

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD500213	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	UNCLASSIFIED
FROM:	CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.	
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization: Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC. Document partially illegible.	
AUTHORITY	
AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING


The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications, or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

AD 500213



18
OACSFOR

IN REPLY REFER TO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M)

(17 Feb 69)

19
FOR OT-UT-684269

25 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th
Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light) ~~Period Ending 31 October~~

SEE DISTRIBUTION

"This document contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations
may be adapted for use in developing training material.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as

12 Feb.
Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
- US Continental Army Command
- US Army Combat Developments Command
- Commandants
- US Army War College
- US Army Command and General Staff College
- US Army Adjutant General School
- US Army Air Defense School
- US Army Armor School
- US Army Aviation School
- US Army Chemical School
- US Army Civil Affairs School
- US Army Engineer School
- US Army Field Artillery School
- US Army Infantry School
- US Army Intelligence School
- US Army Medical Field Service School



Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

003 (60)

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Military Police School
 US Army Missile and Munitions School
 US Army Ordnance School
 US Army Quartermaster School
 US Army Security Agency School
 US Army Signal School
 US Army Southeastern Signal School
 US Army Special Warfare School
 US Army Transportation School
 US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
 Deputy Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Engineers
 Chief of Research and Development
 Assistant Chiefs of Staff
 The Surgeon General
 The Provost Marshal General
 Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
 Defense Documentation Center
 Security Officer, Hudson Institute
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Joint Action Control Office
 Air University Library
 Commanding Generals
 US Army Weapons Command
 US Army Materiel Command
 US Army Flight Training Center
 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)
 Commanding Officers
 US Army Limited War Laboratory
 US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
 Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
 Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project Office
 Research Analysis Corporation (Library)

ACCESSION FOR	
CPSTI	WHITE SECTION ☐
DOC	BUFF SECTION ☒
UNANNOUNCED	☐
JUSTIFICATION	
BY	
DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY CODES	
DIST.	AVAIL. and/or SPECIAL
9	23

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)
APO San Francisco 96279

AVBHH

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
For Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65, UIC WFBDA8

SEE DISTRIBUTION

(C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command.

(1) Brigadier General Franklin M. Davis, Jr. departed the command on 21 August 1968, as a result of wounds received 051130 August 1968 while on a combat operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone, center of area YS1060. Units participating in the operation included the 27th MAC GI (VN), the 1099th Boat Company of the 4th Transportation Command (US), the 3/48th Regional Forces Regiment (ARVN), and the 999th Regional Forces Company (ARVN), in addition to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB). Brigadier General Davis was wounded when the command boat from which he was observing and directing operations was hit by enemy fire on the Rach Ong Keo River, vicinity YS040774. Wounded in the same action was the Commanding Officer of the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert H. Ray. From 22-31 August 1968, Colonel Frederic E. Davison, the Deputy Commanding Officer, 199th LIB, served as the acting commander. On 1 September Colonel Davison assumed command of the brigade as General Davis was permanently reassigned in the United States due to the wounds received during the action previously described. On 15 September 1968, Colonel Davison was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and has since served as the Brigade Commanding General. On 14 September 1968, Colonel Jeffrey G. Smith was appointed the Brigade Deputy Commanding Officer.

(2) Changes of command occurred in 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery; Troop D, 17th Armor Cavalry; 87th Engineer Company; 179th Military Intelligence Detachment; 152d Military Police Platoon; and 298th Signal Platoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORCOT 01
684267
INCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

In addition, Major Benjamin J. Basil, Executive Officer, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, assumed duties as the Acting Battalion Commander for 31 days (6 Aug-5 Sep) while the Battalion Commander LTC Herbert H. Ray was hospitalized as a result of the incident mentioned in Para 1a(1). All changes in command were due to rotations with the exception of 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Due to the death of Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Hall in a helicopter accident on 24 June 1968, the Battalion Executive Officer, Major James F. McGill, served as Battalion Commander until the new commander arrived on 26 August 1968.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
LTC Manuel J. Asensio Jr.	CO, 2/3d Inf	20 Aug 68
LTC Roy J. Herte Jr.	CO, 3/7th Inf	26 Aug 68
LTC Frederick D. Bell Jr.	CO, 2/40th Arty	17 Sep 68
CPT William B. Garber	CO, D/17th Cav	21 Oct 68
CPT Peter J. Cahill	CO, 87th Engr	1 Sep 68
CPT Dennis F. Hightower	CO, 179th MI Det	6 Oct 68
1LT Michael J. McCann	CO, 503d Chem Det	1 Sep 68
1LT Michael J. Baranick	CO, 71st Inf Det (LRP)	17 Oct 68
CPT Benjamin Whitehouse IV	Plt Ldr, 298th Sig Plt	29 Oct 68
1LT James D. Keik	Plt Ldr, 152d MP Plt	30 Oct 68

b. Personnel.

(1) Principal Brigade Staff personnel who were changed during the quarter included the Executive Officer, S3, Aviation Officer, S5, Headquarters Commandant, Chemical Officer, and Adjutant General.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
LTC William C. Carper III	Bde XO	20 Aug 68
LTC Robert J. Cottey	Bde S3	9 Aug 68
MAJ Delano R. Brister	Aviation Officer	20 Sep 68
MAJ Powell A. Johnson	Headquarters Commandant	21 Oct 68
CPT Mark F. Moran	Bde S5	1 Sep 68
CPT Charles A. Lynch	Chemical Officer	6 Oct 68
CPT Edwin H. Sutcliffe	Adjutant General	13 Sep 68

(2) The total assigned strength of the brigade increased by 129 personnel during the quarter. On 31 October 1968, the brigade was operating at 105% of authorized strength.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	OFFICER		WARRANT		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Bde HHC	40	57	8	6	155	312	203	375
2d Bn 3d Inf	43	40	2	2	875	827	920	869
3d Bn 7th Inf	43	41	2	2	875	811	920	854
4th Bn 12th Inf	43	38	2	2	875	786	920	826
5th Bn 12th Inf	43	40	2	2	875	819	920	861
2d Bn 40th Arty	52	46	3	4	586	578	641	628
7th Spt Bn	42	38	9	7	490	557	541	602
503d Chem Det	1	1	0	0	4	5	5	6
Troop D 17th Cav	5	5	0	0	190	203	195	208
87th Engr Co	5	5	0	0	160	182	165	187
49th Inf Flt	1	1	0	0	26	23	27	24
71st Inf Det (LRP)	2	2	0	0	59	60	61	62
76st Inf Det (CTT)	0	0	0	0	10	15	10	15
44th Mil Hist Det	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	2
179th MI Det	9	8	2	3	21	48	32	59
152d MP Flt	1	1	0	0	39	44	40	45
40th FI Det	2	1	0	0	3	4	5	5
298th Sig Flt	2	2	0	0	48	105	50	107
hQTC		19				89		108
TOTAL	335	346	30	28	5292	5469	5548	5843

(3) A total of 588 awards were approved for members of the command. Breakdown by units is indicated below.

UNIT	DSC	DSM	SS	LM	SM	BS*V*	BS*M*	AM	ACMV	ACM	PH	DFC
199th HHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	16	1	22	1	1
2/3d Bn	1	0	2	0	0	8	30	7	7	71	24	0
3/7th Inf	0	0	3	0	0	6	18	10	4	32	20	0
4/12th Inf	1	0	12	0	0	6	19	22	12	34	21	0
5/12th Inf	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	4	6	24	0
2/40th Arty	0	0	1	0	0	1	19	8	0	6	8	0
7th Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	36	0	0
503d Chem	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	1	0
87th Engr	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	0
49 SC Flt	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
71st Inf	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0
76th Inf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
179th MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	3	0	0
152d MP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	0
40th FI	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
298th Sig	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	2	0	18	0	1	24	136	65	28	230	105	1

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leaves were taken in-country by 309 men, with 1098 going out of Vietnam for an R&R leave. Utilization by unit was as indicated below.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OUT OF COUNTRY</u>	<u>IN-COUNTRY</u>
HHC	92	26
2/3d	186	42
3/7th	160	42
4/12th	155	42
5/12th	181	40
2/40th	123	35
D/17th	38	15
7th Spt	114	34
87th Engr	31	15
179th MI	8	9
856th RH	10	9
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>1098</u>	<u>309</u>

c. Intelligence.

(1) Following the deployment of the 9th Viet Cong (VC) Division into Cambodia, it was evident that some emphasis was being shifted from Saigon to outlying areas. Elements of Nong Truong I (North Vietnamese Army (NVA)) have been identified in the northern III Corps - Cambodian border area. The 32d, 33d, and 174th Regiments moved from their normal habitat in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) south into III Corps area. The Nong Truong I headquarters did not accompany them at the time. The 7th NVA Division deployed in the general vicinity of Loc Ninh - An Lac. The 5th VC Division moved from its normal area of operation into War Zone L - U-1 province and took positions near the Michelin plantation. Planning meetings were being held at COSVN headquarters. The troop movements and the resupply activities indicated that another phase of VC offensive was imminent. All major VC and NVA units underwent reorganization.

a) The 5th VC Division reestablished control of the 274th VC Regiment which remained in U-1 - U-2 and U-3 provinces. The major elements of the 5th VC Division were the 275th VC, 33d NVA, and the 88th NVA Regiments. Their area of operation was east of Tay Ninh City.

(b) The 7th NVA Division reorganized their forces for combat with the 32d NVA, 141st NVA, and the 165th NVA Regiments and organic artillery battalion.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) The 9th VC Division retained its organic elements - 271st, 272d and 273d VC Regiments. Their movement into their sanctuary in Ba Thu, Cambodia indicated preparation for offensive action.

(2) Within the Sub Regions, the enemy forces conducted resupply and repositioning of their combat elements. From captured documents and interrogation of PWs, the enemy was trying to place a force of at least five combat battalions into each Sub Region. Medical evacuation points, supply caches and Commo liaison points were to be established for the upcoming offensive phase. (See Incls 1 & 5).

(a) VC Sub Region 2 battalions were dispersed in small groups avoiding contact, conducting resupply activities and training. 6th Local Force Battalion was reported dispersed in the pineapple plantation with reconnaissance element in Tan Nhut - Tan Kien areas. 308th VC Battalion was dispersed in the south western portion of the pineapple plantation. 267th and 269th VC Battalions were dispersed along the Vam Co Dong River, north of the pineapple plantation, west-north west of the Duc Hoa. Captured documents revealed that the 267th and 269th VC battalions were to combine forces and keep the infiltration corridor open for 45 days. D-16 Battalion operated north of the 267th and 269th. 267-3 was located near Cambodia - Tay Ninh border in Northern SR-2. Replacements for the SR-2 battalions were drawn from NVA infiltration groups 299, 186, and 2011. From PWs and documents it was indicated that SR-2 is the critical area for a VC offensive. Routes of infiltration used by the VC previously led from the Ba Thu, Cambodia directly east to the Vam Co Dong River through the pineapple plantation and further to Saigon. Numerous caches of weapons, ammunition and medical supplies have been uncovered, indicating the enemy's efforts to prepare the battlefield and preposition his equipment. A large Depot type storage area was discovered in the south-east pineapple plantation. This base storage will be discussed in a separate paragraph. The entire pineapple plantation offers excellent waterway networks and natural cover.

(b) Sub Region 3. The enemy forces in Sub Region 3 consisted of 10 VC Infantry Battalions and one Artillery Battalion. All of the forces operated in small groups, well outside of the 199th Infantry Brigade's Area of Operations (AO). 506th VC Battalion (AKA 1st Long An Battalion) with less than 250 personnel was forced to withdraw to its base area in the south western section of SR-3. The Dong Phu Battalion, which was formed by a combination of Phu Loi II and K3 battalions has less than 200, located generally in central SR-3. The 265th VC Battalion absorbed the old 5th Nha Be Battalion for a combined strength of less than 200. The 520th VC Battalion received on company from the 550th VC Battalion from IV CTZ for combined strength of less than 200. Its normal AO was in South Central SR-3. The 508th VC Battalion A 2d Independent Battalion was estimated at about 350 men who were dispersed in a base area south east of Ben Luc. The 3d VC Artillery

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Battalion was reinforced by one company of rocket troops from the 208th Rocket - Artillery Regiment. Their normal AO is south central SR-3. The 9th (US) Division captured a 12-tube rocket launcher which probably belonged to the 3d Artillery Battalion. In SR-3, the VC are extremely limited in routes, cover and concealment. During the three month period, the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from air strikes and ground contacts.

(3) The 17-19 August attacks on Tay Ninh, An Loc and Loc Ninh were diversionary attacks designed to draw US/FWMAF from Saigon. If the forces had been deployed away from the Capital, the sub region VC forces would have been free to infiltrate into Saigon with relative ease. Since there was no troop redeployment, the Sub Region VC forces continued to prepare the battlefield, pre-stock supplies and conduct extensive reconnaissance. Increased supply activities and shipping from Ba Thu VC sanctuary have been noted. The VC units remained dispersed avoiding contact, conducting scattered attacks by fire, increased terrorist activities, propaganda, proselyting and recruiting. Definite increases in infrastructure operations were noted. Several successful counter-VC operations have been conducted and 18 VCI were captured and 7 killed. Analysis of all available information indicated that as of the 25th of October 1968, the enemy Main Force units had withdrawn into their rear bases and staging areas. The enemy is not capable of launching a coordinated offensive in the near future. He retains the capability to conduct stand-off and limited objective attacks and attacks by fire. He retains the capability to launch rockets on Saigon from the south, east, and north.

(4) Counterintelligence. Captured enemy documents indicate that the enemy is concentrating more on intelligence collection. One document from COSVN directed the VC units to collect all captured documents, personal letters and notes and forward them to higher headquarters for intelligence and psychological type exploitation. The document stated that personal letters containing addresses from the US could be used by North Vietnamese Intelligence to further the communist goals of influencing the people in the United States. Further reports indicate VC use of espionage agents employing females and children.

(5) Location of Enemy Depot Area.

(a) A large enemy Depot area was discovered by the 199th Infantry Brigade on 18 September 1968. Numerous intelligence reports have been received of enemy supply activities, radar indicated nightly movements and the Airborne Personnel Detector confirmed the presence of personnel in the area. From analysis of the area and the equipment captured it was determined that this Depot could support more than one VC Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Description of the area. The Depot is located generally south of the pineapple orchard along the Vam Co Dong River, grid coordinates XS 560805, XS 590800, XS 588790, XS 560798. The terrain in this area is marshy, inundated, characterized by heavy growths of nipa palms along the Vam Co Dong River and its smaller tributaries. Numerous canals and streams form an extensive waterway network. The Vam Co Dong River is a well known VC supply and infiltration route. Also, during the Tet and the May offensives, the east-west canals and the Vam Co Dong River were used as evacuation routes for the wounded. Several important streams and canals connect to the Vam Co Dong River: At XS 554812 Bung Cau Canal connects to the Bobo Canal, leading north-east directly into the VC main base areas in Ba Thu, Cambodia. The majority of the supplies are transported on this route. Kinh Moi Canal connects to the Vam Co Dong River at XS 580766, southwest with the Vam Co Tay River, another well known infiltration and exfiltration route from Cambodia. The extensive waterway network to the east, connects the Depot area with the numerous forward staging areas at Tan Buu, Tan Nhut, Tan Kien, and further into Saigon-Cholon area. (See Incl 3)

(c) The depot area appeared to be well organized and efficiently laid out. The equipment, weapons and ammunition were stored in smaller caches consisting of 2-55 gallon drums welded together, equipped with wooden trap doors, buried in the ground and well camouflaged. Like items of material were stored together in an orderly fashion. Three hospitals were captured in this area. Each of the hospitals consisted of several huts and bunkers, equipped with operating tables and lighting equipment. Surgical tools found in this area indicated that major surgeries could be performed. The area contained several drums of fresh drinking water and gasoline. The numerous small streams and tributaries served as ideal concealment of the numerous motorized sampans found in the area.

(d) The entire area was heavily booby trapped. All the booby traps appeared to be new and recently emplaced. Practically all land areas were booby trapped. The complete absence of booby traps in the waterways and shores indicated the Viet Cong's exclusive use of waterways. The booby traps were placed along the nipa palm groves and on all possible near landing zones in an irregular manner.

(e) Equipment captured or destroyed during the period 18 September - 5 October 68:

Bunkers:	246
Structures:	51
Rock 82-107mm	25
122mm	18

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Weapons- Small arms:	48
Crew served:	6
Ammunition-Small arms:	24,530
Crew Served:	1,213
Field Gear (pounds):	655
Medical Supplies (pounds):	115
VC Uniforms:	245
Ponchos:	265
Gas Masks:	158
Rice (Pounds):	2,600
Complete Hospitals:	3
Motorized sampans:	36
Booby traps*:	916
Explosives (pounds):	800

* Those booby traps found, destroyed or disarmed not including those exploded by air strikes and artillery.

(b) Enemy strengths and dispositions.

(a) VC Sub Region 2.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
6th LF Bn	200	Dispersed in the pineapple plantation Tan Nhut, Tan Buu, Tan Kien.
50th Bn	100	South western pineapple plantation; XS5680.
207th Bn	200	Dispersed in VC Base area; XS5396.
25th Bn	250	Dispersed in VC Base area; XT4701.
116 Bn	200	XT4307.
(b) Sub Region 3.		
506th Bn	250	XS6873.
Don Hu Bn	200	XS7873.
265th Bn	200	XS8866.
520th Bn	175	XS6963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

508th Bn 175

XS6770.

3d Arty Bn 100

XS8065.

(7) The total cumulative losses for the Viet Cong are shown below for the period 1 August to 31 October 1968. (Operation TOAN THANG II).

VC KIA (BC)	59
VC KIA (FMOB)	65
Detainees Processed	250
ITW	10
Hoi Chanh	1
Small Arms Captured	133
Crew Served Wps Opt	14
Rounds of ammo (SA)	53,808
Rounds of ammo (CS)	238
Rice (tons)	3.448
Fortifications Destroyed	2,496
Buildings destroyed	28
Grenades Captured	163
Humvees Destroyed	69

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) The brigade, under Operational Control (Opcon) of the Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC), continued Operation TOAN THANG II in Area I. The brigade continued its mission of participating in the ground, rocket, and mortar defense of Saigon. The brigade's area of responsibility remained south and west of Saigon. Elements of the brigade continued aggressive and extensive operations; patrolling, night ambushes on all likely land and water approaches into the city through the brigade's AO, and maintained a 24 hour surveillance in all assigned sectors. As of 31 October, the brigade continued its active coverage of the AO, and maintained a high state of readiness to react to and to crush any enemy threat that could present

(2) Operations Conducted:

(a) 1-31 August (6-31st Infantry Opcon from 9th Infantry Division). On 040350 hours vicinity XS739839 an ambush patrol (AP) of E Company 2/3d Infantry, engaged 3 or more VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA, AK-47, one 9mm pistol, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 3 RPG rounds, 472 rounds of 11.4mm ammunition, and one half pound of documents captured. On 07.00 hours vicinity XS684852, an AP from C Company 2/3d Infantry sunk

