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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO:

AGAM-P (M) (4 Mar 69)

FOR OT UT 684282

10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

AD 500799

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-T (MHD)

16 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during the reporting period, continued in the performance of its general missions.

(a) Destruction of main force VC/NVA forces, equipment, and base camps.

(b) In conjunction with GVN forces, the identification and destruction of local force VC and infrastructure in order to provide a secure environment to further GVN control over the area and people.

(c) Overwatch of the TAOI.

(d) Assistance in the training and improvement of GVN forces.

(e) Area preparation (Destruction and Construction).

(2) The basic essential missions assigned by II Field Forces, Vietnam, in conjunction with Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) continue to be the protection of Saigon, protection of main routes of communications within the Div TAOI, and the defeat of enemy plans.

(3) The operational trends of the period, based on command guidance, experience, and the changing tactical environment, continue to be:

(a) Night operations.

(b) Maintain contact.

(c) Small unit operations.

(d) Area search.

(e) B-52 exploitation.

(f) Intelligence exploitation.

b. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized 1 Aug 68	1038	172	15387	16597
Authorized 31 Oct 68	1042	173	15382	16597
Assigned 1 Aug 68	960	164	15826	16950
Assigned 31 Oct 68	1068	170	15488	16726

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Inclosure 1.

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(b) Gains, qualifications and status:

1. Enlisted:

a. Replacements received: 4243

b. Outstanding requisitions: Sr Enl Grades: 11B40 (12), 11C40 (5), 11F40 (3), 11F50 (1), 11G50 (2), 13Z50 (1), 62B40 (1), 63C40 (1), 67Z40 (1), 71P40 (1), 73C40 (1), 76S40 (1), 76P40 (2), 76Y40 (3), 82C40 (2), 94B40 (16), 95R40 (1), 96B40 (1), 96B50 (1). E6 and below: During the quarter, emergency requisitions were submitted for 622 personnel due to shortfall by MOS in fill of normal monthly requisitions (Aug - 101, Sep - 207, Oct - 314). The emergency requisition for September was returned by USARV without action. Comment on the return indorsement indicated that USARV monitors shortfall and automatically takes appropriate action to requisition necessary personnel by MOS.

c. Credits: None

d. Qualifications: None

e. Status: Same

2. Officer:

a. Replacements received: 626

b. Outstanding requisitions: 0

c. Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses; however, a shortage of Captains still exist in combat arms, particularly Infantry.

d. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill received for requested Captain requirements, particularly in combat arms Infantry and Artillery.

(c) Losses:

1. Enlisted: There were 3685 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board action.

2. Officer: There were 463 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board action.

(d) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

1. Aug:	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
KHA	5	1	48	54
WHA	25	0	330	355
NBD	0	0	2	2
NEM	1	0	31	32
2. Sep:				
KHA	13	1	47	61
WHA	25	0	318	343
NBD	0	0	6	6
NEM	1	0	41	42
3. Oct:				
KHA	4	1	75	80
WHA	26	1	407	434
NBD	0	0	5	5
NEM	1	0	48	49

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(e) Maintenance of Morale:
Awards and Decorations:

Medal of Honor	0
Distinguished Service Cross	3
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Legion of Merit	15
Silver Star	322
Distinguished Flying Cross	98
Soldier's Medal	48
Air Medal Valor	187
Air Medal Merit	2525
Bronze Star Valor	1389
Bronze Star Merit	1920
Army Commendation Medal Valor	637
Army Commendation Medal Merit	2645
Purple Heart	586
Certificate of Achievement	62
TOTAL	11044

(2) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) There were 15 serious incidents and 39 AWOLs reported to the PM during the period and 16 apprehended.

(b) There were 9 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarters. A total of 31 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 10 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

(3) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 194 remains processed and evacuated.

(4) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 2105 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 55,324.

(b) During the quarter 3917 out-of-country R&R allocations were utilized.

(5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the division employed 650 daily hire local nationals.

(b) There were 746 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) General: The 1st Infantry Division participated in Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory), Phase II, which commenced 312400 May 68 and continues through this reporting period. All organic and attached units of the Division are involved. Tactics have consisted of combined reconnaissance-in-force and extensive ambush patrol operations designed to interdict VC/NVA infiltration to the south. Extensive land clearing operations have been conducted throughout the period in the south Lam Son (vic Phu Loi/Di An complex) and east Catcher's Mitt (vic YT 0335) areas. Key installation security operations were conducted in the Thu Duc and Song Be areas and route security operations were conducted along Highway 13. Ground and air reconnaissance efforts in the Saigon Rocket Belt continued to hamper VC/NVA activity in that area. Overwatch of US Special Forces activities, Vietnamese Government installations, and ARVN activities in the Division's TAOI continued throughout the reporting period.

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(2) Force Disposition. (a) The geographic disposition of division forces remained generally balanced throughout the reporting period except for those occasions in late Aug and mid Sep 68 when threats in the northern portion of the TAOI required shifting of forces to that area.

(b) The 1st Brigade provided one battalion (-) regularly to Song Be installation security. Security for the northern portion of Hwy 13 was provided by cross attachment of mechanized and infantry elements in total size of battalion (-).

(c) The 2d Brigade generally employed one infantry battalion in the Thu Duc and Lai Thieu area and one cavalry squadron in the Di An Phu Loi area, and one cavalry troop (OPCON) and one infantry battalion along the Phu Loi interdiction line.

(d) The 3d Brigade generally employed one infantry battalion in the vicinity of Lai Khe with conduct of frequent operations in the north and central Lam Son area and "rocket belt" west of Lai Khe. Principle effort was directed to possible enemy infiltration toward Saigon. Security along Hwy 13 was provided by an infantry company (-) and a mechanized infantry platoon and armor platoon.

(e) Inclosure 3 provides a detailed description of force disposition by unit.

(3) Land Clearing Operations: (a) The 1st Engineer Battalion utilizing organic equipment continued jungle clearing operations in the southern Lam Son area in addition to cutting fields of fire in the Phouc Vinh perimeter, vic XT975505, and Song Be bridge area, vic XT925442. There were a total of 3,097 acres cut during the period.

(b) The 27th Land Clearing Team cleared a total of 7,488 acres during the month of Aug 68 vic XT 7030 & XT 8040. On 24 Sep 68 the unit moved into the Catcher's Mitt area (vic YT 0335) in which a total of 10,969 acres were cut during the period 24 Sep - 28 Oct 68. During this period identification of the 27th Land Clearing Team was changed as that unit became a platoon of the 168th Land Clearing Company. The unit continues to support the 1st Infantry Division as of the close of this reporting period.

(4) Operation Toan Thang, Phase II: (a) During the early part of Aug 68 activity in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI remained at a low level. During the period the enemy initiated an unusually low number of rocket and mortar attacks in comparison with the number recorded in prior periods. Friendly activity of early Aug 68 was characterized by extensive reconnaissance-in-force and ambush patrol operations by organic and OPCON units. Contacts, for the most part, were with NVA/VC units of platoon size and smaller. Village search and seal operations met with measurable success during the period.

1. On 2 Aug 68, B/2-16 Inf was conducting reconnaissance-in-force and night AP operations in an area SE of Lai Khe under OPCON of the 11th ACR. At 1942 hours vic XT926353 an ambush patrol from the unit engaged an estimated NVA platoon with artillery and light fire team supporting. Contact continued sporadically until 2030 hours when the patrol pulled back, and artillery was fired into the area. The results were 13 NVA KIA with 4 AK 47s and miscellaneous documents captured. US forces suffered 1 KIA and 3 WIA.

2. On 5 Aug 68 the 1st Inf Div commenced operations in the Trapezoid (approximately 160 sq km area south of Michelin Rubber Plantation) with the completion of an airmobile assault vic XT585330 by 1-16 Inf (-) and an overland move to an NDP vic XT621330 by the 2-2 Inf (-). The units were under OPCON of 3d Bde. The operation resulted in intermittent activity

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throughout its duration and was concluded on 14 Aug 68 by the 2-2 Inf (-) and 16 Aug 68 by the 1-16 Inf (-). The most significant engagements were by the Reconnaissance Platoon/1-16 Inf (-) against an estimated NVA platoon on 7 Aug 68 vic XT567357 and a Co B/2-2 Inf (-) ambush patrol action in the vicinity of that unit's NDP on 7 Aug 68. Total losses for the two units for the 12 day period were 5 US KIA and 19 US WIA. A total of 12 VC/NVA (BC) were credited to the participating units and the following equipment listed as captured or destroyed.

1 French carbine	60 bunkers
6 AK-47s	misc small arms rds
1 CHICOM carbine	misc NVA uniforms/equipment
6 RPG rds	1 bolt action carbine
4 misc gren	1 carline
1 satchel charge	1 RPG launcher
4 apers mines	1 9mm pistol
1 AT mine	1 box ARVN armbands
1 ox cart	1 tool kit
3 60mm mortar rds	3 gas masks
29 82mm mortar rds	misc cooking equipment
1 sewing machine	1 optical map reading device
misc documents	7 tons rice
2800 lbs foodstuffs	6 bicycles

3. On 8 Aug 68 elements of the 11th ACR, including 3-11 Cav & 2-16 Inf (-), in combined operations with the 1-8 ARVN Bn, sealed the village of Chanh Luu vic XT818322. The seal went into effect at 082300 hours and was broken at 101600 hours. Combined reported results of the seal and search were 18 VC KIA (BC) and 100 VC PW of which 2 KIA and 1 PW were credited to US forces. The following equipment/material was captured.

200 gal salad oil	3 apers mines
2100 lbs salt	16 gren
100 pts condensed milk	5 lbs TNT
14 bags cheese cloth	21 RPG rds w/boosters
100 gal salted fish	500 rds AK-47 ammo
100 lbs flour	3 AK-47s
misc NVA clothing	1 M-79
200 vials vitamin K	1 M-16 rifle
2 tons rice	1 RPG launcher
50 lbs sugar	2 SKS carbines
160 lbs medical supplies	1 pistol

4. On 9 Aug 68, the 2-11 Cav was conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations and night AP operations in the An Loc area under OPCON of 1st Bde. At 1034 vic XT683842 G Trp located and evacuated a sizable cache consisting of 3-7.62 MGs, 2 M1 carbines, 6 SKS rifles, 4 Mauser bolt action rifles, 4 M1 rifles, 5 82mm mortar rds, 3 CHICOM claymores, 3 AT mines, 12 gren, 3 rifle gren, 35 RPG rds, 1270 rds small arms ammunition, 1 VC gas mask, 35 lbs clothing, 1 lb medical supplies, 3 rolls claymore wire, and 5 lbs documents.

5. On 11 Aug the 1st Inf Div assumed responsibility for an area E and NE of Bien Hoa, designated AO Stonewall, effective at 1200 hours. The assigned mission was to assume responsibility for ground, rocket, and mortar defense of the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area within AO Stonewall. Responsibility for AO Stonewall was further assigned to the 11th ACR.

6. On 11 Aug, the 2-16 Inf, while conducting reconnaissance-in-force and AP operations under OPCON of 3d Bde in an area SE of Lai Khe, engaged an unknown number of VC in significant contact. At 0500 hours vic XT853371 a Co A ambush patrol initially received 60mm mortar and small arms fire.

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The contact was reinforced by an Infantry platoon at 0515 hours and a Cavalry platoon at 0535 hours. Total results were 6 US KIA and 18 US WIA with enemy losses of 6 KIA (BC) and 10 KIA (possible). Two RPG launchers, 5 RPG rds, 2 gren, and 1 AK 50 were captured.

7. On 12 Aug 68 the 11th ACR effected another successful search and seal operation. While conducting operations SE of Lai Khe the 3-11 Cav (-) sealed the village of Cau Dat vic XT843269 at 2300 hours. The 2 day operation resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC PWs. Captured/destroyed equipment included 100 75mm RR rds, 39 mortar rds, 32,500 7.62 rds, 8 107mm rockets, 1 122mm rocket, and 5 lbs of documents.

(b) The later part of August 68 was a period of intensified activity within the 1st Inf Div TAOI. Enemy forces initiated several coordinated attacks on friendly units and installations with activity heaviest in the An Loc/Loc Ninh area where elements of the 7th NVA Div were operating in force. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy appeared to have committed large forces in the northern part of the TAOI for the purpose of drawing Allied attention away from Saigon in order to infiltrate supplies and personnel into the Saigon area.

1. On 13 Aug 68, 3 Trp/2-11 Cav under OPCON of 1st Bde engaged an unknown size enemy force while operating in the Quan Loi/An Loc area. During the morning and early afternoon hours the unit was in sporadic contact resulting in 4 US WIA and minor damage to an ACAV. At 1530 hours solid contact was established with an enemy force vic XU732067 resulting in 17 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 60mm mortar, 3 RPG launchers, 10 AK 47s, 1 CHICOM radio, and 20 RPG rds. There was 1 US WIA who did not require evacuation.

2. Again on 19 Aug 68 elements of 2-11 Cav were engaged in heavy contact in the Quan Loi/Loc Ninh area. During the early morning hours the G Trp RON position and Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp received an estimated 280-300 rounds of RPG, 60mm mortar, and 82mm mortar fire. Intermittent contact continued throughout the morning as G, F, & H Trps/2-11 Cav conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations west of Hwy 13 near Loc Ninh. Cumulative results for the 2-11 Cav were 18 VC KIA and 20 VC PW. One AK 47, 1 M16 rifle, 1 LMG were captured. The unit suffered a total of 4 US KIA and 24 US WIA. Two ACAV's were destroyed.

3. Contact between the 2-11 Cav and elements of the 7th NVA Div continued on 20 Aug 68. In a one hour contact vic XU716076 commencing at 1410 hours G Trp engaged a dug-in force of unknown size. Light fire teams and Tac Air supported the contact. Another intense contact of 15 minutes duration occurred at 1500 hours at the same location with F Trp engaging an enemy force of undetermined size. The combined units suffered a total of 7 US WIA while a search of the area uncovered 14 VC KIA (BC), 7 individual weapons, 2 RPG launchers, 10 gren, 8 RPG rds, 25 bunkers connected with field wire, 1 CHICOM telephone, and miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

4. On 20 Aug 68 forces in the area of heavy contact were reinforced by the 1-2 Inf (-) which conducted an airmobile assault vic Loc Ninh.

5. Sporadic activity in the rubber tree area west of Loc Ninh continued with increasing intensity throughout the period of 21-23 Aug 68. Elements of the 2-11 Cav and 1-2 Inf (-) conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations in an attempt to dislodge the enemy forces located throughout the area. A number of smaller violent contacts of limited duration occurred during the period with cumulative results as 8 US KIA, 55 US WIA, 1 US MIA, 85 VC KIA (BC), 60 VC KIA (poss), 1 VC PW, 1 rallier, 1 detainee. Captured or destroyed during the period were 16 individual weapons, 7 crew served weapons, 46

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mortar rds, 12 RPG rds, 28 gren, 149 bunkers, and miscellaneous documents.

