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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 Jan 67) FOR OT RD

17 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned - 1st Logistical Command (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Incl
a/s

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~~LESSON LEARNED~~, ~~DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY~~
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND (U). (U)
~~APG 96307~~

AVCA GO-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966.
(RGS 08508-0000)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APG 96307

Commander In Chief
US Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2.

1 Incl
as

C. W. KIFLER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Inclosure 1

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SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Significant Events of the Command for the Period Ending 31 July 1966.

a. The strength of the 1st Logistical Command has grown from 27,782 on 30 April 1966 to an assigned strength of 35,920 on 31 July 1966.

b. During the period the 1st Logistical Command effectively supported the following major tactical operations:

Subok	26 Mar - 22 Sep	El Paso	2 Jun - 3 Sep
Fillmore	1 Apr - 21 Jul	Hawthorne	3 Jun - 20 Jun
Austin II	13 Apr - 26 Apr	Hooker	10 Jun - 21 Jun
Longfellow	17 Apr - 1 May	Deckhouse	18 Jun - 1 Jul
Mosby II	21 Apr - 3 May	Nathan Hale	20 Jun - 1 Jul
Birmingham	24 Apr - 15 May	Beauregard	21 Jun - 15 Jul
Davy Crockett	4 May - 16 May	Henry Clay	2 Jul - 29 Jul
Paul Revere	10 May - INDEF	Hayes	17 Jul - 30 Jul
Hardihood	17 May - 17 Jun	John Paul Jones	21 Jul - 4 Sep
Cooper	19 May - 1 Jun		

c. Debarking operations and movement of personnel and equipment to base camps was successfully completed by 1st Logistical Command units for the following major units arriving in Vietnam.

Operation HARDIHOOD	1st Australian Task Force
Operation ROUNDOUT II	12th Direct Support Battalion, Republic of Korea
Operation MOONLIGHT	25th Infantry Division and associated non-divisional units

d. Operation Robin, the debarkation of the 4th Infantry Division, was initiated on 20 July and is scheduled to be completed in October.

e. On 4 July 1966, the 4th Transportation Command assumed the responsibility for discharge and delivery to first destination from Saigon port for all military and USAID/Central Procurement Agency cargo. This action was requested by USAID and approved by COMUS MACV to permit better utilization of facilities and programming of labor and other resources.

f. Port operations and tonnage throughput increased progressively during the period in the ports of Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Total monthly tonnage handled rose from 356,910 s/t in April to 481,438 s/t in July.

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g. Although limited work was initiated prior to 1 May, project "Newport" was essentially started during this period, over 1,000 pilings were driven, an area of approximately 10,000 square yards filled, an area 160 feet x 500 feet was dredged to accommodate two LST's, and prefabrication of deck slabs for wharf areas has been started. Use of completed portions of the port project commenced in August.

h. At the close of the period permanent POL storage facilities have increased to a total of 172,000 bbls at Cam Ranh Bay, 62,000 bbls at Nha Trang and 52,000 bbls at Qui Nhon.

i. The percent of savings bond participation for the headquarters rose from 87 percent on 31 May to 100 percent as of 30 June 1966. The rate of participation for the command has been steadily increasing from 83.1 percent on 31 May to 87.9 percent on 31 July 1966.

j. Distinguished visitors to the command during the period included:

The Honorable Paul H. Nitze Secretary of the Navy	14-16 Jul
General John K. Waters Commander In Chief, US Army Pacific	22-25 Jul
The Honorable Robert A. Brooks Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics)	27-28 Jul
General Howard K. Johnson Chief of Staff, US Army	30 Jul - 9 Aug
Lieutenant General H.D. Meyers, USA Director J4, Joint Chiefs of Staff	31 Jul - 3 Aug

A list of significant visitors is attached as Inclosure 1.

k. The following personnel changes and awards were affected during the period:

(1) Colonel Paul A. Troup was assigned as Chief of Staff on 27 April 1966. Colonel Troup replaced Lt Colonel Robert A. Shircliff who assumed duty as Deputy Chief of Staff.

(2) Colonel Ray L. Miller was assigned on 5 June 1966 and assumed command of the 44th Medical Brigade on 10 June 1966 from Colonel James A. Weir who became USAF Surgeon.

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(3) On 9 June 1966, Colonel Elbridge L. Snapp, Special Assistant for Material Readiness and Lt Colonel Robert A. Shireliff were awarded the Legion of Merit. Both officers departed on 13 June 1966.

(4) Colonel James Gilman arrived and was assigned duty as Special Assistant for Material Readiness on 21 June 1966.

(5) Colonel Jack Fuson arrived on 6 July and was assigned as Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command (Terminal) on 11 July 1966.

(6) On 20 July 1966, Colonel Richard W. Aronsen, Former Commanding Officer of the 4th Transportation Command (Terminal), and Colonel Emil L. Hosheim, Commanding Officer of the US Army Support Command, Saigon were awarded the Legion of Merit.

(7) Colonel Gilbert Levy arrived on 28 July 1966 and assumed command of US Army Support Command, Saigon on 3 August 1966.

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2. (U) ACofS, PERSONNEL.

a. To provide the command and control personnel for the headquarters, a request was submitted to DA for 259 additional manpower spaces to reorganize the headquarters as a Modified Logistical Command C with 268 officers, 2 Warrant Officer and 480 enlisted men.

b. The recruitment and filling of DAC spaces in the proposed TD for US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam will not be accomplished in sufficient time to be helpful in handling the expanded workloads. On 24 July 1966, a revised TD was submitted to USARV reducing the number of DAC spaces previously requested from 71 to 35 with a corresponding increase of 36 military spaces. The revised strength requested for the organization is 47 officers, 23 enlisted men and 35 DAC for a total of 105 personnel. Pending approval of the TD, officers and enlisted men meeting the qualifications for this type duty are being assigned to the unit.

c. The proposed TD for the Central Real Estate Office is being revised to include country-wide real estate personnel requirements. Upon approval, these spaces will be added to the TDs of the various Support Commands.

d. A request for 1 officer and 26 enlisted spaces was submitted to USARV on 18 May 1966 to assume the responsibility for receiving, storing, and distribution of gifts and relief supplies to the Vietnamese people. Upon authorization, the personnel spaces and the mission will be transferred to US Army Support Command, Saigon.

e. Major Lee E. Odell joined Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command on 8 June 1966 and assumed additional duties as Civilian Personnel representative. TD (incl DAC spaces) for Depots at Saigon, Cam Ranh, and Qui Nhon were submitted to USARV in May 1966 and returned in June for further study. The Commanding General requested the establishment of a Civilian Personnel structure capable of furnishing support required by the current and proposed Local National and DAC employment population which is expected to exceed 15,000. USARV recognized the need for and approved the recruitment of a DAC specialist full time to provide professional guidance to the Commanding General and his staff. The employment of local nationals is rising steadily with some 9,000 hired at end of reporting period.

f. The accident and injury rates, both military and non-military declined steadily during the 4th quarter FY 66. Motor vehicle accidents continue to be the primary contributor of injuries and property damage. Army motor vehicle accidents at US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, experienced an increase at the end of the period countered by a decrease in Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon which represented a steady decline in the overall 1st Logistical Command rate. The sporadic fluctuations of subordinate commands is attributed to the urgency of the mission and the

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weather conditions encountered. The constant decline of the Army motor vehicle rate is attributed to the increased emphasis on motor vehicle accident prevention and utilization of safety measures designed to produce safer transportation; such as rear view mirrors, directional turn signals, and driver orientation. The driver awards program initiated in April 1966 has created an additional incentive for accident free vehicle operation.

g. Four civilian Safety Directors arrived during June and July for assignment to Saigon, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, and Nha Trang. Safety directors for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Qui Nhon are expected in the near future. Increased effectiveness of the Command Safety Program is anticipated with the assignment of full time safety personnel.

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3. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. The operation of the Civil Affairs Branch of the 1st Logistical Command consisted of two major functions:

(1) Distribution of Relief Supplies. Processed requests for relief supplies and supervised pickup of supplies from various locations in Saigon. Supplies were packaged and/or palletized as required and delivered to points of departure for transport by rail, ship, air, or road, as available and appropriate. Relief supplies consisted of food, medical supplies, clothing, and construction materials which were provided by Committee American Relief Everywhere (CARE), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), American Civic Donations, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and many independent donors. Relief Supplies were distributed to Vietnamese Armed Forces, Ranger Command, Regional Forces/Popular Forces, Special Forces Command, US Combat units, hospital, orphanages, and approximately 60 Vietnamese Province and Regional Chiefs for distribution to Vietnamese people in 34 provinces. Average daily distribution was 100,000 pounds.

(2) Supervision, coordination and reporting of military unit Civic Action Projects. Constant surveillance of Civic Action Projects conducted within the command was maintained. Coordination with support agencies for materials and equipment in support of Civic Action Projects received close attention. Received, consolidated, and forwarded reports from major subordinate commands concerning status of Civic Action Projects throughout the command.

b. Projects performed by personnel of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 1st Logistical Command were coordinated. This unit supports three orphanages.

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4. (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL

a. LTC Peter C. Casperson departed on 7 June 1966 and was replaced by MAJ C. C. Rice on 13 June 1966. During this period, progress was made in the improvement of the personnel management and administration activities within the AG office. The AG Personnel Management team made assistance visits to all support commands to help set up programs within their areas.

b. The command station list was published in May and July from machine listings. Copy attached at Inclosure 2.

c. Command strength during the period attached at Inclosure 3.

d. Personnel rotation and replacement statistics attached at Inclosure 4.

e. Report of casualties attached at Inclosure 5.

f. Significant progress has been made in the command reenlistment program. Two full-time career counselors have been assigned to each support command. CPT William M. Toohey, AGC, has been appointed Command Reenlistment Officer. Staff visits were made to each support command to assist in the establishment of this program. A monthly news letter was published effective in June. A reporting system is being developed for accurate reporting of reenlistment statistics. Unofficial recap is at Inclosure 6.

g. Appointment allocations and appointments made are attached at Inclosure 7.

h. Awards and decorations processed are at Inclosure 8. On 3 July CG, 1st Logistical Command, was delegated authority to award the Silver Star. Authority was delegated designated commanders of medical facilities to award the Purple Heart.

i. Postal Service. No new postal units arrived in country. The 56th APU located in Long Binh became operational on 15 May. Additional units are programmed to arrive in country.

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5. (U) CHAPLAIN

a. Personnel.

(1) As of 31 July 1966, 1st Logistical Command had a total authorization of 55 chaplains. 54 of these spaces were filled, 41 with Protestant Chaplains and 13 with Catholic Chaplains. There is no Jewish Chaplain assigned, coverage being provided by Jewish Chaplains assigned to MACV and IFFORCEV, and authorized lay military personnel.

(2) In July 1966, the Staff Chaplain's office was brought to full TOE strength of 3 officers and 4 EM.

(3) The implementation of COSTAR caused a momentary loss of 7 chaplain spaces within the command by the redesignation of units as direct support. This loss was counteracted by the organization of general support groups and battalions.

(4) In early June a delineation of functions agreement was arrived at between the USARV and 1st Logistical Command Staff Chaplains, whereby chaplain reassignments within 1st Logistical Command would be "coordinated with" but not "approved by" the USARV Staff Chaplain. This arrangement provided increased flexibility in the assignment of chaplains within the command.

b. Religious Coverage.

(1) Given the peculiarities of the Vietnamese situation, the area religious coverage concept dominated the mode of chaplain employment.

(2) Under the provisions of the self-help program, additional chapel facilities were constructed or programmed. The recapitulation of total chapel construction in Vietnam as of 31 July 1966 is as follows:

<u>Logistical Area</u>	<u>Constructed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
USASC, QN	17	10
USASC, CR3	7	2
USASC, Saigon	12	6

(3) Chapel attendance percent of strength:

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	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Saigon - Vung Tau	33.9	46.1	28.9
Cam Ranh Bay - Nha Trang	16.2	33.3	32.6
Qui Nhon	17.4	18.6	26.4

(4) Average number of weekly services per chaplain:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Saigon - Vung Tau	5.75	7.05	4.5
Cam Ranh Bay - Nha Trang	3.35	3.75	9.2
Qui Nhon	3.94	5.00	5.32

c. Civil Affairs.

Chaplains continued their support of civic action and community relations projects. Besides meeting humanitarian and educational needs, these projects have enhanced troop morale and contributed to American-Vietnamese understanding. During the reporting period, chaplains were directly responsible for the following welfare contributions:

- (1) Money: VN\$582,729.
- (2) Food: 34 tons.
- (3) Soap: 18,827 bars.
- (4) Clothing: 35 crates.

d. Pastoral Coverage, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

Significant here was the Ecumenical Worship for Christian Unity of 28 May 1966, the first such worship to be held in Vietnam. The service was under the direction of the Staff Chaplain's Office, with Major General Charles W. Eifler and SPl Andrew Grabania presenting the Scripture Readings.

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6. (C) PROVOST MARSHAL

a. On 2 May 1966 the Provost Marshal section assumed responsibility for physical security, a function previously executed by the Director, Security, Plans and Operations.

b. The section published two 1st Logistical Command regulations. Regulation 210-4 was published for the purpose of providing guidance and procedures for carrying, possession, registration control and use of government and privately-owned firearms. Regulation 380-1 established procedures to be followed during civil demonstrations in the Saigon, Cholon and Tan Son Nhut areas.

c. On 3 June 1966, 1st Logistical Command was assigned responsibility for security of the Saigon-Nha Be port complex (approximately 10 ports). Immediate action was taken to modify appropriate TOE's to provide the support required for protection of US Forces operated ports, port facilities and in-port anchorages to include safeguarding of all US Flag ships and other specifically designated shipping of prime interest to US Forces.

d. On 28 June 1966, 1st Logistical Command was assigned responsibility for port security in all ports in II, III and IV corps areas. Evaluation of personnel and equipment requirements is presently under study.

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7. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES.

a. Major Marland L Whiting, AGC, joined Headquarters 1st Logistical Command and assumed the duties of Special Services Officer from Major Duanne W. Andrews, AGC, on 25 July 1966.

b. There are 8 officers, 22 enlisted men, 6 DAC's and 82 local national employees assigned to Special Services as of 31 July 1966.

c. R&R Branch.

(1) The Out-of-country R&R quotas have increased 60% during the last 3 months. In April, 1st Logistical Command was allocated 1031 spaces, and in July 1596 spaces.

(2) By the addition of an annex at the Vung Tau R&R Center, the bed spaces increased from 134 to 260. The In-Country R&R quotas increased by 41%. 1st Logistical Command allocations were revised from 18 to 30 per month, beginning 6 July 1966. The annex was officially opened by Lieutenant General Engler, DCG, USARV, and Major General Eifler, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, on 17 July 1966. Additional effort is being expended by this branch to reach the established goal of 100% fill of allocations in both R&R Programs.

(3) In May, the Central Welfare Fund (CWF) Council, USARV authorized an expenditure of \$960.00 for eight issues of "Life in Vietnam" for distribution to Army units in Vietnam. In June, the CWF Council approved an additional 1st Qtr, FY 67 expenditure of \$1,209.37 for R&R Information Pamphlets for distribution to units; and \$1,683.50 for R&R Cities Booklet, with map, for each R&R passenger departing from Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang and Pleiku.

d. Supply Depot Branch.

(1) The Special Services Depot began operations 1 April 1966. The current on hand balance is \$623,227.69, and issued \$451,487.87 in stock to units during May, June and July.

(2) The depot has committed \$1,397,147.82 in requisitions from appropriated funds as of 31 July 1966. Lease 1160 was signed on 24 July 1966, for 30,000 square feet of storage space, located at 507 Ben Ba Dinh, Saigon. Approximately \$800,000.00 in nonappropriated funds was committed and obligated for Special Services Depot Supplies during the fourth quarter, FY 66. \$900,000.00 in nonappropriated funds were approved in June for purchases of Special Services Depot Supplies during the first quarter, FY 67.

e. Library Branch.

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(1) Two new libraries were officially opened in July 1966. One at Vinh Long, and one at Headquarters USARV, Tan Son Nhut. 12 libraries, one library service center, and one field distribution center are now in operation in Vietnam.

(2) Total library book stock for all libraries has been increased to approximately 38,000 volumes.

(3) A monthly distribution is made, from the Saigon Field Distribution Center, to 1300 military units of 31,000 military newspaper, and 110,000 paperbooks. The library has 75,000 annual magazine subscriptions.

f. Recreation Requirements Branch.

(1) The FY 67 Special Services appropriated fund budget was accepted for \$18,171,450.00.

(2) 1st Logistical Command Circular 28-3, outlines the authority and establishes the basis for issue of dayroom furnishings. In June 1966, \$939,486.45 in appropriated funds were approved and purchase orders were submitted for dayroom furnishings.

g. Entertainment Branch.

(1) The Entertainment Branch is in a building stage. With the arrival of a Staff Entertainment Director in late May 1966, additional personnel have been assigned, and the program is expanding to include soldier music activities. Basic musical instruments have been obtained and will be distributed for use by field troops in the near future.

(2) USO and professional entertainment touring shows are a large part of the operating entertainment program at this time. During this quarter, there has been a total of 203 performances with total attendance of 201,630. The performance figure does not include the Hand Shake tours.

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8. (C) Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations.

a. Security.

(1) The personnel security program included directing and coordinating a number of limited investigations through the 524th MI Detachment. Completed investigations, an average of 25 per month, are reviewed at this headquarters and forwarded to Hq, USMAV. During the reporting period, personnel security actions were completed by the Security Division as indicated below:

- (a) Number of clearances validated: 1472
- (b) Number of requests for I.C processed: 307
- (c) Number of requests for BI processed: 20
- (d) Number of clearances granted:
 - 1. TOP SECRET: None
 - 2. Interim TOP SECRET: 137
 - 3. SECRET: None
 - 4. Interim SECRET: 211
 - 5. CONFIDENTIAL: 8

(2) 1st Logistical Command Memo 380-5, dated 27 May 1966, was published to provide definite guidance for the headquarters in matters pertaining to personnel and document security. 1st Logistical Command regulation 380-5, dated 12 July 1966, applicable to subordinate commands, prescribes document and personnel security procedures.

(3) The CI Inspection program included announced CI inspections of each staff section within this headquarters and most of the major subordinate commands during the fourth quarter, FY 66. All subordinate units of this headquarters, battalion size or larger, which were not inspected during the previous quarter will be given announced CI inspections during first quarter, FY 67. Inspections revealed administrative deficiencies in most of the inspected facilities. Reports from inspected elements indicate that the deficiencies have been corrected. Unannounced after-duty inspections were continued with generally satisfactory results.

(4) On 22 June 1966, the 1st Logistical Command assumed responsibility for the Industrial Security Program of all civilian firms under contract to US Army elements in the Republic of South Vietnam. The Security Division monitors and exercises staff supervision of the program. Operational aspects of the program are discharged by the 524th MI Detachment.

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(5) On 28 June 1966, upon direction of Headquarters, USARV, this command assumed responsibility for port security of all ports in the II, III and IV Corp Tactical Zones. The Provost Marshal exercises staff supervision of the physical security aspects while the Security Division will retain the counterintelligence responsibilities. A load sheet has been sent to the 524th MI Detachment for the conduct of countersabotage threat surveys of all ports for which this CI service has not been performed.

(6) During the reporting period VC attack and terrorist activities having a direct impact on the command have shown a gradual decline. Closely associated with this trend has been the apparent calm on the domestic front as a result of the Government's success in consolidating its strength and suppressing the subversive movement inspired by the Buddhists and the continued setbacks suffered by the enemy on the battlefield. Of major concern to the command was the successful sabotage of cargo vessels anchored at Nha Be. On 26 May mines were attached to the anchor chains of three ships resulting in the partial sinking of one. Another mine exploded causing no damage or injury. The third mine was removed undetonated. Buddhist demonstrations conducted from March through mid-June had little effect on the command's logistical support mission. However, their blocking of streets caused re-routing of some military traffic resulting in some delay in delivery of supplies and equipment. On several occasions Saigon and Qui Nhon's operations were considerably hampered. Labor activities during the period remained normal except for a two-day walk out at Saigon Port on 16 and 17 May and a partial strike at Long Binh on 20 June when 182 out of the 450 workers failed to report to work. In both cases, the major issue was higher wages although the Long Binh strike was reportedly Viet Cong influenced.

(7) The transition from the dry northeast monsoon season to the rainy southwest monsoon season began in March, continued through April, and was completed throughout Southeast Asia by the end of May. Except for the east coast of the Republic of Vietnam, where precipitation remained light and infrequent, there was a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of showers and thunderstorms. Temperatures generally decreased slightly, however, along the east coast temperatures increased. Humidity levels rose throughout Vietnam reaching a mean value of 80 to 90% over most of the country. During June the southwest monsoon continued with afternoon showers almost every day. During May and June the weather had no significant effect on the logistical support mission of the command. Heavy rains and poor visibility during July hampered airlift operations supporting operations Hayes, Hawthorne, Henry Clay and Aurora II. Ve Dat airfield was washed out forcing the command to alter combat support plans for operation Aurora II and rely on land lines of communications and helicopter airlift.

(8) On 1 May 1966, the physical security responsibilities for 1st Logistical Command installations were transferred from the Security Division, Security, Plans and Operations, to the Provost Marshall section.

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(9) 1st Logistical Command Memorandum 220-3, Exercise and Alert Procedures (U), was published 23 June 1966 and prescribes policy and directs action and reports required for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, in the execution of practice exercises and alerts.

(10) 1st Logistical Command Standing Operating Procedures for Emergency Operations (U) (SOP for SOP's) was published on 24 June 1966. The SOP includes: Defense Readiness Conditions (U), Ground Defense (U), Passive Air/Mortar Defense (U), and Civil Disturbance (U). Sections to be published include: Area Damage (U), Chemical and Biological Defense (U), Severe Weather Warnings, Tidal Waves and Typhoons (U) and Emergency and Alternate Communications (U).

(11) On 27 July 1966, the implementing instructions for Defense of Tan Son Nhut Airbase (OPLAN 6-65) were revised. The revision relieved the USASC Saigon of overall responsibility for execution of the 1st Logistical Command requirements under the plan, and the ACofS, SP&O, this headquarters assumed the responsibility.

(12) On 5 July 1966, responsibility for the Xenon Searchlight project for all tower and vehicular mounted Xenon lights in Vietnam was transferred to the Provost Marshal's Office.

(13) During the period, liaison and orientation visits were made to USA Depot Cam Ranh Bay, USASC Saigon, 4th Transportation Command, and port facilities in the Saigon/Nha Be area. Tactical security and problem areas were discussed. During the visit to Cam Ranh Bay, discussions were held concerning the activation of a Provisional Defense Battalion. A proposed plan was forwarded to USARV on 5 July 1966, as directed by MACV.

b. Plans Branch.

(1) Logistical Contingency Planning: In April, this branch was tasked to work with USARV in preparation of plans for emergency resupply in the event of damage to one of the major logistical complexes. A draft plan was completed in time for a planning conference held at USARV in June. After further refinement resulting from the USARV Conference, the plan was being prepared for publication at the end of the period.

(2) Intra-Coastal Shipping Study. In June, a study group was formed to study intra-coastal shipping in RVN for the purpose of recommending ways to reduce the amount of unnecessary shipments resulting from balancing of stocks, single port consignments and discharge requiring transshipping, etc. As a result of the study, intra-coastal control officers were designated throughout this command to evaluate the necessity of intra-coastal shipments originating in their respective areas, and to deny those which do not meet requirements. Measures to evaluate the results of this action are inconclusive as yet.

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(3) Transfer of Headquarters Support Area, Saigon (HSAS). The transfer of functions from HSAS to USARV continued during this period with all but four of the remaining functions being transferred by early May. US Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) was to assume responsibility for the last four functions. The major problems encountered during the transfer were delays resulting from delayed negotiations between the concerned services, and slow response of the agency assuming the function. The latter was primarily caused by lack of personnel.

(4) Project EXPEDITE/Container-Ship Study: In May, this headquarters evaluated a proposal for commercial container-ship service to RVN and determined that this service could not be accepted prior to Oct 67. Subsequently, USARV questioned the reasons for this reply and a study group was formed to re-evaluate the proposal. An additional requirement to evaluate was the possible use of a new off loading system (EXPEDITE) using helicopters to unload ships at anchorage and fly containers directly to inland depots. As a result of the study and the Commanding General's guidance, a reply was sent to USARV stating that both conventional and "EXPEDITE" container services were feasible and desirable in RVN. However, no container-ship service could be accepted at any port until adequate facilities and equipment were available. Congestion in the port and city of Saigon is, and will be such that regular container-ship service is not desired there, but would be acceptable at Newport if adequate facilities were available. The size of the Nha Be/Saigon river channels precludes the use of larger type container-ships including all of those of the proposed "EXPEDITE" system. Based on this reply, USARV recommended to CINCPAC that regular container-ship service be withheld from RVN until Oct 67.

(5) Support of Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKRV). In April, 1st Logistical Command received the task to revise the support for ROK Forces in Vietnam. OPLAN 25-66, Support of ROKRV (U) was published in July 1966. The major problems encountered were lack of timely and complete information from MACV on equipment densities, and the short lead time for requisitioning to meet ROK requirements.

(6) DA Team Visit and the Common Supply System. As a result of a DA team visit in June 1966, it was determined that specific range, scope of items and supply procedures needed to be defined at subordinate command level. It was also determined that subordinate commands must advise their own supply activities of the Army responsibilities for implementing the Common Supply System and to identify the non-Army customers authorized to draw from those sources. To this end, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 725-1 was published by this headquarters in June 1966. Demand data from the services was not submitted promptly and caused some slippage in the time phasing for accumulation of demand and requirement, but most difficulties encountered in implementing the Common Supply System were due to a mutual lack of understanding and appropriate supervision at the operator or exchange point level. At a working conference conducted

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in July, it was generally agreed that frequent liaison visits by both customers and suppliers alike would resolve the majority of problems encountered.

c. Force Development Branch.

(1) CY 67 CINCPAC Planning Conference. The CY 67 CINCPAC Planning Conference was held in Hawaii during the period 2-10 June. Each component commander conducted a similar conference prior to 2 June (15-31 May) in order to prepare, in detail, a troop requirements list to support the MACV CY 67 concept of operations. A complete and detailed study was conducted to determine, by month and port, the programmed tonnages for RVN. These tonnages were then utilized to justify certain transportation and supply unit requirements as well as the overall construction requirement. The logistical concept of operations was reviewed and refined to provide more definitive guidance for the troop base planners. Logistical planning factors were developed and adapted by CINCPAC for the computation of consumption and throughput, tonnage requirements.

(2) Justification of Port Construction Program. MACV tasked USARV with a requirements to recompute tonnage requirements and capabilities for all Army ports as of December 1966 and June 1967. MACV was furnished detailed justification and rationale for the port construction program to include spread sheets for each port.

(3) Long Range Stationing List. A plan for the Long Range Stationing of Combat Units in RVN is being developed. Force Development compiled a list of combat service units required to support this plan to include quantity and types. This list also placed all combat service support units in categories depending on the length of time they will be retained in-country.

(4) Shortfalls. Shortfalls still exist in combat service support units scheduled for deployment to RVN. Plans Division continues to request that units be rescheduled/or diverted to locations in-country where the most critical requirement exists.

(5) Navy Barracks Barges. Plans Division conducted a study to determine whether additional Navy Barracks Barges were required for use in RVN. It was determined that six barges were required. The Commanding General was briefed on the results of the study. He directed the Engineer to provide plans for remodeling one barge so as to reduce occupancy from 650 to 450, and to provide more lounge type facilities for occupants.

d. Operations.

(1) COSTAR. On 20 Jul 66 COSTAR reorganization was implemented in the 1st Logistical Command. Selected Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, and Chemical units providing supply,

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services, and maintenance were inactivated. The inactivated units were replaced by COSTAR units, which provide functionalized support. COSTAR reorganization was so planned that every mission being performed by the technical service units would be assumed by a COSTAR unit, without movement of personnel and equipment. A total of 140 technical service units, company, detachment, and team size, were inactivated and 53 COSTAR units were activated. The reorganization resulted in an authorized strength increase of 1001 spaces within the command. USARPAC General Order 157, dated 14 Jul 66 lists all units activated and inactivated.

(2) US Army Support Command, Nha Trang discontinued 17 May 66 and was redesignated US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay by HQ, 1st Logistical Command GO 92, 14 May 66.

(3) The US Army Marine Maintenance Activity was activated in-country as a TD organization by USARPAC MSG G7P2-1D 13588 DTG 230158Z and DA MSG 770235 DTG 181725Z Jun 66. The assets for the unit came from the 32d Transportation Company (Amphibious) (GS) and the 169th Transportation Detachment (Floating Craft Maintenance) which were inactivated by the above messages.

(4) The 4th Transportation Command (Terminal A) was reorganized to 4th Transportation Command (Terminal C) by DA MSG 771801, 29 Jun 66 and USARPAC GO 149, 30 Jun 66. The new strength of the unit is 304.

(5) An Aerial Delivery Company (Provisional) was organized by USARPAC, as an interim measure until an aerial delivery company arrived in RVN. The unit was organized by USARPAC GO 3537, 8 Jun 66, and assigned to HQ 1st Logistical Command.

(6) Training. Three training directives were published by 1st Logistical Command in order to train maintenance personnel in repair procedures for new equipment arriving in Vietnam and to train inexperienced personnel in their duties. Subjects of these directives are as follows:

- (a) Ammunition Handlers.
- (b) Maintenance Training, 1578 AAV.
- (c) DS/GS Maintenance, AF/CMC-106 Radio.

(7) Operation LADHOC. OPORD 13-66, dtd 9 Apr 66 provided for reception, debarkation and processing of the 1st Australian Task Force thru aerial/surface ports of Tan Son Nhut, Saigon and Vung Tau, movement to the staging area and providing the necessary support to move the units from the staging area to an inland tactical deployment area. The operation commenced 20 Apr and ended 23 Jun 66. USARPAC, Saigon, Vung Tau Sub-Area Command, 4th Transportation Command and 68th Medical Group participated in the operation.

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(8) Operation ROUNDOUT II. OPLAN 17-66 dated 4 Jun 66 provided for the reception, debarkation, and processing of the 12th Direct Support Battalion (AOK) through aerial/sea port of Nha Trang, movement to a staging area and then to the initial deployment area. 1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support to move the unit from the port of debarkation to the initial deployment area. The operation commenced 6 Jun 66 and ended on 15 Jun 66. USASC Can Ranh Bay and the 43rd Medical Group participated in the operation.

(9) Operation DOWNLIGHT. OPLAN 1-66 dated February 1966 provided for reception, debarkation, and processing the 25th Infantry Division and associated non-divisional units thru aerial/sea ports of Qui Nhon, Vung Tau and Saigon. 1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support from ports of debarkation to area of operations. The operation commenced on 19 February 1966 and ended 31 May 1966. USASC Saigon, USASC Qui Nhon, the 43rd Medical Group and the 4th Transportation Command participated in the operation.

(10) Operation ROBIN. OPLAN 27-66 dated 23 Jul 66, provided for reception, debarkation, and processing of the 4th Infantry Division thru aerial/sea ports of Qui Nhon, Can Ranh Bay, and Nha Trang, movement to staging areas then to tactical deployment areas. The operation started 20 Jul 66 and is scheduled to end in October 1966. USASC Qui Nhon, USASC Can Ranh Bay, and the 44th Medical Brigade are participating in the operation.

(11) Airdrop.

(a) On 6 Jul 66, 12,448 lbs of Civil Affairs supplies were air dropped to Tinh Linh (YT 9326). Detailed after action report is attached as inclosure 9.

(b) On 26 Jul 66, 28,080 lbs of Class V were dropped to the 1st Infantry Division at Quan Loi (XT 8241). Detailed report attached as inclosure 10.

(12) 1st Logistical Command has continued planning for the support for deployment of Army troops in I CTZ. A considerable capability has been developed for the support of operations in this area.

(13) 1st Logistical Command supported tactical operations in II & III CTZ for the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1st Australian Task Force, 7th Fleet Special Landing Force, ROK Capital Infantry Division, and the AOK Marine Brigade.

(14) Logistical summaries for operations AUSTIN II, MOSBY II, DAVY CROCKETT, HOOKER I, LONGFELLOW and BIRD INGLE are attached as inclosures 11 thru 16.

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9. (U) ACoFS, COMPTROLLER.

a. Personnel. LTC Henry D. Millican was assigned principal duty of Comptroller on 21 July 1966 vice LTC Bert G. Winter.

b. Budget & Fiscal Operations.

(1) The FY 67 revised Command Operating Budget was submitted to Headquarters USARV.

(2) The mid-year review and revised AIK CY 66 budget estimate was forwarded to USMACV.

(3) During period 19 June - 4 July 1966, LTC Blandy C. Haynes, Budget Officer, performed TDY at the US Army Procurement Agency, Japan, for the purpose of coordinating and expediting funding aspects of the FY 66 year-end procurement actions for the 1st Logistical Command.

(4) Responsibility for administration of AIK Imprest Funds was transferred to COMUSMACV on 7 July 1966.

(5) On 1 July 1966 the fiscal function including accounting responsibilities and reporting requirements was transferred to Headquarters Area Command.

c. Staff Finance Operations.

(1) The 29th Finance Detachment (FJ Team) arrived in country in May 1966. This unit was attached to the 10th Finance Section (D) for the purpose of training until permanent facilities are made available at Long Binh. On 22 July the 29th Finance Detachment activated its account for the purpose of handling all in-bound/out-bound currency conversion requirements of the 90th Replacement Battalion.

(2) As of 14 July 1966 1st Logistical Command was delegated the authority to audit thirteen clubs and messes within the command. Staffing is being accomplished and upon completion of a training period, the Internal Review Team will commence auditing.

d. Management Operations.

(1) A Department of the Army Quick Reaction Team, which was performing 90 days TDY at this headquarters to assist the command in the development of a management reporting system, departed on 10 June 1966. Considerable management assistance was given in the areas of port and supply operations, and in the development of statistical data formats for a major local contractor. Assistance was also given in the techniques of charting command statistical data for the Commander's Monthly Review and the Commander's Goals. This team was requested by this headquarters in response to correspondence from Department of the Army, indicating that such assistance was available if required.

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(2) A Data Automation Requirement (DAR) was submitted to Headquarters, USARV on 26 July 1966 on a proposed automated management personnel system. This system will be used to provide the command with information that will facilitate maximum use of personnel resources. A few of the principle objectives follow.

1. Reconciliation of present for duty strength.
2. Status listing of all command personnel.
3. Matching of vacancies against requirements.
4. Planned requisitions.

Basic equipment requirements for this system include the UNIVAC 1005 High Speed Card Processor/Computer, with selected UNIVAC and IBM peripheral equipment.

(3) Commander's Monthly Review was published on or about the 10th of each month for distribution among the directors, staff office chiefs, and subordinate commands. This publication reflects a series of charts depicting command statistical data such as AWOL, VD, injury, accident, and vehicle deadline rates. Command letters are forwarded to each subordinate commander pointing to areas needing immediate attention to correct or terminate adverse trends. In addition, a quarterly document was published on 25 July 1966 entitled the Commander's Goals, which is a compilation of all command statistical data for the quarter, and certain data which is reported only on a quarterly basis. Each of these charts are supported by a narrative analysis highlighting significant factors affecting trends positive or negative, during the reported quarter. These publications are one of the commanders primary management tools for isolating areas of effective management and possible problem areas.

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10. (C) ENGINEER

a. Repairs and Utilities Branch Activities.

(1) Pacific Architect and Engineers, Inc., Contract DAJB-1167-C-0001 for fiscal year 1967 is for \$42,500,000. Recruiting of personnel to man 35 installations is about complete. MACV Advisory Teams and Free World Forces will also be provided R&U support. The contract also includes operation of construction materials depots at Saigon, Vung Tau and Nha Trang. Field maintenance and repair of engineer equipment in the Saigon Support Command is also a PA&E responsibility. An annual work plan is currently being developed that will be the basis for conducting a quarterly review and analysis of the effectiveness of the contractor. The work plan will also provide data for budget justification for FY 68.

(2) Generators. The continuing demand for power generation equipment has been partially alleviated by the arrival of 100 kW Taiyo generators from Japan. One hundred seventy units have been received in-country and one hundred fifty additional units are enroute. A breakout by area is as follows:

<u>SUPPORT COMMAND</u>	<u>NO. RECEIVED</u>	<u>NO. ENROUTE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Saigon	75 ea	65 ea	140 ea
Cam Ranh Bay	45 ea	35 ea	80 ea
Qui Nhon	40 ea	35 ea	75 ea
Nha Trang	10 ea	15 ea	25 ea
Total	170 ea	150 ea	320 ea

Contracts for these generators total 600 units, and the remaining 280 generators are to be ready for shipment on or before 31 August 1966.

(3) Well Drilling.

(a) The Bureau of Yards and Docks let contracts for:

1. Exploratory drilling to Pope, Evans, Robbins Limited.

2. Developed wells to R&K for approximately 60 wells.

3. Developed wells to Husee Moss Company for 10 drilling rigs to operate in-country for approximately one year.

(b) The 18th Engineer Brigade deployed four, TO&E 5-500C well drilling detachments. These combined resources will execute the USARV MCA well drilling program.

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b. Installations Branch Activities.

(1) Construction. Major construction projects completed or started during this period are the following:

(a) Saigon.

1. Shed storage amounting to 46,800 square feet was completed in the fish market area.
2. Messhalls, latrines and showers were completed for the 90th Replacement Battalion at Long Binh.
3. The construction of facilities for the 24th Evacuation Hospital was started on 15 June 1966; BOD 1 September 1966.
4. Major work commenced on Newport project.

(b) Can Ranh Bay.

1. A barge discharge facility at South Beach completed during April 1966.
2. Six 120' x 200' warehouses were completed on 20 June 1966.
3. Work was started on the 200,000 bbl tank farm with an EDC of 15 December 1966.

(c) Qui Nhon. The temporary ADPS building was begun on 1 June 1966 and completed on 28 June 1966.

(d) Nha Trang. A 120' x 200' warehouse was completed for use of the Medical Depot on 1 May 1966.

(2) In order to utilize the increasing rail transportation capability in Vietnam, and to lessen the requirement for coast-wise ship and truck transshipment, on 28 April 1966, USARV assigned the 1st Logistical Command the mission of developing a rail plan. The complete plan was forwarded to USARV on 16 June 1966. Included in the plan were provisions for acquisition, control, and maintenance of US-owned rolling stock requirements for construction to extend rail service to US facilities.

c. Construction Materials Branch Activities.

(1) 15 June was the initiation of stock control activities in the Can Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon areas. This eliminated the PUSH method of supply for construction materials in RVN, and gave each depot the responsibility of completely processing all demands for construction materials.

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(2) On 15 June, the Inventory Management Section received the machine print-outs with the IILSTRIP documentation of the ICA Program. This is the basis for establishing valid due-ins for this material and for a revaluation of the entire Construction Material Stockage List in all depots. This information from USAFEC forms the basis for standardization of the items to be stocked, and for the standardization of design of new buildings in RVN.

(3) During the period 1 May thru 31 July 1966, the procurement Section processed 90 Purchase Requests and Commitments, with a total dollar value of \$12,806,309.41. By category:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>
MAA	48	\$11,445,231.27
ICA	11	1,203,509.59
ALL	30	157,568.55
TOTALS	90	\$12,806,309.41

d. Engineer Real Estate Branch Activities.

(1) The principle event of this period was the establishment of the Central Real Estate Office as an operating branch of the Engineer, 1st Logistical Command. This office was formed pursuant to MACV Directive 405-3 and USAFV Regulation 405-5 with overall real estate responsibilities for Vietnam, except I Tactical Corps and airbases where USAF has primary mission. The Central Real Estate Office was formed by combining personnel of the former FSAS and SIA Real Estate Offices, with real estate personnel assigned to the Engineer Division, 1st Logistical Command. The merged organization operated from 15 April 1966 to 15 June 1966 under the operational control of the Engineer, 1st Logistical Command, to provide a training period and to establish operational policies and procedures. On 15 June 1966, the Central Real Estate Office became operational, and the Area Real Estate Offices for the US Army Support Command, Saigon, and US Army Headquarters Area Command, were established. Major problems encountered by this newly formed activity were as follows:

(a) Acquiring adequate personnel, equipment, office space, and transportation.

(b) Accomplishment of a backlog of administrative work to standardize, correct, and legally amend the existing contract files.

(c) Publication of useful policy and procedure to the Area Real Estate Offices, to ensure that future real estate operations are performed properly and in accordance with guidance received from MACV, USAFV, and the American Embassy.

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(d) Establishment of close liaison with real estate offices of other US forces and DOD mission elements in Vietnam, such as the US Navy, US Air Force, COMNAVFOR V Representative, Danang (I Tactical Corps), American Embassy, USAID, and civilian contractors.

(2) Some success was achieved in the problem areas, but effort continues into FY 1967.

(3) Two staff visits were made to the I Corps area to coordinate the transfer of real estate to the COMNAVFOR V Representative, Danang.

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11. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

a. Inspections: During the reporting period Annual General Inspections were conducted of the 4th Transportation Command Headquarters and Port Operations, the Vung Tau Sub-Area Command, two battalion headquarters, thirteen companies, eight detachments and one dispensary.

b. Summary of complaints and requests for assistance during the period:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>JUSTIFIED</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIED</u>	<u>REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
HQ, 1st Log Comd	4	3	19
Vung Tau Sub-Area Comd	1	7	0
USASC, Saigon	0	0	21
USASC, Cam Ranh Bay	0	0	23
USASC, Qui Nhon	8	1	98
USADEP, Cam Ranh Bay	5	4	118
4th Trans Comd	0	2	1
TOTAL	18	17	280

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12. (U) INFORMATION.

a. The Information Office submitted 5,575 hometown news releases, 155 general news releases and 52 photo stories. Representatives of fifty-six news media visited the command during the period. In addition to forty-two from the United States, news representatives of the following countries were included: West Germany, England, France, Netherlands, Phillipines, Denmark and Japan.

b. Special projects during the period included emphasis on savings bond publicity and medical activities.

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13. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. LTC Malcolm L. McCain departed 26 June 1966, and LTC Charles M. Powell, Jr. assumed duties of Acting Staff Judge Advocate until 21 July 1966. LTC Hubert G. Miller assumed the duties of Staff Judge Advocate on 22 July 1966.

b. In addition to normal SJA functions, this office furnishes legal support to Purchasing and Contracting Office, and general counsel support to the USAPAV through the assignment of one officer on a full time basis. Branch offices to provide legal support to US Army Support Commands Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay are also operated and staffed with one officer each. In addition, legal assistance is provided to Vung Tau Sub-Arer on a weekly basis.

c. Courts-Martial. The following is a break-down by area of Courts-Martial tried during the months indicated:

(1) GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL:	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>
SAIGON:	0	2	2
QUI NHON:	0	1	0
NHA TRANG:	0	0	0
VUNG TAU:	0	0	0
CAM RANH BAY:	0	0	0
4TH TRANS COMD:	0	0	0
1ST LOG COMD (AGGREGATE):	0	3	2
(2) SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL:			
SAIGON:	23	15	15
QUI NHON:	15	6	17
NHA TRANG:	1	2	2
VUNG TAU:	3	2	2
CAM RANH BAY:	3	9	9
4TH TRANS COMD:	3	0	8
1ST LOG COMD (AGGREGATE):	48	34	53
(3) SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL:			
SAIGON:	5	6	3
QUI NHON:	29	12	19
NHA TRANG:	2	2	0
VUNG TAU:	6	2	4
CAM RANH BAY:	4	12	10
4TH TRANS COMD:	0	3	2
1ST LOG COMD (AGGREGATE):	46	37	36

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d. For comparative purposes court-martial rates per 1000 military personnel for 1st Logistical Command (4th Quarter FY 66), USARV (4th Quarter FY 66), and worldwide Army (3d Quarter FY 66) are shown below:

	<u>1ST LOG</u>	<u>USARV</u>	<u>ARMY WIDE 3D QTR FY66</u>
GCM	.05	.06	.11
SPCM	1.51	1.57	1.60
SUMCM	1.37	1.20	1.05

e. Claims: The following claims were paid to members of this command for personal property lost, destroyed or damaged incident to service in accordance with AR 25-100 and AR 27-29:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>
Number of Claims Paid:	10	6	0
Amount Claimed:	\$1780.33	\$800.60	0
Amount Paid:	\$1370.31	\$677.05	0

f. Legal Assistance. The following is a breakdown of Legal Assistance rendered during the period 1 May - 31 July 1966:

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>
Adoption & Change of Name:	8	0
Citizenship, Immigration & Passports:	6	0
Domestic Relations & Paternity:	152	5
Notarizations:	208	15
Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance:	18	0
Personal Property:	5	0
Powers of Attorney	405	405
Real Property, Sale & Lease.	34	1
Taxation	12	12
Torts.	3	0
Wills & Estates:	18	13
Miscellaneous	29	0
TOTAL	898	457

g. Procurement Law. The following services were rendered by an officer from this section on full time duty with the Purchasing and Contracting Office.

(1) Reviewed 147 requests for proposals or requests for Quotations.

(2) Reviewed 74 contracts for over \$10,000 with a dollar volume of \$85,801,562.

(3) Reviewed 114 contracts under \$10,000 for a total dollar volume of \$298,234.

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14. (FOUO) COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE.

a. A complete dial central office consisting of three exchanges is programmed for the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area during FY 67. With the installation of this dial central office system a total of 8,000 telephone main lines will be available. This should adequately serve all existing units in this area as well as those assigned to this area in the foreseeable future.

b. Communications for Transportation Boat Companies.

The program to mount old series (AN/GRC-3 through AN/GRC-8) FM radios in boats has been completed. This provides the boat units with a shortrange tactical FM capability, enabling them to communicate with combat and close combat support units. The developmental work of the five year plan for electronic retrofit will not be implemented until Fiscal Year 1968. Due to this time lag in the projected five year program two new interim programs have been initiated. First, the new series (AN/VRC-12) FM radios have been requisitioned for approximately one-half of the marine craft in Vietnam and the requisitions for the radios for the remainder of the boats are being processed. This replacement is part of the over-all program to convert all units in Vietnam to the new FM radios. The second program is the replacement of old AM radios with the AN/SRC-32 radio. 314 AN/SRC-32's, sufficient in number for all boats and a substantial maintenance float, are being purchased by the US Army Electronics Command. The radios will be shipped in increments commencing on 1 Aug 1966, with the final shipment projected to leave CONUS by December 1966. Repair parts and necessary crystals are being shipped with the radios. The installation of the AN/VRC-12 series FM radio and the AN/SRC-32 AM radio will insure that adequate communications will be available for marine activities until the retrofit for boats has been completed and all craft conform with the Standard US Army Marine Configuration.

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15. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT.

a. On 10 May 66, Purchasing and Contracting Division, First Logistical Command was redesignated US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam, with location in Saigon. (USAPAV) The table of distribution of this newly activated unit, commanded by Colonel Charles R. Fulbruge, authorizes forty-six officers, twenty-three enlisted men, and thirty-six local nationals. USAPAV has the mission of providing centralized procurement support for US Army Vietnam, and elements of other military departments, agencies, and activities. On 26 May 66, Buddhist activities in and about the main Pagoda made it impossible for the US Army Procurement Agency to work so the building was evacuated, and the agency moved to Warehouse 18, in the Saigon Port area. On 3 July 66 USAPAV moved to its present location at 412 Truong Minh Giang.

b. During recent months the number and dollar value of transactions has increased. Number and dollar value of transactions:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Dollar Value</u>
May 66	1389	\$ 8,296,000
June 66	3520	\$ 4,542,000
July 66	2533	\$74,830,000

c. On 4 June 66 the Office of Director of Procurement was established at 1st Logistical Command. The Director of Procurement is charged with staff supervision of procurement policy, procedures and other general staff actions dealing with procurement.

d. This agency expects that off-shore procurement of supplies should level off and begin to decline by 1 Jan 67. The forecast is predicated upon catch-up by the US productive base, improved port capability, better inventory management and a greater reliance upon the Northwest Procurement Agency, (NPA) Oakland, California. The decision to use NPA is based on the fact the NPA has been making deliveries to Vietnam within the same time frame as it takes US Army Procurement Agency Japan (USAPAJ) to place the item on contract. Thus, procurement lead time has been appreciably reduced for those items provided by COMUS as well as reducing gold flow by purchasing within the US.

e. The following figures indicate the number and value of actions transferred to USAPAJ and NPA:

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<u>Period</u>	<u>USAPAJ</u>		<u>NPA</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Value</u>
May	2	\$23,092	13	\$47,303
June	4	\$1,460,500	5	\$151,082
July	10	\$7,215,460	47	\$1,492,237

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16. (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION.

a. Surveillance Activities.

(1) Six Department of Army Civilian Ammunition Inspectors (Surveillance) have been allocated to this command; three have arrived and the remainder are programmed to arrive in the near future.

(2) During the period a number of military ammunition personnel were trained to conduct inspections of 1st Logistical Command unit basic loads of ammunition. By the end of July 50% of the unit basic loads had been inspected in USASC, Saigon; 40% in USASC, Cam Ranh Bay; and 30% in USASC, Qui Nhon.

(3) During the period Ammunition Inspectors (Surveillance) from this headquarters conducted quarterly inspection of ASP's. Additionally they reviewed, in detail, 3 requests for waiver from three ASPs.

(4) As a function of the 81mm HE renovation program, the ammunition inspectors supervised the function testing of lot samples of 81mm HE rounds to be modified (refused) to ascertain serviceability of ignition systems.

b. Renovation Activities.

(1) 81 mm HE Renovation Program.

(a) During the period November 1965 to 11 February 1966, USARV units reported 3 premature malfunctions of 81mm HE ammunition with the M52A2 fuze. These 3 malfunctions, resulting in 16 casualties, occurred with the expenditure of 75,000 rounds for a rate of 1 malfunction for every 25,000 rounds fired. Information received from ASPs indicated that the known premature rate was 1 in 217,000 rounds. This high malfunction rate was unacceptable; accordingly, the decision was made to modify existing stocks in order to provide the firing units with the most reliable and safest ammunition possible.

(b) In-country production of modified rounds began at Long Binh depot (3d Ord Bn) on 2 May, followed by Ploiku ASP (184th Ord Bn) on 19 May, Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Provisional Bn-Armco) on 23 May, and Qui Nhon (184th Ord Bn) on 8 July. Total production as of 31 July was 257,000 rounds. The first issue of modified ammo was made on 27 May.

(2) 81mm WP and 60mm HE renovation program. Upon completion of the present 81mm HE program, it is planned to initiate a program to modify all 81mm WP and 60mm HE rounds assembled with the M52 serial fuze. Projected quantities to be modified are 60,000 81mm WP and 185,000 60mm HE rounds.

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c. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities.

(1) During the period covered by this report the nine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) activities completed 1,564 incidents in support of combat operations. They also presented 26 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOA) courses, training 1,476 personnel in the techniques of locating, detecting, reporting and protecting against the hazards of explosive ordnance. These courses are of 2 to 4 hours duration and are presented to the user units on their verbal request. 774 liaison visits were conducted during the report period.

(2) On 2 June 1966, the EOD Control Detachment completed and distributed a set of 12 35mm colored slide transparencies of enemy explosive ordnance which had been found in-country. Also included were slides of several EOD operations. The EOD activities will use them in their EDA Program in-country and those distributed in COMUS will be used in EOD training activities to prepare EOD replacements for duty in Vietnam as well as in briefings regarding our activities here.

(3) The 44th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) arrived in-country on 4 June 1966 and has been assigned in support of the 25th Infantry Division.

d. Ammunition Supply Activities. The overall ammunition supply situation in Vietnam has improved steadily during the period. Stock levels in each support command are generally good and well distributed. Ammunition reporting procedures in use are responsive to requirements.

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17. (C) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE.

a. The 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions requested the assistance of this office in obtaining gun shields and hatch armor for the M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. Nonavailability of required materials in Vietnam coupled with excessive fabrication and delivery time from COMUS required the search for other sources. The materials and capabilities were located at the 2d Logistical Command in Okinawa and delivery was made to the units within three weeks.

b. Continuing difficulties with the 8" Howitzer, M110, and the 175mm Gun, M107, prompted the initiation of evacuation and replacement program for all M107/M110 weapons. The program is based upon the withdrawal of the worst weapons in Vietnam for repair to the extent possible by DA/GS maintenance support units and return to the using units. Those weapons beyond the repair capabilities of the maintenance units will be evacuated to COMUS for rebuild. The deadline status of M107/M110 weapons has been reduced considerably using the limited assets received to date from COMUS.

c. Implementing instructions were disseminated to each support command outlining the requirements for establishing service stations in their areas of responsibility. Currently three stations are in operation at Qui Nhon, An Khe, and Pleiku. Service stations are designed to provide intransit service for all military vehicles and personnel on the main supply routes.

d. In order to effect timely repair of critical items in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) a program, designated Project Boomerang, was designed for priority evacuation to COMUS for repair and return of critical items to RVN. During the period 15-19 May 1966, 50 each power generators, which had been deadlined in excess of sixty days, were evacuated by priority air shipment from Qui Nhon RVN to Shafter Army Depot under Project Boomerang. On 9 July 1966 an additional 21 generators were evacuated by this program.

e. Phase 1 of the program to standardize materiel handling equipment in RVN was 83% completed with the receipt of 500 standard model forklifts and warehouse tractors in-country. Significant reduction in the deadline rate was noted as well as a reduction in the volume of critical parts required.

f. The program for standardization of generators commenced with the arrival of 100 each standard model 10kw generators in June 1966. The 100 each 10kw generators were air shipped to fill immediate requirements. Shipping information has been received for 400 more of the standard model 10kw.

