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**USAF  
TACTICAL OPERATIONS**

**WORLD WAR II**

**AND**

**KOREAN WAR**

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**USAF HISTORICAL DIVISION  
LIAISON OFFICE**

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USAF

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

WORLD WAR II AND KOREAN WAR

With  
Statistical Tables,

10

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## FOREWORD

The statistical information contained in this study was originally prepared as part of a comprehensive examination by Headquarters USAF of the past and present role of tactical aviation. The extensive effort required to assemble this data seemed to warrant an additional effort to prepare it for publication as a historical study for use throughout the Air Force and elsewhere. Continuing requests for such data have already justified this decision.

In the main, this is a compilation of statistical data on combat operations in World War II and the Korean War. The brief narratives preceding the statistical tables are intended primarily as background information. All of the major theaters of operations are included.

The statistical coverage varies greatly from theater to theater because of the differences in the quantity and type of information available. The particular statistics required for the original compilation often could not be found in any existing overall compilations. This made it necessary to use theater sources of information on a large scale. For some theaters, individual daily missions for periods up to a year were examined and statistical tables compiled therefrom. Accordingly, a number of the tables represent original contributions to the knowledge of tactical air operations in World War II.

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
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SECTION I

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EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, II (Chicago, 1949), 44.

## I. NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER 1942 - MAY 1943

Allied military operations in French North Africa began on 8 November 1942 with Operation Torch—the landing of American and British forces in Morocco and Algeria. Their objective was to secure quick control of these French territories by seizing the key cities and surrounding installations. They then proposed to advance into Tunisia before the Axis could send forces there in effective numbers. The invaders, divided into three task forces, totaled about 107,000 men. To oppose them the French had available ground forces of about the same number plus strong fortifications at several points, but most of their equipment was obsolescent, they were not well deployed for action against an invader, and their attitude was mixed and irresolute. Carrier-based aircraft of the three supporting Allied naval task forces would provide the principal air support for the initial assaults. The French could muster an air opposition of about 350 aircraft, and Axis aircraft based in Sicily would also be able to attack the Eastern Task Force.<sup>1</sup>

Allied landings began at 0100 on 8 November; strong resistance made it quickly apparent that secret negotiations to secure the adherence of French military leaders had failed. Nevertheless, at Algiers the Allied forces made rapid progress; by the end of the first day they had won French agreement to a cessation of fighting and Allied control of the city. The other two Allied task forces also made substantial advances in the Casablanca-Port Lyautey sector and near Oran, which they captured on 10 November. Fighting ceased in all areas on 11 November when the local French commanders negotiated an armistice. A key factor in shortening the fighting was the

unexpected presence in Algiers of Adm. Jean Darlan, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Vichy France, who decided to swing over to the Allies and influenced other civil and military leaders to follow him. During the fighting carrier-based naval aircraft and land-based aircraft from Gibraltar operated effectively in silencing strongpoints, disrupting the French air resistance, and interdicting the deployment and reinforcement of French forces.<sup>2</sup>

Although Allied losses were not unduly heavy, considering the size of the operation, the delay in Algeria and Morocco, together with the wavering attitude of the French leaders in Tunisia, permitted the Germans to recover from their tactical surprise and rush troops by air to Tunis, beginning on 9 November. On the same day the Allies abandoned plans for a seizure by parachute and commando troops of Tunis and Bizerte and prepared for an overland advance of 400 miles against the Tunisian strongholds. Meanwhile, the two Allied air forces--the American Twelfth and the British Eastern Air Command--began a buildup. Although the Twelfth numbered 1,244 aircraft (71 squadrons) and the Eastern Air Command 454 aircraft (25 squadrons), it was possible to bring only a fraction of these to North Africa during the first few weeks because of the lack of hard-surfaced airfields. Consequently, the Germans, operating from airfields near Tunis and in Sicily, held air superiority in Tunisia during the crucial engagements of December 1942. Although aided by several successful airborne and seaborne landings, the extemporized Allied land advance from Algiers was turned back outside Djedeida, about 15 miles from Tunis, by relatively small Axis forces brought in from Italy.<sup>3</sup>

During the winter of 1942-43 both sides built up their forces in Tunisia,

and the Allies carried out an extensive program of airfield construction. In February, Rommel's army, retreating westward from Libya ahead of Montgomery's Eighth Army, joined with the Axis forces in Tunisia and launched an offensive that pierced the American lines at Kasserine Pass. Though momentarily threatening, the drive reached no vital point, and withdrawal followed.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, in late February the tactical air units of the Twelfth Air Force and the Eastern Air Command were removed from the control of ground commanders and consolidated with other tactical and strategic air units, including the Western Desert Air Force in Libya, into one cohesive force capable of integrated action. The resulting Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF) consisted of tactical, strategic, and coastal forces. During March and April 1943 the new organization, in part by abandoning air umbrellas over ground units in favor of attacks on enemy airdromes, gradually suppressed the German tactical air effort. NAAF and the Allied naval forces pursued a campaign of interdiction that resulted in the near strangulation of Axis supply lines between Italy and Tunisia. Axis sea and air tonnage fell from a high of 35,500 in January to 23,000 in April, as against an estimated need of at least 90,000 per month.<sup>5</sup>

The British Eighth Army repulsed the last important Axis offensive early in March, and on 20 March the Allied forces began a series of attacks which first outflanked the Mareth Line in the south and then pushed the Axis forces back into northern Tunisia. Tactical air forces harried the retreating enemy, destroying more than 200 vehicles. By 23 April, NAAF had secured air superiority; enemy tactical aircraft had ceased to be a significant military factor, and the Germans had begun a partial evacuation

of the Tunisian airfields. During the spring campaign air-ground support by tactical aircraft consisted largely of difficult and not always successful pinpoint bombing of concealed enemy positions in broken country. A change came on the climactic day of 6 May when the Northwest African Tactical Air Force flew more than 2,000 sorties to blanket an area four miles long by three and one-half wide ahead of the British First Army's main attack. Under the concerted air-ground effort the Axis defenses disintegrated. Tunis and Bizerte fell on 7 May, and by 13 May all enemy elements had surrendered. The bag of 275,000 prisoners represented the largest single Axis loss up to that time. Over 600 damaged aircraft remained on the captured airfields.<sup>6</sup>

TABLE 1

Tunisian Winter CampaignAllied Air Order of Battle--5 Jan 43

	<u>RAF</u>	<u>Twelfth AF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	144	149	293
Beaufighters	20	-	20
Fighter-bombers	23	-	23
Light bombers	11	22	33
Medium bombers	20	41	61
Heavy bombers	-	35	35
General recon	30	-	30
Photo recon	3	3	6
Transports	-	23	23
	<u>251</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>524</u>

Enemy A/C Available for Tunisian Campaign--Jan 43  
 (Bombers based largely in Sardinia, Sicily,  
 southern Italy; fighters in Tunisia)

Fighters	
ME-109	
FW-190	150
Bombers	
JU-88	225
Italian	
Bombers	
Fighters	560

SOURCE: Hist, 12th AF in Northwest Africa, II, 11-12.

TABLE 2  
Tunisian Spring Campaign

Strength--Northwest African Tactical Air Force, 21 Mar 43

	<u>RAF<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>USAAF<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Total</u>
A/C	248	319	567
Units	15 sqs	5 sqs 2 sqs	

a. RAF had 9 Spitfire, 4 Bisley, & 2 Hurribomber sqs.

b. USAAF had 2 Spitfire, 1 P-39, 1 P-40, 1 A-20 gps; 2 P-39 obsn sqs.  
By 1 May, 1 B-25 gp & 1 P-39 gp had been added--40 more planes.

Strength--Northwest African Strategic Air Force, 21 Mar 43

	<u>RAF<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>USAAF<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Total</u>
A/C	24	383	407
Units	2 sqs	7 gps	

a. RAF had 2 Wellington sqs.

b. USAAF had 2 B-17, 2 B-25, 1 B-26, & 2 P-38 gps.  
By 1 May, 1 B-26, 2 B-17, & 1 P-40 gps had been added--174 more  
planes, totaling 581 A/C.

SOURCE: Hist, 12th AF in Northwest Africa, II, 34, 36.

TABLE 3

Twelfth Air Force in North Africa  
Enemy and U.S. Aircraft Claimed Destroyed and Damaged

	<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>			<u>U.S. Aircraft</u>	
	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>
1942	95	27	39	77	35
Jan 43	178	59	82	92	51
Feb 43	129	47	83	97	45
Mar 43	191	64	105	92	89
Apr 43	332	81	130	158	83
May 43	<u>302</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>65</u>
TOTAL	1,227	351	538	641	368

SOURCE: 12th AF Monthly Statistical Summary.

TABLE 4

Enemy Aircraft Losses Claimed, North Africa  
8 Nov 1942 to 14 May 1943

<u>In the air</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>	<u>Total</u>
8 Nov-18 Feb				
By 12th AF	384	127	166	677
By EAC	255	55	160	470
19 Feb-14 May				
By NAAF	772	227	472	1,471
By WDAF	<u>303</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>521</u>
	1,074	460	965	3,139
 <u>On the ground</u>				
8 Nov 42-14 May 43				
Transports	147		115	262
Bombers	221		23	244
Fighters	<u>636</u>		<u>68</u>	<u>704</u>
	1,004		206	1,210
 TOTAL	 2,718	 460	 1,171	 4,349

SOURCE: Hist, 12th AF in Northwest Africa, II, 53-54.

TABLE 5  
Ships Claimed Sunk and Damaged by NAAF  
8 Nov 1942 - 14 May 1943

	<u>Sunk</u>	<u>Prob Sunk</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cargo ships	28	31	46	105
Naval ships	16	15	19	50
Naval aux	30	17	10	57
Misc	<u>42</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>106</u>
TOTAL	116	84	118	318
Tonnage	113,650	131,750	235,350	480,750

SOURCE: Hist, 12th AF in Northwest Africa, II, 54.

TABLE 6  
Twelfth Air Force in North Africa  
Sorties and Tons of Bombs Dropped

	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Eff Sorties</u>	<u>Noneff Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1942	908	4,181	109	1,264
Jan 43	607	3,660	82	1,336
Feb 43	508	3,413	234	1,086
Mar 43	744	6,979	459	1,653
Apr 43	1,002	12,003	451	3,489
May 43	<u>1,124</u>	<u>11,579</u>	<u>376</u>	<u>6,022</u>
TOTAL	4,893	41,815	1,711	14,850

SOURCE: 12th AF Monthly Statistical Summary.

TABLE 7  
Twelfth Air Force in North Africa  
Tons of Bombs by Type of Target

<u>Target</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>					<u>Total</u>
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	
Airdromes	255	191	313	414	1,119	1,326	3,618
Highways	1	20	18		29	70	138
Railroads	66	163	62	89	42	125	547
Rail yards	-	52			84	274	410
Ports & bases	913	535	392	497	890	1,162	4,389
Cities & towns	3	56			41	1,370	1,470
Troop conc	9	131	97	98	439	473	1,247
Motor trnsp	-	14	38	28	154	131	365
Signal fcly	-					1	1
Utilities	-	18				23	41
Industry	-					241	241
Shipping	1	145	163	527	666	712	2,214
Targets/oppo	1	11			8	42	62
Other	8				17	6	31
Dumps	7		3			66	76
<b>TOTAL TONNAGE</b>	<b>1,264</b>	<b>1,336</b>	<b>1,086</b>	<b>1,653</b>	<b>3,489</b>	<b>6,022</b>	<b>14,850</b>

SOURCE: 12th AF Monthly Statistical Summary.


## II. CONQUEST OF SICILY, JULY - AUGUST 1943

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the British and Americans had decided to invade Sicily as soon as possible after the conquest of Tunisia. North Africa was cleared of enemy forces by 10 May, and the island of Pantelleria was bombed into surrendering on 11 June. The landing on Sicily was scheduled for 10 July: the British Eighth Army would land on the east coast of Sicily, below Syracuse, and around the southeasternmost tip of the island, while the Seventh U.S. Army would land two forces on the south coast, one in the Gela-Sampieri area and the other near Licata, farther to the west. The operation was given the code name Husky.<sup>1</sup>

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF)—mainly the Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF)—carried the burden of air support for the Sicilian operation. The Allies had available for this operation about 900 fighters, 570 medium and light bombers, and 180 heavy bombers.

The Allied air plan for covering the landings was divided into three parts: counterair attacks to neutralize or disperse enemy air forces; attacks on communications and transportation to deny reinforcements and supplies to the enemy; close support to cover the landings and assist the ground forces.<sup>2</sup>

The first phase of the air attack destroyed much of the enemy's air strength and caused him to disperse his air units. Between 15 June and 9 July, NAAF planes dropped 5,140 tons of bombs on airfields in Sicily and



Reproduced from V.P. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, II (Chicago, 1946), 443.

Italy. By the end of June the enemy had suffered such heavy losses that he began to move his air units out of Sicily. To prevent reestablishment of enemy air strength in Sicily before the landing, the Allies made heavy attacks on airfields in Italy, around Capua, Foggia, and Naples. For the whole Sicilian campaign, the Allied air forces claimed about 800 enemy planes destroyed.<sup>3</sup>

As the neutralization of enemy air strength progressed, NAAF turned its attention to communication and transportation facilities. The first step was to impair ferry service across the Strait of Messina to isolate Sicily from the mainland. At the end of June a raid on the marshalling yards at Messina began a series of attacks which completely demolished Messina station, yards, and buildings at the harbor and ferry terminal. Attacks extended as far north as Naples, and Allied planes continuously covered the Messina Strait area to cut off reinforcements.<sup>4</sup>

Direct air support of the ground forces took three forms--troop carrier operations, protection of the landings, and attacks on enemy strongpoints and materiel. The Allies used 370 aircraft to drop 7,160 paratroops and 149 gliders to land nearly 2,100 troops in Sicily. Although these helped speed up the advance, the airborne operations were generally considered too costly to be worthwhile.<sup>5</sup>

On D-day--10 July--NAAF planes flew nearly 1,100 sorties to protect the landings and hit enemy forces behind the beaches. Only 12 of the 3,000 ships bringing American and British troops to Sicily were sunk by enemy air action, although it had been feared that as many as 300 might be lost. During the first week after the landings the Allied fighters and fighter-bombers exerted their main effort on roads, railways, and

other targets behind the enemy lines; they also struck gun positions, radar stations, and supply centers. Because the armies advanced so rapidly, there could be little close air support, although there were some outstanding examples of this later, particularly at Randazzo and Troina. From 18 July to 6 August, Tactical Air Force planes flew 265 fighter-bomber, 97 light bomber, and 12 medium bomber sorties against Troina.

Enemy daylight air activity practically ceased by 14 July. On the 13th the Allies occupied the first of six airfields in Sicily, and by the 17th they were operating from five of them. When the Germans renewed bomber raids infrequently in the first two weeks of August, Allied fighters foiled most of the attacks so that the damage inflicted was small.<sup>6</sup>

After a counterattack of 11-12 July failed, the Germans fought to hold a line based on Mt. Etna while they evacuated their forces across the Strait of Messina. Allied armies broke this line, supported by devastating air attacks against such strongholds as Catania, Troina, and Randazzo, and occupied all Sicily by 17 August. The Germans managed to evacuate most of their troops, ferrying them across to Italy at night under cover of extremely heavy flak. Allied aircraft sank many enemy ships but could not stop the withdrawal.<sup>7</sup>

The capture of Sicily, coupled with heavy bombardment of the Italian peninsula, brought ruin to the government of Benito Mussolini, who fell from power on 25 July. His successors sued for peace and signed an armistice on 3 September 1943. But this did not end the campaign in Italy, for the Germans had effective control of the country.<sup>8</sup>

TABLE 8  
Air Operations in Sicily  
Husky - July 1943

Combat Aircraft Available to Allies

Fighters	904
Medium and light bombers	572
Heavy bombers	<u>182</u>
TOTAL	1,658

Combat Aircraft Available to Enemy  
(In Sicily, Sardinia, and Southern Italy)

Fighters <sup>a</sup>	1,160
Torpedo bombers <sup>b</sup>	75
Long-range bombers <sup>c</sup>	<u>160</u>
TOTAL	1,395

- 
- a. German and Italian.  
b. Italian.  
c. German.

SOURCE: AAF Evaluation Board Report, MTO, Vol II, Pt III, pp 1-3.

TABLE 9

German Air Force Strength in Sicily, April 1943  
(German Sources)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Combat Ready</u>
1-engine fighters	345	237
2-engine fighters	<u>89</u>	<u>72</u>
	434	309

TABLE 10

GAF Strength in Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy  
May-July 1943  
(German Sources)

	<u>14 May</u>	<u>1 June</u>	<u>14 June</u>	<u>3 July</u>	<u>10 July</u>
Sicily	415	275	315	290	175
Sardinia	80	80	115	175	115
Central & southern Italy	<u>200</u>	<u>360</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>345</u>	<u>460</u>
	695	715	720	810	750

SOURCE: (G VII 10a) & (G VII 3) studies by 8 Abteilung, Gen Staff, Mil Div, July 1944.

TABLE 11

Allied Air Effort in Sicilian Campaign  
9 Jul to 17 Aug 1943

	<u>Totals</u>		<u>Daily Avg</u>	
	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Fighters	10,604	-	272	-
Fighter-bombers	5,216	2,137	146	55
Medium bombers	7,417	8,974	190	230
Heavy bombers	1,833	5,132	47	131

SOURCE: AAF Evaluation Board Report, MTO, Vol II, Pt III, p 6.

TABLE 12

Sicilian Campaign  
Tactical Bomber Effort of Twelfth Air Force  
2 Jul to 17 Aug 1943

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Tons of Bombs</u>
Towns and ports	3,185	53.2	2,800
Airdromes	1,031	17.2	1,081
Armed reconnaissance	591	9.9	306
Barges and beaches	167	2.8	123
Gun positions	320	5.3	209
Petrol and ammo dumps	96	1.6	43
Shipping	34	.6	41
Road and rail junctions	489	8.2	403
Transport concentrations	70	1.2	48
	<u>5,988</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>5,054</u>


SOURCE: Hist, 12th AF in Sicily, III, 49.

TABLE 13

Enemy Aircraft Destroyed in Sicilian Campaign  
15 Jun to 17 Aug 1943

<u>Destroyed in combat:</u>	
Fighters	222
Bombers	35
Transports	<u>36</u>
Total	293
<u>Destroyed on the ground:</u>	
Fighters	204
Bombers	257
Transports	<u>53</u>
Total	514
<u>TOTAL enemy losses</u>	807

SOURCE: AAF Evaluation Board Report, MTO, Vol II, Pt III, p 4.



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, II (Chicago, 1949), 556.

### III. OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL ITALY MARCH - AUGUST 1944

On 15 March 1944 the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) launched a series of attacks to reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to a level that would make it impracticable for him to maintain and operate his forces in central Italy. The operation was designated Strangle.\* On 11 May the Allied air and ground forces began a full-scale offensive against the Germans, driving the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies north of Rome and pursuing them to the Pisa-Fano line. This operation, designated Diadem, ended on 4 August with the capture of Florence and the attainment of most other objectives. Strangle-Diadem thus constituted a continuous air operation, with the principal shift in tactics occurring on 11 May—from almost complete concentration on interdiction to a combination of interdiction and close support.<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of Strangle the German army in central Italy, consisting of 18 divisions, held a series of strong positions across Italy, south of Anzio, from Caeta to Termoli, known as the Gustav Line, with the main anchor point at Cassino. The Allies were divided into two armies—the U.S. Fifth and the British Eighth.† They held a considerable numerical

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\*Although MAAF had attacked German communications with vigor as a part of Operation Shingle during January and February, Strangle represented a much higher degree of concentration as well as a shift in the target plan. During early March much of MAAF's striking power had been diverted, over the protest of the air commanders, to saturation bombing of Cassino in preparation for an unsuccessful ground assault. The directive for Strangle was issued on 19 March, but the operation was actually already under way.

†Operating under each army were sizable contingents from other Allied powers.

superiority but had not been able to break a stalemate of several months, despite the establishment of a beachhead at Anzio behind the German front and an intensive series of attacks at Cassino. Following the failure of their last massive attack on 15 March, the Allied command determined to use its air forces to weaken the German army's ability to supply, reinforce, and shift its forces so seriously that it would be unable to resist a determined ground attack or conduct a successful withdrawal. Meanwhile, Allied ground forces would be refitted and their supply system built up.<sup>2</sup>

The Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) undertook to carry out this mission with some assistance in north Italy and along the coasts from the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force. During the period covered, MATAF controlled an average of about 1,700 operational aircraft and could occasionally draw in another 2,000 from the other MAAF commands. Since the Allies held air superiority, the operations of the Luftwaffe constituted only a minor annoyance. During Strangle, the main effort was directed against rail lines, the most efficient existing means of transportation. It differed from previous air interdiction campaigns, for the Allied planes attacked sections of rail lines rather than a particular category such as marshalling yards or bridges. When the enemy turned to other means of transport, such as motor vehicles and coastwise barges, MAAF also attacked these. Ultimately, nearly all enemy transport movement was confined to night.<sup>3</sup>

By 24 March, at least two breaks had been established in every north-south rail line, so that substantially all enemy supplies south of Florence had to move by alternative means. By the end of March the average number of railroad cuts per day was 25, rising to 75 by mid-May. Total daily

transport capability fell from more than 80,000 tons to below 4,000, capable of supporting only the lightest defensive effort.<sup>4</sup>

By 11 May the stage was set for Diadem, the combined ground-air attack. The drive for Rome and the Po Valley began with heavy attacks on the German right flank between Cassino and the Mediterranean. Almost immediately the Germans experienced critical shortages of ammunition because of lack of transport. Forced to attempt day movement of supplies and men by motor transport, the Germans lost in excess of 10,000 motor vehicles destroyed and damaged by Allied aircraft between 15 March and 22 June. During the same period the Germans made a precipitate withdrawal of about 200 miles, suffering an estimated 70,000 casualties, about one-third of their forces in Italy. Rome fell on 4 June and Florence on 4 August. The retreat stopped when the Germans reached a prepared defense zone extending from Pisa to Fano. Here they were supported by relatively undamaged supply lines, the Allied supply lines were stretched to the limit, and a large part of the Allied air strength was drawn off to support the invasion of southern France.<sup>5</sup>

TABLE 14  
MATAF Aircraft, Crews, Sorties,  
Bomb Tonnage, Losses, Victories  
1 Mar to 31 Jul 1944

	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>FAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Avg A/C opnl	778	509	52	1,339
Avg crews opnl	823	789	82	1,694
Sorties	66,955	69,475	3,823	140,253
Eff sorties	60,601	68,272	3,618	132,491
Tons bombs dropped	51,778	15,793	2,670	70,241
Aircraft lost	349	276	9	634
Aircraft dmgd	407	268	3	683
Enemy A/C dest	87	165	2	254
Enemy A/C prob dest	21	20	2	43
Enemy A/C dmgd	47	87	2	136

SOURCE: MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary.

