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AREA HANDBOOK for BOLIVIA

Prepared by
FOREIGN AREAS STUDIES DIVISION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The American University
Washington, D.C.

August 1963

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The American University
Washington, D.C., 20016

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August 1963

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FOREWORD

This book is one of a series of country handbooks designed for use by persons who have need for such background information. The emphasis is an objective description of contemporary national societies, focusing on basic social, economic and political institutions. Treatment is intended to be comprehensive rather than exhaustive. The studies are introductory, and it is expected that the reader will have recourse to many other sources for more detailed information in areas of special interest. Extensive bibliographies are included for this purpose.

The authors have reached certain conclusions concerning the character of the society today and the kinds and direction of change which appear possible or probable within the near future; interpretive judgments are their sole responsibility. The study is in no sense a plea for any special point of view, or a recommendation for any specific policy.

The users of this work should consider it not as a final product, but as a basis for further research to fill gaps in the present study. The authors' conclusions are subject to modifications in the light of new developments and information. Readers are accordingly urged to submit comments correcting errors of fact or interpretation, filling or indicating gaps of information and suggesting changes as may be appropriate. Comments should be addressed to—

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FOREWORD TO THE BOLIVIA HANDBOOK

In 1952, Bolivia underwent a revolution which, in the rapidity and proportions of the social, political and economic changes it produced, stands with few precedents in Latin American history. This upheaval and the course of events following it have given the country a significance far out of proportion to its small population and traditional marginality.

The 1952 revolution changed a society which was basically similar to those of many other Latin American countries. A small upper class dominated the country, maintaining an absolute monopoly over political power and controlling most of its lands and natural resources. The vast majority of the population belonged to an impoverished, illiterate and politically voiceless lower class. Compounding these inequities was an underdeveloped economy, almost wholly dependent upon the export of a single raw material—tin ore.

The revolutionary government moved rapidly to end upper-class economic and political dominance by the nationalization of the largest tin-mining enterprises, by a radical land reform program and by the enactment, for the first time in the nation's history, of universal suffrage. The effectiveness of this redress of longstanding inequities was not, however, matched by equal success in dealing with the heritage of problems created by mass illiteracy and basic economic underdevelopment. Rather, the destruction of a stable, if underproductive, agrarian system resulted in an economic chaos which had only begun to be resolved in 1962. Similarly, nationalization of the mines was followed by a host of difficulties caused in large part by the loss of skilled supervisory personnel and by the lack of labor discipline.

Bolivia's major significance lies in its role as a model of revolutionary change and reform. On the one hand, many observers believe that a similar process of change is imminent in other Latin American countries and that the Bolivian experience of more than a decade offers a potentially valuable lesson. On the other hand, the dominant philosophy underlying most current programs of economic and social development, including the Alliance for Progress, stresses the necessity for the sort of reforms (particularly land redistribution) which were the cornerstones of the 1952 revolution. The outcome of Bolivian efforts to build, on the basis of such reforms, a more democratic and prosperous society is therefore a matter of considerable interest.

Also important is the fact that the revolutionary leadership has accepted little direction or material aid from Communist sources. Despite periodic disagreements, Bolivia has maintained close and essentially cordial relations with the United States and has been the recipient of massive economic aid and technical assistance. The country therefore assumes additional significance as a crucial testing ground of United States relations with non-Communist revolutionary governments.

This book attempts to provide a comprehensive study of the whole society of this newly important nation. Although fairly recent English-language studies of the country exist, most of them are specialized political, economic or sociological reports or sweeping and undetailed descriptions. The Bolivian Handbook is not intended to supplant either of these types, but rather to provide a unified and fairly complete source of information within a single volume. Interpretations and judgments are presented, but they are offered tentatively, as befits research done from a distance on a nation in so great a state of flux.

Grateful acknowledgment is due many people who gave of their time and experience to provide data and friendly criticism of preliminary chapter drafts. In particular, the authors are grateful to Mr. J. Robert Busenberg of the Agency for International Development, to Dr. Charles R. Davenport of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and to Dr. Dwight B. Heath of Brown University for their constructive criticism and knowledgeable guidance. A debt of gratitude is also extended to Miss Susan E. Gilmour, Miss Skaidrite Maliks, Mr. William Pruzensky and Colonel Clyde McBride for valuable assistance in research and writing.

English usage in this handbook follows *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language* (3d ed., unabridged). Spanish usage is based upon Velázquez' *A New Pronouncing Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1960). For words and phrases drawn from the Indian languages, Quechua and Aymara, there are no published standards, and usage follows that of Bolivian authors.

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


Figure 1. Departments of Bolivia, 1963.

SECTION I. SOCIAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

Because the functioning part of the Bolivian nation has historically been Andean in locale and culture, the country is usually thought of as one of lofty mountains and high, cold, windswept plateaus. Less often considered is that over three-fifths of its extent is Amazonian rain forest, savanna and swamp, lightly populated and, except for small areas at the foot of the Andes, contributing little to the economy or to the national life.

The virtual restriction of settlement and social activity to the highland regions is attributable in part to the considerable difficulty of movement to any neighboring area, but even more to economic causes. The attention of the Spanish conquerors was early fixed on an otherwise inhospitable region through the discovery of enormous deposits of high-grade silver ore, and thenceforth highland Bolivia lived only to mine it.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century demand for the industrial minerals, mainly tin, but also copper, tungsten, antimony, zinc and lead, all of which were found in abundance, served to confirm the country's dependence on mining. It is true that large agricultural holdings also existed, especially in the fertile parts of the valleys on the eastern Andean slopes, but their importance was distinctly secondary.

The wealth derived from the mines was more than sufficient to cover the cost of the imports needed by the small white population, and the rest of the people lived as they always had.

Throughout most of the history of the republic the educated upper class, of European or relatively unmixed ancestry, has held the government and the economic destiny of the country in its exclusive control. Indian labor and *cholo* (of mixed racial and cultural heritage) stewards, artisans and foremen were plentiful, and no need to provide them more than minimal educational advantages was felt until well into the present century. The most immediate and evident result was that an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants spoke only an alphabetic Aymara or Quechua and remained illiterate in Spanish. Such lack of both economic and educational opportunity has inhibited

social mobility, and hence, even in the mid-twentieth century, what might be a stabilizing factor—a well-rooted and economically secure middle class—is largely lacking.

Symptomatic of the attitudes of the directing minority toward its place at the apex of the society is the fact that during a century and a quarter of the existence of the republic, the franchise was limited to the few literates. In the election of 1951, only slightly over 200,000 (of a population already in excess of 3 million) could vote, and only 59 percent of them exercised that right in a crucial presidential election. Forces leading to radical change were, however, nearly on the point of eruption.

The paramount social and political fact in contemporary Bolivia is the revolution that resulted in a complete change in the tone and purposes of national leadership in 1952. Bolivians themselves, as well as many outside observers, tend to regard the country as a follower of the pattern of social revolution established early in the twentieth century in Mexico and since followed in no other Latin American state. The revolutionary model, to some extent read into the events of 1952 only in retrospect, excludes the doctrinaire reconstruction of society which the Cuban revolution has become and excludes as well the frequent but usually superficial uprisings by means of which Bolivian and other Latin American insurgent groups have been wont to usurp political power. The kind of revolution enthroned in this outlook is neither a coup d'etat nor a revamping of society according to the dictates of a particular doctrine; it is more aptly characterized as that pivotal stage at which modernization receives official endorsement.

Such an understanding of the Bolivian revolution makes the actual overthrow of the old regime in 1952 seem almost paradoxically pale and unexciting. Armed strife was confined to the period of April 8–11, 1952, and almost exclusively to La Paz. Estimates vary as to loss of life, but 3,000 deaths seem to be a reasonable figure, hardly an overwhelming number. The outcome placed the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) firmly in the position of power to which it considered itself entitled by reason of its clear plurality gained in the election of 1951, only to have power seized at that time by an antirevolutionary military junta. The latter group had been the last refuge of the traditional politicians, and its deposition cleared the way for implementation of MNR policy for Bolivia.

The comparative ease with which the MNR assumed power may be partially explained by the extended period of ferment leading up to the overthrow of the traditional social and economic system. Essentially this was neither a conspiracy among the unprivileged nor a planned mobilization of popular sentiment by their sympathizers, but rather a gradual and still far from complete awakening of hitherto

dormant elements of the population. The modern world dawned so belatedly for the majority of Bolivians because they had never experienced any contrast or challenge to the unchanging set of circumstances governing their lives. The tardy encroachment of modernity on their circumscribed existence initiated the rise of new aspirations and expectations. The MNR, founded by and among upper-class intellectuals, which was astutely aware of the growth of this consciousness, at times used means verging on the conspiratorial and employed opinion-molding techniques to assert its leadership and gain numerical support.

The event customarily proposed as the starting point for this awakening is the Chaco War (1932–35). This clash with Paraguay necessitated large-scale levies from among the Indians and peasants, and the dispatching of these troops to a distant battle zone constituted for many of them a first experience of the world outside their isolated rural highland habitat. The war occasioned a mixing, in the military establishment, of previously segregated groups and an introduction of the concept of a Bolivian nation as counterpoise to the prevailing regional parochialism. A corresponding effect on the educated minority of Bolivians was embodied in a new awareness of dependence, in a time of national peril, on previously ignored countrymen and in the bitter shock of a defeat attributable to the deficiencies of governmental and military leadership.

From 1935, when the fighting ended, to the early 1950's, the signs of change became increasingly visible in the country. The more liberal regimes attempted to reduce unrest by concessions that further stimulated the desire for improved conditions, and reactionary governments only worsened the situation by seeking to restore the *status quo*, for by this time the unfavored majority had at least grasped the privilege of being dissatisfied and was beginning to learn the means of self-assertion.

In a setting thus favorable to change, the MNR was formed in 1940, under the capable leadership of Víctor Pas Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo, as an intended vehicle of social change and nationalism. Originally an aggregation of intellectuals united chiefly by the desire to transform Bolivia into a socialist nation, the party only gradually, and never completely, refined its programs and policies. The diverse factors influencing the thought of its leaders have included both the radical, Indian-oriented Aprista movement in Peru and the crypto-fascist demagoguery of Peronism in Argentina. Its ranks have included both the quasi-fascistic Cause of the Fatherland (Razón de Patría—RADEPA), a group of nationalistic officers disenchanted with their superiors' record in the Chaco War, and the spokesmen, many imbued with Marxist ideas, of the tin miners. In the face of such diversity, it would have been difficult at any time before 1952 to foretell precisely what the MNR program would be upon assuming power,

but there was never much doubt as to its general tendencies and loyalties. The broad objectives stated by Paz Estenssoro a few years after the MNR's formation did not change:

> We have seen that a country with a semicolonial structure like Bolivia, in a revolutionary period, and within the present realities, must insofar as possible achieve a socialist regime which will permit the realisation of social conquests appropriate to any nationalist policy, the grand objectives of which will be economic liberation and reform of the agrarian system.

The last years of World War II were marked by the regime of Major Gualberto Villarroel. Having won the presidency by a coup through a RADEPA-MNR alliance and having taken MNR members into his cabinet, including Paz Estenssoro as finance minister, Villarroel was stigmatized by the United States and the other American republics except Argentina as pro-Axis until the MNR members were officially dropped. After the war Villarroel, who had ruled by police-state tactics, was the victim of an armed uprising which also sent Paz Estenssoro and other MNR leaders into exile. Paz Estenssoro remained the symbol of the revolution sought by increasing numbers of disaffected Bolivians under the banner of a persecuted by steadily growing MNR. When, in the election of 1951, the MNR won a surprising popular mandate approaching a majority of the vote, the more alarming to the elite as suffrage was still restricted to a small literate minority, a military junta took over to prevent MNR victory. It was only a matter of months before Siles, Juan Lechín Oquendo, of the tin miners' organization, and others led irregular forces to victory over the weakened front of traditional privilege.

The commitment to social and economic change of the MNR and the varied interests supporting it supplied sufficient momentum to attain power by 1952, but the challenge of governing the country and putting into effect a revolutionary program in the still more vital phase of the revolution was of a different order. Popular support was sufficient to sustain the new regime in some security in the years after 1952, but this support had also to be tended. The diverse groups responsible for victory had assorted, and not always compatible, requirements, and the government could ignore them only at the risk of imperiling the revolution. Moreover, like any party gaining power through insurrection, the MNR was especially sensitive to the threat of a return to the old regime. Consequently, the social and political aims of the revolution often seemed expendable at a given moment for the sake of maintaining loyalty among the rank and file. The payment of political debts proved more often than not to conflict with rational economic needs, and the revolutionary promise of democratic procedures and the rule of law could be postponed in the interest of preserving a firm grip on the levers of power. In short, the MNR government, headed in turn by Paz Estenssoro, Siles Zuazo, and Paz

Estenssoro again, was caught up in the toils of compromise at the same time as it sought to capitalize on the revolutionary slogans that expediency was beginning to tarnish.

Still more basic were the natural obstacles to a policy of social transformation. Many of the conditions that had inflamed popular indignation to the benefit of the revolutionary cause turned ironically into handicaps after the MNR assumed power. Significant economic improvements depended on a tight social fabric capable of sustaining a vigorous national effort. Yet the extreme regionalism fostered by Bolivia's topographic diversity, uneven pattern of settlement, ethnic heterogeneity, and lack of transportation and communication links stood in direct contradiction to any sense of national purpose. The approximately 70-percent illiteracy among Bolivians over 5 years of age and the existence of substantial numbers of Indians who neither spoke nor understood Spanish underlined the difficulty facing a regime in need of trained personnel as well as unified national support.

The MNR had gained a directing role in the destinies of a population in excess of 3 million, most of whom were living, as had countless generations of their ancestors, in an agrarian economy barely touched by the modern refinements of medical facilities, education, suffrage, nationwide marketing, transportation, and communications media. The country had relied since the Spanish Conquest upon mineral products for national requirements beyond the bare subsistence economy. As the mines had been depleted, provision had been made neither for improved extraction methods nor for diversification of the single-industry economy. Bolivia had few competitors for the title of poorest country in South America.

Of the 3 million plus, over half were identifiably Indian in the sense of wearing indigenous costume, speaking an Indian tongue, and living outside the market or cash economy. Most Bolivians were at least nominal Roman Catholics, but the level of religious understanding and observance was too low to assist the nationalist movement by fostering a sense of unity. Although a process of perceptible urbanization had followed the Chaco War, nearly 80 percent of Bolivians lived in rural areas, of which only small parts of the highlands were more than thinly settled. Only one city, La Paz, had more than 100,000 people and afforded a significant number of people the modernizing influence of large urban concentration. Apart from a few indigenous communal settlements in remote areas, local government was known to most Bolivians only in the form of directives from the capital and paternalistic governance by landlord or mine owner.

Finally, the small, privileged elite, which had hitherto assumed the right to rule the country and in the pursuit of this assumption had acquired administrative and managerial skills, was shattered by the revolution. True, a segment of it furnished core members of

the MNR, and many others have chosen to work under the new regime, but a considerable proportion of the elite chose self-exile. Their withdrawal, while unlamented by regime or populace, deprived the nation of an appreciable part of its small reservoir of trained, educated, and experienced personnel.

On the other hand, the success of the revolution of 1952 had certain immediate and largely automatic effects that were fundamental to the encouragement of social change. The closed society of well-to-do oligarchs was neither liquidated nor entirely impoverished, but it was removed from its commanding position in the economy and the political system. Short of counterrevolution, there remained no possibility that the elite might recover its privilege of running the country for its exclusive aggrandizement. Where this group had formerly enjoyed a monopoly of the weapons ultimately decisive in preserving its system, it found itself disarmed in a country where everyone else was armed. This shift in the possession of weapons was symbolic of the entire overturn of the traditional social order.

At the other end of the social scale, mineworkers, peasants, and Indians all felt that the new regime represented their interests. They perceived the revolution as their liberation and for the first time enjoyed the sensation of having friends at court. Although their separate interests were often at variance with each other and with the welfare of the country as a whole, the fact that they were free to pursue their interests and, hence, to participate in their own government was a requisite first step in welding the nation into an integrated whole.

Perhaps the most dramatic measure of the impact of the MNR insurrection, apprehended by Bolivians as a genuine social revolution, was a change of posture. The Indian had for generations, perhaps without interruption since he had been ruled by the Inca at Cusco, been in the habit of confronting his superiors in a stooped, deferential stance of supplication, his hands folded prayerfully in front of him. After 1952, with a rapidity that could only amaze those habituated to the notion of innate Indian inferiority, he readily adopted an upright posture and the handshake expressive of basic equality. Once again, the symptom was basic to the achievement of an integrated social organization.

One of the first acts of the MNR government in 1952 was to confer citizenship on the Indians and institute universal adult suffrage. This act fulfilled a promise of long standing without strain on the shaky economy, at the same time confirming the MNR's popular support in its view of the nature of the revolution. If, in abolishing the voting qualification of literacy in Spanish, the decree opened up new possibilities for electoral manipulation and demagoguery, it also opened the door to the acquisition of political experience by the formerly disfranchised populace. It was at once the entering wedge of

political modernization and perhaps a safeguard against counter-revolution.

The remaining items on the MNR agenda were incomparably more problematical. Because the large tin-mining concerns had so long dominated the Bolivian economy, the MNR was on record as favoring nationalization of the mines. Within the first year of the revolution, the largest companies had been expropriated, and the government had entered the mining business. The tin miners had long been organized, and they regarded themselves, correctly, as both an essential prop of the MNR government and a potent armed force in their own right. Pitted against the articulate and forceful demands of this group, the government often allowed political considerations to outweigh economic requirements in administering the mines. Labor discipline was frequently nonexistent, and production difficulties, combined with deteriorating mines and equipment and an unfavorable world tin market, kept the country's economy in precarious straits through most of the first decade of MNR rule.

The rest of the government's economic program was conceived in part as an antidote to excessive dependence on mineral extraction. Diversification of the economy implied a variety of measures including improved transportation facilities, resettlement of people and agricultural training; but above all it meant a basic restructuring of the ownership of land. The MNR had not specified the precise pattern of the agrarian reform advocated in its slogans, and in this matter it appears to have been carried along much farther and faster than it was prepared to go by the spontaneous action of the *campesinos* (peasants). The redistribution of land undertaken at the local level by nascent *campesino* organizations and by individuals newly aware of their political power forced the hand of the government. To avert outright warfare in the rural areas and to validate their assertions of sympathy for the *campesino*, the revolutionary leaders quickly formulated a decree which had the effect of recognizing the spontaneous expropriations without permitting such fragmentation of landholding as would have been wholly ruinous to agricultural production. The *campesino* became a landowner and, potentially, a participant in the national economy. Equally important in his eyes, his newly acquired citizenship was undergirded by the only economic base that could be meaningful to him, his own plot of land. The initial and predictable losses in output were severe but fortunately temporary and, in the long run, of little importance when weighed against the complete reorganization of rural Bolivia that had taken place.

Further plans, particularly concerning education, health and basic economic and social services, were balked or delayed by the severity of the country's economic crisis. Official intentions aimed always at further integration of society and modernization of the political and

economic system, but conflicting claims on limited resources and, reportedly, not infrequent instances of opportunism by strategically placed persons have made the record of accomplishment uneven.

The government's 10-year plan, prepared in 1961, is addressed to overcoming existing deficiencies in the socioeconomic area. Ambitious and indeed creditable in its goals, though perhaps overoptimistic about its ability to realize them, it is at least an indication of the intent to renounce stopgap measures and to adopt a consistent policy.

Political activity, as distinct from proclaimed goals, still flows in accustomed channels of personal influence, and it is difficult to find genuine improvement in the style of political life. The fundamental changes that have been wrought in the organization of society and in the distribution of political power exerted influence on the manner in which public issues are resolved, sometimes in salutary fashion, but also in the direction of divisiveness. The revolutionary party itself has suffered one group defection which split off to the right, and also cracks in its internal structure (never in fact monolithic), which divide it into discernible sectors of right, center and left. The *campesino* groups, though generally loyal to their benefactors, the party, have in some localities developed strong chieftains who have at best used them as self-interested pressure groups and at worst made themselves virtual warlords with the capability of actually defying the government. The miners, for their part, are often even more vocal in their opposition to party plans, particularly in economic matters. Nevertheless, withstanding these divisive trends, the party has demonstrated its ability to hold power for over 10 years, a state of stability not seen in Bolivia since early in this century.

Despite the firm entrenchment of the revolutionary party and its commitment to the modernization of society, the effort might well have foundered on the sheer inadequacy of resources, material and human. Bankruptcy was averted by the establishment of an alliance of an unusual kind. The United States, attempting to forestall a condition of chaos in which the outcome might have been unfavorable to its strategic interests, offered assistance on a continuing basis which has helped to avert economic collapse. Without imposing political conditions that would have humiliated the Bolivian Government, the United States aid program has, nevertheless, increased its insistence on sound economic policies designed to maximize the benefits of its grants, loans and technical assistance.

Such efforts have sometimes met with less than full success, but the prevailing arrangement has kept the country's economy afloat through a trying period. There appears to be hope that the review of Bolivia's plans by the agencies of the Alliance for Progress and the continuing attention of the international banking institutions will help create conditions of economic stability and progress.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SETTING

The most consistent theme in Bolivian history can be found in the life of the majority of inhabitants, the indigenous population. The Indians have occupied substantially the same role in the relationship between governors and governed for at least five centuries. Whether occupied with the filling of Inca granaries or with the supplying of mineral wealth to the colonial or national exchequer, the pattern of exploitation was essentially constant. And, of the other side of the coin, the record of Inca paternalism in safeguarding the economic welfare of subjects is reduplicated to some extent in the Spanish missionary concern for welfare of potential communicants. Whatever the source of authority, the Indian's gaze has been directed inward toward his own traditional community and the serious business of survival.

The recorded history of the territory has been made, of course, by more active agents, and these have been more varied. The functions of the Spanish colonial representatives resembled in many ways the functions of Inca imperial agents, and were perhaps not too different from those more recently performed by representatives of the central government of the Republic or by the agents of mining concerns. These assorted instruments of central authority did, however, represent different political and social systems, embodying the fairly obvious distinctions that underlie the division of Bolivian history into periods.

In many ways, the human elements in Bolivian history are overshadowed by purely physical factors in the environment. Certainly no important aspect of that history has been unaffected by the country's topographic and climatic extremes, by the natural barriers to transportation and communication, by the patterns of soil, vegetation and mineral resources. At the first level of significance, such factors have been important among the determinants of settlement, land use and ethnic diversity. At another level, they have constituted a most difficult set of handicaps to the process of nation-building. Since the modern state depends by its nature on social and political integration and on the infusion of modern technology into economic processes, Bolivia's physical inheritance has presented it with uncommon disadvantages, hampering the application of precisely those essential

factors in modernization and economic development. This may help to explain why Bolivia, of all the Latin American countries, was catapulted into a social revolution at mid-century, why gradualism gave way to social convulsion in the face of an unpromising course of evolution. It certainly explains many of the difficulties that have stood between the revolutionary regime and realization of its aims.

PREHISTORY

In the period ending with Francisco Pizarro's invasion and conquest of the Inca empire in 1532, the highland territory now within the boundaries of Bolivia was part of the greater cultural and political complex of Andean South America. The greater part of this territory fell, late in the period, under Inca sway; but, as in much of the rest of the region, the influences of a series of pre-Inca cultures were only partially obliterated by Inca rule.

The most impressive single evidence of pre-Inca development in Bolivia consists of the remains of Tiahuanaco culture. The ruined site located just south of Lake Titicaca, from which the culture takes its name, is one probable center of this cultural flowering and is associated by some observers with the forebears of the Aymara-speaking Indians. Its principal remnants in stonework and pottery have been compared in architectural achievement and technological skill with Etruscan art. The stonework especially testifies to a high degree of skill attained in cutting, dressing, fitting and decoration. In pre-Inca times, the culture called Tiahuanaco was widespread in the Altiplano and the southern half of Peru (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Although the advent of Inca domination over the whole region marked a break with the past, it is all prehistoric in the sense that there were no written records before the arrival of the Spanish. Much light has been shed on the prehistoric epoch by chronicles of the Spanish invaders, but they were written at a particular time and from the particular standpoint of the alien invader. Hence, their validity is questionable, especially as they project their conjectures into the past, and most of the little we know of Inca and pre-Inca culture emanates from archaeological findings.

Archaeological evidence combines with the oral tradition of conquered Indians to date the Inca period as one of relatively short duration. In and around Cuzco in present-day Peru, where the Inca system arose, it goes back at least as far as A.D. 1300, although the few radiocarbon dates available suggest something nearer A.D. 1000. Most authorities agree in placing the expansion of Inca rule in the century after about 1440. The process of conquest was of course gradual, but some time before Pizarro arrived, Inca rule had been

extended to take in most of Andean and coastal Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, northern Chile and parts of adjacent regions.

This century or so of dominion by the Quechua-speaking Incas created a cultural, political and economic overlay resting on the varying local substrata. Little is known of the precise nature of the local societies brought under Inca sway, and perhaps least of all of the local groups within present-day Bolivian boundaries. The region of Beni, in the eastern plains, has a distinctive history in that it was never conquered either by the Incas or the Spanish. It was finally brought into the Spanish colonial system by the peaceful penetration of Jesuit missionaries, all military efforts having failed in the face of inhospitable terrain and inhabitants. In general, in all the territory of lowland Bolivia, the societies encountered by the Spanish during the colonial period revealed a traditional character without Inca features.

Linguistically and politically diverse, these Indian groups of the eastern two-thirds of Bolivia preserved their assorted ways of life well into modern times in relatively unchanging social patterns. The highland areas, on the other hand, constituted a most important segment of the Inca domain, and the native ways of the pre-Inca groups had been partially obliterated by the time of the arrival of Europeans.

The establishment of Inca hegemony had far-reaching consequences on the Altiplano. The Inca system exercised absolute autocracy through a highly effective decentralization that took into account and even fostered local customs of social and political behavior. Local chiefs usually retained a great measure of their former powers and, indeed, were reinforced in them by the imperial authority so long as the not unreasonable demands of the central power for goods and services were met. Inca rule thus combined absolute authority in matters fundamental to its own preservation and to the well-being of the ruling group with a significant measure of local autonomy and impartial adjustment to local practices where nothing vital was at stake. Nearly a hundred years of such relatively benevolent subjection did little to prepare the peoples of highland Bolivia to resist what turned out to be a harsher alien domination.

Since the local social and economic patterns of the Inca as well as the pre-Inca period are even more obscure than the centralizing features of the Inca system, the most that can be said with certainty is that a communal tradition of landholding and agrarian production runs through all of Andean prehistory. The communal structure, the *ayllu*, predated Inca rule and remained a fixture in the centrally administered Inca system of production. Indeed, communal ownership and economic operation survived the Spanish colonial period.

The attributes of the central Inca administration remain, however,

both impressive and important for developments that followed the empire's fall. When the Inca invaders moved into a new territory, as they did in the Bolivian Altiplano around 1450, they of course crushed local resistance and then proceeded to enlist the local leaders as allies and imperial representatives. That the ruling hand was not always sure is attested by revolts, such as the one staged by Aymara tribes near Lake Titicaca in the 1470's. The goal was nevertheless always pacification, and the means employed, involving all the ruthlessness of barbaric warfare, were usually geared to that minimum of force required to establish imperial dominance.

The stage that followed pacification was a skillful venture in public administration. In the Altiplano this occurred during the latter half of the fifteenth century. By 1493 the empire extended into Chile, the Maule River marking its southern boundary, and Huayna Capac, last ruler of an undivided domain, was able to devote himself largely to administrative consolidation. This meant the introduction of the tripartite division of cultivation and production whereby the central authority extracted the tribute needed both for its own support and for an elaborate scheme of centrally administered social welfare, part of the *quid pro quo* for accepting Inca hegemony, which insured Inca subjects against crop failures and other natural calamities. Inca exactions were not confied to produce but also included military service and a kind of labor draft. This was not an Inca innovation, however; only the employment of it on an imperial scale was new.

Central regulation also entailed efforts to introduce the Quechua language as lingua franca, as well as both the ritual and tributary features of the official religion. When imperial needs so dictated, large population movements might be ordered either as a means of removing dissident groups or as a colonization device. This habit is often invoked to account for the pockets of Quechua-speakers on the Bolivian Altiplano (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The efficiency and extent of the Inca administration were remarkable by any standards of the time and made a deep impression on the Spanish invaders. Yet the elements of prehistory most relevant to the unfolding of recorded Bolivian history are the less striking continuities which emerged before the Inca expansion and survived Spanish rule. The communal social and economic patterns and the localized structure of political power have persisted and continue to resist the centralizing efforts of the modern revolutionary regime. The Indian's rediscovery of dignity and his growing awareness of his place in an emerging social order may signalize a possibility of transcending the ancient molds; in any case, the relevance to contemporary Bolivian problems is self-evident.

THE SPANISH CONQUEST AND COLONIAL RULE

The Structure of Spanish Rule

The year 1492 marked not only the discovery by Columbus of the New World but also, and much more significant to Spain at the time, the conquest of Granada which terminated Moorish power in the Iberian Peninsula. During the ensuing century, Spain established its rule in the New World from Florida and New Mexico in the north to Rio de la Plata and Chile in the south. It was as if the expulsion of the Moors, the culmination of seven centuries of strife, had released a new wave of energy by its momentum, energy which sufficed to carry the Spanish flag to a whole new continent.

The record of discovery and conquest is well known; less well known is the enormous fund of state and human effort required to place the conquered territories under a manageable administration and to begin the process of settlement. Spain was enriched, to be sure, by the mineral wealth of its colonies; Aztec and Inca plunder were succeeded by the silver of Potosí and agricultural produce from Rio de la Plata and Yucatán, as well as by the profits of a possibly short-sighted trade monopoly. On the other hand, the mother country was partly depopulated by the effort and, whereas much of the riches accrued to individuals, the state bore a heavy burden as underwriter of expensive expeditions and a far-flung colonial government.

By the time what is now Bolivia enters history, Spain was well along in the process of devising a political and economic framework for the control and management of the great areas which discovery and conquest were bringing to the Crown. Notwithstanding the numerous local differences from one Spanish colony to another, Spain attempted to weave a single imperial fabric for its entire New World dominion. The Council of the Indies, formally established in 1524, oversaw the whole enterprise on behalf of the Crown; laws were devised for the entire territory; and policies were adopted for universal colonial application.

To put the relationship in its most precise terms, Spanish America was a possession of the Crown of Castile, deriving from the legacy of Queen Isabella. The Spanish monarch made its laws, acting through the Council of the Indies. That body had supreme legislative, judicial and administrative authority in the Indies, while serving also as an advisory body in connection with all civil and ecclesiastical appointments. The Council also supervised the Casa de Contratación which had been established at Seville in 1503 to control commerce with the New World. The legislative output of the Council forms the basis of the monumental codification of 1680, the Recopilación de Leyes, which contains most of the story of official policy for the period. Only in the

Bourbon period, during the eighteenth century, did the Council begin to lose its authority to other institutions.

The King's personal representative in Spanish America was the viceroy. When the Viceroyalty of Peru was designated in 1542, its jurisdiction began with the Isthmus and included all of Spanish South America except Venezuela, which belonged to the Viceroyalty of New Spain with its seat in Mexico City. Such a vast territory inevitably invited division, but Alto Perú, or Charcas, as the present-day Bolivia was variously known, remained a part of Peru until it was allotted to a new Viceroyalty of La Plata (Buenos Aires), created in 1776. The viceroy of Peru was the highest ranking personage in Spanish America, since appointment to this post counted as a promotion for successful viceroys of New Spain.

The viceroy's duties were numerous, his authority great, for he was the effective ruler of a substantial domain. He was aided by his council (*audiencia*), which was simultaneously the highest court of appeal in the jurisdiction and, in the absence of a viceroy, also a governing body.

An *audiencia's* territory did not necessarily coincide with that of a viceroy, for lesser *audiencias* were also attached to executives of lower rank, presidents and captains general, and in some cases, became almost independent of the viceroyalty to which they belonged. Apart from the restraining influence of the *audiencia*, the actions of a viceroy—and those of lesser officials too—were checked mainly by the institution of *residencia*, an inquiry of variable duration into the official's conduct in office.

Smaller administrative units included the *gobierno* and *corregimiento*, but these were superseded late in the eighteenth century by the intendant system, the officials of which were vested with far-reaching powers and directly responsible to the Crown. Municipalities also enjoyed a distinctive governmental institution, imported like the others from Spain; but the town council (*cabildo*) seldom exercised the independent self-governing function for which it was designed and, except for such importunate towns as Potosí, the municipalities were frequently dominated by royal officials.

Although the colonial enterprise is remembered more for the strenuous feats of the *conquistadores* and for their impressive material consequences than for moral content, the intellectual problems posed for Spain by its commitment to justice are crucial to any understanding of Spanish-American history in its fuller dimensions. The association of temporal and ecclesiastical authority was exceptionally close in the Spanish empire. Several papal bulls had, by the time the conquest was well begun, conferred on the Crown an exclusive jurisdiction over the Indies in the religious sphere. The missionaries who accompanied the expeditions of the *conquistadores* were

agents of the Crown as well as of the Church. The responsibilities of the Crown for bringing Christianity to the Indians were clear and acknowledged. The spreading of the faith was an unmistakable motive in the establishment of the empire in Spanish America.

Both civic and ecclesiastical representatives were serving the Crown, but they were moved by varying considerations in deciding what the monarch's policy should be in his new domains. Moreover, the split was not simply between civic and ecclesiastical personnel but rather divided each group. In the same fashion, the Crown itself was subject to the conflicting considerations, for the responsibilities of serving the interests of state and the interests of justice were equally compelling.

The moral issue turned on the conquerors' treatment of the Indians and expressed itself in questions about the right of Spain to rule, the possibility of peaceful colonization and transmission of the faith, the nature of the Indian and the circumstances under which a just war might be waged against Indians. A major question was the validity of the *encomienda* system, whereby rights over Indian labor and tribute were granted to individual colonists, and the *mita*, a compulsory labor system used in working the mines. In general, the conquerors themselves took a harder line than did the Crown or Church in all these matters, for the ease with which they could extract the material gain for which they had risked their lives depended largely on the continued exploitation of Indian labor and possessions. On the other hand, the theory in favor of the more compassionate alternative was vigorously argued by such men as Bartolomé de las Casas. In the learned disputations seriously waged for the purpose of guiding the King, the humane theory tended to prevail, a fact reflected in the laws and official policy directives. The remarkable feature, which has been obscured by the legend of unrelieved Spanish brutality and exploitation, is the serious intent with which the debate was pursued and the genuine moral concern animating the Crown's policies.

The more humane New Laws of 1542, largely the result of Las Casas' protestations, provoked the debate of the century over colonial policy. The colonists contended that the empire depended on the preservation of the *encomienda* and exactions of tribute and labor from the Indians, while Las Casas and his allies argued vehemently that peaceable settlement and conversion of the Indians were required by the dictates of justice.

The problem was never solved finally during Spanish rule. For the most part exploitation prevailed, notably in the mines of Alto Perú. But on occasion, as in the Jesuit missions of the eastern lowlands, experience lent credibility to Las Casas' arguments. Certainly the worst of the colonial practices were mitigated in time by the insistent voices of Spanish conscience.

The Pizarros and Peru

Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro, partners in the discovery and conquest of the Inca empire and eventually enemies in the management of their victory, were both long-time residents of Panama when they set out on their adventure to the south in 1524. The Isthmus had long been aware of stories of untold riches in South America, and some unsuccessful efforts had already been made to uncover them. During 8 years the two adventurers made three voyages, following the coastline southward in quest of the unknown but reputedly wealthy empire and finally gaining a foothold in northern Peru in 1532. The account of their setbacks, hardships and intrepidity makes an almost incredible narrative of bravery and persistence in the face of obstacles of all kinds and illustrates the combination of lust for material gain and sheer impulse to adventure which was at the root of so much of the *conquistadores*' achievements.

The Inca domain fell with extraordinary ease, owing in part to a civil war preceding Pizarro's arrival and in part to the overly hierarchical organization of central authority which made capture of the person of the Inca, or emperor, tantamount to total victory. There was, then, little need for expeditions to the far ends of the empire, and none of the stirring events of the conquest took place in Kollasuyu, the northern Altiplano region, but revolts and resistance still awaited the Spanish.

Resentment had already arisen between Pizarro and Almagro when the latter concluded that his associate had dealt unfairly with him on a trip to Spain to secure royal backing for the Peruvian conquest. After the victory Pizarro built his capital at Lima and was granted authority over a territory called New Castile, Almagro receiving a similar award under the name of New Toledo which was to extend southward from the vaguely defined southern limit of Pizarro's domain.

In 1535, before the boundary between these territorial grants was established, Almagro left on an expedition to Chile, following the Inca military road through Kollasuyu and past the silver-laden mountains that were to become so important in a few years. A member of this party, Juan de Saavedra, established the first colonial settlement at Paria, near the present city of Oruro. Unsuccessful in Chile, Almagro returned (in 1537) in time to put down a revolt led by Manco Capac, whom Pizarro had intended as puppet Inca, and seized Cusco (Peru), which he regarded as being within his grant. This act brought about armed conflict with Pizarro, which, but for its relatively short duration and unequivocal outcome, could have made a shambles of the nascent keystone of the Spanish empire. As it turned out, the war soon ended with the defeat and execution of Almagro early in 1538.

The war concluded, Francisco Pizarro busied himself with the restoration of stability. His brother Hernando was dispatched to Kollasuyu to quell disturbances in that hitherto docile corner of the empire, but was soon sent to Spain. Interest in the region grew, and in 1539 Pedro Anzures founded a city he name La Plata, which was to become the seat of government of the whole district of Charcas, as a center for maintaining the order that had been re-established. (This city, called Charcas as often as it was called La Plata, was later named Chuquisaca, and after independence it became Sucre.) Gonzalo, another brother of Francisco Pizarro, was granted lands and the governorship of Charcas, but later was called to Lima.

In 1541, Francisco was assassinated by Almagrists, and civil war again broke out. Charcas declared for the King, and his representative, Vaca de Castro, and Governor Pedro Anzures led a military contingent to Cuzco which was instrumental in defeating the younger Almagro. Gonzalo, who had boisterously proclaimed his right to succeed Francisco as governor in Lima, was neatly handled by Vaca de Castro and sent off to his *encomienda* in Charcas to enjoy his princely revenues.

After the New Laws were promulgated in 1542 with the intent of abolishing the *mita* and at least limiting the *encomienda*, Nuñez de Vela was sent out from Spain with express orders to apply the New Laws in Peru. No mission could have been less welcome, and the opposition gathered around Gonzalo Pizarro who left Charcas for Lima. Under some intimidation, the *audiencia* there invited Gonzalo to head the government and lead the resistance against Nuñez and the Crown.

Fighting spread the length of the Viceroyalty. La Plata, loyal to the King, was taken and retaken several times, suffering much damage in the process. Only in 1548 did the Crown succeed in reasserting its power through the skillful efforts of its new representative, Pedro de la Gasca. Gonzalo was beheaded after his army had melted away in the face of Gasca's advance at the head of the greatest military force yet assembled in Peru.

Gasca's administration of the Viceroyalty concluded the stormy era of conquest. He reformed the government, moderated the burdens of taxation and forced labor in behalf of the Indians (without imposing the New Laws strictly or too zealously), and celebrated the inauguration of peace and stability by founding the city of La Paz southeast of Lake Titicaca.

With the advent of relatively stable colonial government in Lima, capital of the viceroyalty, developments in Charcas began to follow a distinctive course. Apart from the unsuccessful but bloody revolt led by Francisco Hernández Girón in 1553 and the severe consequences for the Indians of Spanish eagerness for quick profit, activity

in Charcas tended to be mainly constructive. Within slightly more than half a century, all of the major urban centers of modern Bolivia had been founded. By 1575, in addition to La Plata, La Paz, and Potosí—which arose at the foot of the mountain of silver—the towns of Cochabamba, Tarija, and Santa Cruz had been founded (under different names and Santa Cruz on a different site from the one it presently occupies). Oruro dates from 1601.

The Audiencia of Charcas, necessitated by remoteness from Lima and by both the wealth and the lawlessness of the mining communities, was decreed in 1559 and began to function in La Plata 2 years later. Its jurisdiction was first defined as covering a radius of 100 leagues about La Plata, but this was soon extended to Santa Cruz and to Tucumán, Paraguay, and Rio de la Plata—all in territory outside modern Bolivia. Cuzco and its environs in southern Peru also belonged to Charcas until 1568 when the royal Audiencia of Lima absorbed it.

Officially, the executive functions of the *audiencia* were divided; the one at Charcas had a president of its own, but the functions of governor and captain-general were vested in the viceroy at Lima. Most important decisions were thereby reserved to the viceroy, leaving the *audiencia* empowered to deal only with routine matters, particularly when, as in the case of Francisco de Toledo, the viceroy was disposed to assert his authority. This situation led to a competitive attitude and, therewith, to Charcas' reputation for assertiveness, a condition reinforced by the economic importance of the province.

From 1661 to 1671 Buenos Aires had its own presidency, to which were attached the provinces of Tucumán and Paraguay, but at that time Charcas was better able to maintain the institution in proper style and the provinces were restored. A century later, however, after the Bourbons had succeeded the Hapsburgs in Spain, a viceroyalty was created in a more highly developed Buenos Aires. Charcas was then attached to the new jurisdiction, squeezing Peru into the approximate boundaries of the modern nation.

Location accorded Alto Perú another distinctive function in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Spanish, at home and on both sides of the South American continent, were concerned about Portuguese rivalry and the danger that Portugal might extend its territory in the New World. This, along with unassuaged appetite for new sources of wealth, prompted concerted efforts to penetrate and explore the lowland to the east of the Altiplano. Both Buenos Aires and Alto Perú participated in such ventures, and Charcas thus became involved with the center of the continent. Although success of any kind was limited, the two sides of the continent were linked by expeditions setting out from both the east coast and Alto Perú. It was one such expedition, proceeding from the south under Ñuflo de

Chávez, that founded Santa Cruz about 1560 at a site 180 miles east of the present location to which it was moved in 1595. The Portuguese were forestalled, but the rivalry arising between the two groups of Spaniards prefigured subsequent hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia over this lowland territory.

The great distinction of Alto Perú remained, however, the seemingly inexhaustible mineral wealth pouring from its mountains. The glitter of silver sufficed to frustrate all efforts at bettering the conditions of the Indians and to divert most of the attention that the Spaniards might otherwise have devoted to agriculture. The embodiment of the social and economic order based on silver was Potosí.

Potosí

The event of greatest import and most far-reaching consequences for the future of Alto Perú occurred early in the period of Spanish rule. Scarcely more than a decade after Pizarro's initial victory over the Inca, the richest silver deposits ever known were discovered in the place that was rapidly to become famous throughout the world as Potosí. This city of silver had overwhelming importance as a determinant of the country's future development.

Potosí in the period after the silver discovery has been described as a "boom town," and indeed the available evidence suggests something very like the temporarily prosperous, often rough and brawling atmosphere of mining towns in the North American West of the nineteenth century. The principal difference lay in the relatively prolonged productivity of the Potosí mines, attributable in part to the richness of the veins and in part to the primitive extractive technology which served to delay exhaustion of the mines.

Another difference was that Potosí held a unique position, rather than being merely one of several silver-producing towns, by reason of its immense riches and the demand for its wealth. The mine operators therefore enjoyed a strong bargaining position in relations with the Crown and its local agents and were able to secure special consideration corresponding to the official designation of the Imperial City of Potosí (Villa Imperial de Postosí). A petition of the times reveals the miners' desire to reduce the royal share from a fifth of silver output to a tenth, to be exempted from the sales tax (*alcabala*), to be assured of ample supplies of merchandise for the vigorous municipal market and of the mercury from Huancavelica in Peru so necessary to silver extraction, and to protect their labor force against conscription and other diversions. Here as elsewhere, the Crown was skillful in substituting fine words for costly performance, but it did accede to some of the demands, thereby demonstrating its recognition of Potosí's importance.

Population statistics afforded another measure of the city's importance. Some 25 years after the mountain of silver (the Cerro Rico) began to be worked, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo ordered a census which registered 120,000 inhabitants in Potosí. A century after the silver boom began the population was reported to total 160,000, much the largest urban concentration on the continent. Such figures are perhaps no more reliable than the widely varying estimates of silver production—one treasurer of Potosí calculated that between 1556 and 1783 miners had derived 820,513,893 pesos and the Crown 151,722,647 pesos worth of silver from the Potosí mines—but all available figures can be discounted heavily and still effectively demonstrate the city's importance.

The fame of Potosí spread far and rapidly. The name was placed by Cervantes in the mouth of Don Quixote and became current in English as a symbol of riches. The city was located on the Jesuit Father Ricci's Chinese map of the world toward the end of the sixteenth century, and appeared on European maps as Spain's enemies learned of the important source of revenue.

The internal life of Potosí during the approximately two centuries of mining prosperity was in keeping with the "boom town" image. Continued prosperity did bring certain amenities, handsome dwellings and palatial official buildings as well as public works, which survived the city's fall from prominence, but it never contributed to the establishment of a permanent economic foundation capable of sustaining a populous urban concentration beyond the demise of the silver economy. The recklessness which typifies even a prolonged mining boom doubtless contributed to the record of almost uninterrupted intrigue and revolt. With so much at stake, the more or less permanent tension between Spanish-born and American-born residents and between entrepreneurs and agents of the Crown were here exacerbated, and occasions for conflict and conspiracy were never lacking.

Potosí, crucible of the New World's silver, became such in human terms as well. Spaniards flocked to the mines, and Indians either found their way there in the hope of enrichment or were driven there as labor. Negroes were imported for work in the mines, and foreigners abounded—to the discomfiture of both officialdom and the Inquisition, wary respectively of unrest and heresy. Ethnic mixing was prevalent, and many an Indian laid claim to mestizo status as a means of avoiding compulsory mine labor.

The impersonal requirements of silver production overrode all considerations of human welfare and healthy community development. The toll in Indian lives was overwhelming and brought Potosí squarely into the controversy over the nature of the Indian. A disciple of Las Casas, defender of the Indian and foe of both *encomienda*

and *mita*, gave the Council of the Indies a report vehemently denouncing Potosí's exploitation of Indians, but the mines still needed workers and Peru as well as Spain needed silver. Official enforcement of the *mita* system of forced labor prevailed except for brief interludes, and no amount of smuggling by the laborers, of which there was an incalculable amount, could make Potosí attractive to the Indians.

Colorful as the city's history is from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, greater contemporary importance attached to the less obvious implications of the silver boom. Silver production, described as the "jugular vein" of the Viceroyalty of Peru, became a technological problem of major import as soon as the first high-content ores had been exhausted. Hydraulic power then took on increased importance in the process of refinement, and by 1621 several wealthy mine operators had accomplished what a modern engineer has called "a remarkable feat of engineering." A system of artificial lakes was created with a storage capacity of several million tons of water, thus regularizing the supply for the refineries.

Nearly as much attention was given to the development of improved refining techniques as to the discovery of new veins. Before the end of the eighteenth century an academy of metallurgy had been founded in Potosí. Nevertheless, foreign technicians of the same period remarked upon the absence of technical facilities and sophistication, which, had they been available, might have combatted the inordinate waste that hastened the city's economic collapse. The retarded state of mining technology prefigured the conditions prevailing much later in a national economy built not on silver but on tin.

Alto Perú and the Road to Independence

By the end of the sixteenth century the pattern was established for Alto Perú that was to prevail with only moderate change through the remaining two centuries of the Spanish-American empire. The economy was definitely built on the extraction of silver. The population was divided into strata which permitted only slight mobility, the Spanish-born *peninsulares* reserving for themselves the most attractive positions with the bulk of the population consigned to permanent exploitation in the mines. The Audiencia of Charcas had by that time made its relative autonomy a tradition within the viceroyalty of Lima, and the Roman Catholic Chuch was firmly ensconced as sole spiritual guardian of Spaniard and Indian alike. The two centuries were not, however, rich in events. Only the end of the period began to manifest interesting new tendencies.

The seventeenth century was still a period of turbulence in Charcas. The mining boom was still strong, and a stable mode of life crystallized slowly. Gradually the Audiencia of Charcas evolved that majestic disregard of both external authority and external affairs which

brought it into outright conflict with the viceroyalty, and which finally produced in it a state of parochialism at once self-isolating and self-defeating. The arrogance of this final stage, when members refused even to kneel during religious observances, coincided with the greatest power that the body ever held.

It was near the end of the eighteenth century, in 1780–83, when the revolt of Tupac Amaru mobilized practically all the Indians of the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes in an effort to expel the Spanish and restore the Inca empire. The Audiencia of Charcas, by rallying the Spanish inhabitants, was instrumental in putting down the revolt, during which La Paz was besieged for more than a hundred days by some 40,000 Indians. The insurgents were not easily overcome, and even when Tupac Amaru was captured through treachery among his own followers and executed, the revolt continued for 2 years. Its final suppression was accompanied by terrible reprisals. Among its effects, it kept alive the sense of Indian identity in the face of continued subjugation. Also, its occurrence so late in the colonial period and the effort it cost the Spanish to quell it undoubtedly reinforced strongly their conviction that rigid suppression of the Indians and their exclusion from society was a continuing necessity.

The *audiencia's* zenith of majesty and power was very quickly overtaken by other events. In 1778 Charcas was transferred to the jurisdiction of the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, while new *audiencias* were set up at Buenos Aires and Cuzco which cut into the sphere of influence of Charcas. Still more important, in 1782 the intendancy system was instituted as a step in the process of executive centralization in the colonies designed to improve the control mechanism of the mother country. Eight intendancies were established in the Charcas jurisdiction, each intendant being directly responsible to the viceroy. This bypassed the *audiencia*, making it more of a court of appeal than a governing body, and, at the same time, reinforced the judges' concern with details of ceremony. By concentrating on the fine points of their status, the members of the *audiencia* lost sight of important issues and became unconscious tools of the minority of radicals desirous of separation from Spain.

Equally important in its way was the decline in prosperity that accompanied the falling off of mineral wealth. Technology had not kept up with the exhaustion of high-grade ores and was unequal to the task of refining ores of lower silver content that had once been disdainfully cast aside. And, since no other economic base had arisen to take up the slack, the Indians continued to be driven to extract mineral wealth despite the many attempts to lighten their burden—a circumstance closely related to the ferocity which characterized the Tupac Amaru revolt.

A final trend that characterized the last period of colonial rule manifested itself in the intellectual realm. Chuquisaca (as La Plata was by this time called) was not only the seat of the *audiencia*, it was also a university town. The University of San Francisco Xavier had been founded there by the Jesuits early in the 17th century. After that order was expelled in 1767, the university became subject to the often conflicting influences of the archbishop (who was also chancellor of the institution), the president of the *audiencia*, and the internal university organization. One result, in any case, was to shift emphasis from theology to law, in which connection the Real Academia Carolina was founded in 1776 to serve as a final internship for advanced law students.

Partly because of its university life, which drew students from outside Alto Perú as well, Chuquisaca contested Bogotá's claim to the title, "the Athens of America." Its intellectual life, and especially the student discussions current by this time, reflected the impact of the Enlightenment on Spanish America. The Inquisition had not kept the writings of Machiavelli, Franklin, Thomas Paine and Rousseau out of Spanish America, and the ideas of these men were often discussed. The learned speculators of Chuquisaca were also capable of finding ideas in Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez that could be molded to their predilection for independence. Such ideas, especially pronounced among the so-called generation of 1809, the fomenters of the initial break with royal authority, had a profound impact when the Napoleonic invasion of Spain complicated the hitherto simple question of legitimacy. Despite its frequently independent course, Charcas was fundamentally loyal to the Crown (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Yet, when it became difficult to determine just where the Crown resided or just who was wearing it, the radical lawyers understood how to exploit the confusion to turn Alto Perú in the direction of independence. By strengthening the determination of the president and archbishop to pursue what they regarded as a legitimist course, the partisans of independence drove a wedge between those leaders and the *audiencia* and raised the curtain on the first act of defiance in the Spanish-American struggle for independence.

INDEPENDENT BOLIVIA

Liberation

A perplexing mixture of loyalties and justifications therefore kept Alto Perú in a condition of turmoil from 1809 to 1825. The former year marked the first overt step taken toward Spanish-American independence—the deposition of Ramón García León de Pizarro, president of the *audiencia*, by the people of Chuquisaca. The later year is remembered for the entry of Marshal Sucre into Alto Perú to com-

plete the victory over the last vestige of royalist force. The intervening years saw a succession of military campaigns, many of a guerrilla type, waged over the territory that was to become Bolivia. Despite the initiative of Charcas in the independence struggle and despite the leading role that intellectuals of Alto Perú had played in preparing Spanish-American minds for independence, the campaigns within the country were in no sense decisive factors in the eventual liberation.

The critical event leading to the independence struggle took place in Europe when the Iberian Peninsula was invaded in 1807 and 1808 by Napoleonic forces. The overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty divided local sentiment in Charcas into three main camps: those loyal to the deposed dynasty, those loyal to Spain irrespective of royal incumbency, and those desirous of pursuing an independent course in the Spanish American territories. Charcas had already made significant contributions to the third school of thought through the intellectual ferment of its academies and through its relatively iconoclastic behavior in the face of royal authority for three centuries.

Like all Spanish America, Charcas was rent by the standing quarrel between Spanish-born *peninsulares* and American-born *criollos*, the latter resentful of the privileges reserved to the former and open to radical ideas that promised them an improved position. At the same time, among those loyal to Spanish rule were conservatives, mostly prepared to wait for the question of legitimacy to resolve itself in Spain, and liberals, eager to welcome the reforms of colonial rule and practice that the Bonapartist victory seemed to promise. And through it all ran a thread of intrigue, a highly conscious pursuit of self-interest by many of Bolivia's future leaders which led them to change sides with bewildering agility.

The situation grew particularly complicated in 1808 when José Manuel de Goyeneche, a Peruvian general representing the junta of Seville—an organ of popular Spanish support for the Bourbon Ferdinand VII against the Napoleonic forces—arrived in Chuquisaca. He came to press the claims simultaneously of Ferdinand and his sister Carlota, then governing Brazil with her husband the Prince Regent John of Portugal and anxious to extend her position into Spanish America. Goyeneche sowed confusion in the Audiencia of Charcas and compromised the president, Pizarro. When Pizarro attempted to arrest the judges of the *audiencia* for their resistance to Goyeneche and their general intransigence, the people of Chuquisaca rose against the president, arrested him, forced the archbishop to flee for safety, and established their own government under the recalcitrant *audiencia*. This move in the direction of independence (although based on proclaimed loyalty to the deposed Ferdinand) immortalized May 25,

1809, in Bolivian history and set in motion a contagion of similar attempts.

La Paz was the next city to fall to the forces of independence, and, indeed, went further than had Chuquisaca in demanding independence from Spain. This happened in July, and by November Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí had followed suit. Although the movement received sharp setbacks at the hands of royalist forces sent to La Paz under Goyeneche by the Viceroy of Peru and to Chuquisaca under General Nieto by Viceroy Liniers of Río de La Plata, Alto Perú was never again wholly subdued.

In Spain, the defeat of Napoleon brought Ferdinand back to his throne in 1814. The Spanish Cortes was favorably disposed toward the interests of the overseas Spaniards and, during a constitutional interlude in 1821, passed measures designed to conciliate them. But Ferdinand set aside the liberal constitution of 1812 and, in 1823, re-established his absolutist regime. In Alto Perú he enjoyed the unquestioning loyalty of General Pedro de Olañeta, an unswerving monarchist who resisted appeals by independence forces and liberalizing Spaniards with equal vehemence. As commander of the absolutist forces, Olañeta was the paramount force in Alto Perú for the last years of the Fifteen Years' War. He finally found himself in the curious position of trying to found an independent kingdom in that territory for the sake of preserving it intact for Ferdinand. It was Olañeta's pocket of royalist resistance that confronted Bolívar and Sucre in 1825 after the rest of Spanish America had been liberated.

The chronicle of the war in Alto Perú is less than inspiring. Apart from the hardship inflicted on the countryside by marauding troops and on the cities as they changed hands repeatedly, economic life and social organization were disrupted. The population probably numbered fewer than 1 million by this time. Moreover, the political morale of the country, always noted for its autonomous inclinations, was destroyed in large measure by the personal ambitions and vacillations that have clouded the patriotic image since fostered by Bolivian historians. Although Marshal Antonio José de Sucre was a trusting man, impressed by the patriotism of the partisans of independence in Alto Perú, he had a premonition of what awaited him when Bolívar appointed him to lead an army in pursuit of Olañeta. Not wishing to assume the task, he foresaw "that we shall get ourselves into a maze of trickery."

After a bloodless campaign in which the remaining Spanish forces gradually melted away, and after Olañeta had been killed, Sucre witnessed the convocation of the General Assembly of Alto Perú in Chuquisaca on July 10, 1825. In accordance with the Marshal's decree of the preceding February, the delegates to the assembly were

chosen by the five provinces—La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Potosí and Santa Cruz—to decide on the future political status of the country. Although Bolívar was cool to Sucre's initiative in this matter, the latter did his best to insure honest elections so that the voters could choose freely among the alternatives. He even withdrew the army of liberation to avoid any hint of pressure on the delegates.

The assembly was hardly representative of the independence movement and, despite Sucre's good intentions, was less interested in faithful representation of the country's interests than in furthering the ambitions of the delegates. Almost all desired sovereign status for Alto Perú, however, and, after much rhetoric, they agreed to reject both alternatives, attachment to the viceroyalty of La Plata and reunion with Peru. Not altogether absent from their consideration was the factor of balance among the nations of the southern part of the continent, and, by choosing independence, they made a better state of Bolivia and prevented either Peru or Argentina from assuming undue weight in the regional configuration. Before the assembly completed its work, it adopted a highly florid and grandiloquent Declaration of Independence, proclaimed on August 6, 1825, and five days later the assembly resolved to name the new nation after the Liberator, not without the hope that this act would placate Bolívar's reservations about independence for Alto Perú.

On August 18, 1825, Bolívar entered La Paz and was greeted by elaborate ceremonies to honor him as Liberator—recognition which he never failed to share with Sucre. But Bolívar was outspoken about his doubts as to the ability of Bolivians to govern themselves. In all official acts from that time until his departure at the end of the year, he was careful to avoid recognition of Bolivia's independence, always referring to it as Alto Perú and signing his plentiful decrees as dictator of Peru. Only in January 1826, when he turned the country over to Sucre, did he promise approval by the Peruvian congress of Bolivia's independent status.

Bolívar's tenure as dictator of Bolivia was marked by energetic attempts to impose his ideas as a blueprint for the country. His decrees covered matters of landholding, education, public works and the ordinary affairs of government, and he showed his awareness of the Indian problem by seeking to inculcate respect for manual labor in the rest of the population, hoping thereby to overcome the liability of continued exploitation of the indigenous population. Even after he had left Bolivia late in 1826, Bolívar, on request, supplied the General Constituent Assembly with the draft of the country's first constitution (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

Marshal Sucre inherited Bolívar's mantle of authority in January 1826 and continued to govern by decree. He was an able administrator and farsighted in such matters as encouraging immigration.

Formally installed as president after the General Constituent Assembly convened in May, he carried on the Bolivarian policies already elaborated. At the end of the year he was confirmed in office under the new constitution. The country seemed at this point to have been placed on a firm footing, enabling it to look foward to a national development that would restore some of its former prosperity.

Foreign and domestic machinations led to Sucre's downfall in 1828, by which time fears had arisen that Bolivia might continue indefinitely as an appendage of the Gran Colombia, the new republic composed of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, to which both Sucre and Bolívar properly belonged. The foreign author of Sucre's downfall was Agustín Gamarra, dictator of Peru, who engineered the Bolivian revolt against Colombian influence in which Sucre was badly injured. Gamarra invaded and, with the connivance of certain Bolivians, forced Bolivia to expel Sucre in August 1828.

Assessments of the Bolívar-Sucre regime vary considerably. Their detractors emphasize the non-Bolivian character of their rule, the naivete of their attempts to alleviate conditions for the Indian, and the baneful military influence which they established as the basis of their positions. Their defenders can point, with at least equal justice, to the enlightened nature of their administrations as compared with much of what followed, and to the Bolivian ingratitude which prevented realization of their hopes for Bolivia.

The Perils of Independence

The president put into office by Gamarra ruled five days and was assassinated. Bolivians then elected their first native-born president, Andrés Santa Cruz, marshal in the armies of Bolívar, whose previous military and political experience had been mainly in the service of Peru. The son of a Spanish official and María Calahumana, direct descendant of the last Inca, he had joined the Spanish army as a youth. After capture by the forces of San Martín in Peru in 1820, he changed sides and thereafter had a brilliant career in the patriot cause. It is believed that his mother had thoroughly imbued him with a consciousness of his Inca heritage, which may explain his later ambitions.

Santa Cruz assumed office in 1829 and, while watchful of events in Peru, devoted the first few years of his administration to highly constructive work in Bolivia. He ruled without a legislature for 2 years, but called one in 1831 which united extremely capable men. They produced a constitution that year to supersede the Bolivarian one, and approved a legal code drawn up at the direction of Santa Cruz, the first law code to be enacted in the new Spanish American republics. The University of San Andrés in La Paz also dates from

this period. Making full use of his wide powers, Santa Cruz, in his first 4 years of rule, did much to order the affairs of the country, encouraging trade and industry and making advances in education, public works and pacification.

In 1835 he signed a treaty with President Orbegoso of Peru which permitted Bolivian intervention in Peru for the purpose of pacification. Acting in support of the agreement, Santa Cruz led forces to Peru and defeated in turn two competing would-be dictators, Gamarra and Salaverry. He then proclaimed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation with himself as "Protector." The potential power of this combination awakened the opposition of neighboring countries, even though the United States and several European powers had recognized the Confederation. Brazil and Argentina both protested, and the latter unsuccessfully invaded Bolivia, but it was Chile which proved the decisive opponent. Its invasion of Peru, culminating in the battle of Yungay, brought the Confederation to an end in 1839, and with it the career of Bolivia's ablest nineteenth century president.

Santa Cruz was succeeded by former president Velasco. The new Peruvian president, Gamarra, believing it safe to absorb a Bolivia now lacking a Santa Cruz, invaded. General José Ballivián, distinguished revolutionary soldier and erstwhile Santa Cruz lieutenant who had been exiled by Velasco for conspiring against him, was recalled and became a national hero by repelling the invader at Ingavi, a battle celebrated in the country's annals as placing the final seal on Bolivia's independence.

Ballivián then succeeded in overthrowing Velasco and making himself provisional president in 1842. With his position later secured by electoral mandate, he drew up a new constitution notable for its concentration of power in presidential hands. In some 5 years of autocratic rule, Ballivián aroused jealous forces of opposition, but maintained at least essential order in the country, in contrast to his equally dictatorial successors in office.

Velasco enjoyed a brief return to the presidency after Manuel Isidoro Belzu had, in 1847, instigated a revolt which brought about Ballivián's fall. A year later Belzu repeated the performance with Velasco as victim and succeeded to the presidency.

Himself a La Paz *cholo* of little education, Belzu injected a temporary innovation into the country's political life during his tenure in the presidency from 1848 to 1855. Whereas his forerunners, all of aristocratic origin, had never seriously contemplated the participation of the lower classes in the affairs of government and national life, Belzu encouraged the *cholos* to rise against the ruling class and preached vengeance for the years of exploitation to which they had been subjected. The result was a succession of atrocities and reprisals producing a state of complete anarchy. The regime of

Belzu consisted of a series of repressions of revolts rather than any program of reform that might have seemed implicit in his espousal of the *cholo* cause. Belzu resigned in 1855 after securing the accession of his relative Jorge Córdova as his own successor. Ten years later he returned to public life in characteristic fashion, leading a revolt against President Melgarejo and this time losing his life in the attempt.

The country's first civilian president, José Maria Linares, who authorized the overthrow of Córdova in 1857, was no less dictatorial than Belzu but otherwise of completely different stripe. A member of the elite and supporter of Ballivián, he had served the latter as minister to Spain and secured official Spanish recognition of Bolivian independence in 1846. His rule, from 1857 to his overthrow in 1860, re-established the educated class in the seats of government, but was so harsh that it paved the way for the reform constitution of 1861. The junta that succeeded Linares ordered elections to choose deputies for the national legislature—an exceptionally able group as it turned out—which then drew up the new basic law. The ensuing year was one of struggle between the elected president, General José María de Achá, a foe of the liberal constitution, and Colonel Adolfo Ballivián, son of the ex-president and advocate of the 1861 charter. The revolution which resulted in 1864 brought into office the most flamboyant of Bolivia's military dictators, Mariano Melgarejo.

Melgarejo, whose origin was similar to that of Belzu, was a man of impressive native ability and military valor, but he was also without restraint in the use of power—the restraints of responsible behavior and of constitutional limitation being equally absent—and his tenure has been recorded as "the acme of dictatorship" in Bolivia. His natural shrewdness, however, kept him in power through 6 years of intrigue and revolt. It was during his dictatorship, in 1867, that the first large subtraction of Bolivian-claimed territory occurred—not, however, through military defeat, but through negotiation. In return for navigation rights on Brazilian rivers, including the Amazon, of which Bolivia was in no way prepared to take practical advantage, Melgarejo ceded something like 100,000 square miles of territory. In this way Bolivia lost claim to its access to the Paraguay River in its northern reaches, and about half its claims to lands in the Amazon basin (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). In keeping with Bolivian tradition, nearly unbroken for 40 years, a revolt unseated Melgarejo in 1870. According to a contemporary diplomatic dispatch, his assassination while living in Lima as an exile "caused a profound sensation throughout the country but excited little sympathy."

Augustín Morales, in spite of his avowed preference for "more liberty and less government," represented little improvement as president. Only with the accession of Tomás Frías, a man of education and cultural attainment, did Bolivia enjoy a respite from the military style of dictatorship. The relief was of short duration, however, for only 2 years later, in 1876, Frías' war minister overthrew him. Hilarión Daza restored the military tradition in the presidency and, partly to strengthen his internal position, recklessly involved his country in the disastrous War of the Pacific.

Bolivia's Atacama desert and Pacific coast territories had become a coveted region because of its fertilizer resources, guano and nitrates, for which there was a ready market. Chilean companies had obtained concessions for exploitation of these resources earlier, but Daza saw an opportunity for increasing Bolivia's revenue by imposing higher charges. Chile seized the Bolivian ports, and in 1879 a war resulted for which Bolivia was unprepared. Bolivia's troops in its coastal province were easily defeated, and Chilean forces moved by sea to attack Bolivia's ally, Peru. Daza led a force to the coast to take part in the defense, but soon deserted his troops and was exiled in ignominy. His successor, General Campero, led another force to help Peru, but the combined armies were defeated in 1880 and Bolivia withdrew, leaving Peru to fight alone for 2 years. It was not until 1904 that a treaty of peace was agreed upon by Bolivia and Chile, but the diminishing verbal disputes of the intervening years only underscored the futility of the Bolivian position. Its landlocked condition was as much the product of inept leadership as of foreign depredation (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

The alternatives of continuing the war or accepting defeat and a landlocked status became the basis for the formation of the country's first political parties to be other than mere factions associated with ambitious men. The Liberal Party was originally formed by those who would not accept defeat and consequently drew the support of Army leaders like General Campero and his wartime chief of staff, General Camacho. The Conservatives, the peace party, nevertheless won the election of 1884 and succeeded in remaining in power for 15 years.

During this period a degree of relative prosperity returned, owing to a resurgence of mining. Not only did the world price of silver increase for a time, but the industrial ores, hitherto almost disregarded, appreciated in value. Copper, lead, zinc and, most of all, tin, began to be valuable as exports. The construction of the railroad from Oruro to Antofagasta, on the coast, in the 1890's, facilitated the transport of ore. On the cultural side, there was a modest increase in the availability of schooling, but its benefits were reserved

for the prosperous. The lot of the Indian remained unenviable, for increased economic benefits still depended on cheap Indian labor in the mines and in agriculture.

Writing about the period around the turn of the century, a Bolivian author, Alcides Arguedas, applied the term "a sick people" (*pueblo enfermo*) to his countrymen, in recognition of the depth and persistence of national problems. Mining remained the principal earner of the costs of the government and the chief means of employment for wages; but the general diminution of returns from the exploitation of mineral resources had long since foreclosed any possibility of national prosperity under existing conditions. Only in the first two decades of the twentieth century did tin emerge as a large-scale mining enterprise capable of substantial earnings on the international market.

While the business of tin extraction did contribute notably to improvements in the country's rail network, its domination by a few large firms, controlled in substantial measure from outside Bolivia, prevented the kind of prosperity that silver had earlier provided for the whole country. Enrichment did not spread far outside the small group of owners and operators, while minimal wages and unsafe working conditions continued to bear heavily upon the workers. At the same time, agricultural production remained primitive, settlement thin and spotty, illiteracy high and public life the province of only the well-to-do upper stratum.

Revolution and violent change of government came again in 1898–99. The Liberal Party, by now the party of the newly emergent and prosperous tin-mine owners and other entrepreneurs, ousted the Conservatives and, after interim rule by a junta, General José M. Pando became president in 1900. Besides dissatisfaction with the long-continued rule of the Conservatives, regionalism and federalism were also at the root of dissension. The Liberals were strong in the mining area to the north and west, while the Conservatives, led mainly by the great landowners, controlled the south. The immediate cause of conflict was the Liberal demand to move the capital from Sucre to the larger, more vigorous and accessible La Paz, which in fact became thereafter the *de facto* capital.

The so-called Federal Revolution failed to achieve its announced goals, chiefly the substitution of federalism for the unitary system of government and the separation of church and state, but there became evident a new inclination to think soberly about, and act with deliberation toward the nation's problems. The reasoning of the Liberal movement was that the unitary arrangement had failed to produce national unity or political democracy and that federalism would be more in keeping with the nation's physical and mental regionalism. A national convention debated the alternatives for

months in 1899 and found itself so evenly divided that decision could not be reached. Notably, its decision to adjourn was reached without undue rancor and was not followed by violence.

On the religious question, the Liberals opposed the official status of the Roman Catholic Church and the privileges which such status afforded. The church-state question remained alive longer than the goal of federalism and actually brought about some changes. The right of public worship in other faiths than the Roman Catholic became law for the first time in 1905. Later, certain special privileges of the Church were denied, and civil marriage was made a requirement in 1911.

Highland Bolivia's remoteness from its eastern borders again contributed to its dismemberment. When the increased demand occasioned by the tire industry made Amazonian rubber highly profitable, Brazilian rubber gatherers and other adventurers working up the tributaries encroached on Bolivia's Acre territory. As early as 1899 one of these armed his men and proclaimed an independent republic, which was suppressed by a Bolivian expedition. Thereafter there was commercial competition and diplomatic negotiation with Brazil which finally resulted in a convention by which Bolivia relinquished its claims in return for two small areas on the Madera and Paraguay Rivers, the equivalent of $10 million and the use of a railroad to be constructed around the rapids of the Madera in Brazilian territory (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

The Liberal Party retained power for 20 years without any outbreak of internal violence. This unprecedented situation in the country's history is attributable in part to the party's successful identification with the sources of real power and also to its always shrewd and often wise use of the position it gained thereby.

Most significant was the rise of the three great mining interests: Patiño, Aramayo and Hochschild. Their growth was favored by the Liberal group, which was committed to a laissez-faire policy toward private enterprise. The tin magnates provided the government's principal tax source and soon came to carry so much weight in the Bolivian economy that they became a potent political force. It is no exaggeration to say that the nation was run for over 40 years with a sharp eye on the interests of the tin-mining group, for the national welfare was almost as dependent on its support as upon the world price of tin.

The Liberal Party, having come to power through military support, was most favorable to projects leading to the development of a strong, well-trained army, and by reason of funds derived from the mining interests, able to contribute to them. Conversely, its purchases of military equipment, its approval of improvements in or-

ganization and training and its employment of a German military mission all helped insure the support of the Army's senior officers.

In addition to taxes and fees from the mining industry, the government received substantial sums through its treaty settlements. Besides the $10 million from Brazil, the country in 1904 finally concluded a treaty with Chile under which it received $8.5 million, less the value of the Bolivian section of a new railroad Chile would construct from La Paz to the sea at Arica. With these funds in hand other railroads were constructed, and by 1917, Sucre, Potosí, Cochabamba and the lake port of Guaqui were all connected in one system.

The long rule of the Liberal Party came to an end in 1920, not from any resurgence of Conservative strength, but because of an internal split. A faction calling itself Republican was defeated at the polls in 1917 but seized the government by a bloodless coup in 1920. The Republican period lasted through the 1920's and was marked by hectic financial operations backed by loans contracted abroad, mainly in the United States. Some of the money was put to good purpose—for example a rail link connecting the Bolivian system with that of Argentina was built—but in general the national economy benefited little, and graft was rampant. The loans were supposedly secured by pledges against national revenue, and finally the foreign creditors had to insist on the appointment of a resident commission to oversee collection. With the arrival of the world depression in 1929 the whole system collapsed and with it the administration of Hernando Siles, the last Republican president.

The immediate cause of Siles' downfall was his attempt to bypass the constitutional provision forbidding re-election by resigning in order to run again. The revolt which unseated him brought rule by a military junta until 1931 when Daniel Salamanca was elected as a coalition candidate. Supposed by many to have been backed by Patiño money, he was nevertheless highly respected for his competence and personal honesty. In his turn, however, he fell a victim of the frustrations stemming from Bolivia's series of defeats in the Chaco War.

The dispute with Paraguay over a region in the Gran Chaco, to which neither country had clear title, and its development into the greatest conflict to take place in the Western hemisphere since the American Civil War, constituted a classic but ironical tragedy. Whereas the War of the Pacific had concerned a territory of great importance, both as to economic potential and the obvious Bolivian desire to retain its outlet on the sea, the Chaco dispute concerned terrain that was largely undeveloped. There may have been hope of oil discoveries in the area, but evidence indicates this to be a rationalization of postwar origin. Yet by the 1920's the war with

Chile had been laid to rest in Bolivian minds: although they still professed to yearn for access to the sea, they showed little if any bitterness toward their erstwhile opponents and had apparently come to terms with the arrangements agreed upon for Bolivian use of Pacific ports in Chile. Hostile feelings toward Paraguay, on the other hand, rose to a level quite out of proportion to the value of the area at issue.

From the late 1920's, despite conciliation attempts by other countries, border incidents multiplied. Bolivia's determination to see the dispute through to victory was traceable to an overweening confidence in its resources and population, significantly greater than those of its neighbor, and its armed forces which, German-trained for a decade past, appeared to outclass those of Paraguay. Moreover, and here is the principal irony in the contrast between the War of the Pacific and the Chaco War, the loss of its important Pacific territory had aroused a desire to open up avenues of transport and communication with the Atlantic to the east, in seeming disregard of great impracticalities. Even complete victory would face Bolivia with the problem of providing means of land transport across 400 miles of roadless semidesert and swamp to river ports still nearly 1,000 miles from salt water.

The war raged openly from 1932 to 1935, while continuous efforts by several groups of neutral conciliators, including the League of Nations, failed to mediate the controversy. From the first the Bolivians were tactically outclassed and, while at times able to win small local successes, were consistently defeated in the more important engagements. By the end of 1934 they had been driven back 300 miles from their original positions deep in the Chaco to the foothills of the Andes where a final stalemate was reached. Their vaunted German training and their superior numbers were canceled out by inadequate logistical arrangements, poor intelligence, inept leadership and dissension between military and civil officials. Not the least of the Army's handicaps was the excessive rate of non-battle casualties stemming from the inability of the highland Bolivian to become acclimated to the heat and the alternating drought and excessive rains in the low-lying Chaco (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Frustrated by their own lack of success, a group of senior officers in the field—including the commander, General Enrique Peñaranda, Colonel David Toro and (then) Major Germán Busch—took the opportunity afforded by a visit of President Salamanca to seize him and force his resignation. In his stead, his vice-president, Tejada Sorzano, known to favor a cessation of hostilities, was accepted as president.

An armistice, arranged in 1935 by a commission of neutral nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and the United

States), was followed by a prolonged effort to reach a final settlement and a new boundary line (finally established in 1938). As loser in the war, Bolivia could not hope for satisfaction in the post-armistice deliberations, but even so there ensued a wave of bitterness against the neutral nations involved, especially the United States. The bitterness was partially responsible for the seizure of Standard Oil properties in 1937, to the accompaniment of charges that the firm had instigated the war in order to protect its oil concessions in the Chaco.

Seedbed of Revolution

The period immediately following the Chaco War bears many similarities to the era of military dictatorships in the nineteenth century. From 1936 to 1946 most transfers of power occurred by means of revolt, and the heads of government were all military men, most of whom resorted to dictatorship in the face of economic and social disruption. There was the same absence of political participation by the vast majority of the population. The traditional dissension among leaders continued. The social fabric was still strained by regional sentiment, reinforced by physical separation, and by a continued disregard of the lower classes on the part of those in positions of power.

There was, however, a difference of signal importance. In the midst of chronic floundering in matters of policy, there was a growing awareness that there were, after all, corrective steps which could be taken to deal with the deep national problem other than the acceptance of one version of dictatorship after another. Precisely this awareness, and a willingness to act accordingly, represented a developing revolutionary situation based, to a degree surprising in Bolivia, on ideological rather than sheerly personalist grounds. Even the postwar military *caudillos* were moved to make some accommodation to mounting tension, although they failed to develop the truly constructive and promising programs that would have forestalled more radical attempts at finding solutions.

The Chaco War was an important factor in the awakening. It not only revealed in unmistakable profile the inadequacies of the traditional system, but also afforded positive opportunities for many Bolivians to catch their first glimpse of the world around them. Many Indians of the Altiplano obtained their first perception of the meaning of the term Bolivia, and groups of the population established their first contacts with each other. Furthermore, the war left large elements of the population with a ranking sense of injustice, with the conviction that they had been used and misused by the national leaders. This feeling was especially apparent among veterans of the war, many of whom joined together in associations aiming at

redress of their specific grievances and, more ambitiously, at national regeneration.

The initial manifestation of active unrest took the form of a general strike fomented by unemployed Chaco veterans in May 1936. This Act brought about a coup d'etat, organized by some of the officers who had deposed Salamanca and backed by students. Calling itself the National Socialist Party, this movement upset the government and established Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch at the head of a military junta in which socialist leanings were well represented. The self-serving Colonel David Toro, who was responsible for many of the blunders of the war, was invited by the junta to assume the presidency. In July Toro suspended the constitution and decreed the conscription of workers to counter the labor shortage afflicting the country. Ironically, the veterans opposed the move since their pensions were worth more than current wages. To carry out his announced purpose of creating "gradual socialism," Toro then inaugurated a quasi-syndicalist program which was designed to do away with political parties in favor of the organization of all employers and employees into two compulsory associations. Such attempts aroused enough dissatisfaction, especially among veterans, that another coup in July 1937 easily displaced him in favor of Germán Busch.

The Busch government abandoned state socialism, restored political parties and, in 1938, promulgated a new constitution. By 1939 economic conditions had again worsened to the point where Busch was moved to adopt police state methods to maintain order. At the same time the government undertook a barter agreement with Germany to exchange its minerals, oil and hides for manufactured goods. Busch announced his intention of establishing a planned economy with wide controls for the purpose of raising living standards. His death, reportedly a suicide but called murder by his supporters, intervened to prevent elucidation of what the program might mean in practice.

After a few months' interregnum under the provisional presidency of General Quintanilla, an election was held which placed another Chaco veteran, General Enrique Peñaranda, in the presidency in the spring of 1940. The new executive oriented his policies to secure North American support, particularly with regard to tin purchases. The Japanese capture of Thailand, Malaya and the Dutch Indies made Bolivia the principal source of that metal for the United States and its allies, and arrangements of mutual benefit were made. A remunerative agreement to produce tungsten was also negotiated.

Despite the attainment by the country of a degree of relative economic prosperity, the Peñaranda administration found itself subject to growing hostility. During the late 1930's agents of the Rome-Berlin axis had been active in the country, working through the

German Legation, cultural groups and the then German-managed Lloyd Aereo Boliviano. Long-established Nazi elements in Argentina had made many converts who were active in Bolivia, and the Italian Fascists—members of an air force mission—also preached the virtues of totalitarianism. Marxist thought, which had gained a foothold during the 1920's among intellectuals and had had some impact within the labor movement since the Chaco War, also began to manifest opposition to the Conservative regime. Still another group was influenced by the example of Franco's Spanish Falange.

Out of the ideological ferment developed first factions and then parties. The oldest of these was the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB), patterned on the Spanish model, which in its early days, attracted little strength. The extreme Left produced two parties: the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR), adhering to Trotskyite principles, which also was of little force and effect at the time; and the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolutionario—PIR), representing itself as an independent Marxist group but consistently following the line of international communism, which gained considerable strength in the labor unions, notably that of the railroad workers, and was the only party to nominate a candidate to oppose Peñaranda in the election of 1940.

The party, also emerging in 1940, that was in the end to demonstrate the greatest potential was the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario—MNR). It originated somewhat earlier as a small group of middle- and upper-class intellectual dissidents representing a wide range of political persuasions from Right to Left and united by their discontent with the whole trend of events, which seemed to be reverting to type. Among its earliest leaders were Víctor Paz Estenssoro, a brilliant lawyer, Hernán Siles Zuazo, son of the former president, and several prominent and influential writers. Intensely nationalistic in purpose, it aimed to unite the dissatisfied of whatever origin and to create from mass support a broadly based national party. Its early pronouncements were highly chauvinistic and contained ideas borrowed freely from socialism, nazism and the new Peronism of Argentina. To achieve its ends, it was willing to use all means that came to hand.

The MNR found its ally, strangely enough, in the Army. There was already in existence a secret military society under the name of Cause of the Fatherland (Razón de Patria—RADEPA). It had cells in most military units and key institutions, such as the high command and the military schools, and exercised control to a far greater degree than its numerical strength would indicate. As nationalistic in character as the MNR, it was also totalitarian in principle, and its influence

within the Army was capable of supplementing the MNR's political astuteness (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Opposition to the Peñaranda government was not limited to that arising for ideological difference. The outwardly moderate tone of the regime did not extend to advocacy of any measures to improve the lot of the Indians, especially the miners, who continued to be worked under appalling conditions as the "tin barons" strove to derive the utmost profit from their labors. The miners' growing resentment, given new force by unionization, led them to strike in December 1942. The government backed the management in its efforts to break the strike and sent troops to Catavi, one of the Patiño mines. The pitiless severity used in subduing the strikers, involving the machine-gunning of men, women and children, occasioned wide revulsion. The indignant interrogation of government ministers in the congress was led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro, and resulted in the rise of MNR influence with the miners.

A year later the RADEPA–MNR alliance came to fruition in a coup unseating President Peñaranda. The affair was a typical palace revolution carried out by the officers in the secret society, and the influence of their cells in high military circles was of such magnitude that Army interference with the execution of the plot was forestalled. A junta was set up with Major Gualberto Villarroel as president. In his Cabinet were three MNR members, of whom one, Paz Estenssoro, was Finance Minister. The United States and all Latin American nations except Argentina denied recognition to the new regime on the grounds that its revolt had been supported and financed by Nazi Germany and Argentina. Six months later recognition was given, after Villarroel had gone through the motions of dismissing the MNR members of his Cabinet and protesting his willingness to cooperate with the United Nations.

The MNR won a majority by questionable means in the July election, and its Cabinet members returned to their posts. Villarroel then took measures to convert his police into an arm of repression and set about eliminating all opposition to the regime. Several prominent citizens, opposition leaders and former office holders were assassinated or kidnapped, properties were confiscated and, in general, all potential opposition was moved against by terroristic methods. The effect was opposite to what was intended, and people and groups found themselves united against the regime.

The reaction finally came in July 1946 when mobs in La Paz, largely unorganized and composed of students, teachers and workers, took to the streets. The Army remained aloof in its barracks, and only the police supported the regime. Villarroel dismissed his MNR officials but refused demands that he resign. The mob seized arms from the

arsenal and moved on the palace, where Villarroel was captured and shot and his body hung from a lamppost in the main plaza.

That rare manifestation in Bolivian politics, a civilian junta, governed until a constitutionally elected government supported by all moderate Centrist parties took over early in 1947. The new president, Enrique Hertzog, formed a coalition Cabinet which included members of most opposition parties, including the PIR. Neither the MNR nor their allies, the Trotskyite POR, were represented, although both were able to elect senators and deputies. Outside of ousting many leaders and members of the MNR (several thousand, including Paz Estenssoro, fled to Argentina), the new government was moderate in its conduct of affairs. It was, however, a regime devoted to the status quo, and while it did propose some liberalizing reforms, it showed enough political ineptness to render it vulnerable to constant MNR propaganda and agitation, vigorously led from outside the country. One result was the increase of MNR representation in congress after the elections of 1949. The government's evident hope that the lid might be held down by a program of mild and gradual reform, combined with a policy of enforcing peace and quiet by repressing the threats it considered most serious, in the end offered no satisfactory alternative to the radical revolutionary solution toward which the country had been drifting since the Chaco War.

Among the government's mistakes was the unconstitutional act of arresting and exiling Juan Lechín Oquendo after his election as Senator in 1949, and it was this that initiated a chain of events that in the end proved fatal to it. Lechín, long the popular Leftist leader of the miners' union, was a firm MNR supporter and, as the agitator responsible for many strikes, was anathema to both government and the mine owners.

The arrest brought on a violent strike, again at Catavi, in the course of which two United States mining engineers were murdered and others hurt. Troops again put down the strike with severity, killing many. This brought on sympathy strikes, and finally a wide-spread civil war in which MNR–POR forces succeeded in gaining temporary control of Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, Sucre and Santa Cruz. A revolt in La Paz was narrowly averted, and exile forces from Argentina invaded. The Army remained loyal, however, and suppressed the revolt in a matter of weeks, thus earning the lasting hatred of the MNR. After the uprising the ailing President Hertzog, who had already turned his administration over to Vice President Urriolagoita, resigned.

The year 1950 was marked by a general strike, suppressed without difficulty, and by preliminary preparations for the presidential elections of May 1951. Overconfident by reason of recent successes, the group of Centrist parties which had supported the government failed

to unite behind a single candidate—an action which might have insured a clear mandate from the little over 200,000 enfranchised citizens. Instead, each party put up its own man. The MNR, on the other hand, already supported by the POR, established a firm and formal alliance with the newly formed Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB), and with Lechín's Mine Workers' Federation (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB). The FSB, on the Right, and the PIR, on the Left, also nominated candidates.

When the votes were in, the MNR candidate, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, was found to have won a substantial plurality, 43 percent of all votes cast (slightly over 126,000, only 59 percent of the registered electorate). In the congressional elections the trend was reversed, with the Centrists gaining twice as many seats as the MNR. The constitutionally provided method of resolving the situation where no presidential candidate had a majority would have been to throw the election into the Congress. Instead the president—fearful of the show of unexpected strength by the MNR, of the results of its announced policies of nationalization and land reform, and of its known alliance with the extreme Left—persuaded the Army, over its initial reluctance, to take over the government, and resigned. Thus again the country was denied a peaceful alternative to violent revolution and the inevitability of the latter was brought closer to the point.

The military junta, under General Hugo Ballivián, ruled with judgment in some respects, negotiating favorable international contracts and granting amnesty to all political exiles, but it alienated labor by prohibiting strikes and demonstrations and antagonized all press censorship. Further, it disregarded its promise to hold new elections, and perhaps most serious of all, it lost much of the otherwise sympathetic support of moderates by the illegality of its very existence.

It took less than a year for the MNR to complete its plans for seizing control. Mass support, toward which the party had for years been working, was strongest among the organized miners and other labor unio s, but also present to a limited extent in some agricultural areas. Many of the weapons taken by the mobs of 1946 were in the hands of men now supporters of the party, and the MNR had supplemented these with other acquisitions over the years. A final accession of strength to the revolution was the defection to its cause of the ambitious Minister of Government, General Seleme, the junta member in control of internal administration and the National Police. The insurgents rose in La Paz on April 9, 1952, but within a day the Army seemed to be getting the upper hand and agreed to a truce urged by the Papal Nuncio and foreign ambassadors. Armed miners

from outside La Paz, however, occupied the heights of El Alto above the city, blocking all hope of reinforcement. The Army surrendered on April 11. Paz Estenssoro assumed the presidency four days later, and Bolivia's revolution thereafter controlled its destiny.

CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Bolivia's area (estimated in the absence of an accurate survey to be between 412,000 and 424,000 square miles) approximates that of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona together. Its population, never accurately determined, was computed by commonly accepted sources as 3,509,000 in September 1961, or nearly half a million less than that of the same four states combined. Fifth in area of the 10 South American republics (a little smaller than Colombia), it exceeds in population only the far smaller Paraguay and Uruguay.

Structurally the land is divided into three main regions, a high basin (the Altiplano) and its surrounding Andean rimlands, the eastern slopes of the Andes and the broad eastern plains. Within each main division subregions are distinguished, accounted for mainly by differing amounts of rainfall and the effects on relief and vegetation, but also by local structural variations. The country is entirely in the tropical zone, but the extreme spread in altitude—from about 300 feet to over 21,000 feet above sea level—produces a wide variation in climate ranging from the continuous moist heat of the Amazonian rain forest to the perpetual snow of the Andes.

Bolivia is underpopulated, with an average density of only a little over 8 persons per square mile. Population distribution is very uneven. The highland areas have always been more densely peopled, but even here, the southern arid portion of the Altiplano supports less than 2 persons per square mile. The rest of the highlands, including the eastern Andean slopes, has a density of over 25, with greater concentrations in the vicinity of Lake Titicaca and Cochabamba. La Paz, with over 300,000 people, is the only large city. Only the department capitals of the highlands and Santa Cruz, at the edge of the plain, have more than 50,000 inhabitants each. The plains, except for a small area around and northwest of Santa Cruz, have a density of less than 2 per square mile.

Ethnic distribution is not determinable from official figures. The consensus of estimates indicates a proportion under 15 percent of unmixed Caucasian origin, perhaps 65 percent Indian and the rest mixed, or *cholo*.

Highland or Andean Bolivia, comprising the Altiplano and the eastern mountain slopes, entirely different in its physical and eco-

nomic aspects and in the numbers and activities of its people, from the lowland plains, which form nearly 70 percent of the country's area, but are sparsely populated and as yet of relatively slight economic productivity. The populous Inca empire, an efficient and self-sufficient highland culture, made little effort to expand into the lowland tropics. The Spaniards found more than enough to occupy them in exploiting the rich highland silver deposits through the use of a plentiful Indian labor force, as did the tin-mining enterprises of the later nineteenth century.

There were, and remain, great difficulties of communication and travel to and within the plains region, increasing the difficulty of getting profitable economic returns from this area of tropical forest and swamp, in part subject alternately to flood and drought. Such conditions created a predisposition, even today hardly overcome, to consider the plains as not only remote but not worth the capital and effort to exploit, at least as long as a more comfortable living could be made in mining in the highlands. Also, the Andean Indian, depended on for manual labor, has always been reluctant to move to the hot plains.

Such disinterest in and neglect of the lowlands persisted well into the present century with the result that the plains contain less than 10 percent of the population of the country. The government has made more or less continuous efforts since 1955 to encourage colonization in the Andean slopes and the nearer plains, but as late as mid-1962 without notable success.

The concentration of interest in the highland area, amounting almost to a refusal to look beyond it, added to the very real physical obstacles to communication, is also at the root of Bolivia's inability to retain and defend its border areas. It has lost, through an unrelieved succession of negotiations and military defeats, about half the territory it claimed on attaining independence. There has developed as a result, a rueful, impotent, but always latent attitude of irredentism, especially with respect to the country's lost coastal province. The same attitude of regret is reflected in the Bolivians' adoption of the dramatic description of their country as "a beggar sitting on a chair of gold," a phrase originating with the French traveler d'Orbigny more than a century ago.

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

The dominant geographical feature of the country is the Andean mountain system, which splits into two main chains in Peru some 150 miles northwest of the Bolivian border. The western range generally lies along the Chilean border. The two ranges, which embrace between them the high plateau of the Altiplano, nowhere less than 12,000 feet in elevation, merge again near the southwest corner of Bolivia.

The northern half of the eastern range falls off steeply to the Amazonian plain to the east, while in the southern part the descent is more gradual and is cut by many deep and long river valleys, some draining toward the Amazon and others toward the Paraguay-Paraná system. All the rest of the country forms the eastern plains, the Llanos del Oriente, sloping very gently to north and east, and almost without hills (see fig. 2).

The Altiplano

The Altiplano, generally considered to include the adjacent habitable slopes of its mountain boundaries, is the largest region of interior drainage in South America. The crest of the western chain




Figure 2. Structural Features of Bolivia.

of the Andes (Cordillera Occidental) runs about 25 miles west of the Chile-Bolivia line for most of the northern half of the common border, with the result that several rivers rise in Chile or Peru and flow into the Altiplano. The long-threatened damming of one such, the Lauca, and the proposed diversion of its water for irrigation purposes by Chile caused diplomatic representations before the Organization of American States by Bolivia in the spring of 1962. South of about the 20th parallel, the boundary generally follows the crest line.

The western cordillera trends generally in a north-south direction, at an elevation said to average 16,500 feet. For lack of accurate surveys, at least four different figures can be found for most points; where available, figures derived from Bolivian sources are used in this chapter. Many peaks rise above 19,000 feet; the highest is Sajama, an outlying mountain of the western range, entirely within Bolivia, at an altitude of 21,420 feet. The quiescent volcano of Ollagüe, overlooking the pass of the same name, is over 19,000 feet in height, as is Licancábur, at the extreme southwestern corner of the country. Many volcanic peaks dot the range, especially toward the south. None of those in Bolivia are currently active, although some emit volcanic gasses. Many passes, none lower than 13,000 feet, are traversed by pack trails. Only two, those carrying the Arica (Chile)-La Paz and Antofagasta (Chile)-La Paz rail lines, are of commercial importance.

The Altiplano proper, the relatively level surface of the depression between the mountains, is over 500 miles in length and from 80 to 100 miles in width. Three-quarters of its area, or about 38,000 square miles, is in Bolivia. Two ranges of hills and low mountains project eastward from the western cordillera, dividing it into three parts. Along the foot of the eastern mountains, however, a relatively level strip has served as route of communication from pre-Colombian times, and is now followed by the Inter-American Highway and the rail line to Argentina.

Lake Titicaca, at 12,500 feet, is the highest navigated lake in the world, lies half in Peru and half in Bolivia and has a surface of 3,500 square miles (about the area of Puerto Rico). Three or four lake steamers, the largest having 1,000 tons displacement, operate to connect the Bolivian railhead of Guaqui with that of Puno in Peru. The lake is also a source of fish, supplying the surrounding area as far as La Paz.

The Altiplano has a slight southerly tilt, affording Lake Titicaca an outlet in the Desaguadero (drain, outlet), and thus maintaining it as a fresh water lake. The Desaguadero in turn drains into Lake Poopó, a very shallow lake with no regular outlet and a very high rate of evaporation, and which is consequently salty. Further south and southwest are the lake and *salar* (salt pan) of Coipasa and the

salar of Uyuni. The two *salares*, whose combined area is greater than that of Lake Titicaca, are deposits of solid salt, the remnants of former large lakes. The south shore of the Salar de Uyuni marks the lowest point of the Altiplano, at about 12,000 feet. From there southward, the land rises again to the 19,000-foot peaks of the cordilleras which close off the basin from similar but smaller ones in Chile and Argentina.

The Altiplano is walled in on the east by the other branch of the Andes, known in its northern section as the Cordillera Real (Royal Range), which enters from Peru north of Lake Titicaca and runs southeast in several segments to about the 17th parallel. It then turns south to a point opposite the Salar de Uyuni, where it begins to trend southwestward to rejoin the Cordillera Occidental.

The Cordillera Real forms an impressive line of peaks rising above the snowline, with an average elevation of over 18,000 feet for 200 miles. The best known of its prominences are Cololo (19,400 feet), Illampu (21,500), Huayna Potosí (20,500), Illimani, which overlooks La Paz (21,300), and Tres Cruces (19,300). Southward the height of land rarely rises above 16,000 feet, a mere 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the level of Lake Poopó, which it overlooks from a distance of about 20 miles. It again rises to peaks of 19,000 feet or more as it approaches its junction with the western range in the little known mountain desert country of the south.

The far greater quantity of rain received on the eastern slope of the Cordillera Real has caused the formation of one of the most spectacular examples of headward erosion and stream capture in the world. The Rio de La Paz which originally rose on the east slope of the Andes, has through millenia of erosion cut "backward" or headward entirely through the Andean range. Upon attaining the level of the soft soils of the Altiplano, it began to receive the waters of a number of streams originally draining into Lake Titicaca, thus capturing them as tributaries of its own. Its headwaters now are a mountain stream rising at snowline about 20 miles north of La Paz, running first south and then southeast, before turning northward to join the Beni. The city of La Paz, though itself at an altitude of 12,000 feet, lies in the river gorge nearly 1,500 feet below the level of the Altiplano. Where the river passes through the Andes between Illimani and Tres Cruces, its gorge is 10 miles wide and over 12,000 feet deep.

Soils of the Altiplano, which was originally a cleft of unknown depth, are the result of sedimentary deposit from the mountain slopes. Originally of glacial or alluvial origin, they have been laid, since the post-glacial onset of relative aridity, almost solely through an accumulation of wind-borne dust, a process still continuing. Hence on a level surface they are peculiarly absorptive of water, and on slopes, readily subject to erosion and slides.

Rainfall decreases from north to south, from sparse amounts to mere traces. Except in the close vicinity of Lake Titicaca, nearly all rain falls in heavy summer storms (December to February). All rain comes from the eastern sector, originating in the Atlantic Ocean or the humid Amazon basin, and the Altiplano receives only that which escapes being precipitated on the eastern plains or the high Andean wall. The Pacific generates no rain which falls on Bolivia. In terms of annual rainfall, only in the fairly close vicinity of Lake Titicaca does it ever reach 40 inches, averaging nearer 20; in most of the rest of the basin it ranges downward to less than 10, and in the extreme southwest there are years when no measurable rain falls. At the general level of the Altiplano and the lower mountain slopes, snow falls occasionally, but neither covers the ground deeply nor lasts long. In the Andes the snow line is generally at about 16,000 feet; in the western range it is even higher.

Its altitude brings the Altiplano generally cool temperatures despite its location within tropical latitudes. The mean annual daytime temperature is between 45° and 50° F., though on the not too frequent hot days of summer the thermometer may approach 80°, and on cold winter days maximum temperatures may be close to freezing. The daily range is considerable because of generally low humidity. Nights are cold, even in summer, and winter nights may be as cold as 0° F. Lake Titicaca is sufficiently large, and because of the altitude, subject to enough evaporation to create a moderating influence on temperature variations. This and its greater rainfall make the region the most agriculturally productive in the basin.

The natural vegetation of the Altiplano, except in the close vicinity of Lake Titicaca, is sparse at best, and progressively decreases to the south and west. The most common growth is *ichu*, a coarse bunchgrass which serves as food for the llama and as matting and thatch for houses. Thinly interspersed are hardy shrubs, such as the *tola*, and a close-growing resinous herb, the *yareta*, both sources of fuel. The banks of Lake Titicaca are thickly grown with *totora*, also used for thatch and mats, but most importantly, when lashed into tight bundles, to make the Indian boats called *balsas*. Cacti are also found. South of the saltpans, almost nothing grows. There are no native trees on the Altiplano, but around the lake and in sheltered valleys, the eucalyptus has been successfully introduced (see fig. 3).

The Altiplano is considered the original home of the potato, which was domesticated there thousands of years ago. Another root crop is the *oca*. Indigenous grains include quinoa and *cañahui*. The basin is too high for wheat, and corn will not ripen except near the lake. Barley is moderately successful (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The animal most prominently a part of Altiplano life is the llama, beast of burden and source of wool, meat and leather. Even its dung




Figure 3. Generalized Vegetation Pattern in Bolivia.

is used as fuel. The alpaca, too small for a pack animal, is also kept for its wool. The vicuña, which is now rare, cannot be domesticated because it refuses to breed in captivity; it is captured for its exceptionally fine wool. A type of guinea pig is also bred for meat. The condor, a species of vulture with sometimes a 10-foot wing spread, lives in the high Andes; it is the national bird, represented on the coat-of-arms. Many kinds of water and shore birds are hunted in the Titicaca region. Further south the rhea, the South American ostrich, is found. The only local source of fish is Lake Titicaca. Imported domestic animals include mules, donkeys, pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry, but there is little pasturage suitable for cattle.

Intermediate Zones

The Yungas

Yungas is the Aymara name given to the eastern slope of the Cordillera Real from the Peruvian line to opposite Cochabamba. Originally a series of more or less parallel front ranges and piedmont ridges, river erosion has changed the grain of the land so that long sharp spurs separated by steep-sided valleys now extend perpendicularly from the main range. Although in the northern part the nearly level Amazonian plain is not reached for more than 100 miles, measured horizontally, elevations of 2,000 to 3,000 feet are found not 50 miles from the great peaks of the main range. V-shaped water gaps have cut the lower ranges into segments, and every valley has its water-course. The hydroelectric potential, more than enough to supply all Bolivia, is almost totally unrealized for lack of capital.

Rainfall, according to recent Bolivian records, ranges between 30 and 60 inches a year. There is a summer maximum (December to February), and a month without rain is rare. Annual mean temperatures are between 60° and 70° F., and relative humidity is high. The most habitable and productive part of the region, the Yungas proper, roughly between 3,000 and 9,000 feet in altitude, has therefore a subtropical climate.

The natural vegetation of the Yungas is the montane rain forest, differing from the true tropical rain forest or selva of the Amazon basin mainly in the smaller size and more open distribution of its forest cover, the density and variety of its undergrowth of small trees and shrubs and in the greater fertility of its underlying soils. Trees useful for timber include the tropical cedar, walnut, mahogany, lignum vitae, ironwood palm and many others; there are several types of dyewoods, and a number of aromatic trees and shrubs such as sarsaparilla, saffron, "incense trees" and others used for medicinal purposes. A product of considerable past importance native to the area is the bark of the cinchona (*quina*) tree, from which the antimalarial quinine is made. Gathered from wild trees in Bolivia, it was an important export a half-century ago, but today cannot compete with the plantation crops grown elsewhere. Another, the coca plant, is the economic mainstay of the Yungas. Its leaves, from which cocaine derives, are dried and chewed (sometimes with lime) by the Indians of the highlands. Known and used from pre-Columbian times, coca is considered an indispensable daily necessity by all the highland natives.

Scores of other fruits and plants, native and introduced, grow in the region, among them grapes, figs, peaches and apples (at upper altitudes), all types of citrus fruits and bananas, avocados, pineapples, papayas, melons, mangoes, guavas and hot peppers. Root crops include the sweet potato (*camote*), manioc and peanuts. Sugarcane, tobacco, cacao, and coffee are also grown. Despite the agricultural

potential of this fertile area, relatively small quantities of its products can be distributed even in Bolivia, much less to other countries. The main difficulties are transportation and lack of capital.

Puna and Valles

Structurally the eastern Andes change, at about latitude 17° S., from the folded and fractured series of ridges which forms the Yungas to the form of a lifted and tilted block with a steep series of escarpments facing the Altiplano and a more gradual, deeply eroded 200-mile slope to the east. The highland area of the block is called the Puna. The western heights average between 13,000 and 15,000 feet, with a few scattered elevations rising above 16,000 feet, and form the divide between interior and Atlantic drainage. Some of the high valleys which carry the headwaters of Amazonian or La Plata drainage are only 10 to 30 miles east of Lake Poopó. East of the divide, the more resistant surfaces of the tilted table pursue a more or less even slope to the east, but are dissected by river erosion so that east-west, northwest-southeast, and north-south ridges are found in a highly irregular pattern. Like the Altiplano, the Puna is almost treeless, and in general useful only for grazing. Temperatures are only slightly higher than on the high plateau.

It is the area of the valleys (Valles) which is significant from the point of view of habitation and agriculture. These are cut in winding, trellised courses through the less resistant rock of the Puna, in general lying from 2,000 to 5,000 or more feet below the surrounding heights, and are correspondingly warmer. In many places restricted in width by the surrounding mountains, they also often open out into fertile and well-watered basins. The most notable of these is that in which Cochabamba, the second city of Bolivia, is located. Formed at the confluence of a number of source streams of the Río Grande, the entire basin occupies an area of over 500 square miles, with about 100 square miles of flat, alluvial bottom land. It lies 8,000 to 8,500 feet above sea level. Similar, though smaller, are the basins of Sucre and Tarija.

Rainfall is moderate, with a summer maximum and a semiarid winter, and decreases toward the south and southwest. Mean annual precipitation in the Valles ranges between 20 and 30 inches, and mean annual temperatures are in the 60's. The rivers are capable of supporting irrigation, which is necessary in many places.

The natural vegetation of the Valles is mainly drought-resistant scrub and small trees, away from the river bottoms. The foothills on the east along a strip running from the Argentine boundary north to Santa Cruz carry a semitropical deciduous forest in which the commercially most useful trees are the walnut and quebracho, a tree of extremely hard wood and a source of both timber and tannin. The cultivated crops include wheat, barley, alfalfa, grapes and many other fruits such as peaches, apricots and pears (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The Eastern Plains

From the foothills of the eastern Andes to the northern and eastern boundaries are the eastern plains, occupying approximately 70 percent of the country's total area. The plains slope very gently to the north and east. Over the 600 miles traversed between Rurrenabaque, where the Río Beni emerges from its last Andean gorge, and the northeast corner of the country where its waters, joined to the Madera, leave the country, the loss in altitude is only 400 feet. Similar low gradients apply nearly everywhere. A few hills or very low mountains, rising 1,200 to 3,000 feet above the surrounding plain are found in the extreme east on the Brazilian border, and in a long narrow ridge rising 180 miles east of Santa Cruz and extending toward the Brazil-Paraguay corner. Otherwise the general flatness of the terrain is unrelieved.

The general uniformity of structure does not create uniform characteristics, however. Three main zones exist, the tropical forest, the savanna country and the Chaco. Distinctions between them are caused principally by the differences in the rainfall regime.

Forests

The tropical forest regions are of two classifications. The entire north end of the country west of the Río Beni and the northern part of the area between the Beni and the Namoré is occupied by the true Amazonian selva, or tropical, largely evergreen rain forest, which requires heavy rains, fairly evenly distributed throughout the year. Further to the southeast, and covering most of the eastern quarter of the department of Santa Cruz, is a large belt of mixed, but mostly deciduous, tropical forest. Most of this area has insufficient rainfall in winter to support the evergreens.

The selva is formed of tall trees (80–100 feet) without branches for most of their height. The crowns form a dense canopy through which sunlight can hardly penetrate. Occasionally, even taller trees rise above the canopy. Lianas, parasitic vines, orchids and other air plants festoon the trees. For lack of sunlight, there is little underbrush, and the ground cover is formed of decaying vegetation and fallen leaves. The selva contains many valuable hardwoods, including mahogany, but difficulties of transport have hindered exploitation. Two other forest products, quinine and rubber, are abundant in their natural state, but have never been developed as plantation industries. Brazil nuts constitutes a valuable export product (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The semideciduous forests of the east are hardly explored and only locally exploited. Many varieties of hardwood exist. Toward the east there are great areas of swamp.

Savanna

Between the selva and the drier forest are the savannas extending from Santa Cruz north to the edge of the selva and generally filling the drainage basin of the Río Mamoré and its tributaries. Their vegetation consists of great areas of coarse tropical grasses, scrub, palms and heavier tropical woodland, the last, especially, near the rivers. Around Santa Cruz commercial crops of sugar cane, rice and citrus fruits are grown, with grazing lands to the east. Further north are the great open plains of Mojos in the department of El Beni, where the herds of wild and semi-wild cattle are estimated to number in the hundreds of thousands. The savanna region has as heavy or heavier summer rains than the selva, but a relatively dry winter.

The Gran Chaco

South of the Santa Cruz plain and the low range east thereof is the Gran Chaco, extending south as far as Argentina. Only its northern rim is in Bolivia. Essentially a rather open, grassy woodland, it has in places extensive treeless areas. It is principally grazed by half-wild cattle and goats, but is also the source of quebracho wood and bark. Drenched with up to 40 inches of rain in the summer (December to February), it receives little rain the other nine months, and becomes a semi-desert, with water scarce everywhere (see fig. 3).

Drainage and Waterways

North of the Chaco the drainage of the entire plains area forms part of one system, that of the Río Madera which continues into Brazil as one of the major tributaries of the Amazon. The Madera is formed at the junction of the Río Beni and Río Mamoré near the extreme northern corner of the country. At the very north is the Abuná, serving as part of the boundary with Brazil, and isolated by selva from the rest of the country.

The largest tributary of the Río Beni is the Madre de Dios, which rises in Peru not far east of Cusco, and joins the Beni at Riberalta. The Beni itself is the resultant of innumerable tributaries joining together near the foot of the Yungas and is fed by many others of the plain. The Madre de Dios is nearly half a mile wide as it joins the Beni, which is even wider at that point.

The Mamoré and its tributaries form an entire system in themselves. Most of the tributaries rise in the Yungas from near the Río Beni to the ridges overlooking Santa Cruz. The main river takes the name Mamoré only after the junction of two of the largest affluents, the Chaparé and the Ichilo. The longest tributary, the Río Grande or Guapay, has its headwaters in the Cochabamba basin, turns a half circle and flows southeast for 150 miles (under four separate names) before reaching the plains. It then makes another and wide-half-circle around Santa Cruz and joins the Mamoré.

A great deal of the area between the Beni and the Mamoré was an inland sea in prehistoric times, of which Lakes Rogagua and Rogoaguado and the swamps between and around them are the remnants. Not only there but elsewhere on the plains the annual rainy-season floods cover hundreds of square miles, possibly only inches deep, but enough that livestock starves, because there is little rising ground on which to find forage. The floods usually last several months, beginning in February.

The northeastern section of the plains is drained by the Río Iténez, or Guaporé as it is called by the Brazilians, and its tributaries. Rising in the Mato Grosso of Brazil, it forms much of the northeastern boundary. It is fed by the Paraguá; the San Martín and Blanco which unite to form the Baures; and the San Miguel, which in its lower reaches is called the Itonamas. Most of these flow through or at least partly through wooded and drier country and are less subject to flooding. There are nevertheless large swampy areas where the slope is insufficient to carry off the water. In a sense, the Río Parapetí is part of the eastern system. Rising in the Valles region, it enters the northern Chaco about 150 miles south of Santa Cruz, and loses itself in the Bañados de (Swamps of) Izozog, which in turn have intermittent outlets toward other swamps to the north, near the source of the Río San Miguel which some of the water eventually reaches.

The almost imperceptible divide between Amazon and Paraguay river drainage lies south of and parallel to the Parapetí, and continues northeast to the Brazilian border. Direct Paraguay drainage consists of a few shallow, slow-running swampy rivers in the extreme eastern forests. The Paraguay itself runs outside of and parallel to Bolivia's boundary, except for a short distance (20 miles) in the extreme southeast corner of the country. The only other permanently flowing river draining toward the Paraguay is the Pilcomayo whose many small source streams rise south and southwest of Potosí. Issuing from the Andes at Villa Montes, the Pilcomayo soon leaves the country to form the boundary between Paraguay and Argentina. A few of the upper tributaries of the Bermejo rise in the department of Tarija.

The principal rivers of the plain are wide and deep enough that certain sections of them are navigable by shallow draft, paddle-wheel steamers or launch-towed barges. Interconnection between the greater rivers of the Mamoré-Madera system is prevented, however, by a series of granite outcrops producing rapids or cascades (*cachuelas*), which effectively block the rivers to navigation. The Beni is thus blocked at Esperanza, and the Mamoré at Guajará Mirim, the location of the uppermost of a series of rapids extending for more than 200 miles into Brazil. The upper limits of power-driven navigation of any sort are reached some distance below the Andean foothills; in general,

these points are not connected with the highland centers of population by all-weather roads. Therefore, while water transportation is of considerable importance locally to the river settlements of the plains, it contributes little to the national economy or distribution problem (see fig. 4.).

Fauna of the Plains

All the rivers of the plain are teeming with fish of many edible varieties, some weighing up to 80 or 100 pounds. It is said that at certain seasons fish may be scooped from the Pilcomayo with a bucket, and that receding floodwater leaves many fish stranded on the banks. The voracious, carnivorous *piraña*, schools of which will strip a man




Figure 4. Communications Systems of Bolivia.

or animal to a skeleton in minutes, is found but is fortunately rare. A type of sting-ray is also found. Fresh water turtles are plentiful, as are alligators. River mammals include the capybara, an 80-pound member of the guinea-pig family, the so-called river seal and the otter. Other animals of the plains include swamp deer, squirrels, badgers, jaguars, anteaters, peccaries, and many kinds of monkeys. Birds include herons, ducks, parrots, turkeys and partridges.

MINERAL RESOURCES

The mineral wealth of Bolivia was known and exploited before Spanish times, and even before the rise of the Inca empire. Copper and tin, as well as gold and silver, were extracted, but the Spaniards, on their arrival, were interested in little but the precious metals.

Alluvial gold continued to be exploited, but silver was the great discovery. The mines of Potosí alone are believed to have produced, under the Spaniards, the worth of about $1 billion in current United States money. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the known silver mines were reduced to producing low quality ores. Twentieth century silver production is mostly incidental to the mining of the metals of interest to modern industry (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Deposits of tin, which since the latter part of the last century have been the mainstay of the Bolivian economy, are found in many places along the Cordillera Real and its southern extension all the way to the Argentine border. Tin ore is often found in association with the ores of other minerals, such as silver, zinc, lead, bismuth, antimony and tungsten. Sometimes three or four metals are found in the same mine. In most cases, declining metal content and lack of proved reserves contribute to reduced output.

Copper is mined in several places in the Altiplano proper and in the western cordillera. Sulphur is plentiful in the volcanic regions of the west, but is not extensively mined. There is also some silver in the west. The salt and soda deposits of the saltpans are virtually unexploited commercially.

Gold, principally alluvial, is mined by placer methods in the Yungas. There are other deposits near La Paz and in several other places to the south along the mountains, but the proportion of deep to surface mining is unknown.

Coal has not been found anywhere in the country. The only known deposit of iron is in the far east, near Puerto Suárez, but its isolation and the high cost of transportation prevent its exploitation.

There are three main petroleum fields in production, all in the southeastern foothills of the Andes, on the Chaco's edge. At least one, that at Camiri (about half way between Santa Cruz and Yacuiba) has large proved reserves. The two others, Sanandita (40 miles north of Yacuiba) and Bermejo (further west on the Argentine

border) are smaller in output and reserves. Natural gas, in quantities probably sufficient for all Bolivia's needs, is also present, though as yet little used (see ch. 19, Industry).

SURFACE AND AIR TRANSPORT FACILITIES

Only very recently has the country's transportation net begun to be a unifying factor in the country. With the entire economy for centuries based on mining in the Altiplano and its rim, the main objective of routes of transportation was to haul minerals out of the country and food and manufactured goods into it. Routes which were termed roads were of course used to link the towns; but they were, as many remain, mainly wagon and pack-train trails following the routes of least difficult going, with by far a greater number of fords than bridges, and the minimum necessary of gravel surfacing and ditching. Other improvement is almost entirely the work of the last 30 years. There are only four or five roads connecting highlands and plains, and except around Santa Cruz, almost none in the whole lowland area, where most travel is by water, on horseback or, recently, by air.

Railroads, construction of which began only after the beginning of this century, were also principally for the benefit of the export and import of goods. Even today, only two railroads can be said to provide exclusively internal service: the short La Paz-Yungas line and the Oruro-Cochabamba spur off the main north-south route. Two railroads traverse the southern part of the plains, one completed in 1962 and the other still lacking several bridges. Neither connects with any other rail line in the country.

Roads

During the last decade the highways have begun to emerge from a state which can only be called primitive. Writing in 1953, Harold Osborne characterized Bolivian roads as "uniformly bad, usually incredibly bad, and most often dangerous." Improvement has started since then, particularly in areas of strategic importance to the internal economy, especially connections between the highlands and the Yungas and Santa Cruz areas.

The government reports the existence of over 12,000 miles of roads, but its classification of them is qualitatively undependable. What are called national main roads are frequently dirt roads, partially graveled and sometimes undrained or ditched, and often on unstable mountain sides, subject to landslides. Intent on the part of government is probably best indicated by the National Planning Council's publication *Planamiento* (Planning) for September 1961, wherein roads are classified in two groups: the basic road net (*red fundamental*), presumably to be paved eventually; and a secondary net

(*red complementaria*) of principal feeder roads, evidently at present to be provided with no more than a gravel surface.

As listed, the basic road net had 2,350 miles in service and 280 miles actually under construction, with another 700 miles planned. Of the 2,350 miles (outside of principal towns), only 343.5 miles were paved (asphalt) and 207 miles graveled. Of the balance, only 600 miles had roadside drainage. The asphalted roads were the newly completed Cochabamba-Santa Cruz road, and the Santa Cruz-Montero road. The feeder net had 2,883 miles in service or under construction, but only 92 miles was even graveled in 1961.

The Inter-American Highway is at a very early stage of development within Bolivia. It follows generally the historic route from the Peruvian line: Desaguadero-El Alto-Oruro-Potosí-Tarija, reaching the Argentine border at Bermejo, a total distance of about 780 miles. Little of it is hard-surfaced, even with gravel, and several hundred miles are not even drained by roadside ditches. It has a lower priority in improvement plans than the rest of the basic net. There are several passable roads from the Altiplano into the Yungas, and it is those, and others from the highlands to the plains, which are currently of high priority (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

Railroads

La Paz and the mining areas to the south and southeast are connected by four railroad lines to three countries. A line runs from La Paz to the lake port of Guaqui, from where shipment is made across the lake to the Peruvian port of Puno, whence a rail line runs to the Pacific ports of Mollendo and Matarani where Bolivian goods have free entry. Similar arrangements with Chile are in effect by means of a line from La Paz direct to Arica, also a free port. To the south, a line runs through Oruro to Uyuni, and then to the Chilean port of Antofagasta. From Uyuni a branch line runs to Argentina, crossing the border at Villazón, and eventually reaching Buenos Aires.

From near Oruro a branch line runs to Cochabamba through extremely difficult terrain, where the railroad, as well as the road, is frequently cut by rainy season landslides. Short branch lines from Cochabamba reach Vila Vila and Arani, originally constructed to service the agricultural area. Because of high costs, they are little used, and are deteriorating. The mining area of Uncia is served by a spur track from just south of Oruro, and another branch runs from Río Mulato over the highest rail and highway pass in the world (15,800 feet) to Potosí and Sucre.

Two other rail lines are completed or in process of completion—that from Yacuiba to Santa Cruz and from Corumbá (Brazil) to Santa Cruz. The former is finished (less several bridges) and transports passengers, mail and light baggage from Argentina to Santa

Cruz, light loads are ferried across the places lacking bridges. The Yacuiba-Santa Cruz line is financially supported principally from Argentine sources. As a result of diplomatic negotiations, Brazil has built a railroad from Corumbá, on the Paraguay River, to Santa Cruz. For some years, the entire line has been complete and operative, but has lacked the final bridge across the Río Grande east of Santa Cruz. In mid-1962, this bridge was finally completed, and as a consequence, Bolivia now has a line eventually connecting with Brazil's Atlantic port of Santos.

All the railroads in Bolivia are of meter gauge (39.37 inches) except the spur line to the Uncia tin mines which is .75 meter (29.53 inches) (see ch. 19, Industry; ch. 22, Domestic Trade; ch. 3, Foreign Economic Relations).

Air Facilities

Bolivia is another of the Andean countries of South America which has recently both figuratively and literally changed from the ox-cart to the air transport stage of communication, and to a limited extent, of distribution. Airlines efficiently serve it internationally, and rather completely but somewhat ineffectively internally.

Two of the great international airlines serve the country—PANARGA (Pan American-Grace Airways) and Braniff. Both land at La Paz (El Alto Airport) and fan out from there south and east. Several other South American lines stemming from Peru, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay operate lines in and out of Bolivia.

Domestic lines of which the Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano, a semiprivate line (the government is believed to own 60 percent of the stock) is by far the largest, operate within the country. They fly in and out of airports and landing strips of varying quality distributed through both the highlands and the plains, some on scheduled runs and many simply on the occasion of obtaining a cargo. Prepared and improvised landing strips are in considerable number. Few fields below the level of the Altiplano, except those at Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, are usable by modern, heavy planes; and none, including that of La Paz, will in 1962 take jet transports, but a project exists, financed in part through the United States Development Loan Fund, for the improvement of El Alto. Nevertheless there are many lightly surfaced fields and grass strips, from which cargoes of vegetables and beef are delivered to the population centers of the Altiplano and the Valles. For most such places on the plains, air transportation is the only practicable means of moving persons and goods between highlands and lowlands.

The Bolivian Military Air Transport Service supplements the efforts of the other lines, especially to places uneconomical to reach on a commercial basis, and hauls commercial passengers and freight

as well as purely military cargo. Both the Bolivian Development Corporation and the Mining Corporation (government entities) have small fleets (see fig. 4).

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Territorial Losses

When Bolivia emerged from the wars of liberation as an independent state and adopted its first constitution in 1826, it was considered to comprise the area previously administered by the Spanish Audiencia of Charcas, probably twice the extent of the present state. In the southwest, Bolivia had an outlet to the sea extending for some distance north and south of the port of Antofagasta, including the desert of Atacama, then considered useless. In the north, in the unexplored and unexploited Amazonian region, the land as far as a line from the headwaters of the Javarí River to the Madeira River, approximately along the seventh parallel, south latitude, was claimed. Other strips of what is now Brazilian territory ran east of the present boundary as far as the Paraguay River. In the far southeast, Bolivia claimed all the territory in the angle between the Paraguay and Bermejo Rivers as its inheritance from Charcas (see fig. 5).

Except for those between Bolivia, Peru and Chile, none of the boundaries was even agreed upon, much less marked. Further, then even more than now, the country's population and commercial and cultural interests were concentrated in the highlands, and the remoteness and difficulty of communication with the fringe areas made their retention difficult. The result was a continual loss of territory, either through negotiation or war.

In 1867, all territory in the east outside the present boundaries was ceded to Brazil in return for navigation rights on the Madeira and Amazon. The Pacific coastal province was lost through the War of the Pacific (1879–82) in which Chile defeated Bolivia and Peru. The northern region of Acre went to Brazil after a jungle war which was ended by the Treaty of Petropolis in 1903, and the present boundary with Peru in the northwest was established by negotiation in 1909. The land between the Pilcomayo and Bermejo Rivers, claimed but never effectively occupied by Bolivia, was awarded, over that country's protests, to Argentina in the settlement of a war (1865–70) between Paraguay and the triple alliance of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Bolivia's stubborn refusal to abandon its historic claims to the northern Chaco, plus its desire for a river port on the Paraguay, were underlying causes of the Chaco War of 1932–35 by which Bolivia lost the major part of its claimed territory in that region (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).




Figure 5. The Maximum Extent of Bolivia

Territorial Subdivisions

The largest territorial subdivision of the country is the department (*departamento*). Each of the nine departments is subdivided into provinces (*provincias*). The number of provinces increased markedly, in spite of the loss of territory, during the first half of this century. It is not known whether the process has continued during the past decade. Traditionally, provinces have been divided into cantons (*cantones*), which may perhaps be compared to townships (see fig. 1).

Both the 1945 and 1961 Constitutions mention, without however either definition or description, an intermediate subdivision between

the province and canton, called the section (*sección*). Nothing is known about this unit except that the constitution prescribes that its capital, like that of the department or province, shall have a mayor and municipal council.

The Two Capitals

Many maps show Bolivia as a country of two capitals, Sucre and La Paz. Sucre, founded early in the Spanish conquest under the name of Charcas, was the earliest seat of government and so remained throughout Spanish times and into the era of independence. Successively it has borne four names—Charcas, La Plata, Chuquisaca and Sucre—the last given at the time of the creation of the Republic in honor of Bolívar's Marshal Antonio José de Sucre. Traditional center of culture and learning, its title as legal capital has never been extinguished. La Paz, founded a little later, grew in commercial and strategic importance because of its location beside the main route of communication at the eastern edge of the Altiplano. By 1900, most of the functions of the central government had been moved to La Paz, which has become the *de facto* capital. Since that time, of the arms of national government, only the Supreme Court has functioned at Surce (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

POPULATION

Size and Growth

Bolivia does not have a history of thorough, scientifically conducted censuses. Before that of 1950, the last with any pretension to completeness was conducted in 1900, but it was admittedly incomplete in its head-count, and relied heavily on unreliable official reports and estimates. The census of 1950, the last conducted, was probably far more complete in its enumeration, but it, too, was subject to official correction for estimated omissions and resorted to local estimates for unreachable tribal Indians of the eastern plains and selva. Its adjusted figure for total population was 3,019,031, which includes an 8.4 percent upward adjustment for undercount, and a rounded estimate of 87,000 for tribal Indians in seven departments.

Projection forward by extrapolation from a figure obtained partially through estimate doubtless produces some error, particularly when the bases for determining change—birth, death and migration records—are also far from complete. Nevertheless, from such statistics as are available, United Nations documents, with stated reservations, estimate a net growth rate of approximately 1.4 percent during the 1950's, while the general rate of increase in South America as a whole was of 2.3 percent. Projection on this basis produces, for the beginning of 1962, a figure of roughly 3,526,000. Some confirmation

of that growth rate is found in the partially complete vital statistics for 1959, which show a crude excess of births over deaths of 14.7 per thousand, and a tendency for emigration to exceed immigration.

Distribution and Settlement Patterns

Based on the number actually enumerated in 1950, the population of the country is generally young. Over 49 percent are 19 years of age or younger, 38 percent are between 20 and 49 years of age, and less than 13 percent are 50 or over. Females outnumber males in the proportion of 104:100.

Urbanism in any meaningful sense is difficult to determine from the statistics, because by census definition the administrative centers of departments, provinces and cantons are all classified as urban, and in the last-mentioned category a considerable majority have populations smaller than 1,000. All of the department capitals with the exception of Cobija, Pando, have undeniably urban characteristics. The same is true of a number of the other larger towns, of which there were, in 1950, 11 with populations over 5,000 and 15 others with 2,500 inhabitants or more.

According to Bolivian official sources, urban growth between 1950 and 1960 has been considerable, measured by the estimated increase in the population of department capitals. It has been, however, unevenly distributed among them: Sucre and Santa Cruz have each increased by about 50 percent; all others have grown between 15 and 50 percent except La Paz and Cochabamba, already the largest, which have gained approximately 8 and 11 percent respectively, and Cobija, whose gain is unreported (see table 1).

Table 1. Department Population and Urban Growth in Bolivia

Department	1950 population [1]	Capital	Population	
			1950	[2] 1960
La Paz	948, 446	La Paz	321, 073	347, 942
Cochabamba	490, 475	Cochabamba	80, 795	90, 006
Oruro	210, 260	Oruro	62, 975	81, 553
Potosí	534, 399	Potosí	45, 758	53, 538
Chuquisaca	292, 980	Sucre	40, 128	60, 112
Santa Cruz	286, 145	Santa Cruz	34, 837	54, 241
Tarija	126, 752	Tarija	16, 869	20, 125
El Beni	119, 770	Trinidad	8, 695	11, 156
Pando	19, 804	Cobija	1, 726	([3])

[1] Population for departments not available for 1960.
[2] Estimate.
[3] Not available for 1960.

Source: Adapted from Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, *Resultados Generales del Censo de la República de Bolivia, 1950*, 1951; and Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, *Boletín No. 80, 1960*, 1960.

Accepting as a basis for estimate the area assumed by the census (412,000 square miles, approximately) and the 1962 population projection, the population density country-wide is 8.56 per square mile. Excluding from consideration those provinces of the plains and the southern Altiplano where the population density is well under 1 per square mile, the density of the more heavily populated northern Altiplano, Yungas, Puna and Valles, the effective national territory, rises to 25.8 per square mile.

Within this area of major concentration, there are two areas of maximum density. One is in La Paz Department, where in the five provinces most closely grouped around Lake Titicaca (but excluding La Paz itself) the density is about 60 per square mile. The other area is essentially the Cochabamba basin, where the density is even higher, rising to 84 per square mile, again not considering the city itself (see fig. 6).

Distribution figures based on ethnicity have to be deduced, because ethnic distinctions no longer have the validity they formerly did. Traditionally, inhabitants were either white, *cholo* (mixed) or Indian. The last census took no account of mixed blood, but defined as indigenous persons those who fitted a socioeconomic pattern characterized by distinctive (non-European) clothing, dialect, traditions and culture, and general illiteracy. In the actual enumeration, 63 percent of the population actually counted were so categorized. Presumably the estimated 87,000 uncounted plains Indians should be added, which would raise the percentage to about 66.

Another approach to an ethnic division is possible through the census report on "mother tongue." In this enumeration about 988,000 were listed as Quechua-speaking, 664,000 Aymara-speaking, and another 68,000 as speakers of other unspecified Indian dialects. (Again, the estimated 87,000 could be added to the last figure.) Taken together, this amounts to nearly 67 percent of the population. Opinions of unprovable validity place the "white" population from 5 to 15 percent, the remainder being considered of mixed or Indian blood. The question of Negroid characteristics hardly enters, so few African slaves were ever taken to Bolivia.

Aymaras inhabit the northern Altiplano and mountain slopes, including part of the Yungas. These regions are their ancestral lands, where they have maintained their ethnic integrity throughout Inca and Spanish conquest. Deeply attached to their difficult terrain, they resist stubbornly any attempt to change or move them. The Quechuas are the people of the southeast Altiplano rim, the Puna and the Valles. They seem slightly more adaptable than the Aymaras to the idea of transplantation, but nevertheless adhere quite tenaciously to tradition (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).




Figure 6. Population Density of Bolivia.

The attachment of the highland Indians to their respective homelands has acted as a strong deterrent to the longfelt need on the part of Bolivian governments to colonize and exploit the more fertile parts of the lowland areas. Past efforts to establish colonies have been of small success; in general, about 90 percent of the colonists have returned to their homes in a short time.

A long-range plan, probably highly optimistic, visualizes the transfer to the Yungas and plains of nearly a half million persons over the 10 years after 1961. All means of orientation, training, persuasion, and initial government support in the way of subsidies, housing and tools are in consideration. The existing widespread road construction projects are part of the effort of suasion, in a sense. In the Yungas, it has had some success, particularly along the La Paz-Caranavi road,

where the voluntary development of colonies has tended to keep up with the progress of road building. It is hoped that branch roads, to the north off the Santa Cruz highway, now in planning stage will have similar effect.

Population of Foreign Origin

The country has not attracted a large number of immigrants. The census of 1950, in its language analysis, lists 4,740 speakers of Portuguese (mostly from Brazil), and 3,559 German speakers, some of whom may be members of the 500-family Mennonite colony near Santa Cruz, and others of whom are Jews who fled Germany in the 1930's. There are only about 2,500 speakers of other European languages, including English, a small number listing Arabic as their mother-tongue, and almost 1,000 "others."

Immigrants later than 1950 include one colony of Japanese (1,500) and three of Okinawans (totaling over 3,000), all settled on farming land near Santa Cruz. The Japanese are said to be resolutely self-isolating, except for business contacts, while the Okinawans are assimilating and acculturating to a marked degree.

CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

The population of modern Bolivia draws its ethnic origins from two major components: the linguistically and culturally diverse native Indian groups and the white Spanish speakers who, in the mid-sixteenth century, imposed their rule upon the area and its peoples. In spite of more than four centuries of contact and considerable interbreeding, however, these disparate ethnic elements have never been welded into a single people, with one language and a sense of common nationality. In modern times the descendants of the conquerors and the conquered continue to be sharply divided, by language and by differences in way of life, into socially isolated ethnic groups.

From the earliest days of colonial rule, interbreeding between Spaniards and Indians had two effects. On the one hand, it introduced racial admixture to the ranks of both ethnic groups, for many children of mixed parentage were assimilated socially to one or the other. On the other hand, it gave rise to a distinct group of *mestizos* (persons of mixed blood who were seen by society as intermediate to and distinct from both their backgrounds). The greatest proportion of *mestizos* were the illegitimate children of casual alliances between Spaniards and Indian women and were born in or near centers of Spanish population. In consequence, they were usually raised with their Indian kinsmen but, at the same time, sustained contact with their white neighbors. Bilingualism in Spanish and one of the native tongues therefore came to be a cultural hallmark of the *mestizos*. As the population of *mestizos* grew, its members developed an increasingly strong sense of social identity, and by the middle of the seventeenth century they constituted a third recognizable ethnic grouping in colonial society.

Great contrasts in physical environment between the eastern lowlands and the Andean highlands of what is today Bolivia have always been reflected in sharp contrasts between the ethnic histories of the two areas. When the Spaniards arrived in the highlands, they encountered a relatively dense population of sedentary agriculturalists, predominantly speakers of Quechua or Aymara (both languages classified by the American linguist, Joseph Greenberg, as members of the widespread Andean-Equatorial family). These peasant peoples had

achieved a high level of technological efficiency and sociopolitical organization and had been united under the rule of the powerful Inca Empire. In the lowlands, by contrast, the white invaders found a sparsely settled population of culturally varied and socially disunited peoples, speaking several dozen tongues affiliated with the Arawakan, Tupían and other less widespread linguistic families. None of the lowland groups had achieved the high level of technology and organization characteristic of the highlanders.

The conquest of the Inca highlands was achieved with a minimum of physical combat, for once the invaders had captured control of the highly centralized imperial government, local units were left without leadership and capitulated readily. The Indian peasants had to work for and pay tribute to their new masters in much the same way as they had under the domination of the Inca overlords. In spite of civil wars and forced servitude in the silver mines early in the colonial period and continuing mistreatment, the highland Indians survived the conquest with a minimum of disruption to their way of life.

The lowlanders, on the other hand, being more mobile and generally lacking the Inca-imposed traditions of obedience to central authority, most often mounted a fierce resistance to the white intruders. In consequence, most of the lowland native groups rapidly became extinct, both by physical extermination and by dispersal of their members.

The social order, imposed by the Spaniards, which persisted until the 1952 revolution, was structured around a rigid system of ethnically based castes. The invaders occupied all key positions of power and authority, and the natives were relegated to a subservient status as peasants, forced laborers and payers of tribute. The *mestizos* rapidly came to assume a middle position in this social scheme, serving as artisans, small merchants, petty local officials and, most important, overseers of Indian labor (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The position of the Indians in this system was not only one of subservience, but also one of almost total isolation from the rest of the society. By the end of the colonial period, most of the Quechua and Aymara speakers had been forced either into virtual servitude on the great landed estates owned by the dominant Spaniards and their descendants or, as freeholders, onto the most marginal and inaccessible lands. In either situation, they remained isolated from the national economy, for they did not control the resources necessary to the production of marketable surpluses. Their inferior social status also resulted in their being denied even a minimal voice in national politics under both colonial and republican governments. The existence of the *mestizos* as a bilingual middle group obviated the need for the Indians to learn Spanish, the language of national social and economic life. In general, the social isolation of the Indians was—and con-

tinued until very recently to be—such that they never came to perceive themselves as citizens of a national state.

Radical social, economic and political changes which have taken place since the 1952 revolution have largely destroyed the bases of the ethnic caste system. Agrarian reform has caused the return of control over productive farmlands to the Indians. Constitutional reforms have given them an at least potentially powerful voice in national politics. The rural educational programs instituted by the revolutionary governments have already begun to spread the knowledge of Spanish and increase literacy among the previously monolingual and illiterate Quechua and Aymara speakers.

Although it is quite clear that as the traditional caste-based social structure disappears, the cultural and linguistic barriers which have divided the Bolivian population into isolated ethnic segments will tend to fade, this process will undoubtedly be slow. The ethnic groups around which colonial society was structured continue to be clearly defined in 1962 and will probably persist for some time.

Although ethnic divisions in the modern population are much more social and cultural than biological, Bolivians tend to speak of them in explicitly racial terms. Thus, the minority of Spanish-speaking persons of predominantly European cultural orientation who have traditionally dominated national society are commonly called whites (*blancos*) in spite of the fact that most members of the group have some Indian ancestry.

The *mestizo* caste has also ceased to be a specifically racial group, for in addition to the mixed-bloods who formed its earliest membership, many persons of more-or-less unmixed Indian ancestry have been assimilated to it by virtue of having learned Spanish and abandoned their Indian social identity. The degree to which this group has come to be identified by social and cultural, rather than racial, characteristics is reflected in the fact that Bolivians rarely apply the term *mestizo* (which means, literally, "mixed") to it. More commonly, members of this ethnic group are called *cholos*, a term which implies no more than an unspecified degree of Indian racial heritage. In common discourse, *mestizo* is used to denote specifically persons of mixed ancestry, rather than members of the ethnic group of social and cultural intermediates.

The blurring of racial lines, along with some fluidity in the criteria which mark off the ethnic groups from one another has made census classification difficult. In addition, no Bolivian census has been taken with the degree of accuracy and completeness necessary to inspire confidence in the population statistics reported therein. As a result, estimates of the relative proportions of the socially recognized ethnic groups in the national population vary considerably.

The compilers of the 1950 census abandoned the attempt to treat Bolivians in terms of traditional racial categories. Taking no ac-

count of the racially and culturally intermediate categories *mestizo* and *cholo*, they defined as "Indian" a person whose language and way of life reflected an indigenous rather than a European heritage. On this basis, 63 percent of the Bolivian population was classified as "Indian." This indigenous category did not include the remnants of lowland Indian groups who were not directly counted by the census takers. These isolated and reduced tribes were estimated to number approximately 87,000. On this basis, the total 1950 census estimate for the proportions of culturally defined Indians is on the order of 66 percent. Other estimates of the Indian population, also on the basis of sociocultural criteria, range as high as 70 percent and as low as 53 percent. The remainder of the population in these estimates would include *cholos*, whites and detribalized Indians, with the first group predominating (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN ETHNIC STRUCTURE

The Highlands

Although much is known of the general outlines of highland prehistory, detailed archaeological studies are available only for the northern Altiplano. For certain periods, the cultures of the Lake Titicaca basin can be described in some detail, but knowledge of the numerous and diverse peoples of such important areas as those now called Cochabamba and Chuquisaca is derived almost totally from the sketchy and probably inaccurate oral traditions recorded by early Spanish writers (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Throughout approximately 2,000 years of prehistory, the peoples of highland Bolivia were culturally similar to their better-known neighbors in what is now Peru. For most periods, there is considerable evidence of communication between the various Bolivian Indian groups and those of quite distant parts of the Andean area. Subsistence, for most of the groups, was based upon a combination of intensive agriculture and the herding of llamas and alpacas. Although no traces of large cities have been found, archaeological remains of pre-Inca peoples in certain Altiplano zones and in the Cochabamba valleys indicate that their level of technology and organization permitted the support of quite dense populations. Both archaeological evidence and oral traditions suggest the existence of small political states, similar in organization to those of the Peruvian section. The technologies typical of most Andean cultures, such as metallurgy, pottery and weaving, were well developed in most parts of pre-Inca Bolivia and bore much stylistic resemblance to those of Peru.

In the ruins of the great temple center of Tiahuanaco, on the Altiplano a few miles south of Lake Titicaca, are found the remains of the most important pre-Inca culture of highland Bolivia. The Tiahuanaco culture reflected not only a rich artistic and technological achievement, but also the degree of culture communication which existed in early times between Bolivia and neighboring Andean areas, for sometime around A.D. 1,000 art styles and architectural features characteristic of that culture had spread rapidly over both the highland and coastal sections of what is now Peru. The identity of the builders of the Tiahuanaco has never been definitely established, but many archaeologists hold that they were the ancestors of the present-day Aymara (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The periods between the decline of Tiahuanaco and the advent of the Inca are not well-known archaeologically, but it is possible to establish a definite link between the Altiplano cultures of that time and the Aymara. The pre-Inca Aymara were organized into several small states, each apparently under a hereditary ruler, which were involved in a continuous series of wars and shifting alliances. It was by exploiting these divisions that the Quechua-speaking Inca entered the northern Altiplano, around 1450, and later extended their rule over all of what is today Bolivia (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

In addition to the numerically dominant Aymara, the Altiplano and the valleys of western Bolivia were populated in pre-Inca times by several other culturally and linguistically distinct peoples. In what is today Potosí Department, there were two fairy numerous groups, the Chicka and the Lipez. On the islands of western Lake Titicaca and in the swamps of the northern Desaguadero River lived a small group of fishing people, the Uru, who spoke a language (Puquina) unrelated to Aymara or Quechua and who were subjugated to the Aymara. Another group of Puquina speakers, the Chipaya, lived as herders in the Altiplano zone surrounding Lake Poopó. In the populous Cochabamba region was another group, also believed to have been linguistically distinct from the Aymara, to which, along with their territory, the Inca applied the name currently applied to the area. In the valleys of Chuquisaca (Sucre), the dominant group was called Yamparâ.

The scant 80 to 100 years of Inca rule had resulted, by the time of the Spanish conquest, in the imposition of considerable cultural and linguistic uniformity over the entire area. Inca polity was designed primarily to effect the rapid incorporation of alien ethnic groups into the empire and to foster absolute loyalty to its rule. The method used to achieve these aims normally included mandatory instruction in Quechua, the language of the ruling group; the imposition of sun worship, the official cult; and the forced migration of potentially hostile people to distant parts of the empire and their subsequent

replacement by groups of unquestioned loyalty (see ch. 2, Historical Settings).

These measures were applied with considerable rigor in the Bolivian area. Large groups of Aymara speakers were moved to other sections of the empire, where they were settled among peoples known to be loyal to the Inca. In addition, numerous Quechua speakers were brought in to colonize many of the valleys, particularly Cochabamba and Sucre. One exception to normal policy was the dispensation extended to many groups of Aymara speakers which permitted them to retain their native tongue. Certain tribes, however, were forced, either by official decree or by circumstances, to abandon Aymara for Quechua. Other groups did not fare so well in the retention of their linguistic and cultural identity. By the time of the Spanish conquest, only Aymara and Uru, of the numerous aboriginal tongues, had not passed into extinction. The deportation of some Aymara speakers and the enforcement of Quechua on others, along with the introduction of large numbers of settlers from the north, resulted in a radical shift in the ethnic and linguistic balance of the country, for by the middle of the sixteenth century, Quechua speakers predominated.

The institution of Spanish rule in the former Inca territories had immediate and profound effects upon the Indian population and its way of life. War, famine and social disorganization caused a drastic decline in population. The destruction of the Inca imperial system and the undermining of traditional authority reduced what had been a complex society to an undifferentiated subordinate caste. New agricultural techniques and products were introduced and caused radical changes in economic and social organization. Old priesthoods and temple cults were suppressed, and Christian forms were substituted in religious life (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Social Structure).

The Spanish colonial government's Indian policy was guided, essentially, by two aims: religious conversion of the native population and exploitation of its labor for the extraction of the mineral and agricultural wealth of the colony. In accordance with the weight assigned to either the religious or the economic aim, two basic philosophies of Indian policy materialized in the early postconquest days. On the one hand was the view that the Indian was a rational human being, endowed with a soul, and hence redeemable through missionary work. Exponents of this philosophy, the best known of whom was the "Apostle of the Indians," Bartolomé de las Casas, called for education and humane treatment of the natives, with the idea of ultimately integrating them into Christian, Spanish society. On the other hand was the view that the Indians were subhuman, probably without a soul and good only for enforced, hard physical labor. Although the latter philosophy was most current among civil and military Spaniards

resident in the colonies and seeking to exploit Indian labor, it also had its ecclesiastical supporter in Father Ginés de Sepúlveda, whose conviction was that the natives were inherently incapable of absorbing the teachings of Christianity.

The two conflicting approaches to the Indian question were debated in the Spanish court and among churchmen, with the final result that the Las Casas position won, and the Indians were officially and ecclesiastically declared to be human. From this resolution arose a policy of Indian government which was most humane and rational in conception, designed to effect a rapid religious conversion, to educate the Indians to the Spanish way of life and, at the same time, to ensure that by moderate tribute they made their contribution to the public wealth (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

These aims were formally implemented by measures intended to concentrate the population in areas accessible to Spanish control and to distribute colonial authority as widely as possible. One of the most important measures was the forced resettlement of dispersed populations in planned villages (*reducciones*) close to Spanish towns. To effect the distribution of Spanish authority, colonial law provided for the *encomienda*, a system by which individual colonists were given the right to collect tribute from Indian communities in return for assuming the responsibility of supervision and religious education (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 2, Historical Setting).

If the institutions of Spanish colonial policy were humane in conception, their application was most often fraught with abuse. Holders of *encomiendas* (called *encomenderos*) used their positions of authority to exact excessive tribute and, in some cases, to appropriate Indian lands for their own use. The system of labor conscription (*mita*), which required that all able-bodied Indian men present themselves periodically for short periods of paid work in the mines, was abused by inhuman treatment of the conscripts, by arbitrary extensions of the service period and by placing such large demands upon individual communities that they were left virtually devoid of adult males.

Estimates of highland Indian population at the time of the conquest, based upon early Spanish censuses of doubtful accuracy, vary widely. Taking into account exaggeration on the part of some reporters and underreporting on the part of others, a reasonable estimate for the Indian population of what is now highland Bolivia would be about 800,000 in 1532.

The early years of colonial rule were marked by a sharp decline in native population, conservatively estimated for the entire viceroyalty of Peru (including present-day Ecuador and Bolivia) at approximately 50 percent in the first 30 years following the conquest. A major part of this disastrous population loss is accounted for in the civil wars of the period, both those between the Indians and their con-

querors and those among the Spaniards themselves. Not only were large numbers of Indians killed in physical combat, but the disruption of food production caused many local famines. Another factor in the drastic decline in census numbers was migration to lowland areas not yet effectively penertated by the conquerors.

Firm imposition of Crown rule and the administrative reforms introduced by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the late sixteenth century resulted in the establishment of peace and economic stability which lasted unbroken until the mid-eighteenth century. However, the Indian population continued to decline for some time, though at a considerably slower rate (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Many Indians sought refuge from intolerable conditions by joining the class of urban servants and artisans (*yanaconas*) which was free from *mita* and tribute burdens. An individual assuming the status of *yanacona* was in general forced to abandon his native language and way of life for those of the Spaniards he served. Cut off from his communal roots, language and way of life, the *yanacona* quickly became assimilated to an urban class which was not identifiably Indian in either a cultural or a social sense (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Interbreeding between the Spaniards and Indians, quite common throughout most of the colonial period, rapidly gave rise to a large population of *mestizos*, whose position in society was often equivocal. *Mestizo* offspring of legitimate marriages (most often between high Spanish civil and military officials and Indian noblewomen) were generally assimilated to the elite group. Illegitimate children of lower-status Indian women by Spanish fathers were either absorbed into their mother's group, or, if they had been given a rudimentary education (as was often the case), as an expression of their fathers' interest in them, they entered the urban trades as artisans or petty merchants.

The growing ranks of *mestizos* merged socially with elements of the *yanacona* group to form a burgeoning lower class. In general, members of this class were Spanish speaking and culturally much closer to the European elite than to the Indian masses.

Although it did not consist overwhelmingly of racially mixed persons, for it included large numbers of more-or-less pure-blooded *yanaconas*, the colonial urban lower class was popularly called *mestizo* (and somewhat later, *cholo*) and most members subjectively identified themselves as such, regardless of their parentage. Thus, the confusion of racial and cultural terms gave rise to the ethnic and social category *cholo*.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the *mestizo* caste had achieved a large population and a high degree of group consciousness, which led its members to see themselves as distinct from the Indians and superior to them. This strong in-group feeling and sense of

superiority made it increasingly difficult for a person of known recent Indian background to become socially accepted by members of that caste.

By the end of the colonial period, the mining enterprises of Potosí were in nearly total decline, and most Spanish fortune seekers had turned their attention to another area of economic interest—large-scale commercial agriculture on huge landed estates, worked by entailed Indian labor. Through various means, largely illegal, the European elite had acquired control over most of the better farmlands and the Indians resident upon them. Thus, the great majority of highland Indians became tenant laborers, bound for life to their estates, a position which was to be typical of their caste status until the 1952 revolution.

The reversion of almost the entire Indian population to peasant life—a process virtually complete by the mid-eighteenth century—resulted in some increase in their numbers. Although the system of large tenant-worked estates (*latifundismo*) was exploitative and often abusive, neither mistreatment nor physical danger neared the level characteristic of the *mita*, which had been responsible for so great a population loss.

Independence from Spanish rule produced virtually no changes in the social and economic lot of the Indian population. Except for the departure of a few Crown officials, the small white elite remained unmodified in power and outlook. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, white control over the most productive lands and over Indian labor was further consolidated, and the landed estates with their populations of entailed Indian tenants grew in size and number. The necessity to maintain close control over the Indian peasants led the whites to oppose any attempts at their education or their employment outside of agriculture. The bulk of the Indian population was thus shielded from further culture change, and the way of life laid down in colonial times was perpetuated into the twentieth century (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The rigid social system of republican times was reflected in a considerably hardened attitude on the part of the whites toward both Indians and *cholos*. If the question of Indian racial inferiority had been a subject of debate among the Spanish conquerors, it was affirmatively settled for the great majority of their descendants, who saw the natives as totally incapable of absorbing more than the rudiments of civilization. During the first century of independence, Bolivian writers—almost all of them members of the white elite—were virtually unanimous in their scorn of or indifference to the Indian.

White racist prejudice directed at the Indians was largely a rationalization of the exploitative caste system, based upon transplanted

notions of economic liberalism which came into vogue during the nineteenth century.

The Indian, as a subsistence farmer, made little independent contribution to the national market. Most of the native communities which had escaped despoliation of their lands by the encroaching whites were organized around communal, rather than individual, land tenure. Under such conditions, social and economic writers of the period despaired of ever making the Indian into the sort of capitalistic producer they saw as necessary to modern society.

The views of the economic liberals seemed to have been amply confirmed by the hopeless inability of the Indians to adapt to conditions created by the attempts of Simón Bolívar to abolish communal land tenure (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Indeed, that inability to adapt served as a justification for the continued expansion of the large landed estates at the expense of Indian communities and for the almost total lack of attention to Indian education until the mid-twentieth century.

The social position of the *cholos*, intermediate to those of the Indians and the whites, continued more-or-less unchanged from colonial times, except that the achievement of national independence resulted in the grant of political suffrage to those who had learned to read and write. Throughout the republican period, the *cholos* gained a slowly increasing political and economic power, in spite of the often bitter opposition of the whites. The nascent middle class has been recruited largely from members of this group. Urban *cholos*, constituting the great majority of petty merchants and industrial workers, formed the backbone of the 1952 revolution (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The growth earlier in the present century of political and economic radicalism, particularly extreme nationalism and Marxist-oriented doctrines, was accompanied by the development of *indigenismo*, a view of the Indians which values both the population and its way of life as being truly expressive of Bolivian nationality. Socialistically inclined exponents of this philosophy saw in the Indian tradition of communal land tenure the roots of a new national social order. Cultural nationalists saw in Indian folk art and indigenous themes the basis of an art which would be truly independent of European models. An early *indigenista*, the great *cholo* writer Franz Tamayo, summed up this new view of the Indian and his tradition, saying that "All that is strongest, all that is morally best in Bolivia is Indian" (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Indigenismo was one of the philosophical roots of the national revolution, for not only did it underlie the nationalism which is an important part of the revolutionary ideology, but the theme of Indian emancipation is recurrently expressed in the call for both agrarian

and rural education reform. Certain *indigenistas* were personally responsible for much of the first political action which led to the establishment of the peasant leagues (*sindicatos campesinos*), through which the Indians, for the first time in national history, began to assert organized bloc power (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The mining boom of the early twentieth century, with the associated growth of urban population and the development of an at least rudimentary network of transportation facilities produced important, if not immediately dramatic, changes in the Indian way of life. Individuals who ventured into the mining centers for temporary wage work often returned to their communities with a rudimentary command of Spanish and a somewhat broadened outlook. The burgeoning of regional markets in more accessible areas, such as the Lake Titicaca shore and the Cochabamba Valleys, resulted in the introduction of industrially produced goods—particularly clothing—which slowly resulted in the disappearance of traditional Indian handicrafts. As early as the 1930's in many areas, the old male Indian costumes had been supplanted by factory produced clothing. The disappearance of highly distinctive Indian handicrafts tended to blur—if only in small degree—the most visible lines of ethnic division. Perhaps more important, the influx of new people, products and ideas to the hitherto isolated rural areas opened lines of communication which were later to be instrumental in the political agitation which was so important to the national revolution (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade; ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

During the Chaco War of the 1930's, Indians were conscripted into military service on a large scale (perhaps over 200,000 of them) for the first time in national history. Brought under the immediate control of elite officers and *cholo* noncommissioned officers of widely divergent ethnic and social backgrounds, Indian soldiers became aware of issues and ideas which transcended their previously circumscribed experience. This new awareness indicated to them, quite forcibly, because of the Army's defeat under the hitherto unassailable superiors, the fact of their Bolivian nationality and induced in many a sense of participation in national life which was traditionally quite alien to them. Chaco veterans were the core of a small, but active peasant leadership which was instrumental in forcing the institution of land reform (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

To a great extent, the 1952 revolution merely formalized the previously burgeoning small changes which had become at least faintly visible in the ethnic structure. A few Indian groups, particularly among the Quechua speakers of the Cochabamba area, but also to some extent among the Aymara, had demonstrated at least an incipient political awareness in their organization of the earlier *sindicatos*.

Many free Indian communities had begun petitioning for schools during the 1920's and 1930's.

The importance of the national revolution lies particularly in the fact that the entire political system was committed to the destruction of the caste structure which had so effectively isolated the Indians from national society. Organization and effective support were given to the previously weak and uncoordinated *sindicatos* through which the Indians were attempting to exert some force on the national political and economic scene. Strenuous but not as yet totally effective efforts have been made by revolutionary governments to spread literacy and Spanish among the culturally isolated Quechua and Aymara speakers. Land reform, although hastily and somewhat inefficiently implemented, has shown small but significant results in breaking down the traditional Indian isolation from the national economy (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics; ch. 8, Education).

The Lowlands

The eastern two-thirds of present-day Bolivia was, in preconquest times, an area of extreme linguistic and cultural diversity. The peoples who occupied the area extending from the dry grasslands of the Gran Chaco on the south to the hot, rainy jungles of Pando on the north spoke several dozen languages, affiliated with probably more than a dozen linguistic families. The area was apparently the terminus of numerous migrations, for many Indian groups there speak languages of the Tupían and the Arawakan families, whose centers of distribution are far from the Bolivian lowlands.

The preconquest peoples of eastern Bolivia varied widely in subsistence technology, population and level of sociopolitical organization. At one extreme were the numerous small kinship organized bands of hunting and gathering nomads of the Gran Chaco or the wandering Sirionó farmers and hunters of the forests of Santa Cruz and Beni Departments, whose only form of political organization was the informally appointed headmen who had little power. At the other extreme were the sedentary agricultural chieftainships, such as those of the Arawakan-speaking Moxos (Mojos), whose larger villages often had populations of some 1,500 people and were connected by causeways built above the level of the seasonal floodwaters.

Although the Inca sent several expeditionary forces into the eastern lowlands, they were never successful in subduing any of the numerous Indian groups of the area. There was, however, considerable trade between Indians of the Inca-dominated highland areas and those of the lowland chieftainships.

One of the largest and best organized of the preconquest groups in the East was the Chiriguano, sedentary Tupían-speaking farmers whose formidable military forces made occasional forays against Inca

outposts. The Chiriguano were a subtribe of a large group of Tupían speakers which, by a rapid series of migrations during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, spread out from a center of origin probably to the south of the lower Amazon in Brazil to reach northeastern Peru and into eastern Bolivia, covering a significant part of tropical South America. The dispersal of the Tupían speakers was apparently motivated by a burst of religious fervor which sent whole communities on pilgrimages in search of the mythical Land of the Grandfather, a sort of earthly paradise. A part of the group, which penetrated and settled in Paraguay in the fifteenth century and came to be known as the Guaraní, later returned northward (across the Chaco) to the area of Santa Cruz, where they formed the powerful Chiriguano chiefdoms.

Spanish control over the Oriente (eastern lowlands) and the Indian populations was established largely by two means. On the one hand, religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, set up a widespread system of mission settlements in which many Indian groups were induced, by peaceful persuasion or by force, to settle. Numerous expeditions of Spaniards set out, both from the Inca Highlands and from Paraguay, in search of the fabled land of the Great Tiger Lord (El Gran Paititi), whose wealth was said to rival that of the Inca Empire. Certain of these expeditions—notably that captained by Ñuflo de Chávez in the late 1550's—resulted in permanent settlements of Spaniards. From such population centers, military forces were sent out periodically against the surrounding Indian groups (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Jesuit missions were established among both the sedentary and populous chieftainships and the smaller, nomadic groups. From their earliest establishment until 1767, when the Jesuits were expelled from the American colonies, the missions maintained a very tight control over the Indians in their charge. The process of conversion to Christianity was completed quite early, and the Indians became subjects of what amounted to theocracies, with the priests occupying all positions of supreme authority. The Indians were expected to work in the missions' fields without remuneration, and the slightest breach of obedience was severely punished by the missioners. Indian groups settled in mission communities did, however, enjoy certain advantages. The priests introduced crops and farming techniques which considerably raised the standard of consumption. Support of the mission and observance of Christian ritual brought with them new crafts, art styles and musical forms which enriched the lives of the natives. Most important, the mission territories were forbidden by royal decree to the encroaching Spanish civil and military settlers. Hence, their populations were free of the gross exploitation (and often downright slavery) imposed upon other groups. The missioners spoke to the

Indians in their native languages, and those aspects of native culture not in conflict with Christian morality and belief were not suppressed.

In 1767, with the explusion of Jesuits, many of the formerly subject Indian groups fled to the forests and resumed a totally independent existence. Both they and the groups which remained settled on the old mission grounds soon came to suffer intensely from the mistreatment and exploitation which followed the influx of new settlers. Particularly the Moxos, who had thrived under mission rule, were hunted and sold as slaves. Many were set to work, under absolutely inhuman conditions, practicing the high level of weaving skill taught them by the Jesuits. Others were forced to work as boatmen and carriers along Spanish trade routes. The influx of white settlers also brought new diseases—particularly smallpox and influenza—which made terrible inroads on the population. The major blow to the once numerous Indians of the missions came with the rubber boom of the late nineteenth century, when forced labor and slave trading reached all-time highs.

Many Indians successfully evaded the slave traders by retreating within the forests, where they attached themselves to groups which had migrated earlier. Others escaped by assuming the way of life characteristic of lower-class townsmen, becoming general hangers-on in white population centers. Such large-scale abandonment of the traditional way of life, along with the extremely high mortality rates, has led to an almost total extinction of Indian cultures in the most accessible parts of the Oriente. The Moxos and other once-numerous groups now live as small farmers and workmen, speak Spanish and perpetuate very little of their native tradition.

It is significant that of the many and varied native peoples of the Oriente, only those with the more simple cultures have survived into modern times. In spite of drastic reduction in their numbers, the Sirionó, primitive nomadic hunters who practice some rudimentary farming, continue to forage through the forests of northern Santa Cruz and even, on occasion, to attack white settlements. The more highly developed sedentary chiefdoms could not survive as social and cultural units in the deeper recess of the tropical forest. They could live only in the more open lands of the Beni and the lightly forested Santa Cruz region, where they were exposed to the depradations of white invaders.

PRESENT-DAY ETHNIC GROUPS

The Aymara

The idea of Bolivian nationality has only recently come to be meaningful to the great majority of Aymara speakers of the northern Altiplano, for prior to the 1952 revolution most of them lived in a

social, economic and cultural world which was sharply circumscribed by the boundaries of their communities. Until land reform, most Aymara lived either as entailed tenant laborers (*colonos*) on the large agricultural estates (*fincas*) or in the reduced number of remote and marginal free communities which had successfully resisted encroachment by white landlords.