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g. Construction of maintenance facilities by the Vinnell Corporation got underway at Cam Ranh Bay in June 1966. The Vinnell Corporation was awarded a contract to provide for the establishment of fully equipped 3rd and 4th echelon shops for the repair of engineer and marine equipment. The contractor was scheduled to become operational on 1 August 1966.

h. Request for cyclic overhaul of Radar Sets, AN/SP-4A, has been coordinated with USMACV. Sets meeting the overhaul criteria, outlined in SB 11-464, with Change 1, 27 Jan 66, will be evacuated to COMUS upon receipt of replacement sets. To date, four replacement sets have been requisitioned with two sets to be requisitioned monthly until all AN/SP-4A meeting the criteria of SB 11-464 have been replaced.

i. Due to a recent malfunction of a 175mm Gun, K107, in the Pleiku area, new breech mechanism criteria were placed in effect by MACV. The effect of this new criteria caused 80% of the K107 weapons to be declined. Action was taken to airlift the required number of breech mechanisms to Vietnam, and within less than two weeks, all weapons were firing once again.

j. Maintenance support planning during the quarter was centered on advance planning for direct and general support of divisional and nondivisional units scheduled for deployment through December 1966 and into 1967.

k. Conversion to the COSTA configuration became effective on 20 July 1966. At this time a shift of the 578th Maintenance Company (Light Equipment) (US) from Saigon Support Command to Cam Ranh Bay is the only major deviation of support units from the original plan. A shortfall in maintenance support capabilities will be experienced throughout the following quarter.

l. A study has been completed to determine requirements versus capabilities during the buildup phase. Study results confirm shortfalls, especially in heavy engineer support areas. This may pose a question as to the feasibility of deploying tactical units too far in advance of support units.

m. USMIV and 1st Logistical Command have established a program for evacuation of reparables out-of-country which are beyond in-country repair capability. Implementation of the program began on 11 June 1966. This will reduce backlogs in-country and promote the return of the repaired items back into inventory.

n. 1st Logistical Command Regulations 750-10 and 750-11 establishing a direct exchange program and implementing a controlled cannibalization program have been published and are expected to result in the lowering of equipment deadline rates.

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18. (C) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM.

a. During period 18 Jun 66 to 16 Jul 66, LTC Francis A. Sailer was Director of Petroleum. COL Robert M. Dill assumed duties as Director on 16 Jul.

b. In the field of day-to-day operations, it has been determined that, while petroleum directorates have been established in the support commands, these directorates have not been adequately staffed with persons knowledgeable in petroleum operations to effectively control all aspects of petroleum distribution within the support commands. Efforts are continuing to correct this shortcoming.

c. Use of C-130 aircraft outfitted as "Flying Tankers" has been discontinued by USAF as uneconomical, and primary reliance is being placed upon use of 500-gallon drums. It is anticipated that improved aerial logistics equipment will be received in country to re-established an aerial delivery capability for bulk product.

d. Tank farm construction has proceeded at a slow but steady pace. Currently operational are Tank Farm Number 1, Cam Ranh Bay, storing 172,000 bbls of aviation fuels; 62,000 bbls of the 72,000 programmed at Nha Trang, and 52,000 bbls of the initial 112,000 bbl tank farm at Qui Nhon. Construction has started on the Vung Tau tank farm, and the first tank fill there should occur in early August. The first increment of Tank Farm Number 2 at Cam Ranh Bay, some 180,000 bbls, has been started, as has construction of 9,000 bbls of the 50,000 bbls programmed for Pleiku. Yet to be started is Army tank farm construction at Thanh My Ahn, Long Binh, Cu Chi, My Tho, Phan Thiet, Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa and An Khe. Lack of shore tankage has forced continued reliance upon "floating storage", (Tankers kept at a location to deliver fuel as necessary thru assault submarine lines or hose lines). This is an uneconomical, but unavoidable, use of tanker vessels, under present storage limitations.

e. Personnel of the Quality Surveillance Branch of the petroleum Directorate conducted 34 quality surveillance liaison trips during period 1 May 1966 through 31 July 1966. There were nine reports of contamination during the quarter.

f. Bulk fuels consumption in thousands of barrels consumed by US Forces in II, III and IV CTZ, RVN, for this reporting period is shown below:

		MAY	JUN	JUL
Qui Nhon	JP-4	49.9	68.0	55.7
	AVGAS	14.0	22.4	25.8
	MOGAS	32.0	35.8	37.7
	DIESEL	25.9	28.9	28.4
Cam Ranh Bay	JP-4	218.8	236.6	304.7
	AVGAS	22.1	33.3	33.2
	MOGAS	32.2	36.2	46.4
	DIESEL	41.7	42.4	48.9

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Saigon	JP-4	MAY	JUN	JUL
	AVGAS	338.8	340.6	495.1
	MOGAS	71.1	33.6	33.7
	DIESEL	53.2	41.9	37.8
TOTAL		<u>58.0</u>	<u>46.3</u>	<u>47.0</u>
(II, III & IV CTZ)		957.7	966.0	1194.4
RVN				

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19. (U) DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES.

a. During the period 1 May 1966 to 31 July 1966, QM field bakeries produced 3,275,257 pounds of bread, QM laundries process 2,315,606 pounds of laundry, and 420,475 personnel used QM mobile bath facilities. Commercial contract laundries processed approximately 1,957,155 pounds of laundry during the period. Conversion factors used for the previous statistical period were erroneous, and figures were excessive.

b. The 96th and the 266th Supply and Service Battalions (DS), arrived with only 8 of 36 authorized tumblers, which completely negated their laundry capability.

c. Problem Areas.

(1) Laundry.

(a) Age of equipment, lack of parts, and units arriving in-country without their authorized laundry equipment still cause problems in the support of combat operations. Increasing reliance is being placed on contract laundry to fill the gap created by deadline time and lack of adequate field units to accomplish the mission. Support requirement is increasing.

(b) Requirement for laundry equipment was previously based on troop strength. As the number of small combat task forces increase, laundry units must be provided to task forces regardless of the number of personnel comprising the task force. This laundry equipment is not utilized to capacity; however, the service is required. To immediately relieve this situation, eight new laundry units have been requested to be airlifted to Vietnam from CONUS. Requests have been forwarded to support commands to determine additional field laundry equipment required to support base camps, cantonment areas, and task forces.

(2) Bath. Four sections of the 574th Quartermaster Company were transferred from Cam Ranh Bay to Saigon to meet increasing combat support requirements in the Saigon area of responsibility. An increasing amount of problems are being experienced with bath unit generators.

(3) Bakery. There are no major problems in this area except for the increasing age of the already old equipment. The 574th Quartermaster Company has requested ten ovens and ten mixing trailers for an in-country maintenance float.

d. Summary of Property Disposal Operations, Vietnam:

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(1) Program Management.

(a) On 11 April 1966 a Staff Property Disposal Officer was designated within the Services' Directorate and assigned the responsibility for development, management, and supervision of the Vietnam Property Disposal Program.

(b) With exception of Saigon, those activities scheduled for sales functions 1 July 1966 were not capable of assuming a sales mission due to the lack of facilities, office equipment, and personnel knowledgeable in sales contracting functions. Property Disposal Officers were advised to account for property to the Saigon Sales Office until further notice. In addition, Property Disposal Officers were informed that instructions would be published on preparation of property listings to be furnished the Sales Office and the schedule for submission.

(c) 1st Logistical Command Reg 755-2, Disposal of Supplies and Equipment, 11 June 1966, as amended by Message, AVLC QS-PD, C0461, 18 June 1966, established policy and procedures for the operation and control of Foreign Excess Sales Offices and holding activities for the disposal of foreign excess personal property. This regulation also defines responsibilities for Program Management, US Army Support and Sub-Area Commands, Foreign Excess Sales Office, and holding activities in accomplishing the property disposal program.

(d) In furtherance of program management and to insure uniform operating procedures, SOP's 755-20-1 through 755-20-15 were compiled, published, and forwarded on 2 July 1966 to all property disposal activities on an ad hoc basis for implementation.

(2) Program Development.

(a) Usable Property. The first phase of the sales program was implemented with the publication of Consolidated Invitation for Bid 67-1, 23 June 1966. It includes all usable property in property disposal accounts on 1 June 1966. Total acquisition cost is \$5,266,651.00. The program provides for the sales office at Saigon to conduct at least one consolidated sale each month and as many additional sales as may be necessary for holding activities: maintain a rate of disposal equal to or better than the rate of generation.

(b) Scrap and Waste. The second phase of the program was implemented with publication of Consolidated Invitation for Bid 67-2, 10 August 1966. This sales offering included all salable scrap and waste in property disposal accounts on 1 July 1966 plus estimated generations through 24 October 1966. Prior to the expiration of resulting contracts, another invitation for bid will be issued which includes estimated generations of salable scrap and waste during the period 25 October 1966

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through 24 October 1967. This consolidated sale will result in annual term contracts. Through this method of sale, the property is committed for sale before it is generated, the contractor is required to make payment and remove property when accumulations reach a predetermined amount, and the storage problem within disposal yards is eliminated.

e. Graves Registration.

(1) The GRREG platoon of the 229th Supply and Service Company was sent to work at the US Army Mortuary, Tan Son Nhut. The GRREG platoon of the 228th Supply and Service Company is working in conjunction with the GRREG section from the 506th Supply and Service Company (DS).

(2) The 221st Supply and Service Company at Cam Ranh Bay and the 226th Supply and Service Company at Tuy Hoa are operating graves registration collecting points in those areas.

(3) Action was taken for the sections to requisition chain saws, if needed, for search and recovery operations in areas with heavy underbrush.

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20. (U) DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SUPPLY

a. Class I

Four reefer vessels had been used on a cyclic basis to transport freeze and chill subsistence cargo to RVN depots. The in-country time for each vessel has been limited to 18 days so that an interval of 15 days between ships could be maintained. Four vessels were not enough to provide sufficient vessel bottom space to transport all perishable cargo required in RVN and 16 days in-country did not provide sufficient import time to insure discharge of all cargo. An additional reefer vessel has been added to the cyclic run, without altering the interval between ships. The in-country time has been expanded from 16 days to 24 days.

b. Class II and IV

(1) The materiel handling equipment standardization program for Vietnam began in March 1966 and consists of two phases. Phase I of the program has been completed Phase II is expected to begin during the second quarter of FY67.

(2) A standardization program is scheduled to begin during the second quarter, FY67 for construction type tractors and scrapers.

(3) Generators in Vietnam are being standardized by models ranging from 1-5KW to 100 KW.

(4) USAMEC has recently offered a 40 ton crane for standardization in Vietnam.

(5) Consumption Rates: The active wartime consumption factors contained in TM 710-1 do not reflect the combat consumption losses experienced in Vietnam. Multiplying the rate in TM 710-1 by two has provided a realistic rate for most types of combat vehicles and many other end items.

(6) The assignment of project codes to assist in monitoring movements of multipackaged shipments has proven to be advantageous.

(7) New Series Radios: On 18 June, with completion of the 25th Inf Div (-), all divisions and separate Brigades in RVN had been converted to the new series of FM tactical radios.

(8) A project is in process to expedite the procurement of supplies for Class IV projects for the 1st Signal Brigade. This project involves close coordination between this Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade, 2nd Logistical Command and the CG, USAECOM.

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(9) Refrigerators, 1600 cu ft. 391 refrigerators (1600 cu ft) have been received for bulk refrigeration storage to depots and Class I supply points throughout VN. Ninety three are operational and the remainder are being assembled.

(10) Ice Plants, 15 ton. Twenty-four ice plants of the forty-one programmed have arrived and are currently under construction. Each has the rated capacity of producing 15 tons of ice per day.

(11) Howitzer, 105MM. The lack of repair parts support continued to plague units equipped with the 105MM Howitzer M102. To alleviate the situation push packages of repair parts were requested for the units equipped with this weapon. The packages were assembled by AMC and shipped to Vietnam during June.

(12) An AMC quick reaction assistance team arrived in-country on 19 June for 90 days TDY at Cam Ranh Bay Depot. This team is composed of selected Department of the Army Civilians. Extensive progress in the areas of planning, supply management and training of military personnel is evident as a result of this team's effort.

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21. (FOUO) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION

a. Rail. USARV tasked the 1st Logistical Command to develop a comprehensive rail plan which would include maintenance of existing line, construction of new trackage (right of ways), car requirements and the management of the rail system. The results of this study are being implemented progressively. As shown below, the month of July indicates the increased emphasis being placed upon this mode of transport.

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>		
		<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
SAIGON	Di An/Bien Hoa/Xuan Loc/Thu Duc	200.5	361.9	3313.8
NHA TRANG	Phan Rang/Dalat/Thap Cham	794.0	891.0	1275.5
QUI NHON	Phu Cat	0	0	702.0

b. Port.

(1) Port operations and tonnage throughput increased progressively from May through July. In July record high tonnages were discharged at Saigon, Qui Nhon and Jam Ranh Bay. Inclosure 17 contains statistics on port operations. Inclosure 18 reflects ship status.

(2) A requirement for high speed transmission of ocean manifests has been recognized and this command is in the process of establishing procedures whereby all ocean manifests from CONUS ports will be transceived into this theater.

(3) Recently, Vietnam ports have been experiencing poor packing and crating of cargo originating from CONUS vendors. Action has been taken to report such instances to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. Results of the improvement action taken by MTMTS will be closely monitored by this command.

(4) On 4 July 1966 the 4th Transportation Command assumed the responsibility for discharge and delivery to first destination from Saigon port all military and USAID/CPA (Central Procurement Agency) cargo. This management action was necessary because the conflict of interests among various agencies was resulting in poor utilization of port facilities and inadequate programming of labor and other resources. The Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command will also be the Senior Advisor to the Saigon Port Authority. So far this consolidation has been carried out smoothly and the rapport between the military and the Saigon Port Authority has been excellent.

c. Vehicle. Truck performance figures are contained in Inclosure 19.

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(1) The organizational phase of the Transportation Motor Pools has now passed into the developmental phase. Vehicle status is as follows:

	<u>Total Vehicles Authorized</u>	<u>On Hand 1 Feb</u>	<u>On Hand 30 Apr</u>	<u>On Hand 30 June</u>
SAIGON	833	104	649	701
VUNG TAU	90	7	27	35
CAM RANH	157	0	2	97
NHA TRANG	219	6	74	104
QUI NHON	304	41	112	121

(2) In June, Philco Corporation began contractual operation and management of the Centralized Commercial Vehicle Parts Warehouse in Saigon. This warehouse will provide commercial vehicle parts resupply for all US Army Vietnam commercial design vehicles for a total of over 16,000 line items. The US Navy and US Air Force have also shown an interest in participating in this program.

(3) The progress of the 240 government-owned, contractor operated, 2-ton trucks exceeds expectations. On 3 May, Equipment Rental Inc., a division of McLean Industries, began operations with twenty trucks, almost two months ahead of the expected starting date of 1 July. At present, Equipment Rental Inc., is operating about 175 trucks on day and night shifts in the Saigon Area, clearing approximately 2,000 S/T from the port daily.

(4) On 13 July the Motor Ship "New York" arrived in Saigon with 200 International Harvester 10-ton trucks for the 200 truck contract of Equipment Rental Inc. Operations began on 20 July and it is expected that full operations will be implemented by 15 August. These two Equipment Rental Inc., contracts will provide approximately 7,500 short tons per day of port, beach and depot clearance capability in Saigon.

(5) USATSA (RO/RO) trailers began operations in Vietnam in April 1966. The trailers are loaded in Okinawa and transported to Vietnam by conventional and RO/RO vessels. Initially, trailer control measures were not adequate. In July, under the sponsorship of the Director of Transportation, control and management procedures were formalized among MACV-TMA, USARV, the RO/RO Control Team, the 1st Logistical Command, and the Seventh Air Force. Control of all RO/RO trailers will be exercised by MACV-TMA since the consignees include all Military Services and Civilian Agencies within Vietnam.

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d. Air. A survey on the current utilization of the 1st Logistical Commands CV-2 with delivery of high priority cargoes revealed unacceptable utilization when used on a scheduled basis. The CV-2 has been removed from a scheduled basis and it is now on a mission basis.

e. Coordination of Civilian Contracts. Due to a shortfall of transportation units and equipment, civilian contracts have been established to increase transportation capability as shown.

<u>FIRM</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS</u>	<u>STARTED OPERATIONS</u>	<u>SERVICES PROVIDED</u>
Alaska Barge & Transportation	Vung Tau	1 May 66	Discharge, lighterage and port clearance
	Nha Trang	7 Apr 66	Discharge, lighterage and port clearance
	All Ports	Apr 66	Intra-coastal shipment and discharge
Han Jin Trans Company	Qui Nhon	26 May 66	Discharge, lighterage port clearance, local haul and limited line haul.
Equipment Rental Inc. Division of McLean Industries	Saigon	20 Jul 66	Port clearance and local haul by 200 contractor owned 10 ton trucks.
Equipment Rental Inc. Division of McLean Industries	Saigon	3 May 66	Operation and maintenance of 240 government furnished trucks for port clearance and local haul.
Luzon Stevedore Company Huebeck Inc.	Saigon	Jan 66	Harbor and river lighterage.

AB&T contract has been performing at Nha Trang and Vung Tau as programmed. The AB&T contract is controlled by the US Navy through MSTs. Han Jin began slowly due to equipment and personnel shortages. Han Jin presently has most of its equipment and is expected to hit contract requirement performance by the end of August. Equipment Rental Inc., has started operations earlier than expected and is performing adequately. Luzon Stevedore Company and Huebeck Inc., have produced the equipment contracted for.

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f. Status of Conex Containers. A requirement was given by USARV to obtain the status of all CONEX containers in Vietnam, in order to ascertain that sufficient containers were available within the system. The status is as follows:

<u>CONEX STATUS</u>	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>CAM RANH</u>	<u>QUI NHON</u>	<u>NHA TRANG</u>	<u>VUNG TAU</u>
Total Required	1371	647	3464	1136	350
Total On Hand	1371	591	2775	1136	342
Total Serviceable	1332	568	2377	977	338

The status of CONEX containers has been forwarded to US Army Vietnam.

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22. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MEDICAL SERVICES

a. During the reporting period the Medical Directorate was staffed as follows:

(1) 1-30 May two Plans Officers, one Medical Supply Officer, one Medical Corps Officer, and three enlisted men.

(2) On 10 June Colonel James A. Wier, the Medical Director was reassigned to US/RV and was replaced by Colonel Ray L. Miller. Colonel Miller assumed duties as the Director of Medical Service and Commanding Officer of the 44th Medical Brigade.

(3) On 1 July the Medical Supply Officer was transferred for duty to the 44th Medical Brigade. The Directorate continued to function with three Officers until 24 July at which time a Dietitian was placed on special duty to the Directorate as advisor to the Medical Director (Major MCS 3420 Medical Specialist Corps).

b. Plans and Operations:

(1) The responsibility of this area continued to be more clearly defined during the months of May and June. During the preceding quarter lines of responsibility between this office and the operations section of the 44th Medical Brigade had not been clear.

(2) With the change of duty of the Supply Officer, the Directorate lost responsibility for supervision of medical supply activities. The Directorate Staff was also relieved of the responsibility of coordinating construction. Thus, the primary function of the Directorate became planning.

