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AGAM-P (M) (14 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691324

18 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

AD 501 405

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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HEADQUARTERS II FFORCEV
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969

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HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-T6-13)(U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command.

(1) During the reporting period there were four major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV.

(a) On 28 November, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones became the Staff Judge Advocate, replacing Major Barney L. Brannen, Jr.

(b) On 7 January, Colonel Richard L. West became Engineer, replacing Colonel James A. Vivian.

(c) On 15 January, Colonel John L. Kennedy, Jr., became Commanding Officer of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing Colonel Norman F. Allen.

(d) On 16 January, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Hill, Jr. became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 upon the departure of Colonel H. S. Long, Jr.

(2) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increased during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
30 April 1968	337	27	2983
31 July 1968	339	34	3148
31 October 1968	390	53	2947
31 January 1969	376	36	3105

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, Discipline and Base Development.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached, and under the operational control of II FFORCEV remains satisfactory.

(2) The experiences of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV, particularly the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in operations near the Cambodian border, reveal that the malaria incidence rate (especially falciparum) invariably increases as VC/NVA contact increases, other factors notwithstanding. Furthermore,

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from operations in Bien Hoa Province south and southwest of Long Thanh City the RTAVF experienced an astounding increase in their malaria incidence rate as a result of their personnel having spent a great deal of time inside VC/NVA bunkers found on the operation. These dark moist bunkers are frequently nesting places for mosquitoes which have recently bitten VC and NVA troops coming from Cambodia.

(3) The morale of the command continues at a high level.

(4) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued are listed below.

	<u>Aug 68 - Oct 68</u>	<u>Nov 68 - Jan 69</u>
SILVER STAR	54	43
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS	6	34
SOLDIER'S MEDAL	4	24
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	469	420
AIR MEDAL	315	488
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL	703	536
PURPLE HEART	<u>24</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	1575	1561

(5) January was designated as USARV Safety Month. Notices were published daily in the II FFORCEV Daily Bulletin emphasizing safety. A number of safety posters were distributed. The six major accident categories are listed with comparison figures for the last two reporting periods. The increase is due to the number of accidents incurred by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which came under the operational control of II FFORCEV in November. Figures in parentheses are those of the 1st Cavalry Division.

<u>ACCIDENT</u>	<u>DEAD</u>		<u>INJURED</u>	
	1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69	1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68	1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69	1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68
Accidental Dis- charge of weapons	18(5)	8	81(20)	76

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Aircraft	16(8)	13	25(15)	33
Vehicles	8(1)	7	42(6)	32
Jumps and Falls	0	2	45(22)	25
Burns	0	0	43(11)	28
Ordnance	6(2)	7	38(6)	32
TOTAL	48(16)	37	274(80)	226

(6) The status of discipline within the command improved significantly during the past quarter with a marked decrease in all categories of reported offenses. This decrease is attributed to an extensive educational effort made by this headquarters and the active support rendered by commanders and staff agencies. These actions enhanced the Crime Prevention Program, and developed a general overall awareness of the necessity for improved standards of behavior.

(7) Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continues satisfactorily. The status of significant projects as of 31 January is as follows:

(a) Repair of perimeter defensive positions and bunkers throughout the area was continuous.

(b) A project to air condition the main chapel was started on 18 November. The project is expected to be completed in February 1969.

(c) Construction of a game room addition to the Service Club building was started on 15 January and is programmed for completion in March 1969.

(d) The new building for the Officers Open Mess was opened on 24 December.

(8) On 20 December, the Commanding General, II FFORCEV was tasked by COMUSMACV to meet with an enemy delegation on 25 December to arrange a time, place, and procedures incident to the release of US prisoners held by the enemy. ACoFS, G1, II FFORCEV, was appointed project director and charged with staff responsibility for all preparations for and conduct of the operation. The appointed contact team met with the enemy delegation on 25 December and a second time on 1 January 1969. Three US prisoners were released by the enemy delegation to the US contact team at the second meeting. Ambassador Bunker summed up the operation as follows: "It (the operation) was very well worked out and well concluded and a good way to start the New Year. I am very pleased; I don't see how it could have turned out better." An after action report of this operation is being prepared and will be submitted in accordance with AR 525-15.