For the *colono*, bound for life to his landlord by indebtedness or lack of alternatives, the *finca* supplied virtually all material wants. He normally chose his wife from among the women resident upon his *finca*. His religious needs were served by a visiting priest from a chapel on the *finca* grounds. Although he was often grossly exploited by the landlord, who normally exacted three or four days of free work per week and numerous other services, he was protected from the exactions of petty government officials, who seldom intervened in the life of the *fincas*. Except for infrequent visits to town markets, *finca* Indians had little reason to seek contacts among outsiders (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The free Indians (*comunarios*) were even more isolated from their fellow Bolivians. The few remaining free communities had survived largely because their lands were so inaccessible to markets and so marginal that they did not arouse the interest of the white landlords. This geographic isolation was sharply underscored by the social isolation imposed by the *comunarios* upon themselves. Particularly those communities organized around communal land tenure, but to some extent all free communities, sought to prevent the entrance of people not born within their boundaries. A *comunario* who attempted to sell lands within the community to outsiders, even though he were the sole owner of such lands, was subject to general disapproval and often to violence. Young people were discouraged from marrying outside of the community, and when such marriages did occur, the wife normally moved to the husband's community, for her people would not have tolerated the latter's assuming control over their lands. The self-imposed isolation was such that even the parish priest, on his occasional visits, was seldom invited to spend the night in the community. Most *comunarios* consistently attempted to avoid any sort of contact with local government officials, for government meant only taxation, forced labor, military conscription and often illegal exploitation (such as demands of free personal service and substantial gifts of farm produce) by petty functionaries. Although contacts were inevitable, they were infrequent and then only with the immediate local (often dreaded) official, the *corregidor*, or canton administrator. Hence, the *comunarios* had very little interest in or knowledge of the larger units of government. An observer writing in the mid-1940's reported that many free Indians could not even name the province in which they lived (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

This extreme isolation and the conscious efforts on the part of most Aymara to maintain it have been reflected in certain characteristics of personality which have been described by many writers, generally in a somewhat exaggerated form, as supposedly innate characteristics of the group. The anthropologist, Adolph Bandelier, writing early in the twentieth century, said of the *colonos* with whom he had lived:

> Cupidity, low cunning, and savage cruelty are unfortunate traits of the Indians' character. . . . The Aymara Indian is not at all stupid, but the degree of intelligence he possesses seems to be used mostly for evil.

Other writers, observing the same traits, do not agree with Bandelier in crediting the Aymara with any degree of intelligence. They note that repeated experience of outsiders, even those who speak fluent Aymara, seems to indicate that the Indian is virtually incapable of communicating with his fellow Bolivians in any language.

These stereotypes of Aymara outward character seem to bear considerable objective truth, but closer scrutiny indicates that such traits as cupidity and apparent inability to understand even simple questions are not at all innate, but a direct result of the highly disadvantageous social position of the Indians. Such descriptions are based on reports of outsiders—usually government officials or landlords—who, in the experience of the Indians, come only as despoilers and exploiters.

It is noteworthy that Bandelier, who lived on a *finca*, was introduced to the *colono* subjects of his study by the landlord, who left strict instructions that the visitor was to receive "the same courtesy and attention normally accorded himself." The obvious identification with the landlord made intimacy with the Indians impossible for him, for there was no basis of mutual trust.

The observed inability of Indians to understand clearly stated questions seems to arise most prominently when such queries concern matters of personal wealth, ownership of land or names and ages of children. Fear of additional taxation, expropriation and military conscription of sons make the Indian reluctant to divulge such simple facts as where his fields are located or how many children he has, their ages or even their names. Those who have been able to observe the Aymara in their own communities, without being obvious in the process, have reported a marked absence of the morbid suspicion, the cloud of apparent stupidity and the truculence so often described as typical of them. Those rare individuals, usually foreign anthropologists or missionaries, who have managed to form friendships among the Aymara confirm that the repulsive character traits displayed by them are an almost consciously assumed barrier to protect themselves from the exploitative outside world. The savage cruelty often mentioned, which sometimes takes the form of revenge cannibalism, comes to the fore only during the sporadic outbreaks of violence which have

occurred usually as the result of accumulated abuse by landlord or local officials. The general picture of the Aymara is one of patience and fortitude in the face of adversity, alternating with explosions of suppressed hostility (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Aymara cultural distinctiveness has traditionally found strong expression in costume—both male and female. Although characteristic dress varies considerably from region to region, there are many common styles. The basic male costume, throughout Aymara territory, consists of a pair of tight, ankle-length trousers, slit at the lower end, a short and tight jacket, a poncho and a knitted wool cap with ear flaps, worn under a homemade felt hat. The trousers and jacket are patterned after styles introduced in the sixteenth century by the Spaniards. The poncho is not native to the area, but was also introduced by the conquerors, from Chile. For women, the costume consists either of a large number of superimposed and differently colored knee-length skirts or of one ankle-length skirt, along with a homespun shawl, an embroidered blouse and a variety of felt hats, all of archaic Spanish design.

In the past few years, this highly distinctive costume has been increasingly supplanted by industrially produced garments, all in styles characteristically worn by *cholos* and urban workers. Men have tended to adopt such elements of lower-class dress as blue-jeans and modern-cut suit jackets. The archaic Spanish headgear of women has been rapidly supplanted, in most areas, by the felt derby so in vogue among *cholas*. This tendency toward the disappearance of the distinctive Indian costume has been considerably accelerated since the revolution and is symptomatic of the extent to which ethnic lines are becoming blurred.

The cultural distinctiveness and social isolation of the Aymara are accented by their religious life, both in belief and practice. Their conversion to Christianity was considered by Spanish missionaries to have been completed by the end of the sixteenth century, but the religion of the Aymara continues, in the mid-twentieth century, to include large areas of preconquest belief and practice. Hence, while they are fervent believers in the Trinity and the saints of Catholicism, they also believe in and propitiate the old place spirits (*achachilas*) and the Earth Goddess, Pachamama.

Most Aymara communities include among their residents a group of specialized sorcerors who not only act on behalf of individuals but also lead communal field rites. Such collective observances have traditionally served to symbolize and to bolster the social unity and distinctiveness of individual communities.

Much of the social life which binds together the Aymara communities revolves around the celebration of Christian fiestas. Most communities have specific patron saints, whose days in the ritual

calendar are observed by masses, dancing, drinking and banqueting. Since the patron is an important symbol of identity for the community, the celebration calls forth the most strenuous and organized exertions of the residents. The sponsorship of such fiestas is closely bound in with the structure of local leadership, for, traditionally, prestige, respect and power have been vested in those men who have been most active in support of the long and expensive festivities (see ch. 10, Religion).

The economic self-sufficiency and the highly distinctive ceremonial life of the Aymara have traditionally been associated with a rich and varied pattern of handicraft, music and dance. The poverty and the great expenditure of energy for mere subsistence which have been the Indians' lot for the past 400 years have sharply limited the development of art and ornament for their own sake, but even the most utilitarian objects made by Aymara craftsmen are often of a high degree of technical competence and are aesthetically pleasing.

Although the well-developed tradition of ornamental ceramics which was characteristic of the area had largely passed out of existence in early colonial times, the Aymara have continued to be very competent potters. Certain villages have long been known as centers of this industry, turning out both utilitarian vessels and some ornamental objects—particularly bird and animal figures.

Spinning and weaving of all available forms of wool (sheep, llama, alpaca and vicuña) are skills which were at one time known to almost all Aymara. The traditional costume is made up exclusively from homespun textiles. Until recently, such textiles were dyed rather soft hues with pigments extracted from vegetable sources, but anilines of sharp hue, mostly of German manufacture, have largely supplanted the old dyestuffs except in the most remote areas. The substitution of industrially produced clothing has caused a considerable decline in the weaving craft, which in 1962 survives only in certain centers of specialization.

The dance is the focal point of Aymara ceremonial and recreational life. Every major festivity is celebrated by continuous dancing, both by individuals and by groups specially organized for the occasion. Although steps and costumes vary considerably from locality to locality, many common themes are represented in dances throughout Aymara territory. Many of the fiesta dances are re-enactments of the conquest, with the part of the Spaniards being taken by participants wearing pink, whiskered masks. Early in the century, an observer reported a dance representing a war between two preconquest rulers. Perhaps the most widely known Aymara dance is that of the devils (*diablada*), performed during Carnival in the area around Oruro. Costumes are rich and often fantastic, made from brocades, silver thread and braiding, glass beads and mirrors. They are purchased at

great expense from *cholo* craftsmen who manufacture them in town workshops.

The folk music of the modern Aymara is, like most other aspects of their culture, a distinctive blend of aboriginal and sixteenth-century Spanish forms. Many of the dance tunes, which constitute the largest part of the musical heritage, are composed of two alternating and largely independent strains: one in a European, eight-note scale and the other in an aboriginal, five-note scale. Most of the preconquest Aymara instruments were either wind or percussion. There were a large variety of flutes and panpipes, wooden trumpets, drums and rattles. The Spaniards contributed guitars, which are only occasionally used, and a type of mandolin (called *charango*), made from a dried armadillo carapace, which is most commonly used as accompaniment in songs.

The national revolution has gone far toward ending the cultural and social isolation of the Aymara. Although the great majority of adults are still illiterate and unable to speak Spanish, a significant percent of their children are receiving at least a rudimentary education. The hitherto distrustful Indians, both on the expropriated *fincas* and in the free communities, have increasingly welcomed the opportunities afforded by formal education and in many cases have clamored for the establishment of schools. Through membership in the *sindicatos* and through exercise of the vote, the Aymara are coming to have a voice in national affairs and to enjoy at least a minimal means of protecting their interests.

The recent transformation is also reflected to a great extent by a gradual disappearance of the mask of personality traits which the Aymara have traditionally used to minimize communication with mistrusted outsiders. Both the mask and the basic mistrust which underlies it still exist, but observers in the early 1960's note a new confidence and openness, particularly among younger people, in dealing with the outside world (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Many aspects of traditional Aymara culture, more resistant to change, have been carried over into the newly emerging way of life. The fiestas, so important in defining local leadership in the traditional social structure, continue to be celebrated with enthusiasm (see ch. 10, Religion). Traditional Aymara folk music has not suffered replacement by the more commercialized popular music, in spite of the increasing ownership of transistor radios and phonographs by the Indians. One recording company in La Paz has issued a large number of discs featuring Aymara musicians playing traditional instruments, and several political songs have been composed in Aymara musical style and language.

Since the 1930's the Bolivian artistic community has come increasingly to value and to emulate native tradition in art and music. This

indigenismo is also very much part of the revolutionary ideology. It seems likely, therefore, that as the Aymara are integrated into national life, they will bring with them at least a small part of their cultural heritage (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The Quechua

The classification of all Quechua speakers into one ethnic group is valid only in a very general sense, for most of them are members of local groupings which consider themselves to be ethnically distinct from each other. The Quechua language was imposed by the Inca on several culturally and linguistically divergent peoples, and at the time of the conquest, many of these groups still maintained separate social identities. The social isolation and relative immobility of the Indian population during the subsequent colonial and republican periods served to perpetuate the ethnic independence of such small local groups of Quechua. In 1962, some of the pre-Inca tribal names (Yampará, for example) continue to have social meaning.

The strong sense of local ethnic identity has been reflected not only in disunity but often in open strife among Quechua speakers. In Potosí Department, two neighboring groups, the Laime and the Jucumán, have sustained a continuous and bloody feud for many years. The issues underlying the disputes seem to change periodically (at present they are reported to be political), but the enmity is permanent.

The ethnic independence of the small regional groups of Quechua is sharply underscored by the many distinctive traditional costumes. Although the characteristic dress, as in the case of the Aymara, consists of garments uniformly patterned on old Spanish styles, the head gear, color and poncho design vary greatly and often serve to mark off Indians from neighboring communities. In addition, the Quechua language, much more than the Aymara, is divided by many variations in regional dialect.

The areas occupied by the Quechua are more varied in altitude, climate and proximity to urban centers and markets than are those of the Aymara. There are Quechua speakers in the relatively low, fertile valleys of Cochabamba and on the high, bleak plateaus of Potosí. The social and economic environments in which they live are equally varied. Many areas, particularly the isolated heads of valleys, are virtually devoid of white and *cholo* population. The Indians living in settlements dispersed through such zones have been largely free of outside influence for centuries. In contrast, the Cochabamba Valleys have long been centers of white and *cholo* population and the scene of an intensive commercial activity which has attracted people from all parts of the nation.

Unfortunately, of all the numerous and diverse Quechua-speaking peoples, only those of the Cochabamba Valleys have been described in any detail. Published knowledge of the many and culturally distinctive Indians of Chuquisaca, Potosí, parts of Oruro and the mountainous western edge of Cochabamba Department is quite sketchy. While a fairly complete account can be given of the rapid social and cultural change which has taken place among the Quechua of the Cochabamba Valleys since the 1952 revolution, it is possible, with respect to other areas, only to make the broad inference that this change has been considerably less marked.

Many of the generalizations commonly drawn by writers with respect to the Quechua, as a group, are based solely upon observation of those of the Cochabamba Valleys. In particular, many observers have contrasted the Quechua with the Aymara, pointing out that they lack the morbid suspicion, the tenacious self-isolation and the general sullenness attributed to the Aymara. The British writer, Harold Osborne, for example, notes that "The Aymara is dour, taciturn and resentful; the Quechua in general more urbane and adaptable." Observers who have some familiarity with the isolated Quechua of the heads of valleys, or with the *finca* tenants of Chuquisaca or Potosí, find little evidence of outstanding urbanity or adaptability. On the other hand, the Quechua speakers of the Cochabamba Valleys, with a long history of intimate and not always unfriendly association with whites and *cholos*, have always been reported to be quite self-confident in their dealings with outsiders and generally receptive of new ideas.

Gross mistreatment and exploitation of the Indian population by by whites and *cholos* never reached in the Cochabamba Valleys the proportions traditionally common in other parts of the highlands. Although, before agrarian reform, there were numerous *fincas* in the area, they generally lacked the expansive tendencies which elsewhere constituted a danger to Indian lands. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that the number of such estates decreased slowly throughout the republican period. Feeling less threatened by their white and *cholo* neighbors, the Quechua small farmers of the Cochabamba Valleys never developed the strongly self-isolating tendencies so common among other Indian groups (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Friendly contact between *cholos* and Indians in the Cochabamba Valleys has always been facilitated by the fact that many of the former, unlike their Altiplano counterparts, are small farmers, living interspersed among their Quechua neighbors at roughly the same level of subsistence. Although their social status in prerevolutionary times was superior to that of the Indians, the *cholo* small farmers have never been averse to making common cause with the Quechua. Many such *cholos* were members of the early *sindicatos* and were willing to

accept Indian leadership during the troubled days of the eary 1950's (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Although they habitually speak Quechua, the Indians of Cochabamba have always been bilingual in greater degree than other native groups. In communities close to the provincial centers, a significant percent of the men command a relatively fluent, though heavily accented, Spanish. All *cholos* in the area speak Quechua, and many—particularly women—prefer it in casual conversation.

The Cochabamba Quechua have come to adopt, with much more readiness than other Indian groups, many aspects of the *cholo* way of life. In particular, even before the 1952 revolution, they had lost many of the customs which have traditionally distinguished Indians from *cholos*. Such changes in their way of life have tended to weaken the image of their ethnic distinctiveness and to facilitate the process of social integration which has been taking place since the national revolution.

The Quechua farmers have never produced surpluses of the magnitude necessary for market participation on a commercial scale, but they have long been more active sellers and buyers at the regional fairs than have Indians of other areas. Since the early part of the twentieth century, they have increasingly abandoned traditional handicrafts for a dependence upon industrially produced goods. In particular, weaving has almost totally disappeared from Quechua communities close to market centers.

Except for those living in more isolated communities, the Cochabamba Quechua had abandoned their traditional costume many years before the revolution. The men now wear cotton work clothes, purchased in the market, and the women have adopted the factory-made shawls and high-crowned, enameled hats of the *cholas*.

The religious life of the Cochabamba Quechua includes many preconquest survivals—the propitiation of Pachamama, for example—but in contrast to the Aymara, they lack specialized ritual functionaries and communal observance. In consequence, ritual does not serve to underscore the unity and strong identity of individual communities. Also, many *cholo* farmers share the beliefs in Pachamama and other preconquest supernatural beings, so that belief does not sharply distinguish the Indians from their non-Indian neighbors (see ch. 10, Religion).

Music and dance of the Cochabamba Indians are largely identical to those of the local *cholo* population. Only in the most outlying areas has there been any survival of either aboriginal instruments or melody forms. Most of the songs with Quechua words presently sung in the area come from the pens of commercial songwriters rather than from Indian folk tradition.

Even more than those of the Altiplano, the Cochabamba Indians have enthusiastically responded to new opportunities for formal education, and the prospects are that most of the coming generation will be fluent and at least minimally literate in Spanish. There are convincing indications that the Quechua farmers are moving toward more active participation in the market economy. On the one hand, the demand for industrially produced consumer goods, particularly bicycles and sewing machines, has increased rapidly since the mid-1950's. On the other hand, qualified local observers report that many Indians have recently been seeking to update their centuries-old methods of cultivation, at least to the extent of using chemical fertilizers—a practice hitherto unknown in the area.

Other Highland Indian Groups

The Uru and Chipaya

On the northern and western peripheries of the Aymara territory live the now dwindled remnants of two groups which managed to retain language and ethnic identity through both the Inca and the Spanish conquests. The Uru, a fishing and herding people who inhabit the reed swamps of the Río Desaguadero and adjacent portions of Lake Titicaca, and the Chipaya, llama and sheep herders of the Carangas region of western Oruro Department, speak Puquina, a language with no connection to either Quechua or Aymara, but believed to be related to the Arawakan group of the Amazonian jungles.

The Uru have always been despised by the numerically superior Aymara who, throughout known history, have encroached increasingly on their lands. Indeed, the term *uru* seems to have been used by the Aymara of the seventeenth century as an adjective meaning "dirty," "ragged" or "rustic." Significantly, the only oral tradition of any antiquity which has survived among the Uru recounts that the pre-Inca Aymara made a regular practice of hunting them down for use as human sacrifices.

The Uru have continued into modern times to suffer despoliation at the hands of their neighbors. In the 1930's, the Aymara speakers of Jesús de Machaca, in southwestern La Paz Department, drove one of the largest Uru groups from most of their lands. In the face of such pressure, the Uru have continuously dwindled in population. Many communities have been dispersed and their former residents isolated among the Aymara or driven to the towns, where they quickly adapt to alien ways. In addition, there has been considerable intermarriage with the Aymara. By 1931, it was estimated that there were no more than 100 Uru in the entire Desaguadero region.

The Chipaya of the Carangas area make their living largely from trading llamas and sheep milk cheese to neighboring Aymara farmers for quinoa and potatoes. They practice some agriculture, but the ter-

rain in which they live is the driest and least hospitable portion of the Altiplano, and their crop production consequently satisfies only a small part of their need.

Although they have not suffered so intensely at the hands of the Aymara as have the Uru, the Chipaya are also a dwindling population. Various estimates would suggest that there are no more than 300 of them. Surrounded by a large and probably growing population of Aymara, the Chipaya have increasingly intermarried with their neighbors. Aymara influence has been so strong that members of the group have been increasingly adopting that language for everyday use. Most Chipaya are bilingual in Puquina and Aymara, and recent reports indicate that many of the younger members of the group have never learned their ancestral tongue. Between the acculturation of the Chipaya and the drastic disappearance of the Uru, their common language, Puquina, will probably be extinct within a very few years, and remnants of the two groups will undoubtedly be absorbed into the Aymara population.

The Callahuaya

The Callahuaya, who live in the provinces of Muñecas and Caupolicán, La Paz Department, are historically a subtribe of the Aymara, but at least since colonial times, they have considered themselves to be ethnically distinct from them. The Inca were successful in imposing Quechua on most communities of the group, and although most Callahuaya speak fluent Aymara, their primary tongue is Quechua. Virtually all Callahuaya men and many of the women also speak Spanish. In costume and in many other aspects of their way of life, they are quite different from their Aymara neighbors.

The Callahuaya are the famous traveling curers and charm sellers of the Andes. At some time in his life, almost every man of the group leaves his home village, carrying a sack of herbal remedies and amulets, and travels the length of the Andes, often from Argentina to Ecuador, visiting the weekly fairs held in virtually all market centers. Many of the group make lifetime careers as traveling vendors and curers, returning to their communities only at infrequent intervals.

The herbal remedies known to the Callahuaya number in the thousands and are prepared from plants of both the highlands and the Oriente. Several historians credit them with having introduced quinine and ipecac to the Spaniards. In addition to their empirical remedies, they manufacture and dispense a large number of charms and amulets, designed not only as protectors against illness but also as bearers of good luck.

With their highly specialized way of life, the Callahuaya have been able to maintain both their ethnic independence and their freedom from outside domination. In contrast to the history of other Indian

groups, the expansion of the colonial and republican cash economy and its market activity was a source of prosperity for them.

The Cholos

The most widely distributed of all ethnic groups, the *cholos*, occupy an equivocal position in Bolivian society. In the cities, they form the backbone of the lower-status working group—the factory workers, artisans, petty merchants and servants in middle- and upper-class households. In rural areas they have traditionally constituted a sort of local gentry, monopolizing local trade and political office and, in prerevolutionary times, serving as administrators of white-owned *fincas*, on which they enjoyed virtually total power over the Indian tenants (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

For the most part, the *cholos* are not peasants. Only in the Cochabamba—and to some extent, the Chuquisaca—Valleys do many of them engage in subsistence farming. Those who own lands most often derive only part of their support from this source, in combination with some commercial or other nonagricultural activity. Not being tied to the land in the degree characteristic of the Indians, most *cholos* find it a matter of relative ease to leave their home communities in search of better economic opportunities. Command of Spanish and often at least minimal literacy, along with considerable self-confidence in dealing with outsiders, enable them to adapt readily to the prevailing conditions of life in all parts of the country. As a result, the *cholos* are probably the most mobile of the ethnic group. For example, a series of sample surveys made during 1960 in predominantly *cholo* neighborhoods of La Paz showed approximately 25 percent of their resident populations to be composed of recently arrived migrants from other parts of the country.

In spite of seeing themselves as members of Bolivian national society, the *cholos*—particularly those in rural areas—retain in their way of life much from the various Indian traditions. Their magico-religious beliefs, folk arts and diet are permeated with cultural features derived from the surrounding Indian groups. In consequence, the flavor of *cholo* life varies significantly from region to region.

The hallmark of *cholo* status is ability to speak one of the Indian tongues along with Spanish, for in their position as rural merchants, petty government officials and (until land reform) supervisors of Indian agricultural labor, they have always served as virtually the only intermediary between the local Indian populations and national society. For many *cholos*, however, Quechua or Aymara is much more than a language of economic and political life; it is a mother tongue, learned in the home before Spanish. For *chola* women everywhere, the Indian language is the medium of everyday conversation. Even in the largest cities, conversations one overhears among the *chola*

vendors in public markets are most often in Quechua or Aymara, although the same women can switch immediately to fluent Spanish in order to bargain with customers. In many places, the men also use the native tongues as more than a medium of communication with Indians. In the Cochabamba area, for example, many *cholos* insist that certain types of humor and meaning can only be conveyed in Quechua.

Indian folk religion, magic and curing techniques are an accepted part of the *cholo* way of life in most areas of the country. The *cholo* small farmers of the Cochabamba Valleys are almost as punctilious as their Indian neighbors in the observance of field rituals in honor of Pachamama. Even in so large and relatively cosmopolitan a city as La Paz, there is an entire marketplace devoted to the sale of amulets, magical remedies and llama fetuses (used for burial sacrifices in the dedication of new houses). Although many of the buyers are Indians from the nearby countryside, most are *cholos* from the surrounding lower-class neighborhoods. In celebration of Christian fiestas, the *cholo* townsmen and city-dwellers expend almost as much energy as do the Indians, and many of the dances are identical (see ch. 10, Religion).

Although Indian folk belief and practice are incorporated into the *cholo* way of life, they have an entirely different social significance. Among the Indians—particularly the socially isolated Aymara and Altiplano Quechua—observance of ritual in honor of preconquest supernaturals is most often a communal practice, led by specialized magico-religious practitioners. Celebration of Christian fiestas is surrounded with an aura of communal duty, with prestige and local power resting upon individuals who have been most active in assuming the burdens of sponsorship. Among the *cholos*, belief in and propitiation of preconquest supernaturals is a highly individual matter. Field ritual is much more likely to be celebrated by households, rather than by community groups, and without benefit of expert leadership. Belief in the supernaturals is generally much less unanimous. Sponsorship of fiestas is more a matter of personal choice and is generally independent of such considerations as local power and prestige. Native magico-religious belief and practice are, for the Indians, a means of cementing the local community structure; for the *cholos*, they represent merely a set of traditions retained largely as a matter of individual choice.

Cholo men have long affected a Western-style (though generally somewhat out-of-date) costume. Their wives, however, have for the most part retained a highly characteristic set of traditional forms of dress. *Chola* costumes are quite different from those of most Indian women, particularly in the fact that garments and fabrics are usually industrially produced, but like those of the latter, they are regionally

distinctive. The *cholas* of the Altiplano wear several brightly colored knee-length skirts, a colorful blouse (which usually clashes with the outer skirt) and a small felt hat in the "bowler" shape, which has come to be virtually a national symbol. In the Cochabamba Valleys, the highly distinctive *chola* costume (also worn by Indian women) consists of a collection of somewhat longer skirts than those of the Altiplano women, a brightly colored blouse and a straw hat with wide brim and "stovepipe" crown, enameled a gleaming white. The *cochabambina* hats are trimmed with varying ribbon designs, each of which is characteristic of a specific provincial town.

The retention of considerable tradition in the *cholo* way of life seems to be owing particularly to the conservatism of the women. They, more than their husbands, perpetuate the use of Quechua or Aymara for, as their children's first teachers, they impart the Indian language as the earliest and most meaningful medium of personal expression. Magico-religious beliefs, being home-centered, are also passed on largely through maternal influence. While the sons normally move, as adults, into the Spanish-speaking world, the daughters remain closer to home, where they speak the Indian tongue almost exclusively and, in their turn, pass on the traditions (see ch. 6, Family).

The mark of *cholo* adaptability is the ease with which they abandon their tradition-oriented way of life for that of the cities. *Cholos* of the Cochabamba Valleys who move to La Paz, for example, enter a world in which there are few Quechua speakers and in which the *cholo* way of life and social custom are quite different from those of the home area. They effect their adaptation essentially by calling upon the specifically Hispanic and national part of their heritage. It is observed, for example, that migrant women often change to Western costume rather than maintain a form of dress which would be conspicuous in the new environment. Both men and women adapt well to speaking Spanish to the virtual exclusion of Quechua.

If *cholo* adaptability to new conditions of life has involved the abandonment of considerable tradition, it has also resulted in the incorporation of many features of local folk culture into national life. Styles of folk music brought by *cholo* migrants to urban centers often gain quick acceptance and are made part of the popular tradition through commercial publication either in sheet music or on phonograph records. An outstanding example of the way in which *cholos* have served to introduce local Indian custom into the wider popular culture is the nationwide celebration of Alasitas, the January festival in honor of Ek'eko, the Aymara god of fertility and good luck. Originally an Indian custom, the observance of Alasitas was introduced to La Paz by the *cholos* during colonial times and became a popular practice among all classes. From La Paz, the Ek'eko celebration spread to the *cholo* population of virtually the entire high-

land area and has more recently come to be celebrated even by the Quechua speakers of th Cochabamba area (see ch. 10, Religion).

The ethnic identity of the *cholos* was strongly underscored, in pre-revolutionary times, by the fact that they occupied a caste position intermediate to those of the whites and the Indians. The ethnic caste system was thoroughly upset both by the institutional reforms of the revolutionary regime and by the assertion of block power on the part of the Indians through the *sindicatos*, and the rural *cholos* no longer enjoy the totally paramount position they once occupied in the local social structures. Recent indications are that many of the formerly superior *cholos* have joined the powerful *sindicatos compesinos* and thereby have identified their interests with those of their Indian neighbors. The application, in many areas, of the blanket term *campesino* to members of both groups is indicative of the degree of social integration which has taken place. It is abundantly clear that the social lines between Indians and *cholos*—a major basis for the ethnic identity of the latter—have been largely blurred.

On the other hand, as the Indians move toward a fuller participation in national society and toward social integration with the *cholos*, their way of life becomes increasingly similar to that of the *cholos*. In costume and in musical taste, they are coming to share the same folk tradition (although they have also introduced into that tradition much of their own folk music). It is likely, therefore, that the highly distinctive *cholo* way of life will be maintained and that it will serve to perpetuate traditions of the Indian cultures long after both groups have completely lost their identities as separate ethnic castes.

Lowland Groups

The remnants of lowland Indian groups which have survived into the mid-twentieth century are probably not so well known as were their ancestors in the mid-seventeenth, when missionary activity was at its height. Trustworthy information on even so basic an aspect as population is totally lacking. The estimate of 87,000 forest Indians (*indios selváticos*) given in the 1950 census was based, by admission of the compilers, on the broadest conjecture. It is certain, however, that the population of lowland Indians with a traditional way of life continues to decline.

In general, attempts by the national government to protect the dwindling population of forest Indians have been no more than desultory. The white settlers continue to commit abuses against them, and diseases brought in by outsiders continue to make serious inroads on their numbers. Typical of the prevailing situation is the case of a school which the government set up in the early 1940's to train the primitive and nomadic Sirionó in the skills necessary to life as sedentary peasants. Within two years after the establishment of the school,

its underpaid and unsupervised administrators had turned it into a plantation and cattle ranch and were, according to the report of an American anthropologist, using their Indian pupils as virtual slaves. The latter quickly revolted and took refuge in a part of the jungle even deeper than that from which they had emerged.

A few small groups of lowland Indians live under the protection and supervision of Catholic missions. Such groups are almost totally insulated from contact with outsiders, for the priests who administer the settlements are adamant and generally successful in their opposition to the entrance of white settlers.

Although the lowland Indian tribes, generally isolated in the deep forest and dwindling in numbers, are of little importance to national society, their detribalized and urbanized members form part of a growing population with at least incipient political and economic significance (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). Those Indians who, by choice or force of circumstances, cut themselves off from their native societies and ways of life were generally attracted to centers of white settlement, where they merged socially with the lower class of service workers, agricultural tenant laborers and subsistence farmers. Other ethnic elements which form part of this lower class by membership and interbreeding are white and *cholo* adventurers, who have failed to gain the fortune which attracted them to the region, and impoverished descendants of earlier white settlers.

The lower class in each of the fairly important population centers of the Oriente, such as Trinidad (El Beni), Cobija (Pando) and Santa Cruz, is racially mixed and continues to assimilate tribal Indians to its numbers; but only that of Santa Cruz has been studied in any detail. In the relatively populous region surrounding that city, the lower class forms a distinctive and highly self-conscious group, popularly called *cambas*. Although populations of analogous background in other lowland areas are not so well known, isolated evidences suggest that they are economically, culturally and socially similar to the *cambas*.

The *cambas* of Santa Cruz are, for the most part, tenant laborers on the sugar and rice plantations or subsistence farmers, living either as squatters on the outer, less developed fringes of white-owned *fincas* or on plots they carved out of the more distant virgin forest. They have been largely outside the national cash economy, not from their own cultural isolation, as in the case of the Indians, but rather as a result of their geographic isolation from markets.

No more than isolated vestiges of their various Indian traditions remain in the way of life of the *cambas*. Isolated words from Indian languages and some items of food (*yuca*, for example) are the only visibly Indian traits in their ways. Their costume consists entirely of Western-style garments, and their only language is Spanish. Noth-

ing of aboriginal belief and practice remain in their religious life. Although they are not fervent Catholics, they obey sacramental requirements of the Church.

The scattered nature of *camba* settlement, along with a general lack of specialization in agricultural work, has led to a very loose social structure. There is nothing resembling the highly integrated community organization typical of Altiplano settlements. Family organization is quite casual, with male desertion of households very common (see ch. 6, Family).

Since they speak Spanish and are not, except in their poverty, visibly different in way of life from the small group of paramount white landowners, ethnic differences with the latter are not so sharply perceived by the *cambas*. They form, with respect to the whites, a lower status group, but this difference is much more one of socioeconomic class than of ethnic caste. The relatively intimate and friendly relationship between *camba* and white was reflected in the general lack of violence and strong feeling attending the change brought about in the area by the 1952 revolution (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

In spite of the relative lack of ethnic division within the Santa Cruz area, the *cambas* do feel themselves to be sharply different from the *cholos* and Indians of the highlands, whom they lump under the single term *colla* (adapted from the tribal name of a pre-Inca Aymara group). This sense of distinctiveness is partly a reflection of the strong regional loyalty felt by all members of Santa Cruz society and the concomitant resentment of the traditional political domination by the highlanders. *Cambas* are acutely aware of the visible differences in language, dress and religious life between themselves and the *colla* migrants who have recently settled among them. This awareness is associated with a strong sense of their own superiority. It is probable that the ethnic differences between the *cambas* and their fellow peasants in the highlands will continue to be socially important for many years to come.

The Whites

The very small and traditionally paramount segment of national society which is generally recognized as "white" (*blanco*) is more of a socioeconomic than a racial group. Although its membership is made up predominantly of persons descended from the Spanish conquerors, along with the descendants of later European immigrants, the group also includes large numbers of persons whose physical features show unmistakable evidence of some Indian ancestry.

Although the whites are aware of the admixture of Indian blood in their ranks, their highly exclusive group consciousness and sense of superiority rest to a great extent upon a notion of "purity of blood" (*limpieza de sangre*). This concept of purity is not strictly racial

but arises more out of a strong sense of aristocracy and "good lineage" (*abolengo*) (see ch. 5, Social Structure). A person of "good lineage" is one who can trace legitimate descent from one of the families generally recognized to be of the traditional upper class. Legitimate marriages between Spaniards and Indians were fairly common in early colonial times, before the formation of a stable society and the arrival of large numbers of European women. A descendant of such a marriage can claim to be of "good lineage" and, hence, of "pure blood." Isolated cases of miscegenation in his geneology do not affect his claim upon membership in the white ethnic group.

The racial attitudes which underlie Bolivian white ethnic consciousness are extremely ambiguous. The general trend in traditional thought on the subject of race has been a profound conviction that the Indian is innately inferior and that the *cholo*, child of both races, inherits the defects of his aboriginal and European ancestors. Nevertheless, there are firm indications that persons of *cholo* background have continuously, throughout the history of the country, gained social acceptance in elite circles and, hence, membership in the white ethnic group. For example, in the city of Sucre, a significant percent of all families counted as elite in the early 1940's had sprung no more than two generations earlier from known *cholo* backgrounds.

The apparent inconsistency in white attitudes springs from a confusion of racial and cultural stereotypes. Because the whites are well aware of their own Indian admixture, physical features suggesting native background are only mildly disturbing to them. Their negative attitudes toward *cholos* are conditioned much more by behavioral stereotypes than by those of race. Traditionally, the whites have seen the *cholo* as an incurable social climber—one who constantly seeks every means, fair or foul, to push his way to a station far above his ordained place. The general self-confidence of *cholos* in their dealings with national society, along with at least theoretical equality of educational opportunity afforded them by republican constitutions, has led to certain propensities toward social climbing which the whites have generally seen as a threat to their paramount position. Fear of this challenge to their political and social superiority has often resulted in attitudes toward *cholos* which border on hatred. The white essayist, Daniel Pérez Velasco, for example, says of the *cholo* that:

> **His psychology is that of a suspicious, . . . lying, double dealing, and insolent man. Enemy of the Indian and the foreigner, the *cholo* is good only for the *cholo*.**

The traditional white stereotype of the *cholo* social pretender is modeled on the examples afforded by such nineteenth-century military dictators as Mariano Melgarejo. Having risen from humble origins to the presidency of the nation by force of arms, he and his like were most often unbelievably corrupt in political life and unforgivably vul-

gar (in the view of the elite) in social behavior (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

A person of *cholo* origins with aspirations to assimilation into the white ethnic group must, above all, avoid the appearance of the obvious social climber. The tin magnate, Simón Patiño, violated this stricture by prematurely installing himself in a showy palace and assuming all the material symbols of elite status. As a result, he remained, in the view of white society, nothing more than a pretentious (if wealthy) *cholo*. Avoiding ostentatious display of wealth and remaining discreetly outside the mainstreams of upper-class social life, other economically successful *cholos* have managed to marry their children into families of impeccable lineage, though impecunious fortune. The kinship connections thus established are sufficient to ensure entry to the upper-class group.

The white elite is culturally quite homogeneous. Its members are the bearers of the Hispanic traditions which have always dominated national society, even though they are not shared in great degree by the Indian and *cholo* majority in the population. The Spaniards who settled in the American colonies were, for the most part, persons seeking to better their economic and social positions in a Spanish society. The life which they envisioned as ideal was based upon Hispanic values. Their social pretensions, defined in terms of Spanish culture, along with their view that the Indians were grossly inferior, led the colonials to reject out of hand all aspects of native culture and to be particularly zealous in the maintenance of Hispanic tradition (see ch. 11, Social Values).

The achievement of political independence was associated with attempts by Bolivian intellectuals to divorce themselves from Hispanic tradition in art, music, literature and, to some extent, social philosophy, and to seek their cultural models from Western Europe. The cultural cosmopolitanism which has long been a hallmark of white elite was largely the result of this search for artistic and intellectual orientation. In spite of the wholesale adoption of European models, however, the Bolivian whites never successfully forsook the more deeply rooted part of their Hispanic heritage—the values underlying the structure of their society, in particular, those relating to their sense of aristocracy and innate privilege (see ch. 11, Social Values; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The 1952 revolution totally disrupted the bases of white control over national society, and many members of the group had long before come to question the assumptions underlying white superiority. Nevertheless, most of the traditional attitudes continue to be held by the majority of the group. The ethnic identity and the sense of innate superiority remain so strong that most whites continue to identify themselves as the "only civilized Bolivians." Undoubtedly, with the

shifts of power which have taken place and the large-scale acculturation of Indians to national life, the attitudes and social exclusiveness will tend to dissolve, but the tenacity of the social values underlying the traditional ethnic structure will cause that dissolution to be a slow and, for the whites, painful process (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Immigrant Groups

Settlement by foreign nationals is a fairly recent phenomenon in Bolivian ethnic history, and even at their height, the waves of immigrant Europeans never achieved the volume of those which arrived in neighboring Argentina and Chile. Like all the nations of Hispanic America, Bolivia was, during colonial times, closed to all but Spanish immigration by the Crown's rigorous policies of exclusion. Through most of the nineteenth century, the relatively stagnant economy and the unstable government offered an uninviting picture to prospective immigrants. Only during the tin boom and the associated period of railroad building did foreigners begin to arrive in any numbers (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The first major wave of immigration, occurring during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century, consisted of technicians and petty merchants, attracted by the employment and business opportunities opened by the mining boom. In this group were many British subjects, Germans and Japanese, along with significant numbers of Italians and Levantine Arabs. The great majority of British settlers arrived as technicians in connection with the mining and railway activities. Although they were long-term residents, few of this national group developed firm attachments to the country, either by seeking citizenship or by marrying locally. With nationalization of the mines and the Antofagasta Railway, most returned to their homeland having left little firm cultural impact upon the Bolivian, except for the names of two La Paz soccer teams, "The Strongest" and "Always Ready."

The Germans and Italians, on the other hand, have been much more inclined to integrate themselves into local society. Most of the members of both groups early established themselves in dominant positions in local commerce and industry. As they achieved economic success, the German and Italian settlers found it a matter of relative ease to marry and otherwise integrate themselves into elite social circles, and in the mid-twentieth century, such surnames as Soligno and Freudenthal enjoy continued prominence in La Paz society.

The Levantine Arabs, who arrived as merchants, continue to dominate large segments of the retail trade and, to a lesser extent, the textile industry. Partly as a result of their own rather strong ingroup feeling and partly through a definite prejudice felt toward them by

members of the Bolivian elite, few of them have received social acceptance in local circles. Whereas the Italians and Germans have largely been assimilated, the Levantines continue to form a definite ethnic enclave.

The Japanese immigrants also were attracted to Bolivia by commercial opportunities. They achieved a place of dominance in the field of general retail merchandise and as purchasing agents for the mining company stores (*pulperías*), although many also sought their fortunes as traders in the isolated settlements of Pando. Even more than the Levantine Arabs, the Japanese have remained an isolated ethnic segment within their adopted nation. Completely rejected by the elite (and also tending toward self-isolation), the Japanese have intermarried very little with the local population. Such matches as have taken place between Japanese and Bolivians have been completely within the *cholo* middle class.

Throughout the twentieth century, there have been attempts at the establishment of agricultural colonies populated by immigrants in the unsettled Oriente. At times, these colonies have been favored with official encouragement on the part of governments seeking to attract skilled workmen, but most of them have failed by reason of the colonists' inability to cope with the strange environment or as a result of total isolation from markets. More recently, there have been apparently successful colonies established by the Mennonites, by Japanese and by Okinawans, all in the general region of Santa Cruz (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 18, Agriculture).

Immediately before World War II, a considerable number of European Jews arrived in Bolivia as refugees, where they settled largely as retailers in La Paz and Cochabamba. Although there is little overt and active anti-Semitism, many Bolivians do privately express feelings against the Jewish immigrants, largely on the basis of their putative inability to develop national loyalties and to assimilate socially.

LANGUAGE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The existence of three major languages has been one of the most important factors blocking effective integration of the national society, for the vast majority of Indians, unable to speak any but their native tongues, have had to depend largely upon the limited channels afforded by the *cholos* in order to communicate with the strictly Spanish-speaking Bolivians. At the same time, attitudes on the part of the dominant white elite toward Indian languages have generally reflected their scorn for all other aspects of native tradition. The nineteenth-century writer, Nataniel Aguirre, for example, referring to Quechua, called it ". . . that most ugly jargon, used by the brutalized children of the sun." A result of such attitudes was the almost total lack of

any official attempt to employ Quechua or Aymara in rural education until just before the 1952 revolution (see ch. 8, Education).

Spanish

Spanish speech patterns have always been a social criterion of extreme importance, for only those capable of speaking the official language with an enunciation locally accepted as correct can reasonably aspire to acceptance by the white elite. A common theme in Bolivian social folklore tells of the *cholo* pretender who, wealth and political power notwithstanding, is exposed for the bounder he is by an unintended lapse into a Quechua or Aymara accent. There is even a common belief that such lapses are, for a person of Indian racial background, an inevitable part of his biological heritage.

Certain faults of pronunciation are well-known features of the stereotyped *cholo* speech pattern, derived from the Indian linguistic tradition. Both Quechua and, to a lesser extent, Aymara speakers find it difficult to pronounce the Spanish *e* and *o*. The speaker with a *cholo* accent is likely either to render these sounds in a fashion close to Spanish *i* and *u*, saying, for example, *istu* for *esto* (this), or to overcorrect and utter *e* and *o* where *i* and *u* are the indicated vowels, as in *mel* for *mil* (thousand) or *mocho* for *mucho* (much).

The strong regional self-consciousness of the long-settled but remote Santa Cruz and Beni regions is underscored by a distinctive dialect characterized by the retention of forms long since considered archiac in other parts of the Hispanic world. Specific examples of such archaicisms are to be seen in the pronunciation of *casi* (modern form, "almost") as *cuasi* and in a tendency to sound the initial *h* (as, for example, in *hacer*—to make), usages which did not survive the sixteenth century in other areas. Another characteristic of the speech patterns of the Oriente is a tendency to drop the consonent *s* or to pronounce it indistinctly, for example, rendering *esto* as *ehto*.

The Bolivian sense of cultural nationalism is often offended by the continuing infusion of foreign loan-words—particularly those derived from English—into their language. With some frequency, articles appear in the popular press suggesting that there are perfectly clear and common words of Spanish origin which convey the same sense as, for example, *mitin* (meeting) or *lider* (leader). The Faculty of Humanities at San Andrés University, La Paz, polices the speech of its students to the extent of fining those caught uttering *barbarismos*—particularly those of foreign origin.

Quechua and Aymara

In the years following the 1952 revolution attitudes of educators, intelluctuals and political figures with regard to the previously despised aboriginal tongues underwent rapid modification. Scholars

who had either ignored Quechua and Aymara except, possibly, as relics of a dead past began to study those languages as part of the national heritage. Definite attempts have been made to institute systematic primary school instruction in the native languages. At least one university—Tomás Frías, in Potosí—has published a reader and instruction guide in Quechua for use in adult literacy campaigns. Largely as an expression of cultural nationalism, many poets have experimented with Quechua and Aymara as media of verse (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression; ch. 8, Education).

Quite aside from purely ideological considerations, the sudden introduction of Indians to active political life has forced a very practical interest on the part of politicians in the native languages. Highly indicative of the degree to which Indian tongues have become important in political discourse is the fact that when the Agrarian Reform Decree was promulgated in 1953, the then Minister of Government, Walter Guevara Arze, spoke at length in Quechua to the assembled members of the powerful *sindicato* of Ucureña, near Cochabamba. The text of the decree was published simultaneously in Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní (a lowland Indian language now spoken by few people in Bolivia but of historic importance in the language of the Chiriguanos).

Not only the official party, the MNR, but also the Communists have come to appreciate the political importance of Indian languages. In the campaign which preceded the congressional elections of June 3, 1962, the Bolivian Communist Party was known to have been devoting considerable time and expense to Aymara-language radio broadcasts, directed at the Altiplano areas surrounding La Paz. In addition, Librería Altiplano, the chain of book stores which serve as an outlet for literature from the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc has been very active in the distribution of primers and other instructional materials in the Indian tongues (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda).

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The structure of Bolivian national society has been undergoing fundamental and far-reaching changes, over the past three decades, in basic institutions, in socioeconomic and ethnic groupings and even in underlying attitudes. Although these changes were most dramatic and visible in the years following the revolution, their roots lie in economic and social changes which followed in the wake of the mining boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in the political pressures which became apparent in the aftermath of the Chaco War (1932–35) (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). In a sense the formal institutional changes wrought by the revolution were merely the culmination of social movements which had existed for at least half a century.

The major outlines of the traditional social structure, as it existed well into the present century, were derived by a process of orderly and gradual evolution from patterns laid down in colonial days. Institutions which had grown up in the sixteenth century continued to exist—in name and function—down to the eve of the revolution of 1952.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the traditional society was its extreme regionalism, which was partly the result off geographic barriers and underdeveloped communication facilities, but also was rooted in a long history of political jealousies and conflicts of economic interest often underscored by great differences in language, culture and race (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). In the highland areas—most particularly in the Altiplano—social isolation was pronounced even between neighboring and ethnically similar Indian community groupings. Both fear of land despoliation and almost total removal from the mainstreams of national political and economic life were factors in a strong, self-imposed isolation by communities of Indian freeholders. Tenant workers on the great landed estates of prerevolutionary days were so thoroughly bound to their landlords—in economic and social life—that they enjoyed very little intercommunication with the Indians resident on other estates or in nearby free communities. Mobility has traditionally been minimal, owing to lack of transportation facilities and active restrictions on travel which were imposed upon Indian peasants by prerevolutionary governments.

For virtually all of the 63 percent of the population estimated (in 1950) to be linguistically and culturally Indian, the significant social reality was not Bolivian nationality, or even membership in a nation-wide ethnic grouping, but simply residence in a small, largely self-contained community. National life signified occasional contact with regional markets, infrequent (and preferably avoided) dealings with local government officials and certain onerous obligations—taxes, *corvée* and conscription.

Capital wealth—particularly land—was overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of a small, largely closed circle of families which formed a highly self-conscious upper class. This group also enjoyed a virtual total monopoly upon national political power. Although wealth was one of the prime attributes of the upper class, commerce and industry were not the major concern of most of its members, who generally sought to live at a high standard from the proceeds of passive investment, mostly in land. The keystone of elite status was a concept of group privilege (*fuero*), seen as a birthright deriving from the distinction of pedigree (*abolengo*) (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Far below the numerically small elite—both in power and privilege—were the great masses of farmers, laborers, artisans and petty merchants who formed the group usually called the "common people" (*el pueblo*). Not only quite poor economically, but also essentially disfranchised politically—for the great majority could meet neither the literacy nor the property requirements of suffrage of prerevolutionary constitutions—members of the lower groups had little opportunity to improve their positions, for educational facilities were sharply limited, as were routes to economic advancement.

Only partly bridging the gap between the elite and the masses was a small and poorly defined middle class of relatively recent origins. This class drew its membership largely from among professionals and relatively successful merchants whose background did not include the distinction of pedigree necessary for acceptance by the elite.

The traditional Hispanic value regarding work and entrepreneurial activity—investing neither with great prestige—were shared by Spanish-speaking Bolivians at all levels of society. Most persons who had achieved middle-class status, therefore tended to see their economic success not as a fulfillment, but rather as a means of gaining access to elite circles. Because personal goals were primarily defined in terms of higher social status rather than economic success, no strong concept of a mercantile and industrial class ever developed (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Alongside the rigid socioeconomic class system was another, even more rigid, form of stratification, based upon ethnicity. Roughly, most Bolivians can be placed in one of three loosely defined ethnic castes: white (*blanco*), *cholo* or Indian. Although these terms have a

distinctly racial connotation (*cholo*, is most often translated as "half breed"), in reality culture and language, rather than blood, are the determining factors in defining the castes (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Although mate choice has always been determined, to some extent, by a type of racial segregation, miscegenation has never, by any means, been totally frowned upon. Indeed, in the early days of colonial rule, legitimate alliances between the conquerors and ladies of noble Indian houses were quite common. As a result, many of the elite families have visible Indian ancestry. In spite of the widespread distribution of Indian racial characteristics, however, the uppermost strata of Bolivian society have always been predominantly Caucasian, and Caucasian features have always been accorded a higher prestige value. A successful professional and business man with markedly Indian racial characteristics normally encounters more difficulty in social advance than one who appears predominantly Caucasian.

Except for the rough correlation between social status and racial background, the most important component of traditional ethnic stratification was an amalgam of culture and language. Both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians—who have traditionally occupied the lower status position—can be differentiated from other Bolivians by their inability to speak Spanish and by numerous features in their way of life, such as total engagement in subsistence farming, essential lack of national consciousness and a religious life which shows many holdovers from preconquest days. This specialized way of life has traditionally been associated with the sharply circumscribed social status of an ethnic caste. The rare individual who managed to divest himself of the linguistic and cultural stigmata of the Indian normally found it possible to join the *cholo* group, provided he moved to an area in which his Indian background was unknown.

The *cholos*, marked by their ability to speak Spanish and by their generally national orientation, occupied an equivocal status—one entailing greater mobility. On the one hand, it has always been easy to identify a significant cultural and social grouping among the *cholos* who inhabit the small towns and villages which form the seats of cantons and provinces. Economically specialized in petty commerce, artisanry and administration of landed estates, the town *cholos* occupied a defined caste position—well above that of the Indians and well below that of the whites, who owned most of the land in populous areas. On the other hand, *cholos* who had migrated to the cities or to the mines found themselves in an essentially undifferentiated mass of workers which formed the lower class. In this context they occupied a position more of social class than of ethnic caste, for they shared their status with persons of purely Indian origin who had also migrated to centers of industrial work. Also, it was possible for a

limited number of such persons to achieve middle-class status, thereby totally removing themselves from the group commonly called *cholo*.

The effects of land reform and the institution of universal suffrage have been dramatic. Within a very few years after the 1952 revolution, the bases of the elite monopoly on economic and political power had been totally destroyed. The old patterns of ethnic stratification—contrary to the spirit of revolutionary philosophy—have also shown signs of recent erosion. The etiquette of the present social order has resulted in the almost total suppression of the term "Indian" in favor of the occupational and socioeconomic designation of *campesino* (peasant). This new usage seems to have gained a measure of acceptance, particularly in such areas as the Cochabamba Valleys where the lines of caste division between *cholos* and Indians had never been sharp.

The most important social effect of the revolution apparent in 1962 has been the emergence of a significant national consciousness on the part of the previously isolated Indians. This consciousness has resulted partly from their sudden introduction to national political life by constitutional reforms and partly from a new awareness of their membership in a defined socioeconomic (as opposed to an ethnic) bloc.

Bolivian national society of 1962 is very much in a state of flux. Institutions and practices of an earlier day have been abolished—partly in response to economic and political pressures, partly through the expedient of legislation and decree—but many of the old attitudes of social stratification, along with the old regional and intercommunity isolation, remain operative. Hence, it is possible to perceive traditional social groupings as well as new alignments in the contemporary structure. Although they have been shorn of their class privilege and monopoly upon power positions and live isolated from the larger society, the members of the elite continue to evince a strong class consciousness and exclusiveness. On the other hand, although government fiat and political and economic liberation favor the unification of Indians and many *cholos* into a socioeconomic bloc of *campesinos*, traditional factors of division combine to make the development of this bloc only incipient.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Pre-Hispanic Society

Politically organized, stratified society far antedates the appearance of the Spaniards. Both historical tradition as recorded by the chroniclers and archeological remains offer conclusive evidence of some type of class structure among the pre-Inca Aymara groups of the Altiplano. Graphic reflections of differential privilege are to be found in the elaborate tombs and associated grave goods of the old Colla state. The Italian Jesuit, Ludovico Bertonio, in his seven-

teenth century treatise on the Aymara language, included several terms denoting royalty or nobility implying that there were organized states before the Incas (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

With the advent of complete Inca rule, at about the middle of the fifteenth century, a detailed picture of complex and rigidly stratified society emerges. The many pre-existing Aymara statelets were ruled as one unit by a set of Inca nobles, who formed the highest stratum of local society. Regional officials were largely drawn from among the local people and formed a sort of middle stratum between the representatives of the emperor and the masses of peasants.

Community-level government was left virtually undisturbed in the charge of traditional headmen. Although political incorporation of the Colla and Lupaca peoples into the Inca Empire was achieved, this unity was not effected in social life. Inca government was rigidly pyramidal. Lines of authority and responsibility proceeded vertically through the various levels of officialdom, and little room was left for intercommunication within one level. Thus, for political purposes, neighboring communities had very little basis for unity, and a truly regional integration was never strongly developed.

The Inca rulers encouraged maximal self-sufficiency in economic matters. Every effort was made to ensure that each community group (*ayllu*) met its own sustenance needs, and most surpluses above those needs were drained off in the form of tribute. Thus, the state became the focus of storage. Distribution of food and other commodities, when made necessary by local shortages, was from central storehouses. The market economy was little developed, being largely confined to infrequent distribution of nonessential goods on festive occasions. There was little tendency, therefore, toward the development of regional economic units.

The autonomy and self-sufficiency of local communities, combined with the all-pervading statism of the Inca Empire, left little basis for other forms of unity. Among both the Aymara and Quechua colonists, brought in from Peru to settle the Cochabamba Valley, the sociopolitical structure consisted of a series of tightly knit community groups, tied vertically into an elaborate political system, but largely independent of each other. This fragmentation has continued to be characteristic throughout most of Bolivian history.

Colonial Social Structure

The ease with which Spanish rule was instituted and consolidated was at least partly a result of the rigidity of the Inca power structure. Not accustomed to acting without higher initiative and with the consultation and support of their peers, lesser officials were rendered powerless and confused by the simple act of the Spaniards in im-

prisoning the last Inca ruler, Atahualpa. Uncoordinated local resistance was quickly put down, and even the more organized attempts by Manco Inca to reconquer the empire were frustrated by the Spaniards, who had successfully preempted the central position of control (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). After the initial period of consolidation and civil war, a definite colonial social structure took shape—one which effectively defined the patterns for the traditional society which is only now undergoing modification.

Spanish colonial society was founded on definite ideals of status stratification and associated privilege. At the pinnacle of the socio-political pyramid were native-born Spaniards—*peninsulares*—who had an effective monopoly on the highest political posts and the most remunerative fields of commerce. Although all Spaniards were theoretically equal (excluding considerations of noble rank), those born in the colonies (called *criollos*) in fact suffered discrimination in the allocation of economic and political power and in relative prestige. Despite this inequality of privilege and rank, however, both groups of Spaniards occupied a status immeasurably above that of the Indians, *cholos* and Negroes, who were divided from the ruling elite by full caste lines.

It is recorded that Francisco Pizarro took a half-sister of Atahualpa as his wife. Formal marriage between the conquerors and Indian women, as well as various types of consensual union, occurred commonly in the early days, before Spanish women had arrived in the colony. The vast majority of children born to such unions were illegitimate, but they were recognized as having a special status by virtue of their Spanish antecedents and formed the early basis of the *cholo* caste. Legitimate offspring of such unions were educated as Spaniards and rapidly assimilated by the elite group. Important local chieftains (*curacas*) and Inca nobles who had willingly submitted to Spanish rule were confirmed in positions of local authority and given the privileges of the Spaniards, including grants of Indian labor, tribute, land, the right to ride a horse (strictly forbidden to Indians) and even, in a few cases, patents of Spanish nobility. Some of the Indians accorded this status sought rapid assimilation into Spanish society. Thus, a sixteenth century *curaca* of Potosí, Don Juan Colqueguarache, requested that he be permitted to send his son to school in Spain, a request which received a favorable recommendation by the colonial administrator. Alongside this tendency toward assimilation, however, was a lingering nostalgia for the pageantry and absolute power of Inca days. Costumes and ceremonial dances characteristic of Inca nobility did not die out until the eighteenth century. The maintenance of noble Inca tradition—no matter how attenuated—provided an ideological focus for the later widespread revolts against colonial government.

The earliest period of colonial history—brought to an end in the 1570's, largely through the vigorous military and administrative action of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo—was marked by population declines of alarming proportions and general disruption of normal economic and social life (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The tight regional administration of the Incas was rapidly destroyed and only gradually replaced by extension of full Spanish control to the local levels. Large numbers of Indians attached themselves to the forces of one or another of the Spanish factions which were engaged in almost constant internecine strife. Inhabitants of whole villages took to the roads, usually in an attempt to escape the unbridled exactions of labor and tribute by the Spaniards. Observers of the period estimated that fully one-third of the Indian population had become vagrants by the end of the sixteenth century.

The practices and institutions developed to effect the integration of the Indian populations into colonial society were partly successful in returning some semblance of stability to local social life. The keystone of Toledo's Indian policy was a systematic resettlement of dispersed and vagrant Indians into compact, planned villages located close to Spanish centers.

This resettlement program (*reducción*) was a consistent and partly successful attempt to reorganize Indian society on Spanish modalities and to ensure the penetration of colonial authority at the most local level. People from widely different backgrounds were settled together under community officials whose position and functions were Spanish impositions. Life in the *reducciónes* revolved largely around the necessary adaptations to colonial rule, and the new officials rapidly became more agents of the Spanish authorities, collecting tribute, enforcing the various ordinances of the resident clergy and selecting conscripts for the numerous mobilizations of forced labor.

The basic institution of colonial government in the early period—one which was crucial for implanting direct Spanish control at the community level—was the *encomienda* (the fiduciary grant of collection rights over Indian tribute to individual settlers). Local Indian populations were divided into units called *repartimientos* and placed under the tutelage of the grantee (*encomendero*). The law forbade the *encomendero* to live among the Indians of his *repartimiento* or to intervene in local matters. He was required to build a church and to support a resident priest out of his income. Theoretically, the priest and a series of community officials divided the routine administrative matters among themselves, and the *encomendero* concerned himself only with the overall functioning of the *repartimiento* and saw to the collection of tribute, a large part of which he was permitted to retain as income.

The *encomienda* system, both in legal theory and in practice, was designed—and functioned successfully—to bring the Indians increasingly under Spanish control and to effectively integrate them into the colonial economy. Many *encomenderos*, in an illegal but common abuse of the system, exacted tribute in precious metals and nonlocal produce which could only be obtained through cash purchases. The net result was a thorough disruption of traditional patterns of labor organization and distribution, further hastening the breakdown in the older sociopolitical forms.

Direct Crown rule, through a series of local Spanish officers (*corregidores*), increasingly displaced the *encomienda* after the beginning of the seventeenth century. Many of the old exactions were continued, and in addition new forms of abuse were developed.

In addition to a heavy tribute burden, collected by the *encomenderos* or directly by Crown agents, all Indian men were liable to service in labor gangs conscripted to meet the demands of mining centers. The labor conscription (*mita*) was developed by Toledo as a means for the orderly procurement of manpower and as a means of correcting the abuses of the unbridled exploitation characteristic of earlier periods. In practice, poor working conditions and frequent injustice in the administration of the *mita* made the institution one of the most hated aspects of colonial life. In addition, by encouraging vagabondage and flight to escape conscription, and by further undermining Indian confidence in their *curacas* (who were expected to act as *mita* agents), it was another important factor in the reduction of Indian society to captive status.

The great mass of Indians fell into the tributary class. Colonial society provided for some, however, a route of escape from the often insupportable tribute and *mita* burden through the institution of *yanaconaje*, the legally recognized class of urban Indians who, having abandoned their rights to community lands, had entered domestic and manual service. The *yanaconas*, whose ranks swelled periodically with each new excess of the colonial regime, were not subject to the authority of *curacas*, and their lives were intimately bound into the affairs of urban Spanish society. The result of social uprooting and intimate contact with the colonists was a tendency toward rapid assimilation of *yanaconas* into the ranks of artisans and petty merchants who made up the burgeoning numbers of the *cholo* caste.

With the progressive encroachment of colonial authority into the most local levels of society, *curacas* and other Indian officials rapidly became the creatures of *encomenderos* and *corregidores*, on whose pleasure their last vestiges of power rested. The position of most community headmen, as it had evolved by the end of the sixteenth century, was that of simple foremen—in the eyes of the Spaniards little superior to the mass of tributaries. Thus, the once complex stratified Indian

society soon suffered reduction to the status of subordinate caste with virtually no internal differentiation.

The structure of colonial Indian society was no more conducive to social integration on an intercommunity basis than it had been under the Incas. Although the lives of all were profoundly affected by the exactions and influence of colonial government, these effects were mediated through the community and its officials. Few Indians had direct contact with Spanish officials, except for the numerous priests, who usually spoke the local language and often sought to isolate their parishioners from the abuse of the colonists.

The latter part of the eighteenth century was marked by a series of Indian revolts throughout the territory of the viceroyalty. Earlier outbreaks of disturbances, ranging from riots to minor civil wars, had been an increasingly common feature of urban life and probably served as a stimulus to the more widespread movements among the Indian tributaries. In 1730 a *cholo*, Antonio Calatayud, assumed *ad hoc* leadership of a riot among the artisan groups of Cochabamba, which had started in protest against a tax census, but which quickly spread to larger numbers of participants and to express wider dissatisfactions. The first Cochabamba revolt was put down the following year. In 1739 another *cholo*, Juan Balas de Córdoba, started another revolt in the Cochabamba Valley. This uprising was based on issues of more interest to the Indian tributaries. Its leader made specific overtures to that segment of the population, by claiming royal Inca descent and by raising prominently the issue of *mita* exploitation. But the goals of this and subsequent Indian revolts reflected strongly the degree of integration of colonial society, for their leaders claimed to be loyal Catholics and generally envisioned a society which included not only Indians, but *cholos* and *criollos*.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century was punctuated by frequent, widespread revolt (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The Tupac Amaru revolts of southern Peru and Bolivia (1779–82) were a series of outbreaks under several different leaders, each of whom assumed the name Tupac Amaru and claimed as his goal the re-establishment of the Inca throne. As in the earlier revolts, the point of interest was not the eradication of Spanish influence (in spite of the Incan symbolism), but rather the correction of injustice and the integration of Indians and *criollos* into a national, Christian society.

The common feature of the Tupac Amaru revolts, along with several others of the period, was the involvement of both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians in a widespread movement. The Indian uprisings must be seen, however, not as carefully coordinated revolutions, but rather as a series of local outbreaks, directed at widespread and fundamental issues of dissatisfaction. Thus the revolts, collectively and individually, were carried out by small independent bands,

loosely organized around their respective leaders and capable of concerted action only in specific battles. Coordinated, long-range strategic planning was virtually impossible, for the bases of tightly knit military organization were lacking. It was no more possible to rally the Indians on ethnic or national grounds than it had been at the time of the conquest. Only exploitation piled upon abuse for two centuries could cause rebellion, for there was no ethnic or national ideology, and the social structure, so thoroughly atomized around small community groups, provided no model of military organization.

Republican Social Structure

The War of Independence in 1826 attracted only diffuse response from the Indians. Both Quechua and Aymara participated as soldiers of both sides. The status of Indians in national society remained virtually unchanged after independence, for the only major social change had been a shift of power from an elite of *peninsulares* to one of *criollos*. The tribute, as such, was abolished early in republican times, but in its place was levied the *contribución de indígenas* (Indian contribution), which was in turn supplanted by taxes which had exactly the same economic effect and continued in force until 1952. The concept of group privilege (*fuero*) continued to be a viable part of the value system (see ch. 11, Social Values).

The abuse of political and military power for the despoilation of Indian lands by whites and *cholos*, quite common throughout the colonial period, continued unabated into republican times. The great *latifundios*, landed estates worked by Indians who were, to all effects, serfs, bound legally and customarily to the land, became an entrenched part of the social scene.

The nineteenth cenutry republican governments, essentially oligarchies maintained by and for a very small elite and ideologically founded upon transplanted notions of economic liberalism saw the Indians as a block to national progress. Their most positive programs were directed at forcibly incorporating the indigenous population into national culture, largely by wrecking the bases of communal land tenure (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Negatively, the governments of the nineteenth century Bolivia perceived the Indian as a national labor pool, to be exploited for the benefit of the small national upper class, and therefore to be driven off of their independent peasant holdings and into economic dependence, first upon the large landowners (*latifundistas*) and later, upon the mine owners.

At the time of independence, most *encomiendas* had been converted to Crown administration, or had passed—by illegal means—into the hands of *latifundistas*. Community headmen were thoroughly the creatures of the local political officials (*corregidores*) and the parish priests. Republican society, in respect to its Indian members, was

totally unchanged in this respect. The office of *corregidor*, in name and in function, was continued, with the difference that this official now represented the Republic rather than the Crown.

The development of mining as Bolivia's economic mainstay in the earlier part of the present century, along with the general development of a system of national communication, produced a trend toward urbanization, shown by some acceleration in the growth of city populations. Its social effects were most apparent in the establishment of a proletarian group—the mineworkers—and in the growth of the town *cholo* population. For the Indians collectively, industrialization and accelerated urbanization meant little, except for the addition of opportunities for national acculturation. Individuals now had new alternatives to existence as Indians, for they could join the growing industrial proletariat or they could seek their fortunes by merging themselves with the population of town *cholos*. For the great mass the basic institutions of *latifundio* and the small, socially isolated community continued to be the significant realities of life.

Republican history, through 1952, was one of essential socioeconomic stability. The constant political strife of the period represented nothing more than a mechanism for the distribution and redistribution of power among a closed elite. Fear of Indian outbreaks, however, was generalized among the urban upper and middle classes, the *latifundistas*, and to some extent, the town *cholos*. Throughout the entire period, there were isolated outbreaks of violence, usually triggered by a specific instance of maltreatment, but reinforced by long accumulated resentment. Such manifestations were, however, entirely local and never spread beyond the specific *latifundio*, parish or *corregimiento* of their origin. The participants saw themselves as a small aggrieved group, not as representatives of an oppressed people.

The turning point in national social structure is easily identified as the few years following the Chaco War. The Indians, who had been participants under the flags of national causes only in isolated, individual cases, were called in masses to serve in the army. The cultural influences of travel and association with a wide sampling of their countrymen, along with the often fiery speeches of politically oriented officers, awoke in many an awareness of membership in a social system transcending the boundaries of the community. The development of at least nascent national consciousness among Indian veterans of the Chaco War was general, but it had its most concrete and immediate effects in the Cochabamba area, where groups of Quechua-speaking young men, loosely joined in a veterans' association, were later welded into a prototype of the peasant leagues (*sindicatos-campesinos*), which broke, for the first time, the barriers of community isolation.

The establishment of the *sindicatos* in the countryside and the growth of a unified and highly self-conscious labor bloc within the industrial proletariat added new groupings to the social structure. Each represented an organization of interest at levels far above those traditionally characteristic of Bolivian society. The broadening of the bases of individual sociopolitical and socioeconomic participation—far more than the formal changes brought about by the revolution—lay at the roots of the recent transformation of Bolivian national social structure.

MAJOR SOCIAL GROUPS

La Rosca

La rosca (literally, "the screw") is the term popularly applied to the small group of families which had, prior to the 1952 revolution, held an absolute monopoly on productive resources and political power. United by complex and far-reaching ties of kinship, the members of this elite group have traditionally been distinguishable by a strong current of common ideology and cultural background.

As members of a self-conscious elite class, the *rosqueros* have traditionally seen their position of superiority as socially moral—and even divinely ordained. The most important thread of *rosca* ideology—and one which underlies the tenacious class consciousness of the group—is the idea of *abolengo*. In a very few exceptional cases, economically successful people have been socially accepted by the inner circle of the *rosca* without connection to the group of families generally conceded to form the national aristocracy, but such acceptance is hard won. The high level of social cohesion of the *rosca* depends directly upon the force exerted by kinship connections (see ch. 11, Social Values). The integrative force of kinship is reflected in a strong interest in genealogy which commonly occupies an extremely prominent place in historical discourse, both local and national. Newspaper accounts of important social events—particularly weddings—often contain references to the distinction of the families involved, a term which strongly implies long association with the uppermost segment of local society rather than the substantive achievements of individual members.

Also an important part of *rosca* class ideology are strongly held notions regarding the relative worth of work and leisure. Most remunerative activity has always been looked upon deprecatingly. Work, in itself, is not seen as being innately good, and the distinguished practice of a profession alone has never been a means of achieving membership in the elite. Generous leisure, on the other hand, is seen as a mark of upper-class status and as the only means of acquiring the grace and cultivation essential to the proper gentle-

men. Although the great majority of upper-class men have always received a university education (and usually professional training), scholastic activity enjoys no great prestige. Rather, the purpose of education has always been seen as laying the basis for life as a highly cultured and polished gentleman (see ch. 11, Social Values).

The Bolivian elite group has traditionally maintained a dual cultural allegiance, for sustained residence abroad has always been seen as desirable, and education in foreign universities bears a high prestige value. An important mark of the *rosquero* has been the ability to converse fluently in at least one foreign language, usually English, French or German. Until quite recently, artistic and literary expression have been closely molded by foreign, largely European, models, and the growth of a specifically Bolivian genre in fiction and poetry—confined almost to social and economic themes—seems to have arisen more as an expression of political than of esthetic discourse (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). The economic foundation of the traditional oligarchy rested upon the triple bases of monopoly over agricultural land and labor, control of major mineral resources and large-scale commerce (particularly in the import-export field) (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). The importance of these monopolies lay not only in the vast wealth produced for members of the oligarchy but also in the control achieved over the most vital sectors of the national economy and in the absolute and final authority over masses of Indian peasants who comprised the backbone of the labor force. Overlapping control of vital economic resources and activities by a small, closely knit group of families reinforced the total political control and the extremely high social status enjoyed by members of the *rosca*. The class consciousness and, to some extent, the social status have continued to exist even after the loss of absolute power and privilege resulting from the 1952 revolution.

Established pedigree as a criterion of high social status is intimately related to ethnic stratification. Isolated *rosqueros* do show strongly Indian racial characteristics and, indeed, virtually all families with a heritage dating from colonial times are reputed to have some Indian ancestry. For the wealthy and powerful social pretender (*arribista*), however, known Indian ancestry or obviously Indian features can be a fatal impediment. The great tin magnate, Simón Patiño, was refused membership in a social club of the *rosca* long after he became the most wealthy Bolivian, largely because of his known *cholo* background.

Since social climbers are very often persons of *cholo* origins, with obviously Indian features, dislike of such pretenders is often expressed in terms of ethnic prejudice. A Bolivian writing in 1905 gives clear expression to the dual ideas of social pretension and racial inferiority:

> See that little *cholo* in his green tie, starched collar, with his neck shaven and his bristly mop slicked down; look at the timid way he takes his glass of spirits . . . how he servilely flatters the wench with him and smirks effeminately at her.

In larger cities, which have received significant influxes of foreign nationals, there has been a tendency to incorporate well-educated and wealthy members of certain groups into the traditional upper class. In particular, economically successful families of German immigrants have freely intermarried with old and honored families of La Paz for several generations, a fact attested to by a liberal distribution of German surnames among the upper-class population of La Paz. Members of the German Club find access to the loftiest social circles a matter of relative ease.

A certain amount of ethnic prejudice is commonly directed toward the relatively large Levantine Arab population. Members of some exclusive clubs are by no means reluctant to admit that access to their groups is virtually impossible for an Arab. Indeed, a common rationalization for this policy of exclusion is expressed in the explanation that "They have a nice club of their own."

The *rosca* as a self-conscious social group has lost the almost absolute power which it held over prerevolutionary society. A few families have been impoverished by land reform or inflation, and individuals have fallen victim to political persecution. The upper-class population was sharply diminished by emigration in the years following 1952. With all of these violent changes, however, the *rosca*, as a social class whose outstanding characteristics are wealth and common ideology, continues to exist as a functioning part of Bolivian national society.

The most fortunate segment of the *rosca*—and a sizeable one—has maintained large investments and capital reserves in foreign countries, beyond the reach of expropriation, and immune to the effects of the drastic inflation which beset the nation in the years from 1952 to 1957. Further, many individuals—particularly manufacturers and importers—were able, during the period of dual exchange rates through 1956), to exploit individual connections within the government which permitted them to engage in highly profitable foreign exchange speculation (see ch. 24, Financial System).

A measure of the strength and tenacity of group consciousness—to a great extent, a function of kinship loyalties—is to be seen in the known cases in which members of the rich but politically defenseless *rosca*, themselves not members of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), the ruling party, have successfully sought the protection and favor of relatives with positions in the government. Highly placed members of the official party, of *rosca* origin, maintain cordial and even affectionate ties with kinsmen of the opposition groups.

In spite of the fact that the more exclusive social clubs of La Paz are known to be composed of members drawn predominantly from opposition groups, individuals from the inner cricle of MNR political life also belong to and participate in club activities on a basis of personal friendship and cordiality. Admission to some associations remains contingent, however, upon fulfillment of such prerequisites as good lineage and university education. Even powerful government officials and MNR figures have been subject to pointed snubs and club rejections for lack of proper family or educational background.

Even in a group as small and relatively integrated as the traditional oligarchy, regionalism has always been a factor of division. Ties of kinship, along with those of common ideology and interest, exist between *rosqueros* of all major regions, but each local segment of the upper class stands as an independent social grouping with its own lineages and traditions. An extreme example of this regionalism is afforded by the case of the elite group in lowland Santa Cruz. Not only has the *rosca* of that area been relatively isolated from the kinship circles which bind together the national elite, but the predominant ideology, particularly with respect to prestige, has always differed sharply from the national mode. Members of the elite society of such centers as La Paz and Cochabamba have based their position upon control of land and cash wealth and symbolized that position with an opulent standard of living. In Santa Cruz, where land is plentiful and until recently only peripheral operation in the cash market was possible, such considerations have been secondary. Rather, status and economic power have rested most firmly upon a combination of pedigree and ability to command large labor forces.

The Middle Class

The middle class, of quite recent origin, occupies a somewhat equivocal position in Bolivian society. Defined largely on the basis of occupational specialization and economic status, but lacking a formed ideology and class consciousness, its members are not so readily identifiable as those of other groups. In a major sense the middle class is the joint product of social mobility and elite exclusiveness, for the great majority of persons of modest origins who manage to achieve some degree of economic success think of themselves as upper class and seek acceptance by that group. The middle class, an almost entirely urban phenomenon, consists of individuals who can be fitted into neither the *rosca*—generally for lack of proper pedigree—nor the lower class or peasant groupings. They are, for the most part, successful urban merchants, white collar workers in commerce or government service, less wealthy and high-born professionals and, in general, persons in relatively high prestige occupations who depend for sustenance mostly upon salaries, fees or commercial profits, rather than

upon passive investment. The range of income enjoyed by persons identifiable as members of the middle class is quite broad—lying anywhere between the almost unbelievably low salaries of primary school teachers and the comfortable fees received by successful urban physicians. In general, however, regardless of economic level, persons in middle class social positions feel it necessary to maintain a high standard of living, at least in such externals as housing and clothing, which distinguishes them from the lower class and peasant groups. For many, this standard, which almost invariably includes house servants, places a severe strain on economic resources (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

Although most members of the middle class with predominantly Caucasian racial features have traditionally shared the ethnic prejudices associated with *resqueros*, this prejudice is considerably less rigid in application than among the latter. A significant part of this class, well represented in social clubs of the groups, consists of persons of *cholo* background who have achieved some degree of occupational or commercial success. Members of immigrant groups which are also targets of ethnic prejudice—Japanese and Arabs, for example—most often find a degree of acceptance in the loosely knit middle-class social circles.

The existence of even a weakly integrated middle class, defined occupationally and socially, is a recent phenomenon in Bolivian society. Under the characteristic economic system of Spanish colonial government, mercantile activity on a large scale was more or less limited completely to members of the most privileged group. This pattern of monopolistic control of economic activity by the elite continued well into republican times. On the other hand, prevailing values have never accorded much esteem to petty commercial activity, so that small business could rarely serve as a route to higher status for the socially ambitious.

The static social situation of pre-twentieth century Bolivia and the severe limitations upon educational opportunity afforded little chance for social advancement through entrance to professions which offered both prestige and economic gain. The few individuals who succeeded in emerging from the masses of lower status—farmers, laborers, artisans and petty merchants—by way of distinguished service in the military or the clergy, or by the practice of law or medicine, were generally absorbed into the elite. In some cases such persons occupied merely a questionable and marginal social status because of rejection by the target group, although their children could aspire to greater social acceptance.

Also in a equivocal position were the numerous people from elite families whose economic fortunes had suffered reversal through division by inheritance or other loss. In small provincial population

centers such impoverishment could be genteel, but in La Paz or Cochabamba it was socially fatal. Before the emergence of a middle class, impoverished *rosqueros* most often occupied an unenviable position on the periphery of elite society. Recently such persons have tended to gravitate toward the middle class.

The growth of a recognizable middle class dates effectively from the explosive boom in the mining industry which created demands for a new world of skill, largely administrative, which could be filled only by literate persons with some degree of specialized training. Not only in the administration of the mining enterprise, but also in the developing field of rail transport and in the much enlarged commercial sector, new occupational statuses merged which were endowed with a higher prestige value (and usually a more generous compensation) than those of the lower class. The small size of the elite and the low value accorded to routine work by its members made very unlikely the recruitment of such specialized personnel from among the *rosca*. These new white collar fields almost immediately opened routes of socioeconomic advancement to literate members of the urban lower class.

A somewhat accelerated growth of urban centers, also an outgrowth of the mining boom, led to the exposure of increasing numbers to formal education, which was a prerequisite to higher social status. By sometime around 1920 professional training had been sought as a path to socioeconomic advancement by so many upwardly mobile urban *cholos* that the practice of law had fallen into disesteem among members of the *rosca* in many provincial cities as being the mark of the *arribista*. Lacking the qualification of pedigree and race so necessary to acceptance by the *rosca*, yet immeasurably above the working class and peasants in educational and economic attainment, such professionals, along with recently successful merchants, came almost by default to form a group of their own.

The Bolivian middle class is virtually devoid of group consciousness or distinctive ideology. Although the existence of such a group is popularly recognized—at least in the larger cities—the application of the term middle class has often been confused and inconsistent. In Sucre, for example, the American sociologists, Harry B. and Audrey E. Hawthorn, found that local commentators on the social scene tended to divide the entire population into upper class (often called whites) and lower class (often called *cholos*). There were a few individuals who did make reference to a middle class, but informants and authors had difficulty in identifying specific members of the group.

Traditionally, most members of the middle class have aspired to membership in the most exalted social circles and have sought to surround themselves with the material symbols of that status. The standard of living—in terms of housing and dress—of more successful

middle-class members has tended to approach that of the *rosqueros*. Educational and ideological orientations have also generally been very similar to those of the upper class. Even attitudes toward work and leisure frequently approach those traditionally held by the *rosca*. Hence, the history of the Bolivian middle class does not abound with stories of merchants or industrialists who have devoted their lives to passionate, continued participation in the affairs of their companies, for after achieving success, most such men have retired to genteel leisure. Probably a reflection of these attitudes toward materially productive activities is the strong preference for investment in real estate and other income-producing property which involves a minimum of work on the part of the holder (see ch. 19, Industry; ch. 24, Financial System). Also related to the fact that work—particularly manual and routine—has not achieved the place of a middle-class virtue is the tendency to seek salaried employment with government agencies in positions which involve little or no responsibility. This passion for genteel and not overly demanding work (*empleomania*) until recently stood as an impediment to the development of skilled technicians drawn from the middle class (see ch. 8, Education; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The distinctive features of middle-class ideology, only incipiently developed, lie in the fact that this group, more than any other, has given rise to sociopolitical radicals and to the few avowed intellectuals who have appeared on the Bolivian scene. In spite of aspirations to the contrary most members of the middle class derive their sustenance from salaries, fees or commercial profit, rather than from the proceeds of passive investment. They were, therefore, less firmly committed to the traditional economic order than were the *rosqueros*. In post-revolutionary times the resources of most middle-class Bolivians were extremely vulnerable to the effects of drastic inflation and to the vagaries of the international metals market. Teachers and other modestly paid professionals, along with civil servants and commercial employees whose incomes consisted largely of fixed salaries are, as a result, subject to considerable influence of radical doctrines which offer immediate relief. The literacy and articulateness of middle-class professionals, particularly university professors and military men, have served to impel many into positions of leadership in radical movements on both the left and the right. A disproportionately large part of the prerevolutionary leftist groups was recruited from among the middle class; and in contemporary times political organizations of the extreme right, no less opposed to the *status quo*, have achieved considerable appeal among impoverished members of the urban middle class (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The Industrial Proletariat and Lower Class

As in the case of the middle class the advent of a recognizable urban proletariat as a self-conscious socioeconomic bloc is a phenomenon dating from the beginning of the modern mining boom. The core of this group is the large labor force employed in the mines, but several other branches of industrial activity, notably transportation and textile manufacturing, have large memberships. Also assimilated into the group are most of the domestic servants, petty merchants and small artisans of the cities, by virtue of being quite similar to the industrial workers in economic status and ethnic and educational background.

The lower-class industrial workers, artisans and petty merchants are recruited from among both urban *cholos* and transplanted Indian peasants. Except for the miners' group such personnel stem overwhelmingly from among town and city *cholos*, who sought each new economic opportunity as it opened up. The miners and, to a great extent, the railroad workers are of predominantly Indian origin. Culturally and linguistically all components of the working class have come to be quite similar. Typically, a member of this group speaks fluent Spanish (which, however, often bears a heavy Quechua or Aymara accent) and considers himself a Bolivian national. Although literacy is by no means generalized, urban school attendance has long been relatively high in comparison with the rural situation (see ch. 8, Education).

Members of the core groups, particularly miners and factory workers, show a class consciousness and awareness of common interest almost as strong as that of the elite. These groups are united not only by strong ties of labor organization but also by a sort of group ideology arising out of a long history of strife and martyrdom. Thus, it is easy to mobilize political opinion and action through the use of propaganda which appeals to the memory of such incidents as the massacres of Uncia (1924), Catavi (1942) or Villa Victoria (1949).

Within the local labor union groups an extremely personalistic leadership, along with a high level of group loyalty, makes for considerable unity in political matters. Political unanimity is the rule. Thus, most union locals can be characterized as "MNR unions" or as "FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana) unions." For the same reasons, union groups—particularly those of the miners—are generally formidable contingents in either armed combat or political demonstration (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

There is clear evidence that the labor unions have achieved a place not only as organizations for the defense of economic and political interest but also as important social institutions which provide a locus for friendship, informal cooperation and exchange of ideas (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization). To a certain extent, also, the

etiquette of labor union sociality—particularly in the use of the word comrade (*compañero*) as a form of address—has become an ingrained part of proletarian social life.

Although the ideology of proletarian class consciousness exists at the national level, the social life of the typical member of that group is usually quite circumscribed. While all labor unions are affiliated with national and departmental organizations (*centrales obreras*), the interests and activities of the average worker do not take him far beyond the boundaries of his own local group. Thus, even though mass political action can be mobilized on a national scale, such mobilization must always take place through leadership at the most local level.

In many parts of urban Bolivia, union locals serve an important function as civic associations. In the lower-class La Paz district of Villa Fátima, the Yungas Truck Drivers' Union (Sindicato de Transportadores a Yungas) is one of several groups which continually exert themselves, by petition and other political action, for neighborhood improvement. In another such district of the same city—Villa 18 de Mayo—the most active and articulate civic group, a house owners' association, is affiliated with the Factory Workers' Union (Sindicato de Fabriles).

Particularly in the larger cities, lower-class neighborhood social life is organized around a wide variety of associations. In addition to the labor union locals most such districts in La Paz have neighborhood councils (*juntac vecinales*) which serve to mobilize civic action, women's associations and soccer teams (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare). In several typical lower-class neighborhoods of La Paz such clubs draw their members from the majority of families resident in the area. Overlapping membership in neighborhood-based associations provides a tie which crosscuts occupational speciality. Thus, factory workers, petty merchants, artisans and railway workers are often drawn into an active social life which reinforces the group consciousness of the urban lower class. In purely local matters this pattern of overlapping association normally overcomes occasional differences in economic interest and political orientation.

Class consciousness among the urban proletariat and its associated groups extends to the definition of fairly sharp boundaries with respect to other social groupings. The typical member of the lower class, if pressed to identify his position in urban society, will most frequently place himself among the "working people" (*gente trabajadora*) or the "common people" (*el pueblo*). On the other hand, the "working people" see themselves as quite distinct from rural *cholos* and Indian peasants. The older residents of Villa Fátima have tended consistently to reject recently arrived *campesino* migrants (whom they call Indians), refusing to cooperate with them in civic matters

and denying them admission to local associations. The social rift between the proletarian groups and the *campesinos* has long been underscored by divisions of economic interest and political jealousy. Although both groups have consistently supported the MNR and revolutionary reforms, they have always stood as opposing units within the party. This longstanding rift has been exploited frequently by party leadership and the government, as in the use of *campesinos* to break a miners' strike in 1959.

The Campesinos

The application of a blanket term, *campesino*, to the ethnically diverse and socially isolated masses of farmers who make up the bulk of Bolivian population implies an identity which is only incipient. Traditional barriers of language, cultural differences, regionalism and—to a certain extent—ethnic prejudice, continue to exist. Nevertheless, in spite of these profound internal divisions the *campesinos* stand as a distinctive political and economic bloc in the perspective of the changing social order.

The *campesino* bloc draws its origins predominantly from among three major ethnic groupings: the Aymara-speaking Indians of the Altiplano; the Quechua speakers concentrated in the valley zones; and the generally white, Spanish-speaking farmers and herders of the Oriente (particularly the *cambas* of Santa Cruz). In the traditional social order each of these groups was effectively isolated from the mainstreams of national life: the Aymara- and Quechua-speaking Indians by relegation to the status of inferior caste members and the lowlanders by an almost total absence of transportation facilities and by a long tradition of social and cultural regionalism (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

In the years following the revolution these large but unassimilated groups of peasants moved increasingly into national life and toward a certain bloc unity—at least regionally—based upon perception of common interest. Participation in the *sindicatos campesinos* and exercise of universal suffrage introduced among members of the group a sense of personal and bloc power hitherto unknown. Increased involvement in the cash market and greater use of the public schools awakened an awareness of issues which transcend the narrow boundaries of the traditionally isolated peasant community.

Most of the old factors of division are still operative in 1962, even within small and culturally homogenous areas. Thus, political factionalism, although strongly felt in many places, tends to follow the lines of traditional village jealousies and in-group loyalties. On the national scene such factors as regionalism, linguistic and cultural diversity and ethnic prejudice continue to be decisive in shaping the course of *campesino* social life, but it is safe to predict that the status

of the diverse peasant groups in national society will be increasingly determined by wider perception of common socioeconomic interest.

Both the traditional social structure of rural Bolivia and social trends discernible in the years following the revolution are intimately related to longstanding patterns of agricultural economics. *Latifundismo*—the system of large, landed estates, with an associated pattern of entailed tenant labor—was a keystone of Indian status in most of prerevolutionary Bolivia. Under the prevailing labor economics of the system and with the expansive tendencies of the *latifundios*, the Indians were seen by the landlords as a source of cheap, docile labor, usable only under conditions of maximal subservience. On the other hand the ever-present threat of land despoliation by the *latifundistas* was an important factor in maintaining the extreme isolation of Indian freeholders, particularly on the Altiplano. In the Cochabamba area a more extensive pattern of freeholding among the Indians, along with the fact that they shared their status as small farmers with many *cholos*, served to make the traditional social structure somewhat less rigid. In Santa Cruz the most important issue was not land, which existed in abundance, but rather, ability to control labor and access to markets. This situation was reflected in a much more friendly and less exploitative relationship between large landowner and tenant farmer.

Unfortunately, detailed investigations of rural social life have been made in only a few of the many distinctive regions of Bolivia. In the highlands detailed information is available for the northern Altiplano and for the Chochabamba Valleys, and in the lowlands only for the area surrounding Santa Cruz. Such equally important areas as Potosí, Sucre, Tarija and the Beni remain only sketchily described. The history, settlement patterns, ethnic makeup and rural economies of the undescribed areas present sufficient parallels to the better-known parts of the country to justify the suspicion that their rural social structures are quite similar, but until more detailed investigations are done such suggestions must remain purely conjectural.

The Altiplano

A government survey of land tenure made in 1945 in three typical Altiplano provinces revealed that of all land under cultivation only 10 percent was owner occupied and operated. The great mass of Indians were resident upon the large agricultural estates (*fincas*), bound to their landlords for life, either through indebtedness or through lack of alternatives. The *fincas* of the Lake Titicaca region were undergoing expansion well into the present century, and numerous documented cases are know of the use of public force to effect the expropriation of Indian lands.

The tenants (*colonos*) of the great landed estates depended totally for their livelihood upon the small plots granted them for their own use. Cash wages were either nonexistent or quite nominal, for the landlords were loath to permit their *colonos* the economic independence implied in wage labor. Aside from the limited opportunities afforded by the regional market for the sale of small surpluses and the purchase of a few cash goods, the *colonos* could look only to the *finca* as a source of commercially manufactured necessities and tools. The monopoly enjoyed by the landlords was often abused by the exaction of outrageous prices. Thus, an institutionalized system of indebtedness existed, the perpetuation of which was an important means for binding the Indians to their estates.

The absentee estate owners (*finqueros*), in exchange for the small and often substandard plots granted to the *colonos*, enjoyed the right to virtually free labor in their own fields. Household service was available to them on the same basis, under the institution of *pongueaje*, which obliged *colono* families to contribute periodically the services of individual members in both the *finca* and town houses of the landlords. So important were the *colonos* to the *finca* economy that such estates put up for sale were advertised on the basis of their *colono* population.

Since the estate owners were so often absent the administrative hierarchy of the *finca* was normally headed by an overseer, usually a *cholo*, who was separated from the Indians under his supervision by a caste line. This official often enjoyed, in the absence of the owner, rights and courtesies due the latter. Within the *colono* population there were numerous status differences—largely of a minor order—based upon tenure arrangements and positions of minor supervisory authority (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Denied political participation and almost totally dependent upon the *finca* in their economic lives, the *colonos* lived in a social world which was effectively circumscribed by the boundaries of their *fincas*. They were virtually isolated in the caste status accorded Indians and, at the same time, generally denied even minimal intercommunication with either the free Indians or those of other estates. The tradition of isolation was surrounded by a certain degree of institutionalized hostility toward outsiders—both townsmen and Indians of other *fincas*. The American anthropologist, Bandelier, in his observations of *colono* social life during the early part of the present century, reported the existence of an ever-present current of hostility among Indians of different estates on Titicaca Island, which regularly gave rise to physical violence at the smallest provocation.

The rapid and continual expansion of the *fincas* created a hostile environment for the survival of free Indian communities which, when viewed along with the general history of economic and political exploi-

tation, was an adequate explanation of the cloak of isolation with which the Indians sought to surround themselves. The free communities of the Altiplano were organized around both communal and individual land tenure, but regardless of the distribution of land titles the social forms which developed among the Indians of free communities (*comunarios*) were largely a response to the common threat of despoliation. Much of the social control exercised in the free communities was directed toward preventing land sales to outsiders. Although no explicitly stated value exists regarding mate choice, observers repeatedly report that Altiplano Indian communities tend to be in-marrying and that, in the rare cases in which marriage takes place between such settlements, the wife normally goes to live with her husband's people. The out-marrying husband is usually denied inheritance rights through his wife on the grounds that he is not a member of her natal community.

Under prerevolutionary national governments, *de facto* communal tenure was recognized by local officials and represented a significant source of local taxation. The only political official with whom the *comunarios* normally had sustained contact, the *corregidor* (canton-level officer) traditionally collected a regular tribute from members of communal landholding groups, and the *corvées* levied by him were based on the rationale that such service was a duty incurred by occupancy of the lands. Thus, land tenure was important in defining the status of the free Indian in national society.

Political agitation among Altiplano Indians somewhat antedated the revolution, but in the early days of the 1952 upheavals the Aymara peasants were more or less inactive. The often inflammatory speeches of activists, along with the arms provided by them, were instrumental in mobilizing the Indians to action shortly after the institution of the MNR regime. Throughout the Altiplano, loosely organized bands of *colonos* moved to occupy *finca* lands and to dispossess the landlords and *cholo* administrators. In addition, they engaged in terrorism against the *cholo* town dwellers, whom they saw (more or less accurately) as exploiters. After an initial period of violence, destruction and profligate waste (for example, the consumption of seed crops and dairy cattle), the Indians began (in 1955–56) to adapt in a more peaceful and disciplined manner to the new social order. Attempts by MNR activists and labor unions to institute *sindicatos campesinos*, based upon the early example set in the Cochabamba Valley, met with success, and local units were established among Indians of all *fincas* and many free communities. These local groups were affiliated with departmental federations (*federaciones departamentales*) and with the national labor organization, Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB) (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

The *sindicato campesino* has come to be the most important single institution in defining the status of Altiplano Indians in the national social structure. Reports of long-term observers, such as parish priests indicate that these organizations have achieved general acceptance both as a means of expressing individual and collective interest and as a means for mobilizing civic action at the community level. In most cases they have supplanted the traditional canton and province governments. Thus, in most Altiplano communities questions of new school construction and road repair are more often raised at *sindicato* meetings than in interviews with the *subprefecto* or *corregidor* (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The Cochabamba Valleys

In sharp contrast to the Altiplano the thickly settled Quechua areas of Cochabamba were characterized, even before land reform, by an agricultural economy based largely upon small farm organization (*minifundio*). Large *fincas* existed, but their expansion was never as constant nor as rapid as was the case in the Altiplano. Indeed, there are evidences of a slow but continual decline in the number and average size of family-held estates throughout the entire republican period.

Perhaps most important to the determination of social structure is the heavy representation of *cholos* in the small farmer population, who operate with a technology and market behavior identical to the Indians. Thus, the economic gulf which separated the Altiplano *cholos* from their Indian compatriots and underscored ethnic stratification was never so prominent around Cochabamba. While supervisory positions on the relatively few *fincas* of the region were the province of *cholos*, and most petty commerce was in their hands, this relative dominance was outweighed by the marked similarity in typical subsistence patterns.

The settlement pattern characteristic of most of the Cochabamba region, in *rancherías* (hamlets of dispersed households) contrasts sharply with that of the Altiplano. Within a given *ranchería*, both freeholding farmers and *finca* workers were likely to be represented in the days before land reform. This juxtaposition of small farmers and *finca* tenants, along with a general tendency to open structure, had the effect of minimizing isolation of individual social units. The development of a unified Indian (and *campesino*) movement was thus facilitated.

As a mode of productive organization the *latifundio* of the Cochabamba area was generally similar to the *finca* of the Altiplano. Indian tenants (*pegujaleros*) were granted the use of small subsistence plots (*pegujales*) in return for agricultural and household service for specified periods. Important differences in form from the Atliplano system existed, however. The *pegujaleros* of Cochabamba enjoyed

somewhat more free access to agricultural markets and were correspondingly less dependent upon the landlords. Many of the *latifundios* of the valleys were held on a relatively short-term basis by operators who rented them from their owners (often church bodies). To a certain extent the economic mechanism of institutionalized indebtedness was impeded by the frequent turnover in landlords.

Although predatory expansion of latifundios never reached the proportions characteristic of the Altiplano, the system was entrenched in the socioeconomic structure to the extent that even peaceful attempts to end it met with violent resistance on the part of the landlords. In 1936 a group of Chaco War veterans from the *ranchería* of Ana Rancho in the Cliza Valley, organized a group which was to be the prototype of the *sindicatos campesinos*, with the purpose of renting the *latifundio* on which their village was located. The estate, which was the property of the Convent of Santa Clara, had traditionally been rented by townsmen who bid on it periodically. When several landlords suspected the intention of the Ana Rancho Indians to outbid them when the estate was to be put up for rent, they immediately perceived a grave threat to their interests. Banded together as a corporation the landlords pursuaded the Sisters of Santa Clara to sell them the property. The sale was consummated in 1939, and the new owners took immediate steps to suppress any further movement toward subversion of the *latifundio* system by driving off all Indians who refused to accept permanent status as *pegujaleros*.

The course of development of the Cochabamba Valley *sindicatos* postrevolutionary days has been essentially similar to that of the Aymara groups. The only significant difference arises out of the distinctive features of the pre-existing social order. Thus, the Cochabamba Valley *sindicatos* have large memberships drawn from among people who, on cultural and linguistic grounds, must be identified as *cholos*. The political power wielded by the *sindicatos* is such that even townsmen, in many cases, find it to their advantage to belong. Mutual participation of Indians and *cholos*—on a basis of equality—has gone far to further the social integration of the two groups, thereby instituting at least locally a broader sense of *campesino* unity.

Santa Cruz

The fertile and relatively populous region of Santa Cruz has until quite recently been isolated from the national economy. Regional self-sufficiency and a technological system vastly different from that of the highland areas have resulted in land tenure patterns which contrast sharply with those of other parts of the country. *Latifundios* were the predominant form of productive organization before the agrarian reform although their dominance was based neither upon despoliation nor land shortage, but rather upon the ability of the

finqueros to monopolize developed lands in reasonable proximity to markets. The alternative of existing as subsistence farmers was available to those who preferred not to work as tenant laborers (*jornaleros*) on the *fincas*.

Aside from the *fincas*, there were numerous small family farms (*quintas*), which provided their owners with a comfortable but self-sufficient livelihood. Another important group in the agricultural economy of pre-1952 Santa Cruz were the squatters (*tolerados*), who settled on the forested edges of the *fincas* and opened new fields. When the *finquero* felt the need for using such fields himself, he would simply evict the family of *tolerados*, who would move off in search of other forested land.

Since both landlords and tenants often considered themselves to be *blancos*, economic inequality was not compounded by ethnic stratification. The isolation of the Santa Cruz region gave rise to a socioeconomic system in which absenteeism of *finqueros* was distinctly the exceptional case rather than the rule. The wealth of the large landholders was measured in local terms—command of labor and productive ability—rather than in monetary terms. Commitment of the *finqueros* to the task of administering their properties, along with the traditional isolation of the region, was conducive to a definite sense of *noblesse oblige*. Although there was status stratification based upon land tenure, mutal respect and often genuine affection between landlords and tenants—tangibly expressed in ritual kinship (*compadrazgo*) and other close ties—were important characteristics of the social organization.

The friendly relations which had existed between *finqueros* and *jornaleros* before the revolution were a factor in the generally peaceful situation which existed after land reform. Few tenants tried to expropriate lands of their *fincas*, although attempts to organize peasant leagues did meet with considerable success. Such conflict and expropriation of lands as did take place did not follow the lines of socioeconomic class, but rather those of party loyalty.

Town Cholos

Particularly in the Altiplano, but also to some extent in the Cochabamba Valleys, the rural *cholo* population has always been concentrated in the small towns and villages which form the seats of provinces and cantons, residentially and socially segregated from the Indian peasants living in the countryside. Although many *cholos* were landowners and users of Indian labor—at least on a modest scale—their interests have been traditionally bound up in commercial activity such as marketing and transporting local agricultural produce and petty retail trade. To the extent that Indians in the prerevolutionary society were involved in the cash market either as buyers or sellers, they were forced to deal with *cholo* merchants who had access

to transportation facilities and spoke Spanish. This relationship was most often actually exploitative, for the *cholos* exercised control over prices against which the Indian, as a small producer, was defenseless.

The *cholos* maintained an absolute monopoly over local political and governmental activity through control of cantonal, municipal and often provincial offices. Indian communal officers were generally appointed at the pleasure of *cholo* town officials and served mainly as messengers and assistants to them.

Distinct from the Indians both by language and way of life and immeasurably above them in political and economic power, the *cholos* enjoyed social perquisites normally accorded a superior caste group. Indians were expected to address *cholos* in terms of respect, such as *señor* (sir), and the latter usually responded with familiar forms (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

In most highland communities the only tie between *cholos* and Indians which even remotely resembled friendship and intimacy was *compadrazgo* based upon godparenthood. The Indians frequently made use of this deeply rooted Hispanic social form, seeking *cholos* as godparents to their children as a means of assuring themselves and their families a measure of political and economic protection. The *cholos* often happily accepted the honor as a means of establishing trade partnerships. The pattern of mutual respect and responsibility was one of the few ways of introducing some degree of unity and trust into what was otherwise a relationship of exploitation and domination (see ch. 6, Family).

The economic power of town *cholos* was almost totally destroyed by the collapse of local agricultural markets which followed in the wake of agrarian reform (see ch. 18, Agriculture). On the other hand, the institution of universal suffrage, the arming of Indian militia groups and the organization of the *sindicatos campesinos* completely undermined the traditional *cholo* control of local government. Both the *sindicatos* and local MNR party groups came to wield tremendous *de facto* power, and the old positions of *corregidor*, *alcalde* and *subprefecto* became ineffectual from the standpoint of political control (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). Loss of lands and livelihood as a result of either extralegal expropriations or agrarian reform, along with the violence unleashed by the resentful and powerfully armed *sindicato* members, led to the migration of much of the *cholo* population to the cities. In general the group was reduced to political and economic helplessness and social chaos.

Although the basis of their power was destroyed by the revolution and they no longer form an upper caste group, the town *cholos* have nevertheless continued to exist as a recognizable social and economic entity. To a certain extent the rural market economy shows some sign of recuperation as *campesino* small producers have begun to

place their surpluses on sale. One of the most immediate effects of wide-scale land reform, *de facto* and legal, was the reduction of tension between the *campesinos* and townsmen, and violence and abuse directed at the latter—so common in the earlier years of the 1950's—had almost completely disappeared by 1961.

The *cholos* continue to maintain a monopoly on commercial activity, one which is challenged only by the small but steadily increasing group of *campesinos*, who, by learning Spanish and the ways of national citizenship, are beginning to adapt to town life. Although the *campesinos* have shown some inclination to bypass village markets and to buy and sell directly in the cities when transportation is easily accessible, *cholo* town merchants manage to continue their operations.

During the darkest days of strife, when undisciplined militiamen of the *sindicatos* were terrorizing townsmen, personal relationships between individual Indians and *cholos*—particularly *compadrazgo*—served to ameliorate the situation in many areas. In some instances, town *cholos* managed, by appealing to such relationships, to exert influence in the direction of *sindicato* activities. A concrete case is afforded by the *cholo* secretary general of the powerful *sindicato* of Achacachi, Toribio Salas. Salas, who had been a town tradesman before the revolution and a political activist for the MNR during the early 1950's, undertook (partly at the suggestion of his fellow *cholos*) to achieve a place of leadership in *campesino* affairs. He managed to dethrone an earlier leader, an Indian whose active encouragement of terrorism made him a much feared figure. Partly with the material aid of certain MNR groups and partly through the exploitation of old personal contacts, Salas gained a *campesino* following and, after a few minor armed skirmishes, managed to assert leadership over all the local *sindicato* groups. Consolidation of this leadership—which in mid-1962 was unbroken—was achieved through the further exploitation of personal relationships, largely *compadrazgo*. Thus, Salas, along with several other town *cholos* who enjoyed positions of relative trust and friendship among the *campesinos*, continued to form *compadrazgos* and other ties with residents of outlying villages. Particularly important to the strength of Salas' leadership are relationships of trust with key members of local *sindicato* groups. The total number of baptisms and weddings—which in Latin America also require the participation of godparents (*padrinos*)—sponsored by the political party headed by Toribio Salas is estimated to run into the thousands.

On one hand, the *cholos*, through the participation of individuals in the *sindicatos* and by the virtual disappearance of caste difference have moved closer to integration with the Indian peasants. On the other hand, ties of kinship, economic specialization and a common way of life have sufficed to maintain the *cholos* as a more or less distinctive segment of a changing society.

CHAPTER 6

FAMILY

For the majority of Bolivians a stable family life and widely extended bonds of kinship loyalty provide the most effective source of personal security. Although there are wide variations in family and kinship patterns among the disparate Bolivian ethnic groups, the prevailing value traditions, Hispanic and Indian, place great stress upon bonds of responsibility and affection among kinsmen and upon the faithful fulfillment of marital duties (see ch. 11, Social Values). A rough measure of the degree of family stability in the nation, as a whole, is provided by the extremely low divorce rates recorded in the 1950 census (approximately 5 persons divorced per 1,000 ever married).

The general strength of family and kinship life reflects not only deeply rooted values but the general weakness of other institutions, as well. No other institution—social, economic or political—has ever, throughout national history, evinced the degree of stability and endurance characteristic of the family. Hence, none has ever commanded the degree of loyalty accorded the latter by most Bolivians.

The nepotism long typical of institutional life in the traditionally Hispanic-oriented national society leaves those who would seek security, power and high status with little choice but to cultivate close ties of kinship. Trust and responsibility in national politics and in commerce are largely defined in familistic terms, and the man without wide and intimate bonds of kinship loyalty is seen as virtually powerless in society and therefore worthy of great pity. Indeed, such governmental stability and party strength as have existed have rested more firmly upon kinship ties than upon ideological consensus (see ch. 11, Social Values; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The strength of familism at all levels of Bolivian society is such that those who are unrelated to persons of wealth and power very often seek to establish bonds of fictional kinship with them through the institution of *compadrazgo* (the set of relationships which exist between a child's parents and his godparents). In the Hispanic tradition persons related through godparenthood are seen as ideally sustaining the highest regard and loyalty toward one another. For many of the traditionally dominant whites, *compadrazgo* represents,

on the one hand, the extension of kinship bonds to a wider circle, and on the other, a means of formalizing and ritualizing pre-existing ties of friendship. For the great mass of lower-status Indians, *cholos* (highland Spanish speakers of mixed racial and cultural heritage) and *cambas* (Spanish speaking, largely *mestizo* subsistence farmers of the Lowlands), *compadrazgo* is virtually the only way in which relationships of trust can be established outside the bounds of the local community (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

For the Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians, who constitute the majority of Bolivians, family and kinship loyalties have always provided a first line of defense against their precarious economic and social position. In many communities, cooperative sharing of goods and labor among the members of closely knit kin groups has served to maintain almost total autonomy of the white- and *cholo*-dominated markets and hence to reinforce the shell of self-isolation assumed by the Indians as a matter of protection. In many areas, also, the cohesive kin groups exercise a control over inheritance and sale of lands held both collectively and individually by their members, and thus they effectively protect themselves from encroachments by outsiders. Strong bonds of kinship unity, along with networks of intermarriage among kin groups reinforce cohesion and *esprit de corps* within local communities (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

KINSHIP AND FAMILY ORGANIZATION

The Hispanic Pattern

The basic unit of family organization among the whites is the nuclear household—a father and mother, along with their unmarried and dependent children. It is within this household that children are reared, women play their major social roles and men owe their primary obligations of economic support. Almost invariably based upon formal matrimony—both religious and civil—the nuclear family is extremely stable.

Despite its functional importance and stability, the basic family seldom exists as a totally independent unit. As a result of both the strong traditional familism and the social and economic conditions of Bolivian life, bonds of loyalty, affection and mutual responsibility with the more distant kinsmen of both spouses are strong and abiding. There are few activities or decisions of an individual and his immediate family which do not, in the Hispanic view, affect the wider circle of kin.

Kinship Organization

The political and economic power wielded by the white elite in prerevolutionary days was largely channeled into lines of kinship.

The basis of elite wealth lay primarily in such hereditary assets as land and mineral resources rather than in individually earned salaries, fees and business profits. Groups of brothers and sisters have therefore tended to share a strong economic interest by virtue of their being beneficiaries of a common estate and often sharing a common group of heirs.

In the strongly familistic Hispanic social view, a man's status and reputation are determined largely by those of his kinsmen. Persons not intimately acquainted with an individual will normally judge him on the basis of what is publicly known about his kinsmen. Hence, a strong sense of common economic and political interest felt by circles of relatives is reinforced by an equally strong feeling of collective pride and family honor.

Concentration of power, social status and wealth in the hands of groups of kinsmen throughout most of Bolivian history has been reflected in a strong tendency toward dynastic organization of upper-class and, to some extent, middle-class families. Traditional political loyalties and hereditary economic power have underscored bonds of kinship unity which have persisted over generations.

Because of the right of women, under Spanish tradition, to both inherit and bequeath wealth, a man's ties with maternal kinsmen are often as strong as those with his father's people. Similiarly, marriage has always been seen as a means of cementing alliances between unrelated kin groups.

The ties of solidarity among kinsmen are expressed in an active and highly ceremonial pattern of social life. The nuclear family spends much of its time making formal calls upon relatives and receiving such calls. Weddings, baptisms and funeral masses are virtually command appearances, even when those involved are distant cousins. Indeed, such ritualized visiting and compulsory attendance at weddings, funerals and the like form almost the entire social life of many women. Kinship solidarity is also expressed most graphically by the assumption of mourning garb—particularly by women—on the death of relatives, whether close or distant.

A person's most important line of defense against adversity is his circle of kinsmen. Even though ideally the basic family group consists only of parents and children, in reality many households include more distant relatives—a widowed grandparent or an orphaned cousin, for example. The obligation to extend aid and shelter to orphaned and otherwise distressed relatives is not merely a matter of conscience, for refusal to do so would subject a man to ostracism by those persons in whom lie his best hopes for assistance in case of future adversity.

Although two kinsmen may, as individuals, assume opposing political points of view and loyalties, such opposition is seldom permitted

to disrupt the smooth functioning of kinship relations. Even when political feelings are running high (as is most often the case), relatives of opposed convictions and loyalties are expected to behave toward one another with the utmost cordiality at all encounters and particularly at ceremonial gatherings of the kindred. Those in positions of public power are expected to aid their kinsmen regardless of political convictions or loyalties. Such expressions of kinship loyalty were particularly common during the trying days following the 1952 revolution. Qualified observers report numerous instances in which members of the revolutionary government gave generous and often open aid and protection to relatives whose views and loyalties were publicly stated to be in opposition to the regime (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

In addition to protecting a man's welfare and demanding his utmost loyalty, the kin group also intervenes actively in many aspects of his personal life. If a person's social status derives from that of his kindred, his behavior can reflect, in equal measure, on the public reputation of the latter. Any act on the part of a man which might, in the opinion of his kinsmen, seriously jeopardize their collective image will move them to active expression of displeasure.

Marriage and Family Life

Although the Bolivian Constitution accords women full equality of social, political and economic rights, relationships between the sexes both within and outside of matrimony are founded upon strong notions of masculine dominance. The traditional values which stress firm paternal authority are reflected in the fact that in virtually every matter pertaining to family welfare, the father has the final word. Although he may temper the exercise of his power by consultation with his wife and older children, his word, when given, is binding upon all. To a certain extent, a widowed mother may assume the dominant role accorded the head of the family, at least during the minority of her children, but such authority usually passes to the eldest son as he approaches manhood (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Ideally, the husband is the sole breadwinner and guardian of family fortunes. Even when the wife brings, in her own right, considerable wealth to the marriage, the husband normally assumes full control of the property. In the traditional view, family wealth is seen as "belonging" to the head of the family, even if he does not hold formal title to it. Although such "ownership" bears the attendant responsibility of expending the wealth in the best interests of his wife and children, it does not imply that he is obliged to make any accounting to them of its use.

Although the father exercises final authority in all matters affecting the family fortunes, he is not expected to concern himself with the

routine of administering the household. Typically, he leaves all minor decisions to his wife and turns over to her an expense allowance for which no accounting is required, as long as basic needs are met.

In child rearing, the paternal role is one of little participation. A father admires and plays with his babies and occasionally disciplines his older children, but he does not actively tend them. His most important contribution to the process of educating his children is the model of masculine behavior which he sets for his sons in the exercise of his authority and in the gallantry he ideally exhibits toward their mother. His role in discipline is played only occasionally--as a final and somewhat dire authority in cases of misbehavior which the mother feels to be beyond her control.

For the male head-of-household, the division between life and interests in the outside world and those within the family is sharply defined. In the Hispanic value tradition, men are expected to lead broad and active public lives—both in politics and in informal society. Such activities and friends are not, as a matter of course, shared with the family. In fact, a man's wife and children are often totally unaware of his friends at his club and at the bars and coffeehouses he frequents. Generally these friends are never received at home, for just as a man's social life is seen as essentially his own concern, so his home is seen as an exclusive domain to which are admitted only kinsmen and the closest and most trusted friends (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Although she is subordinate to her husband in all matters, a wife nevertheless has a wide and more or less autonomous range of responsibility. She is expected to see that the household functions smoothly and to the entire satisfaction of her husband. Ideally (and usually in reality, since almost all whites belong to the middle or upper class), the family enjoys the assistance of domestic servants. The mother's role, therefore, most often calls for skill at coordinating and supervising the work of others.

The education of young children is the sole responsibility of the mother. Although servants are usually available and relieve her of the heavier and less pleasant work involved in child care, the mother must make all the decisions and take all the necessary action in physical care, early education and discipline. She can seldom hope for even consultative help from the father. It is her voice which her children hear first and from which they learn to speak. She is also the sole guardian of the children's religious life, for although laxity in the observance of religious requirements is tolerated in men, their wives are generally expected to appear regularly at mass, accompanied by the children (see ch. 11, Social Values; ch. 10, Religion).

In her treatment of the children, the mother tends to rely more upon affectionate cajoling and reason than upon stern authority. She is expected to be open and free in her expressions of affection. When

such techniques fail, rather than assume the role of the open disciplinarian, she generally has recourse to threats of paternal action.

The result of such a division of parental responsibility is a sharp contrast in the quality of relations between children and their mother as compared with those between children and their father. Toward the mother, there is normally a feeling of deep and unreserved affection. Although genuine affection is often felt for the father, it is a love which is usually edged with a degree of fear and reserve.

Most functions of family life are private. The members do little in common outside of the household. The father has his own social and political activities and, in a limited way, so may the mother, in church or club. Outside of the house, the few occasions on which the family acts as a unit lie mainly in the ritualized social life of the kindred. Parents and children visit relatives and attend weddings, funerals and baptisms as a group. Such activity is, however, a part of the obligation of kinship solidarity rather than an expression of shared personal interests.

Although the strictest fidelity is expected of a woman, adultery on the part of her husband is not popularly deemed an offense against wife and family, provided that such relationships be cultivated with discretion. Even though a man's *peccadilloes* usually become known to local society and are commented upon with a degree of amused toleration, he is duty-bound to avoid flaunting his mistress relationships in such a way that they can come to the first-hand attention of his wife. The wife is normally counseled by her mother and other female relatives to accept her husband's infidelities with dignity and resignation. Such counsel almost always includes a strong emphasis upon the moral superiority of women.

Above all, a man is expected to prevent even the remotest possibility of a public encounter between his wife and his mistress and to prevent, as well, any discussion of the latter in the presence of the former. Men friends in Latin societies very often feel somewhat ill-at-ease in the presence of each others' wives precisely because they are intimately and good-humoredly aware of each others' *peccadilloes*.

Changing social and economic conditions have been reflected in modifications in the basic pattern of family organization, particularly in the realm of marital and parental roles. The availability of professional and university education to women, along with the fact that many unmarried girls—even of the upper class—take paid employment, has resulted in a new sense of feminine independence which has made it difficult for many wives to accept the unqualified domination and independence of their husbands. In the middle class particularly, but also to some extent in the upper class, many married women have been required to work in order to enable their families to weather the severe inflation of postrevolutionary times. Making

a concrete and highly visible contribution to family wealth, such wives generally demand more of a say in its management.

To a certain extent, tendencies toward cultural cosmopolitanism among educated and less-conservative young people have resulted in some acceptance by them of North American influences communicated to them in the press and motion pictures. In consequence, some young couples have come to share interests and their social life to a much greater extent than has traditionally been typical.

The Highland Indian Patterns

Kinship Organization

Although in most Indian communities the ties among kinsmen are ideally strong and extensive and, in general, kinship loyalty has traditionally served to protect the Quechua and Aymara speakers in their precarious social anad economic status, kinship organization varies significantly from region to region. In some groups, notably among the Aymara speakers of the northern Altiplano, the focus of unity is upon paternal kinsmen: fathers, brothers and fathers' brothers. Among other groups—the Quechua speakers of Cochabamba for example—maternal and paternal relatives are of more or less equal importance to the individual.

In preconquest times the highland Indian nuclear family was typically a constituent part of a larger and very important kin group—the patrilineal extended family, consisting of a group of paternally related men, their wives and dependent children, along with their married sons and the nuclear families of the latter. This group was settled in a compact area, with the dwellings of all or most of its component families often constructed within a shared walled compound. The members of the extended family owned and worked their lands communally. Because of the importance of ancestor worship in pre-Christian religious life, collective rituals in honor of deceased relatives provided an important symbol of unity for the group.

This basic pattern of kinship organization was subjected, from the earliest days of Spanish rule, to continuing and often insupportable social and economic pressures. Forced migrations and civil wars resulted in the dispersal of many kin groups. Extreme land shortages—arising out of white encroachments—often placed the members of extended families into bitter competition with one another for the meager means of survival. Christian missionaries early suppressed all outward observances of ancestor worship and, with them, much of the ideology of kinship unity (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

Although the extended family pattern was totally destroyed in many areas, it survived in somewhat modified form in others. Throughout the Aymara territory, in particular, economic and social forces com-

bined with traditional values have underlain the continuance of strong bonds among paternal kinsmen.

In Aymara communities, where individual (rather than communal) land tenure is the rule and land is scarce, fathers most often grant their married sons the right to use their fields without giving them formal title. The result is a continued relationship of dependence and subordination between sons and their fathers—one which gives structural meaning to the extended family.

Similarly, inheritance patterns give a focus of unity to groups of paternal relatives. Traditionally, women have been excluded from the inheritance of land. In the most isolated communities, where the Indians have successfully evaded the Bolivian law which requires equal inheritance among children, regardless of sex, the result has been a tendency toward concentration of paternally related families in small areas. The Aymara community is normally in-marrying, and in the rare case of a marriage between members of different communities, the couple invariably settles with the husband's people, for they are felt to have no claim on the lands of the wife's kin group. By virtue of her dependency upon them, the wife is expected to direct her loyalties toward her in-laws rather then toward her own kin.

Although ancestor worship no longer exists, other aspects of religious practice serve to underscore the solidarity of paternal relationships among the Aymara. When a man assumes the costly burden of sponsoring a religious fiesta, his brothers, sons and father are expected to render all financial and material assistance possible. As a result, the fiesta becomes, to a great extent, a collective endeavor of the kin group. The native fertility ritual (*chokela*) is normally celebrated jointly by groups of paternal kinsmen (see ch. 10, Religion).

The Aymara extended family of the mid-twentieth century consists of a dominant older man and his wife and dependent children, along with his married (but dependent) sons and their families. Occasionally, if the elder member of the extended family has more land than he and his sons require, a less-fortunate brother will associate himself with the family. Because the father usually provides the land on which the sons build their houses, the group is settled in a compact area.

Within the patrilineal extended family, the bonds of kinship unity are particularly close. Although the members cultivate ties of affection and cooperation with more distant kinsmen, most of their time and energy is spent in cooperating with one another. In many cases, the traditional system of labor cooperation (*aini*) and general sharing of foodstuffs within the extended family make it a virtually self-sufficient economic unit.

Since the modern extended family reflects not only the unity of paternal kinsmen but also paternal dominance, it rarely survives the

death of the father. When the sons have obtained full title to their own lands, they usually operate more independently of each other, although they continue, when necessary, to share labor and goods. As they age, many of the younger men in their turn, form extended families of their own.

Although, among the Aymara, the focus of solidarity is upon the group of paternally related males, and a woman's primary allegiance is conceived as lying with her husband's rather than with her own people, ties with relatives of one's wife and mother are ideally invested with considerable warmth and readiness to cooperate. In those communities which are strongly self-isolating and in-marrying, the bonds created by marriage tend to unify the various paternal kin groups and serve thereby to underscore local solidarity.

Cooperation and harmony in all aspects of kinship relations are underlain by explicit social values. Refusal to aid a kinsmen, particularly in the paternal line, is considered a grievous offense against social ethnics.

In the rigorous economic and social conditions imposed by white and *cholo* dominance, however, these deeply rooted values break down with some frequency. Although the cooperation and solidarity often achieved have served as a means of protection against the ever-present threat of despoliation, overcrowding of available land leads to a desperation for sheer survival which easily outweighs traditional scruples. Observers familiar with the Aymara report numerous instances of bitter feuds between brothers over ownership or control of small amounts of land, leading to lawsuits and even to attacks, allegedly by sorcery.

The kinship organization of the Cochabamba Quechua speakers contrasts sharply with that of the Aymara in its lack of specific emphasis upon ties among paternal relatives and its lack of structured kin groups outside of the nuclear family. Bonds of kinship are ideally close, but circles of kinsmen never form the isolated and self-sufficient units so characteristic of the Aymara.

Relationships between fathers and their married sons are not based upon the total dependence and subordination of the sons—a result, at least in part, of the fact that in the Cochabamba area land has traditionally been available by purchase. Many young men earn sufficient money, by undertaking periods of paid employment outside the community, to permit them to acquire subsistence plots by the time of their marriage.

Cochabamba Quechua communities tend to be in-marrying, but reports of observers indicate that there is not so strong a feeling against intervillage marriages as there is among the Aymara. Similarly, the fathers of married women are apparently somewhat more willing to turn over pieces of land to their sons-in-law. Thus, paternal kinsmen are not settled in a highly concentrated pattern.

In spite of the lack of an extended family organization and the relative freedom of young people from paternal domination, there are strong bonds of unity among kinsmen which serve, as in the case of the Aymara, to reinforce the solidarity of the community. Relatives are expected to share foodstuffs with one another in times of hardship and to cooperate closely with one another at all times. Any decision—mate choice, for example—made by an individual generally results from consultations not only with parents but with aunts, uncles and older cousins as well. Even the most private disputes between husband and wife invite the ready intervention of kinsmen, near and far, on both sides.

Marriage and Family Life

Although it most often sustains close relationships with the wider circle of kin, the Indian nuclear household is an important and, to some extent, self-contained unit. It has long been, in most areas, the landowning group and, despite bonds of cooperation with related families, is usually the basic unit of production and consumption. While loyalties to the large groups of kinsmen can break down under extreme social and economic stress, those which bond parents and children are invariably firm.

Among all highland Indian groups, the basic family is highly stable. On the one hand, prevailing social values lay great emphasis upon the endurance of marriage and the fulfillment of marital duties by both husband and wife. A man's neglect of duty or purposeful injury to his spouse calls forth strong reactions from his neighbors and kinsmen. On the other hand, a marriage normally entails relationships not only between the spouses but also involves ties of trust and cooperation between their respective circles of kin. In consequence, many people feel that their interests are bound up with the success of the marriage.

The bonds uniting the parents of a nuclear family are ideally, but not necessarily, both civil and religious marriage. Bolivian law requires the civil ceremony as a prerequisite to church marriage, but priests often neglect to enforce this rule. The church wedding and the fiesta which inevitably accompanies it are generally seen as highly important acts, solemnizing the relationships established between individuals and their kinsmen. In many communities, isolation and poverty combine to make church marriage somewhat rare, although in general the Indians desire it. In such cases, the expressed intention of a man and woman to live together, along with the act of establishing an independent household, is sufficient, in the local view, to make a valid marriage. Such couples often seek religious solemnization of their union after years of cohabitation, when they have accumulated the necessary amount of money.

In most Indian communities the prospective spouses are subject to each others' scrutiny and that of the kin groups concerned, not only as fiancés but also as husband and wife, for trial marriage is an old and firmly established custom. In some areas, the couple spends as much as two years together, living alternately in the household of the man's parents and in that of the woman's, before the question of the marriage is settled. In other areas, a year of such an arrangement, passed in the prenatal home of the man, is considered sufficient. During this period, the man and his kinsmen carefully scrutinize the woman to determine whether she is industrious, mild-mannered and fertile. If she meets the tests of industry and mildness and, in addition, bears a child during the trial period, she is considered eminently suitable. Similarly, the man is subject to the approval of his fiancée and her people on such traits as industry, steadfastness, courtesy and consideration for his wife and her people. In the event that either party or his kinsmen see an impediment to a happy marriage, the arrangement can be terminated without prejudice or hard feelings.

Relations between husbands and wives are invested with great warmth, although public expressions of affection are rare. Observers familiar with Quechua and Aymara life report a high level of jealousy in both men and women, which gives rise to most of the infrequent outbursts of violent quarreling in married life.

Adultery is considered undesirable in either sex, but unforgivable in women. Wife murders committed by cuckolded husbands are often condoned by members of the community and rigorously hidden from the police authorities. Aggrieved wives, unlike the white wives in similar circumstances, do not normally resign themselves to their husbands' infidelities, but express their jealousy either in violent wrangling or by threats of separation.

Within the household, the roles of husband and wife do not contrast as sharply as they do in the white family pattern. In most aspects of daily life, the spouses are associated closely in their work. In addition to bearing the major responsibility for housekeeping and child rearing, the wife makes a crucial contribution to the family economy by assuming her full share of the farm tasks. In agricultural work, division of labor by sex is minimal. Invariably a man must do the plowing, either with an ox-drawn plow or with a footplow, but either men or women can perform other tasks (see ch. 18, Agriculture). In those families which depend for a significant part of their livelihood upon such artisan industries as pottery and weaving, men typically do the major production work, but their wives lend important assistance at every stage in the operation and most often take complete charge of marketing the finished product.

The important economic position of the wife is matched typically with a considerable degree of voice in household affairs, in spite of the

fact that social values accord women a somewhat inferior status. Even in the most tradition-oriented communities, it is felt that a wife should be actively consulted by her husband before he makes major decisions. When much of the family economy depends upon cash marketing, Indian wives tend to have an authoritative voice in the manner in which income is spent (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Although the wife does most of the necessary work in caring for very small children, her husband usually takes an active interest. Because children are given farm chores at a very early age, fathers are constantly involved with their sons and must assume much of the burden of educating them to adult roles.

In contrast to the white pattern, there is not so sharp a division between the mother's nurturing role and the father's grimly disciplinary role. Physical punishment is relatively rare in most groups, and when it is felt to be necessary, one parent's hand is typically as heavy as the other's.

Among children in the family, there is a strict age ranking. In common usage, words for "brother" and "sister" in both Quechua and Aymara almost invariably bear prefixes meaning "younger" and "older." Even very young children are often left in complete charge of their younger brothers and sisters during the absence of the parents and, by virtue of their senior age position, expect complete obedience. In communities with strong patterns of paternal kin unity, age grading carries over into adulthood, for on the death of the father, the oldest brother sometimes assumes a degree of dominance over the other sons.

The Cholo Patterns

The diverse social and economic conditions of *cholo* life are reflected in significant variations in family and kinship patterns. Among those *cholos* who constitute the artisan and petty merchant classes of small towns and long-established urban neighborhoods, family life and kinship organization are marked by stability and cohesion. By contrast, family and kinship patterns among those who work as industrial laborers, miners and domestic servants tend toward instability and isolation of nuclear families from their circles of kinsmen (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

The social and economic life of the *cholo* merchant and artisan groups, both in small towns and in long-settled urban neighborhoods, is characterized by stability and a strong orientation to traditional value. Individuals and families are intimately known to each other by long association. The workshops and stores from which members of these groups derive their sustenance often represent several generations of family enterprise.

Among the artisans and merchants, the nuclear family is typically based upon civil and religious matrimony and reinforced by strongly held values regarding the fulfillment of marital and parental duties. Relationships with the kinsmen of both husband and wife are marked by considerable warmth and cooperation, which are expressed, as in the case of the whites, by frequent exchanges of visits and ceremonial congregation, as well as by a willingness to aid and shelter distressed relatives.

Within the household, the roles of parents and children differ somewhat from those characteristic of the white family. The enterprise from which the household subsists is operated by the whole family. Although typically the father is the titular owner of the store or workshop and its major operator, the mother and all children (virtually from the time they learn to walk) are responsible for much of the necessary work. In distinct contrast to the white tradition, there is no sharp division between the role of the father as provider and that of the mother and children as dependents. As in the case of the Indian household, the mother must divide her time between housekeeping and child-bearing tasks and those associated with the family enterprise.

Authority and decision-making power are more equally shared between the spouses than is the case among the whites. Despite his titular ownership of the family enterprise, the *cholo* husband feels constrained to consult his wife in matters concerning the family economy, for she shares fully in his work. In addition, many wives have their own realms of bread-winning activity, such as curbside peddling, and therefore feel a responsibility and an authority far beyond those typical of their white counterparts. The active economic role of *cholas* makes them not only important breadwinners but potentially capable of self-support as well. They tend, as a result, to feel a greater independence of their husbands and male kinsmen than do white women.

Although, as a group, the *cholos* have largely assimilated the strongly stereotyped Hispanic notions of masculinity, the typical *cholo* has never enjoyed so wide a stage for the expression of his *machismo* as have his white compatriots. The realms of politics and active male social life (born out of leisure) have traditionally been more or less closed to most *cholos*. In consequence, there is much less of an antithesis between the world of men and the world of family life. Particularly among the petty merchants and artisans, a man must spend most of his time with his wife, in work which involves continuing cooperation and consultation. Under such conditions, few *cholos* can approximate the traditional Hispanic ideal of the dominant and independent male, whose activities and comings and goings are solely his own concern.

For the majority of the *cholos* who work as industrial laborers and domestic servants, family and kinship life are quite stable, but social and economic conditions of urban working-class life are, in some degree, conducive to temporary common-law unions and family disorganization. In La Paz, for example, a significant proportion of the industrial and domestic-service population is formed by recent migrants from other (largely rural) parts of the country who arrive without family or kin. Many unattached young women are attracted to the city by opportunities for employment in domestic service. So great is this attraction that some lower-class districts of the city have as many as 125 women to every 100 men—in comparison with the national 1950 ratio of 104 to 100 (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). Women in the working-class group enjoy ample opportunities for economic independence, for they are much more in demand for domestic positions than are the men, and *cholas* have traditionally enjoyed a monopoly over market and curbside peddling.

The unstable urban *cholo* family is typically mother-centered, for it consists of a woman, her children by one or more men and, intermittently, of a current lover who may attach himself to the household. The mother normally supports herself and her family by a combination of activities—desultory domestic service and peddling—and is usually assisted by those of her children that are able to walk. Many women who are permanently employed as domestics give birth to children through casual alliances and raise them in the households of their employers. As such children grow up, they frequently serve as unsalaried assistants in domestic tasks.

The Camba Patterns

In contrast to the family and kinship life of the highland Indians, that of the lower-status peasants of the Eastern Lowlands is characterized by strong tendencies toward marital instability and a marked lack of cohesion among kinsmen. Common-law marriage (very often of short duration) is prevalent. For rural areas of Santa Cruz Department the most conservative estimates of the proportion of *camba* households based upon consensual union are about 60 percent, and reports of observers indicate that the rate of paternal desertion of such families is also high.

The instabilities and lack of cohesion characteristics of *camba* family and kinship patterns are a reflection of an over-all lack of social integration. Community bonds are tenuous, for the population is extremely mobile. Although the *cambas* are peasants, they feel little attachment to any specific piece of land, either as independent farmers or as plantation laborers. The majority of independent farmers are migratory slash-and-burn cultivators who clear a small tract of forest land, subsist from it for a few years and then move on.

The tenant laborers have never, as a rule, formed attachments to specific employers, but have tended to move regularly from plantation to plantation. As a result of such population mobility, the ties of neighborhood and community solidarity never develop any degree of strength (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

In *camba* communities and neighborhoods the rate of population turnover is so high that groups of families lack opportunities to form the enduring ties of association and cooperation characteristic of highland peasant life. For this reason, also, large groups of kinsmen are seldom settled in the same area and hence have little opportunity to develop strong bonds of cohesion.

The social structure of the Eastern Lowlands (and in particular, Santa Cruz) has traditionally been free of strong interclass exploitation. The *camba* seldom feels threatened by other members of local society, and because much land is available to him as a squatter and migratory subsistence farmer, he has little to protect. In consequence, the strong motivation of mutual defense which underlies highland Indian kinship organization is totally lacking among the lowland peasants (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The typical nuclear household stands alone economically. All the necessary work of subsistence agriculture on slash-and-burn plots can generally be done by parents and children. On the upper-class-owned plantations, the family is housed in quarters provided by the employer, and both parents and adolescent children normally contribute their labor in return for housing, food and a small wage.

The unstable *camba* family is formed of a man and woman, living in common-law union which, in some parts of Santa Cruz Department, is typically of three to four years' duration. The core of the family is formed by the woman and children, for in the prevailing view, offspring are the sole, ultimate responsibility of the mother. As long as he is associated with it, a man is expected to contribute to a family's support and to share in some degree the tasks of disciplining and training the children, whether or not they are his. He also assumes a strongly dominant role. But when he deserts his common-law household, he does so with no pangs of conscience and with no disapproval of neighbors, and his obligation to it is effectively terminated.

A woman and her children thus deserted by the current "husband" continue to live independently, although they may seek the shelter of plantation employment. In the case of a fairly young woman, liaisons leading to new common-law attachments are quite easy.

CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH

The Hispanic Pattern

Children are strongly desired by both men and women, and prolific parenthood accords closely with the Hispanic value tradition. A

man sees numerous offspring, particularly sons, as visible evidence of his masculinity. For a woman, motherhood—expressed both in the act of giving birth and in passionate devotion to the duties of child rearing—is the fulfillment of the role which, she has been taught, is her highest destiny. Motherhood is not only invested with strong emotional content in Hispanic society, but traditionally it has been the only means by which a woman could achieve public esteem. The roads to social esteem and admiration have traditionally been closed to the spinster and the barren wife. For the kindred, the birth of a new member is cause for rejoicing by all, and the baptism of a newborn child is one of the occasions which most compellingly draws together a wide circle of kinsmen both for the observance of the sacrament and for a protracted period of celebration which follows it.

These traditional attitudes toward parenthood have recently undergone some degree of modification, for many couples—particularly of the middle class—have bowed to a combination of economic emergency and foreign influence and make use of birth control. Nonetheless, virtually all white Bolivian children are born to delighted and doting parents and kinsmen.

In infancy and early childhood boys and girls are typically pampered. Both toilet training and feeding schedules are highly flexible, and breast feeding, either by the mother or by a wet nurse, is the rule.

In all white Bolivian families, pampering of small children is associated with great care in their protection from the slightest possible bodily harm. Since virtually all white families have servants, the number of persons exercising constant vigilance over the child is usually two or more. In white Bolivian homes, one seldom sees a child under 4 years of age playing by himself, for the child-nurse (*niñera*) almost invariably alternates her time between actively playing with him and restricting his movements to a radius of perhaps 6 feet. Children of as many as 3 years of age are generally not permitted to walk about unless their mothers or *niñeras* have hold hold of them either by hand or shirt-tail, sustaining them and guiding their steps.

When they begin school, white children of both sexes are presented with a somewhat rude contrast to the doting and protecting environment to which they had been accustomed. In the Catholic or secular private schools to which the overwhelming majority are sent, discipline is usually strict.

From middle childhood, boys and girls become increasingly aware of the sharply contrasting sex roles traditionally prescribed by the value system. For girls, discipline and close supervision at school are matched with constant scrutiny on the part of their mothers and elder sisters. Whereas the activities of boys attract little attention, those of girls commonly evoke praise or censure, depending on the degree to which they reflect what is considered "ladylike behavior."

Through the primary school years, lasting to about 12 years of age, both boys and girls are given considerable religious instruction and are expected to show outward piety in their devotion to catechism and in accompanying their mothers to mass. With adolescence, boys are permitted to assume the more lax attitude of men toward the requirements of formal religion. Although their secondary school curriculum normally includes a class in religion, neither families nor schools lay great emphasis on the boys' observance of sacramental demands, and they usually come into contact with avowedly anticlerical teachers at this time. By contrast, girls continue to accompany their mothers to mass on Sundays and, because they are constantly in female company, come increasingly to adopt the devotion and pious stance which are considered proper for women (see ch. 10, Religion; ch. 11, Social Values).

In their freedom, adolescent boys move rapidly away from the activities of the home and, much as do their fathers, spend the greater part of their free time in the company of other males. Girls continue to spend most of their time with their mothers and female relatives. Although they cultivate friendships with schoolmates, adolescent girls enjoy neither the freedom of association nor the time to lead an active social life outside the home. Their friendships are subject to the approval of their parents, and they are generally expected to make a strict accounting of the time they spend outside of school and family supervision.

Boys complete the process of establishing their independence with graduation from secondary school. Typically, the sons of white families continue their training in universities or in other higher schools. Friendships and political loyalties formed during university days are often enduring and continue to structure a man's social life long after he has finished school. Ideally, a young man's student days are spent in freedom from any form of supervision and from preoccupation with economic matters. In the traditional pattern, university students (overwhelmingly from white families) divided their time among perfunctory attention to studies, intensive political and social activity, and pursuit, in the company of friends, of sexual adventure. The impoverishment of many formerly prosperous families as a result of the economic upheavals following the 1952 revolution has modified this pattern somewhat, for many university students of postrevolutionary days have had to seek their own support. Generally, however, the combination of intensive, loyal friendship, sexual adventure and political activism continue to be seen as the proper realm of male student life.

During a girl's late adolescence and young adulthood, the watchful concern of her parents and other relatives—always strong—intensifies. The feelings of her fathers and brothers, in particular,

are a compound of extreme jealousy of her reputation and extreme suspicion regarding the motives of men who show even a mild interest in her. Hence, even a suitor who makes his approach in the most proper way, through a series of carefully arranged visits to the family of a young lady, expects a degree of initial coolness from her father and brothers. Only by regulating his behavior to clearly indicate the purity of his intentions can he overcome this automatic hostility.

Although many less tradition-oriented families have come to accept the North American practice of unsupervised dating, such behavior is frowned upon by most white parents, not only for the danger to a girl's reputation, but also because it implies a casual relationship between the sexes. In the traditional view, a proper woman's communications with members of the opposite sex are seen as normally confined to kinsmen, husband and clerics. Only grudgingly, therefore, do more old-fashioned fathers accept their daughters relationships with young men and then only when such young men are obviously qualified marriage candidates.

Over the past few decades, the daughters of white families have tended increasingly to seek higher training. For many girls, university life brings a measure of freedom from family scrutiny and even opportunities for unsupervised contacts with men, but they never enjoy the free rein afforded to their brothers. Virtually all middle-class and many upper-class girls take employment after finishing their schooling. In spite of the time spent outside the home, however, they are never completely free of scrutiny.

No ethnically classified statistics exist on the age of marriage in Bolivia, but qualified observers believe that as a rule young men and women of the white group marry somewhat later than do the Indians, *cholos* and *cambas*. Somewhere in their late 20's, after the completion of their schooling and, ideally, a period of freedom and adventure, young Bolivians of the white group begin to seek wives. After a courtship period which is typically somewhat long, they marry girls whose average age is probably in the early 20's and assume a fully adult status.

The Highland Indian Patterns

That Quechua and Aymara speakers also welcome children enthusiastically is amply attested by the fact that in all Indian communities barrenness is the most common cause of marital separation. The members of an Indian family see children both as welcome additions to the kin group and as helpers in earning a livelihood for the family. In distinct contrast to the Spanish speakers, however, neither Quechua nor Aymara seem to invest great sentimentality in the concept of motherhood and mother-child relationships. Rather, the importance of offspring appears to lie in their role in ensuring the continuity of

family and kin group and the contribution which they make to the economy of both groups.

Of the 333 out of every 1,000 children who, by conservative estimate, die before reaching 1 year of age, most are probably of highland Indian origin. The hazards which face most Indian children begin with birth itself, for they are usually delivered by a midwife (*comadrona*) who, though often technically competent, does not take the necessary sanitary precautions. Those infants who survive the initial hazard of neonatal tetanus are faced with a gamut of intestinal and respiratory ailments, largely arising from the condition of their surroundings and against which they are afforded little or no protection by scientific medicine (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

Great importance is attached by both Quechua and Aymara speakers to the baptism of their children. If an infant appears in no great danger of dying, the ceremony is often postponed for a period of weeks or even months in order to allow its parents sufficient time to make a careful choice of godparents and to accumulate the money necessary for a proper fiesta to follow the ceremony (see ch. 10, Religion).

In general, the Indian baby enjoys tenderness and affectionate attention from its parents and other members of the household. Neither toilet training nor feeding schedules are rigorous. Indeed, a woman normally offers her baby the breast at the first whimper, even though she must divide her time between the care of her small children and a multitude of chores entailed in the care of crops and livestock. Thus, after the first few days of its life, the baby becomes merely one of several important concerns.

Invariably, small infants are carried on their mothers' backs, well wrapped in shawls. As long as the child is asleep (or at least quiet), it receives no maternal attention. If it cries, the mother swings it, with a deft and automatic motion, from her back and offers it the breast with scarcely an interruption to what she had been doing at the moment. During the heaviest agricultural work, babies are often left at the edge of the field, shaded by their mothers' shawls.

In almost all highland Indian communities, swaddling is an important part of child care. For a variable period beginning a day or so after birth and lasting for as long as a year, babies are wrapped in several layers of rags which are held in place with a fabric belt wound several times around the body and tied at several points; the result seems to be a parcel whose only moving part is the head. Swaddling is commonly seen by the Indians as necessary to ensure the growth of a straight and muscular body. For the first few months, all four limbs and the trunk are thus constricted, but the arms are usually released from the bonds earlier than are the legs and trunk. Probably because he is so completely immobilized, the Indian infant

spends the greater part of his first two years in silent and motionless sleep.

At slightly more than two years—earlier if another child has subsequently been born—weaning takes place. Substitution of solid foods for the mother's milk is usually a very gradual process. At about the same time, the child is permitted to spend much of his time crawling about on the ground and is encouraged to walk. The birth of a younger brother or sister results in a child's immediate eviction from his perch on the mother's back. If there are older brothers or sisters, they take over his care; if not, the child shifts for himself.

Both Quechua and Aymara speakers see infancy as ending at about 2½ years and celebrate the transition with a festivity to which are invited a large circle of kinsmen and neighbors. After a period of drinking and general celebration, the guests are called upon to come forward, in turn, snip off a lock of the child's hair—until then uncut—and deposit a cash gift. The haircutting ritual was, in Inca times, of great ceremonial importance, for it was then that the child was named. Although it has lost the significant function to Christian baptism, the fiesta remains an important opportunity for general conviviality.

Discipline and training in deportment are typically relaxed, and little use is made of either corporal punishment or exhortation. Normally, small children are left much to their own devices and are corrected only when their behavior is far out of line. The device most commonly used by parents and other adults in correcting a misbehaving child is a combination of ridicule—often quite harsh—and an appeal to public opinion. As a result, Indian children quickly become sensitive of the scrutiny of their neighbors, and public ridicule and threats of ostracism continue, throughout their lives, to be an important check upon their behavior (see ch. 11, Social Values).

From infancy, Indian children rapidly emerge as full-time workers in the family economy. In all parts of highland Bolivia a common sight is that of a child of perhaps 3 or 4 years maintaining complete charge of a drove of hogs or assisting in light field tasks. Children from 5 or 6 years of age are so busy that organized play is rarely part of their lives. Indeed, the little leisure time enjoyed by them is often spent in imitating such adult activities as plowing and market trading.

Although there are recent indications of growing Indian interest in formal education, few of their children ever enter a schoolhouse. In those communities which have schools, attendance by Indian children is frequently intermittent and dependent upon their families' work schedules (see ch. 8, Education).

From middle childhood onward, boys and girls begin to learn their sex roles, largely through assisting their parents. The boys spend an increasing amount of time in the fields with their fathers. Girls take

on progressively heavier burdens of housekeeping, child care and animal herding. By some time in middle adolescence, a young Indian typically commands the skills necessary to adult life.

Between about age 16 and marriage, Indian boys and girls enjoy a period of relative freedom from both supervision and responsibility. Although they are expected to contribute their labor to the family livelihood, they are also afforded ample opportunities to pursue an active and wholly unsupervised life of courtship and adventure. In the Cochabamba Valleys, particularly, but also to some extent in Altiplano Aymara areas, boys of this age group often take advantage of their freedom by traveling as temporary workers to urban and mining centers or as far afield as Argentina.

The crowded conditions of the typical Indian household make early sexual awareness inevitable. Indian children are reported to engage in more or less unrestricted sex play at an early age, and such play leads to the first adolescent attempts at courtship. Fiestas, market fairs and other periodic gatherings of large groups of people provide much of the sexual opportunity as do remote and isolated areas.

During the period of adolescent freedom it is considered proper for both young men and women to carry on a series of affairs with no more than a casual eye toward possible marriage. As such young people approach their early 20's, however, gradually increasing pressure is brought to bear by kinsmen who begin admonishing them to think in terms of mate choice. In many communities, the free-ranging propensities of young men sharply conflict with the ideas of their elders, for they are reluctant to surrender the adventure and independence of their positions for what they know will be a burdensome and restricted life as heads of households.

Few young Indians assume adult status with mate choice because of the period of trial marriage, during which the newlyweds continue to be dependent upon and subordinate to either or both sets of parents. In the more isolated and self-sufficient Aymara communities, even the establishment of a new household does not mark the end of the dependent and subordinate status, for until a man has clear title or unequivocal rights to some land, he continues to be seen as a "boy."

The Cholo Patterns

The attitudes and practices of child rearing characteristic of Bolivian *cholos* vary considerably as a result of local social and economic circumstances and, to a great extent, the influence of surrounding Indian patterns. In general, *cholo* children begin life with more or less the same hazards which confront those of Indian families, for most of them are also delivered by *comadronas*. The same types of infectious disease attack them, and they generally have little more

access to medical care than do Indian children (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

In many respects the earliest experiences of *cholo* infants are quite similar to those of their Indian compatriots. In most communities *cholos* practice swaddling. Consequently, a *cholo* infant also usually spends his earliest days as an inactive parcel, carried about in his mother's shawl. Some degree of difference in *cholo* and Indian child care arises out of the fact that *chola* women—who engage predominantly in petty commercial work, rather than in agricultural labor—frequently have somewhat more time to spend playing with their babies.

Baptism is, for the *cholos* as for their compatriots, an extremely important occasion for which much preparation and expense is considered necessary. Here too, many families hold the haircutting ceremony during the child's third year. In migrant areas, such as the large cities, this ritual serves not only as a means for collecting a sum of money on behalf of the child, but also as an occasion of sociability, which brings together dispersed kinsmen and friends.

The *cholo* child's earlier years generally give him a firm grounding in that part of his way of life and language which reflect his indigenous heritage. Within her household and often among her female associates in the marketplace, the mother normally speaks either Quechua or Aymara, depending upon which is locally dominant, and it is one of these tongues which a child first learns. Although the father is invariably bilingual, he seldom speaks Spanish in the household. Consequently, *cholo* children only gradually learn Spanish as they begin to range outside of their homes. Those children who attend primary school (most *cholo* boys and many of the girls in the cities and more accessible towns manage to get a few years of schooling) frequently enter with no knowledge of Spanish (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Both boys and girls learn Spanish and the ways of Hispanic culture when they begin to accompany their parents in their accustomed tasks or, as if often the case in the cities, when they enter some street trade. As they associate increasingly with their fathers, and begin to learn male roles, the boys rapidly develop fluency in the national language. The girls, who continue to spend most of their time in the company of their mothers, engaging in tasks which predominantly involve women, learn Spanish more slowly and less completely.

In many areas sexual awareness and experience come as early to *cholo* boys and girls as they do to Indians. Except in certain more tradition-oriented villages and urban neighborhoods where there is a tendency toward social disapproval of promiscuity on the part of girls, adolescence is for young *cholos* of both sexes a period of considerable liberty and little responsibility.

Some time in their early to middle 20's, most young *cholo* men establish their own households with women who are, on the average, somewhat younger. Depending upon the social circumstances, the household is established on the basis of either formal matrimony or consensual union. Marriage—either formal or common-law—is a mark of adult status, but many fully adult *cholos* remain single for many years. Young people of both sexes often undertake paid employment in urban centers, where they either form temporary alliances or remain unmarried.

The Camba Patterns

Camba infants are subject to the heavy risks to life and health generally characteristic of Bolivian childhood, but those who survive are valued and well treated by their parents. During the first few months of their lives they are the subject of affectionate and constant maternal affection and spend most of their time cradled in their mothers' arms. Feeding schedules depend entirely upon the child's own demand, for the mother is always close at hand and ready to offer the breast. Weaning is seldom abrupt, and nursing is used as an occasional means of comforting distressed children up to 4 or 5 years of age.

All children are baptized—as a rule, during one of their families' infrequent marketing visits to town. After the christening the godparents normally sponsor a drinking party, to which a wide and randomly selected group of neighbors are invited. The post-baptism party is the only celebration held in honor of a child until he sets up his own household—by common-law union or formal wedding.

The transition to the more active phase of childhood is gradual. When the baby is capable of crawling about, his mother begins increasingly to leave him to his own devices or to the perfunctory care of his older sister. Small *camba* children have fewer responsibilities than do their *cholo* and Indian compatriots. As a rule, they spend most of their first 10 to 12 years ranging about freely in small play groups. Those children—usually girls—who are entrusted with the care of their baby brothers and sisters seldom let the responsibility interfere with their play.

Some time during middle adolescence children gradually assume the burdens of adulthood. Boys begin helping their mothers and fathers (or as is often the case, their stepfathers) in the fields, and girls take on responsibilities around the house. Children whose families live on the large sugar and rice plantations normally begin to help their parents in their duties.

Virtually the only social recognition of the transition from adolescence to adulthood is given in the form of an invitation to join one of the neighborhood drinking parties. This honor, which is con-

ferred at a varying age, marks the individual's passage from the status of "boy" or "girl" (*muchaco or muchacha*) to that of "young person" (*joven*).

Sexual experimentation, which is not disapproved for either boys or girls, begins early. From casual encounters at drinking parties and other gatherings, young *cambas* pass rapidly to the formation of more permanent alliances. Some time in their late teens or early 20's, after a short and informal betrothal, the young men and women feel prepared to set up an independent household, usually on the basis of consensual union, and a new family cycle is begun.

RITUAL KINSHIP

For all Bolivians, as for Latin Americans in general, the choice of godfathers and godmothers (*padrinos* and *madrinas;* collectively, *padrinos*) is an extremely serious matter. Parents ordinarily ask only those for whom they have the highest trust and respect to stand as baptism sponsors to their children. The bonds between parents and their *compadres* and *comadres* (reciprocal terms; lit., cofather and comother) are seen, in the Hispanic and Indian view alike, as being vested with deep moral and ceremonial significance. Men and women who bear such a relationship are forbidden sexual access to each other under the incest taboo. In most cases, a degree of formality and reserve is expected to obtain between *compadres*.

The formal duties of the *padrino* to his godchild include sponsorship of baptism, assumption of the parish fees entailed in the sacrament and acceptance of permanent responsibility for calling the parents to account for any failure to provide the child with proper spiritual and moral training. In theory, he should always be prepared to adopt the godchild in case of the parents' death, although such adoptions are quite rare. If a child dies—a frequent occurrence in Bolivia—the *padrino* is responsible for its burial.

At a more informal, but equally important level, the *padrino* is expected to maintain an active interest in the welfare of his godchild and his family and to be willing, at any time, to come to their aid in case of adversity. In return, the child and his parents owe the *padrino* a debt of loyalty and affection almost equal to that conferred upon their kinsmen.

In the predominantly white upper and middle classes, men often widen the circle of trust and loyalty provided by blood relationship by establishing ties of ritual kinship with friends and associates. In many cases, the bond of loyalty is compounded by the practice of *compadrazgo doble* (double coparenthood), in which two couples stand as godparents to each others' children.

Members of the lower strata of national society have traditionally tended to seek the *compadres* from among the more powerful and

affluent. *Cholo* petty merchants and local officials often seek to establish bonds of *compadrazgo* with wealthy whites and prominent political officials. In many areas, Indians attempt to obtain *padrinos* for their children from among the local gentry of *cholo* merchants and petty officials. *Camba* peasants of the Lowlands frequently ask upper-class planters to stand as godparents to their children. In every case, the man who asks another of greater power and wealth to serve as godfather to his child expects thereby to enhance his own status. Not only does his stature increase in reflection of his *compadre's* importance, but he most often enjoys at least a minimal claim upon the latter's aid and protection as well. Although in the case of great social distance between the parents and *padrinos*, the relationship can never develop any degree of intimacy, the *padrinos* seldom fail to maintain at least a mild interest and to render economic or political assistance when needed. Powerful and affluent Bolivians are not usually averse to accepting invitations of ritual kinship with the more humble, for personal loyalties thus generated can bear significant economic and political benefits (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

In both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking communities, and particularly in those which are strongly self-isolating, *compadrazgo* serves to cement local loyalties. Very often such bonds provide connecting links between kin groups which would otherwise be virtually isolated from each other.

CHAPTER 7

HEALTH AND WELFARE

By virtually all reasonable standards, Bolivia is among the more unfortunate nations of the Western Hemisphere in regard to health and living conditions. Its crude death rate, although never accurately determined, is among the highest in the Americas and its per capita income (also never precisely determined) among the lowest. General nutritional standards and disease rates are similarly unfavorable. All but a small minority of the population are housed in quarters almost totally devoid of minimal comfort and sanitation.

At the heart of the problem of national deprivation and poor health is the extreme underdevelopment which characterizes most sectors of the economy. Through the use of primitive farming techniques on the less than 1 percent of land that is cultivated, the agricultural population produces insufficient food to feed the nation without supplementary imports. Industrial activity, always meager, has suffered recent setbacks which have been reflected in miniscule output of needed consumer goods and widespread unemployment among the urban population. Mining, beset with problems of undercapitalization, depletion and administrative chaos, has in recent years contributed to the national wealth only through outside (largely United States) subsidization. Under such economic conditions, neither public nor private resources are nearly sufficient to provide the nutritional levels, medical services, education, housing and sanitation necessary to the maintenance of more than bare subsistence standards for most of the population (see ch. 17, The Economic System).

To a great extent, both the low standard of living and the underlying economic ills are the cumulative heritage of a rigid social structure which, for more than four centuries, concentrated wealth and power in the hands of a small, predominantly white upper class. The largest segment of the population, consisting of Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians, was relegated to the status of a subservient and impoverished caste and denied both the conditions and the incentive for improving their living conditions. Similarly, the mining and industrial laborers did not enjoy an equitable share of the national wealth, for wages were always extremely low (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

One of the major objectives of the 1952 revolution was the massive betterment of economic, health and cultural conditions by the redistribution of the national wealth in a more equitable form, by the integration of the Indian population into national economic and cultural life and by basic economic development. The effects of fundamental measures implemented to effect these aims have fallen short of expectations.

Through land reform and through the political power enjoyed by their leaders, the long-impoverished peasants, miners and industrial laborers have won a more equitable share of the national wealth, but that wealth—never great—has declined in the past decade (see ch. 17, The Economic System). The Indian peasantry can only be integrated into national life through education and technical development programs which are both expensive and slow in effect. Because of a heritage of past underdevelopment and general poverty of resources, the task of basic economic development can be executed only slowly and with large-scale assistance from foreign governments and international agencies. Over a decade of revolutionary government, recurrent political disorders and apparently endemic public corruption have further complicated the tasks.

Public efforts to maintain the health and well-being of the population have been generally greater in the postrevolutionary period than at any other time. The social security system has been expanded in both the scope of operation and the number of people served. Public health services, including hospitals and sanitary measures have been improved since 1952. As in the case of more basic programs of development and education, however, the effect of government health and welfare work is seriously hampered by lack of funds, administrative difficulties and, often, poor planning.

International cooperation, by religious and philanthropic groups, United Nations agencies and the United States Government, has played an important role in all phases of health and welfare work. Technical and economic assistance has taken the form of broad and detailed studies of social, economic and health needs; the establishment of institutions and facilities for health and welfare; basic industrial and agricultural development; and support and assistance in work undertaken by the Bolivian Government.

Results of the combined efforts of the Bolivian Government and numerous international agencies to raise health and living standards were only dimly perceptible in early 1963. Significant advances in the control of communicable diseases (notably malaria, yellow fever and smallpox) had been made, and increases in agricultural output had been achieved in some localities. There was, however, evidence of no more than a minimal impact on basic problems of nutrition, housing and sanitation for the country as a whole. In general, it was

apparent that major advances in health and well-being were contingent upon basic economic, social and educational development which had not yet taken place.

The 10-year Economic and Social Development Plan (1962–71), prepared by the National Planning Board (Junta Nacional de Planeamiento), presents a series of ambitious goals for the improvement of public health and living conditions, including large-scale housing and sanitation construction, a 33 percent increase in per capita food intake and a 45 percent increase in the rate of real consumption per capita. The Committee of Nine of the Alliance for Progress found the goals of the plan overambitious and its projected financing (two-thirds from national economic resources and one-third from outside aid) overoptimistic. Nonetheless, Alliance for Progress funds in the amount of U.S. $80 million have been earmarked for its first 2 years' activities (see ch. 17, The Economic System).

CAMPESINO LIVING CONDITIONS

Economic Considerations

Most rural Bolivians live at the margins of the national economy, having little more than limited and occasional contact with cash markets. The generally low level of rural economic development is clearly indicated by the fact that while about three-fourths of the population live by farming or herding, their efforts yield only one-third of the gross national product. Throughout history, primitive farming methods and the social and economic conditions of *campesino* (peasant) life have combined to keep agricultural outputs low (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Prior to the agrarian reforms of 1953, most of the Quechua and Aymara Indians, who form the bulk of the *campesino* population, had lived either as entailed tenant laborers on the landed estates of their white compatriots or as subsistence farmers tilling the most substandard and remote lands. In either condition, few had the resources or the incentive to raise their material standards far above the level of bare subsistence.

Compounding the reduced economic conditions of the highland Indian peasants was a cultural and linguistic isolation from national life which was reflected in an almost total apathy toward the markets and goods of the modern world. Even after the long-exploited and impoverished tenant laborers had gained possession, through the 1953 reforms, of lands formerly controlled by the whites, they were so slow to expand their production of marketable surpluses that nationwide food shortages resulted (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

For the Spanish-speaking peasants (*cambas*) of the populated lowland areas, poorly developed communications with markets and in-

efficient slash-and-burn techniques have underlain an economy no less marginal than that of the highland Indians. Only recently, with the new, but prospering sugar and rice industries, have the *cambas* had any contact with the cash economy, and that largely as wage laborers on commercial plantations (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Contributing little by way of marketable produce, most *campesinos* also buy very little in cash markets. In both Indian and *camba* areas, the typical peasant family supplies its limited needs largely by its own labor, land and animals. Food for the usually meager domestic consumption is grown in household fields. Implements and furnishings are few and simple—most often homemade. Although many *campesinos* clothe themselves in cheap manufactured garments, domestic spinning and weaving are still the rule in most Indian areas. Even when clothing is obtained from commercial sources, such purchases are, for most families, infrequent and represent little cash expenditure.

Aside from desultory purchase of clothing and a few metal tools the typical *campesino* family regularly buys only salt, *aguardiente* (sugar-cane alcohol) and, in the highland areas, coca (a leaf containing cocaine, chewed by Quechua and Aymara Indians for its narcotic effect). For most, marketing is a process which could be aptly described as "indirect barter." In a typical transaction, a farmer sells a small amount of crop surplus—a dozen potatoes, perhaps, or a few pounds of grain—and immediately converts the entire proceeds to salt, coca or other cash-purchased items. Rather than having sold his produce in order to acquire a cash base, the *campesino* has, in effect, traded his small surplus for a desired good.

In late 1962, almost a decade after land reform, there were faint but definite signs that the *campesinos* were beginning to emerge from their centuries-old economic isolation. Local agricultural markets were clearly recovering from the almost total collapse which followed the 1953 reforms, as Indian farmers began to offer increasing amounts of produce for sale. In their newly found freedom as landowners, the former tenants have slowly begun to feel an attraction toward the industrially produced goods available in the market and hence an incentive to reserve a part of their crop production for cash sale. Observers indicate that everywhere in the more accessible highland regions, factory-made shoes, radios and bicycles—hitherto almost unknown—are seen with increasing frequency. Many Indian farm communities have recently shown themselves to be quite receptive to new crops, tools and methods offered by technical assistance agencies.

Although it is probable that, with improvement of transportation facilities and expanded rural education programs, the *campesinos* will be increasingly integrated into national life, rural economic development and the improvement of a traditionally low standard of

living will undoubtedly be very slow. The concentration of the largest segment of the rural population on the highest and most unproductive lands, along with the paucity of capital available for large-scale irrigation and other measures necessary to technical improvement, will long stand as barriers to the fulfillment of such goals. In addition, local overcrowding of arable lands and a virtually unplanned program of agrarian reform have resulted, in many areas, in the overuse and extreme fragmentation of holdings (*minifundio*) (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Housing and Household Possessions

Most *campesino* families, both Indian and *camba*, live in houses which have remained unmodified in design since colonial days. With few exceptions, the *campesino* house is a small (often no more than 10 by 12 feet in floor area), thatched roof hut, inadequate by virtually all Western standards of comfort and health, but displaying in every detail great skill in the use of local materials.

Despite regional variations in layout and the materials used, the rural housing pattern is quite uniform in most parts of the country. The *campesino* domestic establishment is designed not only as a shelter for its occupants, but also as a workshop and storage facility.

The dwelling house is normally constructed in a yard or patio, which may or may not be walled or fenced, depending upon local custom and resources. Surrounding it in almost every case are one or more smaller structures, serving as kitchen, storage bins and worksheds.

In the highlands the typical patio is an enclosure surrounded by a pressed earth or mud-brick wall, with a floor of trampled earth, on which are scattered, in apparent disarray, all the tools and utensils used by the family during the day. Various corners of the patio are occupied by outbuildings and others typically contain stacks of animal fodder and piles of dried manure (use as fuel). Families are often at close quarters with animals since those with only a few animals often use the enclosure as a night corral, and those with larger flocks often keep sick animals there during treatment.

In more conservative Aymara-speaking communities, where the traditional social pattern of the coresident extended family (an older man, his wife and unmarried children, along with his married sons and their families) prevails, the patio is typically a large compound accommodating the huts of several households. In most highland areas, however, the compound normally contains no more than one conjugal family (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 6, Family).

The highland Indian house serves its occupants as little more than a dormitory. Meals are most often taken in the patio or in a shed-like porch built onto the front of the hut by extending the roof. Similarly, domestic tasks—cooking, spinning and weaving—are normally

performed either in the patio or in a workshed. So little is the house used during waking hours, except as shelter from the most inclement weather, that much of its interior space is used for storing grain, water, unused clothing and the meager personal possessions of the family members.

In the highlands almost the sole construction material used in *campesino* houses is adobe—molded, sundried brick made of mud and chopped straw. Floors are of packed earth. The roof, steeply pitched in most Indian areas, is made of grass or reed thatch, lashed to crossbeams hewn from young eucalyptus trunks. In some areas of the Altiplano bundles of thatch are dipped into loose mud, allowed to dry and applied in orderly rows and layers in the manner of shingles.

Layouts of Indian houses vary considerably according to local tastes. A single room with a rectangular floor plan is most common, but some families divide their huts with a partition, and in several villages southwest of La Paz, circular houses are common.

The cramped floor space is commonly enclosed by walls no more than 5 to 6 feet high, pierced by a single doorway, often somewhat less than 5 feet high. Few houses have windows, the dark interiors of most being ventilated only through the doorway and by air circulating through the thatched roof. The lack of sunlight is so complete that during the day temperatures inside are often as much as 10° F. colder than outside.

In contrast to the highlanders, who often live out their lives on the same plot of ground, the *camba* farmers of the tropical lowlands migrate with some frequency, seeking new lands as they exhaust the productivity of older ones through the use of somewhat wasteful slash-and-burn techniques. The mobility of the lowlanders is usually evident in the impermanence of their dwellings.

Camba houseyards are small clearings hacked out of the bush by machetes and kept clear of vegetation in order to deny hiding places to snakes and other animal pests. Enclosures, when they are built, are usually low, flimsy fences of interwoven poles and twigs. Members of the *camba* household typically spend much time in the yard and in low, shed-like outbuildings used for storage, workspace and cooking.

Dwellings are typically small bamboo or wattle and daub structures, partitioned into two or three rooms and roofed with palm thatch. Like those of the highlanders, *camba* huts are usually windowless. Porches, often little more than small areas shaded by an overhanging eave, are common and provide a comfortable place for entertaining guests and relaxing.

Sanitary facilities, in the ordinary sense of the term, do not exist in most rural communities of either the highlands or the lowlands In the lack of strict modesty regarding eliminatory functions, few

campesinos are averse to relieving themselves in the immediate vicinity of the house. Even in densely settled villages latrines, public or private, are almost invariably lacking.

Water for drinking, cooking and laundry use is almost always obtained from natural sources—lakes, rivers and streams. Piped water is available only in the cities, and wells are rare. During the dry season members of highland Indian families must, in many cases, transport water from several miles, for the majority of small streams flow only during the rains.

Water sources, whether streams, ponds, lakes or springs, are often polluted, since they are also used for watering farm animals. Non-flowing sources, such as ponds, are particularly hazardous in this respect. In highland communities with irrigated lands, ditches used to convey water to the fields also service domestic needs. With the lack of latrine facilities, such ditch-borne water tends to serve not only for drinking, cooking and laundry purposes, but also for sewage disposal.

Permanently established *camba* households often depend upon tanks (*pauros*) excavated in the ground and permitted to fill with rain water. To the normal health hazards of stagnant pollution are added those created by the swarms of mosquitoes which breed in great numbers around the *pauros*.

Virtually all domestic furnishings and amenities are made by the *campesinos* themselves from locally available raw materials or are purchased in the market from local craftsmen. In addition to such natural materials as straw, clay and wood, ingenious and enthusiastic use is made of such industrial cast-offs as kerosene tins, condensed milk cans and old auto springs.

Traditionally, few Indian households have such furnishings as chairs, tables and beds, for the scarcity of wood in the highlands makes them quite expensive. Within the hut there is often a stone and adobe platform built against one wall, which serves as a rarely used bench during the day and, covered with blankets and straw mats, as a three- or four-person bed at night. For many families, however, the floor is the only bed. At meals and at sedentary tasks around the patio, the Indians customarily squat on the ground.

Camba houses are also sparsely furnished, although crude benches and tables are sometimes made from planks and hewn log sections. Only the most prosperous and urbanized lowland *campesinos* enjoy the luxury of a wooden bed. Most commonly, hammocks or woven straw mats, rolled onto the floor, serve as sleeping places.

Cooking implements are similarly crude and simple. Many families, both highland Indian and *camba*, rest their cooking pots on only a tripod of three stones over a firepit. In some areas a clay stove with firebox and burner holes, fueled by wood, cornstalks or dried dung,

is used. Recently, forced-air kerosene stoves of the primus type have appeared in village markets, but these (and their fuel) are far beyond the economic reach of most rural families.

Illumination is provided by candles or by *mecheros*, lamps made by inserting a wick into a discarded condensed milk can filled with kerosene. Recently, electric flashlights have also come into limited use. In the highlands, where nighttime temperatures often drop below the freezing point, illumination is a minor item of expense, for the *campesinos* normally retire soon after dusk.

Spending few of their waking hours in their huts, the *campesinos* do little to decorate the interiors. The most common wall ornaments are calendar lithographs of the saints or the Sacred Heart (usually distributed by patent medicine companies), old sheets of newspaper and, occasionally, cinema posters (often dating from the 1930's) purchased in the markets.

Clothing

In the lowlands and in more accessible areas of the highlands, industrially produced fabrics and garments have largely supplanted the traditional homespun costumes. The basic male costume in such warmer regions as Santa Cruz and the lower Cochabamba valleys consists of factory made cotton trousers and shirts, usually in drill or khaki and, occasionally, woolen suit jackets of somewhat out-of-date cut. Around La Paz and other Altiplano zones, *campesino* men are increasingly adopting blue jeans, cotton or wool shirts and, for the prosperous few, leather jackets. The women of the tropical lowlands wear cotton dresses, in common Western cut, made by village seamstresses from factory woven cloth. At night many *camba* women wear a cotton shawl for warmth. Although the Indian women of such areas as La Paz and Cochabamba have to a great extent abandoned homespun clothing for clothing made from industrially produced textiles, their costumes, unlike those of the men, are cut in traditional styles, with long, full skirts (*polleras*) and somewhat shapeless embroidered blouses topped by woolen shawls.

The traditional Indian costumes of both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking areas consist of a few basic garments (knee- or ankle-length trousers, long sleeved shirts and, very often, *ponchos*, for men and *polleras*, blouses and shawls for women) made of homespun wool. Regional variations in color and cut of the native costumes are so rich and detailed that they often serve to identify the home village of the wearer. Topping the basic costume is usually a hat of a regionally distinctive style (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Both men and women in the rural areas commonly go barefoot or wear sandals. Individuals who own factory-made leather shoes often reserve their use for such special occasions as fiestas and visits to

town. The thonged leather sandal is used as footwear for men and women in both Indian and *camba* areas. One of the numerous ingenious *campesino* readaptions of the discards of industrial civilization is a man's sandal whose sole is cut from a piece of worn-out automobile tire.

For women, jewelry forms a common accessory to the costume. Both *camba* and Indian women wear bracelets and necklaces and the latter often wear a large and distinctive shawl pin—usually in silver—shaped like a spoon. Most Indian men round out their costumes with a small, handknit wool bag, slung by a strap over the shoulder and used to carry money and coca.

Campesino children of both the highlands and the lowlands dress in clothing and accessories almost identical to those of their elders. Crawling babies and toddlers up to about 3 years are often left naked or, in colder areas, are clad only in a shirt and a short wrap-around skirt.

Recreation

In *campesino* life there is little division between work and play. In substitution of commercial entertainment and other forms of organized diversion, which are rare or nonexistent in rural areas, both highland Indians and *cambas* invest both their work and their ceremonial life with a recreational aspect.

The Quechua and Aymara system of labor cooperation (*ainí*), which binds kinsmen and neighbors into mutual assistance groups provides excellent opportunities for merrymaking. Whenever a group of cooperatives gather for some field task, their work is frequently punctuated by verbal jesting and practical joking. Very often the man whose fields are being worked provides his friends with food and drink at the end of the day. Similarly, communal public works projects, carried out under the supervision of local government or *sindicato campesino* (peasant league) officials, are the occasion for drinking and merrymaking during the course of the work.

Among both the *camba* and highland Indian peasants, ceremonial milestones in the life cycle—baptism, marriage and funeral—are observed with drinking and feasting. Even such a solemn occasion as a wake has its aspects of diversion, for the male participants customarily while away the long night hours drinking and playing games.

For all *campesinos*, but particularly those of the highlands, the high point of the year is represented by the elaborate fiestas celebrated in honor of the local patron saints. All towns and most villages and small communities of Bolivia have at least one such saint to whom particular devotion is directed. The annual celebration is organized by one or more sponsors (*prestes*), nominated either by the parish priest or by the community, who must expend sizable sums of money—

often amounting to the savings of a lifetime—for the necessary provisions. The typical patronal fiesta begins with a mass and solemn public procession, which are followed by drinking and dancing parties which may last as long as a week (see ch. 10, Religion).

In addition to fiestas celebrated locally in honor of specific patrons, there are several which are more widely observed. Carnival is the occasion for a week or more of feasting, drinking and general merriment in all parts of the country. Alasitas, a celebration in honor of the preconquest Aymara god of plenty and fertility, Ek'eko, is celebrated in both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking areas (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

At all *campesino* celebrations, the focus of entertainment is upon the consumption of alcohol. Party etiquette among both highlanders and lowlanders requires that all adult participants (and particularly the men) drink as much *aguardiente* as their staying powers will permit. Alcohol is seen not only as a beverage to be served, but as an important symbol of hospitality. At both *camba* and Indian fiestas, therefore, the host spends much time exchanging ceremonially worded toasts and drinking from a common glass with his guests.

Weekly markets at nearby towns and annual fairs (such as that of Copacabana) at more distant points provide other opportunities for recreation. For the Indian farmer, living in a remote mountainside community, and for his even more isolated *camba* compatriot, periodic visits to town markets provide not only an occasion for meeting with friends and drinking with them, but also a view of the wonderful products and strange people of the outside world.

Organized sport, only recently introduced by missionaries and government social workers, has found avid acceptance among many *campesino* youths, particularly in the highlands. In those areas which are more accessible to outside influence, village *fútbol* (soccer) teams have been organized with enthusiastic players and fanatic supporters.

Rural Bolivia has a rich tradition of dance, song and games, derived from both Indian and Hispanic sources. This tradition is an important part of any recreational gathering. Two common dances of the highland Indians are the huayño and the *cueca*. The former, which displays considerable native influence, is usually danced in a circle. The more Hispanic *cueca*, popular with Bolivians of all ethnic groups, is danced by male and female partners who circle each other, brandishing handkerchiefs. Dances of the lowlands, which show no Quechua or Aymara influence, are often markedly similar to those of neighboring Paraguay.

Attitudes Toward Living Conditions

Until very recently the lack of developed transportation facilities and the fact that more than one-half of the Bolivian rural population

does not speak Spanish tended to shield the *campesinos* from any impetus toward change. Almost totally unaware of the events taking place outside their communities, the peasants have traditionally been immune from the effects of political and economic upheavals which except in rare cases of open warfare, represent no impediment to subsistence agriculture. The material wants of both *cambas* and highlanders were modest and made few or no demands upon the national economy. For the most part, the isolated lowland peasants have seldom found any difficulty in meeting their wants, and lacking any incentive toward change, they have rarely felt overt discontent with their lot. For the highlanders, on the other hand, harsh environmental conditions and an often exploitative social structure have stood in constant frustration of their attempts to achieve even a marginal standard of living.

Throughout most of Bolivian history the Quechua and Aymara Indians have adapted to their lot of exploitation and poverty with either stoic acceptance or resentful withdrawal. Only in case of extraordinary provocation have they resorted to violence. Until recently such uprisings as occurred had been sparked by specific abuse rather than by any desire to change an abusive social system (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The enthusiasm—bordering on fanaticism—with which the Indians celebrate their religious fiestas seems to reflect long-standing attitudes toward their social and economic lot. The apparent willingness of a fiesta sponsor to expend what amounts to a fortune in local terms—and the fact that his community expects him to do so—is related to a general lack of hope that by capital accumulation or other means he can improve his economic status. Similarly, many observers believe that the frequent lapses into total inebriation, which are an inevitable part of the celebration, represent for the Indian a temporary escape from the frustrations and monotonous drudgery which he sees as associated with his depressed social and economic condition (see ch. 10, Religion).

Slowly increasing contact with the outside world, brought about by work opportunities in the mines and by somewhat improved transportation facilities, seems to have led to a more crystallized resentment on the part of the highlanders. Many of the formerly isolated Indians learned some Spanish. Those who went to the mines and the cities returned to their communities with a first-hand knowledge of the social and economic gulfs which separated them from their countrymen. This awareness, along with conscious agitation by radical politicians, was largely responsible for the militant and organized resentment displayed so prominently in the days following the 1952 revolution (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Social Structure).

Agrarian reform and suffrage have removed the two aspects of the traditional social structure most resented by the Indians. No longer virtually enslaved to the landlords and now in possession of their own lands, the majority encounter greater ease in satisfying the demands of their old standard of living, and many have even improved their diets. Nevertheless, in their new social and economic freedom, the Indians are experiencing rising expectations. Contact with markets and improved rural education are leading to economic tastes which can be fulfilled only by a vast (and unlikely) improvement in the agricultural economy. A conflict between rising peasant expectations and economic underdevelopment, unless resolved by migration to the fertile lowlands and increased industrialization is likely to pose a continuous and growing threat to Bolivian political and social stability.

URBAN AND MINING COMMUNITY LIVING CONDITIONS

Social and Economic Background

Despite the cultural and economic differences which separate the small town petty merchants (mostly *cholos*, who are intermediate, in race and culture, to whites and Indians), the mining and industrial laborers, and the urban middle- and upper-class groups from one another, all of them share the characteristic of being dependent upon the national cash economy. In varying degrees, the members of these otherwise disparate groups are vitally concerned with prices and wages—impersonal economic forces, almost totally beyond their control.

The accuracy and completeness of Bolivian economic statistics leave much to be desired, but some idea of the cash income available to salaried workers is provided by comparison of reported pay rates for selected occupations. In 1962 many schoolteachers were earning approximately U.S. $20 (Bs.240,000) or less per month. In the same year an experienced educational supervisor, in charge of a rural school program, was earning approximately U.S.$70 (Bs.840,000). Stenographers and other skilled office help in the larger cities were receiving an average reported monthly salary of U.S.$40–50 (Bs.480,000–600,000), with supervisory personnel earning up to U.S.$80 (Bs.1,000,000) and more.

Reported monthly compensation during 1962 for a sample of industrial workers (exclusive of miners) varied from less than U.S.$17 (Bs.200,000) for some unskilled laborers to more than U.S.$50 (Bs.600,000) for skilled men. The mean income reported by families in one working-class district of La Paz (according to a survey made in 1961) was approximately U.S.$34 (Bs.410,000) per month (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Even the most generous wages and salaries are barely adequate for more than a very modest standard of living, when applied against the high prices prevailing in urban markets. The chaotic state of the agricultural economy and the poorly developed food-shipping facilities have resulted in prices for such staples as beef and potatoes which, in the early 1960's, often reached levels approximating those of the United States.

A slow and unsteady growth in virtually all sectors of the national economy has been reflected in persistently high levels of unemployment. Although no systematically compiled statistics exist, the severity of the problem was clearly seen, in mid-1962, in the large number of employable men in the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba who were engaged in such marginal and highly unprofitable activities as petty street vending. Only slightly less serious in the degree to which it limits the economic horizons of many families is underemployment, arising out of the low level of industrial activity which has plagued the economy since the stabilization measures of 1957 (see ch. 19, Industry; ch. 20, Labor Force).

The *cholo* merchants and artisans of the small town market centers have traditionally controlled local economic activity. Serving as retailers and middlemen to Indian farmers (and before the revolution, to the large estates, as well), they have always depended for sustenance primarily on cash income. The group suffered considerably in the economic chaos which followed the land expropriations of the early 1950's. Many of its members totally impoverished, have moved to the cities, where they have swelled the ranks of the unemployed.

Despite wages which have, by frequent upward adjustments, more or less kept pace with the rise of prices and despite social benefit programs and government price subsidizations, the urban industrial workers and miners have experienced little improvement in their traditionally low living standards. Food shortages, common through most of the past decade, have kept dietary standards low, even for those whose wages are relatively high, and in the continuing political and economic crises, housing and sanitation programs have not kept pace with rising demands.

Unemployment and general lack of economic activity have had considerable adverse effect upon the stability of many urban lower-class families. Foreign observers, writing in 1961 and 1962, reported a very high proportion of households totally dependent upon female support, by virtue of paternal unemployment or desertion. In the same year large numbers of abandoned children, victims of their families' poverty, were sleeping in doorways and market stalls and maintaining a hand-to-mouth existence—largely by begging and petty theft—in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.

The salaried middle class, consisting of white-collar and employed professional workers, has probably suffered a greater decline in standards of living than has any other socioeconomic group through post-revolutionary economic upheavals. Dependent for the most part on fixed salaries and fees rather than on investment income, many of them were rapidly and disastrously impoverished by the 1952–57 inflation. Because of their small numbers and their weak and divided labor organizations, teachers, office workers and others in white-collar positions have enjoyed neither the bargaining strength nor the voting power to command major concessions from the government, as have the miners and industrial workers. In consequence, adjustments in their salaries have not been so rapidly forthcoming nor, proportionately so generous as those accorded the latter groups.

Many families belonging to the small and traditionally paramount elite (*la rosca*) suffered impoverishment as a result of land expropriations in 1953. On the other hand, there were many more (probably a majority) whose wealth, even before agrarian reform, had rested to a greater extent upon foreign investments than upon landed estates. Such families have managed to maintain most of their affluence. In addition, individual members of the upper class, exploiting friendships within the governing party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), have enjoyed special treatment in matters of foreign exchange and have, in some cases, extended their fortunes (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Housing

Official sources estimate that nationwide, in 1961, the occupancy of urban housing averaged 5.6 persons per unit, or about 2.2 per room. This figure, which indicates only moderate crowding, masks the fact that in many of the poorer neighborhoods of the two largest cities, La Paz and Cochabamba, average room occupancy rises to 6 or more persons. For most Bolivians living in cities, towns and mining camps, poorly ventilated, overcrowded quarters, poorly or not serviced by public utilities, are the rule. A housing census made in 1958 indicated that 86 percent of 20,908 structures inspected failed to meet minimum standards of sanitation and structural safety.

The smaller cities and market towns which dot the more populous rural areas conform in their street patterns to the traditional Spanish plan—a gridiron of streets leading away from a central plaza. The largest and most opulent houses, built in the old Spanish style, with rooms opening off an interior courtyard, or patio, are located in the immediate environs of the plaza; those at a greater distance from the central district decline progressively in size and luxury until, at the urban fringe, they are indistinguishable from peasant huts. In the larger cities, La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, there has been a

degree of inversion in the old pattern, as many of the more affluent citizens have moved their households to the less crowded suburbs. The huge and stately old houses abandoned by their upper-class owners have been turned to commercial or multiple dwelling units.

The more affluent *cholo* small town merchants and artisans live in *adobe* houses, roofed with tile, thatch or sheet tin, which are in plan smaller replicas of the traditional Spanish townhouse, being built around a patio. The wall facing the street is most often blank, except for a door opening into a passageway leading to the patio and one opening into a front room which is used as a store or workshop in the family enterprise. Of one or two stories, the typical town *cholo* house has three to six rooms. Less prosperous *cholos* live in small *campesino*-style houses on the edges of the town.

The furnishings of a town *cholo* house are characteristically modest, but include such cash-bought amenities as beds, chairs and tables. Decoration is provided by family portraits, rotogravure illustrations and the ubiquitous patent medicine "saint" calendar. Kerosene is used for illumination and often cooking, as well.

The greater portion of mineworker housing consists of company-built units of more than 15 years of age. Built of stuccoed *adobe* or concrete, and most often roofed with sheet tin, the units are arranged in long, barracks-like rows of one- and two-room apartments, either attached or separated by no more than 2 feet. Lighting and ventilation are superior to those of *campesino* huts, being provided by at least one window per room. In those camps with water and sanitation facilities, two house-rows (about a dozen families) normally share a single spigot and a single latrine which are installed at the end of the court separating them. Occupancy of such units is normally rent-free.

Household furnishings are sparse, usually consisting of a table, a few chairs and one or two beds shared by as many as six persons. Cooking and illumination are almost always by kerosene.

Members of the urban lower class live in a variety of housing types. Many are accommodated in old Spanish-style upper-class dwellings made over as apartment houses. Others live in *campesino*-type huts on the fringes of the city. A significant number live in squatter huts, many of which are inferior in comfort and permanence to those of the *campesinos*.

Multiple dwellings housing the urban poor are usually overcrowded, with as many as 30 families sharing a single two-storied building. Each family occupies one small room or, occasionally, half of a larger room divided by a flimsy partition. The lower-story apartment units open onto the patio and those on the second story onto a common interior balcony. So cluttered is the inadequate floorspace of the typical unit that its occupants must set up a make-shift kitchen in the patio or on the balcony. Tenants whose building

is connected to the municipal water system ordinarily share a single spigot, set in the patio. Along one wall of the courtyard, one or two latrines may be installed, but many houses lack this facility. The least expensive quarters of this type commanded (in the early 1960's) an average rental of about U.S. $3–5 (Bs. 36,000–60,000) per month.

Large and densely settled squatter settlements, totally unserviced by water, sewers or electricity, exist on the fringes of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. Their inhabitants consist, for the most part, of recent rural migrants, although many are unemployed urban workers. The squatter settlements are located either on vacant municipal lands (in which case they are officially called "clandestine urbanizations") or on private lands subject to the sudden expropriation of the squatters. In Cochabamba one such "urbanization," populated by desperately poor unemployed factory and service workers, occupies land originally intended as a municipal park. In Santa Cruz, most vacant private property has been expropriated by former tenement dwellers, acting under the leadership of a well-known and powerful politician. In mid-1962 the authorities of neither city had dared face the political consequences of ejecting their squatters.

Some less prosperous middle-class families—those of teachers and minor white-collar workers, for example—can afford living quarters little different from those of the working class. On the other hand, the more fortunate members of this socioeconomic group find accommodation in the few modern apartment houses which have been built in the larger cities or even in modest, but comfortable, suburban villas.

Furnishings in middle-class households tend to be sparse, for members of this group, relatively impoverished by recent economic events, must often meet formidable expenses for clothing and other visible marks of their status. In the cities, most middle-class families enjoy the use of electricity and piped water, although the latter facility is often shared by two or more households.

No family can lay undisputed claim to middle-class status unless it has one or more servants. Although for many reduced pocketbooks the wages of a domestic pose a considerable strain, few hesitate to make sacrifices, even to the extent of living in poorer, cheaper housing. The foreign observer is therefore often presented with the paradoxical spectacle of a middle-class housewife directing the labors of servants in a dwelling little better than a hovel.

In the suburbs of La Paz and Cochabamba are districts which accommodate a few fortunate families—members of the old upper class, successful businessmen, newly rich politicians and foreign residents—who can afford truly luxurious housing. The residences in such districts are large, sumptuously furnished villas, surrounded by walled gardens.

Provision of domestic water in almost all urban areas is wholly inadequate. Only the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, Tarija and Trinidad have water systems. The citizens of so large a city as Santa Cruz, whose 1960 population was estimated at 54,241, are totally dependent upon wells, cisterns and streams, as are those of all other urban centers. The mean per capita amount of water available in those cities with piped supplies is approximately 20 gallons per day, far below recommended levels. During the dry season inhabitants of the highland cities are continuously faced with cut-offs made necessary by inadequate storage capacity of the reservoirs. Of all cities in Bolivia, only Tarija had, in 1962, a water supply which could be considered even marginally sufficient: approximately 50 gallons per day per capita.

The quality of water provided by municipal systems is inferior, with purification either incomplete or totally neglected. During the dry season water from the almost empty La Paz reservoirs contains so much visible sediment that a local newspaper columnist, Alfonso "Paulovich" Prudencio, was moved to define it as "a compound of hydrogen, oxygen and aquatic animals."

By no means all households accessible to public water systems are served by them. The 1958 housing census made in La Paz indicated that only 38.1 percent of all housing units were thus provided.

Matching the inadequacy of potable water systems is that of sanitary provisions. Most smaller cities and towns lack sewer systems, and those which exist are typically too small for the populations they serve. The sanitary systems of Cochabamba and La Paz, which empty into nearby rivers, often become almost inoperative during dry spells. In the provincial towns, as well as in the outskirts of the larger cities, sewage is often carried by uncovered sluices excavated in the centers of streets.

The public electrical systems which exist in all the large cities and in many of the smaller market towns are powered either hydraulically or by diesel motors. Although, even in the larger cities, many households do not enjoy electrical service, the power systems are loaded so far beyond their small capacities that voltage boosters are required in domestic lines to maintain even barely adequate illumination. Water sources for the hydroelectric plant serving La Paz are seriously depleted during the dry season, and the citizens of that city are accustomed to long periods of power rationing. In many of the smaller towns political chaos and municipal bankruptcy have impeded maintenance of plants and lines to the extent that their systems have been inoperative for several years.

Clothing

In the highlands, urban lower class and town *cholo* men dress, for the most part, in industrially manufactured work clothes. Their costume generally consists of khaki or denim trousers, a woolen or cotton shirt, either an unmatched suit jacket or a leather one, shoes and socks. For many men, a new, clean and well-cared-for set of such clothing takes the place of a dress suit on special occasions. Their wives often maintain the traditional costume of the *cholas*—the *pollera*, embroidered blouse, shawl and (depending on the region) a bowler or stovepipe hat (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). In the lowlands members of both sexes wear light cotton clothing of modern Western cut.

Middle-class men and women, aware that clothing is an important mark of their status, place great emphasis upon correctness and, when they can afford it, stylishness of dress. In order to meet the demands of their social position—and generally their occupational status as well—many of them will foreshorten budget allotments for less visible aspects of their standard of living, such as food and home furnishings.

Recreation

Urban Bolivians enjoy many of the same recreations available to their rural compatriots. Indeed, most of the dances and much of the popular music of city, town and mining camp are derived from the folk tunes of the surrounding countryside. In contrast, however, the cities and even some of the larger provincial towns offer a variety of commercial amusements which are accessible to all but the most impoverished persons.

Motion picture theaters, which are found in virtually every city or town with an electric power system, are well attended. They present mostly Mexican and United States films ranging from 1 to 30 years old.

The major cities all have local radio stations whose audiences increase daily with the number of transistor receivers being imported for sale at relatively low prices. Many municipalities have installed receiver-loudspeaker hook-ups in their plazas so that all may enjoy the broadcasts.

Sports—both spectator and participant—command a high level of devotion from urban Bolivians of all ages and social classes. *Fútbol* teams are organized by schools, labor unions and neighborhood associations (*juntas vecinales*), and professional clubs have large and passionate followings. In the larger cities, an ever-popular spectator activity is a form of wrestling called *catchascán*, from the English "catch-as-catch-can wrestling."

National holidays, particularly Independence Day (August 6) and Revolution Day (April 9), and certain religious fiestas, such as

Alasitas and Carnival, provide gala occasions for all. Their celebration involves parades, processions and parties given by individuals and social clubs. In the case of Alasitas, a special fair is organized, at which are sold little figures of Ek'eko and the adornments with which they are decorated (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 10, Religion). In the provincial towns and in lower-class city neighborhoods, patronal fiestas assume an importance almost equal to that of the *campesino* celebrations.

For the urban working class and the miners, informal congregation in streets and bars is a favored leisure-time activity. Groups of men and women gossiping, arguing and joking are a common evening sight in poorer sections. Labor union headquarters and those of the neighborhood associations also provide a locale for informal socializing. In the small bars, groups of men spend their evenings drinking beer, *aguardiente* and *chicha* (beer made from corn) and playing *sapo* (a quoits-like game in which the object is to throw a counter into the open mouth of a large brass toad or into one of several holes in the pedestal on which it rests).

The upper and middle classes lead much of their social life in clubs. For men, particularly, the professional or social club serves as a place of resort and relaxation.

All classes participate in the traditional *paseo*, the leisurely Sunday morning stroll around the plaza or, in the case of La Paz, along the boulevard. For young men and women the *paseo* serves as an opportunity for discreet (and very public) courtship and, for persons of all ages, as an occasion for displaying one's finest clothing. A municipal band is usually present to provide a musical background for the mass stroll.

Attitudes Toward Living Conditions

In contrast to the traditionally quiescent *campesinos*, members of the mining and urban lower-class groups were acutely aware of their disadvantaged social and economic position long before the upheavals of 1952. Politicians, addressing themselves to poor urbanites, were playing upon resentment of their poverty—and the rigid social structure which underlay that poverty—as early as the mid-nineteenth century. And through more than a generation of active labor union history, factory workers and miners have been involved in several armed battles sparked by protest demonstrations against their wretched living conditions (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Throughout the first decade of revolutionary government, poverty and promises of relief continued to be most prominent in shaping lower-class attitudes, particularly as reflected in political behavior. When it assumed power, the MNR enjoyed the almost unanimous support of labor groups, not only as expressed by politically oriented

union leaders, but also as seen in enthusiastic popular demonstrations. Insofar as MNR governments have been successful in making visible, if superficial, improvements in living conditions, largely by the expedients of arbitrary pay raises and price subsidization, they have had some success in maintaining that loyalty. Nonetheless, as it has become increasingly apparent that more fundamental and permanent improvements have not been forthcoming, their loyalties have waned and old resentments have been rekindled (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The most impoverished members of the middle class have reacted to their economic adversity with a mixture of resentment, anxiety and grim determination to maintain their social status. Those who, by reason of government employment, are not dependent upon the favor of the MNR have flocked to the right-wing political opposition, and even those who have remained nominally loyal to the government were reported by observers in 1962 to be openly bitter about their plight.

Aware that their social status rests, to a great extent, upon such visible externals of their standard of living as fine clothing, membership in fashionable clubs and household servants, people of the middle-income group are willing to sustain a ceaseless struggle to obtain them. Many poorly paid administrative workers count themselves fortunate for enjoying the opportunity to work at as many as two supplemental jobs, and quite a few middle-class households rely on the combined income of both husband and wife.

ORGANIZATION FOR WELFARE

Kinship, Community and Neighborhood Organization

Informal mutual aid and cooperation among kinsmen and neighbors provide an important measure of defense against hardship and adversity, supplementing—and, in many cases, replacing—formal welfare institutions. The value traditions of both the Spanish-speaking whites and the major Indian groups place great moral stress upon kinship loyalty, and most Bolivians look, as a matter of course, to relatives in time of need. Under conditions of extreme poverty and social stress in the larger cities, many individuals violate the traditional precepts of family duty, but in stable communities, orphans, the very old and the infirm normally find shelter in the households of their relatives. Women who migrate from rural areas to the cities and there give birth to illegitimate children frequently entrust such offspring to the care of kinsmen in their home villages. The wives and children of *campesinos* who migrate to urban work centers or to the mines—often for periods of years—commonly seek shelter in the houses of relatives and in-laws.

Compadrazgo (the ties which exist between the parents and godparents of a child) also provides some degree of security against hardship, for the godfather is obliged to act *in loco parentis* in case of death or default of the parents. Although actual adoption of orphaned godchildren rarely occurs, godparents who are economically able to render assistance will seldom fail to do so (see ch. 6, Family).

Indian communities, both Quechua- and Aymara-speaking, are organized around extensive patterns of mutual aid and cooperation. *Aini*, the traditional practice of agricultural labor sharing, makes assistance available to those whose fields overtax the work abilities of their own households (see ch. 11, Social Values). The erection of a house for a newly married *campesino* couple almost always calls forth dozens of willing neighbors and kinsmen whose cooperation is rewarded with a fiesta.

Traditionally, most Indian communities have expected of their members a certain number of days of unpaid labor in public works projects. Throughout both the Quechua and the Aymara areas, village schools, roads and communal irrigation systems have been built and maintained by the spontaneous enterprise and cooperation of *campesinos*. Technical aid personnel and social workers have encountered some success in mobilizing this spirit of common effort in the organization of producers' and marketing cooperatives.

A similar degree of spontaneous cooperation is often encountered in urban lower-class neighborhoods. Many poor districts of La Paz, for example, have neighborhood associations whose volunteer members organize locally recruited work gangs for the construction of streets and school buildings and spend endless hours petitioning municipal authorities for assistance in their efforts on behalf of the common welfare. Social and athletic clubs, which abound in working-class districts also take pride in making collective contributions of labor and resources in neighborhood projects.

The Role of the Government

Detailed provisions in the 1961 Constitution outline a series of guaranteed social rights and state the government's obligations with respect to public welfare. Labor is defined as a right and duty of every citizen, subject to his capabilities. The state is obligated to assure through law certain minimum standards of safety and comfort in working conditions and to regulate closely the labor of women and children. The integrity and happiness of family life and the basic health and welfare of children are specifically guaranteed. A section dealing with agriculture guarantees every peasant the right to possess and use land in accordance with his needs and capabilities and states that family farmsteads are not subject to attachment for debt of any

sort. Finally, the state explicitly undertakes to assure economic security and a minimal living standard for all citizens through free medical care, pensions and low-cost housing programs.

Implementation of the constitutional welfare provisions is largely by legislative and administrative action. The basic responsibility for such activities is shared by several ministries and autonomous agencies, including the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, of Public Health, of Agriculture and Colonization, of Education and Fine Arts and of Rural Affairs, as well as the Agrarian Reform Council, the Social Security Fund and the National Planning Board (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

In general, the stated welfare policy is either totally without effect or is inadequately implemented. Much of the legislation called for in the Constitution has never been enacted, and such laws as are passed often fail to receive the necessary administrative action. Because of difficulties in communications between La Paz and outlying rural areas (and very often disappearance of funds en route), welfare provisions and programs are frequently not executed in the field. For the same reasons, field personnel—teachers, social workers and technicians—often go unpaid for months. Political rivalries and jealousies among persons charged with administering welfare-connected work often lead to destructive noncooperation and wasteful duplication of effort on the part of their agencies.

Ministries and agencies charged with clear responsibilities in the fields of health, welfare and education received slightly less than 43 percent of the 1961 budgetary appropriation (exclusive of public debt service). Somewhat more than one-fourth of this allotment was specifically earmarked for social security, housing and social service programs.

Family and Child Welfare

Both the Constitution and the Civil Code deal extensively with matters relating to child welfare and family stability. The state is charged with assuring the moral and physical well-being of all children by enforcing parental responsibilties or, if this is impossible, by acting *in loco parentis*. Provision is made for the judicial determination of paternity and the enforcement of paternal obligations of support for both legitimate and illegitimate children. In order to foster stability of family life, the Constitution states explicitly that common-law unions have all the legal qualities of marriage from the standpoints of inheritance rights and obligations of support.

Except for legal enforcement of parental responsibilties, which is a formal attribute of the police and the civil courts, most aspects of child welfare are entrusted to the Office of Child Protection, an agency of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The responsibilities of this agency lie primarily in the protection and rehabilitation of

orphans, abandoned children and juvenile delinquents. It administers the 18 government orphanages and is charged with the periodic inspection and supervision of such institutions operated by nongovernmental organizations. In 1959 the Office of Child Protection inaugurated an ambitious program of recreation with the opening of a vacation camp (*colonia de vacaciones*) at Yanacachi, Department of La Paz. By 1961 this camp had served more than 6,000 children of poor families from all accessible parts of the country.

Except in a few small aspects (the Yanacachi Camp, for example), the basically humanitarian program of family and child welfare envisioned in the Constitution and the Civil Code has never been fully and adequately implemented. Men continue to desert their common-law households with impunity, and large numbers of abandoned children continue to inhabit doorways and market stalls. The judicial, police and welfare agencies charged with enforcing child protection laws have neither the personnel nor the resources to properly discharge their functions. Orphanages—both public and private—are perennially overcrowded to the point that they could not possibly accommodate more than a fraction of the hordes of children in need of shelter.

Social Security

The Social Security Code of 1956 unifies and expands a voluminous body of laws enacted since 1924 in the fields of social insurance and workmen's compensation. It entrusts administration of most funds and programs in those spheres to an autonomous public agency, the National Social Security Fund (Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social). Specifically excepted from the supervision of the national agency are the funds administered on behalf of the railroad workers, the bank workers, military personnel and the petroleum workers, each of which is administratively autonomous. Both the national fund and those of the occupational groups are, however, subject to regulation and audit by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Financing of all social security funds is by contributions of the covered employee (7.5 percent of gross earnings), the employer (30 percent of the total payroll) and the government (5 percent of total declared wage payments).

Coverage, under either the national fund or one of the occupational groups is, according to the codes, mandatory for all full-time wage and salary earners and optional for domestic servants, peasants and self-employed persons. Because peasants and the self-employed are required to pay into the fund both the employee's contribution and that of the employer, very few had elected coverage by 1961.

As set forth in the 1956 code, the social security system operates through two broad programs: social insurance and family subsidies. Specifically, workers participating in the various funds are insured

against the risks of illness, maternity, occupational disease and injury, disability, old age and death, through the provision of free medical care and through the payment of pensions and indemnities (see ch. 20, Labor Force). Family subsidies, intended to aid all covered families to achieve a minimum standard of living, are paid partly by the fund and partly by the employer and include monthly allotments (over and above wages) to legally married participants, lump-sum payments and gifts of infant clothing to new parents, free distribution of milk to children under 1 year of age, monthly child support allotments (per capita) and burial benefits.

Although it is designed to offer a broad coverage to a large segment of the population, the social security system has had, in reality, only a small impact on the poor and precarious conditions under which most Bolivians live. Aside from the fact that the majority of self-employed persons and *campesinos* were not eligible for its benefits in 1961, there are evidences that many persons in occupational groups for whom participation is legally mandatory were, in fact, not enrolled.

Actual benefit payments (particularly the family subsidies) are extremely low. In 1961, for example, the monthly marriage allotment and that provided for child care were each approximately U.S. $0.28 (Bs. 3,500) monthly. The cash value of milk products delivered under the infant milk subsidy was about U.S. $0.42 (Bs. 5,000) monthly, per child. In addition, neglect of payments to the fund by both the government and employers (total arrears amounted to U.S. $28.1 million in 1960) have hampered its effectiveness (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Housing and Community Development

Basic responsibility for the development and execution of housing programs lies with the National Housing Institute (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda—INV), an autonomous government agency. Founded in 1956 as a means of coordinating a multiplicity of public housing programs (largely on the part of the various social security funds), INV provides a wide variety of services in that field. It undertakes construction of residential units with the direct use of public funds and cooperates with prospective builders—particularly cooperatives and labor unions—in developing their housing plans. Its technical services include development of research and low-cost materials and techniques in housing economics.

Although the combined efforts of the social security funds and, since 1956, INV have been ambitiously conceived, they have been continually hampered by a lack of funds. The total of 2,112 units which had been constructed by all agencies between 1952 and 1961 represented an insignificant fraction of the housing deficit for the latter

year, estimated (by the Inter-American Development Bank) to have been approximately 384,000 units.

In addition to difficulties in construction financing, the effectiveness of the various public housing programs has been impaired in measurable degree by poor planning and, occasionally, political interference. For example, one program of worker housing in the La Paz area was implemented with such haste that neither funds nor plans were available for the supply of domestic water, and the new householders were left totally dependent, for somewhat more than a year, on a distant and polluted stream.

The concentration of public housing effort has been in the provision of single-family dwellings to mining and industrial laborers. In a typical project, INV finances and constructs, under agreement with a labor union or a company cooperative, a number of small houses (usually three or four rooms with bath and kitchen) at an average cost of U.S. $1,600. The dwellings are turned over to members on long-term, low-interest mortgages administered by the union or cooperative.

In addition to industrial and mineworker housing, INV has undertaken an apartment house project in La Paz, designed to benefit modestly paid white-collar workers. Construction of this unit, a 12-storied building, was drawn out over several years of desultory activity, but it appeared likely that it would be ready for occupancy in 1963. Operation and maintenance of the building will be under the cooperative management of the apartment holders.

Housing, both urban and rural, has received considerable attention in the 10-year plan. By repair and replacement of existing units and the construction of 228,867 new ones by 1971, the plan envisions both the elimination of the longstanding housing deficit and provision for the increased population. The projected cost of this ambitious program is U.S.$169,000,000, of which an estimated $35,000,000 will represent private investment.

Community development activities, for the most part in the fields of health education, sanitation, technical improvement and leadership training, have been largely the joint responsibility of the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, of Public Health, of Agriculture and Colonization and of Rural Affairs. In addition, the Army—through its colonization detachments (*destacamentos de colonización*)—was engaged in 1962 in road, sanitary and housing construction for migrant settlements established in the Alto Beni lowlands of La Paz Department.

Each of the ministries involved in rural community development—those of Rural Affairs, Agriculture and Public Health—maintains traveling teams (*brigadas móviles*) whose members carry out short-term programs of agricultural demonstration, health education, training in domestic hygiene and technical assistance in sanitary construc-

tion. Where possible, members of the *brigadas* attempt, during their stay in a *campesino* community, to initiate a major self-help project (the construction or improvement of an irrigation system or the digging of latrines, for example) and provide materials and guidance.

Agricultural cooperatives, sponsored and supervised by the National Cooperative Office of the Ministry of Rural Affairs, have served in many places as a basis for collateral programs in community development. Social workers and agronomists, working with producers' cooperatives in several Aymara villages near La Paz during 1961 and 1962, were reported to have had considerable success in organizing the members into public works committees for the construction of irrigation and sanitation facilities. Using their own funds and labor and under their own leadership, the cooperatives made substantial and permanent improvements in living conditions.

Religious and International Agencies

Religious Organizations

Until very recently, the Catholic Church was entrusted with almost the sole responsibility for formal welfare work. Orphanages, shelters for the aged and other institutions were organized under the supervision of religious orders and financed largely by individual bequests made as acts of piety. Even such institutions as were established under public (largely municipal) auspices were operated by Catholic orders. Despite a significant decline in the amount of welfare and charitable work after the expulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century, the national hierarchy maintained its effective control of such activities until well into the present century (see ch. 10, Religion).

Traditionally, Church-sponsored welfare work has been seen as an act of simple charity in which pious and economically fortunate Christians gave of their private resources to provide relief for those in distress. All efforts were aimed at the amelioration of poverty and illness rather than at their prevention through permanent improvement in social and economic conditions. Gift giving and participation in charitable enterprise were considered important symbols not only of piety, but also of social status and tended to call attention to the social distinction between those receiving aid and their benefactors.

In the past decade, however, a new orientation has become increasingly apparent. More comprehensive programs, designed to attack basic social and economic problems, have been instituted, largely under the leadership of foreign missionary orders and lay groups. Institutional facilities for the care of orphans, the aged and the sick have been maintained, but much greater emphasis has been placed upon fundamental improvements in living conditions. To a great extent, the traditional stress on charity has been supplanted by an emphasis upon self-help. Every attempt is made to involve the in-

terest, labor and resources of the beneficiaries in a cooperative attack on their problems. Through training of local leaders and technicians it is hoped that programs of technical education and sanitary improvement will become a a permanently established and functioning part of community life even after the missionaries and social workers have departed. This new orientation toward Church welfare work is clearly expressed in a fundamental objective of the Maryknoll Order: "We aim to retire."

Current Catholic welfare services include the maintenance of the traditional orphanages, old-age homes and hospitals (of which there were 15, 11 and 19, respectively, in 1961), technical training, leadership formation and economic betterment through the organization of cooperatives. Directly involved in these activities are the national hierarchy, numerous missionary orders and such lay groups as Catholic Charities (United States) and Catholic Action. In addition, a German Catholic welfare agency, similar to Catholic Charities was reported in 1962, to have been preparing to enter Bolivia.

Much of the responsibility for executing the various programs of social improvement lies with parish priests, who encourage the formation of local public works committees and exert leadership in locally developed sanitary and educational endeavors. They are also instrumental in the formation within their parishes of Catholic Action groups which act as promoters, leaders and teachers in numerous community improvement projects.

An ambitious program of community development, embracing the fields of housing improvement, fundamental education, technical improvement, consumer cooperatives and leadership training, was inaugurated in 1953 in the Quechua-speaking village of Coipasa, Potosí Department. Established under the auspices of the Escuelas de Cristo (Schools of Christ), an organization founded to further rural Catholic education, the Coipasa project has been a prototype for many similar undertakings in other communities.

The organization of cooperatives, in both rural and urban areas, is an important aspect of the overall economic betterment program. Producers' cooperatives have been used with considerable success as a means of training local religious and civic leaders. Credit unions, the organization of which was pioneered by the Maryknoll Fathers, have been widely established and provide their members with possibilities for home and capital improvements hitherto inaccessible to them.

Protestant missionaries—Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists and Canadian Baptists, along with those of several smaller denominations—provide a wide range of health, welfare and educational services. Virtually every mission has attached to it a school and at least a rudimentary medical facility. Youth groups, formed largely for

religious purposes, also serve as a medium for educational and technical training.

A pioneering effort in community development is the program inaugurated in 1935 by the Canadian Baptists at Guatajata, a tenant-worked estate on the shores of Lake Titicaca. Having acquired the lands, and thereby control over the tenants, the missionaries employed their authority as owners to enforce a degree of acceptance of primary education and technical training. Over a period of 5 years they gradually relinquished both land titles and control of communal affairs to the tenants, remaining only in an advisory capacity. By 1946, Guatajata was reported to have been considerably more prosperous than neighboring communities and to have achieved enviable health and literacy records.

The United Nations

One of the largest and most comprehensive programs of community development, education, health and technical betterment was initiated in 1953 with the establishment of the Andean Mission, a joint agency of several United Nations organizations. Operating in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, as well as in Bolivia, the major objective of the mission is the incorporation of the Indian population into the social and economic life of their respective countries. In 1962, by prior agreement with the Bolivian Government, active operation of the mission's program passed to the Ministry of Rural Affairs, with representatives of the United Nations remaining in an advisory capacity.

The facilities and personnel of the Andean Mission are concentrated in four field stations (called bases), located within populous rural zones. In the highlands there are bases at Pillapi, on the shores of Lake Titicaca; at Otavi, in Potosí Department; and at Playa Verde, in Oruro Department. In the lowlands there is a base at Cotoca, near Santa Cruz, established to accommodate Indian migrants transported by the mission from Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí.

The Role of the United States

Directly or indirectly, United States economic and technical assistance is involved in virtually every public program designed to improve living conditions. Through direct budgetary support, funds are made available for the operation of the various government welfare agencies. The sale of surplus foodstuffs, in addition to generating counterpart funds for budgetary support and other assistance, has been instrumental in the relief of food shortages during periods of economic crisis and production decline.

Technical assistance, rendered through the various binational agencies administered cooperatively by the Bolivian Government and the United States Operations Mission (USOM), has been aimed at a broad front of activities, including sanitation, community develop-

ment, technical improvement and basic education. More basically, it has been directed at the multifold problems involved in the development of communications and natural resources without which little permanent improvement in living conditions is possible (see ch. 8, Education; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

DEATH AND DISEASE RATES

Bolivian vital statistics cannot be considered at all accurate, because of the incompleteness of the census figures and an almost total lack of medical reporting of deaths and diseases. Nevertheless, estimates—of necessity little more than guesses—have been made, largely by extrapolation from local samples. For example, the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission calculated a minimum crude death rate (for 1951) of 30 per 1,000. Other, more conservative (and recent) estimates range from around 15 to more than 20 per 1,000. Regardless of the disparities among the various estimates which have been made, it seems reasonable to say that Bolivia's crude death rate is among the highest in Latin America.

Infant mortality (under 2 years) has been estimated at different times and by different authorities to lie between fewer than 300 and more than 400 per 1,000 for the nation as a whole. Local samples taken in Aymara areas of the Altiplano during the late 1950's yield a figure of 333 per 1,000, one of the highest in the hemisphere. Such figures as exist indicate beyond doubt that infant mortality rates, extremely high for the entire country, are on the order of 50 to 100 percent higher in rural areas than in the larger cities.

Statistics on disease are no more accurate than those on death, but certain generalizations are possible on the basis of recorded medical experience and year-by-year changes in reported incidences. Rates for most of the common infectious diseases are extremely high, and subclinical illnesses, particularly gastrointestinal infestation, never brought to the attention of physicians and hardly noticed by the patient, probably afflict a majority of the population. In the highlands the most commonly reported communicable diseases are influenza, tuberculosis, whooping cough, pneumonia and typhoid; and in the lowlands, gastrointestinal infections and malaria.

There has been a generally steady increase in the incidence of tuberculosis since the end of the Chaco War, an increase which many medical authorities think to be, at least in part, the result of a greater frequency of migration by highland Indians, to lower altitudes, for they are believed to be more susceptible to the disease in the tropics. Other writers take the apparently greater incidence to be nothing more than a reflection of improved medical reporting. There is general agreement, in any case, that a combination of poor, overcrowded and unsanitary housing, along with low standards of nutrition, make

a high rate of tuberculosis infection inevitable. The government estimated that there were some 55,000 cases of the disease in the country in 1961 and the World Health Organization annual report for 1962 declared it the major national health problem.

Louse-borne typhus has long been endemic in altitudes above 8,500 feet, but there are indications that recent DDT campaigns have been partly effective in controlling its spread. Reported incidence dropped from 32.3 cases per 100,000 population in 1954 to 6.8 in 1956.

Until quite recently, Bolivia had the highest reported incidence of smallpox in the hemisphere. A mass vaccination campaign, begun in 1958 and suspended in 1959 before completion because of a lack of funds, seems to have had a significant and permanent effect, for in 1960, only one case was reported.

Whooping cough is a major cause of infant and early childhood deaths throughout the highlands. In 1960 the reported rate was 16.3 per 100,000, a figure which undoubtedly represents only a fraction of the cases which actually occurred during that year.

The two mosquito-borne scourges of the lowlands, malaria and jungle yellow fever, seem to have been brought under a degree of control by recent eradication campaigns. Reported incidence of the former declined from 672.4 to 33.0 per 100,000 between 1953 and 1956. Yellow fever, attacked both by mosquito eradication and vaccination, has been almost completely eliminated; in 1960, only 30 cases were reported.

Bubonic plague has been a constant concern of health authorities. Although cases have been reported from time to time in the highlands (particularly in the city), the concentration has been in Santa Cruz Department in which, in 1960, all 12 known cases occurred.

Leprosy is increasing in reported incidence. Although most cases occur in the lowlands, every highland department except Oruro has reported cases. As of August 30, 1960, the Ministry of Public Health had registered 1,015 leprosy patients.

In 1956 yaws was discovered in the provinces of Nor Yungas and Sur Yungas of La Paz Department and studies revealed that 5,000 persons in a population of approximately 50,000 had contracted the disease. In 1958 an eradication campaign reduced the incidence of the disease, after somewhat more than 1 year, by 50 percent. A high degree of success in the campaign is indicated by the fact that throughout 1960 no new cases were reported.

Venereal diseases, for the most part syphilis, gonorrhea and chancroid, are all fairly common. Because of the notable deficiencies in reporting, particularly in the cases of gonorrhea and chancroid, generalizations are extremely hazardous, but there is some indication that treatment campaigns in urban health centers and dispensaries may have reduced the incidence of such infections.

Although the statistics on various forms of gastrointestinal infection are far from complete, medical experience indicates that they are one of the major causes of infant mortality. The lack of sanitary water supplies in most parts of the country gives rise to a variety of conditions, including dysentery—both amoebic and bacillary—and typhoid. In the lowlands hookworm infection is reported to be extremely common.

Nutritional and metabolic diseases also take a considerable toll in life and health. Goiter is endemic to certain areas, and the death rate from the avitaminoses and other nutritional deficiences was, in 1956, the highest in the Americas—about 45 per 100,000, in comparison with 2 to 3 per 100,000 in the United States during the 1950's.

Silicosis is a major cause of permanent disability in mining areas. The government estimated that in the early 1960's more than 4 percent of all miners were actively afflicted and that more than 45 percent were in danger of contracting the disease.

FOLK MEDICINE AND CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD HEALTH

Among the Indians culturally expressed interest in the body and its ailments is extremely high. The Aymara, in particular, have considerable knowledge of anatomy and a large vocabulary describing organs and their disorders. Although much disease is attributed by both Quechua and Aymara speakers to supernatural causes—and especially to black magic purposely wrought by malevolent persons—natural causes and natural remedies are also part of their medical tradition.

For the most part, minor respiratory ailments, headaches and toothaches are believed to result from a series of natural causes and are cured largely by the use of herbal remedies. Coca leaves are commonly used as poultices for the relief of pain. A variety of herbal teas are used in cases of digestive upset. The fruits of certain cacti are thought to be effective in coughs and other respiratory conditions. Several animal remedies are also used. In the treatment of goiter, mumps and lymphatic swellings, for example, a mouse is often tightly applied as a poultice. Dog flesh is thought to have curative powers in certain types of mental affliction, and in some areas, skunk is eaten for malaria. A few minerals are also included in the native medicine kit. A clay called *chacco* in Aymara, is taken in water for the treatment of lung inflammations, and sulphur is sometimes used in water or urine suspension for bathing patients with minor ailments.

Most severe diseases are seen as being the direct result of supernatural causes. Both the Quechua and Aymara speakers believe in the possibility of the detachment or disappearance of the soul, a condition which, if not cleared up promptly, leads inevitably to death. All persons, but particularly children, are thought to be susceptible to

the loss of their souls through sudden fright (*susto*), a cause to which many infant deaths are attributed. Preconquest tombs and ruins are almost universally feared, for it is believed that the spirits dwelling therein attach themselves to the souls of the living and cause ultimate death. Black magic can cause a variety of ailments, all quite serious. A properly skilled person can cause soul detachment and soul loss in several ways or produce illness by the magical implantation of such foreign objects as sticks and toads in the victim's body.

The treatment of supernaturally caused ills almost invariably involves divination in an attempt to discover the human agent, if any. In cases where there is evidence that a malevolent person has worked black magic on the victim, a common practice is to bathe the victim and to splash the bathwater over the doorstep of the malefactor. Another common practice, used whenever the curer believes the disease to have been supernaturally caused, is to place objects of the patient's clothing in a conspicuous spot on the road, in the hope that an unsuspecting stranger will pick them up and thereby contract the disease, freeing the ill person of the curse. In times of epidemic a similar practice is sometimes followed by loading a black llama with personal effects of the diseased victims and driving the animal from the village.

There are a variety of specialists in the diagnosis, treatment and cure of disease. In both Quechua and Aymara areas, most curers will undertake the treatment of both naturally and supernaturally caused ailments, but there are also sorcerers whose practice is exclusively in the latter category. In most communities there are women who by experience and inclination are skilled midwives, and in many there are men who specialize in the setting of broken bones.

The most famous folk doctors of Bolivia are the Callahuaya of Muñecas Province, La Paz Department, who consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic subgroup and who travel the length of the Andes, selling herbal remedies, charms and amulets. The arrival of one of these itinerant witchdoctors is awaited with considerable anxiety in many villages (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The *cholos* of the market towns and the cities (and many whites, as well) have frequent recourse to the Indian cures and remedies. Several blocks of the street market near the center of La Paz are occupied by vendors of folk remedies which include herbs, charms, pieces of dried animal skin and many others.

Attitudes on the part of Indians and *cholos* toward modern medicine reflect a degree of eclecticism. Those for whom medical facilities are easily accessible will often use the medical doctor and the folk curer as perfectly acceptable alternatives, sometimes consulting one and other times consulting the other. In some areas there has been some resistance to such practices as vaccination, but for the most part, the opposition has seldom been very strong. Investigation has shown

that much of the mistrust of medical doctors stems not from their strange methods so much as from the impersonality of their relationships with patients. Also, accustomed throughout their lives to entertaining suspicions toward outsiders, most Indians feel diffident about entrusting themselves to the care of strangers.

Medical aid missions have had considerable success, in some communities, in their attempts to use folk practitioners as public health workers. Physicians and nurses of the Andean Mission base at Pillapi, for example, have trained many of the local curers in first aid techniques, and the latter have accepted the new skills as part of their own practice. Acceptance by folk doctors of such techniques as antisepsis and simple drug therapy have served to reinforce public confidence in the medical mission and its services. Similarly, considerable effort has been made to train village midwives in modern techniques.

DIET AND NUTRITION

For probably a majority of Bolivians, nutritional standards are extremely low, in terms of both quality and quantity. Although there are regional and class variations in a few details, the basic diet in all segments of the population is overweighted in carbohydrates and severely deficient in most important nutrients. Of the 1,880 calories estimated to be the average daily intake for the country as a whole, only 15.5 percent is derived from animal products, and of the 84.5 percent deriving from vegetable sources, the greatest proportion consists of grains and starchy roots. In one local sample, made in an Aymara community, potatoes alone accounted for more than half of the total per capita food intake (by weight), and grains for almost one-fourth.

The precarious climatic conditions with which most highland *campesinos* must cope leave little margin between well-being and starvation. Most observers believe that those living on the poorest and highest lands do not, even in good years, produce more than a very meager food supply.

Protein deficiency is probably the most important nutritional problem. Such statistics as exist suggest that the greatest lack occurs in the rural highlands. In general, the bulk of the inadequate protein intake comes from vegetable sources, largely beans. Intake of almost all essential vitamins is known to be quite low throughout the country. Mineral deficiencies are widespread. In all parts of the highlands, and in many lowland areas as well, soils are notably deficient in calcium. Iodine deficiencies in several regions give rise to endemic goiter.

The most important dietary staples in the highlands are potatoes, barley and quinoa (a grain native to the Andes); in the lower valleys the most important is corn. So important are potatoes, eaten boiled, baked or dehydrated, in the diet of the Altiplano Aymara that one

observer described their menu as ". . . potatoes, seasoned, at intervals, with a little meat and a few vegetables."

Of all grains, quinoa is probably the richest from the standpoint of nutritional quality. Depending upon the soil in which it is grown, it has maximal concentrations of phosphates and calcium, and its oil and protein content compensate in small degree for a low meat intake.

In the lowlands, yucca, rice, sugar, plantains and bananas form the major sources of caloric intake. In addition, some corn is grown in certain localities.

Green vegetables, which require abundant rainfall or artificial irrigation, are not available to most of the subsistence farmers of the highlands nor, because of their high prices, to the urban poor. Per capita consumption of such foods is, however, reported to be slightly higher in the lowlands.

Meat consumption is quite low—somewhat below the Latin American average. Except in the remote and underpopulated cattle-raising areas of the Beni, meat is for most *campesinos* a rarely accessible luxury, enjoyed only at fiestas and other special events. Even those who own a few animals are reluctant to slaughter them for domestic consumption.

Because of serious inadequacies in transportation and storage, prices of meat in urban markets are quite high (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). Regular consumption at meals is therefore beyond the reach of many (if not most) city dwellers. *Salteñas*—meat pies made from beef scraps, dough and hot pepper—are sold in markets and other public places and, bought as an occasional treat, probably represent much of the total meat consumption among the urban poor.

Eggs and dairy products are consumed regularly by very few Bolivians. Prices are high in the cities, and a majority of the *campesinos* have neither dairy cattle nor hens. Although cheese is made in many Indian communities and is an important dietary item for many families, there are strong attitudinal prejudices against whole milk. Even for those who own hens, eggs are a minor source of protein, for most families prefer to sell them in town markets for a small cash income.

Fresh fruits have become available in many cities, with the opening of roads to various lowland zones. Because of a lack of storage and shipment facilities, however, only a small volume reach small town markets.

Attitudinal factors are almost as important as the economic ones in the generally low nutritional standards. In addition to their strong prejudices against milk, most *campesinos* show considerable reluctance to adopt new foods. For example, large North American potatoes, introduced by a technical aid mission, won little approval among the Aymara, who found their extraordinary size and unfamiliar texture to be unacceptable. Even those middle- and upper-class urban fam-

ilies who can afford a variety in their diet tend, by long tradition, to depend on a basic menu of starchy tubers and grains, with meat, fresh vegetables and other foods served merely as extras.

The precise extent of malnutrition has never been determined, although it is known to be high. Except in their most severe form, diseases of nutritional deficiency tend to go unreported and untreated. A graphic illustration of the seriousness of the problem is, however, provided by Army medical records, which indicate that conscripts (mostly Indians) add an average of 2 inches to their stature and 25 pounds to their weight during their service period, apparently as a result of a more nearly adequate diet.

Use of Alcohol and Coca

An important part of *campesino* social life in all areas, excessive group drinking (to the point of oblivion) is very wasteful of time, labor and resources which could be invested in the improvement of living standards. Estimates of annual work time lost through celebration of week-long drinking parties are uniformly high. In addition to possible physical impairment arising out of simple intoxication, a considerable danger to life and health is imposed by the frequent adulteration of alcohol sold for beverage purposes. Health and welfare workers therefore direct considerable (although often futile) efforts at reducing the consumption rate.

The chewing of coca leaves with alkaline ash to produce a mild cocaine narcosis is an Indian custom of long tradition for both men and women. The state induced by the drug is essentially one of insensitivity to discomfort, and men about to engage in heavy physical labor, those about to expose themselves to extreme cold and those facing protracted periods of hunger commonly fortify themselves with a large dose.

Medical authorities are by no means unanimous in their beliefs regarding the permanent effects of the coca habit. Some are convinced that long-term use leads to irreversible mental and physical deterioration, where as others believe that the amount of cocaine absorbed is never sufficient to produce other than transient effects. As in the case of alcohol use, however, coca consumption involves the expenditure of money which could be used to improve diet and living conditions.

Both alcohol and coca used by *campesinos* seem to bear a measurable relationship to low nutritional standards. It is consistently indicated that the rate of consumption of both tends to decline in communities with more generous and balanced diets.

HEALTH, SANITARY AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health and medical care are among the explicit guarantees contained in the 1961 Constitution, and the 1956 Sanitary Code sets forth a detailed plan of organization and operation for a comprehensive national health service. As envisioned in both Constitution and law, the publicly maintained health services include free medical care, school lunch programs, maternal and child health care, construction and maintenance of sanitary facilities and the organization of a nationwide system of hospitals, dispensaries and dental clinics. Some action has been taken in all these fields, but as in the case of other government programs, implementation is far from complete or effective, because of administrative difficulties and lack of funds (1960 government expenditures for public health were slightly less than U.S. $4 million).

Government health services are both supported and supplemented by a wide variety of technical assistance programs operated by United States agencies, by the United Nations and by several religious and philanthropic groups. Major projects undertaken by such agencies during the past decade cover every phase of the national health program, but probably the greatest efforts have been expended in the fields of hospital construction, environmental sanitation and eradication of communicable diseases.

Medical Services and Personnel

In 1962 there were, according to a report of the World Health Organization (WHO), 657 physicians (approximately 1 to every 5,270 persons), 59 dentists, 54 pharmacists, 240 nurses and 66 trained midwives. Because of a primary dependence by most physicians (including those in public employ) upon income from private practice, there is a tendency to concentration in the largest cities, to the extent that many large regions of the country are totally without professional attention. The requirement that recently graduated medical doctors give a brief period of service in small-town dispensaries as a prerequisite to certification is ineffectual as a means of ensuring attention to rural areas, for there are never more than a small number of graduates.

Despite a notable increase, over the past decade, in the number of hospitals, clinics and dispensaries, most such facilities are both inadequate to meet current demands and located in such a manner that they are inaccessible to a large portion of the rural population. In 1960 there were an estimated 6,183 available hospital beds (approximately 1.79 per 1,000 persons), divided among 19 hospitals (15 public and 4 private), 85 public health and emergency treatment centers, 15 prenatal clinics, 1 mental institution and a number of other facilities, in-

cluding several small rural hospitals (generally with fewer than a dozen beds).

Most of the government-operated hospitals and clinics are under the administration of the Ministry of Public Health, operating through the Directorate-General of Health and regional medical officers posted in department capitals, but certain other public agencies maintain treatment facilities also. The various independent social security funds have constructed hospitals designed to serve the needs of their particular sectors of the working population. The National Social Security Fund has constructed and currently operates, a children's hospital in La Paz, a workers' hospital in Oruro and the National Broncho-Pulmonary Hospital at La Paz, and was reported in late 1962 to be building another large medical center in La Paz.

Many of the institutions listed as "hospitals" are, in fact, little more than clinics, staffed by only one physician and lacking facilities for most kinds of surgery. Since most of the smaller institutions are located in rural centers, however, they perform a valuable service in making more widely available at least cursory medical attention.

Medical and dental schools exist at the Universities of San Francisco Xavier, in Sucre; Simón Bolívar, in Cochabamba; and San Andrés, in La Paz. Training facilities—equipment and libraries—were reported to be barely adequate in the La Paz school and grossly substandard in the others. In 1957 the three medical schools graduated 36 physicians. Other training centers for health workers include a school of veterinary medicine, two nursing schools (one operated by the Seventh Day Adventists) and a college of pharmacy. In 1960 there were 58 students enrolled in the National School of Nursing, a number which apparently represented the institution's full capacity, for in the same year, a number of applicants were turned away.

The Ministry of Public health operates several specialized laboratories for medical research, diagnosis and the production of vaccines. In addition to their basic functions, these facilities also offer valuable specialized training to physicians and other health workers. Those reported to be in operation in 1962 were the Central Laboratory in Cochabamba, the National Bacteriological Institute in La Paz, the Animal Vaccine Laboratory in Ovejuyo, the Thorax Institute in La Paz and the Broncho-Pulmonary Institute in Cochabamba.

In addition to sanitary construction, most of the community development projects undertaken by the mobile teams of Ministers of Public Health, Rural Affairs and Agriculture and Colonization include a health education program. Social workers and nurses attempt, through the organization of home improvement clubs, to introduce new concepts of nutrition, domestic hygiene and child care and, working through local leaders, to develop a public awareness of sanitation

needs. An important aspect of the program, also, is the training of midwives in antiseptic technique.

Other agencies making contributions to community health largely through environmental sanitation are the National Commission of Potable Water and Sewage (an interministry commission, established in 1961) and the School of Army Engineers, which offer the only courses in environmental sanitation available in Bolivia. The object of the Potable Water and Sewage Commission is the integration of all government activities in these fields and the provision of technical advice to municipalities. There were, in late 1962, no reports on its activities.

International Cooperation

Church groups, both Catholic and Protestant, have long maintained medical facilities throughout the country. Indeed, dispensaries and other treatment facilities operated by such organizations represent, for many rural areas, the only accessible medical care. In 1961 the Catholic Church, largely through missionary orders, was reported to have had in operation 35 facilities, ranging in size from small dispensaries, operated by 1 person, to clinics with capacities for 200 and more. The hospitals and clinics operated by the Methodists and the Seventh Day Adventists provide services which are considered among the best in the country.

United States secular philanthropic agencies have been intimately involved in several important medical activities. The Rockefeller Institute, for example, has conducted successful campaigns of malaria and yellow-fever suppression in various lowland zones. The Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere (CARE) has long cooperated in child nutrition programs undertaken by the Andean Mission and was reported to have contributed more than 60,000 food parcels in a single year (1957).

The United Nations and its affiliates, particularly WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have provided a wide variety of consultative and technical services. The western hemisphere representative of WHO, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), in cooperation with United States and other technical assistance missions, has been active in campaigns for the suppression of malaria, yellow fever and yaws. UNICEF has contributed personnel and materials for programs in child nutrition and health.

United States contributions, including both economic aid and technical assistance, have been made in every field of public health work. In addition to budgetary support of Bolivian government programs, economic aid has been given primarily in the form of material and equipment grants and training scholarships for national personnel. Total direct expenditures in health and sanitation (exclusive of budg-

etary support funds) amounted to U.S. $5,210,000 in the period 1952–60.

Technical aid in health work is administered primarily through the Inter-American Cooperative Public Health Service (Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publica—SCISP), a binational organization founded in 1942 and currently working under the joint auspices of the Bolivian Ministry of Health and the USOM. Its activities have included mass immunization programs (particularly against smallpox), campaigns for the elimination of mosquitoes and other insect disease vectors, environmental sanitation and the establishment of health centers and laboratories. The health centers, built and equipped with United States funds, but staffed exclusively by Bolivians, were transferred to full operation by the Ministry of Public Health in 1960.

CHAPTER 8

EDUCATION

Geographic factors, nearly constant economic and political instability and oligarchic social traditions have militated against the extension of education to broad masses of the population. The government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), in power since 1952, has linked educational progress to the Party's political and the country's international prestige. A Code of Education, enacted in 1955, was to be the vehicle of this firmly determined policy. In addition a specific section of the Constitution of 1961 affirms broad educational goals. Because of persistent economic chaos and discord within the ranks of the MNR, however, the implementation of plans introduced since 1952 to extend the scope of education has been sporadic and slow.

In 1961 the country's illiteracy rate was still 70 percent (80 percent in rural areas)—one of the highest in Latin America. This percentage had remained stationary since 1950, in spite of the launching of a nationwide literacy campaign during the mid-1950's. Adding to physical and demographic factors retarding the spread of literacy is the use of the Quechua and Aymara languages by a large portion of the rural population. The teaching of literacy in these languages requires a laborious process of adaptation of Quechua and Aymara sounds to symbols of the Latin alphabet.

The absence of detailed educational statistics since 1950 and the inadequate definition of statistical categories on which estimates are based prevent a meaningful quantitative analysis of educational progress since 1950. However, official estimates prepared for the use of the Bolivian Government and of international agencies concerned with educational development indicate continuing shortcomings in the scope and general level of education. Although primary education is theoretically compulsory and the majority of educational institutions are free public schools, a large portion of the population remains untrained even in basic elementary subjects. In 1961 only about 1 in 10 rural children attended school. This estimate excludes some 30,000 tribal Indians who, living in the forests of the eastern plains, are in effect outside the reach of all means of communication. The ratio of attendance is more favorable in the urban areas, although

some 12,500 children could not be enrolled during 1961 because of the shortage of educational facilities. Enrollment reports on the numbers of students attending schools at the various academic levels include not only school-age children but adults as well, without indicating the proportion between them. In view of this fact an official government release of April 1962, placing the percentage of the total population attending schools in 1960 at 12.27 as compared to 7.34 in 1951, furnished the only (although perhaps optimistic) indication that the number of persons benefiting from educational opportunities has increased.

Most persons terminate their schooling after attending a few primary grades. Out of 100 students enrolled in the first grade of primary school, 29 finish the final sixth grade. Of these only 19 enroll in the first level of secondary school, and only 6 reach the terminal sixth stage of that academic level. In spite of the acute shortage of school buildings this high rate of attrition creates a considerable waste of facilities in some areas, particularly in institutions on the secondary level.

Besides economic and social factors, the general characteristics of the school system tend to discourage long-term attendance. Both its structure and content are based on European models and have, therefore, remained unrelated to the needs of the majority of the population, which is Indian and illiterate. The curricula of primary and secondary schools, respectively, are based on continuity without regard to the high rate of attrition. Students who leave before completing the final grades, therefore, fail to obtain a terminal education. This shortcoming is typical mainly of the curricula of academic secondary schools, although nearly 85 percent of those who enroll in secondary schools choose the academic rather than the vocational course. The low rate of enrollment in vocational secondary schools is attributable both to the poor quality of vocational training, except in a few "model" institutions, and to the traditional Latin American contempt for manual work. Such contempt is dominant among city *cholos* but less general among the rural population. Moreover, the curricula of primary and secondary schools are not coordinated. In addition to the unsatisfactory geographical distribution of secondary school facilities, inadequate academic preparation on the primary level and the absence of the top three grades in many of the primary schools are mainly responsible for the fact that only about one-tenth of the total student population of 469,382 in 1960 attended secondary schools.

Policies and provisions contained in the Code of Education of 1955, which prescribes changes in the structure and content of the educational system, reflect the government's interest in a literate, technically skilled population alert to the need for improved living and health standards. The Code calls for a massive national campaign to

eradicate illiteracy, for an extension of the scope of primary education with particular attention to the needs of the rural population, and for changes in the secondary school curriculum to impart technical rather than academic skills. It de-emphasizes the liberal arts and the patterns of academic organization traditionally associated with the educational needs of a middle class.

Although the MNR government has increased the portion of the national budget allocated to education (about 20 percent in 1961), the shortage of funds constitutes a major handicap for the implementation of reforms. The United States extends substantial funds through the Agency for International Development (AID) to assist the government's efforts to improve educational facilities. During 1962 the country received some $1,200,000 from AID, not including additional amounts derived from local currency funds controlled jointly by the United States and the Bolivian Governments. Further assisting educational progress are the programs conducted under the auspices of the Inter-American Cooperative Educational Service (Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Educación—SCIDE), a joint venture of the United States and the Bolivian Governments. SCIDE's main efforts are directed toward the improvement of vocational and rural education. Another SCIDE activity of major importance is its teacher-training program which reached about 25 percent of the country's teachers in the late 1950's.

Apart from technical assistance, officials in the Ministry of Education rely extensively on professional advice from United States experts in the field of public education. Practices and patterns of education in Communist countries are studied as well, and contacts are maintained with the ministries of education of those countries. Some Bolivians, notably Catholics, feel that most of the government's proposed educational reforms are inspired by educational systems and practices in Communist countries. Others, possibly motivated by the same apprehension, have expressed opposition to what appears to be excessive governmental initiative in the field of education. They feel that the government's role in this area should be limited to financial, technical and administrative assistance, while policies should be determined by regional needs and formulated by local groups of citizens and teachers.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Educational institutions of the Spanish colonial era were under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church. Following the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aguinas, the primary and secondary schools, established by Catholic teaching orders, mainly Jesuits, dedicated themselves to the education of a colonial elite, loyal to the Church and to the interests of the Spanish crown. Theology and moral in-

struction were the mainstays of the curricula, although philosophy, arts and languages were also taught. Private tutors or priests educated the children of many of the families of the ruling elite. However, both private and public instruction were accessible to men only. Education for women was considered dangerous and immoral since it tended to distract them from religious and domestic duties.

The Spanish Government favored the education of Indians as a means of disposing them favorable toward Catholicism and Spanish rule. Royal decrees of the eighteenth century urged that educational efforts be directed mainly at the male children of tribal leaders. The decrees exhorted colonial governments to establish schools for these children in order that they "may be thoroughly grounded in our Catholic faith, in Spanish custom, politics, government and, in the Spanish language . . ." and thus become "better Christians, better taught . . . [and] more friendly disposed toward us. . . ." In fact, however, the education of Indians and *cholos* during the colonial era was limited to religious indoctrination and to instruction in certain crafts and occupations. Such instruction was given in convents, monasteries and missions established for the specific purpose of converting Indians. Many Indians attending these institutions acquired a rudimentary knowledge of Spanish, since not all of the priests and nuns spoke the Aymara or Quechua dialects.

The most influential education institution of colonial times and the only university founded during that era was the Royal and Pontifical University of Saint Francis Xavier of Chuquisaca (Universidad Mayor Real y Pontificia de San Francisco Xavier de Chuquisaca—now Sucre). Founded in 1623 by papal bull, San Francisco is one of the three oldest universities in Latin America. It was under the direction of the Jesuits until 1767, when that order was expelled from the colonies by royal decree. A leading center of higher education for the sons of the colonial elite, San Francisco attained particular importance after the foundation of its graduate academy of law, the Real Academia Carolina, in 1776. It was in the course of legal discussions at the Academia that graduate students and professors first questioned the sanctity of Spanish rule. Some of the arguments advocating independence from Spain were derived from the ideology of the French and American revolutions, but most of them were based on St. Thomas Aquinas' tenets on the justified deposition of the inept temporal ruler. Some leaders of these discussions were later at the helm of the movement for national independence.

After independence was realized in 1825, public education passed into the hands of the government. Under the influence of French enlightenment, both Bolivar and Sucre stressed governmental responsibility in establishing and managing public education. Decrees under the administration of Marshal Sucre (1827–29) called for the

founding of primary, secondary and vocational schools in the capitals of all departments. These decrees served as a basis for the law of January 9, 1827, which established the general structural organization of public education. In addition to elementary schools, it called for special schools to teach vocational skills, including mining and agricultural occupations. Secondary schools were considered university preparatory institutions exclusively, offering a curriculum of languages, history and science. Under Marshal Sucre the need for vocational rather than exclusively academic training was recognized by the government for the first time. However, the decrees calling for the establishment of vocational schools remained unimplemented, and governmental concern with vocational and agricultural training was not revived until the 1950's.

Because of military coups and nearly constant political unrest under the successors of Marshal Sucre, progress in public education during the remainder of the century was sporadic in nature and negligible in scope. Whatever physical expansion took place in the network of schools benefited only the children of the urban upper class. Virtually the entire indigenous population was excluded from even the most rudimentary aspects of primary education. In the urban primary and secondary schools, antiquated teaching methods and highly abstract curricula prevailed. Some teachers and intellectuals proposed educational reforms based on modern concepts of pedagogy. The implementation of these proposals, however, was sporadic because of the lack of qualified teachers. The Roman Catholic Church, moreover, favored the retention of an abstract, classical curriculum and the disciplinarian approach to instruction in the private schools under its control.

Because the founding and development of institutions of higher learning enhanced national prestige as well as the personal renown of heads of state, most of the educational progress tended to limit itself to the university level. General Santa Cruz founded San Andrés University in La Paz in 1830. The universities of San Simón in Cochabamba and Gabriel René Moreno in Santa Cruz were established in 1832 and 1880, respectively. The Technical University of Oruro and Tomás Frías Autonomous University in Potosí were both opened in 1892.

In 1839 the Ministry of Public Instruction was organized, and in 1845 the Organic Decree of Universities was promulgated by the Minister of Public Instruction, Tomás Frías. In addition to regulating the internal organization and curricula of the respective faculties and specifying degree requirements, the Organic Decree established some of the fundamental rules of university autonomy which were still being followed in 1962.

The question as to whether public education was to function under the central control of the government or under the auspices of local councils was subject to much political debate throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. The decentralizing trend was considered to be more in keeping with the principle of "freedom of instruction" which was proclaimed in the Educational Law of 1872. In accordance with the provisions of the Law, departmental councils of education were charged with the financing of public elementary schools and with the supervision of every type of school, including the universities. The Law also called for public secondary schools in the capital cities of departments, although secondary and higher education was declared to be the responsibility of private individuals and of the Catholic Church. A school of arts and a school of medicine were established, however, by the government.

The same law made public elementary instruction free and compulsory, although political and economic conditions and oligarchic social traditions prevented its implementation except on a minimal basis.

In 1877 education was again placed under the central control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, although the principle of freedom of instruction was reiterated and the right to establish private educational institutions was recognized as long as these institutions conformed to "conditions of morality" and to constitutional qualifications.

In 1909 the first normal school was opened in Sucre under the direction of a Belgian mission of educators invited by President Ismael Montes (1904–09). Headed by Dr. George Rouma, the mission's main objective was to familiarize future teachers with modern teaching methods. The mission also proposed the introduction of vocational, notably agricultural, subjects into the public school curriculum.

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church asserted itself mainly through compulsory instruction in that faith in all schools. In an effort to challenge the Catholic influence in education, the Minister of Public Instruction in 1912 replaced the teaching of the Catholic faith with classes in nondenominational moral instruction. Because of vigorous public protest, however, the decision was modified to permit schools to offer Catholic religious instruction for 2 hours twice a week to children whose parents requested it. In 1942 Catholic dogma again was offered as a part of the regular curriculum.

In 1930 a reform of the administrative apparatus of public education was undertaken to permit greater local autonomy and to reduce the influence of political appointees. The quasi-autonomous National Council of Education was created to direct all public schools, supervise private ones, appoint teachers and determine their eligibility. The Council also managed educational funds and drafted annual budget proposals for public education. However, because the ap-

proval and allocation of these funds remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Instruction and of the central government the Council failed to lessen the dependence of educational progress on politics.

In 1931 the first school for Indians was established in Huarisata near Lake Titicaca. Based on the traditional social organization of the Indian community, one center (*núcleo*) controlled several smaller school units in the remote villages. Physical facilities were constructed by community labor and material. This pattern of rural schools (*núcleos escolares*) was later adopted by Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. Although the other *núcleos* were not established until the late 1940's, Bolivians take considerable pride in being first to introduce this system of rural education on the Latin-American continent.

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY

On the part of the governing elite, there was only late perception of any need for broadening the educational base. Even after the passage of a law in 1872 providing for free, compulsory primary education, its implementation was at best sporadic. As recently as the 1940's the overwhelming majority of students in secondary schools and universities were the children of the wealthy. Although aristocratic social philosophies and classical learning prevailed at these institutions, notably at the universities, some of the students came into contact with and felt the influence of liberalism and political egalitarianism. This influence was responsible for a lively although largely theoretical preoccupation with social rights, including public education. The need for mass education had been recognized in all of the country's early constitutions, but the problem of Indian education was largely ignored until the 1930's, when some educators and intellectuals raised the issue in the face of considerable opposition by some members of the elite and government officials.

Among those who recognized the desirability of educating the Indian, few still agreed with the educators of the colonial era in the belief that the main task involved in the education of the Indian was his transformation from beast to man. Yet most proposals were based on a tacit assumption of the Indian's biological and social inferiority, and Indian education was often a sentimental hobby. Rafael Reyeros, a prominent educator, maintained that the Indians' vocational skills must be improved before they could be made receptive to academic subjects. According to Franz Tamayo, the country's best-known poet and essayist, Indian education must be based on the recognition of the fact that Indians are endowed with "small intelligence and a powerful will." The advocates of a low level of education for the Indian included not only the members or supporters of the oligarchic social structure and adherents of the aristocratic social philosophy but

also politicians and demagogues to whom a barely literate electorate represented a more pliable tool for the attainment of their political ambitions.

Since assuming power in 1952, the MNR has endeavored to make public education a major vehicle of its social policies. The Constitution of 1961 describes public education and the development of culture as the highest function of the state. MNR's new definition of the tasks and character of public education stresses the need of serving the masses in their economic and social development and of mirroring the national ethos and the personality of the people (*bolivianidad*). In a speech introducing Supreme Decree 03937 on January 20, 1955, later promulgated as the Code of Education, President Paz Estenssoro stated that "the educational system which we are introducing corresponds to the interests of the classes which constitute the majority of the Bolivian people." Article 187 of the Code instructs the government specifically to develop vocational, professional and rural education. Also typical of MNR's pronouncements prefacing proposals for educational reforms is the denunciation of the allegedly repressive and discriminatory practices of previous governments and their ignorance and neglect of national educational needs.

In spite of official preoccupation with the educational needs of the indigenous rural population, there is still much disagreement concerning the language of instruction in areas where the people speak Aymara or Quechua dialect. Because the revolution of 1952 put the Indian in closer touch with civic and political organization, the need for literacy in Spanish is generally recognized. On the other hand, some politicians, mainly those associated with the far left, advocate instruction in the native dialects and condemn instruction in Spanish as a remnant of *castellanización*, a cultural policy associated with the deposed oligarchy.

The change of 1952 also encouraged the ascent of persons sympathetic to the educational policies of Marxism and communism in the policy-making and higher administrative levels of public education. Some of these have urged the adaptation of curricula, methods and educational philosophies from Communist countries and advocated a largely technical curriculum with a minimum of liberal arts subjects. Labor leader Juan Lechín urged that students of working-class background should be given preference in admissions to universities. Czechoslovakia furnished much of the theoretical advice as well as the equipment for vocational educational programs under Minister of Education, Fellman-Vellarde, during the late 1950's. Similarly, Jorge Muñoz Reyes, President of the University of San Andres, is reported to be a vigorous advocate of a predominantly technical curriculum.

The Catholic Church has become an important factor in stemming the Marxist and Communist influence in education. Catholic schools, although their influence has declined sharply since the colonial era, still enrolled about 20 percent of the student population during the early 1960's. Catholic religious instruction is given in primary and secondary schools by specially trained teachers who are paid by the government. The Office of Catholic Education, under the Director General of Education, was headed by a Catholic priest in 1960–62. Teachers who were graduated from Catholic normal schools forcefully opposed Communist and Marxist tendencies among students and teachers. On the other hand, Catholic authorities claimed in 1961 that some public schools showed evidence of prejudice against the employment of Catholic teachers and that about 90 percent of the public school teachers were graduates of state normal schools, which were under distinct Marxist influence. The influence of these teachers, mainly in rural areas, was responsible, according to the Catholic hierarchy, for the fact that Catholic religious instruction, although prescribed by law, was not offered in a number of rural schools.

Other channels of Catholic influence in education are the various Catholic teachers' and students' organizations, including the Bolivian National Union of Catholic Education (Unión Nacional Boliviana de Educación Católica) which incorporates the Federation of Family Fathers (Federación de Padres de Familia) and the Bolivian Federation of Catholic Educators (Federación Boliviana de Educadores Católicos). During the Catholic National Congress of Pedagogy (Congreso Católico Nacional de Pedagogia) in 1961, these organizations expressed their opposition to the government's policy of signing cultural agreements with Communist countries and to government proposals for educational reform based on methods and practices of certain of those countries, notable Czechoslovakia. Stressing the importance of the role of parents in education, the Congress urged the government to safeguard parents' rights to determine what type of physical, intellectual, religious and moral education is most suitable for their children. This plea tacitly criticized excessive governmental initiative in education—a criticism which has not been confined to Catholic sources.

Although high attrition rates apparently contradict the notion, the attainment of some education is valued by all segments of society. To the lower classes it represents a universal if vague panacea for poverty and other social ills. However, the illiterate or poorly educated tend to regard the high school or university graduate with some distrust. To the slowly emerging urban lower middle class, education symbolizes the means of attaining or at least of emulating the status of the white, moneyed elite.

Wherever facilities are available the rural population has shown great receptivity to education. In the absence of local facilities, many undergo considerable trouble and material sacrifice to send their children to urban areas to attend school. These children later return to their villages as self-styled teachers and give rudimentary primary training to village youngsters. In the areas where *núcleos escolares* operate or where they are in the process of construction, the village councils of elders generally show great interest in the progress of construction and in administrative details. Also, the response of rural communities to governmental appeals for self-help in school construction (notably the furnishing of materials and labor) has been remarkable. To most rural Indians the knowledge of reading and writing is synonymous with education. They have been receptive to technical instruction in modern farming methods and other skills and, unlike their counterparts in some other Latin-American countries, generally have not rejected education which imparts manual skills.

Education is also considered to be the most important single factor in the removal of the social stigma associated with *cholo* status. The term, applied to *mestizos* who have retained some features of rural culture (notably dress) in an urban environment and are engaged in urban economic pursuits, has always carried a contemptuous connotation (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Shopkeepers, artisans or operators of small commercial ventures, the *cholos* represent perhaps the bulk of an emerging urban middle class.

Although their own education is but rudimentary and their wives are often illiterate, they manage in most cases to secure at least some secondary education for their children. A few have succeeded in sending at least one of their sons or daughters to private secondary schools. Second-generation *cholos* with at least 4 years of secondary education have become lesser politicians, civil servants or teachers. *Cholo* teachers take considerable pride in their status. Since nearly all of them attended exclusively urban schools, they communicate in Spanish only and have forgotten their native Aymara or Quechua dialect. Moreover, having been exposed to the overwhelmingly academic curricula of secondary schools, second-generation *cholos* attach great value to a liberal arts education and, unlike the rural Indian, tend to reject vocational training. Teachers who have come from the ranks of *cholos* have been among those vigorously opposing the increasingly technical-vocational trend of proposals for changes in the academic curriculum.

Enrollment in schools, at least in urban areas, is synonymous with initiation into politics. Political activities among students begin at the primary level. It is not uncommon for first or second graders to participate in political rallies and to sustain physical injuries in the process. Organized in the Confederation of Primary and Secondary Students (Confederación de Estudiantes Primarios y Secondarios),

students express their views on subjects involving the full spectrum of national politics as well as many international political and ideological issues.

Political activity is even more intense among university students. The tradition of considering the university years an opportunity to rehearse roles for the political stage rather than to acquire knowledge has remained vigorous among university students. Nearly every student holds membership in one of the many rival student associations which are usually affiliated with one of the political parties. Participation in or organization of strikes, meetings and rallies, and writing and distribution of political pamphlets to express opposition to or agreement with national or international political events are standard extracurricular activities. Organizational and propaganda activities designed to express the student viewpoint in issues involving university autonomy, disciplinary and administrative procedures, or faculty appointments which have political connotations occupy a major part of their time. Since the 1950's, Marxist and Communist influence in student organizations has increased, notably in the Federation of University Students (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios) and in the National Confederation of Students (Confederación Nacional de Estudiantes) which includes students on all academic levels.

Official communications, as well as the press, have traditionally paid tribute to the work of teachers and stressed the importance of their role in society. The MNR government emphasized its reliance on the opinions and advice of teachers in drafting educational reforms. Teachers have made vigorous use of their unions for expressing their views, not only in matters affecting their welfare but also with regard to educational policies concerning the structure and academic orientation of the school system. The National Federation of Teachers (Federación Nacional de Maestros) and the Bolivian National Federation of Catholic Educators (Federación Bolivian de Educadores Católicos) are the two principal organizations representing teachers' interests. The leadership of the former is said to be under Communist political influence, although this influence meets with considerable resistance in the locals of the union.

In 1960–62 the government's plan to emphasize technical rather than academic subjects in the secondary school curriculum was the subject of much debate and controversy among teachers. Some claimed that the transformation of the curriculum reflects a discriminatory trend against liberal arts in general which largely results from the contacts of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts with Communist countries. The same group of teachers stated that while vocational and technical training are undoubtedly of major importance in some parts of the country, notably in the mining areas, the liberal arts curriculum remains essential for the education of an

enlightened middle class. To some extent these views are motivated by concern over job security on the part of secondary school teachers trained in the liberal arts.

LITERACY CAMPAIGN

The legal basis for this campaign is contained in the Code of Education of 1955. Referring to the campaign as a "civic task of national scope," the Code provides for the establishment of a special committee—headed by the Director of Education—to take a special census of illiterates and to plan and coordinate the literacy program. Article 115 provides that in areas where Aymara and Quechua are predominantly spoken, these languages are to be used as a means of teaching literacy in Spanish "as a necessary factor of national linguistic integration." The aim of this method is to facilitate the creation of phonetic alphabets in Quechua and Aymara which should bear as close a resemblance as possible to the alphabet of the Spanish language.

On the basis of literacy surveys which have been partially carried out, the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts released various publications offering theoretical guidelines for literacy instruction and for the organization of local literacy campaigns. On the basis of these guides, departmental and provincial committees were organized to combat illiteracy. No information is available regarding the scope and effectiveness of their work, but it seems unlikely that the campaign reached remote rural areas. Literacy courses were also started in factories and other places of employment.

The government hopes to teach the rudiments of literacy to 60,000 persons each year during the first 5-year period of 1962–71 and to 80,000 each year during the second half of that decade. This hoped-for target, however, should be compared with the actual gain in the number of literate persons—not more than 35,000—between 1952 and 1961.

With a program of its own, the Roman Catholic Church stands in the vanguard of the literacy campaign. Literacy instruction, given by the radio schools of the Maryknoll fathers operating from Peña (near La Pez) and Cochabamba, reaches a considerable number of Indians of the Altiplano. The explanatory texts for the Spanish literacy classes are broadcast by the Peña station in Aymara and those by the Cochabamba station in Quechua. Lectures in history, arithmetic, geography, agriculture, hygiene and religion are interspersed with the literacy broadcasts (see ch. 10, Religion).

The programs are beamed throughout the country by two 1-kilowatt transmitters on the frequency of 620 kilocycles. Reception is by battery-operated transistor radios which cost about $20. The Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere (CARE), the

Inter-American Cooperative Educational Service (SCIDE), the United States Information Service (USIS), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) supply some sets, as well as textbooks and notebooks, free of charge in return for which the stations broadcast public health and agricultural information for these agencies (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda).

Classes are broadcast in the early morning and late afternoon hours. The pupils, ranging from 15 years of age and up, gather around a radio in a small room or building provided by the village authorities or in the house of a person who owns a set. The instructions are broadcast in Spanish and are repeated in Aymara or Quechua. The classes are guided by "auxiliaries," young men between 20 and 30 years of age who offer their services voluntarily and who are chosen on the basis of general reputability and intelligence. The auxiliaries are trained by the Maryknoll fathers to guide the literacy classes and to assume responsibility for the radio receivers, blackboards, textbooks, charts and other teaching aids. They also submit periodic attendance reports and give examinations. In addition to the literacy broadcasts and lectures in practical subjects, the Maryknoll radio-school broadcasts include religious and commentary items which are designed to combat the influence of communism.

In 1961 the Maryknoll radio schools reached an estimated 800,000 Aymara- and Quechua-speaking Indians in the Andean region. The localities reached by the broadcasts included Viacha, Achacachi, Puerto Acosta, Peñas, Guaqui, Pucarani, Corocora and Puno (in Peru).

THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

Administration and Finance

The Code of Education of 1955, which is the legal basis for changes and modifications in the educational system introduced and partially implemented by the MNR government since 1952, reasserts the dominant role of the national government as a policy-making and centralizing body. However, a considerable degree of decentralization exists among the government agencies charged with these functions. The pattern enables these agencies to exercise the limited autonomy which has often been urged in the course of past political debates concerning the system of public education. According to some educators and administrators, this pattern of autonomy has created an unnecessary dispersion of functions and a lack of unity in the entire system, in spite of the presence of a number of agencies organized ostensibly for the express purpose of coordination.

The two key agencies concerned with school supervision are the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and the Ministry of Rural Affairs. The former is in charge of formulating educational policies and of supervising the entire school system, both public and private. It includes an Administrative Department, a Legal Department, a Department of School Building and a Department of Cultural Extension. In 1958–59 a Department of School Statistics was added. This department has considerable potential importance in furnishing data needed by the government and by foreign—notably United States—agencies assisting the country in expanding its public education. The Ministry of Rural Affairs has overall supervision of rural education, including *núcleos escolares*, rural normal schools, departmental secondary schools and vocational schools.

The Council of Educational Coordination (Consejo de Coordinación Educational), an interdepartmental unit is the highest planning and coordinating body dealing with education. Its main function, as defined by the Code of Education, is to ensure the fundamental unity of the system of national education. Among the members of the Council are the Director General of Education, the Director General of Rural Education, the General Inspector of Education for the Schools of the Bolivian State Mines and Petroleum Fields, the National Director for the Protection of Minors and Children and the Director of Vocational Education. Other members of the Council are the representative of the National Council of Universities and the representatives of various ministries which maintain schools under their jurisdiction, notably the ministries of Labor, National Defense, Health and Agriculture. Foreign technicians serve with the Council in an advisory capacity.

The principal agency for the direction and supervision of the technical and administrative aspects of education is the General Directorate of Education (Directorio General de Educación). Although the Minister of Education and Fine Arts is the nominal president of the Directorate, its actual control rests with the vice-president, the Director General of Education. Holding perhaps the most important post under the Minister of Education and Fine Arts, the Director General supervises and coordinates the activities of nine directors of education, in charge of pre-school and primary, secondary, technical-vocational and workers, literacy and adult education, teacher training, physical education, musical, fine arts and Catholic education. Each of the directors supervises an extensive network of offices and inspectorates, and is in charge of the implementation of administrative and technical details. One of the functions of the Director is the planning and drafting of the budget for public education. Within the Ministry of Rural Affairs a separate General

Directorate exists for rural education. Its structure is nearly identical with that of the General Directorate of Education.

For the purpose of local administration and implementation of educational policies, the country is divided into school districts, each headed by a chief (*jefe*). His office (Jefatura de Distrito Escolar) supervises the district inspectors (*inspectores de districo y de zona*). The inspectors are appointed in numbers proportional to the number of schools and the size of the student population. Their functions are grouped according to the level or type of school: preprimary, primary, secondary (including vocational), commercial and professional schools, schools located in the provincial capitals and schools operated by state mining and industrial enterprises. In listing the functions of the district chief and of district and zone inspectors, the Code stresses the importance of close cooperation with teaching personnel, notably in helping the latter in the adoption of new curricula and modern teaching methods.

Although the Paz Estenssoro government has repeatedly stressed its intention of divorcing public education from politics, party loyalty rather than experience in education still decides many appointments in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts. The Director General of Education, however, must be a qualified teacher with at least 15 years of experience and is appointed for a term of at least 4 years. Similar professional requirements exist for chiefs of school districts and for district and zonal inspectors. Although these qualifications are not always met on the local level, their partial enforcement in the directorates has increased the proportion and influence of competent professional men in education. Long-range planning and effective coordination in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, however, is still inhibited by the frequent turnover of appointees as a result of personal and political favoritism.

The Constitution of 1961 guarantees the individual the right to teach but specifies that State Supervision is necessary. Article 190 states, however, that private schools are subject to the same plans, programs and official regulations as public schools and are subject to inspection by the same authorities. Government regulations applicable to private schools provide, furthermore, that 60 percent of their teaching staff must hold teachers' certificates and that the directors of such schools must be Bolivian citizens.

Most educational expenditures are financed by the national government. Since 1954, however, departments and municipalities are required by law to contribute 10 percent of their revenues for school construction, but depressed economic conditions in many areas have prevented the full enforcement of this law. Another law (Law Decree 533, October 27, 1959) provides that parents' and teachers' federations and other civic associations on the community level shall

contribute building supplies and labor for the construction of school buildings.

Although the amounts of the national budget devoted to public education have increased in both percentual and absolute terms since 1956, they are insufficient to cover the needs of the growing number of school-age children and the expenses involved in the envisaged reorganization of the educational system.

In addition to the funds allocated to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and to the Education Division of the Ministry of Rural Affairs, the Ministries of Culture, Labor and Public Health pay for the maintenance of certain schools and subsidize others. For example, the subsidies to Catholic schools are covered in the budget of the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry of Labor pays for breakfasts served to school children as well as for the maintenance of special schools including those for the vocational rehabilitation of the handicapped. The Ministry of Health maintains and operates the School of Nursing. School construction funds and government subsidies to universities are allocated from funds designated to cover "obligations of the state." In 1960, 69,740 million bolivianos—16.4 percent of the national budget—were allocated to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and to the Ministry of Rural Affairs. Adding the amounts allotted to other ministries for the purpose of education, the special schools construction fund (358.6 million bolivianos) and a subsidy of 9.4 million bolivianos to the universities, the figure increased to 84,806 million bolivianos (approximately $7.16 million), or 20 percent of the national budget.

In 1961 the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts was allotted a budget of 91,949 million bolivianos (approximately $7.76 million). Figures for the education funds of other ministries were not available. In 1962 the country's education budget received a considerable boost by a $230,000 grant for rural education by AID. This sum was supplemented by another $300,000 in local currency funds derived from the sale of United States commodities controlled jointly by AID and the Bolivian Government. During the same year AID granted another $250,000 for rural and $600,000 for urban school construction, $200,000 for textbooks and $170,000 for vocational education.

In spite of the increase in the public education budget and United States grants intended specifically for the building of schools, the pace of the school construction program has been totally inadequate to meet the country's needs. In 1962, 90 percent of the schools are still located in rented apartment buildings or buildings which formerly had housed stores. Most of these are poorly lighted and ventilated and have faulty, crowded toilet facilities. Practically none of the rented buildings provide space for gymnasiums, recreational facil-

ities or laboratory space. In the absence of an organized program of school building maintenance and repair for either the government-owned or rented facilities, only a fraction of the school buildings have been improved between 1952 and 1961. According to a government survey in 1961, 431 of a total of 666 public school buildings were in very poor or poor state of repair. According to a newspaper article summarizing educational progress since 1952, 18 new school buildings, including rural *núcleos* were built, and 13 rented premises were purchased by the government. Nearly 2 billion bolivianos were spent on school repairs between that year and 1962. The government's Plan for Economic and Social Development for 1962–71 envisages the building of 324 urban schools and 7,616 classrooms for rural schools as well as 10 technical workshops (*pabellones politecnicos*) with 50 classrooms each.

The inability of the government to provide adequate school furniture and teaching aids as prescribed by law inhibits educational progress throughout the school system. School benches are often totally lacking. In 1956 more than 40 percent of primary school students in the districts of Oruro and Sudeste were without desks. Textbooks, pencils, notebooks, maps and crayons are not furnished in adequate quantities, and most school children lack the means to purchase these items.

Pre-Primary Education

The Code of Education provides for nursery schools (*cases cunas* and *escuales maternales*) for children up to 3 years of age. No information was available in 1962 on the number and location of these establishments or on the number of children benefiting from their services. In accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code certain industrial establishments must provide nurseries for children of employees (see ch. 20, Labor Force). Children from 3 to 6 years of age attend private or public kindergarten (*jardines de niños*). Attendance in the country's approximately 40 public kindergartens is optional and free of charge. In 1956, out of a total of 64,770 children aged 3 to 6, 8,461 (or 13 percent) were enrolled in public kindergartens.

Primary Education

According to legal provisions of the Code of Education of 1955, the compulsory primary school age is from 7 to 14 years of age. In fact, however, the typical median age in the first grade of urban schools is 9 years, although in some parts of the country 17- to 18-year-old first graders are not uncommon. The median age in rural primary schools tends to be higher. Both urban and rural primary schools offer 3 cycles of 2 years each, but their curricula differ in

order to instruct students according to their respective economic and social needs.

Although estimates on the number of school-age children in the 1960's are available, they cannot be related to primary school enrollment figures, for rural and urban areas include many adults attending primary institutions. Thus, in 1955–56 the number of school-age children in the rural areas was estimated at 381,000. During the same period the number of students in rural public schools was 132,167 including adults. According to an official estimate in 1961, 41 percent of the rural school-age population attended school, although indications are that the same qualification must be applied to the term "school-age population" as in 1955–56.

A comparison of recent government estimates concerning urban primary enrollment reveals considerable discrepancies. In 1956 the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts estimated the number of students enrolled in urban primary schools at 172,813. In 1960 another government source estimated urban primary enrollment at 171,895—a lower figure than the 1956 estimate although it included not only school-age children but adults enrolled in primary-school courses and literacy programs. In spite of such conflicting figures, authorities generally agree that the trend in urban primary enrollment is relatively favorable, although about 20 percent of urban children fail to obtain a primary education.

The rate of attrition is exceedingly high throughout the primary school level. Indications are that barely one-quarter of students enrolled in the first year of primary schools reached the sixth grade between 1950 and 1960, although retention improved somewhat during the second half of that decade.

Urban

The majority (586) of the country's 712 urban institutions of primary education are free public schools. Many of the private ones are operated and staffed by the Catholic Church. Other private schools include binational schools sponsored by the United States and schools under Protestant (such as Methodist and Adventist) auspices, although some of these offer secondary curricula as well. In the public schools of large cities and mining towns, school children receive free breakfasts and, in some cases, school uniforms (white smocks). Plans are under consideration to introduce free medical and dental care in the public schools.

The growth of the school-age population in some cities has aggravated the shortage of school buildings and the accelerated deterioration of poorly maintained facilities. Since the revolution of 1952 a growing number of rural families have sent their children to live with urban relatives in order that they may attend city schools. This has created an additional strain on crowded school buildings, particu-

larly in the departments of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Pando. In these localities 40 to 45 children in a classroom are not uncommon. In some cities the lack of school buildings necessitated the introduction of the *horario continuo*—the teaching of different groups of students at various times of day in the same building.

A majority of urban primary students leave school after 1 year of attendance. In 1956 only 25.8 percent of primary school students enrolled in the first grade in 1951 completed the sixth grade. The highest percentage of attrition, or 32.5 percent, occurred after the first year. An analysis of primary attrition for the same period indicates, however, that in some departments, notably Parapita, Beni, Pando, Tupiza and Riberalta, the attrition rate is even higher.

Spanish, history, geography, civics, mathematics, natural sciences, drawing, singing and physical education are offered in the urban primary curriculum. In grades four to six, home economics and child care are added for girls and manual training for boys. Teaching methods are didactic and stereotyped. Pupils learn to copy from blackboards, take dictation or recite by rote. Student participation is not encouraged, and considerable emphasis is placed on obedience and deportment. Although modern teaching methods are used in some normal schools, particularly those supported by United States funds, these methods are practiced on a negligible scale.

Rural

Rural primary institutions numbered 4,801 schools in 1960. This included *núcleos escolares* and their subunits (*escuelas seccionales*)—about 700 small schools not attached to a *núcleo* because of their geographical isolation—as well as about 1,000 private schools operated by Catholic or Protestant missions or maintained by *haciendas* (estates).

Although the response of the indigenous rural population to education has nearly always been favorable and often enthusiastic, many of the students drop out after the first or second grade. Poor health, malnutrition, geographic isolation and the need to begin field work at an early age are among the principal reasons for the high rate of attrition in the rural schools.

Most of the indigenous rural population attend the *núcleos escolares*. Each *núcleo* controls about 15 to 30 *seccional* schools. Duration of the primary cycle in the *núcleos* is 6 years, but most *seccional* schools offer a course of 3 years or less. Many of the *seccional* schools are small adobe huts, often without windows or sanitary facilities. In 1956 a majority of *núcleos* and *escuelas seccionales* were severely handicapped because of the lack of equipment, textbooks and other teaching supplies.

In addition to offering the standard academic subjects on the primary level (reading, writing, arithmetic and language studies) the

rural curriculum placed major emphasis on health education and techniques, rural crafts and industries, health habits, home economics and prevocational courses. However, because of the lack of teachers qualified to give instruction in the practical subjects, the curriculum in many cases was limited to the teaching of the rudiments of literacy and a few academic subjects. Insofar as practical subjects (for example, hygiene) were offered at all, the instruction was theoretical.

During the late 1950's, however, many *núcleos* were improved through the assistance of SCIDE, which was launched in 1944 and financed by United States and Bolivian funds. More than half of SCIDE's budget for rural education is used for equipment and teaching materials intended for classrooms and workshops of the rural schools. To remedy the shortage of elementary textbooks SCIDE has initiated a publishing program of books intended for young and adult pupils of rural primary schools.

Some *núcleos escolares* maintained by SCIDE serve as models for other rural schools. Staffed by SCIDE-trained rural teachers these schools teach practical subjects by demonstration and make wide use of modern visual aids in the teaching of academic subjects. Some of the *seccional* schools have truck gardens, sewing shops and other similar units which contribute to the economic production of the village. A major effort is made by the SCIDE *núcleos* to attract adult members of the community to the school as a source of technical help in the improvement of living quarters and nutrition or for the acquisition of new skills. Some *núcleos* have succeeded in organizing lunch programs, and the food is prepared by parents from supplies furnished by CARE.

The four *núcleos* operated by SCIDE in 1960 were Kalaque, Huarisata, Ucureña and Mineros. The Kalaque *núcleo*, located near Lake Titicaca, a region inhibited by Aymara Indians living mainly by agriculture and fishing, had 30 *seccionales* with 1,221 pupils in 1956. The Huarisata *núcleo* and its 35 *seccional* schools serve as a teaching workshop for graduates of the Huarisata Normal School and is considered to be the country's best rural primary school. The Ucureña *núcleo* in the Cochabamba Valley serves an area inhabited mostly by Quechua Indians. It has 29 *seccional* schools and a total of 1,520 pupils, of which 449 attend the central school. The Mineros *núcleo* is located in a lightly populated part of Santa Cruz. In 1956 it had 11 *seccional* schools with 345 pupils.

A Catholic rural school system called Escuelas de Cristo (Schools of Christ), in existence since 1907, was organized by a Franciscan missionary. Although it enjoys the cooperation of most of the church orders represented in the country, its financial support has been so slight that since the revolution the MNR has undertaken to pay 90 percent of its salaries. In 1961 over 120 schools were

counted under its direction. It is not known to what degree its heavy subsidy has brought national control.

Secondary Education

Secondary education is offered in academic and vocational institutions. The latter include technical, agricultural, commercial and teacher-training institutions and domestic science schools for women. In 1956 there were 130 academic and 74 vocational secondary schools. Of a total of 469,382 persons enrolled in urban and rural schools in 1960, 53,944 (11.5 percent) attended secondary institutions. Of these, 45,333 (84 percent) were enrolled in academic secondary schools.

To enroll in a secondary school students must have completed 6 years of primary education, although some vocational schools accept students with 4 years or fewer or primary training. The government operates the majority of vocational institutions, but more than half of the academic secondary schools are private. Tuition is free in the public secondary schools.

Academic

The traditional association of academic secondary education with social and intellectual prestige and the slow development of vocational institutions account for the popularity of the academic secondary course. But only a fraction of the secondary school students succeed in finishing the top sixth grade of secondary school. Academic failure owing to poor preparation on the primary school level and the need to begin earning wages at an early age force most students to abandon their studies after the first year or two.

The academic secondary course is given in *colegios* for boys and in *liceos* for girls. The private *liceos* and *colegios* charge varying amounts for tuition and board. Some, particularly those operated by the Catholic Church, offer numerous scholarships to students who are unable to cover these costs. The cost of secondary education represents a considerable economic burden to all except the few wealthy students. Even when tuition and board are covered, the absence of a child's earning power imposes a severe economic strain on the average family's finances.

The academic secondary curriculum has been the subject of many revisions. Its encyclopedic, highly abstract content has little if any relation to the everyday life and occupational needs of most students. The 6-year course is divided into 2 cycles. During the first 4 years, general liberal arts subjects are offered, including language and literature, mathematics, civics, history, geography, foreign languages, art, physical education and health instruction. Since 1947 this cycle has also offered 12 hours weekly of manual arts to modify the exclusively academic character of the curriculum. The manual arts

course in *colegios* offers prevocational instruction, including workshop training in such fields as carpentry, electricity and mechanics. However, not all *colegios* are equipped with so-called "industrial departments" which are in charge of organizing the manual arts program. In the girls' schools, home economics and child care replace the manual arts course.

The curriculum of the upper secondary 2-year cycle is adapted to specialization in either the natural or the social sciences, and has a university-preparatory character. Completion of the first cycle leads to the Certificate of General Secondary Education. Students finishing the upper 2-year cycle receive a Certificate of Completion. This terminal certificate entitles them to apply for the diploma of *bachiller en humanidades* (bachelor in humanities) at any university.

A further reform of the secondary school curriculum has been envisaged in 1962 with a view to making more room for technical and vocational subjects and to giving each cycle a terminal character. The plan calls for 3 cycles of 2 years each. General cultural courses will be stressed during the first cycle. The second will be oriented toward vocational guidance, including individual counseling and aptitude tests. The last cycle is to include courses which qualify students to work in jobs on the intermediate technical level, although this cycle also includes college preparatory courses.

Vocational

In spite of the government's efforts to expand facilities for vocational education, enrollment in vocational schools tends to be low. In 1960, 760 students were enrolled in technical, 2,380 in commercial, 2,926 in domestic science and 2,545 in teacher-training institutions. In accordance with the Code of Education of 1955, the Superior Council of Technical Education (Consejo Superior de Ensenanza Tecnica) is charged with adapting the curricula of primary and secondary schools to the requirements of vocational schools, but in 1962 these plans were at best only partially implemented.

Basic and advanced secondary industrial and technical education for boys is given in the schools of arts and trades (*escuelas de artes y oficios*). Two-year courses in carpentry, mechanics, ceramics and related trades are given in the basic course for which the entrance requirement is limited to 4 years of elementary education. The advanced or secondary 4-year course offers mechanics, electricity, metal casting, carpentry and graphic arts. Part of the course, however, is academic and corresponds to the first 4 years of academic secondary schools. Graduates may enter technical institutes attached to universities or may enroll in the terminal cycle of the National Industrial School (Escuela Industrial de la Nacion). The latter was established in La Paz in 1942 and is the center of the government's program of industrial training. During the first year of

the basic 4-year cycle offered at the Escuela Industrial, students acquire the fundamentals of various trades, then devote the next 3 years to fields of specialization. A second cycle of 3 years' duration is open to graduates of the first cycle as well as to graduates of the 4-year secondary vocational program of the *escuelas de artes y oficios* and to graduates of the basic 4-year cycle of academic secondary schools. Advanced technical training and academic instruction are offered during this cycle, graduates of which receive the title of "technician." The Escuela Industrial also operates an artisans' school which offers a 2-year course, open to persons who have completed 4 years of primary schooling. The Industrial School is assisted by SCIDE funds and by personnel trained in the United States under SCIDE sponsorship. SCIDE financed the expansion of the school's building in 1952 and has supplied machines and other equipment for the workshops. In 1958 the School enrolled 600 students and had a staff of 45 teachers.

Schools of domestic science for women (*escuelas profesionales de señoritas*) admit graduates of the 6-year elementary cycle. They offer a 4-year program in nutrition, dressmaking and cooking, in addition to some academic subjects.

Commercial schools (*escuelas comerciales*) admit students who have completed 6 years of elementary school training. They offer 3-year courses for secretaries and bookkeepers and 1- and 2-year courses for typists and stenographers, respectively. Those who complete an advanced 3-year course in commercial training, following the first 3-year cycle, may obtain the title of general accountant (*contador general*).

The first school for vocational training in agriculture was established by SCIDE in 1958 at Muyurina near Santa Cruz. In spite of good equipment and a well-trained staff the school enrolled only 60 students in 1958–59. In 1960 the administration of the school was turned over to the Order of Salesian Fathers.

Teacher Training

Separate institutions train urban and rural teachers. The two largest public normal schools for urban teachers are the Higher Normal Institute (Instituto Normal Superior) in La Paz and the National School of Teachers (Escuela Nacional de Maestros) in Sucre. Both institutions train primary as well as secondary teachers. Departments of music, domestic science, arts, sculpture and foreign languages offer specialization for teachers in these fields. To enroll for the 4-year program for urban teachers, after completion of which the title of *maestro normal* is conferred, persons must have finished the first 4 years of academic secondary schools. The prerequisite for secondary teacher training is the degree of *bachiller en*

humanidades, conferred after successful completion of the 6 years of academic secondary school. In addition, candidates must pass an entrance examination at the normal school.

The 4-year program for secondary school teachers offers specialization in the subjects which the trainees wish to teach, in addition to courses in philosophy, history of education, psychology, teaching methods and pedagogy. After completion of the course a terminal certificate is awarded which qualifies its holder for a teaching position in a secondary school. After 2 years of teaching experience and the presentation of a thesis, the candidates become fully qualified secondary teachers.

The Higher Technical Normal School (Escuela Normal Superior Tecnico) opened in 1958 with a 2-year program for graduates of vocational schools. Persons with teaching experience or some administrative experience in industry may qualify for the teaching of industrial subjects and obtain the title of technical normal teacher (*maestro normal tecnico*) in 6 to 12 months. In addition to the standard subjects taught in teacher-training institutions, the school offers courses on the administration and organization of workshops, industrial organization and workshop teaching methods.

There are seven rural normal schools offering 4-year programs which lead to the title of *maestro rural*. Applicants may enter these institutions after completing 6 years of primary school. In 1955, 166 teachers were graduated. In 1961 the government planned to reduce the number of rural normal schools and convert some of them into secondary schools.

The country's best-known institution for the training of rural teachers is the Huarisata Normal School. The recipient of extensive technical and professional aid from SCIDE, Huarisata has taken the lead in training its students to teach practical subjects which are designed to raise community living standards and to encourage personal habits of cleanliness and good nutrition. On the staff at Huarisata are teachers trained in the United States, and sometimes guest teachers from that country are present. The workshops are well equipped and facilities were expanded during the 1950's. In 1956 the school enrolled 113 students.

The country's teacher problem is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. In fact, the high rate of attrition and consequent low attendance in the upper grades of the school system make for a certain waste of human resources in the teaching profession. On the other hand about 85 percent of the practicing teachers were not certified in 1960. Some rural teachers had but 2 or 3 years of primary education. According to official estimates the number of teachers during that year was 16,904; almost half of these (7,637) were in the field of urban education.

The improvement of teacher training is one of the main objectives of SCIDE. The organization extends technical and administrative aid to three rural normal schools (including Huarisata) and to four *núcleos* which serve as workshops for the training of teachers. To assist instructors and trainees. SCIDE publishes two periodicals, *Educación Boliviana* and *Escuela y Trabajo* (School and Work); it also operates a rotating library for rural teachers.

Because teachers enjoy social standing and general respect the profession continues to attract many high school students and graduates. Salaries paid to teachers, however, allow only poor, often substandard, living conditions. In spite of an increase in salaries in 1957, most teachers in 1962 subsisted on a monthly salary approximately equal to $25—about half of what the industrial and mine workers were earning. According to some teachers, twice the amount would be needed to meet basic living expenses. Teaching in two or more schools in order to increase their income has become standard practice with most teachers in the cities. Positions with private schools are in great demand since their rates of pay are more favorable than those of public schools.

Before the revolution of 1952, employment, dismissal and promotion of teachers depended, in most cases, on their political stand. The job security of teachers improved with the passage in 1957 of a law establishing the National Roster (Escalafón Nacional) which provides that teachers may not be dismissed or demoted except for gross incompetence or immorality. The Escalafón also regulates professional standards and establishes rules governing promotion, transfer and retirement.

Higher Education

In spite of a hallowed tradition of higher education, only a fraction of the population has used the services of the country's seven universities. Indications are that many students of lower middle class, worker and *campesino* (peasant) origin entered the universities since 1952, but no figures are available to indicate the absolute or relative increase in enrollment since the revolution of 1952. Data denoting the proportionate enrollment in various fields of study are also lacking.

The degree of *bachiller en humanidades* is the general entrance requirement for university attendance. However, the Code of Education of 1955 authorizes the National University Council (Consejo Nacional Universitario) to determine the conditions whereby students not possessing this degree may enroll in a university. Also, some of the universities offer technical training on the secondary level which is open to persons who have completed 3 years of secondary education.

University autonomy was granted by the Constitutions of 1941 and 1945 and reaffirmed in Article 195 of the new Constitution of 1961, according to which:

> **The public universities are autonomous and equal in standing. Autonomy consists of free administration of their resources, the appointment of their rectors, faculty and administrative staff, the freedom to draw up statutes and plans of study, the approval of their annual budgets, the freedom to accept legacies and donations, to negotiate contracts in order to realize their obligations and goals and to support and improve their institutes and faculties . . . .**

Article 197 states that "the public universities will be subsidized, as a matter of obligation by the national treasury with national funds . . . ." The Constitution also establishes the universities' obligations in promoting mass education by prescribing that every university is to organize a special institute "devoted to the cultural, technical and social training of the workers."

The seven institutions of higher learning are the University of San Andrés at La Paz, the University of San Simón (also called the University of Cochabamba), the Technical University of Oruro, the University of Tomás Frías at Potosí, the University of Gabriel René Moreno at Santa Cruz, the University of San Francisco Xavier at Sucre and the University of Juan Misael Saracho at Tarija. These institutions constitute a national entity called the Bolivian University.

Each university is governed by a rector in conjunction with a University Council (Consejo Universitario). The rector is elected for a term of 3 years by an equal number of delegates from faculty and student body. The Council is composed of the rector, the deans and directors of faculties and institutes, representative professors from each faculty, a representative of the student body and another for student federations.

University autonomy and the academic freedom of these institutions are a source of national pride to Bolivians. The safeguarding of these rights against government interference is considered by students and faculty to be a personal obligation of the highest importance. The Second Congress of Bolivian Universities in 1958 passed a resolution which denounced Article 187 of the Code of Education as contrary to the principle of university autonomy and, therefore, as unconsttiutional. The Article established a National University Council under the presidency of the Minister of Education and Fine Arts in order to promote the coordination of secondary school and university curricula and to establish policies for the organization of new university faculties and institutes. During the late 1950's, in protest against what was considered governmental interference with university autonomy, several strikes took place, and government troops even entered university grounds. The broad

representative powers of students on governing and administrative bodies of the university has given rise to frequent controversies, mostly politically motivated, between students and faculty. Student representatives on the University Council participate in such functions as the scheduling of classes, appointing professors and adjudicating disciplinary matters. Issues arising between faculty and student delegates on these bodies often end in strikes and demonstrations.

The preoccupation of students with politics and administrative matters and the accompanying propagandistic and organizational activities inhibit academic progress and considerably reduce the number of semester hours devoted to lectures. In 1955 a visiting professor from the United States could deliver only 21 lectures in 6 months because of continual political disturbances on campus.

The University of San Francisco Xavier has faculties of political and social sciences, academies of music and fine arts, and schools of law, medicine, economics, languages and agriculture. The Institute of Bolivian Sociology is also located at this university. The University of San Andrés was the only university in the late 1950's which had a faculty of philosophy and letters. It also had institutes of social, biological and exact sciences. In 1955 San Andrés received $300,000 from the United States to establish a school of public administration. The University of San Simón (Cochabamba) has a school of agronomy. Its Technological Institute also offers a 4-year program to students who completed 3 years of academic secondary training. The University of Oruro specializes in technology. It has faculties of engineering and economics and an Institute of Polytechnics. The latter offers a 3-year technical course to graduates of 3 years of secondary training.

The *licenciado* and the *doctorado* are the most commonly held university degrees. The *licenciado* is obtained after 5 years of study. Seven years of study are required for the *doctorado* in medicine, and also for the title of engineer (*ingeniero*), or civil engineer (*ingeniero civil*). The *doctorado* in law, however, is conferred after 5 years of study and the presentation of a thesis.

In most universities, academic and library equipment are outmoded and inadequate. A visiting professor from the United States who taught economics at the University of San Simón in Cochabamba reported that the economics collection of the library consisted mostly of books on nineteenth century economic doctrine by Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Mill—in addition to a full shelf of works by Marx.

Most university professors are professional men who devote only part of their time to teaching. Inadequate salaries as well as the irregularities involved in the academic schedule have led to this practice. Among students, only few have the financial resources

to study full time. Most of them go to early morning classes at 8:00 a.m., report to their jobs by 9:00 a.m. The 2-hour lunch recess in most businesses provides an opportunity to return to classes at noon. The work day generally continues until 6:00 p.m., after which students return to attend evening classes until 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. Since most students attend school under these circumstances, homework is rarely assigned, and only a few have time and energy left for outside reading.

Relatively few students have opportunities to study abroad and then mostly in the United States. In 1961–62, 205 Bolivians attended United States universities. A majority (148) worked toward undergraduate degrees, mostly in engineering, humanities and the natural sciences. More than half of the students held scholarships granted by the United States Government or religious and other private organizations.

CHAPTER 9

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

The foundation for Bolivian artistic and intellectual expression was laid during the period of Spanish domination. The indigenous culture which existed before the conquest was totally disrupted, and its influence on subsequent cultural developments has, until recently, been purely accidental. During the last 30 years, there has been a strong inclination to find inspiration in local sources, but this has not greatly altered the basic humanistic Hispanic formation characteristic of the entire continent (see ch. 11, Social Values). Within the humanities, Bolivian preference has always been for letters, and it is in letters that the most significant achievements have been made. In fictional literature, poetry and the novel have been the favored forms, while in didactic prose, history, politics and jurisprudence—the major interests of colonial writers—have received the greatest attention. In contrast, the plastic arts, so important before independence, have only recently begun to come out of the long period of inertia which began with the departure of the Spaniards. The musical and theatrical traditions have always been the least significant of the arts and continue with little change in the contemporary period. Scientific activity, never strong in Latin cultures, has been practically nonexistent in Bolivia. What has been done has taken place primarily in the fields of medicine, archaeology and geography. In the twentieth century, Bolivians have become interested in sociology and, more recently, economics.

Although the colonial period conditioned intellectual interests, the social structure it evolved was altered greatly in relation to arts and letters after the revolutionary victory. The change has been fundamental in cultural development to the present time. During the colonial era the elite functioned as patrons, but after independence the *criollo* (Spaniards born in the colony) society, which took over its role of leadership in politics and economics, eventually became not patrons of culture but participants. In the colony the persons engaged in arts and letters had been principally monks, priests and Indian and *mestizo* (Spanish-Indian) artisans trained by the European artists, who, attracted by the opportunities in Upper Peru, emigrated in hopes of finding greater success than they had

enjoyed on the continent. However, in the first half of the nineteenth century, *criollo* interest in arts and letters was obscured by political problems. This break in cultural development resulted in the disappearance of patronage and, consequently, of technical knowledge and skills. A true middle class, from which the artists and intellectuals in Western Europe have traditionally sprung, never developed in republican Bolivia. The result was that the upper class had to look back to the colony or to Europe for models when interest was finally renewed (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Colonial society had always sought to emulate peninsular styles and trends, so the imitation of foreign movements did not begin with the Republic. In painting and architecture, colonial artists had copied the Spanish baroque style, only inadvertently giving it something distinctive. In thought, the eighteenth-century colonial intellectuals subscribed to the ideas of the enlightenment. Although the Spanish influence continued after independence was won, French currents become stronger. The Republic's first artistic and literary movement, romanticism, was imported from France. In the twentieth century, Bolivia has continued to fall under foreign influence with the realist school in the early decades and, more recently, with the indigenous movement which is so similar to Mexican developments.

In spite of the nationalistic attitudes encouraged by the indigenous movement, Bolivians are realistically critical about their past and present cultural achievement. A question which invariably causes concern is whether or not, in fact, a national literature and a national art does exist. Although those who raise this question readily cite the long history ot dependence upon foreign trends, their answer is usually affirmative, based on the fact that Bolivians, because they are Bolivians and not Frenchmen, Spaniards or Russians, have given their own peculiar expression to alien movements they have adopted. Greater emphasis, however, is placed on the future. They feel that theirs is a "culture in formation" which at present is still confronted with numerous problems. Critics charge that one problem has been the characteristic imbalance in the quality of any one writer's work and the superficiality caused by the lack of true vocation or dedication. According to them, few authors have achieved virtuosity in more than one of the forms they employed. Writers also have their complaints. For them, inadequate publishing facilities and, more importantly, the lack of a large interested audience are the issues. The same small group which has produced the country's men of letters has also formed the main body of its reading public. In the arts, although the difficulties in obtaining technical training are not as great as they once were, the situation is still far from satisfactory. Bolivia's most talented and successful artists

continue to study abroad. Even with increased government activity on their behalf, they find the atmosphere at home discouraging.

Typically, the Bolivian intellectual is also a politician, diplomat or journalist. Before the 1952 revolution, he and his family were probably members of the small upper-class group which controlled economics and politics. His interests, therefore, tend to be diverse, and instead of concentrating in one field, he has traditionally espoused the Renaissance ideal of versatility. When he writes, he reveals a tendency toward diversity in subject matter and form as well. If he is a novelist, he has probably also written poetry, short stories, plays or criticisms. This conflict of interests has often made it impossible for him to produce more than one or two works. Few Bolivians have engaged in intellectual pursuits during an entire lifetime; the majority make their contributions at an early age before they are diverted by public affairs and later return only sporadically to their intellectual interests. While the 1952 revolution has worked to bring greater elements of the population into national consciousness, trends in arts and letters still represent the attitudes and efforts of a very small minority as they did in the past (see ch. 11, Social Values).

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

The mineral wealth of the colony gave it an economic and political importance which contributed greatly to its artistic and intellectual development. A large colonial administration, the prospect of financial gain, the opportunity for political advancement and the influx of Spanish priests to meet the spiritual needs of white and indigenous elements, converted the colony into a thriving population center. With this growth in size came the need for the construction of municipal, domestic and religious buildings. In turn, the monumental development of colonial cities stimulated the production of the decorative arts—painting and sculpture. Another aspect of urban growth was the formation of a colonial elite which wished to emulate the life and styles of its peninsular counterpart. Colonial society patronized the arts, participated in them on a casual basis and educated its sons in the university and schools founded by the various religious orders. The Church and its representatives did not limit themselves to educational activities but served with the elite as promoters of the arts by supplying commissions for artists and architects. In literary and intellectual activity the Church was the most important single factor; early musical development also depended upon its efforts.

During the conquest, Gregorian chants were introduced by the priests. With the passage of time, choruses and orchestras were created, led by the choir masters of the great colonial churches in the

major cities. Musical instruments, initially imported from Spain, were soon produced in the colony. In many cases, the missionary program of the Spanish priests resulted in the development of Indian choruses which reached a relatively high degree of technical ability and also incorporated something of their own indigenous music into Western modes.

In higher social circles, musical preference was for pure Spanish styles. The minuet and pavane were danced as were the popular dances like the fandango from which more typically Bolivian dances such as the *cueca* and *bailecito de tierra* derived. Young ladies from the upper classes learned to play the harp, lyre and guitar in the convent schools and, in the absence of theaters or auditoriums where professional performances could be held, their recitals for family and friends constituted the only secular musical programs.

For the general public, musical experience was limited to the religious procession, popular street music, ceremonies held for special political occasions, like the arrivals of important dignitaries, and military marches. Military music was particularly popular, and by the end of the colonial period the bands were often directed by *mestizos* or Indians.

In contrast to the limited musical activity, the cultivation of the plastic arts was very great. Architecture, foremost of the plastic arts, began shortly after the conquest and reached its peak in the eighteenth century. While both Potosí and Cochabamba were important colonial centers, Potosí, the heart of mineral wealth, was the site of the grandest architectural achievements. At first, the architects were Spaniards, trained on the peninsula, but with the passage of time, *criollos* came under their tutelage and later worked independently. Stylistically, the preference was for the more ornate Spanish styles which reflected the colonial desire for elaborate and imposing buildings. The early renaissance plateresque, with its light, intricate superficial decoration, was adopted first, but in the seventeenth century, the period of Potosí's greatest economic power, the more impressive baroque flourished. In 1626 the dike of a large reservoir broke, and the flood did a great deal of damage to the city. The need for the reconstruction of the destroyed buildings created a fertile period for architecture and explains the predominance of the then popular baroque. Although the colonials attempted to copy the grand styles of Spain, the accidental modification by indigenous elements resulted in a distinct *criollo* style. Superimposed on the baroque and plateresque structures, the decorative details clearly show the hand of the Indian and *mestizo* workmen who realized the plans of Spanish and *criollo* architects whose orientation was more purely peninsula. Little is known of the individual Indian and *mestizo* artisans, but the frontispiece of San Lorenzo in Potosí is at-



tributed to the [illegible]zo. Condori. Some portions are [illegible]ric and severe, reflecting the Indian influence, while others of a [illegible]ynamic and tortuous quality, evidence of the *mestizo* love of [illegible] disorder. Other examples of this mixed treatment are the [illegible] of Chuquisaca, the Casa de Monada in Potosí and San [illegible]isco in La Paz.

The sculptural work of the period was limited to religious artifacts, architectural decoration and furniture carving. The artisans, mostly Indians and *mestizos*, were organized into guilds, following the medieval Spanish example. Their work also shows the conglomeration of styles found in monumental decoration. Silver, wood and stone were the most commonly used materials. In the absence of marble, altars and religious articles were usually done in silver. The practice of carving life-sized wooden statues, popular in Spain during the seventeenth century, was also cultivated in the colony. Native ceramics were encouraged by the Spaniards and reached a high degree of quality.

A great deal less is known about colonial painting in Upper Peru, mainly because of the limited amount of study in the field and the absence of cataloguing and classification dating from the period. However, apparently significant schools did exist, particularly in Chuquisaca; Jusepe Pastorelo, a painter and sculptor who worked on the retable of the Cathedral of Chuquisaca is one of the few names from the first half of the seventeenth century.

The blossoming of a truly brilliant school took place in Chuquisaca during the second half of the century with the arrival of Spanish paintings from Seville, especially those of Zurbarán and Murillo. Works from Cusco also made their way to Upper Peru and the characteristics of the Chuquisaca school are, in fact, very similar to those of Cusco. In both there is a love of gold adornments, primitivism in execution and a great use of the iconographic themes of late Gothic painting. The subject matter is predominantly religious, but historical paintings also exist. The outstanding name in colonial painting, Melchor Pérez de Holguín, unknown until recently, comes from this period. In his work, there is a definite influence of the Spaniards, Murillo, famous for his gentle, luminous virgins and children, and Zubarán, painter of mystics and monks.

Although Spanish colonial policy always favored the subordination of culture to political needs, the development of the fine arts was unaffected since there was no source of conflict. Such was not the case with literary and intellectual activity. Yet, despite restrictions imposed by the authorities, literary and intellectual life flourished.

Initially, Protestant ideology was the threat, and the Inquisition, established on the peninsula to combat it, was instituted in the colony as well. While the colonial Inquisition tended to be less rigorous, it

too restricted the sale and production of books on political and religious matters. The suppression of dangerous political ideas became particularly significant in the late eighteenth century with the rise of the Encyclopedists and the American and French revolutions. While colonial intellectuals and writers labored under the handicap of enforced isolation from contemporary European currents of thought and the lack of printing facilities, they did have extensive classical libraries and locally written manuscripts did circulate. Some manuscripts were also published in Spain.

The main literary effort of colonial writers, the majority of whom were monks and priests, was directed toward the production of chronicles and histories. In addition to accounts of post-conquest life and events, much of what was written concerned Inca legend and history. In the absence of native writings, these chronicles offer the only systematic information on the subject. As missionairies, many of the priests learned the Indian languages, and their communication with the indigenous elements was the source for their histories. The resulting combination of fact and legend, while often historically unreliable, retains its literary interest and value. From their contact with the Indians, these missionary writers developed a great deal of sympathy for him and often defended his way of life.

Padre José de Acosta, considered by Bolivians as the first colonial writer, reveals such an attitude toward the Indian in his *Historia Natural y Moral de Las Indias* (Natural and Moral History of the Indies). Knowledge of the Indian languages led some Spanish priests to write valuable grammars and dictionaries of Aymara and Quechua. After the revolutionary period, interest and concern for the Indian was not revived until the twentieth century (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Another important contributor to knowledge of indigenous culture was Garcilaso Inca de la Vega, son of a conquistador, Captain Garcilaso de la Vega, and an Inca princess. Although Garcilaso was born and raised in Cusco, he is claimed by Bolivian letters on the basis that Upper and Lower Peru, in prehistory, were known as Greater Peru. Using his Western education, this talented *mestizo* set down the information absorbed through contacts with his mother's people in *Comentarios Reales de los Incas* (Royal Commentaries of the Incas), which describes the history, sociology and politics of the Inca empire, and *Historia General del Perú* (General History of Peru). As a result of his mixed parentage, Garcilaso becomes the first American man of letters, and he is ranked by critics as one of the best minds of the colony.

The important city of Potosí had its chronicler in Nicolás Martínez Arsanz y Vela, who offers a picture of colonial life in *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí* (History of the Imperial City of Potosí).

The first self-taught Upper Peruvian and also the most outstanding writer of the colonial period, Fray Antonio de la Calancha wrote about the work of his own order, the Augustines, in *Crónica Moralizada* (Moralized Chronicle). A humanist, Calancha, like the other important writers of the period, reflects the influence of neoclassicism and scholasticism in colonial letters.

Not all literary production, however, was limited to history and chronicles. One of the best-known books, Padre Alonso Barba's *Arte de los Metales* (The Art of Metals), summarized and classified all the knowledge of the epoch on metallurgy and served as a primary reference for several subsequent generations. It was one of the few scientific works produced in the country and enjoyed not only a long life but also a wide diffusion. There were also works on law and economics, and one writer, Antonio de León Pinelo, tried to prove that the Garden of Eden had been in eastern Bolivia in his *El Paraíso en el Nuevo Mundo* (Paradise in the New World). Unfortunately, a great deal of colonial writing has been lost, as testified by frequent references in existing works to writers apparently well-known in the colony, and much still lies buried in the archives of America and Spain.

In addition to producing the most outstanding writers of the period, the Church and its representatives were also responsible for colonial education. While the Church was in favor of the Inquisition, it did not agree with all the political restrictions legislated by the colonial administration. Unlike the authorities, it felt that more than a minimal education was necessary and desirable and began founding schools. The Jesuits, well-known for their independence, were the most active in this area and crowned their activities with the establishment of the Universidad de San Francisco Xavier at Chuquisaca in 1624. Intellectual life revolved around this university, and its influence extended beyond the confines of the colony. Located in the same city as the powerful Audiencia de Charcas, which held dominion over the area comprehending all Spanish territory south of Lake Titicaca, it became the most important intellectual center in lower South America, attracting students with both political and scholastic ambitions from all over the region.

Although seventeenth-century Europe was producing great philosophers stimulated by the intellectual change brought about by the Renaissance, the University of Chuquisaca was ignorant of this activity. Its studies in philosophy centered around the Aristotelian doctrines of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which, with courses in the humanities, theology and jurisprudence, formed the basis of its curriculum. The Thomism taught at the university had been modified by the interpretation of Suárez, especially in the areas of politics and law. Suarist contributions included such ideas as royal subordination to law and the justice of regicide in cases where popular rights were

transgressed. This thinking became useful to revolutionaries at the turn of the nineteenth century as an ideological basis for the justification of their actions (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the ferment of ideas had reached its peak. A particular set of circumstances had conspired to produce this situation. The University of Chuquisaca had fallen into discredit because of the decadent and outmoded scholasticism which was the foundation of its educational process. In 1767 the Jesuits were expelled, and with their departure the teaching of pure Thomism returned. A great deal of intellectual vitality had disappeared with the Jesuits. At the same time, many prohibited books begain to find their way into Alto Perú, bring in new ideas from Europe. Among the professors and students, there was a great desire for freedom to study these ideas, stimulated by the thought of a Spanish rationalist, Padre Feijoó and later, the Encyclopedists. Through the works of Padre Feijoó, Upper Peruvians caught a glimmer of the ideas of Descartes and the great physicists of the Renaissance. During the more liberal reign of Charles III, a greater freedom was allowed, permitting some of the works of the Encyclopedists to enter the colony. While Padre Feijoó's writings had stimulated interest in new ideas and introduced a certain restlessness and anxiety in the minds of intellectuals, the Encyclopedists were responsible for stirring up revolutionary spirit. Their ideas, the ideas of empiricists and naturalists against tradition and authority, were quickly associated with and absorbed into earlier doctrines of Suaristic Thomism. Especially popular was Rousseau's *Social Contract*, the most influential work in Bolivia.

With the ascent of Charles IV (1788–1809) to the throne, conditions became more repressive than even before. The subsequent conflict created a very explosive situation. In this period, three archbishops stand out as writers and thinkers, San Alberto, Moxó and Villarroel. San Alberto, a Spaniard who became archbishop of Chuquisaca in 1785, although a monarchist, was aware of the turbulent atmosphere in academic circles and recognized the need to educate people politically. He declined to attack the revolutionaries directly, but wrote the *Catecismo Regio* (Royal Catechism) in which he dealt with the monarchical system and attempted to justify it on theological grounds. Moxó, also a local supporter of the monarchy, subscribed to the encyclopedism and scientific rationalism of the enlightenment and influenced the revolutionaries greatly with his advanced social and philosophical ideas. The third archbishop, Villarroel, expressed politically more radical views. In his *Gobierno de los Dos Cuchillos* (Government of Two Knives), he strongly criticized the Spanish system. Another writer of the period, the Spaniard, Victoriano de Villava, introduced the Indian question. In favor of more enlight-

ened treatment of the Indian as well as greater participation in government by *criollos*, he advocated reform for Spain and the colonies in an effort to avoid the violence which he felt the ideas of the time encouraged. The center of debate and discussion was the Academia Carolina, the law school of the University of Chuquisaca. The faculty and student groups who held secret meetings there inspired the revolutions of May 25, 1809, and July 16, 1809, in La Paz. Although Bolivia was the last South American country to achieve independence, intellectually—through the groups centered around the University of Chuquisaca—it had been a forerunner. Bolivians are proud of the fact that the first declaration of complete independence from Spain originated in their country in 1809.

THOUGHT, LETTERS AND ART IN THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD

The Early Years

From the activity of the colonial period, Bolivian artistic and intellectual life lapsed into a period of inertia which lasted until the latter part of the nineteenth century. With the departure of the Spaniards, the country became preoccupied with national consolidation and was more isolated than ever before (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Politics and political entanglements were dominant in early republican life, distracting those who might have devoted their efforts to intellectual pursuits. Free to think as they chose but without a solid tradition in philosophical speculation, the first generation found themselves temporarily at a loss and retreated to the safety of university dogmatism. As a reaction to traditional thought associated with colonial status, sensualism, utilitarianism and rationalism were championed by the heirs of the revolutionaries. Literary activity was limited to the production of pamphlets and small publications concerned with the issues of the day.

A few of the early governments tried to stimulate national culture. By official decree, Sucre had made Destutt de Tracy's *Idéology*, based on the principles of the French *Encyclopedia*, required reading in the secondary schools, and Simón Rodríquez, who had spent a considerable length of time in Paris, set up a model school which was to inaugurate the transformation of society by education. Both efforts were of short duration. José Ballivián's administration also attempted to give impetus to cultural affairs.

At that time the national theater appeared. Although the populace showed little concern for the names of playwrights or acting companies, a few of which were Bolivian but trained by a Frenchman, Carlos de Lamberti, the performances were well received. In 1833, Santa Cruz had offered large bonuses to any foreign musicians who

would come to the country and take on at least two disciples, but it was not until 1845, under Ballivián, that one did arrive, the Italian, Benedetto Vincenti. In the same year he wrote the Bolivian national anthem. Ballivián had also provided special housing for the military musicians whose stirring marches continued to be the most popular musical expression in the country. After these official endeavors came nearly 30 years of rule by the *caudillos bárbaros* who were no more than military adventurers and warlords and showed no concern for cultural affairs.

Around mid-century the ideological climate in Bolivia changed greatly. During the late eighteenth century the enlightened rationalism of the Encyclopedists had been quickly adopted to political needs and was compatible with the atmosphere which prevailed during the first decades of the Republic (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). As Bolivians settled into independent national life, the old ideas became outmoded and unnecessary. The popularity of the schools of spiritualism and eclecticism and the return to traditionalism were repeated in the country with a reanimation of the Church and a greater prestige for Catholic thinkers. Eclecticism, more a method for the selection of ideas from a wide variety of sources than a philosophy in itself, enjoyed great acceptance and diffusion in Bolivia.

This period marks the appearance of the first artistic and literary movement in the country, romanticism. While the Spanish influence was not lost, the French was by far the stronger. Largely imitative, the work produced in this style is significant, with few exceptions, from a historical point of view alone.

The greatest attention has been given to literature, primarily because the period initiated the cultivation of forms previously ignored or nonexistent in national letters. Romanticism was not confined to the realm of arts and letters, however; it found its political counterpart in *los rojos* (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government). In fact, the movement's first manifestations were in political oratory and poetry. Political oratory in Bolivia, as in other Latin American countries, was a popular and frequently practiced art. Its importance in the nineteenth century is evinced by the fact that Vaca Guzmán's literary history—published in the 1880's—devotes a whole chapter to it. Although the country was not completely lacking in poets during the first half of the century, poetry became the most widely cultivated literary form with the advent of romanticism. Quantity did not mean quality, however, and of the many poets produced during the period, only Ricardo José Bustamante is notable.

Of far greater significance was the novel, which made its first appearance in national letters with the romantics. In the indigenous literature there had been no form similar to the novel; during the colonial epoch, Spanish works were read, but not imitated by the

criollos. Bolivian historians always mention Bartolomé Mitre, an Argentine refugee who wrote a romantic novel in 1847 during his stay in the country, but the first novel written by a Bolivian, Sebastián Delanze, did not appear until 14 years later. Delanze's novel, a superficial copy of the French style, was followed by a number of equally imitative and undistinguished works whose authors, in accordance with the romantic tradition, preferred exotic, faraway settings to the national scene. It is noteworthy that during the long period of romanticism, a period which encompassed 15 presidents, a shift from Conservative to Liberal rule and two wars, nothing of Bolivian reality is reflected in the fictional literature. On the contrary, the novels and poetry produced during the period, with their mood of idyllic serenity, offered sharp contrast to the political disturbances which characterized national life.

The romantic spirit, with its interest in evoking the past, gave rise to the historical novel. Nataniel Aguirre's *Juan de la Rosa*, set in the Independence era, is an exception to the general rule of low quality and is regarded by many as the first Bolivian novel in the sense that its subject matter was specifically Bolivian. For this reason, Aguirre is called the father of the novel in Bolivia.

In addition to being a novelist, Aguirre was one of the playwrights whose work represents the beginning of the national dramatic tradition. During the colonial period, dramatic representations had been almost exclusively religious in theme and technically very simple. While there was some original work, in general, what little was performed had been imported from Spain. There is some confusion as to which was the first play written in Bolivia, but many cite *Odio y Amor* (Love and Hate) by the sentimental poet Reyes Ortiz which was staged in 1859. Early theatrical development faced many obstacles, and politics, the constant antagonist of intellectual activity, often worked to its detriment. In 1877, Hilarión Daza, President of the Republic and the last of the irresponsible *bárbaros*, held a riotous party in the municipal theater of La Paz. Apparently the use of theaters for nontheatrical functions was not uncommon for, according to Angel Salas in his description of theatrical activity of the period, the theater was turned over to "any unscrupulous impresario who turned it into a low-class dance hall." There was also a lack of performers and of an interested public large enough to give support sufficient to maintain those involved. Most of the dramatists did not limit their talents to writing for the stage or even to literary pursuits. Aguirre, for example, was first a novelist, then a playwright and also a vigorous political orator closely associated with the founding of the Liberal party. For the majority, the lack of concentration in any one area meant that proficiency was achieved in none.

The static conditions of the early republican period was even more obvious in the plastic arts. Painting, the first to emerge after the war years, was the most widely cultivated, although it never approached the dimensions that the form had enjoyed during the colonial era. The school, which had reached its height with Melchor Pérez de Holguín and had been continued during the eighteenth century, was without followers at the turn of the nineteenth century and disappeared. However, early republican works still showed a preference for the old religious themes. Gradually, historic scenes and portraits, particularly of national heroes, began to appear. As in most young countries, there was a growing desire to set down the national past and its protagonists on canvas; in style, these paintings imitated the stiff, sterile styles of European "official" art. During the second half of the century, a kind of romanticism, which differed from the European mode in its somewhat patriotic fervor, arose to displace classicism. While religious themes were still in evidence, portraits were now predominant.

Architecture, the crowning achievement of colonial plastic art, fell into a decline from which it has still not recovered. The few major buildings that were completed in the early years of independence had been begun a number of years before and continued the colonial styles. Throughout the century, architecture was imitative; it followed the European periods of classicism and French romanticism, and showed Italian influence in religious structures and academic effect in civil works. Without the extensive monumental activity which had characterized the colonial era, sculpture deteriorated greatly. Most of the sculptural work dating from the nineteenth century was imported from France and Italy.

Beginnings of National Consciousness

Romanticism, which continued well into the twentieth century, lasted longer in Bolivia, perhaps, than in most other Latin American countries. However, after defeat in the War of the Pacific in 1884, new attitudes developed and with them a generation which found romanticism unrelated to its interests. Bolivians, made conscious of their nationality, wanted to explore realistically and systematically the various aspects of their own country. The old traditionalist, eclectic and spiritualist philosophies, which had so adequately complemented the romantic literary and artistic trend, now rejected, could not provide a suitable ideological context for these new goals and attitudes. Consequently, they took up the more practical, humanistic positivism, which had already spread to the rest of Latin America. With its predilection for science and belief in the power of man to shape his future through the application of scientific method, the philosophy generated a spirit of optimism and practicality which

was quickly adapted to politics by the more progressive elements. At the same time there were still those who favored a more traditional, conservative policy.

These divergent attitudes stimulated the creation of Bolivia's first political parties based on doctrine instead of personalties. Positivism came to form the ideological base of the Liberal Party and, therefore, became closely associated with the ensuing campaigns between the two factions (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 12, Constitution and Government). It quickly became a popular philosophy among educated elements of the population. Since the naturalist and sensualist ideas of the Encyclopedists had not been lost despite the intervening period of eclectic and spirtualist inclination, positivism did not represent a totally new way of thinking. Another factor which contributed to its rapid acceptance was its relatively simple and easily assimilated doctrines. During the period of Conservative-Liberal conflict, vigorous debates arose which were sustained not only in political oratory, but also in editorials and essays. The church also became involved in the polemics, since the positivists (who generally coincided closely with the Liberals), with their "scientific, naturalist inclination" were anticlerical. The founder of the Conservative Party and President of the Republic, Mariano Baptista (1892–96) and the Archbishop of Sucre, Miguel de los Santos Taborga, were principal figures in the fight against positivism and the Liberals. The Liberals did not limit the expression of the "new ideas" to political debate and newspaper polemics, but sought to diffuse them through groups and societies. In Sucre the positivist element, strongly combative, was headed by Benjamín Fernández, a university professor who succeeded in changing the spirit of the university there with his positivist doctrine.

Politically, the triumph of positivism came after the Liberal revolution of 1899. The ensuing 20-year period of Liberal government was characterized by mild social reforms (which did not profoundly change national life) and increased commercial activity (which complemented the materialism and practicality of positivism). However, despite its relative simplicity as a philosophy, positivism remained largely an intellectual concern which never directly involved the main body of the population (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

The inclination of the postwar generation towards national themes, which was to increase consistently, although not without its occasional challengers, and the manifestations of a growing cultural interest marked the real beginning of Bolivian arts and letters. The shift in orientation and increased activity did not, however, constitute a complete or immediate transformation. After years of inertia, broken at last by romanticism—an important movement—Bolivians could not

suddenly duplicate the activity of the colony, based on a long period of evolution and tutelage from Spain. The new interests were held only by the same small group which had always controlled economics and politics.

While all areas of artistic and intellectual expression felt some influence of the new attitudes, development was not equal. The arts continued to play a subordinate role to letters. They more than any other area of artistic and intellectual life, felt the lack of a continuous tradition. Writers did not suffer such great handicaps. In method and style, European authors, particularly the French, continued to provide models. The university had been an intellectual center during the colonial era, but the decadence, which had begun to characterize university instruction in the last years before the revolution, continued in the nineteenth century. Consequently, with the exception of those trained in foreign institutions, the artistically and intellectually active were self-taught.

Such was the case with a group of writers, working in the spheres of journalism, science and the humanities, whose common goal to explore Bolivia, past and present, united them loosely in a school which Fernando Diez de Medina has called the Indagadores or Searchers. Their didactic prose was the most notable literary product of the period between the War of the Pacific and the War of Acre in 1899. Some chose to deal with the traditions, customs and way of life of the country in reaction against romantic poetry and novels which still constituted the great body of fiction; others dealt with national history and jurisprudence, the natural sciences, geography, geology and archeology.

Outstanding in the group was the historian Gabriel René Moreno, generally regarded by Bolivians as the greatest writer the country has produced. Before the War of the Pacific, René Moreno had attempted negotiation with Chile on behalf of his country, and for failing to settle the differences which led to the war, he was accused of being a traitor. Embittered by the unjust accusation, René Moreno went into self-imposed exile in Chile where for many years he held the chair of literature at the Instituto Nacional. Although his name was later cleared, he never forgave the insult to his loyalty. The bitter, strongly critical attitude which pervades his work had its origin in his unfortunate political involvement. René Moreno dealt with sociological analysis, political criticism and biographical study, but his most significant contribution was in the field of history. His *Los Ultimos Días Coloniales en el Alto Perú* (Last Days of the Colony in Upper Peru) is the best work done on that period which is favored to a high degree by Bolivian historians and writers. In addition to a generally critical attitude towards Bolivia, one of the most notable characteristics of René Moreno's work is the strong prejudice against the Indian. He

was a native of Santa Cruz, whose homogenous population was extremely proud of its pure Spanish heritage. For him, the indigenous inhabitants of the country were of no value, and the pre-Hispanic past was completely negligible. While Bolivians reject René Moreno's negative attitude towards the Indian and his colonial mentality, they respect his great contribution to national letters and have honored him by giving his name to the university in Santa Cruz.

With the Indagadores, the first literary history appeared in the 1880's written by Santiago Vaca Guzmán. Scientific activity was stimulated by the efforts of Augustín Aspiazu, another outstanding contributor to national studies, who wrote on the natural sciences, medicine, jurisprudence and economics. He was also prominent in some of the numerous cultural and scientific societies that began to appear in the last two decades of the century. Through these organizations, one of which bore his name, Aspiazu was able to spread the liberal doctrine he expounded.

A few of the societies put out publications, and there were also unaffiliated literary and cultural magazines like Daniel Sánchez Bustamante's "*La Revista de Bolivia*" in Sucre. This period also saw the rise of musical organizations like the Haydn Society of La Paz, the first group devoted to the cultivation of classical music, the Philharmonic Society of Sucre and the Academy of Military Music in La Paz. In the early years of the twentieth century the establishment of societies and magazines increased. With the lack of adequate publication facilities and the absence of university leadership in the realm of arts and letters, these institutions and periodicals filled a need of professionals and amateurs alike. Many, dominated by the personality of their founders, had only short lives, but they did reveal the desire to increase artistic and intellectual life in the urban centers.

The investigative inclination which began with the Indagadores continued in the first decades of the twentieth century, but prose fiction and poetry also reappeared as important literary elements. Two parallel currents tended to work simultaneously during the period. In the novel, social realism was dominant, and in poetry the most outstanding work was done by the modernists. An atmosphere which seemed to promise change prompted novelists to voice their criticism and propose reform. Receptive to the realist school of Europe, they began to describe city and country life from a social point of view. In 1911 the problem of the miners was first introduced in Jaime Mendoza's *En las Tierras de Potosí* (In the Lands of Potosí). A later work, *Páginas Bárbaras* (Barbarous Papers), dealt with the rubber collectors and life in the northeastern part of the country. One of the best novels to come out of Latin America in the early twentieth century was Armando Chirveches' *Candidatura de Rojas* (The Candidacy of Rojas) which concerns rural political life. Of the

six novels written by the country's most prolific novelist, the "Bolivian Gorki," as Rubén Darío called him, the *Candidacy of Rojas* is undoubtedly the best. A theme which was to become paramount in subsequent years, indigenism, was initiated in the Bolivian novel with *Raza de Bronce* (Bronze Race) by Alcides Arguedas in 1919. One of the few writers known outside the country, Arguedas later turned to historical and sociological themes, as in *Vida Criolla* (Criollo Life) and *Pueblo Enfermo* (A Sick People), critical studies of city life at the turn of the century. In his own time, Arguedas' novels were well received, but today his criticism is considered too harsh.

The continuing Indagador school was also susceptible to sociological and indigenist material. Prehistoric culture was described in Belisario Díaz Romero's *Tiahuanacu*, while Bautista Saavedra wrote on Indian sociology in *El Ayllu*. Rigoberto Paredes also took up the question from the cultural viewpoint in *Mitos, Supersticiones y Supervivencias Populares de Bolivia* (Popular Myths, Superstitions and Survivals (from ancient customs) of Bolivia). The scientific work begun by Aspiazu was continued in archaeology by Arturo Posnansky. Bolivia's losses in the War of the Pacific prompted writers like Eduardo Diez de Medina and Daniel Sánchez Bustamante to discuss international questions and national maritime aspirations and rights.

Social realism was a tendency which encompassed all Latin America and the period saw the beginnings of intercontinental influences, but the most impressive literary development in the continent was modernism. Although inspired by French symbolism, modernism was Latin America's first original contribution to international literature. With its emphasis on physical beauty, exotic settings, sensuous vocabulary and universalism, modernism represented the antitheses of realism. In Bolivia, its outstanding cultivators were Ricardo Jaimes Freyre and Franz Tamayo.

Jaimes Freyre, well-known throughout the continent, was one of the earliest modernist poets, having founded, with Rubén Darío in 1894, the *Revista de América* (American Review), spokesman for the movement. Three years after Darío published his *Prosas Profanas* (Profane Prose), considered the first manifestation of the movement, Jaimes Freyre's *Castalia Bárbara* (Bold Castalia) appeared. During the liberal reign he was in Argentina, but with its demise he returned to Bolivia where he held the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education and represented his country in diplomatic missions in Washington, Santiago de Chile and Rio de Janeiro.

Tamayo, although less well-known outside the country, holds a more exalted position at present, probably because of his admiration for the Indian. Tamayo, caught up by the modernist inclination toward the use of remote, exotic themes, was also inspired by ancient Greece as

Jaimes Freyre had been by Norwegian folklore. Like Jaimes Freyre, Tamayo was also involved in politics and fulfilled the duties of Minister of State, parlamentarian and diplomat. In addition to poetry, Tamayo occasionally wrote prose works. One of his best known and most important contributions was *creación de la Pedagogía Nacional* (Creation of the National Pedagogy), the best analysis of the Indian and *mestizo*. Although realism never became a popular literature, it stimulated a more widespread interest, while modernism remained the possession of a very small cultured minority.

Between Two Wars

After World War I, attention was not so heavily concentrated on social themes and national interests. In Europe and North America, the postwar period produced radical new movements in art, literature and philosophy which stemmed from a degree of frustration and disillusionment and a search for escape, originality or purpose. This was the period of "isms" with wide divergence in artistic tendencies and ideological orientation. In Bolivia there was something of this spirit, although the intensity and scope were, quite naturally, not nearly so great as in areas where the war had had a direct affect.

Philosophical attitudes diversified particularly with the fall of the Liberals from power and the corresponding decline in the popularity of positivism (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Although modernism had never created a systematic philosophy, it had encouraged interest in foreign currents and continued to do so after the war when reception was more favorable. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, before the Chaco War, Marxism won adherents in intellectual circles, where a logical explanation of Bolivian history was sought in dialectical materialism. Marxism's social concerns also struck an appealing note for those who were interested in the problems that had inspired the realists. Interest was initially aroused by writings produced in Argentina and Peru. The Aprista Party in Peru was another influence; in 1927 one of its writers, Manuel A. Seoane, published *With the Left Eye Looking at Bolivia* which discussed the problems of the Indians and the privileged position of the mining oligarchy. After 1930, popular editions of the works of Lenin, Bukharin and Plekhanov, published in Chile and Argentina, circulated widely in Bolivia. After the Chaco War, many Marxists left their speculative phase and became associated with political factions.

Intellectuals and writers continued to make the most significant contributions. The writers who emerged at that time formed the so-called "generation of 1925," more through a coincidence in time than through any stylistic or thematic affinity. Each went his own way, borrowing whatever he found useful from past or contemporary schools. Spiritually the "generation of 1925" was probably chrono-

logically closer to modern currents than Bolivia had been since the colonial era. For them, the desire was for a break with the past, universality and escape, instead of the "Bolivian reality" which had attracted the Searchers. Typically, few outstanding or lasting writers appeared in the period, but the increased activity and variety in direction served to animate postwar intellectual life. The majority soon gave up their literary efforts for careers in politics, journalism and diplomacy, fields which had always appealed to Bolivian writers and intellectuals. One exception was Gustavo Adolfo Otero whose essays and novels dealt with history, sociology and criticism. Two of his outstanding works are *Figura y Carácter del Indio* (Figure and Character of the Indian) and *La Vida Social del Coloniaje* (Social Life of the Colony), which with René Moreno's *Los Últimos Diás Coloniales del Alto Perú* (Last Days of the Colony in Upper Peru), give the best description of the period.