TABLE 15

MA TAF Bomb Tonnage by Target Categories  
1 Mar to 31 Jul 1944

<u>Target</u>	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>PAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
A/D & L/G	390	88	4	482
Ports & bases	1,498	952	76	2,526
Railroads	26,805	1,885	1,603	30,293
M/Y	3,219	985	60	4,264
Highways	11,311	7,648	665	19,624
Cities & towns	1,587	749	-	2,336
M/T & en mvmt	444	891	12	1,347
Troop conc	3,637	2,717	51	6,405
Shipping	135	51	-	186
Indus estb	209	143	50	402
Supply dumps	2,368	818	149	3,335
Bridges	<u>a</u>	2,283	<u>a</u>	2,283
Misc	<u>174</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>357</u>
TOTAL	51,777	19,393	2,670	73,840

a. Included under RR & Highways.

SOURCE: MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary.

TABLE 16

MATAF Bomber and Fighter Sorties  
1 Mar to 31 Jul 1944

	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>FAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bomber	24,423	8,296	916	33,635
Fighter-bomber	33,036	18,084	2,118	53,238
Strafe and fighter sweep	1,349	22,503	143	23,995
Patrol and scramble	3,170	2,194	-	5,364
Escort	<u>2,022</u>	<u>11,142</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>13,254</u>
TOTAL	64,000	62,219	3,267	129,486

SOURCE: MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary.

TABLE 17  
MAAF Target Destruction  
15 Mar to 4 Aug 1944

	(15 Mar-11 May) <u>Strangle</u>	(12 May-4 Aug) <u>Diadem</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sorties	65,003	88,670	153,673
Tons bombs	33,104	42,999	76,103
A/C dest	296	270	566
A/C lost by MAAF	365	281	646
M/T dest	818	6,425	7,243
M/T dmgd	976	5,423	6,399
Locomotives dest	42	80	122
Locomotives dmgd	71	77	148
RR cars dest	337	1,347	1,684
RR cars dmgd	516	2,066	2,582
Bridges dest		220	
Bridges dmgd		53	
Tunnels dest		9	
Tunnels dmgd		31	
Dumps dest		87	
Bldgs exploded/burning		90	
RR tracks cut		1,474	
Ships & small boats sunk	50	82	132
Ships & small boats dmgd	100	178	278

SOURCE: Hq MATAF, Operation Diadem, 11 May-4 Aug 44, Ann B, p 13; MAAF, Strangle--Interdiction in Italy, in USAF Hist Div Archives; AAF in World War II, V, 373-84.

TABLE 18

Twelfth Air Force Sorties in Strangle  
15 Mar to 11 May 1944

<u>Type Mission</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Bombing	19,920	61.6
Land patrol	4,932	15.3
Convoy & harbor patrol	2,622	8.1
Reconnaissance	1,504	4.7
Escort	2,480	7.7
Strafe & fighter sweep	577	1.8
Other	<u>267</u>	<u>.8</u>
TOTAL	32,302	100.0

SOURCE: Twelfth Air Force Participation in Strangle and Diadem Operations,  
9 Aug 44, p 5.

TABLE 19

Twelfth Air Force Sorties in Diadem  
12 May to 4 Aug 1944

<u>Type Mission</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Bombing	24,063	79.0
Land patrol	1,871	6.1
Convoy & harbor patrol	2,276	7.5
Reconnaissance	1,160	3.8
Escort	62	.2
Strafe & fighter sweep	920	3.0
Other	<u>135</u>	<u>.4</u>
TOTAL	30,487	100.0

SOURCE: Twelfth Air Force Participation in Strangle and Diadem Operations,  
9 Aug 44, p 5.

IV. THE WAR IN ITALY  
SEPTEMBER 1943 - APRIL 1945

After the conquest of Sicily in July-August 1943 the Allies took advantage of Mussolini's fall and used their large forces in the Mediterranean to invade Italy. On 3 September the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina, and on the 9th the American Fifth Army landed at Salerno, hoping to cut off the German forces resisting the British and quickly take the port of Naples. Hope of a quick and decisive victory soon faded because the Germans withdrew swiftly before the British and the Americans failed to achieve surprise at Salerno.<sup>1</sup>

The Fifth Army, supported by about 800 sorties a day from the Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF) and Allied naval forces, gained a foothold at Salerno, but a strong German counterattack of 12-16 September threatened to drive the American troops into the sea. To strengthen the beachhead the Allies flew three airborne missions dropping more than 3,000 men in the battle area during 13-15 September. The first two missions achieved unusual success and helped materially to stem the German offensive. In an all-out effort to defeat the German counterattack, NAAF planes flew an average of almost 1,300 sorties and dropped more than 1,000 tons of bombs each day on German positions during 14-17 September. In the target area the bomb density reached 760 tons per square mile in this four-day effort. Although the Germans could still put up more than 100 sorties a day in Italy, they used their air strength almost entirely against ships off the beaches and troops in the beachhead, leaving their own troops and transport



Reproduced from T.D. Stamps & V.J. Esposito, A Military History of World War II: Atlas (West Point, 1956), Map 105.

completely exposed to devastating air attacks. They suffered such heavy losses that on the 16th they began pulling back, permitting the Fifth Army to go on the offensive.<sup>2</sup>

By 1 October the Americans had taken Naples, and the British, driving up the east coast, had captured the valuable complex of air bases around Foggia, from which strategic bombers could strike central Europe. Under air cover the Allies had landed 200,000 troops, 100,000 tons of supplies, and 30,000 vehicles, while losing only five ships sunk and nine damaged by enemy aircraft. Nevertheless, Allied armies were soon stalled as they encountered the German Gustav Line, the rugged terrain of the Apennines, and unusually bad winter weather.<sup>3</sup>

At the Cairo Conference in December 1943 the British and Americans decided to curtail efforts in southern Europe in favor of the cross-channel attack on western Europe and to move most of the major air commanders in the Mediterranean to England. All Allied air units in the Mediterranean were merged into the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), commanded by Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker.<sup>4</sup>

Although the Mediterranean had become a secondary theater, the Allies still hoped for an early conquest of Italy and were determined to support the major contest by keeping the Germans in Italy under constant pressure. During the winter of 1943-44 they made a number of unsuccessful attempts to break through the Gustav Line, the most important of which was coordinated with the landing behind the enemy lines at Anzio on 22 January 1944. Between 1 January and 15 February 1944, MAAF planes, including heavy bombers, flew more than 35,000 sorties and dropped a total of about 22,550 tons of bombs in support of ground forces, but the Fifth Army failed to break the

German line. The Anzio troops, constantly punished by enemy artillery, could not break out of their small beachhead. Assisting in another attempt to pierce the Gustav Line, MAAF bombers smashed the town of Cassino on 15 March, but the Fifth Army failed in this effort also, partly because it could not move fast enough to take complete advantage of the German confusion.<sup>5</sup>

In mid-March, MAAF launched a series of air attacks designed to reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to the point where he could not maintain and operate his forces. Termed Operation Strangle, this campaign struck primarily at the north-south railroads and secondarily at shipping and roads. The railroads of central Italy, since they contained numerous bridges and tunnels, afforded a promising target for such an interdiction campaign. The main burden of the operation fell on MAAF's 1,700 tactical fighters and medium bombers, assisted at times by heavy bombers and strategic fighters. Since the Allies possessed air superiority the Luftwaffe could offer little more than occasional annoyances. By 24 March, MAAF planes had broken every north-south railroad line in at least two places; by the end of March the average number of railroad cuts had risen to 25 per day, and by mid-May to 75. Daily railroad capacity fell from 80,000 tons to 4,000, far below the capacity needed to support the German army in battle.<sup>6</sup>

On 11 May, the Fifth and Eighth Armies, paced by MAAF fighters and bombers, launched Operation Diadem—a drive on Rome and the Po Valley. In the air, Diadem was essentially a continuation of Strangle. The Germans soon found themselves without adequate transport and resistance quickly crumbled. Allied forces relieved Anzio on 25 May, took Rome on 4 June, and culminated the drive with the capture of Florence on 4 August. In

their 200-mile retreat, the Germans attempted to move men and supplies by motor transport during daylight hours. They lost more than 10,000 motor vehicles in addition to 70,000 men, nearly one-third of their force in Italy. MAAF aircraft flew 50,000 sorties in June alone, mostly in support of the ground advance. The Germans withdrew to a front short of the Gothic Line (Pisa to Rimini)--in the mountains south of the Po River, where they were able to hold, largely because Allied supply lines were stretched to the limit and a number of both ground and air units had been diverted from Italy to support the invasion of southern France.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the transfer of a sizable part of their Mediterranean forces to western Europe, the Allies still hoped to conquer Italy in the fall of 1944. But in this they failed. The Germans held on grimly to their position in the high mountains between Pisa and Rimini. During the fall and winter of 1944-45, planes of MAAF swept almost unopposed over northern Italy, wrecking enemy communications from the Gothic Line to the Brenner Pass in the Alps. It became dangerous for any type of vehicle to move during daylight hours in the Po Valley.<sup>8</sup>

The final ground offensive began on 9 April 1945, after earlier German feelers for surrender terms had failed to produce results. By 20 April the enemy's lines were broken and he made a dash for the Po, but when this happened he was finished. He had the means neither to stave off disaster nor to make a rapid withdrawal. Negotiations began on 29 April, and the Germans surrendered unconditionally on 2 May 1945.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 20

MAAF Effective Sorties against Italy  
by Type, 1 Nov 1943 - 30 Apr 1945

<u>Type</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>
Bomber	291,704
Fighter-bomber	206,821
Escort	103,157
Strafe & fighter sweep	84,729
Patrol & scramble	50,418
Land reconnaissance —	27,024
Sea reconnaissance	6,114
Convoy escort	28,396
Air-Sea rescue	7,013
U-boat hunt	10,292
Photo reconnaissance	14,291
Weather reconnaissance	4,186
Miscellaneous	<u>4,436</u>
TOTAL	838,581

SOURCE: NAAF & MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary, Nov 43-Apr 45.

TABLE 21

Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces in MTO  
Effective Tactical Sorties  
September 1943 - April 1945

<u>Twelfth AF</u>	<u>Tactical Sorties</u>
Sep 1943	10,065
Oct "	12,557
Nov "	7,694
Dec "	9,319
Jan 1944	14,368
Feb "	9,461
Mar "	9,772
Apr "	10,559
May "	17,189
Jun "	13,062
Jul "	10,019
Aug "	13,670
Sep "	9,494
Oct "	6,539
Nov "	9,870
Dec "	10,350
Jan 1945	9,637
Feb "	9,778
Mar "	11,771
<u>Apr "</u>	<u>15,327</u>
Total	220,501
<u>Fifteenth AF</u>	<u>23,819</u>
Grand TOTAL	244,320


SOURCE: NAAF & MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary, Nov 43-Apr 45; AAF Evaluation Board Report, MTO, Vol II, Pt III, App I; Hist, 15th AF, I, 424.

TABLE 22

NAAF & MAAF Bomb Tonnage against Italy  
by Type Target, 1 Nov 1943 - 30 Apr 1945

<u>Target</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
A/D & L/G	32,949
Port facilities	25,966
Railroads	108,307
Marshalling yards	134,261
Highways	33,279
M/T & enemy movement	6,394
Troop concentration	70,088
Shipping	2,254
Supply dumps	18,182
Bridges	25,756
Others	<u>4,686</u>
TOTAL	462,122

SOURCE: NAAF & MAAF Monthly Statistical Summary, Nov 43-Apr 45.



Reproduced from F.C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (U.S. Army in World War II) (Washington, 1954), p. 226.

V. INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE  
AUGUST 1944

In December 1943 the Allies first made the decision to invade southern France in conjunction with the major Allied invasion of western France. Because of the fluid situation in Italy and the demands of the Normandy operations, the decision for the operation did not become firm until 2 July 1944, only six weeks before D-day--15 August. The main objectives of the operation were to capture a major port through which supplies and reinforcements could flow, launch a large-scale flanking attack against German forces battling the Allies in western France, and join the Allied forces from Normandy to liberate France and decisively defeat German armies in the West. Allied air units would neutralize enemy air forces, protect the assault operations, prevent or retard enemy movements into the assault area, provide air support to ground troops (including the French Maquis), and drop airborne troops.<sup>1</sup>

Preliminary air operations in support of Operation Dragoon, as the invasion became known, began as early as 29 April 1944 with a heavy bomber attack on Toulon. From this date to the beginning of the immediate pre-invasion bombing, on 10 August, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) attacked German submarine pens and airfields, interdicted supply lines into Italy, and smashed Italian-French communications from Genoa to Marseille. These operations also contributed to the Allied offensives in Normandy and northern Italy. Although approximately one-quarter of these attacks may be considered as direct support of Dragoon and the remainder as indirect,

they not only achieved extensive military damage but helped cloak the objectives of the Allied assault.<sup>2</sup>

The Allies stepped up preliminary air operations on 5 August. In an important interdiction effort, Allied aircraft made five of the six major railway bridges across the Rhone unserviceable and cut rail lines across the river. Because the German Air Force offered so little opposition, only a few counterair actions took place, primarily the bombing of the Bergamo airfield in northern Italy. During this phase, Allied bombers also attacked submarine pens at Toulon.<sup>3</sup>

The major Allied ground command for the southern France campaign was the Seventh Army, containing nine crack U.S. and French divisions and the 1st Airborne Task Force, composed of British and American troops. The Western Naval Task Force with 835 vessels from Allied navies handled the naval phase of the invasion. Under MAAF the XII Tactical Air Command controlled all tactical air units in the assault area, including aircraft of the Anglo-American carrier task force. MAAF had a composite U.S.-British-French force of about 2,100 operational aircraft based on 14 fields in Corsica. MAAF's Fifteenth Air Force, with about 900 bombers based in the Foggia area, also assisted in the invasion. To mount the airborne operation, a provisional U.S. troop-carrier air division (including British glider pilots) was located on 10 Italian airfields north of Rome.<sup>4</sup>

To oppose the invasion, the Germans had 10 weak divisions, or partial divisions, in southern France, including four limited-employment divisions in the vicinity of the assault area. Only one panzer division was comparatively strong. Behind the invasion zone were 22,000 armed Maquis. The German Air Force had some 200 aircraft, including 90 JU-88 bombers for use

against Allied shipping. During the week preceding the invasion, this small force was badly mauled by Allied air attacks. The only factors in the enemy's favor were sizable coastal defenses and a terrain well suited for defense.<sup>5</sup>

Heavy preinvasion bombing, beginning on 10 August, helped neutralize the main coastal defenses and radar stations in the assault area. XII TAC fighter-bombers strafed seven airfields in the Rhone delta and northern Italy. During the four days before the invasion, MAAF planes flew more than 5,400 sorties and dropped 6,725 tons of bombs. During the four hours preceding the invasion, all aircraft joined in an attack against coastal and beach defenses, flying almost 1,000 sorties and dropping 742 tons. Powerful raids on the Genoa area helped persuade the Germans that the attack would come in that region. The enemy was further confused by simulated naval assaults in many places and a simulated airborne attack by five C-47's.<sup>6</sup>

The airborne operations began seven hours before the amphibious landings and continued later in the day. About 0100 on 15 August, nine pathfinder planes carrying 121 paratroops took off from Italy in three serials for the French coast. The paratroops succeeded in setting up navigational aids in one zone according to plan and in another late on D-day but were 10 miles off at a third. Following the pathfinders the troop carriers for the first paratroop mission began taking off at 0150, 396 planes flying about 5,600 men and 105 pieces of artillery to their drop zones. Despite fog and rocky ground, one group made the most accurate drop of the entire war. Other groups missed their zones by many miles, and the entire operation was about 50 percent effective.<sup>7</sup>

Before 0600 a glider mission took off from Tarquinia with artillery for British paratroops, 35 aircraft towing Horsa gliders and 40 others towing Wacos. Because of bad weather, only 33 gliders, all Wacos, completed the mission after their release at 0926. Another glider mission of 37 gliders preceded the second paratroop mission, which began at 1555 when 41 planes took off with 736 troops and 10 tons of supplies and equipment. The planes arrived at the drop zone at 1804 and, in the main, the paratroop jump was successful. A big glider mission followed immediately, seven serials towing 335 gliders containing 2,250 men and large quantities of equipment. Although 95 percent of the gliders reached the landing zone, many were wrecked, 11 of their pilots killed, and about 100 of the troops seriously hurt. Altogether, the airborne missions of the 15th were highly successful, and few major flaws marred the operations. They encountered no hostile aircraft and very little flak. By evening the airborne force, which met little resistance, had assembled most of its scattered members and contacted the ground troops. A large stray group had joined French Maquis in capturing the important town of St. Tropez.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, at 0800 on the 15th the VI Corps of Seventh Army landed on beaches east of Toulon against little opposition. The German Air Force flew only 60 sorties in the area during the day, while enemy ground troops could not bring in reinforcements over roads blocked by MAAF bombers. Beginning at H-hour, Allied bombers and fighter-bombers pounded coastal positions, strongpoints, bridges, and roads. During D-day MAAF flew 4,249 effective sorties, 3,936 in direct support of ground troops. XII TAC engaged 17 ME-109's, destroying 3.<sup>9</sup>

By noon of the 17th the three infantry divisions of the VI Corps had

passed the beachhead line, the 1st Airborne Task Force had moved inland to capture Draguignan, and French reserves were coming ashore. Exploiting the breakthrough immediately, one ground task force pushed toward Grenoble to trap Germans in the Rhone Valley while another moved to the Italian frontier to block passes through the Alps. Enjoying complete air superiority, ground troops moved so rapidly that they had to be supplied by air. Air units protected advancing troops and bombed retreating enemy troops and communication lines. Allied ground forces moving northward took Grenoble on the 22d and Montelimar on the 28th after a full-scale battle with rear guard German troops at the latter city. On the 28th, French troops also captured the important ports of Toulon and Marseille.<sup>10</sup>

The Seventh Army now rushed northward to get behind the Germans in the Paris area, but logistics rather than the enemy hampered the drive. After 28 August, only XII TAC operated against the fleeing Germans. Moving to airfields in southern France, it steadily bombed and strafed the enemy, exacting a heavy toll. After the 30th, XII TAC refrained from destroying bridges and communication lines because of the swiftness of the Allied advance. German air resistance was so weak that MAAF could claim only 10 enemy planes destroyed in combat between 10 August and 11 September.<sup>11</sup>

On 3 September, French troops entered Lyon while VI Corps moved to block an enemy escape through the Belfort gap. On the 11th, French troops contacted U.S. Third Army units near Dijon, and on the 14th the Seventh Army met the Third Army. On the next day, the Seventh Army and French Army B were formed into 6th Army Group, while XII TAC moved from the operational control of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces to that of the U.S. Ninth Air Force.<sup>12</sup> This completed the transition of these forces from the Mediterranean to the European Theater of Operations.

TABLE 23

**MATAF Dragoon Operations by Type Missions**  
10 - 21 Aug 1944

<u>Type Mission</u>	<u>Sorties</u>			<u>Tonnage</u>			
	<u>Bomber</u>	<u>Ftr-B</u>	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Bomber</u>	<u>Ftr-B</u>	<u>Total</u>
Gun positions, beach defenses	1,945	1,558	38	3,541	3,086	701	3,787
Bridges	1,162	485	16	1,663	1,687	289	1,976
Lines of communication	32	841	406	1,279	30	406	436
Radar	-	107	328	435	-	41	41
Airfields	90	-	277	367	103	-	103
Auxiliary sorties (escort, Patrol, recon, etc.)	292	94	4,786	5,172	206	34	240
<b>TOTAL</b>	3,521	3,085	5,851	12,457	5,112	1,471	6,583

a. The total tonnage and sorties given in this table do not agree with those in the following table.

SOURCE: MATAF, Report on Operation Dragoon, Annex D, pp 13-18.

TABLE 24

MATAF Dragoon Operations by Time Period<sup>a</sup>  
10 - 21 Aug 1944

	<u>A/C</u> <u>Airborne</u>	<u>% Noneff</u> <u>Sorties</u>	<u>Bomb</u> <u>Tonnage<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>Lost</u>	<u>En A/C</u> <u>Dest</u>
Nutmeg <sup>a</sup>	3,202	10	2,000	25	4
Yokum <sup>b</sup>	969	30	400	5	1
Ducrot <sup>c</sup>	<u>7,957</u>	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	<u>3,620</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	12,128		6,482	81	9

- a. Operation Nutmeg: D-5 to D-day.  
b. Operation Yokum: 0350 of 15 Aug 44 to 0800 (H-hour).  
c. Operation Ducrot: H-hour to D + 6.

TABLE 25

Targets Hit by MATAF in Dragoon  
10 - 21 Aug 1944

<u>Target</u>	<u>Number Hit</u>
Bridges	163
Motor vehicles	843
Railroad cars	623
Locomotives	42
Tanks	3
Airfields	7
Aircraft on ground	38

SOURCE: MATAF, Report on Operation Dragoon, Annex D, pp 5-12, 13-18.

TABLE 26

Fifteenth Air Force - Attacks on Communications  
11 - 20 Aug 1944

<u>Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Losses</u>	<u>Tons per Day</u>
Railroads	1,369	3,388.25	21	338.83
Shipping	87	199.50	-	19.95
Roads	<u>280</u>	<u>660.50</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>66.05</u>
TOTAL	1,736	4,248.25	28	424.83

TABLE 27

MAAF Attacks on Communications  
11 - 20 Aug 1944

	<u>Bomb Tonnage</u>
Troop concentrations	9,171
Ports	2,593
Enemy airfields	<u>1,026</u>
TOTAL	12,790

SOURCES: Hist, 15th AF, App I; Hist, MAAF, 10 Dec 43-1 Sep 44, II, 246.

TABLE 28

MAAF Support of Invasion of Southern France  
10 Aug - 11 Sep 1944

<u>Bomb tonnage</u>	
10 Aug-14 Aug	6,725 tons
15 Aug-H-Hour	742 "
15 Aug-11 Sep	<u>6,542</u> "
TOTAL	14,009 "
<u>Air Forces</u>	
Tactical Air Force	7,857 "
Strategic Air Force	5,745 "
Coastal Air Force	<u>407</u> "
TOTAL	14,009 "
Effective sorties	23,830
Planes lost	194
Loss rate	0.0081 percent

SOURCE: Hist, MAAF, 10 Dec 43-1 Sep 44, II, 246.

TABLE 29

Airborne Missions - Invasion of Southern France  
15 Aug 1944

Sorties intended	857
Sorties accomplished	852
Paratroop sorties	444
Glider sorties, Waco	372
Glider sorties, Horsa	36
Troops delivered	9,099
Paratroops	6,488
Glider troops	2,611
Paratroops on or near DZ	50%
Glider troops on or near LZ	90-95%
Drop casualties	2%
Landing casualties	4%
Artillery pieces delivered	213
Vehicles delivered	221
Other supplies and equipment	500 tons

SOURCE: USAFHS 74, pp 107-8.



