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19 OT-UT-683261

6 January 1969

AGAM-P (M) (31 Dec 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade
82d Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 68

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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11 15 Aug 68

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BDE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96228

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15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for
period ending 31 July 1968.

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15 AUGUST 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period ending 31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR 65 (R1)

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15 AUGUST 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period ending 31 July 1968.

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES: The 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, during the period from 1 May 1968 to 31 July 1968, continued Operation Carentan II until 17 May 1968 and then began Operation Nevada Eagle. Also, the Brigade underwent reorganization from an Airborne Infantry Brigade organization to that of Separate Light Infantry Brigade. This entailed the formation of two new companies per battalion (a fourth rifle company and a combat support company), as well as a combat Support Battalion. This portion of this report has been divided into six parts as follows:

A. PERSONNEL

1. (U) General: (C) During the 4th quarter, Fiscal Year 1968, the brigade accomplished a reorganization from its deployment task force organization to that of a light infantry brigade. This particular period was therefore characterized by extreme personnel turbulence. The turbulence was caused not only by the necessity to reorganize the command but also by a decision by the Department of the Army to give each individual who deployed with the brigade the option of returning to Ft. Bragg or remaining with the unit in Vietnam. Additionally, every man who elected to remain in Vietnam was authorized to take either a 30-day leave at his own expense or a 14-day leave on a selected aircraft from Bien Hoa, RVN to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina.

2. (C) Of the 3650 personnel who deployed from Ft Bragg, 2513 were returned to CONUS by 31 July 1968. During that same period a total of 2947 replacement personnel arrived. Of the 1137 individuals who elected to remain with the unit, 827 have taken out of country R and R. The administration required to process these 6487 officers and men had to be accomplished while the administrative element of the brigade was undergoing a reorganization. Problems were encountered, but the task was accomplished without a material effect on the routine administration of the command.

3. (C) The authorized strengths of the brigade units (TOE 77-1000T) are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1-505 Inf	43	2	875	920
2-505 Inf	43	2	875	920
1-508 Inf	43	2	875	920
2-321 Arty	45	3	479	527
82d Spt Bn	43	8	512	563
HHC, 3d Bde	40	8	155	203

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
307th Engr	5	0	160	165
82d MI Det	12	3	33	48
405th RRD	3	0	74	77
58th Sig Co	3	0	99	102
B Trp 1/17th Cav	5	0	196	201

4. (C) The personnel status of the subordinate units as of 31 July is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ASND</u>			<u>FFD</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
1-505 th Inf	43	1	691	36	1	632
2-505th Inf	45	1	697	36	1	647
1-508th Inf	40	1	774	29	1	688
2-321st Arty	50	2	439	42	2	412
82d Spt Bn	26	7	490	22	7	434
Bde HHC	49	3	186	40	2	160
307th Engr	6	0	172	4	0	161
B/1-17 Cav	8	0	132	8	0	137
82d MI Det	7	3	38	7	2	36
405th RRD	2	0	68	2	0	36
52d Chem Det	0	0	0	0	0	0
58th Sig Co	4	0	106	4	0	101

5. (C) The lowest assigned strengths of the brigade units were as follows on the dates shown:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>
1-505 Inf	17	0	383	400	11 Jun 68	43.5
2-505 Inf	40	1	351	392	6 Jun 68	42.6
1-503 Inf	34	0	341	375	8 Jun 68	40.8
2-321 Arty	36	1	232	269	6 Jun 68	51.2
82d Spt Bn	2	0	38	40	29 May 68	7.8
HHC/3/82	24	6	93	123	3 Apr 68	60.7
307th Eng	6	0	75	81	11 Jun 68	49.0
82d MI Det	4	2	13	19	16 Jun 68	41.3
405th RRD	3	0	42	45	6 Jun 68	38.5
58th Sig Co	3	0	71	74	6 Jun 68	73.0
B/1-17 Cav	5	0	62	67	7 Jun 68	30.0

*Lowest assigned strength for the brigade occurred on 11 June and was 2128 or 45.7%.

6. (C) The lowest FDY strength of the brigade units were as follows on the dates shown:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>
1-505 Inf	37	1	487	525	9 Jun 68	57.2
2-505 Inf	40	2	513	535	10 Jun 68	60.2

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1-508 Inf	28	0	508	536	16 Jun 68	58.2
2-321 Arty	42	2	285	329	1 Jun 68	62.7
82d Spt Bn	1	0	37	38	31 May 68	7.5
405th HRD	3	0	57	60	25 Jun 68	78.0
HHC 3d Bde	38	0	114	152	28 May 68	75.0
307th Eng	0	0	113	113	5 Jun 68	68.5
82d MI Det	3	1	12	16	5 Jun 68	33.3
58th Sig Co	3	0	79	82	5 Jun 68	80.0
B/1-17 Cav	3	0	89	92*	31 May 68	46.0

*Lowest EDY for the brigade occurred on 9 June and was 2819 or 60.5%.

7. Casualties:

a. As a result of hostile action, the following casualties were reported:

<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>
30	164	0

b. As a result of non-hostile action, the following casualties were reported:

<u>KNB</u>	<u>NBI</u>	<u>DIS</u>
4	93	84

8. (C) Personnel Programs:

a. Awards and Decorations: Recommendations for the following awards and decorations were submitted:

DSC -	1	BSM	160
DFC	3	LM	46
SS	34	ARCOM "V"	26
LM	2	ARCOM	125
SM	3	PH	93
BS "V"	110		

The following awards were approved:

DSC	0	BSM	4
DFC	0	LM	46
SS	9	ARCOM "V"	4
LM	1	PH	93
SM	3		
BS "V"	32		

b. Postal Activities: A total of 23,101 lbs of parcels and letters were received by the 42d Army Postal Unit, the servicing APU, and a total of 20,061 lbs were dispatched during the reporting period.

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Also during this reporting period 8,107 money orders were sold for a value of 487,777.31 and 606 money orders cashed for a value of 31,815.59.

c. Red Cross Services: There were 342 cases served by the Red Cross representative with the breakdown:

1. Emergency or compassionate leaves	33
2. Health and welfare	243
3. Request for report on EM	62
4. Reports to assist CO	4

9. (C) Chaplain activities: The Brigade chaplains rendered the following services:

a. Total services	442
b. Attendance	10,492
c. Counselling services	2,819
d. Hospital visits	81

10. (C) Staff Judge Advocate:

a. During the period the following courts-martial were convened:

Summary	1
Special	12
General	1

b. The brigade processed 97 Article 15's.

c. Legal assistance was provided for 62 soldiers.

11. (C) Public Information: During the reporting period, 70 home-town releases were made, 65 pictures with captions were released, and 9 in-the-field releases involving enemy contact were made.

12. (C) Financial Disbursements: The unit's reorganization resulting in increased strength and the return of more than two-thirds of the task force to CONUS had a particular impact on the brigade's finance office. Monthly gross disbursements have averaged greater than \$1 million and through 31 July the finance office has distributed a total of \$5,675,023.24. The finance officer had the occasion to review several after action reports of past experiences in Vietnam prior to and during this period of turmoil and found the U.S. Army Finance School's special text 14-192, May 67, Comptrollership and the Finance Corps in RVN, chapters 1, 2, and 6 to be of particular benefit.

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B. INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Intelligence (S2) Section: During the reporting period, the S2 section, at times, operated below authorized TO & E levels, creating workload problems. Initially during the period, there were 4 officers; a Captain as Brigade S2, a Captain as Asst S2, a First Lieutenant as S2 Air. Eight enlisted personnel were assigned to the S2 Section; a Master Sergeant (E8) as Chief Intelligence Sergeant, a Staff Sergeant (E6) as Asst Intel Sgt, a Sgt (E5) and a SP/5 who performed as Intel Assistants, two clerks (SP/4 and PFC), and one light Vehicle Driver (PFC). However, because of personnel either reaching DEROS or returning to the United States for authorized two-week leaves, the S2 Section, at one time, operated with 3 officers and 3 enlisted personnel. With the arrival of a Major as Brigade S2, TO & E levels, with the exception of one enlisted Intelligence Clerk, were reached. During the reporting period the 82d Military Intelligence Detachment was under the staff supervision of the Brigade S2. On 1 July 68, the Brigade LRRP Tn was also placed under the supervision of the S2.

2. (C) Enemy Activities

a. Operation Carentan II continued into May, terminating 17 May with the start of Operation Nevada Eagle. The last stage of Carentan II (1 May - 17 May) was characterized by relatively heavy contact with NVA forces, resulting in enemy losses of 242 KIA.

b. During the period 17 May - 31 July, enemy activity was characterized by extremely light contact with enemy units. Low level incidents, were carried on by the enemy. Hardly any harassing by enemy units using direct fire was noted. Enemy casualties remained light during the period 17 May - 31 July with enemy personnel losses for the period totaling 38 VC KIA and 39 NVA KIA. Also, 9 VC PW and 3 HOI CHANHS were taken into custody.

c. Enemy activities during the period 17 May - 31 July were characterized primarily by efforts to re-supply their forces and obtain ride from the coastal lowlands. Friendly units operating in the brigade area of interest uncovered large enemy caches of foodstuffs (350 tons of rice) and material, including numerous trucks and field guns.

d. Significant contacts have not been achieved for 2 months with the enemy. Continuous RIF operations seriously hampered enemy capabilities to initiate major, coordinated offensives against the city of Hue. Sweep operations forced the enemy to remain mobile, thus rendering his planning for coordinated attacks against FB's very difficult. Present indications of major deployment into the brigade's AO again indicate his plans to begin an offensive against Hue during the coming months.

e. During the latter part of the reporting period, incidents involving reconnaissance of FBs within the area of operations were definite indication that attacks against these FBs were imminent. The enemy has the capability of attacking any FB in our AO with a battalion-size infantry attack preceded by a sapper assault with heavy indirect fire support.

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3. Recapitulation of Enemy Losses: The following is a recapitulation of enemy losses for the reporting period: (C)

a. Personnel	GARENTAN II (1 May - 17 May 68)	NEVADA EAGLE (17 May - 31 July 68)
VC/NVA KIA	1/242	38/39
VC/NVA PW	0/0	9/0
Returns	0/0	3/0
b. Weapons		
Personal Wpns	29	11
G/S Wpns	2	1

4. (C) Military Intelligence

a. Personnel: During this reporting period the unit lost 80% of the original personnel which deployed to RVN with the MI Detachment. Replacements have required additional on-the-job training prior to assuming positions.

b. Activities: The Image Interpreter section of the detachment has flown 89 visual reconnaissance (VR) in support of brigade operations during the reporting period. The Interrogation section has interrogated 76 persons of which 47 were classified as innocent civilians, 16 were Civic Defendants, 10 were prisoners of war, and 3 were returnees.

C. OPERATIONS

1. 1st Bn 505th Inf

a. (C) During the period 1 May - 31 July 1968 the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 505th Infantry conducted Reconnaissance in Force operations, secured Rt 547, engineer work sites (Rome Flow security), and security of the following Fire Support Bases southwest of Hue: Geronimo; Bastogne 3 May - 9 June 1968; Panther II 9 June - 31 June 1968; and from 26 - 31 July Panther II was secured by one (1) company from this battalion, while the rest of the battalion secured Birmingham. In anticipation of the reorganization of the Battalion, a fourth rifle company and Support Company were established. The only significant action in which companies were engaged in during the period was on 1 and 2 May 1968. A and C companies were engaged with an estimated NVA Battalion (K7 or K10) vic FB Geronimo. Results of the two day engagement were 128 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 6 KIA and 17 WIA. (Locations of FSB's, see INCL D, SEC III)

b. Operations: (C)

Garentan II (cont) 1 - 17 May 1968

FRIENDLY		ENEMY	
KIA	3	KIA	129
WIA	17	WIA	0
MLA	0	POW	0

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NEVADA EAGLE 17 May 68 - 31 July 68

FRIENDLY		ENEMY	
KHA	0	KIA	0
WHA	0	WIA	0
MLA	0	POI	0

2. 2nd Bn 505th Inf

a. (C) The Battalion was occupying FB Boyd in the vicinity YD7413 southwest of Hue, on May 1968. The normal mode of operation was to have one company secure the firebase while the other two companies operated. In connection with a surge of enemy activity all over South Vietnam, FB Boyd received sporadic bombardment from 82mm mortars throughout the night. Twenty-nine rounds were received within the perimeter, with negative casualties. On 9 May 1968 C Co conducted a sweep of the AP Ngoc Ho village located in the vicinity YD7317. The sweep revealed that the village was unoccupied as suspected, however a cache of 700 lbs of salt was found buried in village. On 11 May 1968, C Co came under the operational control of 1-327 of the 1st Bde 101st Air Cav. During this period, they participated in Operation Delaware and operated in the area between FB Veghel and FB Bastogne and suffered 28 WHA. On 13 May 1968 in the vicinity YD7711, two personnel of A Co detonated a booby-trap, which resulted in two WHA. In the vicinity YD7811, A Co found a body 4-5 days old KBA. Approximately 200 meters from this location, they also found 122mm rocket sites and bunkers. On 15 May 1968, artillery was called in and subsequent search of the area revealed no confirmed results. B Co at a location on the Song Ta Trach found 4 bamboo rafts, which they destroyed. Later at YD7811, 1000 meters to the west they found a grave of 1 VC KBA. That evening as the 2nd platoon B Co moved into a night ambush position, they made contact with an estimated squad of Viet Cong. The result were 1 US KHA and 1 WHA. A sweep of the vicinity revealed a bunker and a body, three months old. On 4 July, B and C Co's were on a RIF mission south of FB Boyd, concentrating primarily on training. On the 4th, in the vicinity of YD7708 B Co found a mortar position with ten bunkers and an assortment of equipment. On the 16th, in the vicinity of YD7603, A Co made contact with a force of unknown size and received a heavy volume of fire. The company withdrew to call in the artillery. As they withdrew, they received 30 enemy mortar rounds. Counter mortar fire was called, which resulted in a secondary explosion in the vicinity of YD7805, there were no U.S. casualties. The result were one NVN KIA. The same night, the main body units night defensive position received small arms fire and ten chicom grenades thrown in the perimeter. Friendly casualties were five WHA. During the period of 23 - 31 July 1968, the full resources of the Battalion were devoted to the security of the two fire bases. Also during this period, a major effort was made to improve the perimeter defenses of FB Bastogne, west of Hue. With the exception of occasional local patrolling, there was little other activity. (Location of FSB, See Incl D, Sec III)

b. (C) Results:

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FRIENDLY LOSSES

42 WHA
2 KHA

ENEMY LOSSES

2 NVA KIA
1 NVA KBA
1 VC KBA
1 VC Suspect
5 Detainees/civ
3 boats
14x2.75 rocket motors
11x2.75 rocket warheads
24 RPG rockets
7000 lbs of salt
31 82mm rds
21000 AK-47 rds
2 cases AK-47 ammo
4 AK-47 magazines
3 protective masks
5 claymores

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1 Pr binoculars
3 chicom mines
6 B-60 rockets
3 rucksacks
1 AK-47
5 60mm rds
2 cases 82mm fuses
1 blasting cap
1x122mm rocket warhead
14x82mm primers
5x75mm rds
400 lbs TNT
1 can lube oil
7 122mm rocket fuses
5 chicom grenades
1 US Carbine