6. The battles of Loc Ninh reached a peak on 24 Aug 68 when elements of 2-11 Cav (-) and 1-2 Inf (-) engaged company and battalion sized enemy forces commencing approximately 1700 hours with contact breaking approximately 1700 hours. Major battles were fought by G Trp/2-11 Cav in an area 8 km northeast of Loc Ninh vic XU732158 and by Cos A,C,&D/1-2 Inf in an area 2 1/2 km east of Loc Ninh vic XU763098. US forces lost 5 KIA and 49 WIA in these actions. Battle field sweeps during this and later days uncovered 106 VC KIA (BC), 10 individual weapons, 3 crew served weapons, 12 RPG rds, 11 gren, and miscellaneous documents and small arms rounds. Activity in the Loc Ninh area subsided after 24 Aug 68 as enemy forces apparently withdrew north toward the Cambodian border.

7. On 25 Aug 68 the 1-18 Inf (-), while under OPCON of 2d Bde, uncovered vic XT864174 near Phu Loi a sizable cache containing 3 AK 47s, 2 RPG rds, 2 M1 rifles, 1 CHICOM LMG, 2 SKS rifles, 4 60mm mortar rds, 12 gren, 3 claymores, and misc medical supplies, clothing, and documents.

8. On 27 Aug the 2-16 Inf, while operating under the 3d Bde, engaged VC elements 12 km southeast of Lai Khe vic XT928354 resulting in 4 US KIA and 19 US WIA with the enemy losses set at 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK 47, and 1 RPG launcher captured. On the same day elements of the 1-26 Inf (-), operating under OPCON of the 11th ACR in AO Stonewall, located 3 122mm rockets with timed fuzes. In addition, a rocket launching site with 8 firing positions, aiming stakes, and miscellaneous documents was discovered nearby.

(c) During the early part of Sep 68 enemy initiated activity remained at relatively low level with friendly unit reconnaissance-in-force and ambush patrol operations making only scattered and minor contact.

1. On 2 Sep 68 the 2-16 Inf and 2-2 Inf (-) combined to seal the village of Tan Binh vic XT853361 at 0300 hours. The seal broke at 1000 hours. During the search of the village 36 VC suspects were detained, 8 NVN, 1 CHICOM pistol, 1 AK 47, and miscellaneous documents were captured. There were 9 NVN KIA (BC) with no US casualties. A later screening of suspects revealed 11 draft dodgers and 4 persons on the ARVN black list.

2. On 4 Sep 68 AO Voodoo, mentioned during the previous reporting period, was incorporated into AO King. In addition, AO Stonewall was combined with other area to constitute new AO Queen. On 10 Sep 68 AOs King and Queen were desestablished and AO Blackjack (bounded by XT 8030, XT 9431, XT 9041, XT 8343, and XT 7734) and AO Mustang (bounded by YT 2045, YT 2008, YT 1007, XT 9321, XT 8023, XT 8030, XT 9431, and XT 9441) were established.

(d) On 11 Sep 68 the area in the northern part of the TAOI again erupted with heavy activity as significant contact was established with elements of the 32d and 141st NVA Regiments of the 7th NVA Div. The previous contacts of late Aug 68 in the same area had been with elements of the 141st and 165th Regiments of the same NVA Div.

1. The enemy initiated activity early on 11 Sep 68 with attacks by fire on US installations in the Loc Ninh area to include the Special Forces compound, the airfield, and Loc Ninh sub-sector headquarters. The 1-2 Inf (-) was engaged by squad and platoon size enemy elements in the rubber immediately east of Loc Ninh throughout the day. In total, the unit sustained 3 US KIA and 10 US WIA while capturing a 75mm recoilless rifle and killing 10 enemy defenders.

2. The battle intensified early on 12 Sep 68 as the 1-2 Inf (-), in attempting to continue reconnaissance-in-force to the east from Loc Ninh,

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encountered small enemy elements ranging in size from squad to platoon throughout the morning. Movement was limited to several hundred meters. Late in the day at 1600 hours the unit encountered an estimated NVA platoon entrenched in bunker complexes vic XU765094. The contact broke at 2000 hours.

3. Meanwhile, the 1-28 Inf (-) was airlifted into Loc Ninh during the morning of 12 Sep 68 and promptly given reconnaissance-in-force and sweep missions northeast of Loc Ninh toward Hill 222 (XU774147). Progress was made against heavy and stiffening resistance, but Hill 222 could not be secured on 12 Sep 68.

4. On 13 Sep 68 the 1-2 Inf (-) again engaged an estimated NVA company during a 1½ hour battle near the area of the previous day's contacts. The fight against a very tenacious enemy was supported with light fire teams, artillery firing from Loc Ninh, and airstrikes expending 10,000 lbs of ordnance on enemy positions. Contact broke at approximately 1300 hours, and the 1-2 Inf (-) returned to the Loc Ninh airstrip without further incident. The unit's later participation in these engagements consisted of search and sweeps of battlefield areas with no significant contact.

5. Meanwhile, to the north the 1-28th Inf made repeated attempts on 13-14 Sep 68 to penetrate the heavily bunkered and fortified enemy positions in the vicinity of Hill 222 without success. It is noteworthy that enemy elements chose to remain and fight on Hill 222 in spite of expenditure of over 113,000 pounds of various type ordnance by fighter aircraft plus heavy artillery and light fire team bombardment during the two day period. During the evening of 14 Sep 68 the enemy withdrew from their positions, and the 1-28 Inf (-) secured Hill 222 on 15 Sep 68 unopposed.

6. The 2-16 Inf (-) initiated its participation in the Loc Ninh engagements on 13 Sep 68. At approximately noon the unit conducted an airborne assault into an area north of the 1-2 Inf (-) and 1-28 Inf (-) contacts. The mission was to provide a blocking force to those NVA elements attempting to break contact and move to the Cambodian border. The effort was successful, and the 2-16 Inf engaged scattered groups of enemy and casualty carrying parties during 13-14 Sep 68.

7. Still another separate event of extreme significance to these activities in and around Loc Ninh occurred on 13 Sep 68. A command and control UH1D, occupied by Maj Gen Keith L. Ware, Commanding General, 1st Inf Div, crashed at approximately 1300 hours vic XU787059. Maj Gen Ware was directing activities in the Loc Ninh area at the time of the crash. Maj Gen Ware, 3 members of the Division staff, and a 4 man crew were killed instantly in the crash.

8. On 15 Sep 68 activity in the Loc Ninh area subsided to low level as enemy units continued their exfiltration. Officially reported losses for the 11-15 Sep 68 period for the units mentioned above were 33 US KIA, 1 US MIA, and 126 US WIA. Officially the battlefield body count was 216 VC KIA with 14 small arm weapons, 12 crew served weapons, miscellaneous munitions, documents, and supplies captured.

(e) For the remainder of Sep 68 the enemy resumed his harassing tactics such as attacks by fire, use of mines and booby traps, and sapper attacks. The period was highlighted by the uncovering of several sizable enemy caches.

1. On 22 Sep 68 the 1-4 Cav (-), while operating in the Di An-Phu Loi area, uncovered a cache vic YS028917 containing 3 81mm mortar rds, 4 US 2.75" rocket motors, and 5 2.75" warheads.

2. On 24 Sep 68 the 11th ACR located a cache vic XP955350 containing 1000 blasting caps, 129 RPG fuze caps, 103 1-40 booster, 4 82mm mortar rds,

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12 gren, 3 B-41 boosters, 205 B-41 rds, 39 B-42 rds, 1 apers mine and miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

3. On 25 Sep 68 the 1-26 Inf, while operating in AO Mustang under OPCON 11th AGR, located a bunker complex containing 3 CHICOM gren, 7 claymores, 20 CS gren, 8 B-47 rds, 13 B-40 rds, 66 RPG boosters, 6 M-79 rds, 4 M72 LaWs, 2000 CHICOM protective masks, 6 bicycles, 1 lb TNT, 1 strobe light, 3 sniper scopes, 12 CHICOM AT mines, 400 lbs rice, 4 packs civ clothes, 24 US smoke gren, 500 yds demo cord, 300 lbs plastic explosive, 2000 blasting caps, miscellaneous small arms ammunition, cooking utensils, and documents.

4. Again on 26 Sep, in the same area of operation, the 1-26 Inf uncovered 7 SKS rifles, 4 M1 carbines, 1 M1 rifle, 1 CHICOM LMG, 23 B-41 rds, 27 82mm mortar rds, and 60 75mm RR rds.

5. On 27 Sep 68 still other elements operating with the 11th AGR located vic YT865232 a cache containing 351 82mm mortar rds, 200 pressure detonators, 125 blasting caps, 59 60mm mortar rds, 16 lbs plastic explosive, 2 RPG launchers, 16 cans of mortar charges, and 2 US cal 45 pistols.

6. Finally on 30 Sep 68, in the same AO Mustang, the 1-26 located a bunker containing 1 45 cal SMG, 1 M14 rifle, 1 30 cal carbine, 1 M1 rifle, 2 SKS rifles, 7 B-41 rds, 10 B-40 boosters, a 60mm mortar base plate, 17 82mm mortar rds, and miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

(f) The majority of Oct 68 was a period of moderately low level activity. The pattern of US activity continued as reconnaissance-in-force and ambush patrols to interdict VC/NVA movement, while that of the enemy included a number of harassing incidents without indication of major offensive effort. The success of US reconnaissance-in-force and sweep operations in capturing/destroying enemy equipment, supplies, base areas is felt to have had significant impact on any enemy time table for offensive action.

1. During the period 3-10 Oct 68, elements of the 1st Infantry Division, under OPCON of the 1st Bde, in conjunction with the 3d Republic of Vietnam Marines, conducted combined operations in the Trapezoid. Participating maneuver battalions from the 1st Infantry Division included 1-18 Inf (-), 1-28 Inf (-), 2-16 Inf (-), and 2-28 Inf (-). There was sporadic contact with enemy forces throughout the operation. Activity was highlighted by discovery on 7 Oct by 2-16 Inf (-) of a base camp complex estimated to be one half mile long and 300 meters wide containing a large cache which yielded, among other things, 3000 lbs of medical supplies. Results of the operation were 14 US KIA and 80 US WIA while the enemy lost 19 VC KIA (BC). In addition a vast amount of food, munitions, and medical supplies, along with 30 individual weapons, were captured.

2. On 6 Oct 68, the 1-4 Cav (-), while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in the An Loc area under OPCON of 1st Bde, engaged an unknown size element of the 7th NVA Div. The first of two contacts was initiated at 0900 hours as A Trp/1-4 Cav entered a small bunker complex from which small arms fire was received. Contact broke at 1130 hours. While sweeping the area of contact, the lead tank of B Trp/1-4 Cav was engaged with enemy RPG fire at 1330 hours. This second contact was supported by light fire teams and tactical air strikes and broke at 1600 hours. The two engagements resulted in a total of 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA while the enemy suffered 43 NVA KIA (BC). A total of 13 AK 47s, 7 RPG launchers, 2 AK 50s, miscellaneous small arms ammunition, and documents were captured.

3. Also on 6 Oct the discovery of caches played a significant role in operational activity. The 2-28 Inf (-), while operating with the 3d Bde,

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located near Phouc Vinh a medical cache containing the following.

25 ampules penecillin	1 bag penecillin pills	1 bag sulfur pills
2 IV sets	2 ampules 500cc saline	28cc penecillin
5 containers sulphur drugs	8 ampules 30cc sodium	14 ampules 10cc vitamin K
6 ampules snake bite serum	11 ampules quinine	7 ampules morphine

4. At about the same time the 1-26 Inf located, in AO Mustang, a weapons cache containing 3 SMGs, 4 BARs, 8 M1 rifles, 1 M-79, 6 carbines, 1 Russian tankers AW, 2 CHICOM LMGs, 9 30 cal bolt action rifles, 30 RPG-2 rounds, 45 82mm mortar rds, 5000 rds AK 47 ammunition, 4-40 lb claymores, 500 rds 50 cal ammunition, and 1 Russian SMG. Approximately one hour earlier in the same area of operation, the 5-60 Inf (-) (see para 1g (4)), while providing Rome plow security, found a cache containing 11 B-40 rds, 2 CHICOM claymores, 17 82mm mortar fuzes, 14 lbs TNT, 14 B-40 charges, 1 5 lb claymore, 3 AT mines, 1 5 lb satchel charge, 2-20 lb shaped charges, 1 60mm and 7 82mm mortar rds, 73 blasting caps, 30 AT mine fuzes, 10 mortar caps, and 1 CHICOM grenade.

5. On 11 Oct 68 while conducting a reconnaissance of a heavily fortified base camp in AO Mustang vic XT686928, elements of A Co/1-26 Inf and B Trp/1-4 Cav discovered a cache of 202 ID cards, 9 SKS rifles, 3 M1 rifles, 11 gren, 3 B-40 rds, and miscellaneous documents.

6. Again on 15 Oct 68 the 1-28 Inf discovered in AO Mustang vic YT052-299 a cache containing the following: 3 sniper rifles with scope, 1 75mm RR rifle, 2 30 cal MGs, 4 US BARs, 5 CHICOM automatic rifles, 8 US M1 rifles, 8 Thompson SMGs, 1 CHICOM grease gun, 3 US M3 grease guns, 98 other assorted rifles, and 20 60mm mortar rds.

7. On 19 Oct 68 the 2-18 Inf, while conducting installation security operations in the Thu Duc area, discovered a cache vic YS037911 containing 3 SKS rifles, 11 unknown type bolt action rifles and 1 US M3 grease gun.

(g) Activity in the northern portion of the TAOI increased significantly at the close of the reporting period and was centered in an area northwest of Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border.

1. On 18 Oct 68 the 1st Bde commenced a multi-battalion operation in the Tong Le Chon area by establishing three fire support bases vic XT522-892 (FSPB Julie), XT560850 (FSPB Dot), and XT500805 (FSPB Rita).

2. Activity in the area ranged from light to moderate until 25 Oct 68 when H and I fires by D Btry/1-7 Arty from FSPB Dot, commencing 2000 hours and lasting through the night, resulted in 128 secondary explosions vic XT504901 to XT546900. At 2200 hours vic XT530836 elements of 1-16 Inf firing 81mm mortar H and I fires observed another 12 secondary explosions.