VI. LIBERATION OF WESTERN EUROPE AND CONQUEST OF GERMANY  
JUNE 1944 - MAY 1945

Before the Allies invaded western Europe in June 1944, they had gained supremacy in the air. The official U.S. Army historian of the Normandy operation states:<sup>1</sup>

The German Air Force had been defeated by the Combined Bomber Offensive in the early months of 1944. This victory the Allies were sure of. The knowledge was the most important ingredient in the final decision to go ahead with OVERLORD.

After crippling the German Air Force, Allied strategic and tactical bombers struck at railroads and bridges in France and Belgium to paralyze German troop and materiel movements. Attacks on radar warning stations and V-1 sites were also vital to the success of the invasion.<sup>2</sup>

Preceded by a massive airborne operation and heavy air and naval bombardment, five Allied divisions landed on the beaches east of the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Under a fighter cover furnished by 171 Allied squadrons, the convoys were practically free from air attack, and the Allies succeeded in gaining a foothold in France. Protecting the invasion force were the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and the RAF's Second Tactical Air Force and Air Defence of Great Britain.\* Facing the Allies in France and the Low Countries were 58 German divisions, organized into Army Groups B and G, but continuing Allied interdiction prevented the Germans from massing more than 14 battered divisions for defense. The German Air Force in the area, Luftflotte 3, was extremely weak, with only 50 to 121 fighters operational. The U.S. First Army captured Cherbourg

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\*Designated Fighter Command until 15 November 1943.

on 27 June, but the Germans took full advantage of the terrain to hold back Allied ground troops at Caen and St. Lô. During the campaign in Normandy, which lasted through 25 July, the United States placed 19 divisions on the Continent and the British-Canadians 16--all under 21 Army Group.<sup>3</sup>

Heavy bombing near St. Lô on 25 July by aircraft of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces paved the way for the breakout of Allied ground forces from the beachhead and Cotentin Peninsula areas. On 1 August the 12th Army Group assumed control of the U.S. First and Third Armies, while the Ninth Air Force continued to control all U.S. tactical air operations. IX Tactical Air Command supported the First Army, and XIX Tactical Air Command cooperated with the Third Army. The IX Bombardment Command operated in support of both armies.

Early in August one part of the Third Army raced westward into Brittany while another dashed eastward. In a five-day campaign for Brittany only one Luftwaffe daylight attack was reported, and sporadic German air efforts were defeated in every engagement. On 7 August the Germans attempted to drive a wedge between the two U.S. armies by piercing the First Army lines near Mortain. IX TAC, assisted by XIX TAC and British fighter-bombers, stopped the initial thrust, broke up powerful German armored and infantry attacks, and contributed in large measure to the German failure at Mortain. On 13 August the Germans began to withdraw toward the Seine.<sup>4</sup>

Preceded by heavy carpet bombings at Caen on 7-8 August, the British-Canadians advanced to join American forces in an encirclement of enemy troops in the Falaise-Argentan pocket. Allied air-ground forces hammered the pocket, fighter-bombers turning the area into a gigantic shambles.

Sustained Allied interdiction not only prevented many German divisions from arriving on the battlefield but also from escaping. While the Allies did not annihilate enemy forces in Normandy, they won a major victory. The Third Army continued its drive through France, XIX TAC covering the armored spearheads that moved through the Paris-Orleans gap to seize Seine crossings south of Paris on 18 August. XIX TAC accomplished the mission of guarding Third Army's long, exposed right flank along the Loire so successfully that German troops south of the river later surrendered without ground action. From 20 to 25 August, Allied troops advanced on the Seine in a deep encircling maneuver. While the Third Army pushed forward south of Paris, the First Army, supported by IX TAC, moved directly on the city, and the British-Canadians wheeled into northern France. By 25 August, when Allied troops entered Paris, they controlled most of western France between the Seine and Loire rivers.<sup>5</sup>

In late August and September, Allied ground forces sped toward the Siegfried Line. From Belgium, the First Army crossed the German border on 11 September and penetrated German outer defenses south of Aachen on the 14th. The Third Army secured bridgeheads across the Meuse by the end of August, but a shortage of fuel halted its spectacular advance. On 11 September it met troops of the U.S. Seventh Army and French forces—which had landed in southern France on 15 August—and raced up the Rhone Valley, with XII TAC from the Mediterranean spearheading the drive. In the north, the British-Canadian forces took Brussels on 3 September and Antwerp on the following day. But elongated lines of communication, logistical problems, and the stiffening of German resistance at the Siegfried Line slowed the advance. On 17 September the Allies began a large-scale airborne

operation in southeastern Holland to secure a bridgehead across the Rhine. The initial phase was successful, but the Germans succeeded in repelling the invaders at Arnhem by 25 September.

The First Army took Aachen on 21 October after that city had been softened by IX TAC bombardment. A heavy bombing that leveled towns to rubble preceded a drive toward the Roer River on 16 November by the First and Ninth Armies, the latter supported by a new command of the Ninth Air Force, XXIX TAC. The Germans stopped an advance by these armies through the Hürtgen Forest during the next month. The Third Army succeeded in capturing the fortress of Metz on 22 November, however, while the Seventh Army entered Strasbourg on the following day.<sup>6</sup>

On 16 December the Germans massed their available forces, including 1,376 operational aircraft, for a desperate counteroffensive through the Ardennes Forest to take Liège and Antwerp and split the Allied armies. They took advantage of a weakness in the opposing line and bad weather that minimized Allied air superiority to penetrate to within five miles of the Meuse and encircle the key bastion of Bastogne. The American forces finally held their ground, and when skies cleared on 23 December, Allied aircraft began a sustained pounding of enemy troops, materiel, and transportation. The Luftwaffe responded with an effort of 800 sorties on the 23d, but it could not cope with the massive Allied effort of thousands of sorties. On 26 December the Third Army relieved Bastogne. On the next day the Allies launched coordinated ground attacks and succeeded in pinching off the Ardennes salient by 16 January. Allied medium bombers and fighter-bombers struck heavy blows at the retreating German forces and severed their communication lines.<sup>7</sup>

After the Battle of the Bulge was won, the Allies drove toward the Rhine. IX TAC continued to cooperate with First Army moving slowly to the banks of the Roer, while XIX TAC paved the way for Third Army crossings of the Saar and Moselle rivers and helped reduce enemy pockets before Trier. On 22 February, Allied bombers and fighters mounted a massive bombing assault in an effort to paralyze the railway system of western Germany. On 7 March, First Army crossed the Remagen bridge and established a foothold over the Rhine. IX TAC helped beat off German ground and air attacks against this precarious bridgehead. During a third Rhine crossing by the First Allied Airborne Army in the Wesel area on 23 March, there was no enemy air interference with the airdrop of two airborne divisions.<sup>8</sup>

During the last phase of the war against Germany, the shattered German armies could not put up an effective resistance. From 1 April to the German surrender on 7 May, Allied forces overran Germany. The First and Ninth Armies enveloped the vast Ruhr pocket, containing elements of some 19 German divisions and one-third of a million men. Organized resistance in the Ruhr ended on 18 April, with Ninth Air Force aircraft helping reduce stubborn enemy units. During this period, the German Air Force, almost grounded by lack of fuel, lost more than 3,400 planes in seven days of Allied attacks on airfields. Allied ground forces stopped their advances at the Elbe and elsewhere in accordance with prearranged agreements with the Soviet Union.

In the north, British-Canadian forces established bridgeheads across the lower Elbe on 29 April and took Hamburg on 3 May. In the main thrust to the Elbe, Ninth Army troops reached the river near Magdeburg on 12 April, while First Army forces took Leipzig on the 18th and contacted Russian

troops near Torgau on the 25th. Third Army forces entered Czechoslovakia on the 17th and took Linz, Austria, on 4 May. The Seventh Army and French forces took Nuremberg on 20 April, Munich on the 30th, and the Brenner Pass on 4 May.

Toward the end of April, IX and XXIX TAC virtually ceased operations since air activities were restricted to reconnaissance and defensive patrols west of the Elbe. XIX TAC, however, continued to support Third Army as it moved southward against the supposed Nazi redoubt. In the last few days of the war, all offensive air operations ended.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 30

U.S. Army Divisions in ETO<sup>a</sup>  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Campaign</u>	<u>In Theater as of End of Campaign</u>	<u>On Continent as of End of Campaign</u>	<u>In Combat as of End of Campaign</u>	<u>Avg Nr in Combat</u>
Normandy 6 Jun-24 Jul 1944	22	20	16	11.5
Western France and Brittany 25 Jul-26 Aug 1944	25	20	20	18
Eastern France and Siegfried Line 27 Aug-16 Dec 1944	48	41	41	26.5
Ardennes 17 Dec 1944-28 Jan 1945	54	54	47	45
West of the Rhine River 29 Jan-24 Mar 1945	61	61	55	51.5
Eastern Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia 25 Mar-8 May 1945	61	61	60	58

a. The overall average number of divisions in combat during the period 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 was 28. There were 3 divisions in southern France after 15 August which came under SHAEF control on 15 September but are not included here until 1 November.

SOURCE: Roland G. Puppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (U.S. Army in World War II), II, (Washington, 1959), 282-83.

TABLE 31

Ninth AF Effective Strength  
by Number of Groups and Type Aircraft  
Jun 1944 - May 1945

<u>Month</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Avg Groups</u> <u>Operative</u>	<u>Avg A/C</u> <u>On Hand</u>	<u>Avg Eff</u> <u>A/C</u>	<u>Avg Eff A/C</u> <u>Per Group</u>
<u>1944</u>					
<u>Jun<sup>a</sup></u>	Bombers	11	869	620	56
	Fighters	18	1,385	1,009	56
Jul	Bombers	11	874	617	56
	Fighters	18	1,218	912	49
Aug	Bombers	11	738	610	55
	Fighters	18.67	1,189	942	50
Sep	Bombers	11	841	665	60
	Fighters	17.67	1,190	947	54
Oct	Bombers	11	739	615	56
	Fighters	18.20	1,199	952	52
Nov	Bombers	11	734	578	52
	Fighters	15.17	996	822	54
Dec	Bombers	11	723	572	52
	Fighters	14.67	938	780	53
<u>1945</u>					
<u>Jan</u>	Bombers	11	727	584	53
	Fighters	14.67	821	683	47
Feb	Bombers	11	710	533	48
	Fighters	15.17	922	781	51
Mar	Bombers	11	724	563	51
	Fighters	15.67	1,086	960	61
Apr	Bombers	11	749	592	54
	Fighters	15.67	1,137	1,026	65
<u>May<sup>b</sup></u>	Bombers	11.70	749	608	52
	Fighters	17.67	1,306	1,144	65

a. Entire month. b. 1-8 May.

SOURCE: 26th Statistical Control Unit, Statistical Summary of Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oct 43-8 May 45.

TABLE 32

First Tactical AF Effective Strength  
by Number of Groups and Type Aircraft  
Nov 1944 - May 1945

<u>Month</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Avg Groups</u> <u>Operative</u>	<u>Avg A/C</u> <u>On Hand</u>	<u>Avg Eff</u> <u>A/C</u>	<u>Avg Eff A/C</u> <u>Per Group</u>
<u>1944</u>					
Nov	Bombers	2	24	16	8
	Fighters	4	249	188	47
Dec	Bombers	2	162	112	56
	Fighters	4	302	199	50
<u>1945</u>					
Jan	Bombers	2	149	111	56
	Fighters	4	268	187	47
Feb	Bombers	2	164	131	66
	Fighters	5	279	206	41
Mar	Bombers	2	181	156	78
	Fighters	5	413	326	65
Apr	Bombers	2	176	155	78
	Fighters	5	416	335	67
May	Bombers	2	170	153	77
	Fighters	5	427	351	70

SOURCE: First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.

**TABLE 33**  
Eighth AF Effective Strength  
by Number of Groups and Type Aircraft  
May 1944 - Apr 1945

<u>Month</u>	<u>Avg HB</u> <u>Groups</u>	<u>Avg Eff</u> <u>Bomber Strength</u>	<u>Avg Ftr</u> <u>Groups</u>	<u>Avg Eff Ftr</u> <u>Strength</u>
<u>1944</u>				
May	38½	1,304	15	856
Jun	40½	2,123	15	885
Sep	40½	1,831	15	875
Dec	39½	1,826	15	1,010
<u>1945</u>				
Apr	38½	2,018	15	1,001

SOURCE: Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45, pp 8-15.

TABLE 34

ETO Tactical Air Sorties  
All U.S. Air Forces--by Phase  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

Type	Air Superiority		Interdiction		Close Support		Total	
	Sorties	Percent	Sorties	Percent	Sorties	Percent	Sorties	Percent
Bombers	18,459	11	114,536	70	30,611	19	163,606	100
Fighters	<u>103,961</u>	31	<u>134,658</u>	41	<u>86,844</u>	28	<u>225,463</u>	100
TOTAL	122,420	25	249,194	51	117,455	24	489,069	100

ETO Tactical Air Sorties  
All U.S. Air Forces--by Phase  
Per Day and by Division  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

Phase	Sorties		AVE NR Sorties	
	Sorties	Per Day	Per Day	Per Day
Air Superiority	122,420		364	13.0
Interdiction	249,194		742	26.5
Close Support	<u>117,455</u>		<u>350</u>	<u>12.5</u>
TOTAL	489,069		<u>1,456</u>	<u>52.0</u>

a. Average based on 28 divisions in combat.

SOURCES: Eighth AF Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 44-Apr 45; First Tactical AF (Proc), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45; USSBS and Air Effects Code, 12th Army Group, Effect of Air Power on Military Operations--West. Europe, 1944.

TABLE 35  
 Ninth AF and First Tactical AF Sorties by Phase  
 6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945<sup>a</sup>

Type	Air Superiority			Interdiction			Close Support			Total		
	Eff Sorties	%	Avg PerDay	Eff Sorties	%	Avg PerDay	Eff Sorties	%	Avg PerDay	Eff Sorties	%	Avg PerDay
Bombers	4,165	5	13.4	56,222	74	65	15,634	21	49	76,021	100	226
Fighters	<u>58,489</u>	22.8	197	<u>114,046</u>	44.6	347	<u>83,415</u>	32.6	275	<u>255,950</u>	100	819
TOTAL	62,654	18.8	186	170,268	51.2	506	99,049	30	295	331,971	100	988

a. First Tactical Air Force Operations from 1 November 1944.

b. Based on average of 28 divisions in combat.

SOURCES: USSBS and Air Effects Cmte, 12th Army Group, Effect of Air Power on Military Operations--Western Europe, 1945; First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.



TABLE 38

Eighth AF Tactical Sorties by Phase  
6 Jun 1944 - 3 May 1945

<u>Type</u>	<u>Air Superiority</u>		<u>Interdiction</u>		<u>Close Support</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Bombers	14,294	17	58,264	67	14,977	17	87,535	100
Fighters	<u>45,472</u>	65	<u>20,612</u>	30	<u>3,429</u>	5	<u>69,513</u>	100
TOTAL	59,766	38	78,876	50	18,406	12	157,048	100

SOURCE: Eighth AF Monthly Summary of Operations.

TABLE 39  
Eighth AF Tactical Sorties in Close Support  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945<sup>a</sup>

<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Bomber	14,977	40,536.7
Fighter	<u>3,429</u>	<u>512.0</u>
TOTAL	18,406	41,048.7

a. The last close support mission was flown on 16 April 1945.

SOURCE: Eighth AF Monthly Summary of Operations.

TABLE 40

Eighth AF Tactical Sorties in Close Support by Time Period  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945<sup>a</sup>

<u>6 Jun - 25 Jul 1944</u>			<u>26 Jul - 26 Aug 1944</u>		
<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Bomber	3,752	8,982.0	Bomber	1,316	4,883.60
Fighter	<u>1,724</u>	<u>128.3</u>	Fighter	<u>1,020</u>	<u>334.07</u>
Total	5,476	9,110.3	Total	2,336	5,217.67
<u>27 Aug - 16 Dec 1944</u>			<u>17 Dec 1944 - 28 Jan 1945</u>		
<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Bomber	2,492	7,950.1	Bomber	2,950	7,948.4
Fighter	<u>113</u>	<u>28.3</u>	Fighter	<u>85</u>	<u>21.3</u>
Total	2,605	7,978.4	Total	3,035	7,969.7
<u>29 Jan - 24 Mar 1945</u>			<u>25 Mar - 16 Apr 1945</u>		
<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Bomber	1,563	3,231.1	Bomber	2,904	7,541.5
Fighter	<u>437</u>	<u>0</u>	Fighter	<u>50</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	2,000	3,231.1	Total	2,954	7,541.5

<sup>a</sup>. The last close support mission was flown 16 Apr 1945.

SOURCE: Eighth AF Monthly Summary of Operations.

**TABLE 41**  
Eighth AF Major Tactical Targets  
Sorties and Tonnage  
17 Aug 1942 - 8 May 1945<sup>a</sup>

<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Eff Bomb Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Bridges, canals, aqueducts	10,147	28,454
Viaducts	1,538	4,543
Communications centers	2,258	5,938
Marshalling yards <sup>b</sup>	71,996	189,514
R.R. shops & stations	2,443	6,520
Cross roads & junctions	<u>180</u>	<u>341</u>
Total	88,562	235,310
<u>Airfields</u>	15,043	35,958
<u>Tactical Targets</u>	15,793	43,392
Area or pattern "blanket" bombing, choke points, coastal batteries, defended localities, troop concentrations, gun positions		
<u>Military Installations</u>	6,473	15,284
<u>Noball &amp; Crossbow Targets</u>	<u>10,624</u>	<u>30,448</u>
TOTAL	136,495	360,392

- <sup>a</sup>. Almost all of the tactical tonnages dropped by the Eighth Air Force came after 1 April 1944.
- <sup>b</sup>. It is impossible to distinguish between strategic and tactical targets in this category. It is likely that at least half of this effort was tactical.

SOURCE: Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45, pp 38-39.

TABLE 42

Ninth AF Tonnage by Type Target  
1 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Target</u>	<u>Bombers</u>		<u>Fighters</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>%</u>
Troops, armor & motor transport	17,415	16.2	24,051	41.3	41,466	25.0
Communications	4,816	4.5	55	.1	4,871	2.9
Military installations	3,176	3.0	1,315	2.3	4,491	2.7
Bridges (RR & highways)	23,317	21.7	5,482	9.4	28,799	17.4
Marshalling yards	19,167	17.8	8,880	15.3	28,047	16.9
Towns & buildings	8,374	7.8	3,840	6.6	12,214	7.4
Roads	3,079	2.9	210	.4	3,289	2.0
Rail cuttings	3,288	3.0	7,737	13.3	11,025	6.6
Airfields	1,641	1.5	1,172	2.0	2,813	1.7
Canal & river traffic			122	.2	122	.1
Industrial targets	400	.4	320	.5	720	.4
Port areas	2,012	1.9	523	.9	2,535	1.5
V-weapon sites	2,220	2.0	25	.0	2,245	1.4
Gun positions	2,466	2.2	2,911	5.0	5,377	3.2
Dumps (fuel, ammo, & supply)	16,236	15.1	1,597	2.7	17,833	10.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107,607</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>58,240</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>165,847</b>	<b>100.0</b>

SOURCES: 26th Statistical Control Unit, Ninth AF Annual Statistical Summary, 1944, and Monthly Statistical Summary, Jan-May 45.

TABLE 43

First Tactical AF Tonnage by Type Target  
1 Nov 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Target</u>	<u>Tonnage Dropped</u>
Rail traffic	3,423.1
Cities	4,100.4
Marshalling yards	3,434.8
Troop concentrations	1,976.1
M/T & tanks	1,324.3
Bridges	3,633.4
Military installations	3,594.0
Dumps	3,574.8
Industries	317.8
Airfields & A/D	<u>411.8</u>
TOTAL	25,790.5

SOURCE: First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.

TABLE 44

ETO Tactical Operations—All U.S. Air Forces<sup>a</sup>  
Claims against Ground Targets  
1 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locomotives	10,704	6,780
Railroad cars	60,422	94,548
Armored vehicles & tanks	5,093	4,472
Motor vehicles	66,701	26,960
Horse-drawn vehicles	7,299	1,918
Gun emplacements & flak towers	3,984	2,700
Vessels & barges	923	1,811
Dumps	709	440
Railroad cuts	7,555	
Oil storage tanks	60	126
Bridges	408	445
Hangars & miscellaneous buildings	22,125	10,831
Troops killed	1,338 <sup>b</sup>	

a. Eighth AF bomber claims are not included.  
b. First Tactical AF only.

SOURCE: Derived from following tables showing claims by Eighth AF, Ninth AF, and First Tactical AF.

**TABLE 45**  
Ninth AF Claims  
against Ground Targets  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Motor transports	53,791	22,546
Armored vehicles & tanks	4,509	3,751
Locomotives	5,753	2,677
Railroad cars	43,317	51,269
Bridges	360	328
Gun emplacements	3,361	1,649
Dumps	665	402
Hangars	135	118
Factories & misc bldgs	11,073	6,341
Railroads cut	6,066	
Vessels & barges	770	955
Horse-drawn vehicles	6,312	1,362

SOURCE: 26th Statistical Control Unit, Statistical Summary of Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oct 43-8 May 45.

TABLE 46

First Tactical AF Claims  
against Ground Targets  
1 Nov 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
<u>Transportation</u>		
Locomotives	830	1,748
Railroad cars	9,638	18,084
Rail cuts	1,489	0
Railroad sheds	4	3
Marshalling yards	0	452
Motor transport	8,063	7,217
Horse-drawn vehicles	987	556
Horses killed	56	
Road blocks	311	
Bridges	48	117
Tunnels	1	32
Tugboats	1	4
Barges	60	187
Pontoons	7	0
<u>Military Objectives &amp; Instls</u>		
Armored force vehicles	189	172
Tanks	218	307
Hangars	6	16
Dumps	44	38
Oil & gas tanks	5	0
Gun positions	359	607
Barrage balloons	5	0
Troops killed	1,338	
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Factories	5	13
Warehouses	2	0
Buildings	8,814	4,040
Dams	0	1
Radio stations	1	0
Towers	4	7

SOURCE: First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.

TABLE 47

Eighth AF Fighter Claims  
against Ground Targets  
1 Jun 1944 - 30 Apr 1945

<u>Target</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locomotives	4,121	2,355
Oil tank cars	1,421	1,398
Trains	12	128
Goods, wagons, & other R.R. cars	6,046	23,797
Armored vehicles & tanks	177	242
Flak towers & gun positions	260	437
Motor trucks	3,829	3,038
Other vehicles	1,018	711
Tug boats, barges, & freighters	92	665
R.R. stations & freighters	48	205
Radio & power stations	98	226
Oil storage tanks	55	126
Hangars & misc buildings	225	421

SOURCE: Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45, p 50.

TABLE 48

Ninth AF Personnel Casualties  
in Air Combat  
6 Jun 1944 -- 8 May 1945

<u>Month</u>	<u>Bomber</u>			<u>Fighter</u>		
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
<u>1944</u>						
Jun	45	149	80	17	180	15
Jul	24	163	59	19	147	40
Aug	31	186	62	19	177	27
Sep	17	51	18	13	65	11
Oct	29	60	30	9	86	11
Nov	27	61	20	9	91	7
Dec	35	310	68	16	164	29
<u>1945</u>						
Jan	39	65	62	6	75	33
Feb	43	268	66	6	84	9
Mar	58	150	43	10	118	8
Apr	12	93	31	6	81	11
May	—	—	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	360	1,556	540	131	1,270	202

SOURCES: 26th Statistical Control Unit, Ninth AF Annual Statistical Summary, 1944, and Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 44-May 45.