The postwar era also saw the rise of intellectual groups, one of which was the Gesta Bárbara in Potosí. Composed of active but secondary writers, it represented an intellectual upsurgence rather than a particular movement. One of the few general characteristics of the group was a strong tendency to limit itself to the Bolivian scene, in contrast to the broader choice of interest of many of its contemporaries. Evidences of intense nationalism in literary circles increased in the late 1920's, finally exploding after the Chaco War. Most of the members of Gesta Bárbara soon became absorbed in public affairs, but Carlos Medinacelli, initiator of modern criticism in the country, was the exception. Medinacelli's novel, *La Chaskanahui* (Starry Eyes), and Antonio Díaz Villamil's *La Niña de sus Ojos* (The Apple of His Eye), were the best *cholo* narrations written in Bolivia. Díaz Villamil was the most productive talent of the generation; in addition to novels, he also wrote didactic prose, history, short stories, criticism and plays. A great many plays were written by the "generation of 1925," but Díaz Villamil was the only dramatist who continued in the profession. Most of his dramatic works concerned national problems or interests.

The stimulus for this increased theatrical activity came from Ateneo de la Juventud (Youth Athenaeum), a group which appeared in 1922. Organized primarily to protest the lack of organization and effective contribution of the country's intellectuals, the Ateneo felt that the state of "collective culture" might be improved by bringing intellectuals together. This manifesto was followed by the penetration of members into diverse cultural centers of the country. Under the influence of the Ateneo, groups with more specific interests were formed. One was the Ateneo Femenino (Women's Athenacum), the first women's organization with intellectual goals. Its activities were politicocultural in nature and concentrated on raising the level of

culture of the Bolivian woman and campaigning for woman's suffrage. The stimulation which the Ateneo de la Juventud had given to the theater resulted in the formation of the Sociedad Boliviana de Autores Teatrales (Bolivian Society of Playwrights) It was their wish to promote drama, improve the economic status of artists and create a real national stage art. Many of the numerous productions reached the stage, but few were ever published. In theme, they generally tended toward national or local subjects with a popular flavor, but there was still some interest in social problems and moralizing. Although the young dramatists were technically not equipped to produce works of lasting value, their efforts represented the animation of a form which previously had enjoyed few periods of cultivation. Other organizations such as the Centro Génesis whose limited membership was divided into the areas of arts, letters and sciences, the Centro Intelectual Augustín Aspiazu and the academies of language and history were also created at this time.

Information on development in music is extremely difficult to find, but it is known that two dance academies were founded in the period. Events in the plastic arts were of much greater significance. There had been a few small private academies, started in the first decade of the century by artists like Avelino Nogales and Elisa Roche de Ballivián, advocates of the realist school which had succeeded romanticism in painting as well as in literature. However, the scope of these schools and technical abilities of the directors were limited. Then, in 1926, the National Academy of Fine Arts was founded. For the first time, young Bolivians with artistic talent were able to find professional technical training in their own country, even though that training was in styles outmoded by European standards. The academy's first professors were Alejandro Guardia, Humberto Beltrán de Oliveira, both sculptors trained in the European classical tradition, and the French painter, Henri Sène. Professional sculpture, long ignored, had finally reappeared about 1918 with Urrias Rodríguez. Although the two sculptors had studied abroad, they were not influenced by the new trends which were revolutionizing the form. By bringing together a group of young people who were eager to revitalize the plastic arts, the National Academy laid the foundation for a new Bolivian school. Under the tutelage of the painter Cecilio Guzmán de Rojas, director in 1930, the students found a leader who established the direction the arts would take in subsequent years.

CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS: 1932 to 1962

Artistic Nationalism

The young generation of artists was moved by the same spirit which was shaping writers, intellectuals and musicians—artistic nationalism. Their desire was not just to deal with Bolivian subjects as literature

since the Indagadores had done, but also to create something distinctly Bolivian in form. While the scholarly approach was continued, there was an increasing tendency to exploit national themes for their own sake, particularly in the fine arts. Social themes, introduced by the realists of the first 20 years of the century, came into great prominence, tempered by the revolutions in Mexico and Russia, the intellectual Marxism of the twenties and the internal economic state of the period. The Chaco War, brought together many elements of the population and contributed to a better-defined sense of national identity. The Bolivian defeat was seen as the culmination of the shortcomings of the old order. In an atmosphere of frustration, discontent and political instability, the postwar generation envisioned a new Bolivia, wrought by social reform, whose particular character would emerge with the spiritual and artistic return to the indigenous. Foreign trends were simply of no consequence, except when related to national interests. In the discovery and exaltation of indigenous folklore and folk art, the appearance of Indianism, regionalism and indigenism and the cultivation of social themes in literature and painting, Boliva has, however, closely paralleled developments in twentieth-century Mexico. However, the intensity and wide acceptance on all social levels of these movements in Mexico has not been characteristic of Bolivia. While sentiment was strong, it was still limited generally to the younger generation of the same small group which had always produced the country's artists, intellectuals and writers. Their work should be seen more as a reflection of the atmosphere of the period than as a militant force for change. With a few modifications, the trends they set have continued into the contemporary period and compliment the aims of the 1952 MNR revolution.

In literature, the post-Chaco generation can be said to form a school only in its common preoccupation with the indigenous. The variety and diffusion typical of the eclectics persisted in the subsequent movement. Introspective and critical, the young writers tended towards a realism expressed in rugged and brutal language, somewhat reminiscent of French naturalism. In form, they prefered the short story, novel and essay, although poetry was not completely abandoned. After publishing one or two books, many either turned to newspapers or periodicals or stopped writing altogether, for a great deal that emerged from the Chaco experience was the product of young ex-combatants who without the necessary technical skills or real literary motivation, were moved to set down what they had seen and felt. While Bolivian critics feel that a definitive work on the war is still to be written, several notable novels and collections of short stories appeared in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Inspired directly by the war, they nevertheless indicate the thematic direction literature would take after the conflict itself ceased to be a source for creative produc-

tion. Surprisingly, these novels and short stories expressed no animosity towards the recent enemy, but instead preached a general hatred of war. A strong autobiographical current, as seen in Augusto Guzmán's *Prisionero de la Guerra* (Prisoner of War) and Jesús Lara's *Repete*, was also typical of the majority. A suggestion of the Indianism that was to become an important aspect of artistic nationalism is reflected in *Sangre de Mestizos* (*Mestizo* Blood) by Augusto Céspedes. In addition to expressing the common pacifist tendency and criticism of the government in power during the war, Céspedes gives the *mestizo* ethnic factor an important role in his work. The poet, Oscar Cerruto, emphasized the social drama, developing the theme of Indianism from the consideration of the rise of the Indian to his full power. With the use of the geography of the sierra for political and philosophical projections, Cerruto, among others, indicated another trend for postwar literature. The physical nature of the Chaco apparently impressed the Bolivians considerably, for it figures prominently in a great many war novels and stories. A great interest in national geography developed in the period following the war, which gave rise to regionalism and, consequently, *costumbrismo*, the portrayal of customs and daily life in a given city, town or region. The poets, in particular, turned to regionalism; Otero Reiche in Santa Cruz, Campero Echazú in Tarija and Jesús Lara in the Cochabamba valley.

Geography, important in its own right, was also linked to man. The *mística de la tierra* (mysticism of the land) philosophy, which developed in the period, was based on the principle that man's natural surroundings produce a fundamental effect on him, and make him different from those having another physical environment. For those who held the belief, the great Andes were capable of inspiring Bolivians to new initiatives as they had in the pre-Hispanic past. They claimed that all Bolivians felt the power of the national landscape, and that their disassociation from it was a prime cause for the spiritual ills of the nation. The land was to be the new basis for the Bolivian spirit. Such a philosophy revealed a desire for national individuality and for a basic solution to national problems.

One of its foremost adherents was Roberto Prudencio, an art history professor at the University of La Paz. After the war he helped found a short-lived nationalist group, Estrella de Hierro (Iron Star), but his most significant accomplishment was the creation in 1939 of the literary magazine, *Kollasuyo*, which he intended to be the spiritual expression of the country in which essayists, critics and authors would have a forum for cultural nationalism and indigenism. Prudencio's most characteristic concept was the "feeling of the land" manifested in individuals and collectivities. Another proponent of *mística de la tierra* was Fernando Diez de Medina, author, critic and politician. In

1943 he founded the Pachakutismo Party, moderately nationalistic in ideology, whose initial campaign was against the tin magnates. Under the MNR government he became Minister of Education, with ample reflection of his views in an official cultural magazine, *Cordillera*. Diez de Medina is one of the most prolific contemporary Bolivian writers, achieving his greatest success in literary criticism. Although he has never formulated a systematic philosophy, he attributes a spiritual function to the land, considering it a source of esthetic, ethical and religious profundity. Indianism often becomes an adjunct of *mística de la tierra* since the indigenous inhabitants have always lived closest to the land. Diez de Medina's *Nayjana*, which won the National Grand Prize in 1951, is permeated with this sympathy and concern for the Indian. In his most recent work, a collection of essays on national concerns entitled *Bolivia y su Destino* (Bolivia and Her Destiny), which came out in June 1962, he continues to display interest in the Indian. In addition, he offers an evaluation of the MNR government after 10 years and a discussion of his departure from the party.

Politically, intellectual nationalism also had its effect. Since few Bolivian writers limit themselves to their literary activities and invariably have some contact with public affairs, their ideas have often helped to form or modify the political ideology of their particular parties. The postwar atmosphere encouraged the growth of less traditional groups and parties. Most counted among their founders or members intellectual elements of the new generation. Baldivieso and Botelho Gosálvez, one of the leading talents, were socialists. Augusto Céspedes and the critic Carlos Montenegro were members of the MNR and José Antonio Arze, Ricardo Anaya and Arturo Urquidi belonged to the Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario (Leftist Revolutionary Party—PIR), a Marxist group. Arze, a candidate for the presidency on the PIR ticket and backed by the Bolivian University Student Federation, was the undisputed leader of militant Marxism who translated several books dealing with the communistic sociology of the Incas and also wrote original works on sociology. Anaya, a professor of law at Cochabamba and the most dynamic of the Marxists, was author of the PIR program. His political thinking is best delineated in *Nationalization of the Mines in Bolivia* (1952). Rector of the University of Cochabamba since 1946, Urquidi has succeeded in imposing a Marxist ideological orientation on that institution. The works of the MNR's Céspedes and Montenegro are saturated with political doctrine and purpose. Céspedes' most recent work, *El Dictador Suicida* (The Dictator Self-Destroyed), published in 1956, is a nationalistic, revolutionary interpretation of the last 40 years of Bolivian history. The nationalism and socialism expounded by these various groupings

becomes a political indigenism, complementary to the conditions of the period and politically expedient.

Philosophically and esthetically, indigenism represented a reaction against modernism which sought inspiration in remote and exotic sources. Some aspired to the rebirth of indigenous culture and a rediscovery of ancient wisdom, while others adjusted the indigenist cult to the contemporary scene by looking for indigenous values in present reality, studying the ways of the Indian and copying his art. Carlos Medinacelli's *La Chaskanahui*, a novel of provincial customs, and *Estudios Críticos* (Critical Studies), an outline of literary indigenism, reflect this kind of interest. Jesús Lara also took up the indigenist theme in *Surumi*, which describes the social problem of the desolation and misery of the Indians, and in *La Poesía Quechua* (Quechua Poetry) the first systematic study of indigenous literature. Few Bolivian writers have been able to escape some aspect of indigenism.

Social themes, revolving principally around the problems of the Indians, miners and other lower class or rural elements, were vigorously cultivated in the 1940's and, with indigenism and politics, form the major emphasis of contemporary literature (see ch. 11, Social Values). Authors rarely take a purely sociological or an expository position; instead they combine protest and political orientation with fact and creative fancy. Sympathies always lie with the economically downtrodden, with the blame placed on traditional institutions or custom. People and landscape, within the social context, are the focal point. For example, Fernando Ramírez Velarde's *Socavones de Angustia* (Caverns of Anguish) deals with the *campesinos* and miners in the Cochabamba valley, while José Fellman Velarde takes up the exploitation of the Aymaras before agrarian reform in *La Montana de los Angeles* (Mountain of the Angles). When the social problem is general in locale, there is usually a politically propagandist tone. In cases concerned with specific areas, the inclination is toward regionalism.

The persistent trends of indigenism, regionalism and socialism, however, are not without their critics. In recent years, there have been those who feel that the concentration on national problems and aspects has created too limited a viewpoint. While they do not advocate the abandonment of Bolivian themes for foreign literary trends, they do suggest the need for a more universal approach. Criticism has also been leveled at the technical quality of national literary production and the seriousness of purpose of its authors. Many write for superficial or ulterior motives, but those with talent too often leave their writing careers after producing only one or two books. Simultaneously, critics tend to come to the defense of national letters, pointing out that theirs is a "culture in formation." Without a large and receptive public, writers are unable to support themselves by their art,

they acknowledge, and many must seek publication by foreign firms. Abroad they receive the monetary remuneration and recognition lacking at home.

Criticism itself has received greater attention in the last decade. Until the publication of Fernando Diez de Medina's *Literatura Boliviana* (Bolivian Literature) in 1952 and Augusto Guzmán's *La Novela en Bolivia* (The Novel in Bolivia) in 1955, the only major treatment of literary criticism and history was that done by Enrique Finot in 1943. A few essays and scattered references in more general works existed, but interest was apparently slight.

In 1953 the first Bolivian history of modern plastic arts was published, Villarroel Claure's *Arte Contemporáneo* (Contemporary Art). Guillermo Francovich's *El Pensamiento Boliviano del Siglo XX* (Twentieth-Century Bolivian Thought) also came out of this period. Francovich, the first in the country systematically to approach the history of ideas, also reflects the more universalist tendency. It is his belief that there is a new movement in the realm of ideas which is striving towards a more profound intellectual activity and a broader philosophical base. Although the modern European currents have not stimulated great interest, the group of writers and professors which comprise the "new movement" are concerned with a philosophy of life, values, culture and history not restricted by national borders.

The plastic arts have followed much the same course taken by literature. With Guzmán de Rojas and his students, artistic life was regenerated. Following his lead in the development of works inspired by indigenous elements, the new school sought to create a national art. After initial study at the National Academy, the majority perfected their techniques abroad, principally in the United States and Europe. Until this time, painting had been limited almost exclusively to oils, but with foreign experience, many artists began to do water colors, wood cuts, etchings and prints. Sculptors learned new techniques and were influenced by more modern trends. In subject matter, however, artists consistently used native themes, such as the Indian, the Bolivian landscape and local customs. Their work began to appear in foreign exhibitions, winning various forms of recognition. In many cases, however, artists used indigenism as an end in itself and the art movement suffered as a result.

Of all those dedicated to the exploration and exaltation of native themes, Bolivian critics hold the initiator, Guzmán de Rojas in the highest esteem. After studying at the Academia de Bellas Artes San Fernando in Madrid, the artist returned to Bolivia to exhibit for the first time in 1929. In 1930, he became the director of the National Academy. Rigoberto Villarroel Claure, Bolivia's most prominent art critic, considers Guzmán de Rojas the most "vernacular" painter in Latin America and feels that in this way he surpasses the famous Mexi-

can muralists. In his art, he did not merely copy reality but attempted to create "plastic equivalents." It was he who introduced the increasingly popular decorative art of muralism to the Bolivian scene. Guzmán de Rojas' contributions are not limited to the works he produced or to the leadership he exercised; he also developed a process for restoring colonial paintings and discovered the country's greatest colonial painter, Melchor Pérez de Holguín.

Two followers of Guzmán de Rojas, Marina Núñez del Prado and Hugo Almaraz, were responsible for re-establishing the importance of sculpture. None of the plastic arts had suffered more from the lack of technical training and public interest. While sculpture has not, during the last three decades, achieved the prominence of painting, it has made great advances. Never since the colonial era has it received so much attention. Like the painters, sculptors have felt the need to study abroad; both Marina Núñez del Prado and Hugo Almaraz have studied in the United States. Indigenous themes were the initial inspiration for both, but Almaraz has since concentrated on funereal pieces. Emiliano Luján, who appeared later, has taken over the monumental work in the country.

Since the late 1940's and early 1950's a new tendency has appeared on the artistic horizons. Like many writers and intellectuals discontented with the limitations of indigenous themes, the younger generation is seeking a more universal approach. Their desire is not merely to imitate international trends, but to create their own art within them. The "independents," a group which began in 1947, emphasize technical execution and the freedom of the individual to employ whatever influences interest him. They feel that art should be separated from political and moral values. Within this group there is a degree of artistic resentment based on what is felt to be an inadequate appreciation of the artist and a lack of understanding about him. For this reason many have left the country, believing that they can find wider acceptance and greater financial gain abroad. Modern art collectors do not exist in Bolivia, and commissions in the country, therefore, come from organizations or government institutions. Although recently an increasing number of joint and one-man shows has been held, these have not been primarily for the purpose of sales.

More contentment is probably felt among artists who deal with social themes, because they find more opportunities to sell their work. This subject matter is concentrated in mural art which, although not exclusively a product of the present generation, has come into prominence with it. The Ateneo group, organized by Wálter Solón Romero in Sucre, is noteworthy. Strongly influenced by the Mexican school, the work of its members is largely imitative and criticized in this respect by Bolivian and foreign authorities alike.

Abstract art, which has received attention in recent years, is considered to be more original and of greater technical skill. The first abstract show, held in 1953, caused quite a furor. While abstract painters represent a minority in an already small group of practicing artists, it is the newest artistic orientation in the country. The European schools of surrealism, cubism and expressionism find their best reception in this group, although there is no Bolivian exponent of any of these movements.

The other arts have not received the same stimuli felt in painting and sculpture. Architecture, of such great importance in the colonial period, continues to receive little attention. Students interested in architecture can find only inadequate training in the country. Buildings constructed in recent years reveal some awareness of twentieth-century developments, but the modern touches are imitative and superficial. Economics is fundamental in the lack of significant monumental activity.

Bolivia's musical tradition has never been strong, but the indigenous movement did product an effect. Interest was aroused in Indian music, and popular *criollo* songs were the source of inspiration for many compositions. Attempts were made to set down existing musical folklore in written form or on records. Eduardo Caba (1890 to 1953) was one of the few Bolivians whose musical efforts were of a serious nature. At the age of 32, he began technical studies in Buenos Aires. At first Caba was a folklorist, but finding this approach unsatisfactory, he adapted elements of the indigenous musical tradition to Western techniques, expressing the Indian character instead of merely copying it. Although Caba was a prolific composer, only 14 of his compositions were ever published. Jaime Mendoza Nava, the most significant contemporary composer in the country, also spent long periods in both Europe and the United States and has used the same general approach as Caba. In the performing arts, Bolivia's only contribution has been the violinist, Jaime Laredo. Since the discovery of his unusual gift at the age of 8, Laredo has been studying abroad. Foreign soloists who have given performances from time to time and the Symphonic Orchestra of La Paz, created by Supreme Decree in 1945, dominate the serious music in the country. Musical preference apparently continues to be for popular songs and dances.

Government Activity in Cultural Affairs

Since the 1952 revolution, there seems to be a greater attempt to diffuse the nation's folklore and to stimulate cultural activity, but great obstacles still exist. One of the principal problems is the low educational level of the majority of the population. Another is the lack of funds and resources to implement programs of a cultural nature in view of the great needs in other more immediate areas of nation-

al development. The upper class has never shown any real sense of responsibility in cultural and artistic philanthropy, although individuals within the class have made minor efforts. The result is that if cultural activities are to be made available to the general public, their source must be official. In fact, what has been accomplished has come principally from the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, the Municipal Councils of Culture in La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro, and the universities. The Ministry has been most active. It has established a number of institutions to study and promote the arts, national folklore, archaeology and science. The old Tiahuanaco Museum, famed for its excellent collection of pre-Colombian pieces, has been taken over by the Ministry, and a National Museum of Art has also been created. On the local level, the Municipal Cultural Councils maintains museums, sponsor music and dance festivals and, with the Ministry, hold annual art salons. Of the institutions of higher learning, the University of San Andrés has been the most active. Bolivians are proud of the Institute of Cosmic Physics of Chacaltaya it supports, as well as study centers in art and geology. The universities have also been working with experimental theater, but as in most of their other efforts, success has been undermined by political involvement which, in some cases, notably in Cochabamba, has been fundamental in limiting official funds. By ministerial resolution, the MNR government also created the Center of Archaeology which conducts excavations and then exhibits and publishes information on the findings. Publishing facilities, long inadequate in Bolivia, have been increased by the government. The Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and the National Office of Information have sponsored cultural magazines and published collections of modern works and national classics. Smaller publishing activities have been maintained by the municipal councils and universities.

CHAPTER 10

RELIGION

In the Hispanic tradition, Bolivia, like the rest of Latin America, is predominantly Roman Catholic. Nominally, 93.9 percent of the population profess this faith; the remainder includes Protestants and a very small number of immigrants from the Near and Far East who may have retained the religious briefs dominant in their nations of origin. There also are relatively small Jewish groups in all the larger cities, each of which maintains its own congregation. In the literature about the country, virtually no material is devoted to the religious affairs of any minority group except the Protestants.

On the other hand, much has been written about religion as practiced by the Indians, which, since they comprise about two-thirds of the population is not necessarily disproportionate. In addition, the large Indian sector is a contributing factor to the distinctive aspects of Bolivian Catholicism, for in this great portion of national society, Christianity has been fused and confused with religious cultures which existed before the conquest. Despite these deviations from and distortions of the orthodox faith, which until recently have been the object of only minimal, or at best, moderate concern, no differentiation is commonly made in Church statistics. Yet from the standpoint of actual practice and belief there is a cleavage between the Indian and white Catholic. The *cholos* occupy an intermediate position, generally espousing orthodox Catholicism, but often borrowing various beliefs or practices from indigenous tradition. To a limited extent, therefore, their religious behavior is characterized by an interaction between two religious cultures, as is the case to a more highly developed degree, with the Indian, but not with the Hispanic element.

White or Hispanic Bolivians generally share in the attitude toward religion characteristic of Latin America as a whole. Although Latin America owes its Roman Catholic heritage to Spain—notoriously conservative and orthodox in its religious views—in modern times, Catholicism as practiced in these countries has been of a particular nature. With some exceptions, Latin Catholics see their religious commitments primarily as compliance with the outward forms required by the Church. Neglect of religious duties and deviation in daily life from certain moral principles embodied in doctrine are met generally with a considerable degree of tolerance (see ch. 11, Social

Values). In most cases, as long as the individual professes to be a *creyente* (believer), he enjoys the acceptance, though perhaps not always the complete approval, of fellow Catholics, who make up the society in which he lives.

Within the Latin American context, the Bolivian Church has been considered weak in its explicitly religious role and particularly in the nonreligious sphere. This was not always the case, for in the greater part of the colonial period, the Church occupied a position of prominence in both areas. Since the latter half of the eighteenth century, secular influences which resulted in action unfavorable to the position of the Church gradually, but persistently, undermined the weight of its opinion in civil matters and modified a social order which had been strong in its religious orientation. Particularly in the twentieth century, the tendency on the part of government has been toward a greater separation of church and state. There has been no government interference in religious affairs, however, nor any great evidence of anticlericalism as a result. Most Bolivians are apparently not militant Catholics, but they continue to respect and support the Church in its religious function, if not as a major force shaping everyday existence.

During the last 10 years, the Church has demonstrated increasing awareness of its own weakness and has sought to strengthen its role in national society by instituting or expanding programs designed to stimulate greater spirituality among the faithful and more extensive practical involvement of the Church in daily life. Programs with the latter goal most frequently take the form of social action since activity in this area has been given great importance and attention by the government and the people (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). Recognition of the particular need of eastern areas has developed, but concentration of institutions and personnel continues to be in the highlands. To date, the entrance of the Church into social action has not been on a large scale, probably because of lack of funds, personnel, and, in all but charitable work, experience. Important help has been extended by foreign missionary and financial aid groups, with the encouragement of the Vatican, which has expressed concern on the state of the Church throughout the continent. Evaluation of what has been done is difficult, for these projects are still in the initial stages. However, it seems probable that despite good intentions and a more enlightened, modern approach to social problems, the Church will not be able to compete with government action in scope or popularity.

THE CHURCH IN HISTORY

Early Missionary and Welfare Activity

The Roman Catholic Church became a powerful and influential force in political, economic and social life in Bolivia, as in all Latin

America, soon after the conquest. Its dominion and strength were largely promoted by the Spanish kings, who saw themselves not only as rulers of a sovereign nation, later expanded into an empire, but also as Europe's most ardent secular defenders of the faith. One of their foremost concerns after the discovery of the New World was the conversion of the native inhabitants to Christianity. Missionaries were invariably present in the expeditions after the initial voyages. The conqueror of Bolivia was accompanied by six padres who established the first Christian community in 1535 near the present city of Oruro. With the founding of the city of Charcas (later to become Sucre) as the seat of authority for Upper Peru, missionary work had a center in the area. As early as 1540, four religious houses had been established there. A few years later, with the establishment of Potosí, a city which grew rapidly in importance and size, the center of missionary activity shifted. By 1552, it was considered necessary to divide the diocese of Cusco in two, creating the new diocese of La Plata to govern the religious affairs of the rapidly expanding upper colony. The extensive missionary effort, carried out through the instruments of the *encomienda* in the highlands and the rural settlements established by priests throughout the country, eventually brought the majority of the Indians under the influence of the Church and served as the fundamental colonizing force in the eastern lowlands (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

In addition, the Church and its representatives performed the valuable service of organizing and administering educational and charitable institutions. Shortly after the conquest, primary schools were set up around the convents, parish churches and chapels. After the expulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century, the municipal governments shared the responsibility of administering primary education equally with the Church, but the Church schools continued to be the best. Bolivia's colonial university was also the result of Church initiative and only fell into decadence with the disappearance of the Jesuit influence (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). In the social sphere, the Church acted as chief promoter of arts and letters and maintained its traditional role of protector of the poor, sick, orphaned and aged. In the broader sense, the Church closely touched the lives of all society since that society was the child of a culture more medieval than modern, which had not yet been strongly affected by the liberal influence which were reshaping northern Europe.

Church and State Relations

Colonial

While the Spanish kings placed great importance on the spread of Christianity and the development of social institutions in the colonies, as astute politicians, they realized the necessity of conserving their

power in the vast western realm. The Church of Rome was a potential competitor, which, if allowed to act independently, might one day challenge their authority. In Spain a system of partial civil controls over the Church had evolved during the Middle Ages; this system was expanded in the colonies to a much greater degree through the institution of *real patronato* (royal patronage).

Through a series of papal bulls promulgated in the last decade of the fifteenth century and the first decade of the sixteenth, the Spanish kings were granted the exclusive privilege of Christianization of the Indians, the tithes and first fruits of the churches in the Indies and universal patronage over the Church. The latter meant the right to "present" or select candidates for all church positions from archbishop to parish priest. In practice, the rulers of Spain were directly involved with the selection of only the more elevated positions, leaving lesser ones to their representatives, the viceroys, presidents and subordinate officials.

By the end of the sixteenth century, civil control and administration of patronage were consolidated, and no major changes occurred during the rest of the colonial period. The movement of ecclesiastics both to and from and within the colonies was subject to official permission. Also, the erection of churches and cathedrals, the establishing of new orders, as well as the convening of councils and the introduction of papal bulls and pronouncements had to be approved first by the Crown, the Council of the Indies, or colonial governors.

Clearly, Spain had great power over ecclesiastical affairs and united church and state in the colonies more completely than it had been able to in Europe. At the same time, Spain assumed great moral and financial responsibility. The entire monetary support and administration of the colonial church was in its hands, and this responsibility was carried out fairly in most cases. In fact, the Pope's inability to finance the Christianization of America was the major factor in the decisions in favor of Spain. There is also evidence of great concern for the standards and practices of the clergy expressed by their secular benefactors.

While it is true that civil authority over the Church and its dignitaries was great, the Church exerted considerable influence in its spiritual function and its economic power. In addition to property, religious buildings and funds acquired through tithes, fees, inheritance and the sale of papal bulls, the wealth of the Church was increased as a result of its role as "colonial banker." By extending loans or mortgages to the landed aristocracy (also holders of high political positions) and by investing church funds in real estate, it eventually had complete or partial ownership of most of the large estates of the colony. The Inquisition and the religious services performed by the Church, instruments through which great moral pressure could be

brought to bear, provided another means of influence. Thus, church and state, while closely aligned, possessed considerable power and influence over each other. Conflicts arose, but the general attitude was one of mutual appreciation and support.

If the Church had felt any serious dissatisfaction with colonial rule as it had existed almost from the time of the conquest, conceivably it might have championed the cause of the revolutionaries at the beginning of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, it remained loyal to the monarchy and has in fact been rightly called an "effective force in prolonging the rule of Spain." In the issue between royalists and revolutionaries, the Church stood to gain more by preserving the old order than by contributing its support to the new. The Inquisition, initially of purely religious purpose, later also became a political instrument by which colonial administrators sought to suppress the entrance of more liberal ideas which would undermine the political structure of the colony and the social atmosphere (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression; ch. 2, Historical Setting). Members of the hierarchy spoke out to the faithful against the revolutionary cause, and the bishop of La Paz, R. de la Santa, went further, excommunicating and organizing armies against the patriots. Church support was also financial. Although the hierarchy and vast majority of ecclesiastics favored the royalist cause, there were instances of revolutionary involvement on the part of Catholic priests from the lower ranks. Among the *criollo* clergy, there was some resentment because of discrimination against them in favor of ecclesiastics born in Spain, since all the high positions were generally filled by *peninsulares*.

Although the revolutionaries borrowed much of their thinking from the Enlightenment in France, anticlerical attitudes, prevalent during the French Revolution, were not in evidence in Bolivia. Objections were made to the economic power of the Church and to the low moral quality of many members of the clergy, but religious discontent was not a factor in the revolution.

Republican—Preservation of the Old System

At the constitutional convention which was convened in 1826 after the winning of independence, an important issue concerning religion arose. The secular delegates desired the preservation of the powers of *real patronato* which would allow the new republican government to control the Church as the colonial administration had done in the past. Hoping to bring the restricting institution of *real patronato* to an end, the Church and its representatives and supporters argued that the patronage had been expressly recognized as a privilege of the Spanish kings and could not be inherited by a state which did not exist as a political descendant of the peninsular monarchy. To the dismay of the Church, the principles of *real patronato*, called *patronato nacional* by the delegates to the convention, were incorpo-

rated into the Constitution. The Senate and President in the new republican system would exercise the functions previously administered by the Spanish monarch and his representatives. With the exception of *patronato nacional*, a number of the framers of the Bolivian Constitution favored separation of church and state, in accordance with the ideology of the French Enlightenment. Chief among them was Bolívar, whose plan of the Constitution, sent to Bolivia from Lima, carefully avoided all mention of religion, with the exception of the article dealing with *patronato nacional*. The Assembly accepted Bolívar's provision for *patronato nacional*, but rejected his ideals of religious freedom and the separation of church and state by including an article stating that Roman Catholicism was the religion of the state, to the exclusion of all others; that the government of Bolivia would protect the Church and insure its respect; and that the presidents of the country would be required to profess the religion of the state. The numerous constitutions which followed did not essentially change the nature of the religious provisions of the Constitution of 1826, although in 1871 freedom to practice other religions in future colonies, presumably in the eastern lowlands, was granted. It was felt that prospective immigrants, finding the previous article objectionable, would not come to the largely unpopulated regions to the east.

The Pope did not officially recognize the assumption of the powers of *patronato nacional* by the Bolivian Government, but had no means of effectively nullifying the Bolivian decision. To Bolivia the lack of papal recognition constituted an affront to national sovereignty, and in 1851, Andrés Santa Cruz, who had been the President of Bolivia from 1829 to 1839, was sent to Rome to negotiate a concordat which would iron out the differences between La Paz and Rome. At a special assembly called by the President, the concordat was rejected because it curtailed the rights of the *patrono nacional* (the president of the republic). A later attempt was made to improve relations with the Vatican but failed more completely than the first.

The Bolivian Government also quickly demonstrated that it would tolerate no interference from the national clergy. In the 1820's, decrees and resolutions restricting the activities of the Church were published but many were later repealed. A real conflict arose over a law passed during the administration of José Ballivián (1841–48) which required a civil oath of all ecclesiastics and reiterated Bolivia's inheritance of all rights and concessions made to the Spanish monarchs. Despite protests, acceptance was inevitable.

With the ascent to power of the Liberals, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Church suffered more distasteful legislation. In contrast to the conservative opposition which stood for the preservation of the status quo in church-state relations, the Liberals

favored the separation of church and state, freedom of worship, lay education and civil marriage. While they did not achieve a total separation during their rule, they did succeed in secularizing the schools, which put education under the control of government; repealing ecclesiastical autonomy in civil and penal matters; repealing the chapter in the Penal Code which dealt with crimes against the state religion; instituting the freedom to practice publicly other religions; and requiring civil marriage. However, Roman Catholicism continued to be the state religion and as such enjoyed a privileged position and the financial support of the Bolivian Government. The liberal ideas of the governments in power during the first 20 years of this century were not a source of concern for the great majority of the Bolivian people, who in all probability would have been content for relations between state and church to remain unchanged.

In the 1930's, after the demise of Liberal rule, the situation remained essentially the same. The Church continued to receive some financial support, although government funds went only to prelates and chapters of cathedral churches while previously parish priests had benefited also. The Church had legal title to possession of its property, which, although by law tax exempt, in practice was taxed. Taxes were also levied on the income from church properties, but this was in accordance with civil legislation. In relation to politics, modifications had abolished the requirement of religious tests for the exercise of political rights and the holding of public office. Clerics were prevented by the law of municipal organization from holding office on councils, but were permitted to become national deputies or senators if elected.

THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

Church and State

In the Constitution of 1938, some new articles on religion were included which reappeared in subsequent constitutions up to the present. The general article on the state religion remained the same, but churches and orders were conceded the same rights, obligations and limitations as those of individuals; ecclesiastics were required to declare their income and property before assuming office; and the right to give religious instruction in private schools was expressly recognized. Only four years later the Peñaranda government, by supreme decree, re-established religious education in public schools, exempting only non-Catholics from such instruction. Bolivian Catholics attribute this action to the agitation of the Church and its lay groups.

In addition to the reiteration of the articles first expressed in the Constitution of 1938, the Constitution of 1961 introduced a major innovation, which was the elimination of the articles dealing with

patronato nacional. The government no longer reserves the right to select major church officials nor to approve conciliar decrees, briefs, bulls and rescripts emanating from the Pope. By this measure, Bolivia took a great step in the separation of church and state and relinquished a privilege still held by most other Latin American governments. However, the Constitution states that the country still "recognizes and upholds the Roman Catholic apostolic religion," though practice of other religions is permitted. Bolivia's most recent budget (1961) indicates that the Roman Catholic Church continues to receive financial support through the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. The majority of the funds are designated for subsidies to Catholic organizations, primarily schools and scholarship-giving groups and for the salaries of high-ranking members of the hierarchy. Total expenditures by the government amounted to $72,006 or a little less than 0.2 percent of the 1961 budget.

Relations between the Catholic Church in Bolivia and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), the government party, are officially cordial. Unlike many revolutionary parties—for example, those of Mexico or Cuba—the MNR has not adopted a strong anticlerical position. It continues to recognize the Roman Catholic Church, extends it some financial assistance and makes sure that a high-ranking member of the hierarchy is present at important official functions and the ceremonial openings of government projects, such as dams, highways and bridges. The Church has expressed a position of noninterference in politics and supports the social reforms of the government, although as a declared adversary of communism it is highly critical of what it considers leftist tendencies in the country. While it maintains satisfactory relations with the government party, the Church looks with greater favor upon the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC), a small party organized since the 1952 revolution, and the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), which before the advent of the Social Christians was considered by the Church to be the only party which represented the Christian tendency in politics. Students who are members of FSB or PSC university federations are also in many cases active in the lay organization Catholic Action. The Church also points to various incidents, such as the stoning of the office of its daily newspaper in La Paz, *Presencia*, as an example of unofficial government harassment. On the other hand, *La Nación*, the official voice of the government party, and individual MNR members have been openly critical of the Church, associating it with the social order of the past. Accusations have been leveled at members of the hierarchy for alleged support of revolutionary attempts, but both the Church and the government have officially denied them.

Roman Catholic Church

Organization and Hierarchy

In ecclesiastical divisions as in other spheres, there is a split between the highlands and the eastern lowlands. The two archdioceses of Sucre and La Paz, the two prefectures nullius (the lowest level of major ecclesiastical division) and four of the five dioceses—Cochabamba, Tarija, Potosí and Oruro—are all located in the western section of the country. The city of Santa Cruz is in the lowlands, but since it is in the eastern extremity of the diocese which bears its name, the major portion of that diocese also falls in the highlands. Regarded as missionary territory by the Church, the lowlands are divided into six apostolic vicariates, the boundary lines of which do not follow those of the political divisions. In the older western area, the diocese boundaries correspond to those of the departments, except in the case of La Paz, from which the two prefectures are taken.

The hierarchy which governs the Church in Bolivia includes two archbishops, five resident bishops, three auxiliary bishops, three prelates nullius and six titular bishops and apostolic viscars. The prelates nullius and the vicars are emissaries of the Pope and, as such, are directly responsible to him rather than to the bishops. As the Vatican and Bolivia exchange diplomatic representatives, there is also a papal nuncio in La Paz. There are a surprising number of foreigners in the hierarchy: one archbishop, two of the five residential bishops and all of the apostolic vicars. It is also noteworthy that the regular clergy (belonging to and subject to the discipline of the various religious orders), has a much greater representation than the secular or diocesan clergy (subject to the direction of the bishops). Presumably, most of the more elevated positions in the Church are held by members of the upper classes. The Bolivian hierarchy has remained generally within the realm of religious affairs and consequently does not figure importantly in other areas of national interest, contrary to the situation in some of the other predominantly Catholic Latin American republics.

Clergy

The condition of the clergy reflects the relative weakness of the Church and is a major contributor to its present state. In a country with an area which exceeds 412,000 square miles, there are only 734 priests to serve a population of over 3 million. The decrease over the last 15 years in the numbers of the secular or diocesan clergy, which is predominantly Bolivian, and the extremely high drop-out rate of the country's four seminaries suggests that the appeal of a religious vocation is weak. It is estimated that only 3.6 out of every 100 seminarians are eventually ordained. Although no detailed data are available, it is probable that the great bulk of candidates for the priesthood

come from the lower socioeconomic groups whose economic motivation is greatest and often leads to abandonment of the religious profession upon the discovery that the motive of vocation is not equally strong. The average age of the clergy, high even by Latin American standards, also attests to the fact that recent generations have not considered the religious career attractive. As a result, the ratio of inhabitants per priest is high, and consequently while the population has increased, the number of parishes has necessarily remained static.

The significant growth in the number of regular clergy during the last 15 years has helped to compensate for the diminishing strength of the diocesan clergy and has also served to change the complexion of the ecclesiastical structure which is now decidedly religious. However, this growth has been due primarily to the increase in foreign, not Bolivian, clergy. Of 282 members of religious orders fulfilling the function of priest in the country, only 7 are Bolivians. Figures are not available for members of the religious community who are not ordained priests, but the number of foreigners among them is probably also very high. The largest foreign nationality groups represented in Bolivia are the Spaniards, North Americans and Italians, in that order. Other missions include Germans, Belgians, Austrians, Dutch and Canadians. In all, 19 religious orders for men are represented in Bolivia, the most numerous being the Franciscans, Maryknoll Fathers, Jesuits and Redemptorists, who represent well over half the clergy belonging to religious orders. While a great deal of their work is done in the missions and in education, their greatest effort is in parish work. Thus, it is only through the influence of foreign priests that the diocesan clergy, which in theory is charged with the duties of the parish, maintains its role.

Geographically there is great inequality in ecclesiastical distribution. The clergy is concentrated overwhelmingly in the highlands, particularly in the oldest departments, La Paz, Cochabamba, Sucre and Potosí. Almost all of the national clergy come from this area, and half remain in La Paz and Cochabamba alone. There is also a heavy concentration in the highlands of religious houses for both men and women as well as of Catholic educational and charitable institutions. However, since the population is also heaviest there, the greater numbers of religious personnel and institutions are still not adequate. In the lowlands, the same problems exist with the additional difficulty of widely diffused groups. The most extensive missionary work, maintained exclusively by foreign religious orders, is carried on in that area.

Current Activities

In recent years, the Catholic Church has become increasingly concerned with the state of religion in Latin America and has also developed an awareness of the need to broaden its activities in the social

sphere. These attitudes have been reflected by the Bolivian Church and, particularly in the realm of social action, have probably also been stimulated by the growing social consciousness which has been encouraged by the MNR government since its rise to power in 1952 and by the same ferment which brought about the revolution.

While the Church has traditionally furthered education and charitable works, its orientation has tended to be paternalistic, and its response to social consciousness, which had its beginnings in Bolivia in the 1920's, has not been rapid. Many ecclesiastics, conservative in their outlook, counseled the lower-class elements to be loyal to their employers despite the fact that the latter, through abuse, were contributing significantly to the dissatisfaction of the working class. As a result, many still associate the Church with the old order which they found oppressive. Recognizing the great needs of a large part of the population and the value of social activity as a means of reaching these somewhat alienated ranks of society, the Church has adopted a new approach which emphasizes self-help and close cooperation between clergy and parishioners.

The most serious problems facing the Church in the planning and implementation of new programs is the lack of sufficient personnel. In spite of the increasing numbers of foreign clergy going to the country, the religious functions of the Church can not even be maintained in all areas. A partial answer has been found in lay apostolic groups, such as Catholic Action, the largest and one of the oldest. Begun about 25 years ago, Catholic Action has about half the total membership of apostolic organizations and more than half of the 350 apostolic centers in the country. Its appeal is primarily to young people of both sexes from the middle class. Among the adult membership, women greatly outnumber men. Apostolic activities are generally social in nature, such as the Equipo de Obras Sociales (Social Work Team) in Cochabamba, which has been helping to improve the homes of members of the lower socioeconomic groups. From available data, it would seem that most of the projects are on a small scale.

The Bolivian Church has also appealed for financial assistance from foreign Catholic welfare organizations like Cáritas. Over the last seven years it has been responsible for distributing surplus food from the United States and has also contributed food, medicine, and personnel to other church and state projects and institutions. A recent report prepared for a German Catholic welfare organization indicates that it, too, may soon be assisting in Bolivia.

In addition to specifically Catholic organizations, the Church has tried to stimulate the creation of Catholic-inspired but nonaffiliated groups to appeal particularly to workers and *campesinos*. One of these is Bolivian Workers' Action (Acción Sindical Boliviana—ASIB), founded in May 1958 and concentrated in areas of urban trade.

Since by law only one federation of trade unions, the Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB), is allowed, the organization has met with some difficulties and government harassment. Although over half its active members are former participants in Catholic Working Youth (Juventud Obrera Católica), recruiters find it necessary to stress that ASIB is not a branch of any political party, business enterprise or the Catholic hierarchy, in view of the suspicion of potential members that the Church is involved in nonreligious affairs and their belief in the ineffectiveness of trade unions directed by priests. Another recent organization is Rural Catholic Action (Acción Rural Católica), which sends teams composed of a doctor, priest, teacher, social worker and nun on visitation missions in rural areas.

Of especial concern to the Church has been the appearance of militant communist elements in the mining regions. A few cooperatives and leadership training programs have been set up, mainly in Potosí, in an attempt to counteract leftist forces. Another measure has been the establishment of a lay apostolic group, the League of Christian Workers, dedicated to the spiritual formation of its members. These activities have met with stronger opposition than any of the other affiliated or nonaffiliated Church projects. Priests have been threatened and buildings stoned.

Work in education and charity has been continued. Again, the factors of geography and population have resulted in unequal distribution, for of the 61 Catholic charitable institutions, 75 percent are in the highlands. Most numerous are the centers for children, followed by those for the sick and the aged. With the exception of the hospital at Cueva, with a capacity of 240, the institutions in the lowlands are small. In education, Catholic activity is limited to 390 secondary and mission schools. There is no formal network of parochial schools. Although religious instruction is permitted, Catholic schools are subject in all other matters to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts. Many of the secondary schools are among the best in the country and draw their students from the upper class. In line with its increased social awareness, the Church has attempted to join the campaign against illiteracy by expanding its educational program directed toward rural and worker groups. The number of "Escuelas de Cristo" (Schools of Christ) has been increased; more lay teachers have been sent out into the field with teams drawn from apostolic groups; and Catholic radio stations, which devote a major portion of broadcasting time to basic education, have received more attention in recent years (see ch. 8, Education). Of the five radio stations, three are run by the Maryknoll Fathers, one by the Spanish Jesuits and one by the Canadian Oblates. Young Bolivians assist the foreign missionaries. Programs, few of which are strictly religious

in nature, are broadcast mainly in Spanish, but also in Quechua and Aymara. In August 1962, it was announced that a news agency had been organized by Catholic broadcasters with the object of informing the public of problems in remote regions of the country (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda).

In the field of publications, the Church has not been particularly active. The only widely read Catholic organ is *Presencia*, begun in 1952 as a weekly newspaper. By 1958 its circulation had increased sufficiently to warrant daily publication, and it now is the second largest paper in La Paz. With *El Diario*, it has the best facilities and offers the best news coverage. On occasion its offices have been stoned, but this is not greatly significant since such activity is not infrequent in Bolivia. The limited number of Catholic cultural reviews have an extremely small reading public.

Religious Life and Practice

Hispanic

Although most Bolivians are Roman Catholics, religion is not a strong force in daily life. The small number of ecclesiastics in the country cannot attend to the spiritual needs nor administer the religious services of the population, particularly in the rural areas where a priest may appear only two or three times a year. Even in those parishes which have priests regularly in attendance, Catholic critics complain that there are no strong bonds between the priest and his congregation, especially in the departmental capitals. They also feel that religious education is grossly inadequate, pointing to the fact that only a small minority of the population has more than a rudimentary background in doctrine and dogma. In an effort to combat this situation, various programs like the *cursillos* (short courses), retreats devoted to intensive indoctrination in theological fundamentals, have been established. In large measure, participants in the *cursillos* are also members in the FSB, a fact which has led some observers to conclude that these groups have political overtones.

Still, Catholics in Bolivia are generally lax in religious practice. Occasions such as baptism, marriage in the church and last rites are universally considered desirable. Likewise wakes, processions and saint's day fiestas are well attended, but there is little confession or communion. The saint's days of the Catholic Church are observed along with those of the patrons of individual churches, cities, departments, etc. Peculiar aspects of Bolivian Catholicism include the revered status of the Virgin of Copacabana (Lake Titicaca) and the Virgin of Catoca (Santa Cruz) and carnival, celebrated the week before Lent with various festivities, among which are *diabladas*, symbolic dances which represent the struggle with Satan, performed

exclusively by Indians wearing colorful costumes and distinctive devil masks.

In all classes, women are more conscientious in religious practice, which is considered more properly a feminine sphere and function. Among men, religious practice generally diminishes, though not always, as socioeconomic status increases. From adolescence on, boys, particularly of the upper class, are discouraged from rigorous religiosity, especially when they are exposed to the university environment. Even if they later return to the church, their attitude is most often lukewarm. In the middle class, male indifference, though less widespread than among the upper class, is not infrequent. The strongest religious commitments occur in the lower class with the exception of the mining sector, where there is evidence of strong anticlericalism founded on a basic distrust of the Church and encouraged by Communist elements. The lack of positive value attached to religiosity among men is illustrated by the fact that one popular form of political abuse is the designation of a man as a *santito* (a little saint) or a *beato* (pious one). Clearly, religious devotion plays no part in the Bolivian ideal of masculinity (see ch. 11, Social Values).

Indian

Most of Bolivia's Indians came under the influence of the Roman Catholic Church through the extensive missionary work of the Spanish priests during the colonial period. Yet, because of their satisfaction with external compliance with Roman Catholic practice and the absence of a real program of indoctrination, either through lack of time or concern, Indian beliefs today are an intricate blend of Roman Catholicism and pre-Hispanic religion. The missionaries may have succeeded in destroying temples and priestly cults, but they did not eradicate private practices, which continue today. While the Inquisition was still in force, such activity was conveniently termed superstition, not idolatry, which removed the baptized Indian "convert" from the possibility of being charged with lapsing into heresy.

Necessary adaptations were met with equal ease by the Indian. Previous experience with domination, under the Incas, had introduced new gods which were incorporated into their pantheon, so that when the Spaniards came, the Indians were easily able to again graft foreign beliefs and practices onto the existing religious culture. However, the Indian does not divide his religious beliefs into Spanish and indigenous elements, nor does he concede greater or lesser power to the supernaturals on the basis of origin. The basic lack of system in the synthesis is partly a result of the absence of a priestly cult dedicated to the study and formulation of a theology. Although this lack leads to confusions and incongruities, it is not a source of concern for the Indian.

While the older religious beliefs have tended to persist more strongly among the Aymara than among the Quechua, the two groups are generally characterized more by their similarities than their differences. The Aymara world is densely populated with spirits which are constantly influencing everyday events. They are related to and explain his economic state (in agriculture), his health, his personal relationships with other members of his community and the fearful unknown. Most commonly, spirits are place spirits (*achachilas*), living in the air, in or around a natural phenomenon or wandering with no fixed dwelling. The association of the spirits with place reveals the Aymara's preoccupation with his natural environment, which plays such an important role in his life, and also explains the variations in objects of veneration from town to town or area to area. Other supernaturals include ghosts, demons, the souls of the dead and Catholic saints. These spirits are malevolent, if not ambivalent, in their attitude toward the Indian, concerned with his affairs but not necessarily with his welfare. For this reason, the individual must attempt to remain on good terms with them through propitiation and the use of magicians and diviners who can speak with or interpret the actions of the supernaturals for him. The rank accorded the spirits is based on their intelligence and power and progress from those most intimately associated with everyday life, who are relatively weak and unintelligent, to those who are supreme, but very remote. At the bottom of the scale are the individual house guardians, the only spirits who are consistently kindly disposed toward the Indian; next, the place spirits, ghosts, souls, demons and devils; then, the spirits which inhabit important physical phenomena like large rivers and mountain peaks; and finally, the saints. The Virgin and God, often confused with Christ and at times with the sun, occupy the position of supremacy but are also so remote that they do not figure significantly in the Indian's life. God and Christ, as the Indian envisions them, are white men who are not interested in his affairs and who are potentially threatening. Although God is not seen in relation to a final judgment, since the Indian is not essentially concerned with the hereafter, nonetheless it is considered a good idea to remain in His good graces. This may promote a degree of proper behavior. The Virgin, referred to even less than God or Christ, is seen as a white woman, a wealthy señora whose attitude is one of casual and patronizing benevolence. At the same time she is strongly identified with the earth mother, Pachamama. To the Indian, there are as many Virgins as there are representations of her, and each is a different being. There is no comprehension of the Holy Ghost. Of all the supernaturals in the Roman Catholic religion, the saints have been incorporated most effectively, usually to the degree to which they can be associated with indigenous deities. Often they are confused with the more important place spirits, mountains, rivers

and lakes, which now bear the names of the saints as well as their own. Moreover, the Aymara tends to identify with one particular image or designation of a saint, with the result that he resents any attempt to suggest that the St. James whose physical representation he knows through a local church is the same as the St. James in another town. At times it would appear that he venerates the animals or other attributes often represented with the saint and not the symbolic concept. The Christian divinities and their relationships to man are not as clearly conceptualized as are the native ones.

The view of the soul is at great variance with the Christian concept. First, the Indian has not one, but several souls, which leave the body not only at death but during life, in a dream or through the machinations of a practitioner of black magic. Since children's souls are thought to be less securely attached to the body than adults', they are particularly subject to loss. Wandering souls are a source of fear, and exposure to a corpse can cause sickness. For this reason death and the dead are greatly feared, and elaborate precautions are taken to remove all traces of the dead. Since the souls wander at night, the Indian is highly reluctant to go out after dark. Propitiation to souls is also common for the purpose of discouraging their suspected malevolent intentions towards the living.

Generally, Catholic rites and celebrations are seen primarily as social outlets, indigenous practices are the means by which spiritual and material difficulties are resolved. Novenas, processions and watches are popular, as are the sacraments of baptism and marriage in the church, which are also sources of prestige. However, the cost of marriage is most often prohibitive, for rural priests frequently demand sums higher than those specified by the official church lists for the performance of religious services. Of all the Catholic observances, the most notable among the Indians are the fiestas, held on the numerous saints' days, which are celebrated with extended festivities, that include drinking, music and feasting. Various observers have characterized these affairs as drunken orgies. In addition to the sociable atmosphere, the fiesta also brings prestige to the individual who sponsors it, and while not the only criterion of worth, such activity is observed to precede his rise to the status of village notable. It usually occurs only once in a lifetime since the cost is high in terms of the Indian's income. However, reliable reports indicate that among the Quechua-speaking Indians of the Cochabamba area, improved economic status has led the Indian toward more secular avenues of prestige. Although the religious elements in these fiestas are greatly obscured, they have been encouraged because at least in name they are religious occasions. The *cholo* merchants, who supply the Indians with the necessities for a fiesta and make a greater profit from it at such times than they do in normal commerce, encourage

the celebrations and have even collaborated with priests in promoting sponsorship when no Indian benefactor was forthcoming.

Except on fiesta days, more solemn functions like mass are not popular and, if attended, are done so out of fear. According to some observers, the Catholic practice of confessions is seen by the Indian as a form of punishment, and he therefore rarely goes on his own initiative. Catholic morality has not been adopted by the Aymara, whose ethical behavior is based on indigenous cultural tradition (see ch. 11, Social Values).

In contrast to the group aspect of Catholic practice, observance of strictly pre-Christian rites is characterized by its private and often secret nature. The only ceremonies in which the whole community participates are the fair of Alasitas, in honor of the jovial little god Ek'eko, which curiously has become a national fiesta celebrated by all Bolivians, and *chokela*, the rite to increase agricultural produce. The Aymara ritual is set but not particularly elaborate or formal. Essentially the same type of rite and offering is used to propitiate various kinds of spirits under differing circumstances. There is no rigid schedule of religious ceremonies during the annual cycle. Rites are performed by a magician, usually in the home of the client and his family after an initial formal call has been paid to the magician. No particular day of the week is prescribed for these rites, but they are never held on Tuesdays or Fridays, which are unlucky. In serious atmosphere, offerings of coca, *chicha* (native beer), cigarettes, food, llama fetuses or gold and silver leaf are made and spontaneous prayers said. Coca chewing and drinking are central to Aymara ceremonialism and always retain a measure of reverence. The influence of Catholicism on indigenous rites has not been great, but can be seen in the use of crucifixes, rosaries and medals and, borrowed from the mass, in the ringing of a bell at the beginning and the end of the procedure.

In Aymara thinking, religion, curing, divination and magic are all closely and equally bound up in the fundamentals of successful coexistence with the supernatural world. Since the spirits do not work spontaneously for the good of the individual it is necessary to manipulate them, interpret present calamities caused by them and divine the future. All Aymara engage in divining and personal propitiation, but there is a group of specialists, magicians, sorcerers, doctors, diviners and midwives whose techniques and activities often overlap. Most are familiar with at least one specialized method of divination and can cure some form of disease. Each has a particular area in which he works; for example, one class of specialists may have the ability to cure a certain illness, but not another, which must be treated by a member of a different group. In curing, equal consideration is given to infirmities of physical cause as to those of strictly supernatural cause, like soul loss.

Magic, the most powerful specialty, is divided into classes, good and evil. The Aymara holds that magicians practice the former, and sorcerers the latter, although the fear and awe in which he holds the magician suggest that he, too, is suspected of being a covert practitioner of the black art. (This distinction is not apparently made by the Quechua.) Evil magic is socially disapproved of but blame is not placed on the sorcerer himself. Disease or theft are frequently attributed by the suspicious Aymara to the work of some sorcerer engaged by a fellow Aymara. Although the magician is respected, feared and given special treatment by his fellow citizens, his status is achieved after he assumes his profession and does not develop from previous standing in the community, for neither magicians nor any other specialists come from a particular class or family background.

The process of becoming a magician necessitates being struck twice by lightning, a supernatural source of power, and is followed by an unfixed period of apprenticeship. Once the Indian has been struck, served his apprenticeship and become a magician, he has only the power to mediate between the people and the supernatural world. He himself does not possess any personal power. After becoming a practitioner of magic, he continues to engage in agriculture and assumes no special costume except during the performance of rites, when he wears a red poncho and cap. In addition to social prestige, the profession of magic is also desirable from a financial standpoint since fees are paid for ritual service and by apprentices. As a force in the community, the magician holds a stronger position than the local priest who, although feared for his power over supernaturals and as a representative of white society, is not intimately linked with the belief and practice of the Aymara in daily life. When sickness, crop failure or misfortune befall him, he turns not to the priest, but to the magician, diviner and curer.

Cholo

The *cholos* as a group do not have any one system of religious practice and belief for, although Catholicism represents one of the dividing lines between *cholo* and Indian on the social scale, many *cholos* continue to give credence to various aspects of indigenous religious culture. Although they do not participate in the few Indian community ceremonies, they may summon a magician, diviner or curer. Among rural farming elements, offerings and personal rites to Pachamama may occur. Moreover, the actions or professed beliefs of the *cholo* cannot always be taken at face value as he may secretly accept what he publicly views with skepticism.

PROTESTANT ACTIVITY

After more than 50 years of missionary work in Bolivia, Protestants still represent only a fraction of the total population. However, although great inroads have not been made in the number of communicants of the firmly entrenched Roman Catholic Church, significant activities have been instituted on the fields of education and social work which have gained the respect of the populace. According to 1962 statistics, there were 18,897 communicants among the 21 Protestant missions in Bolivia and a total Protestant community of 43,135, which represents a 300 percent increase over the preceding 10 years. Fixed centers of worship number 517 as compared with the 313 parishes and 2,136 chapels of the Catholic Church. Correspondingly, the Protestant staff of 763 has grown, and though not as significantly as the membership, internal changes in the ratio of foreign to national workers indicate a greater effort to train native Bolivians than in the past.

In the 1880's the American Bible Society succeeded in getting three of its agents into the country, but it was not until the arrival of the Canadian Baptists in 1898 that a real missionary program was established. Within a few years, the Methodist Episcopal Church, the interdenominational Indian Mission and other groups began work there also. Initial activity was concentrated in education because the practice of faiths other than the Roman Catholic was forbidden by law. The law of 1906 which introduced religious freedom is considered the Magna Carta of Protestant missionary work by those in the Bolivian field. Even with the enactment of such legislation, Protestants still had their greatest success in the areas of education and medical assistance. The Institutos Americanos, begun by the Methodists in La Paz and Cochabamba soon after their arrival, enjoy an excellent reputation and count among their graduates the former president of the republic Siles Zuazo as well as a great number of prominent figures in Bolivian government and society. The Methodists also maintain the only nursing school in the country and have been asked by the government to direct or establish a number of clinics. Until recently the Methodists have not expended great energies in direct missionary work, having agreed with the Canadian Baptists to a division of labor. Thus, until three years ago the only Protestant seminary, which drew its students from all Protestant denominations, was run by the Canadian Baptists. These two groups continue to hold the key positions in the cities where they maintain both English- and Spanish-speaking churches. The only Protestant radio station is also run by them in La Paz.

The numerous fundamentalist groups which followed the pioneering denominations have located primarily in the rural sectors. In fact, the largest Protestant denomination in Bolivia is the Seventh Day

Adventists, whose work has been concentrated among the Indians of the Lake Titicaca area. Although the Indians are conservative and often strongly attached to the Catholic Church through custom, the appeal of its ceremony and fear of the local priest, the evangelistic approach employed by the fundamentalist groups has created an atmosphere of social acceptance and comradeship which the Indian finds attractive. The fundamentalists have been less tolerant of the drunken fiestas of Indian religious practice than have the Catholics and attempt to substitute for them other group activities like volleyball games and coca-cola fiestas. Other appealing factors include the few economic demands the Protestant missionary makes on the Indian in contrast to his Catholic counterpart, a greater concern for the individual's temporal state, the strong emphasis on the virtue of physical labor and the conviction that all fellow believers share equal status in the community.

In spite of these appeals, the Protestant movement has not gained many followers. Although the present conditions of change and social upheaval have created an atmosphere of optimism among Protestants, it is doubtful that the religious complexion of the country will change appreciably in the future, in view of the existence of the strongly entrenched Catholic tradition. However, among those Bolivians who have been converted, few revert, since those who do become Protestants must go through a relatively long instruction and observation period before becoming communicants. Also, the loss of prestige involved in becoming a Protestant in a predominantly Catholic country works against casual conversions. In addition to the communicant members, there are those who attend Protestant functions and express sympathy for Protestant doctrine, but return to the Catholic Church for important ceremonies like marriage and baptism.

The Catholic Church has displayed a degree of concern about Protestant missionary work which would seem out of proportion to the progress made. Although no strong action has been taken, Protestants feel that minor obstacles occasionally imposed by the government stem from Catholic agitation. They also cite various instances of Catholic schools or clinics appearing in close proximity to recently completed Protestant institutions which serve the same function. What open conflict does arise usually occurs on the local level.

CHAPTER 11

SOCIAL VALUES

The deeply rooted assumptions and beliefs which define and sanction the national social order are derived from the Hispanic traditions of which Bolivia as a Latin American nation partakes. Although most Bolivians are Quechua- or Aymara-speaking Indians reared in cultures whose value patterns are entirely alien to those imposed by the conquerors and although leaders of social thought have long been exposed to the influences of other traditions, the quality of national life continues to be markedly Hispanic. Despite the fact that the majority of citizens neither speak Spanish nor partake of the Hispanic tradition, the social patterns of Bolivia are in many ways indistinguishable from those of other Latin American nations which have little or no enduring Indian background (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The persistence and dominance of the Hispanic tradition in national society is, in part, the result of the entirely marginal and passive role which has traditionally been played by the Indians. Considered inferior by the small, dominant group of Spanish speakers, forced either into debt servitude on the white-owned agricultural estates or onto isolated and inferior lands, and disfranchised by various means—legal and illegal—they have not had the opportunity to assimilate much from the Hispanic values or to contribute anything of their own tradition to national life (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Most central in the Hispanic value tradition is the complex of strongly held beliefs regarding the individual and his place in society subsumed under the concept of *personalismo*. With regard to the individual, *personalismo* represents, on the one hand, a conviction that every person is unique and endowed with an innate dignity—independent of social status—which is worthy of universal respect and, on the other hand, a preoccupation with the expression of personal worth through the embodiment of highly stereotyped personality ideals. In social life, *personalismo* is reflected in a tendency to emphasize personal qualities and interpersonal relationships over substantive achievement and purely formal roles in forming judgments of men and in establishing bonds of trust and loyalty with them.

In striking contrast to, but in no essential conflict with, the great emphasis placed upon individuality and personal dignity is an equally

strong sense of social hierarchy and a value preference for authoritarian and centralized public power. Except in the most casual bonds of friendship, virtually every sort of relationship—in family, society and state—is cast in terms of dominance and submission. At the most informal levels, men are seen as being engaged in a constant status competition, from which the victorious emerge as leaders and those less successful as followers. Within the family a rigid hierarchy of authority has traditionally been accepted. The father is almost always the undisputed arbiter of family welfare, with only a minor and advisory role accorded other members. At the most formal levels, Bolivian society, like those of other Latin American nations, has been traditionally marked by strong tendencies to stratification and inherited privilege.

In the Hispanic social view, two kinds of status attach to the individual. All persons are seen as having a personal status, one which is accorded public esteem or disparagement in the degree to which it embodies the characteristics of the ideal personality types. Parallel to and independent of personal status is social status, which arises out of the strong sense of hierarchy. A man may be generally esteemed because he approximates in behavior and attitude the cultural ideals of manhood, yet he may occupy an extremely humble social position because he was born into a lower-class family. In much the same way as certain traits of behavior separate the prestigeful personality from that which is disparaged, others divide those of exalted station from those of humble place in the social structure. Although, to a great extent, social status has traditionally been seen as fixed by birth, there has always been some degree of social mobility. As a result, men of self-made wealth and high social aspirations tend to adopt the values of chivalry, personal cultivation and leisure which are considered appropriate for those of higher station, in the hope that they may be accepted by the upper class.

The fundamental beliefs and assumptions which form the social outlook of most culturally and linguistically distinctive Indians have been subjected to considerably less systematic study than have those which form the contrasting Hispanic tradition. To a great extent it is only possible to infer the values which shape their views of individuality and society from observations of social behavior.

The Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians, who together form the majority of the population, are basically similar to each other in their ways of life, despite numerous variations in minor detail, and the sketchy descriptions of their value systems strongly indicate that the members of these two groups share a virtually identical social outlook. The marked similarity of value patterns is underlain by at least a thousand years of common tradition and experience. All archaeological evidence indicates that the Aymara speakers and those

groups which, in pre-Inca times, shared with them the territory now known as Bolivia were quite similar culturally not only to each other but to the Inca invaders as well. Over this basic homogeneity, Inca rule resulted in the imposition of common social forms and, hence, further uniformity. Finally, the conquest of the various native Indian groups by the Spaniards resulted in their common inclusion in a white-dominated social order as members of a uniformly subjugated caste (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure). Hence, both by considerable uniformity in underlying tradition and by reaction to virtually identical social experience throughout their history, the various Indian groups have come to show value patterns so uniform that they can be collectively subsumed as a common social outlook—one which balances and contrasts with that of the Hispanic tradition.

The Indian view of the national social order has traditionally been one of reaction and adaptation. Seeing the white-dominated national society as generally hostile and exploitative, both Quechua and Aymara speakers have, in varying degree, conditioned their behavior and attitudes toward those outside of their communities with a profound distrust and a tendency toward withdrawal from contact. Distrust of outsiders is balanced by a correspondingly high level of in-group feeling within the community, along with some degree of emphasis upon relations of mutual trust and obligation between close neighbors.

When Indians are involved, even peripherally, in relationship with those outside the narrow bounds of their communities, they are required to participate under conditions set down by the Hispanic-derived values, not those of their own tradition. Relationships involving mutual trust and those tying together leaders and retainers are founded largely upon the deeply rooted values arising out of *personalismo* and the social hierarchy.

Unlike the feelings traditionally held toward the national social order by the Indians, values regarding individuality, the family and interpersonal relationships within the community are highly specific and in distinct contrast to those of the Hispanic view. The great emphases of the Hispanic value tradition upon personal uniqueness and self-expression are completely lacking in the Indian view. In Quechua and Aymara life, a man is not judged on the unique inherent qualities of his personality so much as on his substantive achievements and his social contributions. Whereas the Hispanic view accords great value to self-expression and status competition in social behavior, that of the Indians stresses circumspection and conformity.

The *cholos* (persons of part or, occasionally, of pure Indian racial background who, by their way of life and their ability to speak Spanish, are not identified as Indians) have traditionally occupied a middle

position—both culturally and socially—in national life. Their way of life contains elements of both Indian and Hispanic tradition, and their position in the national social structure has traditionally been seen as an intermediate one, markedly below that of the dominant whites and vastly above that of the Indians. Insofar as they have considered themselves to be Bolivian nationals and have actively participated in the national social, economic and political life, however, they have guided themselves more on the basis of the dominant Hispanic value pattern than on that of their Indian ancestors. Social and economic mobility has generally been a characteristic of *cholo* life, and a general aspiration toward higher status and personal acceptance in white elite circles has led to a conscious tendency toward behavior in conformance with the dominant values (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

Both the 1952 revolution and events preceding it (the Chaco War, for example) have resulted in significant changes in the national social order. The bases of inherited privilege—particularly monopolistic control over land and other strategic resources—have vanished. In official, and to some extent in popular, attitudes the traditional view of social inequality which had relegated the Indians to a position of subjugation and inferiority have diminished. For the first time in Bolivian history, it appears that the various ethnic and linguistic groups which have made up the traditionally fragmented society have begun to perceive a common nationality (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Despite the profound disruption of the old social order, the revolution has not fulfilled the hopes of its leaders in modifying to any observable degree the values associated with and sanctioning that order. Although the elite has lost its traditional power, the values traditionally defining elite status—particularly those which tend to disparage manual labor and grossly materialistic aims and activities—continue to exist. Those anxious to rise in social status continue to pattern their behavior upon values which ascribe high status to personal cultivation and genteel leisure rather than to work and entrepreneurial activity. The trend toward the absorption of the entire Bolivian population into a unified nationality is progressing largely under values which emphasize strong personal leadership and loyalty rather than institutional stability.

THE INDIVIDUAL

The Hispanic View

Personalismo

Like North Americans, Spanish-speaking Bolivians express, both verbally and in social behavior, a strong preoccupation with the indi-

vidual and place a high premium upon self-expression. In both value traditions, the individual is seen as being inalienably endowed with an inner dignity which is worthy of general respect. However, the use, in both English and Spanish, of such identical terms as "person" (*persona*), "liberty of expression" (*libertad de expresión*) and "personal dignity" (*dignidad de la persona*) to express common-sounding sentiments regarding the individual tends to mask important differences in outlook. Whereas the North American value system stresses the basic similarities and kinship of all men, the values of *personalismo* emphasize the uniqueness of each individual.

The North American preoccupation with the similarities of men is strongly associated with a credo of egalitarianism which sees the ideal society as providing, at least in theory, equality of opportunity as a basis for self-expression and the fulfillment of personal potential. On the other hand, the Hispanic notion of personal uniqueness sees self-expression and personal status as something completely independent of social status. In consequence, a strong respect for individuality is in no way contradictory to equally strong social patterns of stratification and gross inequality of opportunity.

An individual's inner dignity is seen as an inalienable personal integrity—a self-esteem and a sense of personal honor—quite independent of social status, which can be attacked by others only at the risk of incurring bitter hostility. It is this strong notion of inner dignity which makes Spanish-speaking Bolivians, along with other Latin Americans, acutely conscious of insult. Any failure to recognize an individual's worth or any imputation of personal inadequacy, whether or not intended, is likely to be construed as an insult and to evoke a violent response which would seem excessive to most North Americans. For the same reason, perhaps, techniques of delivering insults of an extremely personal nature constitute almost an art in political battling, for a politician thus attacked by his opponent who does not successfully defend himself loses stature in the eyes of his constituents.

Associated with the idea of inner dignity is that of *respeto* (respect), which to Spanish speakers means specifically respect for a person's inner dignity and a studied attempt to avoid giving offense. The behavior involved in *respeto* is expected of all people, regardless of social rank. Although a person of superior station is not expected to imply equality in his behavior toward those of lower rank, he is expected to avoid all behavior which might, in any way, slight the latter's unique qualities or injure his self-esteem. As an example, since artisans and chauffeurs occupy a low social status, a social superior would never address a shoemaker or taxi-driver as *señor* (sir), but neither would he fail to call such a person *maestro* (master), a title to which all skilled workers are socially entitled.

Although individuality and self-expression are highly valued, there are definite notions of ideal personality characteristics, and an individual is esteemed or disparaged according to the degree to which he fits the cultural models. There is a highly developed sense of sexual differentiation in concepts of both ideal personality and social role. In national society, leadership and domination are almost exclusively male prerogatives, the fact of female suffrage notwithstanding. Aggression, forceful self-expression and overt status competition are expected of men. Women are seen as ideally passive, undemanding and ornamental, deriving their individual status from that of their families and husbands.

In family life, the man is almost always seen as the household's representative to the outside world. His interests, both economic and social, are expected to be broad. Ideally, he has a wide circle of acquaintances which he does not share with his wife and children. A woman is expected to limit her range of action—particularly after marriage—to the household and to a social life confined to kinsmen and long-established family friends.

Male Personality Ideals

The complex of values which define the image of the ideal man in the Hispanic view is called *machismo* (literally, maleness). In all assessments of a man's personal worth, he is measured against the standards set by this highly stereotyped image. The term *machismo* epitomizes a set of virtues which revolve around intensive activity, successful competition, domination and heroism. The list of personal attributes which mark off the most masculine (*macho*) from less outstanding in this characteristic include zest for action (both physical and verbal), a display of self-confidence bordering upon the daring and overwhelming and constantly demonstrated sexual prowess. These virtues form inseparable elements in the image of *machismo*, for it is inconceivable that a man could lack one of them without being correspondingly deficient in the others.

In the context of *machismo*, forcefulness and conquest in the fields of love, politics, intellectual life and business become ends rather than means, for men are judged publicly and esteem themselves in proportion to the extent to which they approximate the model of the *macho*. In the political sphere, it is the persuasive, forceful and assertive leader who most successfully maintains his following. In business, it is the daring speculator, rather than the shrewd, hard-working but pedestrian investor, who is most admired. In intellectual life, it is the brilliant polemicist, rather than the contributor to substantive knowledge, who enjoys highest prestige. In all fields of male endeavor, prestige attaches more closely to those who show themselves to be *machos* than to those who contribute material accomplishments by simple, but unobtrusive, competence.

An example of the degree to which intensely personal characteristics, rather than material accomplishment, are central to a man's image in society is to be seen in the popular view of the nineteenth-century dictator, Melgarejo, whose corrupt and inept rule resulted in loss of national territory, total bankruptcy of the national treasury and almost total stoppage of state services. Bolivian political writers have held Melgarejo up as the extreme in public immorality and have even applied the term *melgarejismo* as a generic term for completely selfish and wantonly corrupt political behavior. Yet, despite the universal recognition that this classic nineteenth-century military dictator contributed to the almost total national ruin, his memory lives on in political folklore with an underlying aura of admiration for his personal qualities. Bolivians, speaking informally of Melgarejo, almost always grant him an amused, tolerant, almost incredulous praise for the degree of forcefulness and charismatic leadership which he demonstrated. In general, modern-day, Spanish-speaking Bolivians privately concede him a sort of championship rating in *machismo* (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The drive toward demonstration of *machismo* through amatory conquest is a most important part of the male social image. Reportedly, some fathers are openly proud of, and even encourage, their sons' early sexual adventures. Extramarital conquest, preferably through the cultivation of mistresses by those who can afford it, is a perennial source of admiring gossip in middle- and upper-class male circles. Although the Catholic Church, to which virtually all belong, takes an official stand of strong disapproval of extramarital sexuality, the popular view sees such behavior with an eye of amusement, tolerance and even admiration. According to observers, more devout men—often members of the Catholic lay religious education groups (*cursillos*) which have recently sprung up in major cities—who espouse the Church view, tend to be defensive about their attitudes, for they are aware that they seriously jeopardize their public images (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 10, Religion).

In lower-class circles, the institutionalized sexual activity available to wealthier men in the cultivation of mistresses is not economically possible, but casual liaisons are common among both married and single men. Frequent success in amorous conquest serves for the humble as well as for the rich as a means of establishing and maintaining both public prestige and self-esteem.

Of all the attributes of *machismo*, overt sexuality is the most visible and the one most commented upon. The inability of Spanish-speaking Bolivians to conceive of a *macho* who lacks one characteristic but is strong in the others leads to considerable aggressive use of insults based upon accusations of effeminacy and impotence. For example, much of the folklore surrounding well-known political figures,

for whom the image of *machismo* is extremely important, concerns their sexual lives. A common type of attack directed against political opponents is the imputation of sexual inadequacy. Unrebutted, such a charge can result in public ridicule sufficient to ruin a man's political career. Protection against this type of calumny commonly takes the form of public flaunting of mistresses by such men and their frequent appearance in brothels.

The achievement of personal status, as measured by *machismo*, is open to all men, regardless of class. On the other hand, there are also values which ascribe social status and which prescribe the behavior of upper-class men. Parallel to the notion of the *macho* is that of the *caballero* (gentleman), whose image is as stereotyped as that of the former. Generally, social recognition as a *caballero* has traditionally been limited to those born into the small, closed, elite, but the idea of social mobility has not been totally lacking. Roughly since the end of the nineteenth century, there has been a small and largely unintegrated middle class, consisting of persons who, by wealth and occupational status but not by pedigree, are similar to members of the elite. Such middle-class persons have almost universally set themselves the goal of social acceptance by the upper-class group and have therefore tended to approximate, in their behavior and attitudes, values held by the latter (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Very definite notions regarding the qualities of the *caballero* are part of the deeply rooted Hispanic concepts of nobility and social worth. The *caballero* is a man whose behavior and attitudes clearly demonstrate such qualities as leadership, chivalry, generosity, personal cultivation and total disinterest in grossly materialistic aims and activities.

In spite of the sentiments often repeated in Bolivian constitutions to the effect that productive work is both a right and a duty of citizenship, industriousness, *per se*, is not seen as a virtue of the gentleman. This does not mean that laziness is considered a social value, but that generous leisure is a mark of genteel status. The upper-class man is not inherently slothful, but he sees work as a means of achieving the goals of his position, rather than as a necessary and virtuous quality. In the pursuit of socially approved aims, such as political power, public prestige or public expression of his convictions, he is capable of extraordinary energy output.

The achievement of wealth alone does not confer high social status. Rather, the *caballero* is assumed to command sufficient resources to enable him to live in a genteel style. Remunerative activity for its own sake is therefore generally disparaged, for it is in direct violation of the strictures against interests of a purely materialistic nature. Although upper-class men, in many cases, engage in entrepreneurial activity, it seldom commands much interest for them. Consequently,

in business and in industry, the entrepreneur most often seeks to relieve himself of active management through the use of hired administrators, so that he can devote his time to the political and intellectual worlds which have traditionally been seen as his natural arena. Until 1953, when agrarian reform so thoroughly disrupted the traditional economy, the basis of wealth for both the elite and the well-established middle class had been ownership of large landed estates, worked by Indian tenants. While the *caballero* was traditionally a landowner, he could hardly have been classed as a farmer, for it was rare for him to take a technical interest in the administration of his holdings. The typical pattern was one of absentee ownership, with direct control being delegated to *cholo* supervisors, whose actions were not subject to question so long as the owner received a satisfactory profit (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Those who had made their wealth in commerce or the professions most often sought to convert their holdings to landed estates—precisely the sort of passive investment which provided both the economic means and the leisure necessary to life as a gentleman. Since agrarian reform, many of the landholders have sought to continue the pattern of passive investment through the establishment of wholesaling businesses, largely in the buying and selling of agricultural produce, with active management being delegated to hired administrators.

The personal cultivation which is so important a characteristic of the upper-class man is seen as arising out of a university education and both the appreciation and desultory practice of the arts and intellectual activity. The highest prestige is attached to education in a foreign university, and socially ambitious families have generally sought, often at great sacrifice, to send their sons abroad. The ideal education is broad in scope, although strongly weighted in the direction of the humanities (see ch. 8, Education; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Traditionally, the sons of the socially prominent have been professionally trained, for the most part, in the fields of medicine and law. The medical profession combines the advantages of independence of practice (and hence, of work routine) with that of high social esteem. The practice of law long ago lost most of the prestige originally attached to it because it has been the classic path of social and economic advance for the ambitious of humble origin; but the fact that it serves as an easy road to a political career continues to provide an attraction.

An almost total lack of interest in technical work, arising out of the prejudice against purely materialistic activity, has been reflected in the very small number of persons who have been trained in engineering and allied fields. Similarly, the pure sciences have held little attraction for upper-status Bolivians, for such activities demand a

personal commitment to study and work far beyond that seen as desirable.

Critics of Bolivian artistic and intellectual production have almost universally stressed its superficiality and the fact that many of the most promising and productive artists and intellectuals have abandoned their activities quite early in life (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). In this situation is seen the clear evidence that while both appreciation of art and scholarship are important in the life of the *caballero*, they serve more as ornaments to that life than as commitments of it. In general, upper-status men find more satisfactory self-expression in politics, where they can validate their personal status as aggressive, assertive *machos*. Although artistic talent and intelligence are by no means seen as contradictory to the model of *machismo*, their full-time exercise in pure art and scholarship gives little rein to forceful and public self-expression. In general, therefore, the *caballero* with talent and interest, usually merely adds desultory artistic or intellectual production to a long list of activities, while spending most of his time in politics. The man of arts and letters and the man of affairs are thus most often one and the same.

The treatment of cultural creativity as a means rather than as an end is particularly apparent in the fact that of all artistic media, the overwhelming proportion of Bolivians have always chosen literary expression. Since the disappearance of the bloc of professional artists who, under the sponsorship of wealthy patrons, were so prolific, particularly in architecture, during colonial times, the plastic arts have fallen into an almost unrelieved neglect. It is in letters that the artist can most directly and cogently communicate his personality and ideas to the public.

Throughout the history of Bolivian letters, most literary production, whether in fiction or essay, has been heavily polemic in theme, and literary quality has often been subordinated to the demonstration of a social or political conviction. A casual observer of the La Paz bookstalls in 1962 reports that somewhat more than three-fourths of the novels then on sale had social and economic themes and were heavily polemic in style (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Although virtually all Bolivians are baptized in the Roman Catholic faith and most are punctilious in meeting the minimal sacramental demands of the Church, active practice of religion is not at all an important aspect of the personal quality or social status of the ideal male. The rejection of materialism which is so much a part of the model of the *caballero* is expressed in a strong interest in ideas, in general, rather than their specifically religious and moral aspects. On the other hand, the model of *machismo*, with its emphasis on domination and competition, is hardly consonant with Church teachings of humil-

ity and abnegation, and its strongly sexual aspect brings many men into direct conflict with moral strictures. In general, the lack of interest in a specifically religious life has been reflected in the fact that few Bolivians enter the priesthood (see ch. 10, Religion).

Female Personality Ideals

The ideal woman is in virtually every way antithetic in her behavior to the ideal man. The male personality is forceful and aggressive, strongly driven to self-expression. The ideal female personality is accepting, passive and retiring. When Spanish-speaking Bolivians extol the qualities of womanhood, they strongly emphasize those of modesty and sacrifice.

Even though women have made significant advances in achieving professional acceptance in politics, university life and medicine, according to prevailing social values, the proper female role is confined largely to domestic activity. Much popular sentimentality attaches to motherhood, and Mother's Day is a holiday which is celebrated with a fervor matched only by that of the Ninth of April (Revolution Day) (see ch. 6, Family).

One area of public activity in which women have traditionally been accorded enthusiastic social acceptance is that of charity and good works. Upper-class women of leisure (and very often their imitative middle-class counterparts) typically spend much time and energy in the organization of charity benefit balls and in dispensing, personally, such bounty as Christmas toys and Christmas dinners to the urban poor. The importance of the "Lady Bountiful" image in the ideal female role is amply attested by newspaper accounts of charitable activity, which never fail to emphasize the degree to which the participants are showing themselves to be good and "truly maternal" women.

Another—and perhaps the most important—field of social activity dominated by women is formal religious observance. Although their husbands, brothers and sons are socially excused from more than the most perfunctory attendance to the demands of mass and sacrament, women are expected to faithfully attend mass, to confess regularly and to evince piety in general behavior and speech. Similarly, in her maternal role, a mother ideally devotes great energy to the religious education of her children (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 10, Religion).

The ideals of passivity, abnegation and acquiescence which form the feminine image in the Hispanic tradition are somewhat abrogated in the behavior of *cholo* women. Although the contrasting values implicit in *machismo* are very much part of the value pattern of that segment of the population, social and economic realities have never permitted the active development of the totally passive, largely ornamental female. Particularly in the cities, where the economy of many

cholo families depends heavily upon the female-dominated petty commerce of the retail market, women have tended to assume a very active role. In her social stance and in her dealings with the public, the *cholo* market woman expresses a type of personality which, in loquacity and aggressiveness, would almost rank her with the *machos* (see ch. 6, Family).

The Indian View

The strong emphasis placed upon social role, rather than upon personal uniqueness, by the Indian view is reflected strongly in the values which define personality ideals and those which prescribe desirable social behavior. In virtually every aspect of life, prestige and general esteem are accorded to those who have made some substantive contribution to the community rather than to those who have been most successful in the forceful projection of their personalities. For example, leadership in the affairs of most Quechua and Aymara communities, along with the associated prestige, has traditionally been vested in those men who have been most active in sponsoring the expensive religious fiestas which are seen as crucial to common welfare by the fact that they invoke supernatural protection. Even after the radical social changes brought about by the formation of the *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant leagues), this pattern of leadership and prestige ascription has been carried over in many communities (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 10, Religion).

Although among both Quechua and Aymara speakers there is considerable differentiation of social role and some division of labor between the sexes, in comparison with the strongly stereotyped and contrasting male and female images of the Hispanic view, those of the Indian value pattern seem muted. In general, leadership in public affairs is almost exclusively male, and in most domestic situations the husband has final authority. On the other hand, such descriptions of family behavior as exist indicate that there is a definite feeling that the wife should be consulted in major decisions affecting family welfare. Most important, there is no strong social value requiring that men overtly demonstrate strength and aggressiveness and women weakness and acceptance as abstract character traits. The impression of most observers is that division of farm labor, insofar as it is rationalized, is explained by the Indians on the basis that men are recognized to have greater physical strength rather than that any task is particularly unfeminine.

Overt sexuality as a measure of personal worth seems to be completely neglected in the Indian view. One of the stereotypes applied to Indians by whites throughout Latin America (and often adduced as a racial characteristic) is a tendency toward sexual impotence in the men. Close inspection of this stereotype leads many observers

to suspect that it arises out of a contrast between the extreme emphasis on sexuality in the Hispanic tradition and its lack of explicit social meaning for the Indians.

The aggressive and competitive personality traits which are so highly esteemed in the Hispanic view are not only de-emphasized in that of the Indians, but they are actively disparaged. Both Quechua and Aymara vocabularies abound in derogatory terms applied to people of either sex who attempt to dominate or impress their fellows by sheer force of personality. A common epithet applied to such persons by the Aymara, for example, is *laram hak'e*, which could be loosely translated to the English slang "big cheese," but which literally means "blue man"—one who fancies himself to be of aristocratic (blue) blood and who therefore acts like a Spaniard.

Descriptions of child-rearing practices among both the Aymara and the Cochabamba Quechua indicate definite attempts to inculcate quiet, circumspect behavior and conformity to established custom, along with a tendency to discourage exuberant self-expression and over-exercise of initiative. To control his child's public behavior, the parent lays great stress on shame and public scrutiny. For example, the most common form of admonition issued to an Aymara child, according to one writer, is "People are watching you." The result is the reinforcement of the strongly social orientation in the values which define personality ideals. Such warnings of public scrutiny are generally cast in negative terms—admonitions against socially undesirable behavior—and do not contain any element of promise that outstanding characteristics of the child will receive public praise. The emphasis is on conformity for the avoidance of disapproval rather than on personal excellence for the accrual of prestige (see ch. 6, Family).

Associated with the conformity and circumspection which are part of the value system is a marked tendency toward repression of feeling. In contrast to the demonstrative Spanish speakers, who seize every social opportunity to express themselves, to communicate something of themselves and their feelings to their fellows, both Quechua and Aymara speakers generally appear quite stolid and phlegmatic. Behavior toward kinsmen and friends, while often quite affectionate in tone, is generally lacking in open and physical demonstrations. Similarly, expressions of anger are neither so frequently observed nor so violent among the Indians as among the Spanish speakers. In general, those who have observed Indians under conditions of extreme adversity and mistreatment report great stoicism and ability to withstand almost unbelievable physical punishment.

Repression of feelings, both negative and positive, reflects strongly established socal values—not only those tending to discourage self-expression, but also those which disparage self-preoccupation. The

extensive pejorative vocabularies of both the Quechua and Aymara have numerous terms which translate almost literally to the English slang "bellyacher."

A striking contrast to the repressive tendencies in Indian behavior lies in the infrequent paroxysms of extreme violence which have been known to seize entire communities during the occasional uprisings which have spotted Bolivian history, particularly in the Lake Titicaca area. During the heat of such rebellions, which have generally been unplanned and uncoordinated attacks upon whites and *cholos*, resulting from the accumulated pressures of years of abuse, instances of extreme savagery on the part of the Indians have been reported. In addition to killing every non-Indian encountered in battle, the Aymara have been known to commit a sort of frenzied cannibalism, eating the brains of their victims and dipping up their blood with dried potato (*chuño*). Such revenge cannibalism and wanton killing on the part of the ordinarily passive Indians has apparently served as a mechanism for the release of extreme tension, resulting from the gross mistreatment which they have suffered and from the lack of culturally prescribed outlets for the expression of pain and anger.

Similarly, the fiestas which form an important part of the ritual and recreational life of every Indian community offer an arena for virtually uninhibited behavior. During the two or three days which every adult spends in a state of total inebriation, one observes extreme loquacity and frequent loud laughter in people who are normally taciturn and almost sullent. Hostilities which are almost certainly felt, but seldom expressed, in sobriety cause the celebrants to break out into loud quarreling and physical combat. The alcohol-induced exuberance and frenzied gaiety continue until utter exhaustion fells the strongest. The fiesta over, the Indians return to their normal mode of behavior, which so clearly reflects the values of stolidity and circumspection (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare; ch. 10, Religion).

The life goals traditionally available to Indians are quite limited in scope. Although the national revolution has laid the basis for a broader participation in national life, few Indians can as yet envision a proper role outside the circumscribed life of their communities. All boys in both Quechua and Aymara communities generally look forward to a future as subsistence farmers, and all girls to one as farm wives. Within individual communities, there are more specialized roles available—in the crafts and in the practice of curing or of magical and religious arts—but even such men as weavers, potters, folk-doctors and sorcerers are most often subsistence farmers who engage in a part-time specialty.

Unlike their countrymen of Hispanic orientation, the Indians do not invest leisure with any specific social value. The rhythm of daily life in Indian communities and the unspecialized nature of social roles

result in a pattern of activities within which there is little differentiation between labor and leisure. In much agricultural work, for example, there is a distinctly recreational note which is introduced by the fact that a man receiving cooperative assistance in his fields from neighbors and kinsmen is most often obligated to provide a festive meal at the end of the day (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

It is commonly observed that in matters of religious duty, both within the Roman Catholic Church and within the purview of surviving native belief, the Indians tend to be punctilious. On those rare occasions when the village chapel is visited by a priest from the parish center, Indians flock to his masses and to seek his sacramental services. For the most part, both Quechua and Aymara speakers are reported to be equally dutiful in observance of field rituals to Pachamama, the Earth Goddess. Such devotion to religious duty seems to arise, however, more out of a sense of the necessity to placate supernatural powers in order to assure physical well-being than out of any specific value placed upon spirituality as a personal trait. Those individuals who show themselves to have an obvious vocation for service as native religious practitioners are universally acknowledged to have a useful talent, but there is little evidence that they are considered to be worthy of outstanding prestige for such specialized personal qualities (see ch. 10, Religion)

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The Hispanic View

Personalismo and the Social Order

The tendency on the part of Spanish-speaking Bolivians to emphasize the personal and interpersonal aspects of social life over those of institutionalism and abstract ideology is visible in all areas of social, economic and political behavior. Loyalties are invested in kinsmen, friends and others with whom a definite personal basis of trust has been established. Men in positions of power and civic trust do not hesitate to use such positions to further the aims of those loyal to them, nor are they generally expected to do otherwise. Although much political debate centers around ideas, the core of a politician's attack on another or appeal for support generally rests upon questions of his personal characteristics or those of his opponents.

Political life is by no means barren of ideology. The man of letters and action, who represents the finest type of leader envisioned in the cultural ideas, expresses himself most clearly in the espousal of ideas. Nationalism—both the idea and its symbolism—has great emotional appeal for most Spanish speakers. Similarly, the national revolution, with its basic goals of rapid social change, national political regeneration and massive economic development, has come to have universal

and emotionally charged appeal for the great mass, excepting only those few whose interests were irrevocably bound up in the old order (see ch. 16, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

Notwithstanding the general importance of both ideas and their espousal, however, ideology is always subordinate to more personal considerations in real political life. As a rule, public political debate—as expressed in campaign speeches and election propaganda—is limited to the espousal, on the part of the candidates, of ideas which are so general in import and so universal in acceptance that they are hardly subject to dispute. In their campaigns, all condidates express themselves unequivocally to be in favor of the national glory and the progress of the revolution, without devoting any great amount of time or energy to the exploration of more concrete issues involved in the implementation of such worthy goals.

The core of a campaign speech lies not in an attack on the ideas and program proposals of an opponent but rather on the opponent himself. Rather than assert that an opposition candidate has mistaken notions about the course of the revolution and that implementation of his own ideas will, by contrast, lead to the rapid achievement of its aims, a man will most often clearly state that his opponent has betrayed the revolution or will do so. Such betrayal is generally ascribed to some pact entered upon by the opponent with agents of the *rosca* (traditional elite), now dispossessed, but ever seeking opportunities to reassert its power. In the popular political view, society and nation are less in danger of injury by incompetence or mistaken notions than they are of betrayal by malevolent men.

Notions of general public morality are not lacking. Journalists and private citizens—and very often political candidates as well—are quick to attack the tendency of public officials to employ their positions of trust in the service of their private interests and those of their friends and retainers. Such condemnations are, in the context of real life, almost always academic, for they directly contradict prevailing social values. While a man may abstractly condemn use of public power and funds for private purposes, and attack known instances of it, upon his own entrance to public office he is faced with the reality that the intensely personal support of his retainers was instrumental in his success. A refusal to grant personal advantage to friends, relatives and political associates, even at the cost of common welfare, would be taken by them as a gross breach of the most important trust that which binds together specific people.

Friendship and Trust

The quality of informal social life is ritualized to a far greater degree among Spanish-speaking Bolivians than among North Americans. In a society whose values place so great a stress upon self-

expression, the notion of silent friendship is inconceivable. Gestures and words of friendship are expected from even casual acquaintances at every encounter. Indeed, one of the major points of misunderstanding between Spanish speakers and North American visitors in Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, is the latter's difficulty in appreciating the importance of social forms which express cordiality. Close friends and casual acquaintances often greet each other not only with a handshake (which is compulsory at every encounter), but also with an *abrazo*, an embrace which involves simultaneous hugging and vigorous backslapping. Such physical demonstrations of affection between male friends—far from being seen as effeminate—are considered highly necessary in the maintenance of friendship. At informal social occasions, particularly drinking parties, male friends find nothing amiss in uttering loud public avowals of eternal affection and loyalty toward each other. North Americans, who not only find the *abrazo* rather embarrassing, but who also incline to be somewhat careless in their observance of the compulsory handshaking ritual are often seen by Bolivians as cold and standoffish.

Hospitality, as a demonstration of esteem, is invested with an equally high degree of forceful and ritualized expression, which would strike many North Americans as almost compulsive. The host is under an obligation to ply his guests with food and drink well beyond the point of satiation. At drinking parties, for example, a glass which remains empty in the hand of a guest for more than seconds is considered a distinctly unfavorable reflection upon the quality of hospitality. For their part, the guests must respond not only with effusive expressions of gratitude for the hospitality extended them, but also with a ready acceptance of the proffered food and drink. Any lapse in the exchange of generous offerings on the part of the host or grateful and ready acceptance on the part of the guest is seen as a rather sour note.

Highly important to social life is an individual's care in not treating any acquaintance, no matter how casual, as a nonentity. When a man meets a group, only one of whose members he knows, he is under an obligation to greet and exchange conversation with every other member. His friend, correspondingly, is duty-bound to see that he is introduced to every person in the group. Anyone denied an introduction and the resulting handshake and greeting, no matter how short and casual the encounter, is likely to feel mortally insulted.

The whole complex of handshaking, *abrazo* and friendly small talk which marks the behavior of acquaintances upon encountering each other is called *saludo*. One's neglect of the entire *saludo* in favor of a more casual greeting is likely to be taken by others as reflecting lack of interest in them and is reacted to accordingly.

In the most businesslike and contractual relationships, the interplay of personality assumes an importance equal to that which underlies informal friendship. Since trust is more readily placed in people than in institutions, a man is likely to enter a negotiation with more interest in the man with whom he is bargaining than in the firm which the latter represents. Accordingly, in political or commercial negotiation, the personal sensitivities of the negotiators are as crucial as the issue under discussion in determining the outcome.

A most important concept in business and political life is that of the *hombre de confianza* (man of confidence), a person with whom one sustains an acquaintance based upon an intimate and well-defined relationship, such as kinship, *compadrazgo* (the ties which exist between the parents and godparents of a child) or long and proven friendship (see ch. 6, Family). Ideally, the parties to any important negotiation should see each other as *hombres de confianza* by virtue of a past association in some other context, but where such a basis for trust does not exist, every attempt is made to immediately establish one. Frequently a series of negotiations follows only after a long prelude of polite small talk between the participants, including an interested exploration of possible mutual ties of kinship and friendship, cordial but often quite incisive questions about each other's past life and activities and general talk designed to explore each other's outlooks. The subsequent course of the transaction will be much smoother if a high degree of mutual confidence arises out of this preliminary probing.

Whether or not the participants in a transaction are known to each other as *hombres de confianza*, the climate of negotiations is always one of utmost cordiality, for at all stages the personal interaction is as important as the issue itself. A man is pleased with his dealings not only by the concessions or advantage he has obtained for his firm or political group but also by the treatment accorded him by the other negotiator. Any such concession or advantage granted his group which is not matched with recognition of himself as a person is therefore likely to arouse resentment rather than gratitude. Any personal favor granted him by the other man which is not extended with an accompanying expression of high personal regard is likely to be construed as patronizing—arising out of charity—and hence highly injurious to his self-esteem.

Familism

An important determinant of social behavior is a strong familism—on one hand, an emphasis upon strong unity and bonds of loyalty among blood kinsmen, and, on the other, a tendency to base one's judgments of others upon the social status of their families. The high degree of mutual loyalty which is expected among blood rela-

tions, even distant relatives, makes kinship the prime means for the establishment of bonds of confidence. A man's kinsmen are seen as his most important line of defense and worthy of his unquestioning and unconsidered support and assistance, and in public life, the morality of kinship loyalty far outweighs, for most, that of more general social responsibility.

In establishing relationships of trust with new acquaintances, a man will normally attempt to find kinsmen of such persons who are known to members of his own family or will attempt to determine whether their families, in general, enjoy a good reputation among both his near and distant kinsmen. Much of the social and political status which a man enjoys is seen as deriving from the public reputation of his kindred, and at the same time, his public actions are generally subject to the most intense scrutiny and criticism of his kinsmen, for their quality can reflect upon the family's position in society.

A measure of the importance of kinship as a basis for mutual trust is the traditional practice on the part of those in poorer and weaker positions of seeking to establish bonds of artificial kinship with the more affluent and socially prominent through the institution of *compadrazgo*. When a man agrees to sponsor the baptism of a child, he is involved in a relationship of strong mutual obligation with the father which is seen as being ideally almost as strong as that arising out of kinship. The bond of *compadrazgo* has no implication of social equality between the *compadres* (father and godfather), if they are of different statuses, but it does mean that the godfather (always the wealthier and more powerful of the pair) is duty-bound to use his position in the interests of both godchild and father. Although such an obligation is in reality never nearly so strong as the one which the wealthier man bears toward his own blood kin, it is seen as a degree of economic and political security for the more humble man and his family. For his part, the socially prominent man enjoys both the loyalty and affection of his *compadre*'s family and their unquestioning support. If he is a merchant (often the case is small towns), his *compadre* and many of the latter's kinspeople are his firmest clients. If he is a politician, he controls the votes of his *compadre* and the latter's family (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Most of the social life of men at all levels of Spanish-speaking society is carried on outside of the household and wider circle of kin, in clubs, in bars or simply in the street. This life, which includes close friends, colleagues and casual acquaintances, is normally kept quite apart from that which he leads within his household. With his wife and children, a man most often confines his social activity to formal and largely ceremonial gatherings with kinsmen. If the Spanish-speaking family is a closely knit unit, it is also an exclusive

one, and a man will seldom invite to his home any but those friends whom he invests with the highest degree of trust and regard (see ch. 6, Family).

Hierarchy and Leadership

Strong notions of hierarchy and authoritarian leadership color social and political life. On the one hand, men are judged by the degree to which they approximate the personality ideals. The ability to dominate by forceful projection is therefore not only a source of leadership but also one of prestige. On the other hand, concepts of responsibility and decision making have traditionally stressed the role of the strong leader speaking for a passive group, over that of a democratically organized collectivity.

Although the real political situation has varied, throughout national history, from unstable to downright chaotic, Bolivians have always tended to see as ideal a sort of order which arises out of strong, centralized political authority. In the Hispanic tradition, initiative and collective decision making are seen as ineffectual and slow means of achieving social aims.

Within parties and other alignments of political loyalty, there is always a strong leader who makes decisions for the entire group with no more than perfunctory consultation with his retainers. Such leaders rise and fall—and with them, often, their parties—but the principle of central authority remains unmodified.

In government itself, the longstanding preference for centralized authority has been reflected in Bolivia, as in most Latin American nations, by an absolute supremacy of executive power—whether wielded by a popularly elected president or a militarily imposed dictator—over the more diffuse power vested in the legislative organ.

This strong sense of centralized power represents, in part, the heritage of sociopolitical practices established by the Spanish colonial governments, which were based upon pyramidally organized, rigidly stratified authority. Within the colonies, the greatest power was vested in Crown-appointed officials, most of whom were *peninsulares* (those born in Spain), rather than natives of the area they were administering. Such high colonial officials had power to overrule even the most minor decisions of local authority. Similarly, any act or decision of the higher colonial authorities, no matter how trivial the issue involved, was subject to scrutiny and reversal by the Crown. Virtually no form of intercommunication was allowed officials at any level of authority; such communication was limited, in general, to the issuance of directives to inferiors and the acceptance of directives from superiors. Within the entire fabric of colonial policy the only locus of consultative and collective decision making lay in the locally elected town councils (*cabildos*), whose powers and attributes were, except in rare cases, very narrow. Attempts on the part of a few

republican statesmen to establish institutional means for collective responsibility and decision making have been frustrated, throughout Bolivian history, by this formidable tradition of centralized authoritarianism (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

A reflection of the pattern of hierarchy, but in a sense also one of its roots, is the strong and constant status competition in which men are seen as being involved. Such competition inevitably leads to a definite division between the winners and the losers—the most *macho* and the least. In political life, the most forceful and expressive man wins the right to speak for, and demand allegiance of, his fellows. So long as such a leader remains in undisputed command of the situation, largely by the appeal of his personality, there is little overt opposition to his decisions.

In all sociopolitical groupings, the leader is crucial to unity, for in his authority to speak for his fellows, he represents the consensus. In political life, particularly, the importance of the leader to unity is seen in the fact that both parties and factional wings within parties are often nothing more than groups of retainers who unite in support of some strong figure. During the 1962 elections, two of the largest parties running in opposition to the official Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) had stated ideological positions which were so close as to permit some sort of coalition for mutual effectiveness. Rather than seek the strength which might have resulted from at least temporary union, however, the leaders of the two parties chose to attack each other on violently personal grounds, with greater vigor than either attacked the government candidates (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

To his retainers, the ideal leader—from the President of the Republic down to the head of a small party cell or labor union local—embodies two important images of chieftainship: that of the *caudillo* (daring, aggressive strong man) and that of the *patrón* (sponsor and protector). Each of these attributes is important to the satisfaction of members and hence to the unity of the group.

A man is given the right to represent and, to some extent, dominate his fellows because he has shown himself to be the most daring and forceful member of the group and is therefore seen as being most capable of advancing common interest. Also important is the fact that any socially recognized group derives its public status from that of its spokesman. Hence, the weaker and less effectual retainers are rewarded for their loyalty and support by association with a publicly admired man. The sense of personal identity thus achieved is an important factor in cementing the loyalties of followers. The image of the *caudillo* therefore serves both to assure the group that its interests will be protected and actively sought and to enhance the self-esteem of its members.

The image of the *patrón*—the paternal, wise and powerful protector—is important to the relationship between leader and followers because it offers assurances of the type of security which arises from relationships of personal confidence. No matter how large the group, the leader must always appear to be accessible to and personally interested in every individual retainer. In practice, the accessibility and personal interest are often expressed by political and labor leaders by consenting to sponsor the baptism of their retainers' children. As *compadres* to their retainers, they assume a quasi-kinship relationship with them which effectively symbolizes the mutual esteem and personal commitment which is seen as necessary.

The Indian View

The Community

The high premium placed upon circumspection and conformity as personal qualities by the value patterns of both Quechua and Aymara speakers is strongly reflected in the nature of interpersonal relations. In contrast to the lively interaction—in the form of voluble conversation, enthusiastic greeting and, often, noisy discord—which is so apparent at all levels of Hispanic-oriented society, the social life observed in Indian communities almost always appears muted. Conversations are carried on in a lower voice, with considerably less gesturing. The enthusiasm and physical contact which are so important in the *saludo* of the Spanish speakers are lacking in the matter-of-fact greetings exchanged between the Indians.

In virtually all aspects of social life, there is some reflection of the values disparaging forceful self-expression. Observers familiar with the way of life of both the Quechua and the Aymara speakers report, for example, that few children's games native to either tradition contain any element of competition. Rather, the emphasis in childhood play is on a sober imitation of adult activities. Although soccer and volleyball have gained enthusiastic acceptance among young unmarried men, in many areas, the competitive emphasis is wholly upon the team, which usually represents a village. The concept of personal excellence—as opposed to general team quality—is almost totally neglected.

Similarly, in the most serious aspects of adult life the strong sense of competition which is part of the Hispanic tradition is largely lacking among the Indians. Although the supposed collectivist tendencies of Indian society have most often been subject to exaggeration (and even downright misrepresentation) by the usually socialistically inclined *indigenista* (exponents of Indian culture) writers, it is true that a high level of cooperation in economic activities is characteristic among both Quechua and Aymara speakers (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Ex-

pression). In most Indian communities there is a system of mutual aid in agricultural labor (usually called *aini* in both Quechua and Aymara) by which groups of men cooperate in working each others' fields in turn, during the periods of plowing and harvesting. In many communities an important measure of social status lies in the number of men an individual can muster to assist him. Since all assistance thus rendered a man in agricultural tasks must be reciprocated, most male members of such communities are constantly involved in working for others. This involvement is hardly consonant with the development of strongly competitive economic ambitions.

Although there are definite roles of leadership in Indian communities, the quality of power and its exercise have generally been much less centralized and authoritarian. On the one hand, in the traditional national social order, only those communities which were extremely remote from centers of white and *cholo* population enjoyed any degree of autonomy. Most were subject to constant interference on the part of local government officials and parish priests—even in the most minor internal matters. Very often, too, the village headman was not freely chosen by his fellows but was imposed by outside authority and was consequently seen as a creature of mistrusted white and *cholo* officials. In general, the social history of both Aymara and Quechua speakers in white-dominated society has been such that they have had few opportunities to develop patterns of internal leadership to replace those destroyed by the Spanish conquest (see ch. 5, Social Structure). On the other hand, the personality ideals disparaging aggressive and domineering behavior result in a general tendency for men to shun rather than to seek positions of leadership.

Both the attributes of leadership and its range of operation are somewhat more narrow in Quechua and Aymara social life than in that of their Spanish-speaking countrymen. While the freely chosen (and therefore trusted) leader is seen as the spokesman for the group, he is not given the right to speak without the prior consultation of those whom he represents, as is so often the case in Hispanic-oriented society. The leader is seen as instrumental in developing a consensus by coordinating the opinions of his followers, but he is not seen as defining that consensus by his own fiat. Even the leaders of the postrevolutionary *sindicatos campesinos*, who have generally been more powerful figures than the traditional community headmen, are reported by observers to make a practice of carefully determining the free consensus of their retainers before speaking in their behalf.

The strong values of conformity usually serve to make the achievement of consensus relatively easy in Quechua and Aymara groups for, conditioned from childhood to be sensitive to the opinions of his neighbors, a man is generally unlikely to maintain what he perceives to be an unpopular minority stand. Use of the fear of public scorn

and censure is one means by which an effective leader can impose his views upon recalcitrant followers. An observer of one powerful *sindicato campesino* reports, for example, that its leader makes a practice of assuring himself, privately and individually, of the support of a significant number of followers before speaking publicly on any issue. At an open meeting, after having spoken his point of view on the issue in question, he sees that his supporters speak first, then submits the matter to a quick voice vote, asking any potential opposition to speak out against what appears to be general public acceptance of his ideas.

There exists among members of most Indian communities a relatively high level of trust which can be violated by an individual only at the risk of the strongest opprobrium of his neighbors. Instances of theft and other injury do take place within the bounds of communities, but the mechanism of social control—based largely upon ostracism and public scorn and ridicule—is usually quite effective in keeping such behavior at a minimum. Anthropologists familiar with both the Quechua and the Aymara speakers describe cases in which thieves and other offenders have been driven to abandon their houses and lands to seek refuge in some place where their name and infamy are not known.

In addition to maximizing the feeling of trust which exists within the community, the extreme sensitivity to public opinion which is inculcated in the Indian from childhood serves to prevent outbreaks of overt discord between neighbors. Certainly, hostilities are felt, but even in the most obvious case of injury a man who resorts to violence in avenging himself is likely to incur the combination of ostracism and scorn which he so fears. Hence, those who feel themselves injured usually have recourse to covert means of revenge—often to witchcraft, the specialized arts of which are highly developed among both Quechua and Aymara speakers (see ch. 10, Religion).

Ideally, a high level of trust and cooperation exists among kinsmen. A man is expected to work in *aini* with his father and brothers and with the close male kinsmen of his wife. Among most Indian groups, but particularly among the Aymara, the patrilineal extended family (consisting of a man, his sons and their wives and children) is envisioned as the ideal economically interdependent unit (see ch. 6, Family).

In those communities which have been subject to severe land shortage, and in those in which the proximity of markets or other factors have introduced a cash-market orientation, this ideal pattern of kin cooperation most often breaks down. In addition to the tendency toward the individualization of landholdings, the breakdown in trust and cooperation is reflected in often bitter land disputes among groups of heirs and even between fathers and sons. The strength of the values

specifying kinship loyalty is not such as to prevent close kinsmen from employing sorcerers against one another. There is an indication that, in general, the values underlying Quechua and Aymara familism are rather weakly rooted and tend to be compromised most readily by the pressure of outside influences.

The National Social Order

Having lived for more than four centuries in what they accurately see as a hostile national social order, the Indians have few bases for establishing relationships of trust with those outside of their individual communities. The outstanding fact of Indian social life is a strong in-group feeling which, in general, defines as potentially hostile not only the white and *cholo* exploiters, but even linguistically and culturally identical Indians from neighboring communities. There are exceptions to this pattern of social isolation—the Quechua speakers of the Cochabamba Valleys, for example, whose villages often contain *cholo* residents—but in general, the members of an Indian community seek their mates from families within the bounds of the local group, repel outsiders seeking to acquire lands within the area of their community and, very often, consider Indians from other communities not only as strangers, but as enemies.

The values which discourage any show of overt violence or hostility among members of the community are relaxed with respect to outsiders. In both Quechua and Aymara areas, there are local instances of longstanding feuds between neighboring communities which have been expressed in constant and often bloody warfare (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

On an individual basis, relationships of confidence are occasionally established—even with non-Indians. In spite of the usually rigorous self-isolation of their communities, the Indians have always been acutely aware that they are members of a society which includes them with the untrusted outsiders. As individuals, therefore, many Indians have seen the necessity of seeking the protection—economic or political—of those enjoying more power than they in the national social order. For their part many non-Indians, particularly *cholos* (seeking, perhaps, some sort of commercial entree to an Indian community) have desired to gain the confidence of individual Indians. The only basis open to those who would establish such bonds of confidence across ethnic lines has always been in the models of trust established by the Hispanic value tradition—*compadrazgo* and the *patrón*-retainer tie (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The changes brought about in the Bolivian social structure by the 1952 revolution and the reforms resulting from that upheaval have resulted in vastly increased participation by Indians in national economic and political life. If land reform and universal suffrage have given them the bases for such participation, the organization of

sindicatos campesinos and the armed strength which they have enjoyed since the early days of the revolution have gone far toward the destruction of the feelings of embattled, disunited isolation which had made each community a virtual world unto itself. All recent indications point to the eventual disappearance of the adaptive values of withdrawal and self-isolation (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

As they move toward a more complete participation in the emerging revolutionary social order, the Indians continue to structure their behavior largely around models provided by the traditional values. Much of the political participation is ordered by communal, rather than wholly individual, interest. The relationships of trust sustained both by individuals and by whole communities with those commanding central power in political life have been largely structured around the old bases of *personalismo* and *compadrazgo*.

The degree to which communal solidarity, rather than perception of individual interest, guides this new Indian participation in political life is seen in the fact that such factionalism as has arisen in their ranks tends strongly to follow community lines. In the populous and politically active province of Cliza (Cochabamba), for example, the success of one opposition leader, Wálter Guevara Arze, in mustering support among the Quechua speakers has resulted in bitter rifts between villages of his followers and those loyal to the official party. In villages of both sides, there is no openly expressed minority opinion (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Individual national political leaders have generally gained the support of Indian communities by the establishment of relationships of *compadrazgo* and other forms of mutual trust and obligation with key persons in such groups. For example, the energetic leader of the Aymara *sindicatos campesinos* of Omasuyos (La Paz Department), Toribio Salas, owes his virtually unanimous following to the fact that he and his closest collaborators have made a consistent practice of cultivating such relationships with influential men in every village of the province. The individual loyalty of his followers is cemented largely by a chain reaction of social process, for those leaders who are his *compadres* and close friends are duty-bound to espouse his cause, and their influence within their villages normally results in the establishment of close to unanimous support (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

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SECTION II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 12

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT

Since 1826 Bolivia has had 15 constitutions adopted through a variety of methods, including legislative amendment, executive decree and action by constituent assemblies. Few of these constitutional changes have reflected significant change in basic political philosophy or even in wording. Each fundamental law adopted in Bolivian history has provided for a democratic republic in the tradition of European liberalism and for basic civil rights, an independent judiciary, a representative legislature and a limited executive. However, until the 1952 revolution, all were written from the exclusive point of view of a small, educated and propertied upper class which saw itself alone as capable of directing affairs. Consistent with such a viewpoint, this group established literacy and property-holding qualifications for the exercise of citizenship rights which effectively disfranchised the great mass of the population.

Similarly, in real political behavior, as opposed to constitutional form, the governing minority consistently violated every tenet of the democratic liberalism which it verbally espoused. The great majority of people—Indian and *cholo* (of mixed racial and cultural heritage) peasants and laborers—were politically and economically defenseless against elite power. Laws regarding wages, working conditions and land tenure were generally written in exclusive service of upper-class interests, and the few provisions that existed to protect the interests of the poor and powerless were left unenforced (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Provisions written into each of the 15 constitutions providing for an orderly succession of governments through elections and those designed to delimit the powers of the president were seldom honored. Governments rose and fell through armed revolt and maintained their authority through the fiat of armed strength. Despite the carefully worded provisions for the separation of powers, the judicial and legislative branches were never independent of the executive. Even duly elected presidents often resorted to government by decree. The frequent rewriting of constitutions reflected little more than attempts by the governments to legitimize their rule.

The price of this minority rule and disregard of constitutional reform was an extreme instability of government. During the nineteenth century, Bolivian history was marked by more than 60 coups d'etat. From 1925 to 1952 no president completed his term of office On the one hand, the disfranchisement of a large segment of the population left all governments with a scant basis of popular support. Every pretender to power found it easy to recruit armed support for the overthrow of the incumbent government. On the other hand, the tradition of strong personalist leadership and disrespect of institutional order gave encouragement to the ambitions of such pretenders (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

This facade of political instability, however, cloaked an unchanging and rigid social stability. If governments rose and fell and presidents exiled their opponents or went themselves into exile, the participants in such affairs were usually drawn from the same social groups. The upper class consistently retained all decision-making power. Although many of the presidents who established themselves through force of arms had been born members of the lower class, they were generally assimilated to the elite, and their rule faithfully reflected the interests of that group.

The 1952 revolution, which almost totally destroyed the basis of elite power, was immediately reflected in profound modifications in political life and government policy, and—somewhat later—in constitutional form. The government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario—MNR), in an attempt to effect a more equitable distribution of power and economic opportunity, initiated a program which included: nationalization of the country's major economic resource, the tin mines; agrarian reform; educational reform; and universal suffrage. In 1961, 9 years after the triumph of its revolution, the MNR government promulgated the fifteenth, and latest, constitution, which embodies much of the revolutionary philosophy of its writers.

The genuine efforts of the MNR government to define and serve the interests of a majority of the population seemed in early 1963 to have been rewarded by a measure of political stability almost unknown in the country's history. Both MNR presidents, Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952–56) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956–60), were able to complete their full 4-year terms—the first to do so in a quarter century—and, in 1963, Paz Estenssoro had completed 2½ years of a second term with little evidence of danger to his rule. In general, it appeared that attempts to gain wide-scale popular support for MNR government (and hence strong opposition to any attempts at its overthrow) had thus far been successful.

Nevertheless, much of the old body of attitudes and practices persists. The executive remains by far the strongest branch of govern-

ment, both in constitutional form and in real practice, and the leadership exercised by the president has been no less personalistic than in the past. In 1956, after a period of 4 years during which no elections were held, the legislature, a two-chamber body called the National Congress (Congreso Nacional), was reactivated and offers the numerically weak opposition a limited opportunity for political expression. True to traditional Bolivian practice, however, it remains overshadowed by the executive. The same is true of the judiciary, which, although formally responsible only to the laws and the Constitution, has little real independence of the presidential will.

A constitutional keystone of the supremacy of the executive is the strong grip it legally maintains on departmental and local government, for the administrators of all territorial divisions and municipalities are named by, and responsible to, the executive. Thus, local action, political patronage and other means of exerting power are concentrated in executive hands to the almost total exclusion of the other branches.

Another means by which power and initiative are monopolized by the executive lies in the constitutional provision permitting the president, under certain conditions, to assume extraordinary powers after having declared the nation to be in a state of emergency due to war or widespread disorder (called a "state of siege"—*estado de sitio*). Under this provision, which occurs in most Latin American constitutions and was in most of Bolivia's earlier charters, the president may suspend civil guarantees, impose censorship and levy taxes on his own initiative. There are certain limitations on this power—largely in the form of a requirement that legislative approval be obtained in order to continue a state of siege beyond 90 days or to declare such a state more than once in the same year. In view of the numerical dominance of the MNR in Congress and the relative weakness of that body with respect to the executive, however, the limitations do little to stay the president's hand, and the power of the state of siege has remained an extremely effective weapon for dealing with threats of the opposition.

CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Constitutional Development, 1826–1961

After independence had been won under the leadership of Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, a General Deliberative Assembly was elected by the white, native-born upper class and inaugurated its work in July 1825 in the city of Chuquisaca (now Sucre). On August 6 independence was formally declared by the adoption of the Acta de Independencia. Five days later the decision was made to name the republic after the Liberator, Simón Bolívar, and formally to designate him the "Father and Protector" of the new nation. This same action

made him the supreme executive power so long as he chose to remain in the country.

The General Assembly of 1825 went no further than to establish the guidelines for future government organization. The new nation was to be a republic with a unitary, highly centralized government composed of three branches—legislative, executive and judicial. In addition, a flag and monetary system were chosen.

Bolívar entered La Paz on August 18, 1825, and assumed the dictatorial powers with which he had been invested. Openly expressing his doubts as to the ability of the Bolivians to govern themselves, he immediately dissolved the provisional junta. His acts of the next few months—a series of decrees, resolutions and orders—clearly reflected his thinking in social, political and economic matters. For example, he issued a number of decrees abolishing the conditions under which the Indians had, for centuries, lived as virtual serfs. He gave great attention to the question of educational reform and road construction.

In addition, he attempted to reduce the influence of the Church in public matters. None of these efforts at reform long survived his departure from the country.

Bolívar continued his rule by fiat throughout the rest of 1825. In the meantime, the General Deliberative Assembly had adjourned after providing that Marshal Sucre was to replace the Liberator in his absence from the country.

A Constituent Assembly opened on May 26, 1826, and enacted a series of statutes designed to govern the country until the adoption of a constitution. Instead of drafting the basic charter itself, the delegates asked Bolívar, now out of the country, to draft one for them. The paternalistic Liberator did so, forwarding a document which, with relatively minor revisions, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly as Bolivia's first constitution on November 6, 1826.

This charter provided for a unitary republic with sovereignty formally vested in the Bolivian people. A four-fold separation of the powers of government was delineated. Government was headed by a lifetime president, responsible to no other branch, supported by a vice-president, who was charged with the routine administration of government and was responsible to the legislature. In the tricameral congress, two houses, the Chamber of Tribunes and the Senate, had fixed terms, and the Chamber of Censors served for life. The Chamber of Tribunes possessed general legislative power; the Senate was charged with the codification of law and the reorientation of court and church officials; and the Chamber of Censors had general supervisory powers, including that of impeachment, over the proper observance of constitutional and legal provisions. The judicial branch was completely independent.

The fourth branch of government, the electoral body, was selected on the basis of 1 elector to 100 voters. Not only was this system indirect at its base, but the indirectness was compounded in that the electoral body nominated slates of three persons to fill each vacancy in the legislature, from which each chamber made its own selections.

The Bolivarian Constitution, with its complex and sometimes cumbersome provisions, and furthermore soon decried as a foreign imposition, remained in force for but a short time and was disregarded after the departure of Sucre in 1828 (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). It did, however, set certain precedents in both principle and practice that proved pervasive in Bolivian political life from then on.

One effect, still in force, was the establishment of a system in which a great preponderance of power was put into the hands of the executive and little effective curb put on his use of it. Not only was Bolívar's lack of confidence in the ability of even the educated minority of the country collectively to govern themselves openly expressed, but his observation of the common people in the whole northern half of Spanish South America led him to believe that a constitution plunging them into a pure democracy could bring only chaos. Hence, the lifetime presidency of large and irrevocable powers, he thought, offered the best chance for stability.

Distrust of a government founded on a broad electorate was reflected not only in the highly selective manner of establishing the electoral branch of government, but in the restriction of voting rights. The franchise was granted only to those literate in Spanish who possessed property worth 400 pesos or engaged in an art or science or held some other remunerative position; all personal or domestic servants were excluded. Such restrictions limited the vote to about 10 percent of the population, and they prevailed in successive constitutions, whose provisions differed only in degree, until the mid-twentieth century.

After President Sucre resigned in 1828, General Andrés Santa Cruz ruled as dictator for 2 years. He then called a Congress that approved his previous acts and drafted a new organic law which was adopted on August 31, 1831.

The 1831 Constitution abolished most of the novel features of Bolívar's document—the tricameral legislature and the lifetime presidency, for example—and substituted an organization more in line with other Latin American systems of the time. A bicameral legislature and a 4-year presidential term, renewable indefinitely through successive reelections, were established.

In 1834 another constitution was promulgated by Santa Cruz. It was basically a rewriting of that of 1831, and the few changes that were instituted were of a merely formalistic nature. Its historic importance lies in the fact that under it the short-lived Perú-Bolivian Confederation was governed (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Between 1839, when Santa Cruz and his confederation were overthrown, and 1880, when the nation's first durable charter was adopted, Bolivia was ruled under 5 constitutions, and a sixth was framed but never adopted. Except in regard to the length of the presidential term and the powers ascribed to the president, these charters were little varied in either language or substance and, for the most part, represented little more than attempted *ex post facto* legalizations of strong-man regimes imposed by force of arms. The constitution promulgated by José Miguel de Velasco in 1839 went far toward weakening the power of the president, probably in reaction to what had been a headstrong and impulsive rule by Santa Cruz. Those of José Ballivián (1843), Manuel Isidoro Belzú (1851), José María de Achá (1861), Mariano Melgarejo (1868) and Agustín Morales (1871), on the other hand, provided for the traditionally strong executive. When Velasco was briefly returned to power (1847–48) by the overthrow of Ballivián, a projected constitution similar to that of 1839 was framed, but its promulgation was prevented by the successful coup d'etat staged by Belzú.

In 1878 the tenth constitution of Bolivia was adopted. This was a document of extreme importance, for its readaptation—the 1880 charter—was the first durable constitution, remaining in effect for an unprecedented 58 years. Indeed, some constitutional authorities—seeing in the subsequent charters little more than a reworking of the 1880 document—believe that its spirit persisted up to the 1952 revolution.

During the time it was in effect, the 1880 Constitution was amended several times. Among the most fundamental of these changes were a series of modifications adopted in 1906 regarding religious freedom and the special privileges traditionally enjoyed by the clergy and by military personnel. Replacing a provision in the original text which forbade the public exercise of any religion but the Roman Catholic (except in immigrant colonies), the reform of 1906 decreed absolute religious freedom, although the Catholic Church remained the officially established and protected one. Both the clergy and the military lost their traditional right to trial in special courts and came under the jurisdiction of the common court system. Other important amendments were adopted in 1931; a comptroller general's office was established, the judicial branch was made independent, and habeas corpus, previously lacking, was specificially introduced.

The 1880 Constitution was explicitly designed to maintain social, economic and political relationships according to the status quo of that period. It continued to maintain property and literacy requirements for the electorate, denied religious toleration and guaranteed the property and special status of the Church. It was under this constitution

that the basis for the party system, as it existed until the national revolution of 1952, developed.

The business-minded Liberal Party, which dominated politics for the first two decades of the twentieth century, blunted the edge of repressive government, and the century-long period of flagrant military rule came to an end with the Liberal Party's ascent to power in 1898 (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The regimes of both the Liberal Party and the Republican Party (which succeeded in power during the 1920's) did much toward the modernization of the country. In addition to the tradition-breaking constitutional reforms of 1906, other gains were made; for the first time in the nation's history education was officially encouraged, mineral resources were rapidly developed and a concerted effort was made to develop a nationwide transportation system. Nevertheless, neither party did anything to effect changes in the social system. By the retention of literacy requirements and by property laws which made possible the continued concentration of lands in the ownership of a few, the great mass of Indians and *cholos* remained politically and economically helpless.

An accompanying feature of the rapid but uneven development of the economy in the direction of almost total dependence upon mineral export was the tightening control over Bolivian politics exercised by a small group of tin magnates, in particular the Patiño family. The Patiños were instrumental in the election of Daniel Salamanca to the presidency in 1931 after the overthrow of the unpopular Hernán Siles (1926–30) and continued to be influential in the determination of policy throughout most of the remaining prerevolutionary years. Their influence was particularly visible in the repressive labor policies of most pre-1952 governments, excluding those of David Toro, Germán Busch and Gualberto Villarroel (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Two events during the 1930's combined to crack the static mold into which Bolivia's political, social and economic life had been cast during the years of Liberal and Republican rule. The first was the world depression, which struck the country in 1930 and nearly destroyed its tin-based economy. The other was the disastrous defeat suffered in the Chaco War (1932–35), which created so total a lack of public confidence in succeeding governments that none was able to avoid violent overthrow.

The first evidence of the onset of significant change came when a strange assortment of military nationalists, intellectuals and socialists, under the nominal leadership of Colonel David Toro, seized power in May 1936. After a short but hectic period of power, Toro was replaced by Colonel Germán Busch, who governed until 1939 when he died, presumably a suicide. The complexion, motivation and accomplishments of the Toro-Busch administrations are still much in doubt.

In any event, they apparently represented an inconsistent but nonetheless intense revolt against the old patterns of rule by oligarchy.

Their legacy was the 1938 Constitution, an interesting reflection of the new social ferment the country was experiencing. The Busch Constitution, the twelfth in the country's history, was in form a revised version of the 1880 document, but substantively it embodied revolutionary changes in the context of Bolivian society of the period. Human rights were declared superior to property rights; the national interest in the subsoil and its riches was declared preeminent; and there was a hopeful insistence on educational facilities for all children. These pronouncements were extremely radical in the context of the traditional views of the elite, which had consciously rejected universal education in its determination to retain its grip on the country. A key provision recognized the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. This was to have its influence on future political developments, for it was through the armed strength of the unions of the miners and *campesinos* (peasants) that Bolivia underwent revolutionary change in the 1950's.

The bold, new measures of the Busch Constitution were nullified after his death by the government of General Enrique Peñaranda, which took office in 1940 with the support of the Army and the large mining interests. In keeping with its general emphasis on the protection of property rights, it compensated the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey for the expropriation of its properties undertaken by Colonel Toro.

The excesses of the Peñaranda government, particularly in dealing with a miners' strike, led to its overthrow in 1943 and its replacement by a government under Major Gualberto Villarroel. The new President was the leader of a strange coalition, the two dominant elements of which were the Cause of the Fatherland (Razón de Patría—RADEPA), an extremely nationalistic military organization, and the MNR, largely dominated by non-Communist radical intellectuals clustered around the central figure of Víctor Paz Estenssoro. In addition, the Villarroel government, at least in the beginning, numbered among its supporters Communists, important leaders of the miners' union and anti-United States elements thought to admire the Nazi movement in Germany.

After a period of contradictory policies, reflective of the nature of the government, Villarroel was overthrown and assassinated in 1946. The postwar governments, once again dominated by the mine owners and the traditionally conservative parties, then sought to reverse the direction of change by attempting to suppress the growing labor movement and other forces agitating for basic reform.

Both the Villarroel regime and the conservative government which followed it left new constitutions as their contribution to an already

complicated chronicle. The nation's thirteenth charter was adopted in 1945; after the fall of Villarroel his conservative successors followed traditional practice in sanctifying their revolution with another constitution in 1947. This basic law remained in force until the current constitution was adopted in 1961.

Background of the 1961 Constitution

All current constitutional developments in Bolivia must be considered in the context of the national revolution of the MNR, a continuing system of reform inaugurated in 1952 (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). A cornerstone of MNR political philosophy has been the necessity for effective redistribution of economic resources and the subordination of individual and corporate property rights to the collective good. In this conviction, the newly triumphant MNR regime almost immediately (in 1952) decreed the expropriation of the three largest tin-mining companies and followed this measure a year later with a full-scale land reform. At the same time, perceiving in the Army a dangerous opponent to its power and program, it set about rendering the military establishment virtually powerless, through purging its leaders and creating peasant militias as a counterforce. Educational and electoral reforms were initiated to provide the long-absent foundation for self-government. The traditional literacy requirement, which had sustained what amounted to government-by-minority, was abolished.

All of the reforms, sweeping and permanent, were accomplished without resort to constitutional change. Indeed, all major political and economic changes were complete, and in the opinion of most observers, the revolution had entered a period of relative stability before the governing MNR turned its attention, in 1960, to the drafting of what was to be Bolivia's fifteenth constitution. The slowness with which the revolutionary regime, in contrast to its predecessors, approached the matter of constitutional reform reflects an explicit point of view long held by its leaders.

The leading thinkers of the MNR, many of them professors of law, recognized that their society had never succeeded in developing constitutional forms to fit its basic needs, but basically disagreed with the conventionally accepted concept of Bolivia as an unstable and continually changing society. On the contrary, they complained, in all its history Bolivia had changed hardly at all. The chronicle of more than a dozen constitutions was merely a facade, hiding a political system where power remained where it had always been—in the hands of a very small group at the top.

The MNR leaders reasoned that the constantly changing constitutional scene had directly contributed to the maintenance of the status quo. By focusing attention on the legalistic aspects of constitutional forms—to which practice had never conformed—the elite had diverted

the energies of the population from dealing in practical fashion with basic social and economic problems.

Carlos Montenegro, a writer and commentator closely identified with the MNR, in his influential *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje* (Nationalism and Colonialism), had expressed this distrust of constitutional formalism with great directness in the 1940's. In his view, constitutionalism had served the oligarchy "more effectively than an army to consolidate itself in power. The extraordinary privileges granted to private industry and the limitations of the state's sovereignty had been established beneath that majestic tutelage [of the Constitution]."

This view of constitutional history had also been expressed earlier in the century by José Carrasco, whose widely known *Estudios Constitucionales* had also attacked the utilization of constitutional legalism as a device for the economic exploitation of the country's resources by the ruling class.

The constitutional philosophy of the MNR was also influenced by exposure to a wide variety of contemporary political movements. Before coming to power in 1952 the leaders of the party had been in close contact with the pro-Nazi views of their erstwhile allies in the RADEPA; with Peronism in Argentina, where Paz had spent much of the interlude between the Villarroel government's fall and the 1952 revolution; with both the Stalinist and Trotskyite versions of communism in the form of support from the Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB) and the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR); and with the extemporaneous nationalism of the Toro-Busch period during the late 1930's.

From this extremely diverse historical experience evolved a kind of pragmatism in dealing with the need for changes in Bolivian society. Thus, the MNR has vigorously supported nationalization in certain important areas of economic life but has avoided a doctrinaire espousal of this method to deal with all economic problems; in fact, the government has recently negotiated leases with several United States and other foreign oil companies. The Army was nearly abolished because of the revolutionary regime's initial apprehension over the power of the military, but it was later restored as the regime came to feel more secure.

The government under the MNR adopted a program which, by Bolivian standards, has been both revolutionary and nationalistic. These values have been thoroughly incorporated into the 1961 Constitution and the important laws and decrees which preceded it. But in comparison with the constitutional systems adopted by governments which also share these values—such as the Cuba of Fidel Castro or the United Arab Republic—the Bolivian national revolution has been relatively moderate. The institutions of representative govern-

ment—competing political parties, periodic elections, separation in the powers of government and active, self-conscious interest groups—have all been retained in the Constitution, though the system may function far less effectively and with far less freedom than in better regulated and more stable societies (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). The revolution has also successfully avoided entanglement with the political goals of both branches of the Communist movement with which the MNR has been associated in the past; its use of the slogan "workers, peasants and the middle class" to denote the interests it serves is an obvious attempt to differentiate the national revolution from Marxist-Leninist ideology (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The most significant result of the revolution and the MNR's pragmatic approach to the solution of national problems has been a greater harmony between constitutional form and real practice. Sentiments regarding the need for universal education have come closer to fulfillment than ever in the past. Land reform, though its hasty application has caused considerable economic upheaval, has laid a basis for a much more equitable social system. And universal suffrage has made the expressed sentiments of democracy more meaningful than ever before.

Nonetheless, much reform in political practice remains wholly or partially unaffected. Although the basis of suffrage has been broadened, freedom of electoral choice remains severely restricted by the repressive and fraudulent measures sometimes used by the incumbent governments to assure their continuance in power. Similarly, there have been known instances of blatant violation of the civil rights guaranteed in the 1961 Constitution by the very political leaders who wrote it. Such evidence as was available in early 1963 suggests, however, that the social, political and economic reforms, begun as the practical action of the MNR and codified in its Constitution, have become a permanent part of Bolivian life and that the country and its society have embarked on an era of continued change and modernization (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The 1961 Constitution

The new constitution drafted by the MNR regime was promulgated by President Víctor Paz Estenssoro on August 4, 1961. The work of a previously constituted Congressional Reform Commission, it was confirmed and adopted by an extraordinary session of the National Congress which met during July 1961 and completed its work on July 29.

Entitled the "Political" Constitution, as were all of the Republic's former basic charters to differentiate them from ecclesiastical constitutions, the new document reflects the history and experience of the national revolution and the government it has supported. In form,

however, the government which emerged is not radically different from that which existed in Bolivia prior to the national revolution.

Roman Catholicism continues to be the official religion of the Republic. An increased emphasis on economic planning and the rights of labor has been introduced into the Constitution, though private property rights continue to be recognized. The MNR Constitution also extends the legal rights of citizenship to illiterates—nearly 80 percent of the population—the first constitution in Bolivian history to do so. This latter step confirmed in the constitutional sense the electoral system instituted by a decree of July 21, 1952 (No. 3128) and the later Electoral Law (No. 4315) of 1956 establishing universal suffrage.

The government structure continues to be unitary with pronounced centralization of power on the national level. Within the three branches of government, the executive continues to overshadow the legislative and judicial branches. The Constitution provides for a relatively typical Latin American executive. A president, vice-president and ministers of state, each in charge of one of the specialized executive departments, are entrusted with the direction of the affairs of the Republic.

The President of the Republic remains, as he has always been, the chief repository of power in the political system. As such, the office retains its traditional powers in the areas of decree legislation, foreign relations and the command of the security forces of the state. The executive's power to issue decree laws has been a particularly crucial one; this function is widely used whenever the Republic is in a formal state of siege, as it was during much of 1961. Though the decree power may not legally be used to amend or repeal constitutional provisions, it has historically served this function in Bolivian governmental practice and has continued to do so under the MNR government.

Appointment powers remain an additional and almost inexhaustible reservoir of opportunities to influence internal decision making. Most important, the president since 1952 has been both the leader of the state and of the revolutionary party and thus holds an unusual concentration of power, even for Latin American nations which traditionally favor strong executives. Slight procedural changes have been introduced into the executive's role in the budgetary process, and new functions have been assigned the president in the increased emphasis on state economic planning.

The legislature, at least in constitutional theory, is no longer deprived of its powers as it was during the first years of the MNR government when it did not meet at all and the executive carried almost the total burden of government. The National Congress is a bicameral body composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. A new provision requires that all deputies be affiliated with a political

party or coalition of parties, in accordance with the general provision that political representation in the Republic be accomplished through political parties.

The traditional functions of the Congress have not undergone extensive change. The centrality of the legislature to the budgetary process, at least in a formal sense, has been retained and somewhat simplified by the proviso that the legislators may request a specific financial project from the executive. If the executive does not satisfy this request within 10 days, the Congress may adopt its own proposal by a simple majority vote. Congressional approval--usually obtained *pro forma*—is also required for presidential decrees though interim approval may be granted by the Legislative Commission, a new body which looks after congressional interests between sessions.

The National Congress also amends and interprets the Constitution. Amendments and interpretations differ from ordinary legislation in that they require a two-thirds majority for passage and are not subject to presidential veto. Whether these formal powers of the legislature will be realized in practice is difficult to tell, given the short time the new Constitution has been in force, but this branch of government has in reality exercised only a small part of its functions in the past, and the pattern of acquiescence to the will of the executive seems likely to continue.

The Constitution provides for a judicial structure composed of the Supreme Court, district courts and other courts that may be authorized in subsequent legislation. Though all judges are to be independent and subservient only to the law, a shortening of the term of office at all levels of the judiciary may be an attempt to hedge against the possible development of a judiciary overly independent from the rest of the government and its political goals. Evidence for this motivation may also be found in the deletion of a constitutional provision permitting the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction over litigation contesting congressional resolutions affecting political rights. Its former right of intervention in cases involving civil rights has been retained. A limited form of judicial review is extended to the Supreme Court.

The Constitution generally endorses the legality of courts which have functioned for some time in the area of agrarian, labor and electoral affairs. A provision of the preceding Constitution vesting the power to adjudicate electoral disputes in the regular courts has been deleted in view of the creation of a system of electoral courts on both national and departmental levels.

The Constitution provides a detailed outline of the individual's rights, duties and guarantees in relation to the state. All persons are considered equal before the law, and a conventional list of civil rights, such as freedom of association, individual expression, press, education,

petition, travel and labor, is guaranteed. Many of the civil rights stipulated in the Constitution have been violated during 1961 and 1962 in the case of individuals antagonistic to the government, though large-scale repression has not occurred. The new charter includes a lengthy section on the citizen's economic duties. All are enjoined to work according to their capacities in socially useful activity, to contribute proportionately to the revenue of the state and to advance the interests of "social service and security" in the community at large.

In return, broad provision is made for the social and economic welfare of the individual. The system of state social security is to provide support for a wide variety of contingencies, such as sickness, unemployment, old age and death. The state is also to provide assistance in the areas of maternity aid, general family welfare and public housing. Most of these constitutional provisions, for a variety of reasons, are only formal goals as yet unsupported by effective programs of implementation. Bolivia's limited social and political resources will probably impede the realization of these goals for many years.

In questions of legal responsibility, *ex post facto* judgments are proscribed, as well as the use of extraconstitutional tribunals. The death penalty has been abolished. A provision recognizing the right of diplomatic asylum formalizes traditional Bolivian and Latin American practice. The maximum time during a public emergency for which a person may be held under arrest prior to arraignment before a court has been increased from 2 days to 6. Criticism of the living conditions under which such persons were detained in 1961 has resulted in specific safeguards as to diet, communication and visiting rights for the families of detainees.

There is heavy emphasis on the economic reforms the MNR has attempted to introduce over the past decade. Private enterprise is recognized but restricted. Any accumulation of capital which tends to make the state subservient to private interests—a reference to the past power of the tin barons—is prohibited. Public service franchises must be limited to 40-year periods. The state's ownership of the soil, the subsoil and the Republic's natural resources—a conventional concept in Latin American jurisprudence—is asserted. The development of petroleum resources is the exclusive prerogative of the state, though limited concessions can be made. The government is no longer required to compensate the owners of nationalized property beforehand, an obvious reference to the inability of the state to pay in the case of the tin mines. Utilization of sources of nuclear energy is a public function.

The right of foreign concerns to seek diplomatic intervention on their behalf—formerly recognized—is abrogated. The government's

duty to play an active role in overseeing and planning the economy is stipulated. Labor is declared a social obligation and "the foundation of the social and economic order." Extremely strict safeguards for trade unions and their officers are stated, along with an explicit affirmation of the right to strike.

The MNR's sweeping agrarian reform program is recognized and sanctioned in a special section of the charter, in striking contrast to the almost total neglect of rural matters in previous constitutions. The right to possess land is said to derive from work performed on the land. As the representative of the state, the National Agrarian Reform Service plays an adjudicative and directing role over all rural property in the Republic. The explicit right of the government to redistribute rural properties is recognized. Generalized guides are constitutionally established for the formulation of public policy on agrarian matters. Thus, the legal status of the peasant homestead and small farm are unconditionally guaranteed, while medium-sized and commercial properties are conditionally recognized if they fulfill social functions. The large estate (*latifundio*), with its extremely inefficient utilization of the soil, is prohibited. Communal and cooperative arrangements for working the land are supported and are to be regulated by subsequent legislation. The state is to recognize the peasant leagues (*sindicatos campesinos*) and to sponsor educational programs in rural areas.

Great emphasis is placed on the role of education in developing a more productive and sophisticated society. The government is obligated to emphasize the technical and scientific aspects of higher education. Vocational education for the *compesinos* is to be facilitated, and literacy for the whole population is established as a national goal (see ch. 8, Education).

In the area of military organization, the armed forces have been expanded to include the Air Force and the River and Lake Forces, as well as the Army. The popular militias—created by the MNR—are formally sanctioned and stated to be part of the military reserves. The national police are explicitly placed under the authority of the president and are to be administered by the Minister of Government (see ch. 25, Public Order).

The former provision for constitutional amendments is retained. This may be accomplished on the initiative of either chamber of the legislature. Passage by two-thirds of the members present in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies is required. Additionally, in order to strengthen the popular mandate of the amending Congress, it is required that amendment take place in the first congressional session following an election for the Chamber of Deputies. The President does not hold the power of veto for amendments.

The legislative houses may also clarify issues involving constitutional interpretation by a congressional resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote. As in the case of amendments, the president may not officially object to such action on the part of the legislature.

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The Executive

The executive branch of the government is composed of the President of the Republic, who functions both as head of state and head of government, the vice-president and the Council of Ministers. The president and vice-president are elected by direct universal suffrage. The term of office for both officials is 4 years, and an individual is permitted to serve two consecutive terms, after which he must retire for 4 years before being eligible to stand for another election. Current ministers or heads of state agencies, close blood or marital relations of the current officeholders, and members of the clergy are prohibited from holding either of the two offices.

The president has broad powers, in conformity with Bolivian tradition. He is charged with the general duty of enforcing and implementing the law and may issue the appropriate decrees and orders to secure this end. He has the right to veto bills proposed by the legislature and may convene special congressional sessions when an appropriate need arises. He is charged with the preservation of internal civil order as well as with the external defense of the Republic.

One of the president's most important powers in the area of preserving order involves the use of the "state of siege." The declaration of a state of siege may only be made by the chief executive during a period of exceptional domestic or foreign threat. Such action may be taken only with the consent of the Council of Ministers. Ordinarily, a state of siege must be terminated within a 90-day period and cannot be re-invoked during the same year without the special permission of the Congress or the Legislative Commission acting for it. During a state of siege the president may impose additional taxes, increase the size of the armed forces and enforce certain restrictions on freedom of movement. Civil rights may be suspended, but only in the case of individuals, rather than general groups of the population, and with the subsequent sanction of competent judicial authority. The executive may also confine persons who threaten the public order to a specific village or town, provided that such confinement does not imperil the health of such persons. Censorship may be imposed. Members of the Congress, however, are explicitly exempted from any such restrictions, and the executive must justify its use of the state of siege power to the subsequent meeting of the Congress. During the numerous crises in 1961 arising from political agitation and

labor strikes, the state of siege was resorted to frequently by the government.

The chief executive is also charged with the conduct of foreign relations; he appoints and receives diplomatic officials and negotiates treaties on behalf of the Republic. He has a large measure of fiscal power; he administers the national taxes and can decree the disbursement of state revenue through the various ministers. This latter power is exercised in conformity with both national and departmental budgets which the executive is to draft and present to the Congress for its approval. Supervision of municipal government is also entrusted to him. He must deliver a report on the state of the Republic to the Congress at its first regular meeting; he also replies through the ministers to inquiries which may be pressed by members of the two chambers. The president is constitutionally required to enforce the decisions of the judiciary; he may additionally decree amnesties for political offenses, a power widely used by the second MNR president, Siles Zuazo.

The power of appointment is one of the chief executive's most important sources of strength; it enables him to exercise control over the large number of public servants at all levels of government. In general, the executive names all government officials whose appointments are not specifically delegated to another branch of the government. Specifically, he appoints the ministers, the two attorneys general, the comptroller general and the national superintendent of banks, as well as the presidents of important state agencies, from the lists of candidates proposed by the two chamber of Congress. In his capacity as captain general of the armed forces, the president also designates the commander in chief of the forces, and the individual commanders of the three services within the forces: the Army, the Air Force and the River and Lake Forces, which substitutes for a navy in landlocked Bolivia. The commandant general of the National Corps of Police and Carabineros also is named by the president (see ch. 25, Public Order; ch. 27, The Armed Forces). The president's already extensive powers in this area are broadened even further by the provision that, in the event of resignation or death of an official ordinarily appointed by the legislature, the president may make an interim appointment when the particular appointing chamber is in recess.

Traditionally, the patronage system, functioning under the general direction of the president, has severely interfered with the development of an impartial, effective body of public servants. Some efforts, however, have been made in the direction of professionalization in recent years. After a series of preliminary studies, the National Civil Service Office was created in the Office of the Presidency by decree in May 1956. This body was given a broad mandate in the field of public

administration: salaries were to be regularized; a classification plan developed; and training programs for employees encouraged. By 1961, however, it had accomplished little. Recommendations were made in 1962 for the creation of a National Civil Service Commission, but as of early 1963, no action had been taken.

The lack of a professional spirit and of a sense of responsibility toward the public have been consistently reflected in low standards of performance and honesty. Both Bolivian and foreign observers have long decried the widespread acceptance of bribes on the part of public officials, and reports of the La Paz press in the early 1960's indicated that such dishonesty was a continuing problem (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Similarly, according to both Bolivian and North American sources, salary schedules are primitive, and payrolls often are not met on time. A rational attitude toward the utilization of time is generally lacking, and inefficient utilization of the workday by employees is a universal complaint of observers.

Standards in budgetary administration are little better than those in personnel administration. Standardized forms are not always used, and their absence handicaps the comparison of proposed expenditures with past ones. Estimates are often defended orally in the Council of Ministers by the minister concerned, and written, detailed background reports are seldom provided. The absence of trained personnel has wide-reaching effects; cost accounting, performance budgeting and general programing are all primitive. This general deficiency in the techniques of budgetary administration has, without doubt, been partially responsible for the continuing difficulty in bringing order out of the chaotic condition of Bolivia's public finances (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Efforts toward a rationalization of the system of public administration have been made extremely difficult by the traditional importance of party patronage, which has probably increased under the MNR. Membership in, or at least overt support of, the party has generally been a requirement for public employment with the exception of a few government agencies.

Since nationalization, public employment has been badly swollen by the large numbers of industrial workers in the various industries affected. Given the armed strength and political influence of these groups, the government has been powerless to improve the situation (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The president is assisted by the secretary general of the presidency, who aids in coordinating and preparing decrees, and by a military assistant, who performs routine housekeeping duties for the president's official establishment. Three governmental agencies are included within the organizational structure of the presidency—the National

Planning Council, the National Council of Monetary Stabilization and the National Office of Information. With the exception of the National Office of Information, the actual duties and personnel of these bodies are negligible; the National Office of Information performs public relations functions for the government, including the administration of the publicly owned radio station, as well as the less conventional function of intelligence and surveillance of key individuals in the Republic.

The president also serves as the highest appellate authority in title disputes under the agrarian reform. He has ultimate authority generally over the work of the National Agrarian Reform Service, the implementing agency of the agrarian reform program (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The line of succession to the presidency is from the vice-president to the president of the Senate and then to the president of the Chamber of Deputies. The vice-president ordinarily serves as presiding officer over the Senate, the upper body in the legislature.

In mid-1962 the Council of Ministers included 12 Ministers: Foreign Affairs and Worship; Government, Justice and Immigration; Finance and Statistics; National Defense; Education and Fine Arts; Public Works and Communications; Public Health; National Economy; Labor and Social Security; Mines and Petroleum; Rural Affairs (formerly Indian Affairs); and Agriculture and Colonization. The secretary general of the presidency, the chief administrator of the president's office, has the status of Minister without Portfolio.

The ministers are jointly responsible for decisions taken by the Council. In theory, each is responsible individually, along with the president for actions taken by his respective ministry. The ministers are requred to file reports concerning the work of their departments with each Congress at the opening session. The independence of the executive and the legislative branches is emphasized by a provision forbidding the ministers to remain in either of the two legislative chambers when voting is taking place. In order to be valid, a presidential decree must be countersigned by the minister charged with the administration of affairs in the area of the particular decree.

The Legislative Branch

The legislative branch of the government, known as the National Congress, is a bicameral body composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Congress meets once a year in La Paz, the actual seat of most government institutions, for a regular 90-day session, beginning on August 6. The length of sessions can be extended by the executive or Congress itself to a maximum of 120 days. Extraordinary sessions may also be called on the initiative of either the executive or legislative branches. Certain categories of citizens are

constitutionally excluded from membership. These include the military and police on active duty, civil servants, members of the clergy actively engaged in ecclesiastical duties, agents or representatives of concerns in which the national treasury participates, officials of state agencies and public contractors. Limited freedom from criminal arrest and civil suit is granted the members of both houses. Ordinarily, the Congress must meet in public sessions, though either chamber can convene in secret session by the vote of two-thirds of its members.

The legislature has the power to enact laws for the general advancement of the public interest and to impose taxes at the initiative of the president. Though a draft budget is prepared by the executive, it must be approved by the legislators. They also hold the right to authorize the president to contract loans on behalf of the government. The Congress also determines the number of departments, provinces and municipalities and delineates their boundaries.

Amnesties for political offenses may be granted by the legislature, as well as by the president. The Congress also wields important power over the abolition and creation of public offices, though it largely responds to the will of the executive in this as in many other matters. Ratification of treaties and conventions is one of its functions, as well as the approval of public contracts involving important concessions to corporate bodies.

Several important functions are performed by the Congress meeting in joint session. The houses meet together to consider whether a president's veto of a bill is to be overridden, a process which can be accomplished by a two-thirds vote of the members present. A joint meeting is resorted to when one of the chambers rejects a bill passed by the other, and the annual report of the strength of the armed forces is given in joint session. Legislative joint session has been dramatically involved in the presidential election process in the past, when an absolute majority was required. Since the requirement was changed to a mere plurality by the 1961 Constitution, the problem of utilizing the Congress as an electoral body in the event no candidate receives a majority has been greatly reduced. Only in the unlikely event that a tie resulted from the popular election would a joint session of Congress be called to decide among the presidential candidates.

The Congress is also vested with the power to censure the acts of the executive, a function denied to many Latin American Legislatures, in order to guard against the growth of a dependency relationship between the executive and legislative branches, as in a parliamentary system. As a partial response to the experience of other political systems where the problem of delegating legislative functions has arisen, the 1961 Constitution also contains an explicit prohibition of any such congressional delegation.

Bills may be initiated in either chamber. The Supreme Court may initiate legislation to reform the legal codes, by a message sent to the Congress. The executive is authorized to initiate bills through the minister of the department concerned.

A chamber has 20 days to act on a bill sent to it by the other chamber. If at the end of another 10 days no action has been taken, the bill is taken up in joint session. The president has a 10-day limit within which he may veto a bill. Should the 10-day period elapse without action, the bill is considered enacted and must be promulgated. Resolutions of the Congress or one of its houses do not require the assent of the president. All legislation is effective from the date of the promulgation unless provided otherwise by the law itself.

Both houses are to be elected by the universal suffrage provisions decreed under the first Paz regime. The age requirements are 25 years for a deputy and 35 for a senator. Deputies serve a regular term of 4 years, with half of the Chamber standing for reelection biennially. Senators serve a term of 6 years, with one-third of the body standing for reelection every 2 years. The number of deputies is not specified in the Constitution but is left to be fixed by legislation; it does, however, specify the size of the Senate, which consists of three representatives from each of the nine departments.

The more directly representative body, the Chamber of Deputies, is vested with a primary interest in fiscal matters. It is this house which exercises the congressional function of determining the public expenditures for each fiscal period after the executive's presentation of the draft budget. The deputies also authorize the executive to contract loans and to determine the manner in which both principal and service charges are to be met.

The Senate, in addition to its legislative duties, serves under certain circumstances as a court of last resort in that it tries charges brought by the Chamber of Deputies against the justices of the Supreme Court and the attorneys general. A sentence passed by the group must be by a concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present and voting and is without appeal.

The Senate also may reinstate Bolivians who have lost their citizenship. Its considerable powers in the realm of appointments include the congressional prerogative of submitting to the President of the Republic the lists of three candidates each for the positions of comptroller general, attorneys general and the national superintendent of banks. Additionally, they propose candidates for the presidents of important state agencies, who in turn are selected by the executive. Except in time of war, all promotions to the ranks of colonel and general in the armed forces and the police must be submitted to the Senate by the executive for approval in a secret ballot.

The Legislative Commission, a body often found in Latin American political systems, performs the functions of the Congress while it is in recess. It is composed of five senators and nine deputies, elected by their own houses; the Vice-President of the Republic, who normally is its presiding officer; and the elected presidents of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, who serve as members *ex officio* of the Commission. Alternates to the regular members of the Commission are also elected.

The Commission serves generally as an agent and representative for the Congress during the annual recess period. It may devise bills for the later consideration of the legislature. Undoubtedly, its most important powers concern the decree-making role of the executive and the declaration of a state of siege. In this connection, it may by a two-thirds vote authorize the executive to issue supreme decrees in the event of a national emergency. It may also approve on a provisional basis the declaration of a state of siege by the president or the prolongation of a previously declared state of siege beyond the usual 90-day period. In the latter event, however, the Congress must be convened in extraordinary session to ratify the action of the Commission. On the convening of the next regular legislative session, the body suspends its activity after reporting to the Congress.

The Judicial Branch

As Bolivia is a unitary state, there is only one court system. Under the Constitution, provision is made for a Supreme Court, district courts and such other tribunals as may prove necessary. Extraordinary courts are proscribed. The administration of justice is free, and court proceedings, with rare exceptions, must be public. Secret collection of evidence in criminal indictments is not permitted.

The Supreme Court, which is divided into civil and criminal chambers, sits in the legal capital, Sucre. Its 10 justices (called *ministros*) serve terms of 6 years, a reduction from the pre-1961 era when a decennial term was in force. Members of the high court are elected by the Chamber of Deputies from panels of three submitted by the Senate.

The Supreme Court has a constitutionally recognized supervisory power over the lower courts. In addition, it is vested with a form of judicial review—the right to take cognizance, in each instance, of matters of "pure law," where the constitutionality of a law, decree or resolution is at issue. It also handles matters of administrative law involving jurisdictional and in some cases substantive disputes among the departments, municipalities and other government divisions. The area of law usually described in Latin America as *contencioso-administrativo* (administrative contention)—those suits involving claims by or against the government and its officials—also falls within its jurisdiction.

As in most court systems, the highest court asserts jurisdiction over suits against diplomatic officials representing other countries. In Bolivia similar jurisdiction obtains in the event of suits against the rectors of universities, departmental prefects, the comptroller general, officials of the National Agrarian Reform Service and of the National Labor Court, as well as certain other specified functionaries, for offenses committed in the exercise of their official functions.

District court judges are appointed by the Senate from panels submitted by the Supreme Court. They serve terms of 4 years, shortened from a term of 6 years under the previous constitution. One of the important tasks of these tribunals, in addition to the general duty of entertaining suits which cannot be directly addressed to the Supreme Court, is intervention against a wide category of lesser officials, including subprefects, agrarian and labor judges, mayors and municipal councilors, for offenses committed in connection with their duties.

Still lower levels of the judiciary comprise the *jueces instructores*, who usually serve where small financial sums are involved, and the *jueces de partido*, who serve in cases involving larger sums. They serve for terms of 3 years and are eligible for reelection, as are all members of the judiciary. Usually, judges on this level would serve as the judges of first instance, with the district courts serving as courts of second instance or appeal. In the event litigants wish to contest a ruling of a district court, it is necessary to prepare almost a new case and appeal to the Supreme Court for a nullification decision.

In three areas of national life, special courts exist for relevant litigation: the labor courts, the agrarian courts and the electoral courts. In the labor court system, there are only two levels of court organization: the judges of first instance (*jueces del trabajo*—labor judges) and, for appellate matters, the National Labor Court (*Corte Nacional del Trabajo*). Electoral courts, which hear electoral appeals and generally oversee the electoral process, exist on both national and departmental levels (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

A Public Ministry, closely linked to the judiciary, serves to safeguard and advance the legal interests of the state. There are two attorneys general, appointed by the president, at the head of this body; before the promulgation of the 1961 Constitution, there had been only one attorney general. Also in the Constitution, the term of office for this official was shortened from 10 years to a period coinciding with the term of the appointing president (see ch. 25, Public Order).

Departmental, Provincial and Cantonal Government

The form of local government has not been altered greatly under the MNR, though the locus of actual political power has been significantly altered (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). The Republic con-

tinues to be divided into 9 departments, which in turn are subdivided into provinces: La Paz (16 provinces), Cochabamba (14 provinces), Chuquisaca (9 provinces), Potosí (13 provinces), Santa Cruz (11 provinces), El Beni (8 provinces), Oruro (6 provinces), Tarija (6 provinces) and Pando (4 provinces). Each province, of which there were 93 in 1961, is then broken into sections which apparently serve as geographic rather than administrative units. For purposes of political administration the provinces are divided into 983 cantons, the smallest unit of local government.

The political administration of the lesser units is organized tightly under the national Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration. The president appoints prefects, who are responsible to him for the general administration of affairs in their departments. They hold the over-all authority in military, fiscal and administrative matters, working in each substantive area under the supervision of the appropriate minister. Centralized control is further ensured by the president's appointment of the subprefects, officials vested with the administration of the provinces. The cantons are in the charge of *corregidores*, who are appointed by the prefect of their department. Traditionally, many of the *corregidores* have been accustomed to serve without formal stipends and thus have been perhaps the governmental link most susceptible to favoritism and corruption.

In some areas, another category of officials functions under the supervision of the *corregidores*; in the pre-MNR period they were called *alcaldes de campaña*. Since the revolution, they have been known as *agentes* and have quasi-judicial-executive functions.

The municipal governments are autonomous, at least in the formal sense, and function under the direction of municipal councils, as provided in the 1961 Constitution. As of 1963, however, the councils were reported to have been defunct for some time, and it was uncertain whether they would be restored. They are elected in the capitals of all departments and provinces. Control from La Paz is ensured by the president's right to choose a mayor from among the members of the municipal councils. Hierarchical supervision of the work of the municipalities within the structure of local government reinforces this feature in Bolivian governmental practices.

In some areas the Indians continue to be organized in their traditional community groups (*ayllus*). Even during the long period which witnessed the disfranchisement of the Indian on a national level, he continued to make quasi-political decisions in the selection of his local communal leaders (*jilakatas* or *mallcus*). This long-preserved and deeply embedded tradition of local communal responsibility has been considered by some to explain partially the ability of indigenous Bolivians to reenter the stream of national political life with no greater dislocation than has been the case.

CHAPTER 13

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Political life in the decade following the 1952 revolution of the now dominant Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) has reflected Bolivia's long history of ethnic cleavage and social conflict. Endowed by the revolutionary regime with armed strength and, for the first time in Bolivian history, with the political franchise, the Indian majority—traditionally landless and politically impotent peasants—has increasingly clamored for further social rights and economic opportunity. Similarly, the traditionally impoverished and politically voiceless miners now present a formidable front of armed might and voting strength. The clamor of these two long subordinate and impoverished groups and competition among political leaders for their support have provided the dominant note on the political scene. In addition, a deeply rooted heritage of regionalist conflict, particularly between the traditionally isolated Santa Cruz regions and the cities of the highland, traditionally the centers of economic and governmental power, has provided a continued threat to political stability (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Social Structure).