3. On 26 Oct 68 the 2-28 Inf while occupying FSPB Julie received a heavy mortar and ground attack at 0100 hours from an unknown size enemy force. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the perimeter but was repelled at 0210 hours. Another penetration occurred at 0630 hours by a platoon size enemy force which was repelled immediately. Contact throughout the evening was supported by light fire teams, artillery, and C-47 flare ships. The results of the action were 8 US KIA and 33 US WIA, while a total of 80 VC/NVA, 26 AK 47s, 3 CHICOM MGs, 3 RPG launchers, and 50 B-40 rds were located within and adjacent to the FSPB. Another ground attack of less intensity was launched against the FSPB at 2230 hours, 26 Oct 68, and was repulsed. Sweeps around the FSPB on 27 Oct 68 revealed an additional 25 VC/NVA KIA. Action continues at a high level in the vicinity of these three FSPBs as of the close of the reporting period.

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(h) The total results for Operation Toan Thang, Phase II, for the 1st Infantry Division assigned and OFCON units for this reporting period are: Friendly: US KIA 155, US WIA 1114, US WIA (evac) 962; 14 tanks, 29 ACAV, 1 duster, 1 lowboy, 4 romo plow, 1 (5) ton truck, 9 helicopter, 2 AVLB, 1 CEV, 6 (2½) ton truck dam; 4 helicopter, 33 ACAV, 2 romo plow, 6 tank, 2½ ton truck dest. ENEMY: VC KIA 1095, VC KIA (poss) 389, VC cptr 102 (9 NVA), 18 ralliers, 971 dtn; 554 indiv wpns, 111 crew sev wpns, 35897 SA rds, 1888 gren, 122 at mines, 1181 AP mines, 1341 RPG rds, 1448 mort rds, 42 tons rice, 324C bkrs, 23 rkts cptr/dest.

(1) Eighty-five B-52 strikes were employed to attack enemy base areas and infiltration routes in the Loc Ninh, Fishhook, and Catcher's Mitt areas. The majority of the strikes during this period were employed in the Catcher's Mitt area resulting in the destruction of numerous Dong Nai Regt base complexes. Ground operations in the Catcher's Mitt area exploiting these strikes were successful in discovering and destroying several large arms and ammunition caches.

d. (U) Training.

(1) Replacement Training:

(a) The objectives of replacement training are:

1. To provide initial briefing and orientation to all incoming personnel upon their arrival in the division.

2. To provide training to company grade officers and all enlisted personnel prior to their participation in combat operations.

3. To provide a four hour course of instruction on the M16 rifle.

(b) Replacement Training is conducted by the Brigade Replacement Training Schools. During the period covered by this report the former five schools were consolidated into two, one at Di An and one at Lai Khe. Further consolidation of all Division Schools under a school command located at Di An is being considered.

(c) No. of replacements trained during the reporting period:

1st Bde	973
2d Bde	1082
3d Bde	1336
Div Arty	288
Cpt Comd	109

(2) Mobile Training Team: This division employs a mobile training team within the framework of the division's training program.

(a) The mission of the team is three fold: To train small unit leaders, to standardize small unit tactical procedures within the division, and to get the Commanding General's policies down to the troops.

(b) The team is composed of one senior infantry captain who has commanded a rifle company in the division for at least four months, and five NCOs, grade E-6 and above, who have prior experience as instructors and who have served as platoon sergeant or platoon leader for at least six months.

(c) The normal course of instruction conducted by the team consists of three days of intensified training on general subjects, offensive tactics, and defensive tactics.

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(d) Statistics of MTT activities for quarter ended 31 October 1968:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NR OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>HRS OF INSTRUCTION</u>	<u>MAN HOURS</u>	<u>DATE LAST TRAINED</u>
1-2 Inf	171	42	3524	5 Sep
2-2 Inf (Mech)	30	1	30	18 Sep
1-16 Inf (Mech)	498	39	3810	31 Oct
2-16 Inf	76	3	150	10 Sep
1-18 Inf	251	25	3128	29 Sep
2-18 Inf	108	20	529	26 Oct
1-26 Inf	125	30	1740	25 Sep
1-28 Inf	330	42	4734	7 Oct
2-28 Inf	292	56	4879	2 Oct
11 ACR	377	28	181	19 Oct
TOTAL	2258	286	24343	

(e) Cumulative Statistics of MTT activities through 31 Oct 68:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NR OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>HRS OF INSTRUCTION</u>	<u>MAN HOURS</u>	<u>DATE LAST TRAINED</u>
1-2 Inf	612	277	9716	5 Sep 68
2-2 Inf (Mech)	419	81	7126	18 Sep 68
1-16 Inf (Mech)	526	63	4026	31 Oct 68
2-16 Inf	703	181	13070	10 Sep 68
1-18 Inf	693	244	12352	29 Sep 68
2-18 Inf	678	101	8831	26 Oct 68
1-26 Inf	752	292	12558	25 Sep 68
1-28 Inf	614	306	11532	7 Oct 68
2-28 Inf	862	224	17580	2 Oct 68
11 ACR	377	28	181	19 Oct 68
TOTAL	6236	1797	98602	

(f) Future activities will be directed toward inspecting and recommending improvement of the division's replacement training schools. Road clearing and road security operations and offensive tactics will be emphasized in unit training.

(3) ARVN Battalion Refresher Training: The 1st Infantry Division is responsible for conducting refresher training for 11 infantry battalions and 1 engineer battalion. During this reporting period, 3d Battalion, 8th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division, completed refresher training in conjunction with 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Battalion, 7th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division, began refresher training on 1 Oct and will finish in mid Nov 68. 5th Combat Engineer Battalion, 5th ARVN Division, is scheduled to begin refresher training in conjunction with 1st Engineer Battalion in early Nov 68. The next ARVN infantry battalion to receive refresher training from the 1st Infantry Division has not been designated.

(4) Mobile Advisory Teams: All MATs were transferred to MACV on 1 Aug 1968.

(5) Impact Teams: This program was initiated by the 1st Division with the same mission as MAT - to improve the RF/PF unit effectiveness. The team consists of 1 officer, 1 NCO, and 1 interpreter, plus Specialists in medical, signal, ordnance, engineer, etc. on call. The working method of the IMPACT teams differs from the MATs in that the team's visit is of short duration and emphasizes high impact-low cost projects stressing Vietnamese self-help. The assistance rendered is across a broad spectrum with the team tailored to meet the needs of the unit being trained.

(6) Mortar Platoon Testing:

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(a) Mission is to evaluate the effectiveness of the individual rifle company mortar platoons and to insure that all 81mm mortar crews and fire direction personnel of this Division are capable of performing their assigned mission in a safe and efficient manner. Program began on 21 Oct 68.

(b) Testing is accomplished by a test team composed of NCOs with 81mm mortar instructor experience and a technical inspection team to determine serviceability of mortars and related equipment. Both teams work under the direction of an OIC and NCOIC.

(c) Failure to achieve a rating of satisfactory will necessitate retraining and retesting.

(d) The following units have been tested as of this date.

D/2-16	B/2-2	A/2-18
A/2-16	C/1-18	B/2-18
A/1-18	C/1-16	C/2-18
D/1-18	C/1-26	D/2-18
B/1-18	C/1-2	

(7) TDY schools in and out of Vietnam: Schools and number of personnel attended are listed below.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>No OF STUDENTS</u>
MACV RECORDS	NHA TRANG	36
COURTS	VUNG TAU	46
JUNGLE SURVIVAL (N. VY)	REPUBLIC OF PHILLIPINES	4
JUNGLE SURVIVAL (AF)	REPUBLIC OF PHILLIPINES	2
SEA SURVIVAL	JAPAN	2
AH-1G	BEN HOA	2
SIGNAL	LONG BINH	34
NEW EQUIPMENT TNG	LONG BINH	11
NCR 500	SAIGON	3

e. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) The total estimated strength of the enemy Main Force military units operating in the 1st Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) is approximately 10,000 personnel with an additional 2000 Local Force personnel. This figure represents a combat strength of about 12,000 personnel, with an additional 4000 personnel providing logistical support. The known rates of infiltration, in retrospect, appear to have been adequate to maintain strength in III CTZ and to increase enemy strength in the 1st Division TAOI. At present, known infiltration into III CTZ was at least 12,000 personnel during Aug, Sep and Oct 68. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry TAOI are not known.

(b) Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division TAOI are from the 9th VC Division, the 5th VC Division, the 101st NVA Regiment, the 174th NVA Regiment and the Cu Chi VC Regiment. All units within the Division TAOI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

(c) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division TAOI and along its periphery are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>CURRENT PROB LOC</u>
<u>7TH NVA DIVISION</u>	6000	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
HQ & Spt Units	500	N/A	Loc Ninh Area
13th Arty Bn	UNK	UNK	Loc Ninh Area

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141st NVA Regt	1200	CE	Loc Ninh Area
165th NVA Regt	1150	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
32d NVA Regt	2000	CE	Loc Ninh Area

SEPARATE REGIMENTS

Dong Nai Regt	1000	MCE	Binh My Area
Song Be Regt	1000	CE	Bo Duc District
Thu Duc Regt	600	MCE	Vic XS 9594

69TH VC ARTY CMD

74 Arty Regt	1000	CE	Dispersed SR-4 Ba Bien
208th Arty Regt	650	CE	Dispersed SR-1
K33 Arty Bn	350	CE	Unlocated
K34 Arty Bn	300	CE	Unlocated poss dispersed in War Zone C
52 Arty Bn	400	CE	Poss Vic Michelin

LOCAL FORCE UNITS

C61 Ben Cat Co	80-150	CE	XT 8240
C62 Chau Thanh Co	75-125	CE	XT 7819
C63 Lai Thieu Co	75	MCE	XT 7705
C64 Dau Tieng Co	100	CE	XT 5555
C65 Phu Cuong City Plt.	50	CE	XT 8214
C238 Co	95	CE	XT 1624
D368	200	CE	E of An Loc
D5 Sapper Bn	140	CE	YT 1506
K10 Co	40	MCE	YT 3497
K11 Co	60	CE	YU 2510
K14 Co	100	CE	YU 1614
K16 Co	60	CE	XU 9815
K17 Co	50	CE	YT 9788
K18 Co	30	MCE	YU 4225
K19 Co	70	CE	YU 5510
C300 Dong Nai Co	75	MCE	XT 9021
C301 Phu Giao Co	85	CE	XT 9441
C302 Tan Uyen Plt	35	CE	XT 9224
C303 Co	70	CE	XT 9926
Di An Plt	30	CE	XT 9709
C55 An Loc Plt	40	CE	XT830970
C45 Chon Thanh Plt	30	CE	XT698680
81st Rear Service	UNK	NA	Logistical area "A" War Zone "D" & large portions of SR 5, U1 & Ba Bien Prov
83d Rear Service Gp	UNK	NA	Logistical area "C" Long Nguyen SZ, por- tions of Tay Ninh Prov SR 5, and Saigon area and SR1
85th Rear Service Gp	UNK	NA	Logistical area "F"/ Binh Long Prov, W border of Phouc Long Prov and the Cambodian Border.

(d) The Accepted Locations of Confirmed Enemy Units considered available as Reinforcements are:

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<u>5TH VC DIVISION</u>	4500	MCE	War Zone C
33d Regt	1200	CE	Boi Loi Woods
275th VC Regt	1300	CE	Boi Loi Woods
88th NVA Regt	1400	MCE	Michelin Plantation area
 <u>9TH VC DIVISION</u>	 5800	 CE	 SW Tay Ninh City
<u>101ST NVA REGT</u>	1200	NCE	Michelin/Trapezoid Area
 <u>274th VC REGT</u>	 1125	 MCE	 SE of Dinh Quan
<u>268TH VC REGT w/aka IRON TRIANGLE REGT</u>	850	CE	Trang Banh/Cu Chu Area
 <u>174TH NVA REGT</u>	 1250	 CE	 Poss War Zone C

LOCAL FORCE UNITS

1st VC MF Inf Bn	150	NCE	Hoc Mon Area
2d VC LF Inf Bn	150	NCE	Hoc Mon Area
4th Gia Dinh Sapper Bn	250	MCE	Ben Cat Area
C10 Sapper Bn	175	NCE	CMD Area
Go Mon Plt	25	CE	KT799067
7 VC LF Inf Bn	225	MCE	N of Cu Chi
8th VC Arty Bn	270	CE	Southern SRL
D1 VC LF Sapper Bn (U-1)	200	MCE	YT 1422
D2 VC LF Sapper Bn (U-1)	125	NCE	YT 1816

(e) Main Force Combat Units within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI.

