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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980	

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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (7 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684103 20 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

1 Incl
as

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 222D COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96291

AVGC-I 11 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. The mission of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion has not changed since the last OPLL.

b. There have been no changes to the organizational structure since the last report.

c. The following personnel changes within this command and principle staff group have taken place since the last report:

CO - LTC Wallace I. Baker, 070259, replaced LTC George W. Adamson, 068855, on 18 August 1968.

XO - Major James E. Rogers, 01930337, no change.

S1 - Major William K. Kuykendall, 04071924, no change.

S2 - Major David E. Hurd, 05405408, replaced Major Val D. York, OF109352, on 12 August 1968. Major John L. Brown, 095639, replaced Major David E. Hurd on 10 September 1968.

S3 - Major Orin D. Plooster, 04041521, replaced Major Larry E. Honsinger, 085185, on 10 September 1968.

S4 - Major Robert F. Sternat, OF102275, replaced Major James Thomas, 02312713, on 6 September 1968.

d. Unit strengths as of 31 October 1968:

(1) Military:

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified indorsement

FOR OT UT
684103

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INCL 1

SUBORDINATE UNIT	OFFICER		WO		EM		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL
147th ASHC	14	11	26	18	215	187	255	216
205th ASHC	14	11	26	18	223	193	263	222
273rd ASHC (Hvy)	17	7	17	13	154	139	188	159
HHC, 222d CSAB	16	20	3	4	71	108	81	132

(2) Civilians:

SUBORDINATE UNIT	DAC		VN		3RD NAT'L		CONTRACTOR
	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	
147th ASHC	0	0	8	8	0	0	2
205th ASHC	0	0	8	9	0	0	2
273rd ASHC (Hvy)	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HHC, 222d CSAB	0	0	15	15	0	0	0

e. Aircraft status as of 31 October 1968 is included as Inclosure 2.

f. Operational results as of 31 October 1968 are included as Inclosure 3.

g. The Battalion engaged in aviation support operations on each of the 92 days in this reporting period. Missions included aerial resupply, vehicular airlift, troop lift, artillery air movement, bridge airlift, and administrative missions.

h. No tactical movements were made by elements of this Battalion during this quarter.

i. On the night of 19 August 1968, two CH-54's engaged in support of artillery fire support bases in the vicinity of Tay Ninh were required to fly numerous sorties into the bases during the hours of darkness. Visibility was restricted due to overcast conditions, with intermittent rain showers. As a result, the aircraft crews relied heavily on "FM" homing for navigation. The "FM" homing was very effective, however, identification

of the landing zones was difficult as the ground commanders would not illuminate their zones due to tactical considerations. Once the crews identified their landing zone, they were required to make their approaches to a single flashlight. During subsequent aviator debriefings it was the opinion of all the aviators that under these visibility conditions, a single flashlight is inadequate illumination of landing zones. The use of a lighted T is considered to be essential to the success of future night operations.

j. On 6 September 1968, a CH-54A experienced a main gear box failure at a field site 15 miles northeast of Cu Chi, RVN. Immediate extraction of the helicopter was impossible as there was insufficient daylight remaining to gather the necessary personnel and support equipment required to prepare the helicopter for airlift. Due to the tactical situation, the decision was made to await first light the following day to begin the extraction. On the morning of 7 September 1968, a recovery crew from the 652d Transportation Detachment, and ground support equipment was flown to the field site to begin preparation of the helicopter. Current procedures for helicopter recovery of a CH-54 call for the removal of the main rotor blades, and certain other items, to include draining fuel to reduce the weight before lifting. Evacuation of the helicopter is then accomplished by another CH-54, with the single point suspension system, utilizing a sling lifting assembly which is attached to the head of the helicopter to be recovered. Removal of the main rotor blades at a field location, without the aid of a blade cradle and hoist, requires rotation of the head and placement of each blade over the fuselage and tail section, so that sufficient personnel may lift and remove each blade. However, due to the main gear box failure, the mast could not be rotated, and the blades could not be removed from the head assembly. To overcome this problem, the entire head assembly, including blades, was removed from the main rotor mast by utilizing the single point system of a CH-54. It should be noted that during this operation, one of the attached ears on the main rotor head being lifted broke, allowing the head and assembly to be damaged. This fact makes it extremely doubtful whether a CH-54 can be successfully recovered utilizing the sling by the head technique. Failure of any one ear on the head assembly during transport would probably require jettisoning the load, thus defeating the purpose of the operation. With the head and blades removed from the CH-54, the sling, by head technique, could not be utilized. Therefore, it was decided to rig the downed CH-54 for four point evacuation by securing individual slings to the aircraft's hard points. The CH-54, which was to perform the recovery, hovered over the downed aircraft after having previously extended the cable on each of four cargo lashing reels which comprise the aircraft load leveller system. The individual nylon straps which had been attached to four hard points of the downed aircraft were hooked onto the extended cables of the hovering CH-54. The combined length

of the cables and nylon straps permitted the downed helicopter to be carried well below the main landing gear of the recovery CH-54. After checking the load at a hover, the take-off was accomplished without difficulty, and the disabled CH-54 was carried to Phu Loi. The aircraft was then repaired and returned to service. Enroute to Phu Loi, oscillations of the load were experienced, and maximum permissible airspeed was 20 knots. Had better rigging material been available, and more time to experiment, the disabled CH-54 could have been carried to its home station at Vung Tau with little difficulty. The downed CH-54 was not damaged in any way by utilization of the four point carry technique.

k. On 17 September 1968, eight CH-47's were scheduled to move three battalions of ARVN infantry from a field location to two tactical landing zones. This mission was accomplished utilizing an Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) for the initial insertion, and eight CH-47's from three seperate Assault Support Helicopter Companies (ASHC) for movement of the remaining troops. A command and control aircraft (LOH) was utilized to coordinate the move with the ground commander, and the AHC commander. The command and control (C&C) aircraft coordinated the PZ and LZ spacing, the loading, frequencies, and weather with the CH-47 flight leader at the rear location. After this coordination was made on the ground, the C&C aircraft commenced all aspects of the move from the air, insuring that the AHC and ASHC mission leads were coordinated, and that fire team support escorted all CH-47's into the LZ's. Each CH-47 carried 50 to 60 ARVN troops per lift. The total time required to move 1400 troops 18 nautical miles, was two hours and forty-five minutes. The third battalion move required considerably more time as weather obscured the LZ for four hours. During this time, the C&C aircraft had to land eight different times to coordinate with the ground commander, solving small problems that normally would have caused hours of delay. This mission indicates that whenever more than six CH-47 aircraft are required to perform a mission, a C&C aircraft, as well as a ground LNO and pathfinders to assist in rigging and inspecting loads in the PZ should be utilized.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Flying hour program for CH-47 aircraft.

AVGC-I 11 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

(a) OBSERVATION. Flying in excess of 1200 hours per month per ASHC has reduced aircraft availability.

(b) EVALUATION. During this reporting period, ASHC's were flown in excess of 1300 hours per month. This resulted in a 10% decrease in aircraft availability. Flight experience for the past 9 months has shown that when CH-47 ASHC's fly a maximum of 1200 hours per month, availability remains high. When the flying hours exceed 1200 hours per month, aircraft availability decreases rapidly. The reason for this can be attributed to the inability to obtain certain aircraft parts such as rotor heads, forward rotor blades, engines, and servos on a timely basis. Some of the AIMI items are not received by AMMC during the month forecast to be required. Once items are released from AVCOM to AMMC, 30 to 45 days may elapse before receipt is realized.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. To ensure CH-47 ASHC's combat effectiveness and availability remains high, no more than six aircraft per ASHC per day should be scheduled, for no more than six hours forty minutes per aircraft per day.

(2) Flying hour program for CH-54 aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION. Flying in excess of 500 hours per month per CH-54 ASHC has reduced aircraft availability.