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Sampan and killed 2 VC (BC) and 2 VC (PROB). On 092130 hours vicinity XS 76583, A Company 2/3d Infantry fired on 10 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) with supporting artillery accounting for 1 VC killed by artillery (KBA)(PROB). On 102120 hours vicinity XS684853, B Company 2/3d, while conducting a reconnaissance in force (RIF) destroyed 1 sampan killing 2 VC (BC), and capturing 1 AK-47. On 111030 hours vicinity XS709881, a Light Fire Team (LFT) (2 Armed Helicopters) killed 2 VC (BC) and B Company 4/12th Inf captured 1 female prisoner of war (PW) and killed 1 VC (BC) while on a RIF after an airmobile assault into the area. On 151240 hours vicinity XS638864, a patrol from B Company 2/3d Inf made contact with an estimated VC squad, contact was lost at 151545, results, 1 US KIA, 5 US wounded in action (WIA) and 5 VC KIA (PROB). On 151555 hours vicinity XS643875, C Company 2/3d made contact with an unknown size VC force resulting in 1 VC KIA (PROB). On 160808 hours vicinity XS643874, D Company 2/3d found 1 VC KBA (BC) probably killed by supporting fires on the 15th. On 161930 hours vicinity XS 638862, a Chieu Hoi surrendered to B Company 2/3d. On 171100 hours the Commanding Officer, 2/3d, in a helicopter, found 2 VC KBA vic XS 655870, at 1910 hours vic XS767827, B Company 5/31st captured 2 VC. On 180350 vic XS673858, an AF from B Company 2/3d sank 1 sampan, captured 1 sampan motor and 1 AK-47 and 3 VC KIA (PROB). On the 19th, 3/7th conducted a RIF vicinity XS7877 resulting in 2 detainees and 1 PW. On 200726 hours vic XS643925, during an airmobile assault by B Company 4/12th, a UH-1D helicopter was downed by ground fire, resulting in 1 US KIA, and 3 US WIA, at 1300 hours vic XS647916, B Company 4/12th received SA fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. On 262303 hours vic XS709823, an AP from D Company 2/3d killed 1 VC (BC) and captured 1 pistol. On 272257 hours vic XS732827, a patrol from B Company 6/31st engaged a sampan, resulting in 1 sampan destroyed and 2 VC KIA (PROB). On 291657 hours vicinity XS706832, C Company engaged an unknown size force of VC. LFT, Flareship, and artillery supporting the action resulted in 5 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC). On 301613 hours vic XS791808, B and C Companies 3/7th, while patrolling, received RPG and SA fire resulting in 4 US WIA and 1 VN WIA.

(b) 1-30 September. On 041150 hours vic XS803751, a LFT engaged 6 VC, resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC). Vic XS802754, C Company 3/7th, while on patrol, received SA fire from an estimated 3 to 5 VC resulting in 1 US WIA, not evacuated, and unknown casualties. At 1740 hours vic XS803753, C Company 3/7th found 1 VC (BC), and at 1655 hours vic XS345886, D Company 3/7th captured 1 VC WIA PW and destroyed 3 RPG rounds. On 052250 hours vicinity An Lac Bridge, one platoon from D Company, 4/12th, while securing the bridge, sank 1 sampan and engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (PROB). On 072000 hours vic XS651865, while conducting a RIF after an airmobile assault, C Company 4/12th engaged 3 VC carrying automatic weapons, resulting in 2 US KIA and unknown VC losses. On the 12th, 4/39th Infantry, 9th Division, became Opcon to the 199th Brigade and 6/31st Infantry returned Opcon to the 9th Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Division. On 151300 hours vicinity, XS768826, A Company 2/3d Inf engaged and killed 2 VC. D Company 2/3d Inf killed 1 VC and captured 1 AK-47. On 251036 hours vic XS709830, while conducting a RIF, C Company 2/3d killed 1 VC. On 291950 hours vic XS593797, B Company 4/39th, while conducting a RIF after an airmobile assault, engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and at 2050 hours B Company, 4/39th engaged an unknown size VC force, resulting in 6 VC KIA (PROB) and 8 VC WIA (PROB). Enemy soldiers were observed dragging their wounded away. During September, the brigade carried out extensive operations in the western portion of AO Laura, in addition to normal activities. The VC showed a reluctance to engage Brigade forces and when they did engage, they broke contact despite aggressive pursuit by brigade forces. The operations resulted in the capture and destruction of large quantities of enemy supplies, materially hampering the enemy's efforts to regroup and mount sustained operations in any portion of the AO.

(c) 1-31 October. On 082030 hours vic XS712835, an AP from C Company 2/3d engaged 1 sampan resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 with 5 magazines, 1 HFG-2 launcher with 3 rounds and 1 sampan destroyed. On the 18th the 4/39th Infantry was released from Opcon and returned to the 9th Division. On 241120 hours vic XS776753, while conducting a RIF as part of TASK FORCE RHINO, D Company 3/7th killed 1 VC. Enemy actions remained the same as September, the brigade initiated a series of four Task Force Operations with AO Laura to force the VC out of hiding. Two operations were basically cordon and search operations while the other two were RIF's with blocking forces to assist. Each of the operations (1 in Oct, IMEX on 14 October, FERRIT on 17 Oct, RHINO on 24 Oct, and HIBO on 28 October 1968) was a combined operations utilizing ARVN forces, National Police and brigade forces. The operations made extensive use of psychological warfare techniques and the civil affairs resources available to the brigade.

(d) In Mid October the 199th LIB employed a new tactic termed "IMPLO" (Implosion/Explosion). This concept permits large groups of forces to be used in cordon and search operations. The 199th LIB utilized up to 14 rifle companies on such operations. The operation is conducted by emplacing a cordon well out from the area of prime concern. The search force is inserted by air inside the ring. Once the search force is inserted the outer ring sweeps or squeezes in toward the center to a well defined "no fire line". When the no fire line has been reached, the search force begins pushing outward. Two such operations were conducted by the 199th LIB, one of which resulted in seven IWs.

1. Results of this portion of Operation TOAN THANG II:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a Friendly losses: 12 US KIA, 208 US WIA.

b Enemy losses: 60 VC KIA, 219 Detainees, 11 PW, 52 KIA (PROB), 1 Chieu Hoi, 140 small arms, 55,260 rounds of small arms ammo, 10 rounds 155mm ammo, 171 pounds of documents, 159 VC protective masks, 114 RPG rounds, 22,655 pounds of rice, 22 mines, 915 pounds of explosives captured, 72 sampans, 2,361 bunkers destroyed, and 52 military structures destroyed.

c Caches found by unit:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3d Infantry	11	2	3	16
3/7th Infantry	0	3	2	5
4/12th Infantry	7	2	2	11
5/12th Infantry	2	3	1	6
6/31st Infantry (Opcon from 9th Div)	2	-	-	2
4/39th Infantry (Opcon from 9th Div)	1	-	1	2
71st Infantry Det. (LRP)	0	1	0	1

(3) Training activities:

(a) The Redcatcher Combat Training Center during the period 1 Aug-31 Oct 68 trained a total of 1,603 replacement personnel for the following units: 199th Infantry Brigade (1,087), USARV Special Troop (301), 54th Artillery Group (215). In addition, 186 officers and NCO's attended the squad leader - platoon leader course during the period.

(b) The Brigade Mobile Training Team, continued to present refresher training to units in the brigade. The following units received instruction during the quarter: 3/7th Infantry (Companies A, B, C, D, and E), 4/12th Infantry (Companies A, C, D, and E), 5/12th Infantry (Companies A and E). During the month of September the team gave a 3 hour block of instruction in the operation, care and cleaning of the 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars to all of the combat units in the brigade including 4/39th Infantry, then Opcon from the 9th Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) ARVN Ranger Mobile Training Teams completed instruction to the following units during the period: 1st Battalion, 43d Regiment and 2d Battalion, 43d Regiment (both ARVN).

(4) Chemical operations of the 503d Chemical Detachment:

(a) Personnel Detectors. There were seventy-eight personnel detector (People Sniffer) missions flown during the above period. The XM-2 Personnel Detector was not utilized on these missions. The new XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector was used on all of the missions and has proved to be far superior to the XM-2. Experience has determined that whether the sniffer is used up, down, or cross-wind, depends upon weather conditions, terrain and area to be covered. Follow-up checks of the Brigade Daily Incident Reports have shown the People Sniffers to be successful and helpful to the accomplishment of the brigade's mission.

(b) Insecticide. Two insecticide spray missions were flown during the period. One mission was flown using three percent Malathion and the other using two and one-half percent. Results and reports show the missions were effective in reducing the insect population.

(c) Herbicide. Three Herbicide missions were flown during the period. It was learned that the success on grass and small vegetation can only be determined by burning the defoliated area three weeks after spraying. Herbicide has proven successful for removing the leaves from trees to allow for better aerial reconnaissance. The missions were flown over hill #837 and the Perimeter of Bien Hoa Air Base. The 503d has now been authorized one airborne, helicopter mounted herbicide sprayer in our TO&E.

(d) Riot Control Agents. No CS missions were flown during the period. However the unit has received manufactured CS munitions and has made various types of field expedients and maintains a constant state of readiness should the opportunity arise to use them. Ten drums of CS were given to 4/12th Infantry for tunnel and bunker use.

(e) Flame weapons. No flame weapons were used during this period. The unit is prepared and has assisted the battalions with various types of flame weapons and field expedients.

(f) Personnel Detectors. All personnel have had some training on the operation and maintenance of the Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) to include the XM-2 and XM-3 and more training is outlined for the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(g) Insecticide and Herbicide. Training has been conducted in the capabilities of the various types of insecticide and herbicides now being used by this organization. In addition, all personnel have been trained in the methods of employment of these sprays.

(h) Riot Control Agents. The personnel of this unit have received training in the use of various types of RCA munitions. Two more members of the Detachment went with the 266th Chemical Platoon, 1st Infantry Division to participate in a CS drop involving 55 gallon drums of CS. The unit is trained and prepared for this type of operation to include having the rollers for installation in a Chinook type helicopter.

(i) Flame Weapons. Training in Flame Field Expedients have been minimum during this period. The unit has given assistance to various personnel within the brigade on flame weapons and has participated in the CMMI.

(5) Air Operations:

(a) United States Air Force: The USAF Tactical Air Control Party gave continuous support to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade during Operation TOAN THANG II, flying 489 missions and logging a total of 1,065 hours. There were 199 FAC missions and 290 VR missions flown for a total of 499 and 566 hours respectively. During critical periods, the TACP maintained a scramble capability so that it could give timely response to the needs of the ground commander during the time a FAC was not airborne.