(3) During this period, eighteen units were processed in country. Included were two surgical hospitals and one medical group.

(4) Five units were diverted from their originally intended locations due to changes in locations of tactical units.

(5) The most difficult problem in planning for incoming units was that of attaining approval for locations of hospitals. Hospital locations require approval by MACV. The Directorate Staff continues to expedite these requests.

(6) Another problem area during this period has been relocation of units from Saigon to the Long Binh area. Construction efforts in the Long Binh area have not kept pace with the relocation schedule, consequently some medical units were not able to comply with the relocation schedule.

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(7) During this period the Directorate Staff conducted two medical troop list evaluations. As a result the Directorate was able to recommend that four units be deleted from the programmed troop list. If approved, this reduction will result in significant savings of critical medical resources.

(8) During the period 28-29 July the Directorate hosted a conference attended by all major medical unit commanders. The conference was monitored by the medical brigade and the agenda included all aspects of medical operations in Vietnam. The conference was considered highly satisfactory and more are planned.

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: 23. (U) HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT.

a. Captain Ronald C. Fayette assumed command of the detachment on 24 May 1966, replacing Captain Vester L. Shuman.

b. The new billets were completed in June and the mess hall opened on 1 July.

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SECTION II PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

1. (U) CHAPLAIN.

a. Item: Area Religious Coverage. Activation of COSTAR direct support units and inactivation of technical service units resulted in a momentary loss of 7 chaplain spaces.

Discussion: The activation of direct support units produced TOEs without chaplain spaces. This reorganization did not alter the need for chaplain coverage in the areas of troop density. To maintain adequate religious coverage and to alleviate the immediate morale problem among chaplains who were suddenly without firm assignments, the incumbent chaplains were picked up in an excess status by the losing organizations and provided use of chaplain TCE equipment authorized by the previous tables. As the general support battalions and groups were activated, the chaplains were phased into authorized spaces.

Observation: During the transitional phase of COSTAR, Support Command Supervisory Chaplains must maintain close coordination with Commanders, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, SP&O, and Chaplains to ensure the continued adequacy of area religious coverage.

b. Item: Chaplain Supply Experience. Chaplains with little or no supply training or requisitioning experience are coming into the command. In many instances supervisory chaplains are woefully ignorant of supply procedures and authorized allowances.

Discussion: Despite chaplain supply advisories, letters, reproductions of TAs applicable to chaplain items, and regional and personal conferences, calls received throughout the period indicated that many chaplains still believe that the Staff Chaplain operates his own independent depot upon which chaplain customers may directly requisition. During entrance interviews chaplains either were unable to recall the proper procedures for requisitioning supplies and appointments for chapel facilities or gave erroneous answers.

Observation: Chaplains need realistic training in supply procedures. This training must be area or country oriented to acquaint the chaplain with such factors as the adverse effect of climactic conditions on certain chaplain items, and the peculiarities of a combat zone as compared with a zone enjoying a peace-time posture. While ideally this instruction can be best conducted at the Chaplain School, there is nothing to preclude the chaplain's discovering the information for himself through coordination with knowledgeable supply personnel and the reading of available literature.

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c. Item: Self-Help Chapels. Through the self-help program units and chaplains have constructed 36 chapel facilities. 18 more are programmed.

Discussion: Engineer specifications and recommendations for chapel construction under the self-help program are available to units and chaplains authorized to construct chapel facilities. There is evidence that engineer guidance has not always been sought.

Observation: If a chapel is to receive maintenance support from engineer sources, the facility must be constructed in accordance with engineer standards.

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2. (C) PROVOST MARSHAL

ITEM: Security Guards

DISCUSSION: The lack of security guards is a problem that is inherent throughout the 1st Logistical Command.

OBSERVATION: The problem has been partially solved by hiring CIDG (indigenous) personnel. Requisitions for security guards have been forwarded to and approved by higher headquarters. However, until the guards are in-country the problem will remain critical.

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3. (U) OPERATIONS.

a. Item: Present packing and rigging procedures for G-12D parachute make recovery difficult in Vietnam.

Discussion: Present instructions for packing the G-12D parachute provide for the 68 inch pilot parachute assembly (including static line and deployment bag) to break away from the aircraft when the load leaves the aircraft. The pilot chute performs the function of an air brake which pulls the deployment bag of the G-12D parachute from the canopy. The G-12D deployment bag with the attached pilot parachute then breaks away from the large canopy and falls separately. The separation of the G-12D deployment bag from the canopy increases the danger of the bag falling into inaccessible areas which make recovery difficult or impossible.

Observation: Pack procedures for the G-12D parachute should be modified as follows:

- (1) Do not prepare the static line of the pilot parachute for break-away. Attach the static line clevis to the static line loop.
- (2) Attach the apex lines of the pilot chute to the apex attaching loop on the pilot chute with one turn single thread, ticket No 3.
- (3) Substitute a 60 inch connector strap between the canopy bridle loop and the deployment bag bridle loop for the single turn Type III Nylon Cord.

b. Item: Unit Equipment.

Discussion: Units are deploying to RVN with equipment beyond their required needs causing unnecessary handling, transportation and storage problems.

Observation: Deploying units should be advised not to deploy with equipment and cargo beyond their authorization.

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4. (U) ENGINEER.

a. Item: MACV advisory site construction.

Discussion: Inflationary trends in Vietnam resulted in bids ranging from 200% to 500% in excess of the Government cost estimates for construction by local contractors.

Observation: Area Engineers were directed to provide government furnished materials, except for sand, gravel, concrete blocks, and bricks, for construction at MACV advisory sites. Materials to be issued from O&MA funded stocks or minor items to be locally procured from AIK funds.

b. Items Current authorized stockage list for construction materials is inadequate.

Discussion: During this period, it became apparent the stockage list presently in use left out many items and carried many items not necessary for the construction program. As demand data has been developed for this program and the MCA program has been analyzed, items have been added to the ASL and items have been deleted from the ASL to bring the ASL in line with the construction program that exists.

Observation: Demand data must constantly be scrutinized in order to retain purity of the stockage list.

c. Item: Shipping status on incoming shipments is too voluminous and confusing to be of valid assistance to the depots.

Discussion: This aspect of control of incoming shipments has become a very important part of the entire construction materials program as transshipment in-country has grown to be a large problem. By constantly monitoring the incoming shipments, manifests, and cargo loading information, this branch has been able to relieve some of the pressure developing on Saigon Port.

Observation: This headquarters must continue to monitor shipping status and disseminate it to the appropriate agencies.

d. Items Control of supplies by 18th Engineer Brigade is an inefficient and unworkable system.

Discussion: Visits to the engineer construction materials yards and their respective headquarters confirmed the view that the control heretofore exercised by the local engineer brigade units, virtual complete issue control, was unworkable. This resulted in the strong recommendation that this control be transferred to the 1st Logistical Command, under

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the staff supervision of the Construction Materials Branch. This approach in essence, was affirmed by USARV and implementing this control decision now becomes the section's major concern.

Observation: Expeditious action must be continued towards the goal of establishing this command in a firm position of control over construction material storage yards.

e. Item: Project stock YTB was not required for any specific project.

Discussion: Due to the vast amount of MCA construction already performed using available materials (O&MA for the most part) and the need for flexibility in using available MCA project coded material on the ground, the decision was made to break down the YTB project stock, putting it on the shelf to be used as needed for MCA projects.

Observation: Other project stock packages must be reviewed to determine if project requirement exists.

f. Item: Personnel for real estate office operations.

Discussion: Most real estate offices in the US Army are staffed with Department of the Army personnel. Under wartime conditions, TM 5-300 prescribes that real estate offices are established by the theater Army engineer. Normally, an engineer real estate course is established to train personnel for these duties. However, experience to date indicates that the necessary skills can be developed by on-the-job training methods.

Observation: Normally available Corps of Engineer personnel can successfully be assigned to a real estate office. Adequate and timely Staff Judge Advocate assistance must be available however. Enlisted personnel with finance and accounting skills are desirable.

g. Item: Real estate office operations.

Discussion: It became apparent that leasing offices of the US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, American Embassy, USAID, and civilian contractors with US Government contracts were competing on the real estate market with an undesirable effect of inflating rental rates. Coordination at the working level was sought by the American Embassy and led to a mutually satisfactory set of rules and procedures that quickly equalized the US position on the real estate market. Close liaison has continued and regular meetings are held at the working level to insure continuity of policy and protection of the taxpayer's interests.

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Observation: That direct communications and liaison between all US agencies is necessary in country-wide real estate operations because of the political and economic effect of rapid and heavy expenditures on a real estate market in a given locality.

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5. (U) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION.

a. Surveillance Activities.

Item: Suspension of Ammunition.

Discussion: Various reasons require ammunition contained in certain lot numbers to be suspended from use except for emergency combat use. Communication failures may prevent all interested parties from receiving this information.

Observation: Communication loops must be completely closed when directives suspending ammunition are transmitted. This loop cannot be considered to be closed until the headquarters issuing the directive has received a reply acknowledging receipt of the transmission and has been furnished a report of on-hand quantities of the suspended ammunition, to include negative reports.

b. Explosive Ordnance Explosive Activities.

(1) Item: Booby Trap VC Grenade.

Discussion: On 21 May 1966 the Staff EOD Officer, MACV recovered a manufactured VC booby trap hand grenade. The fuze and safety lever are so constructed that when the safety pin is withdrawn the safety lever does not fly off thus functioning the grenade as with a normal hand grenade. Instead, when pressure is applied to the safety lever to safe the grenade in the normal manner the lever moves toward the grenade body and functions the fuze detonating the grenade instantaneously with no delay time.

Observation: All explosive ordnance encountered, enemy or friendly forces manufacture, must be treated with extreme caution, especially if its origin is unknown and it may have been in enemy hands. In the case of hand grenades especially, the safety lever must be immobilized in the position found.

(2) Item: Booby trapped US Bomb Fin Assembly.

Discussion: On 3 July 1966, two EOD men of the 42d Ordnance Detachment (EOD), providing EOD support to the 1st Infantry Division near Quan Loi, RVN, were wounded by a booby trapped US Bomb Fin Assembly. The bomb fins had been placed and dug-in in such a manner as to give the appearance of a normally impacted "dud" US bomb. Using normal EOD procedures the NCO's probed under the fins for the bomb in order to positively identify the fuze. The bomb was not present. Assuming that it had torn away from the fins, the EOD men then carefully moved the fins which released an enemy placed hand grenade. The men hit the dirt; the grenade exploded causing the minor injuries.

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Observation: Apparently the enemy has begun to recognize the importance we place on denying him the use of our "dud fired" ordnance and is attempting to deter our recovery operations. Personnel locating "dud fired" ordnance should not disturb it in any way unless absolutely necessary, and then, by some remote means to activate booby traps if present.

c. Ammunition Supply Activities.

(1) Item: Cross Leveling of Stocks.

Discussion: Cross leveling of ammunition stocks between depots in-country are hampered by lack of roads. In this type of warfare, roads cannot be relied upon to be used as a primary route for movement of supplies. Air and water are the only reliable routes for movement of supplies. The heavy tonnage of ammunition further limits the use of air due to the limit of flights per day that can land at a given airfield. Maximum emphasis must be placed on timely movement of heavy tonnage of ammunition by water.

Observation: The Director of Ammunition must anticipate in-country cross leveling requirements between depots early enough to allow time for water shipment. Air shipments should be reserved for emergency resupply.

(2) Item: Lift Capability of Ammunition Units.

Discussion: The sandy soil, extreme heat, and high humidity have reduced the efficiency of personnel and caused higher than normal deadline of materiel handling equipment. These factors have at times reduced the overall lift capability of ammunition companies by 50%.

Observation: Commanders must be alert to causes and effects of heat fatigue as well as preventive measures and must follow the advice of the Medical Corps to maintain maximum efficiency of the ammunition troops. Aggressive preventive maintenance must be performed on materiel handling equipment.

d. Stock Control.

(1) Item: Trip flares, Illuminating Rounds and Pyrotechnics.

Discussion: Once issue data was collected, 1st Logistical Command Stock Control realized SB38-26 rates inaccurately reflected requirements for flares, illuminating rounds and pyrotechnics in Vietnam.

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Issue rates were twice those contained in the SB. Consequently, in coordination with USARV and MACV, changes to our stockage and theater required supply rates were recommended to USARPAC. These rates were published in USARPAC Reg 710-15. Data collected since publication of the regulation indicates a continuing rise in issue rates. Further changes in these rates are being recommended.

Observation: Issue experience indicates, that for this type of warfare, large requirements for these ammunition items exist. Future planning should include larger quantities in basic loads and theater stockage.

(2) Item: Experimental Ammunition.

Discussion: Tactical units and organizations in Vietnam such as JRATA and ACTIV are requesting experimental or specially modified ammunition from CONUS agencies. Stock Control, 1st Logistical Command has been requested to track down many incoming shipments that have been misdirected.

Observation: These organizations should funnel requests through USARV to the 182d Ordnance Detachment (SC). The Stock Control Detachment, which has information on stocks in-country and arrival of shipments, can monitor these requests and insure pick up of incoming ammunition and take follow-up action where required.

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6. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

a. ITEM: Maintenance Planning

DISCUSSION: The rapid troop buildup throughout the year along with conversion to COSTAR configuration on 20 July 1966 has complicated maintenance support planning. Current COSTAR TO&Es fail to give factors or equipment workload equivalents. Because of this, the job of determining a support unit's capability is extremely difficult. While this computation has been accomplished on a mathematical basis, the accuracy of such an approach may be questionable. Information in the 101 series manuals, which is largely based upon WWII and Korean experience, has to be adjusted for application to Vietnam combat conditions.

OBSERVATION: Troop and base planning for required maintenance support where there is no fixed front line and no continuous secured road net becomes difficult. While the base support area concept works rather well, planning must be continuous to assure that sub areas are designated and teams dispatched as required for unit back up support.

b. ITEM: Logistics Data

DISCUSSION: The field of logistics data includes the functions of collection, compilation, and analysis of data relative to logistical operations. These data include equipment densities and equipment disposition within support commands, data relative to repair parts usage and resulting requirements for input of sufficient quantities of parts into Vietnam, and equipment serviceability data required to form a basis for evaluation of combat service support and to effect orderly provisioning for new equipment input rates. Initially, all data gathered resulted from local input reports which were designated to produce necessary management information. As the scope of combat operations increased in magnitude, it became apparent that manual techniques for statistics gathering were far from adequate to provide necessary data. It is increasingly more evident that machine techniques must be employed. A study of requirements and existing reporting systems revealed that data resulting from the Army Equipment Records System (TAERS) and Equipment Status Reports compiled under the provisions of AR 711-5 would provide a major portion of the logistics data required for effective maintenance management. In conjunction with technical assistance personnel from the Army Maintenance Board, basic programs for collection, analysis, and utilization of these reports were established.

OBSERVATION: Although manual data collection utilizing local input reports will provide maintenance management data sufficient to manage small scale operations, such a system is totally insufficient for theater-wide maintenance and supply management problems. Of necessity, machine capability must be utilized and maximum use made of data generated from TAERS and Equipment Reports. It is evident that a Directorate of Maintenance at a logistical command level requires personnel trained in machine techniques to insure proper collection, storage, and analysis of maintenance management data.

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c. ITEM: Project Boomerang.

DISCUSSION: Project Boomerang was designed to evacuate critical items from Vietnam to CONUS for repair and return to Vietnam on an accelerated basis. 50 each power generators were evacuated by priority air shipment from Qui Nhon, RVN, to Sharpe Army Depot under Project Boomerang during the period 13-17 May 1966. 21 additional generators were evacuated from Qui Nhon on 9 July 1966 under this program. The 50 generators evacuated on the initial shipment could not be repaired and returned within the anticipated 30 day turnaround objective and were therefore replaced by air shipment from CONUS of 50 each standard model 10kw generators.

OBSERVATION: Expedited repair and return of critical items within 30 days under Project Boomerang is a significant method of maintaining a high state of readiness in this command. It is premature to evaluate the overall success of Project Boomerang at this time because of our limited experience. Further shipments of critical items are planned.

d. ITEM: Standardization Program for Material Handling Equipment.

DISCUSSION: Phase 1 of the program to standardize material handling equipment (forklifts) and warehouse tractors was 83% completed in RVN during the last quarter. The 1st phase of the program consists of 720 forklifts and warehouse tractors composed of 4 models of forklifts and 1 model of warehouse tractor. Results of standardization are recognized by lower deadline rates and the reduced period of time the items remain on deadline.

OBSERVATION: Advantages of having standard models of MHE include a reduction of the quantity of repair parts required for stockage at all levels, increased maintenance effectiveness resulting from specialization, and rapid identification of problem areas and trends.

e. ITEM: Standardization of Generators.

DISCUSSION: The first of the standard model generators arrived in-country with the air shipment of 100 ea International Ferment 10KW generators in June 66. Receipt of the 100 generators helped to alleviate the power generator shortage in this category which was caused by shortage of repair parts. Shipping data of 400 more of the standard 10KW model has been received.

OBSERVATION: Standardization of generators will significantly reduce the high deadline rate caused by insufficient repair parts for the numerous makes and models.

f. ITEM: Vinnell Corporation Maintenance Contract.

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DISCUSSION: Construction of maintenance facilities at Cam Ranh Bay is progressing. However, the contractor will not be operational on 1 August as originally scheduled. The contract provides for 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance of engineer and marine equipment at Cam Ranh Bay. Additional facilities at other locations may be established at the option of the US Government.

OBSERVATION: Establishment of contract maintenance at Cam Ranh Bay relieves the shortfall of engineer and marine maintenance capability in RVN. The option for additional sites and increased scope of work provides flexibility to the maintenance program.

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7. (U) DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES:

a. Laundry:

Item: Problem encountered in supporting combat task forces.

Discussion: Equipment needs are normally based on troop strength, and laundry sections are programmed accordingly. However, laundry sections are committed to support combat task forces without regard to the strength of the combat task force. The use of the capability factor for determining requirements for laundry sections in-country is not in consonance with troop employment. Laundry sections will be required to support the constantly increasing number of combat task forces. Therefore, additional field laundry equipment is needed. When not used in support of combat operations, these units will process items being done by commercial contract, thus reducing the expenditure of piastres. Requirements will be submitted to USARV explaining our concept of operations to support combat elements which are widely scattered throughout RVN.