The result is a shatter-prone society. Beneath a facade of government stability and party unity, and many discordant ethnic, regional and economic elements of the national scene are held in tenuous balance by manipulation, patronage and bargaining among a group of political strongmen.

The MNR, as the dominant party, has been the chief actor in the decade of revolutionary politics. Because the revolution has witnessed a broad process of basic social change, all elements of Bolivian society—including those which have supported parties other than the MNR—have been deeply involved in and affected by it.

The MNR has generally received the determined support of those groups, such as the *campesinos* (peasants), who initially benefited from revolution and the pronounced and fervent disapproval of those groups, such as the former landowning and industry-oriented upper class (*rosca*—literally, the "screw"), whose interests have suffered at the hands of the revolution.

The central issue of Bolivian politics is the future course the national revolution will take and the extent to which it will further the interests of its various constituents. The MNR permeates and embraces the most significant and powerful groups in present-day Bolivia, and the core of decision-making in the country as a whole is centered in the party. Therefore, key groups have tended to gravitate toward the MNR and remain associated with it in the belief that influence on the national decision-making process is exerted most effectively from within the revolutionary party. This manifestation of practical politics tends in itself to perpetuate the MNR regime and, along with the great benefits received by such powerful interest groups as the *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant leagues), makes any total interruption of the revolutionary process unlikely. To a great extent the security of the present regime is also based on its ability and willingness to manipulate basic political processes such as elections. The MNR has in the past been able to neutralize opposition forces which it has seen as serious threats, whether they have been regional centers of opposition, as in the case of Santa Cruz, or strong and potentially threatening right-wing political parties such as the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB).

The trends which have been set in the revolution's first decade probably forecast its future course. It is likely that the Indian peasants and miners whose status and welfare have seen some improvement in the past will continue to pose demands based upon constantly rising expectations. The elevation of the Indians from their former status as a submerged and voteless caste—with its great reverberations for Bolivian society as a whole—is an irreversible accomplishment, though their ultimate reaction to their new status and role in national life is by no means clear. The extent to which other groups—urban middle-class elements and the nascent groups of industrial workers, students, and trade unionists—come to share the benefits of the revolution will provide other specific issues of political conflict.

The competition among interest groups for the revolution's rewards is reflected in an increasingly divisive tendency within the MNR and in the development, in recent years, of rival sectors within the movement. One such sector, originally the Authentic Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Auténtico—MNRA), has now broken away to form a separate opposition party, the Authentic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Auténtico—PRA), particularly persecuted by the orthodox Movimientistas (adherents of the MNR) and considered by them to constitute, along with the FSB, their most important right-wing opposition. The danger of the PRA is considered particularly great because its leader is Wálter Guevara Arze, one of the leading spokesmen for the MNR in the early days of the revolution.

In 1963 three intra-MNR factions were active—the so-called "Socialist," or Right Sector (Sector Socialista), the Left Sector (Sector Izquierda), and the National Unity Front (Frente de Unidad Nacional—FUN), a centrist sector focused around President Víctor Paz Estenssoro. Purported to represent ideological diversionism within the MNR, the policies of these groups appeared to be heavily opportunistic. In reality, the internal competition within the MNR by formal "sectors" such as these is probably less important than the clash between the various socioeconomic groups and powerful regional interests, sometimes centered in semiautonomous warlords with their armed *sindicatos* or militias.

One of the most important advantages the MNR enjoys in the rivalry of competing interests has been its intimate and continuing association with the *sindicatos campesinos* and their powerful militias, based on its advancement of the interests of *sindicato* members through agrarian and educational reform. The *sindicatos campesinos* probably form a major locus of power outside the cities.

Outside the MNR, those groups customarily opposed to the revolution—the dispossessed oligarchy, dissatisfied professional groups, other economically threatened middle-class elements and alienated intellectuals—can find limited opportunity for opposition through the dissident parties.

Political behavior is still conditioned by traditional attitudes and mores in Bolivian life. Although aspects of Bolivian politics have undergone striking changes in the last decade, political affairs remain highly personalistic, with the motivations of many Bolivians, both in and out of the MNR, influenced by hopes of short-term personal and family gain. As a result, the traditional provincialism, corruption, violence and inefficiency seriously limit the achievement of the revolution's goals and the satisfactory functioning of the day-to-day affairs of government.

The present regime, however, has greatly increased the number of Bolivians who participate directly in the national political life. This achievement, more than any other, is likely to be a major determinant of the future course of Bolivian political development. At the same time the stability of the regime will be increasingly challenged as the broader level of political participation provides a more effective forum within which to pose further economic and political demands upon the government.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SETTING OF POLITICAL LIFE

The Hispanic values carried to Bolivia by the conquest continue to influence the political behavior of both Spanish- and non-Spanish-speaking segments of the population. Though the MNR has attempted radical changes in the pattern of politics, prerevolutionary

practices based on personalism and regionalism persist and their influence can be expected to continue (see ch. 11, Social Values).

The concept of *personalismo* which stresses the uniqueness and innate dignity of each individual, has permeated political relationships so thoroughly and for so long that efforts by the MNR to institute the notion of loyalty to the party and the revolution have been impeded by the tradition of interpersonal leader-follower relationships. At the national level, despite party pronouncements and programs couched in terms of the movement as a collectivity, the loyalty of the rank and file remains based on personal admiration for Víctor Paz Estenssoro as the originator and dispenser of such tangible benefits as land. Known widely and affectionately as "Papa Pipa" (for his habitual pipe smoking), he is celebrated in sentimental popular ballads. Rated only second to him as benefactor is Hernán Siles Zuazo, president from 1956 to 1960 and Paz' long-time associate.

The president and former president are remote figures, however, and *personalismo* demands a closer and more intimate association. Taking the place of the *patrón* (landlord, employer, but in any case patron and protector) is apt to be found, for example in the countryside, the leader (*dirigente*) of a *sindicato campesino*, of a militia force or of a *comando* (party unit) and sometimes all three united in one person. These new *patrones* are the direct and visible sources of leadership and benefit. They are the providers of arms and the intercessors in welfare cases, and they can often influence the local distribution of central government funds and aid.

A prime example of the reciprocity which traditionally governs interpersonal relationships is found in the obligations of *compadrazgo* (the ties which exist between the parents and godparents of a child), which finds its application also in politics. The politician, *dirigente* or union official is always eager to serve as *padrino* (godfather) to the children of supporters and thereby establish lifetime ties highly advantageous in political situations. The *padrino* takes these assumed obligations most seriously, and so strong is the tradition that any failure to observe them might well be damaging to his political future.

Another historic force which continues to influence political behavior is regionalism. Some parts of the republic, separated from the capital by distance and by varying historical backgrounds and interests, have developed separatist traditions which have laid the foundation for strong and sometimes violent resentment against the present national government. Santa Cruz, historically restive under government from La Paz, erupted in May 1958 in a revolt, led by the FSB and backed by the multiparty Comité por Santa Cruz, which was suppressed only after considerable bloodshed; nonetheless, Cruceño regionalism remained rampant. Disaffection has also been evident in Cochabamba and Oruro, where strong opposition votes have been

cast in the presidential and congressional elections held under the MNR.

The persistence of the values attached to personalism and regionalism has not been overcome by the efforts of the MNR leadership to make of the party a true and unified "movement" on a mass basis. Even the fractionization of the party into three acknowledged sectors, Left, Right (or Socialist) and Center, is essentially based on personalist ties. The Left Sector is definitely the preserve of Juan Lechín Oquendo; the Right is under the leadership of Aníbal Aguilar and other prominent Movimientistas; and the Center is under Paz himself with the support of Siles, who is considered as having a more conservative following, not identifiably dissident.

SIGNIFICANT INTEREST GROUPS

Campesinos

A force of strong potential in the political life of the nation is the Indian *campesino* population, comprising approximately 65 percent of all Bolivians. Although they have the potential for becoming a single interest group and may realize that potential in the future as communications improve, the *campesinos* do not yet comprise a cohesive element in the Bolivian society. They are torn by conflicting regional interests and on occasion engage each other in armed combat. Regional differences are reconciled to a degree on the national level, and the MNR has enjoyed general support from most of the competing *campesino* groups, regardless of local enmities.

Distributed widely throughout the settled part of Bolivia, the rural population has over the last 10 years adopted the *sindicato campesino* as the predominant form of social and political organization. The strong association of the MNR with electoral and land reform has resulted in nearly solid support for the MNR and its national revolution (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Intellectual interest in the Indian problem was awakened through the works of writers such as Gustavo Navarro ("Tristán Maroff") and Franz Tamayo during the 1920's and 1930's (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). In 1936, after the Chaco War, Indian tenant farmers formed the first *sindicato* in the Cliza valley. Often beset by opposition from both the *latifundistas* (estate owners) and the government, the group survived and gradually, during the late 1940's, extended its influence through the general area of Ucureña in the Department of Cochabamba.

After the 1952 revolution, the countryside fell into chaos, as the old socioeconomic patterns were violently changed by the then armed and belligerent Indian population. The new MNR government, with

the support of José Rojas Guevara, the leader of the Ucureña *sindicato*, set about organizing the rural population into groups similar to that of Ucureña. Since that time the rural *sindicatos* have grown enormously. Now organized into the National Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), the *sindicatos* claim 2 million members affiliated with the national trade union federation.

Perhaps the most important political aspect of the *sindicatos* is the armed militias they support. In some particularly strong *sindicatos*, these exist as units of fully armed men, quartered in barracks, at the disposition of the group's officials. In less well-organized groups, they are composed of the members themselves, mobilized at need. The amount of force available in the *sindicatos* is extremely large. In the Ucureña prototype, an armed force of 1,600 men is quartered permanently in the town, and a far greater supporting force is reported to be available from the leagues of the Cochabamba Valley on 48 hours' notice.

The importance of the *sindicatos campesinos*, however, does not lie exclusively in the degree of effective power they represent. More than any other institution, they have come to be the most effective avenue for the expression of rural initiative. Local aspirations for schools, roads, irrigation projects and the many other tangible goals on which *campesino* energies have focused since the revolution are more likely to find expression through action by the *sindicatos* than by any other agency.

Such activities of the leagues have resulted in a special pattern of cooperation between local government officials and the *sindicato* officials. The *dirigente sindical* (league chief) will often also serve as the *agente* (local government representative). In any case, both *dirigentes* and *agentes*, as well as the *corregidor*, in charge of cantonal affairs, are usually members of the MNR. In all but a few cases, the membership of the *sindicatos* is affiliated with the MNR through its local *comandos*.

The interlocking membership and leadership of *sindicato*, *comando* and local government has resulted in the rise of regional warlords whose personal control reaches all three organizations but is usually most firmly based on the *sindicato*. Through energetic cultivation of local sources of power, these warlords have built positions nearly independent of both the national government and the MNR. When rival *sindicato* leaders have clashed, the conflict has involved hundreds of armed men, often severely testing the power of the national government to maintain control of the situation.

The power of the rural *sindicatos* has been so great that political leaders of national prominence have been drawn into *sindicato* politics as the MNR has continually sought to enhance its influence within the

sindicatos. A recent manifestation of this MNR policy has been the reported attempt of the Minister of Rural Affairs, Roberto Jordán Pando, to achieve prominence in the *sindicato campesino* of the Department of La Paz. At the same time the *sindicatos* have served as a means for thrusting non-Spanish-speaking *campesino* leaders to the forefront of the national scene. Quechua-speaking José Rojas, for example, was appointed Minister of Rural Affairs in the Siles Zuazo government.

Use of the *sindicatos* and their militias to further party policy has been extensive. They have been used to suppress regional and party uprisings, as in the case of Santa Cruz in 1958, as well as to quell, ironically, intransigent labor strikes. This occurred in the mines of Oruro Province in 1959. Heavily armed units of miners and *campesinos* are habitually brought into the cities for demonstrations on holidays, such as the April 9 anniversary of the revolution, or during election time to impress potentially disloyal elements in urban centers with the power available to the MNR. They have also been used more overtly at election time to stifle the appeal of the opposition parties for electoral support.

Sindicatos have also provided a context for interaction in the countryside based on objective, socioeconomic interests rather than on the old, ethnic patterns. Though the *sindicatos* have been the vehicle for the expression of ethnic hostility on the part of the Indians for whites and *cholos* (persons of mixed racial and cultural heritage), at the same time they have provided the Indians with opportunities to see Spanish-speaking Bolivians in a new light. The initial organization of the leagues by whites—students, Movimientistas and others—and their subsequent support by the white MNR presidents—Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo—was not lost on the Indians. Additionally, although most *sindicato* members undoubtedly have negative attitudes towards *cholos*, the presence of *cholos* as small farmers in areas such as Cochabamba Valley has provided opportunities for organized cooperation between the two groups in a way that seldom occurred before.

In recent years there has developed a division within the *sindicatos* on the national level. Insofar as any one man has succeeded in establishing a pre-eminent position among *campesino* leaders, it probably has been José Rojas who has established connections with *sindicato* leaders throughout the Cochabamba Valley and in other eastern departments. However, the important *sindicatos* of the Department of La Paz and those of Potosí and Oruro have opposed him. Consequently, there is no single *campesino* leader who can speak for the entire group. Rojas' position is made somewhat uncertain by the existence of opposition in his own territory, where Miguel Veizaga, a figure of considerable dynamism, has challenged Rojas' leadership and remains as a potential threat.

Despite the dissension between regions and leaders, most observers have felt that the *sindicato* system has entered the lives of the Indian population as a permanent feature. Because of the close association between the leagues and the MNR, and particularly with the program of land reform accomplished under MNR rule, any faction which might hope to displace the revolutionary party would have to contend with massive resistance from the powerful *sindicato* militias. This, perhaps more than any other single factor, tends to favor retention of power by the MNR.

Miners and the Urban Lower Classes

Since 1952 miners and other more urbanized industrial workers have shared, along with the *campesinos*, in the most dramatic expansion of any group in Bolivia. The origins of this development may be traced to the turn of the century when, with the quickening pace of industrial growth in the country, an incipient working class began to emerge. In the 1920's trade unions were founded and Marxist ideas were introduced into the country, largely through the universities (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Class consciousness among workers, especially in the mines, rapidly accelerated after the Chaco War.

By 1951 the labor movement had become a major source of strength to the MNR. In April 1952, trade unions throughout the country became members of the newly created Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB). MNR leadership even experimented briefly with direct labor participation in the government through the system known as "co-government" (*cogobierno*), in which key positions in the Cabinet, the National Assembly and MNR's Executive Committee were assigned to members of the labor movement. This principle, however, proved unworkable in practice and was soon dropped (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

In succeeding years, the COB developed into an immensely powerful interest group, which, if it did not control the MNR government, often held the power of veto over it. The oldest, most disciplined and strongest of the unions in the COB was the Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB), through which Juan Lechín Oquendo, the former secretary of the COB, rose to national prominence. The COB also included unions representing utility workers, commercial sales personnel, petroleum workers, printers, building-trades workers, transport workers, millers and industrial factory workers. In addition, the *sindicatos campesinos* were incorporated into the formal structure of the COB, although the nature of their interests and general outlook prevented them from becoming thoroughly integrated into the organization.

Very early after the revolution, the COB's constituent unions organized their own armed militias in imitation of the miners' militias. When its interests have been threatened, the constituent groups of the COB have not hesitated to use this armed power either singly or in concert.

The most serious clash between the COB and the government took place in 1957, when the Siles Zuazo government was attempting to execute its fiscal stabilization program. At that time a majority faction in the Second COB Congress, led by Lechín and Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, succeeded in having the organization threaten a general strike to register opposition to the program and to demand wage increases. Success would have meant the abandonment of any serious attempt at stabilization. In an interesting display of opportunism, the same elements which had earlier introduced orthodox Marxist goals into the COB program in 1952—largely Communists and members of the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario—PIR)—rallied to the support of the moderate MNR president, Siles Zuazo and, because of their intense opposition to Lechín, opposed the general strike.

Ultimately, the COB had to abandon its plans for a strike when the more conservative unions gave in to the entreaties of the MNR that their demands be subordinated to the needs of the economy as a whole. Although the crisis of 1957 was finally overcome and moderation prevailed, the lines drawn at that time, as a result of the extreme antagonism between Lechín and Siles Zuazo, have remained as significant ones for current Bolivian politics and influenced the lines on which the MNR split into separate sectors in the early 1960's (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

The Left Sector of the MNR, as presently constituted, represents an attempt on the part of Lechín and his followers to rally decisive support for the extensive demands of the COB. Lechín's opponents have been attracted to the Socialist Sector of the MNR. The internal dynamics of MNR politics therefore continue to reflect the schism embodied in the 1957 controversy.

To a great extent, the politics of the COB is closely related to the bid for political power by Lechín. After 10 years of prominent leadership of the trade union movement the COB leader has achieved a high level of national leadership and power. As the spokesman for urban labor groups, he held key Cabinet positions through the 1950's and in 1960 was elected Vice President of the Republic in the second Paz Estenssoro government. He has the almost unanimous backing of the strong miners' militia—larger than the Army and enjoying the advantage of concentration in the Altiplano, whereas the Army is dispersed throughout the country; in recent years he has

also bid for *campesino* support in an effort to broaden his base of political support.

Lechín's leadership within the general labor movement was reaffirmed by the COB conference in the summer of 1962. Regarded with apprehension by moderates in the MNR, he had aroused enough distrust among his associates by the summer of 1962 that public reports linked President Paz Estenssoro's cancellation of a proposed trip to the United States to his unwillingness to leave the miners' leader as provisional president in his absence for an extended period of time.

During 1962 there was much speculation about Lechín's role in the future leadership of the revolutionary party. Some reports saw a weakening of his identification with the miners—the group which has always given him keenest support—partly because of an inevitable lessening of his contacts with the mining camps while he devoted increasing time to the national political scene. Others have predicted more restraint on his part in pressing labor's demands as he begins to realize that should he succeed to the presidency in 1964, he would then be confronted with labor problems of his own making. As of March 1963, it was unclear what effect Lechín's announced appointment in late 1962 as Ambassador to Italy would have on his political future.

Closely tied though the COB's interests may currently be to the career of Juan Lechín, the strength and importance of the labor movement is essentially independent. The recognition of organized labor's importance will doubtlessly continue as long as the revolutionary party depends on the unions for so much of its support. The *sindicatos* have enjoyed strong representation on the Executive Committee of the MNR, the policy-making body of the organization, as well as in the National Assembly, where many of their members are MNR deputies. The government has, however, shown a willingness to reject labor's demands when it has felt strong enough to do so. In situations where clashes between the authority of the government and industrial labor unions has occurred, the government has called on the armed *campesino* militias as a counterweight, as in the suppression of the miners' strike in Oruro in 1959.

The support of the general aims of the MNR government by organized labor groups has been strong; a disparity of interests between the two continues to provide the background for serious conflict. The government has been faced with the urgent need for curbing inflation and achieving a more rational utilization of the labor force. Where this has meant discharging surplus workers and denying wage increases in the many nationalized industries, conflict has been intense and bitter.

The result has been the paradoxical phenomenon of violent labor conflict in the labor relations of a country where organized urban and rural labor is the strongest single element in the political system. The resultant disorganization is partially indicated by the fact that in the first 6 months of 1961, bitter nationwide strikes took place among miners, teachers, printers, oil workers, construction workers, railroad workers and bank employees.

Some groups in the urban lower classes are not associated with the trade union movement. These individuals fall primarily into one of two classes: persons with marginal socioeconomic positions, such as porters, day laborers and medicants and persons who are engaged in trade on a scale too small to justify their inclusion in the middle class. The former category is found in large numbers in the shantytowns that have sprung up on the peripheries of urban communities, where the concentration of such persons with their peculiar needs has led them in many cases to establish dependency relationships with some powerful political patron and in turn to constitute class-conscious political blocs. Such marginal persons are also found within the city where their dispersal among a larger population has retarded the formation of such political blocs. Individuals in these groups form ready reservoirs of political demonstrators in times of crises and are mobilized to express their support of the political leader or party from whom their welfare benefits are derived. Both categories, the small traders—usually of *cholo* background—as well as the independent, nonaffiliated laborers, are far overshadowed in politics by the organized trade unions.

Upper Class

The present political power of the upper class is negligible. After the 1952 revolution the well-to-do members of Bolivian society found themselves suddenly shorn by nationalization and land reform of the economic power which had served as the foundation for their political position. In the following years exile and emigration drastically reduced their numbers in the country, and the sudden shift in attitudes against the old regime made the mere identification of an individual as a former *rosquero* (member of the elite class) a severe liability. Nevertheless, in spite of the loss of its political and economic power, the upper class has managed to retain its identity and consciousness as a social unit (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Many of the leaders of the MNR and the government, however, were themselves products of the upper class, and through their friends and relatives the power of the party inevitably radiated in the direction of persons with similar backgrounds. Considerable publicity was focused on this aspect of the revolutionary party's oblique connections with the former elite during the period of the exchange rate speculations prior to stabilization in 1957 (see ch. 5, Social Structure). Al-

though such acts were publicly deplored by the MNR leaders, the importance of personal loyalties in social life will probably ensure a continued relationship between party members and the *rosca*.

Politically, the upper class divides its support among the opposition parties, with the FSB, the PRA and the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC) receiving the strongest support. Significant numbers of younger members of the upper class, however, particularly those who have received their education since 1952, have tended to recognize the MNR's claim to have provided a more just and equitable arrangement of society. It is not uncommon to find younger members of the elite aware, in a way which was seldom encountered before 1952, of the inequities and cleavages of prerevolutionary society.

One of the paradoxes of current politics in Bolivia is the frequency with which one hears the *rosca* mentioned in political discussion, in view of the near-total state of its decline as a power group. In reality, the MNR has frequently sought to give the impression, particularly to the *campesinos*, that it is the only institutionalized bulwark that stands between the achievements of the revolution and a renascent *rosca*, ready and able to reimpose the old injustices.

Though the traditional upper class is of negligible importance, the period since the revolution has seen the growth of a group of *nuevos ricos* (new rich). This group, though it possesses significant wealth, usually derived from political connections and favor, does not constitute a class comparable to the former *rosca* and generally conforms to middle-class characteristics.

Middle Class

Relatively little is known about the political socialization of the middle class. Concentrated in the cities and often employed in positions with fixed salaries, members of this group have been particularly vulnerable to the endemic inflation which has afflicted the country since 1952. During this time professional and clerical workers have seen their interests suffer near disaster in many cases while those of the *campesinos* and miners have been promoted by the MNR (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Inevitably, there has been a reinforcement of the association of the middle class with those political parties oriented towards the more traditional organization of Bolivian society. The FSB and the Church-backed PSC probably receive the support of most of the members of this group who have not affiliated with the MNR. On the other hand, the MNR has made a determined bid for the support of the middle sectors in the hope of welding as broad a progovernment coalition as possible. Its use of the slogan, "workers, *campesinos*, and the middle class," and the organization of *comandos* composed of scientists, teachers, students and other professional elements is evidence of

this campaign. Though it is difficult to assess the success of this attempt, the generally accepted estimate of a 50-percent abstention rate in the urban areas in the 1962 congressional elections probably points to a significant lack of identification on the part of most middle-class persons with the course the revolution has taken.

The most politically active group in the middle class is the students, who have traditionally shared an intense interest in politics. The two major student organizations, the Federation of University Students (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios) and the National Confederation of Students (Confederación Nacional de Estudiantes) are influenced by Marxist and Marxist-derived political thought, though other political viewpoints are represented as well (see ch. 8, Education).

Student organizations are represented on the university level by Frentes Universitarios Locales (Local University Fronts) which publish newspapers, issue pronouncements on issues involving both foreign and domestic affairs and stage loud and sometimes violent political demonstrations. Student strikes are serious matters and have resulted in deaths among those involved and the closing of universities.

Generally, the issues most subject to agitation among students involve foreign affairs. Students affiliated with the MNR and the Marxist PIR have bitterly attacked United States aid programs and the Alliance for Progress as an attempt to dominate Bolivia's internal development. Student groups affiliated with parties on the Right are eager to criticize the MNR government. There is a tendency for Catholic students to support the PSC.

The Military

Historically, the Army had been an institution of the greatest importance in political life, where its role had been largely directed toward the maintenance of the status quo and the oligarchy and the expansion of its own position in Bolivian society. In consequence, no other group except the *rosca* underwent such a rapid constriction of power after the 1952 revolution.

During the 12 years immediately preceding the revolution, three of the Republic's six chief executives had been military men, and the other three had had effective Army support, especially against the serious rebellion engineered by the MNR in 1949. On coming to power, the MNR, associating the Army with the traditional order in Bolivia, consciously set out to nullify the power of the military. Even the influence of the military group known as the Cause of the Fatherland (Razón de Patría--RADEPA) with which the MNR was allied in the early 1940's, was negligible by 1952 (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Apprehensive about any potential threat to its own government, the MNR moved rapidly against the Army through drastic

retirement of its career officer corps. With the sudden growth of armed militias among the miners and the *campesinos*, the Army was virtually destroyed in the first year of the revolution.

On July 24, 1953, President Paz issued a decree restoring the Army and at the same time launched a program to remold the military in the revolutionary image. The Army's military academy was directed to adopt admission policies favoring lower- and middle-class candidates, and its faculty and curriculum were changed in an effort to insure the inculcation of the party's revolutionary principles. At the same time, a supporting propaganda campaign was launched in the press. During 1953 and 1954 frequent articles appeared in *La Nación*, the MNR daily newspaper, stressing that the Army should reflect the new synthesis of social forces emerging under the revolution.

In 1954 there were other signs of government resuscitation of the military. Some career officers, active in the prerevolutionary army, were reinstalled in their former positions on the basis of thorough background investigation and in consideration of their taking an oath to support the MNR. The Army's participation in construction and colonization projects in various parts of the country has been favorably publicized. This restoration of the Army, which has continued into 1963, is believed to represent an attempt on the part of the MNR to provide at least some degree of freedom from the revolution's nearly total dependence on the civil militias. The 1961 Constitution's incorporation of the militias into the armed forces reserve is seen by some as evidence of intent to go further in this direction.

In 1963 there was a general appearance of amicable relations between the revolutionary party and the military services, only partially marred by the report in the fall of 1962 of the arrest of a number of officers alleged to be conspiring against the regime. Frequent attendance by high officials of the government at military functions and a general tone of harmony seemed to indicate considerable confidence in the loyalty of the services.

The *carabineros* (national police) were closely associated with the MNR in its rise to power in 1952 and inherited a less intense distrust than did the Army. Officers from elite units were selected by the MNR government to be among the first Bolivians to undergo special antisubversive training at the United States-sponsored facility in the Panama Canal Zone. This suggests that the *carabineros* also are thought of as a hedge by the MNR against the power of the militias (see ch. 25, Public Order; ch. 26, Internal Security). The *carabineros*, as well as the Army, have their own *comandos* in which those of their members who are also affiliated with the MNR are organized. The presence within these groups of units specifically tied to the party thus provides still another safeguard to insure their loyalty to the revolution.

The Church

The Church has never been strong in Bolivia, and its position in politics has usually reflected this fact (see ch. 10, Religion). Though the hierarchy had been identified with the *rosca*, the MNR has not made any especially strong campaign against the status or position of the Church. Probably the relative isolation of the Church from crucial national problems had much to do with the absence of bitterness toward it after the 1952 revolution. Unlike the Church in Mexico, where vast tracts of land were held by the ecclesiastical authorities, the Bolivian Church was not the holder of great properties.

Although the Roman Catholic authorities clearly favor the PSC and the more extreme FSB, the government apparently feels that the Church's influence is so limited that reprisals are not justified. The result is an outward state of amicable relations between the revolutionary movement and the Church. Catholic dignitaries are present at most official ceremonies, and the various MNR organs have often sponsored special masses commemorating party victories or dead heroes of the revolution.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The history of Bolivia is reflected in current party politics. The many years during which the forms of representative government were used to cloak what was oppressive minority rule led many in the Republic to lose faith in representative institutions. Instead of rejecting these institutions, Bolivians have sought to adapt them to their own needs and problems. In the case of political parties, this has meant the retention of a modified multiparty system with one party, the MNR, heavily dominant. Other parties—some rooted in the prerevolutionary period and others formed since 1952—have coexisted uneasily with the revolutionary party itself, subject to varying degrees of coercive pressure. The revolutionary government has observed different atitudes toward the degree of freedom that should be permitted the opposition parties, largely on the basis of its estimate of their potential threat to continued MNR rule.

The social and economic reforms of the MNR government during the past 10 years have so largely satisfied the demands of the Bolivian Left that the MNR has drawn off a high proportion of its voting strength. Consequently, formal opposition from the Left has been restricted to several small parties, such as the so-called "independent" Marxist PIR and the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR), a Trotskyite group divided within itself. Such groups have polled extremely small returns in the elections and have therefore been generally tolerated, though conflict has been bitter

where their activities have directly collided with what the MNR has seen as its vital interests.

The Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB) is in an entirely different position from other organized leftist groups. While the PCB overtly supports any MNR program compatible with Communist objectives—and this includes all moves in the direction of the radical Left—it works covertly to increase penetration of government machinery and the MNR with the aim of eventual take over by subversion. Available evidence is that these tactics have been effective. Thus the PCB, while not part of a consistent formal overt opposition coalition, is a *de facto* threat to the government of considerable significance in view of its connection with and support from the international Communist apparatus.

The absorption into the MNR of most of the Bolivian Left did not occur in the case of the rightist parties. Their appeal is to groups intensely dissatisfied with the course of events since 1952 and to the one or two groups accustomed to active and dominant participation in politics. The revolutionary leadership saw potentially serious threats as originating in the Right and shaped its policies accordingly. The FSB has attempted several abortive coups against the government and has been repressed, although it is allowed to participate in the presidential and congressional elections. The PRA—which since 1960 has suffered the disadvantage of speaking not only for the Right but for a "heretical" Right (having been born of dissension in the MNR ranks)—has been the subject of even more severe measures. The PSC—more moderate than the other two and less popular—has enjoyed greater toleration from the MNR.

Just as the individual opposition parties have been plagued by dissension and internal disagreement, the opposition's collective power has been crippled by disunity. This crucial lack of cohesiveness has vitiated the attempts of the opposition parties—both rightist and leftist—to render formal political resistance to the objectives and program of the MNR.

Since the MNR has embraced such a broad spectrum of political opinion and interests, much of the real political activity of the country has been internalized within it. Within the last few years political differences within the party have been formalized in the development of three factions. The Left Sector, led by Juan Lechín, is largely a vehicle for his own political advancement, but it also represents the more radical elements within the party and the COB. The Socialist, or Right Sector, under the leadership of Aníbal Aguilar and other prominent Movimientistas, largely reflects a desire to curb the excesses of the powerful mining unions and also represents regionalist sentiment, particularly in Santa Cruz. Between these two groups is the

FUN, under Paz Estenssoro, which represents a centrist faction wishing to maintain a moderate revolutionary course.

The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement—MNR

By 1952 the leadership of the MNR, which was formed in the late 1930's by a group of intellectuals of diverse political beliefs, had coalesced around Víctor Paz Estenssoro, an economist and former Cabinet minister in the Villarroel government (1943–46). Paz remains the pivotal figure in the party, and in the intervening years he and his associates have succeeded not only in keeping together the amorphous coalition of interest groups that supports the party but in building a nationwide organizational structure.

The organization of the MNR closely parallels the governmental structure of the Republic. The primary unit of the party is the cell. The cells in turn are organized into *comandos* on the departmental, provincial and lower levels. A process of periodic elections is the formal basis for the selection of *comando* leaders, usually termed *jefes* (chiefs), who in turn direct the work of *subjefes*, responsible for specific areas of *comando* activity such as education, propaganda, finances, political action and the *comando* militias. Another key party functionary on the intermediate and lower level is the *vocal* (director) who implements the disciplinary program of the party. In the event of serious infractions of party rules or the commission of criminal offenses, the *vocales* may sit in judgment on the offending member and can levy fines or deprive him of his membership.

At the top of the structure is the National Political Committee (Comité Político Nacional—CPN), which under the MNR's Executive Secretary, Federico Fortún Sanjinés, a close associate of Paz—directs the over-all activity of the party. Though the actual assignment of leadership functions on the intermediate and lower levels is not well documented, it is believed that elections among the rank and file for lesser officials are subject to review by CPN. Because of the tradition of personalism, however, the feelings of the rank and file can hardly be overlooked in the election of local officials. In any event the form of democratic elections is almost always observed.

The MNR also has attempted to organize units for specific groups, such as students, teachers and various professional groups. Such groups customarily are organized into special *comandos* of their own, though they may also participate in the regular units of the party as well. There have periodically been reorganizations of the vocational *comandos* with the purpose of promoting greater effectiveness in obtaining the cooperation of the specific segment of the population concerned.

Such a realignment took place in early 1962 when a national commission was formed to prepare the way for the reorganization of the

Women's Comandos of the MNR (Comandos Femeninos del MNR), which would presumably incorporate all feminine Movimientistas into a special unit. As preparation for this step, a National Women's Congress of the MNR was then called, and committees were appointed to prepare its work. This process has been fairly typical of the party's approach to organization: the appointment of preparatory committees representing the various departments, the convening of a "national congress" and the subsequent formation of a nationwide organization supporting the objectives and leadership of the MNR. The formation of "specialist" cells, such as the Cell for Biological Sciences of the MNR, has also taken place in the case of highly specialized professional and scientific groups.

The MNR, in its attempt to create a revolutionary mystique, follows Latin American tradition of commemorating its revolutionary and prerevolutionary heroes and important dates in the designations given to such subdivisions as cells, *comandos* and military and militia units. Also, when *La Nación*, the MNR in the daily organ, publishes the orders of the party, they are often closed with the hortatory phrase, "Por la Revolución Nacional" ("For the National Revolution").

The press also reports the almost daily visits to La Paz of representatives from *comandos* in distant parts of the country, particularly from the Indian *comandos*, to present ceremonial awards and medals to the President of the Republic as the leader of the revolution. Such presentations are fully reported in the press, often with pictures of the *comando* officers in Indian dress, and represent an obvious attempt to intensify the identification of the Indian population with the revolultion. On the occasions when party policies have been questioned or in times of severe crisis, subordinate party units habitually pass special resolutions of support for the MNR's leaders.

The *comandos* have been put to even more overt use in the service of the party. Just after the 1952 revolution, the party set about arming the *comandos* and organizing them into party militia units. This military aspect of the *comandos* has persisted and on occasion has been effectively used to defend the party against its enemies, though major reliance in this area has generally been relegated to the larger and stronger *sindicato* militias. In La Paz during the June 1961 crisis arising from what the government asserted was an attempted Communist coup, the *comandos* took over the city and guarded key buildings and intersections until the *sindicato* militiamen arrived.

The local party units—particularly in the countryside—have been used to maintain a form of surveillance on the *sindicatos*, with which they are almost always closely associated. The party has looked with apprehension on the growth of opposition influence among the *campesinos*, and many of the most violent conflicts in the country have occurred when PRA or FSB elements have succeeded in gaining control

over a *sindicato*. The local party units thus serve as a means of binding the *sindicatos* to the party and preventing defections in their ranks.

In almost all cases, the party officials form part of the local power hierarchy—which usually includes the *sindicato dirigente*, the *comando* chief and the local governmental official.

Funds to support the party's apparatus and operations come from several sources. Dues from the membership are a significant item, and in many cases payment is obligatory for government workers. A visiting professor from the United States, teaching in a government institution, found that party dues were automatically deducted from his salary. Another source of party revenue has been money extracted from the general funds of various ministries, a practice extremely difficult to challenge since all of the ministers are Movimientistas and since opposition representation in the legislature is small and relatively impotent.

In the early 1950's, after coming to power, the MNR established a Training Institute (Instituto de Capacitación) to provide qualified leaders for the party. No studies have been made of the backgrounds or general ability of party functionaries, but while often lacking in formal skills, most probably possess considerable adeptness at manipulating the local and regional units.

Just as before the 1952 revolution, party leadership has remained in the hands of Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo. Their MNR program was described by one commentator on the national revolution as based on "a formula equidistant between capitalism and communism." Understandably enough, the broadness of such an approach has left room for disagreement both as to actual goals and methodology.

The sectors within the MNR that have sprung up in recent years are expressive both of different concepts of ultimate objectives and of personal clashes between the various leaders of the party. The Left Sector, led by Lechín, finds its strength in the miners' unions and the more radical elements of the party, particularly in the Department of La Paz, where numbers of armed military chieftains (including the most powerful of them, Toríbio Salas) are said to be associated with Lechín. Its chief competitor in 1963 was the Socialist Sector, which has indicted Lechín and his followers with the stereotyped charge of "betraying" the revolution and has particularly railed at the "millstone of the mines" around the neck of the Republic's treasury. The nature of such charges and the character of its leadership has brought it significant popularity in Santa Cruz, where Socialist Sector cells have been organized, and a wider organizational structure is beginning to be formed. Many observers in the Republic feel that the Sector's motivation is not basically ideological but rather

a response to the fear that, with the end of Paz's current presidential term, Lechín may succeed in gaining power. The Socialist Sector is, therefore, generally seen as a coalition of the more conservative Movimientistas as well as those personally opposed to Lechín.

Apparently Paz himself has been sufficiently disturbed by the development of the sectors to sponsor the formation in February 1962 of the FUN group, in which the MNR's Executive Secretary, Federico Fortún Sanjinés, has also been active. This centrist group has a special armed unit attached to it, the Víctor Paz Estenssoro Regiment of Militia, which is stationed at La Paz where it guards the El Alto Airport.

Though there is considerable fragmentation within the society after 10 years of chaotic social revolution, the MNR has so far been successful in counterbalancing regionalist as well as personalist or ideological disputes among party membership. On a national level the MNR leadership has served as a common denominator of agreement, preventing factionalism from getting out of hand. Various *campesino* groups, for example, may be strongly hostile to each other. Yet they continue to support national party leadership which has prevented any one group from dominating the others. With some exceptions, therefore, the MNR in a sense can claim the almost complete support of the *campesinos*. In addition, there is strong support for the MNR among students, industrial workers and the relatively large force of government employees. The strong miners' union is pro-MNR, but its past policies and particularly its personal attachment to the leadership of Juan Lechín have often placed it in opposition to elements of the central party leadership.

Opposition Parties

It was inevitable that the drastic political, social and economic upheavals following the revolution of 1952 gave rise to the development of deep and abiding animostities both among those who suffered damage or injury in the process and among those who became convinced that the scope of radical reform has been too limited and its pace too pedestrian.

On the one hand, those who were injured by the loss of political influence, social eminence or economic fortune have been given no grounds in the decade since the revolution for assuming that their lot may improve. They believe that the MNR is leading Bolivia down a road that can end only in complete social and economic chaos and that to prevent it they must reassume the reins of government themselves. Collectively, these elements have crystallized into parties and organizations that form the political opposition of the Right—the PRA, FSB and PSC.

On the other hand, those of Marxian persuasion who originally sponsored and supported the revolution have grown increasingly disenchanted with the regime because it has not pushed as vigorously as they would like for the total realization of their ideological objectives. These dissidents have banded together into parties and organizations that form the political opposition of the Left—the PIR, POR and PCB.

Both of these forms of opposition are active and aggressive, but because they are different in outlook, they differ also in the strategies and tactics they employ against the dominant MNR. The Right is motivated by extreme nationalist sentiments and strives to gain control of the government in order to create a homeland that is paternalistic and totalitarian in form but sovereign unto itself. Its adherents are little schooled in methods other than the classical *cuartelazo* (barracks revolt) and coup d'etat in the Latin style. When they do operate clandestinely, it is for the *sub rosa* creation of an armed force capable of ousting the MNR. The Left, on the other hand, is motivated not by national but by international considerations and strives to seize political power in order to create a state integrated into a world system. Its leaders are guided and supported by non-Bolivian interests, which, for the time being at least, have decided to forego the use of force and rely on the methods of subversion to gain their ends. The Left, therefore, overtly supports the MNR, especially in those actions and proposals which tend to increase radicalism, while covertly it seeks diligently to undermine the confidence of the people in the regime and make it increasingly dependent upon and subject to manipulation by leftist leaders.

Rightist Opposition

The two chief opposition parties on the Right are the FSB and the PRA, which have shown impressive strength in the cities. Of the two, the FSB is the more ideologically oriented. The Church-oriented PSC is considerably weaker.

Influenced by the political theory and program of the Spanish Falange, the FSB seeks a return to the two great traditions of Bolivian history—Hispanicism and Catholicism. They see the liberalism and egalitarianism of the French Revolution as weakening the fabric of traditional society and encouraging its disintegration into a secular and amoral modernism. Falangist writers castigate both orthodox socialism, which, in their view, elevates the masses above society as a whole, and capitalism, which selfishly elevates the will and needs of the individual above those of society.

In the historical process the Falangists see a continuous competition between the two values of "order" and "liberty." As the instrumentality for social progress, the party prefers the intelligent and politi-

cally conscious minority which, with its superior discipline, should impose order and conscience on the general community. Only in this way can society achieve "freedom in order."

Founded in 1936 by Bolivian students in Santiago de Chile and consciously modeled after the Falangist Party of Spain, the party was strongly influenced by its leader, Oscar Unzaga de la Vega, a native of Cochabamba, one of the later centers of support for the FSB. Unzaga rejected representative institutions and democracy in general, which he castigated as "an artifice of words for the distraction of the people." In 1941 he wrote that the party should be "proud of violence," because violence served as the proof of courage.

During the early 1940's the FSB collaborated with the MNR in university elections, running joint slates for student offices, and shared a common pro-Axis orientation with the MNR. During the postwar period the FSB opposed the unpopular conservative governments of Enrique Hertzog, Mamerto Urriolagoitia and the military junta that succeeded them. Hence, it was in a position after 1952 to profit from the general discredit that overtook almost all the other rightist and centrist parties which had been associated with those regimes.

After 1952 the FSB came to see the MNR more and more as the instrument of communism in Bolivian life, to be opposed by all means, including violence. In November 1953 it attempted a coup in Cochabamba, which set the pattern for the future. In the 1956 elections, inheriting the supporters of the moribund Republican Socialist Union Party (Partido Unión Republicana Solcialista—PURS) and the old Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), the FSB ran Unzaga and Mario Gutiérrez as the only rightist slate to oppose the MNR.

Defeat and the coercive policies of the government in the election reinforced the FSB tendency to violence. In 1958 two serious coups were attempted and put down by the MNR. In April 1959 the party supported still another abortive revolt in the capital, which left Unzaga dead—murdered according to his supporters and a suicide according to the government.

Under Gutiérrez, Unzaga's successor, the FSB soon found that it was no longer the sole rightist party. The formation of the PRA, led by Guevara Arze, gave rightists a choice of opposition parties, although the FSB continued to enjoy strong support among some Catholic circles, certain disgruntled mineworkers unions and substantial members of middle-class urban dwellers.

The campaign of the FSB in the 1962 congressional election was extremely negative in tone and tended to dissipate the strength it had retained over the years. For example, instead of concentrating its fire on the MNR, the party's speakers spent much of their time assailing Guevara Arze, who, as the former MNR Minister of Government, was excoriated as the assassin of Unzaga. This embittered those of its

potential supporters who admired the eloquent and persuasive Guevara, while the MNR was left free to belabor the FSB's record of "treason." Though the party won more than 10 percent of the votes cast in the 1962 congressional elections to retain its status as chief opposition party, it had clearly lost much of its appeal since the death of the dynamic Unzaga (see table 2).

Nonetheless, it retained enough support to defeat the MNR in the city of Oruro, a long-time Falangista stronghold. In La Paz the vote of the FSB along with that of the PRA and the PSC exceeded the MNR's total vote. The 1962 campaign, however, gave little indication that the MNR might grow more tolerant of what it has regarded as an overt threat to the security of its government.

More perhaps than any other party, the PRA is representative of the personalistic approach to Bolivian politics. The group was founded in 1960 as the MNRA or the "authentic" MNR (to be later renamed PRA), when the return of Paz to active politics, after an intervening period of retirement (1956–60), frustrated the presidential ambitions of his long-time associate, Guevara Arze. With the strong popular appeal of its leader, the party won nearly 140,000 votes in the election of 1960, arousing extreme apprehension on the part of the MNR.

After the election the party's name was changed to the PRA—the Authentic Revolutionary Party—as the result of an electoral court decision. Guevara Arze had managed to retain the support of some of the miners' unions and had also assiduously cultivated the support of *sindicatos* in the Cliza Valley. At the beginning of the 1962 campaign he announced the availability of $50,000 to underwrite a vigorous campaign laying bare the MNR's betrayal of the revolution.

The government party's reaction was to direct the most scathing fire of the entire campaign at the PRA. Posters appeared caricaturing Guevara over the legend "Traitor" and castigating him for having deserted the "true" party to join the "enemies of the working class."

Apparently, policy-making levels of the MNR had fixed on the crippling of the PRA as a major objective in the campaign, and Guevara Arze's activists were openly suppressed throughout the country. In several instances, MNR *sindicato* leaders led bands of militiamen on destructive forays into PRA villages, with considerable loss of life.

The PRA reaction was to protest the advance rigging of the elections and call for supervision by the Organization of American States (OAS). Guevara bitterly attacked the corruption of his former associates while offering the electorate the rather vague promise of "good government" under the PRA.

According to reports of reliable observers, the electoral returns reflected the heavy-handed methods of the government. Even going so far as to inflate the votes of the other parties, the MNR reduced the

Table 2. Selected Recent Electoral Results in Bolivia

Party	Presidential candidate	Votes
1951		
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).	Víctor Paz Estenssoro	54, 129
Republican Socialist Union Party (PURS)	Gabriel Gosálvez	40, 381
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)	Bernadino Bilbao R	13, 259
Bolivian Civic Action	Guillermo Gutiérrez	6, 654
Liberal Party	Tomás Manuel Elio	6, 530
Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR)	José Antonio Arze	5, 172
Total		126, 125
1956		
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).	Hernán Siles Zuazo	786, 792
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)	Oscar Unzaga de la Vega	130, 494
Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)	Felipe Iñiguez	12, 273
Revolutionary Workers Party (POR)		2, 329
Total		931, 888
1958—Congressional elections only		
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).		391, 437
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)		56, 950
Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)		6, 913
Social Christian Party (PSC)		2, 937
Revolutionary Workers Party (POR)		1, 994
Total		460, 231
1960		
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).	Víctor Paz Estenssoro	735, 619
Authentic Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNRA).	Wálter Guevara Arze	139, 713
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)	Mario Gutiérrez	78, 963
Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)	Víctor Paz Estenssoro	10, 934
Revolutionary Workers Party (POR)	Hugo González Moscoso	1, 420
Total		966, 649
1962—Congressional elections only		
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).		346, 824
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)		51, 332
Authentic Revolutionary Party (PRA)		26, 357
Social Christian Party (PSC)		12, 645
Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)		10, 589
Total		447, 747

PRA vote to approximately half that of the FSB. When initial returns from La Paz Department indicated that Guevara had won a seat in the Congress there, "late" returns were produced, favoring the PSC just enough to deprive the PRA leader of his victory.

After the disappointing 1962 election, Guevara left for the self-imposed exile in Chile. Though the immediate problem of the PRA had been disposed of in the congressional elections, it had been accomplished at the cost of massive and open electoral fraud. In any event, the real threat of the PRA, in one sense at least, remained: the example it offered to all future dissenting MNR factions of an overt rupture in the Revolutionary Party. The path of party schism remained open to the Socialist and Left Sectors in the late 1962 and partially explained the intense animosity of the official party's leadership for Guevara and the PRA.

The third rightist opposition group, the PSC, is by far the weakest of the three. Favored by the Church, the PSC was formed as a splinter of the older Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata—PSD). Probably the most moderate of the three opposition parties on the right, the group espouses a conventional form of Christian socialism. With the aid of the influential Catholic journal, *La Presencia*, the PSC has managed to attract the support of most of the upper class in La Paz and is influential among Catholic university circles. Its campaign in the 1962 elections was notably enlivened by its leader in La Paz, Alfonso Prudencio Claure, known as "Paulovitch," a social commentator of great popularity. The Social Christian campaign was mainly directed against the corruption of the MNR, a vulnerable target for the opposition. Never clearly defined, the PSC's program was characterized in the campaign by the slogan, "Neither Capitalism which Exploits nor Communism which Suppresses." The MNR's approach to the PSC has been in part a condescending one. Realizing that the party's potential support is limited, the Movimientistas dismissed the group's leaders as "pizza politicians," an apparent reference to the Italian origin of its philosophy as well as of the PSC senatorial candidate, Remo di Natale. With an appeal that lost its force outside of a relatively small and sophisticated circle, the party won a little more than 12,500 votes in the congressional elections, and they were concentrated enough in La Paz to send Paulovitch to Congress.

The potentially strong opposition on the right has been critically impaired by the inability of the PRA and the FSB to set aside their differences and make common cause against the MNR. There were signs of change after the 1962 elections, particularly in August, when an FSB–PRA unity pact was concluded, but it is questionable whether the strong differences between the personalistics leadership of the two groups can be permanently resolved.

Leftist Opposition

If the electoral process provided an accurate scale upon which the contending Bolivian political forces could be weighed, the leftist opposition parties could be said to be of more historical than current importance in national politics. The PCB has never, for example, won more than a small percent of votes cast in any Bolivian election since the MNR won power in 1952. There are no Communist deputies in the Parliament.

On the other hand, the Communists have never relied upon either Western parliamentary tactics or the classical Latin barracks revolt as means of gaining ascendancy. They know they are a tiny minority unable to realize their objectives at the polls. They employ instead the tactic of making "deals" with those who can command a large vote. Their bargaining position is strengthened by the international character of the Communist movement, which is considered able to marshal impressive resources in any given area. In Bolivia the Communist strategy is to infiltrate and penetrate loci of power where it can influence policy-making as well as exert pressure on the government through strikes, demonstrations and propaganda.

In the 1960 presidential election of the PCB—alone among the three recognized leftist parties—presented a slate of candidates in formal opposition to the MNR, but the PCB nominee for president was Víctor Paz Estenssoro. Thus, formal PCB opposition to the government is a façade behind which the real power struggle takes place. The MNR revolution itself was achieved with the support of the PCB, as was attested in 1953 when President Paz acknowledged the "ties of convenience" which existed betwen the MNR and the Communists. In recent years, Paz has cooled towards his former supporters, but the Left Sector of the MNR closely follows the Communist line. Its leader, Juan Lechín, is closely identified with Communist causes and has always both accepted PCB support and fought for PCB legality. The COB, of which Lechín is Secretary General, carefully follows the Communist line on all important issues such as Castroism, nuclear testing and so forth.

The MNR has conducted a strong proselytizing program among the Communist groups both to weaken those groups and to procure needed technicians and skilled propagandists and administrators. The Communists have not fought this campaign. Instead they have chosen to go along with it as a means of penetration and ultimate control.

The PIR was active during the 1940's under the leadership of José Antonio Arze, an important figure in Marxist circles. Although an avowedly independent Marxist party, the PIR actually followed and supported international Communist policy under the direction of Moscow. About the same time a group of Trotskyite intellectuals formed the POR, which, advocating the direct mass action principles of

Trotsky, gained considerable influence among workers in the mining and industrial unions as well as in intellectual circles. During the 1940's significant numbers of individuals who after the revolution joined the MNR were active in one or the other of these parties, and this later influence of the Marxists has been greater than was any direct impingment on politics during the earlier period.

At the time of the revolution in 1952, the PIR had been seriously split between its "hard-line" members and those accused by them of collaboration with the conservative governments that had been in power during the period 1946–52. Much of the membership of the PIR was absorbed by the PCB—the first formal Communist party in Bolivia, when it was formed in 1952. For a time the PIR was practically out of existence.

In 1955 the PIR was reconstituted under the leadership of Ricardo Anaya, a prominent professor on the University of Cochabamba faculty. With the death of the widely respected PIR leader, José Antonio Arze, in the same year and under the less popular leadership of Anaya, the PIR has not regained its former influence among Bolivian leftists. Moves toward cooperation with the Communists have been made, notably the sponsorship of a joint slate in the 1956 elections.

With little support among either rural or urban masses the PIR has followed the double theme of attacking "Wall Street imperialism" and MNR corruption, a strategy which thus far has not succeeded in attracting significant support beyond its present limited circle of partisans in the universities.

Significant numbers of individuals affiliated with the PIR during the 1940's have remained outside the new organization. Prominent among these is Arturo Urquidi, a well-known Cochabambino and professor of law, who has maintained wide contacts in radical circles. It is possible that still another independent Marxist group might be formed under his leadership.

The POR is currently split also. Two factions, the Lucha Obrera (Workingman's Struggle), under the leadership of Hugo González Moscoso, and Masa (Masses), led by Guillermo Lora, sponsor their own publications, and each accuses the other of being less faithful to Trotsky's principles. The formal objectives of the two groups are quite similar, except that the Lucha Obrera group supports a more rapid achievement of the workers' state. The main differences among the PORistas, as among so many Bolivian political groups, seem to arise from personalistic antagonism between their leaders.

Both groups, though caustically attacking the MNR for its alleged subservience to the United States, abstained from sponsoring candidates during the 1962 congressional elections. Bitterness of the Trotskyites towards their more orthodox Marxist associates was evidenced by the appearance in 1962 of POR posters bearing the legend,

"Abajo el Stalinismo—Viva la Revolución Cubana" (Down with Stalinism—Long Live the Cuban Revolution).

The PCB demonstrated its durability, flexibility and internal discipline in the elections of 1960. It polled almost 11,000 votes, a drop of only 1,300 since the election of 1956, about the same proportional fall-off as was experienced by the MNR. Flexibility and discipline were shown not only by the fact that the party's nominee was the MNR's Paz, rather than one of its own, but also in that so many members and adherents followed the decision of the party to support an outsider, in spite of an earlier reported dissension over policy.

The Communists were the only Marxist group to put up candidates in the 1962 congressional elections, reflecting again the greater discipline and superior resources of this group. The Communists' access to funds is seen in their publication of two weeklies in the national capital, *Unidad*, the official party organ, and *El Pueblo*, a more lively paper edited for popular consumption. The PCB also made more extensive use of radio than did any other party in the 1962 election campaign and sponsored some broadcasts in Aymará. The Communists won less than 11,000 votes and failed to win any seats in the Chamber of Deputies or Senate. However, in an off-year election when all other parties voting in both 1960 and 1962 polled less than one-half of the votes they had polled in the presidential year, the fact that the PCB vote fell off less than 400 is again indicative of party discipline (see table 2).

The Communists' main strength is drawn from a relatively small number of intellectuals, professionals and segments of the industrial working class. Probably its most important support comes from certain constituent unions in the FSTMB, which has usually been the center of the more extreme elements in the country. Two mine-union leaders, in particular, Ireneo Pimentel and Federico Escóbar, have been identified with support of Communist positions. The degree to which the Communists can command the loyalty of certain miners' unions was demonstrated in both 1961 and 1962 when the miners struck to protest the government's detention of Communist leaders in the country.

Although the PCB lacks the capability of coming to power either through the conventional electoral process or by staging a coup d'etat, it is clear that by its careful, disciplined and well-financed program of penetration and infiltration of the machinery of government and of the MNR itself, the Communists indeed pose a significant threat to the stability and continued independence of the MNR government in Bolivia.

THE REVOLUTIONARY DECADE

After the inauguration of the new government in April 1952, the MNR put into effect the several plans and programs which its leaders

had evolved during its 12 years of development. Never formally published in detail, their trend had been forecast in party pronouncements and commitments made at various times. In July 1952 universal adult suffrage, without literacy or property requirements, was decreed for the first time in Bolivia's history. Its implementation, however, was delayed an additional 4 years as the MNR continued to rule by decree during that period. The next important step, in October, was the nationalization of all the mines of the three great companies, Patiño, Aramayo and Hochschild. Also in 1952 the Indian *campesinos* on their own initiative began to seize the land. The government followed in 1953 with decrees establishing a program of expropriation and distribution of large underexploited agricultural properties (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government; ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry).

In addition to these dramatic reforms, the government issued a decree in 1955 to provide rudimentary educational opportunities for the whole population and, despite great difficulty, earnestly tried to make it more effective than earlier laws to the same purpose. After an unsuccessful attempt at fiscal reform in 1953, the government undertook a more thorough and effective program in this area in 1957 (see ch. 8, Educational; ch. 24, Financial System).

Though accomplished without countrywide conflict and bloodshed, these vast changes in social and political organization brought in their wake dislocation and disorder. Large numbers of the educated class occupying executive and managerial positions left the country in fear of the new regime and in face of considerable persecution from it. Doubly stricken by the rapid loss of foreign technicians employed in industry—particularly in the mines and the railroads—urban life was thrown into near paralysis.

Another disquieting feature of the early revolutionary period was the serious constriction of personal liberties which took place under the first Paz administration. Extremely sensitive to the danger of overthrow, the MNR government moved against those forces which, in the light of their previous history, were likely to pose active or potential threats. Newspapers associated with the opposition, such as *La Razón* of La Paz and *Los Tiempos* of Cochabamba, were either closed or harassed in their activities. Political opponents, many of them holders of high office in former governments, were sent to detention centers in outlying parts of the country, where they led an uncomfortable existence under the surly supervision of the miners and their armed militias. Some accusations of political assassination were leveled at the MNR, but apparently mindful of the mistakes of the Villarroel government, the party was not openly associated with the murder of any prominent opposition politician during this period.

Violence directed against less important persons, however, was reportedly common (see ch. 25, Public Order; ch. 26, Internal Security).

Nationalization of the mines had for so long been a basic and announced principle of the MNR that, regardless of predictable effects on the economy, it became a prime political necessity once the party had seized the government. Far from swelling the treasury, nationalization proved a substantial burden on the Republic's finances. The three great mining companies had for years been operating as internationally owned concerns and maintained their headquarters and all but the minimum operating capital abroad. With the advent of the MNR, all readily convertible funds were sent out of the country in expectation of the takeover. For some years little capital had been expended in modernizing or even in repairing the mining plants. When the government moved against the mining companies, it inherited run-down equipment and—after more than a half century of intensive exploitation—nearly depleted deposits of low-grade, complex ore. There was, in addition, the problem of meeting the payroll for a large labor force in the mines, which, because of its great power and influence in the new government, could not be reduced and was even increased by nearly 50 percent. Skyrocketing internal inflation and dropping tin prices on the world market combined to make the mines a net burden rather than an asset.

In agriculture, too, land reform, admirable as social justice, brought initially diminished production. The *campesino*, unused and formerly unable to produce for a market economy, failed to plant for a marketable surplus over subsistence needs. Consequently, the food supply for the urban population was significantly less than it had been before the land reform. Declining revenues from the sale of tin meant that there was less foreign exchange available to underwrite the import of food, and thus the continuance of shortage was reinforced.

The revolutionary step of admitting the Indian majority to citizenship and the electoral privileges which accompanied it brought a salutary change in the attitude of this group toward the country and their place in it. However, since the government suspended the electoral process until 1956, the newly broadened electorate had no elections in which to make its voice heard for 4 years. Along with the increased self-respect that the revolution brought to the lower class—both in the cities and the countryside—came a general loss of social discipline. In the rural areas the Indians celebrated their newly won independence by terrorizing, at least in some localities, the non-Indian population, and thus contributed to a general decline of law and order. In the cities the new power of the trade unions was used to enforce their demands—sometimes excessive—on the MNR and, ironically, often produced a strained state of labor relations with a

government which was basically prolabor and seemingly more concerned with the general welfare than was any of its predecessors.

A leading representative of the government has characterized the change wrought by the revolution in the economics of the Republic as a "socialization of poverty." But in spite of this, the effects of the changes earned the MNR, and Paz Estenssoro in particular, the loyalty of much of the population. By 1956 the revolutionary party felt secure enough to permit elections for both the Congress and the presidency.

The MNR nominated the President's more conservative associate, Hernán Siles Zuazo, who was generally respected for his integrity and selfless interest in the goals of the revolution. Most opposition strength coalesced in the FSB, which nominated Oscar Unzaga de la Vega, a figure of considerable personal appeal, as Siles' chief opponent. In an election which was marred by extensive manipulation and coercion by the MNR and threatened abstention by the FSB, nearly a million Bolivians voted—most of them for the first time. The MNR received 786,792 votes—84 percent of all votes cast—with the FSB receiving 130,494 and the Trotskyite POR and the Communist PCB receiving a total of 14,602. Legislative cooperation with the MNR executive was assured when the Party won all 18 Senate seats and all but 5 seats (which went to the FSB) in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Siles Zuazo regime was marked by a slight turn toward the right, as the government attempted to cope with the problems created by the great changes to the preceding 4 years. The first task of the government was to deal with the inflation which had reached great proportions. Since 1952 the official import rate of exchange of the boliviano had dropped from Bs60 to U.S.$1 to nearly Bs7,800 to U.S.$1, with the free-market rate approaching 13,000. Supported by advice from the United States Government and the International Monetary Fund conveying a strong implication that subsidies essential to the maintenance of the economy could not reasonably continue if stabilization through reform were not achieved, Siles and his few knowledgeable advisers decided to act. A program of rational but politically dangerous measures was drafted, including the abandonment of the government-subsidized miners' commissaries, the freezing of wages and salaries and other measures extremely distasteful to many of the government's strongest supporters (see ch. 24, Financial System).

In late 1956 and early 1957, when Siles pressed the stabilization program, Bolivians witnessed the first serious rupture of the MNR coalition. Radical elements in the COB called for a general strike which threatened chaos in the already disrupted economy. The strike threat was avoided only by a personal tour of the mining camps by the President and by the unwillingness of the more moderate unions to

carry through with the strike. This internecine dispute brought the resignation of Vice President Nuflo Chávez and continuing bitterness on the part of Juan Lechín, Chávez, and other party members who had opposed Siles' action as a betrayal of the revolution.

Meanwhile, under Siles the complex machinery set up to administer the agrarian reform program ground on with the time-consuming process of examining legal appeals, settling the inevitable disputes and forwarding tentative titles to the President for his signature. Siles was criticized for the slowness with which the new owners received title to their lands during his term. It was said that at his rate of speed the validation of land redistribution would require 25 years for completion. Though there was no doubt that the more conservative-minded Siles favored a careful and deliberate approach in distributing land titles, it was also true that by June 1956 even the Paz government had succeeded in expediting the legal expropriation of only 109 large estates. Because of the numerous opportunities for appeal, thought to provide safeguards for smaller landowners, the title-granting process was of necessity a time-consuming one. The complexity of the reform law itself—which exempted medium-sized estates and larger properties which had been rationally utilized and in which significant capital had been invested—prevented its immediate implementation. Though dissatisfaction continued over the expense *campesinos* were subjected to in having their titles searched and the government's failure to provide technical assistance to new owners, the *campesinos*, with relatively few exceptions, continued to support the MNR.

In the latter part of Siles' term, disaffection began to grow on the right of the MNR spectrum. Wálter Guevara Arze, Foreign Minister and then Minister of Government in the first Paz government and perhaps the most fervent orator of the revolutionary movement, had aspired to accept the mantle from President Siles in 1960. Just as the left wing of the Movimientistas under Lechín and Chávez had been frustrated during Siles' term, so too was the right wing under Guevara. When Paz returned to Bolivia from his post as Ambassador in London and indicated that he was available for nomination in 1960, Guevara Arze pulled away from the MNR to become the first formal dissenter and, with a large personal following, formed the MNRA. Charging betrayal of the revolution by the MNR, Guevara posed formidable opposition in the presidential elections of 1960. With the nomination of Paz by the MNR, a political understanding awarded the vice-presidency to Juan Lechín, in the hope that strong support would thus be generated from the left wing for the ticket, to offset the anticipated defections from the right wing.

Though disaffection both within and outside of the MNR was visibly increasing, the government with the aid of electoral manipulation

once again produced returns which were self-vindicating. With nearly a million votes cast, the government received the support of 735,619; Guevara Arze was successful in siphoning off 139,713 acknowledged votes, a significant number considering that many more votes probably were cast for the PRA but not recorded. The FSB split the vote on the right with Guevara's party, the former receiving 78,963 votes, while the POR and the Communists received the relatively insignificant support of the radical Left.

Though the MNR had successfully avoided major embarrassment at the polls, disillusionment was clearly evident in the 1960 election results. The cities, afflicted by food shortages and high prices had obviously given heavy support to the rightist opposition, with the FSB nearly matching the government's vote in La Paz. The opposition increased its representation in the Chamber of Deputies from the 5 seats the FSB had held since 1956 to a total of 17 seats, with the FSB's representation dropping to 3 seats and the MNRA gaining 14 seats, under the proportional representation system. The official party, however, retained control with 51 seats. The 18-member Senate remained solidly MNR as it had since 1956.

During the second Paz administration the government's position has become more rather than less tenuous. The interest groups to which it has looked for support have themselves become increasingly divided. The heavy involvement of Lechín, the FSTMB leader, in national politics weakened the bonds of communication and identification which he had enjoyed with the miners. The COB itself has also never fully recovered from the divisions engendered in the bitter general strike dispute of 1957.

The *campesinos*, too, organized in their *sindicatos*, have found their previous unity of purpose—which was in many ways more nominal than real—diminishing in recent years. After achieving their goal of landownership, the most critical purpose in the *campesinos*' organization has been accomplished, and tendency to focus on local issues and needs hampers their effectiveness as a national interest group.

This disunity within the major pro-MNR interest groups has been matched by conflict within the ranks of the party itself. Since 1959 the leftists within the movement have coalesced into the Left Sector under the general leadership of Juan Lechín, and cells and an embryo organizational structure have been formed by the sector, particularly around La Paz. A similar group, the Socialist Sector, has grown up on the Right. The central leadership of the party, under Paz, has good reason to be disturbed by this polarization of what has always been an extremely loose coalition of disparate groups drawn together for their own pragmatic reasons.

The June 1962 congressional elections were held against this background of internal disunity. Outside the revolutionary movement,

however, the opposition was also afflicted with increasing problems. Guevara Arze had become convinced that the MNRA must establish its own identity separate from that of the MNR. Rechristened the PRA (except for a small band of dissidents, who deserted Guevara's leadership and retained the old name) it was prepared for an even more serious challenge of the MNR's leadership.

The natural affinity of the two largest rightist parties brought some talk of a united front against the MNR. This idea, however, soon foundered on the refusal of either Guevara or the FSB's leader, Mario Gutiérrez, to relinquish primacy to the other. These two parties, considered by the MNR to be by far its most serious opposition, centered most of their fire on each other, and their campaigns deteriorated into personal attacks on each other's leaders rather than on the MNR.

Nonetheless, with the degree of widespread dissatisfaction that existed, particularly in the cities and certain specific areas such as Oruro, the MNR campaign was a bitter one. Deeply disturbed at the possibility that the election might indicate a shift of the popular consensus away from the revolution, the party, by report of both foreign observers and the La Paz press, engaged in massive coercion and fraud, directed from the top level of the party and the government. Affronted by the heretical nature of the PRA and seriously concerned by its strength, the MNR strategy was to reduce that party's vote by all available means. Deals were made with other parties, and the votes of the PSC and the PCB were artifically inflated as a means of frustrating the election of PRA candidates to the legislature.

Another party active in the early campaign was the rump of the MNRA. On the formation of the PRA it fell under the control of loyal Movimientistas. The MNR kept the name in reserve during the spring in order to provide the official party with a front for formal opposition in the event the other opposition parties abstained. When this did not occur and it became clear the election would be bitterly contested, the PMNRA was withdrawn.

With a reduced number of the electorate voting in the off-year elections, the MNR received a much inflated vote of approximately 347,000; the FSB, 51,000; the PRA, 26,000; the PSC, 13,000; and the PCB, 11,000 (see table 2). The government party won all senatorial seats being contested; of the 38 seats in the Chamber of Deputies up for election, the MNR won 27; the FSB, 6; the PRA, 4; and the PSC, 1. The PRA suffered the most from MNR manipulation. In La Paz Department the PSC's electoral strength was inflated in such a way that Guevara Arze lost his seat there under the system of proportional representation. In the city of Oruro the FSB vote exceeded that of even the MNR, though a desire to see the PRA lose its position as the most important opposition party may have played some part in the manipulation of returns there.

Regardless of superficial appearances, the election represented a significant setback for the government. With abstention running to nearly half the electorate and the fraudulent nature of the elections widely reported both inside and outside Bolivia, the government lost considerable prestige at a time when it could poorly afford it.

The postelectoral period produced the usual round of charges and countercharges. The PRA leader, Guevara Arze, left for self-exile in Chile, charging the government with the theft of his seat in Congress. In August an event of some significance occurred when Mario Gutiérrez of the FSB signed a pact of unity with Guevara's associates on behalf of the PRA. Presumably, only the next election campaign will show whether this alliance can bring continued cooperation between the two groups or whether, as in the past, divisive factors will eventually prove too strong for its maintenance.

The government's problems in early 1963 were, if anything, more serious than before the congressional elections. An immediate concern was the question of the presidential ambitions of Lechín, regarded by many as potentially the most powerful man in the country. Should Siles follow Paz's example by returning to the presidency, the miners' leader might take the formidable Left Sector out of the party or conceivably head a coup to prevent the government from falling once again into the hands of his rival.

In spite of these preoccupations the Paz government has continued, with external assistance, particularly from the United States, to develop and expand the programs with which it hopes eventually to pull the Republic out of economic chaos and political disorder. A serious attempt to put national planning on a long-range basis, abjuring previous practices of *ad hoc* programing, was made with the announcement in July 1961 of an ambitious and comprehensive 10-year plan for economic and social development; in early 1963 it was under revision after review by Alliance for Progress agencies. In addition, further economic programs involving international aid were planned (see ch. 17, The Economic System).

As the government attempts, often ineffectively and wastefully, to move toward these goals, it is hampered by the very improvements which have occurred in the country. By raising questions never before faced by Bolivians, the Revolution has brought about a marked increase in the level of expectations of the population which it must now attempt to satisfy. By endowing previously deprived groups—miners, workers and *campesinos*—with a new sense of their own worth and power, the government finds itself in the position of having to accede to the exactions of its principal sources of political support, even though the satisfaction of such demands is beyond the capacity of the economy.

At the same time that increased demands are being placed on the government and the MNR, the room for maneuver has been significantly reduced. Sectors of the urban population are impatient for the material rewards of a decade-long revolution, as the 1960 and 1962 election results graphically illustrated. The demands of this group have become increasingly difficult to meet, and strikes have become endemic.

Confronted with the prospect of the increasing fragmentation of the initial, nearly countrywide support it received, the MNR—and consequently the government—is facing a self-created dilemma. Born of violence, it has continually to pay for its existence to the turbulent elements that brought it to power, and any effort by government or party to curb excessive demands or opposition only increases the trend toward divisiveness. By the same token, the result of acceding to such demands in exchange for political support is progressively to reduce the chances of attaining that economic stability without which government cannot survive and, further, without which foreign sources of economic aid would be alienated. Extensive as have been the efforts of the national revolution to achieve socioeconomic reform, the political future of the country remains subject to grave risk.

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Since the national revolution sweeping changes have been introduced into the electoral practices of the Republic. Before 1952, the literacy and financial qualifications had limited the potential electorate to barely over 200,000 out of a population of more than 3 million. Less than 130,000 citizens went to the polls in the 1951 election. One of the MNR's first acts after its assumption of power, confirmed in the Constitution of 1961, was to make all Bolivians over 21 years old eligible to vote. This abrupt enlargement, along with a law making voting compulsory, produced a potential electorate of more than a million and was to introduce the vast majority of the rural, Indian population to the ballotbox for the first time.

The electoral process is supervised by a system of courts, headed by a National Electoral Court, consisting of representatives of the three major branches of government (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government). The Electoral Law was decreed in 1956, amended in 1958, enacted as law in 1959 and further amended in April 1962, before the elections in May of that year. The Constitution and Electoral Law provide for procedures wholly free from official interference or manipulation, with the most stringent safeguards against fraud and improprieties of any sort. In no area of political life, however, is there greater divergence between formal principle and actual practice.

The basic procedures of voting are not complicated. Before the current electoral law went into effect, each party recognized by the Electoral Court was responsible for printing its own ballots, which listed the candidates for both the executive and legislative branches in each electoral district (in off years, only congressional candidates were listed). To the smaller parties the ballots involved considerable expense, whereas the MNR had access to government-owned printing facilities. Current procedure is designed to remedy this inequity and calls for the government to print ballots for each party which contested the previous election, in a proportion 10 times the number of votes each received then (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

A system of registration exists whereby Bolivians, upon reaching their majority, are entered on the civic register and receive a *carnet* or *libreta* (certificates of personal record) which serve as identification at the polls. Registration must by law be closed 30 days before election, though this stipulation is often violated.

The Republic is divided into nine electoral districts, which correspond to the nine departments. These are then subdivided into wards, precincts and subprecincts. Each recognized party has the right to appoint referees to supervise the conduct of the election. The actual polling places are called *mesas* (tables), and notice of their location is given in the press.

On election day the voter, legally compelled to attend the election, signs the electoral register and receives an envelope countersigned by an electoral official. He then enters a curtained booth where he may, in private, insert the ballot of his choice into the envelope, which is then placed in the ballot box. After this is accomplished, the little finger of the voter's right hand is dipped in red ink to guard against multiple voting. The citizen is also given, as proof that he has voted, a receipt which, in turn, is required for various formalities of civil life.

In an attempt to insure orderly voting, all electioneering is required to cease 48 hours before the election, and the sale of liquor is prohibited during the 12 hours before the opening of the polls. The main vehicle for campaigning is advertising in the daily press. Each party purchases space in which it dramatically appeals for support. Wall posters are also utilized extensively. In the later stages of the 1962 congressional campaign, sound trucks were hired by the various parties to take their messages to urban residents. Little use is made of the radio.

Under the present electoral statute a "single quotient" system is used to distribute the seats in a district among the various parties. This provides a fairly simple method of arriving at proportional representation, to match the strength a party will hold in the legislature with the strength it demonstrated at the polls. Although

there has been some demand from the opposition parties for change, the MNR has retained the single list ballot in which a split ticket is not possible and all votes cast for a certain party are counted in favor of the entire list of candidates.

The attitudes of the ruling MNR toward electoral practice are relatively typical of its approach towards the problem of government in general. On the one hand, the party has vastly broadened the franchise by making suffrage universal. On the other hand, it has, through a policy of manipulation and coercion, frustrated the development of an impartial and effective electoral system.

Perhaps the area of greatest flagrance in electoral malpractice involves the ballots themselves. MNR activists have resorted to a wide variety of methods of preventing the electorate from expressing itself freely. In many areas, particularly those where strong MNR warlords rule, the opposition has been so thoroughly terrorized that it has not been able to bring its ballots to the polls. In Achacachi, the Salas machine has simply intercepted the trucks of the opposition carrying ballots into the area and destroyed them. In other areas, where such strong-arm tactics are impractical, the party activists have stolen or destroyed the ballots in the polling place after they have been placed there. Thus, the Movimientistas forced those wishing to cast votes against the government to ask openly for non-MNR ballots in the polling place, destroying the secrecy of the vote. A more subtle method is used in areas of high illiteracy. There, the MNR has printed and distributed false ballots of the opposition parties, closely resembling the *bona fide* ballot but of a slightly different hue or, alternatively, marked "Void," so as to disqualify the ballots in question after they are cast.

During the 1962 congressional elections, there were reports of extensive ballotbox stuffing, particularly in areas such as Cochabamba where a strong opposition vote was anticipated. The registration lists in such areas also were frequently reported to have been "misplaced," and subsequent reregistration made extremely difficult for voters not carrying MNR membership card.

A wide variety of fraudulent methods were reported. The location of several of the *mesas* in La Paz was kept secret until the morning editions of *La Nación* identified them, making it difficult for opposition voters to find them. Flying squads of *carabineros* were observed to be moving back and forth between various polling places casting votes for the MNR. Army conscripts, legally prohibited from voting, were similarly seen voting for the regime. The practice of marking the fingers of voters with indelible ink was circumvented by bandaging the marked finger.

MNR permissiveness towards the opposition varied from place to place. In rural areas, where strong pro-MNR *sindicatos* existed,

some leaders exerted direct pressure to assure attendance and conformity at the polls. Toríbio Salas, the MNR boss in Omasuyos Province, levied a fine of one sheep on each of his followers who could not produce a properly stamped voting receipt. In well-to-do urban neighborhoods, where the revolutionary movement apparently wished to present a face of electoral regularity, little interference was reported during the elections; some La Paz districts, such as Obrajes, witnessed a total absence of the malpractices which were widespread elsewhere.

This tolerance contrasted with violence and brutality of remarkable proportions reported by the La Paz press to have taken place in the countryside. Two PRA leaders, Wálter Guevara Arze and José Luís Jofre, were seriously assaulted during the campaign. In the Cliza area, an MNR warlord, Julián Chávez, led a destructive foray against a nearby village loyal to the PRA *sindicato* leader, Macedonio Juárez. In Apolo, violence occurred during which, according to some reports, two children were hanged by members of the local *sindicato campesino* and a score of people were held hostage. Rumor magnified these incidents into even bloodier pictures of brutality, with a reported loss of life in the hundreds. One report told of a group of PRA workers which was captured by Movimientistas while attempting to distribute the party's ballots in the rural areas and held captive for several days until after the elections. The substantive background of these incidents was, for all practical purposes, almost impossible to learn, each party having its own official version in which it was the innocent party.

In some instances, the fraudulence of the electoral results was reported to have bordered on the ludicrous. In Cliza, a center of opposition strength, more than 15,000 votes were recorded for the government party, with no votes at all being reported for any of the opposition lists. In other areas the MNR received more votes than the total population of the area.

It would be misleading, however, to conclude either that electoral cheating is an innovation of MNR or that it is exclusively linked to it. Electoral fraud was also evident on the part of the other parties in areas where they were strong enough to make it feasible. Vote manipulation has long been a tradition in the Republic, and there has never been any deeply rooted concept of the electoral process as an effective indication of the popular will. Dishonesty at the polls reflects the history of moral relativism in politics as well as the incumbent party's determination to remain in power. Eyewitness reports indicate that the MNR carries on the practice, but its fraudulence and coercion are more massive and obvious than was heretofore the case, largely because of the increased size of the electorate.

CHAPTER 14

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

Geographic, linguistic and social barriers have long inhibited the development of communications. Whatever progress has been made since 1952 in lowering the social and linguistic barriers has been largely due to the government's concerted efforts to integrate into the national society the heretofore almost completely isolated Indian population and to promote literacy in Spanish. The proportion of total illiterates, however, remains high—as much as 80 percent in rural areas (see ch. 8, Education). To these must be added an unknown number insufficiently educated to read a newspaper. The fact that the total circulation of daily papers in La Paz, a city of 350,000, is only slightly over 40,000 strikingly suggests the ineffectiveness of the dissemination of information (and propaganda) by the written word. Further, political and economic difficulties have interfered with the development of effective dissemination by radio. Consequently, in many areas, rumors and word-of-mouth are still the main channels for the diffusion of news, and some 80,000 Indians living on the eastern plains are beyond the reach of any communication media.

Official interference with the freedom of expression to silence political opposition was not unusual during the 1950's but by 1960 the practice had considerably diminished and is now resorted to only when newspaper reports or articles contain direct or implicit appeals to subvert the public order. Also, in accordance with the General Regulations of Radio Electric Services (Reglamento General de Servicios Radioeléctricos), embodied in Supreme Decree No. 05632, November 1960, the government is entitled to order private radio stations to relay its messages and programs in the event of national emergencies.

Public support of official policies of the government party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria—MNR), is solicited through several government newspapers and radio stations. In the government-owned information media propaganda themes pertaining to domestic issues have remained relatively unchanged since 1952. Particularly before election time, MNR newspapers and radio stations are replete with references to the former misrule of the *rosca* (the elite). Dramatic references to the former exploitation of *campesinos* (peasants) and the shooting

of striking miners are linked to appeals for support to the MNR government, which alone can prevent the recurrence of such misrule. Pleas for unity within the MNR have also been a frequent propaganda theme in government media since the 1960's.

The radio is potentially the most important public information medium, although in 1962, its technical facilities were underdeveloped and its organization was chaotic. Provided that the government and private station owners can overcome physical and financial factors which inhibit the development of broadcasting facilities, the radio will assume added importance as a vehicle of public information and political propaganda and as a means of furthering the participation of Indians in national life.

Broadcasting schedules are irregular; frequencies are subject to repeated change; and program information is often unavailable. Although there has been a proliferation of broadcasting stations in recent years, they are weakly powered, and the range of their broadcasts is extremely limited. The government operates some of the more powerful stations; most others are owned by private individuals or by various political groups and parties, many of them opposed to the MNR. A considerable number of radio stations operating under private or political auspices refuse or fail to obtain licenses but continue to operate illicitly. Although the government has sharply condemned this violation of the official radio code and has prohibited commercial firms from advertising their products over unlicensed stations, it has not been successful in eradicating them. Neither have the sharp antigovernment comments of both official and illegal stations drawn drastic government reprisals, although all of them were affected by the general censorship between October and December 1961.

The extreme variations in the estimates concerning the number of radio sets in the country prevent an even approximately accurate assessment of the size of the radio audience. Indications are, however, that the number of radio owners and listeners is steadily growing, particularly since the appearance of transistor radios in shops and markets. Imported mostly from Japan, these sets may be purchased at relatively low cost and obviate the need for local electric power, which is not available in many of the villages. Largely as a result of the popularity and wide availability of these sets, there was a radio audience in nearly every rural market center in 1962. In the cities the radio rates as the most popular medium for news and recreation. A survey of a selected urban group conducted in La Paz in 1958 indicated that 40 percent preferred the radio to any other information media (as compared to 33 percent favoring the press).

The effect of the Indians' newly found ethnic consciousness is reflected in the increasing use of Quechua and Aymara in broadcasting. In 1962 political, religious and commercial organizations regularly

used Indian tongues in addressing rural radio audiences. Communist radio propaganda, intended for the indigenous population and aimed at ideological indoctrination or dealing with current domestic or foreign affairs, is also broacast in Aymara and Quechua although Spanish is retained for ideological terminology and political slogans.

The ephemeral and highly irregular nature of the press renders the systematic study and evalution of this medium difficult. Newspapers are published and vanish after their political effectiveness has passed or when they are unable to meet printing and operating costs. In any event their appeal is limited to small, educated urban groups who have traditionally looked to the press as a source of material for informal political debate. Rural groups have not customarily attached great importance to the written word, and even if literacy increases at a faster pace than it did in 1962, it is doubtful whether the press will assume much greater importance in the near future.

Achievements and failures of the MNR revolution since 1952 were prominent editorial themes during the last months of 1961. During the same period, many papers also editorialized—nearly always favorably—on the Soviet Union's offer for economic aid. The traditionally rousing theme of "yankee imperialism" was featured in many left-wing editorials and often linked to the Triangular Plan (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). On the other hand, the United States drew only mild criticism concerning its role in the Cuban invasion. At the same time, the press sharply condemned the invasion of India by Communist China and editorialized on the fallacies of "neutralism."

Motion pictures, where available, are a favorite form of recreation and are gaining importance as channels of information and propaganda. Feature films from the United States are the most popular, although a growing number of Italian, French and Mexican films are shown as well. Documentary films, supplied mainly by the United States Information Agency (USIA) but also by Communist countries, have become universally popular for their informative value and as aids in teaching technical and agricultural skills and promoting sound dietary and health habits. Informational material shown in documentary films supplied by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Communist China are practically always linked to political propaganda and sloganeering.

Public and university libraries are located in the major cities only. Because of a low acquisition of funds, most of their nonfictional material is badly outdated. The exorbitant cost of books and the low general level of education has restricted the practice of recreational reading mostly to educated, urban, middle-class professionals and students. Since 1961, however, inexpensive paperback editions have enjoyed great popularity and are sold in large numbers. Historical books from the Western world, modern fiction, digests of current

international documents and some Communist political manuals have reached the country in this paperback form.

In the cities there are a considerable number of publishers and bookstores, some of which deal mainly in Communist propaganda publications. Since 1960 the number of books, pamphlets and magazines from the Soviet Union, the bloc countries, Communist China and Cuba has exceeded similar material originating in Western countries.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of expression, although consistently guaranteed in most of the country's constitutions, has not been consistently upheld. The right of the Bolivian citizen "to express his ideas and opinions freely by any means of diffusion whatsoever" was reiterated in the Constitution of 1961. However, the MNR government has interfered with press freedom on several occasions. Shortly after its ascent to power in April 1952, it failed to protect *La Razón*, a newspaper noted for its popularity and high journalistic standards, against an unruly mob, allegedly incited by the MNR. Because of its former association with the Republican Party and its criticism of some of President Paz' policies, *La Razón* earned MNR disfavor and was forced to close down when the Minister of Government refused to intervene and permitted legal harassment and persecution of its staff. The Cochabamba newspaper *Los Tiempos* met with a similar fate in 1953, when it criticized the land reform. Its offices were destroyed, and its owner-publisher, journalist Demetrio Canelas was imprisoned.

Since the late 1950's the MNR government has abandoned its suppressive measures toward the press, although confiscation of individual issues and temporary suspension of newspapers published by the MNR's political foes, whether of the extreme left or right, has occurred from time to time. Also, in some instances, censorship has been imposed when newspapers tended to exploit situations which jeopardized the public order. On the other hand, the presence of strong criticism of government policies and personal attack and ridicule of some government officials by the opposition press seem to indicate considerable inconsistency in the application of these measures.

In March 1961 the Inter-American Press Association (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa—SIP) criticized the allegedly unsatisfactory state of press freedom in Bolivia. Government newspapers, notably *La Nación*, and *La Tarde*, vigorously rejected SIP's criticism and claimed that the country's press freedom was "unlimited" and that, in fact, opposition newspapers have "flagrantly" and with impunity abused this freedom by publishing "calumnies and lies" about the dignitaries of state and the leadership of the MNR. However, in October 1961, Minister of Government, Justice and Immigration

Eduardo Rivas Ugalde imposed a temporary but general censorship on the press to prevent further public unrest which arose following the rise in gasoline prices.

THE PRESS

Retrospect

The predecessors of today's newspapers appeared shortly after the printing press was introduced in La Paz and Chuquisaca (now Sucre) in 1825, and freedom of expression was granted in the Constitution of 1826. Newssheets and bulletins containing government proclamations, official notices and religious items were published at irregular intervals. In addition, handbills and pamphlets were circulated containing excerpts of university debates dealing with ideas and theories of the French and American revolutions (see ch. 8, Education; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Excerpts of learned debates and theoretical articles on politics, law and economics later became the principal items in the more regularly published newspapers and bulletins and helped to determine the eminently political and opinionative character of the press.

The internal disturbances of the 1830's and 1840's curbed the free flow of ideas and sent many authors of political articles into exile. Only one major newspaper, *El Comercio*, published in La Paz, served the entire north. *El Cruzado* of Sucre featured mainly religious items. The ensuing 30 years of disorder were even less favorable to the growth of a healthy press.

Journalism and pamphleteering were revived during the 1870's. The press, however, continued to serve a small, educated elite whose interests were theoretical and who had little contact with the practical aspects of national issues. Newspapers featured mainly political articles and platforms with only sporadic and irregular news coverage.

While the literate readership of the country increased in numbers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its proportion of the population remained about the same. No newspapers of more than local distribution arose until relatively recently, and though there was some increase in news coverage as national and world-wide communications improved, the press remained devoted to the political interests of its owners. To look for a period in which a vigorous, objective press existed is to seek in vain.

Character and Scope

In 1959 (the latest date for which circulation data are available), 23 newspapers and magazines were published. Six of these were dailies with an approximate total circulation of 51,000; none of their

respective individual circulations exceeded 20,000. Four of the dailies, with a total circulation of about 43,000, were published in La Paz, the other two in Cochabamba and Oruro, respectively.

Most newspapers serve the political interests and publicity needs of parties or individual politicians. Some newspaper publishers, although they are technically not party members, are connected through family ties or political connections to one of the parties or party leaders, and their newspapers reflect the political views to which they are committed by virtue of these connections. Support for official policies and for unity within the MNR is solicited in the publications of the government, but their appeal is limited to a small group of party faithfuls and some government employees.

In recent years, opposition newspapers have freely criticized the government, including President Paz. Their articles on corruption, treason and political blunder within the MNR government appeal mainly to members of the disaffected middle class. The letters-to-the-editor columns in the opposition press reflect a variety of antigovernment opinions though they are not necessarily in agreement with the political philosophies which these newspapers represent.

A prominent and relatively durable influence in the press since the late 1950's is that of Vice President Juan Lechín Oquendo. Along with his dramatic rise in national affairs, Lechín has strengthened his foothold in the public information media until, by 1961, his political interests were served by at least two newspapers in Cochabamba, and by the new (in 1961) Santa Cruz daily, *El Progreso*.

A multitude of minor newspapers serve the needs of domestic political propaganda before election time. Designed to win public support for certain candidates or platforms and to vilify rival groups and their leaders, these newspapers usually disappear after the election is over and their political expediency has passed. The MNR government also founded certain newspapers to provide personal publicity for President Paz or to counter the influence of opposition press organs for the 1960 elections. For instance, the government's afternoon newspaper, *La Tarde*, which ceased publication in 1962, was originally founded to provide presidential publicity and to attract the readers away from the right-wing afternoon newspaper *Ultima Hora*.

Because of the lack of a large, literate urban lower class, the typical city tabloid with banner headlines, suggestive pictures and accounts of crime and scandal has been markedly absent. To some extent, its place has been taken by the weekly or irregularly published propaganda sheets of Castroist and Communist groups, some of which combine party oratory and defamation with "cheesecake." Usually short of funds and subject to confiscation because of the publication of subversive material, they survive only briefly but tend to be replaced by publications of the same character.

Accentuating the ephemeral nature of the press are the chronic or recurring shortages of funds in which newspaper publishers find themselves. Many newspapers are forced to suspend publication temporarily or permanently because of financial problems or labor troubles. Indications are that, at least in some cases, labor troubles are exploited and sometimes precipitated by trade unions whose members work for newspapers hostile to the MNR. On the other hand, government newspapers are by no means immune to bankruptcy, and MNR's own *La Nación* was intermittently off the press during 1961 because of lack of funds.

The metropolitan press enjoys more prestige and greater popularity than do the local newspapers of Cochabamba, Oruro and Santa Cruz which feature mostly local and area news. The country's two leading newspapers, *El Diario* and *Presencia* of La Paz are available three times a week in some of the departmental capitals, where they are avidly received because of their extensive coverage and relatively neutral reporting.

With the possible exception of *El Diario* and *Presencia*, objective reporting in the press rates low. Totally conflicting reports in different newspapers of the same event are not unusual. Incidents of violence involving members of rival political parties tend to be exaggerated in proportion to the respective newspapers' loyalty to the group involved. Educated readers, aware of this practice, often read the account of such events in newspapers representing opposing political parties and arrive at the approximate truth by calculating an average between the two extremes.

Although used to highly polemical journalism, the small group of habitual newspaper readers deplores the paucity of "straight" reporting. They have also become increasingly critical of the strong political bias of most newspapers and are likely to comment cynically on the prevalence of florid and hortatory editorials.

Newspapers and Magazines

The largest and most widely read daily is *El Diario*, with a circulation of about 20,000. Owned by José Carrasco and his two sons, Jorge and Mario, it is practically the only newspaper which has attained universal prestige and popularity because of its relatively independent attitude toward national politics. *El Diario* is often critical of government policies and strongly condemns communism and Castroism. Its foreign policy comments are generally friendly to the United States. During 1962 the newspaper was nearly forced to close down because of the publishers' inability to meet its employees' demand for a pay increase. Adding to the difficulties was competition between the two Carrasco brothers for control of the newspaper;

the conflict was resolved in view of management's need to cooperate in the presence of threatening labor troubles.

Presencia, a La Paz daily with a circulation of about 5,000, is the most prestigious among opposition papers. Published under Catholic auspices, it has a marked Christian-Socialist slant and is one of the most outspoken critics of the MNR government. *Presencia* has consistently and vigorously opposed communism and, in most cases, has supported the foreign policy of the United States.

Ultima Hora, the only afternoon paper in La Paz in 1962, is a right-wing publication with an approximate circulation of 7,000. Formerly published by Alfredo Alexander, *Ultima Hora* was reportedly acquired in 1961 by a group of investors strongly opposed to the MNR government. One of them, Demetrio Canelas, was the owner of the Cochabamba *Los Tiempos*, which the MNR closed down in 1952.

La Nación, a daily with a claimed circulation of 8,000 is the official voice of the MNR government. Since 1961 the newspaper's foreign coverage has improved considerably through the use of Associated Press (AP), Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA) and United States Information Service (USIS) news services. Generally, *La Nación* is friendly to the United States, although it has criticized some aspects of its policies, notably the sale of tin on the world market.

Revolución, a weekly publication of the MNR is intended mainly for the MNR youth group. The newspaper features slogans pleading for unity and strength within the MNR and is distributed mostly through party channels. Two new MNR-sponsored weeklies appeared in 1962. *Nacionalismo* supports the MNR's official policies, although it has shown favoritism to the left-wing sector of the MNR. *Avance*, a weekly organ of MNR's centrist faction, the National Unity Front (Fente de Unidad Nacional—FUN) is designed mainly to promote the cause of unity within the party.

Also new in 1962 was *Tribuna*, a weekly published by Manuel Morales Davila. In its initial issues, the newspaper pledged an independent, nonpartisan approach in domestic and foreign affairs.

USIS in La Paz publishes an 8-page tabloid-size bulletin, *Actualidades*, containing mostly international news and reflecting the foreign policy views of the United States. It is published twice a month. Since it appears as a supplement to the Sunday issue of the nationally available *El Diario*, it has, therefore, become familiar to newspaper readers in many smaller cities as well as in mining camps.

In Cochabamba, there are two dailies (although neither is published on Mondays), *El Mundo* and *Prensa Libre*. In 1960, *Prensa Libre* (published between 1954 and 1960 as *El Pueblo*), the official local MNR newspaper, was heavily in debt for newsprint and wages. By mutual agreement between management and employees, the operation of the newspaper and its heavily mortgaged equipment were

turned over to the employees to be run as a cooperative venture. In the summer of 1962, *Prensa Libre* was noted for its competent reporting of local events. Even though its foreign news coverage was based almost exclusively on material furnished by the Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency, some of its editorials were friendly to the United States.

El Mundo is strongly pro-Communist and contains mostly news items copied from La Paz newspapers, without attribution. Like *Prensa Libre*, it usually uses the services of Prensa Latina to the exclusion of all other wire services. Occasionally, however, both newspapers use USIS feature stories, notably those dealing with the exploits of the United States in space.

Counteracting the pro-left trend of *El Mundo* and *Prensa Libre* is the Cochabamba weekly *Crónica*, with an approximate circulation of 3,000. *Crónica* is published on Mondays, when the other two local papers are off the press. It is consistently friendly toward the United States, makes extensive use of news material supplied by the USIS and features *Actualidades* as a supplement.

La Patria, a daily with an approximate circulation of 6,000 serves Oruro and is noted mainly for its economic features. *Crónica* (published every other day) and *El Progreso*, both serving Santa Cruz and its environment, print local news only.

Publications of the extreme left include *Lucha Obrera*, an organ of the moderate Trotskyite faction of the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR). With an approximate circulation of 3,000, *Lucha Obrera* has maintained itself with relative success since the mid-1950's, although some of its issues have been confiscated by the government. *Masas*, edited by Guillermo Lora, represents the more radical Trotskyite wing and is often violently critical of the official wing of the MNR.

Unidad is published by the Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista Bolivia—PCB). It appears irregularly and has a circulation of barely 1,000. Of little value in keeping its readers informed of current events, *Unidad* restricts itself mostly to party polemics and to the vilification of government officials and representatives of the Western diplomatic community. *El Pueblo*, with a circulation of about 8,000, follows the Communist Party line. It has better coverage, is more efficiently edited and much more popular than the "official" PCB publication, *Unidad*. *Wiphala*, the Communist "cultural" weekly combines political commentary with articles on art and sociology and short stories focusing on social problems. Much of its material is derived from foreign magazines, without attribution. Despite its Aymara title, its text is in Spanish.

Foreign magazines are available in the cities. Although their readership is small, they are of some importance as channels of propa-

ganda conveying a favorable image of life in the countries of their publication. Communist periodicals available mainly in La Paz and Cochabamba include *Unión Soviética*, *La Mujer Soviética*, *China Revista Illustrada*, *Tiempos Nuevos* (published in Rumania), and the Cuban *Verde Olivo* and *Bohemia*. Spanish editions of *Life*, the illustrated newsmagazine *Visión*, *Time* and *Businessweek* are available in urban newsstands and USIS binational centers.

Content, Format, Professional Training

Because of the shortage of qualified reporters and lack of funds for dispatching foreign correspondents to the major cities within the country, local news predominates in most newspapers. The same factors are responsible for the relatively widespread practice among the small newspapers of copying items from the metropolitan press without attribution.

The format of newspapers varies between the standard 22- by 15-inch and the 15- by 11-inch tabloid size. Some of them, however, do not follow either standard size. Typical weekday editions of the more prominent newspapers have about 10 pages, the tabloid-size, only 8 pages. Only the major La Paz and Cochabamba papers use pictures regularly. Those of international events or persons are usually on the front page; local or sport pictures are on the last pages or the back cover. Cartoons usually appear on the editorial page. Advertisements, a principal source of revenue, are featured throughout the papers as are personal notices of births, deaths and engagements. Professional services of physicians, dentists and lawyers are also advertised. Foreign, including United States, clients advertise mainly in *El Diario* and *Presencia*. Movie programs, social and obituary columns and horoscopes are featured regularly only in the major papers. Nearly all of them carry gossip columns, allegedly presenting the "inside angle" on domestic politics and personalities. These columns sometimes include items written in a facetious manner about diplomatic representatives of the West. Newspapers favor the use of cartoons to ridicule and expose political blunders and economic and social problems which are blamed on the MNR. Just as frequent are cartoons dealing with foreign relations, usually identifying Bolivia as a victim of aggressive neighbors or "yankee imperialism." Vigorous cartooning accompanied the congressional elections of 1962. In *La Tarde*, the MNR was depicted as a huge fish, about to swallow the small fish of the opposition. Another cartoon portrayed an automobile race in which the MNR drove an ultra modern racer while the other parties labored with Model T Fords and other outmoded cars.

Training in journalism is offered at the University of San Andrés in La Paz. However, because of low salaries and the lack of job security, there are only a few professional journalists. Most of them

pursue the profession only part-time, supplementing their incomes with another job. In some cases, publishers have had training and experience in journalism and continue to write features and editorials for their papers. Journalists are organized in the National Group of Newspapermen (Agrupación Nacional de Periodistas) and the Professional Union of Newspapermen (Unión Professional de Periodistas). However, because of the multitude of political loyalties which journalists represent, there is little professional solidarity and social cohesion among them.

NEWS AGENCIES

In the absence of foreign correspondents, newspapers rely heavily on wire services. Besides providing the only source of foreign news, wire services have assumed increasing propagandistic importance in diffusing the foreign policy views and interpretations of different powers.

Most of the major Western news services, notably Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), the Agence France Presse (AFP) and the West German Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA), have regularly or intermittently served the major newspapers. The Cuban Prensa Latina news agency, established in La Paz since 1960 with a staff of 10, and the Czechoslovakian Ceska Tislova Kancelar (CTK) represent the Communist wire services. In 1962, AP served *La Nación* and *Presencia*, and UPI served *El Diario* and *Ultima Hora*. Prensa Latina supplied mainly the Cochabamba papers.

Because of the frequent lack of funds, most newspapers are unable to pay the wire services regularly and, therefore, remain without foreign service coverage from time to time. In 1962 even the relatively solvent *El Diario* was heavily in debt to UPI. Prensa Latina and CTK have used the recurrent financial crises of newspapers to the advantage of Communist propaganda by offering financial terms which are within reach of the debt-ridden papers. However, the Communist-Castroist news agencies have adopted the habit of offering some of their material free of charge. USIS has always followed the policy of issuing releases without cost to all newspapers, whether or not they habitually use the material.

RADIO

Estimates of the total number of broadcasting stations vary from 56 to 90 stations, depending on the source consulted. According to the Ministry of Public Works and Communications, which supervises the licensing of radio stations through the Director-General of Radio Communications (Dirección General de Radiocomunicaciones), who is in charge of technical aspects, there were 37 licensed broadcasting stations in 1962. However, an additional 33 broadcasting stations

operated without official license, and 25 more applicants for establishing radio broadcasting stations awaited action from the Ministry of Public Works and Communications.

Controls, Organization and Ownership

In order to obtain a license a broadcasting station has to meet certain technical standards, set forth in Supreme Decree No. 05632 of November 1960. Regulations also specify that the executive and directive personnel of the radio stations must be Bolivian citizens, except for stations of an educational and religious nature, and that announcers and commentators must be Bolivian citizens, having a "general cultural background," as well as correct diction in the national language and the ability to pronounce foreign names and expressions. Although regulations are explicit in regard to technical and qualitative aspects of radio broadcasting, many of them have not been enforced.

One of the radio regulations most freely violated is that requiring licensing. With a very few exceptions, the 33 illegally operating radio broadcasting stations are not clandestine in the real sense (though the government so denotes them) but rather merely operate without license.

All of the 37 legally existing broadcasting stations in 1962, operated AM transmitters. Of these, 23 were medium-wave, 9 medium- and short-wave and 5 short-wave. The only FM transmitter is operated by the Canadian Baptist Corporation station, Radio Cruz del Sur, in La Paz. The FM broadcasts are relays of the stations' religious programs, also carried on short- and medium-wave. As of 1962 there was no national network, only an informal relay system, but the government is planning to establish a network of stations on medium-wave, under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts.

Indications are that the government has not censored radio programs since December 1961, when a general censorship of the press and radio was lifted. Radio station owners are therefore free to dictate or influence the policy and programing of their respective stations. Accordingly, radio stations generally follow the political biases of their owners. The radio stations controlled by labor unions at times follow Communist or leftist lines. About 20 percent of the other commercial or privately owned radio stations are Communist oriented, 50 percent support the government and 30 percent are independent and usually friendly to the Western powers.

The MNR government controls the La Paz Domestic Service, Radio Illimani. It consists of the most powerful medium-wave station (20 kilowatts) and two short-wave radio stations (10 and 1 kilowatts), designated as CP 4, 5, and 6, respectively. A third short-wave station (10 kilowatts), to be known as CP 7, is planned. CP 4 acts as the base station serving the La Paz area, while CP 5 and 6 relay the pro-

grams for the outlying areas of the country. It is believed that many local stations in the outlying areas rebroadcast the short-wave programs of CP 5 and 6 over their own medium-wave facilities and thus cover the entire country. In accordance with the Radio Electric Regulations, the government, in the event of national emergencies, may also temporarily take over the Canadian Baptists' powerful (10 kilowatt) short-wave station Radio Cruz del Sur in La Paz and order all the broadcasting stations in the outlying areas to relay Radio Illimani.

The power shortage poses a serious problem to radio broadcasters. With the exception of Radio Illimani, Radio Cruz del Sur, which has two short-wave (10 and 1 kilowatts) and two medium-wave (5 and 1 kilowatts) transmitters, and Radio Méndez, a commercial station in La Paz which has a 10-kilowatt, medium-wave transmitter, the rest of the country is left with radio stations that operate on 1 kilowatt or less. In an attempt to remedy the situation, the government has adopted the policy of requiring radio stations applying for the use of short-wave channels to agree to the use of high-powered transmitters of modern design, in accordance with specifications established by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). However, in 1960, only two stations, Radio Cruz del Sur and Radio Altiplano had signed agreements to this effect.

The privately owned radio stations depend entirely on commercial sponsorship, advertising or nongovernmental subsidy for revenue. Government and labor union stations, though subsidized by their respective sponsors and owners, also attempt to obtain as much advertising revenue as possible.

The Bolivian Association of Radio Station Owners (Asociación Boliviana de Radiodifusoras—ASBORA) in La Paz is the most active of similar professional organizations and represents most of the privately owned, licensed stations. It publishes monthly information bulletins and several booklets dealing with radio broadcasting. ASBORA is an affiliate of the Inter-American Association of Broadcasters (IAAB), although it has not been very active in this organization.

Stations and Programing

Although 31 out of the 37 authorized radio stations claim to maintain continuous, regular broadcasting schedules, only a few adhere to them. Broadcasting regulations require that stations devote 65 to 75 percent of broadcasting time to musical presentations and 25 to 35 percent to nonmusical (informational and educational) presentations. In practice, however, 85 percent of broadcasting time represents musical and related entertainment, 10 percent education and 5 percent general informational features.

In the case of the government station, Radio Illimani, all programs are broadcast in Spanish between 0700 and midnight, daily. The station carries a daily 20-minute program of official, domestic and international news, early in its schedule, and one 15-minute newscast during the lunch hour, except on Sundays. Another daily news broadcast is given in the evenings, except on Mondays. Radio Illimani also features a program known as "The Voice of Bolivia in the World" (La Voz de Bolivia en el Mundo) in the early afternoon, daily, except Mondays. Twice a week, on Mondays and Tuesdays, it rebroadcasts from the Organization of American States (OAS) program, the "Revista Radial Panamericana." Radio Illimani is also known to have used British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) news and recorded programs, in addition to rebroadcasting news and musical programs from the United States and Argentina networks.

Radio Cruz del Sur transmits programs in Spanish, English, German, Quechua and Aymara. Most of its programs are of a religious and educational nature. The station appeals mainly to the educated class and frequently has excellent programs of classical music.

Its programs in Aymara, of 20 to 30 minutes duration, are broadcast 4 days a week, and those in Quechua, the other 3 days. Radio Cruz del Sur, also conducts language lessons over the radio in French, German and English. It carries three daily, 15-minute news broadcasts, except on Sunday when there is but one. Another 15-minute news program of Radio Cruz del Sur, the USIS-sponsored "Crónica," has enjoyed much popularity. It is heard twice daily, except Sundays and Mondays, when it appears once. "Crónica" is also rebroadcast by Radio Nacional, Radio Fides, Radio Continental, Radio El Cóndor, all of La Paz, and Radio Chuquisaca of Sucre. Radio Cruz del Sur also rebroadcasts daily two 15-minute Voice of America (VOA) news programs called "Noticias Internacionales" (International News).

Of the five Catholic broadcasting stations in the country in August 1962, two were operated by the Maryknoll Fathers, two by the Spanish Jesuits and one by the Canadian Oblate Fathers.

Radio Pio XII, at the Siglo XX mine, was started by the Canadian Oblate Fathers in 1959. Its principal objective is to offer fundamental education and Catholic instruction for the adult mining population and to counteract Communist influence in the mining area. About 11 percent of its programs are broadcast in Quechua. Seven percent of broadcasting time is devoted to religious programs, 59 percent to education, and 34 percent to music, including musical commercials. The station has teletype service from AFP.

Radio Pio XII has been the object of several violent Communist attacks and had to close down its operations temporarily on various occasions because of damages sustained by its transmitting equip-

ment. When it suspended its broadcast in July 1961, following a Communist attack, the station went off the air proclaiming that it was not defeated but answered Communist violence with the "spiritual power of nonviolence." It closed with the dramatic words: "Free men of the world help us." The radio station has been reopened since, but it continues to be the object of violent Communist attacks. The last known attack was on September 21, 1962, when the radio station was damaged by a dynamite explosion. The newspapers *Presencia* and *Libertad* both blamed the Communists for the attack and reported the indignation of the Catholic miners.

Radio Fides in La Paz is directed by the Spanish Jesuit Fathers at the Colegio San Calixto. Originally it was intended for the middle class, but recently it has broadcast fundamental education programs in Spanish and Aymara.

Radio Loyola in Sucre is also directed by the Spanish Jesuits assisted by some students at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazón. Since there are no newspapers in Sucre and since La Paz newspapers arrive only after much delay, Radio Loyola with its news commentaries, economic reports and radio plays performs an important function. Every Sunday, the station also presents a program with a social theme, entitled "Verdad" (Truth). Other features are round-table discussions of letters sent by the listeners, a commentary on events entitled "Nosotros pensamos así," (We think thus) and a program which appeals for assistance for the needy, "Ustedes son buenos" (You are good).

Radio San Gabriel in Peñas, founded in 1956, is operated by the Maryknoll Fathers. Its main objective is to serve as a radio school, broadcasting literacy programs in Spanish and Aymara. Its 7-hour broadcasting schedule includes 2¼ hours of music, 2½ hours of religious instruction and prayers, 2 hours of literacy instruction and 15 minutes of fundamental education, except on Sudays, when this program replaces the 2-hour literacy class. The radio school has 100 transistor radios for issue to pupils of the literacy program. The program has had considerable success in the Aymara Altiplano area and is being moved into Cochabamba in order to reach the Quechua regions.

Radio San Rafael in Cochabamba, also directed by the Maryknoll Fathers, was started as an experiment on December 25, 1960, but has been handicapped by poor equipment and lack of trained personnel. It plans to offer literacy courses in Quechua although in 1963 the course had not yet begun because it lacked a qualified instructor.

Other radio stations include Radio Altiplano in La Paz, operated by Mario Carrasco, one of the owners of *El Diario*. The station features three VOA programs once a week, including "Teatro Musical Norteamericano," "La Comedia Musical," and "Cuentos Cortos Norte-

americanos" (North American Short Stories). Radio América in La Paz changed ownership and was renamed Radio Nueva América in 1962. Although its board of directors includes former newspapermen of the right-wing *Ultima Hora* as well as from the Communist newspaper *El Pueblo*, its broadcasts have a marked pro-Soviet and pro-Czechoslovakian slant. Radio Méndez in La Paz is a privately owned commercial station. During the congressional elections in June 1962, one of its commentators was an influential newspaper columnist, Alfonso Prudencio "Paulovitch" Claure, a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies on the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano--PSC) ticket. Emisora San José in Oruro claims to be the official voice of the mine workers and has broadcast pro-Catholic news programs critical of the government. Radio Excelsior in La Paz, operated by the construction workers' federation, is known for its Communist leanings. However, the radio station has softened its language towards the United States since the placement of USIS programs with the station.

Unlicensed Stations

The majority of illicit stations are scattered over the interior of the country and operate both on medium- and short-wave transmitters. However, they are of such low power, generally less than 1 kilowatt, that their audible range is very limited. Despite continuous efforts at prosecution, they have continued to flourish in ever-increasing numbers. Steps taken by the government to close down these stations have included orders to commercial and industrial firms forbidding them to give their advertising to such stations and to light and power companies prohibiting the supply of electric power to them. All these efforts have met with limited success because many are owned or operated by powerful labor unions, such as that of the mine workers which alone has 11 unlicensed stations in operation, and still others are operated by influential political groups or individuals who have been able to ignore or circumvent the government's efforts. The latest incident of international signficance was a charge by the Peruvian press in January 1963 that a powerful Bolivian radio station is operating near the Peruvian border and that the transmitter was used by the Communists to direct a subversive plot against the Peruvian Government.

In Potosí, the clandestine Radio Falange Socialista Boliviana, which transmits on short-wave (6,000 kilocycles), is operated by the rightist political party of the same name (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). Radio Continental in La Paz, Radio Nacional de Huanuni in Oruro and La Voz del Minero in Llallagua-Potosí are mouthpieces for the leftist elements of the political spectrum.

Radio Continental, a pro-Communist station broadcasting on medium-wave (960 kilocycles), has been highly critical of the United States.

It also has rebroadcast programs from Prensa Latina. The station is operated by the second largest trade union, the factory-workers' federation, and enjoys a large following among its union members and workers' audiences in general. However, Radio Continental and other similar radio stations are not always consistent in following the extreme left line. For instance, in 1962 Radio Continental broadcast programs supplied by the USIA and toned down its anti-United States propaganda.

Radio Nacional in Huanuni and La Voz del Minero in Llallagua-Potosi are Marxist radio stations located in the vicinity of the country's biggest tin mine, Siglo XX, a center of Communist agitation among the miners (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 25, Public Order). Both stations are controlled by the mine workers' union and operate short-wave transmitters. They are in competition with the legally operated Catholic station, Radio Pio XII, in the same area, for the sympathies of the miners. Radio Nacional has transmitted pro-Castro programs, including a proclamation by the Abraham Lincoln Provincial Committee for Defense of the Cuban Revolution. It also transmits irregularly a 20-minute evening news broadcast, "El Reportage del Momento," (Reports of the Moment) and "Revista Radial Panamericana," (Pan-American Radio Review) of Organization of American States (OAS) origin.

Receiving Sets

Estimates for the total number of radio sets in the country range from an exaggerated figure of 1 million to a more conservative 350,000. Standard radio receiver sets range in price from $50 to $200. Transistor radios may be purchased for about $20, but may cost as much as $100.

All radio receivers are imported since the Bolivian radio industry only assembles imported component parts. During 1959, Bolivia imported radio receivers and combinations worth $334,126 and accessories and component parts valued at $158,496. The United States was formerly the leading exporter of radios to Bolivia. In the 1960's, however, most radio sets were imported from Germany, Japan, Holland or Italy.

Foreign Broadcasts

Spanish-language programs are broadcast to Latin America daily by VOA, BBC, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking and Radio Habana. However, there are no available figures indicating the size of foreign broadcast audiences.

In the winter of 1962–63, VOA broadcasts to Latin America in Spanish totaled 8 hours and 35 minutes daily. One-hour programs broadcast nightly are directed mainly at Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay.

There are 5 frequencies used for broadcasting on wave lengths of 19, 25, 31 and 49 meters. These broadcasts include news and commentaries and cultural, scientific and musical programs.

The VOA has arrangements with some Bolivian radio stations to monitor its broadcasts and then rebroadcast them nightly over the Bolivian radio transmitting facilities. It is difficult to estimate the number of stations which relay these programs because of the frequent practice of picking up bits from another's broadcast and rebroadcasting them without attribution as to source.

It is reported that VOA and BBC come in strongly and clearly on the 19-meter band. Spanish-languages programs of the BBC were broadcast to Latin America (south of the Amazon) in 1961 on 16, 19, and 25 meter bands for 1½ hours each evening. BBC broadcasts daily news and news commentaries as well as conducts English-language instruction programs. It also features a program on cultural and scientific topics.

Communist-bloc broadcasting to Latin America increased by 30 percent in 1961. This is mainly attributed to the introduction of East German broadcasts to Latin America, in Spanish, Portugese and German, about 42 hours per week. It is claimed that the East German broadcasts are poorly heard. There was also a marked increase in the number of weekly broadcasting hours to Latin America by the other Communist countries.

Radio Moscow in 1961 broadcast to Latin America during the noon hour on wave lengths of 13, 16 and 25 meters and in the evening on wave lengths of 16, 19, 25 and 31 meters, a total of 2½ hours daily. In the same year Radio Peking broadcast 2 hours in the evening on the 19, 25, 31, 41 and 45 meter bands. Between 1960 and 1961 there was an increase in Spanish-language broadcasts from Moscow, Peking and the European satellites of 35 hours weekly, to a total of 128 hours.

Since September 1962, Radio Habana, the Cuban International Service, has broadcast 123½ hours weekly in Spanish to the Americas, a marked increase in time allotment. Programs include news, commentaries and entertainment. The broadcasts highlight the achievements of the Castro government, stress the economic and social problems of Latin America allegedly caused by the United States and call to the left-wing leaders and organizations to rise up in revolt. During the quarantine imposed on Cuba in the fall of 1962, the broadcasts solicited the support and solidarity of the Latin American people for the Cuban cause. The Cuban propaganda broadcasts also stress Soviet economic aid and at the same time portray the United States as a reactionary force, dedicated to aggressive economic imperialism. The increase in Cuban broadcast time, considering both the simultaneous decrease in broadcasts to Latin America originating in the Soviet Union and an increasing doctrinaire expertise over that formerly

characteristic of the Havana output, has suggested to qualified listeners that the Cuban staff has had the reinforcement of highly proficient Russia propagandists.

However, it is also claimed that Bolivians can hear several clandestine anti-Communist and anti-Castro broadcasting stations, such as Radio Libertad and La Voz Anti-Comunista de America, which claims that its transmissions are rebroadcast by stations in Bolivia.

TELEVISION

In 1962 there was no commercial television, only a series of closed-circuit transmissions, initiated by Phillips S.A., in conjunction with a local radio station in La Paz. The programs are presented once a week in their showroom, using a 16-inch television set.

There is, however, an increasing interest among private and government circles in establishing a television service in La Paz. In May 1961 the government authorized the establishment of Television Boliviana S.A., to be known as Televibol. This commercial firm is authorized to install and operate a television transmitter in La Paz and subsequently others in the country. It is also licensed to sell and service television receivers. The total authorized capitalization is, however, only about Bs324 million ($27,000).

Immediate success seems doubtful. There is no domestic production of electronic equipment, electron tubes or other components and accessories which would have to be imported from abroad at considerable cost, and the high price of sets would be a deterrent to the development of a wide audience, even with group purchase and viewing. Further, early reports of transmission testing indicate difficulties due to the special situation of La Paz in its narrow, 1,500-foot deep gorge.

FILM

Films are a favorite form of entertainment in the cities and mining centers. In 1962 there were 124 theaters equipped for showing 35-mm feature films, with a total seating capacity of 36,210. In addition, there were also 62 commercial motion picture theaters, located mainly away from La Paz, equipped for showing 16-mm films, with a total seating capacity of 12,200. Statistics for attendance are conflicting, but the Motion Picture Theater Owners Association's (Asociación de Propietarios de Cínema) claims of a marked decline over the past few years are unquestionably correct.

Admission prices in La Paz vary from the top price of Bs4,000 (about $.33) for evening performances to about Bs2,000 (about $.17) for matinees. The Association alleges not only a decline in the real income of the public as a reason for low attendance, but points to the fact that in 1962, in addition to a 25-percent income tax on distributors' incomes, over 43 percent of the average admission price of

Bs3,500 (about $.30) represented taxes and other charges on the total price of the admission ticket. The percent of taxation on the cheaper admission tickets is even higher. The Association has appealed to the President to veto legislation passed by Congress to further increase the taxes on admission tickets in order to obtain revenues to amortize a loan which would be granted to finance the South American Football Championship.

Domestic motion picture production is limited to the government-sponsored Instituto Cinematográfico Boliviano (Bolivian Cinematographic Institute), the privately owned Bolivia Films Ltd., and Telecine, which produce newsreels and short documentaries. According to 1956 data, the latest available, the Bolivian Cinematographic Institute had distributed, since its foundation in 1943, about 100 newsreels and 20 documentaries.

It is estimated that Bolivia imports about 300 feature films per year, 65 percent of which are from the United States, the remainder from Mexico, Argentina, France, Italy, and the Soviet bloc. Import licenses for motion pictures are not required, nor are there any other import restrictions, film quotas or government limitations on rentals and dubbing. It has been the policy of the government to waive taxes on imported equipment and supplies for construction and improvement of movie theaters.

Feature films are widely advertised in the newspapers of La Paz, with enticing illustrations. There are also film reviews and gossip columns, notably "Cinelandia Confidencial" by León Baleta in *El Diario*.

In 1962, United States feature films shown in the theaters of La Paz included *Return to Peyton Place* and *John Paul Jones*. Argentine, Mexican, Polish, Italian, German and French films were also popular. The suggestive Spanish retitling of both feature and B-grade foreign films to attract attendance is common in Bolivia as in Latin America generally. Some foreign films, including two American ones, *Leave Her to Heaven* and *Sons and Lovers*, were barred to minors and not recommended to ladies.

In addition to feature films, documentary films are shown to a growing urban and rural audience, under the auspices of the government, the USIS, the British Council, other Western agencies and embassies and visiting delegations of Communist countries. The Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, which has taken special interest in the development of visual aids for schools, has a 16-mm mobile film unit for the showing of educational films made available from time to time by USIS in La Paz.

It was estimated in 1961 that an audience of some 1.4 million attended documentary film shows of the USIA in Bolivia. USIA documentary films have been shown at Bolivian-United States binational

centers; in universities; in government agencies; for labor, professional, art and cultural groups; and at fairs in both urban and rural areas. In 1962, USIA cooperated with the Bolivian Minister of National Economy in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Bolivian national revolution by offering weekly films for selected ministry personnel on economic development in the United States, Puerto Rico and Bolivia. The film programs were followed by lectures delivered by prominent American and Bolivian economists.

In September 1962 four USIA films were shown during the Third Annual Agricultural and Industrial Fair held at the University of San Simón. One showed technical aid in action in roadbuilding, agriculture, education and various other fields; another illustrated methods for improving potato production; the third showed the establishment, with United States funds, of the country's only pasteurizing and powdered milk plant; and the four publicized the Alliance for Progress.

The *Golden Age of Comedy*, shown in 1962 at the University of San Andrés at La Paz, was repeated because of its popularity. The same university arranged a competitive showing of the USIA film, *Project Mercury*, against the Soviet film of Gagarin's orbital flight. USIS also made arrangements with the government mining corporation, COMIBOL, to show films in the company theaters, nearly all of which are located in isolated parts of the country.

In addition to the showing of films through government and university outlets the USIS has arrangements with two of Bolivia's major film distributors to show films of current documentary interest in the commercial theaters of La Paz and in the interior of the country. At times such films have been playing in as many as 60 commercial theaters out of the 124 in existence. A monthly feature of some 50 commercial theaters is the USIA-sponsored 20-minute newsreal, *Horizontes*. Other well-received USIA documentary films in 1961 were: *The Inauguration of John Kennedy, 35th President of U.S.; Alliance for Progress; Small Plot of Land;* and *World Watches Experiment in Space*.

Other foreign countries which engage in film showings in Bolivia are Great Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands, which participated with the United States in a film festival sponsored by the University of San Andrés in 1960.

In 1957 the Russians rented a local commercial theater in La Paz for an invitational showing of a lengthy Soviet film on the Sports Festival in Moscow in 1954. Another Soviet film shown in one of La Paz' leading motion picture theaters was *The Forty-First*, which received good reviews in the newspapers.

Russian dignitaries visiting in Bolivia in 1962 gave a 16-mm Russian-made projector to the Trade Union Federation of Mine

Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB). It was made available later to the Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB) for showing Czechoslovakian and Cuban propaganda films. Three of these films made available through the Cuban Embassy were shown in La Paz and to locals of the FSTMB. They included *El Negro*, a propaganda film about racial discrimination; one about new Soviet arms in Cuba; and a third entitled *Invasión de la Bahía de Cochinos* (Invasion of the Bay of Pigs).

Communist Chinese films were shown in 1959 in La Paz, Cochabamba, Catavi and 40 other towns.

PUBLISHING AND BOOK SELLING

Because of the financial insolvency of the small, literate middle class and the poorly organized distribution of books the country has one of the most stagnant book markets in Latin America.

The annual output is estimated at 100 titles, which include privately published materials and government publications. There are 20 publishing and printing establishments in the country, 19 of them in La Paz and 1 in Cochabamba. In 1957 commercial enterprises in La Paz published 13 titles in books and pamphlets, the government 10, and institutions 3. Textbooks for use in schools amounted to 19 titles by commercial publishers, 12 by the government, and 5 by institutions. Publishers in La Paz produced some 450,000 copies—75 to 80 percent of the national production of books, pamphlets and periodicals. Publishing in the interior is largely restricted to the universities.

The size of the editions published is determined by the approximate demand for a given publication. For instance, a scholarly work in the humanities is generally published in about 1,000 to 2,000 copies; writings in law and jurisprudence, in about 1,000 to 3,000. The average printing of a periodical amounts to 2,000 copies. Textbooks for school use are published in 500 copies or more.

In 1957, Bolivia spent U.S.$398,715 on importing books. Export figures are not available. In 1960 the country's total book imports increased to $432,000. The country's largest book supplier was Argentina ($158,000), followed by Spain ($100,000) and the United States ($46,000).

Tariff regulations state that books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers and manuscripts, except those containing advertising matter exclusively, are exempt from import duties, surtaxes and sales taxes, except for a processing fee of 2 percent of the import value of the publications, intended to cover handling charges in the custom houses. The regulations also provide duty-free import of newsprint, but a 2 percent duty is placed on the declared value of imported paper for

typographic purposes plus a consular fee of 6 percent, a service fee of 2 percent and a tax of 3 percent. No import license is required for books, but Bolivia does require an export license.

There are some 20 bookstores, 7 of which are in La Paz; the rest are scattered in the interior of the country. One of the larger publishing and bookstore establishments is Los Amigos del Libro in Cochabamba, which imports books from the United States, Germany, Spain, France, Argentina, Mexico, Cuba and many other foreign countries.

Until the late 1950's, low-priced classics of fiction or educational books were not available. Imported publications have a limited market because of their high prices. In 1959, however, an Argentine publishing house undertook the sale in Bolivia of low- and medium-priced books in large quantities. The Catholic newspaper, *Presencia*, hailed the venture, claiming that a market for books existed, ready to buy at prices within its means. Low-priced books especially in demand included short stories, novels, biographies and other nonfiction. Most of these books sold about 15,000 copies or more in a 6-month period. The medium-priced books, which included works on international affairs among others, sold between 2,000 and 3,000 copies during the same period.

Marxist and other left-wing literature is sold in the majority of the bookstores in La Paz and other centers in the interior. Librería Fuente de Cultura, in La Paz, displays Communist publications almost exclusively, as does Librería El Mundo, which is owned by Fernando Siñani, editor of the Communist newspaper *El Pueblo* and president of the Czechoslovakian-Bolivian Friendship Society.

It is claimed that about 90 percent of Communist literature displayed in La Paz is published by the Argentine publishing-distributing organization, CODILIBRO, which distributes about 1,500 titles. It is also claimed that Librería y Papelería Altiplano Ltda., in Cochabamba, with headquarters in La Paz and outlets in all the larger cities, is the distributor of Communist propaganda for the entire country. The Librería Altiplano in La Paz was the object of violent attacks in October 1962 by organized anti-Castro students and politicians as a part of a demonstration staged against the Cuban regime (see ch. 25, Public Order).

China-Revista Ilustrada, *China's Sports*, *China Reconstructs*, *Unión Soviética*, *La Mujer Soviética*, *Tiempos Nuevos* (Rumanian), *Verde Olivo*, *Bohemia*, *INRA* and *Avance* (all Cuban), are standard items of Libería Altiplano's display. It also carries César Guardia Mayorga's reflections on Chinese land reform, Mao Tse-tung's and Che Guevara's books on guerrilla warfare and many other Communist books which were published either in Moscow or Peiping and supple-

mented by editions from Uruguay, Havana, Mexico City and Buenos Aires.

In addition to the Communist magazines and revolutionary literature which is often sold below cost, there is a wide selection of lavishly illustrated children's books published by the Foreign Language Press in Moscow and the Foreign Language Editions in Peiping. The Communist Chinese paperbacks sell for Bs2,000 ($.17) and the hardcover books for Bs4,000 ($.34).

In 1961, Spanish-language books published by the Soviet Union doubled in volume over 1960. The emphasis was placed upon publishing scientific textbooks. Many more Communist publications not accounted for in official records have been transported through the Cuban diplomatic mail pouches.

LIBRARIES

The country's libraries are poorly distributed and are accessible only to readers in the major cities. Thirty of the libraries are in La Paz and 8 in Sucre. Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí have 3 each, and Tarija has the other 2. The largest among these is the Dirección de Cultura, Departamento de Inspección Cultural y Biblioteca Alcaldía Municipal, with 130,000 volumes, followed by Biblioteca Municipal Mariscal Andrés Santa Cruz, with 80,000 volumes, both located in La Paz. The latter library has the second largest number of readers (68,640) after the Biblioteca Central of University of San Andrés (80,000).

Fourteen of the libraries are affiliated with universities. The largest is Biblioteca Central of the University Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz, with 70,000 volumes. There are also 13 specialized libraries, including the Foreign Ministry's, which has 11,000 volumes in law and international relations.

OTHER CHANNELS OF INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

The generating and circulating of rumors is a favorite pastime. The city cafe and, in the rural areas, the weekly markets are prominent rumor centers. Rumors also originate and are passed on during fiestas, although they lose much of their effect because of the general state of intoxication. Trade union chiefs and *sindicato campesino* (peasant league) bosses are considered authoritative sources of rumors. Inhabitants of remote communities, eager to hear and savor rumors, look forward to visits of *contrabandista* trucks and long-distance buses.

In 1962 rumors dealt mainly with speculation about dates of a Communist takeover and with alleged sinister manipulations of the MNR designed to retain and expand their power at the expense of

the opposition parties. Other rumors, circulated presumably by the extreme left, dealt with an alleged pact between the MNR and the FSB designed to deprive Bolivians of their cherished civil liberties. In communicating rumors, Bolivians like to enhance their personal prestige by linking themselves to prominent or powerful contacts who have allegedly supplied them with the inside information. Thus, when the rumor involves a government move, the person conveying it generally claims to quote a friend in some ministry. Or, he alludes to close personal associations with a party leader or a well-known public figure.

Because of the high rate of illiteracy and semiliteracy, posters, wall paintings and inscriptions have considerable potential propaganda value. However, since the loyalty of the target audience nearly always follows that of the local leader, their persuasive power is limited, and they serve mainly to set the mood and charge the atmosphere before elections.

In the publicity campaign preceding the congressional elections in 1962, one commonly used MNR poster showed opposition party leaders embraced by the well-known propaganda image of the Wall Street capitalist labeled *rosca* (former ruling elite). On another poster, opposition party leaders were shown as puppets dangling from the hand of the same figure. Much use is also made of sanguinary portrayals of opposition members engaged in the act of murder or torture. The words "assassin" and "traitor" are frequently used in the texts of such posters.

The alleged corruption of the MNR government, its support of "yankee imperialism" and its schemes to "exploit" Bolivia were prominent propaganda themes in posters, flysheets and mural drawings of the opposition parties. These were presented in contrast to pledges for "good" government which the opposition claimed to represent.

Foreign and domestic Communist and anti-Communist groups also make considerable use of posters and wall paintings. Communist propaganda themes and symbols coincided to some extent with those of the MNR and its rivals. Many of them dealt with the alleged threat of the return of *rosca* exploitation and vilified the Wall Street capitalist and "yankee imperialism." In addition, the Communists made much use of slogans and the hammer and sickle insignia. Anti-Communist wall posters in 1962 were directed mostly against Castro. One of them showed the island of Cuba, surrounded by barbed wire, with dead bodies strewn over it. The other showed the map of Bolivia under the shadow of a bearded figure resembling Castro.

CHAPTER 15

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The role of Bolivia in international affairs has been described by one observer as "largely passive and sacrificial." Plagued by ill-defined borders and internal weakness, the Republic's history has been one of continuous territorial shrinkage; half of its national territory has been lost to its five neighbors in little more than a century. Although this history of national defeat was the result of a complex set of factors, it provided grounds for internal dissatisfaction and frustration and contibuted to developments culminating in the revolution of 1952.

In the nineteenth century, Bolivian relations with its neighbors mainly centered around the west coast of South America. After a temporary union with Peru, an ally in later contentions with Chile, the attention of the Republic gradually shifted to the east coast of the continent. In the twentieth century, the country has found itself involved with Argentina and Brazil because of their political and economic importance and with Paraguay in the Chaco War of the 1930's. Relationships with the United States, first centering around private economic relations and later in massive economic aid for the MNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement—Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) government of the 1950's and early 1960's, have become and remain crucial in the mid-twentieth century.

Economic relationships—chiefly the export of mineral wealth—have been at the core of Bolivia's external relations since the colonial period. First silver, then tin, oil, tungsten and other minerals provided the country with vital contacts with the outside world. The nature of these relationships—chiefly a heavy element of foreign economic ownership, the exploitation of resources by these companies for their own benefit and that of the small white elite, and the dependence of the Bolivian economy on external commodity price levels—has been conductive to a strong sense of resentment against the "economic imperialism" often attributed to the United States. Founded in part on legitimate apprehension over the way in which such relationships were disadvantageous to Bolivian interests, this resentment persisted even after 1952 when the MNR expropriated large mining interests dominated by foreign or absentee owners, and by this and other meas-

ures assumed virtually complete dominance of the economy in both its internal and external aspects.

The most important single feature of current foreign relations is the essential economic support provided by the United States for the MNR regime and its domestic program. Although marred by periodic friction, this relationship appears likely to continue, since both nations are aware of its advantages. In early 1962, United States-Bolivian relations were marked by dissension over economic issues involving the administration of Alliance for Progress aid to Bolivia, the allegedly harmful sale of key minerals by the United States on world markets and political differences involving Bolivia's attitude toward the Castro government of Cuba.

In the global arena, a tendency to adopt more independent attitudes in the East-West struggle, signaled by attendance at neutralist meetings, has become apparent. Discussions with the Soviet Union concerning political relations and various forms of economic aid have also taken place recently. Nonetheless, despite the temporary flaring of intense reactions over the Chilean diversion of the Lauca River and the persistent desire of the nation to regain access to the sea, the most central issues and attitudes in the country concern domestic rather than foreign affairs.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although the attention of most Bolivians has been directed toward the ordering of relationships within the society, external affairs—wars with neighbors, isolation from the South American sea coasts and the crucial importance of foreign economic relations—have been a significant part of Bolivian history since independence in 1825.

The formal part of this history is, to a great extent, a series of territorial disputes with its neighbors. Such disputes were rooted largely in two factors. When the republics of Latin America first emerged, it was generally accepted that boundary lines would correspond to those dividing the various Spanish colonial provinces before independence. However, this general principle, known as *uti possidetis*, resulted in conflict, for the viceregal boundaries themselves have never been clearly defined. The second significant factor in the Republic's troubled external relations was the uncertain balance of power which existed in the Andean region. The existence of more powerful neighbors on at least three sides made Bolivian territory a tempting target for expansive aims.

Bolivia's closest initial relationship was with Peru, understandably enough in view of their common history under Spanish rule. Their early relations were marked by hostilities brought to a close by a treaty of peace in 1828. The ambitions of President Santa Cruz produced a short-lived confederation with Peru from 1836 until 1839

when Argentina and Chile, alarmed by the concentration of power in this axis, invaded and dissolved the confederation. Considerable tension again characterized relations between the two countries; the Peruvian invasion of 1841 provided the Bolivians, under President José Ballivián, with one of their rare military victories.

A treaty of demarcation between Lima and La Paz was finally concluded and ratified in 1902, the problem having been simplified by Bolivia's intervening losses to Chile in the War of the Pacific. Later demarcations by commissions took place, with Argentina serving as arbitrator in a complicated case, the resolution of which Bolivia refused to accept. Until the late 1940's, the definitive settlement of some sections of the boundry between Bolivia and Peru was still pending, though the question was no longer prominent in relations between the two countries.

Problems on the Argentine frontier were rooted deep in the colonial period, when the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires had absorbed the Audiencia of Charcas which was later to become Bolivia. Active negotiations took place in the 1860's, with the conclusion of a treaty in 1889. This pact was not wholly sacrificial: Bolivia retained Tarija while ceding a large part of the disputed Chaco Central to its more powerful neighbor. An earlier arbitral decision of President Rutherford B. Hayes of the United States in 1878 had clarified the Argentine-Paraguayan border in awarding to Asynción territory north of the Pilcomayo River, which had been traditionally claimed by Bolivia. This let the Argentines assume the burden of protection for the Puna de Atacama in the Andean region despite insistent Chilean demands for it. Later clarifications and redefinitions were achieved, largely through a "definitive" treaty concluded in 1925.

The government of President Villarroel (1943 to 1946) was considerably influenced by Bolivian admirers of the Perónist regime and its immediate predecessors in Buenos Aires. There also had been a significant association between the early theoreticians of the MNR and Argentine political ideologists. This identification was probably influenced by an early attraction towards national socialism—later outgrown—of which Argentina was then the outstanding representative in South America. The strong tradition of Argentine hostility toward the United States probably also influenced the Villarroel regime which was the subject of an unsuccessful "quarantine" attempt on the part of the United States. A more durable factor in relations between Bolivia and its southern neighbor is a rail link constructed by Argentina under the terms of a treaty in 1941. This railroad, completed in 1962, connects Yacuiba with Santa Cruz and serves as a direct link to Buenos Aires, the Argentine terminus of the Yacuiba line.

Conflict with Brazil also began in the colonial period. An early demarcation agreement between Spain and Portugal foundered on the attraction of the rubber producing territory of Acre. In 1867, Brazil succeeded in gaining the acceptance of her incorporation of the northern half of Acre and the important outlet to the Rio de la Plata (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). One hundred thousand square kilometers of potentially valuable territory were exchanged for scarcely comparable commercial concessions on the part of Brazil. Informed opinions in Bolivia were strong over the cession, and the agreement has been regarded as a contributory factor in the fall of the Melgarejo regime (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Both Brazilians and Bolivians sought to exploit the remaining area, and pacification attempts by both nations proved futile.

In 1903, the Bolivians, far less dynamic and less interested in their border territories than the Brazilians, adopted the course of least resistance and agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Petropolis. La Paz gave up the remaining half of the Acre region—about 73,000 square miles—for an indemnification of £2 million and Br[illegible]ertaking to construct the Madeira-Mamore Railway as a means of reaching the sea by way of the Amazon. The La Paz government had been no more able to assert its control over the Acre territory ceded in 1903 than it had been with the earlier portion; local plantation-owners, principally Nícolas Suárez, carried the defense of the rubber-rich area with little effective support from the Republic's government. As in the case of most of Bolivia's boundaries, work on clarifying the Brazilian border was still under way during the middle of the twentieth century.

At independence, Bolivia had inherited, under the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, a considerable stretch of the Pacific coastline; the colonial frontier between Chile and the Audiencia of Charcas was fixed at the Salado River—26°, 10′ latitude south. The usual treaties of peace and friendship were concluded, and Bolivia's coastal rights went largely unquestioned until Chile's interests were awakened by the development of a rich export industry in nitrate deposits from the Atacama Desert and guano from the coastal islands. From the very first, Bolivia was at a disadvantage because of its inability to interest its population in the settlement and exploitation of the area. As a result, contractual arrangements with private companies were instituted.

A treaty concluded in 1866 recognized Bolivia's rights as extending to the 24th parallel and granted its neighbor a half share in the profits from guano and minerals in the southern part of the territory. In 1870 the discovery of extremely rich silver deposits in the area whetted the Chilean appetite still further. A treaty revision in 1874 extended the boundary line farther north to Chile's advantage and provided additional commercial concessions. Even this, however, proved insuf-

ficient, and in 1879 Chile precipitated the War of the Pacific by occupying the entire area.

Bolivia, even with the aid of Peru, was able to carry on only ineffectual defense of its rights and withdrew defeated in May, 1880. Peru, with a substantial interest at stake in its own coastal province of Tarapacá, fought on for three years. A truce ended hostilities in 1884, and was followed by a treaty conceding the entire Bolivian coast to Chile. The agreements concluding the war were questioned, however, and it was not until 1904 that a treaty was concluded which established the broad lines of a *modus vivendi*. Under this arrangement the victor retained territorial possession of the mineral-rich coastal area. In return, Bolivia was offered perpetual free-port rights in Antofagasta and Arica, and the Chileans agreed to build a railway linking Arica with La Paz.

The outcome of the War of the Pacific again demonstrated the Republic's inability to defend its territory. It also established the setting for the disastrous Chaco War in the next century, which was the product of Bolivia's determination to regain access to the sea, this time by means of the Paraguay-Paraná-La Plata river system.

Bolivia, defeated by Chile on the field of battle, sought redress after World War I through the League of Nations and pressed a request for renegotiation of the coastal question under the terms of Article 19 of the 1904 treaty. This approach, however, was unsuccessful; the League lacked jurisdiction in the matter.

In spite of unpleasantness associated with the loss of the Atacama province, Bolivia's later relations with Chile were not irrevocably affected, though the question of Bolivia's regaining a maritime outlet is still a live issue. La Paz had purposefully chosen to press her interests in such spheres as the Inter-American Conferences.

The long and bitter background of the Chaco region dispute extended from the very beginning of Bolivian-Paraguayan relations. In a dispute, stemming, again, from the old claims based on the extent of Charcas, both parties tended to be intransigent, and several treaties concluded by the governments failed subsequent ratification. Various international attempts at arbitration—by the United States and Argentina among others—also failed.

By the late 1920's, the two nations were engaged in active, though intermittent, hostilities. The discovery of oil in areas adjacent to the Chaco, allied with the increasing desire of La Paz for a maritime outlet via the Rio de la Plata river system, contributed to a gradual loss of restraint by both governments. Despite negotiations, increasing intemperateness on the part of the forces in the field finally led to general hostilities. The Bolivians, confident of the ability of their German-trained army and conscious of their superior resources and population, were falsely optimistic. Bolivian tactical and logistical

ineffectiveness led to the advance of Paraguayan forces well into Bolivian territory.

The peace settlement in 1938 extinguished Bolivia's claim to more than 90,000 square miles of territory without any provisions for the long-sought maritime outlet. The impact of the Chaco War on internal developments was profound. The politicians had failed, the Army had failed, and each blamed the other in the full view and awakening consciousness of the 200,000 survivors of the war. The resulting ferment, set in motion the political and attitudinal changes which were the prelude to the revolution (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Bolivian relations with the United States had been heavily influenced by the nature of their economic ties and particularly by the Bolivian opinion that these relationships were basically exploitative. Nationalists contended, for example, that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was frustrating the development of the petroleum industry in the country by holding its Bolivian oil fields as reserves. The construction of railroads by United States and British financial interests in the early twentieth century also provided grist for the mills of anti-gringo commentators.

The most direct involvement of United States business interests in the internal economics of the Republic, however, occurred in the extractive industries. The Patiño mines were incorporated in Delaware as the Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated, a United States corporation. The copper industry was organized under even more evident North American auspices—the American Smelting and Refining Company.

During the 1920's when official Washington diplomacy in Latin America was devoted mainly to protecting its citizen's business interests, United States banking institutions also came into unusual prominence in Bolivian internal affairs. Loans to the La Paz government were conditioned on its acceptance of the authority of the Permanent Fiscal Commission, an entity controlled by New York financial interests, to collect the Republic's taxes for a period of 25 years. Thus, one representative of United States banking interests functioned during the 1920's as Director General of the Republic's customs and still another as head of the Permanent Fiscal Commission and a director of the National Bank. External intervention of this sort tended to bring much-needed efficiency and rationality to the Republic's fiscal system, but a considerable segment of opinion resented it as a form of economic imperialism.

A general perception of the United States economic presence in the country as allied with the exploitative internal elite further reinforced negative attiudes towards the larger country. Even though United States investments in the Republic were greater than those of any

other country in the 1920's, the presence of other international investment, particularly Chilean and European capital, tended to prevent the direction of antagonism toward the United States alone, and hostility as bitter as that in Mexico and the smaller Central American countries never developed.

United States-Bolivian relations were not highly developed on the political level, but contacts were present. United States recognition came early, as it did to all the Latin American republics, but involvement in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth was not great. Bolivia was integrated into the inter-American system under the aegis of the United States, and Washington participated in several attempts at arbitration over the Republic's boundaries.

Official insensitivity to Bolivian feelings, exemplified by the publicized remark of a former American diplomat in Bolivia that "a bluff at the use of force was the only way to deal with these people," did create ill will. Stimulated by the cynicism Latin Americans felt toward the North American colossus in general, Bolivians reacted suspiciously to the proposal of Secretary of State Kellogg in 1926 that the Tacna-Arica issue be resolved by the transfer of part of the area to Bolivia. Even the prospect of reacquiring the much-desired marine outlet did not allay nationalist suspicions; the motivation behind this suggestion was alleged to be a desire to remove Bolivia from her isolation and thus expose the country to greater United States influence.

Later United States involvement in attempts to arbitrate the Chaco dispute under neutral inter-American auspices further precipitated Bolivian resentment when the ultimately fixed boundary line seemed disadvantageous to the Republic's interests. Another important factor in hostility was the seeming association of the United States with elitist governments on important policy questions. Thus, the Peñaranda government, installed in 1940 and heavily dominated by the conservative mining interests, vigorously supported Washington's lead against the Axis, promptly breaking diplomatic relations and becoming one of the first countries in the area to associate itself formally with the United Nations. Moves were also made during this period to compensate United States oil interests expropriated by the Toró government in 1937.

Reciprocal support of the interests of the oligarchy appeared forthcoming in the rising prices paid for tin by the United States, in reality a largely fortuitous matter created by the wartime shortages of that period. United States refusal to recognize the heavy-handed but revisionist Villarroel government until June 1944, after it had purged itself of Victor Paz Estenssoro and other MNR figures, tended to confirm United States support of the domestic *status quo* in the minds of many Bolivians. The advent to power of this party in 1952, its

expropriation of large United States interests in the mining industry, and the unrelated but important decrease in Washington's need for tin, all posed problems in the 1950's. The mutual interests of the two countries in avoiding chaos in Bolivian national life coincided, however, to provide grounds for close economic cooperation and amicable political relations during most of the first decade of MNR rule.

CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS

Regional Affairs

The desire of Bolivia for an outlet to the sea remains a significant issue in relations with its immediate neighbors. This goal is expressed in various ways in the pronouncements and policies of the Republic. The more obsessive aspects of this preoccupation are reflected in the recent practice of Army and Air Force academy graduates in subscribing to a ceremonial oath "not to rest until they see a free and sovereign Bolivia, with a sea and justice for all."

On the level of international negotiation, the issue was actively pursued in 1961 and 1962. It was widely reported then that the Bolivian delegation to the long-postponed Eleventh Inter-American Conference to be held in Quito would press for hemispheric recognition of the country's need for a maritime outlet. This issue had also been raised by the Republic's spokesman at the Punta del Este hemispheric meeting in the summer of 1961. Positive responses were not forthcoming, however, and the Bolivian Senate subsequently adopted a resolution expressing regret at the lack of consideration shown Bolivia's needs at the conference.

Although much of this activity was obviously of a *pro forma* nature, designed to satisfy public opinion, the matter was of serious enough concern to Chile, which was most closely involved in any bid by Bolivia for a seacoast, for the Santiago government to forward a protest to the Foreign Ministry in La Paz.

In spite of this official stress on the need for an outlet to the sea, it is unlikely that policy-making circles in the Republic entertain serious expectations of success in achieving their objective in the near future. The hope is made even more tenuous by a standing treaty agreement between Peru and Chile to engage in mutual consultations before granting marine access to any third party.

A long-standing trend has inclined Bolivia more towards intimate relations with Argentina than with any of her other neighbors. Initially moved by the nineteenth century dispute with Chile, the Republic has increasingly turned towards Argentina. A growing dependence on Argentine wheat and a general attraction towards its dynamic industrialization reinforces the trend.

There has been a close association between the MNR and Argentine political affairs since the 1940's. The protection and support afforded

Paz Estenssoro during his exile in Buenos Aires was part of a story that extended back to the original affinity of the military forerunners of the MNR for their colleagues in Argentina (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Against this background of closeness, there were concrete signs of continuing association between the two countries in 1961 and 1962. In November 1961, an agreement was signed providing funds for highway construction from Rio Bermejo to centers in Southern Bolivia. There were also reports of an understanding regarding various aspects of military cooperation between the two countries, primarily the possibility of general staff cooperation and joint military maneuvers. These latter prospects evoked some adverse criticism in the Bolivian Congress.

President Arturo Frondizi, before his deposition by the Argentine military, visited the Republic and engaged in consultations with the Bolivian Government regarding questions arising out of the United States-sponsored Alliance for Progress program. The only two readily apparent foci of irritation involved the issue of smuggling across the border, a problem Bolivia faces with all its neighbors, and a brief but intense period of superficial antagonism following the charge leveled at Vice-President Juan Léchin Oquendo by Argentine provincial officials in September 1961, of involvement in illegal narcotics traffic across the border. Resentment in Bolivia was allayed by the swift disavowal by Buenos Aires of any official association with such charges.

Considerable areas of popular contact existed between the two republics in 1962. Seasonal migration of workers has been responsible for regular movement back and forth across the international boundary. The practice by Bolivians in the south of traveling to Argentine centers such as Córdoba and Mendoza—often more easily reached than Bolivia's own metropolitan centers—has created numerous kinship ties on either side of the border. Travel, particularly by middle-class Bolivians on business or shopping missions, has been common; it also has been popular for well-to-do Bolivians in this area to send children to school in the larger Argentine centers near the border.

Bolivia reacted noticeably to the military overthrow of President Frondizi in the spring of 1961. Generally supported by the Bolivian press, Frondizi also received the support of an active poster campaign in La Paz during the Argentine governmental crisis, reportedly the efforts of Peronists residing in exile in the capital.

Only mildly disturbed by the steady flow of smuggled goods and the Léchin affair, Argentine-Bolivian relations remained calm, although the rejection of constitutional processes by the military in Buenos Aires injected an uncertain element in future relations.

There have, perhaps, been more grounds for antagonism toward Chile than toward any other neighbors during the last half century. A country which contrasts sharply with Bolivia, Chile is ethnically overwhelmingly European, far more advanced industrially and generally more sophisticated. Ill feeling betwen the two nations reflects these more generalized disparities as well as Chile's present possession of Bolivia's former coast.

In December 1961, Foreign Minister Arze Quiroga indicated in La Paz that the possibility of negotiations for a maritime outlet had been broached in a Chilean memorandum the previous July. This report was denied with some heat by the Chilean Foreign Minister. Misunderstanding followed in several other areas. Charges were made in La Paz of the expulsion of Bolivian workers previously hired by Chile to work on Lauca River development projects across the border. At the same time, the Republic complained of Chilean military construction and reinforcements in the border area. Early in 1962, reports circulated in La Paz of the closing of free port facilities in Arica; these were denied at first but later confirmed.

The most contentious issue in Bolivian-Chilean relations, however, concerned Santiago's Lauca River development project. In the face of Bolivia's insistence (since 1939) on the mutual use of the river—which rises in Chile and flows into Bolivia—Chile undertook preparations in the fall of 1961 for a unilaterally developed hydroelectric project involving the Lauca in its Azapa Valley. Diplomatic exchanges took place in November and December, followed by the unanimous adoption by the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies of a resolution condemning its neighbor for "geographic aggression and territorial usurpation." Against this background of antagonism, severe anti-Chilean rioting, mainly student-led, broke out in La Paz early in 1962, and diplomatic relations were severed on April 16. Later, the matter was submitted by Bolivia to the OAS Council. Following the OAS passage of a resolution appealing to both governments for peaceful settlement, Bolivia proposed mediation by other Latin America governments. After the rejection of this proposal by Chile, La Paz appealed once again to the OAS.

Increasingly disturbed by the regional organization's inability to force Chile to suspend its action in the area, the Republic announced in protest on September 3, 1962, that it was suspending "its participation in the OAS Council and all of the organizations of the system." The note declaring the move expressed Bolivia's hope that her empty seat would "remind the nations of the continent that she continues to wait a just solution" of the Lauca River issue.

Although the Republic did suspend its attendance at regular OAS functions and was absent from the next special hemispheric gathering in Mexico City, the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and

Social Council in October, 1962, left little doubt that La Paz's move only reflected its strategic thinking on the exacerbated Lauca question, and that Bolivia had not, in fact, left the inter-American system in any permanent sense. Added to these relatively transient issues was the continuing problem of contraband trade across the border, particularly from the free port of Arica.

Hostility towards Chile was evident on the popular level during the world soccer championships held in Santiago in 1962. The Brazilian defeat of Chile's team evoked widespread popular acclaim in Bolivia; La Paz newspapers appeared in green ink to form the Brazilian national colors—green and white—with laudatory headlines in Portuguese.

Relations with other neighbors impinged even less on the national consciousness of Bolivia than did those with Chile and Argentina. There was a growing interest in tactfully following Brazil's lead in evolving a policy of less consistent alignment with United States interests and policy in global relations. Bolivia joined its larger neighbor in sending a delegation to the International Conference on Problems of Economic Development of neutralist states in Cairo in July 1962, and diplomatic conversations between the two countries were held regarding the problems posed by a policy of less close alignment with Washington.

Popular feeling toward Peru was relatively neutral as of 1962, with some jealousy over Peruvian economic success, a state of envy apparently avoided in the case of Argentina and Brazil by the obvious disparity between those countries and the situation of Bolivia. An important factor in the ruffling of Peruvian relations was the large influx of smuggled manufactured goods across the northwestern border, particularly textiles produced cheaply and in large quantities by Peruvian industry.

The military overthrow of the constitutional government in Peru in July 1962 created for Bolivia a problem analagous to the earlier Argentine crises. However, after a short time, La Paz granted recognition to the new government in Lima, as did the United States and other Latin American nations.

Feelings toward Paraguay ranged from neutral to friendly in 1962 with no outstanding difficulties on the governmental level. The Chaco War left surprisingly little resentment against Paraguay, in part perhaps because of the MNR's tendency to explain that disastrous national defeat in terms of the internal organization of Bolivian society rather than solely or even mainly in terms of the relations between the two countries. With Paraguay, as with Argentina, there is believed to have been discussion of the possibility of future military cooperation.

Impressed by the program of social and economic change of the Castro government of Cuba, leftists within Bolivia looked favorably on the Cuban revolution and associated it with their own. But the movement of the Cuban Government toward an intimate association with the Soviet bloc and its acceptance of Marxist-Leninist theory injected an unsettling element into Bolivian-Cuban relations.

Even more important in influencing the relations between La Paz and Havana, however, was the apparent intervention of Cubans in internal Bolivian affairs. Relatively well-confirmed reports linked Cuban diplomatic personnel in the Republic to the abortive coup d'etat allegedly attempted by Communists in May and June of 1961. Subsequently, La Paz requested the recall of the Cuban chargé d'affaires, Mauro García Triana, although it did not break diplomatic relations.

Through the latter part of 1961 and early 1962, however, the Cuban cause continued to receive the vocal support of various elements in the population, particularly student groups and trade-union leaders who are strongly identified with the Castro government's revolutionary values and anti-United States policies. Hardening policies on the part of Washington, including the unsuccessful invasion of April 1961 and the attempted expulsion of Cuba from the OAS, tended to confirm these quarters in their support of the Havana government.

Recognition of support for Castro by certain elements in the Republic along with a desire to seek a more independent role in regional and global affairs seeemd to be reflected in the Bolivian government's refusal to support the United States proposal to oust the Cuban regime from the inter-American system at the Punta del Este Conference of foreign ministers of January 1962. The formal *raison d'être* advanced for its position by La Paz was the view that there is no constitutional provision in the OAS charter for the expulsion of a member government and its strongly reiterated support for the general principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Western Hemisphere states. These positions were taken by the five other Latin American governments abstaining from the vote on the United States-sponsored resolution of exclusion. Bolivia did join in the compromise resolutions, finally adopted by all the delegations at Punta del Este except that of Cuba, condemning communism as incompatible with the inter-American system, supporting the Alliance for Progress and excluding Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board.

During 1962, however, with the growth of arms shipments to Cuba from the Communist bloc and the acceptance by Havana of several thousand Russian military specialists, La Paz indicated a willingness to harden its position, at least on the official level. In October 1962, Bolivia joined in a communiqué issued by the informal meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers in Washington, D.C. This statement

explicitly condemned Russian intervention in Cuba and called for measures to counteract "the transfer of Communist funds to other American republics, the flow of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques." At the same time, military intervention was regarded as not being "justified." Bolivian willingness to move towards Washington's position was probably influenced by the unanimity of the foreign ministers and by the communique's specific repudiation of military intervention.

Bolivia's commitment to participation in the regional institutions of the Western Hemisphere under the leadership of the United States has been temporarily suspended, but not broken, by La Paz's decision to withdraw from an active role in the OAS as a result of its dissatisfaction with the body's handling of its dispute with Chile. This continuing commitment embraces not only formal affiliation with the OAS and its important components such as the Inter-American Defense Board, but also includes functional relationships with institutions such as the area-wide Alliance for Progress program and the Latin American Free Trade Association. Although La Paz is not formally associated with the latter group, which includes all the South American nations with the exception of Bolivia and Venezuela, the Association has made specific provision for the Republic's probable later entry.

Global Affairs

Never vitally involved in world affairs except in regard to world commodity price levels, Bolivia maintained membership in the League of Nations during the interwar period even though it became relatively inactive after its rebuff on the question of territorial revision on the Pacific coastline. There were other international contacts during the interwar period. The Germans had pioneered in the development of Lloyd Aéro Boliviano, a national airline founded in 1925, and had played an important role in the training of the Bolivian military during the 1920's. After formal participation in World War II and a conventional Latin American voting record in the early years of the United Nations, Bolivian attitudes towards global politics began to shift.

Current Bolivian attitudes and policies in the world arena are oriented towards achieving a wider measure of independence in foreign policy. Politically, this has been sought through increased contact and the beginning of not wholly clear, but nonetheless real, identification with the neutral powers of Africa and Asia, along with increased but restrained contact with the Soviet bloc. Economically, the same end has been sought by the development of greater self-sufficiency, particularly in the foodstuffs which the Republic has long imported, as well as by the diversification of Bolivia's industrial and

extractive production to end its once critical dependence on world tin markets (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

In 1961, La Paz issued invitations to Presidents Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of Indonesia to visit the Republic. Its relations with the United Arab Republic moved toward greater intimacy with the announcement in January 1962 that technical specialists from that country would assist Bolivia in mining, petroleum and railroad development as part of a technical aid program. The announcement of a visit by President Nasser later that year followed the raising of the diplomatic missions of both countries to embassy status.

The Republic had expressed itself in September 1961 on two key issues in the East-West struggle. In that month, the Chamber of Deputies had adopted a resolution addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union, attacking the great power practice of nuclear testing, then recently renewed by the Soviet Union, and asking that nuclear weapons be outlawed. In that month also, the Bolivian delegation to the United Nations had supported an independent Latin American proposal for the resolution of the Berlin problem.

Even more concrete signs of non-alignment appeared in late 1961 and in 1962. La Paz sent an observer delegation—the only Latin American country other than Brazil to be so represented—to the Belgrade conference of neutral states in the fall of 1961. Bolivia then joined Cuba, Mexico and Brazil in sending a fully accredited delegation to the Cairo international economic conference of nonaligned nations in July 1962. Given the Bolivian record at the Punta del Esta Consultative Conference of Foreign Ministers in January, the Republic had thus achieved in foreign policy a record of considerable independence from the traditional Latin American acquiescence in following the United States' lead in global affairs.

A prominent but perhaps less significant aspect of this accomplishment lay in the opening of new contacts with the Soviet Union and the members of its bloc. Communist policymakers had taken advantage of the extreme weakness of Bolivia's economy to make tantalizing offers of assistance. At the United Nations General Assembly session of September 1960, Premier Khrushchev offered La Paz $150 million in credits to assist the mining and oil industries. The reported offer of a tin foundry which would satisfy the long-time Bolivian desire to free herself from dependence on foreign processors of her ore was also made in 1960. Shortly thereafter, there were reports of a Czech offer to underwrite the construction of a foundry for processing the country's rich and relatively unexploited deposits of antimony; in 1962, a contract between Prague and La Paz was successfully negotiated.

These offers of economic assistance came against a background of exchange visits of parliamentarians, students and trade-union leaders

which established unprecedented contacts between the Communist bloc and the Republic. The inauguration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and La Paz was also reported to have been discussed by officials of the two countries in 1961.

In spite of the relative rapidity with which contacts were being established, compared to Bolivia's previous political isolation from the East, caution was evident in the attitude of La Paz. Advice was sought from Brazil which found itself in very much the same position but which had the self-confidence and security of being the largest power in Latin America. Evidences of a strong grasp on reality were also apparent in November 1961, when *La Nacion*, influential voice of the MNR government, warned that Cuba presented an unhappy example of Soviet aid which had ultimately materialized in weapons shipments rather than in capital investments. Coupled with Bolivian resentment of Russian and Chinese dumping of tungsten on international commodity markets with harmful effects on Bolivia's own foreign earnings, the general picture was one of cautious welcoming of contacts with the East in the obvious hope of improving Bolivia's own global position.

Bolivia was indirectly concerned by the July 1962 decision of the International Court of Justice, in the form of an advisory opinion, holding that all United Nations members must share the costs of the special Congo operation and United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East as part of the regular expenses of the organization. La Paz was not one of the governments refusing to pay for these special operations, but it had seriously fallen behind in its contributions to the regular United Nations budget. Although assessed at the lowest rate offered to any member of the United Nations—0.04 percent of the total cost of adn inistering the organization for 1961—Bolivia still owed the United Nations for its contribution back to 1959, a total of $55,050 as of February 1962. The World Court decision thus set the stage for discussion in the subsequent fall session of the United Nations on whether Bolivia and the three other nations similarly delinquent in their payments might be deprived of their vote in the General Assembly. In the event of the Republic's partial payment of its back debts, this embarrassment would be avoided.

