MINIMAX PREDICTION AND AN EVASION GAME.
Abstract
The problem of determining how an evading target should maneuver to survive a lethal weapon, and reciprocally, how the attacker or marksman should aim and when he should fire is, in its general form, much too complex for a satisfactory solution. In this paper, an idealized version of the problem is formulated and solved as a 2 person zero sum game. The game is shown to have a saddle point with pure strategies. The evader moves in one dimension and is constrained to choose from a class of Gaussian processes. The marksman uses linear prediction theory, observing the complete past history of the evader's motion. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 06, 1963
- Accession Number
- AD0415434
Entities
People
- J. Bram
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses