBER

1289

PERSONALITIES

COMMANDER NGUYEN HUY KINH
EXECUTIVE OFFICER SR. LT. D.O
POLITICAL OFFICER SR. LT. THANH

STRENGTH

330, men, Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

LOCATION

Vicinity BS 4876 Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

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120TH MAIN FORCE MONTAGNARD BATTALION

DISPOSITION AS

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
PERSONALITIES

Q-20
X-20
T-20
20th Battalion

20.1396-M
20.1390M
BAC HIEN

COMMANDER CPT DINH QUYEN

13



STRENGTH

475 men, Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

LOCATION


Vienhuy BS 3548 Source: Task Force Oregon 9 August 1967

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Inclusive 2 (Operation Schematic) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HOOD RIVER (U)



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Enclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation HOOD RIVER:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HOOD RIVER were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4128
Assigned	4775
Present for Duty	4466
Airhead - Duc Pho	3603
Base Camp - Phan Rang	863
Not Present for Duty	309

(2) The assigned strength was 116% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 106% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 54 were intransit, 105 were on TDY/SD status, 138 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 3 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation HOOD RIVER:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HOOD RIVER were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4128
Assigned	4931
Present for Duty	4557
Airhead - Duc Pho	3719
Base Camp - Phan Rang	838
Not Present for Duty	382

(2) The assigned strength was 119% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 110% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 38 were intransit, 143 were on TDY/SD status, 182 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 10 AWOL.

c. Replacements received during Operation HOOD RIVER were assigned subordinate units as follows:

	OFF	EM		OFF	EM
1/527	1	9	2/320	1	9
1/527	4	44	Spt Bn	1	17
2/502	4	37	Sep Co	4	52

d. Total replacements received for Operation HOOD RIVER were 183.

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Enclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER

1. CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for Operation HOOD RIVER were as follows:

UNIT	KHA	WHA
HHC LRRP	0	0
1/327	0	0
2/327	2	15
2/502	0	4
2/320	0	0
A 2/17 Cav	0	0
A 326 Engr	0	1
42 Inf (SD)	0	0
RTF	2	20

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aa. Total casualties for Operation HOOD RIVER were:

KHA	WHA	MHA
0	20	0

u. Total casualties to date from 29 July 1967:

KHA	WHA	MHA
180	2643	3

3. PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during the operation.

A Forward Red Cross representative remained located at the Brigade Forward Command Post during Operation HOOD RIVER.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: During the period of Operation HOOD RIVER, 2 August 1967 thru 12 August 1967, 106 personnel completed their Foreign Service Tour and were rotated to CONUS; 183 replacements were received during the same period.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation Hood River (U)

1. (U) Organization for Support

17 a. This section of the Logistics Inclosure deals with the support provided for the maneuver elements of the Brigade and does not deal with support provided in the Carentan Base area.

b. Supporting Forces

(1) 15th Spt Bde, TFO coordinated and controlled all supply and services support provided at the Quang Ngai Forward Support Activity. The support consisted of the following elements:

- (a) Distribution point for all classes of supply.
- (b) Shower unit from the 221st S & S Company.
- (c) 163 Light Truck Company (-).

(2) The 11th Avn Bn Chu Lai provided UH1B, UH1D and CH47 aircraft in support of tactical and logistical operations.

c. Support Bn (FSE) aided a Forward Supply Point Team at Quang Ngai that included a helicopter element which commanded and controlled the Forward Supply Air and D/326 Medical Company (-) which established a forward clearing station at Quang Ngai Airfield. The Quang Ngai FSP supported the maneuver elements of 3 Infantry Battalions and one Artillery Battalion.

2. (C) Material and Services

a. Supply: Accomplished by point distribution for Carentan Base and by a Forward Supply Point at Quang Ngai.

(1) Class I: Meal Combat Individual formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. "A" rations and condiment supplements, to include ice cream, were served whenever possible. Ice cream was not available through the Quang Ngai FSA. Fresh vegetables and potable ice were available through out the operation. A total of 27,000 rations were issued during the operation from the FSP, 36894 from Duc Pho to Phan Rang.

(2) Class II and IV: The Quang Ngai FSP drew all Class II and IV items from the TFO, FSP at Quang Ngai. Shortages of Class II and IV items during the operation included small fatigues and some sizes of boots. A total of 45.54 short tons of Class IV and II were used.

(3) Class III: JP-4 accounted for the majority of 10L consumption during the period. Two artillery Batteries were displaced by road in preparation for the operation but the short (26 mile) moves accounted for the little increase in MOGAS consumption. No shortages of Class III were noted. A total of 131,747 gallons of Class III were issued during the operation.