(b) EVALUATION. During this reporting period, the CH-54 ASHC has flown in excess of 570 hours per month. This resulted in a decrease in aircraft availability. This also can be attributed to the timeliness in obtaining certain aircraft parts when needed. During the past six months, EDI requisitions for CH-54 parts have been been taking on an average of 18 days to receive, rather than the programmed seven days. High priority 02 requisitions have taken an average of 45 days to receive, rather than the programmed seven days, and 05 requisitions have taken an average of 54 days to receive, rather than the programmed 30 days. Because of these order ship time delays in the parts supply system, a flying hour program in excess of 500 hours per month per CH-54 ASHC cannot be sustained.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. To ensure CH-54 ASHC combat effectiveness, and availability remains high, no more than four aircraft per ASHC per day should be scheduled for no more than four hours twenty minutes per aircraft per day.

(3) Security requirements for CH-47 insertions and extractions.

(a) OBSERVATION. Two CH-47 aircraft have been shot down while making

[illegible]

[illegible] Operational [illegible] - Lessons learned of the [illegible] [illegible] Battalion for the Period Ending [illegible] [illegible] (21)

[illegible] s.

(a) [illegible], On 20 August 1968, a [illegible] aircraft [illegible] [illegible] while extracting Class V from a field site. [illegible] troops were on the ground providing security. On [illegible] [illegible] was shot down and destroyed while extracting a [illegible] field site. No security was provided for this [illegible] fire team were not requested for any of the [illegible]

[illegible]. For large troop insertions at least [illegible] placed [illegible] the ground by an AHC prior to [illegible] aircraft [illegible] troops. [illegible] conducting troop extractions, [illegible] [illegible] company. The final company should be extracted [illegible] extracting from a secure fire support base, [illegible] with a light fire team prior to extracting the last [illegible] and security force. That for all aircraft recoveries from [illegible], a light fire team be provided.

[illegible] sling loading of artillery gun platform.

[illegible] [illegible] aircraft [illegible] problems while sling loading artillery gun platform, [illegible] carriage of one [illegible] was damaged as a result of [illegible] forward edge of the platform. One platform had to be [illegible] it began to oscillate severely during flight.

(b) EVALUATION. This platform is extremely unstable in flight [illegible] a tendency to oscillate at airspeeds greater than forty knots. [illegible] effects the mission as this greatly reduced [illegible] time required to fly a single sortie, and causes [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] parts to oscillate, the [illegible] [illegible] critical. [illegible] situation, the pilot [illegible] to reduce his airspeed to [illegible] platform settle [illegible] using the aircraft [illegible] ground [illegible] cases, [illegible] load in order to [illegible] control of the aircraft.

[illegible] problem can be reduced [illegible] rigged in the following manner:

Use 20 foot slings in the front of the platform, and [illegible] [illegible]. This will give the platform a slightly [illegible] an additional [illegible] lbs. of ammunition on the loading edge of [illegible] in A [illegible] to the platform with slings [illegible]

procedure results in a more stable load plus better utilization of the CH-54 as the load is increased from 8700 to 13000 lbs.

c. Training.

Training of nonaviator crewmembers.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel in MOS 67U20 are being assigned to ASMC's without sufficient knowledge to perform their duties.

(b) EVALUATION. Personnel arriving in-country from service schools are not adequately trained to perform crew duties aboard aircraft, to include hoist and winch operations, ground guiding of aircraft, communications procedures, weight and balance, external loads, internal loads and lashing, and refueling procedures. Due to personnel not having this knowledge, units are required to have an extensive OJT program. However, mission requirements, high flying time on aircraft, and maintenance work loads precludes the efficient accomplishment of this training program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That personnel attending service schools in MOS 67U20 be better trained to perform crew duties. As an interim measure, these personnel could be trained in-country at a USARV approved school.

d. Intelligence.

Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a need for information concerning radar controlled anti-aircraft guns.

(b) EVALUATION. At 1610 hours, 10 July 1968, a CH-54 aircraft was flying VFR on top at 6000'. The aircraft commander heard a sound similar to the ringing of a field phone on the FM radio. The pilot immediately executed a 90degree right turn. Approximately one minute later the pilot heard another ringing sound and turned 90 degrees left and started descending. No further rings were heard after the second evasive maneuver. Approximately three weeks before this incident, an aircraft reported an airburst from an unknown weapon in the same general area. CH-54 pilots flying in the A Shau Valley expressed the belief that radar tracking devices of anti-aircraft guns give such an indication before the guns fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That characteristics of enemy radar controlled anti-aircraft weapons be supplied to all aviation units. Additionally, follow up information should be supplied to units which report suspected

AVGC-T 11 November 1[illegible]

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 222d Combat Su[illegible] Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

[illegible] tracking of their aircraft.

e. Logistics. None.

f. Organization. None.

