STRATEGY IN THREE GAMES: A REPLICATION,
Abstract
An attempt was made to replicate the situations in which significant differences in strategy occurred between the sexes as a function of differences in the character of games played by triads. Each of two experimenters ran 12 triads through the masculine board game, the masculine quiz game, and the feminine quiz game, with order of games counterbalanced. Three contests of each of four power-patterns were used, namely, All-Equal, One Stronger, All-Different, and All-Powerful. Cumulative scores were maintained as an incentive condition. The sex differences previously ascertained occurred also in this experiment, but the Index of Strategy did not significantly differentiate the three kinds of games. The Feminine Quiz Game did not significantly increase accommodative strategy, as measured by this Index, although the two sexes differed significantly in the predicted direction in each of the games. The Feminine Quiz Game elicited less bargaining in the male triads and more bargaining in the female triads than did the other two games. In the Feminine Quiz Game there was a greater tendency in the female triads for the two players behind to ally, and an opposite tendency in male triads. Both characteristics can be interpreted as reflecting differential interest in the games. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 15, 1964
- Accession Number
- AD0433863
Entities
People
- Donald Ragusa
- Doris Crowell
- W. Edgar Vinacke
Organizations
- State University of New York