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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

A TYPE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE, 1970-75 (U)


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
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UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

A TYPE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE, 1970-75 (U)

A Handbook in Support of the USACDC Study,
The Threat to Army 75

FINAL STUDY

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(C) FOREWORD (C)

1. (C) This handbook is designed to provide basic guidance for agencies conducting combat development studies, war games, and field experiments involving a hostile guerrilla force in the South-east Asia area in the time period 1970-1975. It is based on information derived from current area studies, afteraction reports, captured guerrilla force documents, and current intelligence studies. It reflects projected tactical doctrine and estimated weapons and equipment which will be available to a typical guerrilla force in the area and time period described.

2. (U) This handbook was prepared by the Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations Inc., under the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Division, Plans Directorate of this headquarters. It was reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. (U) The organizational breakdown of the force described has been carried down to squad level to provide for a realistic evaluation and analysis of results when the study is used in war gaming exercises and field experimentation.

4. (U) No intelligence later than 1 February 1966 was considered in the preparation of this handbook.

CORRELATION

This project is identified as USACDC Action Control Number 5453.

A TYPE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE, 1970-75

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A TYPE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE, 1970-75

PART I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. (U) The Area

a. As defined for this study, the term Southeast Asia designates that continental portion of the area encompassing North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. This area forms a southern peninsula of the Asian land mass between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea and lies between 5° 30' and 23° 30' north latitude. Heavily forested mountain ranges and high plateaus form a perimeter about the areas, extending from the western Thai border through northern Laos, North Vietnam, and following the east Vietnamese coastline south to Saigon. Three great rivers interrupt this mountainous periphery: the Mae Nani Chao Phraya emptying into the Gulf of Thailand at Bangkok; the Mekong flowing into the South China Sea Southwest of Saigon; and the Red River which flows into the Gulf of Tonkin. These silt-rich delta areas have been the traditional centers for population, economic and political growth.

b. Mountains rising to peaks of 7,400 feet separate northern Laos and North Vietnam. The Mekong and its tributary watershed have deeply eroded this portion of Laos. The heavy vegetation and few usable trails and roads make communication and movement difficult. To the east the Northern Highlands ring the landward sides of the Red River delta. The streams of the Red River systems have cut deeply into the mountains and, like northern Laos, very little of the area can be cultivated. The road network is primitive, and the streams can be navigated by small boats with difficulty. As the Red River drops down to the Tonkin Plain it has formed a broad delta by depositing silt in what was once a gulf. As a result this low lying area does not rise more than 50 feet above sea level and is subject to frequent and extensive flooding.

c. The Annam mountains form the backbone of Vietnam and southern Laos, extending from the Plain Des Jarres in central Laos southeastward along the coastline, terminating at the Mekong Delta about 50 miles north of Saigon. The northern portion of this chain is very rugged with peaks rising to a height of 8,500 feet. The

steep mountain ridges and deep narrow valleys combined with the dense broadleaf evergreen forests make surface transportation extremely difficult. The southern portion of this section forms a plateau which is covered in the main with tropical broadleaf evergreen forest. The soil is quite productive and the area is interspersed with rubber, coffee, tea, and tobacco plantations. Evergreen forests flourish at the higher elevations.

d. The low level plain of the Mekong delta area crisscrossed with over 1,000 miles of canals connecting the main waterways, is very fertile. Over 9,000 square miles are under rice cultivation. A tributary which enters the Mekong at Phnom Penh drains the Tonle Sap, a large fresh-water lake in central Cambodia. At the height of the dry season this lake covers an area of 400 square miles and has a maximum depth of five feet. At this time the water is flowing down channel to Phnom Penh. In June the Mekong rises to 45 feet and empties its flood waters into the channel and back to the lake. During this flooding season the Tonle Sap covers an estimated 1,000 square miles, inundating marshes, rice fields and forests.

e. The Dangrek mountains form a frontier between Cambodia and Thailand in the north while the Cardaman Range separates the Cambodian lowlands from the southern coast. A broken arc of hills forms a watershed between the Mekong and Tonle Sap. Most of Cambodia is heavily forested and much timber is cut. Agricultural production in the central lowlands includes maize, rubber, cotton, sugar, coffee, and tea. Hard surface roads connect the larger centers of population, but communication with the outlying areas is rudimentary, especially in the north.

f. Thailand, which is inclosed by 8,000 foot mountains to the north and west, consists of four main geographical areas. The northern area, between the Salween and Mekong river systems, is an area of mile-high ranges deeply cut with stream valleys. Only a small percentage of the area is under cultivation, but enough to support the scanty population. East to west communication between adjacent river valleys is difficult except by footpath. The large northeastern area known as the Khorat Plateau is sparsely populated and largely given over to savannah grass. Elevations do not exceed 600 feet, and the soil is poor and rainfall unreliable. The area under cultivation is sufficient to provide rice for local consumption. The area is crisscrossed with several hard surfaced roads and a number of good weather trails. The central basin, which forms the southern portion of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya valley, is the heart of the country in both population and economic productivity with 16% of the area under cultivation with rice, tobacco, and corn. This low alluvial plain terminates in a large fertile delta at Bangkok. Hundreds of miles of eastwest canals link the three main

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river systems that form the delta. Peninsula Thailand, extending south to Malaysia is divided by low mountains running the length of the area. Some rice is cultivated and the area provides the principal mineral deposits of the country. Tin, tungsten, lead, and some coal are mined. Thailand has a more advanced transportation system than the other countries of Southeast Asia with 2,000 miles of railway connecting major cities and over 7,000 miles of hard surface roads, trails, and cart tracks to outlying areas.

g. The climate and weather of Southeast Asia are monsoonal in nature. The summer monsoon extends from mid-May to early October and the winter monsoon season from early November through March, with the intervening periods known as spring and autumn transitions. During the summer monsoon the heat of the central Asian land mass rises and this low pressure centers causes humid air to move inward from the south bringing heavy rains to the mountain and plateau areas. High humidity and temperatures are prevalent during this period. Areas on the lee side of high mountains frequently receive relatively little moisture as the rain clouds pile up on the western slopes. A chronic high pressure zone persists over Asia during autumn, winter, and early spring. The prevailing northerly winds are arid in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, but the winter monsoon provides considerable rain along the coastline of Vietnam. Annual rainfall varies from 50 inches per year in the northern mountainous areas to 125 inches in the southern river valleys.

h. Detailed information on terrain and weather can be found in National Intelligence Survey (NIS) #43C & D, sections 23 & 24.

2. (C) Political Background

a. Prior to World War II European colonial powers exercised sovereignty over all of Southeast Asia with the exception of the independent Kingdom of Thailand. But nationalism was already a strong force in several of these states, particularly Vietnam. The military occupation of much of the area by the Japanese during World War II revealed its strategic importance. After the war the colonial powers were confronted by "independent" republics in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. In 1946 the French recognized Ho Chi Minh's Republic of Vietnam as a "free" state. Subsequently, France's attempt to restore colonial rule over Indochina, led to hostilities which did not end until the Geneva settlement of 1954. Like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia attained independence in 1954.

b. Independence left many Southeast Asian countries still striving to achieve national unity. The cohesion formed by the major religion, Buddhism, and the sense of historical nationhood held by ethnic majorities are sources of potential strength. But artificial

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boundaries have brought about border disputes, and ancient regional rivalries plus subversive actions of dissenting minority groups have led to disorder, armed insurrection, and social and political unrest.

c. The Vietminh struggle against the French in North Vietnam began receiving substantial aid from Communist China in 1950. It has been generally accepted that Communist China was taking an opportunity to fulfill its ambitions to "liberate" the area and establish Vietnam as a puppet state. It is doubtful that they reckoned with the strength of Ho Chi Minh, who, though an avowed Marxist, was essentially a nationalist and distrustful of Chinese intentions. In 1954 when the Soviets lent their efforts to halt the war, an unenthusiastic Communist China was forced to swing over to their point of view. Caught between two fires, though his appetite for additional territory to the south was unsatisfied, Ho signed the Geneva Accords under pressure. The elections scheduled for 1956, ostensibly to unite North and South Vietnam, were never held. After the signing of the 1954 agreement the majority of Viet Minh troops located in South Vietnam were withdrawn. But hidden caches of equipment and several thousand selected guerrillas were left behind in the delta and mountain jungles along the Laotian and Cambodian border. Following the refusal of the established government of South Vietnam to participate in a referendum, these guerrillas, soon to be known as the Viet Cong, began a campaign of terror, intimidation, and propaganda to convince the population to oppose the government. Through 1958-1959 the ever-increasing tempo of sabotage and harassment began having its effect. Peasant morale was generally low, and the incompetent administration in rural areas was exploited by the Viet Cong whose strength mounted to 10,000 men. Some of the old Viet Minh base areas were reactivated, and a strong political foundation was established in many rural areas. After 1961 Hanoi's support became more material and thousands of cadre were infiltrated to the south. By July 1965, total Viet Cong personnel reached an estimated 65,000, including several large organized units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The effort by the communist regime of North Vietnam to conquer the South continued to grow and military personnel, technicians, and agents were infiltrated into South Vietnam in growing numbers. The continuing goal remains the reunification of the two Vietnams under a Communist regime.

d. The Geneva Accords of 1954 was to have left Laos, in effect, a neutral buffer zone between pro-Western Thailand and Communist North Vietnam. But Laos was in reality an artificial creation based generally on a former French administrative unit formed from three frequently conflicting ancient Lao principalities and honeycombed with non-Lao tribes. Under these conditions a sense of national unity has been difficult to attain. A communist foothold in the form of the Pathet Lao remained in Laos after the 1954 Geneva conference and a guerrilla force estimated at 6,000 men

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controlled the two provinces bordering North Vietnam. In 1957 the Pathet Lao abandoned armed insurrection, and came to an agreement with the Souvanna Phouma neutralist government to exchange control of their two provinces for two cabinet seats in the government, and the right to operate as a legal party. As a result of an intensive organizational drive among the peasants, the Pathet Lao managed to win over one-third of the National Assembly seats in the 1958 elections. Fearing the Pathet Lao would come into power in the next general elections, the Laotian right wing, led by the army, ousted the neutralist government and formed a cabinet from which the Pathet Lao was excluded. This led to remobilization of Pathet Lao guerrilla units and consolidation of the northeastern provinces under Pathet Lao jurisdiction. The government was again overthrown in August of 1960 and a return to neutralism under a unified, coalition government was demanded. When the neutralist government opened negotiations with the Pathet Lao, the right wing faction under General Nosavan launched a rebellion from southern Laos. The seesaw battle continued for eight months with aid being furnished the participants by the United States, Communist China and the Soviet Union. The Soviets joined the British in sponsoring a conference at Geneva on the Laotian conflict and a cease-fire was obtained in May of 1961. At this time the neutralist-Pathet Lao combine were in possession of over half of Laos. The settlement, confirmed by the Geneva powers in July 1962, reinstalled the coalition government. But the 70,000 right-wing, 25,000 Pathet Lao, and 15,000 neutralist soldiers have yet to be integrated into a single army responsive to the central government. The struggle for Laos has not ended. The Pathet Lao, Chinese Communist, and North Vietnamese can be expected to continue to exploit the advantages won previously on the battlefield.

e. Cambodia's ancient troubles with Thailand and Vietnam again appeared as Cambodia attained independence under the Geneva Accords of 1954. Attempting to remain neutral in the Vietnam conflict, Cambodia declined to recognize either North or South Vietnam. The Saigon government then blockaded Mekong River traffic to the Cambodian capital until recognition was forthcoming. Since 1954, there have been numerous border skirmishes, with South Vietnamese charges that Cambodia was harboring Vietnamese rebels. In a similar manner, Cambodia has battled with Thailand over the frontier, a disputed temple, and the granting of asylum to Cambodian right-wing rebels. As a result of the threatening attitude of Thailand and South Vietnam, Cambodia, while professing to maintain a non-aligned international position, has developed an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communist in the Vietnamese situation.

f. Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country that escaped colonial rule and until recently was the least threatened by communism. Prior to 1961 communist influence was limited almost entirely to Chinese who form an economically influential minority. A more potent

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danger appeared in 1961 in the northeast. The erosion of the situation in Laos, which borders Thailand for 800 miles, brought the revolutionary Pathet Lao within easy reach of the backward north-eastern provinces where several million residents speak Lao and have only weak ties with Bangkok. In addition, some 80,000 Vietnamese refugee nationalists have settled in this region since World War II.

g. Sporadic fighting between Pathet Lao guerrillas and Thai government troops broke out in early 1962. Considerable military aid and even small ground and air units were provided Thailand by the United States in 1962 to bolster defenses in the northeast. Continued guerrilla activity among the villages on the Thai side of the Mekong has been a cause of constant apprehension by the pro-Western Thailand government. Any overt support of these insurgents by either North Vietnam or Communist China would no doubt cause the SEATO nations to take counteraction in Thailand's behalf.

3. (U) Principles of Guerrilla Warfare

a. The development of the nuclear weapon has brought warfare to its ultimate limits. The cost in money, resources, and especially in human lives has made war almost prohibitive. But unfortunately, human nature being what it is, if one form of killing is outlawed by the threat of nuclear suicide, man will seek and find a less risky alternative. The answer for the present is guerrilla warfare.

b. Guerrilla warfare has been described as "an irregular war carried on by independent bands." Based on the circumstances of its origin it can be separated into two types. In the first case it will be a spontaneous uprising of an internal faction or group against its own government. This rebellion may, if it grows and is successful, develop into a revolution. In the second case, the insurrection is provoked or chiefly supported by another country in an attempt to weaken or overthrow the established government by exploiting discontented elements from within. This "resistance", as it has been called, may take the form of sabotage, terror tactics, propaganda, and organized guerrilla units. For the purpose of this study the term guerrilla force covers both types described above but excludes subversion and propaganda campaigns not accompanied by the use of force. A guerrilla force may develop into a conventional force when it acquires sufficient troops, equipment and logistic support to challenge a major enemy force in open combat.

c. The first and undoubtedly basic principle of guerrilla warfare is mobility and the capacity for taking the enemy by surprise. Guerrilla units gather rapidly for the offensive, attack with speed, maneuver aggressively, make use of advantageous terrain to deliver heavy firepower, disengage rapidly, and disperse immediately.

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d. Guerrilla warfare is a war of movement in the extreme sense. The principle of never presenting a target necessitates the establishment by the guerrilla of a safe base area to which he can retire when threatened by a superior force. The guerrilla by his very nature will be strategically on the defensive. On the other hand, he will be tactically on the offensive whenever possible. He will extricate himself when threatened with a pitched battle but immediately afterward will make every effort to strike again from a new direction.

e. For the guerrilla, military action is a method to obtain a political goal. He must live among the people, gain their affection and sympathy and alienate them from their government. He will recruit activists from within their ranks. Eventually, having established the legitimacy of the movement, he will create a political structure for administering the countryside and attempt to gain acceptance of the guerrilla movement as a de facto government.

f. The guerrilla will, to the extent possible, attempt to be self-sustaining. As the tempo and size of the movement increases, the successful guerrilla force will lean increasingly on overt support from friendly governments. In the initial stages he will live off the land, confiscating food and materiel in "liberated" areas, attacking and sabotaging enemy military stores and dumps, and recovering enemy equipment and materiel from the battlefield.

PART II

HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE DOCTRINE

1. (C) Force Organization

a. Political Structure. Every guerrilla movement, whether an internal uprising or one directed by or receiving overt support from another government, is dominated by a political apparatus which establishes the aims and directs the activities of the guerrilla force. This political organization usually takes the form of a liberation front which is ostensibly a democratic and independent organization, though in reality it may be guided and directed by an enemy government. As the guerrilla movement intensifies, the front organizes insurgent-held areas and establishes a shadow governmental machine, develops town and village political organizations, directs the agricultural and industrial effort, levies taxes, and develops propaganda campaigns. In short, the front is designed to provide an alternative government, seeking its support from organized social groups, religious organizations, and labor unions.

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b. Military Structure. The military structure of the guerrilla force will be integrated into the political structure. Each military unit and headquarters will have a military and political component. Though equal in theory, the political headquarters exercises control. The initial success of a guerrilla movement and its natural growth tendencies spawn a more sophisticated military organization. As more and more territory comes under insurgent jurisdiction, forces are organized which will remain tied to a particular area or district. These local district forces are established to safeguard the guerrilla gains, to conduct military operations within their district and to assist in the administration of the area. Simultaneously, the build-up of a regular guerrilla force is expanded. This force, established at national or front level, is located, organized, and equipped for immediate response to front direction and prepared for movement and commitment anywhere in the area of operation. Of course, the district forces are also responsive to front directives and, when necessary, may be called on for use in other areas. In addition to the regular and district level forces, a type of militia or self-defense force is organized in towns and villages. These groups usually consist of local individuals who have embraced the insurgent cause, and they are organized into small quasi-military units which receive direction from the district political/military headquarters. They will aid the district insurgent command in the administration of their locality and will function as part-time soldiers in defense of the area against government forces. They will be especially trained for conduct of sabotage and terror missions and in the important function of intelligence gathering.

c. Military Organization

(1) Base Areas. Essential to the success of the guerrilla movement are safe base areas from which the guerrilla can plan, rehearse and organize his operations, and into which he can fade or disappear when enemy action forces him to disengage or withdraw. Without this base area the guerrilla unit would be unable to establish training facilities, troop bivouacs, arms workshops, supply depots and the apparatus necessary for the conduct of successful operations. These areas are usually remote and in many cases may not have known strong central government influence. The guerrilla will attempt to dominate the populace of these areas by exploiting any hostility the people may show for the government, by initiating programs of land reform, and by establishing a local defense program. Routes of access and key villages will be fortified and extensive use made of mines, booby traps, and antipersonnel devices to discourage government forays into the area.

(2) Regular Forces. The regular guerrilla force, a type of which is depicted in Part IV of this study, is usually organized as a conventional battalion or regimental size unit, with

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the normal staff organization, infantry units, and combat support and combat service units. The composition and strength vary with the status of the insurgent movement, the operational locale, and the type enemy force to be encountered. In the Southeast Asian area, with its precipitous mountains, impenetrable jungles, rudimentary roadnet, and monsoonal climate, it is doubtful that a guerrilla force fighting its preferred type of hit and run action will be encumbered with wheeled or tracked vehicles, heavy engineer equipment, or artillery. Limited usage of pack artillery and heavy mortars is feasible if pack animals are obtainable. However, this will be possible only where roads and trails are available and will reduce the flexibility of movement so necessary to the successful guerrilla force. The type regiment depicted in Part IV of this study reflects an organization that has been operating for a considerable period of time as part of a guerrilla movement that is in an advanced and successful stage. The equipment and weapons represent the type likely to be encountered in the typical organized guerrilla force in Southeast Asia in the 1970-1975 time period.

(3) District Forces. Responsible to the district political headquarters, this guerrilla force will normally operate only in the home district. They may, when directed by the front organization, be utilized for actions outside the district in conjunction with regular force units. The guerrilla district force organization will vary considerably based on the factors incident to insurgency operations in a specific area. The economic importance of the district, strategic location, population, and political situation will all be considerations in tailoring a military force for a particular district. A typical district force may consist of an infantry battalion with a supporting heavy weapons company, an engineer (demolition) company, and various supporting sections including medical, signal, and intelligence. A sizable rear service element may include a workshop, a supply depot, medical facilities, and a communications group. District forces may be equipped in the same manner as regular units, though weapons and equipment issued the district force may be older and of inferior quality. Many items such as mines, grenades, and booby traps may be homemade at available workshop facilities.

(4) Self-Defense Forces. These are militia type forces based in a particular town or village. As part-time soldiers, whose strength is drawn from the local villages and countryside, they probably will be led by several hard-core guerrillas from the district level headquarters. Though usually only partially armed and poorly equipped, these units play an important role in the guerrilla movement. Normally of platoon size, they probably will be organized into squads and 3 - 4-man cells for small tactical operations. They will prepare defense plans for their locality, conduct intelligence gathering operations, and special operations

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including sabotage and acts of terror in nearby government controlled areas. These units provide eyes and ears for the district force headquarters and are a source of replacement manpower for district and regular units. The success or failure of the guerrilla movement hinges to a large extent on the effectiveness of self-defense force operations and its ability to recruit the populace and win it over to the insurgent cause.