3. 1st Bn 508th Inf

a. (C) During period 1 May - 25 July the 1-508 conducted RIF operations, secured Rt. 547 for convoys, engr work parties, Rome Flow clearing teams and secured FB Birmingham (YD706103). Additionally, the 1-508 from 11-24 July performed the economy of force mission of securing FB Bastogne (YD626095) with a two company task force under control of the battalion S3. On 24 July, the TF Ring command group deployed to FB Boyd (YD737133) with one company and secured the FB and the Nam Hoa Bridge (YD755139), a tactically critical bridge over the Purfume River on the MSR, Rt. 547. On 25 July, the battalion relinquished responsibility for FB Birmingham and assumed responsibility for FB Boyd after completion of a 5km motor march by the battalion TAC CP. Effective 1 July 68 the battalion was reorganized into six companies under MTOE's 7-478T (HHC); TCE 7-177T (rifle Co) and 7-477T (Cbt Spt Co). In anticipation of the reorganization, the battalion had established the fourth rifle company and the Combat Support Company during the previous ORLL reporting period which greatly facilitates the change over upon receipt of the implementing general order. The only significant enemy contact occurred on 7 May during a pre-convoy sweep along Rt 547. C Co, while sweeping the brush line encountered the 9th Bn 90th NVA Regt, which had established an ambush 1.5 Km long on both sides of the road, center mass YD687090. C Co became heavily engaged immediately. Co A sweeping 800 meters to the west was committed in a thrust turning the western flank of the ambush. As the NVA attempted to withdraw, TAC AIR, LFT'S and intensive Arty were employed. Results of the six hour engagement were 84 NVA (BC); 6 US (KIA) and 5 WHA (US). During the period 21-29 May while Co C was OPCON to the 2-502 of the 1/101, the company was in daily contact with elements believed to be from the 90th NVA Regt via YD5715. There were no joint or combined operations conducted. The battalion initiated an intensive company level training program for new personnel in conjunction with combat operations. Days devoted exclusively to troop movement: 0. Standdowns: None. Battalion participation in named operations as follows:

b. (C) Results:

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CARENTAN II (continued)1 - 17 May 1968

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>	
KHA	9	KIA	93
WHA	25	WIA	0
MIA	0	POW	1
		CHIEU HOI	3
		Wpns	10 IW
			5 CS

NEVADA EAGLE 17 May - 31 July 1968

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>	
KHA	6	KIA	23
WHA	15	WIA	0
MIA	0	POW	0
		CHIEU HOI	3
		WPNS	7 IW
			0 CS

4. Support Battalion

a. (C) **Significant Unit Activities:** The 82d Support Battalion was activated effective 25 May 1968, in accordance with paragraph 1, SECTION I, General Orders Number 231, Headquarters, US Army, Pacific, dated 13 May 1968. This battalion was engaged during the remainder of the period with in-country organization while concurrently providing logistical support to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division while the brigade conducted limited combat operations in the vicinity of GIA LE, Republic of Vietnam.

b. Operations (C)

1. See organization chart, inclosure A, Sec III.
2. The 82d Support Battalion is organized under the following TOE (MTOE).

- a. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, MTOE 29-24T, PAC 1/68.
 - b. Company A (Administrative), MTOE 12-197, PAC 4/68
 - c. Company C (Maintenance and Supply) MTOE 29-247, PAC 2/68.
 - d. Company B (Medical), MTOE 8-197, PAC 1/68.
3. (C) Sources of Personnel and equipment.

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Company was formed from personnel obtained primarily from outside of the brigade; that is, from the personnel pipeline. One officer and three NCOs volunteered for reassignment to this unit from within the brigade. No equipment was transferred to the battalion from the line battalions.

(b) Company A (Admin) was formed by assigning Adjutant General, Finance and Staff Judge Advocate personnel from Headquarters and Headquarters Company 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div. A small amount of equipment was transferred from HHC, 3d Bde.

(c) Company B (Med) was formed from personnel formerly assigned to Company D, 307th Medical Battalion. All TOE equipment was transferred from that company.

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(d) Company C (Maintenance and Supply) was formed by assigning the personnel from a platoon from Company A, 782d Maintenance Battalion and a provisional platoon from the 582 Supply Company. These elements had accompanied the 3d Brigade on TDY from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Only a small quantity of TCE equipment accompanied these elements.

c. Mission: To provide brigade level supply, direct support maintenance, medical service and miscellaneous services for all assigned or attached elements of the brigade.

1. HHC: To provide command and control of brigade support battalion organic and attached units, except operational control of the brigade special staff elements of the Administration Company. (Added by MTCB) To provide/graves registration services and limited bath services to the brigade.

2. Co A: To serve as a carrier unit which provides support for certain elements of the special staff. To provide the necessary personnel and administrative support to sustain the brigade. This includes the centralized personnel service for all units that are assigned to the brigade and replacement support. This company comprises the brigade rear echelon.

3. Co B: To provide division level type medical service within a separate brigade, a unit level medical service as required on an area basis to units operating in the separate brigade area.

4. Co C: To provide direct support maintenance and repair parts service for brigade material, except medical and cryptographic. To support the brigade and attached units by providing all classes of supply. To provide and maintain the brigade reserve of supplies and equipment for which the unit is responsible.

d. Personnel

1. Commanders and staff during the period were:

Bn CO	LTC James R. Wheaton, Jr
	LTC Grace G. Thomas Jr
Bn XO	Maj David F. Anderson

2. (C) Upon assignment of the S3, Communications Officer, S1, and Brigade Maintenance Officer between 25 and 28 July, the battalion staff became operational. Key personnel shortages in the headquarters at the end of this report are as follows:

<u>PAR/LIN</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>
03-01	Brigade Supply Off	Maj	4200
03-03	Armo Off	Lt	4514
03-05	Ch Armo Clk	E6	55B40
03-08	Pet Supply Sgt	E6	76W40
03-06	Eng Supply Sgt	E6	76W40
03-09	Sig Supply Sgt	E6	76V40
06-01	Ops Intel Sgt	E8	76Z50

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e. Logistics

1. (U) Concurrent with efforts to activate and organize the support battalion during this period, this battalion began to assume the logistical support to the brigade that had been provided by elements of the 101st ACD. In addition to the changes taking place within the brigade's own support structure, this period was marked with the turbulence associated with the rapid changes taking place in the support rendered by elements of the 101st ACD, 1st Logistical Command units, and the Navy and Marine units providing area support.

2. (C) General Orders Number 231, USARPAC, dtd 13 May 1968, officially reorganized the brigade and created battalion, effective 25 May. A copy of GO 231 was received on 22 May and was hand carried to 3d Brigade on 24 May. Authorization to requisition supplies and equipment was also granted by GO231. A Department of Defense Activity address Code (AT Code) was assigned by USARV G4 on 29 May 1968, permitting this battalion to requisition directly from depot as a requisitioner recognized in the world wide supply system. USA Support Command's Da Nang Depot was designated by USARV G4 as our primary depot.

3. (C) Requisitions for TOE items for the infantry battalions, artillery battalion, support battalion, signal company, engineer company and Cavalry troop were prepared and hand carried to USA DA Nang (Stock at this time had not yet been officially notified of the new brigade status, or that they would support us as a customer.)

4. (C) Difficulty was encountered immediately in that over one hundred requisitions were cancelled by depot. Many of these were described as "Command Controlled" or "USARV Controlled" items, which required submission of a letter request to USARV G4, rather than normal requisitioning procedures. A letter request for release of USARV Controlled Items was sent to USARV G4 on 14 June 1968. A reply was received from USARV on 28 June (dated 25 June), which approved the requests. Requisitions were immediately resubmitted to obtain these items.

5. (C) On 15 July 1968, a liaison visit to HQ USARV was made. A listing of all requisitions for the 82d Support Battalion showing those filled, those cancelled, those re-requisitioned, those released by depot for shipment but not received and those passed to 14th ICC was provided Chief of Supply and Maintenance, USARV G4. They identified the mission essential items that should be required as expeditiously as possible. The list was broken down and the commodity managers directed to take the necessary action to expedite acquisition and shipment of equipment to US Army Depot Da Nang.

6. (C) On 27 July the Brigade Supply Officer was sent to the 14th ICC to obtain a reconciliation of all requisitions passed from controlled requisitions, to resubmit all requisitions for PRC 25 and VRC 12 radios and to act as material release expeditor for those items released for issue from Saigon Depot.