The difficulty in meeting her payments to the United Nations was only symptomatic of the problems which Bolivia's internal impoverishment posed for her foreign relations. With the weakest economy in Latin America next to Haiti, as measured by per capita income, Bolivia has had a long history of difficulty in meeting its international financial obligations. In the face of the falling commodity markets after World War II and the severely disrupting effects of the socio-economic changes wrought by the National Revolution, Bolivia was in severe straits regarding its public international payments and its

internal economy. The United States, both alone and through the Alliance for Progress, The International Monetary Fund and other international lending agencies, various United Nations organizations, and foreign industrial concerns have all come forward with grants, loans and services to help keep the economy viable (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

Bolivia has also been exposed recently to a wider variety of cultural influences than at any time in the past, although its relative isolation from the outside world has by no means been ended. In early 1962, the Duke of Edinburgh included Bolivia on his Latin American tour, and an agreement was concluded with Denmark obviating the necessity of visas for travel between the two countries. Cultural contacts with the United States have been promoted by the American Embassy through the gift of books to Bolivian institutions and the sponsorship of events such as art exhibits and receptions honoring cultural leaders. Many long-established North American cultural contacts, such as the sponsorship of American schools in various Bolivian centers, have been maintained with little disruption even during the most bitter anti-American demonstration (see ch. 8, Education).

The Communist bloc also has been active in promoting as wide an expansion of its contacts with Bolivia as possible. Czechoslovakia has been particularly successful in the field of cultral relations and has exported numerous films and other cultural media to the Republic. The Russians have also been successful in introducing significant amounts of cultural material, particularly, inexpensive university textbooks in Spanish which are especially valued because of the severe shortage of books in the country. And Russian as a foreign language was being increasingly studied in the secondary schools (see ch. 8, Education; ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda).

The vast bulk of the country's contacts with the outside world, however, continue as in the past, to be with its immediate neighbors. The sharing of a common language, literature, and, broadly speaking, the same values and customs, provide the basis for considerable intercourse with the rest of Latin America in the realms of art, theatre and music. But the lack of intensity of interest by Bolivians in the outside world and its relative geographical isolation prevent such contacts from significantly influencing the texture or content of Bolivian national life.

United States-Bolivian Relations

The advent of the MNR to power in 1952 enormously complicated United States-Bolivian relations. Associating North Americans with the foreign capital at whose hands Bolivia's resources had been exploited and recalling the role played by Washington in ousting Paz Estenssoro from the earlier Villarroel government, MNR leaders were

initially antagonistic to the larger country. A large element of United States opinion, on the other hand, viewed with disfavor the uncompensated expropriation of the large mining companies in which North America investors had a considerable interest. In the light of this background, the paradox of Bolivian-United States relations is that the United States Government has come to be the main external support of the revolutionary government.

The evolution of a *modus vivendi* which both governments would find acceptable was not easy. The MNR entered the Government Palace at a time when the United States, with a large emergency stockpile of tin and operating its Texas City smelter at a loss, was no longer as intensely interested in Bolivian tin as it had been for reasons unconnected with the revolution. Nonetheless, much of Bolivian opinion--official and nonofficial--interpreted the closing of the Texas facility, the nonrenewal of contracts and the general reluctance to support what Washington considered an inflated international price level for tin as retaliation for the MNR's seizure of the large mining companies and indicative of general hostility towards the spirit and objectives of the revolution.

However, Washington, deciding that the importance of avoiding chaos and total disruption superseded any ultimate assessment which it might make of the MNR government, inaugurated a program of economic aid in 1954. Thus, the heavy economic involvement accepted by the United States inevitably involved it in political decisions crucial to Bolivia.

Unavoidably, the painfulness of some of the measures advocated by Washington in the name of long-range economic stability, such as the Siles Zuazo government's stabilization program of December 1956, made the United States unpopular with segments of the population adversely affected. These measures were an even more tempting target for Bolivian political factions wishing to capitalize on the safe and certain return of attacking the *imperialismo* of the north.

In spite of these difficulties, Washington underwrote an aid program totaling approximately $220 million through the end of 1961, in addition to maintaining a military mission in the country, the present status of which is based on an agreement concluded in June 1956. This decade of United States financial aid has provided indispensable support for the government's programs in fields such as agrarian and educational reform and has prevented the disintegration of various areas of Bolivian life (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

In spite of the crucial need of the Republic for United States aid, large sectors of the population have expressed opposition, sometimes violently, to the policies and goals of the United States. Although various political factions were associated with anti-American positions in 1961 and 1962, their opposition was often largely opportunis-

tic and more closely related to internal political issues than to any genuine differences with the United States. An influential and voluble segment of leftist Bolivian opinion, however, tended to identify itself in doctrinaire fashion with positions critical of the United States (see ch. 16, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

The Cuban invasion attempt in April 1961 touched off violent expressions of anti-Americanism in La Paz where the American flag was burned, and in Cochabamba where the United States Consulate was attacked. The Bolivian Workers Center (*Central Obrera Boliviana—COB*) under its anti-American leadership sponsored bitterly anti-American demonstrations on this occasion. Following the general trend of Latin American reactions, the MNR political committee, as well as the national Cabinet, publicly condemned the invasion attempt as a violation of the hemispheric principle of nonintervention.

The visit of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in June 1961 was the occasion of violent demonstrations in La Paz, then racked with unrest over the unrelated issues of a miners' strike and the possible resignation of President Paz. The COB again organized mass meetings on the last day of the Punta del Este Conference in January 1962 which it portrayed as part of a North American-sponsored program of persecution of the Castro government in Cuba.

In this climate of opinion, anti-American demonstrations by disgruntled or self-seeking Bolivian factions were not unusual; five demonstrations were directed at the U.S. Ambassador in a period of a few months and culminated in a bomb attack. Xenophobic elements publicly attacked wheat shipments by the United States as an attempt to keep Bolivia dependent on outside sources for vital foodstuffs; similarly, they censured technical assistance to the Bolivian Mining Corporation (*Corporation Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL*) as a device to keep the mining industry under Washington's thumb. The arrival in La Paz in July 1962, of the first contingent of Peace Corps volunteers from the United States was the subject of criticism by politicians and newspapers associated with the far left.

Government officials, however, were discernibly careful during the first half of 1962 to avoid statements inside Bolivia that might aggravate relations between the two partners. An interesting exception to this general policy of restraint was the serious attack on United States aid policy launched by Roberto Jordán Pando, Minister of Rural Affairs, at the April 1962 Buenos Aires meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank's Board of Governors. The Bolivian cabinet minister attacked the administration of the Alliance for Progress program in Bolivia, charging that La Paz's requests for assistance were being held up in spite of its having met the qualifications of social and economic reform spelled out in the Alliance. Dramatizing the issue, he described a forthcoming Bolivian mission

to Washington as a final attempt by Bolivia to determine whether the Alliance program was "fact or fiction." The Republic's government was particularly anxious that, having met the program's criteria in the area of land and tax reform and the formulation of a national development plan—one of only two Latin American countries to accomplish all three by March 1962—Bolivia not be passed over in favor of other countries' applications. In its eagerness to head the list of hemispheric applicants under the new program, La Paz had become the second government to submit an integrated plan of economic development to the OAS's Committee of Nine—its special advisory body on national applications under the Alliance for Progress.

The visit by the Bolivian delegation to Washington took place under the leadership of Jordán Pando in May, but its substantive results were still unclear in the fall of 1962. The only other issues of major importance in official United States-Bolivian relations were the continuing La Paz resistance to action against the Castro government and Bolivian fears that Washington's disposition of its excess tin stockpile might lead to dumping on the international market and a concomitant drop in the price of tin (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

MACHINERY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Constitutional Provisions

The 1961 Constitution provides only generally for the conduct of the Republic's foreign relations. Primary responsibility is assigned to the executive branch of government which possesses a conventional power of treaty negotiation. In his general conduct of the country's foreign relations, the President, as head of state, receives foreign diplomatic officials and appoints the diplomatic and consular personnel who will represent La Paz abroad, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship.

The legislature also plays an important, though secondary, role in this area. Once again, the constitutional references are meager. Approval of Congress is needed for the ratification of treaties which the executive may conclude on behalf of the Republic. Congress also must act favorably in joint session to uphold a President's request for a declaration of war. Legislative authorization is required for the dispatch of the armed forces beyond the Republic's boundaries, as well as for permission to be extended to foreign troops to enter the national territory.

The only other specific reference to legislative participation in the foreign policy-making process is a clause permitting the Congress to counsel the executive in this general area. No apparent provision is made for legislative confirmation of presidential appointments to the diplomatic corps (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

In spite of this wide delegation of power to the executive, the Congress maintains a considerable degree of influence through the traditional instruments of legislative interpellation, of possible condemnation of the government's policy, and most important of all, through the legislature's control of the appropriation of funds.

Organization and Personnel

The chief instrument for the executive's formulation and conduct of foreign policy is the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship, whose activity in religious affairs will become even less important as a result of the 1961 Constitution's abolition of the state's patronage power over the church, previously exercised through this ministry.

Internally, the Ministry is organized into eight Directorate-Generals divided along substantive lines: Protocol; International Organs; Latin America; North America, Europe and Asia; Boundaries; Special Departments; the Secretariat-General; and the Economic Adviser. The housekeeping functions of the Ministry are largely administered through the Secretariat-General.

The Consultative Corps of the Ministry, which is an advisory body and apparently lies outside the Ministry itself, is composed of citizens who are accorded membership in this largely honorary body. In 1962 its membership included such distinguished intellectuals as Luis Iturralde Chinel and Raúl Botelho Gosálvez.

Assisting the Minister and directly under him in the administrative hierarchy of the Ministry are the Undersecretary and the General Adviser. Directing the affairs of this government organ in the summer of 1962 were José Fellman Velarde as Minister or Chancellor, as he is variously designated, and Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui as Undersecretary, both of whom were appointed to their respective offices early in 1962.

In the Congress, topics concerning foreign affairs are referred to the International Relations Committee in each house. In January 1962, the chairmen of the committees were Ciro Humbolt Barrero in the Senate, and Jorge Flores Arias in the Chamber of Deputies.

Institutional Affiliations and Recognition Policy

Bolivia is a charter member of the United Nations and, although it has suspended active participation in the Organization of American States, retains its membership in that group. It also participates in the collective security arrangements for the Western Hemisphere through its subscription to the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty of 1947—The Rio Pact.

In addition, the Republic participates in nearly all the affiliated United Nations agencies, having had particularly important relations

with its fiscal agencies: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the International Finance Corporation. Bolivia has also played an active part in the internal functioning of the United Nations itself, occupying a seat on the Trusteeship Council which it will hold until December 31, 1962.

In late 1962, La Paz had diplomatic relations with all the other countries of South America except Chile. Economic factors tightly restricted the number of diplomatic missions the country could support abroad, but missions were found in most of the important nations of Western Europe, including the Vatican City. In October 1962, the Republic was represented by an official delegation at the meeting of the Ecumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church. In the Communist bloc, Bolivia had diplomatic relations only with Czechoslovakia. In August 1962, La Paz and the government of Yugoslavia raised the status of their diplomatic missions from that of legations to embassies. In Asia, Bolivian missions were only in Japan and Nationalist China. Although the Republic has recognized all the new nations of Africa, it has only one mission on that continent, in Cairo.

With the growing importance of the neutral nations of Africa and Asia and the increasing interest of La Paz in playing a more active role in international affairs, a broader exchange of missions with these countries is likely to occur in the future, but until the present the exigencies of Bolivia's strained economy have prevented such a development.

CHAPTER 16

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

Before the national revolution of 1952 only a small segment of the population took an active part in political life and only a small proportion was more than dimly aware of membership in a nation-state. Power, political action and even citizenship were the virtually exclusive prerogatives of the Spanish-speaking whites. Conscious of their supreme position and jealous of their power, members of the small elite consistently relegated the majority of their countrymen—Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians and most *cholos* (persons of mixed racial and cultural heritage)—to a position of subordinacy and political passivity. At the same time, they tended to justify their dominance by depreciation of both the racial qualities and the cultural traditions of the Indians. Hence, the prerevolutionary society was not only dominated by white men, but it was also sanctioned exclusively by their attitudes, values and ideas, drawn largely from Hispanic and Western European sources. Stressing their adherence to liberal democratic forms (at least in theory) and to Christianity, members of the dominant group saw themselves as the natural rulers of the country and the sole repository of national honor.

The submerged Indian and *cholo* groups neither acted in political life, except at the most local levels, nor felt more than a tenuous bond of co-nationality with their fellow Bolivians. Denied an arena of political action by custom and by restrictive suffrage laws, they seldom had either the necessary experience or the occasion for entertaining attitudes and opinions on matters of national concern. The trappings of republican government—elections, candidates, issues and laws—had very little meaning for them, for most communication with compatriots was limited by virtue of language blocks and the fact that few ever traveled far from their homes. Also important was a tendency on the part of most Indians to withdraw from all but necessary contact with persons and institutions beyond the bounds of the community, a tendency born of an intense distrust of whites and *cholos*.

For almost a century after the War of Independence (1825) few Bolivians questioned the established social order. The Spanish speakers continued almost unanimously to express their conviction of racial and cultural superiority. The Quechua and Aymara

speakers, for their part, expressed, in both action and word, attitudes of resignation and acceptance. To be sure, such acquiescence was not untempered by resentment, but discontent never resulted in more than local outbreaks of violence (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 5, Social Structure).

In the earlier years of the twentieth century, there developed an increasing conviction in certain sectors of the Spanish-speaking group that some modification of the traditional sociopolitical system was overdue. Some, like the indigenist, Franz Tamayo, argued that the nation was being deprived of both useful citizens and a valuable cultural heritage by the oppression and subordination of the Indians. Others pointed to the country's failure to develop a sense of national unity transcending narrower regional interests and jealousies. Yet others wrote bitterly and at length about their nation's almost unrelievedly dismal record of diplomatic and military defeat, accusing its past rulers of incompetence and even treason (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The introduction of new social and political ideologies—notably fascism, in its several varieties, and Marxism—crystallized this growing discontent and numerous parties and movements dedicated to reform grew up, including the now dominant Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR). The inconsistent but revisionist regimes of David Toro, Germán Busch and Gualberto Villarroel during the late 1930's and the 1940's were expressions of such organized dissatisfaction with the traditional system (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

At the same time, the hitherto quiescent Indians were subject to increasing influences from the national culture. On the one hand, contact with Spanish speakers and with the cash economy in the mining centers and along the transportation routes which were developed earlier in the century provided many Indians with a new perspective on their position in the national society. On the other hand, the forced introduction of thousands of Quechua and Aymara speakers to the duties (and to some extent, the rights) of Bolivian nationality through military service in the Chaco War awakened a degree of political awareness which had never before existed (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The 1952 revolution and the sociopolitical changes arising from it resulted from an uncoordinated groundswell of discontent felt by both a large number of Spanish speakers in the cities and politically awakened Indians in the countryside. The former, under the banner of the MNR, deposed a conservative caretaker government, and the latter, organized into armed *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant leagues) under the leadership of Chaco War veterans, forced the beginning of land reform.

Both government policies and party platforms of the MNR have been dedicated to the introduction of change not only in the resented sociopolitical order but also in basic attitudes underlying that order. Most official pronouncements and actions of party and government are directed at furthering the social integration of the Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians into national life and to upgrading the low esteem in which they have traditionally been held by their literate Spanish-speaking compatriots. For example, the term "Indian" (*indio*) has been completely supplanted in the official vocabulary by "peasant" (*campesino*), on the grounds that the former symbolizes their old lower-caste status, whereas the latter is an honorable socioeconomic badge. Similarly, government propaganda has consistently stressed the value and beauty of the Indian cultural traditions as an integral part of the national heritage, and official cultural agencies have fostered the use of indigenous languages as a medium of literary expression.

Another aspect of attempted change lies in the campaigns by both the government and the MNR to develop a sense of nationalism in the traditionally isolated Indian groups, not only by broadening the base of political participation, but also through the use of expanded educational facilities. Much of the time and energy of rural schoolteachers, Army training personnel and similar functionaries is devoted to lectures on patriotic subjects and to extolling the hopes and accomplishments of the revolution.

The MNR attempts to put forth the image of a mass party, representing, as the "party of the workers, peasants and middle class," a coalition of nationwide socioeconomic interests, rather than, as traditionally, merely representing the followers of personalistic or regional leaders.

The degree of success achieved in implementing these aims was by no means clear in early 1963. That some change in the attitudes underlying the traditional ethnic caste system had taken place was apparent. On the one hand, the newly found political and armed power of the *campesinos* was immediately translated into a new sense of self-esteem and confidence, replacing their former stance of servility and acquiescence. On the other hand, that same power, wielded through the *sindicatos* has resulted, at least in areas accessible to urban centers, in a degree of communication between the Indians and national institutions, with the growth of at least a nascent sense of national identity.

Nevertheless, much of the old pattern of attitudes remains. Although the quality of the Quechua and Aymara speakers and the value of their cultural traditions have become official dogma, these notions have not been accepted wholeheartedly by significant numbers of whites and *cholos*, who tend to see the Indians as semisavage, armed

interlopers. At the same time, probably a majority of Indian communities continue to be socially isolated from their compatriots by linguistic barriers and age-old suspicions. It appears likely that considerably more than the decade which has elapsed since the revolution will be necessary to achieve attitudes on the part of whites, *cholos* and Indians conducive to full social integration.

The strong persistence of traditional political forms—particularly *personalismo* (the exaggerated importance given to personalities over issues)—indicates that the image of the MNR as a mass, nationally based party is far from being fulfilled. Similarly, the broadened political participation of Indians, through the exercise of suffrage and through the pressure tactics of their *sindicatos*, has had only a slow effect in producing a widened sense of national identity, for the issues and leadership involved in such participation are almost always local, frequently community based. All available evidence suggests that in the early 1960's the symbols of the nation and the meaning of citizenship still had only an unclear meaning for most *campesinos* (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

For a majority of the population, the 1952 revolution and the reforms following it have been vested with an aura of near sanctity. The Indians are fully aware that their claims on farmlands and their newly won rights of citizenship are, at least in part, the result of the revolution. For their part, the miners and urban workers also associate such benefits as they have derived by nationalization and liberalized labor laws with the 1952 upheaval. In consequence, not only the MNR but all the major political parties publicly endorse both the revolution and its reforms. Thus, also, much political battling centers around allegations of treason to the revolution and its goals (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

To the extent that it has been successful in maintaining its image as author and executor of the national revolution, the MNR has enjoyed continued support of large segments of the population. Some of its leaders, notably President Víctor Paz Estenssoro and former President Hernán Siles Zuazo, have been permanently enshrined in the popular mind as patron saints of the revolution and authors of reform.

Nonetheless, although popular allegiance to the social, economic and political changes of the past decade remains strong, there has been a significant diminution of the once enthusiastic and massive support of the MNR. In their attempts to satisfy the urgent and accumulated demands of Indian peasants, miners, factory workers and other groups, the postrevolutionary governments have been successful only to the extent of awakening expectations. The continued and possibly growing strength of opposition parties in mining centers and in the coun-

tryside may well reflect a broadening discontent with the rate at which the benefits of reform have emerged.

Geographically isolated and in their majority illiterate, the Bolivians have traditionally displayed a measure of indifference toward foreign countries and peoples. For the most part, only members of the literate, Spanish-speaking upper and middle classes hold strong attitudes toward the world beyond the national boundaries. The *cholos* and Indians have reacted to foreigners only to the extent that they tend to harbor suspicions toward those residents in the country and to the extent to which political agitators have been successful in creating an association between foreign powers (notably the United States) and Bolivia's economic plight (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda.)

INTERGROUP ATTITUDES

Ethnic, socioeconomic and regional cleavages continue to fragment the population and to offer an ever-present threat to political stability. On the one hand, there has been a notable persistence of the old jealousies and suspicions, and on the other, new stresses and strains have been created by the power shifts arising out of the revolution.

Although now thoroughly shorn of its power as a class, the old elite maintains a high degree of social and ethnic self-consciousness. Few of its members dare speak publicly against the revolution and its reforms, and most pay lip service to the officially propagated notions of ethnic equality. Nonetheless, observers writing in the early 1960's report that many privately state strong convictions of Indian inferiority. At the same time, class consciousness is evidenced in a continued exclusiveness of upper-class social life. Memberships in clubs and other elite associations remain closed to those who cannot claim high status by race or birth, no matter how politically powerful such individuals may be. In political life, ties of kinship and longstanding class association between public figures often outweigh publicly stated ideological differences. Thus, the MNR politician of elite background who has just openly and bitterly excoriated an opposition party sees no contradiction in later drinking and socializing cordially with its members who may be related to him by blood or longstanding personal friendship (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The small and disunited middle class, consisting largely of persons of lower-class origins who have achieved a degree of economic and educational status, provided much of the initial support for the national revolution. Its members, not enjoying more than a modicum of power in the traditional sociopolitical order, had been among those voicing their discontent before 1952. Despite their initial loyalty, middle-class Bolivians have not enjoyed the benefits of MNR rule in the same proportion as have the peasants and industrial workers, for

they have never commanded the strength of numbers and unity necessary to enforce their demands. Hence, by the late 1950's, the middle class had become, as a group, one of the most important foci of discontent, and its members were flocking to the opposition parties—largely those on the right of the MNR (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

As a result of their newly won power and legal equality, the Quechua- and Aymara-speaking Indians have developed a stance which appears to many observers to verge upon aggressiveness. In most parts of the country, the old habits of deference and subservience—the stooped posture and the whining voice of supplication—disappeared soon after 1952. In place of cringing behavior, members of Indian communities have substituted an upright posture and a direct, occasionally insolent manner of address in dealing with outsiders, white, *cholo* or Indian. Indians who had formerly approached local government officials only in fear and apparent reluctance now do so with open confidence.

If the traditional subservience has disappeared, other Indian attitudes—intense suspicion, reserve and strong community in-group feelings—have been more persistent. The fact that most Indian communities see not only whites and *cholos* but also other Indians from neighboring settlements as potentially hostile outsiders makes virtually impossible any attempt to mobilize cooperation on a level higher than the local group. Old blood feuds between communities of identical language and culture have continued despite government pacification campaigns, and political disputes, often involving bloodshed, tend to follow lines of community affiliation (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Among the miners and urban workers, a degree of class consciousness had developed some time before the national revolution. Such self-awareness has its basis in a long history of labor-union organization and political agitation. In addition, over nearly half a century of sporadic armed strife, including several bloody massacres, legends and martyrs, has provided a ready basis for a common ideology. The class consciousness of the industrial proletariat, along with the constant political agitation directed at its members, makes it one of the most aggressive and vociferous elements in the national society. Although mostly loyal to the MNR, the miners and factory workers have displayed a continuous undercurrent of resentment at the government's failure to resolve their most pressing economic problems, and there has been some defection to the ranks of the opposition (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Regionalism, always a major factor in Bolivian politics, continues to be an obstacle to the stability of both the MNR and the government. A particularly important regional cleavage is that which divides the

lowland Department of Santa Cruz from the rest of the republic. Acutely aware of being different from other Bolivians in their traditions, especially in the lack of a specific Indian cultural heritage, the people of Santa Cruz (who call themselves *cambas*) have long resented the domination of La Paz. Although many *cambas* display signs of an Indian ancestry, they nonetheless tend to rationalize their dislike of highlanders on ethnic grounds, referring indiscriminately to Indians, *cholos* and even whites from the mountains as *collas* (the name of a historic subgroup of Aymara, used as a term of contempt). In their expressions of dislike for the highlanders, the people of Santa Cruz are quick to point out that their language and culture are "contaminated" with numerous Indian elements, whereas their own are purely Hispanic (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The regionalism of Santa Cruz has become apparent in several ways. On the one hand, the department has been a traditional center of opposition to incumbent governments (most recently as an important focus of strength for the Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB). On the other hand, factionalism within the MNR has at least partly reflected the regional loyalties and the disaffection of the *cambas*, for the newly emerged and dissident Socialist sector was reported in mid-1962 as having received its major support from the Santa Cruz area (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Politicians and governments of the MNR (and often figures from opposition parties, as well) have had a consistent policy of exploiting the various attitudinal rifts dividing ethnic, socioeconomic and regional groups. Perhaps the most notable instance of this technique lies in the use of the now powerless upper class as a bogey-figure to frighten the less-educated sectors of the population into political compliance. Calls for unity and support are almost invariably prefaced with warnings that the *rosca* (the elite class), greedy as ever, stands ready to recapture its lands and privileges and that only a strong MNR can prevent such a counterrevolution. Even opposition parties play upon the theme of a dangerous and predatory *rosca* by accusing individual members of the MNR of secret complicity with its putative agents.

Attitudes toward the small immigrant populations—Germans, Japanese, Levantines and Jews—are not clearly defined. There have been periods of relatively mild feeling against the latter three groups, particularly on the part of the urban upper and middle classes, but these have been short in duration. Throughout the earlier part of the century, German influence, particularly in politics and military training, was perhaps stronger than that exerted by any other national group, and Germans continue to enjoy high social esteem among the upper and middle classes (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NATION AND THE GOVERNMENT

Nationalism

A strong sense of national unity has only recently begun to emerge. The white, Hispanic upper class had fostered a concept of nationalism, theoretically embracing all Bolivians, as the supreme value of the republic's society. This concept emphasized the country's Hispanic, Christian culture and included, at least on the formal level, the liberal and humanistic philosophies which had emerged during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, most particularly in the French and American revolutions (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

However, while this concept of nationalism was formally invested with primacy, it was only publicly reflected in political behavior. The elite, in its rule, had placed far more emphasis on advancing its own material interests than on the national interest, while more than two-thirds of the population—the non-Spanish-speaking Indians—remained almost wholly unintegrated in the national social and political life.

Many Bolivians—on both right and left—were aware of and deeply concerned over the failure to develop as an integrated and united nation. Before 1952, men such as Montenegro and Diez de Medina sought a solution in the synthesis of the Hispanic and the indigenous cultural traditions. Under the name of *indigenismo* this philosophy has had profound and continued influence on the thinking of revolutionary politicians (see ch. 9, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Although the MNR governments, more than any previous regimes, have attempted to foster the growth of a truly national unity, their efforts have thus far borne little fruit. Linguistic divisions, geographic barriers and a very high percent of illiterates in the population stand as obstacles to a sense of common nationality and patriotism. Although the *campesinos* are becoming increasingly active in the political life of the nation, it will undoubtedly be a long time before they fully perceive ties of common interest and sentiment with their compatriots.

Among the Spanish speakers, on the other hand, nationalism and national honor are concepts of considerable political importance. City dwellers of all socioeconomic classes are quite receptive to propaganda appealing to nationalist sentiments. For example, in 1959, when *Time* magazine published an article seen by Bolivians as unsympathetic to their country, there were widespread and violent demonstrations against the United States in every major city. Again, during the 1962 dispute sustained with Chile over the diversion of the waters of the Lauca River, popular feelings ran very high. Perhaps most fundamentally, the loss of the seacoast area to Chile during the

War of the Pacific is seen by Spanish-speaking Bolivians not only as an economic disaster but as an affront to the national honor. All political figures therefore find it necessary to call fervently, if in fact meaninglessly, for measures to restore access to the sea (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Attitudes Toward the Government

While no faction in the country denies support to the concept of nationalism, attitudes toward the government *per se* are quite different. By and large, the government has received the support of the *campesinos*, most of the industrial workers and miners, and a significant part of the middle class. Support from these groups has tended to weaken as they have not received the material benefits to which they have felt entitled, but even so, the government probably still retains the support of a majority in the country.

All the opposition groups, and many members of MNR itself, are aware of and critical of the corruption prevalent among government officials on all levels. Deep-rooted traditions of personalism have always encouraged nepotism and dishonest personal advancement in public life, and the MNR governments have proven to be no exception. People of most classes see the constitutional and statutory requirements of honesty and impartiality as stated principles rather than as guides for actual practice (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government; ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

There has been little tendency for Bolivians to identify their personal interest with the orderly and just functioning of their government. This is illustrated in public attitudes toward smuggling and tax evasion. Huge amounts of goods are smuggled into the country, both by small operators and by businessmen dealing in large quantities (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). One observer reported an incident in which a busload of travelers from the Peruvian frontier agreeably donned sweaters and other articles of clothing being smuggled by their fellow passengers in a friendly conspiracy to thwart the customs collectors. Also the National Committee of Planning estimates that illegal evasion of taxes diminishes the public revenue by 50 percent.

Most of these problems arise from the attitudes of Bolivians toward government in general rather than toward the MNR government in particular. They are the inheritance of many years, and although popular identification with the government, particularly on the part of the Indians, may have increased under the MNR, it is doubtful that substantial improvements will come except over a period of many more years.

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES

Attitudes toward foreign countries, held for the most part by only a few literate Spanish speakers, are strongly colored, either by historic sentiments or by the vagaries of the international markets upon which Bolivia depends. Strong and persistent feelings are enunciated only for a few countries—notably Germany, the United States, and, recently Cuba and the Soviet Union—which, as trading partners or sources of cultural examples, have had a major influence on national life. Attitudes toward less important nations, including the neighboring republics, are seldom strongly enunciated, except when political feelings are running high (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Germany, as a trading partner and military and educational adviser of long standing, has enjoyed the continuous esteem of upper-class Bolivians. Nationals of that country have always been welcomed as residents in Bolivia and, in many cases, have easily integrated themselves to the local society. German influence on Bolivian political thinking has been strong throughout most of the twentieth century and was particularly apparent in the earlier pro-Fascist pronouncements of the MNR (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Attitudes toward the United States have been more or less consistently tinged by a suspicion of that country's motives. As the "Colossus of the North," the United States has long been subject to accusations of imperialism and "dollar diplomacy" by Bolivian intellectuals. The initial hostility of the United States Government toward the pro-Axis Villarroel regime of the 1940's has, for example, often been cited as an example of Washington's interventionist tendencies.

The MNR governments have, from the earliest postrevolutionary days, given ready acceptance to United States economic and technical aid. Nonetheless, in the context of the strong underlying popular suspicions of the United States, Bolivian government officials have maintained public attitudes of neutrality and occasional hostility toward the United States. Both right and left opposition parties have attacked the United States aid program as an attempt to dominate the republic's economy. Some of this opinion reflects quasi-objective criticism. Consequently, because its benefits have often fallen short of expectation, the Point Four program has been caustically referred to as the "Punto Muerto" ("Dead Point").

Though it is only a minority of the population which has distinct attitudes toward the United States, views expressed in public are often extremely antagonistic. In 1962 non-Communist critics of Washington assailed the Organization of American States (OAS) as "an instrument of United States oppression." Student groups affiliated with the MNR attacked Latin American governments associated with the United States' foreign policy as "lackeys" of that government. The Bolivian Labor Central (*Central Obrera Boli-*

viana—COB), the national labor organization, attacked Washington's attempt to isolate the Castro government of Cuba as "aggressive" and "imperialistic." The mine-union leaders in the COB have been particularly virulent in attacking Washington's Cuba policy. The visit of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to the Republic in June 1961 was reported in much of the Bolivian press as part of a plot to pressure the country into a rupture of relations with the Cuban Government. Pro-Communist forces joined with anti-United States nationalists in violent demonstrations.

Communists and pro-Communists generally view the United States and its policies with the greatest bitterness. The Alliance for Progress has been a favorite target for this group. So also is the Peace Corps; a delegation of its members arriving in June 1962 was excoriated as an espionage group. *El Pueblo*, the Communist organ, attacked the visit of President Kennedy to Mexico in 1961 and asserted that it had been necessary for 2,000 United States agents to accompany him to provide protection from the Mexican people. The effectiveness of such far-fetched attacks must be weighed in the light of the extreme ignorance most of the population shares about the United States and foreign countries in general.

Despite this widespread criticism, there is an understanding by a few educated Bolivians of the importance of past United States aid and the continuing need for it. Indeed, many political figures who publicly castigate *imperialismo yanqui* confess in private that their real views are very different. The traditional anti-Americanism, however, of Bolivians, as of most Latin American nationalists, makes it difficult for public stands to be taken in favor of the United States.

A positive factor in Bolivian attitudes toward the United States has been the sympathetic view taken by certain North American academic specialists toward the country. Bolivians in policy-making positions are aware of the influence such individuals had in bringing about a favorable opinion of the Bolivian revolution in Washington. As a result, scholars from the United States, such as Professor Frank Tannenbaum and Professor Robert J. Alexander, are received cordially no matter what the degree of official friction between the two countries.

Attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its bloc follow the lines of internal political opinion quite closely. The left, both in and beyond party circles, always critical of the United States, looks with favor on Moscow and its policies. The right violently opposes communism and has often attacked the MNR for what it regards as undue cordiality toward the Soviet Union.

At the popular level, remote as the public is from understanding the motives of communism, the constant inflow of propaganda has had its effect. Entering through the Czechoslovakian Legation, through

the legitimate distribution of Communist printed material and through the activities of Bolivian-Soviet bloc "friendship societies," and mostly transmitted by the efforts of active far-left groups of educated persons and leftist labor leaders in and out of the MNR, Communist agitation reaches many people. At least to the degree that United States aid may be made to appear suspect and that anti-United States disorder is easy to foment in urban areas, it has to be recognized that such opinion formation is partially effective upon popular attitudes (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda).

The Castro government has provided a controversial issue for the republic's internal politics. Initially quite sympathetic to the Cuban revolution, the politically conscious part of the population has become somewhat more reserved in its support. The Paz government's charge that Cuban diplomatic officials in the country had been involved in subversive activities may have negatively influenced the population. Bolivia's support in the OAS of the United States "quarantine" policy of October 1962 may reflect the government's assessment that popular support for Cuba had cooled considerably during the previous year. Nonetheless, as of late 1962, there remained considerable support for Castro among university students, Communist and other radicals, and the far-left sections of the MNR, the COB and the miner's unions.

SYMBOLS OF THE NATION

The coat of arms consists of an elliptical shield superimposed on three pairs of crossed Bolivian flags, a pair of cannons, two pairs of bayonetted muskets and an Inca battle-ax crossed with a liberty pole bearing a Phrygian cap. The shield is surrounded by a border, the upper half of which contains the word "Bolivia" inscribed in black against a gold background; the lower half contains nine gold stars, representing the 9 departments, against an azure background. The central escutcheon depicts a range of mountains surmounted by the sun. The lower part of the shield contains a representation of an alpaca, a sheaf of grain and a tree. A small building stands back of these symbols of Bolivia's products on the slope of the mountains. Surmounting the shield is a condor with spread wings, between branches of laurel and olive.

The flag is a horizontal tricolor, consisting of red, yellow and green stripes. These colors represent the animal, mineral and vegetable kingdoms, respectively.

The national flower is the Khantuta (Cantua buxifolia), a crimson flower blooming in clusters on a small bush. Resembling a fuschsia, the bloom is tubular in shape.

The anthem is known as the "Himno Nacional" ("National Hymn"). It opens with the words "Bolivianos el hado propicio coronó nuestros

votos y anhelos" ("Bolivians, propitious fate has crowned our hopes and fervent desires").

Antonio José de Sucre, Bolívar's successor, holds the status of the national hero. There are more than 15 public holidays. Of these, 3 are fixed holidays of religious origin: All Saints' Day, November 1; All Soul's Day, November 2; and Christmas, December 25. Three other holidays commemorate significant events in the history of the republic: Independence Day, August 6, which is celebrated as part of a 3-day national festival; Martyrs' Day, July 21; and the Anniversary of the National Revolution, April 9. In addition, the republic celebrates New Year's Day, January 1; Labor Day, May 1; and Columbus Day, October 12. The following holidays are celebrated on variable dates: Carnival, Ash Wednesday, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Holy Saturday, Easter and Corpus Christi.

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SECTION III. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 17

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

THE BASE

Few nations of South America have been endowed with greater natural wealth than Bolivia, and none has surpassed it in poverty. "A beggar sitting on a golden throne" has been a rather common metaphor used by Bolivians themselves to describe the paradox that has consistently perplexed both observers and participants of this Andean society.

Silver, gold, tin, zinc, antimony, tungsten, lead, copper and a variety of other valuable minerals occur in large quantities in the highlands; petroleum, natural gas and the hydroelectric resources are plentiful (see ch. 19, Industry). Fertile valleys and wide plains provide good soil and climate for rice, corn, sugar, coffee, tea, citrus fruits and cacao, and even the high-lying Altiplano produces barley, potatoes, quinoa, wheat and some other basic necessities. Two-fifths of the country is covered with forests rich in valuable timber, fibers and a good supply of natural wild rubber. There are extensive pastures for cattle in the valleys and on the plains and for sheep and llama in the highlands; lakes and rivers can provide ample quantities of fish (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

In spite of all the natural richness, most of the relatively small population of some 3.5 million has barely adequate food, shelter and clothing. The annual per capita income is less than $100, next above that of Haiti, the lowest in Latin America. The gross national product, which stood at about $370 million in 1961, has not increased significantly since World War II and has even slightly declined during the past 10 years.

Agriculture, which contributes about 32 percent to the gross national product, engages some 72 percent of the population, but only 1 percent of the land. Mining, with a contribution of 11 percent to the gross national product, occupies only 3 percent of the labor force, but produces over 95 percent of all foreign-exchange income. The manufacturing industry is in a rudimentary state, and even this limited core has been working below capacity. Capital formation is slow, and a

large part of that which accumulates is being expatriated (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Both natural and sociopolitical factors are responsible for the present state of affairs. Because of the precipitous topography of the mountain region and the insect-infested tropical climate of the plains, the cost of construction and maintenance of roads and railroads has been prohibitive. Mining, which shaped the direction of urbanization, of trade and of government, had a decisive influence on the development of transportation facilities. While large areas of the interior were left without roads and railroads, the international trade of the landlocked country became dependent on a few railroad lines connecting mining centers with neighboring countries and the seacoast (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

The retarded and unbalanced development of a modern transportation system has prolonged the isolation of the subsistence farmer and has discouraged internal trade and industrialization. The urban-industrial segment of the population, not more than 800,000 persons, which participates in the market economy, has found it easier and less expensive to buy consumer goods from abroad in exchange for exported minerals than to promote their production at home (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

THE PROBLEMS

Overlying the natural causes of retarded development were those of a sociological and political character. In reality, the proverbial "beggar" never sat on the throne. Instead he has slaved through centuries in a colonial-type political and economic system which, as a rule, was dominated by external forces and resulted in a continuous expatriation of wealth. The Spanish conquerors siphoned out thousands of tons of silver produced by the "beggar." For two centuries after the discovery of silver in 1545, Potosí was the largest silver producer of the world (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

When the country achieved independence in 1825, it also severed economic ties with Spain; nevertheless, it failed to establish a stable and permanent center of political and economic power inside its borders. Political instability and civic disorder caused the continued expatriation of capital. Simultaneously, the rigid social structure, which virtually limited the distribution of wealth to the apex of the social pyramid, has offered little if any incentive to higher production by that vast majority which remained outside of the money economy (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The discovery of large tin deposits and a growing demand for this and other minerals by the industrialized countries during the second half of the nineteenth century promised a prosperity similar to that of the silver boom of the colonial period. Tin producing became the

mainstay of the Bolivian market economy by the turn of the century. Nevertheless, distribution of wealth followed the historical pattern. Bases of operation were established abroad. The largest of all, the Patiño Mines and Enterprises Consolidated was incorporated in Delaware, and the "tin barons," as the heads of the three largest companies were popularly called, built some of the most spectacular fortunes of the world. Through their accumulated income, which exceeded that of the government by a large margin, they exerted political influence from abroad but returned only meager cash to the country.

The distribution of rural wealth has remained even more static. Ninety-two percent of the farmland was owned by 6 percent of the landholders, and the vast majority of the rural population worked either as laborers for the hacienda owners or produced barely enough to subsist on their own small lots. According to the 1950 census, cultivated land amounted to only a half an acre per capita, much too little to provide an adequate diet. Government efforts to strengthen its economic position were feeble, uncoordinated and consequently only partially successful.

The historic sociopolitical order was finally broken by the revolution of 1952, which accomplished a redistribution of wealth through institutional changes. The two principal reforms involved the nationalization of the large mining companies soon after the take-over and the seizure and division of large estates by the peasantry, combined with a consequent land reform law one year later. The former consolidated private industrial wealth in the hands of the government; the latter dispersed agricultural lands among thousands of landless farmers. Unfortunately, neither the state nor the *campesino* (peasant) was able to raise the level of output immediately or even to maintain the prerevolutionary level. In fact, output has declined in almost every segment of the economy during the ensuing 10 years, in spite of massive foreign assistance which has, over the decade, amounted to $220 million from the United States alone (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

The principal reasons for the failure to achieve the economic goals envisaged by the revolution were in a large part sociopolitical in nature and only in a lesser degree of economic character. Neither the government nor the *campesinos* were able to attain full control over their newly acquired possessions. In the case of the government, the strongest restricting influence came from labor. Miners have been led by their leaders of the radical left to believe that nationalization of the mines would automatically and immediately result in an improved economic status of the individual. To get their share in the benefits, thousands of unemployed miners flocked back to the mines and were put on the payroll by labor leaders who are in control of management and eager only to advance their political strength

through an increase in the number of votes and rifles they commanded. Virtually all managers and engineers left the companies and returned to their homes abroad. Production costs in some mines soared to $2.80 per pound of tin concentrate, when the world market price was below $1, and the public sector of the economy experienced mounting deficits instead of the desired gains (see ch. 19, Industry; ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Demands of the emancipated miners and industrial workers for a greater share in wealth presented an uncomfortable pressure on the government, at a time when almost the entire working capital had fled the country. Mere possession of mines and industrial undertakings without adequate working capital, managerial skills and controls, and with a greatly reduced income, could lead only to bankruptcy. To avoid it, the government resorted to deficit financing and made concessions to labor, moves which only perpetuated the uneconomical conditions. The government used up its foreign exchange reserves, and along with the nationalized enterprises, it borrowed heavily from the Central Bank, thus increasing the money supply and accelerating the existing inflationary trend. The boliviano, which sold at the rate of Bs60 to the dollar in 1952, was worth only Bs13,000 to the dollar in 1956 (see ch. 24, Financial System).

The spiraling inflationary pressure, which had further undermined economic stability, was also misused as a weapon against the political opposition to the ruling party. Labor leaders and supporters of the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) in and outside the government, were provided with dollars at artificially maintained low rates, while disfavored businessmen had to buy at inflationary rates. Goods, imported with low-rate dollars at a fraction of their real prices, were exported in the form of contraband and further disrupted production (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

An exchange stabilization, which took place under the guidance of United States advisers on December 15, 1956, did much to arrest this nearly disastrous decline. The fact that the boliviano settled at Bs11,885 to the dollar by the end of 1958, together with a modified and more liberal petroleum law, renewed to some extent the interest of foreign investors, especially that of oil companies and international lending institutions.

Meanwhile, the rural economy began to make the necessary adjustments. Sociological results of the revolution became apparent immediately by the changed behavioral patterns of the newly freed Indian, but economic results have been forthcoming at a somewhat slower pace. In fact, the contribution of agriculture to the national economy declined immediately after the land reform went into effect, when most estates, the traditional suppliers of the market, were expro-

priated and the new landowners did not possess either the necessary skills or means for producing a marketable surplus. Assignment of land titles has followed actual distribution of land only at an extremely slow pace, and without a legal title the *campesino* constituted a poor risk for essential credit. Although he was unable to equip himself adequately for his newly acquired role, the growing realization that everyone has to work for himself induced him to farm more intensively, to improve the nutritional standards of his family and eventually to produce for the market.

The improvement in agricultural production has been visible though moderate. The presence of an increasing number of durable consumer goods, such as bicycles, sewing machines and transistor radios, was evident on the rural scene by the early 1960's. The country will undoubtedly continue to depend on imported wheat, wheat flour and canned products, but the sugar and rice output has reduced the need for import to a minimum in these commodities, and truck vegetables and fruits began to flow to urban markets from small farms situated along lines of transportation. In short, the *campesino*, who became a significant political force through the emancipation process which began in 1952, is slowly but increasingly extending his economic influence beyond his plot of land.

The future of the Bolivian economy depends greatly on the flexibility of its policy toward institutional changes but even more on the extent of changes in terms of attitudes and values. In a philosophical vacuum created by the revolution, the attitudes and values of prerevolutionary Bolivia still thrive and act as the main guidelines of decision-making in politics and economics. When choices present themselves on the national scene, preferences are given to solutions promising quick gains to partisan, regional and individual interests rather than to those promoting general national goals. Because of this tendency, many foreign observers believe that the transformation will need a long period of time, perhaps as much as a generation.

Successful efforts made by the government to keep institutional changes flexible under the pressure of a continuous economic crisis are demonstrated by the revision of the Petroleum Code in 1955–56, by the recall of the British owners to assist in the rehabilitation of the nationalized railroads in 1962, and by the gradual liberalization of the monopoly of the Mining Bank (see ch. 19, Industry). A 10-year development plan, published in 1961, offers some hope that the government is at last concentrating on bringing the economy closer to self-sufficiency and abandoning its former discontinuity of policy. Success of the plan requires not only a more scientific assessment of national resources but also a continuous cooperation and coordination of various public and private interests and their dedication to a common national goal.

THE PLAN

In 1960 the government found the financial conditions sufficiently improved and the continuing economic crisis sufficiently pressing to attempt to abandon its haphazard policy of stop-gap economic measures and to develop more permanent, long-range economic policies. To accomplish this objective, it created the National Planning Council (Junta Nacional de Planeamiento).

The first task of the Council has been the preparation of a 10-year development plan. In drawing up the plan, the Council received assistance from the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Technical Assistance Board, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United States Operations Mission to Bolivia. Declaration of the Alliance for Progress program by the United States Government has given a strong impetus to planning activities, which ended in the presentation of the Economic and Social Development Plan, 1962–71, to the Committee of Nine ("Wise Men") of the Alliance for Progress in 1961.

The plan visualizes a growth in the gross national product from an estimated $400 million in 1962 to $584 million in 1966 and to $838 million in 1971, which would require an annual growth of 6.4 percent during the first five years and of 4.7 percent during the second five years. This process, if successful, could permit a 45 percent increase in real consumption per capita during the same decade.

In its more specific objectives, the plan hopes to add 1 million acres to the land under cultivation and thereby increase agricultural output by 90 percent and the daily caloric intake, which at present is only 1,800 calories per person, by 33 percent. It also proposes to build 2,000 miles of new roads, rehabilitate the mining industry, expand oil production and raise school enrollment from the present 30 percent to 70 percent of all school-age children.

To achieve these goals the plan calls for a total investment of some $1.3 billion during the 10-year period, of which a little over two-thirds is to be raised through domestic savings and about one-third from outside sources. It estimates that net domestic savings will grow from $3 million in 1962 to $144 million in 1971. One of the keystones of the plan is an extensive program for reducing imports through diversification in production. The success of these efforts would, the planners consider, result in a gradual reduction of imports from the present 29 percent to about 19 percent of the gross national product and a comparable reduction of foreign exchange requirements from $80 million in 1962 to $3 million in 1971.

The Committee of Nine, in accord with most foreign economic observers, found the plan somewhat overambitious in terms of predicted domestic savings. While it gave full recognition to the fundamental changes the plan represents in governmental thinking, it recognized

the lack of detail and expressed its doubts of success unless the plan is accompanied by simultaneous extensive reforms in the fields of public administration, taxation, the structure of the banking system and fiscal, monetary and pricing policies of the government (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Perhaps the greatest handicap to the plan is the absence of detail, a condition which bars international lending institutions, bound to finance specific projects only, from allocating funds. To overcome these temporary difficulties, the United States Government has provided $80 million for the first two years of the plan. Part of this sum has already been allocated to pre-investment studies, and to the Triangular Plan (Operación Triangular), in which the Inter-American Development Bank, the United States and West German Governments cooperate for the rehabilitation of the mining industry (see ch. 19, Industry).

Although the 10-year plan is principally a government undertaking, its success depends heavily on the degree of political and social stability the country as a whole can achieve and maintain without which the enlistment of financial and managerial cooperation of private sectors, both in Bolivia and from abroad, cannot be secured.

CHAPTER 18

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture engages the labor of over three-fourths of the economically active population but accounts for only about one-third of the gross national product. A United Nations survey, based on estimates of the Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture, reports that 40.8 percent of the total area is covered by forests, 37.7 percent is wasteland, 21.0 percent provides natural pastures, and 0.5 percent is in actual agricultural cultivation. Wide variations in altitude and climate, combined with vast unused arable acreage, provide an agricultural potential which could easily feed the country's 3.5 million inhabitants, leaving a substantial surplus for export. Agricultural output is so low, however, that the country is forced to use scarce foreign exchange earnings for importation of food and other agricultural commodities.

Before 1900 agriculture produced sufficient food for the nation. Demand for more consumer goods, especially food, increased sharply when the export of minerals began to provide new sources of income to a rapidly growing urban population. Simultaneously, construction of railroad lines connecting mining areas with neighboring countries and with the ports of the Pacific Ocean facilitated imports of foreign products, while the continuous absence of links between the overpopulated highlands and the more fertile valleys and eastern lowland regions of the country virtually barred the internal movement of agricultural goods.

After the turn of the century domestic production continued to supply the demand for potatoes, barley, quinoa, meat, coffee, vegetables and fruits, but covered only a small fraction of the demand for wheat, rice, sugar, milk and milk products, edible oils and fats, brewery barley and chili peppers, which were imported in large quantities. Production for the market contracted and the rest of the agricultural sector continued to provide only bare subsistence for the farming population. Official price policies and the prevailing land tenure system provided little or no incentive for farmers to increase output by improving the soils or their farming techniques. Uneven distribution of the agricultural population aggravated these conditions (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Poverty and undernourishment among the rural population, together with an increasing pressure by the industrial and mine workers for a higher standard of living, helped to foment the revolution in 1952 and inspire the subsequent agrarian reform in 1953 which paralleled the earlier land reforms of Mexico and Guatemala in scope and thoroughness. The reform changed the land tenure system radically, but had little effect on population distribution and on production techniques. In fact, agricultural output declined sharply immediately after the reform went into effect. A gradual recovery has since been evident, but per capita food consumption in 1958 still included only one-fourth the calories, one-sixth the protein and one-third the fat considered desirable according to nutritional standards developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for nine Latin American countries. Import of large quantities of food remains necessary, although the country has achieved near self-sufficiency in rice, sugar and meat.

The ills which continue to plague agriculture are both economic and social. In part they are inherited handicaps of the past, such as the immobility, illiteracy and tradition-bound attitudes of the Indians; in part they are inherent in the fluid socioeconomic conditions which prevail as a result of the 1952 revolution; and in part they are results of external factors, mainly the world tin market (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). The government, with the assistance of United States and international agencies, is making efforts to guide the agricultural sector toward higher output and ultimate self-sufficiency.

Among the remedial actions perceived and pursued during the last decade are liberalization of price controls, alterations in the tariff system, improvements in general and vocational education, improvement and expansion of the transportation system, use of technical assistance, development of the Santa Cruz area and internal migration from the overpopulated parts of the highlands and valleys to the underpopulated lowlands. Movement toward these goals has been uneven. Monetary stabilization, which took place in 1956, helped to establish a free market economy and tariffs became more protective in character; but like earlier systems the present tariff system has the effect of encouraging large-scale contraband activities and gives less than sufficient stimulus to market-oriented agricultural production. Vocational education has made inroads but, in the absence of proper motivation for higher output, has not achieved the impact that was expected in the decade following the revolution. Technical assistance from abroad achieved notable results in some agricultural areas, and means were being found through experience in other areas to adapt such aid more successfully to local conditions.

The only modern highway of the country, connecting Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, has been completed, and roads have been built to connect parts of the Yungas with the highlands. Development of the Santa Cruz area and internal migration have been closely related projects; after many years of failures in these programs new patterns have emerged which promise a growing success. The Santa Cruz area is responsible now for higher national rice and sugar-cane output and may, together with colonization in the Yungas, enable the country to achieve self-sufficiency in several other farm commodities.

Accurate and reliable information on the agriculture of the country has always been difficult to obtain. Data gathered by field observers and technicians of United States agencies, together with reports of international agencies and those of the Bolivian Government, form a basis for a cautiously optimistic forecast of gradual increase in total agricultural output, provided foreign assistance is not diminished.

AGRICULTURAL REGIONS

Great variations in altitude, climate, soils and cultural patterns exist among the highlands, where four-fifths of the population lives on relatively meager land; the valleys of the eastern slopes; and the fertile, sparsely populated and in part unexplored eastern lowlands (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

The Highlands

The highlands (Altiplano or Estancias) of the Andes comprise about 16 percent of the total area of the country and extend in elevation between 12,000 and 14,000 feet above sea level (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). Variations in daily temperatures are considerable, and occasional frosts and hailstorms during the growing season cause substantial crop damage. Erosion is extensive and cultivated soils lack basic nutrients, especially nitrogen and phosphorus. Despite such adverse conditions, the highlands, especially their northern area near Lake Titicaca, have always been the center of population and agriculture in Bolivia.

Of the 37.8 million acres of land that constitute the highlands some 370,000 acres are cultivated, mostly by subsistence farmers producing barley, quinoa, potatoes, *oca* (a tuberous plant) and such hardy cereals as *cañagua*; near Lake Titicaca and Lake Poopó wheat, alfalfa, beans and vegetables are also grown. While horses, cattle, hogs and donkeys are not uncommon, the climate and elevation favor sheep and the endemic llama and alpaca.

Crop and livestock production satisfies about 80 percent of the demand of the producers and provides some surplus for urban areas. Poor seed selection and antiquated production techniques are respon-

sible for the poor quality of crops; lack of pasture management and regulated breeding, for the degenerated condition of livestock.

In the absence of scientific surveys the agricultural potential of the highlands has become a controversial issue among economists, and it is difficult to determine the exact ratio of man to land. Some believe that decreased rainfall and agricultural practices of the last 50 years, which have resulted in accelerated erosion, have undermined the productive capacity of the area to a point of no return, while others maintain that to farm the large areas of uncultivated good soils, which contain adequate organic matter and moisture, could expand the agricultural area up to 5 million acres. Higher yields and better quality produce on a few progressive farms and experimental stations seem to support the more optimistic approach.

The Valleys

The agriculture of the valleys, which descend from the highlands to the great eastern plains and cover about 14 percent of the total area of the country, displays wide variations as determined by elevation and latitude. The Yungas, as the valleys northeast of La Paz are called, have a humid subtropical climate, somewhat better soils than those of the highlands and relatively easy access to the city. Manual work is predominant, terracing is practiced on steep slopes and some commercial crops, such as cacao, coca and coffee, are produced in addition to the subsistence farmers' staples, which include rice, tropical fruits, cassava and sugar cane (for the production of alcohol).

In the basins and valleys near Cochabamba fairly good soils and somewhat lower rainfall than in the northern valleys provide more stable conditions for diversified agriculture. Pressure for land is high, and farming units are often uneconomically small in size. Nevertheless, there is some surplus of the principal products, which include wheat, corn and barley, occasionally vegetables and tropical fruits, which are sold to the large urban centers of the highlands.

Valleys to the south are less densely populated and grow few if any crops for the market, mainly because of the arid climate and the absence of transportation. Nevertheless, near large cities such as Sucre and Tarija, cereals and fruits are grown, and cattle and goats furnish some meat and milk for the market.

The Lowlands

The vast tropical and subtropical eastern lowlands (Llanos or Oriente), which extend from the foot of the Andes beyond the eastern border of the country and cover about 70 percent of the national territory, are least developed and have an agricultural potential not yet assessed. Of the some 190 million acres only an estimated 140,000 acres are under cultivation, in the vicinity of Santa Cruz and in

scattered small areas. Pando Department and northern El Beni Department are almost entirely covered by rain forests. Here, rubber and Brazil nuts are the cash products, while on the pastures of southern Beni extensive livestock raising is practiced. The heavy annual rainfall causes floods which are responsible for the rich pastureland but also for considerable loss in cattle. In the absence of surface transportation, meat is flown to market areas. Scattered Indian tribes subsist as hunters and food gatherers but plant some banana and yucca around their huts.

The general area of Santa Cruz, particularly that which lies northwest of the city between the Yapacani River and the Rio Grande, represents the focal point of recent agricultural expansion in Bolivia. Temperate climate and the relatively good quality of soils were principal factors in the selection of this area for colonization and resettlement. Over half of the area is covered by forests and has to be cleared before cultivation can commence, but the pampas, vast, grass-covered areas with scattered groups of trees, offer good pasture for livestock. The area is well suited to the large-scale production of rice, sugar cane and corn, but it also produces tropical fruits, cassava, fibers and oilseeds. Livestock raising yields small-scale diary, beef and pork production. The major handicap of the area has been the long distance from marketing areas with no adequate means of transportation, but roads and railroad lines have been extended to Santa Cruz since World War II and a limited feeder road network is in the process of expansion (see fig. 7).

South of the Santa Cruz area the climate of the eastern lowlands becomes increasingly arid, and cultivation of annual crops without irrigation is impossible. Cattle raising and some production of cereals and fruits exist on a subsistence level, but no commercial agriculture has yet developed.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

Precolonial Era

The precolonial Indian population based its existence on farming, in which both males and females participated. A large part of the religious life revolved around the agricultural cycle, and argiculture also provided the base for the political system, inasmuch as farm surplus supplied an annual government income which sustained a considerable political and social superstructure composed of hereditary aristocracy, technicians and the clergy (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Over half of the food plants used in the world today are said to have originated in Andean agriculture. On the Altiplano, potatoes, corn, quinoa and *oca* were the staples. On lower elevations, chili peppers, tomatoes, beans, squash and such fruits as avocado, guavas and papaya


were grown. Even lower, in the Yungas and in the tropical lowland, peanuts, cassava, pineapples, tobacco and cotton were produced. Meals prepared from most of these crops have not changed during the last 500 years. *Chuñu*, the first-known dehydrated food, was kept in public storehouses as insurance against shortage and is still prepared by a process in which potatoes are frozen and then mashed, usually by foot. *Chicha*, a mild beer prepared from corn, has retained its popularity over the centuries. *Chupe*, a corn or potato stew, is still prepared and consumed widely on the Altiplano.

Hunting and fishing were secondary occupations on the highlands and in the valleys. Meat was derived from domesticated animals, among which the llama played the leading role. A relative of the camel with great adaptability to elevation, it provided the fundamental means of transportation as a pack animal, but it was seldom ridden and never milked or used for drayage. Its meat, cut into strips and dried, supplied a staple food called *charqui;* its dung used as fuel was called *taquia*. Llama lungs were consulted for omens as chickens' entrails were by the Romans. Llama wool and meat were supplemented by wool and meat of domesticated alpaca and wild guanaco and vicuña.

Farming techniques were well advanced. Precolonial terraces have survived to the present day. Irrigation, fertilization and crop rotation were standard procedures. The basic agricultural tool was the *taclla*, a six-foot digging stick with a foot-rest near its tip to assist in pressing it into the ground. The tip of the stick was either charred or reinforced by a metal point. Rocks attached to a hoe-like instrument (*lampa*) were used to break up clods. Drying, freezing and storage of food for off-season consumption were well organized processes and provided adequate supplies at all times. Spanish conquerors reported on immense warehouses stocked to the roof with food and supplies.

Land ownership and cultivation were on a communal basis. The concept of individual land titles was unknown. Part of the land was assigned to support the Inca, another part for the support of the clergy, a third part to the local group (*ayllu*) under collective ownership (see ch. 5, Social Structure). Grazing land was undivided and it supported the herd of llamas of the community. Cultivated land was distributed annually among the families of the *ayllu*, the head of each family receiving a parcel about 2.4 acres in size known as *sayana*. In addition to the basic allotment, families received other plots according to the number of male children. A small plot on which the family hut was erected was usually exempt from the annual redistribution and was held permanently by successive generations.

Cultivation of the land had to follow a strict order. First, the land of the state and clergy was cultivated, then the lands of the indi-



Source: Adapted from U.S. Operations Mission to Bolivia, Point Four in Bolivia 1942-1960, December 1960

Figure 7. Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Area Development Indicating United States Assistance Projects in 1960

vidual families, who helped each other on a communal basis. The community took collective responsibility also for the cultivation of lands of those whose menfolk were absent or incapacitated.

Consequences of the Spanish Conquest

When the Spanish conquered the Incas, they met with little resistance in transplanting the land tenure system of contemporary Spain. Under that system, which had its roots in Imperial Rome, large tracts of land were granted to nobles who distinguished themselves in the services of the Crown. Although such land grants (*encomiendas*) were theoretically restricted to use during the lifetime of the grantee or perhaps to that of the next generation, corruption and distance from Spain made it impossible to apply the law strictly. Illegal practices eventually gained permanence through legislation, and land was handed down from generation to generation as permanent property of a family.

The large estate (*latifundio*) had little or no value without a sufficient number of laborers to work it. In Rome freemen had been settled in colonies to cultivate the land of the nobles, hence their designation as *coloni* (Spanish: *colonos*). In the New World the defeated Indians who had tilled the soil for centuries remained on the land assigned to the conquerors and assumed the role of *colonos*. The largest estates had as many as 150 to 200 Indian families. As far as the individual *colono* was concerned, there was not much change in his relationship to the soil and the outside world; he still tilled one piece of land which belonged to his superiors and another which he could not call his own but which supplied sustenance for his family. This patch of land was given to the *colono* in usufruct, for which he was obliged to perform 3 to 5 days of labor a week for the owner (*patrón*) on his land and in his household. He was required to use his own implements, draught animals and seeds and in some instances to pay a small cash tribute (*canon*).

Another type of farm worker, designated as *pegujalero*, was similar to the *colono*, except that he had to perform 6 days of work a week for the *patrón*, regardless of the need. If there was not enough work on the farm, the owner could rent his laborers to his neighbors or send them to work in town and collect their wages. The *pegujalero* could ease his plight by sub-letting some of his duties to a member of his family or to a stranger (*arrimante*) with whom he would share his produce.

The *huertista* or horticulturist enjoyed somewhat more independence. He rented his land from large landowners for cash and usually one week's labor per month. Another form of relationship was that of the *arrendero*, who held land in usufruct like the *colono* or *pegujalero*, paid for its use in cash or in labor but had no other obligations.

Similarly the *sitiajero*, who held a lot of approximately 60 by 150 feet on which he built his home and perhaps raised some poultry, paid his rent to the owner in labor--about 3 or 4 days a month.

As a rule, the listed categories of farm workers lived on the land of the owner while the independent farmer (*piquero*) usually lived in a hamlet (*rancheria*) and made up the mobile labor force of the area. He could work as a sharecropper (*compañero*), in which case he was usually entitled to one-half of the produce, or as a daily wage earner (*péon*) who usually received cash pay and food.

In addition to the feudal and semifeudal relationships and free individual categories of land tenure, indigenous communities (*comunidades*) continued to exist, dispersed through remote areas of the country. They were self-sufficient, did not contribute to the market and developed socio-cultural organizations which remained almost unchanged from precolonial times. They owned land in common and divided it annually into plots (*ainokas*) devoted to certain crops. Every family was assigned one parcel or more of land, the number depending upon the family's standing in the community (whether an original member of the community or a newcomer), the size of the family and the number of families in the community. The community elected a manager (*alcalde*) who was entrusted with its administration, who represented it in its dealings with the outside world and who was assisted by elders of the community council (*mallcus*) (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

From the time of the conquest numerous attempts were made to abolish the independent Indian communities, seize their land and use their manpower on the *latifundios*. In 1866 Indian communes were abolished by decree and the land distributed to their members. Many Indians, unfamiliar with the concept of individual holdings and legal procedures, sold their land to whites and mestizos who took advantage of the law. So grave was the consequent tension that the government had to annul the decree in 1871 and order that the land be returned to the Indians. The reimbursement of the purchasers who had to return the land drained the government budget for decades.

The encroachment on Indian land did not end, however, with the reversal of legislation. Ever since, Indian communities have frequently had to defend their land and rights from outsiders. Economic and social isolation became one of their weapons of defense and perhaps offers an explanation for the widespread distrust and lack of hospitality observed and recounted by many travelers in the highlands.

MODERN DEVELOPMENT

Land Tenure System

The land tenure system which developed from these circumstances was characterized by extreme inequality in ownership. At the time

of the 1950 census, 6.3 percent of the landowners possessed 91.9 percent of the privately owned land in units of 2,500 acres or more (see table 3). In the Santa Cruz area, for example, large estates of 12,500 acres were common, those of 25,000 acres were not unusual and several had 50,000 acres or more. In 1939 eight owners possessed one-tenth of the national territory. The Suárez brothers, for example, owned El Carmen estate which measured 5 million acres; and the Alto Paraguay estate, owned by Manuel Pena, measured almost 4 million acres.

Table 3. Number and Sizes of Individual Land Holdings in Bolivia, 1950

Size (in acres)	Number	Percent of holdings	Total area (in 1,000 acres)	Percent of total area
0.0–2.22	24, 747	28. 6	26. 92	0. 03
2.47–12.10	26, 451	30. 6	155. 61	. 20
12.35–49.15	14, 671	17. 0	336. 16	. 42
49.4–123.25	4, 832	5. 6	351. 72	. 43
123.50–246.75	2, 776	3. 2	452. 25	. 56
247.0–1,234.75	4, 732	5. 5	2, 596. 46	3. 21
1,235.0–2,469.75	1, 539	1. 8	2, 591. 77	3. 20
2,470.0–6,051.25	2, 138	2. 5	8, 126. 30	10. 05
6,175.0–12,349.75	1, 861	2. 2	13, 421. 73	16. 59
12,350.0–24,699.75	797	. 9	12, 711. 36	15. 71
Over 24,700.0	615	. 7	40, 097. 98	49. 57
Not reported	1, 217	1. 4	21. 48	. 03
Total	86, 376	100. 0	80, 889. 78	100. 00

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *The Agricultural Economy of Bolivia* (ERS–Foreign 1), May 1961, p. 4.

On the other end of the scale were 69.4 percent of the farmers who held only 0.4 percent of all privately owned farmland, in units of 25 acres or less. The 1950 census established the number of Indian communal groups as 3,783 but did not show the area occupied and cultivated by such communities.

Regional differences were significant. On the highlands the large estate was the usual ownership form, especially in the fertile northern region near Lake Titicaca. In the relatively poor and remote regions, Indian communities have survived. According to a Bolivian Government survey, 90 percent of the large landowners were absentee landlords who lived in urban centers or abroad and left their farms to be operated by managers. Managers of large estates were usually white or mestizo, while those of small holdings were often Indians. Managers frequently hired assistants or foremen (*jilicatas*) selected with the consent of the owner and the workers.

Laborers on the large estates of the highlands were predominantly Indians who entered into a verbal contract with the landowner. Terms of the contract were severest for *colons* and *pegujaleros*, who in

addition to the basic services had to provide members of their families to assist at times of planting and harvesting, assume specific responsibilities for the care of livestock and provide services at times in the urban household of the landowner. In return they were usually entitled to use specified uncultivated land as pasture for their own livestock and to use irrigation water, if the supply was in abundance, on parcels of land assigned to them for their own sustenance. These parcels, usually not the most desirable land available, totaled about 60 to 70 percent of the cultivated land of each large estate.

Land tenure systems in the valleys have included various forms of semifeudal arrangements, some similar to those on the highlands, others containing more liberal provisions for both *patrón* and *colono*. The striking difference between the two areas lay in the fact that over 50 percent of the farms in the valleys were owned by those who worked them. Fragmentation of land holdings, which began early in the eighteenth century, resulted in a large number of small farms, some too small to support the farmer and his family. In the Cochabamba region, for example, 50 percent of the families cultivated less than 2.5 acres; 13.2 percent less than 7.5 acres. The shortage of land contributed to migration to urban and mining centers, and also to the earliest organization of the peasantry in peasant leagues (*sindicatos*).

Settlement of the tropical lowlands has been limited not only by the hostile climate but also by the scarcity of labor. With the exception of a few large estates and the equally few settlements centers where various forms of land tenure existed, the principal portion of the land belonged to the state. Although the Church was not allowed to possess large tracts of land, it was given control over state-owned land as a reward for its religious and educational services. Thus, in the eastern lowlands where it established missions, the Church exercised considerable influence (see ch. 7, Religion).

In the northeastern part of the lowlands a few individuals and corporations owned about 75 percent of the privately owned land, which they exploited for rubber or simply kept untouched. Scattered settlements of small farmers consisted mostly of squatters (*tolerados*) who settled on patches of land without any formal arrangement as to title. Since these families provided the only available labor of the area, their arbitrary occupation of private or public land was tolerated and their family members were hired for the collection of rubber and for other labor on the farm. Squatters, found at the fringes of most settled areas, not only provided the principal labor force for large estates but also acted as pioneers in pushing the frontiers ever deeper into the vast, largely uninhabited tropical lowlands.

In the Santa Cruz area large owner-operator estates had been perpetuated from the early days of colonial settlement. They were of variable size and were frequently operated as family corporations.

Only a few of the large estates were broken up into family-size units. Because of the relative isolation of these estates from the more densely populated areas, the turnover in hired labor was low, and the relationship between owner and laborer was paternalistic, a fact which played an important role in the execution of the 1953 land reform. In addition to nominal wages, the owner usually provided housing and food for his workers and their families. Frequently rudimentary medical and welfare services or cash loans were also provided. Although economic mobility of the farm laborer was the exception rather than the rule, a number of workers established themselves as small farmers on purchased or rented land.

The southeastern regions of the lowlands have never attracted large numbers of settlers. Because of the low density of population in a vast and arid area, the form of land tenancy was never of much significance. A few large cattle ranchers held most of the privately owned land and employed wage workers from among the squatters on conditions similar to those prevailing in other areas of the lowlands.

The 1953 Agrarian Reform

Some form of agrarian reform had been advocated by almost every political party and group since the 1930's, but no agreement existed on the best possible solution and no plan was prepared on implementation. The Chaco War, which removed large numbers of Indians from their isolated habitat and brought them into close contact with whites and mestizos as well as with other Indians, was an eye-opening experience for them and contributed to the growth of their self-consciousness, accounting for much of the social and economic ferment that followed. Perhaps the first attempt of Indians to extricate themselves from the traditional feudal or semifeudal relationship to landowners occurred in 1936 at Santa Clara, Cochabamba, where veterans of the Chaco War formed a peasant league, raised funds and leased land from a Catholic convent of nuns for whom they had worked previously as *colonos*. The *sindicato* chose as its adviser, Eduardo Arze Loureiro, who later, in 1953, became the first president of the National Agrarian Reform Council.

Large landowners of the area, alarmed by the unconventional arrangement, felt that they must display their strength and persuaded the convent to sell them the land leased to the Indians. Gaining legal control over the land, the new owners flooded it and destroyed the homes of the Indians. Some of the peasants fled, others found it more convenient to work for the new owners as *pegujaleros*, having obligations little different from those of the *colonos*.

Out of this and similar experiences grew a strong popular demand for agrarian reform. *Campesinos*, as the peasants are called, became more unified and better organized, and they produced such political

leaders as José Rojas of Ucureña, who in 1947 spearheaded the *campesino* movement (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). By 1952 the rather modest Peasant League of the Ucureña Valley (Sindicato Campesino de Ucureña del Valle) became a model for *campesino* organizations and inspired a movement which soon grew beyond the control of the central government.

After taking power in 1952, the revolutionary MNR government under Victor Paz Estenssoro gave priority over agrarian reform to the nationalization of mines, while friction between landowners and *sindicatos* multiplied to alarming dimensions. Spontaneous seizure by peasant groups of large estates, homes and machinery became commonplace and in some areas the situation approached anarchy. Most of the large landowners left their estates and sought refuge in cities, but tension developed also, at times verging on civil war, between *campesinos* and populations of the Spanish-speaking small towns.

To put an end to further violence and establish a method of redistributing land in an orderly manner, the government on January 20, 1953, appointed a commission, headed by the Vice-President, Hernan Siles Zuazo, to prepare a study on and make recommendations within 120 days for an extensive agrarian reform law. The commission received a series of suggestions and advisory reports relating to their efforts, some of which had heavy Marxist leanings.

The comprehensive recommendations submitted to the President were adopted with some alterations and proclaimed as Decree-Law 3464. August 2, 1953, the day of proclamation, was declared "The Day of the Indian" and the President with other members of his Cabinet signed the law in the presence of some 100,000 armed *campesinos* at Uruceña, Cochabamba. Walter Guavera Arca gave a speech in the Quechua language, President Paz Estenssoro made a short speech, then honored the occasion with a public libation of *chica* and by chewing a coca leaf to the honor of Pachamama (see ch. 7, Religion).

Enactment of this Agrarian Reform Law, which actually had a much broader scope than its title would suggest, brought a radical change of the land tenure system. The reform aimed at emancipation of the Indian and the transformation of the fundamental socio-economic patterns which had persisted since early colonial times. The 175-paragraph document, which was translated into Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní from the original Spanish, re-established the theoretical claim of the state to all land, water and natural resources, but recognized private ownership of property if it fulfilled useful purposes in the service of the society. It enumerated six fundamental objectives: redistribution of land; abolition of unpaid labor; promotion of Indian communities; stimulation of agriculture; preservation of national resources; and promotion of internal migration to the less populated eastern regions.

Redistribution of land began with the abolition of the uneconomically managed *latifundios*, making their lands available to farmers who had little or no property of their own. The law defined a *latifundio* as "large rural property, which has been unexploited or deficiently exploited through the extensive cultivation system, with antiquated instruments and methods, and which allowed waste of human efforts. . . ."

The law recognized six types of land tenure. The most generally applicable were the *campesino* homesite; the small property or that which the farmer and his family could cultivate without assistance; the medium-sized property worked with the help of hired labor or farm machinery; and the large-scale agricultural enterprise requiring considerable capital investment, hired labor and machinery. The size of these properties varied according to location. Small properties ranged from 7.5 acres in the valleys to 200 acres in the Chaco region, medium-sized properties from 600 to 1,500 acres, and agricultural enterprises from 200 acres in the valleys to 5,000 acres in the tropical and subtropical regions. In addition to these individual properties, the law upheld the communal properties of Indian communities and authorized them to recover land that had been taken away through illegal means since 1900. The law also recognized the common holdings of farming cooperatives or societies of farmers.

For stock-raising purposes the law recognized property rights on holdings ranging from 1,200 acres to 124,000 acres, provided a commensurate number of livestock was raised, approximately 1 head per 12 acres.

All persons over 18 years of age who wished to engage in farming were entitled to own land, regardless of their citizenship status. Preference was granted, however, to persons with farming background and to those who had served with merit in the national revolution.

Former owners of expropriated land were entitled to compensation in the form of bonds paying 2 percent interest for 25 years; simultaneously the new owners of the land were expected to pay off the assessed value of the land within the same period of time.

The abolition of the *latifundio* eliminated all tenure forms that had sustained it and thereby changed the status of the *indio* to *campesino*, who now owned his land and could enter into a contract with other landowners for cash wages or share of produce. The *campesino* also became a supporting member of the *campesino* army which in 1962 was still a militant political pressure group under the slogan "Only those who possess arms are entitled to eat" (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The administrative mechanism charged with the implementation of the agrarian reform is headed by the President of the Republic and

by the National Agrarian Reform Council, a public body composed of a president, vice-president and seven members appointed by the President of the Republic (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government). The Council is the supreme authority in all cases of litigation submitted to it by the regional offices of the National Agrarian Reform Service, which investigates disputed cases on the spot and submits its decision for approval. Regional offices, which are set up in each province, consist of an agrarian judge, who as a rule is a professional lawyer, a committee of five members and a number of inspectors.

Implementation of the Reform

The implementation of the reform showed uneven results, but in the densely populated areas of the highlands and valleys the large estates disappeared. The function of the National Agrarian Reform Service frequently became the simple acknowledgment of spontaneous expropriations which had been carried out by local *campesinos* in the wake of the 1952 revolution or at the 1953 proclamation of the reform.

In many instances, especially where relationships between landowners and their workers had been unfriendly, violence accompanied the act of expropriation; buildings were plundered, livestock slaughtered, seed supplies consumed and agricultural machinery wrecked. The aggressiveness of the *campesinos* varied widely. Aggression and violence were in direct ratio to the intensity of desire for land and to the level of *campesino* organization. In areas of relatively dense population where land was scarce and *campesino sindicatos* were well organized, as, for example, in the Cochabamba Valley, expropriation took place without an orderly transfer of titles. In their eagerness to obtain land, *campesinos* disregarded national interests and distributed even lands of government experimental stations, as in Belén, or slaughtered the prize stock of dairy farms. In the eastern lowlands and remote valleys where land was plentiful and socio-economic relationship between owner and worker less feudalistic, the proclamation of the agrarian reform law had little effect and its application was delayed for years.

By the end of the 1950's several provinces, among them Germán Jordán, Quillacollo, Esteban Arce and Punata in Cochabamba Department and Los Andes, Omasuyos and Camacho in La Paz Department, reported the completion of the process. At the end of July 1962, over 10 million acres, the land of 5,515 large estates, had been redistributed to 126,000 families, under the 1953 law. Production statistics, based mainly on marketed and exported agricultural products, revealed a significant decrease in output in almost all segments of agriculture as an immediate result of the agrarian reform. Although most of the large estates had been managed inefficiently, they had produced some surplus for the market, and in combination with

those which specialized in commercial agriculture, they were responsible for most of the marketed produce. About 20 percent of the dairy farms were saved by last-minute intervention of the central government, but few of the other commercial farms escaped destruction. Hence, marketed agricultural produce, with the exception of truck vegetables produced by small farmers, declined sharply and had not recovered fully by 1962.

The new owners of the land produced only for the subsistence of their own families. Any marginal surplus which might have occurred because the land available was greater, livestock were more plentiful and obligations were fewer, has been absorbed by the increased consumer demands of the farmer and his family. Production of surplus for marketing had not existed in his value system as a desirable goal when he worked as a *colono*. On the contrary, as Richard Patch observed in his study of the reform, "accumulation of surplus was considered an open invitation for the fateful forces to deprive the individual of his hoard. In such cases the hacienda *patrón* usually accommodated fate." Although the *patrón* has become practically nonexistent, the newly created *sindicatos* have been more than eager to take his place (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics; ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

On the other hand the *campesino*, habituated to the paternalistic order that existed through centuries, felt a sense of security in a social order in which a powerful benefactor held a protective shield over his head. Landowners and representatives of church and government appeared to him as fatherly protectors, and the removal of the landowner from the hierarchy had little effect on this basic concept. Hence, he accepted the new political bosses readily.

Outlook

Despite the setback suffered in agricultural production as a result of the reform, observers are confident that recovery will continue. There are signs that the establishment of permanent contact with markets encourages the *campesino* to improve his cultivation methods in order to better his economic status. The standard of living of the farmer has moved up slightly, to a degree perhaps not measurable by existing statistical means in Bolivia, but apparent in the more frequent occurrence of manufactured goods such as blue jeans, radios, and bicycles in the rural areas. A trend toward stability is indicated by the fact that some former landowners felt sufficiently optimistic to reoccupy their abandoned rural residences, start farming on the land left to them or even buy back part of their land from the new owners. *Campesinos*, in search of leadership and in hope of receiving credit, encouraged the return of some former landowners and in some

instances even started to pay compensation directly to them when it became apparent that the government had failed to do so.

PRODUCTS

Crops

Potatoes constitute the basic diet of the population on the highlands, and are also important in other parts of the country. Many varieties and species have been produced since pre-Inca times, and output has kept pace fairly well with the increase in population. The most popular variety on the highlands is white, about the size of a ping-pong ball and very hard. Barring years of exceptionally bad harvest, the country is self-sufficient in potatoes, producing an estimated 500,000 metric tons in 1961 (see table 4). Production methods have changed little and output is still only a fraction of what it could be on the same land with the use of fertilizers, better seeds and improved cultivation practices. Although the preservation and storage of dehydrated potatoes in the form of *chuño* has a long history, storage is seldom extended beyond 1 year.

Table 4. Selected Crops in Bolivia, 1961

Crops	Estimated area planted (in acres)	Estimated production (in metric tons)
Major Crops		
Maize	544, 000	295, 000
Barley	297, 000	66, 000
Potatoes	272, 000	200, 000
Wheat	222, 000	60, 000
Sugarcane	69, 000	900, 000
Rice	62, 000	*27, 000
Quinoa	40, 000	12, 000
Minor Crops		
Fruits	74, 000	.....
Yucca	23, 000	.....
Alfalfa	20, 000	.....
Oca	16, 000	.....
Coffee	14, 000	.....
Other	188, 000	.....

*Milled rice.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Government sources.

Maize provides the most important food item in the valleys and lowlands and occupies more land—about 544,000 acres—than any other crop. Its principal uses for human consumption are in the form of flour and meal and as an ingredient in the manufacture of alcohol and *chicha*. Some maize is fed to animals, mainly to chickens and

hogs. Production has been most intensive in the Cochabamba Valley, but higher yields of newly introduced Cuban yellow corn in the Santa Cruz area, where an estimated 45 percent of the cultivated land produces maize, may shift the center of production toward the lowlands. Both volume and quality of maize is below the potential. The acreage devoted to maize production is about twice that sown to potatoes. The output was about 295,000 metric tons in 1961, almost enough to meet local demands.

Rice, a standard item in the diet of the lowland and valley people, was mostly imported until World War II, at which time increases in prices and difficulties in transportation began to stimulate domestic production. Government assistance, increased use of farm machinery, improved storage facilities and the building of nine rice mills lowered production prices and increased the output to reach about 27,000 metric tons in 1961, or almost enough to meet the entire domestic demand. About one-third of the output is credited to the Okinawan and Japanese colonies. Further improvement of cultivation practices and seeds, as well as extension of the area planted in rice, could eliminate the need for import in the near future (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). About 70 percent of the total output originates in the Santa Cruz area, where dry rice is cultivated. Some wet rice cultivation is practiced in Beni and other areas. Agricultural advisers estimate that rice production could be doubled on the same land if irrigation and mosquito control methods were perfected.

Barley is well adapted to the high altitudes, where it is second in importance only to potatoes. For human consumption it is either roasted or milled. In some places it is used as animal feed (forage). The growing needs of the brewing industry demand an increased portion of the harvest. Output averages 66,000 metric tons annually, which is far short of the domestic demand, making import of barley necessary. The low domestic yield is due, among other causes, to low soil fertility which could be corrected by the use of fertilizers.

Quinoa, a staple on the highlands, is a small hardy cereal with high protein and vitamin content. In fat content it is exceeded by corn and oats but surpasses wheat, rice, barley or rye. Its mineral content makes it a very valuable supplement to the otherwise deficient diet of the highland Indians. The only disadvantage is its relatively high content of saponin, which has to be removed before the cereal is used as a human food. Quinoa requires little care, is resistant to disease and pests and grows best on elevations between 11,800 and 13,000 feet. Early in its growth it is susceptible to frost and extensive dry periods; hence annual yields vary. Annual output is estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000 metric tons, two-thirds of which is produced in the Departments of La Paz and Oruro.

The present low yield of about 350 pounds per acre could easily be increased through better cultivation practices, to the point that quinoa could become an export crop.

Wheat, a basic item in the diet especially in urban areas, grows poorly in Bolivia. Some 60,000 metric tons, less than half of the domestic demand, were produced on about 222,000 acres in 1961, mainly in the departments of Cochabamba, Potosí, Tarija and La Paz. The present wheat varieties are vulnerable to frost and rust, but experiments with new varieties have shown promising results, in some instances increasing the yield by 80 percent. Another means to improve wheat output and relieve the country of its largest import burden is the application of "dry farming" techniques in which the land is cultivated but not cropped continuously. In this manner, moisture is conserved during fallow periods and aids growth in the next season. There are large areas where corn and other grains are grown and which are suitable for wheat production, but the production of corn involves fewer risks and, under the existing price policy of the government, is also more profitable. The use of substitutes for wheat, such as corn, yucca and bananas, depends on changing customary food preferences, on the establishment of processing enterprises and on effective stimulation of production.

Other grains include rye, grown mainly as an experimental grain with good adaptability to elevations and climate of the highlands, and oats, grown in small amounts in the Cochabamba and Potosí areas. Among forages, alfalfa is predominant and is grown on some 20,000 acres, over half in the department of Cochabamba.

Fruits and vegetables are grown mainly in home gardens in the valleys in Cochabamba and La Paz Departments and are transported by truck to nearby urban settlements. Because prices of fruits and vegetables have been excluded from control, supply has kept up fairly well with demand. As railroad transportation improves and trucking increases, a larger flow of vegetables and fruits reaches more distant urban areas and mining centers. Little fresh and canned fruit is imported; apples, pears, grapes, peaches, pineapples, citrus fruits and bananas thrive in the subtropical and tropical climates, and it is expected that after the completion of the Yacuiba-Santa Cruz line the country will be able to export citrus fruits to Argentina.

Among the vegetables, yucca has a considerable potential and, in addition to being consumed fresh or cooked, could be dried and milled for use as a substitute for 5 to 10 percent of the wheat flour used in the preparation of bread. The milling of yucca flour is limited by the capacity of available yucca mills, which at present process some 4,500 metric tons annually. Beans and *oca* constitute important items in the diet of the highland dwellers; sweet potatoes and chili (*ají*) are produced and consumed in the lowlands.

Oilseed production is making only slow progress despite favorable climatic conditions for many kinds of oilseed-yielding plants. Sesame, castor beans, soybeans, sunflowers, peanuts and cotton seeds are all doing well in the lowlands, and linseeds have been grown with success in the Cochabamba Valley. Nevertheless, the government price policy favors import rather than domestic production, and the absence of oil mills discourages production. Hence the larger part of domestic demand, about six pounds per person in 1958, is satisfied from abroad. There is a considerable oilseed potential in unexploited Cusi palms of the eastern lowlands, especially northeast of Santa Cruz, which together with the cultivation of domesticated oil plants could easily eliminate the need for importation and could provide oil cakes for cattle feed. In addition to the one existing oil mill, the Okinawan colonists plan to erect one near their settlement north of Santa Cruz and engage in large-scale oilseed production by 1963.

Sugarcane production centers in the Santa Cruz area, where it covers about 12 percent of the land under cultivation, which produces 80 percent of the national output. Small plantations in other parts of the lowlands supply the remainder. Output has been on the increase from about 2,000 metric tons of refined sugar in 1950 to 41,000 metric tons in 1961. Sugar production is expected to be 60,000 metric tons in 1963, but this yield will require a simultaneous increase in the capacity of existing sugar mills. Over half of the sugarcane is used in the manufacture of alcohol, which brings proportionately greater returns than refined sugar, and in producing coarse sugar for local use. The government has assisted sugar production to reduce the need for import by extending financial aid to sugar mills, by constructing roads, and by imposing protective tariffs. However, the trade policy has not been consistent and has frequently canceled out the assistance given. The expansion of milling facilities now underway in the producing areas is essential to increased production (see ch. 19, Industry).

Coffee and tea are commodities in which the country could easily become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter. Both plants thrive in the Yungas and coffee also grows well in the Santa Cruz area. Enough coffee to meet domestic demand is produced on small and medium-sized farms under forest shade as a sideline of regular farming activities. Improved management and processing could increase output considerably. The Agrarian Bank has stimulated expansion of coffee production through credit since 1942; but its hope that coffee may become an export commodity bringing as much as $10 million by 1965, provided favorable price conditions on the world market prevail, may be too optimistic since farmers give preference to other crops which are easier to produce and bring faster returns than coffee. Both coffee and tea suffer from the inadequacies of transportation facilities. In addition tea production, although favored by climate

has not been able to yield sufficient amounts for local consumption because of lack of processing equipment.

Cacao of relatively low quality grows wild in the Yungas of La Paz and Beni, but through the use of better varieties and application of improved processing practices, cacao production could become a promising economic activity. An experimental cacao project started with 70 families by French Redemptorist missionaries at Convendo, El Beni, in the early 1950's has shown excellent results. Plans were made to enlarge the present processing plant and establish also a small chocolate factory. It is believed that increased domestic sugar production will make cacao consumption more desirable.

Coca leaves, when dried and chewed with vegetable ash, produce cocaine alkaloid, a stimulant which has been popular among highland Indians since prehistoric times. More or less genuine attempts by church and government to reduce coca consumption by planting coffee and citrus fruits as replacements have had little success, mainly because unit price of coca is higher and therefore provides a larger profit, but also because taxes derived from the sale of coca leaves constitute a significant source of income which the government is reluctant to lose. The annual production is estimated to be about 3,000 metric tons of which legitimate export consumes 20 to 200 metric tons depending on the results of the harvest. Large amounts are said to be smuggled out of the country as contraband.

Cotton production satisfies about one-eighth of the domestic demand. The bulk of the short staple cotton is produced on about 31,000 acres of the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz areas, mostly on small farms where manual planting and harvesting methods are used, but also on highly mechanized plantations like that of the Said brothers north of Santa Cruz. High hopes are placed on the Villa Montes area in Tarija Department where, with government assistance, some 15,000 acres of irrigated land are to be planted in cotton. Nevertheless, it is hoped that, by future expansion of the irrigated area at Villa Montes to almost 100,000 acres, the greater part of domestic demand could be satisfied.

Fibers find favorable climatic and soil conditions in the Santa Cruz area, and agricultural experts have selected ramie, jute, sisal, manila hemp and ambary as suitable for promotion and production to eliminate the approximately $1 million outlay for imported mining bags. Some ambary has been produced, supplying a small rope factory which meets domestic demand.

Among the agricultural products which contain a high potential for expansion are bananas, which when used as flour have a higher relative food value than yucca, and which could be used as partial supplement for wheat. In the favorable climate of Beni, bananas grow wild; experiments with domesticated production are being

carried on by the government. Pyrethrum, a chrysanthemum used for the production of insecticides, thrives in the valleys and in some areas of the highlands and could become an export commodity. Turmeric, an herb of the ginger family is used as a condiment, medicine, yellow dye and honey: these items, whose production is becoming increasingly popular in the Santa Cruz area, could also center the export market.

Livestock

Llama and alpaca have been used by the highland Indians since prehistoric times. Sturdy domesticated animals with high resistance to insects, cold and disease, they are as important to the highland people as camels to the Near East nomads or reindeer to the Lapps. Having similar characteristics in endurance and transportation as camels, llama and alpaca are never milked, but their dung serves as an important, often the sole source of fuel. Their wool is used for the preparation of cordage and clothing, their meat is seldom consumed fresl. but rather dried and conserved, bones are turned into household implements and musical instruments, and skins are made into good shoes and bags.

The total number of llama and alpaca is not known. Most families on the highlands own 4 to 5 head; foreign observers estimated the total stock to be about 500,000 to 600,000 in the early 1950's, and the Bolivian Government estimated their number to be about 1 million in 1961.

The vicuña and guanaco have similar characteristics, but have not been successfully domesticated and are hunted mainly for their precious skins.

Cattle are raised in varying extent in almost every quarter of the country. Their number was estimated to be over 2.0 million head in 1960. On the highlands and in elevated valleys oxen are used as draught animals and are slaughtered for local consumption when no longer useful. Large-scale cattle breeding for beef exists mainly in the department of El Beni, but there is some in Santa Cruz. Up to the late 1930's the greater part of domestic demand in cattle products was imported from Argentina and Peru. In the 1940's cold storage facilities and air transportation between outlying districts of Beni and consumption centers of the highlands made possible the shipment of large quantities of beef, derived mainly from wild cattle herds. Some Beni cattle went to Cochabamba, shipped by barges on the Mamoré and Chaparé Rivers, to San Antonio, where it was slaughtered and then trucked to the city. Extensive exploitation, lack of replacement of herds, and disease have reduced the stock and raised prices so that import from Argentina becomes necessary occasionally.

The production and marketing of milk and milk products follows

the traditional pattern in which the farmer processes his own butter and cheese and delivers it directly to the consumer or market place. Only the milk plant in Cochabamba delivers bottled, pasteurized whole milk and other dairy products processed by machinery. The plant, built as a joint venture of the Bolivian and United States Governments with the cooperation of the United Nations, began operation in 1960. It has a processing capacity of 40,000 quarts of milk per day, but actually processes only 5,700 to 8,800 quarts. Of this, about 5,000 quarts are consumed locally, 600 quarts are sent to La Paz, and the remainder is processed into powdered milk and butter, for which no sufficient market has yet been found. Low domestic demand and competition from imported butter and powdered milk are given as basic reasons for sub-capacity production. Although the stock of dairy cattle was greatly reduced at the time of the 1952 revolution when dairy farms were expropriated by peasants who slaughtered over 80 percent of the cattle for meat, the Cochabamba plant seems to have sufficient supply for expansion if demand required it. Some 240 farmers supplied the plant's need in 1961.

Natural pastures on the highlands are overgrazed by a large number of sheep, and planted pastures are almost unknown. Improved pasture management, breeding and health standards could increase the present output should a higher standard of living increase demand for livestock products. Oxen are fed barley, hay and straw during the winter months, and a drive for the building of silos on farms gained impetus in recent years. In the lowlands natural pastures are poor in quality, requiring about five acres to feed one cow. Along the tributaries of the Amazon River, cattle herds take advantage of floods by following receding flood waters to feed on fresh pastures. Artificial pastures on woodland clearings in the Santa Cruz lowland region show the best results and are able to feed one cow per acre.

Insects and diseases take a high toll--15 to 20 percent of the cattle population annually. Argentine tick, rabies, brucellosis and intestinal parasites are common; black leg and hoof-and-mouth disease are contributing factors. The Eastern Biological Institute (Instituto Biológico Oriental) at Santa Cruz produces vaccines, and the Reyes experimental station has imported several hundred head of zebu-type cattle which thrive under similar conditions in neighboring countries.

Sheep, totaling some 5.7 million head in 1961, are raised mainly on the highlands where they graze freely on natural pastures the year round. Small, sturdy varieties, descendants of Merino, Park and Romney Marsh crossed with native varieties, produce about 1 to 1.5 pounds of poor quality wool, and about 12 to 15 pounds of good quality meat. Mutton, however, is not very popular with the highland Indians, and sheep are raised more often for wool than for meat. Most of the wool is used on the farm, some is smuggled out to

neighboring countries and some is sold to the Agrarian Bank, which is the authorized collector of wool in the country. Sheep are sheared only once or twice in their lifetimes; the resulting low production of wool makes import necessary. The close grazing of large sheep herds has caused extensive overgrazing on the highlands, which has in turn reduced nutrition and quality of all livestock. Their resistance weakened, sheep suffered heavy losses from extensive droughts. Bolivian Government sources estimate, for example, that some 200,000 sheep died during drought conditions in the 1940's. Low quality pasture and poor nutrition have increased sheep mortality rates, which for the past 10 to 15 years have equaled birth rates, and have kept the number of sheep from growing.

No reliable data are available on other livestock. According to Bolivian Government estimates in 1961 there were over 650,000 pigs, 200,000 horses, 50,000 mules, over 400,000 donkeys, about 1.2 million goats, 700,000 rabbits and an unknown number of guinea pigs in the country. The 1961 figures on poultry show an estimated 1.8 million chickens, 60,000 turkeys and 240,000 ducks.

Forestry

In timber resources Bolivia is one of the best endowed countries in the world. Estimates based on regional surveys contend that the country has some 125 billion feet of standing timber, if exploited its value would be more than $25 billion. Nevertheless, the annual per capita wood consumption is extremely low, about 3.5 cubic feet per person, and even a large part of this has to be imported from neighboring countries, the United States and Canada.

The highlands are virtually treeless, except for a few recently developed eucalyptus groves near principal urban centers. The valleys are much better endowed with trees, and exploitation of cinchona bark used in the production of quinine, has been a profitable business in the Yungas. Some eucalyptus trees are grown for fuel and mining supports near Cochabamba and Sucre, but the best forests are found on the eastern slopes of the Andes and on the lowlands along the rivers of the Amazon basin. Here large areas of tropical forests of evergreens and hardwood exist.

Rubber of high quality grows wild in the forests of Pando and El Beni and constitutes the primary forest export commodity. Extraction began in 1864 and reached peaks of 6,000 and 4,400 metric tons in World War I and World War II respectively. Because of transportation difficulties and adverse tariff policies only small quantities are sold legitimately, the bulk being smuggled down the rivers to Brazil. Rubber sold on the regular market amounted to 2,300 tons in 1959 and added $1.3 million to the foreign exchange earnings of the country.

Few large-scale plantations exist, but at the Riberalta experimental station the government is conducting tests with new varieties.

Brazil nuts, which also grow wild on trees often 100 feet tall, constitute the second most important forest export commodity. Although shelling by hand involves a considerable amount of labor and the meat is only about one-fifth of the harvested fruit, in good harvest years the legitimate export has exceeded 3,000 metric tons, while unknown quantities have been smuggled to Brazil.

Dry forests of abundant hardwoods, such as quebracho with a high potential as a tanning agent, walnut and mahogany exist in the southeastern part of the country between Yacuiba, Tarija and the slopes of the Andes. Carandy palms, which grow in extensive areas of the Chaco and are exploited for their lumber and fiber, could be put to good use as a source of wax necessary for the manufacturing of polishes, explosives and phonograph records. A group of technicians of the West German Government arrived in 1962 and began preparations for the exploration and exploitation of forest resources.

Most of the vast timber resources lie beyond the reach of modern means of transportation, but the tropical hardwoods northwest of Santa Cruz and those in the Todos Santos-Piray river area could be exploited more intensively under present conditions and with little improvement of feeder roads. Also, the high unit price of wax could pay for air transport from the Chaco area and could increase the foreign exchange income of the country.

In general, poor forest management, uncontrolled cutting and burning for clearing have destroyed valuable forest resources. In addition to high transportation costs, lack of trained foresters and of popular understanding of the basic principles of forest management contribute to uneconomical exploitation. Protective laws have been passed throughout the century, but lack of implementation has made them ineffective.

Fishing

The waters of the country are well stocked with a large variety of fish which are caught and consumed by the people living near lakes and rivers. Commercial fishing exists at Lake Titicaca, from which rainbow trout, lake trout and *boga*, a small bass-like fish, are supplied to the market at La Paz, and on the Pilcomayo River from which fish is trucked to Tarija, Postosí, Sucre and Cochabamba during the season.

FARMING PRACTICES

Patterns of Cultivation

Surprisingly few changes occurred in the pattern of cultivation with the coming of the Spaniards. Barley, alfalfa, sugarcane and a few other crops were introduced; cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and chickens

were brought from Europe; but crops and livestock of the ancient Indian cultures as well as traditional farming implements and techniques continued to play a dominant role. Most significant was the introduction of oxen as draught animals and of the wooden plow as a new farming implement.

Antiquated cultivation practices, combined with a land tenure system that provided little or no incentive for improvement, were responsible for the low per capita farm output, which has been one of the fundamental ills of the Bolivian economy. United States observers contend that even without changing methods presently applied or the size of cultivated land, output could be doubled or tripled if the farmer would work harder. It was hoped that the agrarian reform would change the per capita output, and that the emancipation of the Indian would inspire greater ambitions, but the time required for such cardinal changes was underestimated.

In 1962 the average Bolivian farmer still cultivated about one acre of land, and his output was still among the lowest in Latin America. Regional differences in topography were significant, but not decisive. While the cultivation of one hectare (2.47 acres) of wheat required 489 man-hours on the highlands, it required only 310 man-hours in the valleys, still almost 30 times the 11.4 man-hours required in Kansas.

Mechanization

The first signs of mechanization occurred in the 1930's when some progressive farmers began to import tractors. The difficult topography of the highlands and valleys, the high investment required for the purchase of machinery and the lack of communication and education retarded mechanization. In 1948 only 5.8 percent of all farm land was under mechanized cultivation, and by 1960 fewer than 1,000 tractors were in use in the entire country, most of them on the level lands of the eastern region where large farms and scarcity of labor made the use of machinery more desirable.

Before 1953 the cost of manual labor had been considerably lower than the purchase price and operational costs of machinery. Even in the Santa Cruz area the cultivation of sugarcane by tractor required twice the cash outlay necessary for the same work when done by manual labor. Two reasons for this disparity were the low level of wages and the purchase of machinery ill-suited to Bolivian conditions. Large tractors, which were considered economical in the preparation of the soil, were found to be useless or highly uneconomical in the performance of other farm work and were therefore kept idle for long periods of the year. Lack of skilled operators and mechanics was responsible for additional weaknesses. The use of machinery has frequently been hampered by long periods of dry weather which hardens the soil to such a degree that only the Egyptian plow is able

to break it. The relatively low prospects of mechanization under present circumstances led the Inter-American Agricultural Service to abandon its mechanization program and sell its two machine pools containing also some machinery ill-fitted for Bolivian agriculture at its present stage of development, to private entrepreneurs. By the end of the 1950's about 90 percent of all farm work was still done manually and the vast majority of farmers had little or no contact with mechanized equipment.

On the highlands the pointed digging stick is still the principal tool in the cultivation of potatoes, and wooden mallets are used to break up clods. For the preparation of the soil and planting of cereals the steel-tipped wooden plow is the main instrument. Modern steel plows could not become popular because the oxen are neither large nor strong enough to draw them on the rocky and difficult terrain. Sowing is done by the hand-broadcasting method and the seed covered by plowing. Small sickles serve as the principal tools in harvesting cereals, which are still threshed with oxen and winnowed by hand in the wind. Medium-sized tractors are the only economical machinery on the highlands, and even their role is limited by topography and climate. Among other experts, Cornelius H. Zondag believes that the introduction of more and better draught animals could improve yields more effectively and more rapidly than further emphasis on mechanization.

Mechanization in the valleys is not too different. The rocky slopes are not suitable for large-scale mechanization, but on the more level lands of the Cochabamba Valley the use of light-weight tractors and other mechanized equipment has been promoted on a cooperative basis. Even on the lowlands, where mechanization is most desirable and most widespread, the ancient tools, such as the machete and the axe, are still widely used especially in the slash-and-burn type of land clearing and in harvesting.

Soil Conservation

Erosion is widespread on the highlands and in the valleys. It has been promoted by large-scale overgrazing on natural pastures and by the absence of crop rotation and soil management. The fertility of the soil, therefore, is extremely low, inducing the farmer to leave part of his land fallow for one or more seasons. In part because of this practice only a small fraction of the farm land is actually under cultivation in any given season. Although the highland Indian is attached to the land he lives on, and fields are fenced and protected by walls of stones or unburned brick, he is unaware of or indifferent to soil management techniques.

Fertilization

The cultivated soils of the highlands are exhausted. They lack phosphorus, nitrogen and organic matter. Crop residue and a very

small amount of manure is used on the Altiplano where llama dung has a high premium as the only available household fuel. Commercial fertilizers, with the exception of some bone meal, are almost unknown, although phosphate deposits within the country have been reported. Because of erratic and long periods of drought the application of commercial fertilizers requires special skills. Even if applied with great care they can burn out the crop during an extended period of dry weather or be washed away by a sudden downpour.

The high purchase and transportation costs of commercial fertilizers place them beyond the reach of most farmers, who as a rule also lack the minimum understanding of the benefits of fertilization and the use of fertilizers. Foreign specialists believe that adequate and proper fertilization alone could multiply the present yield of certain crops and eliminate a large part of costly food imports. Plans to build a fertilizer plant in the country were under consideration in 1962.

Irrigation

The uneven distribution of rainfall on the Altiplano results in irregular periods of dry weather which, together with frost and hail, cause total loss in almost all crops once every 5 years in the northern region. Three harvests out of five show some loss, and only one shows good results. Drought becomes increasingly common toward the south, but is of considerably less danger in the valleys. Extended dry periods hamper the use of some mechanical tools and the efficient use of fertilizers, and discourages capital investment in agriculture.

About 10 percent of the cultivated land is irrigated by small-scale gravity systems located mainly in the valleys, with some near Lake Titicaca and Lake Poopó. Government plans for the construction of major irrigation projects with a total coverage of 125,000 acres have been in preparation with varying degrees of interest since 1939, when Mexican engineers were contracted for this purpose. Three projects have been under construction for some time. Part of the Angostura project in Cochabamba was put in operation, covering nearly 10,000 acres. When completed the project should cover about twice that area. Still under construction are the Tacagua project in Oruro, which is to irrigate 11,000 acres, and the Villa Montes project in Tarija, which will use the water of the Pilcomayo River to irrigate some 40,000 acres. The completion of these projects will increase the area of irrigated land by about 50 percent. Irrigation could greatly increase the agricultural output of the Altiplano and make large areas of the arid southern region suitable for cotton production.

Other projects still in the planning stage include the Huarina-Penas (17,000 acres), and the Laja (15,000 acres) projects both in La Paz, the Alalay project (3,600 acres) in Cochabamba, and the Mairana-Valle Abajo project (10,000 acres) in Santa Cruz.

The partial completion of the Angostura project has confronted the government with new problems. One has been land speculation which led to uneconomical parcelization of irrigated land, a situation which was corrected by legislation. It has been more difficult to cope with educational problems, such as teaching the farmer the skills of wet farming and soil management, as well as problems related to marketing the larger output in an area of limited demand. The Angostura project was conceived to increase wheat production, but farmers favored other crops with higher returns and did not follow government guidance until the price of wheat made its production more attractive.

CREDIT AND MARKETING

Credit

A low rate of investment in the agricultural sector of the economy has been a fundamental cause of low output. Before 1953 demand for farm credit was small, but so was cash income. Farming was not considered a business enterprise. Land served as a prestige capital which secured proper social standing and leisure to the proprietor and his family. Hence, investment in agriculture was low, and agricultural credit was scarce and expensive. Even the few progressive farmers who produced for the market did not turn their profits back into their land, but rather invested them in other sectors of the economy. Hazards of frost, hailstorms and tempests which destroyed one out of five harvests in the northern parts of the highlands and a higher proportion toward the south, contributed to the reluctance of capital to invest in agriculture.

Before World War II a landowner who sought a loan had to obtain it through business or family contacts. The first and rather inadequate provisions explicitly for agricultural credit were made in the early 1940's when the Central Bank was expanded to include a Department of Rural Credit. In 1942 the Agrarian Bank (Banco Agrícola de Bolivia) was created as an autonomous government agency to assume the functions of the Department of Rural Credit. As a result of inflation and mismanagement, credit was extended mainly to serve political or commercial purposes, and the Bank had little impact on agriculture (see ch. 24, Financial System). In 1955 the Inter-American Agricultural Service initiated a supervised farm credit program for the purpose of mechanization, crop and livestock improvement and marketing. Between 1955 and 1961, the service extended loans to some 10,000 families and twice turned over its capital of $1.7 million. The supervised agricultural credit program, which employs 33 technicians and additional clerical personnel, is scheduled to be transferred to the Agrarian Bank if and when the reorganization of the Bank is accomplished.

Terms of credit were conservative. Theoretically, for livestock improvement they ranged up to 3 years, for purchase of machinery up to 5 years and for other improvement up to 7 years; but in practice loans were made for 1 year, extended in exceptional cases to additional years up to the limit in each category. Interest rates were 11 to 12 percent, and the amount of loans could not extend beyond 50 percent of the assessed value of the property. The applicant must prove title to the land. Even under such harsh terms, the number of loan applications has always exceeded the number of available loans, which were limited by both the small sum of funds available and the shortage of supervisory personnel. Early in 1961 the Inter-American Development Bank extended a $10 million loan to the Bolivian Development Corporation, which has earmarked $1.7 million for its agricultural credit program for the improvement of rice, sugar, cotton and livestock production. Additional loans will become available from the Alliance for Progress (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Marketing

An extremely small but increasing fraction of agricultural output reaches the urban market and is sold for cash. A larger portion is bartered at local and village markets where occasionally it is bought up by truckers and hauled to the cities if adequate roads exist. The reasons for the low volume of commercial agriculture are many. The land tenure system which existed before the 1953 land reform discouraged the agricultural worker or tenant from producing in excess of his own need. Small items of industrial origin, such as kerosene, salt, sugar and needles, were either provided by the *patrón* in exchange for services or produce, or obtained through barter on the local market. Except for a few progressive landowners, who emphasized commercial production, the large farms have not produced for the market either. In addition, the price and tariff policies of the government before the 1956 stabilization favored imports over domestic agricultural products (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Among other reasons for low commercial agriculture has been the relatively high marketing cost of produce. Inefficient production methods put a high initial cost on many agricultural commodities. This cost is increased through losses from poor handling, inadequate storage facilities especially for perishables, high transportation expenses and excessive profit demands by all those involved—producer, middleman and retailer (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

After the 1953 agrarian reform, when the large farms were abolished, the small farmer continued to produce for his own need. Consequently the flow of domestic agricultural commodities to urban markets has declined sharply. A gradual recovery involving a growing number of farmers is stimulated by the expanding road network

and by an improved price policy which permits the farmer to receive a much more realistic price for his product. In addition, changes in tariff policies protect the interests of the domestic producer of essential foodstuffs.

Air transport is seldom used because of the low unit price of most agricultural commodities. Exceptions have been the large-scale transport of beef from Beni to the highlands and isolated cases of fruit shipments. Lack of adequate surface transportation between production and consumption centers blocks the promotion of national self-sufficiency and encourages illegal transport of produce to more accessible markets of neighboring countries. It is well known that large quantities of rubber, coca leaves, Brazil nuts, cattle and other agricultural commodities are smuggled across the border annually (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS

Government Departments

The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Colonization and Regions is the principal agency concerned with agricultural affairs. Its operations are hampered by modest appropriations (about 1 to 2 percent of the national budget) and by lack of adequately trained personnel. Delegation of functions to various autonomous and semi-autonomous government agencies and assistance from abroad enable the Ministry to execute its responsibilities.

Among other ministries which exert influence on agricultural affairs are the Ministry of Finance, which is instrumental in allocation of funds, the Ministry of National Economy, which affects marketing through manipulation of import controls, and the Ministry of Rural Affairs, which is responsible for rural education and maintains liaison with the political organizations of the *campesinos*.

The Inter-American Agricultural Service

The Inter-American Agricultural Service (Servicio Agricola Interamericano—SAI) was organized in 1948 as a joint undertaking of the United States and Bolivian Governments to provide assistance in agricultural economy, research, extension, mechanization and credit. It has been the most active and best endowed organization in the field and had, at the peak of its operation in 1958, some 60 United States specialists and 800 Bolivian employees. A gradual transfer of responsibilities to Bolivian agencies had reduced its personnel to 17 United States specialists and 400 Bolivian employees by 1962. It transferred its responsibilities for mechanization by selling the two existing agricultural machinery pools to private entrepreneurs and for research by attaching some of its experimental stations to the Bolivian Govern-

ment. SAI retained its role in crop and livestock improvement programs, field demonstration of technical skills, soil surveys, improvement of water resources, preparation of marketing surveys and supervision of agricultural credit operations. It also maintains three technical libraries, one at La Paz and one at each of the experimental station—La Tamborada and General Saavedra.

SAI, which theoretically operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, cooperates with government agencies related to agriculture, with the Agrarian Bank, the Bolivian Development Corporation, peasant leagues and any other organizations interested or involved in agricultural development. Its funds amount to about one-third of the annual allowance of the United States technical assistance program in Bolivia.

Others

The scope of the Bolivian Development Corporation (Corporación Boliviano de Fomento—CBF), an autonomous government agency established in 1942, includes all sectors of the economy. Its role in agricultural development has not been consistent. Outstanding contributions of CBF to agriculture were the initiation and operation of air transport for beef, a service which has gradually been transferred to private companies; participation in the erection of a modern milk processing plant in Cochabamba which gave impetus to dairy farming; and the transfer of $1.7 million to the Agrarian Bank for a development loan received from the Inter-American Development Bank in 1961.

The traditional sharing of land and work in the Indian cultures is believed to provide a favorable frame of mind for the acceptance of cooperatives. However, lack of clear definition of the desirable form of cooperatives, blurred also by various interpretations of related Marxist concepts, delayed the inception of a dynamic cooperative movement. The Cooperative Law, enacted in 1958, tried to clarify government intentions and the functions of cooperatives. It created the Bolivian National Cooperative, a supervisory agency whose task is to stimulate the growth of and supervise cooperatives. As of mid-1962 some 12 producers' cooperatives, comprising over 1,000 members, had been established.

An agency closely related to the cooperative movement is the National Rice Marketing Committee (Comité Nacional por la Comercialización de Arroz—CONCA), established in 1960, which has been instrumental in the grading, pricing and marketing of rice, and has supplied cooperative groups and individuals with seeds, insecticides, storage facilities and other services. It also encouraged the production of peanuts.

COLONIZATION

Colonization has been encouraged and promoted by the government to alleviate population pressure in the highlands and in the valleys and to provide an adequate labor force for intensive agriculture in the lowlands, mainly in the Santa Cruz area. Thus far only voluntary resettlements have succeeded. Overpopulation and the slow pace of industrialization make the movement of some 50,000 to 60,000 persons necessary annually, but only 5,000 to 6,000 move, and mainly to the valleys. Participants in government colonization projects have, as a rule, returned to their original habitat. Veterans of the Chaco War were transported to the lowlands to clear land and were encouraged to stay and farm, but only about a tenth of them did so. CBF started several colonization projects in the Santa Cruz area between 1954 and 1956. By the end of 1961 the Aroma colony had some 800 members, a colony at Cuatro Ojitos had 2,000 and one at Huaytú had 500. Cotoca, a joint colonization venture of the Bolivian Government and the Andean Mission of the United Nations, had about 380 members. Failures of organized colonization projects are blamed on insufficient motivation on the part of highland Indians, who have seemingly been unable to overcome difficult changes and to face isolation, lack of tropical sanitation and uncertainties as to future government policies in a new and strange environment.

Voluntary migration has succeeded in areas of good soil and new roads. Along the newly constructed road to Caranavi, about 100 miles northeast of La Paz, some 12,000 persons settled voluntarily in 60 small communities and, encouraged by the credit programs of SAI, they formed several cooperatives. Concentrating on production of bananas, rice, coca, citrus fruits, corn and coffee, they supply produce to the market of La Paz. Another area where voluntary settlement has shown success in situated about 125 miles northeast of Cochabamba, in the Chaparé area near Todos Santos, where close to 10,000 families have settled since 1957 and cultivate rice, bananas, coca and citrus fruits. Internal migration has moved also toward the region northwest of Cochabamba, especially toward Inquisivi.

Foreign immigrant groups, which entered the country as a result of bilateral agreements between the Bolivian and foreign governments, also settled in the Santa Cruz area. Groups of Okinawan colonists began to arrive in 1955, and by 1962 over one-half of the projected 1,000 families had already settled in three colonies on land provided by the Bolivian Government, about 140,000 acres. Land is assigned to individuals in parcels of 125 acres. The Okinawans have tried to integrate into the Bolivian society, hire Bolivian Spanish-speaking teachers for their schools, adopted Roman Catholicism and established friendly relations with Bolivians of the area. Although they had to move their first colony twice because of unsatisfactory health and soil

conditions, Okinawans have been far more active and successful in land development and agricultural production than have other immigrant groups. Signal results have been achieved in rice production. The erection of an oil-processing plant, scheduled for construction in 1963, will enable them to engage in the production of oilseeds—mainly peanuts, soybeans, sesame and cottonseed.

The Japanese colony of some 1,000 persons is located near San Juan; it receives extensive financial and technical support from the Japanese Government, and lives rather secluded from the rest of the country. Its success in agriculture has been described as good.

Other foreign colonists include settlements of some 250 Mennonites from Paraguay and Canada, who settled in four small groups east of Santa Cruz on a concession of some 5,000 acres, of which about 1,000 acres were under cultivation in 1960–61. Some immigrants from southern Europe, mainly from Italy, were less successful in agriculture, and all but one or two families moved to the cities.

EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

Vocational education is of relatively recent origin and has had little impact on the average farmer, who before 1953 had not been motivated toward farm development. Because of the high rate of illiteracy, language difficulties and topographical barriers, the teaching of practical skills and demonstrations through extension services and specialized training centers have had greater success than related courses given as part of a regular school curriculum. Few schools teach elementary agricultural skills, and only six specialized schools teach graduates of the sixth or higher grades. On the college level only the University of Simon Bolívar at Cochabamba, assisted by United States and international agencies, offers a curriculum in agricultural engineering, and graduates 7 to 12 students a year. Because both students and course content are regional in character, the graduates of the school are reluctant to accept positions outside the Cochabamba Valley. The University also operated the Tamborada experimental station, where students must spend 2 years studying and working. Established by SAI and operated by it between 1948 and 1960, the Tamborada station has been responsible for much of the progress made in agricultural development in recent years. Lack of funds and the departure of many specialists since 1960 have reduced the effectiveness of Tamborada. A Rural Worker Training Center was being developed at Cochabamba in mid-1962, in part through contributions from Belgium.

Another Development Center that has been turned over to the Bolivian Government, which in turn entrusted its operation to the Order of Salesian Fathers, was the Muyurina School of Practical Agriculture and Livestock, which serves as a combination vocational school and center of rural health activities.

Foreign assistance enabled a number of students to study abroad, but agriculture as a vocation has not been very popular because career possibilities exist only in the government, and there, only to a limited extent. In the past landowners were reluctant to hire persons with agricultural training because their management involved improvements and investments the landowners were not inclined to make (see ch. 8, Education).

Extension service is the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, but it is implemented by SAI. The work, which began in 1953, has expanded into the areas of leadership training, guidance of cooperatives, vaccination of livestock, production of forage, community development, youth work and home economics, of which youth work has shown the most promising results. Some 250 4–S clubs (similar to 4–H clubs), with a total membership of 4,000 in 1959, are scattered over the country and are engaged in such projects as gardening and livestock, small animal and poultry raising.

Experimental stations, strategically located in the separate physiographical and climatic regions of the country, provide most of the technical information on which other projects are based. The experimental station at Belén, near La Paz, specializes in highland agriculture and develops new species, varieties and breeds of crops and animals; that at General Saavedra, near Santa Cruz, concentrates on tropical and subtropical crops of the lowlands and on soil analysis; the Riberalta station in northern Beni specializes in tropical crops, especially rubber, cacao, coffee and various herbs.

In addition to experimental stations there are demonstration stations and development centers. One at Patacamaya, between La Paz and Oruro, specializes in livestock, mainly sheep; the stations at Reyes and Trinidad specialize in livestock. Eight additional demonstration centers will be erected by SAI in 1962. The center at Potosí will concentrate on high altitude agronomy and sheep raising; at Todos Santos efforts will be concentrated on citrus fruits, coffee and truck crops; the Caranavi center will concern itself with citrus fruits, bananas, coffee, tea and truck crops; the other five had not yet been assigned locations in early 1962.


CHAPTER 19

INDUSTRY

The combined activities in mining, petroleum and power industries, manufacturing and construction contributed an estimated 28 percent to the gross national product in 1961. The same activities provided employment for some 200,000 persons, produced 95 percent of all export goods and consumed three quarters of all imports. Abundant untapped reserves in raw materials represent a great potential for growth which has been retarded, however, by both sociopolitical and technical factors.

Before 1952 the mining industry, almost the sole source of capital development, was in the hands of entrepreneurs who treated it as a means of acquiring maximum returns which were either expatriated or channeled into other profit-seeking activities—mostly commerce. Only a minimum amount of the profits was reinvested in either the development or maintenance of capital goods or installations. The same applied to the railroads, which were built with foreign capital and intended mainly to serve the mines. The result was progressive exhaustion of resources and deterioration of equipment.

When the government of the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) nationalized the three leading mining companies and increased its share and control in other segments of industry, it gained only the run-down mines and equipment and was itself without sufficient funds or competent personnel to promote efficient operation or development. Furthermore, political considerations dictated personnel policies which, through overstaffing and relaxed production controls, resulted in greatly reduced productivity. Under such sociopolitical and economic conditions, foreign capital feared to invest. Although it has been replaced by foreign financial and technical assistance channeled through the government, such aid, while substantial in volume, has been able only to forestall complete bankruptcy. The promotion of development and expansion has been slight, and the creation of capital virtually nil. The only significant exception to the general decline is found in the oil industry, where progress has been made since the re-engagement of private capital began in 1958 (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 24, Financial System).



Source. Adapted from Ford, Bacon and Davis Incorporated, Report. Mining Industry of Bolivia, 1956, Vol. 2, Exhibit No. 1, and C. H. Zondag, Problems in the Economy of Bolivia, 1956.

Figure 8. Mineral Deposits of Bolivia.

RESOURCES

Bolivia's industry has a vast reservoir of raw materials and energy, a good potential supply of labor and almost no internal source of capital. The country's rich endowment in mineral ores has been

known since prehistoric times. It is said that a sample of almost every known mineral occurs in the soil of Bolivia. Silver, gold, tin, tungsten, lead, mercury, nickel, antimony, zinc, copper and bismuth among the metals, and asbestos, limestone, mica, salt and sulfur among the nonmetallic minerals have been mined with varying degrees of intensity in a belt about 500 miles long and 60 miles wide, running from north to south along the Cordillera Real (Royal Range) of the Andes (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). The only metal ore found in large quantities outside the belt is iron at Mutún on the Brazilian border in the Department of Santa Cruz. This deposit is believed to represent 40 to 45 million tons of ore with 50 to 60 percent iron content (see fig. 8).

A geological survey planned for 5 years was initiated in 1961 with financial assistance from the United Nations. So far, only regional and partial geological surveys have been made; hence, the exact potential of the mineral wealth is not known. According to an extensive report prepared by the engineering firm of Ford, Bacon and Davis Incorporated of New York in 1956, a number of known mineral resources have promising potential, and encouraging signs point to the discovery of new ore concentrations. On the other hand, a condition of near exhaustion prevails in many existing mines, and a trend toward lower-grade ores has reduced output considerably during the past decade. Mining thus resembles agriculture, forestry and fishing in that potential resources are much larger than present output would indicate and could, if developed, easily supply an expanded processing industry (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The oil reserves of known fields, located broadly along the eastern edge of the mineral belt, are believed to be sizable. The potential of wells producing in 1960 has been estimated as about 350 million barrels. New wells, outside the belt and north of Santa Cruz, began to yield oil and large quantities of natural gas in 1962. Exploration by government agencies and foreign firms continues.

Industrial labor is plentiful, although mostly in the unskilled categories, and is concentrated in the urban centers of the highlands and valleys. Relief of urban unemployment through industrial expansion is a frequent recommendation of foreign experts and government planners. Vocational education and on-the-job training are needed to produce the skilled workers which are now either imported or trained abroad (see ch. 20, Labor Force).

The resource needed most for the maintenance and development of industry is capital. The oligarchy which controlled the economy before 1952 was able to obtain capital from the United States and several European and South American sources, but the expropriation of mines, transportation companies and land discouraged investors of foreign capital and left the country without a minimum of capital

resources. Decline in mineral output has aggravated the financial situation and forced the government to liberalize some measures of nationalization and government control—first in the oil industry and later in transportation and mining. Mining and manufacturing still have virtually no access to normal credit for working capital purposes, and although foreign lending agencies have been making a few direct loans to large enterprises and an industrial credit program has been in operation with the assistance of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) since 1958, these funds only helped to keep enterprises from closing down rather than aiding development (see ch. 24, Financial System).

FUEL AND ENERGY

Wood abounds in the eastern lowlands, but because of the long distance from densely populated areas and because of the high cost of transportation per unit, it has little practical value for industrial or household use. Fuel consumption of the rural household in the highlands is still restricted to llama dung (*taquia*) and to some resineus plants, such as *yareta* which burns like peat, *tola* which grows even at an altitude of 14,000 to 15,000 feet, and other plants which provide fuel comparable to charcoal.

Discovery of oil, which has already transformed Bolivia from an oil-importing to an oil-exporting country, may have a profound impact on the energy production and consumption of the country. As yet only a small proportion of the current production is used for industrial fuel, as distinguished from automotive and other uses.

No coal is known to exist in the country. Utilization of solar energy seems impractical at the present level of technical development, but the neglect of windmills as a means of generating power on the ever-breezy highlands in surprising. Only in the Santa Cruz development area of the lowlands were windmill generators observed in 1962. Although no construction of atomic reactors is planned for the foreseeable future, the establishment of an atomic energy commission to study the possibilities of future development has been under consideration for some time.

The country's greatest energy potential lies in its waters. The rivers on the eastern slope of the Andes have an energy potential variously estimated by West German experts to be 6 million kilowatts and by United States geologists to be 21 million kilowatts. The sum of the capacities of established plants plus that of plants which could be established on known sites within the near future represents a more realistic potential estimated at 2.7 million kilowatts, of which only 3.2 percent is utilized at present.

Electricity

In spite of great potential in hydraulic resources, the country has a chronic shortage of delivered energy and the lowest per capita consumption of electricity on the continent. The total installed electric energy capacity was 137,000 kilowatts in 1960 of which 68 percent was produced by hydroelectric plants, 29 percent by diesel motors and the remainder by steam plants. The total consumption was 456 million kilowatt-hours in 1959, which theoretically amounts to 120 kilowatt-hours per person, as compared to 600 kilowatt-hours in Peru and Chile or 4,000 kilowatt-hours in the United States.

Electric current is rarely found in rural areas. The urban centers are variously served: La Paz and Oruro are supplied by the Canadian-owned Bolivian Power Company Limited; Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Tarija own municipal power companies; and Sucre and Potosí are supplied by small private companies, as are mines and industrial plants. The current produced is of alternating type, 50 cycles, and of 127, 220 or 230 voltage.

The Bolivian Power Company represents an investment of some $25 million and produces about 50 percent of the total output in electricity. It is a well-managed company and has expanded continuously to serve its area adequately. In areas not served by the company, the shortage of electricity is critical and during periods of excessively dry weather requires rationing for household consumption and reduction of industrial activities. Shortage of energy is particularly apparent in the Cochabamba Valley where the relatively uneconomical diesel plants are unable to meet present demands, much less provide for industrial expansion.

Plans to eliminate the shortage and to add a capacity of some 1.7 million kilowatts to the present potential are included in the government's 10-year economic development program. A small plant, projected to have a capacity of 1,200 kilowatts, is under construction at Laramcota, near La Paz, designed to supply electric power to the Colquiri mines of the Bolivian Mining Corporation. Among other projects planned, first priority is assigned to a hydroelectric plant with a capacity of 16,000 kilowatts at Corani, some 40 miles east of Cochabamba. When completed it could replace the present thermal plants of the city and those of the government-owned oil refinery; it could also transmit power to the Oruro mining area and still have some surplus available for industrial expansion. Other plans of high priority include a 22,000-kilowatt plant on th Zongo River in the Yungas; a 6,200-kilowatt plant on the Miguilla River; an 18,000-kilowatt plant on the Alto Pilcomayo River; a 9,000-kilowatt plant on the Visicia River; a 5,000-kilowatt plant on the Yapacani River; and a 90,000-kilowatt plant on the Río Grande in the Department of Santa Cruz. To provide adequate electricity for industrialization

and population expansion in the La Paz area, large-scale plans for the utilization of Lake Titicaca and the Beni River system have been given consideration, although the prohibitive cost of construction keeps the planning suspended. The projects at Corani, Carabuco, Chururaqui and Bala are under study; the other projects are as yet only intentions on which no preliminary work has been done.

The Bala project would have the most immediate and profound effect on the industry of La Paz. Planned to create a lake through building dams in the area where the Beni River leaves the slopes of the Andes, it would become a multipurpose enterprise which could supply electricity to mining and manufacturing industries of the region, make the Beni River system accessible for transportation between the highlands and the agricultural regions of the valleys and lowlands, and also assist the woodworking industry in transporting raw material from the lowlands to the cities.

MINING

Mining has been the leading industry of the country since early colonial days. Metallic minerals which have accounted for all or nearly all exports throughout the centuries, in 1960 produced $60 million or 10.8 percent of the gross national product and 88 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings and employed some 60,000 persons or about 4 percent of the economically active population. Because in Bolivian publications the term "mines" designates a wide spectrum of enterprises ranging from mines as conceived in the United States to mere prospecting ventures, it is impossible to establish their exact number. According to a survey made by Ford, Bacon and Davis Incorporated, the industry in 1955 had a gross value of about $73.2 million, 75 percent of which was in the 24 government-owned mines with the remainder distributed among 1,635 private mines, of which many were only "development prospects." Influence of the mining industry in the overall national economy is shown by its consumption of 40 percent of the electric energy, its use of 22 percent of the country's rail transport, its purchase of about 15 percent of the marketed food and its use of a considerable portion of the available domestic timber products.

Tin replaced silver as the leading export mineral at the turn of the century. As tin ores become unecomically low in grade, efforts are being made to diversify mining and replace tin by a more intensive mining of copper, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten and gold, the mining of which has already reached significant proportions. Prospects for increased copper and gold mining are reportedly good (see table 5). Lack of transportation facilities and of an adequate domestic market makes the mining of nonmetallic minerals uneconomical

Table 5. Mineral Exports of Bolivia, 1952 and 1960

Mineral	Volume (in metric tons)		Value (in millions of dollars)	
	1952	1960	1952	1960
Tin	32,472	19,715	84	42.9
Silver	220	152	6	4.5
Lead	30,013	21,419	11	4.8
Zinc	35,619	4,027	13	1.2
Copper	4,703	2,271	3	1.5
Tungsten	2,224	1,291	14	1.5
Bismuth	16	.....	.06	
Antimony	9,806	5,309	4	1.4
Gold	2.8	1	.30	1.6
Sulfur	5,585	.....	.50	
Others	.....	1,376	.....	.6
Total	.....	.....	*136.0	60.0

*Column does not total because of rounding.

Sources. Adapted from Banco Central de Bolivia, *Memoria Annual, 1960*, pp. 47, 48, and Ford, Bacon and Davis Incorporated, *Report, Mining Industry of Bolivia*, 1956, Vol. 2, Exhibit No 2.

at present; nevertheless, deposits of salts, soda and sulfur have been worked to a limited extent.

Mining faces several disadvantages in Bolivia. While the countries of Southeast Asia and South Africa, competing in tin production, obtain most of their ores from placer mines in the proximity of international waterways, Bolivia derives only a small amount of its ore from near the surface, the bulk being mined from veins and lodes located deep underground at altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 17,000 feet above sea level and separated from the seacoast by formidable topographic barriers. A further handicap of the industry is the gradually decreasing metal content and quality of ores. In several of the large- and medium-sized mines, for example, the metal content decreased about 4 percent each year during the 1950's. The ore of placer mines is purer, but their share in the total output is small. Large mines make intensive efforts to improve the concentration process to reduce production costs.

No large-capacity tin smelter exists in Bolivia. A tin smelter suitable for handling large quantities of low-grade ores would greatly enhance the country's position on the world market through savings on freight and handling and through increased independence from foreign smelters. By 1962, however, no sound plan for a technically and economically feasible smelter had been presented.

It has been customary, especially on the part of some Bolivian economists, to blame decline in output and income from mining on the world prices of minerals, but a comparison of mineral output in Bolivia and neighboring Peru seems to disprove this theory and to

indicate that the root of the troubles must be domestic. Between 1950 and 1954, for example, the output in copper, lead and silver decreased 22.1, 41.6 and 23.2 percent, respectively, in Bolivia, while the output of the same minerals has increased by 37.8, 77.7 and 51.2 percent, respectively, in Peru.

Historical Development

The history of mining goes back to the sixteenth century when large deposits of silver were discovered at Cerro Rico in Potosí, enabling Bolivia to become the leading silver producing country of the world, and Potosí to become the largest city on the continent with a population said to be 160,000 in 1611. As silver mines became exhausted and adverse factors affecting the price of silver on the world market reduced silver production in the nineteenth century, the previously disregarded tailings of the silver mines were found to be rich in tin, which was first mined in 1850 at Caracoles. By the end of the century tin replaced silver as the principal export mineral. In most years since 1906, Bolivia has been the world's second largest tin producer.

Before 1952 the three largest mines, representing about 67 percent of the entire mining industry, were controlled by the Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo families, popularly referred to as the "tin barons," who by transferring their profits abroad built immense fortunes and played a decisive role in the course of the country's political and economical development. Part of the management and almost the entire engineering staff were composed of foreigners. The workers were mostly Aymara Indians who performed their labor under extremely unfavorable working conditions. Over 30 percent of the workers suffered from silicosis, and a long series of strikes and unrest expressing dissatisfaction were put down by force, frequently with the assistance of the armed forces.

Divesting the "tin barons" of their power, although not at the price of nationalization of the mines, had become a topic of discussion and exploration as early as 1928. In 1940 the Leftist Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario—PIR) adopted nationalization of the mines as part of its platform, and in 1949 a bill to this effect was drafted, though not submitted. After the successful revolution of April 1952, events followed in rapid succession. In May the new government appointed a commission to study the mining problem; on October 2 the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL) was created, and on October 7 the nationalization of the mines became a law. On October 31, 1952, the "Act of Bolivia's Economic Independence" was signed and promulgated by President Paz Estenssoro at Camp de María Barzola at Catavi, and the three largest mining enterprises—the Patiño Mines and Enterprises Consolidated Incorporated, the Mauricio Hochschild,

S.A. Minera Industrial and the Compañía Aramayo de Mines en Bolivia—together with 11 smaller companies were put directly under government management exercised through COMIBOL.

The remaining private mines fell under government control somewhat more indirectly through taxation, through decrees securing social benefits for the workers and through the authority given to the Mining Bank of Bolivia (Banco Minero de Bolivia) which obtained a monopoly in the export of minerals and import of mining equipment and supplies.

The consequences of nationalization, aggravated by a decline of mineral prices, were disastrous to the mining industry and to the national economy, but miners and their families gained definite benefits which were viewed more as compensation for past deprivations than as fair wages for work performed. The new management was rejected by some 170 out of the 200 foreign mining engineers who, together with almost all managers, resigned their jobs and left the country, leaving the operation of the mines in the hands of a few Bolivian engineers and a large number of unskilled labor leaders. Party leaders and labor groups not acquainted with management problems used their newly gained influence and power to grant personal favors to their constitutents rather than to operate the mines more economically. The labor force rose from 26,000 in 1952 to 40,000 in 1954 at a time when mines had to be deactivated or kept in operation at a loss.

The combined effect of social and political pressures expressed itself in the excessive increase in production costs per worker, from $3.64 in 1950 to $10 in 1953. The average mine worker earned nearly as much as a Cabinet member of the new government but produced only about one-tenth as much as a United States miner in a comparable position. Consequently, the production cost of tin rose to $1.50 per pound when the world market prices were under $1 (96¢ in 1953, 92¢ in 1954 and 95¢ in 1955).

The government, which hoped to use the income of the nationalized mining industry to pay for economic development programs, found itself operating the mines at a loss. Before nationalization, taxes on mineral exports provided over 50 percent of the total government revenue; by 1955 the figure had dropped to only 4.3 percent, a condition which bore major responsibility for the inflation of the 1950's (see ch. 24, Financial System).

With the dwindling value of the boliviano the government's income from mining deteriorated further, and compensation of former owners diminished accordingly. It was the MNR government's intention as stated explicitly in the nationalization decree, to pay 3 percent interest on confiscated property from the day of expropriation until final settlement was reached, and to deposit at the Central Bank 2 percent

of the value of all exported minerals as a fund from which to make payments. No final agreement was reached between the government and the three major former owners as to the amount of indemnity to be paid and on what terms, but the government at least began to make annual payments. By the end of 1960 owners had received $18 million, of which a little over $8 million was paid to the Patiño group

The Public Sector

COMIBOL, entrusted with the control and operation of the nationalized mines and related properties, had 163 properties under its jurisdiction and employed approximately 28,000 persons in 1961. Assets included about 100 mines, of which about one-fourth were operated by COMIBOL, one-fourth were leased to subsidiaries and the remainder were inactive. Other assets were railroad lines, laboratories and a score of undeveloped sites.

In 1955, COMIBOL mines produced over 90 percent of the output of zinc, copper and silver, over 80 percent of tin and bismuth, over 50 percent of tungsten, 41 percent of lead, but only 1.3 percent of antimony and 0.5 percent of gold. The bulk of the output comes from a few large mines. Catavi, Huanuni and Colquiri account for about 75 percent of the tin output; the Quechisla group for about 16 percent and the remaining mines for about 9 percent (see table 6).

The basic problems of the public sector are a decreasing volume of output and high production costs. COMIBOL tin production declined from an annual average of 33,000 tons in the early 1950's to 15,000 tons in 1961, while the cost of production was continuously more than the sales price of concentrates. Rising tin prices in 1961 and a minor adjustment in operation of the mines narrowed the gap of loss somewhat, but production cost still varied between $1.27 and $1.42 in 1961 when the price of tin on the world market was $0.17. Consequently, COMIBOL has been losing some $8 million per year, not considering accumulated losses of previous years, depreciation, royalties and such debts as freight, and purchase of equipment and material. Contributing to the decrease in income were the termination of a contract signed with the United States at the time of the Korean war for the sale of tungsten at inflated prices and the dumping of tin reserves on the world market by the Soviet Union in 1958.

Some of the reasons for the decline in production are inherent in the structure of the organization. COMIBOL operates under a board of directors who are concerned with policy, and a general manager (appointed by the President of the Republic) who at least nominally is in charge of technical operations. The actual control, however, rests in the hands of labor unions, the *control obrero* (workers control delegate) and the *comandos* of the MNR, who interfere with and frequently initiate personnel and technical management decisions on

Table 6. Data on Principal COMIBOL Mines in Bolivia, 1960

Name	Mineral	Output (in tons)	Percent of COMIBOL output	Grade (in percent)	Labor force	Cost per pound (in dollars)	Size of reserve (in millions of tons)	Remarks
Catavi	Tin	5, 280	33. 2	0. 84	7, 800	1. 42	17	
Huanuni	Tin	2, 480	17. 7	2. 07	3, 700	1. 27	1. 2	Underground work is subcontracted.
Colquiri	Tin	3, 500	24. 0	1. 20	3, 700	1. 28	1	Reserve may be higher.
Quechisla group	Tin, lead, silver, bismuth.	(*)	16. 0	(*)	3, 500	(*)	0	May be closed by end of 1962.

*Not available.

all levels with the backing of their membership and with the support of high government officials with whom they have contact through party affiliation (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Decisions are frequently guided by political rather than technical or economic considerations, with the result that labor discipline has deteriorated. Absenteeism is extensive; stealing of both minerals and equipment is prevalent; dismissals and other disciplinary actions need the consent—seldom granted—of the unions; and meetings in which various labor organizations discuss issues frequently interrupt work (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Mining operations, some in part and others wholly, are considered "social," meaning that they are not maintained for profit but only to grant social benefits in the form of wages and privileges to a group of idle persons. Even in producing mines management is forced to keep a large number of unskilled persons on the payroll without economic or technical justification, while competent miners are in demand. In 1955, for example, the number of totally disabled persons on the payroll of COMIBOL was 1,600 or 5 percent of the total labor force. The surplus of labor was estimated as between 4,500 to 7,500 persons in 1961.

Other difficulties include inconsistencies in policies and shortcomings of administration. Local managers have to obtain the approval of the head office on practically everything they do, while officials in La Paz procrastinate for fear of political repercussions.

Lack of coordination between various government agencies, such as the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank adds to the confusion. The United States economist Cornelius H. Zondag observed in 1954 that COMIBOL had a number of essential shipments at the Chilean port of Antofagasta, including several hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment which could not be moved for months because the Central Bank did not make the necessary foreign exchange available. The shortage in material and equipment, long neglected even before nationalization, has reached critical dimensions. Lack of maintenance and equipment has resulted in the deterioration of mining and transportation facilities, seriously affecting production. Zondag observed also that a serious shortage of shovels was apparent in nearly all mines, and managers frequently had to procure secondhand shovels in the black market to enable miners to work.

Problems of management are aggravated by the declining reserves of metal ores in the mines of COMIBOL. According to Ford, Bacon and Davis, only five of the large mines—Catavi, Colquiri, Huanuni, Animas and Matilde—have development potential while the remaining mines lack the possibilities for extended extraction. Several mines have closed down because of lack of reserves since the report was writ-

ten in 1956, and except for the Santa Fe mine near Colquiri, no new mines have been opened in the last 20 years.

The Agency for International Development (AID) of the United States Government extended a contract to Ford, Bacon and Davis to prepare an extensive survey and make recommendations for the rehabilitation of the mining industry. The report, submitted to the Bolivian Government in 1956, had little immediate effect because of continuous political difficulties in the government's mining sector. In 1961 formal rehabilitation of the public sector of mining was agreed upon through the Triangular Plan (Operación Triangular) which involves the cooperation and assistance of the West German Government through its Development Institute (Kredtitanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the Inter-American Development Bank and the USOM, providing a total of $10 million in 1962. This was in addition to $3 million secured for social overhead expenditures from the Argentinian and United States Governments. The plan for rehabilitation foresees a total investment of $38 million over a 3 year period, at the end of which modernized machinery, reduced labor force and restored efficiency of operation should enable COMIBOL to operate without subsidy. Higher metal prices on the world market since 1960 have also contributed to the improvement of financial conditions to some extent.

To reduce its deficit COMIBOL also made attempts to offer mines of low output for lease to private corporations. A significant offer was that of the Matilde mines, which, according to COMIBOL, contain a reserve of 3 million tons of ore containing 18 percent zinc and 2 percent lead. The mine has been offered on a 30-year lease during which the user would be required to build a concentrating plant, an electric generator plant, a smelter and a refinery, all of which would revert to COMIBOL without compensation at the end of the lease period. In addition, the government requests royalties amounting to 4 percent of all gross sales, minus smelting and concentrating expenses, and 3 to 15 percent for COMIBOL. As of mid-1962 no offers had been received.

The Private Sector

Some 20 medium-sized and 1,500 to 2,000 small privately owned mines employed about 30,000 persons and produced 52 percent of the volume and 38 percent of the value of the national mineral output in 1960. Classification of mines is based on the volume of annual output. Medium-sized mines range from those producing 400 tons of fine metal in concentrate to some producing only 60 tons. Small mines include a large number of outcrop operations worked intermittently by farming families during off-season periods. Most of the mines—perhaps as many as 50 to 60 percent of the total—are unable to employ

well-trained technical personnel, have a very small working force, employ crude techniques and consequently have a small output. The large number of small operations is attributed to the accessibility of minerals in various areas of the Andes, where even a little investment and primitive tools can produce some metallic minerals.

The composition of the sector shows that about 32 percent of all private mines produce lead; 24 percent, tin; 16 percent, tungsten; 4 percent, antimony; and the remainder, various other metals. Burdened with decreasing grades of ores, labor problems, transportation difficulties and many other problems similar to those plaguing the public sector, private mines could not escape a depression between 1952 and 1956. The monetary stabilization of 1956 brought some relief, but the sector remains rather weak and brings only marginal profits to owners.

The Mining Bank of Bolivia, an autonomous government agency, founded in 1936 to assist the small independent miners in the marketing of minerals through purchase and resale, became an overwhelmingly bureaucratic institution. Even before 1952 it obtained complete control of all mineral exports, except of those of the big three. On June 2, 1952, a government decree empowered the Bank to set purchase prices of the private sector in local currency and resale prices in dollars. The same decree compelled all private miners to import their supplies through the Bank. These measures, coupled with a drop in international mineral prices and restrictive marketing quotas of tin, retarded development and forced many private miners out of business. Others barely met their expenses. In 1955, for example, the government withheld directly and indirectly 40 percent of the gross sales, a move which reduced profits to nil.

The Bank also collects a royalty tax on mineral exports, conducts a subsidiary program for lead, tungsten and copper, grants credit, operates warehouses selling mining equipment, and maintains laboratories, a museum and other services related to mining (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Liberalization of government controls began in 1956 and received further impetus in succeeding years. Still, in 1962 all small private miners, cooperatives and miners operating on government concessions must sell their products through the Bank, while medium-sized private mines possess a choice between selling their products directly or through the Bank. About half of all medium-sized mine owners make use of the services offered by the Bank. Further reduction of the monopoly may be considered by the Bank, although expenses connected with the operation of the subsidiary system militate against changes which would reduce Bank income.

Smelting

No major smelting facilities exist in the country. Great Britain has been the principal purchaser of ores, except for the period from 1942 to 1956 when the United States surpassed it. Wartime shipping hazards prompted the building of a smelter with a capacity of 90,000 metric tons at Longhorn, Texas. It was, however, closed down in 1956. The erection of a smelter in Bolivia would greatly strengthen the industry's position in the world market, but various studies made on the feasibility of a modern tin smelter resulted in negative recommendations. Gradual depletion of the mines, deterioration of the grade of ores and lack of investment capital all indicated that a smelter, even if applying the best technology, would not be economical. However, if experiments in progress in the Netherlands should produce a new and less expensive method for smelting low-grade ores, COMIBOL and Billiton Maatschappij of Holland plan to establish such a smelter with a capacity of about 20,000 tons of concentrates per year. The government accepted an offer made by Czechoslovakia in 1962 to build an antimony smelter at Oruro at a cost of $1.6 million. Credit to the same amount has been extended to Bolivia by the Czechoslovakian Government for a period of 8 years.

At Oruro, METABOL owns and operates a lead smelter with a capacity of 500 tons per month. A small tin smelter, the Peró smelter near Oruro, has a producing capacity of 100 tons of high-grade tin, 250 tons of lead and 360 pounds of silver per month. The Bernal Brothers operate a small lead smelter at Tupiza, and a small experimental smelter exists in La Paz.

OIL

Bolivians attach great hopes to the oil reserves of their country. They believe that adequate investment could raise oil output within the next 6 to 10 years to a level where it would become the major export commodity, bringing as much as $40 million to $50 million in foreign exchange per year and thereby compensating for the losses suffered through the declining income of the mining industry (see table 7).

Development Before 1952

Since early colonial days oil has been known to exist in the country, but exploration began only in the twentieth century. In 1916 after 7.5 million acres had already been granted to companies engaged in exploration, good prospects of finding oil led the government to pass a law nationalizing oil exploitation. The law was repealed, however in 1920, to encourage foreign investment, and actual production began in 1922 when the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey acquired a concession previously held by Richmond Levering and Company.

Table 7. The Petroleum Industry in Bolivia, 1940, 1950 and 1960

	1940	1950	1960
Crude oil output [1]	288, 768	616, 225	3, 110, 436
Crude oil refined [1]	279, 024	621, 427	2, 261, 066
Gasoline output [1]	124, 183	328, 866	903, 131
Aviation gas output [1]	0	427	31
Kerosene output [1]	10, 177	72, 247	400, 138
Diesel oil output [1]	9, 253	43, 087	344, 283
Fuel oil output [1]	131, 826	167, 018	541, 871
Export of oil and products [1]	0	39, 411	1, 137, 458
Import of oil and products [1]	320, 562	447, 855	(3)
Pipelines, length in miles		371	1, 144
Wells, number producing		[2] 7	43

[1] In barrels.
[2] 1952.
[3] Not available.

Sources. Adapted from Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, *Bolivia; 10 Años de Revolución*, pp. 117-130, Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planeamiento, *Planeamiento*, pp. 181-188, and Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Estadística, *Comercio Exterio, Annuario 1940*, p. 4.

Operations centered in the Camiri region, Chuquisaca, and at Sanandita, Tarija. In 1937 the government declared the entire country a national reserve, expropriated the Standard Oil Company and its Bolivian subsidiary, and vested exclusive exploratory and exploitation rights in a newly established government company, the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB). The Standard Oil Company appealed to the Supreme Court, but lost. Five years later, in 1942, the Company reached an agreement with the Bolivian Government and handed over its maps of exploration to YPFB. In the same year the Export-Import Bank of Washington granted a $3.5 million loan to YPFB for modernization of equipment and construction of pipelines. In 1947 an additional loan of $8.5 million was granted for the construction of two small refineries at Cochabamba and Sucre, the terminal points of the pipelines. Expansion was gradual. Only some 50 wells were drilled between 1937 and 1952, and production rose from 290,000 barrels in 1940 to some 600,000 barrels in the early 1950's.

After the Revolution

The MNR government devoted itself to the development of the petroleum industry with great vigor. Exchange and tax privileges, investments of some $140 million, reorganization of YPFB with the addition of a geological department, drilling of over 200 wells and discovery of the Sararenda field in the Camiri region resulted in a 500 percent increase in output, with a peak production of 3.6 million

barrels of crude oil in 1957. This volume was sufficient to meet domestic demand and have a surplus averaging about 1,000 barrels a day. The Camiri wells proved to be less productive than expected, and the output began to decline. By 1961 the import of a small amount of crude oil from Argentina again became necessary.

Realizing that domestic resources were not sufficient to continue an aggressive expansion program, the government, with the assistance of United States advisers, in 1955, designed a Petroleum Code which contained liberal provisions for private investors and induced some 14 foreign companies to invest about $90 million in exploration on land concessions totaling about 13.6 million acres. Three companies operate in contract with YPFB, and several United States geophysical companies have signed contracts with YPFB and other exploring companies. Several of the foreign companies withdrew after the termination of the initial exploratory concession, but others began drilling, and some were successful. The Bolivian Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation of Pittsburgh, had 11 of its 49 wells producing in 1962, and at its Caranda oil field, northwest of Santa Cruz, produced sufficient crude oil to offset the national need for import. Oil from Caranda is transported by truck to the YPFB pipeline terminal at Santa Cruz where YPFB plans to build a small refinery. A considerable amount of natural gas is also available at Caranda, which could be used in industry and also sold to Brazil.

Other companies which began drilling include the Chaco Petroleum Company—a subsidiary of Tennessee Gas Transmission Corporation of Texas, with participation of the Monsanto Chemical Company and the Murphy Corporation of Arkansas—and the Bolivian Oil Company S.A., a subsidiary of Fish Engineering Corporation of Texas, with investments of the North American Utility and Construction International Company of New York and the Petroleum Machinery and Services Company of Texas. Companies active in exploration include: Compañía Petrolera Boliviana Shell (Shell Oil Company); Bolivia California Petroleum Company (Standard Oil of California); Andes Oil Company (Pure Oil and Hancock Oil, California); Atlantic Refining Company (Pennsylvania); Big Chief Drilling Company (Oklahoma); Bolivian American Oil Company (Consolidated Cuban Petroleum of New York); Bolivian Petroleum Corporation (Delaware); Bolivian Sun Oil Company (Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania); Cataract Mining Corporation (New York); Delta Western Exploration Company Incorporated (Mississippi); Geophysical Service Incorporated (Texas); Kerr McGee, Limited (Oklahoma); Namco International Incorporated (Texas); Nance Incorporated (Texas); White Eagle International Oil Company (White Eagle Oil Company, Oklahoma; and Western Hemisphere Petroleum Corporation (Oklahoma).

Although the Petroleum Code permits participation of private capital in petroleum activities through concessions granted by the government, it maintains explicitly the domain of the nation over hydrocarbon deposits and reserves the right of exploration, exploitation, refinery, manufacture and transport of these products. According to Robert J. Alexander, who interviewed Jorge Fernández Solís, a member of the law firm which drew up the Code, it was the implicit intention of the government to provide an equal share in the profits of oil corporations to the state and to the investor. The Code secured the control of YPFB over regions where it already had operations and in areas best known from a geological point of view. The rest of the country has been divided into five zones which determine the maximum size and duration of the concessions, the amount of tax and guaranty deposits and the required reinvestment of profits.

The urgent need for development capital led the Bolivian Government to accept some limitations in the free utilization of oil resources. In return for assistance extended to the construction of the Santa Cruz-Corumba railroad line, for example, Brazil was granted partnership in exploitation of the zone traversed by the line. Repayment of the loan was also guaranteed in gold, sterling or oil products. A similar clause was included in the contract with Argentina in regard to the financing of the Santa Cruz-Yacuiba railroad line and the Oran (Argentina)-Tarija-Potosí highway (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

The granting of oil concessions to foreign companies and governments has been sharply criticized by left-wing politicians, including some extremists of the MNR, who charge that the government yielded to pressures of foreign capital, especially that of the United States, and has betrayed the ideals of the 1952 revolution.

Transportation and Storage

Transportation of crude oil and oil products, a major problem under the existing topographical conditions, has been solved through the construction of an extensive pipeline system. Although all principal production and consumption centers are connected by pipes, this is augmented by some 160 railroad tank cars and a fleet of trucks. The main network of pipes, 6⅝ inches in diameter, connects the Camiri oilfield with the refineries at Cochabamba and Sucre, with the consumption centers of La Paz and Oruro and with the border town of Yacuiba where it connects with the Argentine pipeline system. The line between Camiri and Yacuiba connects at Palmar with a branch line leading to the oil fields at Bermejo. A 4½-inch line runs from Camiri to Santa Cruz, and a 10¾-inch pipeline connects Sica Sica, located along the main line halfway between Oruro and La Paz, with the port of Arica in Chile. The length of the entire network was 1,144

miles in mid-1962. There are plans to connect the new oil field at Caranda with Santa Cruz, and consideration is being given to the construction of lines to Brazil, Paraguay and Peru.

Storage tanks with a total capacity of 5.3 million gallons are available in the large cities, notably in La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz and Tarija. A plant manufacturing about 7,000 oil drums per day is located in Cochabamba.

Refining

YPFB operates refineries at Cochabamba, Camiri and Sucre and two topping plants for local consumption at Sanandita and Bermejo with a total capacity about 30 percent higher than the country's overall crude oil production in 1960. All plants work below capacity. The Cochabamba plant, the largest of all with a daily capacity of 5,850 barrels, was built in 1950 and operated relatively near capacity, 328 days in 1959, but the Camiri plant, built in 1939 with a capacity of 1,326 barrels per day, worked only 310 days, and two plants at Sucre with a combined capacity of about 4,300 barrels worked only 243 days. Because of the uneconomical operation of the two Sucre plants, it has been planned for some years to transfer the larger plant to Santa Cruz. Sucre authorities opposed the move on the basis that the low consumption of oil in the Santa Cruz area does not justify the move. New discoveries of oil in the Caranda area, however, will give the transfer plans renewed impetus in the foreseeable future.

Bolivia has a plant for the production of lubricants, LUBOL, built between 1955 and 1959, but still inoperative on a commercial basis in mid-1962. The plant, financed by the Tidewater Oil Company and Palacios & Compañía, is located at Cochabamba and should be able to supply the country's total demand of lubricants and waxes.

MANUFACTURING

The manufacturing industry, including registered and unregistered enterprises and urban artisans, contributed 11.6 percent to the gross national product in 1960, and employed about 125,000 persons. No heavy industry exists, and individual plants are very small in size. Even the 900 enterprises listed by the National Chamber of Industries in 1960, represented only 15,350 workers and a capital investment of about $130 million. Little is known of industries not accounted for by the National Chamber of Industries and of the estimated 5,000 to 10,000 artisans spread fairly evenly over the entire country.

No industrial census exists, but a survey prepared by the United Nations in 1954 gives some indication of the potential and geographical distribution of the various branches of registered industries. The heaviest concentration of industries is in the Department of La Paz, where almost two-thirds of all industrial production originates; the

Department of Cochabamba, where about one-sixth of all industries and the heaviest concentration of the leather industry are located, ranks second; and the Department of Santa Cruz ranks third with about one-tenth of the industry located in its territory (see table 8). Non-registered industries have a more even distribution with little or no concentration of any particular branch in any specific area.

Table 8. Distribution of Manufacturing in Bolivia, by Departments, 1954

(In percent of Bolivian total)

Industry	Chuquisaca	La Paz	Oruro	Potosí	Cochabamba	Santa Cruz	Others
Foodstuffs	2.3	55.0	21.4	0.3	16.3	4.6	0.1
Beverages	5.4	47.0	9.2	2.5	11.6	23.2	1.1
Tobacco	29.1	70.8	.1	------	------	------	------
Textiles and clothing	1.3	84.9	4.9	------	8.8	------	.1
Leather	------	19.5	10.9	------	65.4	3.8	.4
Wood and furniture	------	50.1	.3	------	44.5	5.1	------
Paper and paper products	------	92.1	4.5	------	3.4	------	------
Rubber	------	96.8	------	------	3.2	------	------
Chemicals	.7	75.1	10.1	.9	5.2	4.0	4.0
Cement and related products	.1	93.4	.2	------	5.4	.8	.1
Metallurgy	------	79.2	4.7	------	16.0	.1	------
Others	------	92.5	------	------	7.5	------	------
All Bolivia (100%)	3.1	65.4	9.9	.4	16.1	4.6	.5

Source: Adapted from United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, *Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico, IV, El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia*, p. 130.

The manufacturing industry is fairly well diversified, but it is designed to serve an extremely small domestic market consisting of not more than 500,000 to 600,000 customers centered in urban and mining communities. The market has been further reduced through a large volume of illegally imported commodities, especially textiles and tobacco goods, which are sold below the prices of domestic products. Reduction of contraband activities and a gradual incorporation of larger segments of the population into the market economy, which is hoped for as a consequence of socioeconomic changes now in progress, may require industry eventually to undergo structural changes and to expand. During the past decade, however, production has declined in every sector, and consequently the existing productive capacity of industry has been underused. In fact, most branches of industry operate only at a fraction of their capacity, and the volume of output reaches only one-third, in some instances one-fourth, of the production of 10 years ago.

In addition to excess productive capacity, industry has a vast potential in raw materials within the boundaries of the country, an experi-

enced management class and a large reserve of manpower. Counterbalancing these assets are scores of social, political and economic problems, which directly or indirectly bear the responsibility for the present low output and general underdeveloped state of industry.

The quality of labor is not markedly different from that of other Latin-American countries, but wages have been extremely low and so is production per worker. A report prepared in 1962 by the Continental Allied Company Incorporated of Washington, says, for example, that:

> . . . workers of the Said textile factory at La Paz, earning perhaps $40 a month, operate 5 looms apiece. Workers of U.S. textile factories, earning perhaps $300 a month, operate as many as 100 looms apiece. Thus, the "cheap labor" of Bolivia, paid disgracefully low wages, is actually twice as expensive (per loom-month) as the "high-cost" labor of the United States.

In the past, labor unions opposed an increase in output per worker because of fear of an increase in unemployment and an undue strain on the undernourished workers. Lately, however, some enterprises with alert management established incentive plans in cooperation with labor unions. The Said Textile Factory and the National Glass Factory, for example, introduced incentive plans based on piecework and raised their output by 10 percent. Recognition of the need for higher output is demonstrated by a joint memorandum of the Bolivian General Federation of Factory Workers, the La Paz Federation of Factory Workers and the National Chamber of Industries demanding government measures to assist rehabilitation of industry and recommending improved labor-management relations and better planning as means of promoting higher output (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

Other causes of low output include the inadequacies of equipment and machinery which are direct results of reduced investment, negligence in maintenance and lack of replacement of antiquated items. The consequent high costs and in extensive areas the absence of transportation facilities between production, processing and market centers—especially for industry that depends on agricultural raw materials—are largely responsible for the need to import almost half of the industrial raw materials and semifinished goods used by industry.

The shortages of electrical energy and skilled workers, especially mechanics and electricians, are aggravated by an unrealistically high social overhead which resulted from social legislation, unreasonable demands of pressure groups, individual absenteeism, alcoholism and general lack of labor discipline (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

One of the most severe problems of industry is lack of credit for both investment and working capital. Never adequately supplied with capital, industry suffered even more than other branches of the economy from a decreasing flow of capital after nationalization of the mines and expropriation of land. Government efforts to encourage investment during the inflationary period following the revolution of 1952 consisted mainly of foreign exchange rate privileges granted on the basis of the number of employees in an enterprise. As a result, factories inflated their labor forces to highly uneconomical dimensions and found it difficult or even impossible to rid themselves of excess labor when the stabilization of 1956 restored realistic exchange rates. In several cases the government identified itself with labor unions in preventing the discharge of excess labor. To ameliorate the industrialists' problems it preferred to grant loans to enterprises to keep them in operation and to compensate for losses suffered through excessive payrolls. According to the survey of the Continental Allied Company, the Central Bank alone made such loans for a total of $5 million.

A supervised industrial credit program applying United States funds was started in 1958. Loans to private enterprises numbered 92 at the end of 1961, and the average size of the loans was about $23,000. Principal recipients were sugar mills, textile plants, leather and shoe factories, lumber mills and Brazil nut processors. Loans are handled through commercial banks, the Central Bank and the Agrarian Bank (Banco Agrícola de Bolivia). No specialized bank served industry alone, but plans for the creation of an Industrial Bank were under consideration in mid-1962 (see ch. 24, Financial System). Some foreign lending agencies made loans directly to large enterprises, but in general, lack of credit continued to plague industry.

Industrial Branches

Food Processing

The agricultural character of the economy provides industry with a notable potential, although at present several branches suffer from shortages of raw materials and others from legal and illegal importation. Fruits and vegetables are processed, but the mediocre quality of raw materials, expensive containers (handmade from imported tin-plate), deficiencies in operation and relatively short seasons result in high production costs and make canned fruits and vegetables less and less competitive. Government statistics assert that 580,000 cans of fruits and vegetables are produced annually, but output has been decreasing in recent years, and some plants have had to close down because of the competition of foreign goods smuggled into the country.

The meat-packing and -canning industry seems to have a sufficient supply of domestic raw materials, but it is hampered by high transportation costs. Air transport and driving herds on the hoof, the predominant means of movement, are both expensive. Plants are moderately well equipped, but abattoirs lack modern management, and a general shortage of cold storage space is apparent.