[illegible]. Safety.

Airfield congestion.

(a) OBSERVATION. Congested airfields and refueling sites are cont[illegible] [illegible] accidents.

(b) EVALUATION. Recently, a CH-47A struck a telephone pole while [illegible] landing, causing extensive damage to all three forward rotor blades. [illegible] was a direct result of the pick up point for the CH-47 being [illegible] in an area where dense fixed and rotary wing ground traffic would [illegible] a safe departure from the area. A similiar accident occurred [illegible] the [illegible] landing period and was noted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That separate landing and refueling areas for [illegible] heavy helicopters be made available on congested airfields, [illegible] approach and departure routes suitable for sling loads.

Signal. None.

[illegible]. PIO. None.

Wallace T. Baker
WALLACE T. BAKER
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

5 Incl
1. [illegible] Chart & Sta List
2. [illegible] Status
3. [illegible] Statistics
4. Planned load Bul# 6
5. Planned load Bul# 7

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2 - CO, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384
4 - [illegible], 12th [illegible], ATTN: AVGC-SC, APO 96266

AVGC-I

11 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

CF:

CO, HHC, 222d CSAB
CO, 147th ASHC
CO, 205th ASHC
CO, 273rd ASHC (Hvy)
CO, 11th CAB, APO 96289
CO, 145th CAB, APO 96227
CO, 210th CAB, APO 96384
CO, 214th CAB, APO 96370
CO, 269th CAB, APO 96353
CO, 308th CAB
CO, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Cav, APO 96289

AVGC-SC (11 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 21 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam ATTN: AVFBC-RE-P, APO 96243

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15, two (2) copies of subject report are forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following comments are made:

a. Reference paragraph 2 b (1) (c): Current 12th Combat Aviation Group and II FFORCEV policy is that six (6) CH-47 aircraft will be committed from each ASHC per day. These aircraft are scheduled for only six (6) hours per aircraft per day.

b. Reference paragraph 2 b (2) (c): Current 12th Combat Aviation Group and II FFORCEV policy is that four (4) CH-54 aircraft may be committed from the 273rd ASHC daily. These four aircraft are scheduled for a total of only fifteen (15) hours daily.

3. Concur with all other comments and recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Arthur M. Mountcastle
ARTHUR M. MOUNTCASTLE
Captain, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

AVFBC-RE-H (11 Nov 68) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1))

DA, HQ 1I FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 4 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion, for the period ending 31 October 1968, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. B. Fory

O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVBA-C (11 Nov 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 11 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents except as follows:

Paragraph 2c, page 7. Nonconcur with the establishment of an in-country school to replace the unit OJT program. While such a school would produce a more qualified flight crew member, the time away from the individual's unit to receive such training would add to the personnel shortages currently being experienced by units in RVN. Although it is realized that training received in service schools by personnel in the 67U20 MOS should be improved, additional classroom instruction with limited application would not give the practical experience which these personnel need. An OJT program must still be provided at unit level under supervision of experienced personnel to complete the training of recent service school graduates through practical application of procedures and crew duties taught in formal service school courses. A letter has been forwarded to the US Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker and the US Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, advising them of the need for additional crew duty training of personnel attending MOS 67U20 courses.

2. The following additional comment is considered pertinent:

Paragraphs 1j and 1k, pages 3 and 4 are considered to be excellent lessons learned and the information will be extracted from the CALL and sent to the four Combat Aviation Groups of this command.

3. 1 Inclosure, as stated on the 2d Indorsement, is in error, and should be 5 Inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lewis S. Peterson

LEWIS S. PETERSON
1LT AGC
ASST ADJ GEN

AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 68) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

[illegible], UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco [illegible]

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: [illegible]-DT, APO [illegible]

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (1) Reference item concerning training of nonaviator crew members, page 7, paragraph 2c and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1: Concur with the actions taken by the 1st Aviation Brigade.

b. (C) Reference item concerning antiaircraft fire, page 7, paragraph [illegible]: Nonconcur in the recommendation. An investigation by this headquarters failed to disclose any enemy employment of radar directed antiaircraft weapons. Technically qualified electronic intelligence (USLINT) personnel [illegible] indicated that no known enemy radar equipment produces distinctive [illegible] on FM radios. Headquarters MACV has specific intelligence collection requirements for information on radar directed antiaircraft weapons. If positive information is found, it will be disseminated to all aviation units [illegible].