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7. (C) Status of requisitions for TOE items as of the end of this period are as follows:

Original requests	1176
Cancelled	122
Received	119
In-country releases	
Passed to Saigon Depot	45
Passed to Can Ranh Bay	111
Passed to Qui Nhon	79
Passed to Naval Supply Act.	8
Passed to Da Nang Depot	167
Passed out of Country	
To USARPAC ICC	30
To USATC	2
To 2d Log Ctr (Okinawa)	4

5. 2nd Bn 321st Artillery

A. General: (U) During the reporting period the Battalion continued its mission of providing Direct Support Artillery to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. On 26 July 1968, the Battalion fired the 100,000th round since arriving in country on 15 February 1968. The round was fired by Battery B at Fire Base Panther III (YD811079). On 26 May 1968, this battalion was placed in a reorganization and training status until August 1968. Training was conducted at Bn level. Frequent inspections by members of the staff insured that battery level subjects were taught effectively.

B. Location

1. (C) During the reporting period, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery has continued to operate at Camp Rodriguez. On 1 May 1968 the Firing Batteries were at the following locations:

- (1) Battery A FB Boyd
- (2) Battery B FB Geronimo
- (3) Battery C Camp Rodriguez

2. (C) Battery B on 3 May 1968 moved by road from FB Geronimo to Camp Rodriguez. On 10 May 1968, Battery B conducted an airmobile move from Camp Rodriguez to FB Bastogne. On June 1968, Battery B conducted an airmobile move from Panther II to Panther III and remained at this FB until 31 July 1968.

3. (C) Battery C, on 3 May 1968 moved from Camp Rodriguez to FB Birmingham by road and remained at this FB through the reporting period.

4. (C) Battery A, on 23 July 1968, conducted an airmobile move from FB Boyd to FB Veghel and remained at this FB through the reporting period.

5. (C) Battery C 6/33 Arty was attached to this battalion on 11 July 1968. On 11 July 1968 Battery C 6/33 Arty conducted an airmobile move from FB Pinky to FB Bastogne and remained at this FB through the reporting period.

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6. (C) On 9 July 1968, the Battalion fired an artillery preparation in support of combat assault on LZ Greek (Nui Ke Mtn). The Artillery preparation was rather unique in that the fires were massed upon a hilltop less than 200 meters in diameter. The LZ has since been developed into a Battalion observation post. Nui Ke is the highest hill in the Hue area and overlooks what is commonly referred to as the mortar-rocket belt. It has been used by the NV. frequently to mortar and rocket the Hue-Phu Bai-Camp Eagle complex. The OP is manned by the members of the Battalion's target acquisition platoon. The platoon utilizes an anti-intrusion device to assist in security of their position. The Battalion OP has a Battery Commanders scope for observation during daylight hours, and a light observation device (Starlight scope) during the hours of darkness.

C. (C) The Battalion is organized as follows:

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
2. A Battery (DS)
3. B Battery (DS)
4. C Battery (DS)
5. D Battery 6/33 (Reinforcing)

6. (C) Number of days unit engaged in (a) Training, 67, (b) Movement, 7, (c) Operations, 18. Training was integrated into combat operations. This is possible because of the Artillery fire base concept of operations and training status of the Brigade.

6. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry

a. (C) Organization: On 17 May B Troop was organized under the 17-77F TOE. This particular operational period marked the transition period in which B Troop was changing to the 17-57G TOE.

b. (C) Activities: Whereas most of the initial changes in TOE were of minor equipment issues and of personnel strengths, we found our particular mission not changing greatly from the last operation period. The mobility of the Cavalry (on wheels) and the versatility of firepower were utilized immensely during the period.

c. Account of Activities

1. (C) During this period B Troop escorted 44 convoys for a total mileage of 1250 miles. 948 vehicles were escorted. Security of mine sweeps in the 3d Brigade area of operation were conducted for a total mileage of 1940 miles.

2. (C) B Troop for the month of May secured fire support base Panther I while several Artillery Batteries occupied the base in "general support" for the 101st ACD.

3. (C) During the month of May, 30 ambushes were set with negative results. Emphasis was placed along the road network in an attempt to cease road mining incidents. From intelligence reports and suspected enemy movement, B Troop detected the source of mines to be coming from Thon Chau Chu (YD778140).

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4. (C) B Troop pressed operations into Chau Chu area resulting in 4 VC KIA, 1 NVL KIA, and 4 VC POW. Through constant pressure in that area by means of ambushes, patrols, air strikes, and observation posts, all road mining incidents ceased. The last reported mines found in the 17th Cavalry area of operation were on May 27. One such operation in Thon Chau Chu included working with the P.R.U. (Provincial reconnaissance unit) from Hue.

d. (U) S-5 Medical: During the period in question, 16 medcaps were held by the troop in conjunction with the Bde S-5. Approximately 1300 persons attended. Most of the cases treated were for skin infection.

e. (U) Psychological Operations: Over 100,000 anti VC pamphlets were distributed throughout the area, especially along main highway routes. These were distributed by the troops while out on convoy, sweep or search and destroy missions.

f. (U) One significant action that should be noted is the fact that a village chief from the Nam Hoa area led B Troop into Chau Chu to show location of a Viet Cong tunnel complex. In so doing the chief was killed by a sniper round. This marked a point where the villagers finally offered assistance. The loss of their chief's life possibly stymied further help from the villagers in this area.

g. (C) In the month of July, B Troop was called upon to secure the new bridge at Nam Hoa. At the present time this mission is still in effect with no enemy incidents occurring there.

7. Tactical Air Control Party

a. (C) During the period 1 May through 31 July, the 7th Air Force has supported the 82d Abn Div and attached units with 944 fighter sorties and 371 Forward Air Controller sorties. Forward Air Controllers have also controlled 24 defoliation missions.

1. (C) Totals for May: During May 448 fighter sorties were flown, of them 435 were FAC controlled and 13 were radar controlled. There were also 4 defoliation missions flown in May. Forward Air Controllers flew 126 sorties for a total of 421 hrs and 18 minutes. Of the 126 sorties flown, 75 were spent conducting airstrikes and 51 were Visual Reconnaissance. There were 310 hrs and 18 minutes spent controlling airstrikes and 111 hrs and 30 minutes in reconnaissance. Ordnance expended during the month was:

High Explosive	1,088,150 Lbs
Napalm	224,000 Lbs
Rockets	87 Pods
C.B.U.	26 Pods
20mm	166,315 rounds

There were 131 confirmed KBI during the month.

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2. (C) Totals for June: During June there were 340 fighter sorties flown, of then 306 were FAC controlled and 34 were radar controlled. There were also 4 defoliation missions flown in June. Forward Air Controllers flew 119 sorties for a total of 370 hrs and 55 minutes. Of the 119 sorties flown 77 were spent conducting airstrikes and 42 were for visual reconnaissance. There were 287 hrs and 5 minutes spent controlling airstrikes and 91 hrs and 50 minutes in reconnaissance. Ordnance expended for the month was:

High Explosives	1,024,150 Lbs
Napalm	154,500 Lbs
Rockets	150 Pods
C.B.U.	0 Pods
20mm	166,315 rounds

3. (C) Totals for July: During July there were 156 fighter sorties flown. All of them were FAC controlled. There were also 16 defoliated missions flown in July. Forward Air Controllers flew 126 sorties for a total of 355 hrs and 35 minutes, of the 126 sorties flown 62 were spent conducting airstrikes and 64 were for visual reconnaissance. There were 194 hrs and 40 minutes spent controlling airstrikes and 160 hrs and 55 minutes in reconnaissance. Ordnance expended during the month was:

High Explosives	194,350 Lbs
Napalm	27,500 Lbs
Rockets	88 Pods
CBU	2 Pods
20mm	345,965 rounds

There were also 131 confirmed KBA and 1 POW credited to the Air Force during the Quarter.

