STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY, ASYMMETRY AND ARMS CONTROL: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Abstract

This study investigates the conditions under which some types of arms control agreements, hen there is adequate inspection and verification, may be used as a tool by the Soviet Union to achieve strategic objectives that are un desirable or dangerous to the United States, given current U. S. strategic superiority and the asymmetries in the force structures of both nations. Sets of objectives and postures are examined in a dynamic context to determine those sets that could produce future arms agreements and the types of agreements that might be produced.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 1963
Accession Number
AD0404010

Entities

People

  • Harvey Avercha

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Force
  • Arms Control
  • Civil Defense
  • Defense Systems
  • Force Structure
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • Lead Time
  • National Security
  • Negotiations
  • New York
  • Operations Research
  • United States
  • United States Government
  • Ussr

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design