[illegible]:

[illegible]

[illegible]:
[illegible] Avn Bde
[illegible]

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GPOP-DT (11 Nov 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 222d Cbt Spt Avn Bn for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG


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PHU LOI
APO 96289
273rd ASHC (Hvy)
VUNG TAU
APO 96291
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VUNG TAU
APO 96291
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VUNG TAU
APO 96291
612TH TRANS DET
PHU LOI
APO 96289
652D TRANS DET
VUNG TAU
APO 96291

HEADQUARTERS, 222D COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
AIRCRAFT STATUS
QUARTER ENDING 31 October 1968

SUBORDINATE UNIT	OH-6A		UH-1D		U-6		CH-47		CH-54	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
147th ASHC	2	0	0	0	0	0	16	15	0	0
205th ASHC	2	0	0	0	0	0	16	13	0	0
273rd ASHC (Hvy)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	10
HQS	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
222d CSAB	9	1	1	1	1	1	32	28	9	10

Incl 2

SUBORDINATE UNIT	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] LIFTED	[illegible]	[illegible] DAM/DEST	[illegible] DAMAGED	AIRCRAFT [illegible] LOSS	[illegible]	[illegible]
147th ASMC	13,443	47,1[illegible]	16,965	0	0	[illegible]	1	2	[illegible]
205th ASMC	11,288	47,513	16,162	0	0	0	1	2	[illegible]
273rd ASMC (HVY)	4,[illegible]25	[illegible]	14,581	0	0	0	0	2	[illegible]
222d CSAB	29,961	114,633	47,708	0	0	0	2	6	1[illegible]

* DAMAGE REPORTED BY TYPE:
147th ASMC Aircraft Loss: 1 CH-47, Aircraft Damage: 2 CH-47
205th ASMC Aircraft Loss: 1 CH-47, Aircraft Damage: 2 CH-47
273rd ASMC Aircraft Loss: 0 CH-54, Aircraft Damage: 2 CH-54

Enclosure 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 222D COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96291

AVGC-IC

10 September 1968

SUBJECT: Dropped Load Bulletin #6

Commanding Officer, HHC 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion APO San Francisco 96291
Commanding Officer, 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company APO San Francisco 96291
Commanding Officer, 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company APO San Francisco 96289
Commanding Officer, 273d Assault Support Helicopter Company APO San Francisco 96291

1. Investigation of a recent dropped load revealed a series of incidents causing the dropped load. The mission was to transport three passengers and an external load. Prior to the landing approach being made, the Flight Engineer set the winch/hoist control grip (Pickel Switch) on the floor so he could make a few in-flight maintenance checks prior to the approach. One of the passengers left his seat and went to a window to take a quick picture. The Aircraft Commander started the approach and armed the cargo hook. The Flight Engineer instructed the passenger to take his seat and fasten his seat belt. Enroute to his seat the passenger kicked the Pickel Switch, breaking the winch/hoist control handle and causing the load to drop.

2. Several questions immediately arise about this dropped load:

a. Were the passengers briefed to remain seated with their seat belts fastened?

b. Why was the "Pickel Switch" placed on the floor of the aircraft unattended, where it could be easily kicked by a passenger? It was just vividly demonstrated that these two incidents can result in a dropped load. It could have been prevented by paying more attention to detail and being professional. BE PROFESSIONAL!

3. Supported units are showing a great improvement in their rigging of loads. The Flight Engineers, Crew Chiefs, and Pathfinders can take a lot of credit for this, by their explaining the proper procedures and equipment to be used in rigging loads. Any ideas you have that might be of assistance to other units in preventing dropped loads are solicited. Please call the 222d CSAB, S-3 office, with your suggestions.