Candy is produced from domestic sugar, salt and cacao, while other ingredients, such as fats, dyes and artificial flavors, are imported. Cocoa butter and good quality chocolate products are made from cacao beans obtained from the Beni region, sun-dried and shipped by air to La Paz. Brazil nuts are hand-cracked, dried and sorted on the home industry level, mostly in the Riberalta growing region.

Although a number of small-capacity flour mills are located in various parts of the country, practically no milling is done since the demand for wheat flour is supplied by imported flour. According to Bolivian Government statistics some 3,400 tons of wheat were milled in 1960, which was about one-fourth of that milled in 1950. The baking industry uses imported flour, shortening, milk products and yeast. Bread is baked in small bakeries equipped with adobe ovens. Spaghetti and macaroni, both growing in popularity, are prepared in small plants, using automatic and semiautomatic machinery; crackers are produced by only one enterprise.

Edible oil is made mainly of cottonseed in the only equipped and operating plant at Cochabamba. Another plant at Riberalta lacks equipment, which is reported to be available but still in crates, and had not begun operation by mid-1962. Plans to establish a plant in the Santa Cruz area, which would use soybeans produced by the Okinawa colony, is under consideration.

The government-owned milk-processing plant (Planta Industrializadora de Leche–PIL) at Quillacollo near Cochabamba—established with the assistance of the United Nations and funds obtained from the United States and the Bolivian Development Corporation— is the most modern industrial plant in the country. Foreign observers report that it is the only food-processing establishment with adequate sanitation facilities. It began operation in May 1960 with a processing capacity, not yet fully utilized, of 10,000 gallons of milk per day. According to Bolivian Government sources production in 1961 amounted to 358,000 gallons of pasteurized whole milk, 78 tons of butter and 139 tons of dry powdered skim milk. Manufacture of cheese is planned when a sufficient volume of milk becomes available. An increase in milk output depends mainly on better feeding practices and may improve when oil cakes and other supplementary feed become available. The milk collection system is well developed in the Cochabamba area with refrigerated depots along the routes.

The four sugar mills, all located in the sugarcane production center of Santa Cruz, produce an increasing share of the domestic sugar consumption. In 1961 their combined production reached 41,152 metric tons, or more than two-thirds of the domestic demand. In addition, the mills produce 1.4 million gallons of alcohol from the 216,000 tons of sugarcane used in the same year. Largest of the four plants is the government-owned Ingenio Azucarero de Guabirá, which was established in 1956 through investments by Fives-Lille of France and the United States and Bolivian Governments. The plant produced 18,700 metric tons or almost one-third of the domestic demand in 1961. The second largest plant is La Bélgica which increased its capacity during 1959 and 1960, enabling it to produce 17,400 metric tons of sugar in 1961. The San Aurelio mill with a production of 2,800 metric tons and La Esperanza mill with 2,300 metric tons produced in 1961 are in the process of improving their equipment with the help of United States funds. The rapid increase in sugarcane production and processing has reduced the need for import from $6.5 million in 1957 to $1.7 million in 1961, and forecasts total self-sufficiency in the near future (see table 9).

Beverages

Some 46 firms employing 2,000 to 2,500 workers produce an annual 5 to 6 million gallons of beer, over 1 million gallons of alcohol (mainly *aquardiente*, a brandy made from sugar) and about 1.5 million gallons of nonalcoholic beverages. Production of beverages is concentrated in La Paz, where almost half of the national output originates, but Santa Cruz and Cochabamba also rank high among production centers.

Brewing commenced in 1875 with the participation of German brewers and became a major industry after World War I. Largest breweries are the Cervercería Aguila Boliviana, S.A., the Cervercería Boliviana Nacional, S.A., both located in La Paz, and the Cervercería Tiquina, S.A. in Cochabamba. There is a small brewery at Sucre. Wine production, once adequate to meet domestic demand, has declined in the last decade, perhaps as a result of the agrarian reform.

While breweries depend heavily on imported barley, alcohol distilleries and plants making nonalcoholic beverages can obtain the bulk of their raw materials in the country. Fruits are available in sufficient quantities. For the production of carbonated drinks, synthetic flavors, colors and citric acid are imported. Franchised, well-equipped, large bottling companies import all supplies, including bottles, from abroad; smaller plants use bottles produced domestically.

Textiles and Clothing

Some 15 textile mills employing over 5,000 workers process enough domestic wool, cotton (mainly imported) and synthetic materials to

Table 9. *Demand for Marketed Manufactured Goods in Bolivia and Their Origin, 1954*

Industry	Total value (in dollars)	Source	
		Domestic production (in percent)	Imports (in percent)
Foodstuffs	34, 603	19. 0	81. 0
Beverages and tobacco	4, 689	99. 6	0. 4
Textiles	10, 484	50. 1	49. 9
Clothing	4, 666	99. 7	0. 3
Wood products	588	36. 4	63. 6
Furniture	189	75. 7	24. 3
Paper and pulp	1, 247	8. 6	91. 4
Printing and related products	744	73. 6	26. 4
Leather	771	93. 3	6. 7
Rubber	1, 557	5. 3	94. 7
Chemicals	10, 375	12. 3	87. 7
Cement and related products	1, 472	85. 1	14. 9
Machines and metalworking	29, 091	0. 2	99. 8
Scientific instruments	1, 298	0. 1	99. 9
Others	320	100. 0	0. 0
Total	102, 094	25. 2	74. 8

Source. Adapted from United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, *Análisis y Proyacciónes del Dasarollo Economico, IV, El Desarrollo Economico de Bolivia*, p. 118.

produce 1.5 to 2 million yards of woolen, 8 to 9 million yards of cotton and some rayon textiles. In the country there is a good supply of hard fibers available which may be used for the manufacturing of sacks—now imported—for the mining industries.

One of the largest and best-equipped textile plants with modern machinery is that of the Manufactura Textiles FORNO, S.A. at La Paz which produces woolen and worsted fabrics. Also well-equipped and well-managed is the large plant of the Compañía Algodonera Boliviana, S.A. at Santa Cruz, owned by the Said Brothers who grow part of their cotton on 3,259 acres and produce the bulk of the national cotton output.

The clothing industry is able to meet domestic demand and operates through a large number of small shops employing about 1,100 workers (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

Cement

Cement production began in 1925 when the W. Grace Company, with Bolivian and Peruvian capital participation, established the Fábrica Nacional de Cemento, S.A. with its first plant at Viacha, near La Paz. The plant employs some 300 workers and its equipment is in need of modernization. It produces cement and fiber cement using

domestic asbestos. Another plant was built with the assistance of the United States, MIAG (West Germany) and the Bolivian Development Corporation, at Sucre. It began operation in April 1960 with a capacity of 100 tons of cement per day, and plans for a considerable increase in capacity were approved early in 1962. The combined total output of the two plants amounted to 38,700 tons in 1960, only slightly more than the 38,000 tons produced by the Viacha plant alone in 1950.

Other Industries

The National Glass and Crystal Factory (Fábrica Nacional de Vidrios y Cristales) employs about 400 workers and produces bottles and drinking glasses from domestic raw material. Its antiquated machinery and production methods, as well as its financial insecurity, do not enable it to improve the quality of its products. In addition, some 100 workers on the payroll are idle. Hence, annual losses were as high as $400,000 before the fall of 1961 when new management was able to reduce the deficit by about 70 percent. No plate glass is produced in the country.

A match factory, the Fábrica Nacional de Fosforos at La Paz, began production in 1959 and has been able to meet domestic demand by using half of its capacity. The government, which owns 51 percent of the factory, hopes to find foreign markets for match exports in order to utilize the full capacity of the factory.

Some 30 small plants in La Paz, Oruro and Potosí with total employment of about 700 workers produce soap, candles, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and various other chemical products, mostly from imported raw materials. There are also two laboratories, one at La Paz and another at Reyes in Beni, which produce vaccine for livestock. A small plant, Fábrica de Acido Sulfúrico, (FAMAS at Caiconi near La Paz, financed by military retirement deposits, produces sulfuric acid for mining. A plant at Oruro, owned and operated by the South American Chemical Corporation, produces a sufficient amount of hydrochloric acid to meet the demand of the mining industry.

Fifteen establishments, with about 1,200 employees, manufacture about 1 million pairs of shoes per year. With a continuing expansion of the cash economy, there has been a notable increase in the use of industrially produced footwear.

About 30 small shops with 850 employees engage in tanning and leather processing, one of the oldest industries of the country. Raw material is abundant and of excellent quality, and part of the leather products are exported.

Philips South America, S.A., a subsidiary of the Dutch Philips Company, acquired and modernized an existing light bulb-producing plant in the mid-1950's. Its 1960 output was 358,400 light bulbs

(ranging in size from 25 to 200 watts) as compared with about 450,000 manufactured in 1955. Imported semifinished and raw materials were used.

Three factories employing about 130 workers produce good quality cigarettes from domestic and imported tobacco. The industry is one of the few branches which has increased its output slightly during the past 10 years from 1.4 million cartons in 1950 to 1.7 million cartons in 1960.

Many small lumber and woodworking shops scattered in urban areas and wood-producing regions employ about 900 workers and produce construction lumber, furniture and various other wood products. Two small rubber-processing plants are located in La Paz with a combined output of about 50 tons of boots, raincoats, hose, recapped tires, medical supplies, etc.

A plant in La Paz manufactures batteries for automobiles. The raw material used is of domestic origin, with the exception of imported battery cases. Metal shops and small plants—which mainly do repair work and produce agricultural tools, cheese presses and the like—employ about 700 workers.

Printing and paper products are offered by some 43 small shops located in the principal urban centers. La Papelera, S.A., founded in the early 1920's, manufactures cardboard, but all other paper, including newsprint, is imported. Plans to expand paper production with the use of domestic raw material obtainable near La Paz were under consideration in early 1962.

Artisan Activity

A large number of artisans, perhaps as many as 10,000 operate one-man shops, sometimes assisted by their family members. As a rule, only cabinetmakers have more elaborate shops and employ wage workers. Unlike other Latin American countries, where artisans are usually of European background, most Bolivian artisans are either Indians or *cholos*. Adequate skills, low overhead and direct sales to the customer enable them to be competitive, and although their tools and equipment are rudimentary, they seem to meet the domestic need for handicrafts.

Artisans are not organized and therefore acquire prestige as individuals and not as a group. Formal training for artisans is practically unknown, and skills are acquired in the family. Graduates of vocational schools who learn skills necessary in handicraft industries seldom venture into businesses of their own, but seek employment as wage earners in factories and large enterprises.

CHAPTER 20

LABOR FORCE

Of an estimated total population of 3.5 million, about 1.2 million persons are economically active, excluding family workers. Their irregular geographic distribution and the universal lack of skill among them represent formidable obstacles to the implementation of economic recovery plans. Most of the labor force is engaged in subsistence farming, service occupations or occasional work and contributes but little to the national product. Before the revolution of 1952 the performance of work in return for commodities of living had been widespread, particularly in agriculture and in service occupations. Since the ascent of the government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), cash wages have become the principal form of remuneration although the majority of agricultural workers has remained largely outside the monetary economy.

The concentration of a large portion of the economically active or potentially active persons on the Altiplano inhibits official efforts to increase agricultural production by exploiting the accessible fertile parts of the sparsely populated eastern lowlands. Government-sponsored projects to resettle Indians of the more densely populated highlands to the plains have been frustrated mainly by the latter's tenacious attachment to their inhospitable habitat. The nonagricultural sectors of the economy, on the other hand, cannot productively absorb the surplus workers in urban areas. Determined to ward off possible future political and economic crises which are bound to accompany general unemployment, the government has vetoed the dismissal of workers, except for cause. As a result of this measure, enterprises in the nonagricultural sector, particularly in mining and manufacturing, are heavily overstaffed. Many firms on the verge of bankruptcy must nevertheless pay wages and benefits for workers who are idle most of the time.

The lack of skilled workers has been responsible for extremely low levels of industrial productivity. Vocational training facilities are inadequate, but even the few existing ones fail to attract a sufficient number of applicants. Government-owned as well as private enterprises have continued to solicit the services of foreign technicians to

fill critical technical and managerial positions. However, because of the general political and economic instability in the country, the number of foreign technicians has tended to diminish in spite of relatively favorable rates of remuneration paid partly in United States dollars.

The revolution of 1952 brought no major changes in occupational trends, except for a growing interest in margiral commercial occupations, mainly in the cities. In the early 1960's large numbers of men, women and children derived their livelihood by peddling and black-marketing. To many urban workers, including white-collar employees as well as to rural workers living within commuting distances of the cities, these activities represent profitable secondary occupations, while their regular employment serves mainly to maintain their eligibility for medical and other social-serivce benefits (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

The MNR government, having come to power mainly through the support of labor, has proclaimed and attempted to implement a policy designed to improve substantially the economic and social conditions of rural and urban workers. The land reform of 1953 and the nationalization of mines and some other enterprises have been hailed by the government as a transfer of the national wealth to workers. Amendments to the Labor Code of 1939 and other laws enacted since 1952 established extensive cash and social benefits, payable mostly by employers. Because of nearly constant economic crises these obligations have often placed a grave burden on private employers, as well as on the government in its capacity of employer of workers in the nationalized enterprises. Organized labor, on the other hand, has insisted not only on the retention of these benefits but has agitated for their extension as well as for general wage raises (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization). The government has had to grant subsidies to many nearly bankrupt private enterprises to enable them to meet their payrolls, although at the same time the government has found itself in arrears on social security and other benefit payments.

In general, the proclaimed "emancipation" of workers has had a negative effect on working morale and productivity. The government's prolabor pronouncements and policies have been interpreted by workers as license for prolonged and unexcused absences and work stoppages. Labor leaders have not alerted workers to the need for skill and increased rates of output as prerequisites for better wages and improved living standards. To most workers, wage raises and benefits still symbolize victories over owner-exploiters rather than rewards for performance, even though such views appear paradoxical in the presence of a partly nationalized economy.

On the other hand, the depressed state of the economy has rendered many if not most of the newly gained benefits, cash allowances and wage increases illusory. Wages have low purchasing power, and social benefits (notably medical coverage) cannot be implemented because of the lack of facilities and trained personnel (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

The 1950 census, the last undertaken by the government, sets the proportion of economically active persons at 49.9 percent of the total population—an uncommonly high percentage if compared to 35 to 40 percent, a typical proportion in highly industrialized and developed countries. This high proportion was obtained by including unpaid family workers. As a result, not less than 33 percent of children between 10 and 15 years of age and 75 percent of men and 20 percent of women aged 64 years and over were listed as economically active. Most of them worked in the agricultural and service sectors. Not including this group, the actual labor force in 1950 would only amount to about 34 percent of the population. Economically active persons represent a much higher percentage of the population in the departments located on the Altiplano, the Yungas and the valleys than in the departments of the thinly populated eastern lowlands. Throughout the country, however, the proportion of economically active males is low as compared to economically active females. Women accounted for 42 percent of the national labor force; in some departments over half of the economically active persons were women.

More than four-fifths of the population is concentrated on the Altiplano, while the fertile, tropical eastern plains are sparsely populated and partially even uninhabited. Because of the uneven distribution of the population, occasional moderately severe labor shortages occur in some areas, notably in the Beni region during the planting and harvesting seasons. However, apart from occasional small-scale temporary migrations of a few thousand agricultural workers, the labor force is virtually static. Resettlement projects sponsored by the government or the United Nations designed to effect a more rational distribution of the labor force by moving part of the population of the densely inhabited Altiplano to the eastern lowlands have generally failed. During the early 1960's occasional cases of nonorganized resettlement moves involving a few families have succeeded.

The Bolivian Development Corporation (Corporación Boliviano de Fomento—CBF) sponsored a resettlement project of miners from Potosí to the environs to Montero in Santa Cruz Province. Because of the reluctance of the highlander to accept the great change in

altitude and climate, about 80 percent of the settlers returned to the Altiplano soon after their arrival. Most of those who remained abandoned farming and maintained themselves by trucking logs to the city of Santa Cruz. Under a special project sponsored by the Bolivian Army, young conscripts were brought to the northern parts of Santa Cruz province to build roads, clear land and work on farms. Although they were each offered a small house and 50 hectares of land if they settled in this region at the end of their service, only a handful took advantage of this offer between 1955 and 1958. A resettlement project sponsored by the Andean Highland Mission of the United Nations during the late 1950's had equally discouraging results. Only about 8 percent of the people resettled from the Altiplano and the Cochabamba Valley to Catoca (near Santa Cruz) remained in their new locations (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 18, Agriculture).

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT

Although no statistics are published, unemployment severely affects some urban areas. Because of the slow development of the economy, including recessions in some of its sectors, and an estimated increase of 40,000 to 60,000 employable persons between 1960 and 1965, unemployment is likely to increase substantially.

Of more serious proportions in 1962 was the problem of underemployment. Prevalent throughout the economy, it was particularly striking in the manufacturing sector. Estimates during the early 1960's indicated that the average industrial plant was overstaffed by 10 percent and some by as much as 100 percent. At the same time, there were over 10,000 surplus workers in the mines. Overstaffing and underemployment are partly traceable to inefficient production methods. The principal reason, however, is a law passed in 1954 prohibiting the dismissal of workers except for cause. Some enterprises have scores of workers with literally nothing to do. The law also requires that vacancies created by discharge, death or resignation be promptly filled. The surplus, nondismissable workers impose a heavy burden on the economy, particularly on individual enterprises struggling to stay in business under adverse economic conditions.

In 1960 one of the textile plants, although facing bankruptcy, was forbidden to dismiss 300 excess workers. Although the government has become aware of these difficulties, it is unable to repeal the law because of the vigorous opposition of organized labor. On the other hand, absorption of the surplus labor force into other sectors of the economy is not possible at the present because of the limited number of solvent productive enterprises and the impracticability of shifting the surplus labor force into the unexploited eastern regions. In March 1958 a legislative decree was passed providing for the "volun-

tary retirement" of an unspecified number of workers from private enterprises, without obligation to replace them. Inducements, including the lump-sum payment of 3 months' wages plus 1 month's wages for each year worked, were offered to workers who volunteered to retire. A public works plan was drafted to provide employment for the surplus workers, but no data are available regarding its implementation. The number of workers thus dismissed is not known, but it is believed to be only a small fraction of the surplus labor force.

OCCUPATION DISTRIBUTION

The census of 1950 and estimates to include 1959 show that persons engaged in agriculture continue to account for a large majority of the labor force. In 1950, 72 percent of the economically active population was engaged in agriculture, hunting and fishing. Only 3.1 percent worked in the all-important mining industry. Persons working in service occupations accounted for 15.8 percent of the labor force (including transport, commerce, public administration, professional and domestic services), and the percentage engaged in industrial and artisan manufacturing barely exceeded 8 percent.

Estimates for 1959 show no major changes in the number and proportion of persons in the various occupational categories. Agricultural workers increased in proportional as well as absolute terms and accounted for 75 percent of the total labor force. The aggregate of persons employed in nonagricultural occupations showed a 3 percent decrease since 1950, although there were proportionate and absolute gains in some individual occupational categories. Persons in service occupations accounted for 13.9 percent of the labor force. Workers in mines amounted to 4.2 percent of the labor force as compared to 3.1 in 1950. The proportion of workers in the manufacturing industries decreased from 4 percent in 1950 to 3.1 in 1959. The relatively important artisan sector employed 3.7 percent of the labor force as compared to 3.8 at the time of the census.

Agricultural Labor

According to the 1950 census, 750,000 persons were engaged in agriculture and pastoral occupations. More than half of these were unpaid family workers. More recent estimates on the number of agricultural workers vary from 745,000 for 1957 to 1.3 million for 1959.

The large majority of the agricultural labor force is engaged in subsistence farming under some form of tenancy, including sharecropping, or on individually owned, uneconomically small plots. Before the agrarian reform of 1953, the performance of field labor and personal services in return for the use of a small plot of land (*pongueaje*) was a prevalent form of tenancy. The abolition of abuses

which prevailed under this form of tenancy was one of the main objectives of the reform. In the valleys around Cochabamba, Sucre, Tarija and on the Altiplano, tenant workers usually worked 5 days a week in return for the use of a plot of land often too small even to yield subsistence crops. Members of their families worked in the owner's household as servants. On some estates, corporal punishment and the custom of the *droit du seigneur* prevailed as late as the 1940's.

By distributing land to former *pongueaje* tenants, the agrarian reform increased the number of independent subsistence farmers. Although they have been freed of the obligation to work for the owner or to deliver a portion of their crop, most of the new smallholders continue to farm for subsistence. They generally work only about 60 percent of the time and spend the rest celebrating *fiestas*. Several days of inactivity are generally required to overcome the effects of total intoxication (see ch. 11, Social Values).

In the sparsely populated eastern part of the country, notably in the Santa Cruz area, tenant farmers worked under relatively favorable conditions which have remained unchanged since the agrarian reform. Tenants generally work on the estates the year around for a small wage. In addition, they are allowed to cultivate a small plot of land for their own use and to clear as much jungle land as they wish. Usually the tenant's entire family shares in the tasks of seeding, weeding and harvesting. Food, medical care and occasionally some clothing are provided by the owner. The plots yield enough to feed the family on holidays when food is not provided by the owner, and surplus products are sold or bartered on local markets.

The extension in some areas of technical aid and credit to encourage the raising of cash crops has had only sporadic success (see ch. 18, Agriculture). The effort required to grow market crops appeals even less to those who obtain a small cash income by renting to their former landlords as in Nor Yungas Province, near La Paz. In some areas, former tenant farmers who have been allotted land have hired their former landlords to perform managerial duties on the newly acquired holdings. On the other hand, the new smallholder may no longer rely on the assistance, however modest, extended to tenants by most landowners in the form of medical assistance or care for the aged. In 1962 government-offered substitutes for this minimal security exist only on paper. Their implementation is handicapped by depressed economic conditions, by the lack of means of transportation in remote areas and by an inadequate administrative apparatus. The *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant leagues), established since the revolution, are gradually becoming new sources to which agricultural workers can turn for assistance in welfare matters (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization). Since the 1952 revolution, some segments of the agricultural labor force have been brought into closer contact with local

markets and consumer goods. Among these, some interest has been noted in raising cash crops, although it has not made notable inroads on the pervasive pattern of subsistence farming. Cooperative farming for the purpose of market production has attracted a few Aymara farmers in the Alto Beni colonization zone where, in 1962, some 24 families were engaged in the cultivation of wheat and fruit cash crops.

A small proportion of the agriculture labor force depends on hunting, fishing and home industries. About 70 percent of the Altiplano Indians spin and weave for domestic use or for small-scale trading. Tanning is a prevalent occupation among Indians and mestizos in the departments of Tarija, Sucre and Southern Potosí. Indians of the Altiplano and of the valleys also engage in basket-weaving and rope-making. The building of *totora* (reed) boats, basket-weaving and fishing are the chief sources of livelihood among Aymara Indians on the southern shores of Lake Titicaca and on the Desaguadero and Mauri rivers. The Indians of Jésus de Machaca and Corocoro are noted for producing copper articles. Indian silversmiths are numerous in Sica Sica and Umala, although they are outnumbered by their mestizo counterparts in La Paz and other large cities.

In some areas, home industries have become remunerative enough to replace agricultural pursuits, except for the cultivation of kitchen gardens. In the 1960's various projects under the auspices of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United States Agency for International Development (AID) have been launched to develop home industries and to improve the techniques of craftsmen.

Mining

Although the extractive industries are the country's principal source of revenue, mines employ a relatively small portion of the labor force. However, their numbers are considered excessive by most economic experts. Various estimates have been made that from 35 to 80 percent of the miners are superfluous and have virtually nothing to do. Others believe that the problem lies in the assignment of duties rather than in excess numbers; only about one-third of the miners are employed below surface while two-thirds work above ground. Among the latter are a small number of women, hired to break up pieces of ore or to work in the miners' canteens.

Recent estimates on the total number of miners varied from about 55,000 in 1957 to 75,000 in 1959. According to the 1959 estimate, the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL), which operates the large nationalized mines, employed 38.6 percent of the miners. Thirty-seven percent of them worked in small and 7.5 percent in medium sized private mines. Petroleum extraction employed 16.2 percent. Living and working conditions of the miners have been the subject of extensive sociological studies and

much political agitation. The alleged abuse of these workers by the private mine owners of the prerevolutionary era has been a persistent theme of MNR propaganda and one which never failed to rouse popular emotions to a high pitch. United Nations and International Labor Organization commissions studying conditions of work and employment in Bolivian mines during the 1940's have also described these conditions as totally inadequate. High disease rates and frequent industrial accidents among miners further reduced an already notoriously low production. Sanitary facilities, electricity and water supplies were lacking in most places. Most miners, moreover, lived in a state of virtual bondage to their employers because of their indebtedness to company-run commissaries which supplied basic commodities and food at reduced prices.

Since 1952 conditions have somewhat improved in certain mines, notably in those operated by COMIBOL. A plan to improve miners' housing throughout the country is awaiting implementation by the National Institute of Housing (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda) (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare). The rate of industrial accidents and occupational diseases, however, has remained high. Productivity and labor discipline in the nationalized as well as in the private mines have continued to deteriorate. Protected by law against dismissal, miners have staged arbitrary work stoppages with increasing frequency, have shown a general attitude of defiance against supervisors and have systematically thwarted management's efforts to enforce any measure of discipline.

Industrial and Artisan Manufacturing

The industries employ only about 7 percent of the labor force, although in terms of absolute figures the number of industrial workers has risen from 109,555 in 1950 to an estimated 120,000 in 1959. Only a small group of these workers is employed in the so-called registered industries, which may be considered industrial manufacturing enterprises. It is estimated that about 50 percent or more of the industrial labor force works for artisan workshops. Some 40 percent are employed in small nonregistered plants and only about 10 percent work in registered industrial enterprises. In 1950 textile, woodworking, metalworking and food-processing enterprises employed the largest number of workers. Because there have been no major changes in the industrial structure the distribution of workers has probably remained the same. Artisan enterprises are found mainly in the garment, footwear and furniture-making branches. Many of these are operated by self-employed craftsmen working with a few helpers or relying on the help of unpaid family members. Modern tools are nearly always lacking and employees and their master work in dark, crowded, unventilated shops. Because they cater to a relatively static, local clien-

tele artisans are generally not interested in improving productivity or expanding their facilities. Most of the workers in the manufacturing enterprises also work in crowded, unsanitary and poorly ventilated plants frequently under hazardous working conditions. There is a conspicuous lack of enforcement of industrial safety rules provided by law since the 1920's. Dust, vapors, slippery floors and the absence of protective devices around dangerous equipment are among the most frequently found health and safety hazards. Accident and disease rates due to these factors further deteriorate the already poor physical condition of industrial workers. A few major plants in La Paz and Cochabamba have locker rooms and showers, but often these are not used. Others furnish uniforms and inexpensive lunches. Courtyards or similar enclosures are usually available for lunch and rest periods, although many workers go home for the noon meal. Modern, airy, clean and well-lit plants, like the newly built milk-processing plant in Cochabamba, are considered exceptional. This plant, managed by a young Bolivian trained in the United States, is noted for its high standards of cleanliness and a relatively high working morale among its employees.

White-Collar Occupations

Administrative tasks in connection with the agrarian reform and nationalization have increased the number of white-collar employees in governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Because of the absence of standards governing the determination of statistical categories, there are considerable discrepancies in the estimates of their numbers. In 1957 there were an estimated 52,000 government employees, a figure which probably included the number of office employees in nationalized enterprises. For approximately the same period the trade union for state and municipal workers reported 12,000 government employees, not including the personnel of nationalized industries. Commercial workers, including bank and insurance employees, numbered 73,000 during the same year. Social prestige and political influence associated with government positions are likely to intensify interest in seeking such employment, although it is generally recognized that these factors fail to compensate for the low salaries and unattractive physical working conditions.

Personnel for professional as well as clerical levels are hired on the basis of political loyalties rather than qualifications. A civil service system has been theoretically established but not implemented. In 1962 positions were assigned on the basis of merit examinations only when corrupt hiring practices in a ministry or government agency became publicly known and aroused general protest. Working conditions in most government offices are depressing. Crowding, poor lighting and ventilation and other physical inadequacies in govern-

ment office buildings tend to aggravate the already considerable tardiness, absenteeism and bureaucratic inefficiency. Poorly heated, dark, hall-like rooms accommodate most office workers (usually 30 to 40 to a room) and their equipment. Defective furniture and antiquated typewriters, obsolete calendars and an assortment of unused equipment add to the general crowding and discomfort. Filing cabinets are rare, and letters and folders are kept in old cardboard boxes. Many employees pursue secondary occupations—a practice which is legally permissible but which creates widespread tardiness and irregular attendance. Some of the higher ranking employees spend only a few hours at their desks, since they have other jobs as lawyers or accountants with private firms, or pursue commercial activities during the rest of the day. Employees at the lower level also follow secondary occupations, mostly at their desks, during office hours.

Service and Marginal Occupations

The severely limited capacity of industry to absorb the available labor force is also reflected in the large number of persons in service occupations. According to 1959 estimates, this sector comprised 245,000 workers. Even deducting the 1957 estimate of 52,000 government employees (a number which has certainly not diminished), services employed the largest number of persons outside the agricultural sector. For statistical purposes the service category is defined as including persons in transport, commerce, professional and personal services, as well as public administration.

Domestic servants accounted for an unknown but large proportion of service employees. The revolution has not significantly affected the custom of keeping domestic servants, and most families of the emerging "new rich" can afford at least two. However, the custom of offering domestics housing, food and clothing rather than wages in return for their services has been abolished. In fact, servants have become quite articulate in their demands for wages and in defining conditions of employment under which they are willing to work. It has become a growing practice among them to leave their positions arbitrarily, without giving notice. Much of the demand for servants also comes from foreign technicians, as well as embassy and United Nations personnel.

Unemployment and, to a lesser extent, underemployment have created a proliferation of persons engaged in marginal activities, such as peddling, black-marketing and procuring. Persons pursuing these occupations include a large number of women, as well as children, sometimes 10 years of age or younger. Small-scale commercial enterprises, including various stalls and pushcarts, are much in evidence in the cities. Their owners and operators are predominantly *cholos*.

PRODUCTIVITY AND SKILLS

Low productivity represents an outstanding problem throughout the economy. Experts generally agree that the agrarian reform and nationalization of mines and certain industries in 1952 further lowered productivity. It has been estimated that, in the manufacturing sector alone, production has fallen by 55 percent since 1952. In 1960 productivity in the COMIBOL mines was 42 percent lower than in 1951, although the number of workers was the same.

Considerable variations exist between production levels in the registered, nonregistered and artisan industries. The production index for registered industries is nearly twice that of nonregistered industries and nearly three times that of production in the artisan industries. The government veto of the dismissal of workers has led to extensive make-work practices in order to accommodate the excess manpower. The same provision has inhibited mechanization even in the few instances when enterprises were financially able to purchase time-saving equipment. Trade unions also have vigorously opposed mechanization. In 1960 the bottle blowers' union forbade the use of bottling machinery available in one of the plants, even though beverage bottlers complained of receiving shipments of bottles with crooked necks, a defect which is usually caused by hand-blowing.

Only a minute portion of the labor force is skilled. In 1950, the latest year for which data on skilled labor are available, there were only 70,000 persons (about 5 percent of the labor force) with technical or professional skills. Because of the slow development in vocational education and the general decline in industrial output, the proportion of skilled personnel most likely remained the same. On the other hand, many skilled persons and professionals left the country following the 1952 revolution. It was estimated in 1960 that about 52,000 Bolivian skilled technicians and professionals worked outside the country, mostly in other Latin American republics.

A large percentage of factory workers is illiterate, and a very few have been formally trained in their respective skills. On-the-job training is more common, although it is rarely offered within the framework of an organized program in the respective plant. Courses in carpentry, electricity, masonry, ceramics, mechanics and printing are offered in the country's 7 vocational schools. However, the Pedro Murillo National Industrial School, largest among these institutions, graduated only 42 students in 1960.

There is a great shortage of low- and intermediate-level technicians. Clerical and other low-level administrative personnel in government and commercial offices are inadequately trained, generally with only primary education. During the late 1950's, the School of Public Administration (Escuela de Administración Pública) in La Paz was or-

organized under United States Point 4 auspices to offer in-service training courses. The response, however, was generally poor, and the program was discontinued in July 1960.

Inadequate nutrition, poor health and housing and addiction to alcohol and coca (a leaf chewed with lime ash for its cocaine content) are major factors in the workers' lack of motivation and frequent absenteeism. On the other hand, Indians are capable of performing strenuous physical labor under conditions of extreme hardship. The miners of the Altiplano have been exceptionally resistant to hunger, colds and fatigue while subsisting on daily rations of about 1,500 calories or less (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

In some lowland regions, notably the Beni, the economically active or potentially active population of Spanish descent has been reluctant to apply its energies and talents to occupations and activities required by the changing economy. *Benianos* have been known for the physical energy, ingenuity and endurance with which they met the demands of the forest and savanna regions and for their courage and imagination in applying themselves, at least in the past, to grandiose projects, mostly ranching and rubber gathering. To the challenges of small-scale agricultural development and routine commercial and administrative jobs, they have responded with apathy and disinterest.

LABOR LEGISLATION

Legislative provisions to protect workers in case of industrial accidents and occupational diseases, to establish standards for industrial hygiene, and to regulate the work of women and children have been theoretically in force since the 1920's. Some of the labor laws passed since the Chaco War reflected official efforts to protect workers from abusive practices in mines, industry and agriculture. The first comprehensive body of labor laws was decreed in 1939 under the presidency of Colonel Germán Busch. It became subsequently known as the Busch Code and was still in force in 1962. The Code regulates individual and collective contracts, provides for social insurance and medical care of workers and grants the right to organize to workers as well as to employers. In April 1953 the MNR government passed a major law providing for nursing allowances and housing bonuses for workers in the mining, manufacturing, petroleum and construction industries.

Enforcement and administration of labor laws rest with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Reorganized in 1958 and again in 1960, it includes three major branches: the General Directorate of Labor, the General Directorate of Social Security and the National Labor Court. The General Directorate of Labor directs the activities of two bureaus concerned, respectively, with conditions of employ-

ment and industrial relations. Field offices of these bureaus operate in all departments. They are staffed by labor inspectors in charge of enforcing working conditions set forth in the Labor Code and of handling local labor conflicts. Their services have tended to diminish in importance since trade unions have assumed the role of policing conditions of employment set forth in the Labor Code and in collective contracts. Inspectors also supervise the free public employment exchanges attached to the field offices, although the latter are largely inactive. The National Labor Court adjudicates labor disputes and interprets social security claims.

The National Directorate of Statistics and Census within the Ministry of Finance and Census is charged with compiling and publishing statistical and analytical data concerning labor. Technical advisers of the United Nations and of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) are on the staff of the Directorate. Matters connected with housing, health and social security of agricultural workers are handled by the Ministry of Rural Affairs. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum deals with working conditions and industrial relations affecting workers in the extractive industries.

Since the MNR revolution in 1952 the Labor Code has in general been inforced. Application of some of its provisions and of laws enacted since the ascent of the MNR is complicated by failure to repeal provisions previously in force. Another impediment is the inclusion in the various laws of a burdensome number of overdetailed provisions which could be more efficiently settled through the collective bargaining process.

Contracts of Employment

The Labor Code provides for written or oral contracts of employment, both of them legally binding if authenticated by a local labor authority. Youths between 14 and 17 years of age must have the consent of their parents before signing work contracts. Although the earliest legal age for employment mentioned in the Labor Code is 14 years, child workers, aged 8 and upward, abound in domestic services and petty commercial pursuits. The contracts may be terminated by either party on serving notice. If dismissed for nondisciplinary reasons, workers must be given severance pay. During the first years of the MNR government, employers were unable to dismiss workers even for cause. Since 1954, however, dismissal for cause has been allowed. Acts which authorize employers to dismiss workers without advance notice and severance pay are limited to intentional damage or destruction of equipment, disclosure of industrial secrets, sabotage of industrial safety, unexcused absence for more than 3 days, theft and resignation without notice to employers. In 1962 dismissal for disciplinary

reasons was possible with prior approval by labor inspectors, but the date that this provision of the law became effective is not clear.

Because of the combining oversupply of workers, employers rarely resort to formal recruiting devices. Moreover, employers know well that even advertising or posting will not produce the critically needed skilled workers. Verification of previous experience, skill and general reliability is usually obtained by reference to previous employers. Some schools issue certificates on completion of vocational courses, attesting to the applicants' skill. Because of the severe legal restrictions against dismissal and the belligerent attitude of trade unions in this matter, employers prefer to hire workers for a 3-month trial period. Such temporary employment is permitted by law, and employers hiring workers on this basis are free to dismiss them without having to pay severance bonuses if performance is not satisfactory. Because wage raises and bonuses are usually given as a result of government policy and trade union bargaining, workers have little incentive to earn promotions by working harder. It is a relatively frequent practice, however, to reward regular attendance and satisfactory performance with wedding, christening and birthday gifts.

Both wage and salary earners are entitled to severance pay amounting to 1 month's compensation for every year of uninterrupted employment, or a lump sum based on the number of months worked if less than a year. Wage earners are entitled to notice of 1 week after 1 month of regular employment, 15 days after 6 months and 30 days after a year. Salaried employees must be given notice of 90 days after 3 months or more of continuous service. The first 3 months of employment are not taken into account when determining severance pay; these are considered training or probationary periods unless otherwise stated in the work contract.

Wage earners resigning voluntarily must give their employers notice according to the same schedule which binds employers. A wage earner who resigns forfeits his right to severance pay unless he has worked for the same firm for more than 8 years. In the case of salaried personnel, the period is 15 years. When earned, severance pay is computed in the same manner as when the termination is at the employer's initiative. Employers are also entitled to severance pay when a firm changes its location or name. Employees of mines were given severance pay when some of these enterprises were nationalized in 1952. Railway workers will also be entitled to severance pay when the planned nationalization of the railroads takes place. Full severance bonuses were paid to workers of a private manufacturing plant which changed its name when the owner's son became part of the management.

Wages

Economic fluctuations and currency crises require frequent adjustments of the minimum wage which has been established by law since 1937. In 1961 a monthly minimum wage of 205,000 bolivianos ($17.29) was applicable to workers in mining, manufacturing, banking and some nationalized enterprises including government-owned banks, railways and schools. The minimum wage is the same throughout the country, regardless of geographical area or type of work. Some categories of workers, notably agricultural workers, service and municipal employees, are not covered by the minimum wage provisions. Although government policies and trade union agitation ensure the enforcement of minimum wage laws, the rates established by these laws are insufficient to meet the mounting cost of living, and organized labor continues to demand additional compensation in the form of special bonuses.

Skilled workers earn from 2 to 4 times as much as unskilled ones. In spite of frequent upward adjustment of wages the earnings of Bolivian workers and employees are among the lowest in Latin America. Neverthless, many of the domestic firms are barely able to meet their payrolls and are frequently in arrears in wage or social security payments, although the Labor Code provides that the interval between pay periods must not exceed 15 days for wage earners and one month for salaried employees and servants.

In order to halt the emigration of vitally needed and critically scarce technicians, they are paid in United States dollars or in a combination of dollars and bolivianos. The same salary arrangements are made with foreign technicians. Wages and salaries in foreign-owned firms are more favorable, but the number of such firms has decreased rapidly since the MNR revolution.

Detailed wage data are not available. In 1960 a foreign-owned oil company reported that its monthly salaries averaged about $80. In other sectors of the economy monthly average salaries (excluding bonuses and family benefits) ranged from $48.31 in nationalized mines to $15.76 in lower-paid employment. In all industries, including agriculture, monthly earnings averaged $30.45. Employees of the central social security office earned $43.15 and those of the Point 4 *servicios*, $18.61.

Compensation in cash is composed of the basic wage and various supplements, including family allowances, regular bonuses and profit shares. Compensation in kind includes subsidized commissary articles and medical benefits. Supplementary payments may amount to 75 percent or more of the real wage. The standard pay supplements for all industrial workers include a seniority premium (*bono de antigüedad*), a year-end bonus (*aguinaldo*) and a profit share (*prima*), each

generally amounting to one month's salary. In addition, there are family and living allowances.

The method of computing seniority premiums varies considerably. The premium may be granted in the form of a small (2½) percentual increase in the basic salary after each year of service. In other cases, earnings of the last 3 months of employment are averaged and multiplied by the number of years worked. In the government and the Point 4 *servicios* employees are given raises proportionate to length of service. Those who have served at least 2 years receive a 30 percent increase in basic salary. Another raise is given every 3 years thereafter up to a maximum of 50 percent of the basic salary after 20 years of service.

Employees and wage earners are eligible for year-end bonuses after a minimum of 3 months or 75 days of service, respectively. The year-end bonus, usually payable in December, amounts to the full month's salary for employees, 25 days wages for workers. Employees paid in foreign currency or those under special contracts are not eligible for this bonus.

Employers must pay a profit share in the equivalent of 1 month's wages to workers and employees. Although according to the law this bonus is payable only if firms make a profit, both the government and organized labor have insisted that it be paid in any case. During the 1960's many establishments near bankruptcy had to pay profit shares. It has become customary, moreover, to pay profit shares to the employees of municipal and various other governmental administrative offices. Family allowances, increased by 250 percent since 1957, represent about 15 to 20 percent of a worker's income. In 1958 a typical family allowance for a married worker (with 2 school-age children), earning $22.59 per month, was $4.70. Family allowances are also paid to childless married couples in amounts varying from $1.18 to $1.69 per month. The allowance for single adults ranges from $0.70 to $1.27 per month, depending on their earnings.

The MNR government has, at various times, ordered special monthly bonuses for certain categories of workers to narrow the gap between cost of living and real wages and to avoid, at the same time, inflationary consequences of general wage raises. For the same purpose, some employers have paid special yearly bonuses amounting to 15 to 16 month's wages.

Mine workers in nationalized and private mines received a major cost of living bonus in 1956 when subsidized commissary privileges were revoked in the course of the stabilization program. The bonus amounted to $0.17 per day or $3.98 per month for each miner. An additional $0.51 per day was paid by COMIBOL and $0.17 by private mines to supplement the miners' diet.

In 1958 some Point 4 *servicio* employees received recruiting and retention bonuses in order to discourage their seeking better-paying jobs and to attract urgently needed technicians.

Upon retirement, employees and workers usually receive a lump sum (*bono de antigüedad*) based on their years of service. Public old-age pensions, however, are payable to men at 55 years of age and to women at 50 years of age (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare). Provided that the worker has contributed 5 percent of his earnings, he is eligible to receive a pension amounting to 50 percent of his earnings in addition to a 2 percent increment for each year of contribution over 15 years. Following each general wage increase the amount of the pension is increased by 90 percent of the total rise.

Benefits

The Social Security Code of 1956, incorporating and expanding social security legislation passed since 1949, provides coverage in cases of sickness, injury, maternity, invalidism and old age. Although coverage is not extended to all branches of labor and is not operative in all sections of the country, certain uncovered sections may receive the benefits if they pay full costs. For those covered automatically, the worker, the employer and the government jointly contribute to costs (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

Transportation bonuses are paid by some industries which are located at a distance from the workers' quarters. The rate for transport allowances is usually 50 percent of the basic wage, although some industries pay more. The 50 percent rate was paid in 1960 by some oil companies if the workers' travel time to work exceeded half an hour.

Enterprises with 25 or more employees must maintain commissaries, where food and other essential items are sold at low prices. Operated mainly by mining enterprises, the commissaries have become the means of considerable abuse on the part of management as well as workers. The law providing for the establishment of commissaries permitted the sale of basic food items and household items on credit, to be deducted from workers' wages. This practice kept many workers in permanent debt to their employers. During the early 1960's, however, workers could no longer buy commissary items on credit. On the other hand, government subsidization of commissary goods led to vigorous black-market activities among workers who sold these goods at considerable profit on the black market. To discourage this practice, the government abolished the heavily subsidized commissary prices in December 1956 as a part of the general stabilization program. Although general protest of miners and other workers against repeal of subsidized commissary items forced the government to re-introduce subsidization of some items, it succeeded in

reducing the number of subsidized items to bread, meat, sugar and rice.

The Labor Code requires employers of 300 or more workers to cover the expenses of technical training of workers and their children in foreign institutions if no domestic facilities are available. To provide for the education of miner's children, COMIBOL found it necessary to establish a network of private schools for some 28,000 of them.

Working Hours and Holidays

The Labor Code provides for an 8-hour working day and a 48-hour working week. Work performed between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. must not exceed seven hours. The law prohibits night work by women and children under 16. However, women employed as domestics, nurses or entertainers are exempt from this provision.

Since 1951 the weekly hours of work have been reduced in financial and commercial establishments. These are closed from 1 p.m. Saturday to Monday morning, although establishments selling food, fuel and medicines may remain open. The provisions of the Labor Code regulating working hours do not apply to salaried employees in managerial or other key positions, although their working day must not exceed 12 hours and must include a break of at least 1 hour. The 8-hour working day must also be interrupted by breaks totaling at least 2 hours. A Supreme Decree enacted in October 1938 governs the working hours of government employees. Their hours of work are from 9 a.m. to 12 noon and from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. for 5½ days a week. The decree, still in force in 1962, urged employees to be punctual and provided specific penalties for tardiness. These regulations, however, are rarely enforced, and irregular attendance and lateness in public offices are universal.

Overtime is subject to prior approval of the labor inspector and must not exceed 2 hours daily. In 1962, however, there were few requests for overtime because of the slump in many sectors of the economy. On the other hand, during the late 1950's, overtime payments were extracted on the basis of falsified time records by miners of COMIBOL and of some private mines. The practice has also been followed by workers in other industrial sectors and represents a serious problem for management. Overtime is paid at a rate of double the regular wage for both men and women.

According to legal requirements night work, if performed under the same conditions as day work, is paid at time-and-one-quarter to time-and-a-half of the regular day rate. In 1960, however, most industrial plants paid from 20 to 50 percent extra for night work. Petroleum workers in the private sector were paid 30 percent and mineworkers, 50 percent extra. Except for public utility establish-

ments, hospitals, a few ore mines and some canning factories (during the harvest season), little night work is done.

Production workers who work the full 48-hour week receive regular pay on Sundays. Railroad workers receive double wages or compensatory time off for Sundays or holiday work. According to the 1962 legal interpretation of laws governing compensation for Sunday work for other employees, a worker who has completed the 48-hour week and works on Sunday, in addition, receives the regular wage as well as overtime pay (twice the basic wage rate) and a bonus. Only essential work may be required on Sundays and public holidays. Workers on the job on such days are paid double the regular wage or salary. Workers receive regular wages for holidays on which they do not work if they have been with the same employer 3 consecutive days before the holiday or if they worked the day before the holiday and remain in the same employ 2 days following the holiday. Employers who fail to pay for legal holidays are subject to fines amounting to 5 times the wage or salary.

A legal decree passed in 1936 listed 16 holidays, not including Sundays, and local holidays which the departments may declare. The 16 holidays are: January 1; Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of Carnival Week; Holy Thursday, Friday and Saturday; May 1 (Labor Day); May 28 (Corpus Christi); Bolivian Independence Days (August 5, 6 and 7); Family Day (October 12); November 1 and 2 (All Saints' and All Souls' Days); and Christmas. Between 1944 and 1953 additional days have been declared as legal days of rest for certain workers, notably January 22 (Day of Railroads), May 10 (Day of Newspapermen), May 18 (Day of Factory Workers), July 5 (Day of Women Workers), November 16 (Day of Printers), December 1 (Day of Pharmacists), December 8 (Day of Food Workers) and December 21 (Day of Bolivian Miners). In addition there are new national holidays, notably the Day of Martyrs of the National Revolution on July 21, Day of the Indian on August 2 and Day of the Student on September 21. It is not known, however, whether employers must pay wages for these holidays, although workers are given the day off for celebration.

The Labor Code provided for paid annual vacations of 1 week for workers and employees with 1 to 5 years of uninterrupted service, 2 weeks for 5 to 10 years of service, and 3 weeks for more than 10 years of service. These amounts of leave were increased by a Supreme Decree in August 1952 to 15 days, 20 days and 30 days, respectively.

CHAPTER 21

LABOR RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

Because of the delay in industrial development, the lack of communication due to geographic and language barriers and a rigid, caste-like social structure, organized labor had a late and difficult start. The trade unions of the 1930's served mostly as fatuous though durable props to political platforms or personalities, ostensibly dedicated to trade unionism and to the amelioration of depressed conditions among workers. Impoverished and torn by ideological strife, unions were unable to influence government policies and failed to establish their political stature.

With the growing political influence of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), unions gradually gained strength. Launching the theme of "emancipation" among workers and peasants, MNR politicians set out with vigor to organize miners and factory workers and to strengthen and woo the support of other existing unions. MNR's ascent to power in April 1952 became possible largely because of strong labor support, notably that of armed miners and peasants (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

MNR's ideological commitment to a government of workers, peasants and members of the middle class (although adherents of the MNR far left wing disapproved of including the middle class) was implemented by the institution of *cogobierno* ("cogovernment"), which called for the assignment of key positions in the Cabinet, the National Assembly and MNR's Executive Committee to members of the labor movement. Because of their preoccupation with personal political careers, the performance of union leaders in these positions was largely ineffectual and often added to political instability. During the late 1950's the merit of direct labor participation in government was questioned even by some trade union leaders, and President Victor Paz Estenssoro stated that workers' interests could be effectively represented without including members of the labor movement into the Cabinet and other key posts.

Labor's demands for higher wages and additional social benefits for which funds are lacking and their insistence on the retention of excessive numbers of workers, particularly in the mines, places addi-

tional obstacles in the already difficult path of economic reconstruction. Recognizing its past and present political indebtedness to organized labor, the government has attempted to grant these demands, straining, at the same time, to avoid economic disaster. On the other hand, the government has shown firmness when subversive elements within the labor movement have threatened the public order. For the first time since the inception of the MNR government, President Paz ordered the arrest in June 1961 of Castroist labor leaders when they threatened to stage a nationwide "Cuban-style" revolution.

In spite of the modification of the principle of *cogobierno*, labor continued to wield decisive influence in politics. One of the most prominent public figures and perhaps the second most powerful man in the country is Juan Lechín Oquendo, co-founder and leader of the powerful Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB), Executive Secretary of the Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB), and Minister of Mines and Petroleum in President Paz' first Cabinet in 1952. Lechín's growing political stature brought him the vice-presidency in 1960, and by 1962 made him a possible candidate for the next presidency. As a possible sign of his realization of problems he must face if his highest political ambitions materialize, Lechín has given cautious support to some official MNR policies. At the same time, however, he has refrained from interfering with the rise of communist influence within the COB and the FSTMB although he acted decisively when Communists threatened to make sweeping, decisive gains in these organizations. His leadership and personal magnetism have, at least to date (1962), continued to assert themselves, in spite of growing disunity in the labor movement.

The central and local leadership of organized labor includes representatives ranging from the extreme right Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) to the Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB) and sharply reflects the multiple ideological split within the MNR. The majority of the leadership, however, supports MNR's central sector, identified with President Paz. During the 1960's, the labor movement itself has shown a general lack of cohesion and, among individual unions, strong tendencies to localism, aggravated by massive Communist penetration in some. COB's effectiveness in consolidating and coordinating the trade union movement has greatly diminished, and the organization has shown a tendency of gradually becoming a deliberative forum for representatives of various ideological and political factions and a meeting place where arrangements are made for the allocation of political spoils within the labor movement.

During 1961 and 1962, COB's major policy statements, urging the acceptance of Soviet credits and denouncing the United States for its

role in the Cuban crisis of October 1962, indicated strong leftist (Communist and Castroist) influence within its ranks Lechín himself endorsed these policy statements although he refused to yield in the presence of Communist maneuvers designed to gain control over the Third Workers Congress in May 1962 and over the special conference of the FSTMB in January of the same year. Indications are, however, that COB's pro-left stand, particularly its support of the Cuban revolution, is not unanimously endorsed within the labor movement. The growing tension between pro-Castro and anti-Castro COB delegates in connection with the Cuban crisis was followed, in November 1962, by the proposed formation of a new central labor organization outside of COB by the dissenting trade unions.

Since 1952, the number of unionized workers has increased substantially, although the claimed membership of 200,000 to 250,000 unionized wage and salary earners is an exaggeration. However, a strike or demonstration call of a powerful trade union is capable of rallying many times the number of its claimed members. Most workers willingly joined the trade unions which mushroomed since 1952, but have remained unaware of the economic and social role of organized labor. The loyalty of unionized workers is directed toward individual labor leaders who generally have no difficulty in gaining acceptance of their political slogans and platforms among the union membership.

Direct contact between workers and employers is usually found only in small, urban business and industrial establishments. In such enterprises, friction between labor and management is less frequent than in nationalized and private enterprises in the countryside, where labor disputes often erupt in violence. Traditional distrust and fear of employers and recognition of the government's exclusive and decisive role in granting higher wages and benefits has prompted trade unions to shun the establishment of a working relationship with management and to favor direct contact with government representatives. Consequently, a continuous and major source of friction between labor and management is the latter's inability to meet the costs for ever-increasing types and amounts of fringe benefits demanded by the unions. On the other hand, in the nationalized enterprises, notably in the mines of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL), where the government also acts as an employer, labor relations have been notoriously bad.

Constant political agitation coupled with substandard living conditions has rendered the labor force unruly and readily susceptible to strike calls. Repeated labor disturbances, particularly up to 1960, severely inhibited and often nearly paralyzed economic progress. Strikes have been less frequent during 1961 and 1962 although some of them, notably those precipitated by Communist agitation, con-

tinued to handicap production and threaten the public order. The government intervenes in most strikes and nearly always upholds the demands of the strikers. In many cases, however, the economic state of employers prevents the implementation of conditions set forth in the strike awards.

The description of labor unions herein does not apply to the activities of the *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant leagues), which comprise the great majority of *campesinos* (peasants) and agricultural workers. The leagues do not fit any conventional pattern of union activity and are better described as political pressure groups. It is probably accurate to say that virtually all rural workers are under the political control of *sindicato campesino* bosses (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

RETROSPECT

The country's earliest labor organizations were founded by artisans and shopkeepers in La Paz, Oruro and Potosí during the early 1900's. They were mutual aid societies, generally sympathetic to left-wing, mostly anarchist, ideologies, but little else is known about the exact nature of their activities.

Anarchosyndicalists, Socialists and Communists vied for influence in the Workers Federation of Labor (Federación Obrera del Trabajo—FOT), organized after World War I to consolidate existing trade unions. Its strength and influence proved inadequate to achieve any real coherence within the labor movement, although it convoked the first national labor congress in 1927.

Some trade unions representing mining and industrial workers joined forces in the Bolivian Confederation of Labor (Confederación Boliviana del Trabajo—CBT), also organized during the late 1920's with headquarters in Potosí. Although anarchism was the dominant ideological influence in the CBT, the organization sent delegates to the regional congress for Latin American trade unions held in the spring of 1929 in Montevideo under the auspices of the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). Later, however, the CBT refused to join the Latin American Trade Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical Latinoamericana—CSLA). The communist influence prevailed in some local trade unions, notably in the Workers Federation of La Paz (Federación Obrera de La Paz), which became the only Bolivian affiliate of CSLA. At a national labor congress in August 1930, the Communists also claimed to represent the majority of unions in Sucre and Potosí and the railway workers of Uyuni and Oruro.

The Chaco War arrested the development of the trade union movement. The anarchosyndicalist majority as well as the Communists in the unions opposed the war. Their antiwar agitations encouraged desertion among the military and fostered strikes, riots and demon-

strations among workers. To these agitations, the government responded with suppressive measures which sent many trade unionists to jail, others into exile.

Under the administrations of Colonel David Toro (1936–37) and Colonel Germán Busch (1937–39) the government officially espoused the cause of organized labor. Trade unions, however, had no role in the drafting or passage of President Busch's liberal and extensive Labor Code which, among other provisions, guaranteed workers the right to organize and to strike, and which was still in force in 1962. Communists wielded much influence under the socialistic Toro government. Tristán Maroff, founder of the pro-Soviet Socialist Party (Partido Socialista), controlled the Trade Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia—CSTB), a new national labor federation organized in 1936, after the merger of the Communist-ruled Workers Federation of La Paz and the anarchosyndicalist Local Workers Federation of La Paz (Federación Obrera Local de La Paz).

The largely conservative governments succeeding Toro and Busch were hostile to organized labor and indifferent to wage and social problems of workers. Repressive measures against workers who struck against inferior wages and living conditions culminated in the shooting by government troops of striking miners at Catavi in 1942. Scores of the strikers were killed and about 40 trade union leaders jailed in the "Catavi massacre," a rallying cry for unionists for many years after.

Protest against the massacre in the National Assembly as well as through the press and radio was led by the left-wing, nationalist MNR, which emerged with leading support among workers and *campesinos*. Its vigorous organizational activities secured the loyalty of many trade unions and of the still largely unorganized rural workers. Other left-wing parties, addressing their platforms to workers and *campesinos*, eager to secure political prominence through trade union support, rose during the 1940's. Extreme left-wing influence gained mainly through the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido Izquierda Revolucionario—PIR), which succeeded, after President Busch's death, in asserting itself dominantly in the CSTB, displacing Maroff's Communist retinue. Another group, the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolutionario—POR), gained considerable although not durable political importance through its influence over FSTMB.

In the meantime, the living conditions of workers remained deplorable. Their housing, dietary standards and general health were grossly inadequate, according to a United States-Bolivian Commission, appointed in 1943 to investigate the country's labor laws and their implementation. The Commission also reported that, although free-

dom of association was a constitutional right and the right of workers to organize was recognized and encouraged by Busch's Labor Code, policies and practices of employers tolerated and often supported by the government severely inhibited trade union organization and prevented workers from voicing their grievances collectively or individually.

Under the Villarroel government (1943–46) which included several MNR Cabinet members, labor played an increasingly important political role. The official encouragement of workers to join trade unions and the establishment of a government board to study wages was largely the result of MNR influence. The MNR also took the lead in organizing the illiterate, highly underprivileged Indian miners employed in the Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo mines and by 1946 controlled the newly founded Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB).

In the rest of the trade union movement, however, PIR's influence remained strong if not predominant. This became a source of major concern to the government when PIR emerged as the principal opposition group, following President Villarroel's rejection of PIR leader José Antonio Arze's proposition of a coalition government. To weaken PIR's foothold in the trade union movement, notably its control over the CSTB, a government-sponsored "Third Congress of CSTB" was convoked. Although the move was denounced by CSTB's secretary general, PIR leader Flores Gironda, the Congress announced the foundation of a new CSTB which claimed federations in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Oruro.

After Villarroel's overthrow (which also precipitated the exile of MNR leaders from 1946 to 1951), the governments of Enrique Hertzog and Mamerto Urriolagoitia were unfriendly to organized labor. This attitude was at least partly prompted by the recognition of the strong influence in labor of the MNR. PIR's relations with the Hertzog and Urriolagoitia governments, on the other hand, were friendly—a factor which proved politically expedient but weakened its appeal among workers, most of whom were hostile to the government and loyal to the MNR. As a result, PIR was unable to reassert its lead over the trade union movement even during the repression of its rival, and the MNR's support by labor prevailed throughout these years. The armed support of *campesinos* and miners decisively helped the MNR in the street fights of April 1952 which ended in that party's successful coup and inaugurated the regime of President Paz (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The MNR government immediately set out to consolidate its control over the trade union movement. A meeting of all unions was called at the end of April 1952 to establish a new national labor federation,

the COB. Most unions, including the affiliates of the PIR-dominated CSTB and of the anarchosyndicalist Local Workers Federation of La Paz, joined COB or became absorbed by its MNR-ruled affiliates. CSTB and its La Paz affiliate, the Federación Obrera Sindical de la Paz, attempted to rally its supporters in a May Day manifesto (1952), but without success. The Local Workers Federation protested against the "government-controlled" COB through its peasant affiliated Local Agrarian Federation (Federación Agraria Local), but the latter soon lost influence to MNR-dominated *sindicatos campesinos*.

LABOR UNDER THE MNR

Beginning in 1952, labor's role in national affairs became increasingly important. The principle of *cogobierno* established by President Paz conferred the right upon trade unions to submit the names of candidates for the portfolios of the ministries of Labor and Social Security, Mines and Petroleum, Transport and Rural Affairs. The Minister of Mines and Petroleum has usually been nominated by the miners' union; the Minister of Rural Affairs, by *sindicatos campesinos;* the Minister of Labor, by the factory workers' union; and the Minister of Transport, by the railway workers' union. COB leader Ñuflo Chávez was named Minister of Rural Affairs; and Germán Butrón a key figure in the factory workers' union, became Minister of Labor. Juan Lechín, Executive Secretary of COB and leader of the miners' union, was assigned the portfolio of Minister of Mines and Petroleum. He was later replaced by another representative of the miners, Mario Torres.

In the 1955 Cabinet of President Paz, three ministers were leaders or executive officers in different trade unions. Two of these were at the same time members of the COB National Executive Committee.

The expansion of the labor movement and its key position in politics has created a proliferation of "professional" labor leaders. Most have used their trade union posts as stepping stones to political careers and as bases for the all-important operation of cultivating highly placed personal contacts. There is little communication between the membership at large and union officials, although "true representation" is a favorite subject of mutual recrimination in all echelons of the trade union movement. However, most union officials are careful to groom their personal appeal and to cultivate sufficient personal contact to elicit the desired response from union members in case of calls for strikes or demonstrations. There is, therefore, no shortage of meetings and assemblies during which union officials address the members in rousing and dramatic terms.

By 1962 very few unionists had begun to realize the responsibility of workers, both as an organized group and individually, in the task

of economic recovery. Those who have, almost never find it politically expedient to enlighten the workers on the subject. Satirizing the cult of the "professional" labor leader, a columnist in the newspaper *La Tarde* facetiously suggested the formation of a trade union for trade union leaders which would further the following objectives of its members: to become a trade union leader; to become a deputy in the National Assembly; to have a telephone "with good connections"; meticulously to observe Labor Day and praise the virtues of hard work.

The lack of discipline among trade union officials and their repeated abuses of trade union immunity has been noted even by COB. Because of the generous interpretation of the *fuero sindical* (special legal privileges applicable to union officials), legal action against trade union officials is rarely brought although some have used their union positions to engage in illegal activities and subversion. In 1959 the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB) brought charges against trade union officials for actions designed to incite workers to strike. In June 1961 Castroist union officials encouraged mine workers to stage an armed march on the capital as a prelude to a general revolution. President Paz ordered the jailing of the unionists involved, in spite of protests from miners and factory workers.

Only a handful of trade unionists have had training in the practical and theoretical aspects of labor organization. Some training scholarships and liaison visits for unionists have been arranged by the United States. The Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as Red China and Cuba, have also invited visits to their countries for training purposes. The exact number of unionists in the country trained under these auspices is not known.

The miner's and *campesinos*' militias and armed units of other large trade unions have become permanent features of organized labor. Once considered the MNR's main sources of physical support in ascending to and retaining power, they had by 1962 turned into "mailed fists" of *sindicato campesino* bosses or of labor leaders in various mines. The government's concern with these paramilitary units as potential threats to national unity and public order is reflected in the Constitution of 1961 which orders their incorporation into the army as reserves. It is not known, however, to what extent or how effectively this constitutional provision has been implemented.

The COB

Dynamics

The national council of the COB has, since 1952, been the main theater of the struggle between pro-government MNR unionists and the followers of PIR, POR and PCB. Great differences emerged during the various workers congresses when the advocates of the

respective ideologies presented their versions of the country's *raison d'être* and of the solution of economic, social and international problems.

Although MNR's control over the COB seemed firm enough in 1952, the preoccupation with national affairs of its representatives in COB created a vacuum in the organization which union leaders of rival ideological groups, mainly those of the Trotskyite POR, readily took advantage. The Trotskyites succeeded in securing several key positions in the COB so that they virtually controlled the organization during the first 9 months of 1952. The editorship of COB's press organ *Rebelión* went to former POR member José Zegada. The publication in this paper of an editorial which defined the ideological creed of the Bolivian worker in terms of Marxist class war precipitated the first crisis between the MNR leaders and the Trotskyite key figures of the COB. COB Executive Secretary Juan Lechín, although he was known to have formerly sympathized with the Trotskyites, emphatically declared that the statement does not represent COB's official view. Adding to the conflict was an open letter by the Trotskyite leaders in the COB to President Paz, demanding nationalization of the mines without compensation to the previous owners and their exclusive control by the miners. MNR's leadership in the COB reasserted itself, however, during the First Workers Congress in 1954. Lechín's keynote speech stressed the role of workers, *campesinos* and the middle class in national affairs and praised MNR's policies on behalf of workers. The statement of COB's official principles adopted by the Congress endorsed the government's agrarian and educational reforms, the liquidation of monopolies and the nationalization of certain enterprises with compensation to the former owners.

The next years witnessed a general decline of the influence of the Trotskyites in the labor movement, largely because of the schism within the POR (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). The role of PCB union leaders who were members of the orthodox communist party was also negligible, although Communists wielded some influence over the members of some rural *sindicatos*, the railway workers, the La Paz locals of factory workers and over certain members of the miner's union. The influence of trade union leaders associated with POR, whose influence extended over some *sindicatos campesinos* in the Cochabamba area and over the white-collar workers' unions until about early 1954, also gradually declined. In 1955, COB's National Executive Committee included no POR Trotskyites or Communists, mainly because many former members of these parties joined the MNR. Among the top-level COB leaders, however, ideological rivalries among MNR representatives and former members of POR and PIR continued. Personal and political jealousies of long standing

and opposing views with regard to government policies helped to prepare the ground for a major schism. The controversy exploded in June 1957 during and after COB's Second Workers Congress, which split into four factions. One represented former members of the POR and some trade unions, including the miners' federation dominated by Juan Lechín and original MNR members. The second major faction was composed of delegates from unions led by ex-members of PIR. The other two factions included active POR members and members of the PCB, respectively.

The leading issue concerned the adoption of a statement of principles which was to reflect COB's stand on various aspects of government policy, notably on the scope and extent of COB's participation in the government under the institution of *cogobierno*. The version of the POR-Lechín group, which eventually emerged as the strongest element of the Congress, favored the continuation of the MNR-COB *cogobierno* but criticized the presence of right-wing politicians in the MNR and urged a more active role for unions. In the field of foreign policy the statement denounced United States "imperialism" and urged hemispheric unity, particularly in view of an "inevitable" World War III. The version of the ex-PIR members was more moderate but also favored giving labor a larger share in the affairs of government. It endorsed the acceptance of United States economic aid, with certain limitations. This version earned the support of the Communist delegates, who were eager to oppose Lechín. The resolution of the active members of POR urged the replacement of the COB-MNR *cogobierno* by a Marxian workers-*campesinos* government. When the POR-Lechín version of the resolution was accepted by the majority, the Lechín group formed a new executive committee which included only their own supporters.

Nearly all union representatives agreed to COB's issuing a general strike order for July 1957 in protest against President Hernan Siles' stabilization program. After the adjournment of the Congress, however, the unions whose delegates failed to assert themselves during the Congress continued the conflict by refusing to honor COB's strike call. The dissenting unions included the construction, railway, factory and petroleum workers' unions. The members of the Commercial Employees Federation (Federación de Empleados de Comercio) in La Paz joined the protesting unions over the opposition of their leader, Trotskyite Edwin Moller, a supporter of Lechín. Subsequently, the former PIR trade union leaders aligned themselves with President Siles in the conflict between the latter and the ex-POR Trotskyite labor leaders, including Lechín, Ñuflo Chávez and Edwin Moller, and pledged their support of the stabilization program. The schism widened when the dissident unions organized a rival commit-

tee which was joined by several unions who had opposed the POR-Lechín group during the Second Workers Congress.

During 1958 the ex-POR-Lechín group launched vigorous attacks against President Siles and the unions supporting his policies. The dissident unions thereupon intensified their activities, particularly among miners. Meetings held under their auspices were often violently broken up by supporters of Lechín's group. In April 1958 the infighting centered in the miners' union, a longtime stronghold of Lechín. The unions supporting President Siles formed the Bloc for the Reorganization of the FSTMB (Bloque de Reorganización de la FSTMB) which was joined by the large unions of Colquiri, Huanuni and Quechisla. The Bloque denounced Lechín and other FSTMB leaders, refused to recognize the current officers of the federation and declared itself to be the truly representative union of miners, in rivalry with FSTMB. The existence of the Bloque was temporary, but the friction within the miners' union still continued in 1962.

Within the COB, too, the personal and ideological differences continued, although in most cases they took the form of heated theoretical deliberations. Most union leaders came to regard Lechín's leading role in the COB at least as acceptable although far from gratifying. COB's National Executive Committee (Central Ejecutivo Nacional - CEN) included members of the various factions of the MNR as well as Falangists and members of the Communist PCB. The majority, however, supported the MNR left-wing, generally identified with Lechín.

Communist agitation was intense and the pressure to pass resolutions containing the Communists' recommendations was powerful during the Third Workers Congress in May 1962. Ultimately, however, the influence of Lechín and his supporters prevailed, although Lechín's speech was in agreement with several of the measures advocated by the Communists. For example, he urged the acceptance of a $150 million-dollar credit from the Soviet Union and denounced the Alliance for Progress as a scheme which "defrauds" the Bolivian people.

Departing from its earlier stand on the issue of confiscatory nationalization versus indemnification of former owners, the Congress demanded the suspension of indemnification payments to the former owners of the tin mines. The delegates also rejected the 1962 scale of minimum wages and demanded that the wages be adjusted more realistically to the costs of living. In external matters, the Congress advocated cooperation with all peoples on the basis of strict observance of the principle of nonintervention.

In June 1962, COB declared its unanimous support of the Cuban revolution and, at the same time, announced plans for a general strike protesting the proposed sale of stockpiled tin by the United States.

The strike was also to protest the rise in electricity rates (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

International Relations

Since the organization of COB, it has gone no farther than to establish liaison with external labor organizations, although some of its key officials have favored affiliation with extreme leftist and rightist regional labor organizations. José Zegada, who became editor of *Rebelión* in 1952, attended the Congress of Communist-ruled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1953. Mario Torres, Secretary General of FSTMB, was active in the Peronist Committee for Latin American Labor Unity (Comité de Unidad Sindical Latinoamericano), in 1952. However, COB sent representatives to the meetings of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and a delegation in 1957 to visit ORIT headquarters in Mexico City.

Since 1960, COB and its individual affiliates have continued their contracts with labor organizations of Latin American countries as well as with those of the United States and other foreign countries. By the end of 1962, however, COB had not formally affiliated with any major international labor organization, mainly because such a move would precipitate further internal crises among an already ideologically divided leadership. For the same reason, it has also abstained from committing itself to becoming a member of a new Latin American regional labor federation backer by Castro, although some of its delegates, including the miners' union's secretary general Mario Torres, attended the charter meeting of that organization in September 1962. During the 1960's, some individual trade unions have affiliated with international trade secretaries some of which, although technically independent, maintain close associations with the anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. For example, the Bolivian Postal Trade Union Federation (Federación Sindical Postal Boliviana—FESPOST) joined the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI), and the Long Distance Drivers Union became a member of the International Transport Workers Federation. Others have joined the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees and the International Petroleum Workers Federation. Because of these affiliations tensions have at time arisen between the affiliating unions and their central confederations. Since 1962, ORIT has also maintained an office in Bolivia.

The exchange, in 1961 and 1962, of visits between Bolivian and foreign trade unionists was fairly active; exchange visits with Communists countries and Cuba have been more frequent than those with the non-Communist world. In July 1961 the Central Committee of

the USSR Construction Workers Union invited the La Paz local of the Trade Union Confederation of Construction Workers of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores en Construcción de Bolivia) to visit the Soviet Union. The Departmental Labor Federation of Cochabamba (Confederación Obrera Departmental) also accepted eight travel grants to Cuba. Delegates of the Central Council of Labor Unions of the USSR and delegates of the East German trade union movement visited Cochabamba in May 1962. Contact with non-Communist trade unions included a visit to the FSTMB by a representative of the International Metal Workers Federation in September 1962.

Organization

In 1962, COB had some 27 national affiliates. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in 1962, these represented nearly 400 separate trade unions. Three types of union organizations exist—organization by industry, by craft or by geographic area. Within the COB the unions are divided into seven councils, according to type of industry and occupation. In 1957 and 1958 there were central councils for workers in extractive industries, industrial workers, workers in transportation and communication, salaried workers, intellectuals, farmers, and for miscellaneous groups including craft workers, tenants and vendors. Because organizations in the remote areas of the country have found it difficult and often impossible to send delegates to the frequent council meetings, COB appoints deputies in La Paz to represent these unions. This policy has been the source of much controversy and has led some union delegates to call the La Paz deputies *líderes sin bases* (leaders without followers). According to its charter, COB holds veto powers over its affiliates, but this power has practically never been invoked.

The National Executive Committee (CEN), consisting of the Executive Secretary and 22 assistant secretaries (one from each of the major affiliates), represents COB in public acts, administers finances and arbitrates in controversies among affiliates. The Executive Secretary of the CEN is officially considered the head of the trade union movement.

COB's policy-making body is the National Workers Congress which convenes, according to official rules, every 2 years. However, since the establishment of COB in 1952 only three congresses have been called. At the Congress, workers are represented by delegates from affiliated federations and from every regional union, by members of the CEN and by labor members of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly is designed to fill the place of the National Congress when the latter is not in session and to implement the policies drafted by the Congress. Representation in the Assembly is made

up of members of the CEN, leaders of the central councils, and those ministers who have come from the ranks of organized labor. According to official rules, the Assembly convenes every month, but in practice, its meetings are much less frequent. The organization of affiliates is patterned after that of COB, with national executive committees, national congresses and regional groups. These bodies establish their own rules and draft their own plans for their respective activities.

COB is financed by government and private donations and by dues from affiliates, which vary depending on the size and financial status of the individual unions. Although dues are small, some unions, particularly the smaller ones, are often delinquent in meeting their quotas. Dues are collected by the check-off system whereby employer deducts union dues from wages. This practice, however, is not uniform, and in most cases the collections are highly irregular. Some union activities, notably the building of social centers, have been subsidized by government funds derived from special revenues, notably taxes on theater tickets.

The National Unions

The FSTMB

Oldest and most influential of the country's labor organizations, FSTMB, the miners' union, has faced growing problems of internal disunity during the 1960's. Intense Communist agitation in some locals, especially in those representing workers of the nationalized mines, and a tendency to localism among individual unions have rendered the guiding and consolidating role of the central council difficult. Adding to the complexities which accompany the operations of the FSTMB is the role and character of Juan Lechín the union's Executive Secretary and leader. He has, at times, drawn sharp criticism from local left-wing FSTMB leaders because of his identification—however cautious—with President Paz' policies. At the same time, his defense of FSTMB Communists and their interests in the face of tentative government action against them enable him to maintain control over the large segment of far left-wing members of the union.

Most of the real power of the organization lies with the local leaders of the unions who represent the workers of the large, government-owned mines, notably Siglo XX, Catavi, Colquiri, Huanuni, San Jose and Potosí. These unions include about one-half of the federation's membership, which is variously estimated at between 50,000 and 60,000. The local leaders, many of whom have attained considerable political power in certain areas, customarily draft union policies affecting local affairs without consulting with the central FSTMB. The members' loyalty and support extends to these local leaders rather

than to the national union. Although the Federation generally dispatches representatives to conciliate the frequent disputes of the local unions with COMIBOL, its efforts in order to be effective, usually require the personal intervention of Lechín. The miners in the small, privately owned mines (where union membership usually varies between 25 and 100) also have little contact with the FSTMB, partly because in these mines labor disputes tend to be less frequent.

The agitation of Communists has been a major source of the disputes between FSTMB's leadership and the locals. Communist influence is particularly strong in the Siglo XX mine under the leadership of Federico Escóbar who has been elected union representative to management (*control obrero*). Escóbar has been responsible for inciting the workers to strike and to perform acts of sabotage against COMIBOL. A hunger strike of 25 unemployed miners in the spring of 1962 and a subsequent arbitrary takeover of one of the ore concentration plants in Catavi by miners, both under Escóbar's leadership, severely handicapped the operation of that mine and caused great financial losses. In July 1961, Escóbar was responsible for the attack by Communist miners on the Catholic Pio XII radio station in Catavi which developed into a major clash between Escóbar supporters and Catholic miners. Escóbar's activities compelled COMIBOL to request his indictment by President Paz on the grounds of subversion and crimes against the nation. The general unrest among Siglo XX miners after COMIBOL's request prompted Lechín and his secretary general, Mario Torres, to assure the miners via radio that they would not permit Escóbar's indictment.

A special conference of the FSTMB was called in January 1962 in Oruro to consider such major issues as adjustment of wages, unemployment, the unsatisfactory distribution of commissary goods, social security and COMIBOL operations. However, the major preoccupation of the conference was to stem Communist attempts, under the leadership of Escóbar and his supporters, to control the proceedings and force the passage of Communist-sponsored resolutions. Taking advantage of Lechín's temporary absence from the country, the Communists urged the adoption of a declaration of solidarity with Castro and threatened general violence if government plans to sever relations with Cuba materialized. On the issue of the rehabilitation of COMIBOL operations, either through the Triangular Plan (Operación Triángular), sponsored by the United States and West Germany, or through credits from the Soviet Union, Escóbar threatened violent strike action if the latter alternative was rejected (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). The general confusion and unrest precipitated by the Communist agitation prompted the FSTMB's Executive Committee to offer its resignation en bloc. However, they withdrew their offer after a general vote of confidence given them by all delegates but

those representing the Siglo XX miners' union. The non-Communist elements, under the leadership of Mario Torres, finally gained control of the conference.

Other Major Unions

The General Confederation of Factory Workers of Bolivia (Confederación General de Trabajadores Fabriles de Bolivia—CGTFB) is considered the second largest union, with about 35,000 members in 1957. The Communists have infiltrated both the central and the local leadership of this union and have used it as a platform to denounce government policies. During the early 1960's the union's main subject of agitation was the near-bankrupt state of many manufacturing enterprises and the effect of this state on the working conditions and wages of factory workers.

The Trade Union Confederation of Railway and Airline Workers and Workers of Related Occupations (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Ferroviarios, Transportes Aereos y Ramas Anexas) also represents electric utility and telephone workers. Its claimed membership exceeded 20,000 in 1962. Under the leadership of Juan Sanjinés, its Executive Secretary, this union has more cohesion than most others. It has tended to act independently of COB, particularly since Sanjinés has often found himself in controversy with Lechín, who has shown less than usual determination to assert COB's and his own authority. Communist agitators in some locals have exploited this situation to attack COB policies and to agitate for the nationalization of the railroads. In 1962, however, the influence of Communist officials diminished within some railroad locals.

The Trade Union Confederation of Chauffeurs of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical de Choferes de Bolivia), which includes long-distance truck drivers, claims an increase in membership from 15,000 in 1954 to about 20,000 in 1962. Its national leadership has generally supported the policies of President Paz. Among its affiliated unions, the intercity bus drivers and long-distance truck drivers affiliated, in 1962, with the International Transport Workers Federation, a non-Communist international trade secretariat. The long-distance drivers also joined the ORIT. Some of its locals, on the other hand, are affiliates of the Communist-ruled WFTU.

The Trade Union Confederation of Construction Workers of Bolivia represents some 15,000 construction workers, a figure which is highly questionable because of the seasonal nature of construction employment. The lack of job security and the low pay of construction workers has rendered this union highly susceptible to Communist penetration. Communists have succeeded in securing the union's key positions which they use as a platform to agitate against the government. Concentrating mainly on agitation, Communist union officials rarely

address themselves to employers, although most construction enterprises are privately owned.

In October 1962 the union held a special meeting to condemn the United States for its attitude in the Cuban crisis. They renewed their pledge of support to the Cuban revolution and denounced the action of the United States as "aggressive and irresponsible."

The petroleum workers are represented by the Trade Union Federation of Petroleum Workers (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Petroleros) and by the National Federation of Petroleum Workers of Private Companies of Bolivia (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Petroleros de Companias Privadas de Bolivia). The latter, which is a member of the Anti-Communist International Petroleum Workers Federation, has a membership of about 1,500. One of the few trade unions not affiliated with COB, the Private Petroleum Workers Union has kept relatively aloof from politics, concentrated on issues involving membership welfare and practices collective bargaining regularly.

The Trade Union Federation of Petroleum Workers, with a membership of about 10,000, represents workers of the nationalized petroleum industries. This union has tended to be moderate in its demands for wages and benefits, has supported the government's economic policies and has remained relatively immune to attempts at Communist infiltration.

Among white-collar workers' unions, the most influential is the Confederation of Bolivian Teachers (Confederación de Maestros de Bolivia), with approximately over 30,000 members. The membership includes part-time teachers, some of whom teach only one class per day. Communists and FSB members both have sought to assert their influence over the union. The Communists have been successful in some of the locals, although more moderate elements prevail in the important local unions of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Tarija. Moreover, the leadership of the Urban Teachers Federation of La Paz, which represents nearly one-half of the membership, is not dominated by Communists.

Sindicatos Campesinos

In its efforts to build mass support, the MNR early and determinedly pressed the organization of the agricultural labor force, including tenant farmers. The rural workers organized before 1952 were almost solidly behind the MNR, and their armed units, along with those of the miners, figured prominently in the coup of 1952 (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics; ch. 25, Public Order).

Since the revolution their state of organization and development has expanded until the membership of the *sindicatos campesinos* probably closely approximates the total adult male farming population (or at least all heads of families) in the more densely settled departments.

They are organizationally subordinate to the National Federation of Rural Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), and their control and welfare are the particular concern of the Ministry of Rural Affairs.

Despite their name (*sindicato* is usually translated as "union"), their nature and function do not correspond to those usually associated with organized labor. They do, however, constitute a formidable association of pressure groups, by and large supporting the revolutionary principles of the MNR. Units of their militias have been employed in public security duty; others, under the sway of strong leaders who have attained the status of local warlords, have opposed the MNR regime on occasion. Also, some *sindicatos* have shown themselves susceptible to Communist infiltration (see ch. 25 Public Order). The loyalty of the *campesino* to his local leader is firm, and such leaders join with and frequently direct the operations of appointed officials and party chiefs in local governmental functions. The majority of the *sindicatos campesinos* in 1962 still generally supported the MNR, largely because of President Paz' popularity among the farmers, many of whom refer to him with gratitude as "El Liberador."

LEGISLATION

Rights and procedures governing labor organization, somewhat revised by law, and considerably revised in practice since the advent of the MNR government in 1952, are contained in the Busch Labor Code enacted in 1942. The right of labor to organize and the special legal status of union officials (*fuero sindical*) in the course of legitimate trade union activities are also guaranteed in the Constitution of 1961. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code forbid employers to interfere directly or indirectly with trade union activities. The Code also protects union officials from arbitrary transfers from one job or location to another without their prior consent. The *fuero sindical* was first granted in 1944, but was rarely enforced before the MNR revolution of 1952.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code stress the duties and rights as well as the essentially economic and social character of trade unionism. The Code forbids unions to participate in political activities, but that provision is never enforced, and since 1952, unions have, in fact, been encouraged to engage in politics. According to legislation passed in 1951, trade union officials may not be members of the National Assembly or holders of Cabinet posts—a provision which has been disregarded since the revolution.

The Code authorizes all types of unions, but specifies that craft unions must have at least 20 members and that industrial unions must comprise at least 50 percent of the employees of an enterprise. How-

ever, the government has not interfered with the formation of unions which did not have the required minimum number of members. Rules governing the organization and activities of *sindicatos campesinos* are embodied in the Agrarian Reform Act of 1953. According to the Labor Code, public employees may not organize, but unions for such employees have been formed without government objection.

Trade unions, to be officially recognized, must obtain corporate status by submitting an application to the Ministry of Labor. Certified documents containing rules, structural organization, officers and membership must be included with the application. Unions must also submit to the General Inspectorate of Labor accounts of their incomes and expenditures. A decree issued in 1948 requiring prior approval by the Ministry of Labor of all trade union charters has practically never been enforced since 1952.

According to law, trade unions must be managed by a committee whose members are Bolivian citizens by birth. Meetings of the managing committee are to be attended by a labor inspector, but this provision has always been theoretical only. Trade unions may be dissolved by the government if they fail to comply with the provisions of the Labor Code or if they have been inactive for more than a year. However, no trade unions have been suspended for these reasons since 1952.

Extensive legislation governs the process of conciliation and arbitration, but its application has been sporadic. Trade unions are required to submit a statement of grievances to the labor inspector. The measures proposed by the trade union for the redress of grievances must be approved by at least three-fourths of the union members. The parties engaged in the dispute must then appoint representatives to form a board of conciliation. The labor inspector who presides over the conciliation board must refrain from voicing an opinion or voting on the dispute. If agreement cannot be reached, the dispute must be referred to an arbitration board, which must render a decision within 15 days. The board is made up of one member from each of the disputing parties (but not from among persons directly involved in the dispute) and is presided over by a high-level labor authority. If the latter is not available, it is customary to ask an influential local politician to preside over the board. The verdict of the arbitrators must be accepted as binding only if it is agreed to by the disputing parties, if the dispute affects essential public services or if the government reaffirms the verdict. No action by the trade unions may be taken on matters involving the award as long as the arbitration agreement remains in force.

Labor courts are located in every department to handle individual grievances. Judges of labor courts may also enter arbitration and

conciliation procedures, but their role is primarily interpretative with relation to laws, contracts and social welfare legislation.

Strikes are recognized by the Constitution as lawful "defensive measures" by workers. The Labor Code defines "strike" as a peaceful suspension of work and prohibits general strikes, sympathy strikes and the suspension of work in public services. A strike, in order to be considered lawful, must be preceded by arbitration and conciliation. Moreover, the strike must be agreed to in advance by three-fourths of the employees, and management must be informed 5 days in advance of the planned strike. If the strike is ruled illegal, employers are not obliged to pay wages and are entitled to dismiss workers who participate in an illegal strike for more than 3 days. If a general strike occurs notwithstanding legal provisions, the government may declare a state of siege.

LABOR RELATIONS

The dramatic change in the status of Bolivian workers from severe oppression (often including physical maltreatment) during the 1920's and 1930's to complete emancipation in 1952 has not appreciably altered the unsatisfactory course of labor relations. The workers, disease-ridden, ill-fed, poorly housed and mostly illiterate, continue to blame their employers for the depressed conditions under which they must live and work. Employers, on the other hand, find few reasons to abandon their customary mistrust and suspicion of workers, whose apathy and absenteeism have been aggravated by an increasing lack of discipline since the 1952 revolution. In the rural areas, tenant farmers and laborers have been treated with benevolent paternalism by the landlords--a situation which prevailed in spite of the land reform in some areas, notably in Santa Cruz. In general, however, rural workers since 1952 have looked to local political bosses (*coudillos*) and the *sindicatos campesinos* for the solution of problems affecting their personal welfare.

Violence or attempted violence against members of management is a typical feature of labor relations in situations involving dismissals or delinquency in paying wages. Two members of the British management of the Bolivian sector of the Bolivian-Chilean railroad line were held as hostages by railroad workers of Uyuni when they announced the discharge of 32 Bolivian workers in an attempt to reduce the excess labor force on the railroad line. Angry workers nearly lynched 2 managers of the firm Bolinca when they announced that because of lack of funds the firm had to dismiss 71 out of 90 workers without payment of social security benefits.

Employers' associations, notably the National Chamber of Commerce, the National Chamber of Industry and the National Chamber

of Mining, all located in La Paz, serve mainly to advance the economic interests of their members. To date they have not engaged in programs or activities designed to improve labor relations, although the organizations have, at times, represented employers in collective bargaining negotiations.

The Control Obrero

The MNR has long advocated the policy of giving workers a share in the management of enterprises. In the government-owned establishments (notably in the COMIBOL mines) workers elect a *control obrero* (workers' control delegate) to represent them in matters affecting working conditions, enterprise efficiency, workers' welfare and personnel problems. The *control obrero* may veto management decisions if they violate labor contracts or legal provisions granting social benefits, but he must refrain from using the veto in cases involving technical decisions. The position and functions of the *control obrero* have been the source of much controversy. In many cases he has refused to observe the limitations governing the use of his veto power and has often interfered with the management's technical decisions, further reducing an already low productivity. In other cases, the *control obrero* has used his position to incite workers against management and to encourage strikes.

In the case of the government-owned Siglo XX mine, Communist Federico Escóbar has secured the position of *control obrero* and has used his position to create major labor disturbances throughout the mine. In the COMIBOL mines, the delegates have been the main objectors to the nationalization of the mining force and insisted on the retention of an excessive number of miners per job. They have also repeatedly called trade union meetings during working hours and have been involved in the falsification of overtime records. In 1958, COMIBOL delegates had to be dismissed by order of President Siles, because of repeated abuses of their functions.

Although the system of workers' delegates was originally intended for COMIBOL mines only, it was later extended to other government-owned enterprises and public offices. In the late 1950's, delegates also operated in ministries and several nationalized enterprises. On the higher organizational level of businesses, notably on the board of directors of some government and private corporations, labor is represented by a *director obrero*, elected from the local trade union.

Collective Bargaining

The right of organized workers to bargain collectively is recognized in the Constitution, and the process of collective bargaining is set forth in detail in the Labor Code. The process is also officially encouraged by the government, but in practice, little use is made of

collective bargaining. Such instances as exist are mostly confined to unions representing workers of private industries and enterprises. Subjects which generally form the basis of collective bargaining are submitted by the trade unions to management in the form of demands along with an implicit or direct threat that a strike will follow if the demands are not met.

To promote cooperation between management and labor, President Siles, in 1957, urged the delegates of the Second Workers Congress to organize a joint committee of workers and government representatives to propose measures designed to improve labor relations and to solve outstanding economic problems, but the Congress failed to respond to the President's suggestion. In 1959, an attempt was made by the Departmental Chamber of Industry and the Departmental Federation of Factory Workers of Cochabamba to organize a joint labor-management committee. No information is available regarding the achievements, if any, of this meeting.

Conciliation and Arbitration

A majority of unions rarely resort to conciliation and arbitration, although according to law they are compulsory before a strike is declared. In the private mines and the private sector of the petroleum industry, conciliation and arbitration are practiced more often. In such cases, it is customary for the representative of the Ministry of Labor to vote on the side of workers. When a labor dispute arises, the government has often settled the demands involved (usually in favor of labor) by executive decree in order to avoid a strike.

In the nationalized sector of the economy, notably in COMIBOL mines, the government endeavors to settle disputes by direct negotiation between the management of COMIBOL and the local of the miners' union which threatens to strike. The union generally sends a delegation to La Paz to solicit the support of the central FSTMB in presenting the demands to COMIBOL. In some cases, COMIBOL representatives have traveled to the mines to investigate the causes for complaint. COMIBOL President Guillermo Bedregal was threatened with violence by dissatisfied miners during his visit in June 1962 to the Siglo XX mine in Catavi. The mine is notorious for bad working conditions, including substandard housing, sale of spoiled food in the commissaries and high disease rates among the miners.

Strikes

In spite of the government's strenuous efforts to maintain the industrial peace, strikes have been frequent since 1952, though their number diminished in 1961 and 1962. In 1958, when the majority of unions protested against the stabilization program, there were only 136 days of production in industry (including mining) during the

entire year. In 1960 more than 400 strikes were called, but some were minor ones, not involving much loss of working time. The indiscriminate use of strike on the part of organized labor has been inadvertantly encouraged by the government's policy to grant strike pay to workers even in case of illegal work stoppages, despite provisions of the Labor Code to the contrary.

Dissatisfaction with wages and benefits are the most frequent causes of strikes, although Communist agitation is a major factor in some of them. Strikes involving wages and benefits are often "justified" inasmuch as many firms, both private and nationalized, are usually in arrears with wage and social security payments for reasons of near-bankruptcy. The government, whenever it has intervened to settle strikes, has generally upheld the workers' demands. Also, whenever possible it has subsidized near-bankrupt private firms to enable them to meet their obligation to workers and to continue operations. However, many of its own enterprises, including COMIBOL, have been in arrears with social security and medical payments because of lack of funds. In a 1962 strike of textile workers in the Fábrica Soligno, invloving overdue benefits and inadequate working conditions, the government obtained a $500,000 loan from the United States Agency for International Development (AID) to rehabilitate the plant and to end the strike.

Major labor disturbances in 1962 included a nationwide teachers' strike in September. The nearly month-long strike was accompanied by extensive public violence, prompting the government to dispatch police and army units and to issue an official warning to the strikers. Indications are that extreme left-wing agitators were active in the strike which was originally called to protest against the low salaries of teachers.

A strike of about 1,000 miners of the Siglo XX mine in July 1962 was ostensibly called for an increase in benefits although Communist agitation turned it into a protest demonstration against the Triangular Plan (a rehabilitation project for COMIBOL, sponsored by the United States, West Germany and others) (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Political feuding between *sindicato campesino* boss Toribio Salas and his opponents precipitated a "*campesino* strike" in January 1962 involving several thousand *campesinos* and accompanied by much violence and damage to property. The strike, which took the form of a farmers' blockade of La Paz caused serious food shortages in the capital and was vigorously denounced by the metropolitan press (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

CHAPTER 22

DOMESTIC TRADE

The contribution of trade to the national economy can be assessed only inaccurately because of the absence of data. According to estimates of the United States Agency for International Development (AID), foreign and domestic trade has accounted for an annual average of 12.6 percent and transportation 8.6 percent of the gross domestic product of the country during the past decade. Although the contribution of trade has remained almost constant, at about $46 million annually during recent years, transportation has shown a slow but steady increase from $29.4 million in 1955 to $31.8 million in 1961. The increase has been caused by improved road conditions and growing volume of truck transport.

Trade, similar to other economic activities, exists on two separate levels in Bolivia. The trade of cities, mining regions and areas along communication lines depends heavily on goods and prices of the world market; trade in scattered rural settlements, kept remote from national economic activities by absence of transportation facilities or by self-imposed isolation, exists in its most rudimentary form, almost unaffected by the outside world. Change in the socioeconomic status of the Indian as a result of the 1953 agrarian reform and expansion of the road network have brought these two segments of the economy somewhat closer to each other. Much time will have to elapse, however, before domestic trade can assume a coordinated national character. At present, domestic trade patterns on a national scale have only begun to merge in government planning documents, and the various regions of the country remain, to a large extent, commercially self-contained. A large portion of the commercial products entering or leaving the various regions are part of the nation's export-import trade, and are closely geared to the supply and demand in the field of foreign trade.

High distribution costs, caused mainly by inadequacies of the transportation system, lack of adequate storage facilities and a general desire for excessive profits, work to retard the development of nationally organized domestic trade. The country's surface transportation system, designed to serve the urban-industrial region, has been extremely expensive to build and maintain. In addition, technical

difficulties and political pressures have reduced the usefulness of the railroad system since the 1952 revolution. The road network, however, has improved with the assistance of United States technical and financial participation. Extensive breakage and pilferage, occurring at points of transfer of goods from one means of transportation to another, has not only added to the cost of transportation and insurance, but has also discouraged many foreign firms from engaging in legitimate business with Bolivians and supplied the black market with a continuous flow of goods. Although the black market represents a considerable portion of domestic trade in the urban-industrial areas, it has had little adverse effect on the average retailer or merchant who usually finds the means to take an appropriate share in it.

STRUCTURE OF TRADE

Wholesale

Wholesale trade is found almost exclusively in the urban-industrial segment of the economy and is concentrated in La Paz where large import firms have their main offices and warehouses, and where the bulk of industrial establishments are also located. Large import houses frequently act as representatives of manufacturers; hence, distribution of industrial goods on the wholesale level is fairly well concentrated in the hands of a few persons, most of whom are foreigners. Perhaps the largest export-import firm also engaged in extensive distribution on the wholesale and retail level is W. R. Grace and Company of New York which possesses a network of local distributors who serve also as collectors of local produce. Other foreign firms include International Harvester, Toyota (Japanese), Williams Brothers, Gulf Oil Company and various automobile manufacturers.

Some members of the traditional elite invested in trade before 1952, and more did so after the 1953 agrarian reform deprived them of their land. In the Cochabamba area, for example, almost all wholesale trade in farm products is in the hands of former *hacienda* owners or their families. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to identify wholesalers as a class. The group is of complex social and ethnic composition in which whites and *mestizos* dominate.

The uncertainties of transport and business administration make it impossible for wholesalers to specialize in any single line of merchandise, but rather to handle a large variety of goods so that those in ample supply can compensate for those not available at a given time. Only a few of the largest commercial houses have departmentalized structures and handle specific lines of merchandise on their own premises.

Although wholesalers in general rely on middlemen and retailers in the distribution of merchandise, manufacturers and their representa-

tives franchise many agents from the local residents of towns and villages, authorizing them to take orders and, in some cases, also to deliver goods.

Storage facilities are scarce and generally inadequate. A few large commercial houses operate warehouses of their own, and some imported goods can be stored temporarily in warehouses operated by the customs authorities. Because of the limited capacity of government warehouses, merchants are forced to move their goods within a limited time, usually 30 days, or pay stiff fees for extended storage. Goods not withdrawn from the customhouses within a maximum storage period, usually 90 days, are considered abandoned and are sold at public auctions.

Retail

Retail sale of foreign or domestic consumer goods of industrial origin is handled by specialized shops in the largest cities, by representatives of manufacturers in other communities regardless of size, by general stores, and, in the case of handicrafts, also by the producers themselves. In La Paz and some of the other large cities, there exist a large number of street hawkers who engage in selling on the streets in their spare time, perhaps only for a few hours a day, but who, nevertheless, dispose of a considerable volume of industrial goods such as ball-point pens, cigarettes, candy and, occasionally, clothing. The itinerant vendor of the rural areas, a familiar figure for centuries, is gradually being replaced by middlemen who travel by car or truck and franchize owners of general stores or individual representatives from among the local residents.

No department stores or supermarkets exist. The very few highly specialized shops in large cities handle such items as electronic products, auto parts, books and pharmaceutical products; but many specialized shops, particularly those in small towns, profit from occurring shortages by carrying goods not strictly related to their specialty. A bookstore, for example, may carry a small stock of appliances to fill the gap between shipments of such goods to the appliance distributor. Delay in delivery of goods on the wholesale level or in the course of internal distribution is a common phenomenon and results in temporary shortages frequently lasting weeks or even months.

The distribution of foreign agricultural goods closely follows the distribution pattern of industrial goods in the urban-industrial regions, but seldom penetrates the rural-agricultural areas, which, except for sugar and salt, can subsist on their own produce. "Food for Peace" wheat flour, canned powdered milk, rice and other items penetrate the rural market at high prices. Because this is illegal and declining in volume, the distribution system is not easily discernable.

Domestic farm products and goods originating with the handicraft industry are sold directly to customers or retailers in nearby cities and to truckers and middlemen in places remote from urban centers. Small merchants and truckers purchase from producers and haul goods to their own permanent stalls in the city markets, or they sell their goods to local grocers, butchers, bakeries and other retailers. In the more prosperous farming areas frequently, and in other parts of the country occasionally, a producer will personally carry his goods by truck or bus over a long distance to combine marketing with the purchase of goods not available in his area or with social calls on friends and relatives. Improvement and expansion of the road system during the past 10 years has increased the volume of direct farm-to-market sales and has involved a growing number of farmers in market activities.

One of the most common and popular retailers is the owner of a *bodega* or general store. With heavy emphasis on foods, *bodegas* also carry a large variety of other goods and are frequently collection points for local products awaiting the middlemen and truckers who pass periodically. Although often not larger than a small-sized room, *bodegas* carry many everyday household necessities, such as candles, kerosene, matches and utensils, and also serve as meeting places where news and gossip are exchanged (see ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda). The *bodega*-owners may hold produce bought cheaply at harvest-time and resell several months later to the same people, thereby acting as "bankers" extending a "loan" with "interest" to the small farmers.

Retailers do not constitute a cohesive social class clearly identifiable on the national scene. Although merchants and middlemen tend to have an above-average income and usually maintain a somewhat higher standard of living than other people in the same geographical area, they are not recognized as a class similar to the *petite bourgeoisie* of Europe. As a rule, the location of the shop determines the class status of its owner and operator. Thus, in a village the owner of the only general store is probably a member of the local elite because of his connections with the outside world, his skill in reading, writing and arithmetic, his higher income and his special role as focal point for cash transactions. A grocer or *bodega* owner of about the same importance in La Paz may belong to the lower middle class or be indistinguishable from his lower-class environment.

It is not unusual to see retail activity in private homes of *cholos*. Often the one-room dwelling doubles as a shop with a table set across the doorway. Goods sold may include small quantities of cigarettes, matches, bread, cheap manufactured goods such as plastic tablecloths, tin cans, ball-point pens or meat and *chicha* (native beer) when avail-

able. Whenever one goes to the larger cities he usually buys these items for resale at a markup proportionate to the distance.

The ethnic background of the retailers also varies. The middlemen in the sale of domestic agricultural goods and handicraft products are usually Indians and *cholos* on the Altiplano, *mestizos* and whites in the Santa Cruz area, and Japanese in the Riberalta area. Most clothing, radio and hardware shops are owned by foreigners or by middle-class Bolivians (see ch. 5, Social Structure). In La Paz, for example, 44 out of 56 drygoods stores are owned and operated by persons of Middle East background; persons of European background, mainly German and Italian, can be found in almost every specialized branch of domestic trade in large cities.

Both men and women participate in retail trade—women usually as partners and rarely as independent merchants. But women market their own farm produce and constitute the majority of vendors at the open markets. Children assist their parents in marketing farm produce or selling specialized food products, such as bread and other bakery products, roving the market with trays of goods. They may also engage in a small business of their own, selling pencils, ball-point pens, lottery tickets or similar items of low unit price.

Cooperatives and Commissaries

The cooperative movement is still in its infancy and has little or no bearing on the general distribution of goods. In 1960 some 35 cooperatives with a total membership of 3,267, were reported, but only 2 of them with a combined membership of 339 were designated as consumer cooperatives; the others were either producer cooperatives or credit unions.

More influential in the distribution of goods, and at times in the entire domestic market, were miners' commissaries. Originally *pulperías* (mining commissaries) provided food, clothing and fuel to miners and their families to save time on travel and shopping, thereby increasing their availability for work. It was part of the paternalistic philosophy for the *patrón* to care for "his people" whether on the land or in the mines. The net effect of the *pulpería*, however, was the increased indebtedness of the miner; hence, it restrained his mobility and reduced turnover in labor.

After the 1952 revolution, goods distributed through the commissaries amounted to outright subsidies because miners resold them when similar goods were in short supply. By 1956 the value of goods so distributed amounted to about four times the money wages of the miners and became a principal factor in the deficits of the nationalized mines. Upon the insistence of the International Monetary Fund, subsidies were abolished in November 1956 as a condition for the monetary stabilization program. However, under increasing pressure

from the labor unions the government was forced to reinstate subsidies in August 1957. Continuous negotiations among labor, government and the International Monetary Fund finally resulted in a compromise by which the government restricted subsidies to four food items, fresh meat, wheat flour, sugar and rice; all other items were to be purchased at free market prices. Even this restricted subsidy costs an annual $1 million to the Bolivian Mining Corporation and contributes somewhat to the black market of the larger mining centers.

Service Trades

The traveler from abroad encounters a small but highly sophisticated service industry which advertises visits to "Bolivia, three countries in one," a reference to the three principal regions, the Altiplano, the valleys and the Eastern Lowlands. La Paz and the other large cities offer comfortable hotel accommodations with European or American plans, but outside the metropolitan areas travelers must find lodging in private homes. Because of lack of tourist facilities in small communities, it is common to ask for lodging at the local parish-house or at the home of more prosperous residents, who will offer a room or a bed for a voluntary sum.

Most hotels are privately owned, with a heavy participation of foreign ownership, but some more industrious and tourist-minded local governments participate actively in the tourist business by building and operating publicly owned hotels.

Local merchants and truckers stay overnight in a *tambo* (inn), usually located near a market place. *Tambos* are large, old homes with enclosed courtyards where men and animals can find rest and security for a small fee. Rooms are rented usually to truck drivers who park their vehicles on the road, near the gate. *Tambos* also rent storage space for nonperishable crops and merchandise to local residents or merchants who are unable to store them on their own premises.

There are several thermal springs scattered over a wide area of the mineral belt. Mineral analysis of the waters has not been made, but springs near Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba and Urimi are frequented by many local residents. Some foreign observers believe that, with a little more investment and promotion, these and other communities could develop into spas.

Restaurants, which are found only in principal cities, are relatively expensive and have, therefore, not assumed the character of European cafes where large segments of the population meet and exchange information. Barbershops in modern hotels give adequate services by North American standards; less elaborate enterprises serve the population in small shops or even with barber chairs erected in open markets. Beauty parlors, found mainly in La Paz and Cochabamba,

are rare and are operated by women who assume French or French-sounding names for publicity purposes. Since "proper" hair-styling is considered a status symbol by many, giving permanents has developed into an urban trade of its own. Commercial laundries and dry cleaners exist in the major cities only; in other areas laundering is the traditional responsibility of the housewife.

Markets and Fairs

As a rule, outdoor markets are found in the central square of smaller communities and in specially designated permanent market places in large cities. Small-town markets attract farmers from the vicinity who exchange their surplus of agricultural goods and homemade crafts for essential industrial commodities provided by itinerant vendors or local merchants. City markets are monopolized by professional vendors and traders who obtain farm products from wide areas along main transportation routes through truckers or middlemen and industrial goods from manufacturers, their representatives, importers or other middlemen. The large elaborate markets, like the permanent market buildings of La Paz, are equipped with stalls and sometimes with sanitary facilities; they are usually ringed by many off-the-curb sellers who fill the streets adjoining the formal market area.

The frequency of market days varies according to the size of the community and its location in relation to transportation facilities. In small towns regular markets are held once a week, preferably on Sunday when a trip to church is also in order. To permit itinerant vendors to sell in as many markets as possible, neighboring communities frequently agree to have their respective markets on different days of the week. Large cities have daily markets, but even there business is more intensive on main market days, which are usually on Sundays and other religious holidays. Fairs combine business activities, religious observances and entertainment and are more frequent after harvest when field work is not pressing and rural household supplies are at their peak. Fairs are held on name days of favorite saints of the Roman Catholic Church which vary locally. Fairs are usually attended by a larger number of people than regular markets. The Copacabana fair, for example, which coincides with a religious pilgrimage, is held between August 5 and 12, and has developed into an international event to which 20,000 to 50,000 people flock from Bolivia, southern Peru and even from more distant countries.

Going to the market, and even more so, to the fair, is considered a pleasant break in the routine of the farmer's family. Although three out of five sellers are women, men play a dominant role in those marketing activities where handling of merchandise requires physical strength, as in the marketing of livestock, firewood and large quanti-

ties of llama dung. Women carry their merchandise in a bundle on their backs with their small babies on top. At times they may lead a burro or llama on a rope, but strings of animals are led by men; truck drivers are exclusively male.

Occasional sellers, such as farmers at small-town markets and around city markets, place their products on the ground or on a homemade blanket and stand or squat there until everything is sold or the market activity ceases. Professional vendors display their merchandise on portable stands or, in large city markets, in permanent stalls. An important aspect of marketing outside of stores is the necessity of packing and storing goods after each market day, and unpacking and displaying them at the beginning. Not only does this make a long day of continuous physical activity for the vendors, but it frequently results in a subsidiary economic activity, that of renting storage space—a form of small-scale warehousing.

Commodities brought to the market include agricultural products in fresh or semiprocessed condition. Potatoes, for example, are sold fresh, or in the form of *chuñu*, frozen by night air and dehydrated by being mashed underfoot and dried during the day for a few weeks; maize is sold fresh or dried; coca leaves and several other agricultural products including meat are frequently dried before being brought to the market. Products of home crafts, such as pottery, simple tools, blankets and leather goods, are also numerous. Large varieties of medical plants, herbs, minerals and parts of animals, llama fetuses, magic figures and amulets are sold to assist ill people to regain their health, or to protect the healthy from the bad spirits of illness. To quench the thirst of both seller and buyer, soft drinks, soups and *chica*, in areas where it is made, are sold by vendors scattered on the *plaza*. Prepared meals, such as boiled corn, stews, sausages, rice with meat and salads are also available.

The Black Market

Black market activities are intensive in La Paz, the principal destination of most contraband goods entering the country and also the source of smaller black markets in other cities. Black market goods are obtained from illegal imports and pilferage and are sold either in special quarters of the city where permanent shops and street vendors deal exclusively in black market articles or on busy city streets and near regular markets where street vendors sell cigarettes, ball-point pens or other small and easily concealed items.

Because the bulk of the black market merchandise originates in contraband which could not exist to its present extent without tacit cooperation of various government agencies and active participation of individual public servants, black market activities are tolerated by the local and national governments (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic

Relations). No data on the volume of black market sales are available, but the loss in taxes and customs duties is believed to be significant, considering the large number of persons present on the black market 7 days a week, and considering that 8 out of 10 packages of cigarettes smoked by the average person in La Paz do not display customs labels.

TRADE PRACTICES

Basically the country has a free market economy subject to the laws of supply and demand. Wheat flour, meat, sugar and rice are subsidized by the government to stimulate domestic production, but all other goods are freely traded, and their prices are influenced by import prices and local factors. Prices are surprisingly uniform, although no formal market information exists. Some prices are quoted in newspapers, but most market information is spread by word-of-mouth, mostly by truck drivers and travelers. Because news travels slowly by such means, factors outside a particular marketing area affect the price levels only after several days or weeks, while local factors have a more direct influence on daily price levels.

Commercials, extensively used by radio stations, rarely quote the price of the commodities they advertise.

Shopping, as in other Latin American countries, is considered somewhat more than bare acquisition of goods. Bargaining and haggling are part of the fun connected with selling and buying, but also serve the practical end of finding out the actual open market price. The asking price of goods, whether on the open market or in permanent stores, is usually much higher than the expected selling price, and a satisfactory compromise is one in which both seller and buyer feel they have "won" over the other party. Even after a satisfactory compromise has been agreed upon, the buyer demands a *llapa* (an extra portion of the merchandise), which the seller is expected to give cheerfully. Items with fixed prices, where no bargaining is possible, are few in number. Tickets for transportation, lotteries, theaters and other services and goods of state monopolies, such as salt, coca, matches, alcohol and cigarettes, whether sold legally or on the black market, are among the items over which little or no bargaining is done.

Business is conducted on a cash-and-carry basis. The most common means of exchange is now the boliviano which has gradually replaced barter—the use of salt, seashells, coca, potatoes and other articles—used as currency throughout the centuries and still occasionally encountered in remote areas. Barter is rare, but a form of goods-for-labor occurs in rural-agricultural regions, whereby a farmer may pay in potatoes for having his land plowed. Buying on credit or selling on a 30-day consignment is common for retailers. In some instances,

credit is extended to the consumer on durable consumer goods such as bicycles and sewing machines but almost never on perishables. The owner of a general store or similar retailers may occasionally extend credit to regular customers on individual considerations and terms, but it is not a general practice.

As a rule the metric system is used by merchants in the sale of goods, but traditional Spanish measurements are often used in rural-agricultural markets. There is immense local variation in these measurements, even within the same market, depending on the material being measured. For example, the *arroba* at the Cliza market equals 54 pounds of potatoes, 30 pounds of barley or beans, 50 pounds of *chunu*, 37 pounds of maize; but at the Quillacollo market it also represents 26 liters of wine. Other frequently used measurements are the *libra*, which equals 1.01 pounds; the *quintal*, 101 pounds; the *corage*, 158 pounds; and the *vara*, 32.9 inches.

Advertising is limited to newspapers, movies, radio announcements and posters. Only the largest import firms and local producers advertise, and advertising media reach only a fraction of the literate population. La Paz has a number of specialized advertising agencies which assist in the construction and placement of advertisements.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The national government has not exercised price control since the monetary stabilization of 1956. However, it strives toward economic self-sufficiency through protective tariffs which affect the price of essentials, such as meat, sugar, wheat flour and rice, and stimulate domestic production (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

In merchandising, the government retains a few monopolies such as those on the sale of salt, coca, matches and alcohol. It is instrumental in the sale of domestically produced mineral ores and oil and also provides services in the form of transportation and communication. Local governments operate public utilities and, in some cases, hotels.

The government and its large enterprises, operating as semi-autonomous agencies, such as the Bolivian Development Corporation, the nationalized mines, the government's petroleum agency, the Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano, as well as the Army and Police, represent an influential purchasing power which could, if centralized or coordinated, become a decisive factor affecting domestic trade and price developments. Because purchasing is left to the individual departments or agencies and is carried out at their physical location, their influence is predominantly local with some concentration on the wholesale level at La Paz.

The National Monetary Stabilization Council, set up in 1956, has been the principal planning and policy-making arm of the government in terms of economic issues in general and trade in particular. The Council, headed by the president of the Republic, has had frequent sessions during the past five years and has been an effective and active instrument of governmental operations in the field of trade. But meetings became less frequent in 1962, and it is believed that important decisions are now being made by a select few, perhaps three or four, members of the Council (see ch. 24, Financial System).

TRANSPORT

Transportation has been a crucial problem of the country ever since its colonial status demanded reasonably well-maintained lines of communication with Spain. Routes of access to the sea became an even more pressing need when silver was discovered and later when mineral ores had to be moved in large quantity from the heights of the Altiplano to overseas smelters and markets.

In early colonial days when Panama had a monopoly of all goods sent to Spanish America, the main route of transport to Argentina crossed Bolivia. When the port of Buenos Aires was completed, a large portion of the traffic became oriented toward the south. Although the ports on the Pacific were much closer to the population center of the highlands, their distance from Europe was much greater; Antofagasta, for example, was only 300 miles from Uyuni, while Buenos Aires was 1,100 miles away. Before the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, ships had to travel 11,000 miles from Antofagasta to Liverpool, but only 7,000 miles from Buenos Aires.

After the opening of the Panama Canal three ports on the Pacific Ocean were frequented—Antofagasta and Arica in Chile and Mollendo in Peru. Roads leading to these ports as well as to other parts of the colonial empire were paralleled by railroads in the twentieth century.

The formidable physical barriers, largely responsible for the development of regionalism, also made the building of roads and railroads difficult and costly. Technical problems, combined with the external orientation of the colonial period and, later, of the extracting industries, were instrumental in the unbalanced development of the present transportation system. The urban and mining centers are served adequately but over half the agrarian areas are without all-weather roads, and large areas, such as the Departments of Beni and Pando, do not have surface communication with the national capital.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, men, burros and llamas served as principal carriers of goods in the highlands. Wheeled vehicles, of which only donkey carts were known, were of little use on

the rugged terrain of the Andes. Ox-carts are still used in the level terrain of the lowlands. Indian men and women, capable of carrying 50 pounds or more on their backs over long distances and at altitudes ranging up to 20,000 feet, have hauled food, mineral ores and industrial goods throughout the centuries. Burros can carry an even heavier load, but llamas, unwilling to carry more than 25 to 30 pounds, refuse to move if overloaded. Even today, transport by man and pack train prevails along thousands of miles of mountainous tracks and remains the principal means of bringing agricultural products from outlying areas of the Altiplano to market or to collection points along highways.

Air transport has bridged the distance between highlands and lowlands for man and high-priced commodities; the inadequacy of surface transport is clearly proven by the fact that beef, lumber and even empty beer bottles are able to pay their air freight from the lowlands to the Altiplano.

According to Harold Osborne, a British author long familiar with the region, a trip from Cochabamba to Trinidad is an extremely adventurous undertaking:

> In Cochabamba the adventurous traveler must wait his opportunity to obtain passage in a cargo lorry over the quite perilous route to Todos Santos, a road which is cut by inundations for months on end. At Todos Santos he must remain for an indefinite time in primitive accommodation amid the humid and mosquito-infested heat of the Chaparé until he can arrange transport on a launch carrying cargo down the Mamoré. This trip will take him about a fortnight and is more like a pioneering expedition than a pleasure jaunt. Finally, when he reaches La Loma, the port of Trinidad on the Ibare, if the country is not under water, he may obtain a horse and ride the twelve kilometers to Trinidad.

Although written in 1953, the description remained essentially valid 10 years later.

For more effective government operation and economic integration on the national level, the country has been modernizing existing means of transportation and expanding the road and railroad networks since World War II. The high investment necessitated by such development and the present low state of the economy permit only modest progress, but notable gains have been made during the last 10 years with foreign, mainly United States, assistance.

Rail Transport

The railroad network of the highlands, conforming to the interests of the mining industry, re-enforced the external orientation of the economy and neglected to serve important domestic interests, notably the promotion of political and economic integration, in a country of extreme regionalism. This network, some 1,420 miles in length, spreads

over the mineral belt of the Altiplano, reaches down to Cochabamba, Oruro and La Paz, and links up with the railroads of Chile, Peru and Argentina, but it fails to connect with two recently built lines from Santa Cruz to Argentina and Brazil which have a combined length of 672 miles (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). Although not linked physically, the two systems serve identical purposes as the principal carriers of passengers and of export and import goods—mainly ores, oil, forest products, sugar and cereals.

The greatest handicap of the ill-balanced railroad system has been its failure to stimulate domestic agricultural and industrial development. It encourages the import of commodities, especially of raw materials, which are available in the country but beyond the reach of the railroads, and the import of goods which could be produced domestically but which are not competitive in quality and price with those on the world market. Thus, it is possible to sell rail-imported Argentine beef at a lower market price in La Paz than beef from Beni which is flown in due to lack of rail transportation. Protective tariffs have left many loopholes and have been only loosely enforced. Large quantities of contraband goods imported by railroads forced several domestic producers out of business as recently as 1961.

Government efforts to link the two networks and thereby expand the existing lines of agricultural producing areas have been repeatedly proclaimed since World War II but have not been greatly pursued. The 395-mile link between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, for example, has been discussed since 1900, but by mid-1962 only 109 miles were completed. A first-rate highway built between these two cities since World War II has greatly reduced the urgency of the planned railroad link, the construction of which faces formidable physical and financial problems.

The other line under consideration and under intermittent construction is planned to reach out some 331 miles from La Paz through the Yungas to Rurrenbaque on the Beni River. A section of 41 miles was in operation by mid-1962, but construction progress is extremely slow. Experts agree on the desirability of a line through the Yungas, because it would be able to transport large quantities of goods from the fertile valleys to the capital city, but opinions differ widely on the feasibility of the line beyond the Yungas. Critics maintain that it would provide contact only with the fringe of Beni and leave the vast area of the Mamoré still oriented toward Brazil rather than toward La Paz.

One major difficulty of the railroad lies in the prohibitive initial cost of construction. The forbidding nature of the mountainous terrain and the seasonal floods of the lowlands make railroad building an expensive venture and serve as continuous hazards even after construction has been completed. Landslides and floods disrupt traffic on major

lines for days or even for weeks and add to the cost of maintenance and operation.

More accurate information would be necessary to reliably assess the railroads and their operation. From data provided by official sources, it appears that the railroads carried an annual average of 2.6 million passengers and 1.7 million metric tons of freight after 1955 (see table 10). But official data are obtained by a process of adding the figures of each railroad company, thus counting each passenger and ton of freight several times if more than one railroad line has been involved in the transport. Similarly, the report on rolling stock, which accounted for 1,851 units, including 100 steam engines, 11 electric and diesel engines, 62 motor coaches of various types, 146 coaches, 1,495 freight cars and 37 various other units, fails to reveal the number of units in repair or in need of replacement. Observers who returned from Bolivia in 1962 said that 7 out of 10 engines and 1 out of 2 other units were out of commission for an indefinite period of time because of poor maintenance or lack of parts.

Table 10. Passenger and Freight Transport in Bolivia, 1957–60

(In thousands of units)

	1957	1958	1959	1960
Air				
Metric tons	19.1	27.7	27.4	29.4
Passengers	105.0	154.7	174.5	198.2
Railroad				
Metric tons	1,738.0	1,406.0	1,133.0	1,102.0
Passengers	2,528.0	2,102.0	2,270.0	2,131.0
Roads				
Metric tons	685.0	1,425.0	2,575.0	2,684.0

Source: Adapted from various U.S. Government sources.

All lines were constructed with the participation of public funds and foreign capital. Nine out of 12 lines are government owned and operated (see table 11). The first railroad line constructed was from Oruro to the port of Antofagasta, Chile, by the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway Company Limited of Great Britain. This first modern outlet to the Pacific Ocean was completed in 1892 and extended to La Paz by 1917 to export mineral ores and import machinery and equipment. Its monopoly was broken when the Chilean Government built the Bolivian section of the La Paz-Arica, Chile, line under the

terms of the Treaty of Friendship of 1904 (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). This line, completed in 1913 and transferred to the Bolivian Government in 1928, provides the shortest link—only 283.2 miles—between La Paz and the Pacific, as compared to 722 miles to Antofagasta and 525.7 miles to Mollendo, Peru, via Lake Titicaca (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Table 11. Railroad Lines in Bolivia, 1957

Government Owned and Operated[1]	*Length of tracks (in miles)*
FC Arica (Chile)-La Paz (Bolivian Section)	155
FC Atache-Villazón	124
FC Cochabamba-Santa Cruz	109
FC Corumbá (Brazil)-Santa Cruz	423
FC La Paz-Yungas	41
FC Yacuiba-Santa Cruz	180
FC Potosí-Sucre	164
FC Machacamarca-Uncía (by COMIBOL)	60
FC Huanchaca de Bolivia (by COMIBOL)	[2] 20
Privately Owned and Operated	
Antofagasta (Chile) and Bolivia Railroad Company Limited (Bolivia Section)	302
La Paz-Viacha	26
Leased from the Bolivian Railway Company:	
Oruro-Viacha	126
Oruro-Cochabamba	127
Río Mulatos-Potosí	108
Uyuni-Atocha	56
Guaqui-La Paz Railway (a subsidiary of Southern Railways of Peru)	60

[1] Ferrocarriles.
[2] 2 feet 6 inch gauge.

Source: Adapted from Henry Sampson. *World Railways 1956–1957*, pp. 296, 297.

The two most recently built lines were joint undertakings of the Bolivian and a respective foreign government. The line between Santa Cruz and Yacuiba on the Argentine border, opened except for a few bridges in 1961, was financed by the Argentine Government and is operated by a joint Bolivian-Argentinian commission. Similarly, the line between Santa Cruz and Corumbá on the Brazilian border, which was completed in 1962, was financed by the Brazilian Government and is operated by a Bolivian-Brazilian joint commission.

All lines are under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications, which exercises its authority through the Directorate General of the Railroads (Dirección General de Ferrocarriles). However, the supervisory role of the Ministry and its agency is only nominal. All lines, private and government, operate independently with little or no coordination. Since the 1952 revolution, the MNR government has tried through constant political and

social harassment to induce private companies to relinquish their rights voluntarily and, thus, to make nationalization a relatively painless and inexpensive process. Social legislation added new burdens to the existing high cost of operation, permitting excessive featherbedding, absenteeism, and generally poor labor discipline. Rates, on the other hand, were kept constant or raised only belatedly when the boliviano had been affected by staggering losses in value during the height of the inflationary period. No new investment was made; consequently tracks and equipment, 95 percent of which had been in use over 40 years, deteriorated until a large portion was of no use without repair or replacement.

An example is the recent history of the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway Company Limited which, when not permitted to raise its rates or to discharge its surplus labor, reached a monthly loss of over $10,000 and finally decided to abandon its operation and properties in February 1959. In addition to difficulties stemming from technical and labor sources, it was unable to collect some $900,000 from various Bolivian governmental agencies which delayed payments for transport. The company offered to sell the line to the Bolivian Government for $3 million with an annual interest of 3 percent over a 25-year period. Although the original investment of the company amounted to over 7 million English pounds, the Bolivian Government made a counter-offer of $961,000 minus deductions for various purposes. A government commission was appointed to investigate the operation and status of the company and recommended that the labor force be reduced, schedules revised, taxes reduced, medical care of workers taken over by the Social Security Agency, and rates raised to balance losses. Some, but not all, recommendations were accepted, but no new investment was made, and the railroad line continued to lose at a rate of $250,000 per month in 1961. By 1962 the government loss was so heavy and conditions of the line became so desperate that negotiations with the British company were renewed. Under the terms of a two-year contract, the company agreed to rehabilitate the line with outside financial assistance. The British Government granted $750,000 worth of equipment, and the United States Government $1.3 million for the purchase of rail equipment and fuel.

The rehabilitation and economically feasible operation of the Bolivian railroad lines depend on renewed investment and on the extent and timing of urgently needed reforms of administration, technical operation and labor relations. The present multiple-rate system discriminates not only against individual lines, but also against customers and various forms of cargo. Thus the shipment of low-rate tin ores is less expensive than that of high-grade ores; and rates, lower for the Mineral Corporation of Bolivia than for the Mineral Bank of Bolivia, differ on various lines. Duplications in the accounting system raise

operating costs just as much as the uncoordinated use of repair facilities. Replacement of obsolete equipment, especially the acquisition of new diesel engines which can use domestic fuel instead of imported coal, ranks high on the rehabilitation program. The Brazilian Government offered to supply 15 diesel engines to the Bolivian-Brazilian Railway Commission in 1962.

Road Transport

Although thousands of miles of paths have been in use by human beings and pack animals throughout the centuries, few roads for wheeled vehicles existed until the nineteenth century when some of the narrow roads were widened to permit the passage of carts and, later, of motor vehicles, at least during the dry season. Until the middle of the twentieth century the principal roads of the country consisted merely of tracks marked by white stones, occasionally cleared woods and dry river beds. Nevertheless, large quantities of goods moved for great distances—and at very high cost—on this primitive network of roads. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, ores and metals were moved by mules and donkeys to the port of Rosario, Argentine, 1,375 miles from the mines, and silver was carried along 575 miles of mule track from Potosí to the Pacific coast. This explains why transportation rates to and from Europe equaled railroad rates for transporting goods 20,000 miles or ship rates for a distance 6 times the circumference of the globe.

The improved road network, like the railroad, developed more rapidly on the Altiplano and connected larger cities with each other and with their surrounding agricultural areas. Only since World War II have roads begun to penetrate the fringe of the Eastern Lowlands to establish communication between the Altiplano, the valleys and the Santa Cruz area. By 1962 the country possessed one asphalt road, 343.5 miles of modern highway between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz with a branch line to Montero. An additional 207 miles were first-rate graveled highways, 600 miles were improved gravel roads with roadside drainage, and some 1,200 miles were other roads listed by the government as components of the principal network (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Lack of uniformity in criteria applied to the definition of "roads" makes it impossible to establish the length of the over-all road network. Figures vary between 13,000 and 22,000 miles, designating half of the network as national and the other half as departmental and municipal roads. Over half the agricultural area is still not served by roads, and large areas as the Departments of Beni, Pando, the eastern region of Santa Cruz and the Chaco are without road connections to the heart of the country. Nor does the country possess all-weather road connections with Brazil or Paraguay.

Nevertheless, the road network is the most important single factor in the promotion of economic integration. At least three recently initiated government programs have made this role possible. Foremost among these has been the systematic and permanent maintenance of the existing principal roads by a joint United States-Bolivian agency, the Bolivian-American Cooperative Road Service (Servicio Cooperativo Boliviano-Americano de Caminos—SCBAC). This agency, established in 1955 and modeled after state highway departments of the United States, was planned to maintain some 1,200 miles of primary roads, but by the end of 1960 it had actually maintained and improved over 2,100 miles of intercity and farm-to-market roads and 430 miles of secondary roads. In the course of these efforts the agency used over $4 million worth of maintenance equipment provided by the United States. Another $2 million for the purchase of additional equipment was allocated in the Alliance for Progress program in 1962. Preference was given to improvement and maintenance of roads not paralleled by railroads, to roads leading to agricultural and mineral production areas, and to roads leading to potential settlement or colonization areas. By the end of 1960, SCBAC had a sufficient number of trained Bolivian engineers and technicians to require the assignment of only five United States staff members and to transfer the administration of the agency from joint leadership to the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works.

The role of the road network in the national economy has been enhanced also by the completion of the $42-million modern highway between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz with feeder roads to Montero and Guabirá, the heart of the Santa Cruz agricultural development region. Construction, including asphalting, lasted 12 years, but by 1957 travel time between the two terminal cities had been reduced to 20 hours instead of the 14 days necessary before construction began. Over 8,000 vehicles used the road in the first year, carrying sugar, cotton, tobacco, fruits, forest and livestock products toward the highlands and cement, oil, industrial goods, dairy products and processed foodstuffs to Santa Cruz. The road, an engineering feat, constitutes the first modern link between the Altiplano and the lowlands and also bridges the gap between the railroad network of the highlands and the two lines connecting Santa Cruz with Argentina and Brazil.

Road construction from the highlands to the fertile valleys has probably been the most important contribution to the road network as a stimulant of the rural economy. In spite of variations in altitude between 2,000 and 13,000 feet, thousands of settlers are expected to open up hundreds of thousands of acres along the roads leading through the mountain valleys of the Yungas. On the road to Caranavi and on feeder roads branching from it, hundreds of trucks carry citrus fruits, bananas, coffee, coca and other sub-tropical crops


to the markets of La Paz. Plans call for the extension of the road to Alto Beni, about 150 miles from La Paz, and to Rurrenabaque, the practical terminus of navigation on the Beni River. Roads of similar effect are the La Paz-Chulumani-Inquisivi road, which at its farther end will conect with Oruro, and the extension of the road from Montero to Puerto Grether on the Ichilo River with connection from Montepunco to Puerto Beni which will link the Ichilo and Mamoré Rivers with the existing road network. This will open up new agricultural areas and sources of hydroelectric energy, relieve population pressure and, in general, contribute to the economic integration of the country.

Results of expansion and maintenance of the road system are visible in the rising number of registered vehicles which reached a peak of 13,500 cars and 22,000 commercial motor vehicles, or 11 vehicles per 1,000 persons in 1960. Truck freight increased from 685,000 metric tons in 1957 to 2.7 million tons in 1960 (see fig. 9). While air transport tonnage has increased slowly, railroad transport has actually declined.

One problem of road transport is the maintenance and repair of vehicles. Except for the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway, all other roads are, at best, gravel surfaced, a condition which accelerates depreciation of vehicles and especially tires. Replacement of parts is an unusually slow and cumbersome process and keeps a large portion of the vehicles idle at any given time. United Nations observers reported in 1957, for example, that 40 percent of La Paz taxicabs were out of service because of need of repair. Although parts have been more freely imported since the 1956 stabilization, improvisation and homemade replacement parts are still common. Privately owned vehicles are in a state of chronic minor disrepair, although rarely out of action for more than an hour or so.

Financing road construction, maintenance and services is a large order by itself, but collecting the some 200 different fees, charges and taxes which serve this purpose and channeling the revenue to the proper authorities is an overwhelming job which can usually be performed only imperfectly (see ch. 24, Financial System). Road transport charges are levied on vehicles, imported parts, gasoline, goods, passengers, truck owners, drivers and various other persons and activities concerned with transport. Collected revenues are administered by a chain of government agencies and finally deposited with the agency for which they are earmarked. The entire system is complicated and costly, and only the most skilled observer is able to confirm, for example, whether charges levied on the transport of coca from the Yungas really support the financing of the La Paz-Caranavi road system.

Much of the heavy investment in road construction and maintenance has come from foreign sources. The Cochabamba-Santa Cruz high-



Source. Adapted from U.S. Operations Mission, Point Four in Bolivia, 1942-1960, p. 37.

Figure 9. Truck Traffic and Tonnage in Bolivia, 1956–59 (over roads maintained by the SCBAC).

way, for example, was heavily subsidized by United States grants and loans. Feeder roads of the Santa Cruz area also receive United States support, while the Rio Bermejo-Tarija-Potosí road construction is financed with funds from the Argentine Government. The Army is used in road planning and construction and has recently been engaged in the construction of the Montepunco-Puerto Villarroel and the Tupiza-Las Carreras roads.


Air Transport

The landlocked position of the country, the absence of surface transportation to extensive outlying areas, and the difficult topography have been signal factors in stimulating the rapid and extensive development of air transport. It seems natural that Bolivians in general, and residents of remote settlements in particular, should consider air transport as a means of escape from physical and psychological isolation. Hence, the highly sophisticated air transport system, which covers practically the entire country (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Data pertaining to air transport show only a slight increase in the number of flights between 1952 and 1961, but a sharp increase in passengers and a modest increase in freight volume. According to government reports, commercial airlines have flown some 24,000 hours with 225,000 passengers in 1961, as compared to 19,000 hours and 138,000 passengers in 1952.

Although passenger service is predominant, cargo planes are the only means for transporting vehicles, machinery, oil drilling equipment, and various industrial goods to isolated and distant settlements and work projects. The only way beef can reach the highlands from Beni is by plane, and the bulk of domestic meat has been supplied to La Paz markets by planes equipped with refrigeration facilities. Some of the private airlines specialize in the transport of perishables. The Frigoríficos "Los Andes" flies B–17's and the Frigoríficos "Bolivian" flies B–24's, both equipped with refrigeration facilities. The Bolivian Development Corporation also possesses such planes among its C–46's. The Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano (LAB) possesses the largest fleet of planes, mostly DC–3's, DC–4's, C–47's, and B–17's. In 1960 the military air transport command (Transportes Aéreos Militares), various government entities such as the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL), the Public Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB) and private enterprises registered a total of three DC–4's, 32 planes of 15,000 to 30,000 pounds capacity, 37 small aircraft and 10 helicopters.

The number of licensed technical personnel connected with aviation included 119 passenger-plane pilots, 20 cargo-plane pilots, 108 private



Source: Adapted from C. H. Zondag, *Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia*, p. 150A.

Figure 10. The River System of Bolivia.

pilots and 16 other technical personnel. The United States Civil Aviation Mission established a training school for mechanics, Instituto Aéronautico Nacional, at Cochabamba in 1954, now operated by LAB in behalf of the Bolivian Government. Both LAB and the military air transport command have a repair shop at Cochabamba, and United States observers believe that the consolidation of these facilities would improve repair quality and economy.

Air transport will continue to play an important role in the national economy because of the necessarily slow development of road and railroad expansion. Improvement of ground facilities, especially the extension and surfacing of runways, is a prerequisite for further development. At present, heavy planes such as DC–6's cannot land in many places, and no airport can handle jet aircraft. The government's 10-year development plan foresees a $7.5 million investment in development of air transport facilities during the first 5 years. Contracts amounting to $3.2 million, mainly for the modernization of El Alto airport in La Paz, were let in early 1962.

Water Transport

The large rivers of the Amazon drainage system—the Madeira and its tributaries, the Madre de Dios, the Beni and the Mamoré and their tributaries, which transect the eastern plains—are navigable for thousands of miles. Even today, they constitute the main, and in some places the only, routes of communication between river settlements (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). Although lack of all-weather surface transportation between the terminal points of navigation and the population centers of the highlands exclude the river system from participating in the national distribution process, they do serve as vital arteries of local distribution and as routes for some exports. Large quantities of rubber, Brazil nuts, other gathered crops and livestock are transported to Brazil on the river system.

No comprehensive study of the river system exists. United Nations technicians conducted a partial study concerning improvements of the upper Ichilo and Mamoré Rivers. The result was the construction of all-weather roads from Montero to Puerto Grether and from Montepunto to Villarroel which, when completed, will permit access to Trinidad from both Santa Cruz and Cochabamba areas and simultaneously establish a second route of communication between these two cities (see fig. 10).

Steam launches with six-feet draft can negotiate the Beni up to Rurrenbaque, the largest commercial center on the upper river. Rurrenbaque is connected with La Paz via Caranavi by a seasonal road which will be improved into an all-weather highway in the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER 23

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The economy of the urban industrial segment of the nation, involving about one million persons, and the economic development of the entire nation hinge heavily on import of goods and capital. Foreign relations have been basically economic in character and were oriented toward countries importing minerals, providing consumer goods and, in more recent years, toward those providing economic assistance (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

The combined earnings from exports, foreign economic assistance and private capital movements equal about one-third of the gross national product and amounted to some $100 million in 1961. On the other hand, payments for imports and costs connected with the shipping and smelting of minerals absorb such a large portion of the foreign-exchange income that the remainder does not suffice even to service the country's accumulated foreign debt.

Because the capacity to import depends greatly on the income derived from the sale of minerals abroad, the country has been extremely sensitive to global fluctuations of mineral consumption and prices. World demand for tin has increased at a very slow pace. Although new tin-consuming countries have entered the market, their demand has barely made up for the loss suffered by a shift of industry toward the use of aluminum and plastics and the application of more advanced and more economical technology by the major consumer countries. The price level of minerals and the volume reaching the market have been more profoundly influenced by international tensions and conflicts which increase demand with their intensity and decrease it during periods of peace and relative tranquility. To counterbalance sudden changes in the demand and price of tin, Bolivia has joined the International Tin Council, an organization of tin-producing and tin-consuming countries established to control the market. Since Bolivia has been unable to meet the quota set under Council auspices because of decreasing output and the low grade of its tin concentrates, its international position depends heavily on the implementation of government policies designed to increase mineral output.

The 1952 revolution and the successive decade have witnessed a large-scale expatriation of private capital and skilled manpower, a

Table 12. Balance of Payments in Bolivia, 1948–61
(In millions of dollars)

	1948	1958	1959	1960	*1961
Merchandise, services and private donations	−16.2	−36.1	−22.9	−26.8	−30.6
Exports, f.o.b.	100.3	52.3	61.6	54.6	60.0
Imports, f.o.b.	−72.2	−74.1	−62.4	−66.8	−75.2
Transportation and insurance	−30.9	−12.8	−12.5	−12.1	−13.9
Other services	−13.7	−1.7	−9.7	−2.7	−1.7
Private donations	.3	.2	.1	.2	.2
United States economic aid	0	22.3	20.3	13.4	27.1
Government grants	.....	26.5	21.5	12.6	21.2
Government loans	.....	.....	.....	.....	4.9
United States holding of bolivianos	.....	−4.2	−1.2	.8	1.0
Official capital movements	.6	−5.3	−3.4	−5.0	−8.0
Loans from other governments	.....	.....	6.8	.....	1.4
Loans from Inter-American Development Bank	.....	.....	.....	.....	2.3
Gold subscription to International Monetary Fund	.....	.....	−3.1	.....	.....
Capital to other international agencies	.....	−2.9	.....	−1.2	−1.2
Suppliers' credit	.....	2.8	−1.8	−1.9	−.7
Former mine owners	.....	−1.4	−1.4	−1.2	−1.5
Other public debt amortization	.....	−1.1	1.1	2.3	−2.7
Tin buffer stock loans	.....	−3.4	−2.9	.....	−3.6
Other loans from tin smelters	.....	.7	.1	1.6	−2.0
Other	.6	.....	.....	.....	.....
Private capital movements	1.5	16.2	24.8	21.1	12.5
Direct investment	.....	16.6	20.5	20.8	13.0
Loans from Development Loan Fund	.....	.....	2.2	.3	.2
Other long-term loans	−.4	.3	−.2	−.2	.2
Short-term loans	1.9	−1.6	1.7	.3	−1.6
Commercial and specialized bank loans	.....	.9	.6	−.1	.7
Net errors and omissions	14.7	.7	−19.7	−5.3	1.5
Reserve movements	−.6	2.2	.9	2.6	−2.5

*Preliminary.
Source. Adapted from International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payment Yearbooks*, 1957–62; *International Financial Statistics*, October 1962, p. 61.

spiraling inflation, internal political tensions and socioeconomic changes that have reduced production in general and tin output in particular. Falling tin prices after the conclusion of the Korean war

and termination of United States tungsten purchases at inflated prices added to the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. It was under such circumstances that the United States extended its role from an important source of imports to the principal source of financial and technical assistance, enabling the country to pay for the trade deficit and to continue to import. United States assistance equaled about 36 percent of the country's total export earnings between 1958 and 1961 (see table 12). Private capital inflow has gained impetus again with the liberalization of petroleum concessions and through the establishment of closer economic ties with West Germany and Japan.

Bolivians believe that their country's competitive position on the world market would be improved by domestic smelting of minerals and by the possession of free access to the sea. Although foreign economic experts do not believe in the feasibility of construction of a tin smelter on Bolivian soil, appeals to national pride are skillfully used in offers by the Soviet bloc to build such a smelter on favorable terms (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

The need for access to the sea has been recognized repeatedly by the United States Government, but when this issue was omitted from the agenda of the Punta del Este conference in 1961, the Bolivian Senate issued a formal declaration of protest accusing the United States Government of neglect. To overcome the handicap of its landlocked situation, Bolivia secured—through bilateral agreements—port and entrepôt facilities in seaports of neighboring countries. Thus, it has privileges at the ports of Arica and Antofagasta in Chile and at the port of Santos in Brazil. To facilitate trade with its neighbors, free port facilities were established also at Puerto Suárez on the Paraguay River. At Yacuiba on the Argentine border and at Cobija on the Acra River entrepôts are also maintained.

BALANCE OF TRADE

Traditionally, Bolivia had been an export country with a gradually expanding volume of trade producing a substantially higher income from exports than it spent on imports. Between 1900 and 1957, with the exception of the year 1921, the balance of trade had been along these favorable lines. The sociopolitical uncertainties which followed in the wake of the 1952 revolution were reflected in a slackening export volume without a comparable reduction in imports. By 1957 the value of imports surpassed that of exports, reversing the traditional trend, and caused a sizable deficit. This has been characteristic of the balance of trade ever since and has been financed by United States grants and increased private capital imported by oil companies.

A slight improvement in the value of exports in 1961 was the result of a combined rise in metal prices and a consequent increase of out-

put. Increased imports in 1960 and 1961 are explained by larger shipments of machinery and equipment for the mining and petroleum industries.

Composition of Trade

Export

The country's income from foreign exchange has depended almost exclusively on the export of minerals, first of silver and, since the beginning of the twentieth century, of tin. As a rule minerals have made up nearly nine-tenths (tin alone, two-thirds) of all exports during the current century. In 1960, for example, the total value of exports was $67.8 million, of which minerals accounted for $59.8 million or 88.3 percent (tin 63.3 percent and other minerals 25 percent), petroleum for $3.7 million or 5.5 percent, and all others for $4.3 million or 6.3 percent (see table 13).

Table 13. Composition of Bolivian Trade, 1958-61

	Gross value (in millions of dollars)				Percent of total			
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1958	1959	1960	1961
Export								
Tin	36.3	52.8	42.8	50.3	56.1	68.0	63.3	66.1
Other minerals	19.4	16.3	17.6	18.4	30.0	21.0	25.0	24.2
Petroleum	5.1	3.1	3.7	2.4	7.9	4.0	5.4	3.1
All others	3.9	5.4	4.3	5.0	6.0	7.0	6.3	6.6
Total	64.7	77.6	67.8	76.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Import								
Live animals	.2	(1)	(1)	(2)	0.3	(1)	(1)	(2)
Food and beverages	15.3	16.0	13.9	(2)	19.2	24.7	19.5	(2)
Raw materials	4.8	5.0	5.9	(2)	6.1	7.7	8.2	(2)
Manufactured goods	59.3	43.9	51.7	(2)	74.4	67.6	72.3	(2)
Capital goods	(20.6)	(16.7)	(2)	(2)	(25.8)	(25.7)	(2)	(2)
Others	(38.7)	(27.2)	(2)	(2)	(48.6)	(41.9)	(2)	(2)
Total	79.6	64.9	71.5	(2)	100.0	100.0	100.0	(2)

[1] Less than 0.1.
[2] Not available.

Source: Adapted from Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Comercio Exterio, Años, 1960–1959.*

The modern history of Bolivia's trade is, therefore, that of tin. Tin export commenced toward the end of the nineteenth century and assumed a decisive role after 1900 when modern means of transportation, necessary for the movement of bulk, became available. Until World War II, Bolivia maintained its international position as supplier of approximately one-third of the world's tin demand and estab-


lished an export volume which corresponded closely to the fluctuating level of tin-ore prices on the world market (see fig. 11). When demand and prices declined for a few years after World War II, Bolivia's export followed suit. The causes of the decline were, however, not entirely external in character. A decrease in output occurred also because of domestic problems of technical, political and social nature (see ch. 19, Industry). Hence, Bolivia was able to take only partial advantage of the recovery of the world market which occured during the Korean war. Bolivia joined the International Tin Council, but it has been unable to meet its allotted share in the global quota. In 1955 it lost to Indonesia its second place among the tin-exporting countries. Nevertheless, international economic observers believe that Bolivia could maintain its present share and perhaps even slightly increase it if world market prices would remain stable near the $1 per pound level and if production costs could be kept on a reasonable level.

By sheer coincidence domestic petroleum output began to show some surplus at about the same time that tin exports declined sharply. Government officials, encouraged by the new finds of crude oil, expressed hopes that petroleum may eventually compensate for the loss in revenue suffered by the decline of tin exports. Petroleum and petroleum products demonstrated increasing importance by bringing in $5.1 million or about 8 percent of the foreign exchange revenue in 1958, although production, and consequently export, decreased somewhat during the following years.

Among other minerals which make up the spectrum of export commodities, tungsten has played a significant role. During World War II and again in the mid-1950's, it brought an annual average of nearly $15 million of foreign exchange. It lost its prominence when the United States General Services Administration (GSA) terminated its direct purchasing contract in 1957. Lead and silver are among the minerals of secondary importance, providing about $4 to $5 million each. Antimony, already providing over $1 million per year, is hoped to take a larger share in exports after a planned antimony smelter is built (sometime in 1963 or 1964). Copper, zinc and a score of minerals of minor importance make up the remainder of the mineral export list. Other export items of minor importance include Brazil nuts, coffee, coca leaves, hides, reptile skins, beef, timber, railroad ties, vicuña wool and some fruit.

Import

The emphasis of import is on manufactured goods which claim about 70 to 75 percent of all foreign exchange expenditure. In 1960, for example, the total value of import was $71.5 million of which manufactured goods accounted for $51.7 million or 72.3 percent. Mining



Source: Adapted from C. H. Zondag, Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia, pp. 58, 59.

Figure 11. The Role of Tin in Bolivian Exports.

machinery and equipment, transportation equipment and other capital goods make up the largest single item in trade and represent three-fourths of imported manufactured goods, while manufactured consumer goods account for the remaining one-fourth.

In spite of the large number of persons who subsist from agriculture the urban industrial segment of the population obtains much of its food from abroad, thereby causing an annual outlay of $14 to $16 million for the import of agricultural goods. Almost all wheat has been imported, first in the form of grain, later as flour. Sugar ranks second, but is playing a diminishing role as domestic sugar production grows. Rice, an important item on the import ledger, almost disappeared from it by 1960 when domestic production made only negligible imports necessary. Other goods of agricultural origin include lard, meat, butter, canned foods, oils, pharmaceutical specialties, textiles, rubber and paper products.

Direction of Trade

The country's early orientation in the area of trade was determined by its colonial status. Spain insisted on a virtual monopoly on its colonies' trade, for which it also provided most of the sea transport. When independence was achieved early in the nineteenth century, Great Britain's large commercial fleet replaced Spain's and gave Britain a dominant role in Bolivia's foreign trade. Britain, in 1962, has remained the leading consumer of Bolivian minerals, with but few interruptions.

During World War II when perils to overseas transport made reorientation of foreign relations necessary, the balance of the trade scale shifted from Europe to the Western Hemisphere. Between 1941 and 1945 the United States and Latin American countries consumed nearly two-thirds of all exports and supplied over nine-tenths of all imports (see table 14).

The postwar restoration of normal shipping conditions and international trade relations created a distribution of trade similar to that before World War II. The United States and Great Britain still account for about 77 percent of all exports and almost half of all imports, but other industrial countries, such as West Germany and Japan, recovering rapidly from wartime losses, claim an increasing role in Bolivia's trade. The more heavily industrialized Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, have also established closer ties. Trade with Soviet-bloc countries has been small, but the Communists are making strenuous efforts to expand their influence.

United States

United States-Bolivian economic relations are of relatively recent origin. Private United States investment, negligible at the turn of

Table 14. Direction of Bolivian Trade, 1929–60.

[In percent]

Country	1929–33	1934–40	1941–45	1946–51	1952–59	1960
Export to—						
Great Britain	68.3	46.9	35.2	34.5	38.8	54.3
Other European countries	12.3	28.3	1.0	1.5	2.6	6.4
United States	9.8	18.1	61.7	62.0	52.6	23.2
Latin American countries	8.9	4.9	2.1	1.9	5.5	12.4
Other countries	.7	1.8	0	.1	.5	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Import from—						
Great Britain	17.8	8.3	4.8	5.7	6.6	5.2
Other European countries	27.4	25.1	.7	6.5	20.7	24.6
United States	29.5	31.4	35.3	44.3	42.0	43.3
Latin American countries	23.8	28.0	56.3	38.0	25.6	16.9
Other countries	1.5	7.2	2.9	5.5	5.1	10.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Adapted from Rene Ruiz Gonzalez, *La Economia Boliviana y el Comercio Exterior*, pp. 33–40; and Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, *Balanza Comercial de Bolivia Comercio Exterior, 1951–1959*, pp. 1–11.

the century, still amounted to only $11 million in 1914. Although both direct investment in extracting and transport industries and lending on commercial papers and bonds rose sharply during the 1920's, the depression, the wars, and internal political uncertainties reduced investment in 1950 to the 1914 level.

The volume of United States private investment, however, is by itself, not characteristic of either the extent or the effect of United States-Bolivian economic relations. The fact that United States and European investors purchased nearly $1.7 billion worth of Bolivian bonds in the 1930's, most of which became worthless in the same decade, has been overshadowed by the real and alleged manipulations of a few large United States companies and banks. The government, dissatisfied with the rate of progress and the amount of profit derived from petroleum concessions granted to Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1922, decided to dispossess the United States company and to nationalize the petroleum industry in 1937. The move alienated private capital even further, and United States-Bolivian relations improved only under the emergency of World War II.

The disruption of economic ties with other continents during the war not only gave the United States a dominant role in Bolivia's trade but also initiated a closer cooperation between the two governments. Erection of a tin smelter in Texas enabled the United States to absorb the bulk of tin exports and keep its share in Bolivia's export at about 62 percent between 1941 and 1951. Should negotiations in progress

at the end of 1962 toward the sale of the Texas smelter to Bolivia succeed, relationships established during World War II may take a more permanent form.

The Bolivian economy is extremely sensitive to United States import policies. The purchasing and stockpiling of strategic metals in the early 1950's and the release of surplus from these stockpiles in the early 1960's each had its effect on world prices and consequently on the Bolivian economy. For example, when in 1958 lead and zinc quotas were proclaimed by the United States, exports in these commodities were reduced to 10,080 tons from the 16,442 tons exported in 1957. More stable conditions of the world market and the plan of a gradual release of United States tin surplus in 1962 gave careful consideration to Bolivian interests and had little if any effect on the price structure.

Great Britain

Except for a few years after World War I and for about a decade following World War II when a tin smelter had been in operation in the United States, Great Britain received the bulk of Bolivian exports. After the Texas smelter was shut down in 1955,Great Britain regained a leading role in Bolivian exports by purchasing the nationalized mines' entire (though small) high-grade tin output and a large share of the low-grade concentrates. By 1960 its share was 54.3 percent, or larger than during the years immediately preceding World War II.

The role played by Great Britain in Bolivia's export trade was by no means equaled by its share in imports. Because a considerable percentage of Bolivian imports consisted of foodstuffs and raw materials of which Great Britain has not been traditionally an exporter, its share in Bolivian imports has been strongly influenced by the volume of durable consumer goods Bolivia was able to purchase. Since World War II it also had to cope with stronger United States business competition which established itself during the close cooperation of the postwar era.

Latin America

Trade with Latin American countries has been significant only with neighboring countries and Uruguay and Mexico. Since both Bolivia and its neighbors produce about the same type of foodstuffs and raw materials, export to these areas has been minimal, and import has been somewhat more intensive from the industrially better developed countries. Efforts to increase inter-Latin American trade began in the 1930's and gained momentum during World War II when overseas shipping was either abandoned or greatly reduced because of the risks involved. Over half of all imports were supplied by Latin American countries during the war, although their share in Bolivia's export remained on a very low level. By the end of the 1950's imports had fallen back again to about half of what they were during

World War II, but exports had grown to the highest volume of the last 30 years, mainly because of the export of crude oil.

Of Bolivia's neighboring countries, those which are connected by railroads and oil pipelines have played the principal role in trade. In 1960, for example, Argentina was the recipient of 5.9 percent of all exports, buying crude oil, tin ingots, hardwoods and timber, reptile skins and a large variety of raw materials, and providing 12.4 percent of all imports through the sale of cattle, wool, foodstuffs, soap, textiles, paper and a variety of manufactured goods. Peru ranked second in 1960. It purchased 0.6 percent of all exports, mainly crude oil, coffee, hides and rubber; and it provided 6.4 percent of all imports, mainly sugar, aviation gasoline, pharmaceuticals and machinery. The same year, Brazil purchased rubber, tin ingots, lead and Brazil nuts and provided sugar, processed cotton, pharmaceuticals, glass and tires. Chile bought some coffee, oil and hides and provided 3.8 percent of Bolivia's imports in 1960, mainly aviation gasoline, dynamite, iron, steel, fresh fruits, malts, wines and spices. Trade with Paraguay, Uruguay and Mexico amounted to not more than one percent of the total.

Other Countries

Among European countries West Germany has been playing a role of rapidly increasing significance. It increased its share in imports from 1 percent in 1950 to 12.8 percent in 1960, providing mainly manufactured capital goods, chemicals, malts, cotton and a variety of durable consumer goods. It also absorbs nearly 5 percent of Bolivia's exports, mainly minerals and coffee. As a contributor to the $50 million Triangular Plan (Operación Triangular), in which West Germany, through its Credit Institute for Redevelopment (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), joins the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and the Inter-American Development Bank, it assumes significant responsibilities in the rehabilitation of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Boliva—COMIBOL) mines and exerts considerable influence as adviser of government economic policy.

Another country which has increased its share in Bolivia's trade is Japan, which produces the bulk of imported electronic devices, especially transistor radios, engages in petroleum exploration, supports its highly successful agricultural colony near Santa Cruz, and offers a growing volume of credit to various branches of the economy.

Countries which each provide between 1 and 3 percent of the total import include Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. A score of countries supply less than one percent of the total import.

Until the end of the 1950's economic relations with East European countries was not significant. Export to Communist countries was

negligible, and import from the area amounted to about $200,000 per year, or the same in 1958 as in 1938. Both Czechoslovakia and Poland began to promote their durable consumer goods through all available media of mass communication in 1960. The campaign was followed by exchange visits of small economic missions, and a large fleet of Skoda trucks was imported in 1961. The low interest and the extended terms allowed by the Czech Government enabled the truck owners to charge lower transportation rates and thereby assist in the creation of a more favorable atmosphere toward Soviet-bloc attitudes and industry.

INVISIBLES

Costs of international transport, insurance on exported goods, smelting of minerals, and wages of foreign employees make up the bulk of expenditures which reduce the income from sales of exports by about 25 percent and that of tin by an even larger proportion. Expenditures of Bolivian citizens abroad make up the remainder of invisible outlays, while expenditures of foreign tourists and residents in Bolivia, as well as a small sum of foreign donations, mostly to religious organizations, account for the rather modest income in this sector.

Foreign economic observers believe that the natural beauties of the country would attract a much larger number of foreign tourists, and thereby increase the income from tourism considerably, if the improvement of tourist facilities and the need for an extensive advertising campaign were better understood by government and private business leaders.

Transfer of invisibles takes place at the market rate of the currency and is not restricted by the government, except for a compulsory 2-percent exchange tax.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID

United States Aid and Technical Assistance

Technical cooperation began during World War II when the United States was cut off from its customary sources of strategic materials, and Bolivia had difficulties in shipping its ore to Great Britain. A United States mission composed of economic experts assessed the economy and prepared a report for the Bolivian Government in 1941. The recommendations of the mission were soon followed by the creation of a semiautonomous government agency, the Bolivian Development Corporation (Corporación Boliviano de Fomento—CBF), which has played a dominant role in the economic development since its inception. The agency received an initial capital of $25 million jointly from the Export-Import Bank of Washington and from the

Bolivian Government. Shortly after the Corporation began its operation a United States technical assistance program was inaugurated to attack the country's most acute problems in health, education and economic development. The program began its operation with a health project in 1942, to improve health conditions as a prerequisite to the development of rubber and metal reserves and to facilitate cinchona procurement. The program expanded into education in 1944, into agriculture in 1948, and gained in intensity and extent after the 1952 revolution.

It had been feared by friends of the United States in Bolivia that in the course of the rapidly broadening social and national self-consciousness, the close affiliation of United States businessmen and members of the Bolivian elite might foster an unfavorable image of the North American among the rising masses, and ultimately lead to the alienation of the two countries. The fears proved to be little justified. In 1952, when the revolutionary government came to power, complete depletion of capital resources and the urgent need for external assistance, together with a rather satisfactory experience in technical cooperation, not only avoided a rupture but led to greater cooperation. The technical assistance program was supplemented by an economic assistance program in 1954 and was considerably strengthened by projects of the Alliance for Progress program in 1961. The total value of economic aid and technical cooperation disbursements between 1942 and 1961 was over $222 million, of which $22.4 million was used for technical cooperation, $24 million was received in the form of agricultural surplus commodities and $176.6 million was in loans and grants—including $26.4 million from the Export-Import Bank and $5.8 million from the Development Loan Fund.

Both the technical cooperation and the economic assistance programs are carried out by the United States Operations Mission to Bolivia (USOM) of AID. Their explicit objectives are "to help develop local leadership and understanding by Bolivians and North Americans alike of the factors that are deterrents to social and economic improvement and progressive means to prevail over them . . . to improve existing facilities and to create new institutions to promote national growth."

To pursue these goals the technical assistance program has evolved into *servicios* or administrative units which have been attached to the various ministries, and in which United States technicians and their Bolivian counterparts work together until such time as the ministry is prepared to incorporate these activities into the regular functions. Each government contributes funds in its own currency to the various *servicio* funds to pay for the cost of projects. In addition, the United States pays the salaries of its own technicians and Bolivian trainees and for the commodities needed for demonstration purposes.

The largest of all *servicios* has been the Inter-American Agricultural Service (Servicio Agrícola Interamericano—SAI) which expanded its initial activities of research and education to include machinery pools, establishment of an extensive network of supervised agricultural credit, construction of a modern milk plant and promotion of irrigation and various other projects (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Closely related to agricultural devlopment have been the construction of the country's first major highway, financed in part by a $33.4 million 20-year loan from the Export-Import Bank, and the activities of the Bolivian-American Cooperative Road Service (Servicio Cooperativo Boliviano Americano de Caminos—SCBAC) which in 1962 was transferred in its entirety to the Bolivian Government. In the field of aviation, particularly in the preparation of airport studies and the modernization of the El Alto Airport of La Paz, the cooperation continues to be very close.

The Inter-American Cooperative Public Health Service (Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publica—SCISP) assists in the establishment of an effective national health program. Among other activities it has reduced the heavy incidence of disease and favorably affected the high mortality level. Over 85 percent of the population received smallpox vaccination through the 16 health centers maintained by the service (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

In industry the supervised credit program and construction of plants for the production of milk, cement and other essential commodities have been the major contributions. A thorough study of the mining industry was essential and became the basis of development, together with programs of technical advice and credit to the private sector and government mining and petroleum agencies (see ch. 19, Industry).

In the field of public administration a training and research center has been established at the University of San Andrés in La Paz, and various government agencies and related organizations received United States technical assistance to improve their administration procedures, accounting systems, in-service training and general effectiveness. The police training programs and technical assistance extended to the Comptroller General, the postal service, the customs administration and the Superintendent of Banks were especially outstanding, but perhaps the most important assistance was that which resulted in stabilization of the currency. Technical assistance in this project has been heavily undergirded by budgetary support and loans. The Bolivian Government used about 60 percent of its counterpart funds to defray normal operating expenses, so as to avoid extensive budgetary deficits and inflationary financing (see ch. 24, Financial System).

Although the explicit intention of USOM is the gradual transfer of projects and *servicios* to the Bolivian Government, as was demonstrated by the recent transfer of the transport *servicio*, the Alliance for Progress program has increased the volume of aid and is giving renewed vigor to United States assistance operations. The personnel of USOM, reduced from some 140 persons in 1957 to 60 in 1962, is projected to increase again to about 80 in 1963, and an additional number of technicians and experts will enter the country as employees of contract firms.

