STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION

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INTER-NATION CONFLICT, DYADIC AND MEDIATED: CASE STUDIES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED NATIONS AT FIVE POINTS IN TIME [PHASE ONE: 19-28 July 1956].*

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Chapter I

PROBLEM, METHODS, RESULTS

Richard A. Brody

The behavioral scientist, working in the field of international politics, is confronted from all sides with a seemingly limitless set of interesting and challenging questions posed by the phenomena of politics in this arena, by traditional conceptions of the subject, and by the results of behavioral scientists pursuing other topics. Any given empirical situation the student of international politics examines involves a multiplicity of individual and collective actors (and all the diversity that follows therefrom), a seeming uniqueness of location in time and space, and a presumed uniqueness in history; all of which raise serious questions about the application of logics based on probability models. The scholar in this field is, moreover, normally barred from direct access to the subjects of his analyses and, therefore, from the application of standard techniques of behavioral science data collection.[1] To acknowledge, therefore, that the field of international politics is a difficult one in which to do research is to at least engage in understatement.

Traditional approaches to the field have confronted these problems in one of two ways: One approach follows from explicitly or tacitly acknowledging the problems, resigning from the effort of discovering laws of human behavior in the context of international politics, and, instead, focusing on the richness of detail in a given situation. The product of this resolution of the problems of research is a voluminous literature on the diplomatic history of this or that nation in this or that situation or time period.

The alternative traditional approach stems from ignoring the diversity and attendant difficulty and from imputing to individuals and nations a small set of uniform motives which guide international behavior. The

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1. R. Brody, "International Relations as a Behavioral Science. . .," in G. Sperrazzo (ed.), Psychology and International Relations, Washington, D. C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 53-61.

results of these efforts have been on the one hand, a corpus of normative judgments about how this or that nation has strayed from its "national interest" in failing to take account of the "reality" of international politics and, on the other hand, a very interesting set of unconfirmed hypotheses about international behavior in its most general form.[2]

Behavioral approaches to international politics have tended to rely on the proposition that since diversity characterizes all arenas of social intercourse and since stable regularities have been discovered in other social situations, despite the diversity, that there is no reason to expect a priori that regularities cannot be discovered in international politics. This position is sometimes, though not necessarily, accompanied by the assumption that the laws that account for human behavior in other social systems will also apply to the international system.[3] The products of the attempt to consider international politics as a consequence of social-psychological processes are a growing scientific literature and a heightened sense of the difficulties involved in systematic investigation of international political phenomena.

The problems created by the apparent diversity of the phenomena and the difficulties of access are still with us and no easier to confront directly for all the devices created for moving around them. This latter point becomes clearer when one compares relative progress in the study of international relations and in the study of international politics.

Since international relations focuses on the factors affecting, and the effects of, any and all contacts between individual and collective actors in different nations, virtually any sound study is a contribution to knowledge. By contrast, international politics focuses on the factors affecting the relevant behavior of those individual and collective actors whose roles include the task of selecting courses of

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2. For example, see H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd, ed., New York: Knopf, 1960; and K. Thompson, "The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments," Review of Politics, 14 (1952), pp. 433-67.

3. For examples, see O. Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1964; and C. Osgood, An Alternative to War and Surrender, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962.

action which commit the resources of their nations (in a word, the "decision-makers"). This is a restricted domain within international relations and research can be judged according to the light it sheds on this domain. Using these characterizations as guidelines, it is easy to understand why progress, in the accumulation of knowledge, has been more rapid in international relations than in international politics--in the wider sphere of international relations, more laws from other loci of social relations are apt to apply and access to the subjects of analysis is easier to obtain.[4]

The Studies in International Conflict and Integration represent an attempt to work directly with the phenomena of international politics by the joint application of historico-descriptive and analytic-quantitative techniques to cases drawn from recent and contemporary history. Our studies have included analyses of the European crisis in the summer of 1914,[5] the October, 1962, Cuban missile crisis,[6] and several cross-crisis comparisons.[7]

In the simplest sense, these studies have been undertaken in order to explore the relationship between cognition and behavior in the context of international politics.[8] That is, to ask: Given acts on the part of a nation that have relevance to other nations, what roles do

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4. This can be clearly seen in the best available collection of work on international behavior (H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, New York: Holt, Rinehard, Winston, 1965); only five of the sixteen chapters deal at all directly with policy making (Chapters 1, 11, 12, 13, and 14) and of these only two (Pruitt, Chapter 11 and Alger, Chapter 14) offer direct evidence on the subject.

5. R. North, O. Holsti, and R. Brody, "Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis," in J. D. Singer (ed.), Quantitative Studies in World Politics, New York: Free Press, in press.

6. O. Holsti, R. Brody, and R. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," Journal of Peace Research, 1 (1964), pp. 170-190.

7. R. North et al., The Analysis of International Tension, (unpublished ditto) Report to the Behavioral Sciences Group, USNOTS, June 15, 1964; and M. G. Zaninovich, An Empirical Theory of State Response: The Sino-Soviet Case, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science Stanford University, August 1964.

8. R. Brody, "Cognition and Behavior: A Model of Inter-State Relations," in O. J. Harvey (ed.), Papers from a Conference on Cognition and Development, forthcoming.

decision-makers' attitudes and cognitions play in the choice of alternatives (i.e., in the selection of the acts) and what factors affect these attitudes and cognitions and the roles they play? We have attempted to derive testable hypotheses relevant to these broad concerns by combining in a (lamentably) loose conceptual framework insights drawn from other behavioral science efforts and empirical generalizations drawn from our early case studies.[9]

Having derived testable hypotheses, it is still necessary to address ourselves to questions of the comparability of events or situations and access to data. We have sought comparability in several ways: (1) By focusing on individual and collective actors whose roles are postulated to be functionally equivalent even though the actors are differentially located in time and/or space; (2) by specifying the position of the nation (whose resources are committed by the individuals or groups who are the subject of our analyses) in relation to other nations in the international system or sub-system (that is the context of action) in terms of factors that are trans-historically applicable, e. g., communication patterns,[10] and that, other things being equal, can be expected to affect behavior; and (3) by developing measures of attitudes and cognition,[11] and behavior[12] that are not time or culture bound. It must be emphasized that these developments toward comparability are by no means completed and that we expect to draw substantial aid from the now blossoming field of comparative foreign policy.[13]

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9. C. Osgood and R. North, "From Individual to Nation: An Attempt to Make Explicit the Usually Implicit Process of Personifying International Relations," (Unpublished mimeo), Urbana and Stanford, 1962; and Brody, "Cognition and Behavior. . .," op. cit.

10. K. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1954; also, Brody, "Cognition and Behavior...," op. cit., pp. 13-17.

11. See Chapter IV below.

12. See Chapter V below.

13. J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative Politics and International Relations, Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, forthcoming; and J. N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," (Unpublished mimeo) Rutgers-Douglas, n.d.

We have created our research technology with the problems of data access squarely in mind. We have come to rely on experts for judgments about who the central decision figures are in a given situation but we do not rely on experts for judgments about the attitudes and cognitions of these decision-makers. Rather, we have come to depend on the content analysis of documents authored by the decision-makers as the best means of reconstructing the details of their attitudes and cognitions in the absence of direct contact with them.[14] We have sought understanding of the impact of context on decision-making through the use of extant historical descriptions (when they exist) and the development of our own historical descriptions. These "histories" have also provided the raw-material for our scaled event chronologies (from which we derive our indices of conflict behavior). Finally, following the examples of Deutsch[15] and his associates,[16] Richardson,[17] and Triska,[18] we have made some use of aggregate data in examining trends in conflict and integration and to characterize the international position of the nations on whose decision-makers we are focused. Our reliance on aggregate data analyses will of necessity increase as we seek to establish the effects of position in the international system on international behavior.

The study of Israeli-Egyptian relations (which is the substantive focus of this report[19]) was undertaken to satisfy our curiosity on a number of points: Chiefly, (1) could theory and methods developed in the study of "great power" relations be applied to the central conflict

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14. O. Holsti with J. K. Loomba and R. C. North, "Content Analysis," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, forthcoming.

15. E. g., Deutsch, Political Community. . ., op. cit.

16. E. g., B. Russett, Community and Contention, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963; and B. Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964.

17. L. F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity, Chicago: Quadrangel, 1960.

18. J. Triska, The World Communist System, (mimeo), Stanford Studies of the Communist System, n.d.

19. This report only covers the first of five time periods of Israeli-Egyptian relations we are studying. As such it serves to introduce the project, to clarify our approach, and to report a limited amount of data analysis. Subsequent reports will cover the remaining four periods and a general analysis of the Sinai invasion.

of another sub-system? (2) What is the effect on bilateral conflict of the entrance of a third international actor (the United Nations)? (3) Were our instruments sensitive enough to pick out factors leading to a change in the status quo (the outbreak of hostilities in Sinai) against the background of the intense (albeit, non-official) conflict that characterized Israeli-Egyptian relations from the time of the armistice?

Our research to the point of the submission of this report has not satisfied our curiosity on these questions (nor was it expected that analysis of this first phase would satisfy our curiosity). Nevertheless, we do feel we have obtained results to report even at this early stage of the project.

1. We have found that our General Inquirer dictionary is satisfactory for the analysis of Egyptian and Israeli documents. The few additions suggested by an analysis of the "leftover list" have been made, and the data were re-run with the modified dictionary.

2. An extensive experiment on methods of scaling action data has been performed, and the scale was used to analyze behavior during the time period studied.

3. The data for the time period studied were rather limited, for reasons discussed more fully in Chapter VI. Thus our hypotheses can not be tested adequately until data for subsequent periods are analyzed. Yet even with the data at hand, we find that our techniques reveal that some important distinctions were being made by Egyptian and Israeli decision-makers. For example, given the limitations of data, it is interesting to note that we were able to find eleven international objects of perception in the Egyptian documents, whereas the more limited Israeli data contain only two international objects of perception. These differences give rise to speculation about the constriction of the field of focus under stress.[20] But at this early stage in the research, this can only be speculation.

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20. F. E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research," in L. von Bertalanffy and A. Rapoport (eds.), General Systems Yearbook IV (1959).

Chapter II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Joanne K. Loomba

An understanding of Arab-Israeli tensions begins with a realization that the historical experiences of the Arabs and of the Jews provide them with the bases for personal and subjective interpretations of events which occur in the present. The hostility between them must be viewed in the context of the struggle among the Islamic states themselves and between them and Israel for positions of self-respect and leadership in the Middle East. These conflicts, in turn, are tied closely to the disputes of the Great Powers for dominance and influence in the area. The diplomacy of the Western Allies has done much to provoke in both Arabs and Israelis feelings of betrayal, of frustrated nationalism, and of having to fight for one's own survival.

Independence for the Arabs

Although the contest among European Powers for domination of the Middle East goes back for hundreds of years, the outlines of today's conflicts developed at the time of World War I. With the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the Great War in 1914, Britain undertook negotiations with various Arab leaders to draw them into anti-Turk alliances. Financial subsidies and the recognition of heredity rights induced coastal chiefs along the Persian Gulf and the Arabian chief, Ibn Saud of Riyud, to adopt positions of pro-Allied neutrality. Of far greater importance was the agreement concluded by Sir Henry MacMahon in 1915 with Emir Hussein of the Hijaz. In this agreement the British endorsed Hussein's scheme for an empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian border. This scheme, incidently, conflicted with French designs on Syria. For his part, Hussein and his sons Abdullah and Feisal launched a revolt against Turkish rule in May 1916; the revolt was sustained by British arms, funds and advisers. Thus the two rival monarchies of the Saudis and the Hashemites were encouraged in their aspirations for

territorial expansion and for leadership of the newly awakened Arab nationalism upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

The Allies did not concern themselves greatly with the overlapping claims, for these promises were superceded by the secret Sykes-Picot agreement signed between Britain and France on May 9, 1916. The Sykes-Picot agreement recognized French control in Syria and British influence in Baghdad and southern Mesopotamia; moreover, Palestine was to be placed under an international administration. Hussein learned of the perfidy when the Bolsheviks published the secret agreements in the Tsarist archives in late 1917. He hoped that the Fourteen Points promulgated by President Wilson might bring about some modification. However, according to the Treaty of Sèvres signed August 10, 1920 with the Ottoman sultan, mandates were given to France over Syria and Lebanon and to Britain over Iraq and Palestine. In addition, the British obtained a protectorate over Egypt.

In spite of the fact that the Arab National Congress in Damascus elected Feisal as King of Syria and Abdullah as King of Iraq, the French forcibly ousted the former and the British refused the latter his throne. Instead, the British carried through a scheme in 1921 which made Feisal the King of Iraq and created the state of Transjordan out of eastern Palestine for Abdullah. At this time, Hussein refused to be recognized as merely the sovereign of Hijaz and his subsidy was cut off. He and his son Ali were overthrown in 1925 by Ibn Saud, who became King of Saudia Arabia. In response to growing nationalist demands for more freedom, treaties of independence were signed between Britain and Iraq in 1930 and Egypt in 1936, and between France and Syria and Lebanon in 1936.

The colonial powers continued to dominate the Middle East until their exhaustion resulting from World War II by virtue of their financial support and their control of local military forces. After the fall of France in 1940, the British-sponsored Hashemite kings initiated discussions intended to develop a Fertile Crescent union with Syria and Lebanon. But the Syrians, with a background of republicanism, were unwilling to be subordinated to Abdullah of Transjordan. The Lebonese, with a delicate domestic equilibrium between Christians and Muslims, sought to pursue a middle course. Subsequently, Syria developed close

friendships with Ibn Saud and with King Farouk, who wished to block the expansion of British influence through the Hashemites. The United States, with its oil investments in Saudi Arabia and its anti-colonial sentiment, supported the Riyadh-Cairo axis.

In 1942, the Syrians suggested the reuniting of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into a Greater Syria. Egypt countered with suggestions for an Arab League in 1943. Britain favored the League as offering better security both for its oil interests and for its passage to the Eastern dominions. On March 22, 1945 the Arab League pact was signed at Cairo by Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Yemen, Libya and Sudan joined later. The pact guaranteed the sovereignty of each member state and pledged cooperation in economic, social and cultural affairs. When the partition of Palestine became certain, the League urged its members into war against Israel in 1948.

From Palestine to Israel

Pogroms in Russia and anti-Semitism in nationalistic-minded Europe in the late nineteenth century led to the founding of the World Zionist Organization in 1897 in Basle, Switzerland, by Theodor Herzl. The Zionists in both Europe and America endeavored by appeal to public opinion and by private pressures to win approval for the creation of a national homeland in Palestine. When, during World War I, it seemed desirable to check the pro-German activities of Russian Jews and win all Jewry to the cause of the Allies,[1] the British pledged such support in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. The Zionists declared, for their part, that their new state, so strategically placed on the approach to the Suez Canal, would remain within the British sphere of influence. France, Italy and the United States accepted the Declaration, even though it was contrary to both the Hussein-MacMahon negotiations and the Sykes-Picot agreement. It was incorporated into the Versailles peace treaties and accepted by the League of Nations.

At the close of World War I, the population of Palestine was approximately 550,000 Muslims, 70,000 Christians, and 50,000 Jews.[2] Although

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1. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs: 1920-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 127.

2. Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 427.

resentful of the broken promise to Hussein, the Arabs of Palestine, enjoying a majority of about 85 percent of the population, accepted Britain's interpretation of the Balfour Declaration as promising only a cultural and religious home. The Jews, however, did not; they thought in terms of a nationalist state. Consequently, the Jews sought to encourage rapid immigration in the hope of building up their own majority by the time the mandate was awarded independence. In August 1929, serious fighting broke out between the Arab and Jewish populations. The British responded by issuing the Passfield White Paper. The White paper emphasized again the restricted interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, which infuriated Zionist circles. When the Prime Minister sought to mollify the Zionists by a public letter to the Jewish Agency in February 1931, the Arabs were angered.

With the development of the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazis and their imitators after 1933, Jewish immigration into Palestine increased greatly. In the face of this fact, the Arabs organized an Arab Higher Committee, representing six Palestine Arab parties. The Arab Higher Committee presented the British High Commissioner with a demand for immediate democratic government in 1936. A scheme was drawn up to which the Arabs promised support, but the Jews announced they would not cooperate. The House of Commons then voted to postpone plans for self-government. An Arab general strike and violence soon led to the sending of Earl Peel to Palestine as head of a commission of inquiry. The Peel report despaired of ever achieving an integration of the populations, as envisioned under the original mandate, and made the security of British oil interests and air and sea routes seem dependent upon the success of the Zionists. The recommendation for a partition of Palestine, embodied in the Peel Report, touched off a virtual civil war.

As pressures built up in Europe and both Germany and Italy began to propagandize the Arabs, Britain announced a unilateral solution to the impasse in a White Paper on May 17, 1939. After five years no immigrants would be allowed to enter Palestine without Arab consent, and after ten years independence would be granted. The White Paper was denounced by both Arabs and Jews. The delay of further discussions occasioned by the Second World War, as well as the illegal entry of Jews fleeing from the Nazis, provoked the spread of fighting throughout the

country. Moreover, the Jewish resistance movement began to organize guerrilla attacks against the British authorities. President Truman, under pressure from American Zionists, advocated the immediate issuance of 100,000 visas to European Jews in October 1946, just prior to American congressional and the New York gubernatorial elections.

On April 2, 1947, the British requested a special session of the U.N. General Assembly to consider the question of Palestine. A Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was constituted. Of the eleven members, Iran, India and Yugoslavia proposed a bi-national federal state; Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay supported a partition plan providing for an economic union and the internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Jews favored the partition, but the Arab League declared it would fight to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state.

The General Assembly adopted the partition plan on November 29, 1947 by a vote of 33 yes, 13 no, with 10 abstentions. Russia accepted the partition and displayed mild support for the Zionists at this time as a means of embarrassing the British.[3] France, while reluctant to offend the Arabs, supported the resolution in order to counteract its declining influence in the Middle East and North Africa.[4] The United States pressured many hesitant members to vote for the resolution. Later, concern over possible retributive measures by Arabs against American oil interests caused the State Department to advocate on March 19, 1948 a temporary U.N. trusteeship, pending future Arab-Jewish agreement on the form of government. Britain was dissatisfied with the partition plan and supported the new American proposal, which favored the Arabs. However, the British Government agreed to terminate its mandate on May 15, 1948 and to turn administration over to the U.N. Palestine Commission, consisting of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines.

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3. Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations 1948-56 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), pp. 3-4.

4. Amos Perlmutter, "Background and Analysis of International Politics in the Near East, 1950-1956: The Israeli Role" (Stanford: Studies in International Conflict and Integration, typed draft, 1965), p. 5.

Civil war was already underway by May 14, 1948, when Premier Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel within the boundaries specified in the General Assembly resolution (an area of about 5,579 square miles).[5] On May 15 the Arab League declared war on and instituted a boycott on trade with the Jewish state. The Big Five of the Security Council appointed Count Folke Bernadotte on May 20th to seek an end to the hostilities. A truce was arranged from June 11 to July 8 and reestablished on July 19, after the Israelis had displayed their military superiority. All fighting terminated after the so-called Arab Liberation Army was driven out of Galilee into Lebanon in October and the Egyptians were forced into a narrow corrider at Gaza in December.

Coexistence Under an Armistice Regime

On September 16, 1948 Count Bernadotte reported to the Security Council his failure to mediate the conflict and suggested a U.N.-imposed settlement. After declaring the impossibility of an economic union, he proposed that Israel be given approximately 2,124 square miles, including all of Galilee. The Negev, including Ramle and Lydda, would be united with the Arab State of Transjordan. Count Bernadotte was assassinated in Palestine by Jewish terrorists the following day and his plan failed to pass the General Assembly. Egypt and Syria voted against it, because it gave everything to Jordan. Israel and its supporters were opposed, since by December its armies held the Negev. The Negev provided the Jewish State with a port opening into the Red Sea and with land for future colonization, while preventing a land connection between Egypt and Jordan.

Armistice negotiations were opened on the island of Rhodes in January 1949 by Dr. Ralph Bunche, Count Bernadotte's successor. Israel signed a General Armistice Agreement (GAA) with Egypt on February 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Transjordan (renamed Jordan in June) on April 3, and with Syria on July 20. The old Palestine frontier was acknowledged between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Lebanon, except that Egypt was permitted the Gaza Strip and the Israel-Lebanon border was surrounded by a demilitarized zone. The Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) established between Israel and Jordan recognized Israeli control

5. Berger, op. cit., p. 23.

of the Negev down to the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Akaba, as well as the New City sector of Jerusalem, and acknowledged Jordanian possession of a bulge into central Palestine which extended beyond Jerusalem on the north from Tulkarm to Latrun to a short distance from the Mediterranean Sea and on the south past Hebron almost to Beersheba, in addition to the walled Old City of Jerusalem. Between Syria and Israel it was agreed that the ADL would be the position to which the Syrian armies had advanced within Palestine. The Syrians withdrew, but the Israelis remained where they were, creating a demilitarized zone in the evacuated area.

The four GAAs were stated to be permanent and to remain in force even after the peace settlements, which were envisioned by all parties as following immediately. The latter were never signed.

In article One the signatories agreed:

1. not to resort to force in the settlement of the Palestine question;
2. not to undertake, plan or threaten aggressive action by armed forces against the armed forces or people of the other side;
3. to respect fully 'the right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack'; and
4. that the establishment of the armistice is an indispensable step toward the restoration of peace in Palestine.

The terms of the armistice itself were set forth in Article three;

1. a general armistice was declared:
2. each party agreed to forbit hostile or warlike action by its military or non-regular forces against the military or paramilitary forces of the other, or against its civilians;
3. each party agreed that no warlike act of hostility would be conducted under its control against the other.[6]

Each armistice agreement established bipartite military commissions, known as Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), to supervise the implimentation of the agreement. The Chairman of all four MACs was the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), originally established on April 23, 1948 to effect a Security Council resolution of April 17 demanding a cessation of all violence in Palestine. The MACs were empowered to arrange investigations of breaches of the armistice agreements through observers supplied by UNTSO. Since the MACs

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6. Berger, Ibid., pp. 60-61.

had no authority to impose sactions, they soon became propaganda forums where each side presented the longest possible list of complaints and attempted to get resolutions passed condemning the other party. Informal agreements by sub-committees or local commanders actually proved more useful in ameliorating border violence.

Another effort to introduce stability into the area was the Tripartite Declaration signed on May 25, 1950 by Britain, France and the United States. The three Great Powers announced that they would limit arms shipments to the region to levels required for internal security and that they would guarantee the Arab-Israeli borders against aggression from either side. These boundaries incorporated into Israel the additional territory won in the Palestine War which increased by about 3,000 square miles the area allotted to Israel in the UN Partition Plan. The Allies, also, tried to induce the Arabs to cooperate in a regional defense organization to be known as the Middle East Command (MEC) in 1951. The Arabs refused, seeing in the plan an infringement of their independence, following military and political successes by Israel.

On January 23, 1950, the Arab League formalized its boycott against any cooperation with Israel, except in the MACs. Egypt extended its blockade of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, and to ships of other nations carrying cargo to Israel, to include the Gulf of Akaba on February 6, 1950. By setting up guns on two islands off the tip of the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptians effectively immobilized the port of Eilat. Iraq shut off the flow of oil in the pipeline to Haifa. Israel took a complaint to the Security Council on July 11, 1951 and secured a resolution asking Egypt to lift the blockade on September 1. When Egypt failed to comply, it was only German reparations and American aid that saved Israel from economic ruin in 1952-3.[7] Moreover, the United Jewish Appeal, mainly effective in the United States, has been credited with balancing the Israeli budget each year.[8]

Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the early 1950's to a permanent peace settlement between the Israelis and the Arabs was the refugee problem. Over a half million Arabs fled from Palestine in 1947-8. Either from fear or from the belief that this would clear the way for invading Arab armies. The Israelis maintained that the refugees left

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7. Berger, Ibid, p. 148.

8. Fisher, op. cit., p. 592.

of their own free will; that to accept them back would permit a fifth column to exist; and that Israel's absorption of Jewish refugees from Arab states should be matched by Arab acceptance of refugees. All the Arab states insisted on repatriation. Neither side has changed its policy to any great extent since.

The U.N. created a temporary Relief for Palestine Regugees (UNRPR) organization in November 1948. On December 11, 1948 the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving repatriation or compensation. When no agreement could be reached for reintegration, the General Assembly established a U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to help them become self-supporting. A number of refugees were packed into the Gaza Strip, away from Egypt proper, while about 75,000 took up residence within Syria. Most of the refugees, however, encamped along the borders in Lebanon and Jordan; from these positions they could infiltrate back into their former homeland for raids and killings.

At first both Lebanon and Jordan made attempts to control violence by civilians across the border, but the refugees soon came under the influence of the more hostile Egypt and Syria.[9] Lebanon, attempting to maintain its equilibrium between Christians and Moslems and beset by cabinet crises, finally decided to exclude them from the mainstream of national life and to leave patrol of the border to locally recruited soldiers (often immigrants). Within Jordan the refugees, being better educated and more political-minded, became an influential group in the government. They stymied any action which would reduce pressure on Israel.[10]

In addition to illegal border crossings and maraudering, attempts by Israel to utilize water from the Jordan River provoked deep disagreements between Syria and Israel. On March 29, 1951, Syria complained to the Security Council that the Jewish state was violating the GAA by draining the Huleh marshes and, thus, affecting Arab-owned land within the demilitarized zone (DZ). The MAC Chairman ordered work to stop, but

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9. Berger, op. cit., p. 131.

10. Fisher, op. cit., p. 599.

the drainage operation continued. After an Israeli patrol was fired upon from the Arab village of El Hamma and from a Syrian outpost just across the border, Israel bombed the two positions on April 5. This retaliation was Israel's first open violation of the cease-fire provisions of the armistices. When heavy fighting and a Syrian invasion of Israel proper at Tel el Mutilla followed in May, the Allies allowed the Tripartite Declaration to lapse.

The infiltration of Arabs from Egyptian territory into Israel for acts of theft and violence was extremely difficult to control even when mutual trust existed between local commanders. The Gaza Strip, five miles wide and twenty-five miles long, had the atmosphere of a concentration camp with about 3900 persons to the square mile (310,000 residents, of which 210,000 were refugees).[11] Furthermore, the MAC ceased to function after the Israelis violated Article Five of the GAA by driving nearly 5,000 beduin Arabs out of the Negev into Egypt and the Gaza Strip in July 1950. Still, the Egyptians did not support organized attacks at this time, for they felt that the blockade of the Suez Canal was an easier and more effective way to punish Israel. It was after the "Committee of Free Officers," led by Neguib and Nasser, overthrew King Farouk on July 26, 1952 that the military--eager for a "second round" to vindicate their defeat in the Palestine War--began to organize guerrilla squads.

As the Jewish state tottered on the edge of bankruptcy in 1953, raiding stepped up from the directions of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Meanwhile Syria complained to the Security Council that Israel's commencement of a hydro-electric project on the Jordan River, near B'nat Ya'acor, was an infringement on the DZ. At this point, Israel fully embraced a policy of reprisals. On October 14, in retaliation for the murder of a mother and child deep inside Israel, Israeli soldiers destroyed the Jordanian village of Qibya, killing over fifty men, women and children. Not only did the raid fail to stir the Great Powers into action, it placed Israel in a position of having to sternly punish future violations of the GAAs or perhaps be thought lacking in nerve by the Arabs. On

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11. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1962), p. 69.

October 27, the Security Council ordered suspension of the work at B'nat Ya'acov and, in November 24, it condemned Israel's attack on Qibya.

Attempting to reemphasize harmony and economic development, the United States sent Eric Johnson to the Middle East with plans for a regional Jordan Valley Authority (JVA). Negotiations lasted from 1953 to 1955 and might have been successful had not old rivalries between Hashemite Jordan and Iraq and the leaders of Egypt and Syria been reactivated. Under pressure from America to make some unilateral concessions, the Israelis offered to negotiate on the question of refugee compensation, to open a free port at Haifa, to provide a landlink between Egypt and Jordan and to sign non aggression pacts with the Arab States. However, in Cairo, the militant Muslim Brotherhood opposed the JVA; the Egyptian Government saw in the Israeli offer an attempt to reduce the economic boycott. Syria and Lebanon felt that if Jordan resumed use of Haifa, this would be financially punitive to the Port of Beirut and to Syrian and Lebanese railway companies.[12] Moreover, news leaked out that Iraq was attempting to establish its leadership in the Middle East by negotiating a pact with Turkey--the only country in the area to recognize and befriend the Jewish State. Since the pact previsioned a military alliance with the West, the Israelis themselves were embittered. The plan was shelved; Jordan began to design its own water project; and Israel transferred work out of the DZ to the southern end of Lake Tiberias.

The Fateful Year of 1955

Four significant events took place in the autumn of 1954 which convinced Israel of its isolation and vulnerability: the resumption of arms shipments to Iraq and Egypt by the West; the Spy Trials; the seizure of the Bat Galim; and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement to evacuate British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. The small supply of arms which the United States and Britain supplied to the Arab countries in 1954, in violation of their 1950 pledges, were for the purposes of inducing Iraq to join them in a military defense alliance and of obtaining clauses in the Suez Canal Zone Treaty permitting certain facilities to British troops.

12. Berger, op. cit., p. 142.

Yet, there were no formal guarantees against their use for an attack on Israel.

In the fall of 1954, a number of Jewish residents in Egypt were arrested and tried for carrying out espionage and sabotage activities on behalf of Israel. A number were found guilty, but because of the international attention focused on the case, it was hoped that Nasser would commute the death sentences. However, to do so would have been politically disastrous for Nasser,[13] since members of the Muslim Brotherhood had recently been executed for similar actions. Most Israelis were convinced that the defendants had been framed and had been tortured for confessions, and there were widespread demands for vengance.

On September 28, Israel attempted to send one of its own ships, the Bat Galim, through the Suez Canal in order to create an issue of free passage before the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed.[14] The ship, its crew, and its cargo of food and hides were seized. Israel complained to the Security Council on October 14, but no action was taken, since Britain was scheduled to sign the Suez Canal Treaty within a week and the United States was in the process of negotiating an arms sale to Egypt. Moreover, not even a resolution was passed, for Russia had already vetoed a request to Egypt in March that year to comply with the 1951 Security Council demand to end the blockade of the Canal to ships bound for Israel. The crew was freed after nine months and the cargo released for land transport, but the ship was retained by Egypt.

Israel, in another reaction to the frustrations that culminated in the Bat Galim incident, made a strenuous attempt to persuade the British not to leave the Canal Zone before Egypt gave assurances of free passage to the Jewish state. But many in Britain had come to believe that, in the new age of nuclear diplomacy, a military base in the Suez Canal Zone was an exposed strategic liability, as well as a financial drain.[15] The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which was signed on October 19, 1954, provided that British troops would be evacuated by June 18, 1956, but that Allied soldiers would have the right for seven years to enter Egypt in case of an attack upon Arab League states or Turkey. Both parties pledged to

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13. Burns, op. cit., p. 74.

14. Berger, op. cit., p. 162.

15. Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 3.

uphold the 1888 Constantinople Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation of the canal. Three weeks after the signing, the United States agreed to give Egypt $40,000,000 for modernization of its economy and to consider constructing a high dam at Aswan.

The year 1955 opened with the refusal by the United States and Britain to grant Israel's request for arms or a security pact; and with the announcement by Iraq on January 12 that it was signing a military alliance with Turkey. The Turks had already made a similar pact with Pakistan, at the urging of the Western Allies. This unilateral adherence by Iraq to what became known as the Bagdad Pact was declared by Egypt to be a violation of the Arab League. Egypt acted quickly to counteract this challenge to its leadership of the Arab states by proposing an alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia at Damascus in March. In October the three states agreed to unify their armed forces under an Egyptian command. The next year Egypt joined with Yemen and Saudi Arabia in the Jidda Pact.

Lebanon and Jordan refused to commit themselves to either of the two camps. In December Britain sent Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, to Jordan to pressure that state into joining the Bagdad Pact. The Palestine refugees in Jordan led the public in violent demonstrations which brought the fall of the Prime Minister. Britain and Iraq were awakened to the possibility of a pro-Cairo coup in Jordan that might place Egypt at the borders of both Israel and Iraq. In the spring of 1956, Iraq agreed with the France-British-Israeli decision that Nasser was a "troublemaker" who had to be removed.[16]

Israel felt that the rivalry between Egypt and its supporters and the Hashemite rulers, involving the appeal to a Pan-Arab union, was a threat to its national existence. The Israeli Government determined to show that it could defend itself and that, if the Arab states did not respect its borders, they would be forced to pay a high price in blood.[17] On the night of February 28, 1955 Israeli troops advanced more than three miles into the Gaza Strip and killed thirty-six Egyptian soldiers and two civilians. Egypt complained about the raid to the Security Council and a motion censuring Israel was adopted unanimously.

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16. Berger, op. cit., p. 211.

17. Burns, op. cit., p. 63.

As a reply to the Gaza Raid, Egypt announced that fedayeen organized guerrillas that had begun to operate out of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip were being trained by the Egyptian Army for their acts of sabotage in Israel. The next month Nasser attended the Bandung Conference. There he further increased the uneasiness of the Western Allies by setting forth his philosophy of Arab nationalism within a foreign policy context of "positive neutralism." Meanwhile, Egyptian military officers were demanding more arms to protect themselves from future raids by the Israelis. The Government was unwilling to sign the agreement in the American Mutual Security program, and this made the price of United States weapons too high. In June it became known that Egypt was negotiating with the Soviet ambassador to obtain Czech arms.

In an effort to forestall, or at least to minimize the effect of a secret arms agreement with Russia, the United States put forth the Dulles Peace Plan in August.

> Very briefly, the United States offered to provide substantial aid toward a settlement of the Palestine question, and security guarantees to maintain that settlement. Loans and grants would be provided to enable Israel to pay refugee resettlement; and to assist in the repatriation of a 'feasible' number of refugees. Money would be provided for the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would facilitate resettlement. Any border settlement mutually agreed upon would be guaranteed.[18]

The Israelis were worried by the reference to "agreed frontiers," but accepted the proposal as a basis for negotiations. The Arabs waited until two weeks after the conclusion of the Czech arms deal to announce their rejection.

The agreement for Czechoslovakia to supply arms to Egypt was completed on September 27, 1955. Simultaneously the fedayeen groups were active throughout the Negev and even reaching the suburbs of Tel Aviv to commit terrorist murders. Israel struck back, and both parties lodged complaints with the Security Council. This time there was no condemnation. Rather, a resolution sponsored by Britain, France and the United States calling on both sides to desist from violence and to hold discussions with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO was passed on September 8. In spite of the turn of events, Britain and the United States went ahead

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18. Berger, op. cit., p. 189.

in December with their offer to assist Egypt in the construction of the Aswan Dam. During the two intervening months, Egypt and Syria signed their mutual defense treaty and the first meeting of the Bagdad Pact was held.

Once again Israel reacted against the failure by the Tripartite Powers to act in its support with a reprisal raid. This time the attack was on Syrian positions along Lake Tiberias, killing fifty. On January 19, 1955, the Security Council voted to censure Israel. In that same month, Britain and the United States conferred on the Middle East situation; they stated vaguely that they intended to intervene against any aggressor. In February Russia warned that any dispatch of troops to the Middle East would be a threat to peace. Thereupon, Dulles assured the Senate that the United States would not participate in any joint military force nor send arms to Israel without the consent of Congress.

Since the Tripartite Powers could not agree on a common policy, they voted in the Security Council to send the Secretary-General to the Middle East. The Secretary-General explained in his report of May 9, 1956 that all governments had reaffirmed Article II of the GAA, containing the cease-fire provisions, subject only to the right of self-defense. However, the Arab states still failed to take effective action to prevent infiltrators from crossing their borders into Israel. Israel maintained that this negligence, as well as the breach of other Articles of the GAAs, permitted crimes against Israeli citizens and justified opening fire in self-defense. The Israelis apparently believed the Arab propaganda about a "second round" to exterminate the Jewish state. They looked forward worriedly to the coming withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone in June.

Sometime early in 1956, Israel had concluded that if conditions did not improve, the most favorable time for a fight for survival would be before the Egyptians and Syrians were fully trained in their new arms and before this change in the military balance could demoralize the Israeli soldiers. Moreover, it was thought that if the Israelis attacked first and reached the Suez Canal, then there was a likelihood that Nasser might fall from power and that an internationally guaranteed buffer zone might be created out of the Sinai Peninsula.[19] But Israel

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19. Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1962), p. 180.

could not act without arms or allies.

Then, in March, several events provided the Israelis with their long-sought friends. A document was found on a captured Algerian leader which was said to prove that Cairo was not only supporting, but materially aiding the Algerian rebellion against France.[20] France, not yet reconciled to the loss of Indo-China and the new independence of Tunisia and Morocco, offered to remain aloof to the Bagdad Pact, if Egypt would cease support of the Algerian rebels. Egypt refused on March 14. On April 15, France announced it was selling Mystère jets to Israel, so that Israel could protect itself from Ilyushin bombers in the hands of Egyptians and Syrians. Within a few months this agreement for Israel's defense evolved into a plan for the invasion of Egypt.

Ever since the anti-Templer demonstrations in Jordan, Britain had been concerned about Egyptian and Saudi financing of political agitation in Iraq and Jordan. On March 1 the Jordanian King, in order to strengthen his position with the people, expelled General Glubb and most of the British officers in Jordan's army. Following this dismissal, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia offered to replace the British subsidy to Jordan. The Soviet Union offered both financial and military assistance. Britain and Iraq began to discuss the desirability of dividing up Jordan between Iraq and Israel and making this the basis for a general Arab-Israeli settlement.[21] In addition, both states agreed that they would like to see the Egyptian "instigator" overthrown.

At the NATO meeting in Paris in late April, Britain and the United States agreed that France might divert some of its Mystère jets to Israel. Canada was also released from some of its obligations, in order to make Sabre jets available to Israel. Concurrently, Soviet leaders visiting London agreed with Britain's desire to have stability in the Middle East to protect its oil supply. Egypt reacted to these events by withdrawing their diplomatic representatives from Formosa and recognizing Red China on May 6, 1956.

The recognition of the Chinese Communists by Egypt deeply upset the United States. On top of this, the Soviet Foreign Minister arrived

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20. Robertson, op. cit., p. 50.

21. Childers, op. cit., p. 189.

in Egypt in June to witness the departure of the British troops from the Canal Zone and to offer the Egyptians a loan of $1,300,000 the full price of the Aswan Dam. In mid-July Britain decided not to go ahead with its part of the loan funds for the dam project, but the United States was unsure of what to do.

> Nasser's word was the sole security for the loan. Egypt's cotton crop was mortgaged for years ahead in the arms deal, and its economy was even unable to meet other commitments to the Communist bloc or anyone else. There was no guarantee that the money would be used for the dam and no visible means of repayment, yet if Washington turned down the loan, the Soviet Union might provide it. On the other hand, if the loan were made the uncommitted nations might quickly interpret Nasser's success as meaning the United States could be blackmailed, that guns from Russia could be paid for with cash from the United States.[22]

By the time the Egyptian ambassador arrived in Washington to conclude the transaction, the United States had made up its mind. On July 19, 1956, it was announced that conditions had changed over the past seven months and that it was no longer possible for the United States to supply funds for the Aswan High Dam. Nationalization of the Suez Canal followed rapidly. And that led to the formulation by France, Britain and Israel of concrete plans for the invasion of Egypt.

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22. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

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Chapter III

EVENTS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST: JULY 19 - 28, 1956

P. Terry Hopmman

An important crisis period in Arab-Israeli relations occurred during the ten days from July 19 to July 28, 1956. One of the interesting characteristics of this period, however, is that there were few direct confrontations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Rather than being a purely bilateral conflict, this period was characterized by the involvement of a substantial number of outside powers in Middle Eastern politics. These interactions ranged from various degrees of conflict to cooperation, as well as attempts at mediation; as a result, these numerous outside actors became directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to summarize the many interactions which occurred during the conflict period of July 19-28, 1956, in the Middle East.

The initial event inaugurating this period occurred between the United States and Egypt on July 19. On that date the United States withdrew its offer to help Egypt build the High Dam at Aswan on the Nile. On the 19th Secretary of State Dulles met with the Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein, informing him that it "was not possible in present circumstances" for the United States "to participate in the 'project.'"

This action by the United States was generally interpreted as a change in American policy to a tougher line towards the neutralist regime of Egypt's President Nasser. Although the Egyptian ambassador offered no immediate reaction, Egyptian officials were quite bitter, accusing the United States of bad faith. The United States' statement did acknowledge the possibility of other more limited projects for Egypt; however, it did express considerable doubt about Egypt's ability to provide the resources to finance the Aswan project, in contrast to the time when the offer was originally made.

At the time that the news of the United States' withdrawal of aid for the Aswan project was announced, President Nasser was returning home from a conference with India's Prime Minister Nehru and Yugoslavia's

President Tito on Brioni Island in Yugoslavia. There was no immediate public reaction from Nasser upon his return home.

Simultaneously a series of armed clashes took place between Israel and Jordan, with the United Nations, represented by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, attempting to mediate the conflict. On July 19 Hammarskjöld visited Israel and held a five hour private conversation with Premier David Ben-Gurion. Following a recent deterioration of the cease-fire along the Israeli-Jordanian border, Ben-Gurion had come to regard the cease-fire as useless, threatening reprisals in response to any future incidents. As a result, Hammarskjöld journeyed to Israel to try to persuade Ben-Gurion that the implementation of the cease-fire agreements remained an essential first step to peace in the Middle East.

Canada also had become involved in this conflict when Israel made application to purchase 24 Sabre jets. On the 19th Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent referred to this Israeli request, reporting that there were still "conversations and discussions going on about the possibility of doing something that would not be an exclusive Canadian action in the supply of arms to Israel." This was interpreted widely as indicating that a joint Western effort was under way to supply equipment to Israel to balance the supply of modern bombers which several Communist nations had provided for Egypt. Consequently, this new threat of a spiralling arms race in the Middle East added to Hammarskjöld's concern.

On July 20 Britain also withdrew its offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam. The British decision was announced to the press several hours before the Egyptian Ambassador was officially informed. The British reported that the reasons for reversing their earlier commitments were the same as those stated by the United States. The Egyptians were quite angered both by the action and by the way it was announced by both the American and British governments. One Egyptian diplomat told the press: "The only explanation for the way this was done is that it is an attempt to undermine Nasser. And what is to come next? We must have the dam and we shall be forced to go to the Russians."

Throughout Egypt there was considerable shock expressed at the American decision, coming as it did so soon after assurances as recently as July 6 that the American offer was still valid. Generally the change

in policy was attributed by the Egyptians to "Zionist pressures" in an election year and to American irritation at Egypt's recognition of Communist China, her expanding trade with the Soviet bloc, and her neutralist policy.

There was no immediate official reaction from the Egyptian government. On July 20, however, the communiqué from the Brioni conference, prepared prior to the American action, was released. Relatively moderate in tone at the urging of Nehru, it called for safeguarding the "legitimate economic interests" of the Western powers in the Middle East while "basing solutions on the freedom of the people concerned."

Meanwhile Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Premier Ben-Gurion concluded their "full and fruitful" discussions on how to keep peace in the Middle East. Ben-Gurion told Hammarskjöld of the deteriorating situation, including an influx of arms into Arab states, a continuation of warlike Arab propaganda voicing an intention to crush Israel, and the recruitment and training of Fedayeen commando gangs in Jordan and Egypt. Hammarskjöld, in turn, urged the Israelis not to undertake reprisals for these provocations but to give the U.N. peace-keeping mission a chance to bring a halt to such incidents.

On July 21 a highly-placed Egyptian source offered a first semi-official reaction to the events of recent days by informing newsmen that his Government would "push ahead with our plans to build the High Dam at Aswan" despite the Western withdrawals of aid. This and other statements in the Cairo press made it apparent that Egypt was asking the Soviet Union for help in building the $1,300,000,000 project.

Egyptian hopes of Soviet assistance received a substantial blow on the same day, however, when Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov told newsmen in Moscow that his government was not considering aid to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan Dam. At the same time, he did say that Russia would consider sympathetically requests by Egypt for aid in the development of her industries, which Shepilov believed to be more important than the High Dam. While indicating that the Soviet Union was not presently prepared to offer large sums to Egypt for the dam, Shepilov's statement did not categorically rule out such aid.

At the same time, Dag Hammarskjöld continued his peacekeeping mission to the Middle East by visits to Jordan and Egypt on the 21st. In Amman,

Jordan, the Secretary-General met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Awni Abdul Hadi to discuss proposals to prevent frontier clashes. Hammarskjöld then flew on to Egypt, where he made a special point of noting the different circumstances of his present visit as contrasted to his earlier trip to the Middle East in April, 1956. This time, he indicated, there was no great urgency and the purpose of his trip was just to check up on the progress of the cease-fire.

On July 23, Hammarskjöld reported that the cease-fire was in fact in good working order. He said that any fears that the situation had deteriorated had been dispelled. In spite of this reassurance, Israel's Premier Ben-Gurion demanded an accounting from Hammarskjöld of Jordan's attitude towards implementing the cease-fire. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman stated: "Israel will consider further its policy towards Jordan in the light of whatever assurances the Secretary-General may have obtained from the Jordanian government." The statement also indicated that Israel might revive her policy of punitive raids against Arab neighbors if border incidents continued. The Israeli Foreign Ministry contended that the continuation of such incidents indicated that "all efforts by the Mixed Armistice Commission and by the United Nations representatives to bring about Jordan's compliance have so far failed." They added: "Now with aggression continuing, the question is again being asked whether reliance can be placed on the Mixed Armistice Commission as an effective organ for reducing tension."

On July 23 Egypt received the final blow to her plans for financing the Aswan Dam. World Bank officials informed Egypt that when the United States' and Britain's offers of grants were withdrawn, the proposed $200,000,000 loan from the World Bank "automatically expired," having been contingent upon the American and British grants. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry countered by saying that it had received assurances from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as recently as July 9 that the Aswan Dam project was economically sound. The Bank acknowledged that Eugene Black, Bank Director, had wished the Egyptians success on their project in a letter dated July 9, but denyied that there was any confirmation of the economic soundness of the project or any assurance that the World Bank would maintain its loan after the withdrawal of the grants offered by the United States and Britain.