Observation: Lack of road nets, low priority for aircraft space, and weather conditions demand laundry support in the immediate areas of operation.

b. Graves Registration:

Item: Disposition of clothing and ID card and tags at time of death.

Discussion: Current practice is that remains are being shipped to the US Army Mortuary, Tan Son Nhut, wearing the clothes in which the deceased was killed. Also being shipped with the remains are the identification tags and card. All personal effects are still disposed of by summary courts officers and not shipped to the mortuary.

Observation: Shipping remains fully clothed and with identification card and tags attached affords a much greater degree of positive identification of the remains. Clothing is removed at the mortuary and disposed of in an incinerator. The identification card is attached to fingerprint cards and identification tags accompany remains.

c. Property Disposal:

(1) Item: Consolidated Sales.

Discussion: Consolidated sales on a separately scheduled basis for usable property and scrap is a sales media whereby more property is sold by fewer sales offerings. However, there is a saving in the number of invitations required. Sales of usable property are on a monthly basis, and invitations to bid are only provided to prospective purchasers who have indicated an interest in the items listed therein. Heretofore, invitations to bid were forwarded to each addressee on the bidders' list without regard to the type of property offered for sale.

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Observation: Consolidated sales include more property on fewer invitations to bid and are more economical than an individual sale for each holding activity.

(2) Item: Issues from Property Disposal to CSD/MACV.

Discussion: The CSD/MACV has a rebuild capability in Vietnam, within certain limitations, for vehicles and other major items of equipment. Heretofore, the CSD/MACV had purchased equipment from the US Government or commercial sources. Since CSD is a recognized DOD activity, it is authorized issues from property disposal channels on a nonreimbursable basis. Action has been initiated to establish an account for CSD with disposal activities, and since June 1966, property with an acquisition cost of over one million dollars has been issued. In addition to this savings is the amount represented by handling and shipping charges from out-of-country sources to Vietnam.

Observation: Redistribution of disposable property to authorized activities is a means of reducing inventories without costs of sales and constitutes monetary savings when issues are utilized for like items which were programmed for requisition.

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8. (U) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION

a. Item: The increased use of rail will alleviate some of the port, beach, and depot clearance problems at Saigon, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon.

Discussion: The gradual increased utilization of the Vietnamese National Railway in July resulted in higher tonnages being moved by rail in the Saigon area and Nha Trang. This increased use of rail will greatly aid Saigon Port (especially in view of the recently acquired USAID mission) in the distribution of cargo to the depots and units.

Observation: The use of the recently completed Qui Nhon - Phu Cat railroad line has resulted in more efficient beach clearance operations and has released much needed truck capability for use on the truck line haul from Qui Nhon to An Khe and Pleiku.

b. Item: The assumption of total responsibility for discharge and port clearance of USAID/CPA cargo by the 4th Transportation Command will result in more efficient, controlled management of Saigon Port assets available to the US Military.

Discussion: Prior to the assumption of USAID/CPA responsibility by the 4th Transportation Command, Saigon Port was beset by various governmental agencies (Military, USAID, Commercial, RVNAF, Saigon Port Authority) all competing with one another for berthing priorities, and labor.

Observation: The assumption of the USAID/CPA mission by the 4th Transportation Command will result in better utilization of port assets available to the military and fix the responsibility of achieving tonnage objectives upon one command. Increased efficiency is expected to result from this consolidation.

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SECTION II PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) CHAPLAIN. It is recommended that chaplains be more thoroughly instructed in supply procedures and authorizations. This instruction must envisage problems peculiar to the various theaters and zones of action.

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2. (U) Engineer

That the Chief of Engineers prepare a Manual for Real Estate Operations in Overseas Commands. The US Navy manual "Real Estate Administration", NAVDOCKS P-73, December 1960 is a useful publication, but does not furnish examples of DD, DA, or ENG forms used by the Army. A broadened and updated TM 5-300 would be desirable if it were enlarged to include extracts of Public Law, sample forms, typical TDA organizations for the field army and logistical commands, and an index of applicable Army Regulations.

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3. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

- a. That the necessary effort be expended to insure that repair and return of critical items within 30 days is effected to make Project Boomerang a workable program.
- b. That standardization of equipment within RVN be effected wherever possible to reduce maintenance problems and to prevent overload of the supply system with excessive requirements for repair parts.
- c. Commercial rebuild facilities should, when necessary, be used as a supplement to existing army facilities to aid in the removal of equipment from deadline status.
- d. That Combat Developments Command initiate studies to determine the capabilities of COSTAR support units and publish these as guidance for troop planning.
- e. That more individual soldiers be trained in the techniques of Automatic Data Processing Systems and their application to maintenance management. Further recommend that COSTAR TO&Es be modified to include the ADPS skilled MOS.

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4. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM

a. Recommend that officers and noncommissioned officers trained and experienced in petroleum distribution (HOS 4960 and 56C) be used in the area of petroleum supply and not be directed to other duties.

b. Recommend that the adequacy of the communications net in RVN be examined to see if additional communications capability can be made available for control of petroleum tender vessels.

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5. (FOUO) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION

It is recommended that continued efforts be made to open and secure the rail and highway LOC's in order that larger tonnages can be moved inland and laterally within Vietnam. Once this is accomplished, the ports will be better able to devote more resources toward the discharge of intertheater vessels and some of the intracoastal sealift may be reduced, resulting in more deep draft tonnage throughput and less port congestion and deep draft backlogs.

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1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND STRENGTH AUTHORIZED, ACTUAL AND PROJECT AUTHORIZED

1ST LOG	AUTH STRENGTH				ACTUAL STRENGTH				PROJECTED AUTH STRENGTH			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
MAY	2705	275	25978	28958	2659	285	26559	29503	2587	287	26183	29057
JUNE	2557	288	26670	29515	2844	316	28035	31195	2677	305	27180	30162
JULY	2785	329	28647	31761	3107	333	32480	35920	2863	338	29463	32664
SAIGON												
MAY	1135	110	9805	11050	1096	101	9787	10984	1150	121	9912	11183
JUNE	1200	120	10097	11417	1246	124	9993	11365	1221	131	10337	11689
JULY	1282	127	10128	11537	1255	111	10755	12121	1323	135	10879	12328

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1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND STRENGTH AUTHORIZED, ACTUAL AND PROJECT AUTHORIZED

Page 3

CAM RATH BAY	AUTH STRENGTH				ACTUAL STRENGTH				PROJECTED AUTH STRENGTH			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
MAY	513	102	7642	8356	629	126	7564	8319	646	102	7687	8435
JUNE	513	110	8095	8318	619	127	9379	10125	645	110	8146	8901
JULY	618	125	10027	10770	669	126	10523	11318	650	125	10052	10827
QUL NICH	AUTH STRENGTH				ACTUAL STRENGTH				PROJECTED AUTH STRENGTH			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
MAY	613	56	8220	8889	704	54	8692	9450	622	57	8369	9048
JUNE	655	54	8343	9052	773	54	8207	9034	544	57	8582	9181
JULY	676	61	7784	8521	830	53	9174	10057	680	61	7820	8561

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1st Logistics Command
Personnel Rotations and Replacements

	MAY 1966		JUNE 1966		JULY 1966	
	ROTATIONS	REPLACEMENTS	ROTATIONS	REPLACEMENTS	ROTATIONS	REPLACEMENTS
HHD, 1st Log Comd	62	43	100	188	80	100
Seigon	376	582	696	943	682	1170
Qui Nhon	568	979	456	665	498	1010
Cam Ranh Bay	1027	457	606	1232	772	1195
TOTAL	2033	2061	1860	3028	2032	3475

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1st Logistical Command
Reports of Casualties: Deaths

Saigon

	<u>Hostile</u>	<u>SI</u>	<u>Accident</u>	<u>Natural</u>	<u>Injuries/ Disease</u>	<u>Total</u>
May	1		1			
June	3		2	1	6	9
July	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{0}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{2}{4}$	$\frac{10}{16}$	$\frac{14}{29}$

Qui Nhon

May	1		2		6	9
June			3		2	5
July	$\frac{1}{1}$		$\frac{1}{6}$		$\frac{1}{9}$	$\frac{2}{16}$

Cam Ranh Bay

May		1	2	1	5	9
June		1			2	3
July	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{7}{7}$	$\frac{1}{13}$

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REENLISTMENT STATISTICS

May 1966

1st Term RA	7
Career RA	58
AUS	3
USAR	1
TOTAL	<u>69</u>

June 1966

1st Term RA	9
Career RA	58
AUS	1
USAR	1
TOTAL	<u>69</u>

July 1966

1st Term RA	10
Career RA	60
AUS	3
USAR	2
TOTAL	<u>75</u>

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1st Logistical Command Promotion Allocation and Appointment by Area

HHD 1st Log	Aloc	<u>May</u> APT	Unused	Aloc	<u>June</u> APT	Unused	Aloc	<u>July</u> APT	Unused
E-9	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E-8	3	3	0	3	3	0	0	0	0
E-7	7	7	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
E-6	6	6	0	9	9	0	6	6	0
E-5	3	3	0	3	3	0	4	4	0
E-4	7	7	0	10	10	0	12	12	0
Total	27	27	0	29	29	0	22	22	0

USASC, CRR

E-9	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
E-8	6	6	0	5	5	0	6	6	0
E-7	25	25	0	16	16	0	13	13	0
E-6	14	14	0	24	24	0	21	21	0
E-5	21	21	0	40	40	0	40	40	0
E-4	215	215	0	355	355	0	445	445	0
Total	262	262	0	446	446	0	525	525	0

USASC, QN

E-9	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
E-8	7	7	0	5	5	0	1	1	0
E-7	19	19	0	17	17	0	17	17	0
E-6	0	0	0	25	25	0	15	15	0
E-5	3	3	0	15	15	0	65	65	0
E-4	292	292	0	301	301	0	309	309	0
Total	322	322	0	364	364	0	407	407	0

USASC, SGN

E-9	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	1	0
E-8	7	7	0	10	10	0	7	7	0
E-7	17	17	0	31	31	0	41	41	0
E-6	40	40	0	29	29	0	78	78	0
E-5	75	75	0	27	27	0	122	122	0
E-4	397	397	0	84	84	0	344	344	0
Total	537	537	0	183	183	0	493	493	0

Grand Total	1148	1148	0	1022	1022	0	1447	1447	0
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AWARDS PROCESSED - 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>HQ, 1ST LOG COMD</u>	<u>USASG, SAIGON</u>	<u>USASG, ON</u>	<u>USASG, CRB</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LEGION OF MERIT	6	3	3	1	13
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS		14			14
SOLDIER'S MEDAL			1	2	3
BRONZE STAR MEDAL FOR VALOR		1		2	3
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	44	49	41	31	165
AIR MEDAL FOR VALOR				5	12
AIR MEDAL	4	329	4	327	664
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL FOR VALOR		1			1
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL	69	74	58	39	240
PURPLE HEART	1	1			2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96307

AVIC 00-0

12 July 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Effective until 11 October 1966 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

1. Purpose: To summarize conduct of the mission and problem areas encountered.

2. General:

a. On 30 June, Lt Sheehan (1st Log Comd CA Distribution Officer) requested airdrop of 12,448 lbs of Civil Affairs supplies to Tanh Ling (TF 938260). Load consisted of the following items:

50 Bags Bulgar Wheat	5000 lbs
42 Cans Salad Oil	2268 lbs
38 Cartons Powdered Milk	2280 lbs
25 Bags Corn Meal	2500 lbs
4 Bales Clothing	400 lbs

TOTAL 12,448 lbs

b. Mission was allocated to the 1st Log Comd Provisional Air Delivery Co.

c. Lift data was reported to III Region TMA using MACV Form 3. (MACV Dir 55-4).

3. Drop Data:

a. Type Aircraft: C-130F (Tail No 968)

b. Type Drop Technique: CDS (G-12) (Container Delivery System)

c. Drop Time: 067010H July 1966. (Plan No 665)

d. Drop Altitude: 600 ft (Flight profile was an 8 degree climb from 500ft to 600ft.)

e. Drop Speed: 135 knots

f. Accuracy: On Target

g. Size Impact Area: 100 Yd x 50 Yd

Incl 9

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AVLC GO-0

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission)

h. Load Survivability: Four bags of wheat were broken at the seams. There was no other damage to the dropped items. Spilled wheat was recovered.

4. Problem Areas:

a. Terminal guidance: Drop zone was not marked and red color smoke was thrown on the first pass over the DZ, indicating a no drop condition.

b. Untrained loadmasters: The mission was delayed $\frac{1}{2}$ hours because there were no loadmasters current in drop technique for A-22 bundles at Tan Son Nhut.

5. Lessons Learned:

a. CAA drops can be made with minimum terminal guidance and untrained loadmasters. More drops should be made to insure aircrew familiarization with drop procedures.

b. Two Quartermaster Air Delivery personnel should accompany drop to assist loadmasters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. G. RICE
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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2-CO, 1st AF, Air Commando Group, TSN, RVN

2- Director, Airborne Department, USAF
Ft Lee Va. (23801)

Internal

2-Command Section

5-SP4O (ATTN: Opns)

8- Historian, 1st Log, Comd

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96307

AVCA CO-0

2 August 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Purpose: To summarize conduct of the mission and problem areas encountered.

2. General:

a. On 24 July, Capt Brem (Asst G-3 Air, II FFORCEV) requested airdrop of 50,840 lbs of Class V to the 1st Infantry Division airfield at Quang Loi (XT 8291). The load consisted of the following items:

(1) 200 Rds - 8 inch High Explosive Projectiles - 40,200 lbs

(2) 200 ea - Charge, Prop, 8 inch WB - 10,640 lbs

TOTAL 50,840 lbs

b. Mission was allocated to the 1st Log Comd Provisional Air Delivery Company.

c. Air lift was requested by II FFORCEV.

d. Two (2) C-130 sorties were allocated to the mission.

e. The first load of 98 projectiles and 100 prop charges missed the desired impact point by 800 meters. The second sortie was cancelled by the 1st Infantry Division on the basis of safety. The first load landed near personnel.

3. Drop Data:

a. Type Aircraft: C-130B (Tail No 301).

b. Drop Technique. CDS (G-12D).

c. Number of bundles: 12 ea A22 Containers (28,080 lbs).

d. Drop Time: 261100H July 1966 (Msn No 667).

Incl 10

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AVCA GO-O

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission)

e. Drop Altitude: 600 Feet (Flight profile was an 8 degree climb from 500 feet to 600 feet).

f. Drop Speed: 125 knots.

g. Accuracy:

(1) Desired Impact Point: XT 823913.

(2) Actual Impact Point: XT 829916.

h. Size impact area: 50 feet by 100 feet.

i. Load Survivability: Two rounds were buried on the rotating bands. The rounds were usable for combat firing.


4. Problem Areas:

a. The miscalculation of the Computed Aerial Release Point (CARP) was due to human error. The navigator computed in feet on a calculator calibrated in yards.

b. At present there are only a few crews in Vietnam who are qualified in the CDS system. This system was validated by the Tactical Air Command in TAC-TR-65-6 dated May 1965 and approved by USSTRICOM in letter, USSTRICOM STRJ4-T on 13 July 1966. It is used extensively by CONUS units and overseas units. At present there is no official doctrine as to the use of this system. Crews must be trained in this system to be able to provide effective support to the airdrop system in Vietnam.

c. Recovery of air items is a continuing problem. Although doctrine and USARV Regulation 700-1 state that recovery, security, and evacuation of air items is the responsibility of the using unit, items are slow in returning and damaged when received by the Air Delivery Co.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



LYNX 782/930

FRANKLIN E. BORING
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Special
2-Command Group
8-Historian
5-AVCA GO-O
2-CG, USARV, ATTN: G3 and G4
2-CO, USASC, SGN
2-CO, 8th Aerial Port Sqdn, APO 96307
2-CO, 315th Air Comd Sqdn, APO 96307
2-CG, Det 5, 315th Air Div APO 96307
2-CG, II FFORCEV
2-CG, 1st Inf Div
2-Div Abn Dept, USAQMS, Ft Lee, Va 23801

Incl 10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO US Forces 96307

AVIC GO-0

2 May 1966

LOGISTICAL CAMPAIGN 5-66 (OPERATION AUSTIN II) (U)

1. (U) Operation Austin II was conducted in the Phan Thiet area by elements of the 101st Airborne Brigade from 13 April through 26 April 1966.
2. (U) There were no changes to the force structure during the period.
3. (U) Tactical contact was light throughout the entire operation.
4. (G) Support Operation:
 - a. 1st Logistical Command forward support area was established in the vicinity of the Phan Thiet airfield (A88007).
 - b. Resupply to the forward support area was accomplished by air LOC's originating at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay; and a sea LOC originating at Cam Ranh Bay.
 - c. The initial establishment and maintenance of stockage levels were delayed. Underlying the delay was an extended entry time into the area of operations by tactical elements and also the lack of priority assignments on aircraft necessary to introduce 1st Logistical Command supplies concurrently with tactical elements. Therefore, it was necessary to divert assets, normally used in port clearance and depot operations, to establish a sea line of communications from Cam Ranh Bay.
 - d. Lesson Learned: When only an air line of communication is available for use by both tactical and support elements, the support elements must be allowed to introduce supplies concurrently with tactical elements. Past experience has shown that supplies can be systematically built up to required levels when support elements are allocated aircraft on a 1:5 ratio.

/s/ John J. Sawbridge
JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
Col, GS
ACofS, SP80

Annexes:

- A-Logistical Support Base Operation Austin II (U)
B- Personnel and Equipment Operation Austin II (U)

Distribution:

2-CG, AID	3-CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	2-Dir of AMMO
2-CG, CDE	3-CG, 173rd Abn Bde	1-Dir of Med Svc
2-OSLOG, DA	2-CG, 2d Abn Div ATTN: DICO-A	3-Dir of SP80
2-MACV JCOC	1-CG, 4th TC (Tnl A)	10-AVIC GO-0
2-MACV J3	5-CG, 68th Med Cp	1-Dir of Svc
2-MACV J4	5-CG, 43rd Med Cp	2-Dir of Sup
2-MACV ATTN: TMA	5-CG, USAAC, Qui Nhon	1-Dir of P&M
1-CG, USARV	5-CG, USAAC, Nha Trang	1-Dir of P&M
2-USARV G3	5-CG, USA Depot Cam Ranh Bay	1-Dir of Trans
2-USARV G4	5-CG, USAAC, Saigon	1-CG, 14th ICC
3-CG, I PFORCEV	2-CG, Vung Tau Sub-area Command	1-Eng, 1st LOGCORP
3-CG, II PFORCEV	1-CG, Op 1st LOGCORP	

Incl 11

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDC IIR 5210.10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO US Forces 96307

AVIC GO-0

12 May 1966

17

LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 6-66 (OPERATION MOSBY II)

1. (U) Operation Mosby II was conducted in the Northern Pleiku-Southern Kontum region by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division from 21 April thru 3 May 1966.
2. (C) There were no changes to the force structure during the period. Estimated troop strength was 4,500.
3. (U) There was light contact reported on one day and no contact reported on twelve days.
4. (C) Support Operations: 1st Logistical Command provided supply point distribution from Pleiku for the first two days of the operation. On 23 April a forward support area was established at Kontum providing supply point distribution for the remainder of the operation.