**TABLE 49**  
**First Tactical AF Personnel Casualties**  
**in Air Combat**  
**1 Nov 1944 - 8 May 1945**

<u>Type</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
Bomber	3	15	1
Fighter	<u>35</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	38	155	17

SOURCE: First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.

TABLE 50

Ninth AF Aircraft Casualties  
and Claims of Enemy Aircraft  
Destroyed and Damaged  
6 Jun 1944 - 8 May 1945

<u>Type</u>	<u>9th AF A/C</u>		<u>Enemy A/C</u>		
	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Cat-E</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>
Bomber	332	299	42	30	60
Fighter	<u>1,585</u>	<u>324</u>	<u>1,838</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>758</u>
TOTAL	1,917	623	1,880	236	818

SOURCES: 26th Statistical Control Unit, Ninth AF Annual Statistical Summary, 1944, and Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 44-May 45.

TABLE 51

First Tactical AF Aircraft Casualties  
and Claims of Enemy Aircraft  
Destroyed and Damaged  
1 Nov 1944 - 8 May 1945


<u>Type</u>	<u>1st Tac A/C</u>		<u>Enemy A/C</u>		
	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Cat-E</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>
Bomber	15	32	9	3	1
Fighter	<u>170</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>903</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>870</u>
TOTAL	185	131	912	78	871

SOURCE: First Tactical AF (Prov), Summary of Operations of American Units, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45.

SECTION II

\* \* \* \* \*

CHINA - BURMA - INDIA



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV (Chicago, 1950), 496.

VII. INDIA-BURMA CAMPAIGNS  
JANUARY 1944 - JUNE 1945

By the end of 1943 the Americans and British, after a long period of preparation, were readying four offensives along the India-Burma frontier. In the north Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell would lead Chinese and American forces of the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) from Ledo, in Assam, toward Myitkyina and Mandalay. From the vicinity of Imphal, south of Ledo, British Brig. Orde C. Wingate prepared for the airlift of his long-range penetration Special Force to positions behind Japanese lines in a move to outflank the enemy opposing Stilwell.\* At the same time, Lt. Gen. Sir William Slim, British Fourteenth Army commander, readied his 4 Corps to invade central Burma while simultaneously moving 15 Corps into Arakan along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. The success of the four offensives depended on the ability of the AAF and RAF to gain and hold air superiority throughout Burma and to conduct effective interdiction. Stilwell and Slim also depended upon airpower for close support as a substitute for artillery.<sup>1</sup>

After 15 December 1943, all AAF and practically all RAF units in the Burma campaigns were integrated in the theater-wide Eastern Air Command (EAC) under Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, AAF. The number of EAC squadrons varied from time to time, but during much of 1944 and early 1945 the Allies had 7 heavy and 7 medium bombardment squadrons and 28 fighter squadrons. This gave EAC a 15-month average operational strength of 71 heavy

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\*Wingate's Special Force was an airlifted, air-supplied assault force. Since its support activities were confined generally to air transportation of troops and air supply, its history is covered in a separate study on air-borne operations.

and 72 medium bombers and 516 fighters.\* Over the same period the Japanese 5 Air Division, Burma Area Army, had an average total strength of 66 medium and 35 light bombers and 215 fighters. The numerical superiority of EAC was enhanced by the quality of its latest fighter augmentation--P-51's, P-38's, and Spitfires, which far exceeded both the range and altitude of the earlier P-40's and Hurricanes.<sup>2</sup>

### The Counterair Offensive

The counterair offensive began in January 1944, and within five months EAC achieved air superiority over Burma--an advantage never lost. The Japanese reinforced their 5 Air Division from time to time, but, stung by their heavy losses of January-April, they gradually withdrew most of their air units from Burma to bases in Sumatra, Malaya, and Thailand. By the late spring of 1944 they had adopted a policy of conservation that bordered on inactivity. They abandoned attacks on Allied positions and sent up fewer and fewer aircraft, even in defense against AAF-RAF raids.<sup>3</sup> The success of EAC's counterair offensive soon affected the Japanese soldier at the front. Writing in his diary on 1 June 1944, a company officer in central Burma observed:<sup>4</sup>

Enemy aircraft are over continuously in all weather. We can do nothing but look at them. If we only had air power! Even one or two planes would be something. Superiority in the air is the decisive factor in victory.

The first five months of 1944 constituted the decisive phase of the counterair offensive. During this period the AAF and RAF destroyed respectively 274 and 75 enemy aircraft of all types and, in turn, lost through enemy action a total of 138 aircraft destroyed and 136 damaged. Some

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\*For monthly averages and other statistics, see tables following this chapter.

fighters were doubtless lost in close support operations, but most of the Allied losses occurred in counterair activity.<sup>5</sup>

### Interdiction

The enemy was particularly vulnerable to EAC's campaign of interdiction because of the peculiar lines of communication. Under Japanese occupation, Burma was a salient between China and India, its area of entry confined to a narrow base. Rangoon was the only port of access for large shipments by sea, and the sole ingress by railway was the line from Bangkok to Rangoon. The flow of reinforcements and supplies could be seriously hampered by air attacks concentrated on a relatively small region. Within Burma the lines of communications were equally limited. One railway and one unpaved highway, both closely paralleling the Irrawaddy River, led north from Rangoon to Mandalay and Myitkyina. Dirt roads fingered out toward China and Thailand on the east, toward India on the west. On the railway and roads, several hundred bridges carried traffic across the many deep ravines. The destruction of any two consecutive bridges on the railway or the roadways isolated the intervening sections and made locomotives, rolling stock, and motor vehicles motionless targets.<sup>6</sup>

Allied efforts at interdiction were very successful even during the early months of 1944. As early as June 1944 a Tokyo broadcast admitted trouble in Burma:<sup>7</sup>

Our . . . difficulty in operating on . . . the [Imphal] front lies in lack of supplies and air supremacy. The enemy received food supplies through the air route, while our men continued in battle eating a handful of barley or grain.


This state of near famine to which the Japanese army was reduced resulted from the widespread destruction by EAC medium and heavy bombers of bridges,

locomotives, motor vehicles, port facilities, and coastal and river craft. By October 1944, shipments over the Bangkok-Rangoon railway had fallen from a normal average of 800 tons a day to 150 tons; at about the same time the Rangoon-Mandalay railway was no more than partially operative; and in December the enemy abandoned Rangoon as a port of entry. As a result, the Japanese lacked military and medical supplies as well as food before the end of 1944, and they no longer dared dispatch important troop movements except during the hours of darkness. The counterair offensive and interdiction combined to reduce the Japanese in Burma to a state of siege that became more strangulating with each passing month.<sup>8</sup>

#### Close Air Support

The first test of air support came in north Burma, where Stilwell successfully pushed through the jungle from Shingbwiyang to Myitkyina with the aid of EAC aircraft. Fighters, sometimes assisted by medium bombers, blasted a path for the infantry through tangled underbrush that would otherwise have been practically impassable. At the same time the fighters and medium bombers hunted out and destroyed enemy strongpoints and supply dumps. During the siege of Myitkyina, 17 May to 3 August 1944, Stilwell continued to rely on aerial close support in lieu of the artillery he did not have. At Myitkyina, AAF fighters operated from airstrips less than 1,000 yards from the enemy and dive-bombed targets no more than 35 yards from Allied lines.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, ground operations had also gone well in central Burma and along the coast in Arakan, though in both instances initial misfortunes threatened disaster. The enemy undertook a strong offensive in February 1944 against the advancing 15 Corps in Arakan and hoped to take Chittagong



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, V (Chicago, 1953), 241.

in India. A month later, on 8 March, the Japanese anticipated Slim's central Burma offensive by a determined strike for Imphal. In both Arakan and before Imphal the enemy isolated superior forces by infiltration. In their predicament the British-Indian troops depended entirely upon air supply and, to a limited extent, air support. The Japanese, already feeling the effects of FAC's counterair and interdiction offensives, were unable to pursue their early success, and the tide turned against them.<sup>10</sup>

After the British broke the siege of Imphal in June 1944, they too depended on air support to cut a way for them through the jungle toward Mandalay. Even when they reached the Irrawaddy valley the Allies still depended on close support because the jungle, though behind them, remained a barrier to the transportation of artillery to the battle front. In the region of Mandalay the British Fourteenth Army and NCAC forces met and moved southward toward Rangoon, which fell on 3 May 1945. In this last phase of the campaign the Japanese became completely disorganized and sought only to withdraw into Thailand. Under these circumstances pockets of enemy forces became the targets of Allied aircraft. Consequently, close support became somewhat more free but not less effective in attacks on the retreating Japanese.<sup>11</sup>

The Eastern Air Command was disbanded on 1 June 1945, having fulfilled its purpose in the liberation of Burma, and the British and American elements prepared for new and separate campaigns that never occurred because of the end of the war. In the course of the 1944-45 campaigns, EAC aircraft flew a total of 207,223 sorties, dropped 68,900 tons of bombs, destroyed 502 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 116 more, and damaged 455. In turn, enemy action destroyed 369 EAC aircraft and damaged 479 others.<sup>12</sup>

**TABLE 52**  
**EAC Squadron Strength**  
**as of 1 Jul 1944**

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighter	3 P-40N	11 Hurricane	
	3 P-51 (including a few A-36 A/C)	8 Spitfire	
	<u>1</u> P-38	<u>2</u> Beaufighter	—
TOTAL	7	21 <sup>a</sup>	28
Medium bomber	5 B-25	1 Mitchell	
	—	<u>1</u> Wellington	—
TOTAL	5	2	7
Heavy bomber	4 B-24	3 Liberator	7

<sup>a</sup>. Vengeance and Mosquitc squadrons are not included as their role was relatively unimportant in the overall campaign.

SOURCE: Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939-1945, III (London, 1954), App XII.

TABLE 53

AAF Aircraft in EAC Operational Squadrons  
Number and Status by Monthly Average  
Jan 1944 - Apr 1945

	<u>Fighters</u>			<u>Medium Bombers</u>			<u>Heavy Bombers</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>
<u>1944</u>									
Jan	141	129	91.5	37	32	86.5	48	46	95.8
Feb	137	132	96.4	16	15	93.8	47	46	97.9
Mar	147	143	97.3	15	14	93.3	46	41	89.1
Apr	146	134	91.8	66	53	80.3	47	46	97.9
May	176	158	89.8	85	71	83.5	46	43	93.5
Jun	182	157	86.3	94	81	86.2	49	41	83.7
Jul	169	143	84.6	88	71	80.7	49	33	67.3
Aug	156	132	84.6	91	74	81.3	47	32	68.1
Sep	144	121	84.0	72	60	83.3	55	39	70.9
Oct	170	125	73.5	83	72	86.7	56	48	85.7
Nov	216	164	75.9	97	81	83.5	52	45	86.5
Dec	233	177	76.0	92	80	87.0	44	30	68.2
<u>1945</u>									
Jan	226	187	82.7	97	82	84.5	42	21	50.0
Feb	230	195	84.8	95	82	86.3	55	37	67.3
Mar	276	243	88.0	95	81	85.3	54	39	72.2
Apr	282	247	87.6	83	74	89.2	54	40	74.1

SOURCE: 22d SCU, AAF Aircraft Status Report, as reproduced in Stratemeyer's Despatch to Air CinC, SEA, 15 Dec 43-1 Jun 45, Apps.

TABLE 54

RAF Aircraft in EAC Operational Squadrons  
Number and Status by Monthly Average  
Jan 1944 - Mar 1945<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Fighters</u>			<u>Medium Bombers</u>			<u>Heavy Bombers</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>% Opnl</u>
<u>1944</u>									
Jan	435	357	82.1	33	25	75.8	31	15	48.4
Feb	469	388	82.7	33	25	75.8	32	16	50.0
Mar	521	439	84.3	32	18	56.2	29	17	58.6
Apr	509	440	86.4	32	23	71.9	32	12	37.5
May	461	400	86.8	29	18	62.1	30	13	43.3
Jun	305	265	86.9	25	13	52.0	32	12	37.5
Jul	245	218	89.0	16	10	62.5	33	19	57.6
Aug	239	190	79.5	14	9	64.3	37	29	78.4
Sep	254	206	81.1	<u>b</u>			46	30	65.2
Oct	321	267	83.2				46	38	82.6
Nov	380	316	83.2				50	34	68.6
Dec	524	453	86.5				60	48	80.0
<u>1945</u>									
Jan	552	464	84.1				89	74	83.1
Feb	498	463	93.0				80	68	85.0
Mar	584	531	90.9				77	63	81.8

a. RAF statistics not available for April 1945.

b. In September 1944 the RAF medium bomber squadrons were withdrawn, and their Wellingtons and Mitchells were replaced with Liberators.

SOURCE: 22d SCU compilation from RAF reports as reproduced in Stratemeyer's Despatch to Air CinC, SEA, 15 Dec 43-1 Jun 45, Apps.

TABLE 55

AAF and RAF Aircraft in EAC Operational Squadrons  
Total by Monthly Average  
Jan 1944 - Mar 1945<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Fighters</u>		<u>Medium Bombers</u>		<u>Heavy Bombers</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Opnl</u>
<u>1944</u>						
Jan	576	486				
Feb	606	520	70	57	79	61
Mar	668	582	49 <sup>b</sup>	40	79	62
Apr	655	574	47	32	75	58
May	637	558	98	76	79	58
Jun	487	422	114	89	76	56
Jul	414	361	119	94	81	53
Aug	395	322	104	81	82	52
Sep	398	327	105	83	84	61
Oct	491	392	72 <sup>c</sup>	60	101 <sup>d</sup>	69
Nov	596	480	83	72	102	86
Dec	757	634	97	81	102	79
<u>1945</u>						
Jan	778	651	92	80	104	78
Feb	728	658	97	82	131	95
Mar	860	774	95	82	135	105
			<u>95</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>102</u>
15-MONTH AVG	603	516	87	72	96	71

- <sup>a.</sup> April not included because RAF statistics for that month are not available.
- <sup>b.</sup> Reduction in medium bomber strength due to transfer of 22d and 491st Bomb Sqs (M) to Fourteenth Air Force to meet threat of Japanese offensive against airfields in China.
- <sup>c.</sup> Reduction in medium bomber strength due to decision to replace British medium bombers with heavy bombers.
- <sup>d.</sup> British medium bombers replaced with heavy bombers.

SOURCE: See two preceding tables.

TABLE 56

Japanese 5 Air Division Aircraft  
Strength and Location

Area	January 1944			November 1944			January 1945					
	Ftrs	MB	LB	Total	Ftrs	MB	LB	Total	Ftrs	MB	LB	Total
Upper Burma	47	9	-	56	10	-	12	22.	-	-	-	-
Rangoon	59	18	-	77	64	-	-	64	75	-	-	75
Sumatra	-	81	36	117	218	24	-	242	69	18	-	87
Malaya	-	-	-	-	32	20	-	52	42	26	-	68
Thailand	-	-	-	-	30	-	23	53	-	3	35	38
TOTAL	106	108	36	250 <sup>a</sup>	354	44	35	433	186	47	35	268

a. Also there were 18 fighter and 9 bomber reconnaissance aircraft, giving a total strength of 277. This total is still 8 less than the 285 given by Mountbatten in his report to CCS.

SOURCES: USSBS 67, Air Operations in China, Burma, India--World War II, p 13; AAF Evaluation Board, China and India Burma Theater, Rpt 3, 15 Nov 44, and Rpt 5, 15 Jan 45; Stratemyer's Despatch to air CinC, SEA, 15 Dec 43-1 Jun 45.

TABLE 57  
EAC Interdiction Operations

Approximate distribution of effort by targets

<u>Target types</u>	<u>Percentage of Effort</u>
Railways	54
Other communications	18
Coastal shipping	6
Gasoline facilities and supply dumps	6
Miscellaneous	<u>16</u>
	100%

Damage to the enemy

Bridges destroyed (all types)	500 <del>7</del>
Coastal and river craft destroyed	3,428
Locomotives destroyed	130 <sup>a</sup>
Motor vehicles destroyed	1,500 <del>7</del>
Gasoline production facilities destroyed	90%
Gasoline storage facilities destroyed	85%

a. The loss of locomotives was very serious in view of the fact that the total number available to the Japanese did not exceed 186. The destruction of 130 left the enemy with a maximum of 56.

SOURCES: 22d SCU, Year Book, 1944, for IB & China; USSBS 67, p 46; W. Frank Craven & James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, V (Chicago, 1953), 239-40.

TABLE 58

Statistical Summary of EAC Combat Operations  
Jan 1944 - Apr 1945

<u>Total Offensive</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Bomb Tons</u>
Fighters	181,890	31,134
Medium bombers	16,673	17,525
Heavy bombers	8,660	20,241
TOTAL	207,223	68,900 <sup>a</sup>
<u>Counterair Offensive (Jan-Dec 44)</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	
Fighters	55,100	
Medium bombers	3,551 <sup>b</sup>	
TOTAL	58,651	(58,651)
<u>Interdiction (Jan 44-Apr 45)</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	
Medium bombers	11,298 <sup>c</sup>	
Heavy bombers	8,660 <sup>d</sup>	
TOTAL	19,958	(19,958)
<u>Close Support (Jan 44-Apr 45)</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	
Fighters		
Shingbwiyang to Myitkyina (Jan-May 44)	7,682	
Myitkyina to Mandalay (May 44-Feb 45)	27,049 <sup>e</sup>	
Imphal to Mandalay (Mar 44-Feb 45)	19,678 <sup>f</sup>	
Mandalay to Rangoon (Feb-May 45)	67,591 <sup>g</sup>	
Campaign in Arakan (Feb 44-May 45)	4,790	
TOTAL	126,790	
Medium bombers (Shingbwiyang to Myitkyina)	1,824	
TOTAL for close support	128,614	(128,614)
GRAND TOTAL Sorties		207,223

- a. It is not possible, with the available source material, to break down tonnage among counterair, interdiction, and close support operations.
- b. This figure is only a rough estimate. It is based on the assumption that of the 10,750 total medium bomber sorties of 1944 approximately 50% flew in interdiction operations, and 50%, less the 1,824 sorties in support of Stilwell's advance from Shingbwiyang, went for counterair operations.

$$\frac{10,750}{2} = 5,375 - 1,824 = 3,551$$

(contd)

(contd)

- c. This figure represents 50% of the medium bomber sorties in 1944 and all of the medium bomber sorties in 1945, since the counterair offensive had practically ended with the withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from Burma by the end of 1944.

$$5,375 + 5,923 = 11,298$$

- d. All heavy bomber sorties are considered as part of interdiction because, in the strict sense, there were so few EAC strategic missions.
- e. This total includes the missions flown during the siege of Myitkyina when it was possible for one pilot to fly as many as six missions in one day. The fighter aircraft, based on the Myitkyina airstrip, were so close to enemy lines that a mission could be completed, from takeoff to touchdown, in 20 minutes.
- f. This figure includes the support given the British 4 Corps during the Japanese siege of Imphal and, later, during the Allied offensive against the Japanese from Imphal to the region of Mandalay.
- g. The total is surprisingly high, but that is because the nature of the war changed after the fall of Mandalay. The enemy was thereafter in full retreat to the south and east, and the Japanese army, dispersed in small groups without air cover, was under constant attack by AAF-RAF fighter aircraft.

SOURCES: Stratemeyer's Despatch, 1 Jun 45, Apps 3 & 5; USSBS 67; 22d SCU and RAF operational reports.

TABLE 59

Summary of EAC and Enemy Aircraft Losses  
1944 - 1945

Eastern Air Command Losses

Destroyed by	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Enemy action	<u>115</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>369</u>
Other than enemy action	<u>216</u>	<u>310</u>	<u>526</u>
TOTAL EAC A/C destroyed	<u>331</u>	<u>564</u>	<u>895</u>

Damaged by			
Enemy action	292	187	479
Other than enemy action	<u>189</u>	<u>379</u>	<u>568</u>
TOTAL EAC A/C damaged	<u>481</u>	<u>566</u>	<u>1,047</u>


Japanese Losses  
(as Claimed by EAC)

	<u>Destroyed</u>				<u>Probably Destroyed</u>				<u>Damaged</u>			
	<u>AAF</u>		<u>RAF</u>		<u>AAF</u>		<u>RAF</u>		<u>AAF</u>		<u>RAF</u>	
	F	B	F	B	F	B	F	B	F	B	F	B
In air	159	22	87	17	42	2	43	3	120	15	178	5
On ground	<u>118</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	<u>277</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>17</u>

Overall Total Enemy Losses

	<u>Fighters</u>			<u>Bombers</u>			<u>Grand Total</u>
	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>AAF</u>	<u>RAF</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Destroyed	277	100	377	97	28	125	502
Prob dest	61	46	107	6	3	9	116
Damaged	<u>194</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>455</u>
TOTAL	<u>532</u>	<u>352</u>	<u>884</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>1,073</u>

SOURCES: EAC Adjudication Board; Stratemeyer's Despatch, 1 Jun 45, Appx 9-14; Tenth AF Statistical Review, Oct 45, Special Sup, pp 8-9; USSBS 67, pp 11-18.



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, V (Chicago, 1953), 216.

## VIII. EAST CHINA CAMPAIGNS—1944

Beginning in the spring of 1944 and continuing through most of that year, the Japanese carried out Operation Ichigo. It had three major objectives: (1) denial to the Fourteenth Air Force of all bases in central and eastern China, particularly those along the Peiping-Canton-Hanoi railway corridors; (2) establishment of an overland line of communication and supply between Manchuria in the north and Indochina in the south, as a means of partially compensating for the tremendous losses being sustained in ocean shipping; and (3) overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and withdrawal of China from the war.<sup>1</sup> The major Ichigo campaigns were in Honan and Hunan provinces.

In conducting Ichigo, the Japanese employed large forces, concentrating them in the Yellow River bend area, in the Hankow environs, and around Canton. Opposing Chinese armies, hopelessly outclassed in training, equipment, provisions, morale, and with one or two exceptions in leadership, although superior in number, were almost totally ineffective throughout the campaigns.<sup>2</sup>

The only American combat force in China—the Fourteenth Air Force—almost single-handedly took on both the Japanese air and ground forces. Although the Fourteenth exacted huge tolls of Japanese men and equipment and frequently thwarted Japanese schedules, it could not contain the enemy advances for the simple reason that it could neither assemble sufficient forces nor even supply adequately those on hand. Supplies, particularly fuel, had to be transported from India into China by air over the Himalayan

"Hump" and took as much as two months to reach the using bases in central and eastern China. With ample forces and supplies the Fourteenth might have stemmed the Japanese advances and defeated Operation Ichigo by "logistics starvation," as almost happened on several occasions.<sup>3</sup>

#### Honan Campaign (April - June 1944)

On 19 April, about two weeks earlier than expected, 110,000 Japanese attacked south and west from Kaifeng on the Yellow River and northward from Hankow on the Yangtze. In less than two months, the Japanese succeeded in their major goal—obtaining control of the railway corridor between the two rivers—in spite of a 20-day defense of Loyang by the Chinese, which slowed and then halted the Japanese drive westward along the Yellow River.