(4) Class V: All types of munitions continued to be available. No shortages were experienced. A total of 198.1 short tons of Class V items were issued during the operation.

(5) Water: Potable water was supplied from Quang Ngai for the maneuver elements by A/326 Engr who established a 1500 gal per hr water point at Quang Ngai Airfield.

b. (U) Maintenance: The Support Battalion's 601st Maintenance Company received and repaired the following items:

Item	Received	Completed
Automotive	19	19
Armament	75	64
Instrument	8	7
Signal	153	129
Engineer	12	10
Quartmaster	11	7

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation Hood River (U)

c. (U) Transportation:

(1) **Vehicular:** In preparation for the operation, 2 Artillery Batteries motor marched from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai using organic vehicles loaned from the 11th Artillery. At the termination of the operation, 1/227 Inf and 1 Arty Btry motor marched from Quang Ngai to Chu Lai utilizing 40-ton trks. The 163 light truck company provided 1 platoon in direct support at Chu Lai Base Camp and 1 platoon (-) at the Quang Ngai FSP.

(2) **Air:** USAF C123, C130 US Army CH-47 and UH1D aircraft provided airlift support for the entire operation. Of primary interest was the airlift, conducted over a two day period, to Quang Ngai. The quartering parties, FSP teams, medical clearing station and the S-4 liaison team were moved on the first day in 5, C130 sorties. 1300 troops and 1000 lbs of cargo, 2 Infantry Battalions were moved on the second day in 13, C-130, and 1, C-123 sorties. The troop move on the second day was accomplished in 5 hours. C-123 aircraft provided a Phan Rang to Duc Pho and return and Duc Pho to Quang Ngai and return air shuttle for cargo and passengers. The Phan Rang bases C-123 continued to be more reliable than previously scheduled air support.

(3) **Sea:** No sea transportation was used during the operation.

d. Other Services

(1) **Graves Registration Service** was available through Caretan Base, Chu Lai and Qui Nhon during the operation.

(2) **Quartermaster Laundry and Shower services** were available at the Caretan Base or Chu Lai.

(3) **Shower services** were available at Quang Ngai.

e. Medical:

a. **General.** Brigade level medical support was provided for a two Battalion Task Force in the Quang Ngai Province Area, as well as the Brigade (-) located at Duc Pho.

b. **Organization.** To accomplish the mission of supplying two areas separate to this degree, it was necessary to echelon one half of the medical company's capability to Quang Ngai as a forward clearing element.

c. Hospitalization and evacuation:

(1) **Hospitalization.** Casualties evacuated from the Brigade area of operation were categorized as serious and routine. Serious casualties were evacuated, in most cases, direct from the pick-up site straight to the Second Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai. Minor casualties were evacuated to the forward clearing section for treatment and subsequently evacuated to the holding section located at Duc Pho. Non battle casualties were evacuated in the same manner as minor IPHA personnel.

(2) **Evacuation.** Evacuation of patients from the Brigade AO was carried out in a smooth, effective manner through the outstanding support provided by the 498th Air Ambulance Company. Fixed wing aircraft were available at Duc Pho airfield for evacuation of routine medical patients to the 6th and 85th Evacuation Hospital at Qui Nhon.

d. Medical Statistics:

Operation Hood River	KHA	WHA	MALARIA	OTHER
	3	1	59	126

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Enclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation Hood
Phase (U)

e. Logistics. Medical supplies were provided by the forward
clearing station co-located Quang Ngai air strip with the FSP.

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f. Lessons Learned:

(1) Organization and control of Brigade level Medical
facilities is difficult with a split configuration.

(2) Dust-off support with three (3) aircraft at Quang
Ngai proved to be more than adequate since enemy contact was minimal.

(3) High turnover individual medical items carried by the
individual soldier such as salt pills, water purification tablets,
chloroquine tablets and Dapsone tablets should be stocked
and regulated by Infantry Battalions. Back up generators must be
readily available to insure constant refrigeration of biologicals
and blood.

(4) The Medical Company's TOE should be augmented with
an additional microscope. This would facilitate diagnosing FUO case
without double handling.

4. Conclusion

a. The present concepts of logistical support are valid.

b. Authorized stockage levels of TA 50-901 have been most
difficult to properly maintain at the FSP level causing shortages
in sized items and undue delays in providing supplies to the troops.

5. Recommendations:

a. The present system of support be continued.

b. FSP's should be designed to handle only high turnover
Class II and IV items and should not stock TA 50-901 items. The
TA 50-901 items should be issued from the FSE II and IV supply
activity to the Bn S-4 in the forward base area. The Bn S-4 will
then be responsible for resupplying the companies in the field.