2. (S) Operational Planning. Guerrilla units have often been depicted as conducting spur-of-the-moment operations, appearing suddenly, fighting fiercely, disengaging rapidly, and melting into the countryside. This tactic of hit and run is indeed characteristic but it is only one-half of the picture. Successful operations conducted by guerrilla units begin with and are based on careful, lengthy, and thorough planning.

a. Terrain Reconnaissance. The guerrilla invariably lives off the land. His intimate knowledge of the communication network, streams, bridges, towns, and village access routes places his enemy in a disadvantageous position. In the planning stage, sketches of the area of operation will be drawn locating major terrain features, ideal defense positions, observation posts, terrain obstacles, and possible ambush sites. Routes for withdrawal and for reinforcement will be pinpointed. Since the guerrilla normally will select the time and location for his operation, ample opportunity will be provided for small unit leaders to conduct a thorough ground reconnaissance of the area on foot. Screening of the area will continue throughout the planning stage, and detailed reports and sketches will be furnished the commander for use in preparation of his operational plan.

b. Enemy Analysis. Assessment of enemy capabilities and reaction probabilities has a significant bearing on the selection of the target area and subsequent planning. Sympathizers among the local populace are recruited to obtain accurate information on enemy defensive positions. The location and strength of enemy forces who could provide reinforcement and the time it would take to reinforce are determined. Data are compiled on strength, composition, dispositions, command posts, and communications. Special enemy strengths or weaknesses indicated by the daily activities within the objective area are noted. Intelligence personnel infiltrate as near as possible to determine the locations of weapons and guard posts. Firing positions for supporting weapons can be selected in advance, based on enemy dispositions. Time will be taken to make accurate range estimations. Sites are selected and reconnoitered for the ambush of relief or reinforcing units.

c. Plan Preparation. The basic operation plan is prepared in great detail. In addition to the typical assignment of tasks,

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coordination instructions and other normal operational matters peculiar to the guerrilla type situation are provided for. These include the obtaining of local guides for use along the route and for assisting in the event of emergency dispersal. Arranging for carrying parties for pickup of ammunition from secret caches and the employment of sympathetic civilians in providing billeting, food supplies, and handling of wounded are also included in the planning. Attention is given to the selection of safe areas for rest halts, ammunition and supply pickup points, and departure areas. Special security arrangements are preplanned to safeguard the secrecy of the operation, with the individual soldier being briefed and rehearsed on only his particular portion of the action. Security forces are provided to control civilian movement and to prevent surprise by enemy forces at critical points along movement routes. By such detailed prior planning the guerrilla regular force command is able to make use of district and self-defense elements. This mixture of forces may appear cumbersome, but it insures that the highly organized and well trained regular units are not expended on tasks which lesser units can perform, and that they are available for commitment against the primary objective of the operation.

3. (C) Troop Movements

a. Guerrilla troop movements will normally be accomplished during the hours of darkness. When required, movements may be conducted during daylight hours but this will be restricted to heavily forested areas where cross-country movement will go undetected and enemy air observation will be of little value. On an operational mission, movement from the base area to the vicinity of the objective is often a long and tortuous procedure. The guerrilla hopes that by frequently changing direction and crosscrossing his route occasionally he will confuse enemy intelligence, denying him knowledge of the ultimate target and the number of units in the area. During the daytime halt periods, defensive positions will be prepared which the unit can make use of during the withdrawal phase of the operation. Though habitually moving on foot, boats or sampans may be used for movement by stream and canal in the Southeast Asian delta areas. Though the terrain normally will dictate the manner of movement, march formations are standardized to a considerable degree.

b. The typical formation for a battalion-size unit moving on one axis is as follows:

(1) Advance detachment (intelligence squad, infantry company).

(2) Battalion forward CP (forward command group, mortar platoon, AAMG).

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(3) Infantry company.

(4) Battalion main CP (command group, signal section, AAMG).

(5) Infantry company (-) (less one platoon).

(6) Battalion rear (medical section, supply and maintenance section).

(7) Rear guard (one infantry platoon)

c. Each element provides its own flank security along the route of march. Supporting weapons are placed well forward in the formation for immediate employment if necessary. The command element is centrally positioned so as to be able to react immediately to any unexpected situation. Antiaircraft weapons are spread throughout the column to provide for defense against low-flying aircraft. Regimental-size units move in the same manner and use generally the same formation as battalions. Where conditions permit the regiment will move on two or more routes.

4. (S) The Offense

a. General. Guerrilla offensive actions usually are characterized by speed, surprise, heavy firepower, and rapid withdrawal. The guerrilla selects the time and place of his attack, and he seldom initiates an action unless the odds favor his success. Thorough planning precedes the attack which is executed quickly and ruthlessly. Surprise is achieved by hitting the enemy at a time and place in a manner he does not anticipate. Movement to the assault is rapid and in overwhelming strength with heavy firepower concentrated on the most vulnerable area. Where possible the enemy is encircled to prevent his withdrawal and to cut off reinforcements. Efforts are made to reduce defenses by using infiltrators. Feints against other objectives and evacuation of nearby villages are used to confuse the enemy. The duration of the attack may be from 15 minutes to several hours. Disengagement and withdrawal are well organized and conducted in a rapid manner. The intent is to leave the enemy disorganized and unable to react quickly enough to pursue the guerrilla force as it melts into the countryside.

b. The Ambush

(1) Forms. The terrain of Southeast Asia is suited for the ambush, a type of offensive action defined as a surprise attack against an enemy who is moving. The ambush may be either static or mobile. In the static ambush troops and weapons are positioned in advance. Fortifications may be constructed and

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camouflaged and mines and antipersonnel devices emplaced. In a mobile ambush, the ambush area is reconnoitered in advance, firing positions selected, fields of fire cleared, and the troops held at a distance under cover. When enemy reconnaissance units have moved past, the guerrilla troops will quickly be maneuvered into position from which an assault can be launched on the unsuspecting enemy.

(2) Selection of Sites. Ambush sites are selected mainly on the basis of deceiving the enemy and lulling him into complacency. Obvious locations such as mountain defiles and heavily forested trails are frequently ignored in favor of less patent sites. However, the guerrilla will seek terrain providing concealment for automatic weapons, good observation of the approaching enemy, and covered routes for maneuver and withdrawal.

(3) Employment of Forces. The actual disposition of troops depends, of course, on the terrain and known enemy strength and certain principles are followed in the conduct of every ambush. A small blocking force is positioned to bring the enemy under heavy fire, thus causing him to halt at a preselected position. This force may be armed with automatic small arms, recoilless rifles, rockets, and mortars. Mines may also be used to insure that the enemy's advance is blocked. A second element circles the enemy rear and places itself in a position to cut off retreat and block reinforcement. The main guerrilla element then launches an all-out attack against the enemy's exposed flank. Security forces are stationed on the flanks and at the rear of the attacking force to warn of unexpected enemy reinforcements from another direction. Where possible, a small guerrilla force will be held as a reserve to be used in pursuing the enemy attempting to break contact and withdraw, and to cover the guerrilla withdrawal if required. Upon completion of a successful ambush a battlefield recovery plan will go into effect. Aid will be provided for casualties and the dead and wounded removed from the area. POW's will be moved to preselected sites and equipment, weapons, ammunition, and enemy documents will be collected. Items that cannot be moved will be destroyed. A detailed withdrawal plan will be followed using prescribed routes. In the event the enemy force is larger than expected, or guerrilla losses of men and equipment preclude complete defeat of the enemy, the guerrilla commander will order a deliberate withdrawal, using his reserve as a covering force. Nearby diversionary actions may be set up to confuse the enemy during the withdrawal period.

(4) Ambush Targets. The basic principles of the ambush apply regardless of the target. There is, however, considerable variation in technique based on the size and nature of the target.

(a) Small Dismounted Units. Small dismounted groups of enemy operating as combat patrols and intelligence gathering


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units near guerrilla base areas are usually attacked in overwhelming force with the aim of inflicting maximum casualties and capturing prisoners. In an action of this nature numerical superiority is insured due to the proximity of the guerrilla base area. A typical ambush of this type is graphically displayed in Figure 1. Note that the guerrilla is well dug in and has preselected positions for automatic weapons. Antipersonnel mines have been emplaced to canalize the enemy force. The tail of the enemy force has been sealed off and reinforcement would be difficult. There may be occasions, based on knowledge of enemy activity, when a successive or coordinated ambush will be set up to trap a reinforcing unit.

(b) Mounted Patrol or Convoy. These are well executed, large-scale ambushes, usually involving regular forces, and are made only after much detailed planning, reconnaissance, and briefing of subordinate leaders. This type of operation follows the basic principles of the technique with a blocking force being positioned to halt the lead vehicle. This may be accomplished by electrically detonated mines, directional mines, recoilless rifles, or rockets. If the enemy reels back or attempts to flee, he finds himself cut off at the rear by an encircling guerrilla force. When the trap has been sealed and before the enemy has time to reorganize, he finds himself taken under withering fire from the flank. The assault forces move in close to the vehicles rapidly so as to make enemy small arms fire ineffective. Figure 2 portrays a typical large scale road ambush. Note the initial location of guerrilla elements (except the initial road block) is at some distance from the field of action. This is necessary to insure complete surprise.

(c) Watercraft. Rivers and canals, which are numerous in Southeast Asia, are a major means of supply and troop movement. Traffic of this type provides an excellent target for guerrilla ambush. Most ambushes of this type are planned for a bend or curve in the stream where the river approach is narrow and watercraft moves at slow speed. It is also advantageous that the waterway have an irregular bottom, thus necessitating close following of the channel. Recoilless weapons are located under cover inside the curve of the waterway with their fire directed at the sides of vessels near the waterline. The enemy is at a disadvantage because his craft must make its way to shore prior to taking any effective counteraction. During this movement guerrilla personnel deploy around landing sites and pour a heavy volume of small arms fire into the disembarking troops.

(d) Railroad Trains. The ambush of railroad rolling stock is closely coordinated with sabotage activities along the roadbed. Tracks are removed by saboteurs, or ties and rails are blown by electrically detonated mines just prior to arrival of the train. Tunnel entrances may be sabotaged and bridges destroyed.



LEGEND

- | | |
|--------------------|----------------|
| 80mm MORT | AP MINE |
| LT MG | BOOBY TRAP |
| 87mm R/R | ENEMY MOVEMENT |
| GUERRILLA POSITION | |

SCALE (APPROX)

0 50 100

METERS

Figure 1. (U) AMBUSH OF DISMOUNTED TROOPS




Figure 2. (U) AMBUSH OF CONVOY

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The ambush itself may not be as much of a set piece as are similar actions conducted against other type targets. The sabotage activities may or may not cause car derailment, and if the railway has been under previous heavy harassment, the train may include a number of heavily armed armored cars. The guerrilla force will concentrate on those cars not derailed, and every effort will be made to destroy the rolling stock by incendiary means or previously located electrically detonated mines. Guerrilla troops will not close with a heavily armed train unless initial sabotage has decimated the enemy organization and his ability to fight back.

c. Raids. Raids are carried out against isolated villages, security posts, and small units in bivouac areas. The guerrilla may use power tactics and attempt to overcome the enemy with a preponderance of firepower and overwhelming numerical superiority. This is known as a "Raid in Superior Force." On the other hand, the guerrilla may approach the target in a covert manner with a small force and attempt to penetrate defenses without being discovered, thus surprising the enemy from within. This is known as a "Surprise Raid."

(1) Raid in Superior Force. Here, maximum use is made of firepower and shock action to demoralize and paralyze the enemy from the very beginning. The raiding force is tailored for each specific mission, e.g., bangalore teams, demolition teams, and bridging teams. Firepower units such as light and heavy machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles are held in a group. Infantry troops are organized into several assault units. A command group with accompanying liaison and communications round out the organization. The attack begins with a heavy concentration of mortar fire and mass fires of crew served weapons being concentrated on the enemy installation. The specialized teams move forward swiftly and clear lanes for the assault troops by blasting fences and tactical wire, exploding mines and booby traps, and bridging ditches. This may turn out to be a human wave type action with backup teams ready to move in and replace those who fall. Cleared lanes and breaks in the enemy's defense are immediately exploited by the assault troops, moving in waves, with the rear unit providing a base of fire. If the target is overrun, a rapid mop-up is executed. A detailed withdrawal plan is followed, and an organized rear guard team is the last to evacuate the area. The guerrilla assumes considerable casualties on this type of operation but believes the risk worthy of results obtained.