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c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing on selected agent reports was continued by the Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing, described in detail in the preceding ORLL, is to better evaluate the intelligence produced by human sources and to determine the reliability of the sources themselves. This, in turn, enables the agency which employs the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be terminated. The briefing also enables the Collection Division to determine which reports are significant and plausible so that they may be utilized by the various divisions of G2 and considered in the current assessment of the situation. The method by which the evaluation is accomplished is as follows: All reports are indexed and filed by the Collection Division. From the total number received, certain reports are selected as significant. These are then forwarded to the Order of Battle Section where the particular intelligence analyst familiar with its subject comments upon its plausibility. Finally, the reports considered both significant and plausible are briefed. Each briefing covers a 24 hour period. A representative from each of the divisions of the G2 Section attends the briefing.

(b) Collection Division is also responsible for ensuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) are published and levied on the appropriate collectors. In addition, Collection Division coordinates the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and keeps subordinate units informed as to which SICRs are current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry. The Registry indexes all SICR by number and by collector. During the past quarter 13 MACV SICR and 14 II FFORCEV SICR were cancelled, while 18 new MACV and 4 new II FFORCEV SICR were levied.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHUCENIX.

(a) During the past quarter steady improvement was noted in the operations of District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) and Province Intelligence Coordinating Centers (PIOCC) in support of the PHUCENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program. In an effort to improve intelligence collection leading to a substantial upgrading of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) - Guerrilla data base, MACV instituted the Intelligence Collection Program, VC Political Infrastructure and Military Forces (C), nicknamed BIG MACK (U). The reports rendered under this program on VCI, guerrilla and local force order of battle are in computer compatible

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format and should result in more comprehensive data, more readily available to US and Vietnamese agencies charged with the attack on the infrastructure. During this quarter, the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) PHUNG HOANG staff opened a school for DIOCC and PLOCC workers in Bien Hoa. The first class completed the 92-hour course on 18 January. The attendance of all GVN DIOCC workers at this school should do much to raise the level of professionalism in the DIOCC/PLOCC. Indifference to the PHUNG HOANG Program on the part of some province and district chiefs and interagency rivalries within the DIOCC/PLOCC remain problems requiring positive command emphasis. Both US and GVN commanders are aware of these problems and are providing the emphasis.

(b) Volunteer Informant Program. During this past quarter, the Volunteer Informant Program has been stressed and command emphasis placed on the program. The G5 Section and Psychological Operations elements have greatly expanded the publicity for the program. As a result of the added emphasis and the increased publicity, the returns in captured materiel and information obtained have far surpassed any like period since the creation of the program.

(c) The Counterintelligence Section, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment has established a program of road-blocks and traveler searches. This program was instituted as a result of agent reports which indicated that medicines and money were being transported to VC elements with the Bien Hoa area. The success of the program has been evidenced by captured enemy documents which have mentioned the road-blocks as an obstacle to be by-passed.

(4) Ground Reconnaissance. Company F, 51st Infantry (LRP) was employed in ground reconnaissance operations in War Zone D. Not only were the teams used to develop the intelligence situation in the vicinity of Rang Rang (YT2054), but they were also employed in an interdiction role, hampering the activities of the 81st Rear Service Group by developing targets for tactical air strikes and B-52 raids. Later in the period, long range patrolling was conducted in southern War Zone D and northern Viet Cong U-1 Province. In January, training for the recently activated Company D (LRP), 151st Infantry was integrated into continuing operations in the same area, providing for a smooth transition as Company D replaces Company F. The results of 208 operations conducted during the period were 62 contacts, 86 sightings, the capture of seven enemy, 27 enemy killed, six US killed, and 35 US wounded.