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Enclosure 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HOOD RIVER (U)

1. (U) Operation HOOD RIVER took place in QUANG NGAI Province from 2 August to 12 August 67. The Brigade operated primarily in four districts: TRA BONG, SON HA, SON TINH, and TU NGHIA Districts. The primary missions of the Brigade S5 Section were: Refugee Movement and Control, Food Extraction, and MEDCAPS.

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a. Refugee Movement and Control:

Although there were no plans for mass refugee movement, the Brigade expected to generate a small number of refugees due to the tactical operation. A total of 840 persons were relocated to District Headquarters within our Area of Operations. Before the operation got underway coordination was made with the MACV Sub-Sector advisors at SON TINH and TU NGHIA Districts, and also with the Special Forces Advisory Teams at TRA BONG and SON HA Districts. The concept of the operation was that the districts would receive only those refugees actually generated by tactical operations. During the ten day period of this operation SON TINH District received the largest number of Refugees. Supplies for these additional refugees were received by District Headquarters from Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support. These commodities included food and other supplies necessary to help the refugees make a quick and satisfactory transition. In all a total of 23 sorties were flown in this operation for refugee evacuation.

b. Food Extraction:

Primary emphasis was placed on this mission during operation HOOD RIVER. The procedure for the accomplishment of this mission was the same used during operation MALHEUR. When a food cache was found the Battalion S5 would notify the Brigade S5. After the decision was made by the ground tactical commander as to whether the cache would be extracted the Brigade S5 would provide the Battalion with the needed rice bags. The Battalion S5 during the interim would coordinate with the District Headquarters in which the cache was found to procure workers to bag the cache for extraction. The workers would be brought to the cache site by our aircraft. After the cache was bagged the food would be extracted along with the workers to the appropriate District Headquarters. During this operation a total of 21.5 tons of unpolished rice and 15 tons of salt were returned to government control. U.S. aircraft flew 11 sorties in extracting these food commodities.

c. MEDCAPS

For this operation MEDCAPS were held in MO DUC and DUC PHO Districts. The MEDCAPS were conducted for the refugees that were taken to these districts during Operation MALHEUR. The districts have dispensaries, but they are not adequately provided with medicine or trained personnel. The purpose of the MEDCAPS conducted during this operation was to aid the districts that received refugees during the last operation. A total of 335 persons and 157 domestic animals were treated medically during these MEDCAPS.

2. (U) Recapitulation of Activities During Operation HOOD RIVER

- a. 840 Refugees relocated.
- b. 54 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
- c. 21.5 tons of unpolished rice extracted and returned to government control.
- d. 15 tons of salt extracted and returned to government control.
- e. 335 persons treated medically.
- f. 157 domestic animals treated medically.

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Inclosure 6 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (U)

1. Missions: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supports the 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division. Battery C, 2d Battalion (Towed), 11th Artillery was placed OPCON to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery and provided reinforcing fires. Battery C, 3d Battalion (Towed), 16th Artillery and Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general support to the Brigade. Fires of a battery of 155mm guns and a battery of 8" howitzers of the 5th Marines were also available.

2. Summary of Operations:

a. In the conduct of Operation HOOD RIVER, the same techniques of artillery employment that have proven successful in the past were employed. The radar was not employed in the area of operations and remained in support of the DUC PHO Base.

b. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was given the mission of establishing a combined Fire Support Coordination Center in conjunction with the 2d ARVN Division and the 1st Korean Marine Brigade. Purpose of the facility was to coordinate fires within close proximity (500 meters) to TACR boundaries and to provide additional fires to Free World Military Forces as requested. Additionally the battalion operated an air traffic control station to all FWWF aircraft operating in the HOOD RIVER AO. The Battalion S-2 section operated the artillery advisory station on a 24 hour basis and passed information to the Air Force control party located in the FSCC. Once established the FSCC functioned smoothly and the flow of artillery information between the participating forces was timely and effective.

c. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OPCON to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery by Task Force Oregon on 4 August 1967. This battalion assumed control of firing and coordination of aircraft allocation for resupply of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. All functions inherent to the mission of reinforcing were accomplished by Battery C. Although an additional burden was imposed on the battalion S-4 section, the overall control and command supervision of the battery was improved.

d. The battalion operations section displaced to Buddha Mountain vicinity QUANG NGAI and collocated with the Brigade Tactical CP and the combined FSCC. A tactical daylight road march was conducted to Buddha Mountain on 1 August 1967, and a night march moved the element from Buddha Mountain to QUANG NGAI Airfield on 9 August 1967. Communications with all battalion elements were satisfactory and coordination with ARVN and ROK Marine elements was facilitated because of the close proximity to the combined FSCC.

e. Batteries B and C were road marched from DUC PHO to QUANG NGAI in preparation for insertion into the AO by CH-47. Battery C continued to road march to positions vicinity TRA BONG, however, enemy action prevented closing as scheduled and the battery was helilifted from a field position. No major problems resulted during the march. It was necessary to augment the battalion with vehicles from neighboring units to complete the move because sufficient battalion vehicles were not available in the forward area.