(2) Surprise Raid. The success of the surprise raid depends upon stealth rather than power. The firepower units move into position but do not open fire. The specialized teams approach the target quietly and cut the tactical wire, remove fences and mines rather than blasting them, and eliminate booby traps without exploding

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them. Assault units will move cautiously and attempt to gain entry to the enemy's position without being detected. Once discovered, the guerrilla force will resort to power tactics, and supporting firepower units will commence their pre-arranged fires. The success or failure of this type raid depends on the enemy's alertness and his ability to react. As in the superior force raid, a detailed withdrawal plan is followed with supporting fires planned to extricate guerrilla troops in event the enemy's preparedness prevents destruction of the target.

d. Attacks on Fortified Positions. Guerrilla attacks on fortified posts and villages follow the same pattern as the superior force raid. The main difference is the scale of the action, number of troops involved, and the decision to occupy the position if the attack is successful. The organization for this type of operation will include the following elements: a spearhead force, a secondary force, an exploitation force, and a reserve. The spearhead and secondary force have like missions and are organized in a similar manner, usually consisting of a demolition team, a base of fire team, and several assault teams of platoon size. Doctrine calls for the spearhead to breach a passage to the main objective while the secondary force conducts a secondary attack with the objective of facilitating entry to the main objective from another direction. Normally the attack will begin with heavy preparatory mortar and recoilless rifle fire being directed on the fortified position. Under cover of these fires demolition teams from the spearhead and secondary forces advance to clear a pathway through defensive obstacles. They are supported by automatic weapons fire from the base of fire team. The assault teams follow close behind and take advantage of obstacle clearance to establish and widen the breach and penetrate the enemy's defenses. The exploitation force, using the first gap that is actually made, then aggressively continues the attack to the main objective. During the operation the reserve provides security and is available for reinforcement in the event guerrilla forces inside enemy defenses must be extricated. The reserve force may be of considerable size, particularly if the enemy has the capability of reinforcing from several directions.

e. Meeting Engagement. Guerrilla doctrine calls for avoiding this situation. The guerrilla prefers to fight on his own terms, at a time and place of his choosing. Since this is not always possible, a set of rules has been established to cope with the situation. In the first place, all around security during troop movement is emphasized. Reconnaissance troops are consistently sent far forward so that warning of enemy units to be encountered may be relayed to the guerrilla commander before contact. This gives him an opportunity to initiate actions which may make the situation favorable for his unit. He makes a hasty estimate of the situation and a visual reconnaissance if possible. If favorable terrain is available, he

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immediately deploys his forces and at the appropriate time takes the enemy under heavy fire. If the enemy is thrown into confusion and his position is particularly unfavorable or untenable, an immediate assault will be ordered. When a favorable situation cannot be obtained due to enemy strength or terrain, the commander will order his forward units to lay down a heavy volume of fire and withdraw his main forces from the area. When the main body has disengaged, the forward elements will quickly break off contact and rejoin their unit.

5. (C) The Withdrawal. For the guerrilla, the withdrawal is the critical period of any offensive operation. The planning of routes, timing, and method of withdrawal must be covered in great detail. Guerrilla units break contact and withdrawal upon an easily identified signal. A sequence of withdrawal is established with security elements leading, followed by carrying parties removing casualties and captured weapons and equipment. Supporting weapons, assault units, and a rear guard element complete the sequence. Withdrawal routes are selected in advance, but small unit leaders retain the option of moving over these paths or breaking into small groups and traveling over multiple routes. Their decision depends on the situation near the target area and the proximity of enemy relief forces. However, each unit will make every effort to assemble at a predetermined rally point where unit integrity may again be established. When reassembled into a march unit, the guerrilla force continues its movement out of the target area. Normally the movement will be to a new or alternate base area. When possible, the withdrawal will be back along the route of approach into the area of operations. In this manner the unit can take advantage of previously selected positions for delaying actions, prepared areas which are mined and booby trapped, established defensive positions, and assembly areas which may be required during the withdrawal phase. A covering force is designated to keep the target area under fire and slow or disorganize any pursuing group. Following the withdrawal, reconnaissance units may remain in the general vicinity and occupy vantage points in the target area to determine and report damage to the target, observe enemy reaction to the attack, and ascertain the status of any planned pursuit. Perhaps the most important facet of guerrilla withdrawal technique is the blanket of security forces established about the periphery of the target area. They provide the commander with last minute information on the movement of enemy reaction forces and permit him to disengage and withdraw prior to the arrival of reinforcements.

6. (C) The Defense. The guerrilla force will not plan a defensive operation. Guerrilla basic tactics continue to be hit and run with the primary defensive technique being escape and evasion. It is true that the occasion may arise when the guerrilla commander may find himself in a predicament: encircled by the enemy

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and no wide avenue of escape. In coping with this situation the guerrilla unit may establish a typical defensive perimeter, but when darkness falls he will probe the enemy for weak spots and infiltrate small groups through the enemy lines. The guerrilla's intimate knowledge of the terrain on which he lives and fights, his penchant for operating in darkness, and his animal ability to move silently and with extreme stealth pay off in this situation.


a. In Southeast Asia the guerrilla may make extensive use of tunnels to hide personnel and equipment. These tunnels will not be constructed to use as active defense installations but, as previously stated, for escape and evasion purposes. The tunnels may be simple underground hiding places constructed beneath village dwellings, or they may be elaborate systems constructed in base areas running in a zigzag fashion for hundreds of meters and contain supply caches and underground rooms. An example of guerrilla subterranean fortifications is shown at Figure 3.

b. Guerrilla antiaircraft defense will be based on the large caliber machine gun such as the 50 caliber and the 12.7mm. Battalion and regimental-size units may be expected to be armed with such antiaircraft machine guns and to be expert with their use. These weapons will normally be mounted on the highest ground in base areas and bivouac areas and will be interspersed in march columns during movement. When employed in permanent or semi-permanent areas, camouflaged circular antiaircraft trenches will be used. This type of trench permits the gunner to fire in all directions while protected by the trench from airstrikes. Areas suitable as landing zones for light aircraft and helicopters will frequently have long bamboo spikes, six to twelve feet high, planted at close intervals to make aerial assault difficult if not impossible.

7. (C) Special Operations

a. Acts of sabotage are extensively employed by guerrillas in conjunction with their offensive campaign. Common targets are bridges, railroads, POL storage tanks, communication facilities, and supply installations. Saboteurs are frequently recruited from sympathetic members of the civilian populace who have access to earmarked targets. They are usually trained in the handling of demolitions and explosives. Sabotage activities are often combined with other operations such as road or rail ambush. Although sabotage is normally regarded as an activity conducted some distance from the active operational area, the guerrilla may employ sabotage teams within enemy held posts and villages, destroying vehicles and weapons if not properly guarded. Definite guidelines for the conduct of guerrilla sabotage operations have been noted.

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LEGEND

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| ① ENTRANCE | ⑤ COVER OF TUNNEL LEADING TO POINT 6. |
| ② COVER OVER SPIKE PIT; REMOVED WHEN TUNNEL OCCUPIED. | ⑥ JAVELIN CAN BE EJECTED BY SPRING. |
| ③ COVER OF LOWER TUNNEL WHEN IN PLACE ENEMY DECEIVED INTO FOLLOWING FALSE PASSAGE. | ⑦ EMERGENCY EXIT. OPENED WHEN NEEDED. |
| ④ ENTRANCE TO UPPER TUNNEL. | ⑧ CONTINUATION OF TUNNEL. |

Figure 3. (U) GUERRILLA SUBTERRANEAN DEFENSE

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(1) Sabotage must not have an unfavorable effect on the daily activities of the local populace of the region nor the agricultural production of the area.


(2) Propaganda activities must be carried on simultaneously to justify sabotage operations to the local population and solicit their contribution to the effort.

(3) Sabotage must not be conducted when it would disclose the location of guerrilla base areas.

b. Mines and booby traps are employed by the guerrilla with much imagination. Their use is based on known enemy reaction when encountering a succession of mines and traps. The guerrilla will employ a variety of manufactured and homemade mines including those which explode on contact and those which can be fired remotely. Discounting standard mine fields, the guerrilla will lay mines singly or in small numbers at strategic locations. Patrol routes and ambush sites are frequent targets. Antipersonnel mines are often placed in locations that are likely to be used as cover from the first explosion. Routes of communication to base areas and entrances to guerrilla underground installations are usually heavily mined and booby trapped. A favorite device used by the guerrilla is the spike trap. Barbed iron or steel spikes, or spikes made of shaped and sharpened bamboo, are placed in ten or twelve inch wooded blocks and installed in holes along trails and paths. Covered with grass and leaves they go unnoticed until stepped upon by the unsuspecting victim, whose weight drives the spike through footwear and into the foot itself causing a painful and slow healing wound. More sophisticated spike devices include traps planted beneath foot bridges with the planks of the bridges cut nearly in two, spiked ditches along roads or trails that have been mined or booby-trapped (Figure 4), and the five pointed spike caltrop with curved shanks and barbed points. When stepped on, this device rolls up from the force of the weight on one of the points, and a second point impales the victim's heel. This type of device is effective even against steel insoles.

8. (C) Summary. The information contained in this section is offered as an introduction to the tactics and techniques of guerrilla forces likely to be encountered in the Southeast Asian area. For more detailed information on specific aspects of the subject, the reader is referred to the bibliography (Part VII). The point to be emphasized is that the guerrilla's tactical success depends upon his retention of the initiative. He accomplishes this by careful and thorough planning, by initiating deliberate offensive actions, and by evading enemy offensives. To cope with an enemy of this kind requires a thorough understanding and indoctrination in this type of warfare and a willingness to depart from deep-seated conventions.