(5) G2 Air.

(a) Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted within III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Full utilization was made of II FFORCEV assets, and requests for 7th Air Force tactical air reconnaissance support (aerial photography and infrared (Red Haze)) were increased. In the Visual Reconnaissance (VR) field, reconnaissance of

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most of the Cambodian-III CTZ border was conducted on a daily basis. The area of the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak was covered on about 90 percent of the days. Portions of the III CTZ coastline were covered on about 70 percent of the days. During the period, a total of 15,383 VR sorties were flown within III CTZ by both Army and Air Force aircraft, resulting in 1,784 significant sightings being reported in the II FFORCv INTSUM, and an average of 43 of 61 established VR areas being covered daily.

(b) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) electronic reconnaissance was conducted on a nightly basis. The major portion of III CTZ is being covered by the OV-1B Mohawk aircraft, presently consolidated under the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company at Vung Tau Army Airfield. SLAR coverage is directed toward likely avenues of approach into the Saigon area and the Long Binh/Bien Hoa military complex. Additional emphasis was placed on the border areas known as the Parrot's Beak, Angel's Wing, and Fishhook. Flight patterns have been planned to provide intelligence over almost the entire III CTZ as required. There has been little use made of daylight SLAR during the past three months as only a small amount of useful intelligence was being gathered. SLAR-detected moving targets, when identified and determined to be significant have been relayed to artillery warning control centers in the area of operations for further dissemination and tactical response. In many instances artillery units and other tactical units have provided successful response.

(c) Infrared (Red Haze) surveillance was concentrated along the Cambodian border, traditional infiltration routes, and suspected enemy base camps and staging areas to maintain a continuing watch for indications of another general enemy offensive aimed at Saigon and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex. The areas receiving major emphasis included the Cambodian border in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing, west of Tay Ninh, between the Dog's Face and the Fishhook and northward to the Flat Iron; the Song Be corridor and trail activity in the vicinity of Bu Gia Map; infiltration routes along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong rivers; the area of the Michelin Plantation, the Tunnel area and War Zone D; the Capital Military District, and the coastal approaches to Saigon. A considerable amount of US Air Force Red Haze surveillance support was requested and received, with an average of five targets being flown each night during the past three months. Analysis and interpretation of Red Haze imagery has been used to determine patterns of heat emitters and concentrations of heat-producing equipment

(d) Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance has demonstrated extensive advances in meeting the requirements of Army, ARVN and Air Force units in III CTZ. Requests for sensor products have increased more than 100 percent in the last three months. In order to expedite the introduction of new technology a comprehensive training program was inaugurated to familiarize users with the newly available multi-sensor systems. This program has resulted in requests for photography that effectively utilize

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the new equipment to provide the best possible coverage of the topography under study. A program of coordination with other staff divisions of the headquarters has provided products that confirm or deny information obtained through other sources. A program of analysis, coordination and response has resulted in the interdiction of enemy activity by field units in receipt of vital intelligence information obtained through Airborne Sensor Systems. A program to improve responsiveness caused both Army and Air Force reconnaissance elements to examine existing procedures. The result of this program was a complete revitalization of the processing and distribution procedures used to request photo products. The changes resulted in a three-fold reduction in time of delivery from time of request. Photo product delivery time has been reduced to eight hours for Priority I missions, 18 to 24 hours for Priority II missions and 18 to 48 hours for Priority III missions. The in-flight assignment of targets has provided units at all levels with unprecedented flexibility and responsiveness. Programmed studies using new high acuity cameras and side oblique photography have aided in monitoring enemy activity on a continuous basis. By providing substantial advancements in techniques, equipment, interpretation and reproduction of sensor products a greater appreciation of the role tactical reconnaissance plays in support of ground operations has been realized.