1 USAF Aircraft flew the following Air Strike missions:

a Fighter missions: 146

b Sorties flown: 331

2 Bomb Damage assessment was as follows:

	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
<u>a</u> Bunkers	412	116
<u>b</u> Structures	35	6
<u>c</u> Fighting positions	59	
<u>d</u> Trenches	50 meters	20 meters

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
<u>g</u> Sampans	3	
<u>f</u> Tunnels		2
<u>g</u> Secondary explosions	41	
<u>h</u> Secondary fires	34	

BODY COUNT

<u>i</u> Enemy Killed by Air	7
------------------------------	---

(b) Army Aviation assets supported the brigade with airmobile companies for air assaults, airmobile supply ships, and CH-47's sorties for build-up of fire support and patrol bases. Missions performed were:

- 1 Command and Control (C&C)
- 2 Air mobile Combat Assets
- 3 Eagle Flight
- 4 Troop Extractions and
- 5 Aerial Reconnaissance
- 6 Artillery Fire Adjustment
- 7 Medical Evacuation
- 8 Radio Relay
- 9 Resupply

Psychological Operations (Leaflet Drops)

(c) Changes in organization. On 1 October 1968, at 1300 hours, Battery B, 2/40th Artillery was activated and joined the Brigade.

e. Fire Support Coordinator.

(1) The most significant procedure and policy imposed on the artillery supporting operations during the reporting period was the centralization of fire control at 1st Battalion. Additionally, procedures for the employment of CS gas from 105mm and 122 inch projectiles were developed and practiced. This gas is ready for use in the attack on confirmed rocket launch sites in areas of high population density.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Several airmobile operations were conducted to support maneuver in the western portion of the AO. Fire clearance procedures were upgraded by staffing the Brigade Liaison Section with two additional personnel to process clearances and by closer liaison with district advisory teams. In the near future, a Brigade Fire Control Net (FM) will be operational to handle requests for clearances on a sole user channel for faster response.

(2) To improve proficiency in gunnery and firing battery techniques, a battalion inspection team tested each battery. The results of the tests identified areas for additional training and retesting. At present, firing batteries conduct thirty minutes of gun drill daily, in conjunction with fire direction center drills.

f. Logistical, Transportation, and Engineer Operations.

(1) During the period covered, no significant redeployment of forces was accomplished. Logistical support remains centered at the Brigade's Main Base at Camp Frenzell-Jones with daily resupply being accomplished to each battalion's forward fire support base located south of Saigon. The unit's organic resupply capabilities continue to be augmented by the attached 543d Transportation (Light Truck) from the 48th Transportation Group.

(2) Numerous riverine troop insertions and extractions have been accomplished with the aid of the 1099th Transportation Boat Company. A procedure has been established whereby two LCM's for the exclusive use of the brigade is currently in operation.

(3) During October the brigade was chosen to participate in an operational test of a new concept for distribution and storing dry batteries, known as "Project Orange Ball." The concept envisions fresh batteries being provided directly to brigade supply with the ultimate objectives of reducing the stockage level of dry batteries within RVN and a better product for the users.

(4) During August a new assembly point for rockets and minigun ammunition was re-established from the Heliport to the Brigade ammunition storage area. The present area is capable of assembly and storage of approximately 650 rockets ready for immediate use.

(5) Resupply and maintenance activities were otherwise normal. The following supplies were issued by the 7th Support Battalion:

(a) Class I:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>1</u> Tons of "A" ration issued:	997
<u>2</u> Tons of "C" ration issued:	368
<u>3</u> Total:	1,365
<u>4</u> Weekly Average:	105

(b) Class II & IV:

<u>1</u> Requisitions received:	10,514
<u>2</u> Requisitions filled:	7,265
<u>3</u> Percent filled:	69
<u>4</u> Average number received per week:	809

(c) Class III:

<u>1</u> Gallons issued:	995,248
<u>2</u> Average weekly issue:	76,200

(d) Class V:

<u>1</u> Ton drawn:	2,265
<u>2</u> Average weekly drawn:	170

(e) The following is the current supply status of the brigade:

	<u>Storage Capacity</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
(a) Class I:		
" rations (tons)	15	15
<u>2</u> "C" rations (meals)	180,000	170,000
(b) Class III (Gal):		
<u>1</u> JP-4	25,000	24,000
<u>2</u> Mogas	22,400	19,000
<u>3</u> Diesel	12,400	10,000

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Since the brigade is no longer being supported by piston-driven helicopters, there is no longer a demand for Avgas.

(d) Class V: Portions of units basic loads are stored in the Brigade Ammunition Dump. Approximately 715 2.75 rockets are maintained for the helicopter rearming point at the Brigade Heliport.

(7) The following engineer projects were completed by the 87th Engineer Company:

(a) 1,826 cubic yards of laterite and 1,421 cubic yards of sand were hauled to work sites in the BMB.

(b) Construction was completed on buildings 5023 (30 x 120 Post Exchange); 5024 (20 x 100 PX Warehouse); and 4324 (20 x 75 admin/supply building).

(c) Renovation of 5005 (Brigade Headquarters); and 5014 (17 x 40 extension of CG's Mess).

(d) Put in Electrical Installations at buildings 5001 (17 x 40 AG Building); 5026 (EM Open Mess); 5024 (20 x 100 PX Warehouse); 5014 (17 x 40 extension CG's Mess); and 5023 (30 x 120 Post Exchange).

(e) Completed primary plumbing installations at 5027 (20 x 100 BOQ) and continued plumbing installations at Bde EM Club.

(f) Poured Concrete for septic tank at EM Club.

(g) Surveyed locations for 500-man mess at 3/7th Infantry area, and for 40 x 100 MCO Club.

(h) Presently under construction are buildings 5025 (20 x 100 APO) (80% complete); and 5717 (20 x 100 storage shed at 5/12th Infantry area) (20% complete).

(i) Constructed water tower and erected tank for 5026 (Open Mess); 4900 block (1/12th area); 5500 block (2/3d area); 5100 block (3/7th area); 5700 block (5/12th area); 7th Spt Bn.; and Bde PX.

(j) Graded, excavated and spread penepime for Bde Extension Heliport; 46th Engr Bn (-).

(k) Surveyed, constructed and sandbagged revetments at Bde Extension Heliport.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (l) Completed Construction of Bde Extension Heliport.
- (m) Graded and shaped building area at 5000 block.
- (n) Constructed chain link security fence at 5023 (code FX).
- (o) Erected 16 x 30 Bde sign at Check Point Alpha, "Camp Fremont-Jones".
- (p) Constructed reviewing stand for the main area.
- (q) Renovated Snack Bar Seating Area.
- (r) Improved fortification of bunkers at the Bde Main Base.
- (s) Constructed Radar tower at 17th Bde Main Base.
- (t) Continued work on the secondary electrical system at the BMB. Prepared building for tie-in with the secondary electrical system.
- (u) General maintenance and repair of BMB roads, loading roads and cutting ditches for drainage.
- (v) Constructed road from BMB to Hawk.
- (w) Constructed berms in the following areas: 17th Cav; Redcatcher Training Center; Bde Ammo Dump and A Troop. 17th Air Cav.
- (x) Prefab 20 x 50 and 20 x 100 building components for admin buildings; 16 x 32 Tent Frames; 10 x 10 x 8 and 6 x 6 x 6 bunker kits; 15 x 14 x 16 Water Tower components; showers, and 12 bunker kits were issued in this period.
- (y) Constructed berm in the Bde Area and 17th Cav (-).

g. Civil Affairs and Psychological

(1) During the reporting period, the thrust of the civil affairs activities conducted by the brigade was directed toward the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Civil Recovery Program, material and technical support of a multitude of self-help projects, and an extensive medical civic action program (MEDCAP). These activities took place both in Ho Nai Village (adjacent to the Brigade Main Base at Long Binh, Bien Hoa Province) and in the Area of Operations **TOAN THANG II**. The brigade is currently participating in the Sixth.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Seventh, and Eighth Precincts of the Capital Military District and portions of Binh Chanh and Nha Be Districts, both of which are in Gia Dinh Province. (See Incl 4).

(a) Reconstruction of homes destroyed in Ho Nai Village during the Tet Offensive progressed slowly, although satisfactorily, due to commitments in the TOAN THANG II AO. During the reporting period, twelve individual homes were completely reconstructed. Work is presently continuing on two additional homes. Material for this work is being provided by the Tet Aggression Relief Program (TARP), a fund composed of voluntary contributions by members of the 199th Infantry Brigade. Medical treatment is being provided the residents of Ho Nai Village through the Loc Lam Dispensary, operated by the brigade in conjunction with Bien Hoa Province. This dispensary, located in a permanent building, consists of a waiting room, a treatment room, a maternity room, and three semi-private wards. Open six days a week, the dispensary treated 1,021 patients during the reporting period.

(b) Civic Action efforts continued at a high level in the TOAN THANG II AO during the reporting period. To insure that the effort of the brigade was being expended in the proper direction, all projects undertaken were first coordinated with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) representatives located at the district and precinct level in the areas where the brigade operated. These projects included the construction and repair of roads, bridges, homes, schools, medical facilities, and defensive positions for the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces; distribution of foodstuffs and clothing to refugees and the needy; extensive cleanup, drainage, and reconstruction of a village that was completely destroyed by the Tet Offensive; conduct of "courtesy" operations, to include medical care, food distribution, and entertainment; and an extensive MEDCAP program.

(c) There were twenty-two incidents involving US personnel and/or equipment and Vietnamese civilians during the reporting period. These incidents resulted in the payment of 98,500\$VN in solatium payments to thirty-seven individuals. Broad categories of incidents are:

- (a) Firearms accidents: 6.
- (b) Motor Vehicle accidents: 8.
- (c) Artillery/Mortar incident: 2.
- (d) "Civilians injured as a result of response to hostile fire" incidents: 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) The Psychological operations conducted by the brigade during the reporting period continued to support three main programs: The Chieu Hoi program, the Volunteer Information Program, and a program designed to instill in the civilian population confidence in the Government of Vietnam (Support GVN Program). In addition to aerial and ground speaker utilization and dissemination of leaflets, the brigade distributed patriotic "T" Shirts (bearing the colors of the Republic of Vietnam and a patriotic slogan); play balls with the GVN colors; health kits consisting of soap, toothpaste, a tooth brush, a comb, and a wash cloth, all bearing the GVN colors and containing a health message. During cordon and search operations, a combined Civic Action/Psychological Operations Team provided food, entertainment, and medical attention to the residents of the village being cordoned. Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) were utilized in the brigade AO. These teams, consisting exclusively of Hoi Chanh's (former Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army Troops converted to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program), proved to be quite effective in dealing with the civilian population. By living in the villages and identifying with the people, the APT's were able to gain the people's confidence and procure intelligence unattainable otherwise.