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**FOOT TRAP WITH BARBED
SPIKES (VEGETATION REMOVED)**



BOARD WITH BARBED SPIKES



**SPIKED DITCH COVERED
WITH VEGETATION**

**GUERRILLA
SPIKE TRAPS**

Figure 4. (U) GUERRILLA SPIKE TRAPS

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PART III

LOGISTICS

1. (U) The Safe Base. A cursory glance would seem to indicate that the essential difference between a guerrilla and conventional type force is that the guerrilla is independent of bases. The guerrilla carries his weapon and rations with him and renews his supply of ammunition by attacking enemy supply installations. He lives off the land by pillaging or by obtaining food from friendly civilians. He takes refuge in the jungle or inaccessible mountain areas. But this refuge is adequate only if he is not pursued by the enemy. Sooner or later the enemy realizes he must pursue the guerrilla, no matter how inhospitable the terrain. This is the time when the guerrilla commander realizes the importance, and necessity, of a safe base area. It is true that small guerrilla bands can elude pursuit by hiding, but as the guerrilla force grows in size, this becomes impossible. A larger food supply is needed which means a larger productive area must be available. A safe area is needed for the training of new recruits. Facilities must be provided to care for the wounded. Safe locations for the establishment of supply depots must be available. Mao Tse-tung has demonstrated that heavily forested mountain areas are probably the safest terrain for permanent bases. He does not discount areas crisscrossed by rivers and canals, pointing out that they provide ideal paths for assembly of raiding parties and dispersal hereafter, leaving no telltale tracks. The Southeast Asian area provides a number of excellent examples of both types of terrain mentioned above. The great river deltas and the deep-cleft mountain periphery offer numerous sanctuaries for use by large guerrilla groups. Wherever a base area is established, an essential condition that must prevail is the friendliness of the local population. It is important that a substantial segment be willing to actively support the guerrillas, collecting food and furnishing facilities for tool shops and hospitals.

2. (C) Supply Procurement

a. Food. The guerrilla will depend on the countryside and on the rural population for most of his food. In areas under established guerrilla control, taxes will be levied and taxation policy will normally permit payment in food items. Where food is not plentiful, especially in the wild mountainous country of South-

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east Asia, guerrilla food production units will engage directly in farming. Guerrilla units operating in certain areas, particularly near the borders of friendly or neutral countries, may receive some food supplies from external sources.

b. Weapons and Explosives. Ordnance items will be accumulated by the guerrilla from various sources. His initial supply of weapons and ammunition may come from the arsenals of several countries who are sympathetic toward the insurgency movement. He will gather and make use of enemy materiel captured on the battlefield or garnered from raids on enemy supply installations. Certain types of ordnance materiel will be produced in workshops after guerrilla safe base areas have been established. As the movement gains momentum, efforts will be made to achieve standardization of weapons, particularly among regular units. Older weapons will be passed on to district and self-defense forces. In the climactic stage of the guerrilla movement, emphasis will be placed on in-country arms manufacturing complexes and supply and maintenance facilities.

c. Medical. Drugs and medical equipment are readily purchasable on the free world market, but the guerrilla problem here is one of availability of funds. Until the guerrilla movement has attained a measure of success and established a sound fiscal policy through taxation in captured areas, the guerrilla leaders must depend heavily on the contributions from friendly powers for the bulk of their medical supplies. The necessity for an effective medical system, evacuation procedures, and hospital facilities is not underestimated. When safe base areas have been established, the organization of hospital facilities and rest center will be given immediate priority. The guerrilla commander realizes that if his soldiers know they are assured of a safe base area where they can receive treatment and convalesce, they will run the risks of combat with considerable more courage.

d. Signal. Initially, the guerrilla communications system will tend to be elementary, and reliance will be placed upon small tactical radios. As organizations become more formalized, wire communications will be given emphasis by the establishment of local telephone nets within major units. Some signal equipment may be purchased, but stress will be placed on the recovery of signal equipment on the battlefield and on obtaining enemy equipment through raids on signal installations and depots.

3. (S) Supply Storage, Distribution and Transportation. The operations and maintenance of a network of supply bases are indispensable to the success of the guerrilla movement. Supply depots are established primarily in safe base areas, although some storage areas are secretly located in isolated mountains or jungle lowlands.

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A typical depot may contain a small cluster of shelters surrounded by a security fence and perhaps an automatic weapons emplacement. Well concealed under foliage, the depot may be staffed with a platoon size unit to provide security, transportation, and liaison. To prevent large losses in the event of discovery and capture, supply depots will be limited in capacity to five or ten tons. Classes of supplies in these depots may be mixed or may be restricted to a particular type such as food or ammunition. Major roads will seldom, if ever, be utilized for the movement of supplies. Movement frequently will be cross-country or follow trails and paths that provide cover against enemy air observation. Supplies will normally be moved by means of porters, ox carts, and pack animals. Human porters will carry 40 to 60 pound loads in back packs or shoulder poles, and usually they will travel in groups of 10 to 100 men. Pack animals will carry from 150 to 300 pounds, while ox carts may be loaded with up to 1000 pounds of supplies. In the lowlands and delta regions, watercraft also may be used for this purpose. Movements by transport units are secured by route protection forces usually assigned to the local district force. It is not unusual for these troops to conduct raids near the route as a diversion to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.


4. (U) Summary. The logistic operations of a guerrilla force operating in the Southeast Asia area will be rudimentary by western standards. However, his systematic stockpiling of supplies establishes the guerrilla as an elusive enemy who would be able to carry on his operations for an extended period even if his external source of supply is denied him.

PART IV

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF A TYPE GUERRILLA REGIMENT

(S) The following organization charts and tables of equipment are for a typical guerrilla regiment:

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EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

389-pist
392-smg
1277-R/cbn
37-1c mg
9-hv mg
16-AAMG (12.7mm)
9-R/R (75mm)
9-R/R (57mm)

87-at lchr (40mm)
18-mort (82mm)
27-mort (60mm)

SIGNAL

74-co radio
23-bn radio
10-regt radio
2-base radio
26-telephone
6-switchboard

Figure #5 (S) GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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	Regt Hq	Rear Svc	Inf Bn		HW Bn	Sig Co	Engr Co	Recon Plt	Total
			(1)	(3)					
PERSONNEL									
Officers	14	10	(35)	105	26	6	6	2	169
EM	69	107	(450)	1350	284	53	62	35	1960
Total	83	117	(485)	1455	310	59	68	37	2129
WEAPONS									
Pistol	14	10	(92)	276	71	7	6	5	389
smg	33	17	(79)	237	58	14	21	12	392
Rifle/Carbine	36	63	(302)	906	173	38	41	20	1277
lt mg	3	2	(9)	27		1		3	37
hv mg			(3)	9					9
AAGC (12.7mm)	4				12				16
R/R (75mm)			(3)	9	9				9
R/R (57mm)			(27)	81					9
at lchr (40mm)	3		(3)	9	9			3	87
mort (82mm)			(9)	27					18
mort (60mm)									27
SIGNAL									
Company radio			(19)	57	12			5	74
bn radio			(6)	18	5				23
base radio	1	1	(1)	3	1	2	1	1	10
base radio			(5)	15	4	2	1		2
tel		1	(1)	3	1	2			26
Switchboard									6


OTHER

- Grenades, mines and explosives are issued to units and groups as required.
- Although not specifically listed, a type force may occasionally use heavier weapons and perhaps vehicles that have been captured from enemy forces.

Figure #6 (S) REGIMENT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION LIST (U)

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WEAPONS

3-lt mg
3 at lchr (40mm)
4-AAMG (12.7)

SIGNAL


1-regt radio

EQUIPMENT TOTALS

Figure #7 (S) HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY,
GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

7-pist
14-smg
38-R/cbn
1-lt mg


SIGNAL

2-regt radio
2-base radio
5-telephone
2-switchboard

Figure #8 (S) SIGNAL COMPANY, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

6-pist
21-smg
41-R/cbn
1-lt mg


SIGNAL

1-regt radio
1-tel

Figure #9 (S) ENGINEER COMPANY, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

5-pist
12-smg
20-R/cbn
3-1t mg
3-at lchr (40mm)


SIGNAL

5-co radio
1-regt radio

Figure #10 (S) RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET



EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

10-pist
17-smg
63-R/cbn
2-lt mg

SIGNAL

1-regt radio
1-tel

Figure #11 (S) REAR SERVICE ELEMENTS, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET





Figure #12 (S) HEAVY WEAPONS BATTALION, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

14-pist
16-smg
62-R/cbn
9-R/R (75mm)


SIGNAL

4-co radio
1-bn radio
1-tel

Figure #13 (S) RECOILLESS RIFLE COMPANY, HEAVY WEAPONS BATTALION,
GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET



WEAPONS

14-pist
14-smg
57-R/cbn
9-mort 82mm

SIGNAL


4-co radio
1-bn radio
1-tel

EQUIPMENT TOTALS

Figure #14 (S) MORTAR BATTERY, HEAVY WEAPONS BATTALION
GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET



EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

30-pist
20-smg
32-R/cbn
12-AAMG (12.7)


SIGNAL

4-co radio
1-bn radio
1-tel

Figure #15 (S) ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY, HEAVY WEAPONS BATTALION,
GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET



EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

92-pist 9-1t mg
79-smg 27-at lchr (40mm)
302-R/cbn 3-hv mg


SIGNAL

19-co radio 5-tel
6-bn radio 1-swbd
1-regt radio

Figure #16 (S) INFANTRY BATTALION, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

SECRET

SECRET



SIGNAL

5-co radio
1-bn radio
1-tel

EQUIPMENT TOTALS

WEAPONS

21-pist
19-smg
76-R/cbn
3-lt mg
9-at lchr (40mm)
3-mort (60mm)

Figure #17 (S) INFANTRY COMPANY, INFANTRY BATTALION, GUERRILLA INFANTRY REGIMENT (U)

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PART V

EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS

CONFIDENTIAL

	* 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Pistol (7.62mm)	Pistol (9mm)	Carbine-1 (7.62mm)	Rifle-2 (7.62mm)	Assault Rifle (7.62mm)	Carbine (7.62mm)	Sub-Machine Gun-1 (7.62mm)
Muzzle Velocity (fps)	1378	1034	2411	2838	2329	2490	1650
Maximum Effective Range (Meters)	50	50	400	400	400	400	200
Rate of Fire (rds/min)							
Maximum Sustained	30	30	20	8-10	600 100	8-10	900 100
Ammunition Types	Ball	Ball	Ball, API, Tracer 102-123	Ball, API, Tracer 144-182	Ball, API, Tracer 102-123	Ball, API, Tracer 144-182	Ball
Proj Wt (gr)	85	94.5					85
Remarks			Semi-auto Gas oper- ated. 10 Rd mag.	Ball oper- ated. Single shot. 38d mag.	Gas operated. Selective fire. 30 Rd mag.	Single shot. 5 Rd mag. (Bolt Action)	Selective. 35 Rd box or 71 Rd drum

*For detailed characteristics refer to DIA Fact Book

1. Soviet 7.62mm model 1933 (TT) or copy thereof
2. Soviet 9mm automatic pistol (PM) or copy thereof
3. Soviet 7.62mm carbine model SKS or copy thereof
4. Soviet 7.62mm rifle M1891/30 or copy thereof
5. Soviet Assault rifle AK47 or copy thereof
6. Soviet 7.62mm carbine Mosin-Nagant M-1944 or copy thereof
7. Soviet 7.62mm smg model 1941 (PPSH-41) or copy thereof

Figure #19 (C) WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS, SMALL ARMS (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Sub-Machine Gun-2 (7.62mm)	Lt Machine Gun-1 (7.62mm)	Lt Machine Gun-2 (7.62mm)	Lt Machine Gun-3 (7.62mm)	Hv Machine Gun-1 (7.62mm)	AAMG (12.7mm)
Muzzle Velocity (fps)	1640	2411	2700	2700	2790	2756
Maximum Effective Range (Meters)	200	800	800	1000	1000	(H)1500 (AA)1000
Rate of Fire (Rds/Min) Maximum Sustained	650 100	750 150	550 80	600 250	600-700 250-300	600 80
Ammunition Types	Ball	Ball, API, Tracer	Ball, API, Tracer	Ball, API, Tracer	Ball, API, Tracer	API API
Proj Wt (gr) Armor Penetration	85	102-123	144-182	144-182	144-182	681-788 18mm at 0° at 550M
Remarks	Automatic Blowback Operated. 35 Rd mag.	100 Rd metal link belt. Bipod mount	47 Rd drum. Bipod mount.	250 Rd belt or 47 Rd drum Bipod mount.	250 Rd belt Tripod mount. Equipped with light wheels.	50 Rd belt. Tripod mount.