(e) On 13 December 1968, II Field Force began an evaluation of the OV-1 Mohawk Direct Support Concept directed by USARV. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the feasibility and suitability of providing OV-1 Mohawk aircraft in direct support of the US divisions in the Republic of Vietnam by the Surveillance Airplane Company in each Corps Tactical Zone. This direct support will be compared with the previous organic support to some divisions by their Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) platoons, and general support to other divisions by the surveillance airplane companies.

(6) The Production Division, which was formed during the preceding quarter, continued to develop its operations as the Current Intelligence, Estimate and Indicator Center for II FFORCEV. The division is currently authorized six officers and two enlisted men, and is organized for 24-hour operation. The division provides daily briefings for the Commanding General and staff, publishes the II FFORCEV Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM), prepares a weekly assessment of the current enemy situation, and evaluates information from all sources to produce assessments of the enemy intentions. As the focal point of information evaluation within the G2, II FFORCEV, the division prepares and presents special briefings on the current intelligence estimate, as required.

(7) G2 Targets Division.

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function has continued to be the development and evaluation of B-52 targets. However, the division

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has been increasingly called upon to provide suitable targets for Combat Sky Srots (radar directed tactical air strikes), chemical targets (herbicide and persistent CS), cluster bomb (CBU) targets and artillery intelligence targets. The all-source intelligence data base and enemy activity indications display are also extensively used by the other divisions of G2 and other staff sections.

(b) During this quarter 298 separate B-52 targets were struck in III CTZ. During the month of November these strikes were concentrated in the northern and western Corps Tactical Zone near the Cambodian border, primarily in War Zone C and along the Vam Co Dong River. During December and January the emphasis shifted as enemy units started moving from the Cambodian base areas to in-country base and staging areas and the infiltration corridors leading toward Saigon. The Saigon and Song Be River corridors were hit particularly hard, as were the Trapezoid (XT5943), Boi Loi (XT5533), Ho Bo Woods (XT6039) and the Catcher's Mitt (XT0825).

(c) The 29th Chemical Detachment, assigned to Headquarters II FFOHCEV and under the operational control of the G2 Targets Division became one of the principal surveillance tools of the Targets Division, flying approximately 90 hours on airborne personnel detector missions. The detachment also flew an additional 30 hours dispersing herbicides.

(8) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains the supreme political-military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordinated either directly to COSVN or to one of COSVN's 13 province-level subdivisions in III CTZ. (See Inclosure 9). There were no known changes during the quarter in the enemy's military-political boundaries. However, during the quarter information became available which clarified the composition and function of the T7 Military Region. The T7 Military Region, which was formed in about June 1968, was activated by COSVN to provide better control of Sub Region 4, Viet Cong U-1 Province, Viet Cong Ba Bien Province and the Rung Sat Special Zone. These regions have maintained their former internal organization, but are now subordinate to COSVN through T7 Military Region. Another significant change during the quarter was the reorganization of rear service support in Sub Region 1. The sub region had been serviced by elements of the 83d Rear Services Group, but in an effort to overcome problems and strengthen the logistical base in the sub region COSVN directed a reorganization. The sub region is now supported by six logistical areas. The five sub regions surrounding Saigon continue to function as political, economic and military command and control structures directly subordinate to COSVN. (See Inclosure 9). However, the enemy has continued to give higher priority for replacements and supplies to his divisions, and as a result the effectiveness of sub

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regional forces has remained on a low level. The only sub region which has been strengthened during the quarter was Sub Region 1, which now has more than the equivalent of a division under its control. As the quarter ended it appeared that the enemy's divisions were intended to be his main striking force with the sub regional battalions playing an auxiliary role.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