1. 7th NVA Division: On 25 July, a Rallier from the K.71A medical unit, who was attached to the 7th NVA Division, indicated that the 7th Division was located northeast of Loc Ninh. On 19 August, the 165th Regt attacked Loc Ninh. However, the remainder of August and the early part of September, the 7th Division avoided contact. During 10-14 September, numerous contacts developed in the vic of Loc Ninh. The Division appeared to employ elements of two regiments, the 141st to the north and the 32d to the east, attempting to draw friendly forces to the northeast. No more than one Battalion was committed at one time, and companies appeared to have been alternated in order to sustain the contacts. The enemy units were able to fight effectively as independent entities down to squad size. Following this series of engagement, the 7th Division is believed to have withdrawn North of Loc Ninh vic of the Cambodian Border.

a. 165th Regiment: Following the May Offensive, the 165th Regiment withdrew from the Binh My Area to Northern Binh Long Province. It remained out of contact until 19 Aug 68 when the 2d Bn was identified at Loc Ninh by documents and by Hoi Chanh on 21 Aug 68. Rallier Long stated that the entire Regiment was engaged in the 19 Aug 68 contact. He also stated that the Regimental HQ was located vic XU594118 and that the Bns were spread along the Tong Le Chon River (XU 6213) at 10-15km intervals. Long stated the plan of withdrawal, if followed, would have taken the Regiment back into Cambodia. On 12 Sep 68, documents were captured vic XU755095 by D/1-26 which contained an infiltrations pass for group D306 and a notebook which belonged to an individual named Van. D306 Infiltration Group reportedly supplied personnel to the 165th Regiment. A Rallier on 19 Aug 68 stated that an individual named Van was the commander of the 8th Co, 2d Bn, 165th Regiment; however, no firm connection between the names was established. No additional contact was made with the 165th Regiment until 1 Oct 68 when an estimated NVA Company

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engaged a platoon of the 214 RF Company. At 1200 hours the VC broke contact and withdrew to vic XT 7185. The action resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC) and documents which identified 1 KIA as an Aspirant and the other two as soldiers from C26 Training Company, 165th Regiment. While there were no holdings on the C26 Training Company in the organization of the 165th, the Regiment possibly used such a company in order to train new personnel. This was the last tenuous identification of the 165th and the Regiment remained in Northern Binh Long Province, northwest of An Loc, vic of the Cambodian Border.

b. 141st NVA Regiment: In late Jul 68, the 141st Regiment left Binh Duong Province vic Binh My (XT 9034) and withdrew to Northern Binh Long Province. Following this relocation, the Regiment was not contacted until late Aug 68. On 21 Aug 68 vic Loc Ninh, the 2-11 ACR made contact with an enemy force and inflicted 11 VC KIA (BC). Documents captured after the contact included a transfer slip for 16 members of the 141st to an unidentified unit. Contact was again made on 22 Aug 68 vic XU728111 by A/2-11 ACR in which PW Nguyen Thanh Mai of the 3d Bn 141st Regiment was captured. Mai gave an attack plan that was to be followed by his battalion on 22 Aug 68. The plan was as follows: The battalion was to attack the Loc Ninh area around the airstrip (XU723083) with the 1st Company attacking from the southeast and the 2d Company attacking from the north, with the 3d Company attacking from the west. On the same day vic XU732112, C/2-11 ACR captured documents from an enemy KIA which identified the 3d Bn, 141st Regiment. On 24 Aug 68 vic XU756101, D/1-2 captured documents which identified Infiltration Groups D304 and D305. Infiltration Group D304 provided personnel to the 141st Regiment. The 141st was not contacted again until 3 Sep 68 when an element of the Loc Ninh Special Forces made contact with an estimated NVA Company. Documents captured as a result of the contact identified C2 Company, 3d Bn, 141st Regiment. On 14 Sep 68, D/2-16 in a contact 6 Km north of Loc Ninh village on Hill 178 captured documents which identified a company of the 2 Bn 141st Regiment. At 1535 hours the same day, D/2-16 captured two PWs from the 6th Company, 2nd Bn, 141st Regiment. The PWs stated that on 14 Sep 68 the battalion departed a base camp located at XU 7219 to engage US Forces. The PW further stated that the entire Regiment was to participate in the operations around Loc Ninh, and that the overall mission of the Regiment was to control the Loc Ninh area. The Regiment withdrew to Base Area 350 north of Loc Ninh following these contacts until 6 Oct 68 when, four kilometers southwest of An Loc (XT718857), friendly forces engaged an unknown size enemy force and killed 43. Among the documents captured after the contact was an Infiltration Pass for D2012. Infiltration Group D2012 provided replacements to elements of the 141st and the 32d Regiment. Therefore, contact may have been made with elements of the 141st. However, it is probably that the major portion of the Regiment was still in Base Area 350.

c. 32nd Regiment: The 32nd NVA Regiment was first identified in III CTZ in a series of contacts on 17-18 Jul 68 with elements of the 11th ACR, 4 km northeast of Loc Ninh. Following these engagements, the Regiment remained out of contact until 21 Aug 68 vic XU746094 when a Recon element and C/1-2 captured documents from an NVA KIA that identified the 334 Bn, 32nd Regiment. Although there was no information of tactical value, it did indicate that an element of the 32nd Regiment was in the Loc Ninh area. The 32nd was again identified by documents captured on 11 Sep 68 vic XU743133 when CIDG operations contacted an estimated enemy platoon. On 12 Sep 68 at XU755095, D/1-2 captured documents which identified elements of the 334 Bn. Again on 12 Sep 68 northeast of Loc Ninh, heavy contact developed with an unknown size enemy force. Documents taken from an NVA KIA indicated that three companies of the 334 Bn participated in the fighting. On 20 Sep 68 vic XU737095, a Loc Ninh CRP Team captured a member of the 2nd Company, 1st Bn, 32nd Regiment. The PW Nguyen Huu Tan stated that on 14 Sep 68 the entire Regiment left Cambodia and traveled South to the Loc Ninh area. On 19 Sep 68, his company arrived at Ap Loc Thanh #3 vic XU733104. Tan stated

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that while in SVN, the 32nd maintained company sized base camps that moved nightly. This confirms the presence of the 32nd Regiment in the III CTZ. Presently it is carried as one of the Regiments under the 7th NVA Division.

2. Dong Nai Regiment: During the month of Aug 68, the Dong Nai Regiment was assigned the mission of operating in battalion-size units in selected areas. A captured document stated that the area missions were to begin the latter part of Jul 68; however, evidence of movement into the various areas did not appear until the middle of Aug 68. Movement of elements of the Dong Nai Regiment from the Catcher's Mitt area, where the entire regiment was based, occurred in early Aug 68. On both 2 and 5 Aug 68, elements of the 1st Inf Division operating east of Binh My (XT 9034) engaged squad and platoon size-plus elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. Elements of the K3 Bn and the C28 Medical Company were identified. Further indications of movement were received 9-11 Aug 68 when allied units conducted a seal of Chanh Luu Village (XT827-321). Of 125 PWs captured, six were positively identified as members of the Dong Nai Regiment. A later PW indicated that some members of a forward recon section for the K3 Bn were killed in the seal. On 22 Aug 68, an AF observed 77 VC vic XT879155 moving north to south. When artillery was fired into the area, the VC moved into a village vic XT885144. A seal of the village resulted in 7 KIA and 2 PWs. One PW stated that the K3 Bn had left the Binh My area seven days prior to his capture to operate in the Lai Thieu area. Reports continued throughout the month of Aug 68 of enemy movement into the Lai Thieu area. In particular, these reports identified elements of the K1 and K3 Bns, Dong Nai Regiment. A PW captured on 29 Aug 68 stated that the K1 Bn had moved into the An Son area on the nights of 25-26 Aug 68. On 5 Sep 68, the XO of the K4 Bn rallied to U.S. Forces. He located various companies of his battalion dispersed east of Lai Khe in eastern Ben Cat District. Based upon the Hoi Chanh's information, elements of the 11 ACR were inserted vic XT800309 where they made contact with a reinforced enemy platoon resulting in 6 VC KIA and 1 PW. With the identification of the K4 Bn in eastern Ben Cat-western Chau Thanh Districts, the battalions appeared to have positioned themselves for area operations. Throughout the month of Sep 68 and early Oct 68, numerous small contacts were made which identified the K1 Bn in the An Son area. Contacts with the K3 Bn, which was initially believed to be located in Lai Thieu because of the indications of movement, were very few. Further information indicated that the movement had in fact been made by recon teams composed of the K3 and K4 Bns, Dong Nai Regiment. The K2 Battalion avoided contact and remained in the Catcher's Mitt where it probably was performing supply functions and protection of Regimental Rear Headquarters. The K4 Battalion continued to operate in Ben Cat-Chau Thanh Districts where it was identified by contacts and PWs throughout Sep 68 and Oct 68. A contact on 27 Oct 68, vic XT802315, identified the C1 Co, K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. As of the end of Oct 68, indications were that the Dong Nai Regiment was preparing for the 4th Offensive in which Saigon was to be the target. The plans for this Offensive were very similar to those of the 2nd Offensive. It is believed that the area missions of the regiment, whose degree of success is somewhat doubtful, are a prelude to the initiating of the larger offensive.

3. Thu Duc (1st VC) Regt: Since the middle of Aug 68, the activity of the 1st VC Regiment has been light. The Regiment still has the AO of the Thu Duc District, and its operations have been dispersed from the vic of XS 9095 to XS 0595. On 14 Aug 68, the villagers of Ap Truong Hamlet (XS 935925) moved out of their hamlet because 40 members of the 4th LF Bn had reportedly moved into the area. PF's found a machine gun position dug. On 18 Aug 68 vic XS967924, D/2-18 Inf engaged 1 sampan resulting in 1 VC KIA. Captured documents identified the 4th LF Bn. Documents captured vic YSO05-950 on 2 Sep 68 indicated that the K16 Mortar Company of 1st VC Regiment was in the area. The documents were dated 1 Sep 68. On the night of 19-20 Sep 68, a group of VC came to Binh Thoi #1 vic XS935970 and encountered an RF ambush, resulting in 2 VC KIA and several wounded. Their main purpose

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was to collect taxes from factories and to appeal to local villagers to supply them with rice, fish sauce, and other necessities. PW's stated that the 2nd Bn, 1st Regt was operating in the vic of Bung Ong Thuan (XS990955). On 5 Sep 68, B/2-18 engaged 3 VC with a LFT vic XS938978 with negative results. They engaged 6 more VC vic XS932960 resulting in 1 wounded PW. Documents identified the 4th LF Bn, 1st Regt. Various agent reports and PW's indicate that the mission of the 1st Regiment is to give support to other units operating in the Saigon area and conduct harassing attacks in the Thu Duc District. On 23 Sep 68, an ARVN captured a PW who stated that, when an attack is pending, the 4th Bn will coordinate with the Thu Duc District. On 19 Sep 68, an agent reported that the mission of a company of the 4th LF Bn was to attack vic XS964990 and XS945997. According to an agent on 23 Aug 68, the mission of C1, C2, and C3 of 4th LF Bn was to attack CIDG forces in Thu Duc area and to conduct mortar attacks against the Thu Duc Sub-sector and the Binh Loi Bridge. Documents indicate the present location of the 1st Regiment to be in the vic of XS 9496, and the presence of Engineer and Recon elements (indicated by captured documents) leads to the belief that they are in the process of reconning and preparing for future operations in the Thu Duc District.

(f) Local Force Units: During the reporting period, local force units supported main force units by acting as guides, reconning objectives, and transporting supplies. Local force units also played a major role in the interdiction of allied supplies in support of the third offensive in the Tay Ninh area. Local force battalions have also been reconning the routes to Saigon, setting up close-in base camps, and transporting or storing supplies for the 4th Offensive.

1. The enemy local force units in III CTZ have undergone a radical reorganization since TEI. The local force battalions have been formed into regimental-sized units. During the 2d offensive, several local force units suffered heavy losses, but local forces through the reporting period have been reorganizing, training, and receiving replacements. The following units have been organized or reorganized in or near the Div TAOI:

Song Be Regt	Thu Duc Regt
211th MF Bn	2nd Bn, 274 Regt
212th MF Bn	4th LF Bn
(poss) 168th LF Bn	C3 & C5 Cos, 5th Div
Quyét Thang Regt	368th LF Bn
1st MF Bn	D1 Bn of U-1
2nd LF Bn	
3rd Bn (newly organized)	D2 Bn of U-1
4th Gia Dinh sapper Bn	D5 Sapper Bn
268th Regt (Iron Triangle)	
K.1 Bn	
K.2 Bn	
K.3 Bn	
7th LF Bn	

2. C.301 Phu Giao District Company: The C.301 Phu Giao Company has avoided contact during Aug, Sep, and Oct 68. The unit probably continues to interdict Highways 16 and 2A and provides support for main force units in the Catcher's Mitt.

3. C.61 Ben Cat District Company: On 19 Aug at XT707363, Recon/1-16, 1st US Inf Div, took documents from a body following a contact. The documents identified C.61. On 23 Aug 68, vic XT841259, I/3-11 ACR picked up

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a PW who was a member of a transportation squad of C.61. He stated C.61 and C.62 had recently combined with C.61 having 110 men and C.62 have 120 men. No further contact with C.61 has been made in Aug, Sep, or Oct 68. It is believed that C.61 has been responsible for the attacks on Ben Cat during the past 3 months.

4. C.62 Chau Thanh District Company: There has been no contact with C.62 during Aug, Sep, or Oct 68. A PW taken on 8 Sep 68 at XT904190 indicated that at least elements of C.62 may be working with the Dong Nai Regiment. Numerous, sporadic attacks by fire in the Chau Thanh area have occurred during Aug, Sep, and Oct 68. C.62 probably has been involved in many of these attacks.

5. C.63 Lai Thieu District Company: No contacts were made with C.63 during Aug, Sep, or Oct 68. C.63 has been identified several times by PWs and documents. The PWs have indicated that C.63 has aided the Dong Nai Regiment in its recent moves to the An Son area in Aug-Sep 68. Documents captured on 12 Oct 68 at XT813085 indicate that C.63 has a mortar section (possibly composed of women, as indicated by agent reports) with 60mm and 82mm mortars. C.63 has probably been responsible for the numerous attacks by fire in the Lai Thieu area.

6. C.64 Dau Tieng District Company: No contacts were made with C.64 in Aug, Sep, or Oct 68. The Dau Tieng District Office has been attacked several times in the last 3 months. C.64 probably has been responsible for these attacks.

7. C.65 Phu Cuong City Platoon: On 19 Sep 68 at XT802308, a PW from C.65 was captured by the 11th ACR. The PW indicated several weeks ago that the C.65 company attacked an ARVN outpost at a location unknown to the subject. Casualties were unknown. A PW taken on 6 Oct 68 at XT817322 identified himself as a member of the rear service platoon of C.65. He stated that his unit's mission was to transport rice from Chanh Luu to Binh My. C.65 probably has been conducting resupply and harassing missions in the Phu Cuong area.

8. Song Be Regt: The Song Be Regt has avoided contact during Aug and Sep 68. On 3 Oct 68 at YU156097, an estimated VC company attacked 1/9 ARVN. The enemy was identified as the 211th Bn, Song Be Regt. A document captured on 7 Oct 68 vic YU185060 from the secretary of Phouc Long Province indicated future operations of the Song Be Regt. The Regiment was to fight from 2 Sep to 9 Oct 68, and from 10 Oct to 27 Oct 68 they were to rest. From 26 Oct to 15 Nov 68, they were to fight. Targets revealed were Son Trung, Phouc Binh, Nhon Hoa I and II, and the Nui Ba Ra relay station. The document also mentioned the 168th Bn which has been working in close coordination with the Song Be Regt. It is possible that the 168th Bn is now subordinate to the Song Be Regt, at least temporarily.

9. 168th Bn: On 21 Aug 68, the 168th Bn attacked Phouc Binh with 82mm mortar and 75mm RR fire. On 22 Aug 68 at YU135057, the 168th Bn was identified in contact in Phouc Binh. PWs were taken, but VC losses were unknown. The 168th Bn has continued to harass the Phouc Binh area through Aug, Sep and Oct 68. Documents captured on 7 Oct 68 vic YU185060 indicate a possible subordination of the 168th Bn to the Song Be Regt. At a minimum, the documents reveal that the 168th Bn works in close coordination with the Song Be Regt.

10. 368th Bn: On 17 Aug 68, a batch of documents were captured at XT895868. These documents identified a new battalion in Binh Long Province, composed of local force companies. On 3 Sep 68, a recon team from 1st Bde, 1st US Div, captured 3 PWs at XT905945. One of the PWs stated the 368th Bn was organized on 3 Aug 68. The battalion was composed of C.70, C.72, and C.73, and had over 400 men. There has been no contact with the batt-

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ation during Aug, Sep, or Oct 68. The battalion operates in company-sized elements, collecting taxes, and conducting supplying missions.