When the Japanese began their attacks the Fourteenth was in process of moving four fighter squadrons (with 18 P-40's) and one bomber squadron (with 12 B-25's) of its Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW) into primitive air bases near Sian, west of the great bend of the Yellow River, some 250 to 400 miles from the expected battle area. The inexperienced CACW squadrons began operations on 5 May and during the following weeks, despite bad weather, carried out a relentless interdiction campaign against Japanese forward supply lines. Although outnumbered in the air, the small force of 60 aircraft succeeded in establishing and maintaining air superiority. CACW slowed the enemy's advance by forcing him to shift from motorized to slower, dispersed cavalry and infantry drives, and it hampered logistical support to the point where Japanese exploitation of victories was appreciably slowed down.

From 5 May 1944 until the close of the Honan campaign in mid-June,

CACW claimed destruction of 28 Japanese aircraft in the air and 9 on the ground, against the loss of 24 to the Japanese and 29 in accidents. The CACW flew 1,158 sorties and claimed the destruction of 1,000 to 1,500 troops (a postwar Japanese statement put their total Honan losses at 869 fatalities and 2,280 wounded); the destruction of 606 tanks, trucks, locomotives, and rail cars, the probable destruction of another 31, and the damaging of 228; and the sinking of 9,910 tons of river shipping.<sup>4</sup>

#### Hunan Campaign (May - August 1944)

With the Honan drive virtually complete, the Japanese on 26 May 1944 unleashed a drive southward from Hankow toward Hengyang, railhead for two branches—one going southwest through Liuchow to Indochina and the other southeast to Canton. Capture of the Fourteenth Air Force's bases in this area of east-central China constituted the primary objective of Ichigo.

The Japanese encountered little ground resistance and easily encircled and captured Changsha, more than halfway to Hengyang. Not until the Japanese reached Hengyang did the Chinese react strongly. Here, they heroically held for 49 days until 8 August, when only 300 defenders remained.

The bulk of the defense effort against this drive from Hankow fell to the 68th Composite Wing, composed of P-40's, P-38's, and P-51's of the 23d Fighter Group and B-25's of the 11th Bombardment Squadron. Detachments of other fighter and bomber squadrons joined the fray from time to time, but they soon withdrew as fuel supplies and, then, bases disappeared.

Initially, the 68th concentrated on Japanese troop and supply movements between Hankow and Changsha. When the latter fell, the 68th devoted its efforts to (1) the enemy's close-in supply funnel area between Hankow and Changsha and (2) the battleground area between Changsha and Hengyang.

With its pilots flying as many as five or six sorties a day and employing ground-air liaison teams, the 68th killed large numbers of troops, closed down river supply movements, and brought troop and supply movement to a virtual standstill during the daylight hours. In addition, the 68th parachuted food and ammunition to the Hengyang defenders and acted as their artillery.

The 68th's operations forced the Japanese to lift the siege of Hengyang while awaiting replacements and supplies. In renewing the siege, the Japanese showed a lack of vigor. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture, the 68th exhausted its gasoline stocks, and between 17 and 24 July virtually all of its aircraft remained grounded. The Japanese regrouped and finally took the city. Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, commander of the Fourteenth Air Force, felt that with adequate gasoline supplies the 68th and its 90 aircraft could have logistically strangled the Japs, caused their retreat to Hankow, and ended Operation Ichigo.<sup>5</sup>

#### Drive on Liuchow (September - November 1944)

Having captured Hengyang and one-half of the 68th's air bases, the Japanese paused to bring up supplies required to resume the offensive. However, the 68th kept up a relentless interdiction effort on the supply lines. A postwar Japanese study revealed that the Japanese army wanted to accrue a modest supply inventory of 400 tons at Hengyang prior to resuming the offensive. The 68th's air attacks were so successful that in the month following the fall of Hengyang the Japanese could stockpile only 100 tons.

In September, with the supply situation showing little improvement, the Japanese opened the third phase of Ichigo—a drive southward from

Hengyang along the railroad corridor to Liuchow and a second drive westward from Canton along the Si (West) River toward Liuchow and Nanning, near the Indochina border. Again, Chinese ground resistance was practically nil. By early November the remaining Fourteenth air bases, including the major ones of Kweilin and Liuchow, had fallen.

As in the earlier phases, only the Fourteenth Air Force provided effective resistance. Despite the continuing loss of bases, the 68th Wing's small force of fighters and bombers took a heavy toll of troops and supplies, but they could only delay, not defeat, the enemy. The toll, however, was sufficiently high to make the Japanese victory a hollow one and forestall the possibility of drives on Kunming and Chungking.<sup>6</sup>

Japanese commanders after the war attributed at least 75 percent of the total resistance in China to the Fourteenth Air Force, which in 1944 received monthly supplies adequate to support less than one infantry division. Statistics for the period between 26 May and November 1944 reveal graphically this air effort by less than 100 aircraft.<sup>7</sup>

TABLE 60

Fourteenth AF in East China Campaign  
Total Sorties by Type Aircraft  
May - Dec 1944

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>26 May-31 Jul 44</u>	<u>1 Aug-31 Dec 44</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	4,454	4,761	9,215
B-25's	583	226	809
B-24's	197	194	391
Photo recon	<u>53</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>232</u>
TOTAL	5,287	5,360	10,647

SOURCE: Draft Hist, 14th AF, pp 446, 485.

TABLE 61

23d Fighter Group in East China Campaign  
Total Sorties by Aircraft on Hand and in Commission  
May - Nov 1944

<u>1944</u>	<u>Total Sorties</u> <sup>a</sup>	<u>Sorties per A/C on Hand</u>	<u>Sorties per A/C in Commission</u>
26 May-June	1,907	-	-
July	2,000 <sup>b</sup>	27	35
August	2,050 <sup>b</sup>	27	36
September	2,514	28	38
October	2,000	23	28
November	675	8	10

a. Includes 118th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

b. Approximate.

SOURCES: 24th SCU, Analysis of Fighter Operations of 14th AF, Jul 44-Feb 45, & Summary of Operations, 9 Oct 43-15 Dec 44.

TABLE 62  
Fourteenth AF Aircraft Losses  
East China Campaign  
May - Dec 1944

	<u>26 May-31 Jul 44</u>	<u>1 Aug-31 Dec 44</u>	<u>Total</u>
Aerial combat	3	5	8
Ground fire	7	10	17
Other causes	<u>33</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>65</u>
TOTAL	43	47	90

TABLE 63  
Japanese Aircraft Losses  
East China Campaign  
May - Dec 1944

	<u>26 May-31 Jul 44</u>	<u>1 Aug-31 Dec 44</u>	<u>Total</u>
Destroyed	114	293	407
Probably destroyed	65	79	144
Damaged	<u>99</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>301</u>
TOTAL	278	574	852

SOURCE: Draft Hist, 14th AF, pp 446, 485-86.

TABLE 64

Fourteenth AF Claims against Japanese Targets  
East China Campaign--1944

<u>Target</u>	<u>26 May-31 Jul 44</u>			<u>1 Aug-31 Dec 44</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Prob Dest</u>	<u>Dmgd</u>
Troops	13,238	2,100	-	7,193	200	-	20,431	2,300	-
Tanks, trucks, etc.	595	-	1,359	641	-	1,313	1,236	-	2,672
Bridges	14	-	42	23	-	62	37	-	104
Shipping									
Small	1,142	61	3,498	555	-	2,168	1,697	61	5,666
Large	24	2	42	54	-	102	78	2	144
Navy ships	-	-	-	4	1	-	4	1	-

SOURCE: Draft Hist, 14th AF, pp 446,486.

TABLE 65

Fourteenth AF Support to Ground Troops  
Hankow - Kweilin Area--Jul - Sep 1944

A 24th SCU special study of November 1944, Air Support of Ground Troops, contains the following statistics on operations in the area between Hankow and Kweilin during July-September 1944 (Kweilin-Liuchow and Canton-Liuchow-Nanning battle areas are not included):

Average Number of AAF Aircraft Deployed: 20 heavy bombers (B-24)  
29 medium bombers (B-25)  
80 fighters (P-40, P-38, P-51)

Tactical Sorties Flown:

	Forward Supply Area			Forward Tactical Area			Total Sorties		
	Ftr	MB	HB	Ftr	MB	HB	Ftr	MB	HB
Jul	581	126	137	1,209	112	-	1,790	238	137
Aug	442	90	119	1,317	107	-	1,759	197	119
Sep	148	13	55	1,640	472	39	1,788	492	94
TOTAL	1,171	229	311	4,166	698	39	5,337	927	350
			Total			Total			Total
			844			1,321			2,165
			651			1,424			2,075
			216			2,158			2,374
			1,711			4,903			6,614

Monthly Sortie Rate per Aircraft: 5.9/heavy bomber  
10.8/medium bomber  
22.5/fighter

AAF Aircraft Lost in Three Months: 52 fighters  
6 medium bombers  
7 heavy bombers  
65 -- Total (most of these during siege of Hengyang)

(contd)  
Tons of Bombs Expended (By Type of Aircraft & Mission):

	<u>Forward Supply Area</u>			<u>Forward Tactical Area</u>			<u>Total</u>					
	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>HB</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>HB</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>HB</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jul	47.4	103.3	216.6	367.3	118.2	74.1	-	192.3	165.6	177.4	216.6	559.6
Aug	57.3	83.3	181.8	322.4	204.9	96.9	-	301.8	262.2	180.2	181.8	624.2
Sep	<u>23.5</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>123.4</u>	<u>158.8</u>	<u>322.9</u>	<u>359.9</u>	<u>54.8</u>	<u>737.6</u>	<u>346.4</u>	<u>371.8</u>	<u>178.2</u>	<u>896.4</u>
TOTAL	128.2	198.5	521.8	848.5	646.0	530.9	54.8	1,231.7	774.2	729.4	576.6	2,080.2

Rounds of 50-Cal Ammunition Expended:

	<u>By Ftr</u>	<u>By MB</u>	<u>By HB</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jul	704,762	51,235	12,643	768,640
Aug	525,375	109,130	15,200	649,705
Sep	<u>620,206</u>	<u>92,125</u>	<u>6,535</u>	<u>718,866</u>
TOTAL	1,850,343	252,490	34,378	2,137,211

Emergency Air Supply (Siege of Hengyang): 3 P-40's, 44 B-25's and 27 C-47's dropped approximately 100 tons of food and ammunition.

(contd)  
Damage to Enemy:


<u>Target</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Aircraft	44	22	59
Troops	13,135	-	2,000
Horses	3,594	-	-
Motor vehicles	1,311	-	3,193
Large boats	30	23	136
Small boats	1,068	-	12,316
Gun positions	61	15	23
Bridges	35	2	76
RR locomotives	7	-	31
RR cars	4	-	100
Tanks & armored cars	8	-	49
POL & ammo dumps	23	-	32
Warehouse areas	7	-	76
RR yards	-	-	7
Power & radio stations	2	-	7
Dock & boat yards	2	-	4
Airdromes	1	-	17
Barrack & bivouac areas	35	-	112
Buildings	150	-	245
Compounds	89	-	715
Villages	1	-	86

SOURCE: 24th SCU, Air Support of Ground Troops, Nov 1944.

SECTION III

\* \* \* \* \*

THE PACIFIC



Reproduced from V.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV (Chicago, 1950), Frontispiece.

## IX. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

### The Fifth Air Force

The Far East Air Force was the first Army air force to engage in extended combat action in World War II. Although badly mauled by the Japanese attack on the Philippines on 8 December and operating against overwhelming odds—with inadequate facilities, few supplies, and very few reinforcements--the Far East Air Force exacted a toll from the enemy far in excess of its meager means. In January the remnants of its bomber and fighter units stationed in the Philippines were sent to Java to help delay Japanese advances in the Netherlands Indies. In February it was redesignated the Fifth Air Force, but its fortunes did not improve as the Japanese speedily conquered the Indies. From the Indies, surviving air units retreated to Australia where, in April, they came under the Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. It was not until 3 September 1942 that the Fifth Air Force was formally established at Brisbane, Australia, with Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney as its commanding general.<sup>1</sup>

Between 4 and 8 May 1942, Fifth Air Force planes, operating from Australian bases, aided the Navy in carrying out reconnaissance over vast stretches of the Coral Sea, the water route by which the Japanese were attempting to sweep southward to Australia and New Caledonia. The Battle of the Coral Sea, a great air battle, was the first major defeat of the Japanese and marked a turning point of the Pacific War.<sup>2</sup>

Denied the Coral Sea route to Port Moresby, the best potential springboard to an invasion of Australia from New Guinea, the Japanese extended

their hold on the northeast coast of the Papuan peninsula. From Buna and Gona, they launched a drive across the Owen Stanley Mountains toward Port Moresby. The Allies strengthened their forces at Port Moresby in September, Fifth Air Force transports bringing in 1,500 fresh troops from Australia. Fifth Air Force planes bombed and strafed the enemy, frustrating his efforts to reinforce and resupply his troops. The tide turned quickly and Allied troops pushed the Japanese back along the trails to Buna. During October and November, the Fifth's transports flew two regiments over the Owen Stanleys to jungle airstrips within a few miles of Buna and supplied them by air. Construction equipment, steel mats, and asphalt were moved in the same manner. Sick and wounded were evacuated on the return trips.<sup>3</sup>

The Fifth made its most important contribution to this campaign by maintaining control of the air. Japanese attacks against the ground forces were few and ineffective. After the P-38's went into action in December 1942, the American margin of air superiority over the Japanese widened steadily.<sup>4</sup>

By 22 January 1943, organized resistance in Papua was finished. The Fifth then launched almost daily attacks against enemy strongholds on the northeast New Guinea coast around Huon Gulf. Chief targets were Iae, the most active Japanese airfield in eastern New Guinea; Salamaua with its harbor and airfields; and Finschafen, shipping center and anchorage for seaplanes and tenders. In addition, the Fifth's planes supported ground troops in the Morobe area of New Guinea, bombed bases in the Bismarck Archipelago and the Netherlands Indies, and attacked shipping in the Bismarck Sea and surrounding waters.<sup>5</sup>

On 2-4 March 1943, Allied Air Forces fought the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. This action lasted about 48 hours from the time of sighting a 16-ship convoy carrying reinforcements to Lae until its destruction. In a total of 20 missions, Allied aircraft scored direct hits with approximately 35 percent of their bombs. Only four ships escaped--all destroyers. The Japanese maintained fighter cover over the convoy, but the Fifth's P-38's prevented them from effectively interfering with the bombers. Level bombing at medium altitude by B-17's and B-25's was closely followed by low, mast-level bombing by A-20's and B-25's. Australian Beaufighters afforded additional protection to the bombers by simultaneous deck- strafing. The Fifth lost one B-17, three P-38's, and 13 men in combat. The Japanese lost, according to their own admission, approximately 3,000 officers and men; less than 6,000 troops survived and fewer than 1,000 reached their destination.<sup>6</sup>

In mid-summer of 1943 the campaign for control of Huon Gulf was intensified. During August the Fifth's attacks on airfields at Wewak, farther west up the New Guinea coast, resulted in heavy enemy aircraft losses. The Fifth also strongly attacked the Alexishafen and Madang areas, along with major Japanese targets in the Hansa Bay area. By 4 September 1943, Allied ground forces, under protective air cover, were closing in on Lae and Salamaua. The following day, 84 C-47's dropped 1,700 American paratroops--fully supplied and equipped--at Nadzab, northwest of Lae, and on 6-7 September the C-47's ferried an Australian division to the Nadzab strip. The paratroops and Australians cut off the Japanese retreat route from the Salamaua-Lae region. The Allies captured Salamaua on 13 September and Lae on 16 September. Shortly thereafter, Allied ground forces landed six miles above Finschafen and took it on 2 October, completing control of Huon Gulf.<sup>7</sup>

The campaign for the Bismarck Archipelago began in October 1943. The Fifth Air Force and the Solomons-based Thirteenth Air Force increased the intensity of their attacks on Rabaul and dropped record bomb loads almost daily. By 11 November, they had neutralized Rabaul as a threat to the Allied landing on Bougainville in the Solomons. Allied troops landed on New Britain on 15 December; Cape Gloucester airfield fell on 30 December. The Admiralty Islands came next, on 29 February 1944, and by 25 March all vital areas in the islands were occupied. Within a few days, remaining enemy bases in the Bismarck Archipelago had been bypassed, and the Fifth's planes came within bombing range of Truk in the Carolines—Japan's supply bastion in the central Pacific.<sup>8</sup>

During March and April 1944 the Allies struggled to gain control of upper Northeast New Guinea and to establish a firm foothold farther west on the north coast of Dutch New Guinea. The Fifth Air Force struck Wewak and Aitape during the first part of the period and Hollandia during the closing weeks of the campaign. It also operated over the extreme western portion of New Guinea, Java, and other points in the Netherlands Indies.<sup>9</sup>

The first daylight mission to Hollandia came on 30 March, and on 3 April the Fifth staged its heaviest air attack to date when 235 bombers, escorted by 74 P-38's, dropped 355 tons of bombs. Only one P-38 was lost. On 22 April 1944, Allied troops landed at Hollandia and Aitape. By June 1944, Hollandia was being used as an advance heavy bomber base. Wakde, Biak, Owl, and Woendi fell in rapid succession.<sup>10</sup>

Far East Air Forces was organized on 15 June 1944 to include both the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. While the Fifth continued to drive westward, the Thirteenth concentrated on bypassed enemy bases, such as Rabaul,

Kavieng, Bougainville, and other points in the rear areas.<sup>11</sup>

Beginning in August 1944 the Fifth Air Force turned its attention to the reduction of the Philippines. This involved attacks on points from western New Guinea northward—through the Halmaheras—to Mindanao Island. Limited operations continued against the Wewak-Aitape area and points in Dutch New Guinea, and by October the important oil center of Balikpapan on Borneo was receiving heavy bombing.<sup>12</sup>

Allied forces landed on Leyte, in the Philippines, in October 1944, and by the end of the year the Fifth was attacking the network of Japanese bases around Manila from airstrips on Mindoro, Leyte, and Samar. On 28 January 1945 the recapture of Clark Field marked a high point for the Fifth's campaign in the Philippines. The return ended a three-year aerial trek of 8,000 miles, via Port Moresby, Buna, Lae, Hollandia, Biak, Morotai, and Leyte.<sup>\*13</sup>

The Fifth Air Force assumed new responsibilities as the Philippines campaign progressed toward a successful conclusion. Formosa, the principal halfway station on the sea lanes from Japan to the Netherlands Indies and Malaya also served as a staging area for outlying garrisons. The Fifth neutralized Formosa's many airfields to protect U.S. forces in the Philippines and to insure the success of the invasion of Okinawa—scheduled for April. In addition, it attacked Japanese shipping in the South China Sea and targets along the China coast. Beginning on a small scale in January, the Formosa-China coast campaign reached its peak in May 1945 and was virtually completed in July. Fighter and bomber aircraft successfully cooperated in day and night missions against airfields, industrial targets,

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<sup>\*13</sup>For more details of the Philippines campaign see following chapters on Leyte and Luzon.

rail lines, and shipping facilities.<sup>14</sup>


When the war ended in August 1945, elements of the Fifth Air Force were moving into the Ryukyus in preparation for the final assault. From Okinawa, Fifth Air Force planes flew against the Japanese home islands and China coast installations--particularly Shanghai.<sup>15</sup>

### The Thirteenth Air Force

Army air units operating in the South Pacific Area, chiefly in the Solomon Islands, were formed into the Thirteenth Air Force in January 1943. After participating in campaigns on Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and other islands, the Thirteenth moved westward and, in June 1944, along with the Fifth Air Force became a part of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF).<sup>16</sup>

The Thirteenth's bombers--B-17's, B-24's, and B-25's--operating from bases in the South and Southwest Pacific areas, aided the Allied drives from Australia to the Philippines. Fighter aircraft included P-38's, P-39's, P-61's, and P-70's. Thirteenth Air Force planes flew long patrol and photographic missions over the Solomon Islands and the Coral Sea and raided airfields, installations, and shipping in the Solomons and Bismarcks until August 1943. They flew repeated missions against Bougainville, New Britain, and New Ireland, inflicting heavy damage on enemy bases. During April and May 1944 they attacked the heavily defended Japanese base on Woleai, in the Carolines.

Prior to the invasion of Peleliu in the Palau Islands and Leyte in 1944, Thirteenth Air Force bombers helped neutralize enemy bases on Yap and Truk in the Carolines and other islands in the Palaus. In the Philippines campaign, planes of the Thirteenth supported ground forces, struck Japanese shipping, and bombed airfields on Leyte, Luzon, Negros, Ceram,



Reproduced from W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV (Chicago, 1950), 39.

Malahera and Formosa. During the closing months of the war, the Thirteenth participated in Allied air operations against the Netherlands Indies, hitting airfields, shipping, and installations. Thirteenth planes supported Australian forces in Borneo, attacked targets in French Indochina, and flew frequent patrol missions along the Asiatic coast.<sup>17</sup>

TABLE 66

Fifth AF Sorties and Tonnage  
Sep 1942 - Aug 1945

<u>Period</u>	<u>Sorties</u>		<u>Tonnage</u>	
	<u>Bomber</u>	<u>Fighter</u>	<u>Bombs</u>	<u>Na.palm</u>
		<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Australia to Hollandia 3 Sep 42-22 Apr 44	30,222	90,418	120,640	42,424
Hollandia to Morotai 23 Apr-15 Sep 44	15,402	26,632	42,034	19,928
Morotai to Leyte 16 Sep-20 Oct 44	2,936	4,224	7,160	4,452
Leyte to Luzon 21 Oct 44-9 Jan 45	5,347	17,160	22,507	7,280
Luzon to Okinawa 10 Jan-1 Apr 45	12,437	26,485	38,922	22,198
Okinawa to Victory 2 Apr-15 Aug 45	17,474	42,855	60,329	44,709
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>83,818</b>	<b>207,774</b>	<b>291,592</b>	<b>140,991</b>
				<b>6,699</b>
				<b>147,690</b>

SOURCE: 5th AF, Misc Collection of Statistical Rpts on Operations, 1942-45.

TABLE 67

Fifth AF Aircraft Losses  
Sep 1942 - Aug 1945

<u>Period</u>	<u>By Enemy Action</u>			<u>By Operational Causes</u>			<u>Grand Total</u>		
	<u>Bmbr</u>	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>Tmosp Total</u>	<u>Bmbr</u>	<u>Ftr</u>	<u>Tmosp Total</u>			
Australia to Hollandia 3 Sep 42-22 Apr 44	210	149	12	371	211	417	40	668	1,039
Hollandia to Morotai 23 Apr-15 Sep 44	51	18	0	69	117	142	7	266	335
Morotai to Leyte 16 Sep-20 Oct 44	16	14	0	30	25	52	0	77	107
Leyte to Luzon 21 Oct 44-9 Jan 45	42	93	6	141	94	236	15	345	486
Luzon to Okinawa 10 Jan-1 Apr 45	53	42	2	97	98	165	40	303	400
Okinawa to Victory 2 Apr-15 Aug 45	58	43	0	101	156	268	54	478	579
<b>TOTAL</b>	430	359	20	809	701	1,280	156	2,137	2,946

SOURCE: 5th AF, Misc Collection of Statistical Rpts on Operations, 1942-45.