President Nasser made his first official reply to the Western action in a speech near Cairo on July 24. He angrily accused the United States of lying about the state of the Egyptian economy. He then declared: "If an uproar in Washington creates false and misleading announcements, without shame and with disregard for the principles of international relations, that the Egyptian economy is unsound and throwing shadows of doubt on Egypt's economy, I look at Americans and say: May you choke to death on your fury!" Nasser was clearly infuriated by Western charges concerning the weakness of the Egyptian economy as he referred to that topic many times throughout his speech. He summed up by saying: "...we Egyptians will not permit any imperialists or oppressors to rule us militarily, politically, or economically; we will not submit to the dollar or to force." Nasser's tirade was also supported by a violent anti-American campaign in the Egyptian press.

Further trouble occurred on July 24 in Israeli-Jordanian relations following an incident in which two U.N. military observers and a Jordanian officer were wounded severely. They accidentally touched off a mine on Mount Scopus, a demilitarized zone behind Jordanian lines but under the control of Israel. Jordan had given Israel limited rights of passage to supply Israeli policemen stationed on the Mount which stood as a religious shrine for the Israelis as well as part of the Hebrew University. Still there was considerable anxiety on the part of U.N. observers that Israel might use force to seize full control of the Mount and its approaches. This would have been a major military loss for Jordan since Mount Scopus dominated all of the roads into Jerusalem from the east and north, so that it would have been of great tactical value to Israel in any attempt to compel the surrender of Jerusalem and most of the Jordanian controlled area west of the Jordan River. Therefore, Major General E. L. M. Burns, U.N. truce supervisor, warned both sides not to "attempt to assert a right on Mount Scopus by military action." He said that it was his intention to maintain United Nations authority over this demilitarized zone.

The only incident of any significance on July 25 involved Jordan and the United Nations, when a group of Jordanian villagers attacked a team of U.N. military observers near Jerusalem. This followed a military clash between Jordan and Israel in which several Jordanians were wounded.

In attempting to get revenge the Jordanians attacked the group of U.N. observers, seriously wounding a Swedish officer, Lt. Col. E. H. Thalin. Israel and Jordan each blamed the other for the incident, each contending that the other party had fired first. Maj. Gen. Burns expressed his concern on behalf of the U.N. to Jordan, requesting that they reduce the number of provocative incidents along the Israeli frontier.

On July 26 this crisis period reached its climax when President Nasser announced that Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal Company. He added that the profits from the operation of the canal would be used to help finance construction of the High Dam at Aswan. Speaking in Alexandria, Nasser declared that the Company was dissolved and that all stockholders would be repaid at the preceding day's price on the Paris Stock Exchange.

At the same time that Nasser was speaking, Egyptian officials took over actual physical control of the offices of the Suez Canal Company. Control of the canal was placed in the hands of a special board attached to the Egyptian Ministry of Commerce. All canal employees, Egyptian and foreign, were required to stay on the job under penalty of imprisonment for leaving.

Almost immediately the Middle East conflict came to have a direct bearing in major Western capitals, and reactions began to be formulated. In Britain, Prime Minister Eden conferred with American and French diplomats, although no formal response was immediately forthcoming. British financial interests in the canal company were outraged, calling the action a violation of international law and of agreements specifically concerning the Suez Canal.

Almost independent of the conflict surrounding Egypt, the United Nations continued its efforts to avert a military conflict between Israel and Jordan. Dag Hammarskjöld sent a new strong appeal to both countries to take measures enforcing the cease-fire. Also Maj. Gen. Burns conferred separately with Maj. Gen. Nuwar, Jordanian Chief of Staff, and Mrs. Golda Mayer, Israeli Foreign Minister, to work out details enforcing the cease-fire. On July 26, however, Israel also notified the U.N. Security Council of their decision to stop providing resolutions of censure to the Mixed Armistice Commission in Palestine concerning attacks from the Arab side. Since the Commission's decisions against Jordan had had so little effect, the Israelis argued that it was useless to report further incidents.

Jordan at the same time was preparing to ask the U.N. Security Council to investigate troubles along the armistice line with Israel. The Jordanians charged that Israel was provoking incidents with the aim of justifying some large-scale retaliation that could lead to war. They felt that the U.N. observers had not done an adequate job of preventing incidents and of keeping demilitarized zones free of weapons. As a result, they feared that an attack from Israel was imminent and that present U.N. arrangements were not sufficient to prevent it.

Western nations reacted to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company with a series of protests, soon to be followed by several counter-measures. Britain delivered a sharp protest to Egypt on the 27th against "this arbitrary action, which constitutes a serious threat to the freedom of navigation on a waterway of vital international importance." The protest note added: "The responsibility for the consequences must rest entirely upon the Egyptian Government." Prime Minister Eden addressed the House of Commons about the Suez situation, outlining a number of possible retaliatory measures, including the blocking of Egypt's sterling balances. Eden did not rule out a member's suggestion that warships could be sent to the canal terminus under the nine-power Constantinople convention of 1888 which pledged freedom of navigation of the canal in peace and war.

Egypt responded to the protest by refusing to accept it. Wing Commander Aly Sabri, chief of Egypt's Political Bureau, rejected the protest because the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was "an act within Egypt's sovereignty." He added that the canal company had been incorporated in Egypt and was hence subject to Egyptian law.

The French Government, in a statement prepared jointly by the Foreign and Finance Ministries, protested the Egyptian action as being contrary to international law. In addition, an emergency meeting of the principle French ministries was held. At the time the French Government appeared to favor military occupation of the canal if Britain would join France in the action. The French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, favored quick Western action, indicating that an appeal to the International Court of Justice would be too slow.

The United States was also consulting regularly with her European allies, without committing herself to any course of action.

Meanwhile, operation of the newly nationalised canal was placed on a martial law basis on July 27. However, ships continued to pass through the waterway at the usual rate. In addition, the Egyptian Minister of Commerce, Mohammed Abou Nasseir, declared that any foreign interests wanting to contest Egypt's seizure of the canal would have to take their cases before Egyptian courts. He contended that the International Court of Justice had no jurisdiction over the matter since the flow of international traffic through the canal had not been interrupted. He also attempted to play down the idea that the seizure of the canal was a retaliation against the West. On the contrary, he argued that the canal was nationalized largely because the Canal Company had "failed to live up to its commitment to improve sailing conditions in the canal."

On July 28 more concrete counter-measures were taken against the Egyptian action. The British treasury blocked all Egyptian accounts in the United Kingdom, freezing all of the assets of the Suez Canal Company and Egyptian banks, companies, and individuals. In addition, the British announced the movement of warships in the Mediterranean which was explicitly admitted to be related to the Suez crisis.

The French had also acted by the 28th to freeze assets of the Suez Canal Company in France. The French, however, also began to develop a plan to impose international controls over the Suez Canal. With the Soviet Union participating as one of the controlling powers, they hoped to establish international supervision of the canal within the framework of the United Nations. The primary purpose would be to insure the "freedom of traffic" in the canal which Foreign Minister Pineau did not feel Nasser could be trusted to do.

The United States was also concerned about events in Suez, although, in contrast to the European allies, they were more concerned with keeping the canal open to navigation rather than with financial interests. Nevertheless, the United States protested to Egypt about anti-American statements made by President Nasser on Western withdrawals of aid to build the Aswan Dam. In addition, it was announced that Secretary of State Dulles was planning to fly to London the next week to join in talks with the NATO allies. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, departed for London to participate in a conference with British and French officials on the Suez crisis.

Egypt also began to consider responses to the European counter measures. Nasser warned the West that any interference with the seizure of the canal would "cause obstruction of navigation." The Egyptians were also preparing to take the British and French actions of freezing Egyptian assets to the International Court of Justice. Nasser himself returned to Cairo from Alexandria on the 28th and was met by cheering throngs. In his speech upon returning he denounced Britain and France but, in contrast to earlier speeches, made no mention of the United States. Throughout his speech Nasser called upon Egyptian nationalism to support his actions; at one point he shouted: "We shall meet force with force and will fight to the last drop of blood to protect our independence, freedom, and rights."

In conclusion, the ten days from July 19-28, 1956 included the expansion of two separate but related conflicts in the Middle East. The first was a series of border conflicts between Israel and her Arab neighbors, primarily Jordan. The United Nations took an active role in trying to mediate this conflict. The second involved the conflict between Egypt and the major Western powers, primarily the United States, Britain, and France. The most important issues in this conflict were the American and British withdrawal of aid to Egypt for construction of the Aswan Dam and then Egypt's subsequent nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which was controlled mainly by British and French financial interests. The Soviet Union also became involved in this conflict with limited support for Egypt.

Chapter IV

COMPUTER CONTENT ANALYSIS AS A TOOL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH

Ole R. Holsti

Introduction

Content analysis has been widely used by social scientists and humanists for research problems ranging from questions of disputed authorship to the analysis of changing values in religious literature. It may be less readily apparent why the student of international relations should find content analysis a useful tool in his research. There are two questions involved here. First, with what kind of research problems are we concerned? And second, why use content analysis rather than other techniques?

Students of international relations are considerably more restricted in access to data than most social scientists--direct access to foreign policy leaders is always severely restricted in time and space. If we want to assess their attitudes, values, and "the definition of the situation" at the time of decision, most standard methods of social research--the interview, the questionnaire, or participant observation--can rarely be used. Even the scholar fortunate enough to gain access to leaders of his own nation cannot do so at those times when the most important decisions are made, as during a crisis situation. The best one can usually do under these circumstances is an ex post facto study of one party in the crisis situation, such as the analysis of the American decision to resist aggression in Korea (Snyder and Paige, 1958). Thus the documents written at the time of decision remain as the most important source of data. This represents only a partial record of the total universe of relevant communication, but the social scientist, historian, or humanist always works with something less than the total record.

What role can content analysis play in such research? Content analysis--which may be defined as a research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text--is not relevant to all documentary research. It cannot, for example, be used to determine whether President Nasser was

sincere when he promised to keep the Suez Canal open. Moreover, if the social scientist uses documents to answer limited questions of fact--such as to determine the terms of the Egyptian nationalization decree of July 1956--content analysis would not be required. But the investigator's questions and the content of documents are rarely coterminous (Dibble, 1963, 216). One approach to documentary research is exemplified by a recent manual, which suggests dependence upon "a sort of sixth sense that will alert you to tell-tale signs" (Gray, 1959, quoted in Dibble, 1963, 204). Content analysis may be considered as a supplement, not a substitute, to subjective examination of documents. The social scientist often requires information of a subtlety or complexity which renders casual reading useless, even if undertaken by the most skillful or sensitive reader. Consider the hypothesis that as crisis increases in severity, decision-makers perceive fewer policy choices open to themselves. A satisfactory test requires the use of the explicit and reproducible procedures which characterize content analysis. Moreover, it can act as a safeguard against the selection of examples, out of a mass of contradictory data, to support preconceived ideas. In general then, content analysis will be useful whenever the research problem requires precise and standardized techniques of analyzing those aspects of symbolic behavior which may escape casual scrutiny.

Manual methods of content analysis suffer in varying degrees from a number of drawbacks. Even the most elementary forms of the method, such as counting the frequency with which a set of words occurs, are expensive and time-consuming. Moreover, most techniques lack flexibility and suffer from a limited ability to deal with complex units of analysis at a high level of reliability. Finally, content analysis must be done by highly skilled and sensitive persons, the very type of person who soon becomes bored and frustrated by the tedious and repetitive nature of the task. Many of these problems can be overcome or minimized by the use of computers.

Computer Content Analysis of Political Documents

The system described here represents an adaptation of the "General Inquirer" program developed by Professor Philip Stone and his colleagues at Harvard University (Stone et al., 1962). The Stanford version,

prepared with the active cooperation of Professor Stone, can be described under three headings: two dictionaries, a system of data preparation, and a series of programs for retrieval and analysis of data.

The Political Dictionary

The dictionary provides the vital link between the theoretical formulation of the research problem and the mechanics of analysis. The development of adequate word lists for each variable is a difficult, but crucial, aspect of preparing a system for computer analysis. The necessity for developing rigorous rules concerning the "tagging" of words, by forcing unstated assumptions into the open for critical scrutiny, is an important check on many theoretical aspects of the project--the unambiguous definition of categories, the precise delineation of the boundaries between concepts, and the internal logic of the research problem.

The initial source in the development of the Stanford "political dictionary" was the Thorndike-Lorge (1944) list of the 3,000 most frequently used words in the English language. In order to make the dictionary more adequate for the analysis of political documents, other sources were examined for additional relevant terms. Previously collected documents were scanned and all relevant words were recorded. The sources used for this purpose included:

1. Documents relating to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.
    a. British documents.
    b. French documents.
    c. Russian documents.
    d. German documents.
    e. Austro-Hungarian documents.
2. Chinese Communist and Soviet Russian documents relating to:
    a. The signing of the Japanese-American Security Treaty (January 1960).
    b. The U-2 incident (May 1960).
    c. The Bay of Pigs Invasion (April 1961).

Prior to the present study the dictionary has been used to analyze a variety of documentary materials, and modified as required. These documents include:

1. American, Soviet, and Chinese documents relating to the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty during the summer of 1963.

2. Chinese and Indian documents concerning the border war of

October 1962.

3. Statements by the heads of the Egyptian (Nasser), Indian (Nehru), and Indonesian (Sukarno) governments.

4. Soviet bloc policy statements concerning the American decision to resist the invasion of South Korea in 1950, and the initial American bombing raids into North Vietnam in February 1965.

While these sources do not exhaust the vocabulary of politics, they provide a good cross section of the relevant terms.

Experience in studies completed to date indicates that the current version of the dictionary is capable of analyzing over 98% of the text. It should be emphasized, however, that dictionary construction is an ongoing process. The computer itself may be enlisted as an invaluable tool in the constant task of refining the dictionary. Calculations of word frequencies and the print-out of unknown words--that is, those not already in the dictionary--on a "leftover list" provide the basis for systematic revisions.

Once the basic words have been collected, the preparation of the political dictionary involved three stages: (1) the removal of regular word endings; (2) the tagging of the dictionary; and (3) the prescaling of the dictionary.

The removal of certain commonly-appearing word endings permits relatively complete analysis of the data with a dictionary of moderate size. The General Inquirer includes a special routine which chops the final "s" off each word in the text. It then proceeds to chop off any "e," "ed," or "ing" which appears at the end of the word. In either of the latter two cases, any remaining final double letter is also removed.

After this process <u>most</u> words require only one dictionary entry. For example, rather than four forms of the word "invade" (invade, invades, invaded, invading), only a single entry (invad) is necessary.

Some multiple dictionary entries are still required, however, resulting from:

1. The chopping of double letters after an "ed" or "ing" is removed. Example: <u>falling</u> is reduced to <u>fal</u>. Thus two entries, <u>fall</u> and <u>fal</u> are necessary.

2. Irregular past tense forms of verbs. Example: <u>fall</u>, <u>fell</u>.

3. Irregular plural endings. Example: <u>families</u> is reduced to

famili. Thus two entries, famili and family are required.

4. Verbs whose present tense form ends in "ed" or "ing." Examples: need, which is reduced to ne, and bring, which becomes br. The words needed and bringing are, however, reduced only to need and bring. Thus both ne and need and br and bring are in the dictionary.

The dictionary--which serves as the instrument by which perceptual data are measured--links the technique of content analysis with the theoretical framework for the analysis of interaction. Tagging is the process by which one's theory is built into the dictionary. The Stanford political dictionary has been tagged for three dimensions:

positive affect. . . . negative affect
strength . . . . . weakness
activity . . . . . passivity

These three dimensions are derived from a number of theories relevant to the study of human behavior, and have a rich foundation of empirical evidence to support their salience. The three dimensions correspond to the evaluative, potency and activity factors which Osgood and others (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; Osgood, 1960; Suci, 1957; Kumata and Schramm, 1956) have found to be primary in human cognition irrespective of culture. The Stanford dictionary thus reflects the premise that when decision-makers (or any human beings) perceive themselves, other decision-makers, nations, events--or any stimulus--the most relevant discriminations are made in a space defined by these three factors. This does not assume, however, that two people will agree on whether the stimulus is good or bad, strong or weak, active or passive; it assumes only that these factors account for an overwhelming proportion of discrimination variance.