(g) Artillery: During the reporting period, there have been no confirmed identifications of enemy artillery units operating in the 1st Division TAOI. The period was characterized with only sporadic rocket attacks, with the most important taking place in the vicinity of Loc Ninh in the time frame 11 - 14 Sep 68. On 13 Sep 68 vicinity XU732081, Loc Ninh airstrip received an attack by fire. Examination of the shell fragments identified the weapon as a CHICOM 120mm mortar. This type weapon has been used extensively in II CTZ. No unit identification resulted from the attack, but the mortars probably belonged to an element of the 7th Division (possibly the 32nd Regiment) or their attached artillery support. The 32nd Regiment did use 120mm mortars while located in Pleiku and it is probable they brought the weapon with them when they redeployed to III CTZ. In the Southeastern portion of the TAOI, Delayed Action Firing Devices for the 122mm Rocket were discovered for the first time. During a sweep conducted on the morning of 27 Aug 1968, C/1-26th Infantry located three 122mm rockets vic XT977247. These three rockets were laid using crossed-stack field expedient launchers and ready to fire at Bien Hoa Air Force Base. Between the rockets and the batteries utilized to supply the electrical charge to ignite the rocket motors, there was a homemade delayed action firing device. The device used a watch rigged to ignite the rockets at a pre-determined hour. The three rockets were found in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh Rocket Belt.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) On 20-24 Aug 68 and again on 11-15 Sep 68, the 1st Infantry Division conducted extensive operations in An Loc/Loc Ninh area. A forward resupply point was established at the Loc Ninh airstrip to enhance tactical operations in the area. All logistical operations of the forward resupply point were directed by the G4 and directly supervised by Support Command and S-4, 1st Brigade. A helicopter refueling point was established giving a direct refueling capability in the operational area. Also established was a supply area for track vehicles, a track vehicular ammunition storage area, and a 105/155 ammunition storage area. Also during the 20-24 Aug 68 period a 2.75 rocket/minigun helicopter rearm point was established. Bulk supplies were delivered by fixed wing aircraft to the Loc Ninh resupply area and delivered to field locations by CH47 and CH54. Specific data is contained in the Support Command report at Incl 7.

(2) On 15 Oct 68 a forward logistical support area was created at the Tong Le Chon airstrip to support tactical operations in the area. These operations were again supported by Support Command and S-4, 1st Brigade, and supervised by G4, 1st Infantry Division. The initial forward logistical support area was created to support 1st Brigade operations in the area, but on 2 Nov 68 the support was increased to include resupply for a two brigade operation. This aspect of logistical operations will be covered in the next reporting period.

(3) Refueling and rearming points were established to support these operations.

g. (C) Organization:

(1) Major organization changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(2) On 24 Sep 68 the Combat Intelligence Battalion (Provisional) which consisted of 55 officers, 10 warrant officers, and 353 enlisted men was disbanded. The Battalion had been organized in Apr 68 with a mission to provide command and control, management and dissemination of all available

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information and intelligence obtained or developed in support of the Division, to provide battlefield information center/battlefield information control center (BIC/BICC) support to the Division, to provide administrative and logistical support to the subordinate and attached elements, and to train assigned and/or attached elements.

(3) The Battalion underwent testing during Jul and Aug 68 to determine the feasibility of this type of organization. The Combat Intelligence Battalion did enhance the intelligence gathering capability of the Division. The final evaluation recommended retention of the Combat Intelligence Battalion; however, it was disbanded to prevent USARV from exceeding authorized strength levels. Elements of the Battalion, such as the Sensor Platoon, proved to be extremely effective and are felt to be feasible for incorporation into future organizational changes for divisions operating in a counter-guerrilla environment.

(4) On 21 Oct 68 the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, was reorganized to become 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 16th Infantry. To accomplish this a transfer of all personnel and equipment from 5th Battalion (Mechanized), 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, was conducted. This reorganization will give the Division increased flexibility, as much of the division tactical area of interest lends itself to mechanized and armor operations.

(5) At present the 1st Infantry Division is operating without a Tank Battalion. Because of the flat terrain, which is partially covered by jungle, a Tank Battalion with M48 or M60 tanks would be of great value to the Division. Lighter armored vehicles such as the Sheridan do not have the jungle penetrating capability of the heavier tank and are also much more vulnerable to the large mines often encountered during operations. A definite need for an organic tank battalion is felt to exist within the 1st Infantry Division.

h. (C) Psychological Operations:

(1) Psychological Operations this quarter were aimed at three general target groups:

- (a) Civilians
- (b) NVA Soldiers
- (c) VC Soldiers and their relatives

(2) During the quarter 51,338,200 leaflets were dropped and 418 hours and 40 minutes of loudspeaker broadcast, 725 hours and 45 minutes ground operations were employed in support of the Division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of support operations:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>BROADCAST TIME</u>	<u>GROUND OPERATIONS</u>
1st Brigade	7,898,600	103 hours 30 min	150 hours 00 min
2d Brigade	10,285,600	101 hours 25 min	511 hours 15 min
3d Brigade	18,186,000	147 hours 00 min	64 hours 00 min
11th ACR	<u>14,968,000</u>	<u>66 hours 40 min</u>	<u>00 hours 00 min</u>
TOTAL	51,338,200	418 hours 40 min	725 hours 45 min

i. (C) Civic Action/Civil Affairs:

(1) The MEDCAP Program within the Division treated a total of 23,406 patients during the reporting period. The overall program was improved by the addition, when available, of PSYOPS elements. These units are utilized to notify the people that a MEDCAP is in progress, and to perform Psychological Operations during the conduct of the MEDCAP.

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(2) Surveys conducted in villages in the division area indicate that when MEDCAPS are performed the villagers credit them to the Americans. Thus it is apparent that in order to gain support for the GVN, MEDCAPS should, where feasible, be conducted in conjunction with GVN agencies.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel.

(1) Personnel Management: Reclassification of MOS 11 Series Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: In late July, USARV published a command letter concerning the reclassification of 11 Series personnel which prohibits commands from utilizing, reclassifying, or promoting personnel out of Army Career Group 11 without USARV approval. The only exception to this policy is where reclassification is required for permanent physical inability to perform in the MOS. The major impact of this policy is the bar to utilization out of the 11 series MOS. Experience has shown that the majority of personnel with civilian acquired skills fall in the 11 series MOS and the restriction on reclassifying these personnel into hard skill shortage MOS's has had an impact on the ability to provide critical specialists.

(b) EVALUATION: In exceptional cases, requests to utilize 11 series personnel in critical positions have been forwarded to USARV for approval. Less than 10% of these requests have been approved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in exceptional cases where a critical skill is needed and the skill is available within Division 11 Series MOS resources, approval for reclassification and utilization of necessary personnel continue to be requested through USARV.

b. (C) Operations.

(1) Modifications in River Boats.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the current river search operation, the aluminum boats and motors need modification or replacement. The boats have no inherent floatation and sink almost instantly if hit.

The 25 HP outboard motor which is being used is a constant maintenance problem. They do not hold up well under the continued low speed to idling conditions under which they are run. Motors of higher horsepower are needed which should provide sufficient torque at low speeds to power the boats smoothly yet also give sufficient power to plane the hull of the boat with a load aboard. The high speed is desirable when aircraft are not in the area. This is generally the time the VC attempt ambushing the boats and maneuverability is essential at this time.

(b) EVALUATION: The current river search mission is an expedient use of float bridge equipment available in this unit. Certain problems have arisen which have limited the engineer's ability to support the search. The light tactical raft half ponton is an aluminum boat built essentially as a component for a military bridge set. Two modifications which should be added to each boat are a self contained floatation unit and secondly some seats should be provided in the bow and stern. These two requirements could be combined by installing seats which at the same time would provide sufficient floatation to keep the boat afloat. During river search operations 2 boats have become combat losses. Had they had adequate floatation the weapons and equipment attached to the boat could have been saved. Once water starts entering through the hull, the boat sinks in less time than it usually takes to get to shallow water. Installation of seats would allow the

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operator to sit in a comfortable position and see where he is going. Operators now sit on ammunition boxes which are not very stable. Motors of greater horsepower are needed since the boats generally are carrying up to 2000 pounds of personnel and equipment. Many operational hours are being put on the motors creating a deadline rate of over 50% at any time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That light tactical raft half pontoons be modified to add basic floatation as a minimum and seats for operation as an assault boat. Also that motors of 40 to 50 HP be issued in lieu of the present 25 HP outboard motors.

(2) Storage of Transistorized Mine Detectors.

(a) OBSERVATION: 30% of the P153 transistorized mine detectors in this unit are deadlined at any one time. Many failures in the field are unexplained or undetectable when taken to support maintenance. One unit recently has started storing mine detectors in a specially constructed box which contains two 100 Watt light bulbs. Mine detectors which have been stored this way have not failed since the beginning of the test.

(b) EVALUATION: The high humidity in this area and hot temperatures have a damaging effect on electronic components. The heated box reduces the relative humidity and the constant light limits the growth of mold and fungus on the storage cases and components. At this point the test is still inconclusive and could be affected by the chance factor of using better than average mine detectors or closer supervision of their use.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units having similar problems with the transistorized mine detector change the storage conditions by using heated boxes as suggested here or by adding bags of desiccant.

(3) Installation of M8A1 Matting.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the installation of M8A1 matting for a helipad for this unit, certain construction problems were encountered.

(b) EVALUATION: The area covered was 96,000 square feet and required over 300 successive rows of M8A1. Mismatch of panels occurred because they varied in size, the difference being from 1/8" to 5/8". Each manufacturer, 5 in this case, had a slight difference which did not become apparent until the last stage of construction, when panels had to be forced to fit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: M8A1 matting when used on large areas should be segregated by manufacturer stampings before installation. This will assist in matching panels easily as the variance can be minimized between large sections.

(4) Location of Enemy Caches During River Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the course of the river search operation, a considerable amount of information concerning the location of enemy fortifications and caches has been gathered.

(b) EVALUATION: Caches are generally located near a prominent terrain feature or have manmade signs indicating their proximity. The purpose of these aids is apparently to guide enemy units not familiar with the area. Individual caches do not necessarily apply to this rule since an enemy soldier hiding his own weapon and personal gear does not require a land mark or manmade signs in order to return to it.

Prominent terrain features indicating nearness of caches are as follows:

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1. At the mouths of streams, rivers, and inlets
2. At the base of large or deformed trees.
3. In clumps of heavy Nipa Palm.
4. At bends of rivers or streams.
5. On islands.
6. At a point dikes of rice paddies cross.

Manmade signs which indicate or point to caches are as follows:

1. Sampan landing site.
2. Stakes in the ground leading to cache (approximately 6 inches above ground and spaced roughly at 10 foot intervals).
3. Broken Nipa Palm leaves along a river or stream.
4. Bamboo poles tied horizontally above ground level leading to cache.
5. Presence of booby traps.
6. Odor of fish sauce or fermenting and rotting rice (in many cases the VC who have positioned the cache have not returned for a long period of time thus allowing the foodstuffs to spoil).
7. Scent left by enemy soldiers.

When searching possible hiding places a knowledge of the river appearance of caches will aid in spotting them.

1. Clay crocks either buried, sitting in underbrush, or in the branches of Nipa Palm.
2. Wooden platform elevated above high water mark.
3. Fifty-five gallon drums buried in the ground.
4. U.S. ammunition cans serving as containers for documents, ammunition, medical supplies, personal effects, etc.
5. Weapons and other small items are sometimes individually wrapped in either brown or green waterproof plastic or in black cloth and separately concealed in the ground or between the branches of Nipa Palms.

Bunkers which sometimes contain caches are generally located at strategically advantageous locations. The location of bunkers can also be roughly determined to be near if the trunks of trees or Palms have been cut, as logs are used to reinforce bunkers.

In order to better locate caches and bunkers, and to deny the enemy concealment and future hiding places, a limited means of immediate removal of foliage has been used. One fully charged flame thrower mounted in one of the riverine force boats can effectively burn out a strip of Nipa Palm 25 meters long. In order to increase the defoliation capabilities of a riverine force the use of boats with several 55 gallon drums of napalm for the flame thrower has been suggested.

In searching for caches and bunkers it is important to know that the Viet Cong follow a pattern when they locate these items. Being aware of

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this pattern and applying this knowledge will increase the efficiency of riverine search operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Careful and through observation of terrain features will give many clues to enemy hiding places.

(5) Erection of Antenna System AS-2169/G for the AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminal Set.

(a) OBSERVATION: Erection of the AS-2169/G Log Periodic Antenna System for the AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminal Set is a problem area due to the insufficient strength of the AB-300/G Mast Section.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/GRC-163 has proven to be a compact, rugged and simple piece of multiplex radio equipment; however, to achieve good reliability, the antenna system AS-2169/G must be used at the recommended height of 40 feet or higher. When erecting the required 40 ft high antenna system the AB-300/G Mast Sections tend to fold in the center regardless of the care or method used. The weight of the Log Periodic Antenna is too great for the recommended height and strength of the Mast Sections. Thirty (30) feet is the highest it can be safely installed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To erect an antenna system higher than 30 feet for the AN/GRC-163, OA-1393/GRC for the AN/TRC-24 should be used; also, stronger mast sections than the AB-300/G should be included in the AN/GRC-163.

(6) Secure Voice, Ground to Ground.

(a) OBSERVATION: Improvement of range and reliability of the KY-8 working with a RT-524 FM radio, in the ground-to-ground operations on the CG secure net has been achieved.

(b) EVALUATION: The KY-8 working with a RT-524 radio has a range of approximately 40KM. The 1st Bde is located approximately 55KM from Division Headquarters. Using an AB-577 antenna, 70 feet high, the reliability of the system to 1st Bde was still only 60%. During this reporting period the 121st Signal Battalion installed a 164 ft AB-214/U Microwave Tower. This increased the range of the system; however, the reliability needed further study due to the instability of the DC power system. To alleviate this problem, a bank of eight (8) 12V Heavy Duty batteries was installed with 2 batteries connected in series and the four pairs of batteries connected in parallel. With a PP-34 rectifier acting as a "trickle charger" for the bank of batteries the Secure Voice System now operates with 95% reliability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To achieve reliable secure voice communications with the KY-8 a stable 27 volt power system is required, and when operating at extended ranges, antennas should be installed at line-of-sight heights.

(7) Ambush Emplacement.

(a) OBSERVATION: The best time to set up an ambush is just prior to darkness (EENT).