Incl 4

AVGC-IC

SUBJECT: Dropped Load Bulletin #6

4. Recently there was an "almost" dropped load [illegible] t[illegible] side out of the trailer it was in, as the lo[illegible] The water tank had not been secured to the trailer, [illegible] was being picked up, it came up slightly front first. This [illegible] attitude caused the water tank to start sliding to the rear, and the load was set down before a dropped load occurred. When picking up this type load, the water tank should be firmly secured [illegible] prevent it from falling out.

[illegible] The following information is extracted [illegible] Supply and Maintenance Newsletter [illegible].

a. 1670-242-9169 Bag, Cargo, a22 service life is indefinite. Serviceability is determined by visual inspection [illegible] in Maintenance Manual TM 10-1670-238-20.

b. 1670-902-3080 Sling, Cargo, [illegible] 15,000 pounds [illegible] inspection [illegible] service [illegible] FSN 1670 air delivery cargo slings.

c. No official procedures or time limits [illegible] the following items:

3940-542-4698 Sling, Cargo rope, 14' x 14'

3940-892-4375 Sling, Nylon, 12' x 12'

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM K. [illegible]
MAJ, Infantry
Adjutant

Cy Furn:
[illegible], 14th CAG 5-Cy
[illegible], 11th CAB 2-Cy
[illegible], 269th CAB 30-Cy

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 222D COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96291

AVGC-IC

23 September 1968

SUBJECT: Dropped Load Bulletin #7

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Recently a 105mm Howitzer with piggy back load (total weight 6800 lbs) was dropped from a CH-47A flying at 1500 feet and 70 knots.

2. Investigation revealed the Howitzer was rigged with two (2) new two loop slings each rated at 6500 lb tensile strength providing a total strength of 13,000 lbs. Upon examination of the slings it appeared one of the slings was partially cut by some sharp metal object such as the trail of the Howitzer or pioneer tools loaded on the Howitzer. This probably occurred as the straps were brought tight on pick-up or the nylon straps rubbed on the metal during flight.

3. To preclude future dropped loads of this nature insure the following procedures are followed:

a. Rig all loads in accordance with TM-55-450-11, "Helicopter External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment", dated June 1968.

b. Have hook up man insure that slings do not become intangled as the load is being picked up.

c. Tape slings together to preclude loose ends from flapping or snagging on the load.

d. Always avoid nylon sling and metal contact.

e. Whenever possible use a minimum of one three loop, 6 ply, 10,000 lb capacity sling or (2) 2 loop 4 ply 6500 lb capacity slings for all CH-47 loads.

f. See Inclosure 1 for proper rigging of 105mm Howitzer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William K. Kuykendall

WILLIAM K. KUYKENDALL
MAJ, Infantry
Adjutant

1 Incl
Proper Rigging Technique -
105mm Howitzer

20

Incl 5



[illegible] LIFTING [illegible]

[illegible] 1. [illegible] one [illegible] foot
cradle [illegible] forward of the sleig

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY *(Corporate author)* HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL 2b. GROUP 4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Hq, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES *(Type of report and inclusive dates)*

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

5. AUTHOR(S) *(First name, middle initial, last name)*

CO, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion

6. REPORT DATE 11 Nov 68	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 24	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO b. PROJECT NO N/A c d	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 684103 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) *(Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)*	

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

ABSTRACT

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 1473

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Security Classification

SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION

AD-500 068

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M)(4 Apr 69) FOR OT UT

14 April 1969

SUBJECT: Notification of Regrading Action

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: classified letter, AGAM-P (M), FOR OT UT 684103, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Adjutant General, 20 February 1969, Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U), with 1 inclosure.

2. Commanding Officer, 222d Combat Aviation Battalion requests that paragraph 2 and Inclosure 3 of Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 October 1968 be regraded to CONFIDENTIAL, Group 4.

3. Addressees should insure accountability of all copies and regrade all copies of subject report as follows:

a. Page 1. Delete: "Regraded unclassified when separated from classified indorsement." Add: "Group 4, downgraded at 3 year intervals, declassified after 12 years. DOD DIR 5200.10."

b. Page 4, para 2. Change to read: "2. (C) Section 2...."

c. Pages 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 17. Add: CONFIDENTIAL markings at top and bottom of each page.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General