8. Army Aviation

a. (C) General: The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division Aviation Section supplied continuous air support for the 3d Brigade during the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968. The following totals are provided to account for the activities during this period:

TOTAL FOR 1 MAY THRU 31 JULY 1968

UH - 1D 4 - 2					
TONS	P.X	MED	SORT	TSKS	HRS
204	6,782	71	4,707	798	616
OH - 23					
1.6	2,873	12	3,872	782	766

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b. (U) On an average for the three months period the aircraft maintenance was as follows:

TOTAL AIRCRAFT	OH - 23 IN-MAINTENANCE	OPERABLE
6	4	2
	UH - 1D	
4	2	2

9. Chemical

a. Non-persistent CS cannister cluster munition E158 was utilized on four occasions in the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div area of operations during the reporting period as follows:

1. (C) Vicinity of Ta Trach River south of Nam Hoa district headquarters. Target was suspected NVA battalion in an assembly area YD780118 to YD787113. Ten (10) cannister munitions E158s were utilized and the area of coverage was approximately 50,000 square meters. 120 rounds of artillery were fired into the area following the delivery of the CS. Results were unknown and no damage estimation could be made because of the dense foliage.

2. (C) Vicinity 4km SW of Nui Ke target was suspected NVA battalion in an assembly area YD730039 to YD734036. Eight (8) cannister cluster munitions E158's were utilized and the area coverage was approximately 40,000 square meters. The drop was made at 1830 hours and was followed by intensive artillery H and I fires throughout the night.

3. (C) Vicinity 5km SW of Nui Ke target was a suspected NVA Battalion assembly area and weapons factory and storage site YD704052 to YD702045. Six (6) cannister cluster munitions E158's were utilized at 1045 hours and were followed by intensive artillery fires throughout the night.

4. (C) Vicinity 1km E of Nui Ke. Target was a suspected mortar position vicinity YD770055. Four (4) cannister cluster munitions E158's were utilized at 1450 hours and were immediately followed by the TAC AIR. The CS was 100% on target and the TAC AIR ordnance (10 @ 500 lb bombs, 2 @ CBU 24's and 20mm) was 100% on target. Area coverage was approximately 24,000 square meters. No damage estimation could be made due to the dense foliage.

b. Persistent CS 1 was utilized on one occasion vicinity YD673188 on 10 July 68. Twenty-four (24) bunkers were destroyed and contaminated with CS 1. C4 and four (4) 80 lb drums of CS 1 were utilized with approximately 10 lbs of CS 1 being placed into each bunker.

c. (C) Defoliation missions conducted by the Brigade were concentrated in four primary areas as follows:

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1. The area on the perimeter of the Camp Rodriguez was sprayed on separate occasions. Defoliation was quite extensive the area was cleared very effectively.

2. The area around FB Panther II was sprayed by helicopter on one occasion. Defoliation was good to fair.

3. The area along route 547 from FB Boyd to FB Bastogne was defoliated in conjunction with Rome Flow operations. Results have been very good and the area is clear and visibility is excellent.

4. A small area vicinity Chau Chu YD831138 (a suspected enemy location) was defoliated and then burned using diesel oil. The area was cleared very effectively.

d. (C) Fougasse and chemical land mines were emplaced at all fire support bases as follows:

FB	55 Gal Fougasse	55 Gal Flame mine	5-10 Gal LM	8" Cannister
Panther II	11	0	0	0
Boyd	0	0	100	0
Birmingham	0	0	4	47
Camp Rodriguez	17	0	30	0

*Attached overlay indicates location of fougasse and chemical land mines at Camp Rodriguez.

e. Approximately 700 protective masks were inspected by the 10th Chemical platoon. After being inspected, the protective masks were cleaned and defective parts replaced.

10. Signal

a. (C) At the close of the last reporting period, communication support to the Brigade Headquarters was provided by the Brigade Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the 3d platoon, B Co, 82d Signal Bn. On 25 May 68, the Signal Company authorized under a Separate Light Infantry Brigade was formed. The 58th Signal Company is made up of 102 officers and men and performed essentially the same function as the two previously mentioned platoons. The big advantage lies in the control of all Brigade Headquarters Communications being placed under one Signal Corps unit which is under the operational control of the Brigade Signal Officer.

b. (C) Multi-channel telephone links have been installed to all 3 Battalion Fire Support Bases utilizing organic radio sets AN/PRC 68 and AN/PRC 112. The SOF channelization is as follows:

1. Bde SWB to FWD SWB (Common User)
2. Bde TOC to Bn FWD TOC (Sole User)
3. Arty FDC to Arty Bn FSCC (Sole User)
4. Bn rear SWB to Bn FWD SWB (Common User)

In addition, one, four-channel, system is installed to the 101st ACD Camp Eagle.

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c. (C) The Brigade operates two internal FM nets. The command net is reserved for use only by stations who do not possess secure voice capability. All traffic with the Infantry Battalions is passed over the secure intelligence net, thus depriving the enemy of considerable intelligence and at the same time speeding the flow of traffic. No difficulties have been experienced in operating in this mode and the separate companies, such as the Cav Troop, will enter this net when the TSEC/KY-38's are received. A TSEC/KY-28 has been installed in the Brigade Commander's helicopter and is also regularly used with no difficulties.

d. (C) The turnover of communications personnel who elected to return to CONUS has created some problems, but for the most part replacements were quickly received. All Battalions have a Signal Corps officer in the position of Battalion Signal Officer, thus an effective training program was conducted and problems minimized.

11. Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion (AEN)

a. Operation Carentan II

(C) During the first 17 days of the reporting period Company C was engaged in supporting 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division operations in Operation Carentann II. Throughout this period the company supplied both direct and general combat engineer support to all brigade units. The engineer support plan followed during this period called for each infantry battalion to have attached at all times one engineer squad with the balance of the company under the company control. Direct support missions such as combat demolitions and LZ clearing were carried out by assigning additional squads and equipment from the equipment platoon to the infantry battalions on a mission basis. Missions accomplished in this manner included sweeping of all lines of communication within the Brigade's area of operation, fire base modification, construction of firing pads, and ammunition storage bunkers for artillery batteries located at forward fire bases.

b. Operation Nevada Eagle

(C) As a result of an enemy rocket, mortar and sapper attack the night of 21 May 68 on Camp Eagle, Camp Rodriguez, and Gia Le combat base complex, Company C was called upon to complete four vital missions. The first of these missions involved the 54 enemy sappers who had been killed within and around the Gia Le combat base. As the rapid completion of this mission was vital to the health of personnel in the area, all enemy dead were buried in a common grave dug with an equipment platoon bulldozer, assisted by a gathering detail from the 1st Bde 101st Air Cav Division. The second mission involved strengthening the defensive wire of the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division base camp. While this wire had not been breached by the enemy it was strengthened none the less. The third and fourth missions resulting from this enemy attack involved the construction of a battalion size fire base astride the enemies most likely avenue of

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approach to the Gia Le base and the construction of 5.4 miles of road from Gia Le to the fire base. Both of these missions were undertaken by the 1st platoon with the equipment platoon in support. The fire base was constructed in five days and the road in seven days. For the remainder of the period the engineers were employed in disposal of enemy bunkers in the hamlet of Nguyet Bui and cutting an LZ for the 2-505 infantry on Nui Ke mountain.