(4) Statistical Summary:

(a) Civic Action Projects conducted and items distributed:

1 MEDICAPS:

a Loc Lam Dispensary: 8,000

b Brigade AO: 23,670

c Total: 31,670

2 Schools:

a Constructed: 11.

b Repaired: 12.

3 Homes:

a Constructed: 18

b Repaired: 15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 Roads:
 - a Constructed: 7.
 - b Repaired: 6.
- 5 Orphanages Supported: 3
- 6 Bridges:
 - a Constructed: 6.
 - b Repaired: 10.
- 7 Cement: 40,710 pounds.
- 8 Culvert: Two 12 Inch pieces.
- 9 Lumber: 412,821 board feet.
- 10 Sand: 5 meters.
- 11 Tin Roofing: 167 sheets.
- 12 Asbestos Cement Roofing sheets: 54 sheets.
- 13 Bricks: 21,750.
- 14 Foodstuffs: 24,781 pounds.
- 15 Health items: 1,717 pounds of soap.
- 16 Nails: 830 pounds.
- 17 Paint: 15 Quarts.
- 18 Whitewash: 1,320 pounds.
- 19 Whitewash brushes: 6.
- 20 55 Gallon drums (empty): 50.
- 21 Beds: 10.
- 22 Chairs: 16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 23 Kits (School): 175.
- 24 Hygiene Kits: 700.
- 25 T-Shirts: 750.
- 26 Shower Shoes: 61 pairs.
- 27 Toy balls: 100.
- 28 Gypsum wall board: 7½ tons.
- 29 Chopsticks: 400 pair.
- 30 Cases Vitamin Tablets: 3.
- 31 Paper Lanterns: 10.
- 32 Gravel (truck loads): 3.
- 33 Medical Supplies (Assorted): 200 pounds.
- 34 Used clothing: 1 bundle.

b) Psychological Operations:

- 1 Leaflets aerially distributed (by supporting units/by organic assets).
- a Chieu Hoi: 5,378,000/120,000.
- b Safe Conduct Passes: 200,000/25,000.
- c Volunteer Information Program: 42,000/40,000.
- d Support GVN: 238,000/30,000.
- Leaflets distributed by land:
 - a Chieu Hoi: 80,000.
 - b Volunteer Information Program: 33,000.
 - c Cordon and Search: 3,000.
 - d Health Tips: 6,200.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 Aerial speaker message (by supporting units/by organic assets).

a Chien Hoi: 98½ hours/2 hours.

b Volunteer Information Program: 8 hours/1½ hours.

c Cordon and Search: 4 hours/2 hours.

d Support GVN: 10 hours/16½ hours.

4 Ground Speaker Messages:

a Chien Hoi: 37 hours.

b Cordon and Search: 12 hours.

c Volunteer Information Program: 13 hours.

d Support GVN: 44½ hours.

5 Summary:

1. The Infantry Battalions' forward CPs remained in the same position. The overall communication systems remained in the same position.

2. The four channel VHF system between CMAC and the 1st Signal Battalion (IIFFORCEV) was replaced by a four channel system between the Brigade and the 1st Signal Battalion using AN/MC-112 equipment operated by the 1st Platoon (FWD Area). Equipment was recently issued.

3. The twelve channel VHF system between Brigade and the 1st Signal Battalion was deactivated and replaced by a four channel system between the Brigade and the 1st Platoon (FWD Area).

4. The AN/PAC-77 and TSEC/KY-38 were issued to the 1st Signal Battalion giving them secure voice communication.

5. The 1st Signal Battalion Teletype Team (RATT) from CMAC became the 1st Signal Battalion Teletype Team to support the Brigade in the FWD Area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(6) A mobile jump team consisting basically of a AN/VRC-49 accompanied the 199th Infantry Brigade Task Force on the following operations: IMEX, 14-15 October, FERRET, 18-19 October, RHINO, 23-24 October, and HIPPO, 28-29 October. The mobile team operated as the NCS station in the Task Force Command Net and as a Station in the brigade secure net.

(7) The communications posture on 31 October for the brigade was as follows:

(a) Radio Relay Systems:

1 The 53d Signal Battalion operated the relay station at Signal Hill.

2 CMAC operated the terminal at their site.

3 The 298th Signal Platoon operated the remaining terminal stations.

(b) Radio.

1 Brigade Forward and FSPB Horseshoe Bend:

a Brigade Command Net-FM (non-secure).

b Brigade Secure Net-FM (secure).

c CMAC Command Net-FM (non-secure).

d CMAC Secure Net-FM (secure).

e Spare Net-FM (non-secure).

f Artillery Command Net for LNO (non-secure).

g ALO Net-FM, AM and WFT (non-secure).

2 Brigade Rear TOC at Camp Frenzeli-1 has:

a IIFORCEV Command Net-FM (non-secure).

b IIFORCEV Secure-net FM (secure) on Hill.

c Brigade Command Net-FM (non-secure).

d Brigade Secure Net-FM (secure).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3 Infantry Battalions:

a Each Infantry Battalion operated a Command Net and a Logistics net.

b Each Infantry Company operated a command net.

4 Artillery Battalion:

a The 2/40th Artillery Battalion operated a command net and monitored the firing batteries nets.

b Each Firing Battery operated a Fire Direction Net.

(c) Wire:

1 Wire lines were limited to local distribution within the CPs and from battalion to company level when possible.

2 Switchboards:

a Redcatcher Forward TOC switchboard utilized an AN/MTC-10 with a 60 line capacity of which 42 jacks were filled.

b Redcatcher Rear TOC Switchboard utilized an SB-86/PT Switchboard with a 60 line capacity of which 40 jacks were filled.

c The Infantry Battalions and the Artillery Battalion utilized two SB-26/PT Switchboards stacked for a total of a 29 line capacity.

(d) Communications centers:

The Brigade Rear Communications Center at Camp Frenzell-Jones was two MGC-17 Teletype Central Office dismounted. It terminated one FCM line circuit from IIFORCEV and one HDX on-line circuit to brigade Forward CP.

The Brigade Communications Center at FSPB Horseshoe Bend was an MGC-17. It terminated on HDX on-line circuit to Brigade Rear CP and on-line circuit to CMAC.

3 Messenger Service was conducted for units at Camp Frenzell-Jones and to headquarters at USAFV and IIFORCEV. Messenger Service was provided between brigade Forward and Brigade Rear with a stop at CMAC twice daily.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(e) Radio Teletype: a radio teletype team organic to CMAC supported the brigade at the Forward CP in the CMAC RATT net.

(f) Power: main power was provided by a 36kw commercial diesel generator with two 10kw and one 5kw gasoline-driven generators as backup.

1. Public Information.

(1) During the period, the 40th Public Information Detachment and attached personnel continued to provide coverage for brigade activities and began working on the first issue of the new twice-monthly brigade newspaper, "The Redcatcher". The funds were approved by the Central Welfare Fund, United States Army, Vietnam for publication of both the newspaper and a yearly magazine. The contract between Tosho Publishing Co., Ltd, and the Central Welfare Fund was prepared by the Information Office and approved by the Brigade Staff Judge Advocate and representatives of the Central Welfare Fund. The newspaper is expected to come out in the latter part of November. The Information Office continues to increase the good relations with the civilian press media. Pre-election coverage was especially good within the brigade due to the nearness of the AO to Saigon. Information Officers and Specialists within the brigade have been appointed and placed on competent officers in all company-size units. This is to insure that each unit will receive adequate coverage in the newspaper, as there is only one writer and one photographer in the Information Office for each company in the brigade. A guidance sheet was distributed and all of the unit information personnel were briefed on their functions and duties.

(2) The following is a breakdown of the Public Information Detachment activities:

- (a) News Releases - 46.
- (b) Picture Releases - 32.
- (c) Hometown News Releases - 694.
- (d) Hometown Picture Releases - 72.
- (e) Hometown Tapes - 139.
- (f) Press Briefings and Interviews - 18.
- (g) News Media Visits - 91.
- (h) Hometown TV Film Clips - 130.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) The U.S. Army Hanoi News Center Quarterly Report, First Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969, indicated 100 per cent usage of the television film sent there by this Information Office. No other combat unit in Vietnam achieved 100 percent use of their film clips. The detachment also submitted more film clips of this nature than any other unit in RVN, except the First Air Cavalry Division. The detachment also had 100 percent usage of its hometown pictures.

(4) The photographic section is having continued problems with the cameras in the field. All of the present cameras are not able to withstand normal field use, despite every precaution by the photographers. Waterproof plastic bags have helped some, but the wetness of the terrain in the present AO combined with the recent monsoon season has taken a toll of photographic equipment. The Information Office now has all of the information and photographer slots filled, but at least half of the replacements are being trained on-the-job in their duties. Only a few have been Army school-trained in their MOS. Two new Information Officers were assigned to the office during this reporting period to fill the two O-2 slots.

J. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the quarter this command paid \$5,158.60 in personal property claims to U.S. military Personnel. The breakdown is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CLAIMS</u>	<u>AMOUNT PAID</u>
August	22	\$3,802.37
September	6	1,276.23
October	<u>1</u>	<u>80.00</u>
TOTAL	29	\$5,158.60

(2) Solatium payments of 70,000\$VN were made to Vietnamese nationals for personal property damage and personal injury. 13 claims filed by Vietnamese nationals under the Foreign Claims Act, AR 27-28, were investigated and processed. The major claim was by the Khai Vinh Finnet Factory for occupation and use of the factory as the brigade forward tactical operations center. The claim was for 3,806,240\$VN per month since the occupation began and for each month of continued use. The claim was investigated and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Commission.