- *1. Soviet 7.62mm smg M1943 (PPS) - or copy thereof
 2. Soviet 7.62mm lt mg Degtyarev (RPD) - or copy thereof
 3. Soviet 7.62mm lmg Degtyarev (DP) - or copy thereof
 4. Soviet 7.62mm company mg M1946 (RP-46) - or copy thereof
 5. Soviet 7.62mm mg Goryunov agm - or copy thereof
 6. 12.7mm hv mg model 38/46 DSHK - or copy thereof

Figure #20 (C) WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS, MACHINEGUNS (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	1	2	3	4	5
	Mortar (60mm)	Mortar (82mm)	Rocket Lchr (40mm)	Rifle Recoil- less (57mm)	Rifle Recoil- less (75mm)
Wt of Weapon (lbs)	45	123	6	52	187.5
Muzzle Velocity (fps)	518	690	276	1115	1000
Maximum Range (meters)	1530	3040	150	3657	6675
Rate of Fire (rpm) Maximum Sustained	15-20	25 8	4-6	15 3	10 3
Fire Control System	Optical	Optical	Metal Sights	Optical	Optical
Ammunition Wt of Round (lbs) Types Fuze Armor Penetration	3.3 HE PD --	7-10 HE, Smoke PD --	4 HEAT BD 6-7" at 0°	5.7 HE, HEAT, Smoke PIBD, PD 2.7" at 0°	22 HE, HEAT PIBD, PD 3" at 0°

Figure #21 (C) WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHER,
AND RECOILLESS RIFLES (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Radios	Range (km)	Method of Transport	Weight (lbs)	Modulation	Emission	Power Output (Watts)	Remarks
Co Radio	3.0	Man-Pack	9	AM	Voice	0.1	Used between Co and Plt.
Bn Radio	8.0	Man-Pack	24	AM	Voice	0.5	Used in Bn net.
Regt Radio	12.0	Man-Pack	45	FM	Voice	1.3	Used in Regt net.
Base Radio	20.0 (Voice) 40.0 (CW)	Man-Pack	80	AM	Voice, CW	3.5	Nets with next higher ech above. Regt. 2-man portable consists of 35 lb power pack and 48 lb transceiver.
Co Radio (A)	1.5	Man-Pack	8	FM	Voice	0.2	Handie-talkie Platoon radio.
Bn Radio (A)	4.0-8.0	Man-Pack	26	FM	Voice	0.5	Used in Bn net.
Regt Radio (A)	10 (Voice) 20 (CW)	Man-Pack	28	AM	Voice, CW	3.0	Used in Regt net.
Base Radio (A)	250 (Voice) 500 (CW)	Man-Pack	50	AM	Voice, CW	7.0-15.0	Nets with Echelon above Regt.

(A) = Alternate Set

Figure #22 (S) CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIO EQUIPMENT (U)

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	Type	Weight (lbs)	Radium-Bursting Area (meters)	Armor Penetration (inches)	Fuze	Average Range Thrown (meters)
AT-AP Hand Grenade	Parachute, Shaped Charge (frag)	2.5	15	5	Impact	15-20
Incendiary Grenade	Flammable-Sabotage (Sodium)	0.1	--	--	Water Contact	--
Antitank Hand Grenade (1)	HEAT, Shaped Charge, Metal Handle (frag)	2.4	20	3.94 at 0°	Impact	20
Antitank Hand Grenade (2)	HEAT, Shaped Charge Wood Handle (frag)	2.7	22	2.95 at 0°	Impact	20
Offensive Hand Grenade	Metal, Cylindrical, TNT Filler	.96	25 Dangerous Radius	--	Time (3-4 sec)	35
Defensive Hand Grenade	Serrated, Cast Iron, Anti-Personnel	1.54	25-30	--	Time (3-5 sec)	40
Off-Def Hand Grenade	Sheet Metal w/Frag Sleeve, Metal Handle	Off-1.1 Def-1.7	Off-6 Def-25	--	Time (3-4 sec)	30-35

Figure #23 (S) GRENADE CHARACTERISTICS (U)

SECRET

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	Type	Action Required To Detonate	Dimensions (inches)	Case Material	Weight (lbs)	Remarks
Antitank Mine (1)	Blast	440 lbs Pressure	Diameter-10 Height-5.2	Sheet Steel	12	Charge-TNT, Amstol
AT-AP Mina (1)	Blast	300-500 lbs Pressure	Diameter-9 Height-4	Cast Iron	11.4	Charge-TNT, Picric Acid. Can be detonated by pull device.
AP Mine (1)	Blast	Pull Device	Diameter-2 Length-6	Sheet Metal	2	Charge-TNT, Friction igniter.
AT-AP Mine (2)	Blast- Frag	Electric Blasting Machine	Diameter-5 Length-9	Cast Ir Serrated	12	Charge-Melinite. Maximum of 10 mines may be detonated simultaneously.
Antitank Mine (2)	Blast	400 lbs Pressure	Diameter-8 Height-3	Cast Iron	11.5	Charge-TNT.
AP Mine (2)	Blast- Frag	Pull Device	Diameter-2 Length-6.5	Cast Iron, Serrated	2.2	Charge-TNT.
AT-AP Mina (3)	Blast- Frag	Electric Blasting Machine	Diameter-8 Height-7	Cement, Serrated	13	Charge-TNT.
Fixed Directional Mine	Frag	Electric Blasting Machine	Diameter-11.75 Height-4.1	Sheet Metal	20	Charge-Cast TNT. Body contains 450 steel fragments. Effective against personnel at 200 meters. Mounted on bipod above ground.

Figure #24 (S) MINE CHARACTERISTICS (U)

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SECRET

PART VI

TROOP LIST AND TYPE TASK ORGANIZATION

Troop List 4th Guerrilla Infantry Regiment - 2129

		<u>Strength</u>
1. HQ & HQ, 4th Guerrilla Inf Regt		83
a. HQ, Elm, 4th Inf Regt	(33)	
b. 4th AA Plat (12.7)	(22)	
c. 4th Gd Plat	(28)	
2. 4th Sig Co		59
3. 4th Engr Co		68
a. HQ, 4th Engr Co	(8)	
b. 1st Plat, 4th Engr Co	(20)	
(1) HQ, 1st Plat	(2)	
(2) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat	(6)	
(3) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat	(6)	
(4) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat	(6)	
c. 2d Plat, 4th Engr Co	(20)	
(1) HQ, 2d Plat	(2)	
(2) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat	(6)	
(3) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat	(6)	
(4) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat	(6)	
d. 3d Plat, 4th Engr Co	(20)	
(1) HQ, 3d Plat	(2)	
(2) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat	(6)	
(3) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat	(6)	
(4) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat	(6)	
4. 4th Recon Plat		37
a. HQ, 4th Recon Plat	(4)	
b. Radio Sqd, 4th Recon Plat	(6)	
c. 1st Sqd, 4th Recon Plat	(9)	
d. 2d Sqd, 4th Recon Plat	(9)	
e. 3d Sqd, 4th Recon Plat	(9)	
5. Rear Svc Elm, 4th Guerrilla Inf Regt		117
a. HQ, 4th Rear Svc Elm	(8)	
b. 4th Med Plat	(30)	
c. 4th Trans Co	(79)	

SECRET

Strength

- (1) HQ, 4th Trans Co (7)
- (2) 1st Plat, 4th Trans Co (24)
- (3) 2d Plat, 4th Trans Co (24)
- (4) 3d Plat, 4th Trans Co (24)

- 6. 4th HW Bn
 - a. HQ, 4th HW Bn (16)
 - b. Sig Sec, 4th HW Bn (11)
 - c. Supply/Trans Plat, 4th HW Bn (14)
 - d. Med Sec, 4th HW Bn (10)
 - e. Co A(75 R/R), 4th HW Bn (92)
 - (1) HQ, Co A(75 R/R) (11)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co A(75 R/R) (27)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co A(75 R/R) (27)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co A(75 R/R) (27)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - f. Btry B (82mm mort), 4th HW Bn (85)
 - (1) HQ, Btry B (82mm mort) (7)
 - (2) Svc Sec, Btry B (82mm) (9)
 - (3) 1st Plat, Btry B (82mm) (23)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (7)
 - (4) 2d Plat, Btry B (82mm mort) (23)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (7)
 - (5) 3d Plat, Btry B (82mm) (23)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (7)
 - g. Btry C (12.7 AAMG), 4th HW Bn (82)
 - (1) HQ Btry C (12.7 AAMG) (7)
 - (2) Sig Sec, Btry C (12.7 AAMG) (9)

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Strength

- (3) 1st Plat, Btry C (12.7 AAMG) (22)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd, 1st Plat (5)
- (4) 2d Plat, Btry C (12.7 AAMG) (22)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd, 2d Plat (5)
- (5) 3d Plat, Btry C (12.7 AAMG) (22)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (5)
 - (d) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd, 3d Plat (5)

- 7. 1st Inf Bn, 4th Guerrilla Inf Regt
 - a. HQ, 1st Inf Bn (12)
 - b. Sig Sec, 1st Inf Bn (11)
 - c. Supply/Maint Sec, 1st Inf Bn (12)
 - d. Med Sec, 1st Inf Bn (14)
 - e. Co A, 1st Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co A (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co A (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)

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SECRET

Strength

- (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
- (e) 4th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- (f) 5th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- (g) 6th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- f. Co B, 1st Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co B (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co B (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- g. Co C, 1st Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co C (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)

SECRET

SECRET

Strength

- (3) 2d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
- (4) 3d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
- (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co C (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- h. Co D (HW), 1st Bn (88)
 - (1) HQ, Co D (HW) (11)
 - (2) Supply Sec, Co D (HW) (2)
 - (3) 1st Plat (hv mg), Co D (2)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (hv mg) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (4) 2d Plat (82mm mort), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (82mm) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, (82mm mort) (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, (82mm mort) (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (5) 3d Plat (57 RR), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat, (57 RR) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (57 RR) (7)