C. Summary of Operations

Missions

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CARENTAN II</u>	<u>NEVADA EAGLE</u>
Helicopter LZ's cleared	1	3
Enemy Bunkers Destroyed	9	10
Bde and Bn TOC's Constructed	1	3
Tunnels and Tunnel Complexes Destroyed	3	5
Aid Stations Construction	0	3
Artillery OP's Constructed	0	3
Firing Battery Positions Constructed or Repaired	0	3

Explosive Ordnance Demolition

500 lb bombs	0	1
106mm	5	7
105mm	0	30
4.2 in	37	10
81mm	3	110
M 79 Rounds	9	15
Chicom Mines	4	11
B40 Rockets	31	9
B41 Rockets	0	5
Viet Cong C-4 Grenades	0	50
60mm Mortar Mines	0	2

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D. LOGISTICS

a. (C) The Brigade logistics activity and span of responsibility during this reporting period increased from that effort required to support a Brigade organic to a Division to that effort required to be self-sustaining as a Separate Light Infantry Brigade. This change was effected by General Order on 25 May 1968 and initiated the re-organization and supply action required to support a separate brigade. These actions include:

1. Activation of a Support Battalion.
2. Activation of a fourth rifle company and combat support company in each infantry battalion.
3. Increased from a Signal Platoon to a Signal Company.
4. Assignment of activity codes to allow requisitioning of required equipment.
5. Defining and coordinating that support required from USARV logistical units.
6. Establishing liaison with supporting depots.

b. (C) At the close of this reporting period, the infantry battalions equipped to perform their combat missions. The following units will not be capable of unrestricted mission accomplishment until required equipment is on hand.

1. Hq Det Spt Bn, (Staff, Graves Registration Det, Bath Det)
2. "C" Company Support Battalion
3. "B" Troop 1/17 Cavalry
4. "C" Company 307th Engineers

Equipment status is being received daily and by the end of the next reporting period these units should be capable of performing their mission with required equipment.

c. (U) Logistical Support of combat operations during this reporting period was normal with no major problems encountered.

d. (U) At the present time, Seabee construction is under way to construct temporary billets (wooden GPM Tent Frames), latrines and showers in the Camp Rodriguez area. This construction will be complete by 1 September 1968.

e. (U) MAINTENANCE: Maintenance of the Brigade equipment has been satisfactory. Some problems have been experienced in Engineer and aircraft maintenance.

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1. GROUND: No major problems exist in ground maintenance. "C" Company Support Battalion has a limited capability in direct support maintenance of all brigade equipment except medical and crypto. Lack of support is provided by the 67th Maintenance Company (DS) and the 578 LEM Company (GS).

(a) Medical: Supported by 23rd Depot Supply Platoon.

(b) Crypto: Supported by 58th Signal Company and Phu Bai Distribution Authority.

2. Aircraft: Aircraft maintenance is being supported by the 339th TAM (DS) and the 610th Trans. Co. (TAM) (GS) located at Red Beach.

f. MEDICAL: (C) The following ailments have been treated by "B" Company Support Battalion during the reporting period.

(a) 2,283 patients seen at Clearing Station (total)

(b) 487 cases of non-battle injury

(c) 59 IRHA (injury as result of hostile action)

(d) 135 gastroenteritis

(e) 140 FUO's (fever unknown origin)

(f) 25 Psychiatric cases

(g) 148 Diarrhea

(h) 158 URI (Upper respiratory infection)

(i) 5 Hepatitis

(j) 339 Dermatitis

(k) 36 Malaria

(l) 47 Heat casualties

(m) 50 Cases VD (Venereal disease)

(n) 78 Foot problems (excluding IRHA)

2. Lessons learned indicate command and personal emphasis on Gastroenteritis, diarrhea, hepatitis (and a recent outbreak of amoebic dysentery).

(a) Consumption of local food and beverages must be curbed. Higher incident rates are from troops occupying inhabited areas (i.e. Hue).

(b) More handwashing facilities.

- (c) Field sanitation teams for environmental sanitation.
- (d) Drinking water must have sufficient chlorine residual.
- (e) Use of non-potable ice must be carefully supervised, so as not to be used for direct cooling of beverages.
- (f) Stress use of Halizone or Iodine Tablets.
- (g) Swimming in ponds, creeks or rivers should be eliminated.

3. Malaria:

- (a) Supervise dispensing of CP tablet every Monday.
- (b) Supervise dispensing of Dapsone tablet daily.
- (c) Increase use of insect repellent especially in jungle area.
- (d) The use of mosquito netting whenever possible, in or out of the field.
- (e) The use of long sleeved shirts and full length trousers during hours of dusk and darkness

4. Heat casualties:

- (a) Increase water intake.
- (b) Taking adequate salt tablets, with enough water for the tablet to be dissolved.
- (c) Minimize direct exposure to sunlight.
- (d) Tactical situation permitting, rest periods should be instituted during hottest parts of the day.

5. (U) Foot problems - Not due to IMA is on the increase.

- (a) Tactical situation permitting, boots should be removed for ventilation of feet, especially after prolonged exposure to wet conditions.
- (b) Whenever possible in a rear, shower shoes should be worn.
- (c) Adequate changing of socks.
- (d) Liberal use of foot powder.
- (e) Issue of new boots if old ones are unserviceable.

6. Psychiatric cases:

- (a) Increased command interest on the individual soldiers problems.

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(b) Observance of new comers, and making them feel part of the team.

g. (U) Rodent control must become an increased part of Moss and Field Sanitation Teams. After a unit has been established in one location for any length of time, the incidence of rodent sightings increases.

a. Use of rat traps.

b. Use of PA&E boxes (poison)

c. Adequate clean-up of moss storage and living areas.

h. (U) SUPPLY: In addition to those comments on supply contained in Support Battalions report, obtaining USARV controlled items was the major problem. With the correct directives on hand and procedures understood, this problem has been eliminated as of the end of this reporting period. No major problems exist in supporting the combat units with essential supplies.

i. (U) TRANSPORTATION: The reorganization under the separate brigade TOE does not provide for a transportation element within the Brigade. Action is being taken to have this element included. At the present time adequate support is being provided by the 39th Transportation Battalion.

E. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. (C) During the reporting period psychological operations were carried out using leaflet drops, loudspeaker missions (ground and aerial), and leaflet distribution. These operations were supported by the 7th Psy Ops Bn, and the 9th ACS utilizing 62-B loudspeaker aircraft, and C-47 Leaflet/Psyop aircraft. Organic missions by the Brigade and 101st Air Cav Division were flown using UH-1D helicopter. An H2 team consisting of two (2) EM and a ground speaker system was attached to the Brigade.

b. (U) During the reporting period, 110 leaflet missions on which 11 million leaflets were dropped, were flown by the 9th ACS and organic aircraft. 115 tape missions were flown for a total of 81½ hours playing time.

c. (U) Themes most often stressed on these missions were:

1. Chieu Hoi
2. Rewards Program
3. Rally to the GVN-ANTI VC & NVA
4. Atrocities by the VC and NVA
5. American allies are Our Friends

6. Public Information

d. (U) Returnees were interrogated on the effectiveness of Psyops efforts and their observations were incorporated into the messages or altered the type of message being presented.

F. CIVIL AFFAIRS

a. (U) The S-5 Section was involved mainly with two separate districts during this period. The districts were Houng Thuy, and Nam Hoa. In addition to medical assistance under the MEDCAP Program, two long term projects were started and several small ones were completed.

b. (U) The type & amount of supplies distributed during the quarter is as follows:

Soy Bean Oil	3,450 lbs
Oatmeal	3,920 lbs
Cornmeal	7,700 lbs
Rice	3,725 lbs
Salt	3,100 lbs
Soap	454 lbs
Cement	7,830 lbs
Shoot Metal	1,650 shoots
Resettlement Kit	105 ea
School Kit	1,600 ea
PE Kit	2 ea
Sewing Machine	1 ea
Rice Machine	3 ea
Pumps	3 ea.
Health Kits	700 ea

c. (U) Repair of schools and other public projects: With the assistance CORDS, materials were supplied for the Well Project in the Houng Thuy District. They also supplied about 2/3 of the materials needed to repair the Market Place of Nam Hoa. Transportation for the materials was provided by the 3d Bde, and the labor for the projects was provided by the Vietnamese.

d. (U) Projects for Community Welfare:

1. Transportation and distribution of 1500 lbs of captured rice for the Nam Hoa district.
2. Repair of small bridge near Chau Cau.
3. Supplied paint and cement for repair of small religious shrine
4. Offered Catholic services during MEDCAPS at the Benedictine Monastery.
5. Repaired Pogoda roof at the Royal Tomb.

e. (U) MEDCAPS: 27 planned MEDCAPS were held in which approximately 1,740 people were treated. Several of the planned MEDCAP operations included PSYOPS and/or intelligence gathering programs. In addition to the planned MEDCAPS, many individual & impromptu MEDCAPS were held by the medics of our various units.