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that units that set up their ambushes during the daylight hours are often detected by Viet-Cong scouts. The scouts later return during the hours of darkness and fire RPG-7 rockets into their position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units set up their ambushes just prior to darkness during EENT.

(8) Ambush Relocation.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Many ambushes trigger twice during the same night.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that different Viet-Cong forces have walked into the same ambush on the same night. Apparently they lack the means to communicate with each other and travel on fixed orders along predetermined routes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ambush patrols, when appropriate, not relocate after their first contact.

(9) Village Seal.

(a) OBSERVATION: Village Seals are best accomplished when the sealing forces approach the village from several different directions. Tank mounted search lights and mine sweepers can enhance the results of a seal.

(b) EVALUATION: When sealing forces approach a village from one direction, the chances for a successful seal are greatly reduced. Once the seal force has been detected personnel in the village will be able to leave the village with a limited amount of difficulty. Tank mounted search lights can be very effectively employed in the seal. ACAVs are placed outside of the light away from the village, so that personnel attempting to leave the village can be easily sighted. Once the seal is in position a combination of search lights and starlight scopes are to maintain constant surveillance. The use of mine sweep teams with the search elements has proven helpful in locating caches under ground, in houses, haystacks and woodpiles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Sealing forces approach village from several different directions. Search lights on Tanks be used to prevent personnel from leaving the village and that mine sweep teams be employed in all Village Seals to assist in discovering caches.

(10) Area Searches.

(a) OBSERVATION: Close, careful, and painstaking searches within small, selective areas yield greater results than hasty searches, conducted over a broad expanse.

(b) EVALUATION: VC have become extremely adept at selecting cache sites which are relatively inaccessible and painstakingly concealed. Units have made their most significant discoveries in areas such as the bottoms of streams, the bottoms and sides of wells, areas within thick ripa palm growths, and storage areas beneath previously destroyed bunkers or beneath the false floors of spider holes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That US and Vietnamese units exercise great care in their selection of areas for search operations and that areas selected be searched closely, carefully, and painstakingly.

c. (C) Training.

(1) Aircraft Mechanics Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: The majority of assigned mechanics are school trained, Single Rotor Turbine Engine Helicopter Repair, MOS 67N20. Graduates from the service school are well motivated and demonstrate an extensive knowledge of the UH-1 aircraft for the rather short length of the service school course. To successfully accomplish the direct support mission, it is often necessary to cross train these 67N20's to the AH-1G and the LOH type aircraft. Experience gained during this cross training has revealed two noteworthy shortcomings in the newly assigned 67N20; (1) a reluctance to utilize the technical publications, (2) A below average ability in the maintenance, selection

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and utilization of common hand tools, and precision hand tools.

(b) EVALUATION: The direct result of these short-comings is:

1. An increase of the OJT period for the purpose of basic orientation.

2. An additional burden upon the logistical support to replace lost or damaged tools and aircraft components. However emphasis at the first line supervisor level will do much to minimize the overall effect. Aircraft availability, individual productivity, and cost of repair amply justify additional emphasis on these short-comings at the service school level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional emphasis be placed by the service school in the following areas: (1) The need for proper utilization of the technical manual, (2) Maintenance and security of individual hand tools, (3) Selection and utilization of correct precision hand tools such as: micrometer, dial indicator and propeller protractor.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Use of low oblique and ground photos.

(a) OBSERVATION: Low oblique and ground photos have proven very useful in interrogation of VC who are unable to read maps or vertical photos and in detailed planning of night ambushes.

(b) EVALUATION: Topographic maps, pictomaps, and vertical photos often provide insufficient data for captured VC to identify enemy base camps and areas of operation. The use of low oblique and ground photos has proven more effective for these purposes. In addition, these photos have assisted patrol leaders in the detailed planning of night ambushes. These photos have been made by battalion personnel using Polaroid cameras from helicopters and on the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That extensive use of low oblique and ground photos be considered by other units.

(2) VC Movement After and Before Curfew.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has found that some VC movements are planned and conducted in the early morning hours after curfew and before aerial insertions (0600-0800) and in the evening hours after daily operations and before night ambushes (1800-2000).

(b) EVALUATION: VC movement during the early morning and evening hours takes advantage of the changover in friendly operations between daylight and night operations. To counter such movement, one brigade has kept its ambushes in place well after curfew and has begun to emplace some of its ambushes prior to darkness. In addition, the brigade has used helicopter VR, hunter-killer teams, deceptive extractions, and stay behind forces in an effort to spot and counter this VC movement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other units plan careful VR's during daily changover periods.

(3) Identification of Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: Environmental effects on jungle uniforms may lead to difficulty in identification of friendly forces.

(b) EVALUATION: During conduct of operations in the Loc Ninh area US uniforms became saturated with red clay and took on the color of the

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NVA dark khaki uniform. On at least two occasions NVA forces approached groups of US troops across open areas with forces clearly visible to each other. In two incidents, witnessed by a battalion commander, the US troops were not wearing their helmets or were equipped with the jungle hat. In both instances the NVA were subjected to impromptu ambushes with favorable US kill ratio. It was obvious that the NVA mistook the red stained uniforms and lack of helmets for NVA troop formations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That forces operating against NVA forces in areas where red clay is prevalent:

1. Emphasize wearing of the steel helmet at all times.
2. Equip reconnaissance elements with steel helmets IIO the jungle hat.
3. Change uniforms as often as practicable.

(4) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Device (PSID).

(a) OBSERVATION: The Patrol Seismic Intrusion Device is a highly effective ambush tool.

(b) EVALUATION: Upon its introduction to 1st Div twelve (12) PSID's were issued to the 3d Brigade. They were effective in the detection of enemy movement and contributed immeasurably to early warning of enemy approach. Within a few days of issue the PSID was credited with the success of two ambushes which netted 14 body count. In addition, the PSID served as a confidence builder on night ambush. Units using the PSID found that the fragile ear piece could be replaced with the ear plug (Headset H-264) from the squad radio receiver AN/PRC 9, the replacement item being more durable and more functional. Several platoons wired speakers from burnt out personal radios to the ear plug back, thus permitting more than one person to monitor the PSID. The plastic case of the device is also highly sensitive to Mosquito Repellent, used in quantity on night ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That issue of the PSID be continued and that the above innovations and comment be considered during future modification of the PSID.

(5) Observation of B-52 Strike Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC are using B-52 strike areas as a "cover" for continued base camp operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During several extensive RIF operations in the Trapezoid area base camps and caches were found in the near proximity to B-52 strikes. Some were constructed in the first tree line from the strike, others were formed by reconstruction of bunkers on the fringe of the craters. One of the largest caches uncovered in the Division AO in recent months was found among craters of an extensive strike area. The bomb strike was obviously six months to a year old. (wrapped in Stars and Stripes with very current date was material recovered in some as new as two weeks old). It was obvious that the VC are taking advantage of the apparently devastated areas with the supposition that the areas will not be restruck.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That B-52 crater areas and adjacent areas be subjected to careful surveillance with a view toward detecting and destroying new construction and/or rehabilitated base camps and caches.

(6) F153 Mine Detector.

(a) OBSERVATION: The F153 mine detector detects metal objects only.

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(b) EVALUATION: The VC have commonly placed explosives in roadways and left them for several days before returning to place detonators. The P153 may locate the detonator and result in compromise of the explosive but a detector that could locate the explosive charge would permit early detection of these devices.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A mine detector working on density change or chemical composition be developed to locate large explosives and mines.

(7) Density Analysis of Mining Incidents.

(a) OBSERVATION: By keeping a map posted with mine incidents as they occur it is possible to identify particular areas of enemy mining activity.

(b) EVALUATION: Using these areas identified by mine incident density charts, the brigades position ambushes, and with care and persistence, can catch the VC harassing the area. Recent elimination of a VC agent stopped mining in one especially active area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units keep track of mine incidents and use the density of incidents to position ambushes.

(8) Combined Forces on Mobile Resource Control Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of combined forces on Mobile Resources Control Teams has proved very effective in the capture of United States and ARVN AWOLs, draft dodgers, Viet Cong suspects and controlled items.

(b) EVALUATION: The knowledge of the local area, language fluency, and police powers of the Vietnamese Military and National Police enables them to question civilians and interpret conditions and events with much greater effectiveness than our own Military Police.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Close co-ordination between Military Police and local government police forces should be encouraged and utilized whenever possible.

e. (C) Logistics.

(1) Howitzer, Light, Towed, 105mm, M102.

(a) OBSERVATION: Failure of weapon to return to battery after repeated firing.

(b) EVALUATION: A problem developed with the recently issued M102 Howitzer in that after sustained firing one weapon would not return to battery. After investigation it was determined that because of the high rate of fire, the pressure in the recoil mechanism had increased to such an extent that it prevented the tube from returning to battery after recoil. The solution to the problem was to decrease the pressure in the recoil mechanism, reestablishing the reservoir level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all batteries with the M102 Howitzer frequently check the pressure level in the recoil mechanism to prevent an excessive accumulation of pressure.

(2) Howitzer, Medium, Towed, 155mm M114A1.

(a) OBSERVATION: Stripping out of recoil guide liners in Howitzers, Medium, Towed, 155mm M114A1 (ref: TM 9-1025-35P, Dec 64).

(b) EVALUATION: The recurring problem of liners (Item C, Fig 137)

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being stripped out of the recoil mechanism of the M114A1 Howitzer can be caused by the four screws (Item B, Fig 137) securing the liner working loose after repeated firing. The liner serves as a guide for the tube during recoil to insure its proper alignment. It is made of brass, about 10 inches long, and shaped like a square "U". The edges of the liner are all square. It is designed so that the key (Item 8B, Fig 16) on the tube will ride in the square "U" shaped groove therefore aligning the tube. Loose screws cause the liner to move out of position and when the tube recoils the key strikes the edge of the liner stripping it out. The screws cannot be tightened unless the tube is dismounted from the recoil. Another probable cause of this problem is the small variance in the position of the tube each time it recoils. If the tube is off the key it will strike the square edge of the liner and drive it out.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To remedy this problem the following modification was made to the liner:

1. In the lip of each screw hole in the liner, two small holes were drilled opposite each other at a 90 degree angle from the screw hole. After the screw has been screwed in tightly allowing the groove in the screw to line up with the drilled holes, a piece of strong wire is laid in the screw head groove with ends of the wire inserted into the holes. The wire is then staked into the screw head groove. Prior to drilling the holes, their position must be determined by securing the screw tightly in the screw hole and marking the lip of the hole at each end of the screw head groove.

2. The square entrance edges of the liner are beveled allowing a smoother and wider entrance way for the key as it enters the groove. This compensates for the difference in the tube's position during recoil.

3. This modification has proven to be effective. Since its application, no weapon experienced a recurrence of this problem.

(3) OH-6A Helicopter - Tail Rotor.

(a) OBSERVATION: High frequency vibrations in the OH-6A helicopter tail rotor has resulted in many premature component changes.

(b) EVALUATION: Corrective action for this discrepancy is limited to rotating the tail rotor hub assembly 45 degrees or replacement. This procedure has resulted in excessive tail rotor replacements and placed an excessive demand on the supply stock level. Procurement of the kit, vibration analyzer, tail rotor balancer, Model 170, provided the direct support unit a repair through adjustment capability. Limited experience with this balancing kit indicated that an excessive high frequency vibration will exist before it is normally detected by the operator.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All OH-6A helicopters are checked for high frequency vibrations with the Model 170 kit in conjunction with the field maintenance portion of the periodic inspection.

(4) OH-6A Helicopter - Lower Vertical Stabilizer.

(a) OBSERVATION: The OH-6A lower vertical stabilizer loosens during normal service use, creating a local high frequency vibration. Corrective action is limited to replacement of the stabilizer and attachment bolt. Experience with this procedure dictates 2-5 hours of flight will loosen the new stabilizer to the extent that replacement is again required and that a tail boom replacement will be required to correct the rapid deterioration of the stabilizer.

(b) EVALUATION: The method of attachment utilizing the "ABC" bolt is not considered adequate in view of the vibration levels prevailing

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during normal operation. Replacement of the "ABC" bolt with a common MS bolt torqued to 90 inch pounds will correct the looseness resulting from elongation in the original attachment bolt holes. An additional hole drilled below and at a right angle to the original hole with another MS bolt installed as above provides a more vibration resistant attachment. This repair was monitored by the local Hughes Technical Representative with the recommendation that shims be installed to compensate for excessive wear in the original stabilizer. This interim repair is considered desirable in view of the expensive component replacements that would be required under the current repair criteria. A correlation between this problem and (3) above does exist, however, a direct cause and effect relationship is not indicated at this time.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: The above mentioned repair has been forwarded to the contractor for evaluation by the assigned Hughes Technical Representative.

(5) OG-6A Starting Difficulties.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several OH-6A helicopters have been work ordered to maintenance for starting difficulties and low RPM engine flameouts which occurred soon after a successful engine start.

(b) EVALUATION: Preliminary trouble shooting usually will determine specific component malfunctions. However, on several instances, component changes were unnecessary as the cause was finally attributed to the main fuel shut-off valve. The design features of this valve and linkage insure positive fuel shut-off, when activated. However, a spring within the cable assembly often prevents returning the valve to the full open position, which results in partial fuel flow and subsequent starting difficulties. It should be noted that this valve is located above the fuel cell and requires removal of an inspection panel to visually check the valve position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Alerting crew chiefs and organizational maintenance personnel to this problem has substantially reduced aircraft down time due to starting difficulties. Safety wiring the valve to the full open position with small diameter copper break-away wire is considered desirable.

(6) 30-45 KW Generator Power Failures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Thirty and forty-five KW generators are a problem area, in that many power failures are experienced due to overvoltage applied to the generator governors, actuator and K-3 relay. This overvoltage causes the weaker of these items to burn out.

(b) EVALUATION: The large engines used to drive the 30 and 45 KW generators consume large amounts of amperage when starting. This causes the storage batteries, used to start the engine, to be in a partially discharged condition. After the generator is started, 28 volts is applied to the batteries as a recharge. Since 2-12 volt storage batteries are used, a two volt overcharge is applied. This overcharge also is placed on the governor, actuator and K-3 relay. These items are designed to operate at 12 volts so the weaker of the three is blown due to excess voltage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To alleviate the above problem, a 3 ohm/10 watt resistor must be placed between the battery and governor. If this item is not available, a resistor of this value can be fabricated by connecting 4-12 ohm/2.5 watt resistors in parallel. This will solve the above problem until the applicable MWO is applied.

(7) Water Containers for Aerial Resupply.

(a) OBSERVATION: The free-fall water container or "hot-dog" is the best container for jungle resupply.