TABLE 68  
Fifth AF Casualties  
Sep 1942 - Aug 1945

	<u>Killed in Action</u>	<u>Missing in Action</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sep-Dec 42	37	72	109
Jan-Dec 43	473	725	1,198
Jan-Dec 44	966	650	1,616
Jan-Aug 45	<u>728</u>	<u>484</u>	<u>1,212</u>
TOTAL	2,204	1,931	4,135

SOURCE: 5th AF, Misc Collection of Statistical Rpts on Operations, 1942-45.

TABLE 69  
Fifth AF Claims against Enemy Aircraft  
Sep 1942 - Aug 1945

<u>Period</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>			
Australia to Hollandia 3 Sep 42-22 Apr 44	2,283	1,138	3,421	612	362
Hollandia to Morotai 23 Apr-15 Sep 44	195	378	573	47	35
Morotai to Leyte 16 Sep-20 Oct 44	70	42	112	21	28
Leyte to Luzon 21 Oct 44-9 Jan 45	751	311	1,062	150	143
Luzon to Okinawa 10 Jan-1 Apr 45	129	305	434	60	169
Okinawa to Victory 2 Apr-15 Aug 45	51	74	125	46	68
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,479</b>	<b>2,248</b>	<b>5,727</b>	<b>936</b>	<b>805</b>

SOURCE: 5th AF, Misc Collection of Statistical Rpts on Operations, 1942-45.

TABLE 70

Fifth AF Claims against Enemy Shipping  
Sep 1942 - Aug 1945

<u>Period</u>	<u>Sunk</u> <u>(Tons)</u>	<u>Probably Sunk</u> <u>(Tons)</u>	<u>Damaged</u> <u>(Tons)</u>
Australia to Hollandia 3 Sep 42-22 Apr 44	611,601	247,162	756,557
Hollandia to Morotai 23 Apr-15 Sep 44	141,207	81,218	187,680
Morotai to Leyte 16 Sep-20 Oct 44	68,981	69,416	142,563
Leyte to Luzon 21 Oct 44-9 Jan 45	92,273	80,234	211,266
Luzon to Okinawa 10 Jan-1 Apr 45	329,977	113,070	237,759
Okinawa to Victory 2 Apr-15 Aug 45	487,540	116,920	443,535
TOTAL TONS	1,731,579	708,120	1,979,360

SOURCE: 5th AF, Misc Collection of Statistical Rpts on Operations, 1942-45.

TABLE 71

Thirteenth AF Aircraft and Combat Crews Authorized, on Hand, and Operational

Aircraft

<u>Date</u>	<u>Heavy Bombers</u>			<u>Medium Bombers</u>			<u>Fighters</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>
1 Jul 43	105	101	70	86	73	52	194	134	105	385	358	227
31 Jul 45	141	128	88	113	81	64	236	198	163	490	407	315

Combat Crews

	<u>HB Crews</u>			<u>MB Crews</u>			<u>Ftr Crews</u>			<u>Total Crews</u>		
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>CR</u>
1 Jul 43	158	102	79	129	77	68	291	280	236	578	459	383
31 Jul 45	216	226	199	120	119	115	248	256	232	584	601	546

SOURCE: Collection of Statistics on 13th AF Operations.

TABLE 72

Thirteenth AF Aircraft Losses  
1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jul 1945

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>By Enemy Action</u>		<u>By Ornl Causes</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>In Air</u>	<u>On Ground</u>		
B-17	2	-	-	2
B-24	113	15	35	163
RB & SB-24	14	2	2	18
B-25	58	3	14	75
P-38	115	7	40	162
P-39	14	-	3	17
P-40	16	-	1	17
P-61	5	-	2	7
P-70	2	-	2	4
P-38NF	1	-	-	1
F-5	8	1	7	16
F-7	-	1	1	2
AC-10	-	4	5	9
C-47	2	-	2	4
L-5	2	-	5	7
UC-45	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	352	34	119	505

SOURCE: Collection of Statistics on 13th AF Operations.

TABLE 73

Thirteenth AF Claims of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed  
1 Jul 1943 - 31 Jul 1945

<u>By USAF Aircraft</u>	<u>In the Air</u>	<u>On the Ground</u>	<u>Total</u>
B-24	484	254	738
B-25	6	24	30
P-33	223	108	331
P-39	14	3	17
P-40	82	-	82
P-61	5	1	6
P-70	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	816	390	1,206

TABLE 74

Thirteenth AF Sorties and Tonnage  
against Netherlands Indies Targets  
Jan - Aug 1945

<u>Type Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Airdromes & dispersal areas	3,059	31.8	5,867.5	41.7
Personnel, supply, & ground support	5,683	59.0	7,051.3	50.0
Shipping, docks, & wharves	748	7.8	1,038.1	7.4
Oil refineries & storage	<u>136</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>130.3</u>	<u>.9</u>
TOTAL	9,626	100.0	14,087.2	100.0

SOURCES: Collection of Statistics on 13th AF Operations; 25th SCU, 13th AF Principal Targets (Jan-Aug 45).

TABLE 75

Thirteenth AF Sorties against Netherlands Indies  
by Type Aircraft and Target  
Jan - Aug 1945

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Airdromes &amp; Dispersal Areas</u>		<u>Personnel, Supply, &amp; Ground Support</u>		<u>Shipping, Docks, &amp; Wharves</u>		<u>Oil Refineries &amp; Storage</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Fighters	525	235.0	1,384	558.9	22	11.0	59	25.5	1,990	830.4
Medium bombers	318	181.3	1,893	1,351.5	132	95.0	27	19.5	2,370	1,647.3
Heavy bombers	<u>2,216</u>	<u>5,451.5</u>	<u>2,406</u>	<u>5,141.1</u>	<u>594</u>	<u>932.1</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>85.2</u>	<u>5,266</u>	<u>11,610.0</u>
TOTAL	3,059	5,867.8	5,683	7,051.5	748	1,038.1	136	130.3	9,626	14,087.7 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>. The Thirteenth's effort was augmented by the Fifth AF's 22d, 38th, 90th, and 380th Bombardment Groups, which dropped an additional 1,863 tons of bombs in June and 75 tons in July 1945.

SOURCES: 25th SCU, 13th AF Principal Targets (Jan-Aug 45); 34th SCU, 5th AF Statistical Summary (Jun-Jul 45).



X. THE LEYTE CAMPAIGN  
OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1944

The primary purpose of the Leyte campaign was to establish an air and logistical base in the heart of the Philippine Islands to support further operations against Luzon, Formosa, and the China coast. Control of Leyte by Allied forces would also serve to divide Japanese forces in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

In preparation for the Leyte campaign, Allied forces captured Morotai, southeast of Mindanao, and the Palaus, east of the Philippines, but these islands were too far from Leyte to permit use of land-based aircraft in support of the landing. Consequently, operation plans called for Navy air to provide initial protection for the landing forces, beginning with the invasion on 20 October. Land-based planes would assume responsibility for air operations after A plus 15 (4 November 1944).<sup>2</sup>

GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, commanded by Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, exercised overall command of the operation. Allied Air Forces, consisting principally of FEAF's Fifth Air Force, had about 750 fighters and 700 bombers ready for use in the Leyte campaign. Allied Naval Forces consisted principally of carriers and transports of the Third and Seventh Fleets, and Allied Land Forces included X and XXIV Corps of the U.S. Sixth Army. About 174,000 troops were made available for the initial assault phase on Leyte, and more than 202,000 ground troops were eventually committed.<sup>3</sup>

Japanese land and air units in the Philippines on the eve of the campaign numbered an estimated 432,000 men, including 21,700 on Leyte. A total

of 70,000, including almost 50,000 reinforcements, was eventually committed to the island's defense. Japanese air strength in Kyushu, Formosa, and the Philippines was estimated at 1,600 planes based at 76 usable airfields. About 152 fighters, 179 bombers, and 9 reconnaissance planes were available on 20 October for attacks against the Leyte beachhead.<sup>4</sup>

During the preinvasion period, beginning about 10 October, FEAF and U.S. Navy aircraft sought to neutralize Japanese airpower. FEAF aircraft attacked hostile air forces in the Celebes Sea area, pounded airfields on Mindanao, and protected Allied naval forces and convoys. The Third Fleet struck at Okinawa, Formosa, northern and southeastern Luzon, and the Visayas area; the Seventh Air Force attacked bases in the bypassed Marshalls; Navy and Marine planes hit the Carolines; and the Eleventh Air Force made a diversionary attack on the Kurils from the Aleutians.<sup>5</sup>

The invasion of Leyte began on 20 October with only naval air protecting the ground forces during the first four days. But growing Japanese air and naval resistance, culminating in the Battle of Leyte Gulf on 24-25 October, exhausted the Third and Seventh Fleets and forced them to withdraw a large part of their air cover over Leyte. To fill the gap, General MacArthur ordered Allied Air Forces to assume responsibility for air defense and air support of Leyte on 27 October, a week earlier than planned. He also allocated all land targets in the Philippines to the Allied Air Forces and directed the Third Fleet to attack them only after coordination.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, the Fifth Air Force immediately assumed control of air operations on Leyte, but it could place relatively few aircraft on the island and its operations were severely hampered by mud, airfield construction problems, and harassing Japanese air attacks. By 1 November the

tactical situation on Leyte was serious, as the Japanese had virtually recovered control of the air, and through 3 November the Fifth's fighters were on the defensive. Meanwhile, other FEAF aircraft attacked airfields in the central and southern Philippines through which the Japanese were sending air reinforcements.<sup>7</sup>

On 4 November, after additional aircraft arrived, FEAF began to establish air superiority, isolate the battlefield, and destroy the enemy locally—in that order of priority. Air superiority was achieved between 11 and 25 November. The need for continuous patrol over Allied positions and for strikes against enemy convoys and reinforcements unavoidably limited sorties in close support of the ground forces. FEAF planes flew some close support sorties on 25 November and intermittently thereafter until the end of the campaign, as the Sixth Army completed the conquest of the island. Elsewhere, FEAF aircraft dropped a heavy tonnage of bombs on air facilities and other targets surrounding Leyte.<sup>\*8</sup>

When GHQ officially announced on 26 December the end of the Leyte campaign except for mopping-up operations by the Sixth Army, FEAF aircraft had flown more than 15,000 fighter and bomber sorties, destroying 643 enemy planes in aerial combat and 408 on the ground. They had also dropped 9,400 tons of bombs, principally on airfield, shipping, supply, and personnel targets, wreaking havoc with the enemy's air and troop reinforcements. FEAF planes destroyed about 50 merchant, escort, and other craft (32 confirmed by the enemy) carrying 40,000 or more men, of whom an unknown number managed to reach islands other than Leyte without equipment.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>\*8</sup>Between 27 October and 26 December the tonnage of bombs dropped on air facilities alone was as follows: Negros, 3,105; Mindanao, 1,277; Cebu, 971; Palawan, 547; Panay, 249; Masbate, 38.

TABLE 76

FEAF Sorties in the Leyte Campaign by Type  
10 Oct - 26 Dec 1944

120

<u>Period</u>	<u>Air Superiority</u> <u>over Mindanao</u> <u>&amp; Visayas</u>	<u>Isolation of</u> <u>Battlefield</u>	<u>Recon</u>	<u>Air Defense in</u> <u>Areas of Ops &amp;</u> <u>Lines of Comm</u>	<u>Close</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Misc</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Eff</u> <u>Sorties</u>	<u>Bomb</u> <u>Tons</u>
Preinvasion 10-16 Oct	6	7	59	-	-	4	76	21.1
Invasion 17-23 Oct	175	314	52	-	-	8	549	621.6
Naval engagement 24-27 Oct	-	312	15	-	-	12	339	255.7
Allied air defense 27 Oct-3 Nov	337	244	50	392	-	14	1,037	594.1
Offensive air action 4 Nov-26 Dec	5,315	1,741	597	4,912	161	410	13,136	7,904.0
TOTAL	5,633	2,618	773	5,304	161	448	15,137	9,396.5
Percent of total	31.8	17.2	5.1	35.6	1.06	2.9		

SOURCE: Report by AEB, SWPA, Leyte Campaign, 1 Jun 45, pp 340-41.

TABLE 77

72AF Close Support Operations in the Leyte Campaign  
25 Nov - 26 Dec 1944<sup>a</sup>

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Aircraft Losses</u>				<u>Bomb Tons</u>
		<u>Enemy A/C</u>	<u>Allied A/C</u>		<u>Operational Dest Dmgd</u>	
			<u>Combat &amp; AA Dest Dmgd</u>	<u>Operational Dest Dmgd</u>		
P-47	24	0	0	0	0	16
P-40	<u>137</u>	0	0	2	0	<u>45.5</u>
TOTAL	161	0	0	2	0	61.5

a. Targets in the Leyte-Samar area.  
b. First air-ground mission flown on 25 November 44; 4 missions with 33 sorties flown between 25 November-3 December 44; 12 missions with 128 sorties flown between 4 December-26 December 44.

SOURCE: Report by AEB, SWPA, Leyte Campaign, 1 Jun 45, p 90.

TABLE 78

Fifth AF Sorties in the Leyte Campaign by Type  
November 1944

<u>Type Sortie</u>	<u>V Bomber Command<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>V Fighter Command<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>91st Recon Wing<sup>c</sup></u>	<u>Total</u>
Attack				
Airdromes	1,276	379	36	1,691
Ack ack	62	8	-	70
Buildings	44	66	48	158
Bridges	12	3	65	80
Docks	-	-	-	-
Industries	-	-	8	8
Gasoline	-	13	-	13
Personnel	252	30	78	360
Roads	5	16	15	36
Radar	9	-	-	9
Shipping	65	304	189	558
Supplies	48	-	115	163
Truck convoys	-	8	6	14
Miscellaneous	25	24	22	71
Total attack	(1,798)	(851)	(582)	(3,231)
Reconnaissance	47	69	164	280
Patrol	-	2,495	135	2,630
Escort	-	1,242	16	1,258
Interception	-	230	8	238
Other	<u>11</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>87</u>
TOTAL	1,856	4,955	913	7,724

- a. B-24's, B-25's, A-20's. Does not include 3d and 380th Bomb Groups.  
b. P-38's, P-47's, night fighters. Does not include 58th Fighter Group during 11-30 November.  
c. P-40's, F-5's, F-7's.

SOURCE: 5th AF Monthly Stat Summary.

TABLE 79  
FEAF Combat Aircraft on Hand  
Sep - Dec 1944

(As of End of Month)

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bombers	1,581	1,547	1,402	1,286	5,816
Fighters	1,274	1,252	1,185	1,133	4,844
Recon A/C	<u>215</u>	<u>213</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>818</u>
TOTAL	3,070	3,012	2,797	2,599	11,478

TABLE 80  
Fifth AF Bomb Tonnage  
Nov - Dec 1944

<u>Principal Targets</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>Total</u>
Airdromes	1,859	1,438	3,297
Supplies	82	321	403
Shipping	179	245	424
Personnel	<u>265</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>411</u>
TOTAL	2,385	2,150	4,535

SOURCES: AAF Stat Digest, World War II, p 172; 5th AF Monthly Stat Summary.

TABLE 81

Japanese and Allied Aircraft Destroyed in Aerial Combat  
in Leyte Campaign--10 Oct - 26 Dec 1944

<u>Japanese Aircraft Destroyed by</u> <u>Type of Allied A/C</u>		<u>Allied Aircraft Losses</u> <u>by Type</u>	
<u>Type Allied A/C</u>	<u>Jap A/C</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>
B-24	46	16	B-24
B-25	2	1	B-25
P-38	420	23	P-38
P-40	7	0	P-40
P-47	158	6	P-47
P-61	7	0	P-61
F-5	0	1	F-5
F-7	3	0	F-7
TOTAL	643	47	

TABLE 82

Japanese Aircraft Destroyed in Leyte Campaign  
10 Oct - 26 Dec 1944

<u>Force</u>	<u>In Aerial Combat</u>	<u>On the Ground</u>	<u>Total</u>
By land-based aircraft	643	408	1,051
By AAA (Army)	251	-	251
By carrier-based aircraft	<u>1,444</u>	<u>1,488</u>	<u>2,932</u>
TOTAL	2,338	1,896	4,234

SOURCE: Report by AEB, SWPA, Leyte Campaign, 1 Jun 45, pp 44, 195.



XI. CONQUEST OF LUZON  
JANUARY - JUNE 1945

The large island of Luzon was considered the main Allied objective in the Philippines, to be used as a base against the Japanese homeland. There were 260,000 Japanese troops on Luzon in mid-November 1944. From bases on Leyte and Mindoro in the last two months of 1944, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) pounded enemy bases on Luzon, putting some 1,500 enemy planes out of action, most of them on the ground, while the U.S. Third Fleet claimed 2,000 destroyed. By invasion day--9 January 1945--the Allied Air Forces had virtually neutralized 120 enemy airdromes in the Luzon-Visayas area. Subsequently, FEAF\* crews encountered little enemy air opposition over Luzon and easily overcame such resistance as they met.<sup>1</sup>

The elaborate plans for the conquest of Luzon almost paralleled those for Leyte. As the ships of the Seventh Fleet moved northward to Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese launched intense Kamikaze attacks, especially on 5 and 6 January, with warships the special target. But the assault convoys safely reached Lingayen beaches by 9 January to find that the main Japanese forces had retreated to mountain positions in the interior. After surging ashore, I and XIV Corps of the Sixth Army established lodgments without difficulty. Carrier aircraft protected the ships and the landings, bombing and strafing on and behind the beaches and shooting down 17 enemy aircraft while also claiming 7 light tanks and 18 trucks destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

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\*The Seventh, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Air Forces also flew missions to assist in the isolation of Luzon. (Hist, FEAF, I, 309-10; W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The AAF in WWII, V, 149, 405, 415.)

Aircraft of FEAF's Fifth Air Force operated primarily to isolate the immediate battleground. On 9 January alone they knocked out 15 key bridges on Luzon. Continuing to press attacks on communications and transportation, by the 16th the Fifth had totaled up minimum claims to equal half of Luzon's prewar locomotives and a quarter of its rolling stock. And its strikes had confined the enemy to movement of troops at night.<sup>3</sup>

Between 9 and 16 January the escort carrier planes of Task Group 77.4 provided direct support of the ground forces, flying 41 air-ground missions. FEAF's 310th Bombardment Wing also flew strikes from Mindoro. By 16 January an airstrip was ready near Lingayen, and C-47's began bringing in cargo while P-61's began moving in. On the 17th, P-38's, P-40's, and P-51's arrived, bringing strength up to requirements for cover and direct support, and the 308th Bombardment Wing formally relieved the escort carriers of responsibility for direct support of ground operations in the Lingayen area and for protection of convoys to and from Lingayen Gulf. On 30 January, Fifth Air Force assumed full responsibility for close support and cover over Luzon, relieving the last of the escort carriers from duty in the area.<sup>4</sup>

Although sporadic enemy air attacks continued until 18 January—apparently from Formosa after the 12th—few if any enemy aircraft reinforcements reached Luzon. The air strength on the island had retreated to Formosa or elsewhere; thus, the Japanese had to defend Luzon without friendly airpower. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of the Japanese ground forces in the Philippines at the time, said in a postwar interrogation, "If we had had your artillery and your air support, we would have won."<sup>5</sup>

Beginning 18 January, FEAF aircraft operated chiefly in support of

the ground drive southward down the central plains, enabling XIV Corps to take risks it could not have dared without effective air support. By early February the 308th Wing had a growing force of 380 aircraft, including those of Marine units, and the 310th Wing on Mindoro had an equivalent strength. Early in March these bombardment wings, plus the 309th based on San Marcelino airstrip, undertook the support of one Army corps each—the I Corps, XIV Corps, and XI Corps respectively.<sup>6</sup>

On 3-4 February, in support of the assault on Manila, 43 C-47's with P-38 cover airlifted 2,055 paratroops of the 511th Regiment (11th Airborne Division) from Mindoro and dropped them on Tagaytay Ridge, which commanded highways to the city and Cavite naval base. Air support provided constant column cover to the advancing troops, and fighter-bombers and A-20's eradicated enemy defenses.<sup>7</sup>

General MacArthur announced on 5 February that the assault phase of the Luzon campaign had been completed, American troops having entered Manila that day. But it took another month to uproot the Japanese from the city and retake Corregidor, Bataan, and other strongholds in the area. In a combined airborne and amphibious assault on 16 February the island fortress of Corregidor fell quickly to the Sixth Army. In two lifts, 82 Fifth Air Force C-47's dropped 2,022 men of the 503d Parachute RCT in a very small area much more safely than planners dared anticipate. The paratroops completely surprised the enemy and took their objective speedily. This action, combined with an amphibious landing that occurred between the two lifts, enabled the Army to complete the assault phase of the invasion that day.<sup>8</sup>

During the consolidation period, Fifth Air Force fighters bombed and strafed enemy positions in close support missions, C-47's dropped supplies,

and heavy bombers struck every significant target, notably enemy concentrations in the Antipolo-Ipo area. On 16-17 May about 200 fighters, in the largest ground support strike of the Pacific war, caused great destruction by dropping napalm on Ipo defenses.<sup>9</sup> A few days later Gen. Walter Krueger, commanding the Sixth Army, sent the following message to Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, the commander of the Fifth Air Force:<sup>10</sup>

Early capture of the vital Ipo Dam made possible by splendid support of our attack by your brave airmen. My heartfelt thanks to you and your men.

Air support of the Philippine guerrillas in north Luzon contributed significantly to the campaign between January and June. FEAF aircraft struck enemy concentrations, supply dumps, installations, and towns. The supply drops and supply landings were of inestimable value, cargoes consisting of ammunition, weapons, rations, medical supplies, and even jeeps.

One of the most successful guerrilla-support missions occurred on 23 February as part of a skillfully executed airborne and amphibious raid on Los Banos prison, in southern Luzon. While fighters strafed and bombed the vicinity, 10 C-47's dropped 125 troopers who joined infiltrators to surprise the Japanese guards and liberate 2,147 Allied prisoners.<sup>11</sup>

Another successful airdrop at the northern end of Luzon on 23 June helped close the final trap on the Japanese in the Philippines. At dawn on the 23d, 54 C-47's and 14 C-46's of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing lifted 994 men of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Lipa a distance of 348 miles and dropped them at Camalaniugan, a few miles southeast of Aparri, which elements of the 37th Division had entered on 21 April. In the flight were 7 gliders transporting heavy equipment, including a jeep and 75-mm. howitzers. This marked the first Pacific airborne operation in which

gliders were used. The paratroops, supplied by air, attacked southward at once and joined the 37th Infantry three days later to clear the Cagayan valley. With the exception of mopping-up operations, the campaign for Luzon was over.<sup>12</sup>

Direct support was the principal air activity of the Luzon campaign. Tactical air operations predominated because of two things: there was a lack of strategic targets and, since the enemy's air force in the Philippines had been largely destroyed, the Fifth Air Force isolated the battlefield within the first few weeks.<sup>13</sup>

Near the end of the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed:<sup>14</sup>

Of the many Pacific tactical air operations, we think the most striking example of the effective use of tactical air power, in cooperation with ground troops and the Navy, to achieve decisive results at a minimum cost in lives and materiel was the work of the Far East Air Forces in the Lingayen-Central Luzon campaign.