Word lists were given to a series of three or more judges, who were asked to indicate which dimensions were relevant to each word. Because it was assumed that the paired dimensions are mutually exclusive rather than overlapping (an assumption borne out by the judges who categorized each word), any word might be tagged for one, two or three dimensions. A word might be rated positive-strong-active, but not positive-negative or strong-weak.

Upon completion of the tagging, the dictionary was divided into six lists--positive affect, negative affect, strong, weak, active, passive--for scaling. A series of judges then rated the words on each list in

terms of three intensity levels. The results of these judgments were then averaged. For example, if two judges assigned the value of 3 to a word, whereas a third judge rated its intensity as 2, that word was assigned a preliminary value of 2.67. The word list for each of the six dimensions was then forced into a 30%-40%-30% distribution according to its preliminary value--that is, those words whose average rating was in the top 30% were given the intensity rating of 3, the next 40% were rated 2, and the lowest 30% were assigned the intensity rating of 1. The choice of three intensity levels and of the 30%-40%-30% distribution of ratings was a somewhat arbitrary one, although based in part on considerations of computer running time. Each added intensity level would materially increase the number of questions required for retrieving desired information.

The current version of the dictionary of 3,521 words is tagged for the dimensions of affect, strength and activity, with each of the dimensions scaled for intensity. Note that some words are tagged for only one or two dimensions. The result is a dictionary in which entries appear as:

```
ABANDON     = NEG2WK3PSV3
ABANDONMENT = NEG2WK3PSV3
ABDICAT     = NEG1WK3PSV3
ABET        = POS2ATV3
ABHOR       = NEG3PSV2
ABILITI     = POS1STR2
```

POS = positive affect
STR = strength
ATV = active
NEG = negative affect
WK = weakness
PSV = passive

This Stanford dictionary can be described quantitatively in terms of tag categories in Tables 1-7.

Second-pass Geographical and Biographical Dictionary

In addition to the main political dictionary, a dictionary of proper names has been written. The names of persons and places serve as the entry words which are tagged with relevant information necessary for identification. Examples of entries used in the analysis of the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1956 include:

```
NASSER = EGYPT+PRESIDENT X
WASHINGTON = UNITED$-STATES+CAPITAL X
```

POSITIVE AFFECT	Number	Percent
positive affect	292	8.3
in combination with:		
strength	314	8.9
weakness	15	0.4
activity	69	2.0
passivity	93	2.6
strength-activity	118	3.3
strength-passivity	40	1.1
weakness-activity	6	0.2
weakness-passivity	30	0.9
Total words tagged for positive affect	977	27.7

Table 1

NEGATIVE AFFECT	Number	Percent
negative affect	385	10.9
in combination with:		
strength	84	2.4
weakness	220	6.2
activity	121	3.4
passivity	119	3.4
strength-activity	357	10.1
strength-passivity	34	1.0
weakness-activity	40	1.1
weakness-passivity	153	4.4
Total words tagged for negative affect	1513	43.0

Table 2

STRENGTH	Number	Percent
strength	214	6.1
in combination with:		
positive affect	314	8.9
negative affect	84	2.4
activity	201	5.7
passivity	29	0.8
positive affect-activity	118	3.3
positive affect-passivity	40	1.1
negative affect-activity	357	10.1
negative affect-passivity	34	1.0
Total words tagged for strength	1391	39.5

Table 3

WEAKNESS	Number	Percent
weakness	57	1.6
in combination with:		
positive affect	15	0.4
negative affect	220	6.2
activity	15	0.4
passivity	43	1.2
positive affect-activity	6	0.2
positive affect-passivity	30	0.9
negative affect-activity	40	1.1
negative affect-passivity	153	4.4
Total words tagged for weakness	579	16.4

Table 4

ACTIVITY	Number	Percent
activity	291	8.3
in combination with:		
positive affect	69	2.0
negative affect	121	3.4
strength	201	5.7
weakness	15	0.4
positive affect-strength	118	3.3
positive affect-weakness	6	0.2
negative affect-strength	357	10.1
negative affect-weakness	40	1.1
Total words tagged for activity	1218	34.5

Table 5

PASSIVITY	Number	Percent
passivity	181	5.1
in combination with:		
positive affect	93	2.6
negative affect	119	3.4
strength	29	0.8
weakness	43	1.2
positive affect-strength	40	1.1
positive affect-weakness	30	0.9
negative affect-strength	34	1.0
negative affect-weakness	153	4.4
Total words tagged for passivity	722	20.5

Table 6

	Number	Percent
Total words in Dictionary:	3521	100.0
Tagged for Affect:	2490	70.9
Tagged for Capability:	1970	56.0
Tagged for Activity:	1940	55.1
Words with Single Tags:	1420	40.3
Words with Double Tags:	1323	37.6
Words with Triple Tags:	778	22.1

Table 7

```
SOVIET = NATION+EUROPE+COMMUNIST+SOVIET*-UNION X
EGYPT = NATION+MIDDLE*-EAST+ARAB X
DULLES = UNITED*-STATES+FOREIGN*-MINISTER+EXECUTIVE+REPUBLICAN X
ASWAN = EGYPT X
EBAN = ISRAEL+AMBASSADOR X
```

Dictionary entries of two or more components must be hyphenated to indicate that the words are linked as a single unit. This prevents such errors as the United States being picked up as two separate dictionary entries (UNITED = FOS1STR2; STATES = PSV1). In addition, hyphenated dictionary entries must include an asterisk immediately before the hyphen on the cards. In coding text, however, the coder adds only a hyphen.

EXAMPLE: UNITED-STATES; AL-RASHID; UNITED-NATIONS

Each time one of the proper names appears in the text, the identification information on the right hand side is automatically inserted, in parentheses, into the document by computer and thus becomes part of the text:

```
MR DULLES (UNITED-STATES+FOREIGN-MINISTER+EXECUTIVE+REPUBLICAN)
STATED THAT THE CZECH (NATION+EUROPE+COMMUNIST+WARSAW-PACT)
ARMAMENTS SOLD TO EGYPT (NATION+MIDDLE-EAST+ARAB) WERE A
THREAT TO THE PEACE IN THE AREA.
```

The geographical-biographical dictionary serves four major purposes. First, it relieves the coder from the necessity of memorizing and adding all desired identification information each time such a term appears in the text. Also, it insures the uniformity of all such added information.

Second, the dictionary serves to cross-reference proper names in order to permit more economical retrieval. For example, references to the Soviet Union are commonly made through a number of terms referring to the nation (Soviets, Russia, U.S.S.R); to decision-makers (Khrushchev);

or institutions (the Kremlin). In the dictionary each of these terms is identified as a synonym for "Soviet Union."

RUSSIA = SOVIET*-UNION+NATION+COMMUNIST+EUROPE+
WARSAW*-PACT X

RUSSIAN = SOVIET*-UNION+NATION+COMMUNIST+EUROPE+
WARSAW*-PACT X

SOVIET = SOVIET*-UNION+NATION+COMMUNIST+EUROPE+
WARSAW*-PACT X

SOVIET*-UNION = NATION+COMMUNIST+EUROPE+WARSAW*-PACT X

USSR = SOVIET*-UNION+NATION+COMMUNIST+EUROPE+
WARSAW*-PACT X

KHRUSHCHEV = SOVIET*-UNION+CHAIRMAN+EXECUTIVE+COMMUNIST X

KREMLIN = SOVIET*-UNION X

Thus the analyst may, if he desires, use a single question set to retrieve all information concerning the Soviet Union regardless of the terms used in the document.[1] This does not, of course, preclude the retrieval of any one term--such as Khrushchev--separately when desired.

Third, the geographical and biographical dictionary is a useful tool in problems which depend on discriminating between sub-units of a larger class. The analyst may, for example, wish to compare the perceptions of members of the legislature with those of the executive. Even though such information may not be explicit in the text, it can be inserted automatically through dictionary entries such as:

EISENHOWER = UNITED*-STATES+PRESIDENT+EXECUTIVE+REPUBLICAN X

FULBRIGHT = UNITED*-STATES+SENATE+LEGISLATURE+DEMOCRAT X

Fourth, the dictionary may be used to aggregate sub-units for economical retrieval. The investigator may wish to analyze the reactions of the members of N.A.T.O. to the Suez situation. He need not use a separate set of questions for England, France, Greece, and so on. Because each of these nations is identified as a member of N.A.T.O., a single question will retrieve the desired information.

ENGLAND = NATION+EUROPE+NATO+BRITAIN+GREAT*-BRITAIN X

FRANCE = NATION+EUROPE+NATO X

GREECE = NATION+EUROPE+NATO X

---

1. A series of questions regarding perceptions of the Soviet Union on 50,000 words of data without use of the second-pass dictionary would require approximately fourteen hours of computer time. The cross-referencing feature of the geographical-biographical dictionary permits the same information to be retrieved in about two hours.

There is no limit on the amount or type of information which the investigator may wish to insert through the second pass dictionary. The decision will be based in large part on the nature of the research problem: What are the relevant categories and sub-categories under which he may wish to retrieve information? The nature of politics will make it likely that a thorough revision of the second pass dictionary will be necessary with each new research problem. The entries for American decision-makers in a study of the Suez crisis (Eisenhower, Hoover, Dulles, and so on) would clearly be inadequate for an analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. The dictionary may be revised quite easily simply by adding or removing cards, and recompiling the program.

Theme format

The basic unit of analysis is the perception or theme, which is defined as having no more than one each of the following elements: (1) the perceiver, (2) the perceived or agent of action, (3) the action or attitude, and (4) the target of action. Although this is a concise operational definition of a theme, few statesmen form their sentences in such a direct and elementary form. Three problems are particularly common. First, many sentences contain more than one theme. Second, some themes share one or more elements with neighboring themes. Finally, ambiguous words such as "it, "they," or "this" require additional identification. Consider, for example, the first sentence of President Kennedy's address to the nation on October 22, 1962, regarding the Cuban crisis:

> This government as promised has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba.

The sentence contains two themes regarding the maintenance of surveillance and the buildup of Cuba, the perceiver being President Kennedy in each case. The Soviet Union, the target of the first these, is the agent of action in the second. In addition, "this government" requires more precise identification. When rewritten in theme form the text would read as:

> This (United-States) government as promised has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build up + (Soviet military buildup) on the island of Cuba.

The words "Soviet military buildup" are placed in parentheses in the second theme because they have been repeated by the coder. This insertion makes possible the separate retrieval of the second theme as a Soviet action.

Multiple themes, each of which must conform to the definition of a theme, are generated from any sentence containing multiple perceivers, agents, actions, or targets.

Word subscripts

There is at present no system of computer content analysis which can discriminate between the functions of words in the sentence. For this reason, the words of major theoretical relevance in the text are identified through the addition of numerical subscripts by manual coding. The symbols for subscripting the text--which include the basic elements of the theme--are as follows:

The perceiver	/1
The perceiver when other than the author of the document	/2
The agent	/3
The action	/4
The independent referent	/5
The dependent referent	/6
The target	/7

Although no theme may contain more than one major element, all modifiers are assigned the same subscript as the words they modify.

The perceiver always refers to the author of the document. The symbol /1 is punched on a special IBM identification card preceding each document; thus it will not appear in the actual body of the text.

The symbol /2 permits the analyst to deal with the problem of a secondary perceiver within a document. In his address on the nationalization of Suez, for example, President Nasser quoted British statements on a number of occasions. In this case Nasser, as author of the document, is identified by /1 whereas the British, in any theme in which they are the secondary perceiver, receive the symbol /2.

The agent is the entity acting or expressing an attitude as perceived by either source /1 or source /2 as defined above. In research undertaken at Stanford the agent and target must meet certain substantive requirements. They must be either a nation (or acting through a

recognized institution or decision-maker), an international organization, or a general broadly inclusive entity such as "world opinion." A term in either the agent or target position not meeting this requirement is subscripted as an independent referent (/5). Both modifying words and possessives are assigned the same subscripts as the agent.

> Israeli/3 foreign/3 policy/3 remains/4 one of patient/3 restraint/3.

The symbol /4 is used to designate the action taken by the agent. The action often corresponds to the verb in conventional grammar; this need not, however, always be the case. A reference to "the Egyptian transformation of the Middle East into an armed garrison" contains no verb; it does, however, have an action word. Thus the theme is coded as:

> The Egyptian/3 transformation/4 of the Middle-East/7 into an armed/7 garrison/7.

The independent referent (/5) may be a substitute for either the agent or for a target which does not meet the definition of a nation-actor.

> Nuclear/5 weapons/5 menace/4 mankind/7.
>
> The United-Nations/3 combats/4 illiteracy/5.

In themes containing both a direct and an indirect object, one of which is a nation-actor, the nation-actor is always designated as the target whereas the other is the referent.

> The United-States/3 consistently/4 advocates/4 independence/5 for the nations/7 of eastern/7 Europe/7.

A separate symbol (/6) is used for a special category of the object of action which is an integral part of the agent itself. It is thus distinguished from the /5 code which is used for an object independent of the agent.

> Yet throughout these months the United-States/3 has repeatedly/4 sent/4 messages/6, both public/6 and private/6, to the nations/7 of the Middle-East/7.

The target of action, which receives the subscript /7, may be either the direct object of action or a nation-actor which is the indirect object.

> Nasser/3 denounced/4 French/7 policies/7.
>
> The World-Bank/3 stopped/4 its economic/6 aid/6 to Egypt/7.

A theme containing examples of each word subscript is:

President/2 Kennedy/2 stated that the unpredictable/3 Soviet/3 leader/3 has/4 brought/4 back/4 his offensive/6 long-range/6 missiles/6, as well as cargoes/5 of sugar/5, from his Cuban/7 satellites/7.

Note that each word in the text need not be subscripted; articles, parenthetical comments and time references are examples of words which may be left unsubscripted without loss of information. Special theme codes are used for the time elements. These are described below.

The subscript system described here is flexible and additional discriminations may be made through the use of secondary or tertiary subscripts. Such changes do not require any modifications of the General Inquirer program. Secondary subscripts will, however, increase computer running time. A question in the format /3 will not retrieve words subscripted /31 or /32. Thus for many purposes the geographical-biographical dictionary is a more economic means of making finer discriminations.

Theme codes

In addition to subscripting words, the entire theme itself is coded for certain essential information which cannot be effectively transmitted through word subscripting alone. This second set of codes facilitates, for example, the systematic investigation of ends-means chains or of the "observation-interpretation-reaction" pattern which lies at the core of the Stanford interaction model.

Five theme codes are currently being used:

The temporal element
- C - Current perception
- P - Past perception
- F - Future perception

The locus of perception
- W - Within the system of the perceiver
- E - External to the system of the perceiver

The type of perception
- O - Observation of the environment
- I - Interpretation
- R - Reaction

The mode of expression
- D - Indicative
- N - Normative
- M - Comparative
- V - Imperative
- B - Probability
- T - Interrogative
- X - Aspiration

Conditional statements
A - Antecedent (if. . .)
S - Subsequent (then. .)

The theme code, which is written as one word preceded by a star, is inserted into the text as the first word of each theme.

*CEDO Czech/3 armaments/3 are arriving/4 in Egypt/7.

Data Analysis Programs

Four computer programs for content analysis of documentary materials are currently being used.