(3) The breakdown of Nonjudicial punishment imposed during the reporting period is below:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	AUG	SEP	OCT	TOTAL
2/3d Inf	16	8	14	38
3/7th Inf	19	17	10	46
4/12th Inf	10	7	5	22
5/12th Inf	31	24	26	81
2/40th Arty	10	7	9	26
7th Spt Bn	9	4	15	28
HHC 199th	7	17	8	32
87th Engr.	2	6	6	14
Trp D, 17th Cav	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL:	104	91	93	288

(4) Court martial rates continued below the overall Army level. Continued command emphasis is being placed on expeditious processing and forwarding of charges. Forwarding indorsements to the general court-martial convening authority include explanation of any delay in forwarding the charges. In keeping with USAHV policy on reducing time individuals spend in confinement, personnel are normally released from confinement after 30 days unless they are pending additional charges or elimination. Increased emphasis is being placed on informing accused persons of the right to request discharge in lieu of court-martial. Such action has reduced the court-martial rate of some battalions. A clemency and rehabilitation program is in operation. Individuals are transferred to different battalions after release from confinement. The reward has not been as great as hoped for by the command. Many of the individuals transferred have been confined again by the new unit for infractions of military law. The breakdown of courts-martial is below:

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

UNIT	AUG	SEP	OCT	TOTAL
3/7th	1	0	0	1

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3d Inf	2	1	0	3
3/7th Inf	2	7	2	11
4/12th Inf	6	6	2	14
5/12th Inf	4	1	2	7
2/40th Arty	5	0	0	5
7th Spt	6	1	1	8
HMC	2	0	0	2
87th Engr	0	0	0	0
D/17th Cav	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	27	16	7	50

SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL

2/3d Inf	0	1	0	1
3/7th Inf	0	1	1	2
4/12th Inf	0	0	0	0
5/12th Inf	0	1	1	2
2/40th Arty	1	0	0	1
7th Spt	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	1	4	2	7

(5) A complete breakdown of legal assistance cases handled during the period are as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Adoption and change of name	2	2	3	7
Citizenship, Immigration and Passport	3	5	4	12
Civil Rights	0	0	0	0
Domestic Relations	14	17	15	46
Depositions	0	1	0	1
Non-support	2	0	1	3
Notarizations	5	18	18	41
Personal Finances, Debts	9	7	6	22
Personal Property	21	10	6	37
Powers of Attorney	23	10	12	45
Real Property	2	0	0	2
Taxation	0	2	2	4
Torts	0	0	0	0
Wills and Estates	3	2	2	7
Miscellaneous	<u>15</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>75</u>
TOTAL	99	124	109	332

Provost Marshal

(1) The Provost Marshal initiated a program to improve the conduct and appearance of personnel within the EMB. On-the-spot corrections are made by MPs and non-commissioned officers and officers. The appearance of military personnel on the EMB improved considerably during the past quarter.

(2) An additional MP patrol was employed from 1800-2400 hours daily to increase the amount of preventive enforcement utilized by the Provost Marshal. This patrol is used in the sensitive areas where

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

protective lighting has not yet been installed. It is also used for nightly security inspections throughout BSB.

(3) The number of accidents and the number of incidents involving the improper utilization of government vehicles declined since the initiation of 199th Infantry Brigade Regulation 58-4, Transportation and Travel, dated 28 September 1968. Compliance with this regulation insures that the number of accidents will remain minimal.

(4) On 16 October 1968, Change 1 to USARV Reg 643-20, War Trophies, was published. This change increases the responsibilities of the local Provost Marshal in the registration of war trophies. DD Form 603 must now be executed by the local Provost Marshal or the USAHAC PM. The change also authorized local PMs to issue a Temporary Export License.

(5) As a result of a survey conducted by the Office of the Provost Marshal, a standardized system for licensing and testing vehicle operators was initiated.

(6) A continual effort has been initiated to insure compliance with USARV Reg 210-5 regarding privately-owned weapons. All privately owned weapons are registered with the Office of the Provost Marshal and secured in the company arms room. Commanders conduct periodic, unannounced inspections to insure that no privately owned weapons remain in the possession of personnel.

(7) The Office of the Provost Marshal continued to stress a positive law enforcement program. Commanders were urged to initiate a positive campaign to decrease larceny of private property, the number of traffic accidents, and educate all personnel on the use of narcotics.

1. Chaplain Activities.

(1) The religious coverage for the 199th Infantry Brigade included services for Roman Catholic and Protestant. Memorial Services were held in each unit where servicemen were killed or died. Information was provided to all personnel interested in denominational services. The Sacraments are always provided as well as religious instruction. Counselling, orientations, visits to hospitals, the stockade, and troop areas continued to establish a good rapport between the Chaplains and the men. The more than adequate Chaplain coverage within the Brigade for Religious Activities and other morale support highlights the overall coverage by the brigade Chaplains. Chapel attendance continues to be satisfactory.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Statistical report for period 1 August-31 October 1968:

		<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Number of Services:	633	13,824
Number of Memorial Services:	22	1,760
Orientations:	13	1,560
Hospital Visits:	161	627
Counselling Cases:	666	
Letters to Churches:	444	
Letters of Condolence:	64	

m. Finance.

The major operation or activity of the current reporting period was the announcement and completion of Conversion Day (C-Day). The first conversion of military payment certificates in Vietnam occurred on 21 October 1968. Upon the official announcement of C-Day, normal finance office operations ceased and immediate implementation of Operation C-Day began. The actual business of conversion with the Finance Office was smooth and efficient. Preparation included briefing of finance personnel, stockage of pertinent forms and review of orders to insure that orders for Conversion Agents remained current. Priority of conversion was given to the Post Office, Post Exchange, and other non-appropriated activities to insure a rapid return to normal business for those activities. The conversion for individuals was handled through conversion agents, appointed on orders. Individual conversions were completed during the first three days of C-Day.

n. Brigade Surgeon.

(1) The health of the command shows an average admission rate of 500/1000/annum, and a daily non-effectiveness in respect to sick days as an average of 353 per month. The highest rates were during the month of September when the brigade was active in its extended AO to the west of Saigon and most of the admissions were casualties from booby traps.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Malaria showed an increase in the number of cases especially during the months of September (25 cases) and October (20 cases). The monthly rate of cases during the previous reporting period ranged from 3 to 7 cases. This increase shows the effect of operating in an area with a high mosquito population.

(3) The incidence of diarrhea remained about the same as the previous reporting period (average of 30/1000/annum). The highest incidence was during the month of September when 40 cases were reported. This shows the effect of a low level of sanitation when a unit began operations in a new area.

(4) The venereal disease rate has progressively increased each month until a new high of 162 cases were reported during September. Emphasis on the purchase of prophylactics from unit funds did not have any apparent effect on the number of cases. Research into the problem revealed that the poor quality of the prophylactics then available during the months of August and September discouraged many units from buying them. The Post Exchange Officer was notified and he was able to obtain 4,032 good quality prophylactics for sale in the PX.

(5) Skin and cellular disease were greatly increased during the month of September when the brigade was operating in an inundated area. The number of cases of foot diseases were $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the usual number. An extensive program of command emphasis on foot care was started in which an officer inspected the feet of the men in his unit daily.

(6) The number of cases of hepatitis tripled (19) during the month of September, but fell to a new low of only 3 cases during October. Extensive operations in the new brigade AO where the area sanitation was low was thought to be the main factor in causing the increase in hepatitis cases.

(7) Field Sanitation Teams appointed during the month of August were trained and certified by a team of instructors from the 20th Preventive Medicine Detachment during the month of September.

(8) New latrines were designed by the 87th Engineers and distributed to all the line companies during the month of September. An improved burn barrel was designed during the month of October to compensate for the absence of urine deflectors. Handles cut near the top of the barrels facilitated the handling of heavy barrels.

(9) The Battalion Surgeons and Corpsemen held MEDCAP in many hamlets and villages of the brigade AO. A total of 20,000 patients were seen and treated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Foot Problems Due To Prolonged Exposure to Water.

(a) OBSERVATION: Troops operating in inundated areas will have fungal and/or bacterial infection of the feet and/or lower legs if exposed to watery terrain for more than 48 hours. Some individuals can tolerate longer exposure than others before maceration and infection occur.

(b) EVALUATION: There are many approaches to preventing foot problems. Frequent changes of socks, air drying of the feet and wearing of shower shoes are all helpful. The exact status of an individual's feet can only be determined by periodic examination of the feet by a responsible individual. The responsible officer will then have some idea of the condition of his troops and will know whether or not they can tolerate additional exposure to water.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis on daily inspection of the feet of individuals involved in operations in inundated areas by the officer responsible for the unit helps alleviate the foot problem.

(2) Utilizing Non-School Trained Personnel as Military Policemen.

(a) OBSERVATION: Both Military Police platoons experienced a shortage of personnel and it became necessary to utilize personnel that were not school trained Military Policemen. After instruction and on-the-job training, these personnel have become excellent Military Policemen.

(b) EVALUATION: The 153d Military Police Platoon and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company Military Police Platoon were experiencing difficulty fulfilling commitments because of the critical shortage of personnel. During this period, personnel with a 95B10 MOS could not be acquired through the replacement system. Over 200 records were screened in Redcatcher Training Center and approximately twenty-seven individuals were selected for Military Police duty after personal interviews were conducted. Selections were made based on individual driver qualification scores, height, weight, education and attitude. Personnel were then given twenty hours of formal instructions before being assigned Military Police duties. Each individual was then trained on-the-job with an experienced MP until the determination was made that he could perform effectively.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

b. Operations.

(1) Artillery Fire Control.

(a) OBSERVATION: Stringent requirements imposed on artillery firing into the densely populated area around Saigon have necessitated significant changes in the battalion's fire control procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: While the battalion fire direction center (FDC) exercised only limited technical fire direction, primarily monitoring registrations and metro computations, the control of fires has been centralized at battalion FDC. Targets of opportunity are attacked conventionally, with the call for fire passing directly to a battery from the forward observer or through the artillery liaison officer if transmission relay is required. Unobserved fires are integrated, planned, and coordinated at the battalion FDC under a Program of Unobserved Fires (PUF). The PUF is produced on a daily basis from intelligence information, analysis of previously acquired targets to pin-point areas of activity, targets submitted by forward observers and liaison officers and from interdiction fires planned to fill gaps in maneuver positions or deny suspected rocket launch sites. The extent of the PUF for any given day depends on three factors: ammunition availability, targeting information, and number of fire units available. The PUF is modified during the night to eliminate targets which are adjacent to areas taken under fire in response to radar and/or visual sightings. By using the PUF, the battalion FDC insures that ammunition expenditures on unobserved targets represent the best planned use of available assets and assists in categorizing targets for reporting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all artillery battalions be enjoined to exercise the maximum centralized control of fires even though massing of fires is not feasible throughout the battalion.