AVELAC

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade 82d Airborne
Division for period ending 31 July 1968.

Section II

Commanders Observations, Evaluations
and Recommendations

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II. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

A. PERSONNEL.

1. (C) Personnel Shortages:

a. Observation: The only category of personnel still in demand is 13B40 (Staff Sergeant E-6).

b. Evaluation: During the period covered by this report, the processing of those personnel returning to CONUS for DEROS and leave has gone smoothly. Replacements, although slow in coming at first, have been received for all losses except 13B40 (Staff Sergeant E-6). In the artillery section there is a shortage of 24 personnel in this MOS.

c. Recommendations: The shortages of critical MOS's should be obtained from each unit based on its TOE and requests for these personnel should be submitted through proper channels.

2. (U) Records Management:

a. Observation: Records management continues to be a problem due to the distance between Bie, (Camp Rodriguez) and AG/FIN (Bien Hoa).

b. Evaluation: The great distance between Bie, (Camp Rodriguez) and AG/FIN (Bien Hoa) makes the problem of keeping records, transfers, and financial problems up-to-date even slower and more tedious than need be. A record of transfers and changes of duty of personnel is rarely up-to-date in personnel records. The process of screening a man's records to find errors in pay complaints is another problem which is greatly slowed down.

c. Recommendations: That Bie AG/FIN be relocated from Bien Hoa to a nearer location so as to resolve record management problems.

B. TRAINING.

1. (U) Need for School Trained Linguist:

a. Observation: There is a shortage of linguist personnel within the MI detachment.

b. Evaluation: There is a need for linguist personnel trained in the Vietnamese language. Under MTC 30-AG, presently being approved at DA, there are 20 seats for linguist personnel within the detachment. At the present time there are only four school trained people in the detachment who speak Vietnamese. If the unit had more language trained people so much dependability would not have to be given to use of native interpreters. Personal contact is lost when someone has to use a native interpreter.

c. Recommendation: More personnel should be sent to language school prior to being sent to Vietnam. When they arrive in country they should be sent to units in the field instead of staying at higher head quarters.

2. (U) Interpreters Need Practical Work

a. Observation: Interpreters do not receive enough practical work in English prior to being sent to their units.

b. Evaluation: This unit has had to give the interpreters additional English training to build their vocabulary. Most of them can read and write English very good, but they need additional training on speaking.

c. Recommendation: A brigade controlled school should be set up to give interpreters additional training prior to being sent to their units.

3. (U) Need For Military Intelligence Officers:

a. Observation: It is imperative that officers assigned to Battalion S-2 position be trained in the collection of intelligence information and in utilization of various agencies available to the combat commander.

b. Evaluation: During the month of July, two Battalions of the Brigade received MI officers as Battalion S-2. There has been a marked improvement in collection of information since the MI officers were assigned. They are not only extremely interested in the job they are doing, but it allows the commander to utilize his infantry officers in the rifle companies. It is highly recommended that MI officers be utilized as Battalion S-2 staff officers.

c. Recommendation: The job of Battalion S-2 is a full-time job and this should be treated as such. The Battalion S-2 is best handled by an MI officer.

C. OPERATIONS.

1. (U) Security Missions:

a. Observation: Security of Rome Plow operations is done best in conjunction with a tank unit.

b. Evaluation: Clearing both sides of the MSR out to 200 meters eliminated the possibility of a large scale ambush. During security of plow operations, the limiting factor is the size of the security force. One company reinforced with a tank platoon can adequately secure an area 300 x 300 meters with the infantry outside the plows at least 30-40 meters to minimize the possibility of B-40 and RPG attacks. Tanks are placed on commanding terrain or move with the plows. All elements enter the Infantry Company radio net for control.

c. Recommendation: In such future operations utilization of armored units should be considered.

2. (U) Proper Employment of LRRP's:

a. Observation: Utilization of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) is invaluable in this type of warfare.

b. Evaluation: Prior to operations being conducted into an unknown area. LRRPs can very effectively warn the commander of enemy strengths and capabilities prior to the friendly operation. The LRRP that is currently operating with this Brigade is not authorized as a TORE unit, consequently the acquisition of personnel and equipment for them has been extremely difficult. However, with the bare essentials, they have effectively interdicted routes of movement by hostile forces. The LRRP must be considered as an information and intelligence collection agency and not a combat patrol. They should not participate in ambushes or firefights unless absolutely necessary.

c. Recommendation: It is imperative that a Brigade-size unit utilize a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol as simply an additional intelligence collection agency.

3. (U) Intelligence Prior to Operations:

a. Observation: In the internal defense environment such as Vietnam no operation should be planned prior to having a good intelligence estimate of the operational area.

b. Evaluation: The intelligence community has many reliable agencies which can effectively locate the enemy for the commander. The commander must understand the capabilities of these agencies and realize the importance of the intelligence apparatus. The commander cannot do the complete job of his S-2, nor can the S-3 act concurrently as the S-2. In all cases where the commander has continuously relied on his S-2, the intelligence has been very effective in interdicting enemy base camps, lines of communications, and reconnaissance activities.

c. Recommendation: All service schools, including C 5 GS and the War College, should stress the capabilities of the intelligence agencies available to the commander.

4. (U) Employment of Armored Cav:

a. Observation: The tendency seems to be to regard the Cav as a group of vehicles rather than as a tactical unit.

b. Evaluation: For operational missions regard B Troop as three platoons rather than as 30 vehicles. In the past the designation of how many vehicles were needed for a mission and almost which vehicles were needed has been passed down from higher command.

c. Recommendation: Recommend missions be given to the troop not to vehicles.

5. (U) Artillery Raid Operations:

a. Observation: The use of an Artillery Raid was useful both tactically and as a training aid.

b. Evaluation: On 3 July 1968 at 0615 B Btry 2nd Bn 321st Arty conducted an Airmobile displacement from FSB PANTHER II (YD800109) to FSB PANTHER III (YD811079) to conduct an Artillery Raid. The Battery fired 1000 rounds and was airlifted back to FSB PANTHER II and operational by 1015 hours.

c. Recommendation: This exercise, in addition to being excellent training exercises, displayed the units ability to make a rapid displacement and engage targets on a quick reaction basis.

6. (U) Wear of Air Items:

a. Observation: Air items wear out faster in some units where these items are in constant use, than in other units but the use requirement is the same for both units.

b. Evaluation: At the present time, this Brigade has on hand enough air items to move one firing battery and ten sorties of ammunition. Air items are critical due to the isolated location of fire support bases that can only be resupplied by helicopter. The current policy of higher headquarters is that air items will not be used longer than six months. The Battalion's limited number of air items reach this age in approximately sixty days. The Battalion has had air items on requisition since 13 July 1968.

c. Recommendation: The automatic distribution of expendable air items be made to all units based on wear out factor and the type unit.

7. (U) Organization of Additional Units:

a. Observation: Due to a change in TCE, it became necessary to organize an additional company. One possibility was to organize it piecemeal with incoming replacements until it is fully operational.

b. Evaluation: The solution chosen was to have each company organize an additional platoon out of its present strength. Any platoon in the company would then be subject to incorporation into the new company. This insured that all less desirable personnel wouldn't be congregated in the same platoon. In addition, while part of the parent company the platoon had the full benefit of operating and becoming a proficient unit.

c. Recommendation: This procedure has been used in similar situations.

C. EQUIPMENT.

1. (U) Utilization of Ground Surveillance Radar:

a. Observation: The GSR sets assigned to the Brigade are invaluable in determining movement of hostile forces outside of the defensive perimeter.

b. Evaluation: Although the current radar (AN-PPS 4) authorized in the maneuver battalions is ten years old and extremely difficult to maintain, every effort should be made to retain this capability instead of simply storing the set. It is realized that the AN-PPS 4 is powered by a generator, but it can also be powered by batteries that are available.

c. Recommendation: Commanders should stress the importance of the utilization of the GSR. Personnel assigned to GSR sections should not be used as perimeter guards while the set is stored. Efforts should be made to obtain badly needed AN-PPS 5 radar sets which are invaluable on defensive perimeters.