1. A word frequency count program which tallies the number of occurrences of each word in the text, rank orders them, and lists them in alphabetical order within each frequency group.[2]

2. A tag tally program counts the scores of words in the text which have been tagged for the various dimensions in the dictionary (positive, negative, strength, weakness, activity, passivity). Because the dictionary is scaled for intensity, frequency counts are made in terms of each dimension and for each intensity level; a weighted total, reflecting both frequency and intensity, is also calculated. In addition to raw scores, an index based on the ratio of occurrence of tag words to total words in the text is computed. For rapid visual interpretation of the results, a special IBM 1401 program has been written which prints out the results of the tag tally in graph form. A separate list of all words in the document not found in the dictionary is also printed out.

3. A question and search program with which sentences in the text meeting any desired specification may be retrieved and printed out. The analyst may wish to search the text for all sentences containing a certain text word or cluster of words--for example, all sentences in which the term "United Nations" occurs as the agent, and which also contain the word "peace." The questions may also retrieve themes in terms of tags, with or without specification of intensity or syntax position. The theme codes may also be used for retrieval. Any of the question

2. Developed by Professor John Starkweather (1964) of the University of California Medical Center, and modified by Mr. Kuan Lee of Stanford University.

specifications may be used singly or in any desired combination. For example, the investigator may wish to search his documents for all normative sentences in which the United States appears as the agent, and which also contain positive references to economic aid.

Retrieval of themes meeting certain specifications may be made with considerable flexibility. The analyst may wish to search the text for all themes containing a certain text word, with its position in the theme either specified or unspecified. Questions regarding the text word "attack," for example, would be written as:

attack attack/4

Retrieval questions for tag dimensions--which are punched on an IBM card by writing the tag word preceded by a period--may take several forms. The question may specify the intensity level:

.positive-three .strength-two/5

Or, it may ask for an entire tag dimension:

.negative .activity/3

The question may also be written referring to evaluation (positive affect + negative affect), power (strength + weakness), or activity (activity + passivity). This type of question must be subscripted for a specific theme element:

.evaluative/3 .power/7 .strength/4

Retrieval may also be undertaken by theme elements, either singly or in various combinations:

/3 /4 /5 /7

Finally, questions may be used to search for themes on the basis of one or more elements in the theme code. If the investigator wished to retrieve all current interpretations of events external to the decision-makers' system stated in the indicative mood, the questions would be written as:

*C *E *D *I

Any of the question specifications may be used singly or in combination. Although overly complex specifications may result in few, if any,

retrievals, there is no limit on the number of specifications which may be used. One could, for example, search the text for all themes which are past observations of external events in the indicative mood, in which the Soviet Union is perceived to be acting positively with an intensity level of three toward Egypt. The question for that search would be written as:

```
$  *P  *E  *D  *O  Soviet-Union/3  .positive-three/4  Egypt/7
```

4. A direct table program in which the printed output is in table form for any required information (Armour, 1964). An added feature of this program is that the intensity level of words in the dictionary may be adjusted according to the mode of expression; for example, the score of the word "aid" in the sentence "The United States may aid Egypt build a dam on the Aswan River," can be reduced by a constant to reflect the probabilistic nature of the assertion. Suppose that the analysts wished to determine Nasser's attitudes, as expressed in any given document or set of documents, toward Egypt, Israel, the United States, the United Nations and the Soviet Union. The information would be printed out as in Figure 1 below.

0512 NASSER/1 EGYPT 7 26 56 SPEECH TO EGYPTIAN PEOPLE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT - 21,444

	EGYPT	ISRAEL	U.S.	U.N.	SOV. UN.
POSITIVE AFFECT	160.0	9.0	57.0	39.0	3.0
NEGATIVE AFFECT	109.0	29.0	34.0	2.0	3.0
STRONG	261.0	26.0	72.0	10.0	6.0
WEAK	29.0	9.0	8.0	----	----
ACTIVE	106.0	13.0	72.0	7.0	3.0
PASSIVE	66.0	----	27.0	4.0	1.0

Fig. 1. Sample Output of Direct Table Program

General Implications of Using Computers

The most apparent characteristic of computers--the ability to

mainipulate symbols reliably at almost unbelievable speed--requires no further elaboration. Less obvious, but of considerably greater importance, are the following points.

First, computers impose rigor and discipline on the formulation of research. The investigator using computers for content analysis is forced to make every step of his research design explicit. For example, the dictionary represents an explicit and unambiguous definition of each variable. Similarly, every step in the analysis of data by computer must be specified with precision. It is not wholly facetious to suggest that all content analysis research should be formulated as if it were to be done by computer.

Second, when data are punched on IBM cards in the form described, they are amenable to re-analysis as often and for as many different purposes as desired. A new hypothesis may well suggest itself after the data have been coded. When content analysis is done by hand, the investigator often must choose between recoding the data and dropping the new idea. Documents on cards, on the other hand, may be re-run with no additional effort to test hypotheses that had not even been considered at the time of data preparation. For example, a set of documents was originally prepared to analyze Sino-Soviet-American interaction during a number of recent crisis periods (Holsti, et al., 1964). Later the same materials were re-run for the purpose of testing quite a different hypotheses about the rift between Moscow and Peking (Holsti, 1965).

Third, the use of computers enables the investigator to undertake very complex problems--such as contingency analyses involving numerous variables--which often cannot be done reliably by hand.

Finally, the use of computers frees the scholar from much of the most laborious and onerous aspects of his research. It is not uncommon to hear well-intentioned persons suggest that the scholar using computers has exchanged his creativity for a mess of hardware. This misses the point that the computer, like any tool properly used, enhances the creativity of the scholar by freeing more of his time for the most important thing he can contribute--the original idea, the creative hunch, or the insight which make facts meaningful.

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Chapter V

EXPERIMENT IN SCALING INTERNATIONAL ACTION DATA

Lincoln Moses, Jeffrey Milstein, and Joseph B. Kadane

1. Purposes of the Experiment

The Studies in International Conflict and Integration have for many years obtained quantitative scores for intensity for variables like hostility manifested by political decision-makers in crisis and other situations. The basic device used has been to assemble all official statements (or all reported actions) from the principal parties in the crisis and then to rank the elements of this collection along a dimension such as hostility. In actual fact, this ranking has usually been an approximate or coarse ranking as is given by the application of Q-sort techniques. This ingenious scheme enables quantitative treatment and comparison and correlation of crisis variables FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS WITHIN THAT CRISIS. Because of the way in which the data are taken, it is not possible to compare numbers developed for different crises, for they have not been judged together and there is no way of knowing how to bring the different scores into comparison. The purpose of this chapter is to describe an attempt to solve the problem of inter-crisis comparability on indices of hostility, criticality, etc.

The underlying idea is to develop a set of "standard markers" which can be put in with the material from any crisis, and to score the materials of a crisis with regard to how intense they are in comparison with the standard markers. How such comparison can be made is illustrated by the following elementary applications of the idea: If the average statement for Country A in Situation 1 exceeded 3/4 of the marker statements and the average score for Country α in Situation 2 exceeded 7/8 of the marker statements, this would permit the inference that the material for Country α was more intense than the material for Country A. Such a deck of marker cards would have to have several properties: (1) It should span a great range of intensity, otherwise some bodies of material might lie wholly above or wholly below the marker cards, vitiating the possibility of comparison with other bodies of material having the same property. (2) Marker cards must be of such character that they

can be applied over a wide range of situations. This, for example, would prevent the word "missile" being used, for that marker card could not be included with World War I data. (3) Marker cards must be in a standard format, such as Country A, Country B, etc., rather than France, Viet Cong, Ecuador, etc. This further requires that the data cards be so coded in order that the marker cards not be identifiable as such. (4) A set of marker cards must be strongly reliable, that is, different judges should put them in nearly exactly the same order, otherwise they are vaguely defined markers.

To implement the above idea, a couple of hundred statements were written, edited and judged. Generally, there was good reliability. Some of the least reliable were removed, and at the end, 120 cards as candidate markers were chosen. Each of them had associated with it an intensity score which represented the judges' consensus. These 120 cards were, in turn, divided into four sub-decks of 30 cards each, spanning the whole length of the intensity scale of the original deck of 120 cards. It is of interest whether 30 marker cards will suffice for the purpose.

It was desirable to appraise the weaker cards in the following respects:

(a) How reliable is a sub-deck of 30 cards?

(b) Can a sub-subdeck of only 15 cards do an adequate job?

(c) How reproducible are the results obtained by different judges using the marker decks?

(d) How "valid" are scores obtained by the use of the markers in comparison with the Q-sort values earlier assigned to the same data cards by the standard procedure of the project?

(e) Can the marker cards be simply put into the material and used with the Q-sort methodology?

To answer these questions, a group of N data cards, previously scored by Q-sort method, was broken up into four sub-sets, each having $\frac{N}{4}$ cards, and the same distributions with respect to Q-sort values (spanning the full scale of Q-sort values). Thus four judges, four data sub-decks, and four marker card sub-decks were used in a Graeco-Latin square design. This permits examining variability among judges, variability associated with successive tasks of the judges (order effects), variability of the different data decks (which should be zero, ideally), and variability of the marker decks (which should aiso be nearly zero).

The data from the Graeco-Latin square consist of the ordered batch (containing $\frac{N}{4}$ data cards and 30 marker cards) for each of the 16 trials, four of each judge who, in those four trials, used each of the data decks and each of the marker decks once.

These 16 sets of data provide the possibility of answering the questions (a) through (e).

(a) The reliability of a 30-card marker deck can be studied by contemplating the amount of variation in scoring particular batches of material by the four different 30-card decks.

(b) The adequacy of a 15-card sub-deck can be studied by considering how similar the findings are if the batches are scored as if there were only 15 cards, the odd-numbered ones, or as if there were only 15 different marker cards, the even-numbered ones.

(c) The reproducibility of the judges can be studied by seeing how variable their scores are on identical material.

(d) The validity of the scores obtained by using marker cards can be assessed by comparing data-set scores obtained by the use of marker cards with the previously obtained Q-sort values for those decks.

(e) To appraise whether throwing some marker cards in with some data cards and simply applying a Q-sort, is a worthwhile technique, can be appraised by scoring the batches as if they had been Q-sorted and then assigning values to the data cards in the following way: A data card lying in some Q-sort category is given a score which is equal to the number of the marker cards lying in less intense Q-sort categories, plus one-half the number of marker cards in its own Q-sort category.

A critical problem in this trial is validity. It is true that the original Q-sort values constitute a fallible criterion. How fallible that criterion is can be assessed from the data, since every data card will have, in addition to its original Q-sort score, four Q-sort scores which can be inferred from what each of the judges did in the current experiment. The most that can be hoped for is that the correspondence between marker scores and original Q-sort scores is as good as the agreement between original Q-sort scores and the newly-done ones in this experiment. In a rather parallel fashion that experiment affords more information on how reliable the marker decks are, for each judge has placed them in an order each time he has used them, and we can inquire how well the judges agree on this ordering among themselves

and how well they agree with the ordering assigned to the marker cards at the time they were developed.

2. Experimental Procedure

Originally, two judges Q-sorted 328 items of international action taken from the July-August, 1914, crisis period leading up to World War I. Each of these items had been written on a card and given an identification number. In the Q-sort method of scaling action data, cards containing individual action items are separated into nine groups with proportions 5, 8, 12, 16, 18, 16, 12, 8, 5, according to increasing amounts of the quality being scaled--in this case conflict. In the resulting nine point Q-sort scale, the items in Group 9 (Q-sort score = 9) were judged to represent most conflict.

Examples of these items of international action and their Q-sort scores from the above judging are:

"New uniforms authorized for the army in France." 1.0

"French Red Cross alerted." 3.0

"British Admiralty temporarily discontinues announcements about the movements of the British Fleet." 4.0

"Russian reserves called up." 6.0

"Russian artillery column crosses German frontier at Schwinden." 7.0

"Austro-Hungarian note presented to Servian Government; 48 hours for reply." 7.0

"General Russian mobilization of 4,900,000 men." 9.0

"Germany declares war on France." 9.0

For each such item the mean Q-sort score of two judges was then computed. This resulted in Q-sort mean scores ranging from 1 to 9 with 0.5 intervals, i.e., 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, . . . 9.0.

Separately, 191 standard statements of international actions, the content of which represented varying degrees of conflict, were written and placed on cards. Examples of such standard statements in order of increasing conflict are:

"Agreement for joint sovereignty over limited geographical areas."

"Creation of an international representative assembly with limited powers."

"Demands for concessions of one nation upon the other or else war."

"Blockade initiated."

"New troop units enter the battle with no units relieved."

"Execution of prisoners of war."

These 191 standard statements were given identification numbers and then given to five separate judges. These judges individually ranked the 191 standard items of international actions continuously according to the amount of conflict each item connoted. The mean rank of each of the standard statements of international actions was computed, as was the variance for each of the items among the five judges.

In order to stabilize the variance of the resulting mean scores, the ranks were adjusted through a logit transform, and the means and variances of the transformed ranks were computed. The results of this transform placed too much weight in the tails of the distribution of the scores. Consequently, the mean rank orders of the items were transformed, instead, according to the following equation:

$$\hat{j} = \text{arc sine}\sqrt{\frac{j}{N+1}} + \text{arc sine}\sqrt{\frac{j+1}{N+1}}$$

In this equation, N=191 and j= the original mean rank of the action item; $\hat{j}$ = transformed mean rank of the action item. This arc sine transform proved satisfactory.

In this arc sine transform, the mean scores appearing in the tails of the distribution of scores are given more weight than those in the middle of the distribution. For example, the mean scores of 0.010 and 0.001 appear further apart from each other when transformed than do the mean scores of 0.510 and 0.501, even though their untransformed distances apart are the same. The effect of this transformation, then, is to spread out the mean scores.

The following approximate arc sine curve (Figure 1) illustrates a comparison of the distance between the values of the original mean scores on the j axis b-a (e.g. 0.010-0.001) in one tail of the curve and d-c (e.g. 0.510-0.501) in the middle of the curve, and the distance between their corresponding transformed mean scores on the $\hat{j}$ axis d'-c' and b'-a'.

The transformed mean scores and variances for the five judges were



$$f = \text{arc sine}\sqrt{\frac{j}{N+1}} + \text{arc sine}\sqrt{\frac{j+1}{N+1}}$$

Figure 1.

computed for each international action item. The action items were listed according to increasing mean score (ranging from 0.22 to 2.97), indicating increasing conflict, and by increasing variance (ranging from 0.00 to 0.34). When this was done it was found that those action items having the greatest variance were concentrated at the lower (low conflict) end of the transformed scale of mean scores. One could not, therefore, simply discard those action items having the most variance among the five judges, for this would have left large gaps in the low conflict end of the scale. Of the 191 action items, 70 had variances between 0.10 and 0.34; 18 had variances between 0.08 and 0.09.

In order to help reduce the variance in the judging of the standard statements of international action, 151 of the original 191 standard statements were rewritten to reduce ambiguity and increase the clarity and precision of the action descriptions. Forty of the original 191 standard statements which were both among those with the highest variance in the first judging and not concentrated at the low conflict end of the scale were discarded. These included those which were most ambiguous. The remaining 151 standard statements were all rewritten in the form, "Nation A does X (to or with Nation B)." Examples of these rewritten statements in order of increasing conflict are:

> "Nation A and Nation B agree to exercise joint sovereignty over limited geographical areas."
>
> "Nation A demands concessions from Nation B, threatening war if the concessions are not granted."
>
> "Nation A blockades Nation B."
>
> "Nation A executes prisoners of war from Nation B."