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(b) EVALUATION: The normal water container used for aerial resupply has been the 5-gal collapsable plastic bottle. On occasion this unit has utilized the Monsanto Free-Fall container. The later is considered far superior for the following reasons:

1. Expense. The free-fall container rarely is damaged in delivery and is easily handled in the jungle without puncture. The 5-gal plastic bottle is subject to puncture during delivery and is awkward to handle during movement and often becomes damaged.

2. Bulk. The free-fall container can be folded and slipped into a pack or belt when empty and back-haul is no problem. The plastic bottle can be compressed, but remains an awkward load. It also is highly reflective and is a camouflage problem, even at night. The free-fall container can be easily knotted and carried when partially filled. The plastic bottle must be carried extended to its full outside dimension when partially filled.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Monsanto Free-Fall plastic water container be used for jungle resupply of water.

(8) LAW, M-72.

(a) OBSERVATION: The LAW M-72 malfunctions on occasions.

(b) EVALUATION: The LAW M-72 is a short-lived weapon. Its light and flimsy construction does not stand up well to extended field exposure, particularly in the rainy season. After being carried approximately six weeks in the field it becomes unreliable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the LAW M-72 weapon be removed from field units after six weeks and fired for training exercises.

(9) Remington and McCullough Chain Saws.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Remington chain saws used on LZ missions and all pioneer work are inadequate for continued use. The saws are not durable enough for combat missions. Many of them are deadlined within the first 10 minutes on a mission and the rest of the work must be finished using hand tools.

(b) EVALUATION: The Remington chain saw should be replaced in the supply system by the McCullough saw which is heavy enough to withstand the work load demanded on LZ missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That McCullough chain saws be made available as soon as possible to totally replace the Remington chain saws. Unreliable equipment on combat mission cannot be tolerated.

(10) Airmobile Bulldozers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many requests are received to provide equipment to clear field of fire in field location.

(b) EVALUATION: This mission is generally provided by transporting a bulldozer to the field location to remain as many days as required or other commitments allow. In order to take the equipment into and out of the field a road must be swept and tactical effort diverted to provide security to move the equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This unit be issued an airmobile dozer which could be lifted by CH 57 to accomplish missions of this nature, without diverting tactical effort.

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(11) Repair Parts for Dump Trucks and Scoop Loaders.

(a) OBSERVATION: Dump trucks and scoop loaders are essential to accomplish missions assigned this unit.

(b) EVALUATION: Dump trucks and scoop loaders are equipment common to engineer units but of low density for repair parts purpose.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: These critical pieces of equipment be readily available in float or some supplementary stockage of spare parts be provided.

(12) OV-1 Mohawk Historical Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit supports six (6) OV-1 Mohawk aircraft. One of these aircraft is equipped with the new L-15 turbine engine. A fuel control unit (FSN 2315-781-7927) for one of the L-15 engines became inoperative requiring the aircraft to be grounded approximately eighteen (18) days awaiting a new fuel control unit to be shipped from the factory.

(b) EVALUATION: A new L-15 Fuel Control unit was received; however, upon inspection of the data plate on the unit, it was discovered that some important information had been omitted by mistake. Without this information the fuel control unit could not be placed on the aircraft as it would be impossible to rig the engine for flight idle, maximum power, and reverse speeds.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Lycoming Engine Technical Representative was contacted and through his efforts the Chandler-Evans (manufacturer of the fuel control) Technical Representative was located in Vung Tau. The Chandler-Evans Tech Rep was contacted and it was discovered that he possessed a machine in which the fuel control could be tested and the omitted information could be determined. As a result, the desired information was obtained in several ways and fuel control placed on the aircraft returning it to a flyable status. Further investigation revealed this fuel control was one of nine that had been shipped from the factory without all of the rigging information. It is understood that the factory is making a thorough effort to locate the other eight units and take corrective action so that this mistake will not be repeated.

(13) Howitzer, Medium, Towed, 155mm, M114A1.

(a) OBSERVATION: A M114A1 Howitzer was deadlined because of excessive wear in the elevating and traversing pinion and arc gear teeth.

(b) EVALUATION: The excessive wear in the above components was causing the howitzer to fire off target. The traversing arc and pinion were received in a very short time by Red Ball, however, the elevating arc had to be taken from a recoil mechanism. The elevating pinion was unavailable from any source. In order to solve the elevating pinion problem, the part was removed, rotated one half turn and reinstalled in the weapons. This expedient proved successful and the howitzer was returned to operational status.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to utilizing this expedient method of repair in similar instances if the elevating pinion is unavailable. It is advisable to use new parts if at all possible. The traversing pinion and both arcs must be replaced with new items.

f. (C) Organization. None

g. (C) Other.

(1) Mobile PSYOPS Team.

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(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period the Mobile Psychological Operations concept was tested in the TAOI. The team is a joint effort combining an American PSYOPS Team with GVN representatives from Province. These consist of, but are not limited to, a VIS representative, Social Welfare Worker, National Police, POLWAR representatives, Cultural Drama Team (when available), and Armed Propaganda Team, and interpreters. The team moves into a village/hamlet and sets up security. If Medics are available a MEDCAP is performed, if not the team plays news and entertainment tapes, shows movies, and/or the Cultural Drama Team performs. Concurrent with the entertainment the Armed Propaganda Team conducts face-to-face propaganda dissemination and hands out leaflets and places posters. The tapes, movies, and broadcasts have integrated PSYOPS themes. The team normally spends the night, departing the next morning. Security is provided by RF/PF.

(b) EVALUATION: This type team, initially, is hard to organize due to the amount of coordination required. However, once its value had been demonstrated to GVN officials and advisors involved they appeared eager to cooperate in the project. The overall program has proven to be an effective way to the "grass roots" level in the dissemination of propaganda. An indication of its effectiveness is the VC reaction to the teams efforts. It has been reported that on several occasions VC units and entertainment/propaganda teams have entered target hamlets, after the departure of the team, in order to counter the effects of the mobile propaganda team's visit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that use of similar ARVN/US Teams be considered, when appropriate.

(2) Ground Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of ground operations as a means of disseminating propaganda increased during the reporting period. Total ground operations this period are better than double that of the previous one. This mainly resulted from using PSYOPS along with MEDCAP operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The effectiveness of ground operations as a means of disseminating propaganda cannot be over-emphasized. However, ground operations may be performed only in relatively secure areas, or areas where security can be provided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend more frequent consideration of the feasibility of using ground operations as a means of disseminating propaganda.

(3) Airborne PSYOPS Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: During this reporting period all 1000 watt airborne systems were mounted on light weight aluminum frames. This packaging of the unit into one, instead of two, frames results in a more efficient use of the PSYOPS ship because of quicker mounting and dismounting of the equipment. In line with the new system of frames, a new system of wiring the sets was devised, eliminating an excess of wire in and around the mechanism. The set as designed for ground use has approximately 240 feet of wiring whereas only 32 feet of wiring is required for airborne use. A reduction in maintenance requirements, plus the lighter frame, result from these modifications.

(b) EVALUATION: The new light weight system has proven effective in its operation and additionally saves 20-30 minutes per mission for equipment mounting and dismounting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That modifications as described be considered by units processing the 1000 watt airborne systems.

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(4) XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector.

(a) OBSERVATION: The XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector is considered a definite asset to the intelligence collection effort of the 1st Infantry Division, but it is subject to mechanical deficiencies which can develop erroneous data.

(b) EVALUATION: The XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector is subject to a real deficiency in that the teflon valve rotates on an anodized aluminum valve seat. After approximately 50 hours of operations, the coating on the valve seat becomes scored or is broken causing scoring on the teflon valve itself. This resulting in "flaking" of the teflon, which is deposited on the optics resulting in false sensings. Further, vacuum loss occurs as a result of poor valve seating, and the instrument will only sense excessively strong sources. During the visit of the COMUS team it became apparent that these equipment malfunctions can be detected on a strip chart when a strip chart recorder is used. They are not readily apparent when meter readings alone are used. The strip chart recorder not only assists in determining quality of sensing but also aids greatly in result interpretation. The duration of the sensing which is clearly indicated on the strip chart can mean the diffuse downwind portion of the effluent plume has been intersected, or it can mean the source is an area source depending on the location of other sensing, wind direction, and other factors. Point sources are also clearly recognizable. Essentially, the strip chart allows a post mission analysis of sensings. Pending receipt of the strip chart recorders recommended by Edgewood Arsenal which have been requested, this Division is using the "tap tap" recorder originally provided with the XM-3. While the post mission analysis is a step forward, it does not in any way provide the quantitative data that commanders want from the personnel detectors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a recorder be used with each XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector and utilized in after mission evaluation of results and instrument performance. Also that an improved rotary valve be used, as they become available in country, to reduce flaking and vacuum loss.

(5) Perimeter Defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Utilization of defoliants alone for base camp perimeter defoliation is not a satisfactory solution.

(b) EVALUATION: It has become very apparent that agents white, blue, and orange are not satisfactory for perimeter defoliation. During the rainy season, vegetation, such as elephant grass, turns brown but will not burn. In approximately 60 days a new growth equalling the old has occurred. It is obvious that some form of soil sterilant must be used if a contribution to base camp defense is to be made.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That wettable soil sterilants be utilized for base camp perimeter defoliation. As an interim measure, defoliant can be used but the vegetation must be burned immediately after the defoliant takes effect.

(6) Tracked Decontamination Apparatus.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a definite need for a track mounted decontaminating apparatus.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience with the M548 cargo carrier in defoliation indicates that a tracked decontaminating apparatus is both feasible and desirable. However, simply instructing a unit to mount an M2 decontaminating apparatus in an organic M548 cargo carrier is not a solution. The M548 is a low density item in the Division and not available for such diversion from normal missions. Consideration should be given to actually issuing a tracked vehicle mounted decontaminating apparatus.

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(c) ReCOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to issuing a tracked vehicle mounted decontaminating apparatus.

(7) Enemy Garden Plots.

(a) OBSERVATION: The efficiency of the interdiction of enemy gardens with persistent CS is an unknown factor.

(b) EVALUATION: In one case a garden was abandoned after contamination while in another case work was noted within two days of contamination. Problems were encountered in obtaining target hits since the garden plots are only 10 to 15 meters wide by 25 to 50 meters long and are randomly oriented in deliberate attempt to make them difficult targets.

(c) ReCOMMENDATION: That persistent CS be used on garden plots only as a last resort when no other means can be used.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

Reference: Letter, Subj: Operational Report-Lessons Learned: Escape and Evasion Information, Headquarters, USARV, dated 6 Aug 68. No instances exist upon which the information requested in referenced correspondence could be based.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



- 16 Incl- Inclosures 2-12 & 15 w/d,Hq, L. M. MONTGOMERY
1-Organizational Structure DA 1LT, AGC
~~2-List of Key Commanders~~ Asst AG
~~3-Force Disposition~~
~~4-1st Bde Operational Report -
Lessons Learned~~
~~5-2d Bde Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~6-3d Bde Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~7-Support Command Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~8-Division Chemical Section Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~9-1st Aviation Bn Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~10-1st Ingr Bn Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~11-1st Signal Bn Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
~~12-1st MF Company Operational Report Lessons Learned~~
13-Commander's Notes #1
14-Commander's Notes #2
~~15-Commander's Notes #3~~
16-Commander's Notes #4

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AVFBC-RE-H (16 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.
2. (C) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 31 October 1968, with the following exceptions.

a. Reference para 1e(1)(c), page 14. The strength of the Dong Nai Regiment is given as 1,000 which is not consistent with the II FFV estimate of 1,600. In addition, the list of Local Force units includes the D5 Sapper Battalion which has been deactivated, and does not include the D6 Heavy Weapons Battalion which has been activated.

b. Reference para 1e(1)(f)4, page 19. This item states that the C62 District Company was not contacted in August, September or October. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment contacted elements of the company on 27-28 October in its normal area of operations, the Chau Thanh District.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. R. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVHGC-DST (16 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 6 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel management: reclassification of MOS 11 series personnel, page 22, paragraph 2a(1). USARV has the requirement to maintain all combat units at 103% of authorized MOS 11B/C/H infantrymen and 100% of all other MOS requirements. In order that this overstrength is not diluted, the reclassification of 11 series personnel must be limited to exceptional cases. Units are authorized to submit requests for reclassification of 11 series personnel in exceptional cases.


b. Reference item concerning erection of antenna system AS-2169/G for the AN/GRC-163 radio terminal set, page 25, paragraph 2b(5). Concur in recommendation. The need for stronger mast sections has been recognized and reported to USAECOM. Information has been received that a stronger antenna mast is under development. A warning concerning the use of the antenna system AS-2169/G and a recommended field expedient antenna system for heights above 30 feet has been issued through separate correspondence.

c. Reference item concerning aircraft mechanics training, page 26, paragraph 2c(1). Concur with recommendation as stated. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

d. Reference item concerning OH-6 helicopter-tail rotor, page 30, paragraph 2e(3). Concur with recommendation as stated.

e. Reference item concerning OH-6 helicopter-lower vertical stabilizer, page 30, paragraph 2e(4). The proposed repair procedures have been forwarded to the 34th General Support Group for evaluation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


for W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (16 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Inf Div for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

8 FEB 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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Organizational Structure

ASSIGNED UNITS

LHC 1st Inf Div	1st Bn 2d Inf
701st Maint Bn	1st Bn 26th Inf
1st S&T Bn	1st Bn 28th Inf
121st Sig Bn	41st Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
1st Engr Bn	HHC 2d Bde
1st Avn Bn	2d Bn 16th Inf
1st Med Bn	2d Bn 18th Inf
1st MI Det	1st Bn 18th Inf
HQ HQ and Band Spt Comd	35th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
1st Admin Co	61st Inf Plat (Combat tracker)
1st MI Co	HHC 3d Bde
266th CML Plat	2d Bn (Mech) 2d Inf
242d CML Det	1st Bn (Mech) 16th Inf
43d FI Det	2d Bn 28th Inf
44th FI Det	HH Etry Div Arty
17th Mil Hist Det	1st Bn 5th Arty
Co F 52d Inf (LRP)	1st Bn 7th Arty
1st Sqdn 4th Cav	8th Bn 6th Arty
HHC 1st Bde	2d Bn 33d Arty

ATTACHED UNITS

234th FA Det (Radar)	260th FA Det (Radar)
314th Avn Det	317th Avn Det
322d Avn Det	340th Avn Det

OPCON UNITS

B Co 2d Bn 34th Armor	D Btry 71st Arty (2 Quad 50)
A Btry 5th Bn 2d Arty (-)	1st Plat I Btry 29th Arty (6 Sect)
11th Armored Cav Regt (-)	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Commanding General
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

21 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) This is the first of my guidance notes for commanders and members of the division staff. I think it important for my first commander's meeting to define for you some of my basic concepts. I am going to confine myself to fundamentals, things that will be just as pertinent to this division six months from now as they are today. The record of this meeting will be published for your permanent record. Review it periodically as it includes the things I feel strongly about.