1 The number and effectiveness of enemy units in the II FFORCEV TAOI underwent several significant changes. The number of units rose slightly reflecting the arrival of two new regiments in III CTZ from II CTZ and the formation of new artillery units. The effectiveness of the regiments dropped slightly, but the effectiveness of infantry battalions rose. The most marked rise in effectiveness was in sapper battalions, demonstrating the emphasis that the enemy has placed on the formation and training of sapper units in the previous quarters. The number of artillery battalions continued to rise, reflecting a reorganization of the artillery support in the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division and the formation of new sub regional artillery battalions. The increase of one sapper battalion is the result of the reclassification of a battalion formerly held as an infantry battalion. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the quarter. Units believed to be present, but not confirmed are shown in parentheses. The table includes units in the portion of IV CTZ in which the 9th US Infantry Division has conducted operations.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNITS

	31 OCT 68					31 JAN 69				
	FCE	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL	FCE	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL
INF REGT		4	5(3)	4(3)	13(6)		1	7(4)	7	15(4)
ARTY REGT		2(1)			2(1)		2(1)			2(1)
INF BN	3(1)	7(2)	4(1)	7(2)	21(6)	2(1)	10(1)	11(1)	3(1)	26(4)
ARTY BN		8			8	1	6(2)	1(2)		8(4)
SAPPER BN			2(1)	1(1)	3(2)		3(1)	1(1)		4(2)
RECON BN			2		2		2			2
FCE - Fully Combat Effective					MCE - Marginally Combat Effective					
CE - Combat Effective					NCE - Not Combat Effective					

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2 During the quarter, the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters was reconfirmed. Analysis of captured documents, prisoner and Hoi Chanh statements, plus agent reports coupled with an evaluation of the enemy situation, places COSVN Headquarters within a 15-square-kilometer area in Cambodia north of Tay Ninh Province (XT3696, XT3899 and XT4595). This location offers the enemy a sanctuary based on the Allied policy of restricting air, ground and artillery strikes to Vietnamese territory. In addition the area is well serviced with trails, sparsely populated and well concealed under a dense jungle canopy.

3 Documents captured by the 52d ARVN Ranger Battalion in a contact near the Fishhook (XT5793) identify the 320th North Vietnamese Army Regiment of the 1st North Vietnamese Army Division. This unit was last contacted in an attack against the Duc Lap Sub Sector Headquarters (II CTZ) in August 1968. Since that time the 320th NVA Regiment was believed to be in Cambodia replacing the heavy losses that it suffered in the Duc Lap attack. The regiment is composed of the K4, K5 and K6 Infantry Battalions. Its subordinate units are the 13th Mortar Company, 14th Anti-Aircraft Company, 15th Engineer Company, 16th Signal, 17th Recoilless Rifle (75mm) Company, 18th Medical Company, 19th Reconnaissance Sapper Company, 20th Transportation Company, 21st Infantry Company, 24th Headquarters Company and the 25th Rear Service Company. The strength of the regiment is estimated to be approximately 1,400. Since only the K4 Battalion has been tentatively identified, the Order of Battle Section considers the 320th NVA Regiment as possibly present in III CTZ.

4 The 95C Regiment of the 1st NVA Division, first identified in a 13 November attack on Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Dot (XT560855), and later identified in a number of contacts with the 25th US Division, has been confirmed in II FFORCEV order of battle holdings. The regiment infiltrated from Cambodia, where it had recovered from heavy losses suffered in the attack on the Duc Lap CIDG Camp, in which the 320th Regiment also took part. Like its sister unit, the 320th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, the 95C Regiment is composed of the K4, K5 and K6 Battalions and similar support companies. The present strength of the regiment, which has suffered a number of casualties in III CTZ, is listed as approximately 1,000.

5 There are indications that the 1st North Vietnamese Army Division has relocated from II CTZ. The Order of Battle Section considers the 1st NVA Division's 95C NVA Regiment as confirmed and its 320th NVA Regiment as possibly present in III CTZ, while the remaining 66th NVA Regiment has not been identified. The headquarters of the 1st NVA Division is unlocated, but it is believed that the division has moved into the northwestern III CTZ to fill the vacuum created by the southward movement of the other three divisions in the Corps area.