These rewritten 151 standard statements of international action were then judged independently by two judges who ranked them continuously according to the amount of conflict each item connoted. The inter-subjective reliability for the two judges was computed with the Spearman Rank correlation formula:

$$r = 1 - \frac{6\Sigma d^2}{n^3 - n}.$$

The inter-judge correlation was 0.964. In the Spearman formula, d is the difference in the ranks accorded to a given item by the two judges, and n is the number of items (151). Because of the high level of agreement between the two judges it was decided to terminate the rankings at this stage without further judging.

After completing the above judging, one judge offered several

comments about the task of ranking standard statements of international actions. He noted that the standard statements which he had judged were disjunctive and really lay along a multiplicity of dimensions, especially in the low conflict sector of the scale. He further noted that this problem was due in part to the fact that the standard statements were not originally selected and ordered a priori along a dimension of conflict. The standard statements were, instead, empirically, but inconsistently selected items of international actions. Because the standard statements lacked a unitary dimension, the judge's problem in ranking them along a supposed single dimension of "conflict" was increased. When he could not rank the action items in the way he had been instructed to, the judge was forced on his own to determine how he should rank them.

The judge's problem of ranking the items was further increased by the fact that many of the items could be seen as being contextually dependent. Instead of ranking the standard statements along a dimension of increasing conflict, a judge might instead rank them according to a supposed scenario, in which, for example, the actions might lead from the generation of an international problem to pre-mobilization actions, to mobilization, to logistical positioning, to threatening overt acts of war, to the actual initiation of war, first limited and then unlimited.

Further difficulty in judging lay in the problem of distinguishing, out of context, the difference between the initiation of an action and the continuation of that action. Another problem was determining the magnitude of the continuing importance of on-going action.

The rankings of the 151 rewritten standard statement items were also adjusted through the arc sine transformation formula described above, and were ranked by their transformed mean scores. Their transformed mean scores ranged from 0.20 to 3.06, and their transformed variances from 0.00 to 0.46. In order to reduce the number of standard statements to be used for experimental purposes to 120 (a number useful experimentally because it can be factored many ways), 31 standard statements were discarded. These included those 20 which had a transformed variance between the two judges greater than 0.01, and 11 of the 26 which both had a transformed variance equal to 0.01 and which appeared in the one-third of the scale nearest least conflict.

Using random permutations (Lincoln E. Moses and Robert V. Oakford: Tables of Random Permutations, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1963), the 120 remaining standard statements of international actions were divided into four groups of thirty items each which were approximately equally spaced with regard to their transformed mean scores.

The previously Q-sorted international actions from the 1914 crisis were also divided into four groups by the use of random permutations. The division was made so that each of the four groups of 82 action items had an equal distribution of Q-sort scores. Those mean Q-sort scores and the number of cards of that score in each of the four groups were as follows:

Mean Q-sort Score	Number of Cards
9.0	3
8.5	2
8.0	5
7.5	1
7.0	8
6.5	2
6.0	7
5.5	6
5.0	12
4.5	5
4.0	10
3.5	7
3.0	6
2.5	2
2.0	2
1.5	1
1.0	3

The international actions from the 1914 crisis were also rewritten in the standard form of "Nation A does X (to or with Nation B)." Examples are:

"Nation A authorizes new uniforms for its army."

"Nation A temporarily discontinues announcements about the movements of its fleets."

"Nation A declares war on Nation B."

In this rewriting, all real-world nations were referred to only as Nation A or Nation B so as to mask the identity of the real world actor and focus attention upon the act. Every item was given its original Q-sort identification number.

The experiment to test the use of standard statements in the scaling of action data through complete ordering was then begun. Four judges were chosen who had not previously participated in judging the standard statements.

The experimental design used was that of a Graeco-Latin square in which the judges, the order in which a given judging of each combined set of action items occurred, the set of 1914 actions, and the set of standard statements of actions were factors in the design. Random permutations were again used to assign judges, order of judging, 1914 actions, and standard statements of actions. The following array is a summary of the experimental design.

Judge /	Order of Judging			
	2nd	3rd	1st	4th
1	A1	B3	C4	D2
4	B2	A4	D3	C1
2	C3	D1	A2	B4
3	D4	C2	B1	A3

A, B, C, D = decks of 82 cards each of 1914 international actions

1, 2, 3, 4 = decks of 30 cards each of standard statements of international actions.

In this Graeco-Latin Square experimental design, each judge scales all four 1914 decks and all four standard statement decks, but none of the judges scale the same 1914 deck against the same standard statement deck as any other judge. Similarly, no judge scales either the standard statement decks or the 1914 action decks in the same order as any other judge. There are thus 16 separate judgments of the combined four decks of 112 cards each. That is, each of the four standard statement decks is scaled against each of the four 1914 action decks by four judges in four different orders. In this way the experimental design controls for the differences in judges, order of judging, and which standard statement

decks are scaled against which 1914 action decks in a given judging by a given judge.

The experimental procedure is to shuffle together at each scaling by each judge the masked deck of 1914 actions and the deck of standard statements of actions. The judges are then instructed to rank completely the combined deck of cards in order of increasing conflict. On a scoring sheet provided them, they are instructed to write down the identification number of each card next to the rank they have assigned it. The complete combined deck consists of 112 cards containing statements of international actions. For the experimenters' ease of identification, identification numbers of standard statement cards were of 4 digits, and 1914 card identification numbers were of 5 digits.

The analysis of experimental results and possible summary statistics are summarized in part 3 of this chapter. The analysis includes the determination of the size of the subsets of standard statements smaller than thirty items that can be used as a scale to measure the degree of conflict in international actions.

In preparing the data for statistical analysis by computer, 1914 action cards retained the initial zero in their 5 digit identification number while standard statement cards were given an initial digit of 1 to their original 4 digit identification number. In this way, both types of action cards had 5 digit identification numbers.

Data processing cards containing the original Q-sort score of each 1914 action card and that card's identification number were obtained. Similarly, the identification number and original transformed mean score of each standard action item were punched on cards from an original computer program. A third set of data processing cards was punched (1792 in all) which contained the rank and identification number of each card in each of the 16 judgings. Mr. Kuan Lee then wrote the computer program to merge the above three decks into one set of data processing cards which was punched out by the computer. He also wrote the computer program for the statistical analysis of the experiment which Professor Lincoln Moses and Joseph Kadane of the Statistics Department, Stanford University, indicated was to be done. The last set of data processing cards mentioned above was then used for this statistical analysis done on the computer.

3. Preliminary Analysis of the Results

The complete Graeco-Latin square design data was collected and a preliminary analysis run. Among other statistics collected, Spearman rank correlations were taken between each judge's ranking of the marker cards and the ranking of the marker cards previously done. For three of the four judges, these rank correlations exceeded ninety-three percent, which led us to discard the results of the fourth judge. Thus a new judge will be found to complete the experiment, and hence only preliminary results can be given.

To examine each of the five purposes listed in the first section of this chapter, we find:

(a) The reliability of a 30-card marker deck is high. In fact, the correlation between the scores based on each of two 15-card marker decks, which is an underestimate of the 30-card deck reliability, is more than 90% for all judges.

(b) In addition, we find that 15-card decks seem adequate since the scores based on 15-card decks correlate as closely with the previously assigned Q-values on the data as do the scores based on 30-card decks.

(c) All but one of the judges give good agreement of correlations and scores. Further data will be forthcoming on the final analysis where the relative magnitude of the sum of squares due to judges will be important.

(d) The validity of the scores found using marker cards is difficult to check because the original Q-values proved not to be very reproducible. Statistics are being gathered to study this problem further.

(e) The scores found using a combined marker-set and Q-sort proved to be just as reliable as those for the complete ordinal ranking of all cards. Thus this method also appears to be confirmed.

Tentative Conclusions

1. All of the methods we seek to test seem to be useful and reliable methods. The combination of Q-sort and small marker decks provides a maximum of information and a minimum of work.

2. The possibility of comparing the order given to the marker cards with a previously established order gives the possibility, available to the old Q-sort method only by paired-comparisons, of testing how well a judge is trained.

3. Thus the tentative conclusion of the experiment is that the marker card method has been established as a good one without serious practical difficulties as to use, and one which overcomes the problem of intercrisis comparison.

Chapter VI

PERCEPTUAL AND ACTION DATA, JULY 1956

Ole R. Holsti

As indicated in the introduction, this study of Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the United Nations in the dispute was designed so that only the period July 19-28 would be examined during the first phase of the research. Considerable effort during the first phase has been devoted to developing a system of scaling action data (Chapter V), locating relevant documents for the entire study (Appendix), and developing a chronology of events for the 1956-1957 period. While this schedule of research has many advantages, one drawback is that it does not permit testing of the hypotheses presented in the proposal[1] at the conclusion of phase one. There are two major reasons for this. First, many hypotheses relate to the role of a third party (the United Nations) in the conflict, and its affect on the actions and attitudes of the parties in conflict. But the United Nations only becomes a crucial participant in periods two, three, four, and five (October 1956-March 1957), which are to be studied in subsequent phases of this project. Second, the remaining hypotheses center on changes in actions and attitudes across time; testing of these hypotheses cannot be undertaken until data for subsequent periods of the conflict have been analyzed.

Thus results of the analysis for period one (July 19-28) will be presented in descriptive terms, without an attempt to indicate whether or not they support our hypotheses.

Data for the period July 19-28 have been subjected to two types of analysis. First, the verbatim text of publicly-available documents authored by specified Egyptian and Israeli decision-makers were content analyzed by the programs described in Chapter IV. Second, from a

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1. "Inter-nation Conflict, Dyadic and Mediated: Case Studies of Egypt, Israel and the United Nations at Five Points in Time," Proposal to ONR from Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration, June 1964.

complete chronology of events for the period, all actions relating to the Middle East were identified, masked, and scaled according to the technique described in Chapter V.

After the documents were coded and punched on to IBM cards, an initial computer run was made for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the dictionary for Egyptian and Israeli materials. Although only a few relevant words appeared in the "leftover list" (a listing of those text words not in the dictionary), we decided to make a second run after these words had been added.

The Egyptian documentation for this period included nearly twenty-five thousand words of text. A summary of Egyptian attitudes, as revealed in a content analysis of these documents, is presented in Tables 1a and 1b. Each column indicates the percentages of the total loading along the positive-negative, strong-weak, and active-passive dimensions. Scores are based on both the frequency and intensity of terms used to describe each of the nations. For example, the Egyptian attitude toward the nations of Eastern Europe was heavily weighted on the positive and strong ends of the evaluative and potency dimensions, and somewhat less so on the active end of the activity dimension.

Tables 1a and 1b indicate that Egyptian leaders during this period perceived Eastern European nations, the Afro-Asian nations, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and the United Nations in strongly positive terms; the nations of Western Europe (France and England excluded), the Middle East (Israel excluded), and the United States in ambivalent terms; and England, the "imperialists," France, and Israel in strongly negative terms. Along the potency dimension all nations were perceived as strong rather than weak, but the United Nations was seen as the least strong. Finally, although all nations were perceived as active rather than passive, those who were seen as hostile to Egypt (France, England, imperialists, Israel) were perceived as more active and less passive than the nations friendly to Egypt (Eastern Europe, Afro-Asian nations, Soviet Union).

Because the figures in Tables 1a and 1b are based on percentages, they do not indicate those areas on which the greater part of Egyptian attention was focused. Table 2 reveals that Egyptian leaders tended to



Key:

POS = Positive Affect

NEG = Negative Affect

STR = Strong

WK = Weak

ATV = Active

PSV = Passive

[a] Excluding Soviet Union

[b] Excluding France and England

Table 1a. Egyptian Attitudes Towards Various Targets



Key:

POS = Positive Affect

NEG = Negative Affect

STR = Strong

WK = Weak

ATV = Active

PSV = Passive

[a] Excluding Egypt and Israel

Table 1b. Egyptian Attitudes Towards Various Targets



[a] Excluding Egypt and Israel

[b] Excluding France and Great Britain

[c] Excluding Soviet Union

Table 2. Egyptian Documents: Focus of Attention

focus most on those nations whom they perceived negatively and less on those perceived in positive terms.

Israeli documentation for this period surrounding the nationalization of the Suez canal presented greater problems of availability than did Egyptian documents. The volume of text is approximately ten percent that of the Egyptian documents (2353 words). Moreover, as would be expected, Israeli documents to which we have access are notably lacking in statements concerning Israel's relations with Egypt, France and England. This indicates one of the limitations of content analysis: if documentation is virtually non-existant for purposes of research, even the most rigorous techniques of analysis will yield few results. Nevertheless, even the limited available data is not inconsistent with the proposition that Israeli decision-makers defined the situation in the Middle East as highly threatening. Table 3 indicates that Israel tended to view the Middle East (excluding Egypt) as negative, strong, active, and the United Nations in rather ambiguous terms.

The action data for this period were drawn from a chronology of all international actions relevant to the Middle East, and not limited only to the actions of Israel and Egypt. The action data were masked and mixed with a "standard deck" of action cards prior to scaling (for further details, see Chapter V). All items were then rank-ordered by two judges, with a level of agreement of .83 (Spearman rank-order correlation). For 58 items (30 from the period under study, 28 from the "standard deck"), this is significant at beyond the .001 level. The score for each action is given as the mean of the ranks assigned by the two judges.

The results of the scaling are presented in Table 4, in which the top figure indicates the number of actions initiated by the agent toward the target nation during this period. The lower figure is the average intensity of the actions on an integration-conflict scale.





Key:

POS = Positive Affect
NEG = Negative Affect
STR = Strong
WK = Weak
ATV = Active
PSV = Passive

[a] Excluding Egypt

Table 3. Israeli Documents

Agent \ Target	Israel	Egypt	U.S.	Gt.Br.	France	USSR	U.N.	Others	Total
Israel		----	----	----	----	----	1 32.5	4 44.9	5 42.4
Egypt	----		3 21.0	1 28.5	1 28.5	----	----	3 23.5	8 23.8
United States	----	4 29.1		----	----	----	----	----	4 29.1
Great Britain	----	5 31.3	----		----	----	----	----	5 31.3
France	----	4 38.6	----	----		----	----	----	4 38.6
Soviet Union	1 9.5	2 12.5	----	----	----		----	----	3 11.5
United Nations*	----	1 26.5	----	----	----	----		----	1 26.5
Total	1 9.5	16 29.3	3 21.0	1 28.5	1 28.5	---- ----	1 32.5	7 35.7	30 29.4

Top figure indicates the number of actions. Bottom figure indicates the mean intensity of actions on an Integration - Conflict scale. The higher the figure, the more conflictual the action.

* Including World Bank

Table 4. Interaction Among Nations Involved in Middle Eastern Crisis, July 17-August 1, 1956.