(2) Fire Clearance Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: The entire problem of fire clearance poses a significant burden on both fire planner and the fire unit.

(b) EVALUATION: In most cases, in the Saigon area, clearances must be secured from US, ARVN and GVN agencies for each target area; however, the district advisory teams are able to secure ARVN and GVN simultaneously upon request. Where ever possible, the artillery liaison officer with the maneuver battalion obtains all clearances for fires within the supported battalion's AO. The artillery liaison officer at brigade obtains the clearances in those areas of the brigade AO which are not assigned to a battalion. This procedure works well

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

and facilitates simultaneous support of widely separated operations. Note that while the clearances are decentralized for rapid response, fire control remains centralized to insure that safety criteria are observed and fires fit the context of responding with the "measured use of artillery".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) Augmentation of Organic Artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION: Supporting a light infantry brigade operating in such a large AO has required additional artillery in the General Support Reinforcing (GSR) role to provide the required degree of coverage (three batteries on each operation of platoon size and larger).

(b) EVALUATION: The 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery has four 105mm Howitzer batteries organic, two 105mm Howitzer batteries GSR, one 155mm Howitzer (SP) battery GSR, and one 8 inch/175mm Gun (SP) battery GSR. This mix of caliber affords great flexibility in the attack of targets and reduces the number of displacements required for support of operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Wherever possible, Force Artillery assets be placed in GSR of the light infantry brigade direct support battalion to augment the fires on a responsive basis.

(4) Consideration of Tides and Season Changes in Evaluation of Enemy Capabilities.

(a) OBSERVATION: There are numerous factors in the evaluation of enemy capabilities of navigation of streams and waterways. Estimates must be based on the enemy's capabilities to use the water routes. Navigability on some water ways depends directly on tides and in some cases on seasonal rains.

(b) EVALUATION: In the central and southern III Corps area the waterways represent the most important lines of communications for the VC. All of the VC base and staging areas are connected by numerous canals and streams, offering the enemy excellent routes of infiltration, ingress and regress. On many streams in central and southern III Corps, the tide differences and the monsoon season influence the navigability of the waterways considerably. Streams that seem to be inadequate for water transportation during the dry season, may be fully navigable during the wet monsoon season. These streams are further influenced by the tides. It has been noted that the VC are conducting most of their waterway resupply during the wet season, when the navigability is at its

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

best.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** To be able to evaluate the enemy capabilities to use the waterways, a detailed waterways study must be conducted. This study will serve as a basis for planning of ground and water interdiction as well as preparation of riverine operations. It is further necessary to continuously update this study, especially when the seasons change.

(5) Census - Population and Resources Control In Counter-Infrastructure Operations.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** An ideal aid in Cordon and Search operations is a complete census of the community within the area of operation. In most cases, these documents are nonexistent. The constant moves of population control problems.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Census and Grievances Committee under the National Police Special Branch is normally responsible for taking census. This task can not be readily accomplished due to security problems. During cordon and search operations the security is easily taken care of and the Census and Grievances teams can accomplish their tasks with relative ease. Coordination has to be effected through District and Province Intelligence advisors. The Census and Grievances teams normally bring their own National Police support. The Commander of the search element must insure that all inhabitants of the community are directed toward the census point. Psychological Operations Team, entertainment, MEDCAP, and other aid activities should be established in the near vicinity. Most effective system of census was found to be "family album". Photographs are taken of entire family groups and forms indicating the names, birth dates, birth places and current residences for each member of the family are accomplished. Folders of hamlets and villages can be assembled and disseminated to the District, Province and the unit operating in the area. The counterintelligence section has the capability to provide technical assistance such as photography and equipment. A complete listing of all residents within a community is a tremendous aid in Cordon and Search operations. It aids the commander and the intelligence officer in determining who belongs to the community, who is missing or who is there at the time of the cordon and search operations.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Command emphasis on census should be stressed. It must be primarily accomplished by the Vietnamese. The people should be handled courteously, and the entire operation must show efficiency and a definite purpose. Thorough coordination with the Census and Grievances teams, National Police, District Officials and troops on the ground must be made.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(6) Safety While Crossing Water.

(a) OBSERVATION: Individual equipment makes water crossing difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Crossings are slow and hazardous.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each unit carry at least one rope (120') for use as a safety line; also that each man be equipped with snap link to use with the safety line while making water crossings.

(7) Combat in Cultivated Pineapple Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: Symmetric planting of pineapple in rows limit visibility and make a unit vulnerable to enemy fire when on the move.

(b) EVALUATION: The terrain of pineapple areas forces stringent control measures for maximum protection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The following points should be considered when planning operations:

- 1 Axis of advance should place wind to the back in the event gas can be used.
- 2 If possible, walk artillery before the advance.
- 3 Make maximum use of reconnaissance by fire.
- 4 Extra smoke grenades, hand grenades, and M-79 rounds are highly recommended.

(8) Protective Masks.

(a) OBSERVATION: Protective mask filters become clogged and inoperative when masks get wet. Protective mask plastic waterproof bags do not adequately protect masks from moisture.

(b) EVALUATION: It is a requirement to have protective masks available at all times when on operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each unit require one member of each squad to carry all squad member's protective masks. They are stored in a waterproof bag, strapped to a ruck sack frame. This keeps the masks out of the water and permits them to be easily handled when making stream crossings.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9) Crossing of Canals at Low Tide.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Navigation of canals at low tide is extremely difficult.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Canals are very difficult to navigate because 12-20 inches of silt and mud remain in the bottom of canals after the water has receded.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That units faced with this situation cut nipa palm and place this on the mud to provide a walkway on which to cross. When walking through mud, walk on the balls of the feet, leaning forward. Never get both feet side-by-side. Don't run at the mud as one will tire quickly and perhaps stop to catch his breath, thus causing one to sink in the mud.

(10) Mines and Booby Traps. (See Inclosures 2 & 6)

(11) Waterway Navigability. (See Inclosure 3)

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Organization: None.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Escape and Evasion.

(1) Camouflage, Cover and Concealment.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The use of camouflage on the body can assist in preventing detection.

(b) **EVALUATION:** At 1700 hours 3 August 1968, SP4 Danny Schutz, USMC 397, a member of 2/3d Infantry, 199th Inf Bde, a Radio Telephone Operator was aboard an LCVP boat returning from a RIF mission with his unit when they were ambushed from the river bank. An RPG round hit the boat in which SP4 Schutz was riding. The impact of the round knocked him and one Vietnamese sailor overboard. Both men found themselves in the water, unarmed, and the boats rapidly departing the area, and a platoon sized VC force along both river banks. The men swam ashore and crawled from the water into the thick vegetation. The action of crawling through the mud while climbing the river bank resulted in both men being completely covered with mud from head to toe. This camouflage is what Schutz credits with saving his life. Once ashore the men lay still and remained undetected although the VC were at times only 15 feet away. Once the LCVP'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

had broken through the ambush kill zone they continued downstream. The VC then gave chase on foot along the river bank. This enabled Schutz and the sailor to move away from the area. They ran to the nearest GVN Outpost - a distance of 1500 meters; there Regional Forces personnel gave the two men assistance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Training in camouflage procedures cannot be over emphasized. SP4 Schutz's successful evasion can be utilized as a training point on the importance of camouflage to the individual soldier.



7 Incl

- * ~~1. Map, VC Routes (Cpys 1 & 2)~~
- * ~~2. Study, Booby Traps~~
- * ~~3. Study, Waterway Navigability~~
- * ~~4. PsyOps Map (Cpys 1-4)~~
- * ~~5. Map, enemy positions.~~
- * ~~6. Training schedule, classes on mines and booby traps (Cpys 1-9)~~
- * ~~7. Chart of Communications Nets.~~

*wd, Hq, DA

FREDERIC E. LAVISON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

AVCE-GC 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65

DA, HQ, CMAC (PROV), APO 96243, 8 December 1968

TO: See Distribution

Subject ORLL has been reviewed by this Headquarters and is forwarded
without comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. L. ERRHALT
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

AVFBC-RE-H 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
For Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WFBDA

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: G-OP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.
2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for the period ending 31 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORY

1LT, AGC

Asst AG

AVHFC-DAT (31 Oct 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFBLAB

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 9 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-ST,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 199th
Infantry Brigade and concurs with the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

JPOP-DT (31 Oct 68) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 199th Inf Bde for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt)
APO San Francisco 96279

AVBH-SC

24 September 1968

SUBJECT: Study of Enemy Booby Traps (BBT)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. INTRODUCTION

Recently the enemy command echelon published a directive to Viet Cong/NVA units to inflict as many casualties on U. S., ARVN and F&MF, without getting decisively engaged. During the past two weeks there has been a marked increase in VC use of booby traps. These booby traps are not new to the VC tactics, but the varied uses and combinations of sophisticated and primitive devices are different.

2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Normal VC employment of booby traps (BBT), was to deny us the access to a specified area. In most of the cases, the enemy had a system of complicated marking and warning signs for booby trapped areas. In the past two weeks there has been a total absence of these markings. A possibility exists that the enemy is employing the booby traps to deny us the freedom of movement through specified areas, not planning to use the area for his own movement. Another possibility exists that booby traps are employed on one side of an area, while a free path (generally from a less accessible approach) may exist. In any case, a careful examination of the area by the troops and Kit Carson scouts failed to discover any markings or warning signs.

b. The purposes of placing booby traps are varied as much as the devices employed. As previously mentioned, BBTs are used to inflict maximum casualties; to slow down the pursuing forces; to protect ammunition and supply caches; to demoralize and harass our forces. In some cases, powerful booby traps were emplaced on high poles along the landing zones against helicopters. Some of these BBTs were command detonated as well as using elaborate trip wires and pressure devices.