3. (U) Executions:

a. Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) A Battery continued to support 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry from ZON AO vicinity BS871330.

(2) On 100800H August, A Battery displaced by air to QUANG NGAI Airfield vicinity BS544739. Unit closed 1130 hours. At 1300 hours the battery road marched to CHU LAI in preparation for future operations.

b. Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) On 310930H July, B Battery displaced overland to QUANG NGAI

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1. Battery 6 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (U)

Airfield vicinity BS544739. Unit closed 1152 hours. Further displaced by CH-47 to vicinity BS391701. Unit closed 1305 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(1) Battery continued to support Operation HOOD RIVER from vicinity BS544739.

c. Battery C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) On 010930H August, C Battery commenced displacing overland to the TRA LONG Valley vicinity BS466869. Because of intense sniper fire, and extensive road mining activity, the unit was unable to complete the road march. One NP escort vehicle detonated a mine resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WHA. The battery returned approximately 5 miles along route and set up for the night vicinity BS588891. Continued preparation for future operations.

(2) On 020645H August, C Battery displaced by air to BS466869. Unit closed 0845 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(3) On 020135H August, C Battery displaced by air to BS411816. Unit closed 1140 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

d. TAC CP, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) On 010930 August, TAC CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to Buddha Mountain vic BS660757. Unit closed 1357 hours. Mission to support operation HOOD RIVER.

(2) On 092030 August, TAC CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to QUANG NGAI Airfield vic BS544739. Unit closed 2240 hours.

(3) On 130930 August, TAC CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to CHU LAM, vic BT549053. Unit closed 1235 hours. Mission to support Operation BENTON.

e. Summary:

a. 10 KIA (KBA) (C)

c. 5 WHA (KBA) (F)

5. Recapitulation of Missions Fired:

a. Number of missions fired: 303

c. Total rounds expended: 3838

6. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. On 3 August, C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery fired into a C-7A aircraft as it made its final approach into the HA THANH Airfield. As a result of this serious incident, positive steps were taken to control both artillery firing and aircraft in close proximity of the HA THANH Airfield. A land line was installed from each firing battery to the airfield control party (US Air Force). All missions were reported to the control party prior to firing and aircraft landing or taking off from the field were reported to the battery. With close coordination between the control party and the batteries this system worked satisfactorily.

b. A security force was formed from battalion resources to conduct a heliborne combat assault and secure a battery position for Battery C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery when enemy action prevented occupation of the position by road. A 30 man force was formed from survey and communications personnel and inserted into the LZ using seven UH-1D aircraft. The assault was successful and the LZ was ready for occupation within 30 minutes. The battery was helilifted

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Inclosure 6 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HOLLYHOCK (U)

into position and fired LZ preparations for the maneuver element with which it is
normally associated.

7. Commanders' Analysis:

a. The overstrength status of the battalion allowed for the formation of
an infantry element from battalion resources which was successfully used to conduct
a combat assault into a potentially hostile area to secure a landing zone for
follow-on firing elements (C Battery). Although an acceptable solution when assets
permit such action, it is not recommended, in that artillery battalion personnel
are not equipped or trained for such a mission.

b. A tragic but valuable lesson was learned in the accidental shooting
down of the C7A aircraft by C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. The Bat-
talion Standard Operating Procedures has been modified accordingly, incorporating
provisions systems between the US Air Force Combat Control Team and firing elements
whenever artillery is located in close proximity to airfields.

c. The establishment of a combined Fire Support Coordination Center to
coordinate the fires of the various Free World Military Forces units enhanced the
coordination considerably. This function was performed by the Battalion Operations
and Intelligence section. Due to the imposition of such a function on existing
communications systems, it was necessary to colocate the Battalion Tactical Com-
mand Post with the Fire Support Coordination Center. Should this function become
Standard Operating Procedures on future combined operations, it may be necessary
to augment the battalion's communications capability.

d. Whenever multi-nation forces are employed in combined operations, it
is mandatory that the headquarters directing the operations establish adequate
control and liaison with the member forces in order to insure proper coordination
and direction of fire support and maneuver elements. This is particularly desirable
in view of language difficulties inherent in such an operation.

e. When operating in relatively small Areas of Operation, care must be
exercised in the selection of colocated Artillery - Infantry Command Post to insure
that adequate fires can be placed throughout the area of operation, including
those close in to the battalion Tactical Command Post.

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