6 Low level agent reports have led the Order of Battle Section to change the artillery structure of the 7th NVA Division. The 13th AA

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Battalion has been dropped as an artillery unit subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. It is believed that the 7th Division now has a D22 Artillery Battalion and a D14 AA Battalion, like the 5th and 9th VC Divisions. Because the information is limited, these two units are currently held as only possibly present in the II FFORCEV order of battle holdings.

7 During November enough evidence became available to confirm the existence of the 268th Regiment (AKA Cu Chi, AKA Iron Triangle) subordinate to Sub Region 1. The regiment is composed of three battalions, the K1 (AKA 170th), K2, and K3 which operated in the Trang Bang area. Documents subsequently captured have revealed that the regiment is suffering from serious morale problems resulting from B-52 strikes, fatigue, combat failures, and an inadequate food supply. In addition the regiment is understrength, especially the K1 Battalion. This situation has rendered the 268th Regiment less combat effective.

8 Documents have confirmed the subordination of the 88th NVA Regiment to Sub Region 1. There were indications in early December that the 88th Regiment had been dropped by the 5th VC Division when it relocated to War Zone D. Elements of the 88th Regiment were identified in the Ho Bo area (XT6038) at that time and it is believed that the regiment was redeploying from the Boi Loi area into the southeastern part of Sub Region 1.

9 The Quyet Thang Regiment, which was reportedly disbanded in the last quarter, has again reappeared in documents captured in Sub Region 1. Letter box designations identify this regiment and the 1st MF and 2d MF Battalions subordinate to it. The Quyet Thang Regiment will be regarded as only possibly reconstituted until further information confirms its existence.

10 The Song Be Regiment underwent a major reorganization, probably in late October. Captured documents note the reduction of the regiment to one reinforced battalion because of the heavy losses suffered by its 212th Battalion. The Song Be Regiment, redesignated Doan Song Be, is now composed of three infantry companies (C1, C3, and C54), a heavy weapons company (C214), a sapper company (C211), a signal company, and reconnaissance and security elements. Doan Song Be is now carried as a confirmed reinforced battalion with a strength of 280 men. It is believed that the battalion will continue to operate from its base area in Phuoc Long Province, subordinate to Military Region 10.

11 A prisoner captured on 14 October has given some information on the 242d Battalion. This unit infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1968. According to the prisoner, the battalion was composed of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. Based on this information and the identification of the battalion in two contacts, the 242d NVA Battalion has been confirmed as a maneuver battalion subordinate

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to Sub Region 2. Its strength is 250 men and it is believed to be operating in the vicinity of Tra Cu.

12 Information obtained from documents and a prisoner has led to the confirmation of the 242d NVA Battalion as a maneuver battalion subordinate to Sub Region 2. Indications are that the 267B VC Main Force Battalion has been disbanded and it has been dropped from II FFORCEV order of battle holdings. It is believed that the 267B Battalion may have merged with the 242d Battalion to form the 2642d Battalion, but the evidence of this is tenuous. Strength of the 2642d Battalion is estimated to be 300.

13 Sufficient evidence was obtained from various sources to accept the D1 Battalion as possibly present in III CTZ. This maneuver battalion, with an estimated strength of 350, is considered to be subordinate to Tay Ninh Province. Indications are that the D1 Battalion has been working closely with the D14 Battalion and that they would participate in future actions together against targets in Tay Ninh Province. There is not enough information in regard to the D1 Battalion's composition to confirm it as a maneuver battalion in the order of battle holdings.

14 There are strong indications that a 3d Artillery Battalion exists in III CTZ, under the joint control of Sub Region 3 and the Combat Control Section. It is believed that the unit is composed of two recoilless rifle companies and one 82mm mortar company and has a strength of 150. This unit will be considered as possibly present in Sub Region 3 until the exact composition is determined.

15 Documents captured in December note the existence of the 9th Artillery Battalion subordinate to Sub Region 1. Indications are that this battalion is probably composed of elements of the C7 and C9 Companies of the 3d Battalion, 208th Artillery Regiment. This unit, which has been added to the possibly present list in the order of battle holdings, gives the enemy in Sub Region 1 a 107mm and 122mm rocket capability.