2. (U) No Basic Change In Big Red One Fundamentals:

First and foremost, "what about those policies and programs set out by General Ware?" Except as expressly modified or changed, every single one of them remains in effect. I believe deeply in the fundamentals General Ware preached.

2. (C) Everybody has his own degree of emphasis; has his own points which he emphasizes a little more strongly than others. These are the ones I emphasize. Not necessarily in priority, although the first one is perhaps the one I do feel most strongly about.

a. Professionalism: There is nothing amateurish about this outfit, about the Big Red One, about our division. Nothing will be tolerated that is amateurish. We will be professional in every sense of the word and in all aspects of our business.

b. Standards ("Eyeballing"): We all desire high standards. We all profess to strive for high standards. But, if you really want to know what the facts are, you have to see it for yourself. You have to demand that your people see for themselves. Paper work and staff work are important. We can't do without them. If you want to maintain standards, however, you have to get out and "eyeball" it yourself. Your battalion commanders have to get out and "eyeball" for themselves. Your company commanders have to get out and "eyeball" for themselves. And, once having eyeballed, look with the eyes that demand, that appreciate and demand the proper standards. And, having identified the things that don't meet those

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AVDB-CG
SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

21 September 1968

standards, demand—not ask, not wish—demand that those standards are met. No outfit will reach the professional goal that we would all like to attain unless the commanders get out and look for themselves and, having looked, demand that the finest quality is attained and maintained.

c. Contacts: When there is an enemy contact of any appreciable size at all, I want somebody up over it. If it's a platoon or a company that's being engaged, perhaps a battalion commander although it might be a brigade commander. We don't have to stack up twelve echelons over the action, but I want somebody up there:

- (1) In a position to monitor.
- (2) In a position to help.
- (3) In a position to guide, whatever the case may be.

But, somebody must be over the contact. On continuing contacts of larger campaigns, for example, the last several days at Loc Ninh, obviously it would be the brigade commander, but he can't stay up there all of the time. The ADC and I can spell him part of the time. Depending on the overall situation, the brigade S-3 might be up there part of the time. But somebody should be present when the units are in physical contact, monitoring the situation, guiding the situation, assisting the situation.

d. Hot LZ's: We have been most fortunate during my time, and I gather for some time before, on the subject of hot LZ's. We don't want any hot LZ's. General Ware's policies about preps not necessarily being required still goes but this requires a very fine degree of analysis by the commanders concerned. I want no mistake on this. We want to find the enemy; we want to clobber him. But, we don't want him to clobber us. We want to stay in control of the situation.

e. "Pile On": I won't paraphrase, I'll quote if I may some of the bywords of the 11th Cav: "Find the bastards then Pile On." This is General Kerwin's policy. This was General Ware's policy. It's my policy. I feel very strongly about this, very strongly. If you have something worth piling on and run out of your own resources, we'll scrape up whatever we can out of the division until we just plain run out. And then we'll ask for more resources.

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21 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

f. Variation of Assignments for Battalions: For a variety of reasons, many beyond our control, we have had battalions that have done the same type of duty for a very long period of time. In the long run you pay too high a price for battalion stabilization. They lose their flexibility; their ability to react; their sense of logistical control; and their aggressiveness. Our general policy is to give battalions a variety of tasks, to exercise them, whether it be in an RIF, in the jungle, or the rice paddy.

g. Tactical Security (Security as a State of Mind): The "zapping" that some American units have had in Vietnam have in nearly every case been because the security has been terrible. There must be security in the attack as well as in the defense. There must be security in an RIF as well as in an NDP. Security, in the final analysis, is a state of mind, a degree of alertness. Security applies in all operations, not just in the defense situation. It definitely applies on the attack. To what degree? How much? That's a matter of judgment. But, if you have an assault, you might have a squad on the flank whose job is to cover the flank and make sure the assault doesn't get enfiladed. Security applies twenty-four hours a day, three hundred and sixty-five days a year. It applies in all tactical formations and in all locations.

h. Variation of Patterns/Routines: Don't, I say again, don't get into a set routine. Change your pace. Vary the approach. Vary your technique. Don't let Charlie figure out what you're going to do next. A lot of what we do is basically repetitive and that can be a booby trap. We need to outthink and outfox Charlie by changing our pace, changing our system.

i. Troops Within 105 Artillery Range: My policy is that our troops will always operate under 105 fans. ARP's and LARP's may be an exception, but, other than that troops will always operate under a 105 fan unless I specifically permit otherwise. We will have special occasions but I want every one referred to me.

j. Commanders and Communications: You must be able to command. And to be able to command, you've got to communicate. When you don't communicate, you don't command. You are just one more soldier. Don't get separated from your commo. It may be a PRC 25 and it may be a C and C ship. Make sure it's operational and you can talk to those necessary. Otherwise, you are contributing nothing as a commander.

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21 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

k. Position of Commander: This is emphasis on one of General Kerwin's points. I believe it to be eminently sound. When two or more major elements of a battalion are operating on the ground, the battalion commander will be on the ground with them. He will not be in the air. He will be down where the action is. It is also General Kerwin's policy that when we have a situation such as at Loc Ninh where major elements of a brigade are operating in continuous combat, the brigade will have an advance CP and the brigade commander will operate out of it. And it may involve an ADC in residence. I would add it might involve the CG in residence, also. Because only by living the situation do you really know what's going on. It is the same basic principle as eyeballing. Being present and knowing what's going on is quite different from getting reports.

l. Reports and Reporting: The greatest single difficulty we have is in reports. Prompt reports, accurate reports, complete reports. Each one of you as commanders, and this division headquarters is one hundred percent dependent upon information. Information is never, at this echelon, one hundred percent correct. Each night we have the staff brief and give the situation to the best of their ability and as they received it. And almost every night there is something that didn't happen the way it was reported because of imprecision in the reporting system. It starts out, of course, at the lowest echelon, the radio operators. It involves all the clerks and all the staff offices and intermediate echelons. You have to work at accurate reporting every day of your career.

m. Radio Operators: I'm going to lash into one pet peeve. This is the only pet hate I'm going to raise at this particular meeting. That's the subject of Kilos, I mean radio operators, voice radio operators. The commanders get separated from their radios. The radio operator becomes the channel of communication and pretty soon the battalion commander or the brigade commander is giving orders to and through a radio operator. Not a company commander, a kilo. What happens on the other side of the coin? The kilo gets excited. He gets hysterical. He begins to panic. And that becomes infectious throughout the rest of the area. You've got to keep this one under control. I feel very strongly about this subject.

n. Intelligence: Everybody preaches the importance of intelligence. But I don't think we practice it very well. Particularly, "intelligent" intelligence. Information? Yes. Details? Yes. But not much intelligent intelligence. Stuff that you have analyzed carefully with your S2 (if you have an S2). Everybody, including the senior personnel in this theater, will say, "Our greatest

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SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

21 September 1968

problem is finding the enemy." The only way I know is through the thoughtful intelligent use of intelligence. This is how we can solve our greatest tactical problem--finding the enemy.

o. Preparation of NDP's or Fire Support Bases: We have a practice of working on a new position for a few hours, setting up a sleeping position one or two sandbags high, for example, and there we sit for six weeks or three weeks or two days. There is always something one can do to improve an NDP: Improving fields of fire, improving wire, improving camouflage, higher sandbags, better protection for your TOC, et cetera. This comes down to a lot of hard work in hot weather. All I can say to that is to be absolutely ruthless, I mean the word literally, be ruthless in the expenditure of sweat in order to avoid the expenditure of blood.

p. Go First Class: We have a particular break being in the Big Red One. This is a very prestigious outfit. But for us to live up to all that means, we have to do several things. Professionalism is certainly one. Another is go first class. I don't mean to be ridiculous. I don't mean you let the tail wag the dog but do go first class. But, make it readily apparent when anyone comes in the area, whether it's the state of police or the military courtesy, or the snappiness of the salutes, or the cleanliness of the helicopter pad, or the base camp. Whatever it is, go first class.

q. Relationship with Vietnamese: I believe from the bottom of my heart this next point is most important to the United States. Our relationships with the Vietnamese whether Vietnamese soldiers or Vietnamese civilians. If the United States is ever going to be completely successful in Vietnam it will be because of the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese government, the Vietnamese Armed Forces. If all of the blood and treasure of the United States expended here is going to have not been spent in vain, it's because the Vietnamese will have been helped up to the level where they can support themselves against a vicious enemy. There has been in the last two or three months a great increase throughout the division in combined exercises and working with units on seals and searches and on combined operations with RF/PF, et cetera. We just can't do too much in this regard. Nothing is more in our interest than bringing the Vietnamese along as far as we possibly can with the fullest cooperation. For example, bending over backwards to go see them rather than having them come see you and similarly with your subordinates. Sharing your formations, your activities, your social affairs, whatever it may be, with them.

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21 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #1 (Fundamentals)

Our greatest two problems relate to vehicles. Convoys on the road and the courtesy of the road, not just to other vehicles, of course, but to ox-carts and to pedestrians. It just takes one driver to run over a child and the efforts of hundreds of others goes down the drain instantly. I intend to give a great deal of my personal time to cooperation with the Vietnamese military, province chiefs, et cetera. I expect every commander and every staff officer and every soldier in the division to do the same.

r. State of Mind: Final point - - a matter of quality. A matter of aggressiveness. A matter of security. The matter of winning is really in the final analysis a state of mind. If you create the right state of mind, you've got it made. So we must work all the time to create the state of mind of winning, of being aggressive, of being on top of the situation, of being in control. If we create this state of mind, we've got half the war won. And we will be fulfilling the traditions established by our predecessors in the Big Red One.

/s/ ORWIN C. TALBOTT
/t/ ORWIN C. TALBOTT
Major General, USA
Commanding

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L. M. MONTGOMERY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Commanding General
APO 96345

AVDB-TP

27 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #2, Damage to Crops and Attitude of the
Populace

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: Message UNCLAS, AVDB-TP 5169 WARE sends, HQ 1st Inf Div, 13 Jul 68, SUBJECT: Damage to Crops and Attitude of the Populace.

2. The following is extracted from "Commander's Notes" II FFV, dated 22 Aug 68: "US Military personnel in armored carriers have indiscriminately driven through cultivated areas causing unnecessary crop damage and financial losses for Vietnamese civilians. In many instances cultivated areas can be avoided by using roads and non-cultivated areas. The civilian resentment provoked by these incidents serves to create a hostile attitude toward US units and their presence. All reasonable precautions will be taken to avoid unnecessary damage to cultivated areas and other property."

3. On numerous flights over the division TAOI, I have noted many violations of the above guidance. Inconsiderate and irresponsible actions causing unnecessary damage to crops and fields develop feelings of resentment and hostility towards our units and our presence in the area. It is extremely important to our mission that the 1st Infantry Division gain and maintain the cooperation and respect of the local populace. Extra care in avoiding unnecessary damage to crops is a must and a positive and effective means available to all troop commanders in improving our relations with the Vietnamese people.

4. As a matter of policy, all reasonable actions will be taken to avoid damage to cultivated areas and personal property. Commanders will insure that this information is disseminated to all levels.



ORWIN C. TALBOTT
Major General, USA
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

21 October 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #4, Detection of Enemy Base Camp and Recovery of Battlefield Casualties

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The results of several recent contacts indicate the need for our point elements and junior leaders to become more adept at recognizing signs of enemy presence and the proximity of occupied enemy base camps. Often the base camp or enemy position will not be detected until the point elements come under fire. Casualties may be sustained initially, and the individual soldier must be trained in the proper techniques of recovering these casualties.

2. As a rule, likely base locations may be accurately predicted by aerial and map reconnaissance. Heavy canopied jungle and dense undergrowth, a well-drained elevated area, seemingly inaccessible terrain, branching of trails, and a readily available water supply indicate possible locations. The soldier on the ground may identify the presence of enemy base camps through the audio and visual senses. The crowing of cocks or sounds of woodcutting, the presence of recently used latrines and cat holes, animal traps, and trails all represent cause for increased care and alertness.

3. When a base camp is encountered, it will normally be found by the point fire team or one of the fire teams on a cloverleaf from the main body. This element, if undiscovered, and upon determining that the base camp is occupied should return to the main body, thus allowing tactical air to be placed on the base camp prior to ground maneuver supported by artillery. Should the lead element be brought under fire and decisively engaged, the unit commander will immediately be faced with two basic questions: how to eliminate the enemy fire, and how to aid the casualties.

4. Until the enemy fire is suppressed or eliminated, all who try to aid the casualties may be subjected to the same fire and possibly become casualties themselves. Therefore, to aid the casualties effectively, the enemy fire must first be either eliminated or suppressed. This is the point I feel many are forgetting. Too many soldiers immediately go to the aid of their comrades without first considering the situation and determining how they can best assist.

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21 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #4, Detection of Enemy Base Camps and Recovery of Battlefield Casualties

To eliminate enemy fire, the steps listed below should be followed:

- a. Place and keep artillery fires on or as close as possible to the enemy positions.
- b. Determine the size force that is confronting you at the point of contact and the size force needed to eliminate it.
- c. Position appropriate friendly forces so that they may eliminate the enemy fires. These positions, if possible, should be obtained by moving to a location other than the point of contact, ideally and ordinarily a flanking position.
- d. If elimination of the enemy fire is not feasible, enough suppressive fire may be placed on the enemy positions so that casualties may be recovered. Here also, the size of force sent to recover the casualties should be minimized, exposing the fewest personnel to enemy fire. On the other hand the maximum number practicable should be used to provide suppressive fires. The company commander or platoon leader has the basic responsibility of determining the size of the force and the appropriate action to be taken. Their subordinates should be trained to look to them for these answers.

5. In order to familiarize the individual soldier and fire team, squad, and platoon leaders with the techniques of ascertaining the presence of enemy base camps and the proper method of recovering casualties should the point, flank, or cloverleafing elements make unexpected and decisive contact, I desire that brigade, regimental, and battalion commanders take the following actions:

- a. Insure that these subjects are continually stressed in combat indoctrination courses.
- b. Conduct frequent sandtable, chalk drill, and simulated tactical exercises.
- c. Monitor closely the actions of the lead unit when enemy contact is imminent or established and provide necessary assistance and direction.

/s/ ORWIN C. TALBOTT
/t/ ORWIN C. TALBOTT
Major, General, USA
Commanding

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L. M. Montgomery
L. M. MONTGOMERY
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Asst AG

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