SECRET

SECRET

Strength

(c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (57 RR)	(7)	
(d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (57 RR)	(7)	
8. 2d Inf Bn, 4th Guerrilla Inf Regt		485
a. HQ, 2d Inf Bn	(12)	
b. Sig Sec, 2d Inf Bn	(11)	
c. Supply/Maint Sec, 2d Inf Bn	(12)	
d. Med Sec, 2d Inf Bn	(14)	
e. Co A, 2d Inf Bn	(116)	
(1) HQ, Co A	(5)	
(2) 1st Plat, Co A	(26)	
(a) HQ, 1st Plat	(2)	
(b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat	(8)	
(c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat	(8)	
(d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat	(8)	
(3) 2d Plat, Co A	(26)	
(a) HQ, 2d Plat	(2)	
(b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat	(8)	
(c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat	(8)	
(d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat	(8)	
(4) 3d Plat, Co A	(26)	
(a) HQ, 3d Plat	(2)	
(b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat	(8)	
(c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat	(8)	
(d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat	(8)	
(5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co A	(33)	
(a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns)	(3)	
(b) 1st Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat	(5)	
(c) 2d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat	(5)	
(d) 3d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat	(5)	
(e) 4th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat	(5)	
(f) 5th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat	(5)	
(g) 6th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat	(5)	
f. Co B, 2d Inf Bn		(116)
(1) HQ, Co B	(5)	
(2) 1st Plat, Co B	(26)	
(a) HQ, 1st Plat	(2)	
(b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat	(8)	
(c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat	(8)	

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Strength

- (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
- (3) 2d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
- (4) 3d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
- (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co B (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg), 4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- g. Co C, 2d Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co C (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co C (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)

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Strength

- (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)
- (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)
- (e) 4th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- (f) 5th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- (g) 6th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- h. Co D (HW), 2d Inf Bn (88)
 - (1) HQ, Co D (HW) (11)
 - (2) Supply Sec, Co D(HW) (10)
 - (3) 1st Plat (hv mg), Co D (21)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (hv mg) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (4) 2d Plat (82mm mort), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (5) 3d Plat (57 RR), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (57RR) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)
- 9. 3d Inf Bn, 4th Guerrilla Inf Regt 485
 - a. HQ, 3d Inf Bn (12)
 - b. Sig Sec, 3d Inf Bn (11)
 - c. Supply/Maint Sec, 3d Inf Bn (12)
 - d. Med Sec, 3d Inf Bn (14)
 - e. Co A, 3d Inf Bn (116)

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Strength

- (1) HQ, Co A (5)
- (2) 1st Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
- (3) 2d Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
- (4) 3d Plat, Co A (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
- (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co A (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns) (3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg) 4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm mort), 4th Plat (5)
- f. Co B, 3d Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co B (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co B (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)

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Strength

- (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co B (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns)(3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- g. Co C, 3d Inf Bn (116)
 - (1) HQ, Co C (5)
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (8)
 - (3) 2d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (8)
 - (4) 3d Plat, Co C (26)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (8)
 - (5) 4th Plat (wpns), Co C (33)
 - (a) HQ, 4th Plat (wpns)(3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (c) 2d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (d) 3d Sqd (1t mg),
4th Plat (5)
 - (e) 4th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (f) 5th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
 - (g) 6th Sqd (60mm
mort), 4th Plat (5)
- h. Co D, (HW), 3d Inf Bn (88)
 - (1) HQ, Co D (HW) (11)

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Strength

- (2) Supply Sec, Co D (HW) (10)
- (3) 1st Plat (hv mg), Co D (21)
 - (a) HQ, 1st Plat(hv mg)(3)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 1st Plat (hv mg) (6)
- (4) 2d Plat (82mm mort), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 2d Plat (82mm mort) (7)
- (5) 3d Plat (57RR), Co D (23)
 - (a) HQ, 3d Plat (57RR) (2)
 - (b) 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)
 - (c) 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)
 - (d) 3d Sqd, 3d Plat (57RR) (7)

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Type Task Organization 4 Guerrilla Inf Regt (2129)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1. HQ & HQ Co, 4 Inf Regt	(83)
(3-1t mg, 3-at lchr, 4-AAMG, 1-regt radio)	
Atchd: HQ, 4 Engr Co (1-1t mg, 1-regt radio)	(8)
TOTAL	91
<u>HQ & HQ Co Total: 4-1t mg, 3-at lchr, 4-AAMG, 2 regt radio</u>	
2. 4 Sig Co (1-1t mg, 2-regt radio, 2-base radio)	59
3. 4 Recon Plat (3-1t mg, 3-at lchr, 5-co radio, 1-regt radio)	37
4. HQ, 4 Rear Svc Elm (1-1t mg, 1-regt radio)	(8)
Atchd: 4 Med Plat	(30)
HQ, 4 Trans Co (1-1t mg)	(7)
TOTAL	45
<u>HQ, 4 Rear Svc Elm Total: 2-1t mg, 1-regt radio</u>	
5. 4 HW Bn (-):	
a. HQ, 4 Bn HQ (1-bn radio)	(16)
b. Sig Sec, 4 HW Bn (1-bn radio, 1-regt radio)	(11)
c. Supply/Trans Plat, 4 HW Bn	(14)
d. Med Sec, 4 HW Bn	(10)
e. HQ, Co A (75R/R), 4 HW Bn (1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	(11)
f. Btry C (-) (12.7 AAMG), 4 HW Bn (1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	(16)
TOTAL	78
<u>4 HW Bn (-) Total: 2-co radio, 4-bn radio, 1-regt radio</u>	
6. Btry B (82mort), 4 HW bn:	
a. HQ & Svc Elm, Btry B	(16)
(1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	
b. 1 Plat, Btry B (3-mort (82), 1-co radio)	(23)
c. 2 Plat, Btry B (3-mort (82), 1-co radio)	(23)
d. 3 Plat, Btry B (3-mort (82), 1-co radio)	(23)
TOTAL	85
<u>Btry B Total: 9-mort (82), 4-co radio, 1-bn radio</u>	

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7. 1 Bn, 4 Guerrilla Inf Regt	(485)
Atchd: 1 Plat, 4 Engr Co	(20)
1 Plat, 4 Trans Co	(24)
1 Plat, Btry C, 4 HW Bn(4-AAMC(12.7), 1-co radio)	(22)
1 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (3-R/R(75), 1-co radio)	<u>(27)</u>
TOTAL	578

Bn Total:

9-1t mg(7.62)	3-mort(82)	21-co radio
27-at 1chr(40)	9-mort(60)	6-bn radio
3-hv mg(7.62)	3-R/R(75)	1-regt radio
3-R/R(57)	4-AAMG(12.7)	

a. HQ & Svc Elm, 1 Inf Bn:

(1) HQ, 1 Inf Bn (1-bn radio)	(12)
(2) Sig Sec, 1 Inf Bn (1-bn radio, 1-regt radio)	(11)
(3) Supply/Maint Sec, 1 Inf Bn	(12)
(4) Med Sec, 1 Inf Bn	(14)
Atchd: HQ, 1 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-co radio)	<u>(3)</u>
	TOTAL
HQ & Svc Elm Total: 1-co radio, 2-bn radio, 1-regt radio	(52)

b. 1 Plat, 4 Engr Co (20)

c. 1 Plat, 4 Trans Co (24)

d. 1 Plat, Btry C, 4 HW Bn(4-AAMG(12.7), 1-co radio) (22)

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e. Co A, 1 Bn (116)
 Atchd: 1 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)
 1 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 1 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 1 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 1 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
TOTAL (137)

Co Total: 1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio
 1-R/R(57) 9-at lchr 1-bn radio
 3-lt mg 3-mort(60)

(1) HQ, Co A (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (5)
 Atchd: 1 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)
 1 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 1 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 1 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 1 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
 HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co A, 1 Bn(1-co radio) (3)
TOTAL (29)

Co HQ Total: 1-R/R(75) 2-co radio
 1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio
 1-hv mg

(2) 1 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg) (5)
 4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

(3) 2 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-lt mg) (5)
 5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-mort(60) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

(4) 3 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg) (5)
 6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

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g. Co C, 1 Bn (116)
 Atchd: 3 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)
 3 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 1 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 3 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 1 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
TOTAL (137)

Co Total: 1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio
 1-R/R(57) 9-at lchr 1-bn radio
 3-lt mg 3-mort(60)

(1) HQ, Co C (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (5)
 Atchd: 3 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75R/R) (8)
 3 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 1 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 3 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 1 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
 HQ 4 Plat(wps), Co C, 1 Bn(1-co radio) (3)
TOTAL (29)

Co HQ Total: 1-R/R(75) 2-co radio
 1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio
 1-hv mg

(2) 1 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-lt mg) (5)
 4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-mort(60)) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

(3) 2 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-lt mg) (5)
 5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-mort(60)) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

(4) 3 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)
 Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-lt mg) (5)
 6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-mort(60)) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)
 1-lt mg 1-co radio

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h. Co D (HW) (-), 1 Inf Bn:
 (1) HQ, Co D (HW) (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (11)
 (2) Supply Sec, Co D (HW) (10)
 (3) HQ, 1 Plat (hv mg), Co D (1-co radio) (3)
 (4) HQ, 3 Plat (57R/R), Co D (1-co radio) (2)
 TOTAL (26)
Co D (HW) (-) Total: 3-co radio, 1-bn radio

i. 2 Plat (82 mort), Co D, 1 Inf Bn (23)
 (3-82 mort, 1-co radio)

8. 2 Bn, 4 Guerrilla Inf Regt (485)
 Atchd: 2 Plat, 4 Engr Co (20)
 2 Plat, 4 Trans Co (24)
 2 Plat, Btry C 4 HW Bn(4-AAMG(12.7), 1-co radio (27)
 2 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (3-R/R(75), 1-co radio) (27)
Bn Total: TOTAL 578
 9-1t mg(7.62) 3-mort(82) 21-co radio
 27-at 1chr(40) 9-mort(60) 6-bn radio
 3-hv mg(7.62) 3-R/R(75) 1-regt radio
 3-R/R(57) 4-AAMG(12.7)

a. HQ & Svc Elm, 2 Inf Bn:
 (1) HQ, 2 Inf Bn (1-bn radio) (12)
 (2) Sig Sec, 2 Inf Bn(1-bn radio, 1-regt radio) (11)
 (3) Supply/Maint Sec, 2 Inf Bn (12)
 (4) Med Sec, 2 Inf Bn (14)
 Atchd: HQ, 2 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-co radio) (3)
 TOTAL (52)
HQ & Svc Elm Total: 1-co radio, 2-bn radio, 1-regt radio

b. 2 Plat, 4 Engr Co (20)

c. 2 Plat, 4 Trans Co (24)

d. 2 Plat, Btry C, 4 HW Bn(4-AAMG(12.7), 1-co radio) (22)