Documents Period I: 7/19/56-7/28/56

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
7/23/56	Ben-Gurion	Report to Cabinet	Jer. Post, 7/23/56	Proceedings of the Knesset
7/24/56	Nasser	Speech in Musturud	USFBIS, 7/2/56	USFBIS, 7/25/56 pp. A1-A2
7/25/56	Nasser	Speech in Alexandria to Congress of Young University Women	Bourse, 7/25/56	
7/26/56	Nasser	Presidential Decree of Nationalization	Problem, Oct. 1956	Problem, Oct. 1956 pp.30-32
7/26/56	Nasser	Speech on Nationalization	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956, pp. 77-113
7/26/56	Eban	Letter to Pres. S. C. (signed by M. R. Kidron)	UNSCOR, 11th Year Suppl. for July-Sept., 1956	UNSCOR Doc. #S/3628 pp. 6-8
7/28/56	Nasser	Speech re: Anglo-French Reactions	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956, pp. 119-122

Documents Period II: 10/27/56-11/10/56

10/27/56	Amer	Declaration	Joint Arab Command	Al Ahram
10/28/56	Israeli Gov't.	Announcement of Reserve call-up and partial mobilization	USFBIS, 10/29/56	USFBIS, 10/29/56
10/29/56	Israeli Foreign Ministry	Statemant re: the attack	N.Y.T., 10/30/56	N.Y.T., 10/30/56
10/29/56	Nasser	C. of S. Conference	Al Ahram Joint Arab Comm.	Al Ahram

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
10/30/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Communiqué on attack and re-call of reserves	USFBIS, 10/30/56	USFBIS, 10/30/56
10/30/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.S.C.	N.Y.T., 10/31/56	UNSCOR/N.Y.T., 10/31/56
10/30/56	Eban	Statement U.N.S.C.	N.Y.T., 10/31/56	N.Y.T., 10/31/56
10/30/56	Nasser	Letter to King Saud	USFBIS, 10/31/56	USFBIS, 10/31/56
10/30/56	Meir	Acceptance of British-French ultimatum	USFBIS, 10/31/56	USFBIS, 10/31/56
10/30/56	Nasser	Rejection of British-French ultimatum to envoys in Cairo	Facts, Vol. XVI No. 835, Oct. 24-30, 1956	
10/30/56	Loutfi Fawzi	Letter transmitting letter of Fawzi to U.N.S.C.	U.S. Policy, Aug. 1957	U.S. Policy, Aug. 1957, pp. 142-143
10/30/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Sess., 561st Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 2-5
10/30/56	Nasser	Letters to Bulganin, Eisenhower, Tito	N.Y.T.	Egyptian Embassy
10/30/56	Amer	Speech	Al Ahram	Radio Cairo
10/31/56	Ben-Gurion	Message to Eisenhower	Jer. Post, 11/1/56	
10/31/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.S.C	N.Y.T., 11/1/56	N.Y.T., 11/1/56
11/1/56	Eban	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st. Emerg. Sess., 562nd Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 20-25
11/1/56	Nasser	Radio Address to Egyptian People	USFBIS, 11/1/56	USFBIS, 11/1/56 pp. A1-A5
11/1/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Communiqué (martial law?)	N.Y.T., 11/2/56	N.Y.T., 11/2/56
11/1/56	Israeli Gov't.	Communiqué	N.Y.T., 11/2/56	N.Y.T., 11/2/56

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/2/56	Loutfi	Aide-Mémoire to Hammarskjold	U.S. Policy Aug. 1957	U.S. Policy Aug. 1957, p. 158
11/3/56	Loutfi	Statement UNGA	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Special Sess., 563rd Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR pp. 45-46
11/3/56	Eban	Statement UNGA	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Special Sess., 563rd Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 61
11/3/56	Eban	Aide-mémoire to Hammarskjold	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956, pp. 272-74
11/3/56	Eban	Letter to Pres. G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess. Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR Doc. #A/3277 p. 8
11/4/56	Loutfi	Statement UNGA	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., 565th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR pp. 80-81
11/4/56	Eban	Statement UNGA	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., 565th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR p. 83
11/4/56	Loutfi	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR Doc. #A/3288 pp. 13-14
11/4/56	Fawzi	Reply to Hammarskjold's Cable	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. p. 279
11/4/56	Meir	Reply to Hammarskjold's Cable	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956, pp. 279-280
11/4/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg.Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda 5	UNGAOR, Doc. #A/3291 p. 15

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/4/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Document published by Egyptian ambassador in Wash., stating no war with Israel, only Britain and France	Chron. Inter., 1956 No. 21, 1-15 Nov.	
11/5/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956, p. 283
11/5/56	Meir	Letter to U. N.	N.Y.T., 11/6/56	N. Y. T., 11/6/56
11/5/56	Fawzi	Cable to Hammarskjold	U.S. Policy, Aug. 1957	U.S. Policy, p. 176
11/5/56	Loutfi	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR, pp. 15-16 Doc. #A/3292
11/5/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Item 5	UNGAOR, Doc. #A/3297
11/5/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Item 5	UNGAOR, pp. 18-19 Doc. #A/3301
11/5/56	Meir	Report to Knesset For. Aff. & Security Comm.	Jer. Post, 11/7/56	
11/5/56	Meir	Report at Secretariat Conference of Mapai Party	USFBIS, 11/5/56 & 11/6/56	
11/5/56	Nasser	Letter to King Hussein of Jordan	USFBIS, 11/6/56	USFBIS, 11/6/56 p. A4
11/6/56	Ben-Gurion	Messag[illegible]o the 9th Brigade	USFBIS, 11/7/56	
11/6/56	Loutfi	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess. Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR, Doc. #A/3304 pp. 26-27
11/6/56	Loutfi	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st Emer. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR, Doc. #A/3305 p. 27
11/6/56	Dayan	Message to the 9th Brig.	USFBIS, 11/7/56	

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/6/56	Ben-Gurion	Reply to telegram from six British Labor Party members	USFBIS, 11/6/56	
11/7/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech in Knesset	USFBIS, 11/8/56	USFBIS, 11/8/56
11/7/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., 566th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 91-93
11/7/56	Fawzi	Cable to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 1st. Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR, p. 30 Doc. #A/3312
11/8/56	Ben-Gurion	Reply to Eisenhower letter	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956, p. 306
11/8/56	Ben-Gurion	Reply to Bulganin letter of Nov. 5	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff. 1956, pp. 307-8
11/8/56	Meir	Letter transmitted by Eban	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 5	UNGAOR, p. 32 Doc. #A/3320
11/8/56	Ben-Gurion	Broadcast to the Nation	USFBIS, 11/9/56 (excerpts)	J.A. Digest, p.322 11/15/56
11/8/56	Amer	Radio speech	USFBIS, 11/9/56	USFBIS, 11/9/56 pp. A1-A3
11/9/56	Nasser	Speech in Al-Azhar Mosque	USFBIS, 11/13/56	USFBIS, 11/13/56 pp. A1-A16
11/9/56	Sabri	Statements	Facts, Vol.XVI, No.837 Nov.7-13, 1956	
11/9/56(?)	Ben-Gurion	Interview by E. R. Murrow on U.S. TV	Jer. Post, 11/19/56	Jer. Post, 11/19/56
11/10/56	Meir	Speech at Mapai Mass Rally in Tel Aviv	Jer. Post, 11/11/56	

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/10/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 2nd Emerg. Spec. Sess., 573rd Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 88
11/10/56	Loutfi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., 572nd Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 132
11/10/56	Eban	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 1st Emerg. Spec. Sess., 572nd Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 132-33

Documents Period III: 11/11/56-11/24/56

11/13/56	Eban	Letter to Pres. S. C.	UNSCOR, 11th Year Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1956, pp130-33	UNSCOR, Doc.#S/3741 pp. 130-33
11/13/56	Meir	Interview with ITIM Corr. at Lydda Airport	USFBIS, 11/14/56	
11/13/56	Meir	Press Conference at Orly Airport, Paris	Chron. Inter., 1956 No. 21, Nov. 1-15	
11/14/56	Dayan	Press Conference in Tel Aviv	Chron. Inter., 1956 No. 21, Nov. 1-15	
11/14/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech before Knesset	Facts, Vol. XVI, No. 838 Nov. 14-20, 1956	
11/15/56	Eban	Letter to Pres. S. C.	UNSCOR, 11th Year Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1956	UNSCOR, Doc.#S/3742 p. 133
11/15/56	Ben-Gurion	Report to Cabinet	USFBIS, 11/16/56	
11/18/56	Sabri	Press Conference with A.P. et al.	USFBIS, 11/19/56	
11/18/56	Ben-Gurion	Reply to Bulganin letter of Nov. 15	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956	Doc. Int'l. Aff., 1956, pp. 330-34
11/18/56	Fawzi	Aide-mémoire to Hammarskjold	U.S. Policy, Aug. 1957	U.S. Policy pp. 222-23

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/19/56	Sabri	Radio Cairo Speech	Jer. Post, 11/20/56	
11/19/56	Nasser	Telephoned Interview by Cairo Al Azhar ed. in N.Y.	Facts, Vol. XVI, No. 838 Nov. 14-20, 1956	
11/20/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Radio Communique on Events since Oct. 29	USFBIS, 11/21/56	USFBIS, 11/21/56 pp. A1-A6
11/20/56	Meir	Speech U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., 584th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 147-48
11/20/56	Amer	Speech to 17th and 18th Battalions	USFBIS, 11/21/56	
11/20/56	Nasser	Reply to Message of Chou En-lai	USFBIS, 11/21/56	USFBIS, 11/21/56 p. A-10
11/21/56	Eban	Speech UNGA	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 587th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 183
11/21/56	Nasser	Statement to the Press A.P. et al.	U.S. Policy, Aug. 1957	U.S. Policy pp. 226-27
11/21/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Statement requesting U.N. Investigation	A-F-I Agg. Pam. 1956	A-F-I Agg. Pam.1956 pp.10,13,16-18,21,23
11/21/56	Loutfi	Statement re: Anglo-Fr. atrocities in Port Said	A-F-I Agg. Pam. 1956	A-F-I Agg. pp. 8-9
11/21/56	Amer	Speech	USFBIS, 11/23/56	USFBIS, 11/23/56 pp. A6-A8
11/21/56	Loutfi	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, p. 12
11/21/56	Meir	Aide-memoire to Hammarskjold	Jer. Post, 11/28/56	
11/22/56	Sabri	Interview on Radio Cairo	USFBIS, 11/23/56	USFBIS, 11/23/56 pp. A1-A5

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/22/56	Meir	Request to U.N. Truce Commission re: Syrian-Israeli frontier inspection	Chron. Inter., 1956 No. 22, Nov. 16-30	
11/23/56	Fawzi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., 591st Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 255-56
11/23/56	Eban	Speech U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 592nd Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 272-77
11/23/56	Dayan	Report to Knesset For. Aff. & Security Comm.	Jer. Post, 11/25/56	
11/23/56	Meir	Letter to Pres. G. A.	Facts, Vol. XVI, No. 839 Nov. 21-27, 1956	
11/24/56	Eban	Speech U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., 594th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 298-99
11/24/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	Jer. Post, 11/25/56	

Documents Period IV: 11/25/56-12/5/56

11/25/56	Ben-Gurion	Letter to Mapai Central Committee	Jer. Post, 11/26/56	
11/26/56	Fawzi	Meet the Press	Jer. Post, 11/27/56	
11/26/56	Meir	Speech U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 595th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 323-24
11/26/56	Meir	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, p. 21 Doc. #A/3395
11/27/56	Meir	Letter to Pres. G. A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, pp. 21-22 Doc. #A/3398
11/27/56	Fawzi	Statement UNGA	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 597th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 347-49

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
11/28/56	Fawzi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 600th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 394-97
11/28/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech in Knesset	USFBIS, 11/29/56	
11/28/56	Egyptian Gov't.	Radio Communiqué	USFBIS, 11/29/56	USFBIS, 11/29/56 pp. A14-A17
11/28/56	Sabri	Press Conference	USFBIS, 11/29/56	USFBIS, pp. A1-9
11/28/56	Amer	Statement	Jer. Post, 11/29/56	
11/30/56	Meir	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, pp. 27-28 Doc. #A/3412
11/30/56	Nasser	Promulgation of a new nationalization law	Chron. Inter., 1956 No. 22, Nov. 16-30	
12/1/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, p. 26 Doc. #A/3410
12/2/56	Fawzi	Radio & T.V. Interview by Canadian Broadcasting Co.	Jer. Post, 12/4/56	
12/3/56	Eban	Letter to Hammarskjold	UNGAOR, 11th Sess., Annexes to Agenda Item 66	UNGAOR, p. 30
12/3/56	Meir	Statement in Washington	Jer. Post, 11/4/56	
12/3/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech in Knesset		Proceedings of the Knesset
12/4/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech at rally at Habimah Theatre	Jer. Post, 11/4/56	
12/4/56	Nasser	Interview with Jon Mecklin of Time Mag.	Jer. Post, 12/5/56	(reference in Time 12/10/56)
12/5/56	Meir	Speech U.N.G.A	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 609th Plen. Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 542-46
12/5/56	Nasser	Statement in magazine Akhir Saah	USFBIS, 12/10/56	USFBIS, pp. A1-A12

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
12/5/56	Ben-Gurion	Speech at 70th Histadrut Council	USFBIS, 12/6/56	
12/5/56	Sabri	Interview with U.P.	Chron Inter., 1956 Dec. 1-15, No. 23	

Documents Period V: 3/1/57-3/8/57

3/1/57	Meir	Speech U.N.G.A.	Mid. E. Jour., Vol.11, No.2 Spring 1957	Mid. E. Jour. pp. 191-93
3/1/57	Fawzi	Statement U.N.G.A.	USFBIS, 3/4/57	
3/2/57	Ben-Gurion	Cable to 13th World WIZO Conference	Jer. Post, 3/3/57	
3/3/57	Ben-Gurion	Report to Cabinet	Chron. Inter, 1957 No. 5, Mar 1-15	
3/3/57	Nasser	Cable to King Hussein	USFBIS, 3/4/57	USFBIS, 3/4/57
3/4/57	Meir	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 667th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 1283
3/4/57	Fawzi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 667th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 1303-04
3/4/57	Meir	Address to U.J.A. Conf. in Miami Beach	Jer. Post, 3/5/57	
3/4/57	Ben-Gurion	Order of Evacuation	Chron. Inter., 1957 No.5, March 1-15	
3/4/57	Ben-Gurion	Statement on Internal politics	USFBIS, 3/4/57	
3/5/57	Ben-Gurion	Speech in Knesset	USFBIS, 3/6/57	USFBIS, pp. C1-C17

Date	Author	Document	Reported in	Text
3/5/57	Meir	Speech before U.N. Correspondents Association	Jer. Post, 3/6/57	
3/5/57	Nasser	Speech	Radio Cairo	Al Ahram
3/6/57	Ben-Gurion	Statement in Knesset during no-confidence debate	Jer. Post, 3/7/57	
3/6/57	Nasser	Cable to Nkrumah	USFBIS, 3/7/57	USFBIS, 3/7/57
3/8/57	Eban	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 668th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 1312-13
3/8/57	Eban	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 668th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, p. 1325
3/8/57	Fawzi	Statement U.N.G.A.	UNGAOR, 11th Sess. 668th Plenary Meeting	UNGAOR, pp. 1325-26

DOCUMENT CHRONOLOGY: ABBREVIATIONS

Bourse	- La Bourse Egyptienne
Chron. Inter.	- Chronologie Internationale
Jer. Post	- Jerusalem Post
Problem	- The Suez Canal Problem, Dept. of State, 1956 Oct.
Facts	- Facts on File
Doc. Int'l Aff. 1956	- Documents on International Affairs, 1956, Royal Institute, 1959
UNSCOR	- United Nations Security Council Official Records
N.Y.T.	- New York Times
U.S. Policy	- U.S. Policy in the Middle East, State Depart., Aug. 1957
A-F-I Agg.	- Anglo-French-Israeli Aggression Against Egypt, pamphlet by Egyptian Embassy in U.S. Press Dept., 1956
M.E. Jour.	- Middle East Journal
UNGAOR	- United Nations General Assembly Official Record
J.A. Digest	- The Jewish Agency's Digest of Press and Events
USFBIS	- United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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13. ABSTRACT

1. The General Inquirer system of content analysis was used to analyze Egyptian and Israeli documents for the period July 19-28, 1956. (U)

2. An extensive experiment on methods of scaling action data has been performed, and the scale was used to analyze behavior during the time period studied. (U)

3. The data for the time period studied were rather limited, thus an adequate test of hypotheses must be deferred until data for subsequent periods are analyzed. Yet even with the data at hand, techniques of analysis reveal that some important distinctions were made by Egyptian and Israeli decision-makers. But at this early stage in the research their significance is only speculative. (U)

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14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
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