2. (U) Utilization of Sniffer Reports:

a. Observation: It has been noticed that sniffer provides the most reliable source of enemy detection.

b. Evaluation: The data gathered is of immediate tactical value and must be acted upon accordingly. By monthly observation of data, a movement pattern is sometimes noticed which also enhances the capability of the device.

c. Recommendation: Immediate readouts of hot spots are required prior to departure of aircraft from AO. Readouts could be passed by KY-33 secure or by point of origin thereby precluding the time loss required to encode data.

3. (U) Utilization of the Image Interpreter Section:

a. Observation: The Image Interpreter section does not function properly in inadequate space of a tent.

b. Evaluation: Under MTOE 30-14G, which is being approved by DA, the II section is authorized 2 expansible vans. The section is presently having to operate in a GP small tent until authorization for 2 expansible vans is obtained. If the section limits its equipment space it can adequately operate within a GP small tent. Due to the environment, the heat and moisture at sometimes hampers working during the hottest part of the day. To overcome this inconvenience the section has been doing the work in the evening.

c. Recommendation: Expansible vans should be employed when possible or work should be limited to the evening hours.

4. (U) Use of the M101A1 (105mm)

a. Observation: Even though expedient means make use of the M101A1 (105mm) possible, the M101A1 could be utilized at even a fuller extent.

b. Evaluation: In sand or mud ammunition boxes can be utilized to build a hasty platform for firing the Howitzer M101A1 (105mm). Boxes should be solidly packed with sand or mud before using. Maintenance has been hampered by lack of repair parts, but the material readiness of this unit is somewhat deficient due to old equipment, which require piecemeal repair.

c. Recommendation: That M101A1 Howitzer (105mm) be withdrawn to depot for use in resupplying ARVN units and that M102 Howitzer (105mm) be issued to all US Units, thus increasing artillery air mobility.

5. (U) Prior Planning When Using Aircraft:

a. Observation: Aircraft planning and utilization on the part of the battalions could cut the work load of the UH-1.

b. Evaluation: The number of the passengers carried by the aviation section (6,782) and the tons of cargo carried (204 tons) is not evenly enough divided by the number of flying hours (766 hrs).

c. Recommendation: The planning of battalions should include maximum utilization of space with minimum amount of time.

AVDG-GC (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division's Operational Report Lessons
Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1968


DA, HA, 101st Airborne Division, APO SF 96383, 5 September 1968

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington D.C. 20310

The inclosed ORLL, 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division, is forwarded
in accordance with XXIV Corps Reg 525-1 and USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as


W. P. TALLON, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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AVIL-GCT (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind

MAJ Sanderson/jas/2506

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1968 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV CORPS, APO 96308

16 OCT 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (U) Comments on Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. Reference page 13, para C4e. Concur with actions taken to organize the support battalion and assume logistical support of the Brigade. The support battalion's aggressive follow-up and reconciliation of requisitions is commendable.

b. Reference page 25, para D1. This headquarters is aware of the shortage of cargo vehicles organic to 3d Bde, 82d Abn. Efforts are being made to expedite supply action to alleviate this shortage.

3. (C) Comments on Section 2, Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Concur with commander's recommendations noted at para A1, B1-2, C1, C3-4, C7, and D4, without further comment.

b. Item: Records management, page 28, para A2. USARV Movement Order 1-68 (Golden Sword), dated 27 Aug 68, will resolve the problems cited in the commander's evaluation.

c. Item: Need for military intelligence officers, page 29, para B3. Concur. Recommend military intelligence officers receive additional training in tactical operations, since they are expected to operate closely with the S3 in planning and coordination of intelligence requests for combat operations. Military intelligence officers are at a disadvantage, in this respect, when compared with combat arms officers of like grade and seniority. They have not had the same opportunity for formal or on-the-job training in combat operations.

d. Item: Proper employment of LRRP's, page 30, para C2. Concur. When an LRRP has been detected and cannot easily evade contact, it should be extracted immediately to avoid decisive engagement and close combat for which it is neither equipped nor manned. Regarding the lack of authorization for LRRP (commander's evaluation): HQ, USARV has acted to provide the Brigade with an authorized LRRP capability.

e. Item: Artillery raid operations, page 31, para C5. Concur. Artillery raid operations can be used effectively for operations and training. However, emphasis must be placed on effective use of target acquisition agencies to preclude unwarranted ammunition expenditures.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVII-GCT

5 OCT 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1968 (R1) (U)

f. Item: Wear of air items, page 31, para C6. Nonconcur. Current directives requiring slings to be dated and retired from service within specified time frames are adequate. To preserve cargo slings, emphasis must be placed on care, storage and handling these items after delivery, and a requirement imposed for prompt retrograde of cargo slings to prevent damage from exposure to weather.

g. Item: Utilization of ground surveillance radar, page 32, para D1. Concur. Ground surveillance radars are an extremely valuable aid in perimeter security. AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radars are silent when operated on batteries and should be employed in that mode whenever possible. The radar's effectiveness is increased when used in conjunction with night observation devices e.g., a Starlight Scope. The radar can acquire and track targets until they approach within range of night observation devices where accurate observed fire can be delivered.

h. Item: Utilization of sniffer reports, page 32, para D2. Concur. However, enemy locations should be reported in clear text. Point of origin systems are suitable for brevity in passing enemy locations, but should never be used to pass classified information.

i. Item: Utilization of the image interpreter section, page 32, para D3. Concur. Expansable vans should be employed when possible. The amount of heat given off by light tables plus the high temperatures and humidity normally experienced during the summer months limits the amount of time an imagery interpreter can effectively function. An air-conditioned environment is required during the warmest months of the year. MTOE submission is appropriate action to request Truck, Van, Expansable, M292, for image interpreter section.

j. Item: Prior planning when using aircraft, page 33, para D5. Concur. However, data provided in the commander's evaluation indicates use of helicopters to be well planned. For planning purposes, 7 passengers or not more than 1600 lbs of cargo are maximum loads for UH-1 helicopters. Using the cited figures (6782 divided by 7, plus 204 tons cargo divided by 1600 lbs) the result is a minimum of 969 passenger and 255 cargo sorties to move the quantities indicated. By dividing the number of sorties (1224) into flight time (766 hours), an average sortie duration of approximately 37 minutes is provided.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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H. R. Taylor
H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy Furn:
CG, 101st Abn Div (AM)
CO, 3d Bde, 82 Abn Div

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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 68) 3d Ind (C)

MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for
period ending 31 July 1968

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 5 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning need for US school trained linguists, page 28, Section II, paragraph B1. This headquarters has requested that additional personnel trained in the Vietnamese language be assigned to this command.

b. Reference item concerning use of the M101A1 howitzer (105mm), page 33, Section II, paragraph C4: Concur. Eleven light artillery battalions will be reequipped with M102 howitzers during FY 69.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Cy furn:
HQ XXIV Corps
HQ 3/82 Abn Div


W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DOD DIR 5200.10**

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96258

7 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
2. (C) Reference paragraph 3c, 2d Indorsement: Further recommend that DA study both the procurement and assignment procedures of junior MI officers. Most MI officers are commissioned from ROTC. Their training and assignment with tactical units is normally very limited. Many lieutenants are assigned directly to MI Group headquarters or on experience serving with a battalion or subordinate level unit as junior officers. Therefore, this headquarters recommends that selection criteria be reviewed to see if factors can be determined to select MI officers on the basis of retention potential. Career-minded officers who volunteer for transfer to MI from other branches have a definite advantage over recently commissioned ROTC graduates. This experience advantage will serve them well in higher level assignments.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

EL Shortt

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EL SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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