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e.	Co A, 2 Bn	(116)
Atchd:	1 Sqd, 2 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R)	(8)
	1 Sqd, 1 Plat(nv mg), Co D, 2 Bn(1-hv mg)	(6)
	1 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 2 Bn(1-57R/R)	(7)
	TOTAL	(137)
<u>Co Total:</u>	1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio	
	1-R/R(57) 9-at lchr 1-bn radio	
	3-lt mg 3-mort(60)	
(1)	HQ, Co A (1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	(5)
Atchd:	1 Sqd, 2 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75 R/R)	(8)
	1 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 2 Bn(1-hv mg)	(6)
	1 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 2 Bn(1-57R/R)	(7)
	HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co A, 2 Bn(1-co radio)	(3)
	TOTAL	(29)
<u>Co HQ Total:</u>	1-R/R(75) 2-co radio	
	1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio	
	1-hv mg	
(2)	1 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr)	(26)
Atchd:	1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg)	(5)
	4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60))	(5)
	TOTAL	(36)
<u>Plat Total:</u>	3-at lchr 1-mort(60)	
	1-lt mg 1-co radio	
(3)	2 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr)	(26)
Atchd:	2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-lt mg)	(5)
	5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-mort(60))	(5)
	TOTAL	(36)
<u>Plat Total:</u>	3-at lchr 1-mort(60)	
	1-lt mg 1-co radio	
(4)	3 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr)	(26)
Atchd:	3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg)	(5)
	6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60))	(5)
	TOTAL	(36)
<u>Plat Total:</u>	3-at lchr 1-mort(60)	
	1-lt mg 1-co radio	

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g. Co C, 2 Bn (116)
 Atchd: 3 Sqd, 2 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)
 3 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 2 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 3 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 2 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
 TOTAL (137)

Co Total: 1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio
1-R/R(57) 9-at 1chr 1-bn radio
3-1t mg 3-mort(60)

(1) HQ, Co C (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (5)
Atchd: 3 Sqd, 2 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75R/R) (8)
 3 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 2 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)
 3 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 2 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)
HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co C, 2 Bn(1-co radio) (3)

TOTAL (29)

Co HQ Total: 1-R/R(75) 2-co radio
 1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio
 1-hv mg

(2) 1 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at 1chr)	(26)
Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-lt mg)	(5)
4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-mort(60))	<u>(5)</u>
TOTAL	(36)

Plat Total: 3-at 1chr 1-mort(60)
1-1t mg 1-co radio

(3) 2 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at 1chr) (26)
 Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-lt mg) (5)
 5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-mort(60)) (5)
TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at 1chr 1-mort(60)
1-1t mg 1-co radio

(4) 3 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at 1chr)	(26)
Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-lt mg)	(5)
6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-mort(60))	<u>(5)</u>
TOTAL	(36)

Plat Total: 3-at 1chr 1-mort(60)
1-1t mg 1-co radio

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- h. Co D (HW) (-), 2 Inf Bn:
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| (1) HQ, Co D (HW) (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) | (11) |
| (2) Supply Sec, Co D (HW) | (10) |
| (3) HQ, 1 Plat (hv mg), Co D (1-co radio) | (3) |
| (4) HQ, 3 Plat (57R/R), Co D (1-co radio) | (2) |
| TOTAL | (26) |
- Co D (HW) (-) Total: 3-co radio, 1 bn radio
- i. 2 Plat (82mort), Co D, 2 Inf Bn (3-82 mort, 1-co radio) (23)
9. 3 Bn, 4 Guerrilla Inf Regt (485)
- | | |
|---|------------|
| Atchd: 3 Plat, 4 Engr Co | (20) |
| 3 Plat, 4 Trans Co | (24) |
| 3 Plat, Btry C, 4 HW Bn(4-AAMG(12.7)), 1-co radio | (22) |
| 3 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (3-R/R(75)), 1-co radio | (27) |
| TOTAL | 578 |
- Bn Total:
- | | | |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| 9-1t mg(7.62) | 3-mort(82) | 21-co radio |
| 27-at lchr(40) | 9-mort(60) | 6-bn radio |
| 3-hv mg(7.62) | 3-R/R(75) | 1-regt radio |
| 3-R/R(57) | 4-AAMG(12.7) | |
- a. HQ & Svc Elm, 3 Inf Bn:
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| (1) HQ, 3 Inf Bn (1-bn radio) | (12) |
| (2) Sig Sec, 3 Inf Bn(1-bn radio, 1-regt radio) | (11) |
| (3) Supply/Maint Sec, 3 Inf Bn | (12) |
| (4) Med Sec, 3 Inf Bn | (14) |
| Atchd: HQ, 3 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-co radio) | (3) |
| TOTAL | (52) |
- HQ & Svc Elm Total: 1-co radio, 2-bn radio, 1-regt radio
- b. 3 Plat, 4 Engr Co (20)
- c. 3 Plat, 4 Trans Co (24)
- d. 3 Plat, Btry C, 4 HW Bn(4-AAMG(12.7)), 1-co radio (22)

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e. Co A, 3 Bn (116)

Atchd: 1 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)

1 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 3 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)

1 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)

TOTAL (137)

Co Total: 1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio

1-R/R(57) 9-at lchr 1-bn radio

3-lt mg 3-mort(60)

(1) HQ, Co A (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (5)

Atchd: 1 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75R/R) (8)

1 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)

1 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)

HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co A, 3 Bn(1-co radio) (3)

TOTAL (29)

Co HQ Total: 1-R/R(75) 2-co radio

1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio

1-hv mg

(2) 1 Plat, Co A(1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg) (5)

4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)

1-lt mg 1-co radio

(3) 2 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-lt mg) (5)

5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A (1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)

1-lt mg 1-co radio

(4) 3 Plat, Co A (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-lt mg) (5)

6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co A(1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)

1-lt mg 1-co radio

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f. Co B, 3 Bn (116)

Atchd: 2 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R) (8)

2 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 3 Bn(1-hv mg) (6)

2 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)

TOTAL (137)

Co Total: 1-R/R(75) 1-hv mg 5-co radio

1-R/R(57) 9-at lchr 1-bn radio

3-lt mg 3-mort(60)

(1) HQ, Co B (1-co radio, 1-bn radio) (5)

Atchd: 2 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75R/R) (8)

2 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1 hv mg) (6)

2 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R) (7)

HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co B, 3 Bn(1-co radio) (3)

TOTAL (29)

Co HQ Total: 1-R/R(75) 2-co radio

1-R/R(57) 1-bn radio

1-hv mg

(2) 1 Plat, Co B (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B(1-lt mg) (5)

4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B(1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)

1-lt mg 1-co radio

(3) 2 Plat, Co B (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B (1-lt mg) (5)

5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B (1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60,

1-lt mg 1-co radio

(4) 3 Plat, Co B (1-co radio, 3-at lchr) (26)

Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B(1-lt mg) (5)

6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co B(1-mort(60)) (5)

TOTAL (36)

Plat Total: 3-at lchr 1-mort(60)

1-lt mg 1-co radio

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Co C, 3 Bn			(116)
Atchd: 3 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A(75R/R), 4 HW Bn(1-75R/R)			(8)
3 Sqd, 1 Plat(hv mg), Co D, 3 Bn(1-hv mg)			(6)
3 Sqd, 3 Plat(57R/R), Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R)			(7)
		TOTAL	(137)
<u>Co Total:</u> 1-R/R(75)	1-hv mg	5-co radio	
1-R/R(57)	9-at 1chr	1-bn radio	
3-lt mg	3-mort(60)		

(1) HQ, Co C (1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	(5)	
Atchd: 3 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co A, 4 HW Bn (1-75R/R)	(8)	
3 Sqd, 1 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1-hv mg)	(6)	
3 Sqd, 3 Plat, Co D, 3 Bn(1-57R/R)	(7)	
HQ, 4 Plat(wpns), Co C, 3 Bn(1-co radio)	(3)	
	TOTAL	(29)
<u>Co HQ Total:</u> 1-R/R(75)	2-co radio	
1-R/R(57)	1-bn radio	
1-hv mg		

(2) 1 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at 1chr)	(26)	
Atchd: 1 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-lt mg)	(5)	
4 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-mort(60))	(5)	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	(36)
<u>Flat Total:</u> 3-at 1chr	1-mort(60)	
1-lt mg	1-co radio	

(3) 2 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at 1chr)	(26)	
Atchd: 2 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-lt mg)	(5)	
5 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C (1-mort(60))	(5)	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	(36)
<u>Plat Total:</u> 3-at 1chr	1-mort(60)	
1-lt mg	1-co radio	

(4) 3 Plat, Co C (1-co radio, 3-at lchr)	(26)	
Atchd: 3 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-lt mg)	(5)	
6 Sqd, 4 Plat, Co C(1-mort(60))	(5)	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	(36)
<u>Plat Total:</u> 3-at lchr	1-mort(60)	
1-lt mg	1-co radio	

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h. Co D (HW) (-), 3 Inf Bn:

(1) HQ, Co D (HW) (1-co radio, 1-bn radio)	(11)
(2) Supply Sec, Co D (HW)	(10)
(3) HQ, 1 Plat (hv mg), Co D (1-co radio)	(3)
(4) HQ, 3 Plat (57R/R), Co D (1-co radio)	(2)
<u>Co D (HW) (-) Total:</u> 3-co radio, 1-bn radio	<u>TOTAL</u> (26)

i. 2 Plat (82 mort), Co D, 3 Inf Bn (23)
(3-82 mort, 1-co radio)

SECRET

PART VII

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PART VIII

ABBREVIATIONS

Because of space limitations on the charts contained in this study, an unusual amount of abbreviating was done. Most abbreviations used are standard; however, some were devised when none existed. A complete list follows:

AAA	antiaircraft artillery	lt mg	light machine gun
AAAmg	antiaircraft machine gun	mg	machine gun
AM	amplitude modulated	maint	maintenance
AP	amphibious personnel	med	medical
API	armor-piercing incendiary	msgr	messenger
APIT	armor-piercing incendiary tracer	mm	millimeter
aslt	assault	mort	mortar
at	antitank	off	officer, offensive
BD	base detonating	PD	point detonating
bn	battalion	PIBD	point initiating, base detonating
btry	battery	pist	pistol
cbn	carbine	plat	platoon
co	company	proj	projectile
CW	continuous wave	R	rifle
def	defensive	rdo	radio
elm	element(s)	R/R	recoilless rifle
EM	enlisted men	recon	reconnaissance
engr	engineer	regt	regiment
FM	frequency modulated	rds/min	rounds per min
fps	feet per second	sec	section
frag	fragmentation	sa	semiautomatic
gd	guard	sig	signal
HE	high explosive	smg	submachine gun
HEAT	high explosive antitank	sqd	squad
HQ	headquarters	svc	service
hv mg	heavy machine gun	swbd	switchboard
HW	heavy weapons	tel	telephone
inf	infantry	trans	transportation
km	kilometer	wpns	weapons
lchr	launcher		