THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ABOUT STRATEGY ON A THREE-PERSON GAME,
Abstract
An experiment was conducted to determine whether information about alternative strategies in a competitive game would result in a shift from outcomes determined by perception of strength to outcomes in line with strictly rational analysis of power conditions. It ran triads first through an extended learning session, followed by an identical information session. In one set of triads, one member was provided with information about both strategies; in a second, two members were informed; and in a third, all three members were informed. Conditions were similar to those employed previously. Results are: sex differences occurred, with males displaying a predominantly exploitative strategy and females a typically accommodative strategy. In the critical power-patterns, when two players were weaker than the third, there was little evidence for a significant shift to an equal incidence of the three possible coalitions. Bargaining increased in the information session, but reached significance only for the female triads under two of the information conditions. There was no evidence that the specially informed players differed from the uninformed players in their ability to enter into coalitions. There is evidence that the chief effect of the information conditions was to increase motivation to win.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 02, 1964
- Accession Number
- AD0436103
Entities
People
- Dora Shu-fang Dien
- Doris C. Crowell
- Vera Young
- W. Edgar Vinacke
Organizations
- University at Buffalo