TABLE 83

Air Units Giving Close Support in Luzon Campaign  
30 Jan - 30 Jun 1945

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Total</u> <sup>a</sup>
3d Air Commando Gp: 3d & 4th Ftr Sqs Commando	P-51	50
8th Ftr Gp: 35th, 36th, & 80th Sqs	P-38	75
35th Ftr Gp: 39th, 40th, & 41st Sqs	P-51	75
49th Ftr Gp: 7th, 8th, & 9th Sqs	P-38	75
58th Ftr Gp: 69th, 310th, 311th, & 201st Sqs	P-47	100
348th Ftr Gp: 340th, 341st, 342d, & 460th Sqs	P-51	100
475th Ftr Gp: 431st, 432d, & 433d Sqs	P-38	<u>75</u>
Total fighters		550
3d Bomb Gp (L): 8th, 13th, 89th, & 90th Sqs	A-20	64
312th Bomb Gp (L): 386th, 387th, 388th, & 389th Sqs	A-20	64
417th Bomb Gp (L): 672d, 673d, 674th, & 675th Sqs	A-20	<u>64</u>
Total light bombers		192
38th Bomb Gp (M): 71st, 405th, 822d, & 823d Sqs	B-25	64
345th Bomb Gp (M): 498th, 499th, 500th, & 501st Sqs	B-25	<u>64</u>
Total medium bombers		128
22d Bomb Gp (H): 2d, 19th, 33d, & 408th Sqs	B-24	48
43d Bomb Gp (H): 63d, 64th, 65th, & 403d Sqs	B-24	48
90th Bomb Gp (H): 319th, 320th, 321st, & 400th Sqs	B-24	48
380th Bomb Gp (H): 528th, 529th, 530th, & 531st Sqs	B-24	<u>48</u>
Total heavy bombers		192
71st Tactical Recon Gp:		
17th Tactical Recon Sq	B-25	16
82d Tactical Recon Sq	P-51	25
110th Tactical Recon Sq	P-51	<u>25</u>
Total reconnaissance aircraft		66
Prov Marine Air Wing: 24th & 32d Marine Air Gps	SBD	<u>166</u>
GRAND TOTAL		1,294

a. Authorized strengths.

SOURCE: Sixth U.S. Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, I, 100-101.

TABLE 84

Air Units Flying Support Missions  
under 308th Bombardment Wing  
15 Feb 1945<sup>a</sup>

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>A/C Assigned</u>
18th Fighter Gp	P-38	68
35th Fighter Gp	P-47 & P-51	69
475th Fighter Gp	P-38	70
3d Air Commando Gp	P-51	49
547th Night Fighter Sq	P-61	11
82d Tactical Recon Sq	P-40 & P-51	21
110th Tactical Recon Sq	P-40 & P-51	24
24th MAG and 32d MAG	SBD	141
312th Bomb Gp (L)	A-20	45
38th Bomb Gp (M)	B-25	43
26th Photo Sq	F-5	10
157th, 159th, 160th Liaison Sq	L-5	<u>51</u>
TOTAL		602

a. The number of operational planes remained approximately the same until end of March.

SOURCE: Sixth U.S. Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, I, 99.

TABLE 85

Fifth AF Support of Ground Troops in Luzon Campaign  
28 Jan - 10 Mar 1945

	<u>Total Sorties<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Number in Ground Support</u>	<u>Percentage in Ground Support</u>
Bombers	12,695	11,309	89
Fighters	13,555	13,064	96.4
Bomb tonnage <sup>b</sup>	13,492 tons	11,697 tons	87

a. Fifth AF sorties not used in ground support were employed to achieve and maintain neutralization of enemy air forces on Formosa and on Hainan Island and to interrupt enemy shipping between Amoy and Cape Padaran.

b. In addition, between 1 February and 7 March, Fifth AF expended 8,133,000 rounds of .50 caliber, of which an estimated 8,000,000 rounds were used in direct support of ground forces.

SOURCE: Air Evaluation Board, SWPA, Report 16, Fighter Bombing and Strafing, Annex G.

TABLE 86

Fifth and Thirteenth AF's in Luzon Campaign  
Bomb Tonnage by Type Sortie  
6 Jan - 15 Mar 1945

133

<u>Type Sortie</u>	<u>Tons Dropped</u>	<u>Percent Dropped on Tactical Targets</u>	<u>Percent Dropped on All Targets</u>
Gain & maintain air superiority	3,438	17.1	15.0
Isolation of battlefield	10,627	52.8	46.6
Close support	6,064	30.1	26.6
All other (recon, industrial, Formosa, NEI)	<u>2,686</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>11.8</u>
TOTAL	22,815	100.0	100.0

TABLE 87

Fifth and Thirteenth AF's in Luzon Campaign  
Effective Sorties by Type Plane  
6 Jan - 15 Mar 1945

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Percent Sorties</u>
<b>Bombers</b>		
B-24	5,509	
B-25	3,202	
A-20	<u>5,075</u>	
Total	<u>13,786</u>	36.00
<b>Fighters</b>		
P-38	9,394	
P-40	1,612	
P-47	6,438	
P-51	3,042	
P-61	<u>1,773</u>	
Total	<u>22,259</u>	58.13
<b>Reconnaissance</b>		
F-5	1,228	
F-6	864	
F-7	145	
OA-10	<u>10</u>	
Total	<u>2,247</u>	5.87
GRAND TOTAL	<u>38,292</u>	<u>100.00</u>

SOURCE: Final Consolidation--5th & 13th AF's in Luzon Campaign.

TABLE 88

FEAF Effective Sorties by Type Aircraft  
Jan - Jun 1945


<u>1945</u>	<u>Heavy Bomber</u>	<u>Med &amp; Light Bomber</u>	<u>Fighter</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	2,284	3,561	9,605	15,450
Feb	2,751	3,757	9,793	16,301
Mar	3,555	4,356	11,884	19,795
Apr	3,450	3,827	13,810	21,087
May	3,548	4,940	12,247	20,735
Jun	<u>3,589</u>	<u>3,042</u>	<u>10,818</u>	<u>17,449</u>
TOTAL	19,177	23,483	68,157	110,817

TABLE 89

FEAF Total Fighter Sorties by Type  
Jan - Jun 1945

<u>1945</u>	<u>Escort</u>	<u>Bombing &amp; Strafing</u>	<u>Recon</u>	<u>Other<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	2,542	2,145	413	5,539	10,689
Feb	2,193	3,177	257	4,991	10,618
Mar	2,284	6,926	268	3,485	12,963
Apr	1,782	11,355	155	1,598	14,890
May	514	11,223	219	1,277	13,233
Jun	<u>962</u>	<u>9,455</u>	<u>304</u>	<u>1,460</u>	<u>12,181</u>
TOTAL	10,277	44,281	1,616	18,400	74,574

<sup>a</sup>. Includes interception, patrol, sweep, & sea-search.



# THE PACIFIC THEATER

Reproduced from USAP Historical Study 86, p. 1.

## XII. CENTRAL PACIFIC CAMPAIGNS 1942 - 1945

In the central Pacific campaigns of 1942-45 the Army Air Forces played a significant but secondary role. The U.S. Navy exercised command of the theater and, together with the Marines, provided most of the land and air forces engaged. The combat elements of the AAF's Seventh Air Force came under the operational control of the Navy with the establishment of the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) on 30 March 1942. This arrangement continued until late in the war.<sup>1</sup>

The Seventh was destined to operate under several handicaps. Except for the Battle of Midway--3-5 June 1942--it saw little combat for most of the first two years of the war. It served primarily as a defense force for the Hawaiian Islands, as an organization for training crews and modifying aircraft for other tactical units, and as a forwarding agency for men and aircraft enroute to more active Pacific theaters. In addition, its units and other resources were frequently lent or transferred to other organizations.<sup>2</sup>

In its first major engagement--the Battle of Midway in June 1942--the Seventh flew 54 B-17 sorties and sent 4 B-26's in a torpedo attack against the Japanese fleet. Postwar Japanese records and interrogations indicate that land-based Army, Navy, and Marine planes did little, if any, damage during the famous naval battle.<sup>3</sup>

Between the summer of 1942 and the fall of 1943, the Seventh's main combat force consisted only of a single group of heavy bomber aircraft.

But its limited bombing and reconnaissance activities ranged over a wide area: Guadalcanal, Wake, Rabaul, the Gilberts, and many other islands. Reconnaissance of the Gilbert and Marshall islands by Seventh Air Force planes provided the Navy with invaluable intelligence for planning an assault against them. In preparation for these campaigns, in late 1943, the Seventh was augmented to a strength of three fighter and seven bombardment squadrons.<sup>4</sup>

The main burden of the attacks on the Gilberts and the Marshalls rested with the U.S. Navy. It employed about 900 carrier aircraft against the Gilberts and about 700 carrier aircraft against the Marshalls. In both operations the Seventh performed search and reconnaissance and struck at enemy shipping, air bases, and installations. By the time the Marines landed on Tarawa, the main target in the Gilberts, on 20 November 1943, the Seventh had flown 141 sorties against the island. Only in the use of fighters did the Seventh's operations against the Marshalls differ from the assault on the Gilberts. Although the Seventh lost numerous aircraft in combat or because of operational hazards, Japanese aircraft losses were so heavy that by the end of January 1944 no more were encountered in the Marshalls.<sup>5</sup>

In preparation for the invasion of the Marianas, the Seventh struck at Wake Island, bypassed islands in the Marshalls, and, beginning on 15 March 1944, the bypassed islands in the Carolines. Missions against the Carolines centered on neutralization of the strategic Japanese naval and air base at Truk and were frequently made in cooperation with aircraft of the Navy and the Thirteenth Air Force from the Solomons. Truk remained under attack until the end of the war. During the first five months (to

17 August 1944), the Seventh flew 1,107 sorties to drop 2,541 tons of bombs on the island. In the same period it claimed 32 Japanese planes shot down, 12 probables, and 26 damaged against 9 aircraft destroyed and 91 damaged by enemy aircraft or antiaircraft fire.<sup>6</sup>

Marine and Army forces began the invasion of the Marianas with a landing on Saipan on 15 June 1944. One week later, on 22 June, two squadrons of P-47 fighters were catapulted--probably for the first time in combat--from two Navy carriers, landing on Saipan. Within a few hours they were providing close air support for ground troops--also the first time by land-based fighters in the central Pacific. After participating with the Navy in softening up nearby Tinian Island, the Seventh's fighters again provided close support for ground troops on Tinian and Guam when these two islands were invaded late in July. On 18 July, the Seventh had more than 100 fighters, including P-61 night fighters, on Saipan. By 15 August the Seventh's P-47's had flown almost 2,700 combat sorties in the Marianas, not counting combat air patrols and alerts. Losses during this period were relatively light. In late July and early August, B-24 and B-25 aircraft arrived on Saipan to support operations on Tinian and Guam, and to begin neutralization of a Japanese airfield on Iwo Jima and a seaplane base on Chichi Jima.<sup>7</sup>

At the end of the Marianas campaign the Seventh Air Force, now sprawled over many Pacific islands and 3,000 miles from its home base, was relieved of responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. By 20 December 1944 its headquarters had moved from Hawaii to Saipan. The combat units remained under the operational control of the Navy except for one group of bombers placed under the operational control of Far East Air Forces (FEAF) on 7 November to support the Philippines campaign.<sup>8</sup>

The attacks against heavily defended Iwo Jima during 1944-45 were the most prolonged that the Navy and the Seventh Air Force carried out, and probably no Pacific island was so heavily bombed before it was invaded. Marines landed on Iwo on 19 February 1945, and on 8 March the Seventh's P-51's joined Marine aircraft in flying daylight and night patrols. The P-51's also flew a total of 125 sorties in close support of the ground troops.<sup>9</sup>

On 1 March 1945, two fighter groups and two night fighter squadrons were transferred from the Seventh to the Army Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, to provide fighter escort for XXI Bomber Command's B-29 attacks upon Japan. The Seventh became essentially a bomber force.<sup>10</sup>

As World War II neared its climax and the Allies obtained bases closer to Japan, AAF forces in the Pacific were realigned. Effective 14 July the Seventh was transferred to FEAF on Okinawa. These changes enabled the Seventh to operate for the first time in World War II as an integrated air force under AAF command. Its strength had grown steadily until in July it possessed three fighter and four bombardment groups and a night fighter squadron. The Seventh began attacking enemy airfields and targets of opportunity on Kyushu and smaller nearby islands. Nearing its peak combat capacity, from 1 July until the end of the war it flew 4,442 sorties, losing only 10 planes to enemy antiaircraft and 2 to enemy aircraft.<sup>11</sup>

TABLE 90

Seventh AF Aircraft on Hand<sup>a</sup>  
Nov 1943 - Aug 1945

	<u>P-38</u>	<u>P-39</u>	<u>P-40</u>	<u>P-47</u>	<u>P-51</u>	<u>P-61</u>	<u>B-24</u>	<u>B-25</u>
<u>1943</u>								
Nov	-	72	107	59	-	-	114	-
Dec	-	75	94	71	-	-	118	85
<u>1944</u>								
Jan	-	61	79	62	-	-	110	91
Feb	-	58	84	57	-	-	132	102
Mar	-	59	-	82	-	-	152	99
Apr	-	41	-	66	-	-	156	98
May	-	41	-	139	-	6	164	113
Jun	-	-	-	182	-	5	220	125
Jul	7	-	-	190	-	7	240	137
Aug	b	-	-	153	-	8	225	141
Sep	b	-	-	162	-	7	187	135
Oct	b	-	-	142	-	19	187	135
Nov	83	-	-	115	6	28	154	-
Dec	76	-	-	78	66	29	166	-
<u>1945</u>								
Jan	35	-	-	73	153	40	178	-
Feb	25	-	-	70	161	45	180	-
Mar	-	-	-	67	-	16	135	-
Apr	-	-	-	97	-	10	131	-
May <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	15	130	-
Jun	-	-	-	-	-	-	129	-
Jul <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	18	120	68
Aug	.	-	-	-	-	18	117	66

- a. Figures for fighters show number operational with units; figures for bombers show monthly average number on hand. Unless otherwise specified, absence of data is due to transfer of units into or out of Seventh AF or to changeover in type aircraft.
- b. All transferred to Twentieth AF on 15 August and reassigned to Seventh AF on 11 November 1944.
- c. Figures for P-61 not based on full month.

SOURCES: 9th SCU, Operations of 7th AF in POA, Nov 43-Apr 45, pp 20-21, & The Last Four Months of War (An Opnl Sum of 7th AF), p 9.

TABLE 91

Seventh AF Effective Combat Sorties  
Nov 1943<sup>a</sup> - Aug 1945

	<u>Period</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
<u>Fighters</u>		
P-38	Nov 44-Feb 45	281
P-39	Dec 43-Feb 44	635
F-40	Jan 44-Mar 44	501
P-47	Jun 44-Mar 45	18,281
P-61	Jun 44-Mar 45	983
P-47's & P-61's <sup>b</sup>	Apr 45-Aug 45	1,824
<u>Bombers</u>		
B-24	Nov 43-Aug 45	12,393
B-25	Dec 43-Oct 44	4,831
	Jul 45-Aug 45	
TOTAL		<u>39,729</u>

- <sup>a</sup>. Statistics on sorties prior to November 1943 not available.  
<sup>b</sup>. Breakdown by type aircraft not available.

SOURCES: 9th SCU, Operations of 7th AF in POA, Nov 43-Apr 45, pp 27, 66, 94, 100, 104, 112, 116, & The Last Four Months of War (An Opnl Sum of 7th AF), p 12, 31; Operations of 7th AF, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, pp 31, 32.

TABLE 92

Seventh AF Claims against Enemy Aircraft  
Nov 1943 - Aug 1945

<u>Type of Action</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Total</u>
Aerial combat	298 <sup>a</sup>	127	195	620
On the ground	115 <sup>b</sup>	38	84	237
TOTAL	413	165	279	857

- <sup>a</sup>. Includes one assist credited to F-7 on joint Army-Navy strike.  
<sup>b</sup>. Although 35 of these aircraft were reported on AAF Form 34 as destroyed, there are reasons to believe they were damaged rather than destroyed.

SOURCES: 9th SCU, Operations of 7th AF in POA, Nov 43-Apr 45, p 18, & The Last Four Months of War (An Opnl Sum of 7th AF), p 7.

TABLE 93

Seventh AF Combat Aircraft Destroyed and Damaged in Forward Areas  
Nov 1943 - Aug 1945

Type A/C	Period	Destroyed		Missing	Total Dest or Missing	Damaged		
		In Air <sup>a</sup>	On Gnd			In Air	On Gnd	Total
<u>Fighters</u>								
P-38	16 Nov 44-21 Feb 45	6	0	2	8	3	0	3
P-39	18 Dec 43-12 Feb 44	7	0	2	9	5	0	5
P-40	3 Jan 44-11 Mar 44	3	1	2	6	6	0	6
P-47	22 Jun 44-30 Apr 45	46	19	3	68	33	3	36
P-61	24 Jun 44-30 Jun 45 <sup>b</sup>	4	1	0	5	0	0	0
<u>Bombers</u>								
B-24	13 Nov 43-15 Aug 45	68	8	14	90	735	7	792
B-25	28 Dec 43-15 Aug 45	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>230</u>
TOTAL		168	29	26	223	1,062	10	1,072

a. Includes 3 aircraft destroyed or damaged by friendly naval and ground fire.  
b. Statistics for July-August 1945 not available.

SOURCES: 9th SCU, Operations of 7th AF in POA, Nov 43-Apr 45, p 19, & The Last Four Months of War (An Opnl Sum of 7th AF), p 8; Operations of 7th AF, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, p 32.


TABLE 94

Seventh AF Bomb Tonnage on Principal Targets  
Nov 1943<sup>a</sup> - Aug 1945

<u>Principal Targets</u>	<u>Bomb Tons</u>
Gilbert Islands	682.7
Marshall Islands	4,919.8
Caroline Islands	6,475.7
Wake Island	512.4
Mariana Islands	1,298.3
Bonins & Volcanoes	6,868.6
Marcus Island	331.5
Philippines	3,193.6
Japanese Homeland	4,366.6
China	719.3
Miscellaneous	<u>1,724.2</u>
TOTAL	31,092.7

<sup>a</sup>. Prior to November 1943, the Seventh dropped a total of 238.92 tons of bombs on targets in the Pacific. (9th SCU, Misc Statistics, p 1.)

SOURCES: 9th SCU, Operations of 7th AF in POA, Nov 43-Apr 45, pp 3-17, & The Last Four Months of War (An Opnl Sum of 7th AF), pp 4-6.



Reproduced from W.F. Caven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV (Chicago, 1950), 393.

XIII. THE ALEUTIANS CAMPAIGN  
JUNE 1942 - AUGUST 1943

Prior to Pearl Harbor, Alaskan defense was a function of the U.S. Navy, supported by air and ground units at points where coastal installations required protection from possible air raids. After the beginning of the war with Japan, the need for an enlarged air defense system caused the Army Air Forces to establish the Alaskan Air Force on 15 January 1942. On 5 February it was redesignated the Eleventh Air Force.<sup>1</sup>

In May 1942 the Eleventh possessed three fighter squadrons, one heavy and two medium bombardment squadrons, and one transport squadron. In late May all Army, Navy, and Canadian forces in Alaska came under the U.S. Navy's North Pacific Force. The Eleventh operated under this command throughout World War II.<sup>2</sup>

On 3-4 June 1942, Japanese carrier planes attacked Dutch Harbor, in the Aleutians, destroying much property and killing 43 and wounding 50 U.S. personnel. On 7 June the Japanese landed troops on Attu and Kiska, farther out in the island chain, adding reinforcements at the end of the month.<sup>3</sup>

Eleventh Air Force B-17's and B-24's and Navy PBY's (Catalinas) attacked Kiska between 11 and 14 June, sinking one Japanese transport and a destroyer and possibly damaging two small craft. But weather conditions restricted flying, and by the end of June only 6 missions had been completed; in July only 7 out of 15. When air attacks failed to dislodge the enemy from the islands the U.S. Navy tried bombardment, without much success.<sup>4</sup>

Fears lest the Japanese extend their penetration led to a continued

if limited U.S. military buildup in the Aleutians. New bases on Adak and Amchitka islands soon permitted increased air strikes against Attu and Kiska. Meanwhile, weather, inadequate radio and navigation aids, and insufficient training continued to take their toll. From 3 June to 31 October 1942 the Eleventh claimed 32 Japanese planes shot down and 13 destroyed on the water but suffered the loss of 72 aircraft, only 9 in combat. In January 1943 a few missions in bad weather cost 11 aircraft.<sup>5</sup>

In early 1943 the North Pacific Force began preparing to retake the islands by assault in May. Air activity increased until in April the Eleventh reached its operational peak, flying 1,175 sorties. But relatively few aircraft reached Attu because of weather. From July 1942 until D-day (11 May 1943), the Eleventh managed only 182 sorties against Attu. Many more reached Kiska, slightly closer. Photo reconnaissance of Attu was good, however, providing the basis for the 2,000- to 2,500-man estimate of Japanese strength that later proved substantially correct.<sup>6</sup>

For the invasion of Attu, North Pacific Force assembled a strong fleet, a large landing force--11,000 men of the U.S. Army's Seventh Division--79 naval aircraft, and the Eleventh Air Force. The Eleventh had 168 planes, consisting of 80 P-40's, 26 P-38's, 3 F-5's, 28 B-24's, and 31 B-25's, based on Umnak, Adak, and Amchitka islands. Against this formidable array of power the Japanese had about 2,600 ground troops, 12 antiaircraft guns, and 15 planes. There remained, however, the danger of Japanese air attacks from the Kurils.<sup>7</sup>

The invasion of Attu began on 11 May at Holtz and Massacre bays. Eleventh Air Force planes were grounded, leaving only a few planes from the carrier Nassau to provide initial air support. There was no immediate enemy

opposition, but as the U.S. troops advanced they found the Japanese well dug in, and the attack proved difficult and costly.<sup>8</sup>