Under the influence of the Alliance for Progress program, United States assistance has experienced a definite change in character, a reorientation from short-term technical assistance projects carried out directly by USOM personnel to long-range capital-investment-type support of development plans designed by the Bolivian Government in collaboration with specialized commercial firms and technical agencies. A total of $80 million has been earmarked as the Alliance for Progress contribution to the Bolivian Government's 10-year plan. AID will provide about $60 million and the Inter-American Development Bank, financed with large United States contributions, the remaining $20 million. Provision of funds is projected to finance preinvestment studies and specific projects, to strengthen credit agencies and to hire technical personnel. Six million dollars to finance engineering surveys conducted by United States firms and $3 million for emergency public works have already been committed in 1962. Another $7.6 million is projected for colonization, $2.1 million for rural development, $4 million for housing, $4.7 million for potable water, $10.4 million for credit banks and the remaining $42.2 million for financing projects that will emerge from the engineering surveys.

United States efforts and funds totaling about a quarter of a billion dollars have saved the economy from collapse, but could not avoid either mistakes or criticism. In the United States critics of the program called it a grandiose "giveaway" which has stabilized the economy in bankruptcy. In Bolivia opposition factions keep pointing toward alleged imperialistic motives behind the façade of good will. The government itself has abstained from criticism, but individual members of the MNR have made critical statements at times. Dr. Roberto Jordán Pando, Minister of Rural Affairs, for example, criticized not only the administration of the assistance program as ill-timed and bureaucratic but also alleged that the basic principle of foreign aid was undermining the vitality of the Bolivian people (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Mistakes have undoubtedly been made on both sides. United States representatives face a setting in which local political considerations frequently overrule sound economic and administrative judgments, and in which continuous sociopolitical tensions, at times violent, make

cooperation and progress difficult. When, for example, two United States engineers were killed by rioting miners at Catavi in 1949, all United States engineers were withdrawn from the country. Implementation of projects resulted in some waste due to misjudgment on the part of technicians or administrative officers, as has been demonstrated by the presence of a large quantity of unused farm machinery imported through SAI. In other instances failure has been due to circumstances over which USOM had little or no control, as in the loss of nearly $2 million worth of fiber shipments through pilferage, fire and extended storage, a case which became the subject of Congressional investigation in 1960.

The average Bolivian who has been a beneficiary of one or another *servicio* is, in most instances, aware of the specific assistance the United States is providing, but has only vague ideas, if any, about the massive volume of the overall assistance program extended to his country. Direct contacts between United States technicians and their Bolivian counterparts are continuous, although too frequently through the use of an interpreter. Social contacts between USOM personnel and Bolivians at large are limited by the small number of bilingual persons in both camps.

The United Nations

The United Nations' assistance program began with the participation of several of the specialized agencies in 1950. Costs of the program were carried equally by the United Nations and the Bolivian Government. One of the first projects undertaken was the thorough assessment and description of the economy in a report which was published and is popularly known by the name of the mission chief, Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, a Canadian. Based on the findings of the Keenleyside Report, 26 experts set to work as "foreign administrative assistants" assigned to various government agencies. The program had just started when the 1952 revolution broke out. The MNR government renewed the agreement with some alterations, changing the title of United Nations personnel to "technical consultants" and shifting the accent to financial problems which arose from the decline of tin prices on the world market. Strengthening the tax system, revising the tariffs and preparing for currency stabilization were the highlights of the joint United Nations-Bolivian efforts. An austerity program for the government and a more orderly handling of public finances brought the cooperation of the International Monetary Fund in the form of loans, but not that of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which adheres to a stricter loan policy, although Bolivia was a founding member of both institutions. The Andean Highland Mission of the International Labor Office, also a specialized agency of the United Nations, engaged in a study of social

adjustment. The expanded United Nations assistance program had some 43 technicians and experts and disbursed about $1 million in 1961.

The Communist Bloc

In the mid-1950's the Soviet Union and several East European countries began to increase their drive for intensive economic cooperation with Latin American countries, including Bolivia. Although the bloc does not ostensibly act as a unit, offers of credit and technical assistance from Czechoslovakia and Poland coincided in time with those of the Soviet Union and with the intensive promotion of cultural ties between various bloc countries and Bolivia.

In 1957 the Soviet Union made an offer to lend $60 million for the rehabilitation of the mining industry. The offer received no official reply, and the dumping of Soviet tin reserves on the world market in 1958 did not favorably influence Bolivian sentiments. As dissatisfaction over economic conditions became more widespread and the opposition within and outside the MNR gained in strength, attitudes toward Soviet economic assistance have also altered. When a Bolivian delegation headed by Frederico Alvarez Plata, a leader of the MNR, visited Moscow in 1960, Premier Khrushchev suggested the establishment of closer economic relations between the two countries and offered, as an initial gesture of good will, to construct a tin smelter in Bolivia. The offer received favorable publicity in La Paz, and when a Soviet delegation visiting Bolivia in January 1961 raised the original offer of credit to $150 million, both the official paper of the MNR and various leaders of the party expressed themselves in favor of acceptance.

Acceptance or refusal of the Soviet offer became a political football in 1961 and caused strikes, demonstrations and declarations of a state of siege by the government. Official attitudes toward bloc assistance have tended toward cautious optimism and hopes of gaining economic advantages from the East-West controversy without assuming political obligations. When President Paz Estenssoro was asked by a newspaperman why Bolivia received the favorable offer from the Soviet Union, he said, "it is part of the cold war." Although pressure for action has been increasing, especially from Communist members of the Bolivian Congress, and a committee charged with drawing up plans for the use of economic assistance from the Soviet Union has been active under the chairmanship of Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, former Minister of Mines and Petroleum, no official decision had been proclaimed by April 1963 (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The Czechoslovakian and Bolivian Governments concluded an agreement in 1962, whereby the Czech Government agency, Techno-Export, will construct an antimony-processing plant near Oruro, ca-

pable of producing 3,500 tons of pure antimony per year. As a gesture of good will and "a demonstration of its industrial superiority," the Czech Government presented a chemical laboratory as a gift to the Bolivian Ministry of Education and Fine Arts in 1962.

OFFICIAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS

In addition to receiving outright grants and technical assistance, neither of which requires the expenditure of foreign exchange, the government has also been the recipient of foreign loans which amounted to about $210 million at the end of 1961. Of this amount some $165 million has been included in official statistics, while an estimated additional $45 million came from Brazil. The bulk of the public debt consists of long-term government loans, such as $52 million in bonds sold after World War I, $34 million of debt to the Export-Import Bank of Washington, a $39 million consolidated debt to Argentina and various smaller loans by the United States Government and international financial institutions.

About $25 million of public debt is composed of suppliers' credits guaranteed by the Central Bank of Bolivia. For example, the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB) is indebted to its suppliers by some $15.8 million. Consolidated debts to suppliers in various countries make up the remaining $9.2 million. There are also loans extended to the government mining corporation by Great Britain and by smelters smelting Bolivian tin, and a negligible $100,000 was owed to the former mine owners at the end of 1961.

The government has been paying more toward the amortization of old debts than it has been receiving from new loans in recent years, and therefore official capital movements show deficits in the balance of payment. Failure to meet current servicing of existing debts has increased debt arrears, even though the total debt has decreased. In 1961, for example, the government received $13 million in loans and credits and paid $15 million for amortization, thereby reducing its public debt by $2 million, but still not meeting all of its overdue payments. At the end of 1961, arrears amounted to $19 million, half of which were overdue payments on loans made by the Export-Import Bank, mainly toward the construction of the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway. Also in arrears were the old bonded debt and debts to railroad companies, to which overdue suppliers' credit of $5 million has to be added. The government announced at the end of 1961 that it will resume payment of two defaulted bond issues in 1962 and full servicing of its bonds in 1964 (see ch. 24, Financial System).

PRIVATE CAPITAL MOVEMENTS

A more favorable picture emerges from the balance of long-term private capital movements, which has been positive and has played a signal role in economic development in recent years, especially since foreign petroleum companies were reinvited to the country in 1956. Direct investment, principally in the form of imported capital goods, was $20.5 million in 1959 and $20.8 million in 1960. A decline to $13.0 million in 1961 was due to reduced activities in the Madrejones oil field where reserves turned out to be lower than expected.

In addition to the investment of private foreign companies in their own operations in Bolivia, the private sector has been the recipient of some foreign capital from official sources abroad in recent years. The sugar industry, for example, has received loans amounting to $4.5 million from the Development Loan Fund (DLF) of the United States, and private mines received long-term loans amounting to $300,000 from the Inter-American Development Bank in 1961.

Short-term capital movements have been recorded only inconsistently and inadequately. Sums which have escaped recording may be responsible for the large amounts of errors and omissions in the balance of payments amounting to nearly $20 million in 1959. Foreign economic observers believe that this sum and other deficit figures reflect the outflow of private capital, a trend which seems to have reversed in 1961, when errors and omissions show a surplus of $1.5 million (see table 12).

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Before 1952 government interference in foreign trade was not significant, and government participation in trade was also modest. A tariff system was maintained which was revenue providing rather than protectionist in character. Through the nationalization of the mines in 1952 and the earlier nationalization of petroleum, the government became the exporter of all oil and of 90 percent of all minerals, and consequently it attained a decisive role in import as well. The output of large mines operating under the autonomous government agency COMIBOL has been sold directly by the government, while the sale of small mine output is monopolized by another government agency, the Banco Minero de Bolivia (Mining Bank of Bolivia).

The government responded to a spiraling inflation with an intricate foreign exchange, tariff and licensing system, which enabled it to control not only the volume and composition of imports, but also their distribution. By assigning or denying import licenses or preferential exchange-rate quotas to firms or individuals, the government was able to exercise decisive influence on their income. The MNR government practiced little restraint in using this system as a political

tool to assist its supporters and to weaken its opposition (see ch. 13, Poltical Dynamics).

The monetary stabilization of December 1956 and the abolition of export and import licenses have greatly reduced the government's influence on distribution, although government mines still provide 62 percent and small mines, through the Mining Bank, an additional 20 percent of the total foreign exchange income derived from the sale of minerals.

Tariff policies in effect since 1960 are designed to assist domestic agriculture and industry, by levying heavy duties on the import of protected goods and low rates on primary materials or capital goods necessary to their production. For example, in 1962—to assist in the rehabilitation of the domestic textile industry—the import duty on rayon and synthetic fibers was reduced from 15 to 2 percent, and the sales tax was abolished. Import duties and consular fees on industrial machinery and parts were eliminated for similar reasons. On the other hand, duties on protected commodities, such as wool and textile products, sugar, rice and some luxury items, such as automobiles and perfumes, are kept at the authorized maximum of 30 percent of their market value. Consular fees, surcharges and various other fees may add another 20 to 28 percent, so that the total real tax frequently amounts to 50 to 58 percent. In the case of sugar, for example, a flexible surcharge is so established that the gross price does not fall under the production cost of domestic sugar.

A factor which greatly influences domestic industrial production and price developments is the extensive contraband activity which floods the market with goods imported illegally and at relatively low prices. Countermeasures have been inadequate. A reduction of the ceiling of import duty rates to 30 percent of the market value resulted in some reduction of contraband and a 54 percent higher income from import customs in 1961, although legal import has increased only 12.5 percent. Further enforcement of existing customs regulations could increase revenue by as much as 30 billion bolivianos.

Occasional efforts displayed by the government to stop the inflow or transit of illegally transported goods are exceptions and are results of personal or political feuds rather than implementation of government policies. One such effort was the highly publicized capture in 1961 of a plane which had made 15 flights from Argentina and Brazil to Santa Cruz, allegedly under military protection, and which smuggled luxury goods, weapons and drugs (notably cocaine) between these countries. The seemingly passive attitude of the government toward contraband activities has been a factor in the encouragement and maintenance of smuggling with its secondary effects on domestic production and trade (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade).

Duties are mostly determined ad valorem, based on c.i.f. value (net market value in the country of origin, less commercial discounts, plus cost of packing, marine freight, insurance and commission). Duty rates are applicable to imports of all countries, with the exception of a few concessions on certain essentials covered by bilateral commercial agreements.

In its foreign economic relations the government has tried to strive for commodity stabilization agreements, but it has not signed the Montevideo Treaty of February 18, 1960, which was designed to form a free trade association among Latin American countries.

The International Tin Council, formed on March 1, 1931, and expanded in consecutive years, unites tin-producing countries—such as Bolivia, the Congo, Indonesia, Malaya, Nigeria, Ruanda-Urundi and Thailand, which together produce over 90 percent of the world's tin output (except that produced by the Soviet Union and Red China)—with a number of countries which consume about 40 percent of the free world output. Significant consumers who are not members of the Council include the United States, West Germany and Japan.

The purpose of the Council has been to adjust production to consumption, prevent sudden and sharp price fluctuation and maintain a stock of reasonable level. Because 60 percent of the consuming countries have never joined the Council, and because of conflicts between high-cost and low-cost producing countries within the Council, as well as discord between producing and consuming countries, the organization has been only partially successful. For Bolivia, however, it secured 23.6 percent of the global quota, or 131,000 tons of tin, a volume it has never been able to meet.

CHAPTER 24

FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Before 1952 there were two centers of financial strength in the country, one in the fiscal system of the central government, the other in the wealth of the private mining companies. Of the two, the latter was the more powerful. It had control over financial means several times larger than those of the government, and it played, therefore, a decisive role in the country's economic life. Various governments attempted to strengthen their position beyond the customary instrument of the budget by establishing public enterprises and autonomous agencies with some degree of financial and administrative independence. Thus, even before the revolution, the government reinforced its financial position by acquiring, among other enterprises, the petroleum monopoly, three banks, some of the railroad, and the telephone and telegraph companies. It also created a powerful semiautonomous development agency.

When the large mining companies became public properties in 1952, the size of the public sector suddenly became so inflated that it equalled about 40 to 45 percent of the gross national product. In addition to the accounts of the national, departmental and municipal governments, the public sector now comprises huge public enterprises, such as the Bolivian Mineral Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL), the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB), the Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano, the state-owned railroads, a match factory and the telegraph and telephone system. It also includes the semiautonomous government agencies such as the Bolivian Development Corporation (Corporación Boliviana de Fomento—CBF), the social security fund (Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social), the universities, the superintendency of banks, the inter-American *servicios* and a variety of other agencies (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Also publicly owned are the Central Bank, the Agrarian Bank, the Mining Bank, the national factory of sulfuric acid, the milk-processing plant in Cochabamba, several insurance agencies and pension funds for the military and for employees of the judicial branch. The Red Cross and the national lottery also depend on the government in terms of fiscal matters.

In 1961, for example, when the gross national product was estimated as between $294 million and $336 million, operation of the public sector involved $143 million, of which only $44 million was disbursed by the central government.

Departmental governments, although they may collect and use certain specific taxes, are dependent for most of their financing on the national budget. They are required to submit their budget proposal to the national executive for approval. Municipalities enjoy a degree of independence inasmuch as they can levy taxes of their own with the approval of the Senate or the Executive.


Since the 1930's, an annually recurring deficit has been an almost permanent financial characteristic of the public sector. Government revenue and the operating income of public enterprises have not been sufficient to cover expenditures. About 12 to 16 percent of the total expenses have had to be met from foreign grants and loans plus internal borrowing. The size of the foreign grant assistance can best be visualized when compared to the volume of investment in the public sector. For example, in 1961 the total revenue derived from taxes and operating income was $120 million, leaving a deficit of $23 million. The total investment of the public sector during the same year amounted to $12.6 million. Foreign aid, which made up the entire deficit, therefore, covered not only the entire investment expenditure of that year but also contributed $10.4 million to the operating cost of the public sector (see fig. 12).

Efforts to eliminate or, at least, to reduce the deficit show a slight progress as far as the accounts of the central government are concerned, but progress in the operating expenses of the mining enterprise and only minimal improvements in the rest of the public sector are evident. The government has no centralized supervision over the financial operations of state enterprises during the fiscal year and, therefore, is usually exposed to unexpected extrabudgetary transfers toward the end of the year.

PUBLIC FINANCES

The Budget

The fiscal year is identical with the calendar year. The budget proposal of the central government and of the departments must be submitted by the executive to the Parliament during its first 30 regular sessions which commence on August 6 of each year. If Parliament does not pass these bills within 60 calendar days after submission, they become law automatically. Before 1961, when the present practice became effective, the passage of the law could be and was frequently, obstructed, and the government was forced to operate on the budget



Source: Adapted from Bolivia, Ministry of Finance, Presupuesto General de la Nación

Figure 12. Public Sector Finances in Bolivia, 1961.

of the previous year with some minor adjustments until the new budget was passed, usually 3 to 6 months later.

The Parliament has power to accept, reject or decrease the lump-sum items of each chapter of the budget proposal but cannot institute alterations within a chapter. A chapter (*capitulo*) of the budget usually corresponds to an administrative subdivision of a ministry or to a regional department. The budget of the Ministry of Finance and Statistics, for example, is divided into the following parts:

1. Offices of the Minister, major officials and general services;
2. Directorate General of Banks, Money and Public Debt;
3. Directorate General of Statistics and Census;
4. Directorate General of Revenues;
5. Directorate General of Expenditures.

Separation of current and capital expenditures or those directed mainly toward economic development was commenced only in 1961.


Extrabudgetary financing during the fiscal year takes the form of amendments to the budget law prepared by the executive and passed by Parliament. Funds are appropriated against prospective future revenues, and meanwhile the government feels free to borrow from the Central Bank.

A Comptroller General, appointed by the executive and responsible to Parliament, has been established by the Constitution. In practice, however, the Comptroller General has belonged to the inner circle of the party in power and, therefore, could not effectively block the executive in his fiscal operations.

Expenditure

In 1961 the central government spent $44 million or about $11.5 million more than it received from regular revenue, a figure $7.6 million greater than that projected in the budget and also about $5.5 million more than in 1960. The bulk of the increase in spending is widely distributed among the various branches of the government and represents higher costs of labor and goods. However, it also represents a considerable increase in compulsory social expenditures related to employment, such as social security contributions, family allowances and Christmas bonuses.

The 1961 budget presented a distribution of government expenditure according to services performed. Some 36.5 percent of all expenditure was allotted to branches performing general administrative and security functions including the armed forces. Public health, education and social services received 40.5 percent, 17.2 percent went to branches serving economic ends such as agriculture, mining, transportation and communication, and 5.8 percent was set aside to service the public debt (see fig. 13).



Source: Adapted from Bolivia, Ministry of Finance, Presupuesto General de la Nación, 1961.

Figure 13. Central Government Finances in Bolivia, 1961.

Because of inconsistent budgetary practices, which have been influenced by incomes related to the inflation and by United States counterpart funds, a comparison of annual allocations to the various ministries, except for broad generalizations, is almost impossible. Among the ministries, Education and Fine Arts has received the largest share of current budgetary expenditure during most of the past 10 years; National Defense ranked second; Rural Affairs, Government, Justice and Immigration, about equal in amount, were next; while Agriculture and Colonization received the least.

The 1961 budget made an attempt to classify expenditure according to economic purpose and allotted 56 percent of all expenditure to wages and salaries of public servants, including the armed forces. Fourteen percent went to other goods and services, 12 percent was transferred to other parts of the public sector outside the strictly defined central government, less than 1 percent was transferred to local governmernt treasuries, 4 percent supported the private sector of the economy, 8 percent went to capital expenditure—including amortization of public debt—and over 5 percent was allotted to pay interest on the public debt and for various other expenditures.

Receipts

Government income is derived from ordinary revenue comprised of regularly or periodically collected taxes, rents, license fees and profits; and extraordinary revenue resulting from single transactions such as a sale of public property, loans, gifts and other nonregularly recurring resources.

All revenues are classified as national, departmental and municipal. About 15 percent of all revenue is earmarked in advance for local governments and specific projects, purposes and agencies. Revenues are collected centrally, assigned to three separately administered funds and distributed to the different treasuries in the proportion required by law. Because the law is not clear on the classification of various revenues, the division is not as clear in practice as legislative principles may imply.

Indirect taxes, in the main derived from the exports of minerals, constituted over two-thirds of the government income before 1952. The postrevolutionary government hoped that the nationalization of the large mining companies would increase the amount of revenue in the form of taxes derived not only from exports, but also from business profits formerly collected by the private owners. However, because of low output and high production cost, the newly established government mining enterprise has operated at a loss and has been unable to make any contribution to the national treasury at all (see ch. 19, Industry).

Government receipts were about the same in 1958 as in 1951, but the portion contributed by taxes fell about 30 percent because of the loss in export taxes, personal and corporate income taxes. In seeking new sources of income, the government broadened the tax base by shifting its emphasis toward import duties and resorted to extensive internal and foreign borrowing.

In 1961, when central government revenues reached a little over $32 million, leaving a deficit of $11.5 million, taxes provided $28.4 million and other sources $3.8 million, while assistance from the United States equaled the entire deficit, or about 27 percent of all income.

Indirect taxes still constitute the largest single source of income. In this category, import and sales taxes play a dominating role. Export revenue amounts to only slightly more than 3 percent of all taxes. Consular fees and various small taxes make up the remainder.

In 1961 the Budget Bureau, which has gained a reputation of exceptional efficiency and integrity, was given authority over all tax collection except that of customs duties. As a result, tax enforcement improved and, with the mechanization of the tax office, resulted in higher revenue, especially from the sales tax on cigarettes and alcohol. It is believed that further revision of the tariff system and improvement of collection practices could reduce contraband activities and increase government revenue to a considerable extent (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations).

Direct taxes, consisting of personal income taxes, business and inheritance taxes, contribute only about 10 percent to the total income (including United States assistance) of the government.

The annual deficit has been somewhat reduced during the last 3 years, but internal borrowing from the Central Bank and the Mining and Agrarian Banks is still necessary, although at a greatly reduced rate. While internal borrowing was $7 million in 1959, it declined to $6.5 million in 1960 and to $760,000 in 1961.

Improved revenue administration, new and higher taxes—such as that introduced on gasoline in 1962—and resumption of tax payments by state enterprises like the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise could result in further reduction of the deficit. Difficulties experienced in the operation of the Bolivian Mining Corporation during the past 10 years make it improbable that mining will become a tax source of the same dimension as it was before 1952.

Departmental and Municipal Finances

Departmental and municipal revenues are very small compared to those of the national government, but they affect a larger portion of the rural populace, and are, therefore, more meaningful in their everyday lives. Land taxes, fees levied on market spaces and road and bridge tolls affect even the lowest income groups of the country and

are more easily recognizable than national taxes, which are frequently included in the price of merchandise or levied on higher income groups by a remote authority.

Because departments are not self-governing political bodies but administrative subdivisions of the national government, their finances are integrated into the national budget. Expenditures consist mainly of the wages and salaries of departmental employees and construction and maintenance costs of departmental institutions and services. Revenues are derived from taxes and fees which vary in kind and in size with different departments. Land taxes constitute the principal source of local revenue; road taxes, tolls and occasional sales taxes make up the remainder. It is a common practice of the national government to levy local surtaxes in a certain area for the support of a specific public work project on the ground that it will benefit the area.

Deficit financing has no constitutional provisions, and efforts are made to balance expenditures by revenues. Nevertheless, in the past, the national government has assumed debt obligations made by departmental governments and has subsidized local governments over and above the allocated funds of the budget. The 1961 budget allotted 1.8 percent of its total to departmental finances.

Municipal budgets are prepared by local councils and submitted to the Senate for approval. Municipal councils can impose and repeal taxes only with the consent of the Senate. Their major source of income is derived from fees paid for licenses required for the practice of almost all gainful activities. Land taxes and income from municipal lands and services, such as markets, water and electric utility companies and cemeteries, provide for the remainder of municipal revenue.

Pattern of Taxation

The most distinct charactertistic of the tax system is the proportionally small number of persons involved in direct taxation. The lower limit of taxable annual personal income is Bs 2 million ($169), or almost twice the average per capita national income as estimated by most international agencies. This limit is lower than in any Latin American country except Haiti and excludes not only the bulk of the rural population from direct taxation but also a significant portion of urban dwellers.

A progressive tax schedule establishes the individual income tax on earnings from all personal services except production bonuses, family allotments and Christmas bonuses. It is graduated from 1 percent on Bs 2 million ($169) to 21 percent on Bs 22 million ($1,859) or more. A supplementary tax is added to all individual earnings; it progresses from 13 percent on Bs 36 million ($3,042) to 36 percent on Bs 70 million ($5,915) or more.

Deductions for dependents reduce the tax base by Bs 600,000 ($50) for the head of the family and by an additional Bs 600,000 for each child or other dependent except the spouse. If both spouses receive income, each may deduct Bs 400,000 ($32). A family of five, for example, may claim a deduction of Bs 2.4 million ($202) or Bs 2.8 million ($235), depending on whether one or both parents are gainfully employed. Deductions are also permitted for payments for retirement, disability, alimony and various other purposes.

A 25-percent tax has to be paid on income from business and industrial activities, such as on profits, interests, commissions, premiums, royalties and bounties. Income from saving deposits, life insurance policies, lottery prizes, or income derived from charitable, educational and religious funds or from dividends paid by banks and railroad companies is exempt from income tax.

Inheritance tax is paid on a progressive scale depending on the value of the inheritance and the degree of relationship between heir and the deceased. On an inheritance valued at Bs 10,000 ($0.84), for example, close relatives pay 1.5 percent, while non-relatives pay 10 percent. The maximum reaches 33 percent paid by non-relatives on an inheritance of Bs 3 million ($253) or more. Heirs residing abroad pay an additional 30 percent inheritance tax.

The relatively low level of direct taxation can be justified not only by a low income level, but also by liberal implementation of tax laws. Before the revolution, evasion of direct taxes was a common practice among those whose taxes were not withheld by their employers, and the practice seems to continue. This tax evasion has been perceived as legitimate by those who participated in the Chaco War and the revolution and who feel that the state is indebted to them for their past services. In part, tax evasion shows that the assessment and collection of direct taxes has been poor and susceptible to bribery. Foreign observers estimate that collection of direct taxes is only about 50 percent effective.

A much larger number of persons are affected by indirect taxes. Both urban and rural real estate are taxed by the national, departmental and municipal governments. The tax scale for national real estate taxes is low, and because of confusion resulting from the 1953 agrarian reform, collection is far from perfect. Rented urban properties pay 15 percent of the gross income, while owner-occupied properties pay 4.80 per 1,000 of the assessed value. Rural properties pay 6.40 per 1,000 on the assessed value. An additional 1 per 1,000 on assessed value is collected for the support of the Military Geographical and Cadastral Institute (Instituto Geográfico Military de Catastración) which is in charge of assessments.

The largest contribution to the national treasury is made by the approximately 800,000 urban-industrial persons who participate in

the market economy. They pay indirect taxes, hidden in the price of imported merchandise in the form of custom duties, and sales taxes, also referred to as consumer taxes. Sales taxes, although simplified since 1956, still consitutes a complex array of basic and supplementary taxes. A specific list of goods is taxed 10 percent, others listed pay 5 percent, and those not listed or not exempt pay 3 percent; these sales taxes are usually collected from importers, dealers and manufacturers. The liquor tax varies from 15 percent on wines to 50 percent on beer; tobacco products may pay as much as 128 percent, a reason for their popularity on the black market. In addition to the regular sales tax, a 1 percent surtax is charged on all domestically manufactured products to support a fund serving recreational facilities of factory workers.

There are two nationwide taxes. Although infinitely small, they affect virtually every inhabitant of the country. If an individual intends to transact any sort of public or private business such as applying for a license, buying tax stamps, signing a contract, or selling on the market place, he must have a certificate of personal record (*carnet*) issued by the Central File of Criminal and Police Records (Archivo Central de Antecedentes Penales y Policiales) for which he pays Bs 500 ($0.04). Since 1955 a new identity card, the *cédula de identitad* may be obtained in lieu of the *carnet* for Bs 500 plus Bs 300. The price of the *cédula* may be altered annually by the Ministry of Finance.

The other general tax is a road tax to be paid by every inhabitant between the ages of 18 and 60. It amounts to Bs 3,000 ($0.25) or 1 day of labor in kind toward the construction of public roads. Collection of this tax is lax and, for practical purposes, amounts to Bs 5,000 per male inhabitant.

Although tax scales and fees are relatively low, there is practically no activity in the urban-industrial area which would not, in one way or another, be subject to hidden or direct taxation. A 2-percent tax has to be paid on foreign exchange and bank drafts; 25 percent is levied on admission tickets for entertainment; license-plates for motor vehicles cost from Bs 50,000 ($4.20) on motorcycles to Bs 1 million ($84) on late-model cars; the bicycle tax is Bs 500 ($0.04) per year; stamps must be affixed to official and business papers including bank checks; and stamped paper sold by the government must be used in many instances. Although the large variety of stamped papers, known as "health paper," "agrarian reform paper" or "judicial stamp" depending on the fund to which the income of the sale of such paper was paid, was abolished in the late 1950's and stamp taxes were made uniform, new fees and taxes again complicate the picture. For example, Law 68 of 1961 established a new stamp tax of Bs 500 on all acts, contracts, proceedings and documents, in addition to the

existing stamp tax, to support the housing fund of government employees.

Although less uniform and less permanent, local taxes, charged either as surtaxes to national taxes or separately on persons and activities not affected by the national taxes, cover a wide area, including properties, consumption, commercial, industrial, professional and artisan activities, entertainments, auctions, local raffles and advertising. Small university, defense and municipal taxes on commercial enterprises grossing over Bs 40,000 ($3.36) amount to about 2.5 percent of income. Christmas bonuses, which amount to 25 percent of the employer's net annual profits, are not subject to personal income tax, but do incur supplementary taxes which must be paid by the beneficiaries.

Employers pay 6.4 to 16.4 percent for health, workmen's compensation and various social benefits, in addition to 30 percent of wages as their share to the social security fund. Employees pay 7.5 percent of their income to the same fund (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare).

Public Enterprises

Mining Corporation

The Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia—COMIBOL) is the largest single public enterprise and has a budget about 25 to 30 percent larger than that of the national government. COMIBOL earns about half of the country's foreign exchange, and it is responsible for the largest deficit in the public sector. Its finances have deteriorated gradually since its inception in 1952, mainly because of high production costs resulting from technical and social maladies. The demand of an inflated labor force to receive immediate and continuing compensation—for deprivation and exploitation they had been subject to for decades (or perhaps centuries)—came at a time when ore reserves and the tin content of ores had diminished dramatically (see ch. 19, Industry).

COMIBOL has not paid custom duties and royalties, although it has paid some $18 million to former mine owners, and it has spent very little on capital investment. Nevertheless, it has been forced to borrow continuously from the national government, smelters and suppliers. The fluctuation of tin prices on the world market has a direct impact on COMIBOL finances, but the solution of its financial plight lies in higher output and lower production cost. The sale of accumulated buffer stocks and higher tin prices enabled COMIBOL to borrow only $10.6 million in 1961, as compared to $27 million in 1960 and $16.4 million in 1959 (see table 15). The Triangular Plan (Operación Triangular), initiated in 1961 through the cooperation of the West German, Argentine and United States governments and the Inter-American Development Bank, is designed to assist COMIBOL with funds and advice in overcoming its deficits within the next

three years (see ch. 19, Industry). Whether COMIBOL will remain a liability or become an asset in the national economy after 1965 depends largely on improved production results and relatively unchanged tin prices.

Table 15. Finances of State Enterprises in Bolivia, 1959–61

(In billions of bolivianos [1])

		1959	1960	1961
COMIBOL [2]	Income	523.3	524.8	604.8
	Expenditure	640.0	652.3	663.6
	Balance	−116.7	−127.5	−58.8
YPFB [3]	Income	152.3	172.5	(4)
	Expenditure	149.1	175.6	(4)
	Balance	3.2	−3.1	(4)
Railroads	Income	69.8	75.2	(4)
	Expenditure	94.1	105.6	(4)
	Balance	−24.3	−30.4	(4)

[1] Bs 1 billion equal about $840,000.
[2] Corporación Minero de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia).
[3] Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise).
[4] Not available.

The Petroleum Enterprise

The second largest state enterprise—the Bolivian Public Petroleum Enterprise (YPFB)—has a budget about half of that of the national government. While prices of petroleum products were frozen by government order, YPFB was operating on a diminishing profit margin caused by steadily rising wages and material costs. YPFB became a liability in 1960 when it had to request financial assistance from the national government (see ch. 19, Industry). Diminishing income endangered even minimum investment in new explorations and foreshadowed further financial deterioration. The government finally overcame vigorous opposition and raised gasoline prices in the fall of 1961, and the United States extended loans amounting to $4 million for urgently needed investment purposes.

The success of rehabilitation depends greatly on results of the most recent explorations, since YPFB's major source of income is from the sale of crude oil and the refining monopoly, and to a limited extent from royalties on crude oil produced by private companies.

Railroads

The publicly owned railroads have incurred mounting deficits during the past decade. Oil pipelines, motor vehicles and air transport

have constituted serious competition and reduced the income of railroads at a time when wages and social expenditures have risen considerably. In addition to their own problems, the railroads have frequently been unable to collect tariffs from other financially unstable public enterprises such as COMIBOL, which has been the largest single user of the railroads (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). Thus hampered in their operations, the railroads attempted to buy fuel from the state on credit, but YPFB refused to deliver. Lack of funds to buy fuel and pay wages has stopped the operation of the railroads several times during the past years, and two hastily nationalized railroads were again entrusted to their former owners for rehabilitation with funds received from the United States and Great Britain (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). The income of the publicly owned railroads in 1959 was $5.9 million and in 1960, $6.4 million, as against expenditures of $8 and $9 million respectively, leaving a deficit of $2.1 million in 1959 and $2.6 million in 1960. Data for 1961 were not available but have been estimated as approximately the same as in 1960.

Semiautonomous Agencies

The Development Corporation

The Bolivian Development Corporation (CBF) is the most important public investment agency and has a diversified program. Its major projects are the Guabirá sugar mill, the Sucre cement plant, the Cochabamba milk enterprise and an air transport project. All of these, with the exception of the milk plant, have been profitable industrial and commercial enterprises during the past 5 years (see ch. 19, Industry). Other projects include a livestock project at Reyes, road construction projects, a hydroelectric plant at Corani, a sawmill at Guabirá, a lime plant, colonization and irrigation. CBF also engages in credit operations to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Its operation produces an annual deficit which has been covered by loans and grants from the national government, the United States and the Inter-American Development Bank in the amount of $4 million in 1959, $2 million in 1960 and $3.5 million in 1961.

The Social Security Fund

The Social Security Fund provides various welfare services to workers insured under the social security system (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare). Employers contribute a sum equal to 30 percent of wages, employees give 7.5 percent of their wages, and the national government donates an additional 5 percent to the Fund. Services and effectiveness of the Fund have been greatly reduced because both employers and the government have neglected their payments; by the end of 1960 the Fund was owed $18.7 million by the national government, $7.1 million by COMIBOL and $2.3 million by private employers.

CURRENCY AND BANKING

Currency

The boliviano is legal tender as established by law in 1928. It contains a theoretical 0.54917 gram of fine gold. The law provides for the minting of 10 and 20 boliviano coins called the bolívar, but only for the use of the government and the Central Bank. Provision was made in 1955 for the Banco Minero to mint gold coins with copper alloy in exchange for native gold produced in Bolivian mines, but these coins also have never entered circulation. In fact, because of the continuous expatriation of gold, both native and minted, most of the gold reserves of banks today are in foreign, mainly Peruvian and British, coins. No gold or silver coins are in circulation, and all currency functions are performed by banknotes ranging in denomination from Bs 50 to Bs 10,000. Because Bs 10,000 ($0.84) is the largest denomination, the handling of large amounts if currency is extremely cumbersome.

A currency reform, approved in 1961 and again in 1962, aims at the replacement of the boliviano by a new unit, the Bolivian peso, at a ratio of 1,000 current bolivianos to 1 peso, so that approximately 12 pesos will equal 1 dollar. The law became effective on January 1, 1963; transactions and accounting are carried out in pesos, but the gradual change-over in banknotes will begin only on July 1, 1963, and be completed in approximately 18 months, during which time both units will circulate simultaneously to accustom the public to the new money.

Structure of the Banking System

In the early nineteenth century, government agencies charged with the purchase of minerals were called "banks," but they actually performed very limited banking functions. The first real bank, the Banco Boliviano, was founded in 1869 and later absorbed by the Banco Nacional, founded in 1871. Both banks were established with private capital. In the absence of a banking law, banks operated on the basis of corporation law or charter, but they issued notes which were convertible upon demand. As tin mining assumed growing proportions and the need for credit operations became more obvious, the first banking law was promulgated in 1890. In 1893 the Banco Hipotecario Nacional was established, and in 1906, Simon Patiño—the mining czar of Bolivia—created his own bank, the Banco Mercantil. Shortly afterward, in 1911, a semigovernmental bank, the Banco de la Nación Boliviana, was established, and in 1914 it was given the sole right of issue.

In 1928 the government invited a mission of financial experts from the United States and, upon their recommendation, promulgated a new general banking law which is still in force. Simultaneously, it

created the Central Bank of Bolivia (Banco Central de Bolivia) to replace the Banco de la Nación Boliviana. The state became the sole shareholder of the Central Bank in 1939, which was completely reorganized by law in 1945.

The law provides for two departments conforming to the two principal functions of the Bank: a Monetary Department, which is designed to perform all normal functions of a central bank and does no business with the public, and a Banking Department, which functions independently and performs commercial banking activities. The Banking Department, divided into an Industrial and a Commercial Section, is also the depository of public funds, which, however, cannot be used in private transactions. Each Department is governed by a board of directors, which in part is appointed by the government and in part selected by various economic sectors. A commission was appointed by the government in 1962 to reorganize, with the cooperation of financial experts of the International Monetary Fund, the Bank into two separate entities. Preliminary plans suggest that the Monetary Department will be turned into a modern Central Bank, while the Banking Department may become a government development bank.

The original paid-in capital of the Central Bank was Bs 50 million (approximately $2 million at the value of the boliviano of the time) and was owned entirely by the government. A decree raised the paid-in capital to Bs 5 billion ($420,000) in 1958. On December 31, 1961, the Monetary Department, which has no registered capital, had reserves of Bs 17.3 billion ($1.5 million), and the Banking Department had a total paid-up capital of Bs 522 billion ($450,000) and reserves of Bs 3 billion ($250,000).

The government owns two development banks, the Banco Minero, founded in 1936 with government and private capital and nationalized in 1939, and the Banco Agrícola, founded in 1942 and reorganized in 1954. The Banco Minero holds a monopoly on the sale of minerals produced by the privately owned small mines and on the import of machinery and equipment for the private mining sector. The book value of its assets was Bs 215 billion ($18 million) estimated as about Bs 117 billion ($9.8 million) in real terms at the end of 1961. It had outstanding loans amounting to Bs 36 billion ($3 million) of which about 40 percent are overdue. It owns the METABOL (Sociedad Metalúrgica Boliviana) tin refinery and a number of retail stores and operates at a small annual profit of Bs 1 billion ($84,000), mainly made possible by tax exemptions. Marketing of mineral products is largely financed by foreign buyers and by credit received from other government agencies involved in transportation and processing.

The Banco Agrícola has been designed to promote agricultural development through credit, organization of cooperatives, purchase of various agricultural products and through providing agricultural

machinery, seeds and fertilizers to the farmer. It maintains a head office and 16 branches and engages also in commercial bank activities, accepting deposits and giving commercial discounts. At the end of 1961, agricultural credit extended by the bank in the form of loans amounted to Bs 917 million ($77,000), of which 91 percent was in default. Commercial credits were about twice as much, and about 39 percent were in default.

The original $4.4 million of authorized capital had dwindled to a mere $300,000 by 1961, and annual losses continue to amount to about Bs 600 million ($50,000). Funds for credit are obtained from the Central Bank. Foreign lending institutions are hesitant to extend loans to the bank because of its weak administrative and financial structure, but United States agricultural services and the Inter-American Development Bank, through the Bolivian Development Corporation, use the facilities of the bank for the administration of its supervised credit programs.

A few foreign commercial banks have established subsidiaries or branches since World War II as their respective countries have become suppliers of Bolivia. The Banco Popular del Perú founded a subsidiary in La Paz in 1942, and the Banco Popular de Colombia established a subsidiary under the name of Banco Popular Colombo-Boliviano in 1954. The Banco Comercial e Industrial was established by United States interests in 1956; the United States and South American Enterprises Incorporated of New York founded the Banco Boliviano Americano in 1957; the Banco de la Nación Argentina and and the Banco de Brasil established branches in the late 1950's.

There are two mortgage banks, the mortgage section of the Banco Nacional de Bolivia and the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. From a practical point of view, both banks have been inoperative since the inflation which virtually eliminated the mortgage market.

The entire banking system operates under the supervision of the Superintendency of Banks, which is responsible for the performance of banks as required by law. The Superintendent and his inspectors are free to inspect the books and operation of any bank at any time; they require quarterly and semiannual statements of every bank and oversee the issue of bank notes and mortgage notes.

The Department of Insurance and Capitalization of the Superintendency of Banks regulates the activities of insurance companies. The 12 existing insurance companies, of which 3 are Bolivian, 2 United States, 6 British and 1 Swiss, write mainly fire and auto insurance policies.

No stock exchange exists, and securities are traded on foreign, mainly United States, British and Chilean, stock markets. Private banks and the Banking Department of the Central Bank buy stock

from and sell to domestic corporations, provided 50 percent of their authorized capital has been paid in.

Monetary Policy

Inflation

Frequent and erratic changes on the political and economic scene have not been conducive to the forming of long-range monetary policies. Bolivian governments have displayed flexibility rather than persistency in adjusting to monetary conditions brought about by mainly extragovernmental forces. Some governments attempted to plan for the projected lifetime of their administration and instituted stopgap measures when complications arose. After the Chaco War, the covering of budgetary deficits from Central Bank reserves became common practice with little consideration for the consequent inflation and its long-range effects.

After the 1952 revolution, when the flight of capital depleted domestic reserves, the inflation assumed rapidly spiraling dimensions. Money supply rose from Bs 6.7 billion in early 1952 to Bs 10.5 billion at the end of the same year, and to nearly Bs 200 at the end of 1956 when monetary stablization took place.

The inflation also had significant sociological implications. A multiple exchange system, controlled by the government, made it possible for some to buy dollars for Bs 190, while others had to pay as much as Bs 13,000. This situation became a powerful tool in the hands of the government in discriminating against its opposition. The discrepancies between exchange rates affected the distribution of wealth by reducing the economic stability of the relatively small middle class and enhancing that of MNR supporters and selected segments of labor. As the absence of a monetary policy favored many influential persons in the government, only weak attempts were made to put an end to the inflation. Consequently, those who depended on savings or a fixed income, largely the educated and professional middle classes, were forced either to abandon their callings or to emigrate, which many did. The inflation also had a damaging effect on the moral integrity of the individual, both in and outside the government, and further deteriorated the credit-worthiness of the country in the eyes of international lending institutions and foreign capital in general.

Effective anti-inflationary measures were undertaken only when the government realized that, without additional external assistance, it would not be able to continue to hold the economic and, perhaps, the political reins. Advisers of both the International Monetary Fund and the United States Operations Mission in Bolivia were instrumental in bringing about the decision for stabilization which took place on December 15, 1956. Exchange rates were stabilized at approximately Bs 12,000 to 1 dollar, and attempts were made to reduce credit expan-

sion. Nevertheless, money supply was keeping up with rising domestic prices and further increased to Bs 496 billion by the end of 1961.

Government wages and salaries made modest adjustment to rising prices. Because of fear of political repercussions, the government has delayed the raising of public utility prices and of products of public enterprises. When, however, the discrepancies between prices and actual cost threatened the survival of some public enterprises, the government decided to raise railroad fares and later other public utilities. Its fears of political repercussions were not unfounded, and when it raised gasoline prices to save YPFB from complete bankruptcy, serious political tension was created by the opposition of the powerful chauffeurs' union (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics; ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization).

A large part of the expanded money supply has remained in private possession, indicating a slight improvement in the liquidity of the individual. Nevertheless, the ratio of money holdings to the national income was only about 1 to 8 in 1961, one of the lowest in Latin America.

Credit

The principal characteristic of credit is its extreme scarcity. Profits of the large mines, the most lucrative enterprises in the country, had been expatriated before 1952, and the bulk of the remaining private capital went into flight when the socialist tendencies of the MNR government became apparent and the mining sector was nationalized. The disappearance of capital resources forced the government to use up its foreign exchange reserves in order to meet budgetary deficits. So, while savings of Bolivians were growing abroad, domestic savings remained on a low level, equalling about 1 percent of the gross national product.

Political and economic uncertainties made foreign private capital hesitant to invest in Bolivia, and with the exception of petroleum companies since the liberalization of concessions in 1956, no significant private investment capital has been imported in recent years. The bulk of the available credit originated with foreign governments and international lending institutions, principally for the use of the Bolivian public sector. Consequently, the credit system became dominated by the Monetary Department of the Central Bank, which has been the source of about 85 percent of all bank credit during the past decade. The relative role of the public sector weakened first in 1961 when the Central government requested only Bs 8 billion ($672,000) internal credit as compared to Bs 77 billion ($6.5 million) in 1960 and similarly large sums in preceding years. However, state enterprises continued to borrow heavily.

Counterpart funds, generated directly from United States supporting assistance and accumulated in banks, amounted to Bs 140 billion ($11.8 million) by the end of 1961. Although they were not available to private sources, their presence had beneficial effects on monetary stabilization and allowed the Banking Department of the Central Bank to extend its credit operations toward the private sector. This slight improvement has not altered the fact that credit for the private sector in general has remained scarce and expensive. Short-term commercial bank loans cost 21 to 35 percent, while loans from private individuals cost as much as 72 percent or more in Bolivian currency and 60 percent or more in gold or dollars.

Traditionally, the commercial loan policy favored those who could produce reasonable securities, preferably real estate, while government institutions were frequently guided by political considerations in extending loans. In defending high interest rates, banks point to the unusually high risk and cost involved in credit operations. Unstable economic conditions, mainly inflation, cause risks which make it difficult even for an honest debtor to meet his obligations. Debtor morality in general is not high, and law enforcement is lax and slow. To foreclose a mortgage, for example, takes 1 year, and collateral, the real or movable property at stake, must be sold at public auction, usually for a fraction of its real value. Costs originate in expensive overhead coupled with interest which the bank has to pay. If, for example, a bank obtains a foreign loan at 5 to 6 percent interest, its own administrative costs and losses from inflation and default amount to another 6 to 8 percent; consequently, it would be unable to provide credit under 12 percent, even if it operated on an altruistic basis.

In spite of the high interest rates, demand for capital is great. A banker, quoted by a report of Continental Allied Company, Incorporated, said in 1962, that if unlimited credit for working capital were offered to good risks at 50 percent interest, he would find 300 customers waiting outside his door the next morning. Lowering of interest rates, therefore, is not a remedy by itself. It would only strengthen the role of the public sector which can operate on a nonprofit basis, and it would not improve debtor ethics. Increased domestic savings and qualitative reforms in the banking organization could strengthen the private sector and produce more funds. At present, hoarding of banknotes is still customary in rural areas, mainly because of distrust in the existing remote banks, but even more because of the absence of such institutions as postal saving or credit cooperatives. The 10-year plan visualizes an improvement in savings institutions and a consequent rise in savings amounting to a net of $3.1 million in 1962, $67.5 million in 1966 and $144.1 million by 1971. However, according to foreign economic observers, these optimistic and overambitious figures constitute the weakest feature of the Plan.

For the time being, all commercial bank credit is short-term, and even this is hard to obtain. Excellent risks, such as profitable industrial or commercial enterprises, can receive only a fraction of their needs. In some instances, even after a loan is approved by the bank, its execution is delayed because the bank finds it is difficult or impossible to make the money available due to lack of cash resources.

Long-term credit is almost exclusively in the hands of public lending institutions, mainly in those of development banks and joint United States-Bolivian agencies. Although international lending agencies prefer to work through the private sector, they find it easier and less expensive to channel their funds through publicly owned development institutions. Shortage of funds has stimulated these institutions to engage in other banking and commercial activities, such as accepting savings deposits and maintaining retail stores, for the purpose of raising operating income. While the inflation provided favorable conditions for such manipulation by government agencies, these activities became a burden after the 1956 stabilization. Also weighted by administrative difficulties and constant political pressures, the development banks could not function efficiently and, consequently, were unable to reach their objectives. It was mainly for this reason that the United States Operations Mission (USOM) set up its own provisional supervised credit organizations to handle the distribution of United States credit to the agricultural and industrial sectors. Both of these programs, set up in 1955 and 1958, respectively, were financed from United States aid sources and run by United States personnel, although nominally the former has been part of the Agrarian Bank and the latter channeled through the commercial banking system.

Structural and financial strengthening of the two development banks and the creation of a new private industrial development bank will make possible a gradual withdrawal of direct United States participation. Some reduction of United States personnel was already begun in 1961, when standing loans under the supervised agricultural credit program totalled Bs 16.9 billion ($1.4 million) with only 11 percent in default, and outstanding loans under the supervised industrial credit program totalled Bs 55.6 billion ($4.7 million) with 4.4 percent in default. It should be noted, however, that Bs 30.5 billion ($2.6 million) of the total industrial loan was extended to YPFB, a government agency, and only Bs 25.1 ($2.1 million) to private industry.

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SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 25

PUBLIC ORDER

The country's history has been full of instances of strife, violence and disorder that have taxed and frequently defeated attempts to contain and control them (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 13, Political Dynamics). In addition to criminal actions which result from the isolated actions of individuals, the government has been faced with politically inspired activities which disturb public order and safety and imperil the life of the government. They have been most radically expressed as armed revolutions but may also assume the form of subversion or inspired riots or demonstrations.

For matters of simple law enforcement, the government's agencies include the National Corps of Police and Carabineros of Bolivia, the Directorate General of Traffic and Travel and municipal police. Violent disorder is countered by the armed forces, the National Corps of Police and Carabineros and an assortment of armed civilian militias (see ch. 26, Internal Security).

PUBLIC ORDER AND LAW

The legislative branch of the government makes or changes the laws governing relationships between individuals or between individuals and the state and appoints the judges of the Supreme Court and the district courts. The executive branch issues supreme decrees that have the weight of law and directs their enforcement through the police forces and the Public Ministry, a quasi-independent arm of the executive performing functions resembling those of an attorney-general's or public prosecutor's department. The judicial branch interprets and administers justice through the courts (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

Laws and the Penal Code

The basic standard of legal behavior is the Penal Code as augmented and expanded by specific laws, police regulations and official decrees. The country's first president, Marshal Antonio José de Sucre, persuaded Congress to adopt the old Spanish Criminal Code

of 1822. The first national code (and in fact the first devised in any Spanish-American republic) was that proclaimed in 1832 and revised in 1834 under President Andrés Santa Cruz. Although some of its provisions have been modified by special legislation or constitutional amendment, it has remained basically unchanged in character and orientation.

Like all codes rooted in the Hispanic tradition, the Penal Code displays an unyielding rigidity. Specific punishable acts are minutely defined with definite maximum and minimum punishments established for each. Little discretion is permitted in interpreting the nature of an offense, and no latitude is allowed in assessing penalities other than between the preset maximum and minimum stated in the Code. The principles of case law and judicial precedent are not applied.

Every violation of the Code is looked upon as being both criminal and civil. On the criminal count the objective is to determine whether or not the accused actually broke the law; on the civil, whether or not he caused damage or injury that requires compensation to the plaintiff. Usually, legal actions to make these determinations proceed concurrently, but often they are tried before different judges and argued by different counsel. Verdicts and punishments for each are rendered separately and may differ radically.

Although the Code was probably adequate and appropriate when drafted, in modern society it is generally acknowledged to be archaic, inadequate and frequently inapplicable. Many attempts have been made to bring it up to date, or to formulate an entirely new document, but no suitable or acceptable alternative has yet been found.

POLICE SYSTEM

Legal Basis and Development

From the inception of the Republic, there has been no official police organization to ensure law enforcement. The first police force and all its successors have been responsible to the national government rather than to subordinate political authorities. The persistence with which the concept of centralization of the police power has remained dominant is attested by the wording of the 1961 Constitution, which holds that the Bolivian police force is an institution which fulfills the entire police function.

The first significant change in enabling legislation covering law enforcement agencies was contained in a law of 1886 which superseded all previous enactments and defined and clarified many concepts of police organization and operation that had not been formally stated before. This system remained basically unchanged until 1950, when it was substantially revised in the Organic Law of Police and Carabineros of Bolivia—sometimes referred to simply as Law No. 311.

Together with the law of 1886, it provides the legal basis for the present police system.

In 1930 a Directorate General of Police was established permanently at La Paz to serve as national police headquarters. During a summary reorganization of the corps in 1937, the official title became its present one of the National Corps of Police and Carabineros of Bolivia.

Until the revolution of 1952, the Corps was subordinate to the regular armed forces. There was a tendency to look upon it as a sort of nondescript appendage of the military, and most senior police posts were given to Army officers. The Army assumed most police functions itself and treated the Corps as a reserve to be called upon only in times of dire emergency. This situation changed radically with the rise of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) to power in 1952. The Corps sided with the revolutionaries and was rewarded by being given greater jurisdiction over normal challenges to public law and order. Since 1956, under the aegis of a United States International Cooperation Administration (ICA) training mission, the Corps has been developing into a professional and technically qualified law enforcement agency.

Command

Under the Constitution the President of the Republic is the Commander in Chief (Jefe Supremo) of the *carabineros* and all other police forces. In this capacity, he names the Director General of Police and Carabineros and other key officials and formulates the policies under which the force operates. Moreover, during times of internal stress when public order and safety are endangered, the president is empowered to, and often does, administer directly the activities of the Corps.

Within the national structure, the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration has jurisdiction over the Corps of Police and Carabineros. The relationship between them is similar, however, to that existing between the Ministry of National Defense and the regular armed forces in that both ministries stay aloof from operational matters and concern themselves exclusively with administrative supervision. In time of war the uniformed *carabinero* units and personnel may be transferred to the Ministry of National Defense and their activities integrated with those of the regular armed forces as though they were reserve units called to active duty for the duration of hostilities.

Operational control is vested in an appointive Director General who may be a civilian but is almost invariably a high-ranking, career *carabinero officer*. Legally, this office is entitled to a general as chief officer, but as of early 1963 no incumbent had as yet been elevated beyond the rank of colonel.

The Director General is also commandant of the National Police Academy, head of the National Identification Service and chief of the Bolivian contingent which cooperates with the International Police (Interpol), all of which are separate entities within his office. International Police cooperation is significant in that Bolivia is a prime producer of coca leaves, from which cocaine is derived, and Bolivian agents work closely with narcotics control agencies of many other countries.

Operational Organization

The Office of the Director General, which serves as national headquarters for all police and *carabinero* activities, consists of a command group and 12 numbered staff sections. The command component includes the Director General and his deputy, a secretariat to handle administrative matters, an inspector general, a legal adviser and a disbursing officer. The staff sections, with the exception of section II, are all conventionally established to plan, supervise and administer Corps personnel, plans, operations, supply, maintenance, religious services, medical services, transportation, communications, morale and discipline. Section II deals only with political control and holds a unique position within the force. It came into being in 1960 when, for political convenience, the formerly independent Directorate General of Information and State Security needed camouflage and was given cover within the regular police organization. Details of its present status and methods are not known, but it is believed that section II still operates independently of Corps routine and receives its guidance directly from the regime.

Under the firm centralized command of the Office of the Director General in La Paz, field elements are stationed in all sectors of the country, where they function without responsibility to departmental, provincial or municipal governments. Subordinate headquarters, known as brigades, are established in the capital of each of the nine departments to coordinate and supervise operations within their respective areas. These vary in size according to needs of the area. Each brigade is commanded by an officer who is also designated chief of police for the department. He is aided by an assistant and by staff sections similar to those in national headquarters. The brigade is divided into two commands, one urban and the other provincial. The urban command, at the departmental capital, has charge of the police stations and local jails and is divided into sections with assigned personnel to patrol and carry out criminal investigations. The provincial command performs similar functions in the rural areas through posts and patrols.

Most Corps personnel and units within a department, regardless of their size, composition, mission or station, are considered to be part

of the brigade in the area where they serve and are members of a single departmental entity. An exception is the city of La Paz where, because of the vulnerability of the national government to attack, two separate regiments of *carabineros*, completely distinct from the regular forces of La Paz Department, are kept under the direct control of the Director General and the president. Other exceptions are made in sections of the country where, for reasons of inaccessibility or rather undefined political consequence, dependence on the regular departmental brigade forces is not deemed advisable or feasible. Two such areas—San Ignacio de Velasco in the Department of Santa Cruz and Tupriza in Potosí—have independent *carabinero* detachments in addition to the department brigades.

Certain departmental brigade personnel of the rural command are on duty at a series of frontier posts scattered at 27 critical points along the borders and at river and lake ports of entry. They include customs personnel, now integral to the Corps, as well as uniformed *carabineros* concerned with combating smuggling and other forms of illegal border crossing.

Personnel

Distribution

The Corps of Police and Carabineros, including officers, enlisted personnel and civilians, has usually numbered between 4,500 and 5,500 persons. There are indications, however, that a total strength approaching 6,000 may be reached in the near future.

Precise figures on the national distribution of Corps strength are not available, but assigned strength is generally in direct proportion to the density of population and the nature and importance of governmental and economic activities in a given area. Most of the Corps is concentrated in the La Paz area, where about 50 percent of its uniformed and 60 percent of its civilian elements are stationed.

Within the Corps itself approximately 80 percent are uniformed *carabineros*, and 20 percent are civilian police investigators, specialists of the identification service and minor functionaries. Both elements are undermanned, particularly in the field of normal police activities. In La Paz there is a rudimentary crime detection laboratory, but its methods of procedure are inefficient because of the lack of qualified operatives. When funds are available, some use is made of police informers, but the main reliance in solving crimes is placed on routine periodic massive roundups of known miscreants which are fairly successful.

Source, Quality and Classification

As of 1963, a career in the police or *carabinero* forces offered little that was attractive or rewarding—pay scales were low; opportunities for personal betterment or advancement were rare; and little if any

prestige attached to members of the Corps. Consequently, Corps personnel have come from a relatively low stratum of Bolivian society. Conscious and deliberate efforts have been made to eliminate, or at least mitigate, these adverse factors, and improvement in both the quality and effectiveness of Corps personnel is beginning to be evident.

The Corps of Police and Carabineros is a strictly volunteer force, and because of the unattractive career opportunities involved, personnel are extremely difficult to obtain. Applicants are usually men from the lowest economic class between the ages of 21 and 25 who have already completed their tours of obligatory duty in the Army. They must pass rather strict physical examinations, but since there is no requirement for educational accomplishment, most of those accepted are illiterate.

The quality of officers and higher civilian employees, drawn mainly from the small urban middle class, is relatively higher. Officers receive their commissions most regularly by graduation from the National Police Academy but also by transfer, or after retirement, from commissioned status in the armed forces and by direct political appointment for demonstrated ability or outright patronage. Civilians nearly always are political appointees. Specialized education is not a prerequisite to their appointment, but some degree of qualification is usually present which can facilitate on-the-job training.

Cadets accepted for the Police Academy are not subject to the age limitations in existence for enlisted military service, and matriculation automatically exempts them from their military obligations. Entrance requirements are rather sketchy as far as education goes, but political reliability and unquestioned loyalty to the MNR are given great importance. Competition for entrance is not intense; there were only 100 applicants for the Academy in 1960 and, of these, 55 were accepted.

The course itself is conducted over a 4-year period under strict military discipline. It includes general academic subjects (literature, mathematics, basic law) as well as basic and rudimentary small-unit military training. Since the advent of the United States police training mission in 1956, specialized training in criminal law, personnel administration, police methods and techniques, and riot-control tactics have been introduced. Upon graduation cadets receive a bachelor of humanities certificate, a saber symbolic of officer rank and a commission as second lieutenant in the *carabineros*.

Personnel of the Corps are classified in three distinct groups. The first is made up of the uniformed personnel, known as *carabineros*. The second includes all technical and auxiliary personnel, such as doctors, dentists, veterinarians, chaplains, communications and transportation specialists and social service workers, who may be either uniformed *carabineros* or civilians. The third is made up of police

investigators and identification personnel, who are almost exclusively civilians.

Uniformed personnel are grouped in four general classifications with a graded system of rank within each class. In descending order, the classifications are field officers (*jefes*); company officers (*oficiales*); noncommissioned officers (*clases*); and privates (*tropas*). Ranks generally correspond to those in the Army (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Uniformed personnel are promoted on the basis of annual examinations given when they enter the zone of consideration. This zone is determined by time in grade, which is normally 4 years for all except captains and sergeants, who must spend 5 years in grade before becoming eligible for promotion.

Classification of civilian personnel is based on a simple, nonmilitary two-category system composed of superiors (*functionarios superiores*) and subordinates (*functionarios subalternos*).

Mission

The mission of the Corps is to preserve "public order and the defense of society through its technical organs and in conformity with its legal functions." Its formal missions are to: preserve public order; enforce compliance with the laws of the land; carry out and enforce orders imposed by competent courts; protect the persons and property of the nation's inhabitants; prevent the commission of crimes and misdemeanors; pursue, capture and deliver to the courts persons accused of crimes; recover stolen property and return it to its lawful owners; cooperate with other agencies in the enforcement of laws governing customs, sanitary regulations, and other municipal rules and ordinances; and maintain a complete criminal file and identification service.

In addition to these functions, members of the Corps have assumed certain duties which are not formally assigned to them. Since 1958, for example, Corps members in La Paz and elsewhere have acted as truant officers and in other capacities designed to reduce juvenile delinquency.

Training

Before 1956, police and *carabinero* training was largely of the on-the-job type. Enlisted men received about 4 months' training in active units and were then assigned permanent duties. Officers had only the formal training they had received as cadets in the Police Academy.

Since the arrival of the United States police training mission in 1956, both the training and the manner in which it is conducted have greatly improved. More of the in-service training is being taken over by the Academy; special courses have been established for duty-time

training of all types of personnel; special unit schools are being run by the brigades; and some officers are being sent abroad for special training. During 1961 a total of 1,648 students (officers, civilian and enlisted men) were trained either in local schools or abroad, and a target figure of 2,600 has been established for similar assignment in 1962.

One of the first of the special courses was an instructors' course conducted by United States mission members at the Academy. Students drawn from each brigade throughout the country received classroom instruction in detection and general police methodology, augmented by practical exercises. Students were required to pass an examination and, on graduation, returned to their brigades and organized local classes.

Other special courses at the Academy for both officers and enlisted personnel have since been established. The courses include for privates and agents, use of the riot stick (unarmed combat, riot control and police ethics; for noncommissioned grades, the same subjects, plus public relations, preparation of reports, personnel relations and leadership; for civilian detectives, scientific crime detection, criminal law and procedure, and methods of interrogation and identification; and for officers, tactics, leadership, control of riots and many administrative functions.

The Police Academy also offers a well-implemented program of foreign training for officers. Personnel selected for training in the United States at official police schools, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Fort Bragg's Special Warfare School, are first sent to the Academy for English-language schooling. Others scheduled for schools in Puerto Rico, Chile or Argentina report to the Academy for brief refresher and indoctrination lectures before leaving the country. On completing their courses abroad these trainees return to Bolivia for duty, to lecture at the Academy or to organize and conduct unit-level courses throughout the Corps.

Other types of training, such as self-improvement courses, are also being stressed and encouraged. Officers are urged to attend off-duty classes in universities near their duty stations, and both officers and detectives are required to select, research and present annually a paper on some aspect of police work. A special off-duty school for enlisted personnel which offers a variety of courses in literacy, arithmetic, hygiene, geography and history has been established at the Academy (with branches elsewhere in the departments). These classes are taught by officially sponsored volunteer teachers, some of whom are members of the United States police mission.

When the customs police was transferred from the Ministry of Finance and Statistics to become an integral element of the Corps,

police officials soon realized they lacked experience and capability in this special form of police work and requested a training program to help them. The United States police mission responded by organizing a master course at the Academy which turned out 52 officer graduates the first year. The course is still in operation and is augmented by short courses run periodically at departmental capitals such as Cochabamba, Oruro and Santa Cruz. Another specialized course offered at the Academy is patterned on the counterinsurgency course of the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg.

The Academy also offers a course in political indoctrination decreed by President Paz himself. The substance of the course has a decided socialistic slant but avoids emphasis on communism. It is conducted under the direction of a faculty designated by the chief executive with the specific purpose of creating a Corps which is loyal to the MNR. The general belief is that future assignments are largely influenced by the nature of the reports made by the teachers on the interests and progress of the students.

Logistical Factors

Budget

Like all governmental activities in Bolivia, the operation of the National Corps of Police and Carabineros is plagued by a chronic lack of funds. Its budget is part of that for the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration, and, until recently, it was almost impossible to separate it from the over-all figures for the Ministry as a whole. In the proposal for 1961, however, most requirements for the police function were listed in a separate section. They call for an annual allocation of about Bs 19.5 billion (U.S. $1,650,000), or roughly 3.75 percent of the national budget. The largest single item was earmarked for pay and allowances of personnel.

Pay and Allowances

Corps personnel rank among the lowest paid officials in the government. Monthly pay for a colonel is the equivalent of about $18, and a *carabinero* gets less than $8 a month. Many of them are therefore forced to seek outside sources of income in order to support themselves and their families—a recourse which is officially permitted.

However, policemen and *carabineros* regularly receive a series of bonuses similar to those in effect for the armed forces. Among them are two regular bonuses—one for longevity and one given at Christmas time—and two special bonuses, the amount and frequency of which vary according to the availability of funds. One of the special bonuses is usually given as a flat sum for all personnel, and the other is prorated by rank within categories based on the type of function performed.

Uniforms

Civilians assigned to the Corps, regardless of grade or duty do not wear uniforms of any kind, but perform in their own civilian attire.

Enlisted *carabineros* are dressed in uniforms of tunic and trousers made of rough blanket material. Its color is not standardized and varies from olive drab through brown to a mustard yellow. Officers wear well-tailored uniforms of olive green wool material or, in hot weather, light khaki. Both officers and enlisted men wear Sam Browne belts, on which they carry black-leather ammunition pouches. No identifying badges are worn, but the insignia of the Corps is affixed to the front of their black-visored service caps.

Arms and Equipment

Enlisted *carabineros* are armed with bolt-action rifles of Chaco War vintage; officers normally carry .38-caliber revolvers with sabers for dress and ceremonial functions; civilian investigators and operators have small-caliber pistols of various makes and styles.

The total quantity and nature of organization weapons cannot be determined because there is no central accounting for stocks. It is known, however, that some units—principally those in La Paz where the danger of uprisings is greatest—have Vickers light machine guns, a few automatic weapons and several heavy machine guns. They also have some 60-mm. mortars and a miscellaneous assortment of other nonstandard weapons. All stocks are old and have not received the care and maintenance necessary to keep them completely reliable and serviceable.

There has been an attempt to provide the Corps with more appropriate equipment. Through United States aid, stocks of 26-inch night sticks, tear gas projectiles, gas masks and steel helmets have been supplied—all of which have proven effective on many occasions—but communications equipment is still lacking. No teletype system links the departmental brigades to La Paz, for example, and no mobile radio system is in operation for patrol cars.

The greatest deficiency, however, lies in the crippling lack of transportation. In 1960 the entire inventory consisted of a few jeeps and trucks manifestly inadequate to police even major urban areas. Outside the cities the men use horses or bicycles and frequently must travel by foot. When travel between cities is required, the police and *carabineros* are authorized to request space on planes of the Military Air Transport Service (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Other Agencies

In addition to the Corps, two other official agencies are involved in the maintenance of public order. One is the Directorate General of

Traffic and Travel, an agency involved only with vehicular traffic and its control. The other is the strictly local municipal police.

Traffic Police

The traffic police force, founded in 1939, operates under the Organic Traffic Law of 1951, which made it organizationally a part of the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration. Like the National Corps of Police and Carabineros, it is headed by a Director General in La Paz and has operating elements in each department. Its responsibilities include traffic law enforcement, accident investigation, intersection control (urban traffic direction), licensing and vehicle inspection.

The entire force consists of about 600 officers and enlisted men, of whom about one-half are on duty in La Paz. Officers are given military titles ranging from lieutenant to major. Men in ranks are popularly called *varitas*, after the wand or baton they use in directing traffic.

Pay scales are slightly lower than those of the *carabineros;* consequently, the quality of personnel is extremely low, and graft reportedly is rampant. Most traffic violations are settled at the scene, with the offender "paying his fine" to the agent involved. Guilt or responsibility for accidents is reported to be solved with equal informality: the newspaper *La Nación* stated that the "guilty one is usually he who offers the *agente* the least money."

Traffic police wear dark blue uniforms with white Sam Browne belts and visored barracks caps. In the lowlands they wear khaki uniforms. Motorcycle policemen (all lieutenants or captains) wear riding breeches with blue tunics, black polished boots, sun glasses and white crash helmets.

Some training is provided for key personnel in La Paz by United States police mission personnel, and an occasional orientation tour to the United States or Puerto Rico is provided for a few officials. Otherwise, operating procedures tend to be left to the judgment of the individual agent.

The equipment of the traffic police is inadequate. In 1962, vehicles consisted of about 20 United States and German motorcycles in various stages of serviceability, 1 truck and 2 Ford patrol cars equipped with flashing lights and sirens. Officers were armed with .38-caliber pistols while *varitas* had only their whistles. A few old rifles and light machine guns were kept at headquarters, and attempts to overrun that office and procure them has frequently been a priority move during revolutions.

Visual control measures are so rudimentary and scarce that their value is negligible. Center lines are not marked on streets; signs of

any sort are rare; and the flow of traffic is controlled by a turnstile-like arrangement which the *varitas* on duty must change manually.

Municipal Police

The Organic Law of Municipalities specifies that mayors of urban centers may organize local police forces if they have the means to do so. Such forces are used exclusively to enforce city rules and ordinances.

Although any city may create a municipal police force, only the mayor of La Paz has been able to raise sufficient funds to create one of any consequence. The force in the capital city numbers about 500, of whom 400 are uniformed and 100 are on plainclothes duty. They guard vital city installations as routine duty, and in time of emergency are available to serve the MNR leadership. The enforcement of city ordinances is left largely to the plainclothesmen.

Effectiveness

When the ICA training mission arrived in 1956 to help improve and modernize the Bolivian police system, it was estimated that law enforcement activities were about 5 percent as efficient as comparable United States agencies. It was felt that many of the causes could be corrected or improved through fiscal and organizational action on the part of the government, whereas others could be resolved only by gradual modifications in traditional concepts and attitudes. Under the constant and insistent urging of the mission, beginnings toward improvement were made in both of these areas with a modicum of success. Lack of funds remains a major problem, despite the considerable aid that has been received from the United States. Formal training in new methods, techniques and procedures has been greatly intensified, with a corresponding advance in individual efficiency. The speed, dispatch and relative ease with which elements of the *carabineros* have dealt with demonstrations and popular uprisings is but one indication of their improved capabilities.

Attitudes toward police activities and law enforcement in general have also improved. Public distrust of the *carabineros* is still widespread, but within the Corps a small but active group of enlightened officers dedicated to converting the force into a strictly professional, civil force is developing.

As a result of this improving status, the present police system is generally considered qualified to protect public law and order under most situations short of open rebellion.

COURTS AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES

The courts and the criminal procedures are rooted in the old Spanish and Napoleonic codes and are unified into a single, national system under the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration. No

juries are empaneled for trials, and the presiding judges make all decisions on their own evaluation of the data and evidence brought out during the proceedings.

Offenses of minimal significance are judged summarily by the mayors (*alcaldes*) of the communities in which they occur or by area police chiefs in rural areas. These dispositions are usually final, although appeal may be made to the next higher legal authority.

More serious offenses are adjudicated in an ascending series of formal courts whose jurisdictions and competencies are determined by the nature and seriousness of the crime committed.

The Public Ministry, within the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration, is also intimately involved in court procedures. It is headed by two attorneys general (*fiscales generals*) at the national level who operate in the fields of criminal and civil law, respectively. Subordinate prosecutors (*fiscales* and *subfiscales*) are stationed throughout the country, where they serve in capacities similar to, but more wide-ranging, than those of state and district attorneys in the United States.

Apprehension of Offenders

Apprehension and arrest of criminals is a function of the police, although the Constitution recognizes the validity of citizen arrest when offenders are caught in the act of committing a crime. The police may also take a suspect into custody on the basis of their own investigation, the formal accusation of a local public prosecutor or the written deposition of any citizen. Persons so apprehended are held in local jails for 24 hours pending a determination of facts before being charged with a crime. When these have been obtained, the police notify the public prosecutor, who lodges a complaint before an investigating judge, who then assumes cognizance of the case.

Pretrial Procedure

Before formal charges are made against the accused, the investigating judge is required to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged crime. The public prosecutor is responsible for assembling the evidence and testimony and, with police assistance, studies the complaint, visits the scene of the crime, locates witnesses and interrogates them. Both questions and answers are recorded so that evidence is available in the form of depositions.

When the evidence is assembled, an open hearing is held by the investigating judge before all interested parties. The public prosecutor makes an accusation and presents all witnesses and documents for the prosecution. Witnesses are not questioned directly or cross-examined, but deliver their testimony as a continuous narrative. The

judge, however, may interrupt at any time for clarification. When the prosecution has finished, the judge interrogates the accused and receives depositions and statements from witnesses who may appear on behalf of the accused.

The judge's opinion is expressed in a summary which he must prepare, with the advice of the public prosecutor, usually within 30 days of the hearing. If he finds that there are no reasonable grounds for continuing legal action, he may release the prisoner and dismiss the case; if there are such grounds, the summary, with the judge's endorsement and recommendation, becomes, in all practical effect, the indictment. If the offense is minor, the judge, with the concurrence of the public prosecutor, may dispose of it on his own cognizance. Usually, however, he forwards the summary, together with all supporting documents and a transcript of the proceedings, to a higher judge (called a trial judge) for continued action.

The investigating judge's summary separates charges into distinct criminal and civil phases. In all subsequent action this duality is maintained, and the two phases may even be tried in separate courts. Moreover, the full case is not closed until both have been dealt with and satisfied.

Trial Procedure

The trial judge reviews the investigating judge's summary and makes one of several possible determinations. In forming his decision, the judge is required by law to consult the public prosecutor. He may decide that the indictment is not warranted, dismiss the case and free the prisoner. If he decides that a trial is necessary, he may remand the case back to the investigating judge for trial and disposition, depending upon the seriousness of the crime.

The trial judge also acts as a court of second instance for actions taken by an investigating judge. When reviewing cases from a lower court, if he concurs in the decision, the action is ended; if he disagrees, he may direct a retrial. He also considers appeals from decisions of the lower court.

In the event the trial judge decides to hear a new case himself, the proceedings are generally similar to those in the lower court, but there are several important differences. The defendant, for example, must be represented by an attorney, either his own or one appointed by the judge. In addition to witnesses already on record, new ones may be called—either for or against the defendant—if the judge feels they might contribute to a better understanding of the case. The judge may also call upon advisers, chosen by him, when he is ready to study the data developed during the trial. Within 3 days after the conclusion of the trial, the judge must publish, along with his decision, the entire transcript of the proceedings as developed in

court, and within another 12 hours, he must confront the defendant, inform him of the decision and pronounce sentence.

Exactly the same procedures for reviews, appeals and higher court trials are followed by the district courts and the Supreme Court. The significant element in all action is the interplay and interdependence of judges at any three contiguous levels, in which the actions of the court of first instance are reviewed by or appealed to the next higher level with the third acting as a court of last resort for appeals.

The Penal System

Conceptual and traditional considerations exert a strong influence on both the nature and the severity of the sentence finally imposed. A wide variety of penalties and punishments are authorized for various types of offenses, and in arriving at a verdict, the judge takes into consideration the nature of the crime committed and the existence of special circumstances that tend to eliminate the need for retribution or to mitigate or aggravate the degree of retribution demanded by law.

Once an offender has been tried and convicted by a competent court, however, he becomes subject to penalties and punishments that are set forth in detail in the Penal Code. These afford the presiding judge very little opportunity to exercise his discretion since they make no provision for parole, probation or the setting aside of sentences and specify that final determinations must fall between fixed limits.

The Nature of Criminal Offenses

Bolivian law makes a clear-cut distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Any crime covered by the Code which is committed voluntarily and in a spirit of malice is considered to be a felony; the same crime done without malice is considered a misdemeanor. In deciding a case, therefore, a judge must give special attention to the intent of the crime.

The MNR regime looks upon political crimes as extremely serious offenses, but has not specified precise penalties for them. Until 1961 such violators were exiled, and their chattels and real properties were subject to seizure by the government. After the enactment of the 1961 Constitution, a person charged, sought or apprehended for political crimes could escape legal prosecution by asking for a passport to leave the country. Since this request may not be denied for any reason, the punishment of political offenders usually takes the form of self-exile.

Types of Punishments and Penalties

The Penal Code recognizes three types, or orders, of punishment that may be imposed on criminals, regardless of whether the offense

was a felony or a misdemeanor. These are: corporal punishments that involve some form of restraint or restriction on the person of the offender, such as imprisonment; noncorporal punishments that call for nonphysical penalties, such as the deprivation of a civil right; pecuniary punishments that exact a fine or other form of monetary payment.

Corporal punishments are usually the most severe and are imposed in various degrees that are difficult to differentiate because firm definitions are lacking and because all may be imposed for as long a time as 10 years. Generally speaking, and in descending order of severity, they include four types: *presidio*, incarceration under maximum security conditions with most privileges denied and only limited movement within the prison permitted; *prisión*, incarceration with more privileges, including greater freedom of movement, outdoor exercise and some visits from his family and friends; *reclusión*, incarcerations with maximum privileges and freedom of movement under guard, frequently in the form of labor outside the prison; and *confinamiento*, restriction to residence in a specific town or area with severe penalties threatened if specified boundary lines are crossed. In addition to restrictions placed upon their persons by incarceration, criminals sentenced to *presidio* or *prisión* may also suffer the loss of some civil rights, such as that of holding public office.

There are at least nine forms of noncorporal punishment: arrest, deprivation, surveillance, bonding, reprimand and warning, public sentencing, retraction, restriction, and public work. Arrest, although it may involve detention, is not considered a form of corporal punishment because it amounts only to jailing for periods of 30 days or less. Deprivation denies an offender, either temporarily or permanently, of the right to practice specific professions or to be employed in specific types of work. Surveillance, while not involving incarceration or restriction to any particular area, subjects a person to police surveillance for a specified time. Bonding is a light sentence in which the offender is required to take a solemn oath to refrain from engaging in specific types of illegal acts—usually the same ones for which he was originally convicted. Reprimand and warning consists of admonishment by the judge and a warning of the consequences should he repeat the offense. Public sentencing, a form of punishment that takes advantage of the power of social pressure, involves open sentencing of an offender before a public gathering; the real intent is to deepen the impact on the offender and to provide a warning and example to those who might be contemplating similar offenses. Retraction involves public acknowledgment of error, as in a case of slander or gross insult. Restriction involves simple commission to a house of correction. Public work involves working on some public project for a stated period.

Pecuniary punishment is used principally against offenders in civil suits, but may also be applied in criminal convictions. It involves two forms of exaction: one is the payment of a simple fine in the amounts specified in the Code; the other authorizes the seizure of the offender's real or personal property in amounts dictated by the judge. The latter form may no longer be pronounced in convictions for political crimes.

Special Circumstances

There is a wide list of special circumstances that may eliminate punishment or mitigate or aggravate the degree of severity of punishments and penalties, which are meticulously considered before a judge pronounces sentence. The age of the offender is taken into consideration, and persons who are insane, demonstrable idiots or otherwise mentally incompetent are usually exempt from prosecution. Women generally receive lighter sentences than men, as do those who voluntarily surrender themselves to justice or who can convince the judge they truly repent their actions. Crimes are usually less severely punished if committed under duress, as the result of extreme provocation, while drunk, out of great need, in situations of self-defense or in the execution of competent orders from a superior. Conversely, punishments may be, and usually are, increased if authorities feel that society might profit from an example of harshness, if the criminal acted with a high degree of premeditation or malice or if the victim of the act was very young or otherwise relatively helpless against the offender. Chronic offenders also may expect an intensification of their punishment.

Limitations on Punishments

Capital punishment for any reason was abolished by the Constitution of 1961; the maximum punishment allowable is 30 years at hard labor with no recourse to pardon or clemency of any sort. This severe punishment is permissible only for the crimes of parricide, assassination or treason in time of war; no other crime carries a greater penalty than 10 years' imprisonment.

The Bolivian penal system also includes a statute of limitations. Severe criminal offenses may not be prosecuted unless the offender is brought to justice within 10 years of the date of commission. In the case of lesser crimes the period during which action must be taken is shorter.

Pardon and Clemency

Judicial pardon does not exist in the Bolivian penal system, but both the president and the National Congress have this power in certain limited circumstances. Both are authorized to declare amnesty for political offenses, and Congress is empowered to pardon offenders in either criminal or civil cases provided the Supreme Court concurs.

Suspended sentences apparently are not given, but a degree of judicial clemency is practiced by the consideration of mitigating factors before sentences are pronounced. After sentencing, a judge may soften punishments only in the case of first offenders. Prisoners who have had no previous convictions may, at the discretion of a judge, have their sentences shortened. There is no mitigation for second or chronic offenders.

Penal Institutions

Persons who receive sentences calling for imprisonment are committed to one of several penal institutions in the country. There is a national penitentiary at La Paz and one in each of the nine political departments. Most provinces have jails of their own to accommodate local offenders whose crimes are serious enough to warrant long-term imprisonment. Other facilities include a correctional farm at Caranavi, a reformatory for women at La Paz and three reformatories for juveniles, one in La Paz and two near Cochabamba.

These institutions, with the exception of the juvenile reformatories, are under the general supervision of the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration, which assigns detachments of *carabineros* to provide guard and security forces. Routine administration devolves upon the departmental and provincial civil governments in the area where they are situated. There is no professional prison service; prefects and subprefects appoint wardens, assistant wardens and other attendants as a matter of political patronage. Often the warden is the commander of the *carabinero* detachment assigned for guard duty.

An attempt to insure satisfactory operation is made by requiring various public officials to inspect periodically the prisons and jails in their areas. Investigating judges are supposed to visit prisoners every Saturday and observe diet, health conditions, the actions of prison officials and the like. Trial judges are expected to make inspection tours quarterly; prefects, subprefects and municipal officials are presumed to do so at least once a month. The beneficial impact of these measures is reduced by the lack of any standard regulation governing the operation of prisons and by the financial inability of local governments to provide adequate facilities.

The prison buildings, almost without exception, are ancient structures of adobe and wood so badly in need of repair that it is hazardous to live in them. Cells are small, sometimes windowless and unheated. Furniture may or may not be provided, and long-term prisoners often have chairs, tables, beds and lamps sent to them in order to gain a modicum of comfort. Food is minimal, and medical care is not always immediately available. Laws to ameliorate these deplorable conditions have been passed, but their effects are slow in appearing. For example, the National Protectorate of Prisoners and Ex-Pris-

oners, created in 1949 by supreme decree, called for better treatment of prisoners, the development of social services such as library and educational facilities, the institution of rehabilitation procedures and similar modern practices. A decade later none of these things had been put into effect.

Inmates who are permitted a measure of freedom within the jail compound enjoy special privileges. Wives are permitted to pay extended visits to their husbands. Prisoners who have useful skills or a trade sometimes establish small shops, such as for shoe repairing, within the prison itself. The profits they earn from these enterprises may be used to augment the austere rations they receive as normal fare.

Better conditions prevail at the correctional farm at Caranavi. Regulations there are strict, and prisoners are tightly secluded in their cells at night under enforced silence. Communication with the outside world is closely regulated, and families are rarely permitted to visit inmates. During the day, prisoners engage in common work in the fields, and since they are at the source of supply, meals are better than in urban prisons. Most livable of all institutions in the system is the Women's Reformatory at La Paz. Small, with a capacity for only 30 women, it is operated under contract by a Catholic order of nuns whose charity, dedication and propensity for cleanliness and order have made it comparable to similar institutions elsewhere in the world.

Juvenile Delinquency

The combined effects of abject poverty, poor hygiene and the exigencies of life in a difficult land all contribute to the presence of an unusually large number of homeless children in the country, particularly in the cities, where family ties often break down under economic and moral strain (see ch. 7, Health and Welfare). Although there are 18 orphanages and youth shelters in the country, government facilities are nowhere equal to the task of caring for all underprivileged children; therefore, they roam and live in the streets, creating sizable problems of delinquency. As is true for crime in general, no valid or trustworthy figures on juvenile delinquency can be found, but its existence as a major phenomenon can be inferred from the attention it has provoked in official circles.

The Penal Code has always contained special provisions aimed at controlling infractions of the law by minors. These reflect a considerable understanding of the unique factors involved and consciously try to mitigate them. The Code forbids authorities to hold children in jails or prisons, where they might be influenced by hardened criminals. Sometimes, however, there is no alternative since there are only three small reformatories in the country. One of these, operated by the Office of Minors and Child Protection in the Ministry of Labor

and Social Security and located near Cochabamba, can accommodate only 64 boys. A second, also near Cochabamba, provides domestic training for a maximum of 80 girls under the supervision of a Catholic religious order. The third, near La Paz, is supported by the Salvation Army; it attempts to rehabilitate delinquents through a rather effective program of professional training but can handle no more than 66 boys.

The Code also classifies juveniles into three age groups and recognizes a differential in the severity of punishment for each. Children under 10 years of age are not considered capable of making sound moral judgments and are exempt from any criminal responsibility for their acts. Minors from 10 to 17 are expected to exhibit the beginnings of mature judgment and may be punished for breaking the law. If they acted in malice, their sentence may equal that normally given to an adult; if malice is not involved, an attempt is made to place them in a reformatory or simply remand them to the care of their parents. Youths 17 to 21 are held fully responsible for any wrongdoing, and if judged guilty, usually receive the minimum sentence meted to an adult for the same crime.

A decree of 1947 called for the establishment of a juvenile court and the development of a probation system, but it has never been implemented. In early 1963 juvenile delinquents were still being administered through the same channels as their elders.

Incidence of Crime

Because of the lack of systematized records, the incidence of crime can be discussed only in general terms. Most observers agree that it is not unusually high but appears to be on the increase, particularly in the urban areas. A survey of the public press suggests that petty thievery ranks high on the list of most common crimes. Also reported with considerable frequency are attacks upon persons, disorderly conduct, rape and nonsupport. Young men seem to be involved more in thievery than in other forms of crime, whereas older men are more frequently arrested for acts of violence against the persons of others. The number of crimes seems greatest during holidays and festivals, when drinking to excess is common.

Smuggling

The national boundaries of Bolivia are among the most difficult in the world to police and keep secure since they are located in exceedingly rugged mountainous, jungle and desert terrain, remote and inaccessible from centers of population.

Twenty-seven frontier posts manned by *carabineros* at critical points of ingress and egress around the nation are a response to the recognized

need to control smuggling, but their net restraining influence is small. The functions of the new River and Lake Force of the Armed Forces, as yet unclear in early 1963, are expected to include a contribution to the efforts to reduce smuggling.

Most smugglers deal for the main part in shipping locally produced narcotics (coca leaves) outside of Bolivia and in receiving basic food and living commodities for the black market from producers abroad. The existence of political parties in determined opposition to the MNR and their propensity to use physical force to unseat the regime occasion a lively traffic also in the illicit importation of arms and ammunitions.

CHAPTER 26

INTERNAL SECURITY

The internal security of the country rests primarily on the ability of the government to cope with two types of challenge. The first is the high incidence of mob violence that periodically sweeps the country; the second is the spate of subversive activities persistently carried out by opposition parties to undermine the regime. Of the two, most observers feel that subversion is the more dangerous and threatening.

There seems to be a close relationship between mob violence and subversion. The violence does not usually occur haphazardly or spontaneously but in connection with strikes, demonstrations and "marches" that take place frequently and regularly. In the period between 1958 and 1960, for example, more than 600 strikes were called, most of them marked by extreme turbulence and often by bloodshed. Almost invariably they had less to do with improving the lot of the laborer than they did with wringing some political concession out of the government, unseating some political adversary or simply harassing the government and forcing it to dissipate strength and resources badly needed for national development elsewhere. The many demonstrations and so-called protest marches, such as those staged after the United States naval quarantine of Cuba, follow a similar pattern, soon ceasing to be simple expressions of public sentiment and degenerating into pitched street battles, riots and other forms of collective violence. Much evidence exists to indicate that these outbursts are manipulated as the result of deliberately contrived subversive action.

MOB VIOLENCE AND THE PEOPLE'S MILITIAS

The divisions which rend the country's political life into so many bitterly contending opposition parties of the Right and Left, and into similar splinter groups within the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) itself, are responsible for most of the mob violence that has characterized the first decade of MNR rule (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). In keeping it under control the roles of the regular armed forces and the National Corps of Police and Carabineros are obvious and self-explanatory.

The part played by the groups of armed civilians known as People's Militias, which in many ways has been the most active and decisive, warrants special attention. Although designated by the Constitution of 1961 as the "reserves of the armed forces," the function of the armed civilian militias has less to do with formal combat than with the preservation of internal security. These elements had their origin in the 1946 uprisings when unorganized mobs broke into the national arsenal and seized its store of arms and ammunition. After order had been restored, the insurgents kept the weapons and were subsequently organized by local leaders into some semblance of military order and unity to act as vigilantes.

During the next several years these irregular bands were a source of concern to the national government, particularly during the rebellion of 1949. They did not really become significant, however, until the MNR revolution of 1952 when their support of the aspiring rebels against the military junta proved decisive to the victory of the MNR. From that point on a unique combination of emotional and ideological factors insured their continued importance in the political life of the nation.

The new regime, fearing a counterrevolution, launched a program of deliberate denigration of the military and conscious strengthening of the civilian militias. Existing militias were legitimized, and weapons taken from the Army were made available to new units sponsored by *campesino* (peasant), miner and factory leaders. In a matter of months the civilian militias were the strongest military forces in the country (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

No sound estimate can be made on precisely how strong these militias became or how much of their original strength still exists. They seem, however, to have reached a peak value (variously estimated at from 50,000 to 70,000 armed men) about the end of President Paz's first term of office, with a gradual deterioration setting in shortly afterward under President Siles. The number of men is still estimated at 50,000 by some, but the consensus is that as of early 1963 the over-all strength did not exceed 16,000. About one-half of these are in *campesino* units, a majority of the rest in units controlled by miners and the remainder scattered among factory, white-collar and other workers' militias.

Originally, the MNR set out to create a highly centralized, party-controlled system of militias in each *sindicato campesino* (peasant league) and industrial union, dedicated to the preservation of the revolution and available on instant call whenever the regime or internal security came into jeopardy. At the local level, militia leaders were elected democratically by unit membership. Industrial militias were placed under regional commanders who in turn were subordinate to national chieftains appointed by the MNR through the

labor federations. *Campesino* units, on the other hand, enjoyed virtual autonomy and worked into the system through liaison with their industrial counterparts. Both types were technically controlled by the regime through over-all supervision centered in the Minister of National Defense for workers' militias and the Minister of Rural Affairs for *campesino* militias. It was a fine concept proved to be largely visionary because its viability was predicated on basic loyalties that did not exist.

Most of those who made up the rank and file as well as the leadership of the militias are motivated not by doctrinal convictions but by the desire to assert local dominance and freedom of action. By nature and background they follow the tradition of military bossism (*caudillismo*) and give loyalty to their immediate leaders rather than to some remote, impersonal central government, but at the same time regard the revolution's top leaders, Paz and Siles, almost with reverence. They mobilize at their leader's sole command and support his strictly personal objectives with or without reference to the plans or requirements of the MNR. On occasion they have engaged in interdepartmental or provincial disputes of their own, thereby creating, rather than fending off, threats to the internal security of the nation.

These uncontrolled proclivities impressed upon the MNR the necessity for taking other stabilizing action. With loyalties so indeterminate, the militias might themselves become the very danger they were created to eliminate. Accordingly, the strengths and capabilities of the militias in relation to the Army and the *carabineros* (national police) were gradually adjusted until, while still retaining sufficient power to contain mob violence, the militias themselves could be deterred should they ever develop revolutionary ambitions of their own (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

The most important civilian militia units are those of the miners, *campesinos* and factory workers, in that order. The miners' militias, sponsored by the Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolovia—FSTMB), are not the largest forces but are considered the most effective because they are better organized, trained, disciplined and equipped. The *campesinos*' militias are the most numerous and, because of their intimate knowledge of local terrain, their ability to live off the land and the ease with which they can merge with local populations, are particularly adaptable for employment as guerrilla units. The factory workers' units, controlled by the Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB), are relatively small but are capable of effective vanguard action because of the speed with which they can be mobilized and their physical presence in urban areas where mob violence is most likely to occur.

Professionally, the civilian militias are not highly regarded. Except for a few permanently on duty guarding entrances to cities, they are part-time forces with little or no previous experience in military operations. Their training programs have not contributed much to their efficiency. There is no standard course to follow, and training sessions vary from unit to unit according to the interest of the local commander. What training is done is sporadic, rudimentary and hampered by the lack of facilities.

Another debilitating factor is the quantity and quality of arms and ammunition with which militia units are equipped. About 90 percent of the individual weapons are rifles and 10 percent various makes and models of automatic weapons. There are a few small mortars and field pieces. Prominent in the militia arsenals are home-made Molotov cocktails which are often employed with abandon. Among the miners, who occupationally work with explosives, bundles of dynamite sticks are favorite weapons. In some units recent stocks of good machine guns, relatively modern Czech rifles and late-model automatic weapons of various descriptions have been observed. Some of these undoubtedly are obtained legitimately from the government, but it is believed that the greater part of them were smuggled in from Cuba, Eastern Europe or neighboring Latin American countries.

Militia units wear no uniforms and go into action in their normal working clothes. They receive no pay and are compensated only by infrequent handouts of money or alcohol when these things become available. Despite these irregularities, morale in the militias is surprisingly good, perhaps because of the slight social prestige that comes from belonging to a unit and the overriding satisfaction of serving an honored leader.

The civilian militias are considerably more dangerous and effective than appearances indicate. What they lack in professional polish they more than make up for in reckless abandon. The record shows that on every occasion when their services were required to protect internal security, they performed successfully and well. Their effectiveness in subduing and controlling mob violence is not to be underestimated. As one source reported when a *campesino* unit from Achacachi was summoned into La Paz to put down riotous elements: "When the units came into La Paz, opposition elements took to their heels, for the militias are dangerous and irresponsible when sober—a real menace when drunk."

SUBVERSION

Since 1952 the MNR has manipulated and controlled the electoral process so consistently and completely that opposition parties at

either end of the political spectrum have never been able to win more than fractional percentages of the vote and exist only as extreme minority groups. At the same time all outward displays of resistance have been so ruthlessly suppressed that legitimate opposition has been effectively stifled (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). These repressive measures have been applied to parties of both the political Right and Left so that subversive activities in one form or another are common practices of both. The precise nature of clandestine operations and the extent to which either the Right or Left engages in them is indicative of their ultimate objectives and the degree of sophistication each has been able to acquire in extralegal maneuvering.

Rightist Activities

The various parties that make up the political Right are universally in agreement that the dominant power of the MNR must be curtailed, but beyond this proposition they have little in common. The Authentic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Auténtico—PRA), for example, has some affinity with the MNR because originally it was a Right-of-Center element of that party. It does not oppose the concept of revolution but objects to the extent of the leftist orientation it has been given by the MNR. Its constant cry is that the regime has "betrayed" the revolution by adopting policies and practices that are more radical than was initially intended. Consequently, the main thrust of its effort is directed, not at nullifying the revolution or changing the basic form of the state, but at replacing the current leadership with more moderate officials to prevent a drift into communism.

Under normal conditions the PRA might hope to achieve this objective by normal political activities, but in view of the bitter hostility the MNR holds for any opposition, particularly that from the Right, legal methods are impossible (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). It has therefore resorted to some mild subversion and usually expresses itself in relatively unorganized, personal maneuvering behind the scenes to win acceptance for rightist views. This does not mean that the moderate Right eschews all organized conspiracy or that it is unaware of the possibilities inherent in more aggressive forms of subversion. It does mean that parties of the moderate Right indulge in full-fledged subversive activities only when it seems expedient and profitable to do so and not as a normal modus operandi.

The Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB), on the other hand, represents the spirit of rightist opposition in its most extreme form. Completely reactionary in outlook and practice, it is totally and implacably opposed to the very concept of the revolution and everything the MNR regime stands for. It does

not want to modify the existing form of government, but wants to destroy it and replace it with an entirely new and different structure (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

The methods of the FSB are simple, direct, unsophisticated and violent. In the first decade of MNR rule, for example, the FSB was the prime mover in at least 12 of the 17 attempted armed revolts and was probably implicated in the other 5 as well. It enjoys some significant strength in labor, student and similar organizations and employs these elements in fomenting strikes, demonstrations, counterdemonstrations and other forms of agitation to attack the regime. Although such activities may appear to fall into the category of public disorders, their obviously calculated timing suggests that they are not spontaneous and that there has been much clandestine preparation of a subversive nature behind them.

Nevertheless, subversion from the Right has been more harassing than dangerous. The animosities that obtain among its various parties preclude any possibility of mustering sufficient strength through united effort to be decisive. Moreover the reliance placed on violence and armed force has been largely self-defeating; the government has had no difficulty in putting down these outbursts and has taken advantage of the acts of rebellion to justify intensifying the already severe measures by which the Right is kept in subjection. The spectacular nature of armed revolt and the inevitable disruption and injury it causes have also lent credence to the government's charge that parties of the Right are the greatest single threat to the nation's security and welfare.

Leftist Activities

Subversive activities carried out by the three Marxian parties that make up the opposition from the Left are typical of the practices of that ideology. Being Communist, they are all dedicated to the establishment of a Soviet-type government in the country and to its incorporation in the world Communist system. They are split, however, into three schools of thought by disputes as to the best method for achieving this objective (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics).

Those who follow Trotskyite theories, holding that only by arousing the proletariat to armed revolt can the ideal state be brought into being, have organized themselves into the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrera Revolucionario—POR) and follow the guidance of the Fourth International in Paris. Those who adhere to similar revolutionary concepts but who prefer to remain independent of all international affiliations have grouped themselves into the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario—PIR). Those who are most orthodox in Communist belief and practice, considering themselves totally integrated into the world Com-

munist movement headed by the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, have formed the Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB).

All three are numerically much smaller than their counterparts on the Right, but they more than make up for this deficiency by the support they are able to receive from their international partners and by the affinity of their programs with that of the MNR. Many of the founders of the MNR were Marxists or socialists and still remain ardent collectivists. Their continued adherence to these principles is evident in the early enactment of the agrarian reform law, the expropriation of the mines and a number of similar actions characteristic of socialist political doctrine.

Since, according to Marxist doctrine, socialism is the first and essential step toward true communism and therefore must be supported, at least temporarily, the Left has from the beginning supported the MNR in all its more radical efforts. In return, the regime has accorded them somewhat preferential treatment in the sense that it has not persecuted the Left as vehemently as it has the Right or been as rigorous in circumscribing the activities of its leaders. The MNR has even openly acknowledged the leftists as "friends in deed," accepted their specific support and rewarded them with high government office.

While openly espousing MNR radical causes, the Left has been acutely aware that the regime, if given too much support, might possibly consolidate its hold on the nation and stabilize the system at some point short of full-fledged communism. To prevent this, the Left has carried on an aggressive program of subversion to harass the party in power. The methods employed in this campaign are those developed and brought to a high state of sophistication by the international Communist movement. They include: infiltration and penetration of all possible loci of power; planned agitation to force further concessions out of the regime; overt and covert propaganda to undermine confidence in the MNR; the promotion of closer ties with Communist-bloc nations; the rupture of friendly intercourse with representatives of Western democracy; and, when expedient, moral and material support to insurgent groups bent on overthrowing the government by armed force.

There are indications that considerable success has been achieved by the Left through these tactics. Its members have been able to gain dominating positions within the labor movement, in educational institutions and in media of mass communications (see ch. 21, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 8, Education; ch. 14, Public Information and Propaganda). Evidence is conflicting on the extent to which they have penetrated the government itself. While some of the reports that appear to indicate that such infiltration has been very

extensive may be inflated, it is true that ample opportunities for penetrating the governmental structure do exist. Leftist leaders have been rewarded with official positions for services rendered, and since 1954 the MNR has carried on a program of converting Marxist leaders and enrolling many of them within its own ranks. No attempt is made to disguise or hide the fact that a large number of former POR, PIR and PCB adherents are currently holding office in the MNR government, and many high-ranking members of the official family have openly expressed their admiration for communism.

Militia Activities

The numerous armed civilian militias, particularly those of the *campesinos*, are not subversive in themselves, but they are extremely vulnerable to manipulation by those who are (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics). The naive opportunism of some of their leaders, and the intransigence they display toward centralized government control of their operations make them extremely susceptible to foreign propaganda and direction.

The most likely direction from which such an attempt might come is Communist Cuba. In January 1963, following the forced removal of Russian missiles from that island, Castro shifted from espousal of the "peaceful coexistence" line to one of fullest support of all dissident elements who would strive "to make the masses march, to launch the masses into battle." Responsible authorities believe that this may well presage an increase in guerrilla activities throughout the continent in which the Bolivian militias could be involved.

What gives significance to these views are the evident guerrilla capabilities of the *campesino* militias and the constantly recurring reports that new arms are being smuggled in to them. The militia chiefs are also thought to be receiving Ché Guevara's training manual, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, in which he boasts that "given suitable operating terrain, land hunger, enemy injustice . . . a hard core of 30 to 50 men is, in my opinion, adequate to initiate armed revolution in any Latin American country." Unconfirmed rumors state that such activities may have already begun in the southern Lake Titicaca area around Taraco and that farmers are being forced to leave the area because of terrorist activities. The subversive elements directing these activities are also said to be offering scholarships to study guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics in Communist-bloc countries.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of these rumors, the militias do pose a subversive threat to the MNR irrespective of foreign influence and backing. This is not lost on the government, which since 1962 has been endeavoring to find some way to assert its complete dominance over outlying areas in which they operate.

Foreign Influence in Subversion

The parties of the Left, particularly the PCB, gain tremendous operational advantage through membership in the international Communist movement—an advantage denied the rightist parties, which cannot count on any external support. The orthodox Left benefits not only from inclusion in a jointly developed and coordinated program for political action but also from the orchestrated support of the vast array of international organizations, movements, fronts, communications media, clandestine mechanisms and reservoirs of material aid that characterize the Communist system. Of particularly significant value is the integration of the local Bolivian program into the overall strategy of the world organization.

In the fall of 1960, for example, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was host to an assembly in Moscow at which 81 national organizations, including the PCB, were represented. After lengthy deliberation this "81 Party Congress" issued a manifesto widely hailed as the official operations order for the movement over the next decade. Early the following year a congress at which the PCB was represented, was called in Montevideo to tailor the international plan to Latin American requirements. After their return to La Paz the PCB delegates called their own national congress and further refined the program for local application. The result was a local Bolivian course of political action carefully and deliberately worked out to mesh with international strategies and gain maximum impact through the planned activities of externally supporting agencies.

In day-to-day operations foreign influence is most effectively applied in areas where the originating source is represented diplomatically. Superficially, it might appear that the activities of the international Communist movement lose impact in this respect for neither of its great power centers, Moscow or Peiping, have embassies or legations in Bolivia. Actually the lack of physical presence in La Paz is no real deterrent because of the universally recognized practice of these two centers in working through satellites. Cuba has an embassy accredited to the country; Czechoslovakia has a sizable legation there; and Hungary is granted diplomatic status through its minister to Argentina, who is also accredited to Bolivia. All of these focal points are active bases for Communist subversive activities to dispense moral and material support to the Bolivian Left.

The Cuban Embassy is especially active in this respect and on many occasions has been openly castigated by the Bolivian Government for engaging in clandestine and hostile operations. For example, in June 1961 the regime was forced to arrest 50 to 60 Communist labor leaders and declare a state of siege to quash an alleged plot to overthrow the government—a plot it openly charged was planned and

engineered within the Cuban Embassy. In this action the subversive dealings of the Cuban chargé d'affaires were so blatant that he was declared persona non grata and forced to leave the country. Members of the Cuban Embassy staff constantly fraternize with leaders of the Left, and it is common knowledge that in these meetings financial support and tactical advice for local Communist activities is provided, arrangements are completed for orientation and training visits to bloc countries, and the tactical coordination of mutual programs and actions is effected.

Other similar foreign influences emanate from the Czech Legation, which is reported to be the major source of funds for local propaganda efforts, and through the diplomatic immunity granted official pouches from the Hungarian Legation in Buenos Aires.

Quite apart from official presence, foreign subversive influence is exerted through informal pressures applied in almost every field of social, economic and cultural endeavor. There is virtually no known mechanism in the Communist system that does not have an affiliate or local counterpart in Bolivia.

At the top of the list are the numerous Sino-Bolivian, Russo-Bolivian, Hungaro-Bolivian and similar friendship or cultural societies that have sprung up in nearly every urban area. Most of these are affiliated with the Latin-American Cultural Institute, a well-known Communist-front organization. In youth activities the Left has organized young Communist leagues, under various local titles, all conforming to standard international models. Delegates from these groups regularly attend the Annual World Youth Festivals sponsored by the Soviet Union and return home to agitate for the objectives developed at these meetings. In the educational field Communists are prominent in student and teacher federations and have managed to affiliate many of them with the International Student Union (ISU), a recognized Communist agency. One Bolivian student leader, Oscar Zamora of Tarija University, is a member of the Secretariat of the ISU and frequently visits bloc countries.

Perhaps most powerful of all mechanisms are those involving labor organizations, through which the literally hundreds of strikes, riots, demonstrations and attitudes of intransigence toward the MNR that have so wracked the nation and jeopardized internal security are inspired. The dominant COB, for example, which can sway the entire economic life of the country, received direction from the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederación de Trajabadores de América Latina—CTAL) that faithfully served the Communist cause in South America for 14 years until its excesses forced its dissolution by Moscow in 1960. To replace the discredited organization, and in keeping with the new emergence of Cuba as a Communist nation, a group of Marxist labor leaders, among them some Bolivians, met in

Havana in early 1962 to draft plans for a new confederation with headquarters in Cuba. The idea was considered in September 1962 at a congress of leftist labor leaders in Santiago de Chile, but the holding of a constituent assembly was deferred until 1963. The COB delegation expressed its support of the project. Through the channels of the nascent organization Communist guidance now is operative in Bolivian labor activities and evidences itself in the COB's agitation for greater governmental support for Cuba against "North American imperialism," in its sponsorship of the "volunteer" military brigades now on counterinvasion duty on that island, and in its adamant opposition to the imposition of economic sanctions against the Castro government.

Other pressure groups acting as instruments of Communist influence within the country include local chapters of the World Peace Council, the Fidel Castro Committee, Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Friends of Cuba Society to Aid Cuba and the National Liberation Front. All of these groups, movements and mechanisms are continuously augmented by intense drives to forge closer ties between Bolivia and bloc countries through such devices as offers of economic aid and trade agreements, provision of scholarships for Bolivians at Soviet and satellite universities, sponsorship of expense-free visits of prominent Bolivians to Communist countries and the development of programs of cultural exchanges. Typical of these are: the Czech agreement to build an antimony smelter in Oruro in 1964 (the first instance of developmental aid to Bolivia from any bloc nation); the Russian offer to finance the trip to Moscow of any delegation willing to discuss trade possibilities; the sponsorship of visits by Bolivian university officials to China; and the completion of a cultural agreement between Havana and La Paz whereby the two countries will exchange 10 music and dance groups during 1963.

Government Countersubversive Action

The government has a variety of countersubversive methods at its disposal and, when occasion has warranted it, has made use of them all. It may declare a state of siege and make use of armed forces to suppress subversive elements (see ch. 25, Public Order). Also in the realm of legal action are two special degrees incorporated in the Legal Code. One of these was promulgated by President Toro in 1936 and declares that any person or persons trying to establish a Communist order in the country may be subject to police surveillance and legal sanction. The other, issued 2 years later by President Busch, makes the distribution of propaganda of a disturbing nature by "communists, anarchists or bolsheviks" a crime. Both of these decrees are still in effect, although they seem to be applied only when it seems expedient to do so.

Subversion itself is not specifically defined by law, but the MNR has broadly interpreted it to mean any opposition at all to the present form of government. Thus the regime has been known to raid meetings of the Right and Left with equal vigor, to arrest their leaders and to confiscate their papers, propaganda materials and records even when hostile intent is only supposed. Sometimes the government deliberately provokes the opposition into actions or situations that provide justification for severe acts of reprisal and intensified suppression. In less drastic atmospheres it imposes the tightest possible censorship over unfriendly newspapers and bans their publication for indefinite periods for criticism of official policies. On one occasion these tactics were so harshly applied that the Inter-American Press Association intervened to investigate charges that freedom of speech no longer existed in Bolivia. Its final report supported the charge.

The MNR is also engaged in a wide-ranging program of counter-penetration of labor, educational, industrial, professional and military organizations. Specific cells (*comandos*) of party faithful are infiltrated into every union, student and teacher federation, military and police unit, professional society and the like. Their job is to keep alert for anti-MNR developments and to indoctrinate their fellows in MNR philosophy and win their undivided support for the party. The regime owns, operates and controls its own press and radio facilities, through which it keeps up continuous propaganda to identify itself with the cause of the workers, the welfare of the people and the future of the nation.

EVALUATION

Seen in retrospect the internal security of Bolivia seems to have a dual nature. On the one hand the MNR appears to be the stablest government the country has ever known. Its forceful use of full executive powers and continuing ability to attract and hold the loyalty of a substantial majority of the voting population has so far been decisive in maintaining the present form of government and in quashing threats to public order and tranquillity. On the other hand, numerically weak but bitter opposition forces constantly keep the country in turmoil. The plethora of strikes, riots, demonstrations, disorders and occasional armed uprisings they have been able to provoke constitute an ever-present source of concern and contain within themselves the seeds of possible future chaos.

Challenges to the government from the Right do not appear to be capable of coming to fruition at present, and unless radical changes in loyalties occur within the armed forces, *carabineros* and civilian militias, they should remain under control for the foreseeable future. Those from the Left, however, particularly in their subversive manifestations, create sources of real concern. Ideologically dedicated

and skillfully engaged in a sophisticated and powerfully backed program to undermine the regime from the outside while sapping its strength from within, the Left has a definite capability for accomplishing by internal radicalization what the Right has evidenced little prospect of doing by force.

The Left's continued ability to implement this program depends on the quality and extent of support it can expect to receive from its international partners. Moscow and Peiping differ as to the proper method of achieving a Communist world. Castro's Cuba, seemingly committed almost exclusively to Moscow for ideological guidance and material support and scheduled to serve as Russia's Western base for spreading communism throughout Latin America, nevertheless has at times shown signs of developing uniquely Fidelista concepts (often with strong Chinese overtones) of the proper role to play in that area. Who eventually directs the efforts of Cuba may have much to do with whether subversion in Bolivia will remain as it was in early 1963—threatening and dangerous but not yet capable of overthrowing the MNR.

CHAPTER 27

THE ARMED FORCES

The country does not publish the strength of its military forces, but a standard reference source gives for 1959 a strength of 6,500 for the Army and Air Force combined. That figure almost certainly includes only the career personnel of the Army (all officers and noncommissioned officers) and the entire Air Force, which is exclusively a volunteer service. The number of conscripts, never more than a few thousand, is controlled annually by the legislature through budgetary limitations. Equipment, except in the few units supported by the United States Military Assistance Program (MAP), is scanty, ill-balanced and obsolescent. Although there is legal provision for reserve forces, they are unorganized, and provisions for their mobilization are believed to be unsystematized.

The Army of Bolivia has played a prominent part in the country's history. From independence in 1825 until 1884 almost all of its presidents were military men, most of them with distinctly dictatorial proclivities and nearly all coming to power through violence. By contrast, the next 50 years saw only one general in the presidential chair, and there were only three revolutions. None of these, however, could have been successful without the support of at least a part of the Army. It is both notable and surprising that, during the entire period from independence to the Chaco War in the Early 1930's, not only was the Army small—hardly ever exceeding 6,000 men—but nearly every successful revolt was accomplished by the seizure of the seat of government by a small force, usually less than 500 men led by the aspirant to power. The rest of the country usually accepted the result peaceably (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

There was again direct military participation in government from 1936 to 1946; thereafter, until the revolution of 1952, the military stood firmly behind the succeeding civilian regimes. In this period the eventually successful Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) was building strength toward what became the only mass-based party ever to exist in the country. After the revolution the party, reacting against the dominant role of the military in politics, deeply purged the armed forces, overshadowed them with a numerous popular militia and, when it

reconstructed the Army, took all possible pains to rebuild it in the party's image.

MILITARY HISTORY AND TRADITION

The Colonial Establishment

The early recorded military history of the territory included in the present boundaries of Bolivia is closely related to that of Peru and commences with Francisco Pizarro's conquest of the Inca Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century. Indian resistance and repeated fratricidal clashes among the Pizarro and Almagro families delayed somewhat the firm establishment of the Spanish. Nevertheless, before the end of the century present-day Bolivia, then governed as the Audiencia of Charcas and regionally described as Alto Perú, was a political entity with an importance assured by its rich silver deposits (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Military developments in the *audiencia* followed the typical South American pattern. All administrative authority, as well as military command, was vested in governors responsible through the viceroy to the Spanish king. Military action was usually limited to occasional forays against dissident Indians or rebellious Spaniards. The Spanish community, trained in the use of arms, was considered a militia from which provisional units were formed for such service. The only permanent units that existed were small detachments that served as police or guarded key installations in a few major cities.

The most notable disturbances of the peace in the *audiencia* occurred in the eighteenth century. The most serious, which lasted from 1780 to 1783 and affected much of the Andean region of Peru and Alto Perú, was a widespread Indian revolt led by a descendant of the Incas, who assumed the name of Tupac Amaru II. Final suppression of the revolt, achieved with great effort, was accompanied by terrible reprisals. Its relevance to modern times lies in the effort Communist propaganda is making to restore and exploit Tupac Amaru's image as a legendary champion of the rights of the indigenous population of both Peru and Bolivia.

The Wars of Independence

Between 1809, the year that marked the first overt action on behalf of Spanish-American independence, and 1825 when it was achieved, a series of military campaigns, many of them of a guerrilla type, were waged over the territory that was to become Bolivia. These were by no means decisive, however, and final victory was due in major part to the achievements of other Spanish-American armies outside of the area (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Within the country marauding troops inflicted great hardships on the countryside and cities changed hands frequently. Political morale was largely destroyed by the conflicting loyalties and shifting allegiances of the forces involved. Nevertheless, while many of the rank and file of the guerrillas followed the almost universal custom of changing sides when an attractive opportunity presented itself, the majority of them did have a genuine longing for freedom and a very strong attachment to their local soil. These sentiments were largely responsible for their fairly consistent support of leaders who favored independence. It contrasted markedly with the attitude of the citizens of the major towns, who would break out new flags in welcome to the latest victor, whether loyalist or patriot.

From 1816 to 1824 the mainstream of events in the liberation of South America flowed around rather than through Alto Perú. Operations there were limited to an occasional raid by Argentine patriots and relatively minor clashes between guerrillas and the loyalist forces that controlled the major cities, under the control of General Pedro Olañeta, a fanatical monarchist (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

By the end of 1823 the success of the Loyalists seemed assured, but dissension prevented the necessary cooperation between elements of their superior forces. The Loyalists in Peru were defeated by Simón Bolívar at Junín in August 1824, and by Antonio José de Sucre's definitive victory at Ayacucho in December of that year. In early February 1825 Sucre invaded Alto Perú, where, aided by effective guerrilla support and the shift of allegiance of various elements of Olañeta's forces, he quickly brought the wars of independence to a successful conclusion with the defeat and death of Olañeta at the battle of Tumusla on April 1, 1825 (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The Armies of the Republic

An Unstable Foundation

At the time of independence armies had marched and fought throughout the Bolivian highlands for 15 years, thereby precluding the establishment of any stable sort of civil central government. Although active warfare was not always in progress, the direction of affairs had been in the hands of military leaders. Their control, however, was regionally fragmented and intermittently held by one force or another. Even at the nominal capital, Charcas, soon to be renamed in honor of Sucre, there was no body of officials then able or competent to form a government and no leader strong enough to unify the country.

After Sucre's victory of 1825, a deliberative assembly convoked by him invited Bolívar to assume the presidency for as long as he cared to stay in the country, and upon his departure in 1826, it elected Sucre to succeed him. In this way a precedent for military heads of

state was set which remained the rule, with exceptions of only short duration, until 1884. The country also had set before it, in the constitution which the assembly had asked Bolívar to prepare, the precedent of the executive of wide powers and few restraints on his use of them. This imbalance of power, too, persisted. It has been more enduring than the once unrelieved rule by military dictators, and indeed the two practices have complemented one another (see ch. 12, Constitution and Government).

Soon after independence the necessity for a national army was recognized. The material immediately available for an officer corps consisted of veterans from such diversified sources as former guerrillas and members of the Olañeta's army, some of whom had changed sides only in the last weeks of the war, while others had remained with him to the end. Commissions and promises of a permanent career were also offered to officers of the Peruvian and Colombian troops then in the country.

The troop units were composed for the most part of *cholos* (persons of mixed white and Indian origin), some barely, and most not at all literate. Fierce and merciless fighters, they possessed no notion of allegiance to country or, for that matter, to any sort of civil government. They were responsive only to the orders of such immediate commanders as could assure their welfare, which was usually seen in terms of sharing the fruits of the seizure of political power. With such an aggregation, not to be called an army in any unified, institutionalized sense, it is not to be wondered at that Bolivia's early years were turbulent.

Resentment at what was felt to be foreign rule bred intrigue and rebellion against the whole Bolivian system in both Bolivia and Peru. Revolts in both countries, in one of which Sucre was seriously wounded, forced his resignation. After an interim president had been assassinated the Bolivian Congress elected another war hero, Marshal Andrés Santa Cruz, as president. Doubtless inspired by his Inca blood, his ambition was to reunite Bolivia and Peru and for a brief time he was able to do so, though only by force of arms. He then established a Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, with himself as protector, and assumed virtually dictatorial powers.

Neither Argentina nor Chile looked with favor on the Confederation, and both declared war. Santa Cruz was able to fend off the Argentine invasion by winning a single battle, but a Chilean invasion of Peru by sea was more difficult to combat, especially as it was supported by Peruvian dissidents. In the battle of Yungay (Peru), in January 1839, Santa Cruz was defeated and forced into exile.

Bolivia was not yet, however, free of its entanglement with Peru. General Gamarra, President of Peru, invaded Bolivia in 1841. Another leader who had come with credit out of the wars of independence,

General José Ballivián, met and defeated him at Ingavi, not far from La Paz. While the victories of Bolívar and Sucre in 1824–25 are celebrated as the winning of independence from Spain, that of Ingavi is considered by Bolivians as the definitive confirmation of their national status and is recognized accordingly.

Ballivián then overthrew his predecessor, General Velasco, and assumed power. He was elected constitutional president in 1843, and until 1847 Bolivia enjoyed relative tranquility, even though under strongly centralist, authoritarian rule.

Collectively, this first group of presidents and military rulers are often called by Bolivian historians the *caudillos letrados*—forceful, autocratic military chiefs who were also educated. Each made attempts to establish a professional army, with more or less systematic training in the tactics of the day and with a cadre of career officers and noncommissioned officers, replenished and maintained by military schools. Because of foreign wars and internal rebellions, however, such basic efforts to build a dependable army were doomed to failure. Sucre's military academy was discontinued after 2 years, that of Santa Cruz after 4, and that of Ballivián in about 5.

Such a heterogeneous army, with no sound basis in discipline and indoctrination, was fated to remain a collection of units commanded by ambitious leaders over whom it was seemingly impossible to exercise centralized control. There being in the country no locus of power other than that of arms, each commander of a regiment saw himself as a potential president and schemed to attain a sufficient strength in numbers and influence to overturn the incumbent and seize the government. Such was the unstable foundation on which Bolivia's nationhood laid.

Disorganization and Chaos

In 1847 Ballivián was overthrown by a complicated but apparently coordinated series of revolts involving the former president, General Velasco, and, among others, General Belzu, whom Ballivián had disciplined for misconduct in the Peruvian war. Velasco again became president, but in his turn was unseated by Belzu a year later. Thus started the period of rule, lasting with but two intermissions for 30 years, of the *caudillos bárbaros*, the barbarian chieftains, so-called to distinguish them from their predecessors, the *letrados*.

Belzu, the first, was a barely literate ex-sergeant who won promotion for his competence as a fighting man. A highly controversial president, he is credited by some writers with espousal of democratic principles because of his championing of the cause of the common man. Whatever his intent, his inflammatory speeches aroused mobs to unrestrained violence against the educated class, and his rule was characterized by disorder and anarchy. His army, after the discharge of

most of the officers of artistocratic origin, was led by ex-sergeants and town *cholos*, many with no military experience, and the most trusted troops were led by Belzu up and down the country suppressing revolts.

What is said of Belzu applies in varying degree to his successor military dictators, Córdova, Achá, Melgarejo, Morales and Daza. Under none was an orderly government established nor a professional army developed. Melgarejo, the worst, was unpredictable, ruthless and murderous, especially in drunken rages.

The two presidents, both civilians, who provided some respite from anarchy were José Maria Linares and Tomás Frías. The first, who overthrew Belzu's hand-picked successor, was a thoroughgoing dictator himself in his efforts to reduce chaos to order. He did, however, attempt to place the Army on a professional basis and to restore discipline and a system of military education. He, too, was overthrown, and it was 10 years before the regime of Frías provided another brief but bright interlude in the Army's history by purging incompetents and attempting to reorganize on a sound and orderly basis.

The Frías regime lasted only 2 years, when it was forced out of office by a rebellion fomented by General Hilarión Daza in 1876. Again the Army went into decline under this last of the *bárbaros*. At the outbreak of war with Chile (1879) it comprised but 2,165 poorly armed soldiers with, over them, 690 officers, of whom 153 were generals and colonels. Only one battalion had the then modern Remington rifles. The rest had ancient muskets. The artillery had only two cannons.

The War of the Pacific

The war by which Bolivia lost its access to the sea was fought by a Bolivian-Peruvian coalition against Chile over the possession of the valuable nitrate deposits in the coastal desert provinces at Atacama (Bolivia) and Tarapacá (Peru) (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Hostilities were opened by Chile's seizure of the port of Antofagasta in Bolivian territory in February 1879. The following month, the small Bolivian garrison in the province was defeated at Calama. Hastily recruiting a force of about 4,000, President Daza assumed personal command and, in April, marched them to Tacna, Peru, in the coastal area. When Chilean forces defeated a Peruvian army not far to the south, Daza's troops could have restored the balance. He did move them in that direction, but, on reaching a point 2 days' march from the enemy, he abandoned the mission and marched his army back to Tacna. It is said that his own troops threatened to shoot him for cowardice.

Daza was in any case deposed by a revolt in La Paz in December, and General Narciso Campero supplanted him both in the presidency and in command of the forces in the field. Chile executed an amphibious maneuver and landed north of Tacna, where the main defending

troops were concentrated. Campero's forces, inferior in numbers and short of both artillery and transport, were severely defeated late in May 1880. Campero led 600 survivors back to Bolivia, where they formed the cadres about which a new army was built. Bolivia, however, took no further active part in the war in which Peruvian-Chilean hostilities continued until late in 1883.

Fifty Years of Relative Peace

General Campero, who despite his defeat retained his popularity and finished his term, was the last soldier-president until the end of the century. A truce with Chile was arranged in 1884, but feeling against that country for what was considered its unwarranted aggression ran so high that a treaty was not ratified until 1904 (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

The balance of the century forms the first period in the history of the republic when presidents ceased to gain power by force of arms. Despite the fact that most Army leaders were also leaders of the Liberal Party, the Conservatives succeeded each other in office for 15 years without being overthrown by military force. Between 1888 and 1892 there were a few revolts in which small troop units took part, but they were relatively weak (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). In general, a more respectable tradition regarding the place of the armed forces in the nation appeared to be developing. The military began to accept a servant-to-master relationship toward the state and to act with some moderation in national matters regardless of the personal inclinations of its leaders.

In 1883 the Army undertook an exploratory expedition from Tarija east across the Northern Chaco to the Paraguay River. Not the first penetration of the plains of the southeast, it was the deepest to that date and constituted the first evidence of intent to take advantage of the ancient claims of Charcas for the purpose of establishing a seaward route via the navigable Paraguay as an alternative to the lost coastal province (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Another significant event of the period was the re-establishment in 1891 of the Military Academy (Colegio Militar), a cadet school for the training, both academic and professional, of candidates for commissions in the Army. In the ensuing years, it has undergone temporary suspension a number of times, for the cadets, in the tradition of Latin American students everywhere, have been the objects of political tampering and have joined and even started rebellions. It has not, however, since that time, ever gone out of existence for long.

Most of the Army supported the Liberal Party in what was called the Federal Revolution of 1898–99. It was a revolt with complicated

causes, stemming from roots both economic and regional, and it is significant that the change of government was from one politico-economic (and regional) interest to another, and not a mere change of *caudillos*. It is true that the generals, probably quite deliberately, chose the party economically best able to further military interests, but the change of government having been accomplished, the military quietly reverted to the master-servant relationship. General José M. Pando, the first Liberal president, was an educated man, and he conducted a businesslike government patterned on the economic liberalism of the times, far different from that of any *caudillo* predecessor.

During Pando's presidency rubber became important as a world commodity, and Bolivia's Acre territory was penetrated by adventurers and rubber gatherers moving up the Brazilian rivers. There they clashed with Bolivian parties engaged in the same pursuits. To preserve order and maintain the country's controls of the proceeds, three small military expeditions (composite infantry battalions) were sent to the area between 1900 and 1903, but with little actual effect. Conditions of travel by river and jungle trail were such that the troops took from 3 to 5 months to reach the seat of disorder. The matter was settled in 1903 by a convention with Brazil (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

During the period of Liberal Party rule, which lasted until 1920, further efforts toward systematic military education were undertaken, but progress was sporadic. The Noncommissioned Officers School (Escuela de Clases) was opened in 1900, suppressed in 1910, reopened in 1919 and closed again in 1920. Refresher courses for officers of the middle grades were also given. A staff school was attempted, but qualified instructors were unobtainable. There was no effective, continuous system of higher military education in existence during the whole period.

In 1905, for the first time, a general staff was organized. Previously such general staff functions as had existed had been performed by a section of the Ministry of War. A separate logistical staff had been organized as a quartermaster function in 1898 and was later expanded to embrace all logistical activities. It is reported never to have acquired order, system or efficiency.

The country's interest in a military air arm dates from 1913. After several false starts, largely due to the difficulty of take-off from the high altitude of the Altiplano by the underpowered planes of the day, a flying school was established and was by 1925 in regular operation under a Swiss instructor. An Air Force of sorts was operative by 1928, using a few fighters and light bombers.

While acceptance by the Army's leaders of a more quiescent role under civil government became the usual practice, there grew along with it a tendency to assume the position of a court of last resort

if a government showed signs of turning "bad" for what were conceived to be the country's best interests. Such was the case in 1920, when, after it had been in power for 20 years, the ruling Liberal Party developed a split. Part of the Army backed its dissident wing, called the Republican Party, in a bloodless coup.

In 1930 the military leaders, for once nearly unanimous, again asserted their power and deposed Republican President Hernando Siles because of his effort to evade the constitutional prohibition against re-election. In both instances the military, their purpose accomplished, made no effort to take over the government themselves. After a brief period of rule by a military junta, Daniel Salamanca was elected president by an all-party coalition. Had it not been for the dissatisfactions and frustrations resulting from the Chaco disaster, the military might have grown to assume its proper place in the national structure.

The Chaco War

The question of possession of the Northern Chaco (*Chaco Boreal*) had never been satisfactorily settled. For more than 50 years Bolivia and Paraguay had disputed the area, and Bolivia had pushed its claims and exploration with a view to acquiring a river port on the navigable Paraguay. Despite negotiations, arbitration and agreements made and broken, however, no understanding had been reached (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Bolivia's method of penetration was to push forward army detachments which established detached posts (*fortines*), usually barricaded with brush and tree trunks, sometimes entrenched, and enclosing huts for the troops. A line of these posts extended down the Pilcomayo, and others were scattered north of it. One, Fortín Vanguardia, was built south of Puerto Suárez on a tributary of the Paraguay River. Paraguay countered with its own *fortines* and built roads and telegraph lines running westward from the river to supplement the existing short railroads. During the 1920's both countries purchased arms abroad and increased their forces. Bolivia did little, however, to improve its supply lines with the distant highlands.

The first important event in a series of clashes which in the end made war inevitable was the surprise and capture of Fortín Vanguardia by the Paraguayans in December 1928. Bolivia retaliated by taking two Paraguayan posts in the south. At this juncture several American countries, including the United States, formed a commission of conciliation. This, however, was able to do little but temporarily postpone major clashes.

Open war was waged between 1932 and 1935. The Bolivians were initially confident of success because of their country's greater resources and what they believed to be the superiority of its German-

trained armed forces. From the first, however, they were technically outclassed. Where local victories were attained, they were negated by poor leadership and staff coordination, faulty intelligence, inadequate logistical arrangements and dissension between military and civil officials. Serious disaffection began to show itself.

The monotonous sequence of brilliant Paraguayan maneuvers and costly Bolivian retreat and defeats continued, and ill feeling between the field commanders and La Paz continued to increase. In late 1934, when President Salamanca made a visit to the field, he was taken prisoner by his own troops and, under the threat of the officers to sue for peace, resigned. Vice-President Tejada Sorzano was then recognized as president and immediately declared general mobilization, a step Salamanca had never taken. It was too late, however. By December Bolivian troops along the southern half of the front had been forced back to the Andean foothills, while in the north the Bolivian II Corps, 12,000 strong, was entrapped while trying to outflank the Paraguayan advance and lost 3,000 men.

Paraguay was also having difficulties. It had nearly exhausted both funds and manpower and was feeling the effects of its long supply lines, now extending more than 400 miles from Asunción. Furthermore, 15,000 Paraguayans were faced by 50,000 Bolivian troops. The first five months of 1935 found the war virtually stalemated, with the advantage on the Bolivian side. Although driven back in some places, Paraguay was nowhere decisively defeated. A new mediatory group of South American nations and the United States finally procured an agreement from both sides to seek a definitive peace, and an armistice was signed in June 1935.

During the course of the war, Bolivia had mobilized about 250,000 men. Of them, over 52,000 were killed, 10,000 deserted, and 21,000 (of whom 4,000 died) were made prisoners of war. Losses in materiel captured reached nearly $10 million in value. For comparison, of the 140,000 mobilized by Paraguay, 36,000 died, but only 2,500 were taken prisoner.

INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

1935 to 1943

The defeat in the Chaco was the third consecutive failure in the country's military enterprises. Having become a national war because of compulsory service, it involved far greater numbers than any previous war and was a more crushing psychological defeat than any suffered before. It therefore disproportionately increased an already existing frustration in Army and nation caused by the seemingly irreversible series of military disasters and territorial losses.

The Chaco War had the effect of reversing previous tendencies. Political activity within and by the Army intensified and finally expressed itself in the uprising of 1943 The intervening years constituted a period in which, in form, at least, there was a reversion to the old relationship of the military to the state, whereby ambitious officers seized power. Nevertheless, a series of influences were building that profoundly affected the form that relationship would take in the future.

Among these influences was a growing sense of nationality among all Bolivians. Before the war communities of all sorts had lived for centuries within the confines of a particular region and, because of the great hindrances to communication, had had little intercourse with one another. To most of them the significant reality of political life was not citizenship in a nation, but local residence in a small, largely self-sufficient community. The Chaco War brought a change in this orientation.

The need to mobilize all available manpower against Paraguay caused perhaps 250,000 men from all over the country to be called up and thrown together in a common, Bolivian Army against a common, non-Bolivian enemy. Even the illiterate conscripts gained a realization that they belonged to something more than a single community and began to learn a broader concept of nationhood.

A second factor in changing concepts was the humiliation of the defeat these men suffered at the hands of an enemy which by every standard of logic should have been the loser. In trying to explain this anomaly, those who were more politically astute tended to attribute it to the ineptitude of the leadership developed under the existing political system and became convinced that such a system could never serve the best interests of the nation.

A third factor in the metamorphosis of political thought in the Army was the impact of new ideologies that began to infiltrate the country during this period. It was a time when the Rome-Berlin Axis was in its ascendancy and was being heralded as the wave of the future. An active fifth column was operating in its behalf out of the German Legation in La Paz and through the German Club and Trans-Ocean Agency in that city. Similar alien agents from Argentina and elsewhere were heavily propagandizing the merits of authoritarian systems, and an Italian mission which arrived in 1937 was energetically trying to proselytize disgruntled officers of the Bolivian armed forces.

The confluence of these three streams—developing ideas of nationalism, disillusionment with the current political system and the promise of new and allegedly better political ideologies—was catalytic. In the military, attitudes crystallized into a readiness to formulate political concepts separate and distinct from those held either by the gov-

ernment in power or by the traditional challenging *caudillo*. For the first time the Army, as an institution, began to see the desirability of giving allegiance to an idea rather than to an attractive personality. It was inevitable that independent political action by the military should follow.

During the period in question, the country was ruled by three military presidents. The first, Colonel David Toro, came to power by a coup and announced a government dedicated to the attainment of socialism by gradual means. His government fell over the question of a labor draft and his attempts to create state socialism on the basis of enforced syndicalization. His successor, Colonel Germán Busch, promised a return to a republican form of government, but economic and political troubles caused him to adopt dictatorial rule. His death, either by murder or suicide, occurred in 1939. General Peñaranda, a moderate conservative elected in 1940, was favored by the demand for Bolivian tin in the rising market which followed the Japanese capture of the sources of that metal in the Far East. For a time he appeared to be bridging the gap between dictatorship and responsible government, but unseen movements developing within and outside the Army overthrew him.

The military bloc that was destined to play such an important role in Bolivian politics began inauspiciously in the prisoner-of-war camps of Paraguay among officers who, disenchanted and distrustful of their government, were fearful of being held responsible for their country's defeat when they returned home. To plan a self-defense, they organized a secret lodge called Marshal Santa Cruz Military Lodge (Logia Militar Mariscal Santa Cruz), the membership of which was strongly nationalistic. Originally they had no intention of converting their organization into a political force, but, in the post-war period when the anticipated indictments did not materialize, the group emerged as an outright political action movement known as Cause of the Fatherland (Razón de Patria—RADEPA). Dedicated to saving the country through changing its political structure along hyper-national, authoritarian lines, RADEPA intensified its secret nature and adopted a cellular form to infiltrate and manipulate centers of political power.

Three types of cells were employed to operate at various levels of governmental and military organization. The highest type was made up of senior officers who attempted to control the administrative acts of the government and those associated with it to ensure that its activities were in line with the program laid down by RADEPA.[7] At the second level were cells made up of influential staff and command officers who were pledged to support the government if its actions were in line with the RADEPA policy and, if they were not, to withdraw support and bring about its replacement and punishment. The lowest level cells were directed to carry out orders issued by the chiefs and

to report acts deemed harmful to the country. To achieve these objectives and to maintain internal discipline, RADEPA members committed acts of severe violence and terror. Individuals judged to be in opposition were secretly apprehended and brought before kangaroo courts of the society. Sentencing frequently involved the death penalty with an executioner selected by lot from among the assembled membership. RADEPA quickly became a force to be reckoned with, and by early 1940 its operations had met with such success that cells were firmly in place controlling key governmental posts in La Paz and the provinces, as well as the general staff, the military schools and organized military units.

The Army had, in fact, undergone a political awakening. The old "servant" or "servant and occasional master" roles were disappearing. Although not all the military were behind RADEPA, the Army as an institution was ready to act in pursuit of its own political goals.

While this unique development was going on in the Army, a similar maturation of political belief was under way in the civilian community. Intellectuals who were attracted by revolutionary movements had been talking of such matters as nationalizing the mines and industry, confiscating the great estates of the elite and redistributing the land among the peasants and organizing labor. Those who favored the communistic approach formed the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario—PIR); those who were extremely nationalistic and more impressed by the propaganda of the Rome-Berlin Axis gravitated into the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR); and still others banded themselves together into smaller splinter groups reflecting various shades or degrees of these two basic schools of thoug[illegible].

The military, under firm control of RADEPA, had little affinity with the PIR or the small radical movements, but it soon discovered it had much in common with the MNR. Both were authoritarian in outlook and strongly antidemocratic; both believed in the imposition of violence to achieve political ends; and both were opposed to the existing political system and desired to replace it with one based on wide-reaching reforms. Neither was capable of realizing its aims alone. The MNR had the support of a large portion of the masses of working people and peasants, but lacked sufficient physical power to move against the government. RADEPA, on the other hand, commanded only the loyalty of its own membership, but through its infiltrating tactics, some of its members had achieved key positions where they could immobilize military reaction and unseat the existing government. When the leaders of the two groups realized their joint potential, they united to form the coalition which staged the revolt of

1943, deposed President Peñaranda and ushered in a new era of military involvement in Bolivian politics.

1943 to 1952

Between 1943 and 1952 the Army was the effective "master" of the government. The military did not always insist that one of its own be president or dictator, but it made sure that no one who did not enjoy its complete approval ever rose to political eminence. Throughout this period, however, an ever-widening rift was developing between the armed forces and the MNR.

Major Gualberto Villarroel, a RADEPA leader, was named president after the joint military-MNR revolution of 1943 had succeeded. In accordance with the terms of their alliance, he appointed MNR leaders to three key posts in his Cabinet. The immediate reaction to this was that 19 Western nations, including the United States, refused to grant the new government recognition because they suspected it of being pro-Nazi. Since Bolivia had to market its tin to survive, President Villarroel expelled the MNR from government in order to reassure his only potential customers. The move achieved its purpose but, since the expellees were speedily readmitted to their former posts unofficially, it amounted to little more than a diplomatic gesture.

Once recognition was obtained the dictatorial nature of the Villarroel government became apparent. In an attempt to crush all opposition, severe repressive measures were imposed; civil rights were abrogated, prominent citizens kidnapped and personal properties confiscated or destroyed. These extremes aroused the hatred of most of the people and also alienated large numbers of formerly apathetic officers within the Army. The latter were now driven by revulsion into formulating definite points of view and into aligning themselves with organized political groups in and out of the Army.

In 1946 popular revulsion brought rebellion, and angry unorganized mobs gathered in the capital demanding the abdication of President Villarroel and the punishment of those responsible for the excesses of the past few years. The few army and police units loyal to the regime at first tried to disperse the crowds, but they remained aloof when the mob broke into the national arsenal, seized its store of weapons and moved on to murder the president and two of his aides. When the situation quieted down the Army moved in to reassert control and sponsor a civilian junta to act as a provisional government. The MNR leadership felt betrayed by its erstwhile allies and openly castigated the Army for its alleged duplicity and failure to defend President Villarroel against the mob. The tempo of MNR opposition accelerated, and to save itself further embarrassment the government forced major leaders of the MNR into exile. Many of them, including the party chiefs, sought refuge in Argentina.

The elected government of President Enrique Hertzog, which took office early in 1947, tried to rule the country efficiently, but it constantly had to deal with disruptive activities of the ousted MNR, which gradually expanded its influence among the masses. In August 1949, after inspiring a number of strikes to set the stage, the MNR attempted a civil war which showed evidence of long and careful planning by the MNR exiles in Argentina. In quick succession uprisings occurred in most areas outside the capital. Within hours the rebels were in control of key areas outside La Paz and it appeared that the revolt was a success. The situation was r ed, however, when labor support failed to develop and the Arm mained loyal.

During the elections President Hertzog had su a physical breakdown and turned the government over to his Vice-President, Mamerto Urriolagoitia in May 1949. Under Urriolagoitia, the political situation remained unchanged until 1951 when the MNR formed a solid front with leaders of the Communist Left, the labor forces and the powerful armed miners' militia. The combined strength of this front was sufficient to defeat the regular forces and seize control of the government, but instead of resorting to violence, it sought voting support to back the exiled Paz Estenssoro for president in the forthcoming elections. The strategy was successful and won a sizable plurality at the polls, although Paz did not receive the absolute majority required for undisputed victory. In this situation, the administration chose an unconstitutional solution. To negate the elections, President Urriolagoitia resigned and turned his authority over to a military junta under the leadership of the former chief of staff, General Hugo Ballivián (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

The power of the Army was able to maintain the junta in office for a time, but its ineptitude and unconstitutionality, coupled with economic hardships brought on by the failing tin market, prompted the MNR-Labor-left-wing coalition to give substance to its opposition. The stage was finally set for revolution when General Antonio Seleme, the Minister of Government, conspired with the Paz forces to weaken the government's capability for resistance. He first strengthened the police and *carabinero* forces under his control until their power compared with that of the Army. He then prevailed on the junta to reassign many competent Army officers to provincial posts away from La Paz and to muster trained veterans out of the Army and replace them with raw recruits. This accomplished, and with the promise of high political reward for his efforts, Seleme defected to the MNR, which immediately launched an attack on La Paz.

On the first day the rebels gained early successes when the junta was slow to react, but by afternoon army units were committed and seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Seleme lost hope and sought asylum in the Chilean Embassy, but before doing so he turned over

the keys to the arsenal to rebel leaders. Rearmed and now stronger than before, the insurgents continued the attack and managed to gain a truce which the Army honored. The rebels, however, used the time as a subterfuge. On the morning of the second day armed miners from Milluni, northwest of La Paz, occupied the El Alto Airport and other avenues of entrance to the city and prevented the arrival of reinforcing army units from the provinces. When the defecting police and the armed workers went into action, the Army was overcome and Paz Estenssoro was welcomed back from exile to form a new and completely different type of government.

1952 to 1963

Upon the accession of the Paz Estenssoro government in 1952, the earlier involvement of the Army in politics was abruptly choked off and stifled. The ill-will and mistrust that had been building up between it and the MNR had hardened into bitter animosity, and the party leadership began systematically to destroy the ability of the armed forces to perform as an independent political force. Officer and enlisted ranks were ruthlessly purged of all elements considered even remotely hostile to the MNR, the military schools were closed peremptorily and all conscripts were discharged. Estimates vary, but it is believed that about 80 percent of all uniformed personnel were demobilized in a matter of days.

The more radical element in the nation applauded these severe measures and called for even more drastic action. The Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviano—COB) issued a declaration stating "the attitude of the working masses toward the Army is clear and definite. . . . It must be replaced." The Stalinist PIR was even more direct with "We need no armed forces. Just arm the people."

Sentiment was running strong, and the temptation was great to eradicate the military entirely. But the Sixth National Congress of the MNR, which met in February 1953, decided to retain at least a semblance of armed forces but to so constitute them that they could never again exercise power to become master of the state. The new forces were to be set up as "an organized arm of the revolution under those officers who have identified themselves with the postulates of the MNR." The same concept was applied to the *carabineros* and police, which the party had also emasculated and which now were to be rebuilt "in conformity to the spirit which is the ideological cornerstone of the national revolution."

These determinations were followed by a series of actions which have set the tone for the armed forces ever since. The official name was changed from the Bolivian Armed Forces to the Armed Forces of the Revolution. All ranks were packed with carefully screened party faithful under criteria of the MNR National Political Com-

mittee. The military schools were reopened with matriculation predicated on political reliability. The oath of office was also altered to emphasize loyalty to the party rather than to the nation and later, when some of the purged officers were readmitted, it was on condition that they subscribe to the same oath. In effect, the armed forces were to be considered and employed as agents or servants of the party rather than as instruments for national security.

Having thus rendered the regular forces politically impotent, the MNR's next act was to strengthen the civilian militias until their power equaled or exceeded that of the conventional establishment. The obvious intent was to create a situation in which the political ambitions of any one of these sources of potential opposition could be held in check by marshaling the strengths of the other two against it. As a solution to the age-old problem of revolution, this was effective as long as the MNR itself remained monolithic. But, when the party's solidarity was shattered by the appearance of minority factions on the Right and Left contending for control against the loose coalition of center groups which formed the leadership, the weakness implicit in such a policy became apparent. The militias stubbornly resisted central control and insisted on a high degree of autonomy. Moreover, they gave primary allegiance to their local leaders rather than to La Paz. It became evident that, were one or more of these commanders to be subverted and generously supported by a power friendly to the Left, that faction might be provided with an anti-government army capable of seizing control of the country for itself (see ch. 13, Political Dynamics; ch. 26, Internal Security).

To obviate this possibility the MNR leadership has begun to pay more attention to its regular forces. The old enmities have somewhat mellowed, party control has proved effective, and the party leaders feel they can afford the military some greater stature and prestige. The strengths of the Army and Air Force are being increased and professional training is being intensified, with the seeming intent to match the rising power of the militias—in arms and training, if not in numerical strength. Further, the 1961 Constitution makes the militia a part of the reserve of the armed forces. While no steps are known to have been taken to implement this implied subordination, it, too, seems evidence of eventual intent. At any rate there is a demonstrable resurgence in the fortunes of the regular forces. While the MNR remains extremely careful to ensure they do not regain their former power, the long period of military denigration seems to have reached and passed its nadir.

In early 1963 the armed forces as an institution had no overtly acknowledged political goals of its own and seemed to be content with its passive role in political affairs. Whether or not this will continue is conjectural and depends on future events.

POSITION IN GOVERNMENT

Basic Provisions

The legal basis for the armed forces of Bolivia is found in the various articles of the Constitution of 1961 and, with few exceptions, adheres to conventional ideas of military organization. Under a Minister of National Defense, there is a regular establishment composed of an Army (Ejército), an Air Force (Fuerza Aérea) and a River and Lake Force (Fuerza Fluviall y Lacustre). Under a Minister of Government, Justice and Immigation, there is a National Police and a reserve force of Peoples' Militias raised and normally employed within the department of origin under local command, but subject to national service when required.

The authorization of a River and Lake Force is unique and, although its establishment was forecast in the Constitution, no steps were taken to organize it formally until early 1963. The basic annual assignment order of the armed forces, published each year soon after New Year's Day, assigned it a commanding general.

Supreme authority over Bolivian armed forces is vested in the person of the president who is, ex officio, designated Captain-General of the Armed Forces. As such, he presides over a Supreme Council of National Defense and designates the Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, the Commanders of the Army, Air Force and River and Lake Force and the Commandant-General of Police.

General missions may be deduced from two articles of the Constitution. Article 95 charges the president with full responsibility for preserving internal order as well as for national security. Article 201 assigns similar operational responsibility to the armed forces and adds a third one highlighting the great emphasis placed on use of the military for public works. Specifically it demands that the armed forces "will cooperate in the growth of national production conforming to economic plans, in tasks of colonization and in works of a national character required for the development and diversification of the economy, and in all those tasks which the government may determine." For the most part this latter statement is merely a broadening of specific concepts found in all constitutions since that of 1938, that the armed forces may be used on public works projects and in colonization.

Every citizen is constitutionally required (Articles 7 and 206) to participate in activities of the armed forces. All are subject to conscription and bound to cooperate with the government in social services as well as national security.

The size and strength of the services, excluding the Peoples' Militias, is normally determined annually by Congress, but the president is empowered to declare a state of siege in emergencies and may then

increase the size of the forces and call up the reserves on his own authority. Congress normally appropriates monies for military requirements, but the president may increase taxation and negotiate loans during a state of siege.

The Constitution authorizes the president to promote officers to the ranks of colonel and general directly in war time, but only with the approval of Congress in peace. He may suspend constitutional guarantees and rights of individuals during emergencies and, in a state of siege, impose censorship and control the movements of persons. Declarations of war can be made only by Congress.

Articles 4 and 202 are designed to guard against the military coup d'etat, which has characterized so much of Bolivian history. These state that all armed forces personnel who attribute to themselves the rights of the people are guilty of sedition, and that the armed forces as an institution must not engage in political action. Similarly, all uniformed personnel, while holding full franchise as citizens, are subject to the regular laws of the land as well as to military regulations governing their individual and corporate acts.

Top Control

The President of the Republic, as Captain-General of the Armed Forces, is provided with a small personal staff known as the Military Household (Casa Militar). At this level is a body presided over by the president and known as the Supreme Council of National Defense which carries out general planning for matters of national defense, including its economic as well as international implications. There is also the permanent Tribunal of Military Justice whose title is self-explanatory.

The Ministry of National Defense is charged with general supervision of the Army and the Air Force. It confines its activities exclusively to the administrative sphere and does not become involved in operational or command matters. The minister has a small personal staff and two undersecretaries—one for the Army and another for the Air Force—whose officers are divided into directorates for specialized functions, such as personnel, logistics, air defense, meteorology and territorial administration. The undersecretaries may be civilians, but are usually military officers.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCES

Armed Forces Headquarters

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, assisted by a joint staff of conventional makeup, exercises full operational control over all elements of the Army and Air Force and performs directly under the president without recourse to the Minister of National Defense

except in purely administrative matters. Except for certain special units at the capital placed under his direct control, he exercises command through the commanding generals of the services.

The Army

Army Headquarters is headed by a commanding general who has a small personal retinue and a General Staff under a chief of staff. The General Staff has the normal four sections—Personnel, Intelligence, Plans and Operations, and Logistics—but is augmented also by a fifth concerned with history, cartography and public relations.

Army units are of several functional types, although all are generally organized along standard military lines. A considerable number of units are performing essentially nonmilitary duties in line with the provisions of the Constitution of 1961, which specify that the forces will cooperate in national production, economic plans, colonization and other projects taking on the aspects of civic action. Practically all engineer troops are engaged in road building, land clearing and colonization work. In furtherance of the government policy of inducing highland Indians to settle in the lowlands, at least one infantry unit, called a "colonial regiment," is using its own conscripts to clear land and erect settlements in the Santa Cruz area in the hope that they will remain there upon discharge (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Other units are organized for conventional military duty but conduct civic action projects part of the time. All units have the task of raising the extremely low literacy level of the soldiers. Still others perform military school service duties. A few—notably the presidential escort Major Waldo Ballivián Regiment—are elite units stationed in La Paz or its close vicinity. These apparently perform military duties exclusively.

Air Force

Like the Army, the Air Force is commanded by its own general who has headquarters in La Paz. His command is not broken down into districts but is unified for the country as a whole. Air Force Headquarters contains the conventional Air General Staff and a small complement of supporting staff personnel.

The very small Air Force has both a combat and a transport element. Combat planes appear to be World War II types or trainers converted to combat purposes. The transport element called the Military Air Transport Service (Transportes Aéreos Militares—TAM), operates as an all-purpose supplementary cargo and personnel line and is used to reach remote and frontier locations where the commercial airlines find it unprofitable to maintain service. It, too, thus partakes of the civic action type of employment.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Manpower and Mobilization

From the point of view of manpower, any army that at the present or in foreseeable future the country is able to afford financially, would constitute no appreciable drain. Of the estimated 440,000 males physically fit for service and of military age (15–49), perhaps 20,000 became eligible to register for the draft in 1962. Bolivia does not publish such information, but it is certain that budgetary stringency did not permit the acceptance for army service of more than a fraction of that number—possibly not even a third.

Any discussion of a wartime mobilization is, of necessity, highly theoretical because of the state of the economy. Considering only the state of the labor force, however, the mobilization of up to 100,000 men would probably not be crippling to agriculture or industry (see ch. 20, Labor Force).

Economic Factors

Throughout the country's history, the percentage of the national budget set aside for defense has fluctuated from year to year. Prior to 1945, it averaged about 25 percent and from 1946 to 1951, about 22.5 percent. In 1954 it dropped sharply to 9.8 percent. Since then it has stayed at about this level, though since 1956 the trend has been slightly upward. The amounts, though small, have been exceeded only by the allocations for education and servicing the national debt.

In 1962 the total defense budget amounted to the equivalent of $4,046,000, or 12.9 percent of the total budget and 2.3 percent of the gross national product. This figure, however, does not reflect the total value of military expenditures for it does not include funds for the civic functions performed by the armed forces which are subsumed under funds of the ministry having primary interest in the specific project involved.

The sudden decrease in defense funds after 1952 is only partially explained by the extreme poverty of the nation. Of more consequence has been the deliberate policy of the MNR to downgrade the armed forces and destroy any capability they might have for staging a counterrevolution. The slight rise in the budget since about 1956 indicates some returning confidence in the loyalty of the military, but it also stems from inflation. Political and financial conditions seem to preclude any substantial increase in defense appropriations for the immediate future.

The industrial base is insufficient to support the Army the country now maintains and completely lacks the potential to support a wartime economy. No weapons are produced, and no explosives other

than dynamite. Only for such things as textiles, leather goods and clothing is manufacturing capacity sufficient to supply the Army. Petroleum reserves are large, but not as yet fully exploited, and refinery capacity is limited.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE

The dearth of qualified, professional military personnel for its armed forces has always posed a problem for the government. Up to the twentieth century the usual solution was to offer contracts and commissions to non-Bolivians who could be persuaded to accept them. After the turn of the century, although the practice continued, major reliance began to be placed on missions.

The first mission (1905–09) to arrive was a group of French officers and civilians under General Jacques Saser. It established a General Staff along French lines, but on the whole, its impact was not significant.

In 1911 a German mission arrived, and its commander, Major Hans Kundt, was to exert a strong influence long after the mission was recalled to the Fatherland at the outbreak of World War I. The mission appears to have been composed principally of drillmasters. It installed the German system of orders, strengthened discipline, introduced the goose-step and effected the adoption of Prussian style uniforms. It was not qualified to organize the military school system the Army badly needed and it did not conduct field training.

After World War I the government re-engaged Kundt (by then a general) to head a new mission. Despite being forced to leave the country on three separate occasions for becoming too deeply involved in national politics, Kundt was able to exert a dominant influence until his ineffectiveness in directing operations during the Chaco War caused him to be relieved from command in December 1933. His greatest contributions had been in the field of troop training and administration which produced an Army rather impressive at parades but somewhat less than ideally effective when it came to combat.

During Kundt's enforced absences from Bolivia between 1926 and 1932, a new mission was hired through the Free City of Danzig. It was composed of retired Prussian officers and free-lancers who proved so inadequate they were dismissed shortly after their arrival in 1927. A Spanish mission arriving in 1932 had no time to accomplish anything of importance before the outbreak of the Chaco War. During this time several foreign experts were also employed on an individual basis, but neither they nor a Czech mission which was present after Kundt was dismissed, contributed anything notable.

The first organized mission of the post-Chaco period was an Italian one that arrived in 1937. The Italians did not impart much useful

professional knowledge but were active in disseminating Fascist doctrine in military schools, particularly influencing RADEPA conspirators.

United States Army and Air Force missions have been active in the country more or less continuously since 1942. The most recent agreement for the Army mission was signed at the request of the Bolivian Government in 1956. The mission agreements are of a type which has become more or less standard with Latin American countries and involve the assignment of United States officers and enlisted men to an advisory group within the country to cooperate with the Ministry of National Defense and the commanders of the services. The purpose of their presence is to advise and assist the local forces, as may be agreed, in matters of training, military doctrine, the standardization of military equipment and its effective use, and to foster mutually friendly relations within the framework of inter-American solidarity.

PERSONNEL ANALYSIS

Sources of Personnel

All personnel, other than officers, enter the armed forces through conscription. The first law requiring compulsory service was passed in 1904 and, though since amended, has seen no major changes. The obligatory universal service of all males is a constitutional requirement, and existing law sets the period of military obligation as between the ages of 18 and 49. In practice, budgetary restriction stemming from another constitutional provision that each congress shall annually set the maximum strength of the forces has placed stringent limitations on the number inducted.

The career enlisted service in the Army (all noncommissioned officers) and the entire Air Force enlisted strength have historically been maintained at authorized levels by recruitment on a voluntary basis from those completing conscript service. No indications of any change in this method are available.

In principle the source of all officer personnel is the Military Academy at La Paz, which conducts a 5-year course, the first 3 years of which are basically secondary academic and the last 2 basically military. Its capacity is small. In 1962 the graduating class totaled only 85. Graduates earn the secondary school certification (*bachillerato*), a prerequisite for university matriculation, and are commisioned second lieutenants in either the Army or the Air Force.

Schools and Training

One of the most highly publicized missions of the forces is basic literacy schooling for conscripts. The fact that there is little publicity about results makes its effects difficult to evaluate, but certainly

the conscripts improve their speaking ability in Spanish, regardless of the degree of reading and writing skill attained.

Selected noncommissioned officers attend a school in the main school center at Cochabamba which has courses devoted principally to technical training in such subjects as communications training and motor mechanics.

Officers attend a series of schools graduated according to ascending rank and command responsibility. Air Force officers attend a flying school at Santa Cruz immediately after graduation from the Military Academy, while the first duty of the Army's graduates is with troops. The next level is the School of Arms at Cochabamba, attended by company grade officers and corresponding to the branch school system of the United States Army. The only branch possessing a special school is the Engineer Command, which conducts specialized training at its own installation near La Paz. For field officers of both Army and Air Force there is a Command and General Staff School at Cochabamba, patterned after the United States school of similar name. On a highly selective basis, very senior officers may attend the School of High Military Studies at La Paz, which is open also to government officials and distinguished persons in industrial and banking pursuits. Modeled after the United States War and National Industrial Colleges, it opened in 1961 with 16 in its first class.

It is known that selected officers and noncommissioned officers have attended United States Army and Air Force service schools in the United States and Panama. Others have taken courses in neighboring South American countries.

The varied duties of the various units, given the emphasis on civic action pursuits directed by the government, make assessment of the purely military training program difficult. At the time of induction of the conscripts, a certain amount of basic training in drill, customs of the service, guard duty and elementary weapons instruction is given. Thereafter the degree of training is obscured. The only field exercises which have received publicity have been those conducted by the elite units in La Paz.

Ranks and Pay

Active commissioned officer rank of the Army and the Air Force are identical and correspond to those of the United States forces with only a few minor exceptions. For one thing, officers do not progress beyond major general except that the President is, ex officio, the Captain General of the Armed Forces, popularly called Marshal. Again only officers of the combat arms become generals; the other two categories (services and professional), are limited to a top rank of colonel.

Career enlisted men are found in four categories of warrant officers, two of sergeants and one grade of corporal. Conscripts are all privates.

Conscripts, found only in the Army, receive no regular pay for their services. Instead they are provided with food, clothing and lodging and, on rare occasions when funds are available, they may be awarded small monetary gratuities or issues of alcohol.

The details of the defense budget are not made known publicly, but a probably valid assumption is that rates of pay for officers and noncommissioned officers closely correspond to those of the *carabineros*, which range from the equivalent of $18 a month for colonel to about $8 for the lowest noncommissioned officer grade. It is known that a similar and complicated system of increments and bonuses exists and that even their total, added to basic pay, amounts to a salary which by North American standards is hardly enough to live on. For that reason it is officially approved that service personnel are given sufficient free time to earn a supplementary income.

Military Justice

The forces lost the historic Latin American exemption of the military from the ordinary law codes and procedures in 1904. Consequently, for all crimes and misdemeanors not exclusively military in nature, men and officers come before the civil courts, though commanding officers may punish minor derelictions by command authority. There are no prisons exclusively for the military.

MORALE FACTORS

Decorations

There are only two known orders in the Bolivian system of awards, of which the grades closely correspond to those of conventional European orders. The degrees range from the Grand Collar or Grand Officer to that of Knight. The circumstances in which military officers are admitted to the senior order, the Condor of the Andes, are unclear, but the junior one is stated to be exclusively military as is indicated by its title, the Order of Military Merit.

Three military medals are also among the decorations awarded servicemen. A Service Cross is awarded in three classes for lengths of service; the Iron Star is the Bolivian Purple Heart; and the War Medal is the campaign badge for Chaco War service.

Religious Ministration

Priests of the Roman Catholic faith serve the armed forces by official sanction and decree. In 1960 a concordat with the Vatican was ratified whereby a special miltary vicarate was established in the

country for the spiritual care of the military. Its activities are directed by a vicar, appointed by the Holy See with the concurrence of the President of the Republic, assisted by a religious military inspector. The permanent Corps of Chaplains is recruited from both secular priests and those belonging to specific religious orders.

Subsistence

Military units produce subsistence on farms allocated to them for that specific purpose and, as regularly assigned duty, provide grain, vegetables, meat and dairy products for their own tables. The persistence with which many Indians and members of the lower classes demand conscription, even though they receive no pay for their services, suggests that the prospects for a relatively better diet than they can get at home is the real incentive behind their action.

Other Amenities

Leave policies in the Bolivian Armed Forces are rather generous and provide for 30 days' vacation a year with pay. There is, however, no compensation for leave not taken and all accounts are closed annually.

The practice of military personnel in living off-post and supplementing their incomes with second jobs of a nonmilitary nature, brings them into close and generally harmonious contact with the surrounding civilian community. Also the observable improvements accomplished by the military in building roads, erecting schools and engaging in similar civic works is much appreciated and, in recent years, has tended to elevate their prestige and make them more socially accepted in the local towns and villages.

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