John J. Saweridge
JOHN J. SAWERIDGE
Colonel, GS
1140

Annexes: A-Logistical Support Data Operation Mosby II (U)
B-Personnel and Equipment Operation Mosby II (U)

Distribution:

2-CG, AMC	3-CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	3-Dir of S&EO
2-CG, CDC	3-CG, 173d Abn Bde	10-AVIC GO-0
2-DSLOC, DA	2-CG, 2d Air Div ATTN: DICO-A	1-Dir of Svc
2-MACV JCOC	3-CG, 1st Air Cav Div	2-Dir of Sup
2-MACV J3	3-CG, 25th Inf Div	1-Dir of Maint
2-MACV J4	1-CO, 4th TC (Tnl A)	1-Dir of Trans
2-MACV ATTN: TRA	5-CO, 68th Med Gp	1-CO, 14th CG
1-CG, USARV	5-CO, 43d Med Gp	1-Engr, 1st LOGCORP
2-USARV G3	5-CO, 43d Med Gp	8-Hist.ian
2-USARV G4	5-CO, 1st Air Cav Div	
3-CG, I FFORCEV	5-CO, 1st Air Cav Div	
3-CG, II FFORCEV	5-CG, 1st Air Cav Div	
2-Dir of AMRO	5-CG, USAD Cam Ranh Bay	
1-Dir of Med Svc	1-Comd Gp 1st LOGCORP	
1-Cmdt, CAGS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66048		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky 40121		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Infantry Sch, Ft Benning, Ga 31905		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Artillery Sch, Ft Sill, Okla 73540		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Quartermaster Sch, Ft Lee, Va 23601		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Engineer Sch, Ft Belvoir, Va 22060		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Ordnance Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Transportation School, Ft Austin, Va 23604		
1-Cmdt, TUSA Aviation Sch, Ft Rucker, Ala 36362		
1-Commander-in-Chief, USAREPAC, APO US Forces 96556		
1-CG, COMARC, Ft Monroe, Va		

Incl 12

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ANNEX A to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 6-66 (OPERATION MOSBY II) (U) Parent Unit: 1st Air Cav Div Period Covered: 21 Apr-May 66
Task Organization: 1 Bde HQ, 3 Inf Bns, 1-105 How Bn, 1-155 How Bn, 1-8" Bn, 1-175 How Btry, 1 ARA Btry, 2 Asslt Hel Bns, 1 Asslt Spt Hel Bn, 1 Air Cav Troop

COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/H BEGIN OF PD	SUPPLY O/H END OF PD	TOTAL RESERVE	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE	
							RESUPPLY DAILY	CONSUMPTION DAILY
CLASS I	6,000 Rtns	3 days	0	14,577 Rtns	72,401 Rtns	57,824 Rtns	5,569 Rtns	4,448 Rtns
JP-4	45,000 Gals	3 days	0	20,000 Gals	463,000 Gals	443,000 Gals	35,615 Gals	34,071 Gals
AVGAS	3,000 Gals	3 days	0	8,000 Gals	52,000 Gals	44,000 Gals	4,000 Gals	3,385 Gals
MOLAS	3,000 Gals	3 days	0	6,000 Gals	35,000 Gals	29,000 Gals	2,692 Gals	2,231 Gals
DIESEL	3,000 Gals	3 days	0	0	30,000 Gals	30,000 Gals	2,308 Gals	2,308 Gals
CLASS V	130 t/t	3 days	0	173.1 s/t	952.8 s/t	779.7 s/t	73.3 s/t	60 s/t

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX B to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE (OPERATION MOSBY II) (U)

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

1. (C) The following personnel and equipment were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation Mosby II, 21 April thru 3 May 1966.

a. Personnel:

- (1) 5 officers.
- (2) 97 enlisted men.

b. Equipment:

- (1) 1 ea $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck.
- (2) 5 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck.
- (3) 4 ea 1200 gallon tankers.
- (4) 2 ea 5000 gallon tankers.
- (5) 1 ea 5 ton wrecker-maintenance.
- (6) 1 ea 5 ton wrecker-MHE.
- (7) 1 ea forklift, rough terrain.
- (8) 1 ea backhoe loader.
- (9) 1 ea dozer.
- (10) 1 ea 20 ton crane (MHE).
- (11) FOL ground fuel system w/18 ea 10,000 gallon drums.
- (12) 2 ea bath sections.
- (13) 1 ea laundry section.

2. (C) The following medical personnel and equipment were provided in support of Operation Mosby II, 21 April thru 3 May 1966.

a. Personnel:

- (1) 1 officer.
- (2) 6 enlisted men.

b. Equipment:

- (1) 1 ea fixed wing aircraft.
- (2) 1 ea medical evacuation helicopter.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Incl 12

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO US Forces 96307

17 May 1966

1. (U) Operation Longfellow was conducted in the DAK TO area with forces of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division from 17 April through 1 May 1966.

3. (U) Tactical contact was light to negative throughout the operation.

b. Resupply to the forward support area was accomplished by an air line of communication (LOC) originating at Pleiku.

d. The stockage objective was reduced from three days to a one day level four days prior to termination of the operation. This precluded excessive back-hauling of supplies. However, selected items were pre-positioned at the Phnom Penh airfield as an emergency back-up for the FSA.

c. Due to distance involved, medical evacuation was handled by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. Two helicopter ambulances evacuated personnel from operational area to DMZ to be picked up for evacuation, when necessary was accomplished by C-2 aircraft.

JOHN L. DAVENPORT
GILBERT, IN
P.O. BOX 2

Annexes: A-Logistical Support Data Operation Longfellow (U)
E-Personnel and Training Operations Longfellow (U)

2-09, AM
2-09, OM
2-08109, IE
2-08109, 100C
2-100V J3
2-100V J4
2-100V JTN. TRA
1-0, US IV
2-10 IV G6
2-100V G4
3-0G, I EFFICIENT
3-0G, II EFFICIENT
3-4, I Eff. 100%
3-0G, 1731 100%

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ANNEX A to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 7-66 (OPERATION LONGFELLOW) (U) Parent Unit: 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div Period Covered: 17 April-May
Task Organization: 2 Inf Bns, 1 Arty Bn (18-105 tubes), 1 Arty Bty (6-155 tubes), 2 Ammobile Co's

COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/H BEGIN OF PD	SUPPLY O/H END OF PD	TOTAL RESERVE	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE SUPPLY DAILY	AVERAGE CONSUMPTION DAILY
CLASS I	3,000 Rtns	9,000 Rtns	9,552 Rtns	0 Rtns	41,118 Rtns	30,670 Rtns	2,319 Rtns	3,167 Rtns
JP-4	12,000 Gals	36,000 Gals	6,500 Gals	12,100 Gals	156,500 Gals	179,500 Gals	11,344 Gals	11,244 Gals
AVIOL	3,000 Gals	9,000 Gals	500 Gals	0 Gals	30,000 Gals	30,500 Gals	1,875 Gals	1,906 Gals
MOCAS	1,500 Gals	4,500 Gals	1,500 Gals	500 Gals	22,500 Gals	34,500 Gals	2,094 Gals	2,156 Gals
UNESAL	1,000 Gals	3,000 Gals	1,000 Gals	3,600 Gals	30,000 Gals	9,400 Gals	750 Gals	586 Gals
CLASS V	66.2 S/T	204.6 S/T	75.1 S/T	0 S/T	349.99 S/T	425.09 S/T	21.2 S/T	25.7 S/T
TOTAL TONNAGE	167.9 S/T	503.7 S/T	141.8 S/T	60.2 S/T	1,410.9 S/T	1,435.9 S/T	86.2 S/T	92.4 S/T

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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ANNEX B to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 7-66 (OPERATION LONGFELLOW) (U)

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

(C) The following personnel and equipment were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation Longfellow 17 April through 1 May 1966.

a. Personnel:

- (1) 4 officers.
- (2) 68 enlisted men.
- (3) 1 medical regulating officer.
- (4) 3 medical attendants.
- (5) 1 medical radio team.
- (6) 2 helicopter crews.

b. Equipment:

- (1) 4 ea $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.
- (2) 2 ea $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks.
- (3) 8 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.
- (4) 2 ea shop vans.
- (5) 1 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton wrecker.
- (6) 1 ea 5 ton wrecker.
- (7) 1 ea 1200 gallon tanker.
- (8) 1 ea fuel system supply point.
- (9) 1 ea rough terrain forklift.
- (10) 2 ea helicopter ambulances.

Incl 13

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO US Forces 96307

AVIC 6000

5 June 1966

LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 8-66 (OPERATION DAVY CROCKETT)(U)

1. (U) Operation Davy Crockett was conducted in the Bong Son area with forces of 1st Air Cavalry Division from 4 May through 16 May 1966.
2. (U) There were no changes to the force structure during the operation.
3. (U) Tactical contact was heavy on two days and light to minor on all other days.
4. (C) Support Operations:
 - a. The 1st Logistical Command forward supply point was co-located with the forward support element of committed brigade in the vicinity of Bong Son (BR8796). There was no displacement of the FSA during the operation.
 - b. Resupply to the FSA was accomplished by a land LAC from Qui Nhon.
 - c. Prior coordination was made for the immediate issue of 25,000 gallons of J24 and 1,000 rounds of 2.75" rockets.
 - d. Services rendered to supported units:
 - (1) 7,200 showers were given.
 - (2) 15 maintenance job orders processed and completed.
 - (3) 29 bodies were processed by graves registration.
 - e. Lesson learned: When a large one-time issue of specific items of supply is immediately required, prior coordination must be made between supported and supporting elements to avert initial resupply problems.

John J. Sawbridge
JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
Col, GS
G-4, MACV

Annexes: A-Logistical Support Data Operation Davy Crockett (U)
B-Personnel and Equipment Operation Davy Crockett (U)

Distribution:

2-CG, MAC
2-CG, CMC
2-DLAC, DA
2-JLGV J60C
2-JLGV J3
2-JLGV J4
2-JLGV ATTC: TMA
1-CG, USARV
2-USARV G3
2-USARV G4
3-CG, I FFARCV
3-CG, II FFARCV
3-CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
3-CG, 173d Abn Bde

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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ANNEX A to LOGISTIC L CATEGORY 8-66 (OFFICIAL NAVY COUNCIL)(U) Parent Unit: 1st Air Cav Div Period Covered: 1-16 May 1966
 Task Organization: 1 Bde C, 3 Inf Bns, 1-105mm How Bn (18 tubes), 1 Aerial Rocket Arty Bn (-), 1 alt Hel Bn, 1 alt Art Co, 1st Air Cav Sqdn (-)

COUNTRY	EST LAY OF STOCKS	SUPPLY U/A	SUPPLY O/A	TOTAL	TOTAL	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CONSUMPTION	CONSUMPTION
CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	CLASS	DAILY	DAILY
CLASS I	4,500 rtms	13,500 rtms	0	2,592 rtms	62,173 rtms	59,581 rtms	4,873 rtms
Jx4	25,000 gals	75,000 gals	0	11,900 gals	366,000 gals	354,100 gals	28,154 gals
AVGMS	3,000 gals	9,000 gals	0	2,800 gals	25,000 gals	22,200 gals	1,923 gals
LOUIS	3,000 gals	9,000 gals	0	4,100 gals	25,000 gals	20,900 gals	1,608 gals
DIKMS	1,000 gals	3,000 gals	0	6,400 gals	40,000 gals	30,600 gals	2,585 gals
CLASS V	100 /T	300 /T	0	125.2 /T	1118.6 /T	993.4 /T	86.1 /T
TOTAL	227.8 S/T	682 /T	0	222.5 S/T	2,932.2 /T	2,709.7 /T	225.9 /T
TOTAL							208.3 /T

A-1

REPORTED AT 3:00 PM 10 MAY 66
 D. CLARK 17110 AFTER 12 YEARS
 C. I. 5200.10

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ANNEX B to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 8-66 (OPERATION DAVY CROCKETT) (U)

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

1. (C) The following personnel and equipment were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation Davy Crockett, 4 May through 16 May 1966.

a. Personnel:

- (1) 5 officers.
- (2) 116 enlisted men.

b. Equipment:

- (1) 1-ANRC 26 radio.
- (2) 1-scoop loader.
- (3) 1-rough terrain forklift.
- (4) 1-5 ton wrecker.
- (5) 2-20 ton cranes.
- (6) 2-5000 gallon tankers.
- (7) 4-1200 gallon tankers.
- (8) 5-2 1/2 ton trucks.
- (9) 1-fuel system supply point with 17-10,000 gallon bladders.
- (10) 1-bath section.
- (11) 1-doser.
- (12) 1-refrigerator, GR

2. (F) Medical support consisted of a medical liaison officer. Air ambulance support was provided from within tactical unit's resources.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO US Forces 96307

AVLC GO-0

9 June 1966

LOGISTICAL CREWMAN 9-66 (OPERATION BIRMINGHAM)(U)

1. (U) Operation Birmingham was conducted in two phases with the first phase in Tay Ninh Province in the area northwest of Tay Ninh and the second phase to the east of Tay Ninh in Binh Duong Province in and near the Michelin Rubber Plantation.
2. (C) a. The operation was conducted by elements of the 1st Infantry Division from 24 April to 15 May 1966.
 - b. In phase I of the operation, from 24 Apr to 6 May, the 1st Infantry Division employed the 1st and 3d Brigades with 6 infantry battalions and one cavalry squadron (-).
 - c. In phase II, from 7 May to 15 May, the division used the 2d and 3d Brigades with 6 infantry battalions and one cavalry squadron (-).
 - d. Before the start of phase II 8" howitzers (8 tubes) and 175mm guns (3 tubes) were added to the force structure.
3. (U) Heavy contact was reported on 1 day and light to moderate contact on the remaining days.
4. (C) a. Support Operations: 1st Logistical Command provided supply point distribution from a forward support area established at Tay Ninh (XT2350) for the entire operation. 1st Logistical Command was responsible for the resupply of Class III and V. The Division retained responsibility for Class I. Resupply was primarily by C-130 aircraft, with Class III originating from Tan Son Nhut and Class V from Bien Hoa. For the first part of the operation, 155mm howitzer ammunition was flown in from Can Ranh Bay. In addition to air resupply, several large convoys were sent to the operational area with one resupply convoy totaling more than 170 vehicles. Because of initial road classification restrictions, convoys were at first limited to 2 1/2 ton trucks. Later, a by-pass southeast of Tay Ninh allowed the use of 3 1/2 ton and 5,000 gallon tankers. Heavy rains made the by-pass highly slippery and treacherous to passage. It was used only one time for logistical vehicles and during this time one 5,000 gallon tanker overturned and a trailer-tractor combination experienced major passage difficulties. In addition to the logistical force manning the 1st Logistical Command FSA, 17 3 1/2 ton and ten 5,000 gallon tankers were kept in the operational area to (1) provide a supply level on wheels, to (2) facilitate dispersion of stocks if needed, to (3) move the stocks to another location in case the action had required opening of a new FSA and (4) to return excess stocks to the 1st Logistical Command after the operation.
 - b. Ammunition expenditures ran extremely high during the beginning of the operation. Because the division did not replenish its basic load in the first days (see Annex D) and then drew heavily to restore its basic load, the logistical backup personnel overestimated division consumption. This, coupled with a lesser degree of tactical action than had been planned initially, created an oversupply of 105mm howitzer ammunition in the FSA. To bring levels down, no issues of 105mm were made to the FSA from 5 May to the end of the operation. However, even with these measures, stocks had to be transferred to the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi, at the end of the operation, to preclude a back-haul.

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LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 9-66 (OPERATION BIRMINGHAM)(U)

c. Lessons Learned:

- (1) That combat units must replenish their basic loads daily, or as often as possible, to enable logistical backup personnel to more accurately estimate the required day of supply.
- (2) That logistical personnel should make frequent reviews of consumption figures in order to maintain realistic day of supply data and stockpile objectives.