3. TYPES OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

a. The most common BBTs are constructed of hand grenades (fragmentation and attack). In most cases, the normal five second delay fuse has been removed and an instantaneous fuse has been substituted. Several booby traps consisting of a cluster of three to five hand grenades were discovered. A trip wire was attached to the pull ring of the grenade pin and stretched across a path or likely avenue of approach. The grenades have been placed on the ground, concealed in the bush about three feet off the ground, or hung in the trees. All


Incl 2

CONFIDENTIAL

47

CONFIDENTIAL

types, including captured U.S. grenades have been found. A primitive, easy to construct, but effective activating mechanism was discovered on numerous occasions. A grenade with pulled pin was inserted into a tin can. The tin can was anchored to a tree while a trip wire was fastened to the grenade. A series (up to 12) of grenades was connected to a single trip wire was used. The point man tripped the wire and the series of grenades exploded along the path wounding every one in the squad.



b. Mines have been used extensively by the VC. Among these are home made variety, manufactured concrete mines, and captured U.S. mines. Claymore mines are most dangerous and are used by the VC extensively along the roads as well as near their base areas. Trip wires as well as command detonation wires were discovered. North Vietnamese, CHICOM and home made claymore mines have been found.

c. Shells, high explosive munitions and bombs are used frequently by the VC/NVA forces. Mortar shells and 105/155 shells are among the most common of these types of booby traps. To prepare these, the fuse is removed and regular detonating mechanism is inserted. In some cases the projectiles were wrapped with det. cord. In one case, a 750 pound aerial bomb (dud) was used as a road mine against a U.S. tank. Subsequent interrogation of a VC PW revealed that the Viet Cong simply drill a hole in the body of the bomb and insert the firing device.

1. Improvised explosive devices are numerous and effective depending on the resourcefulness and imagination of the enemy. C-4 explosive mixed with old nails, scrap metal and glass, stuffed into a tin can provides an effective explosive device. Various forms of cast TNT and homemade mines have been discovered throughout RVN. Firing devices are easily constructed, but in most cases the standard grenade (instantaneous and five second delay) fuses were used. These fuses are readily available through VC/NVA supply channels.

4. TRIP WIRES

a. In most cases the trip wires were found across paths and roads about ankle high and frequently well camouflaged. The explosives were emplaced nearby.

b. In several cases, the trip wires and pressure devices were found not on the path, but along side. A sniper would open fire on a patrol on a path. In this case everybody gets off the road for cover and into the trip wires.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Rice paddy dikes and shores of canals are favorite places for VC trip wires. In many cases, trip wires have been placed just under the surface of water near a dike, with the explosive on the dike or shore.

d. Materials used have also been varied. This green wire, thin cord, nylon strings as well as relatively thick wire were recovered. Trip wires have been found taut as well as slack in the grass and on the bushes. They are very difficult to detect, especially in tall grass.

e. Peculiar tactics in the use of booby traps.

(1) Two instances of booby trap emplacement were noted 23-26 September 1968. Unit in a night defensive position was engaged by enemy small arms fire from nearby nipa palm grove. An element was immediately dispatched to destroy the enemy firing position. A short distance from the perimeter the element encountered numerous booby traps. The enemy troops infiltrated to within 150 meters from the perimeter and placed the booby traps. Then they withdrew and opened fire. The trails were checked out prior to darkness, there were no booby traps there at that time, indicating that the booby traps were placed there after dark.

(2) On one occasion, 28 September 1968, a night NDP was under an intensive VC mortar attack. When friendly illumination was fired, a group of VC was spotted emplacing booby traps. A detailed search of the area revealed that booby traps were placed along all possible routes from the NDP.

(3) During bunker destruction operations several men were injured by a grenade air burst. A further check revealed that a grenade with its pin pulled was placed in a ball of (dried) mud and imbedded into the side of the bunker. When the bunker was destroyed, the grenade was hurled more than 40 meters, exploding approximately 3 meters above the ground. Several enemy bunkers were checked and two additional booby traps of this type were uncovered.

5. RECAPITULATION OF BOOBY TRAP SITUATION IN THE PINEAPPLE PLANTATION.

a. Pineapple plantation is a well known important Viet Cong/NVA training area. It lays 2/3 of the way between Ba Thu, Cambodia and Saigon. There are a series of base camps with extensive fortifications and supply areas in the pineapple. Recent friendly operations in the plantation have kept the VC/NVA from using this area and it is now evident that the enemy is taking steps to discourage and make costly all friendly operations in the pineapple. During the last several operations, the troops from 4/12, 2/3, and 5/12 have encountered numerous booby traps. Excessive casualties were suffered by these units.

b. It is known that the Viet Cong are employing the booby traps around the known base areas, supply caches and routes of approach. In some instances the positioning of the booby traps indicated that the routes to and from landing zones have been found booby trapped. This

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

indicates that after the numerous operations conducted by our forces in and around the pineapple plantation, we have established a pattern. Since the avenues of approach are limited, it must be anticipated that these routes will be booby trapped.

c. There is no particular pattern in type and method of employment of booby traps in the pineapple area. From the varied composition of devices and use of trip wires, it is assumed that devices that are available in a given area are used. It is possible that there are caches of this material in each of the base areas.

d. From discussions with advisors and Vietnamese personnel operating in that area as well as from interrogation reports, it was determined that there is a small unit of Viet Cong that is charged with placing of booby traps throughout the plantation. This method is logical and very effective. Another consideration is that in most cases the booby traps, when found, were relatively new and hastily constructed. These facts indicate that the enemy may have set the devices just prior to or after our arrival in the area. In many cases the short time lapse between artillery LZ preparation and actual insertion is sufficient for the enemy to set the booby traps.

e. The following are examples of VC's heavy use of booby traps in and around the pineapple plantation. These examples have been compiled from reports rendered by units, interviews with commanders and men on the ground. Compilation of these incidents is intended to show the many varied methods in VC employment of booby traps.

(1) 16 September XS742830, B/2d Bn, 3d Inf, found a booby trap consisting of one U.S. grenade and trip wire stretched in nipa palm grove.

(2) 17 September XS751863, A/2d Bn, 3d Inf, found a booby trap consisting of two CHICOM grenades and trip wire. At XS746848 three more booby traps were found consisting of one each U.S. grenades. At XS72723 a CHICOM grenade booby trap was detonated by troops from B/4th Bn, 12th Infantry resulting in one U.S. and one Hoi Chanh (Kit Carson Scout) WIA. In the same area four more CHICOM grenade booby traps were found.

(3) 18 September XS56777, B/4th Bn, 12th Inf, found and destroyed one CHICOM grenade booby trap in the same general vicinity B/4th Bn, 12th Inf suffered 9 WIA from 2-grenade booby traps (one scout dog was killed). At XS578808, D/5th Bn, 12th Inf destroyed 18 grenade (CHICOM) booby traps. String has been used for trip wire. It should be noted that an extensive artillery and air preparation had been conducted. There were several large and small secondary explosions, indicating that some booby traps and caches were exploded.

(4) 19 September XS590799, D/5th Bn, 12th Inf, destroyed six U.S. and CHICOM grenade booby traps. In the same vicinity D/5th Bn, 12th Inf.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

had three U.S. WIA from a CHICOM booby trap. At XS591799 D/5th Bn, 12th Inf found and destroyed a booby trapped 105mm round and one grenade booby trap.

(5) 20 September XS567805, B/4th Bn, 12th Inf, fired M-79 into tree line resulting in numerous secondary explosions caused by booby traps.

(6) 21 September XS776775, A/3d Bn, 7th Inf, had four U.S. WIA from a booby trap. A claymore mine was identified. At XS572796, A/2d Bn, 3d Inf had one U.S. KIA and six WIA from a booby trap consisting of 4.2" mortar round and trip wire. Two more grenade (US) booby traps were encountered causing additional two U.S. WIA.

(7) 22 September XS569799, A/2d Bn, 3d Inf, found an improvised booby trap made of C ration can stuffed with C-4 explosive. Standard CHICOM grenade fuses with trip wire was used. Further examination of the area produced a small ammunition cache of eight cases of AK-47 ammunition and six RPG-2 rounds. At XS556915, C/2d Bn, 3d Inf found and destroyed five booby traps (CHICOM grenades, three grenade booby traps in bunker and one explosive charge (1lb) booby trap with trip wire). In the same vicinity C/2d Bn, 3d Inf suffered one U.S. KIA and three US WIA from a CHICOM grenade booby trap.

(8) 23 September XS559916, C/2d Bn, 3d Inf suffered one U.S. KIA and three U.S. WIA from a booby trap. BBT was a U.S. claymore mine placed in a tree, trip wire attached loosely on the ground and bushes. At XS6108, ARVN Rangers suffered one KIA and nine WIA from a multiple grenade "BT". At XS708834, A/2d Bn, 3d Inf suffered two U.S. WIA from two grenade (US) booby traps. BBT wires were strung across dike.

6. CONCLUSIONS

During an eight day period (16-23 September), the units of the 199th Infantry Brigade suffered three KIA and 34 WIA from booby traps. It is anticipated that the enemy will continue to use booby traps in the future. These devices have proven themselves very effective for the enemy at minimal or no cost of their own lives. Alertness is the key to prevention of casualties from booby traps. Every area of operation must be suspected as booby trapped.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Inc'


1. Lia, ram
2. Diagram
3. Diagram
4. Diagram
5. Diagram

E. H. SUTCLIFFE
Captain, AGC
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

DIAGRAM #1



CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AM #3




54

CONFIDENTIAL

Diagram #4



CONFIDENTIAL



55

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		20. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
		25. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light), Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 August - 31 Oct 1968.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)			
6. REPORT DATE		70. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	75. NO. OF REFS
Undated		59	
80. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		90. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
A. PROJECT NO.		684269	
C. N/A		95. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
D.			
11. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
14. ABSTRACT			