Fog and high winds allowed the Eleventh to provide effective assistance to ground troops on only 11 of the 20 critical fighting days. But when weather permitted, air support frequently helped American troops to clear enemy positions. In addition to bombing and strafing attacks in the battle area, the planes struck at antiaircraft sites, shipping, and installations, dropping a total of 132 tons of bombs during the nine days the Eleventh could operate. A few supply drops were also made. On 23 May 5 P-38's intercepted about 16 Mitsubishi bombers over Attu--the second air strike from the Kurils in two days--and shot down 5 at a cost of 2 of their own. Navy flyers also found the going difficult, the carrier Nassau rarely sending out more than four aircraft at a time and never launching an all-out attack. In the air war for Attu, the Eleventh claimed at least 5 Japanese planes shot down and 7 probables against a loss of 3 planes and 11 men. The Navy claimed two Japanese planes by antiaircraft fire and lost 7 planes and 3 men.<sup>9</sup>

Ground fighting on Attu ended on 29-30 May. Japanese defense of the island cost them 2,351 dead and 28 captured. American losses were about 600 dead and 1,200 wounded.<sup>10</sup>

To retake Kiska a new airfield was quickly built on Attu and another on Shemya, about 25 miles east of Attu. As the Japanese were believed to have 7,000 to 8,000 men on Kiska, a larger Allied task force was assembled by the North Pacific Force. It included 34,426 ground troops of whom 5,300 were Canadians. Eleventh Air Force strength rose in August 1943 to an average of 359 aircraft. Target date for the invasion was 15 August.<sup>11</sup>

From 1 June to 15 August the Eleventh flew 1,454 sorties against and delivered 1,255 tons of bombs on Kiska. The Navy dispatched Catalinas on night bombing raids and its warships shelled installations. The air attacks frequently drew flak and damaged numerous aircraft but none were knocked down. To forestall Japanese surprise attacks from the Kurils, the Eleventh took the offensive against them, striking three times between 10 July and 11 August.<sup>12</sup>

The invasion of Kiska on 15 August brought surprise and chagrin to the troops, for the Japanese had evacuated Kiska on 28 July by ship and submarine. Thus for 18 days the Allies had fought phantom battles. The successful evacuation was attributed to Allied failures, bad weather, and luck. Whatever the reasons, less than 10,000 Japanese troops, a small fleet, and a few squadrons of seaplanes had tied up sizable Allied naval and air units for more than a year. Redeployment of much of the U.S. military strength from the theater followed.<sup>13</sup>

By the end of the Aleutians campaign (June 1942-August 1943), the Eleventh had flown more than 6,100 sorties. Its last major strike against the Kurils with 7 B-24's and 12 B-25's on 11 September was costly. During a 50-minute air battle against 60 enemy fighters, the Eleventh's pilots claimed 12 Japanese planes shot down and 3 probables but lost 3 in combat and 7 more when their pilots had to land at Petropavlovsk in Soviet Kamchatka. Another mission was not attempted for five months. In the interim, the Eleventh Air Force devoted itself to reorganization and training. It particularly tried to reduce operational hazards, which during the Aleutians campaign had claimed 174 aircraft as compared to only 40 lost in combat.<sup>14</sup>

In early February 1944, 16 P-38's and 6 B-25's, flying in relays, covered the retirement of the fleet after it shelled the Kurils. No Japanese aircraft appeared but two P-38's were lost. For the remainder of the war the Eleventh conducted routine patrols and occasional bombing and reconnaissance missions over the Kurils. The Japanese, in turn, made a few air strikes against the Aleutians. But the presence of U.S. naval and air units in the Aleutians caused the Japanese to maintain sizable ground and air forces in the Hokkaido-Kurils area--and out of other combat areas--until the end of World War II.<sup>15</sup>

TABLE 95

Eleventh AF Aircraft on Hand<sup>a</sup>  
Jun 1942 - Aug 1943

<u>1942</u>		<u>1943</u>	
<u>Month</u>	<u>Average Number Aircraft</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Average Number Aircraft</u>
Jun	198	Jan	301
Jul	255	Feb	280
Aug	276	Mar	288
Sep	285	Apr	264
Oct	312	May	278
Nov	324	Jun	292
Dec	321	Jul	352
		Aug	359

a. Aircraft in commission: 67.3 to 87.9 percent.

TABLE 96

Eleventh AF Bomb Tonnage  
Jun 1942 - Aug 1943

<u>1942</u>		<u>1943</u>	
<u>Month</u>	<u>Bomb Tons</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Bomb Tons</u>
Jun	29	Jan	19
Jul	41	Feb	178
Aug	15	Mar	297
Sep	84	Apr	771
Oct	216	May	541
Nov	14	Jun	270
Dec	52	Jul	497
Total	<u>451</u>	Aug	<u>638</u>
GRAND TOTAL.	3,662 tons		<u>3,211</u>

SOURCE: 27th SCU, 11th AF Stat Summary, Jun 42-Aug 45, pp 10, 12.

TABLE 97

Eleventh AF Combat Sorties Flown  
Jun 1942<sup>a</sup> - Aug 1943

	<u>Heavy Bombers</u>	<u>Medium Bombers</u>	<u>Fighters</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>1942</u>				
Jun	77	33	0	110
Jul	86	10	0	96
Aug	13	3	36	52
Sep	110	4	160	274
Oct	229	13	108	350
Nov	43	16	16	75
Dec	97	63	132	292
<u>1943</u>				
Jan	65	36	61	162
Feb	72	62	7	141
Mar	200	232	339	771
Apr	244	147	784	1,175
May	212	187	505	904
Jun	122	109	176	407
Jul	196	113	280	589
Aug	<u>175</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>402</u>	<u>779</u>
TOTAL	1,941	1,230	3,006	6,177

a. Statistics prior to June 1942 not available.

SOURCE: 27th SCU, 11th AF Stat Summary, Jun 42-Aug 45, p 11.

TABLE 98

Eleventh AF and Japanese Aircraft on Hand in the North Pacific  
(Alaska-Aleutians and Hokkaido-Kurils)  
Jan 1944 - Aug 1945

	<u>Average Number</u> <u>Eleventh AF<sup>a</sup> Aircraft</u>	<u>Average Number</u> <u>Japanese<sup>b</sup> Aircraft</u>
<u>1944</u>		
Jan	255	32
Feb	263	38
Mar	261	148
Apr	255	398
May	255	567
Jun	250	538
Jul	259	544
Aug	259	472
Sep	263	352
Oct	258	285
Nov	250	222
Dec	243	155
<u>1945</u>		
Jan	249	105
Feb	300	70
Mar	298	70
Apr	287	85
May	241	179
Jun	238	207
Jul	245	322
Aug	255	435

a. Aircraft in commission: 65.5 to 83.8 percent.

b. Japanese estimates based on WDGS air order of battle reports. Estimates prior to 1944 not available.

TABLE 99

Eleventh AF Combat Sorties Flown  
Mar 1944<sup>a</sup> - Aug 1945

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Noneffective Sorties</u>
<u>1944</u>			
Mar	38	19	19
Apr	37	25	12
May	29	22	7
Jun	42	35	7
Jul	21	20	1
Aug	67	57	10
Sep	110	97	13
Oct	125	99	26
Nov	75	60	15
Dec	33	14	19
<u>1945</u>			
Jan	65	55	10
Feb	65	35	30
Mar	114	53	61
Apr	90	52	38
May	82	77	5
Jun	90	70	20
Jul	75	53	22
Aug	<u>38</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>31</u>
TOTAL	1,196	850	346

a. Statistics for September 1943-February 1944 not available.

SOURCE: 27th SCU, 11th AF Stat Summary, Jun 42-Aug 45, p 19.

TABLE 100

Eleventh AF and Japanese Aircraft Losses in Combat  
Aug 1943 - Aug 1945<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Eleventh AF</u>	<u>Japanese</u>
Destroyed	18	33
Missing	27	-
Probably destroyed	-	24
Damaged	52	48


<sup>a</sup>. From 3 June 1942 to 30 September 1943 the Eleventh Air Force claimed 69 Japanese aircraft destroyed as against a loss of 40 aircraft due to combat. (W.F. Craven & J.L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV (Chicago, 1950), 397; 27th SCU, 11th AF Stat Summary, Jun 42-Aug 45, p 13.)

SOURCE: 27th SCU, 11th AF Stat Summary, Jun 42-Aug 45, p 22.

SECTION IV

\* \* \* \* \*

KOREA



MANCHURIA

LINE OF MAXIMUM  
ADVANCE, 1950  
(UNITED NATIONS FORCES)

MID  
ALLEY


SEA  
OF  
JAPAN

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE  
UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT  
27. JULY 1953

38°

KOREA

LINE OF MAXIMUM  
ADVANCE 1950  
(COMMUNIST FORCES)



XIV. THE KOREAN WAR  
JUNE 1950 - JULY 1953

On the morning following the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25\* June 1950, the U.S. Government directed the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) to prevent enemy interference with evacuation of U.S. personnel. Accordingly, FEAF air cover assured the safe evacuation of 862 personnel by air and 905 more by other means in the first few days of the war. After 26 June, in accordance with directives, FEAF fighters expanded their mission to establish air superiority over South Korea, to attack North Korean targets, and to protect the movement of South Korean troops. By an early date FEAF had destroyed most of the 162-plane North Korean air force.<sup>1</sup>

Although FEAF aircraft, as part of the U.N. forces in Korea, enjoyed air supremacy from the beginning of hostilities, ROK troops and U.S. Eighth Army units, the latter added piecemeal, were pushed back down the peninsula. By August they were forced by the well-trained North Korean army to fall back to a defense line at the Naktong River, for the protection of the vital port of Pusan. Meanwhile, at the direction of Far East Command headquarters, FEAF used most of its fighters and bombers for close support or interdiction in the vicinity of the battle area. On 2 August, after securing General MacArthur's approval, FEAF began its first systematic interdiction program in North Korea. As for FEAF's close support activity, an official Army historian has concluded that FEAF "probably exercised a greater

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\*Local time.

relative influence in August 1950 in determining the outcome of the Korean battles than in any other month of the war."<sup>2</sup>

Relief came to the defenders around Pusan on 15 September when the Eighth Army's X Corps landed on the west coast of Korea at Inchon. In the coordinated naval, ground, and air action that followed, the back of the North Korean ground forces was broken. By the end of September, U.N. and ROK units neared the 38th parallel and in October and November drove through North Korea toward the Yalu River.

The first phase of the Korean War, ending when Chinese Communist forces joined the conflict in November 1950, was marked by extensive use of airpower in support of ground forces. Of the 58,128 FEAF sorties flown by 31 October 1950, 36 percent were for ground support and 26 percent for interdiction. By 25 November, FEAF attacks had exacted a heavy toll, destroying the North Korean air force and destroying or damaging more than 400 tanks and thousands of vehicles, railroad cars, and locomotives, as well as bridges, gun emplacements, and bunkers. An estimated 39,000 troops were also destroyed. U.S. Navy carrier and Marine aircraft contributed to the destruction.<sup>3</sup>

The entry into North Korea of an estimated 300,000 Chinese Communist soldiers in November forced U.N. and ROK troops to retreat to a line south of the 38th parallel. A temporary threat to U.N. air superiority by Mig-15 fighters beginning 1 November ended in December with the arrival of F-86 Sabrejets in Korea. In the aerial battles that ensued until the end of the war, F-86 pilots destroyed 792 Mig-15's while losing only 78 Sabrejets, roughly a 10 to 1 margin of victory. On the ground, U.N. and ROK troops, supported by air, began another advance in January 1951 and by

June had established a new defense line that curved slightly above and below the 38th parallel. This ended the second phase of the war. Enemy losses of men and materiel from air attacks continued to be large.<sup>4</sup>

The third and last phase of the Korean War, from July 1951 to 27 July 1953, was a period of military stalemate along the 38th parallel while the U.N. and Communist representatives negotiated for an armistice. The prohibition against bombing the Communist supply "sanctuary" in Manchuria precluded the most effective use of airpower in accordance with tactical air doctrine. Notwithstanding air battles in "Mig Alley" over North Korea, FEAF easily maintained air superiority. This permitted close support for ground forces whenever they were actively engaged, unlimited freedom to airlift cargo and troops to the battle area, and maximum participation by U.S. Navy and Marine air units.<sup>5</sup>

Interdiction offered the most profitable use of airpower. From August 1951 to June 1952, U.N. air forces, in two major sustained operations, sought to limit Communist manpower and materiel reinforcements by attacking the North Korean rail system. The North Koreans used an estimated 500,000-man labor force to counter it. The U.N. air forces followed this with a program of more selective targeting that continued to exact a huge price from the enemy.<sup>6</sup>

By war's end USAF pilots alone claimed to have destroyed an estimated 145,400 troops. Intermittent attacks on enemy airfields in North Korea had kept the Chinese Communist air force based above the Yalu. Even much of North Korea's irrigation system was finally destroyed. Interdiction and armed reconnaissance eventually accounted for more than 47 percent of all FEAF combat sorties flown, compared with 20 percent for close support.

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This relentless air pressure undoubtedly was a major factor in persuading the Communists to sign an Armistice agreement on 27 July 1953.<sup>7</sup>

TABLE 101

FEAF Average Combat Aircraft Combat Ready in Korean War  
by Type Model  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

	<u>Fighters</u>					<u>Bombers</u>			<u>Total Combat Aircraft</u>		
	<u>F-51</u>	<u>F-80</u>	<u>F-82</u>	<u>F-84</u>	<u>F-86</u>	<u>F-94</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>B-26</u>		<u>B-29</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>1950</u>											
<u>Jul<sup>a</sup></u>	14	69	10	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	93	30	49	79	172
Sep	82	94	6	-	-	-	182	38	109	147	329
Dec	71	118	6	27	15	-	237	65	63	128	365
<u>1951</u>											
Mar	66	123	5	51	28	-	273	50	72	122	395
Jun	67	94	2	50	37	-	250	58	68	126	376
Sep	61	59	2	74	33	-	229	76	71	147	376
Dec	38	47	2	70	58	-	215	73	57	130	345
<u>1952</u>											
Mar	35	49	<u>e</u>	48	80	18	230	78	72	150	380
Jun	28	54	-	80	108	14	284	69	64	133	417
Sep	36	60	-	135	107	16	354	90	60	150	504
Dec	34	74	-	159	117	17	401	98	54	152	553
<u>1953</u>											
Mar	<u>f</u>	53	-	170	174	16	413	102	63	165	578
Jun	-	5	-	195	222	15	437	107	76	183	620
Jul	-	3	-	191	223	12	429	111	76	187	616

a. Includes 27 through 30 June. Compare with figures for all FEAF locations in Table 102. b. F-84's began operations December 1950. c. F-86's began operations December 1950. d. F-94's began operations January 1952. e. F-82's removed from combat status February 1952. f. F-51's removed from combat status January 1953.

TABLE 102

FEAF Combat Ready Combat Aircraft and Crews  
All Locations—25 Jun 1950

	<u>B-26</u>	<u>B-29</u>	<u>RB-29</u>	<u>F-51</u>	<u>F-80</u>	<u>RF-80</u>	<u>F-82</u>	<u>Total</u>
Combat ready aircraft	18	21	2	13	282	8	19	363
Combat ready crews	7	18	8	24	296	12	29	394

TABLE 103

ROK and NKPA Comparative Air Strength  
25 Jun 1950<sup>a</sup>

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>ROK</u>		<u>NKPA</u>	
	<u>Model</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Model</u>	<u>Number</u>
Bombers			IL-10	62
Fighters			YAK-3 & YAK-7	70
Transports			YAK-16	22
Liaison aircraft	L-4 & L-5	13		
Trainers	T-6	<u>3</u>	PO-2	<u>8</u>
TOTAL		16		162

<sup>a</sup>. The figures are as of April 1950 for ROK. They are estimated for NKPA.

SOURCES: FEAF Report on the Korean War, I, 14; Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York, 1961), pp 18-20.

TABLE 104

Chinese Communist Air Strength (Estimated)  
Dec 1950

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighters (conventional and jet)	250
Fighter-bombers	175
Bombers (light, 2-engine)	150
Transports	<u>75</u>
TOTAL	650

TABLE 105

Chinese Communist Air Strength in Manchuria (Estimated)  
Jan'- Jun 1953

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighters (conventional)	165
Fighters (jet)	950
Fighter-bombers	115
Bombers (light, conventional)	65
Bombers (light, jet)	100
Transports	<u>90</u>
TOTAL	1,485

SOURCE: R. Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York, 1961), pp 231, 565.

TABLE 106

FEAF Combat Sorties by Type Mission  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

<u>Type Sortie</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Interdiction & armed reconnaissance	220,168 <sup>a</sup>	47.7
Close support	92,603 <sup>a</sup>	20.0
Counterair offensive	73,887 <sup>a</sup>	16.2
Counterair defensive	12,331	2.7
Reconnaissance	60,971	13.2
Strategic	<u>994</u>	<u>00.2</u>
TOTAL	461,554	(100.0)

a. Note FEAF Report on the Korean War, I, 115, which gives the following combat sorties: interdiction, 192,581; close support, 57,665; counter-air, 66,997.

TABLE 107

FEAF Ordnance Expenditures by Type Mission  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953<sup>a</sup>

<u>Type of Ordnance</u>	<u>Interdiction &amp; Armed Recon</u>	<u>Close Support</u>	<u>Counterair Offensive</u>	<u>Counterair Defensive</u>	<u>Recon</u>	<u>Misc</u>	<u>Total Expenditures<sup>a</sup></u>
Bombs (tons)	218,448	61,469	27	99	958	4,503	386,037
Napalm (tons)	3,815	2,858	61	10	27	53	32,357
Rockets (rounds)	97,885	49,290	557	334	563	1,063	315,600
Ammo (hundreds of rounds)	733,575	254,729	52,927	6,883	17,382	15,279	1,668,531

<sup>a</sup>. Breakdown for bombs and napalm prior to July 1951 not available; breakdown for rockets and ammo prior to March 1951 not available. Therefore, totals do not cross check.

TABLE 108

USAF Combat Claims in Korean War  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

Type Target	26 Jun-25 Nov 50	26 Nov 50-2 Jul 51	10 Jul 51-27 Jul 53	Total
Aircraft	Dest	104		
	Prob Dmgd	38	51	796
		69	19	134
			106	1,011
Bridges	Dest	118	161	548
	Dmgd	393	457	1,405
Buildings	Dest	21,733	68,491	26,615
	Dmgd	13,151	39,454	24,801
Guns & bunkers	Dest	243	266	6,958
	Dmgd	281	637	5,019
Locomotives	Dest	228	216	425
	Dmgd	261	288	536
Rail cuts		379	587	21,862
Railroad cars	Dest	3,120	1,458	10,328
	Dmgd	7,150	3,879	10,061
Tanks	Dest	452	296	69
	Dmgd	405	310	105
Vehicles	Dest	8,367	6,338	59,884
	Dmgd	6,129	5,118	18,350
Troops	Dest	39,000	91,495	14,921
				22,828
				14,906 <sup>f</sup>
				21,090
				817 <sup>g</sup>
				820 <sup>h</sup>
				74,589
				29,597
				145,416

1. Note Table 109. See also USAF Stat Digest, FY 1953, pp 51-52, giving different totals as follows:  
a. aircraft destroyed, 953; probably destroyed, 193; damaged, 1,009. b. 88,839. c. 75,406. d. 8,865.  
e. 7,464. f. 9,358. g. 1,156. h. 1,208.

SOURCE: FEAF Report on the Korean War, I, 62, 82, 96.

TABLE 109

USAF Claims against Enemy Aircraft  
in Aerial Combat and on the Ground  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

Enemy Aircraft	Air-to-Air					Air-to-Ground	Total				
	B-26	B-29	F-51	F-80	F-82			F-84	F-86	F-94	
Destroyed											
Mig-15's <sup>a</sup>	-	16	10 <sup>d</sup>	6	-	8	792	1		4	827
Other <sup>b</sup>	7	3 <sup>c</sup>	31	31	4	1	18	3		49	126
Total											953
Prob destroyed											
Mig-15's <sup>a</sup>	-	7	3	8	-	11	118	1		3	148
Other <sup>b</sup>	-	4	13	13	2	1	-	-		22	45
Total											193
Damaged											
Mig-15's <sup>a</sup>	3	11	9	32	-	82	808	1		5	951
Other <sup>b</sup>	4	4	3	9	-	-	6	1		31	58
Total											1,009

<sup>a</sup>. Includes all type Mig's. <sup>b</sup>. Includes Soviet TU-2; YAK-3, 9, & 11; LA-5, 7, & 9; IL-2, 10, & 12; PO-2; and unidentified aircraft. <sup>c</sup>. Includes one unidentified fighter destroyed by an RB-29. <sup>d</sup>. In-

SOURCE: USAF Stat Digest, FY 1953, p 52.

TABLE 110

USAF Aircraft Losses in Korean War<sup>a</sup>  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

Operational Losses

Enemy action	757
Not enemy action	472
Unknown or missing	237
Total	<u>1,466</u>

Nonoperational Losses

	<u>281</u>
TOTAL	1,747

a. Includes cargo, reconnaissance, and miscellaneous aircraft lost to enemy action.

TABLE 111

USAF Combat Aircraft Losses in Korean War Due to Enemy Action  
26 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Air-to-Air</u>	<u>Ground Fire</u>	<u>Enemy Action</u> <u>Cause Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>
B-26	-	48	8	56
RB/WB-26	-	-	1	1
B-29	17	5	2	24
F-51	10	172	12	194
RF-51	-	17	2	19
F-80	14	113	16	143
RF-80	1	1	1	3
F-82	-	4	-	4
F-84	18	122	13	153
F-86	78	19	13	110
F-94	<u>1</u>	-	-	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	139	501	68	708

SOURCES: USAF Stat Digest, FY 1953, pp 28-29, 60.

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## G L O S S A R Y

AAFEB	Army Air Forces Evaluation Board
ACSEA	Air Command, South East Asia
A/D	Airdrome
AEB	Air Evaluation Board
Avg	Average
Bmbr	Bomber
CACW	Chinese-American Composite Wing
Cat-E	Aircraft damaged beyond economical repair
Comm	Communication
Conc	Concentration
CR	Combat ready
Dest	Destroyed
Dmgd	Damaged
EAC	Eastern Air Command
Eff	Effective
Estb	Establishment
FAF	French Air Force
Fclty	Facility
FEAF	Far East Air Forces
Ftr	Fighter
Gnd	Ground
HB	Heavy bomber
IB	India-Burma
Instl	Installation
KIA	Killed in action
LB	Light bomber
L/G	Landing ground
MAAF	Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
MAG	Marine Air Group
MATAF	Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force
MB	Medium bomber
MIA	Missing in action
M/T	Motor transport

Mvmt	Movement
M/Y	Marshalling yards
NAAF	Northwest African Air Forces
NASAF	Northwest African Strategic Air Force
NATAF	Northwest African Tactical Air Force
NCAC	Northern Combat Area Command
nd	no date
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
nr	number
ns	no signature
Obsn	Observation
Opnl	Operational
Oppor	Opportunity
POA	Pacific Ocean Areas
Prov	Provisional
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCU	Statistical Control Unit
Sum	Summary
Supp	Support
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
Trnsp	Transport
USAFHS	USAF Historical Study
USSBS	U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
WDAF	Western Desert Air Force
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WIA	Wounded in action