John J. Sawbridge

JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
Col, GS
ACofS, S2&O

Annexes: A-Logistical Support Data Operation Birmingham (U) period 24 Apr-6 May 66
B-Logistical Support Data Operation Birmingham (U) period 7-19 May 66
C-Personnel and Equipment Operation Birmingham (U)
~~D-Artillery Position Status Chart Operation Birmingham (U) WITH DRAWN~~

Distributions:

2-CO, AMC
2-CO, CDC
2-DBIAC, DA
2-MACV JCOC
2-MACV J3
2-MACV J4
2-MACV ATTN: TMA
1-CO, USAFV
2-USAHV G3
2-USAHV G4
3-CO, I FFARCTV
3-CO, II FFARCTV
3-CO, 1st Bde, 101st abn Div
3-CO, 173d Abn Bde
2-CO, 7th Air Force ATTN: CDICO-A
3-CO, 1st Inf Div
3-CO, 1st Air Cav Div
3-CO, 25th Inf Div
1-CO, COMARC, Ft Myer, Va
1-Commander-in-Chief, USAFAC, AFM US Forces 96558
5-CO, USABC, Qui Nhon
5-CO, USASC, CIB, Nha Trang
5-CO, USASC, Saigon
1-Comd Gp 1st LACOMD
1-CO, 4th TC (Trl A)
2-CO, 68th Mod Gp
2-CO, 43d Mod Gp
2-Dir of Armo
1-Dir of Mod Svc
1-Dir of Sup
3-ACofS, S2&O
10-AVIC CO-0
1-Dir of Svc
1-Dir of Maint
1-Dir to Trans
1-CO, 14th ITC
1-Eng, 1st LACOMD
8-Historian
1-CO, 44th Mod Bde

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Task Organization: 2 MFL Co's, 1 Recon Squadron, 3 MFL Co's, 3 105mm How Bns, 2 155mm How Bnys

COMPANY	LAST DAY OF MONTH	ACCUMULATED CUMULATIVE	NUMBER OF BILLS OF	SURVEY OF END OF	TOTAL RESERVE	TOTAL CONSOLIDATION	AVERAGE REQUIREMENT DAILY	AVERAGE CONSUMPTION DAILY
CLASS I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CLASS II	42,000 gals	2 days	34,000 gals	150,316 gals	549,223 gals	332,907 gals	42,248 gals	33,300 gals
CLASS III	1,500 gals	3 days	6,500 gals	6,000 gals	31,200 gals	31,700 gals	2,400 gals	2,438 gals
CLASS IV	3,500 gals	3 days	10,300 gals	17,100 gals	69,500 gals	62,720 gals	5,346 gals	4,825 gals
CLASS V	2,500 gals	2 days	10,700 gals	35,000 gals	95,400 gals	71,100 gals	7,338 gals	5,469 gals
CLASS VI	227 gals	2 days	0	1,568 gals	3,137 gals	1,568 gals	241 gals	121 gals

Time	Speed	Altitude	Direction	Remarks
10:00	10.0	1000	100	10.0
10:10	10.1	1010	101	10.1
10:20	10.2	1020	102	10.2
10:30	10.3	1030	103	10.3
10:40	10.4	1040	104	10.4
10:50	10.5	1050	105	10.5
11:00	10.6	1060	106	10.6
11:10	10.7	1070	107	10.7
11:20	10.8	1080	108	10.8
11:30	10.9	1090	109	10.9
11:40	11.0	1100	110	11.0
11:50	11.1	1110	111	11.1
12:00	11.2	1120	112	11.2
12:10	11.3	1130	113	11.3
12:20	11.4	1140	114	11.4
12:30	11.5	1150	115	11.5
12:40	11.6	1160	116	11.6
12:50	11.7	1170	117	11.7
13:00	11.8	1180	118	11.8
13:10	11.9	1190	119	11.9
13:20	12.0	1200	120	12.0
13:30	12.1	1210	121	12.1
13:40	12.2	1220	122	12.2
13:50	12.3	1230	123	12.3
14:00	12.4	1240	124	12.4
14:10	12.5	1250	125	12.5
14:20	12.6	1260	126	12.6
14:30	12.7	1270	127	12.7
14:40	12.8	1280	128	12.8
14:50	12.9	1290	129	12.9
15:00	13.0	1300	130	13.0
15:10	13.1	1310	131	13.1
15:20	13.2	1320	132	13.2
15:30	13.3	1330	133	13.3
15:40	13.4	1340	134	13.4
15:50	13.5	1350	135	13.5
16:00	13.6	1360	136	13.6
16:10	13.7	1370	137	13.7
16:20	13.8	1380	138	13.8
16:30	13.9	1390	139	13.9
16:40	14.0	1400	140	14.0
16:50	14.1	1410	141	14.1
17:00	14.2	1420	142	14.2
17:10	14.3	1430	143	14.3
17:20	14.4	1440	144	14.4
17:30	14.5	1450	145	14.5
17:40	14.6	1460	146	14.6
17:50	14.7	1470	147	14.7
18:00	14.8	1480	148	14.8
18:10	14.9	1490	149	14.9
18:20	15.0	1500	150	15.0
18:30	15.1	1510	151	15.1
18:40	15.2	1520	152	15.2
18:50	15.3	1530	153	15.3
19:00	15.4	1540	154	15.4
19:10	15.5	1550	155	15.5
19:20	15.6	1560	156	15.6
19:30	15.7	1570	157	15.7
19:40	15.8	1580	158	15.8
19:50	15.9	1590	159	15.9
20:00	16.0	1600	160	16.0
20:10	16.1	1610	161	16.1
20:20	16.2	1620	162	16.2
20:30	16.3	1630	163	16.3
20:40	16.4	1640	164	16.4
20:50	16.5	1650	165	16.5
21:00	16.6	1660	166	16.6
21:10	16.7	1670	167	16.7
21:20	16.8	1680	168	16.8
21:30	16.9	1690	169	16.9
21:40	17.0	1700	170	17

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Year	Month	Day	Time	Place	Remarks
1900	Jan	1	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	2	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	3	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	4	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	5	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	6	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	7	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	8	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	9	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	10	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	11	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	12	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	13	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	14	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	15	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	16	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	17	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	18	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	19	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	20	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	21	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	22	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	23	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	24	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	25	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	26	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	27	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	28	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	29	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	30	10.00	10.00	10.00
1900	Jan	31	10.00	10.00	10.00

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ANNEX C to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 9-66 (OPERATION BIRMINGHAM)(U)

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

1. (C) The following personnel and equipment were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation Birmingham, 24 April thru 15 May 1966.

a. Personnel:

- (1) 5 officers.
- (2) 127 enlisted men.

b. Equipment:

- (1) 2 ea $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.
- (2) 18 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.
- (3) 10 ea 5,000 gallon tankers.
- (4) 17 ea stake and platform trailers w/5 ton tractors.
- (5) 400 ea 500 gal sealed bins.
- (6) 8 ea rough terrain forklifts.
- (7) 1 bath section.
- (8) POL ground fuel system w/12 ea 10,000 gallon drums.

2. (U) The following medical personnel and equipment were provided:

a. Personnel:

- (1) 12 officers.
- (2) 8 enlisted men.

b. Equipment: 2 ea medical evacuation helicopters.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
Office of the ACOFS, Security, Plans and Operations
APO 96307

AVLC GO-0

8 July 1966

LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 10-66 (OPERATION HOOKER I) (U)

1. (U) Operation Hooker I was conducted in Kontum Province with forces of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div from 10 June through 21 June 1966.

2. (U) There were no changes in the force structure during the operation.

3. (U) Tactical contact was light to minor throughout the entire operation.

4. (C) Support Operations:

a. The 1st Logistical Command forward supply point was co-located with the forward support element of the committed brigade in the vicinity of Kontum (AR7889). There was no displacement of the FSA during the operation.

b. Resupply to the FSA was accomplished by a land LOC from Pleiku using highway 14 and supplemented by Air LOC from Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.

c. No prestock or build-up was provided prior to the start of the operation. The 3 day level stockage objective for Class III, IIIA and V was reached on the second day of the operation. Class I 3 day objective was reached on the fourth day of the operation.

d. During this period, operation Hawthorne was also being supported by a Land LOC, 26 miles north of Kontum. Due to the road limitations (2 1/2 ton trucks and half-loaded 5,000 gallon tankers) north of Kontum, longer distance involved from Pleiku and the problem of clearing the road with security forces, maximum effort was expended to build up supplies at operation Hawthorne. This resulted in a re-evaluation of the supply plan for Operation Hooker I and the following actions were initiated: Pleiku was designated as an alternate supply point; stocks were allowed to drop below established levels at Kontum and flexibility was introduced through the establishment of a truck capability in Pleiku for large convoys to move out of Pleiku to Kontum on very short notice.

e. Services rendered to supported units:

(1) Baths: Equipment operated 122 hours with a total of 1,970 baths given.

(2) Laundry: Equipment operated for 90 hours processing 6690 pieces in 154 loads.

(3) Grave Registrations: A total of two bodies were processed through the graves registration section. Both were victims of accidents.

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LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 10-66 (OPERATION HOOKER I) (U)

(4) Maintenance

(a) 3d echelon work orders processed: 7.

(b) 3d echelon work orders accomplished: 5.

f. Lessons learned:

(1) When supporting more than one operation over the same land LOC, primary emphasis must be placed on getting supplies to the operation that is farthest away from the supporting supply point.

(2) When supporting an operation by a land LOC, over a class 30 road, where the distance is relatively short, large quantities of supplies are not needed in the forward support area. However, vehicles must be available and plans must be prepared to allow for rapid movement of supplies to the forward support area.

5. (U) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation Hooker I:

a. 4 officers.

b. 89 enlisted men.

c. 2 medical regulating officers.

John J. Sawbridge
JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
C-1, CC
ACofS. SW-0

Annex: A-Logistical Support Data Operation Hooker I (U)

Distribution:

2-CG, AMC
2-CG, CDC
2-DSLOC, DA
2-MACV JCOC
2-MACV J3
2-MACV J4
2-MACV ATTN: TMA
1-CG, USARV
2-USARV G3
2-USARV G4
3-CG, I PFORCEV
3-CG, II PFORCEV
3-CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
3-CG, 173d Abn Bde
2-CG, 7th AF ATTN: CDICO-A
3-CG, 1st Inf Div
3-CG, 1st Air Cav Div

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AVIC GO-0
LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 10-66 (OPERATION HOOKER I) (U)

117 Distribution (Contd)

3-CO, 25th Inf Div
1-CO, COMAR, Ft Monroe, Va
3-CIC, US STRICOM, MacDill AFB, Fla
1-CIC, USARPAC, APO 96558
5-CO, USASC, Qui Nhon
5-CO, USASC, CRB, Nha Trang
5-CO, USASC, Saigon
1-Comd Gp 1st LOGCOM
1-CO, 4th TC (Tnl L)
2-CO, 68th Mod Gp
2-CO, 43d Mod Gp
2-CO, 55th Mod Gp
2-Dir of Armo
1-Dir of Mod Svc
1-Dir of Sup
3-ACofS, SP&O
10-AVIC GO-0
1-Dir of Svc
1-Dir of Trans
1-CO, 14th ICC
1-Engr, 1st LOGCOM
8-Historian
1-CO, 44th Med Bde
1-Cdt, CGCS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66048
1-Cdt, TUSA Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky 40121
1-Cdt, TUSA Infantry Sch, Ft Benning, Ga 31905
1-Cdt, TUSA Artillery Sch, Ft Sill, Okla 73540
1-Cdt, TUSA Quartermaster Sch, Ft Lee, Va 22060
1-Cdt, TUSA Ordnance Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cdt, TUSA Transportation Sch, Ft Eustis, Va 23604
1-Cdt, TUSA Aviation Sch, Ft Rucker, Ala 36362

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ANNEX A to LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 10-66 (OPERATION HOOKER I)(U) Parent Unit: 1st Cav Div Period covered: 10-21 Jun 66
Task Organization: 1 Bde HQ, 3 Inf Bn (-), 1 AC Sqdn (-), 1 Aslt Hol Bn, 1 Aslt Hol Spt Co

CATEGORY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD	SUPPLY O/H END OF PD	TOTAL INVENTORY	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION
CLASS I (RATIONS)	4,500	13,500	0	2,363	55,804	53,421	3,986	3,816
JPA (GALLONS)	25,000	75,000	0	1,000	382,000	381,000	27,286	27,214
AVGAS (GALLONS)	2,000	6,000	0	5,200	42,500	37,300	3,036	2,664
MGAS (GALLONS)	2,500	7,500	0	0	50,000	50,000	3,571	3,571
DIESEL (GALLONS)	1,000	3,000	0	5,000	32,000	27,000	2,286	1,929
CLASS V (C/F)	120	360	0	237.4	765.74	528.34	54.7	37.7
TOTAL TONNAGE	242.5	727.5	0	284.9	2733.8	2,488.9	195.3	173.9

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A. MAY
PORT OPERATION STATISTICS

<u>INTER-THEATER DISCHARGED</u>	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>NHA BE</u>	<u>VUNG TAU</u>	<u>CAM RANH</u>	<u>PHAN RANG</u>	<u>NHA TRANG</u>	<u>QUI NHON</u>
-------------------------------------	---------------	---------------	-----------------	-----------------	------------------	------------------	-----------------

S/T	126,311	25,940	18,644	73,874		10,999	43,782
M/T	283,974	27,814	30,988	144,787		15,752	78,461

TOTAL DISCH

S/T	128,218	25,940	25,969	78,460	6,569	17,510	51,992
M/T	289,047	27,814	51,378	155,075	12,022	27,578	97,702

HANDLED

S/T	153,101	26,236	28,381	93,467	6,773	20,558	55,156
M/T	346,893	28,098	58,625	193,832	12,714	34,065	109,943

B. JUNE

**INTER-THEATER
DISCHARGED**

S/T	132,573	41,469	23,911	76,813		11,717	41,403
M/T	255,424	45,850	41,658	163,047		20,409	63,459

TOTAL DISCH

S/T	135,897	42,915	34,899	82,976	4,156	20,329	48,501
M/T	261,189	46,742	72,442	180,284	7,578	37,706	76,375

HANDLED

S/T	147,858	42,915	41,193	100,102	4,422	24,393	53,852
M/T	296,782	46,339	79,290	225,771	8,872	44,046	83,622

C. JULY

**INTER-THEATER
DISCHARGED**

S/T	145,526	42,993	14,440	106,296		14,218	54,044
M/T	271,538	51,166	39,557	199,914		29,335	97,677

TOTAL DISCH

S/T	152,159	42,993	26,369	112,447	6,086	20,033	62,779
M/T	289,417	51,166	69,289	214,759	9,052	39,840	118,313

HANDLED

S/T	171,892	44,986	30,701	136,079	6,820	24,210	67,027
M/T	344,452	53,150	83,797	285,917	10,600	50,512	129,074

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SHIP STATUS - MEAN VESSELS WORKING/WAITING DAILY

MAY	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>NHA BI</u>	<u>VUNG TAU</u>	<u>CAM RANH</u>	<u>PHAN RANG</u>	<u>NHA TRANG</u>	<u>QUI NHON</u>
Waiting	4.7	1.4	.6	4.5		1.2	2.0
Working	7.3	2.4	1.5	8.5		1.5	7.4
JUNE							
Waiting	6.1	2.3	1.4	5.4		.8	4.8
Working	7.3	2.6	2.1	8.5		1.4	4.3
JULY							
Waiting	7.2	3.0	1.4	10.2		.9	8.4
Working	3.6	1.4	.3	7.0		.8	5.1

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TRUCK, PERFORMANCE

MAY	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>VUNG LAU</u>	<u>CAM BANH</u>	<u>QUI NHON</u>
(A) Port & Beach				
S/T	85,459		67,471	34,458
(B) Local Haul				
S/T cargo	26,901		3,423	31,087
(C) Line Haul	8,692		61	38,222
JUNE				
(A) Port & Beach				
S/T cargo cleared	104,850		68,928	18,894
(B) Local Haul				
S/T cargo	54,365		3,778	25,731
(C) Line Haul				
S/T cargo	2,779		496	49,684
JULY				
(A) Port & Beach				
S/T cargo cleared	113,150		84,349	44,856
(B) Local Haul				
S/T cargo	48,764		4,619	31,093
(C) Line Haul				
S/T cargo	7,983		1,629	48,304

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AVHGC-NH (19 Oct 66)

1st Ind

NOV 6 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the
1st Logistical Command for the quarter ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded
herewith.

2. (U) Concur with the comments contained in the basic report
except as noted below.

3. (U) Reference Section 1, Page 4, Paragraph 2b: USARPAC and
CINCPAC concurred in the request for 105 spaces for the US Army Procure-
ment Agency. USARPAC forwarded the original request to DA on 14 June
1966 recommending approval. The revised strength requested by Commanding
General, 1st Logistical Command was forwarded to USARPAC by this head-
quarters on 2 September 1966.

4. (U) Reference Section 1, Page 15, Paragraph 8a(13): MACV
directed development of the plan and it was forwarded to Headquarters,
MACV as stated in the referenced paragraph. USARV message AVHGC-OT
19108, dated 270015Z July 1966, subject: Provisional Defense Battalion
notified 1st Logistical Command that Headquarters, MACV intended to take
no further action on the plan.

5. (U) Reference Section 1, Page 21, Paragraph 8d(2): This request
is in the final stages of staffing at Headquarters, USARV.

6. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, Page 51, Paragraph 1b and
Section II, Part II, Page 68, Paragraph 1: Concur. This instruction
should be given at the Chaplains' School and emphasize the forms and
procedures used by chaplains to obtain ecclesiastical items available
in the supply inventory.

7. (S) Reference Section II, Part I, Page 53, Paragraph 2: Seven
security companies (less weapons platoons) are scheduled to arrive RVN
on or about 1 December 1966. These units, sponsored by the 18th Military
Police Brigade, will be attached to military police battalions to pro-
vide area and installation security. The arrival of these units will
reduce the criticality of the security problem.

8. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, Page 54, Paragraph 3b: The
situation described has occurred but is the exception and not the rule

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2010524

**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)**

This headquarters advises units of specific items that should not be shipped upon deployment to Vietnam. All authorized equipment not specified for deletion must be shipped.

9. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, Page 69, Paragraph 3a through e:

a. The statement implies that Project "Boomerang" has not been a workable program since critical items of equipment are not returned to RVN within 30 days. Equipment for evacuation from RVN is turned in to supply activities and a replacement requisitioned. Project "Boomerang" as conceived does not necessitate return of repaired items to the originating command except those items which are job ordered. Repaired equipment may be returned to depot stock in CONUS or 2d Logistical Command. Consequently, a 30 day return objective would not be applicable in all instances. Furthermore, this command does not have sufficient experience with the program to establish a reasonable time limit on those items job ordered. Preferably, priorities should be established on a case-by-case basis with the repair activity given as much lead time as possible to respond to especially urgent requirements.

b. The standardization program requires and receives continuous emphasis at this headquarters.

c. Commercial facilities are being used to offset maintenance shortfalls.

d. A USACDC study was received and distributed during August 1966 which provided COSTAR unit capabilities and maintenance equivalents.

e. National Cash Register 500 magnetic ledger system is being installed in direct support maintenance units within the command. The COSTAR 70 includes ADPS skilled MOS's and personnel have been programmed to meet requirements.

10. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, Page 70, Paragraph 4b: Communication equipment from 1st Logistical Command assets are being used

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to control petroleum tender vessels. This problem will be eliminated when programmed POL operating companies arrive in RVN.

11. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, Page 71, Paragraph 5:
The Vietnamese National Railway System is responsible for all mainline railway construction/repair in RVN. USARV Engineer is responsible for those Land Lines of Communication (LOC) designated in MACV Directive 415-6. The 18th Engineer Brigade is preparing a comprehensive plan to begin upgrading the first 1600 miles of Land LOC assigned to USARV. Currently engineer material and troop resources do not permit extensive effort in this direction. LOC's from ports are receiving priority.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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