16 Additional information has been obtained on the composition of Military Region T7. Military Region T7 was activated in about June, 1968 by COSVN for better control of Sub Region 4, VC U-1 Province, VC Ba Bien Province and the Rung Sat Special Zone. The sub regions have maintained the same organizational structure and are subordinate to COSVN through Military Region T7. The 274th VC Regiment is confirmed as a subordinate unit of Military Region T7, and it is possible that the 5th VC Division is also under its control. In addition to the forces subordinate to the various sub regions, Military Region T7 has forces that are primarily artillery and sapper types, possibly the 74th Artillery Regiment, the K34 Battalion of the 96th Rocket Regiment and a battalion of the 208th Artillery Battalion, as well as the D67 Engineer Battalion and the D5 Sapper Battalion. These units, combined with infantry, pose a threat to Saigon and Allied installations in its area

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of operations. Furthermore, Rear Service Groups 81 and 85 are believed to be supporting Military Region T7 operations.

17 Documents captured in early December note the disposition of the 12th Reconnaissance/Sapper Battalion and the location of Sub Region 2 Headquarters in the Ba Thu area (XT2704). The 12th Battalion was moved to the Ba Thu area to train both politically and militarily for an "important mission" that would be assigned to it in the future. A small number of cadre and combatants were left behind to prepare for the offensive. Indications were that Sub Region 2 Headquarters had moved to Ba Thu to avoid Allied operations and harassment.

18 Interrogation of a prisoner has revealed information concerning the Combat Control Section of Sub Region 3. The prisoner noted that the normal military organization of the sub region consisted of five infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company and a sapper company directly subordinate to Sub Region 3 Military Headquarters. However, in May, a Combat Control Section was formed to facilitate the control of the 506th and 508th Battalions. Now all of the units are under the joint control of the Combat Control Section and Sub Region 3 Military Headquarters.

19 Preparations for a possible military effort in Saigon have necessitated the reorganization of forces in Sub Region 6. Documents and a prisoner captured during the quarter have revealed changes in the organization of the sub region. To improve control, the enemy has disbanded the C10 Sapper Battalion, which had an estimated strength of 175 men, in favor of five Special Action Elements designated 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. Indications are that only Special Action Elements 1 and 2 had been assigned personnel as of 30 November. The authorized strength has been reported to be 600 and it is possible that the arrival of personnel to fill the other elements will bring these Sub Region 6 units up to full strength. Pending new information, the strength of these special action elements will be maintained at 175. The C10 Sapper Battalion has been dropped by the Order of Battle Section as a confirmed maneuver battalion.

20 A record book of the 81st Rear Service Group captured on 15 November revealed that B-52 strikes had forced its personnel to live in trenches, resulting in a reduced percentage of personnel available for duty (approximately 69 percent), that there had been a change in unit designators, and that the group had been partially reorganized. Because of the change in designators, previously known units could not be correlated, however, the document revealed the formation of two transportation battalions. The D40A Transportation Battalion is composed of a headquarters, two previously known companies, V14 and V15, and one previously unknown company V16. The D60B Transportation Battalion is composed of a headquarters and three previously known companies, V11, V12, and V13. The total strength of the 81st Rear Service Group was increased to 2,550 by the Order of Battle Section on the basis of this document.

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21 Documents captured by elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division (Airmobile) identify three battalions of the 85th Rear Service Group which were previously unknown - the 532d, the 432d and the 237th Battalions. This information has increased the estimated strength of the 85th Rear Service Group from 425 to a minimum of 1,000. The current area of responsibility of the 85th Rear Service Group in Binh Long Province.

22 The enemy increased significantly his employment of 120mm mortar. The 120mm mortar was identified in a series of attacks on Dau Tieng Base Camp. The 120mm mortar, type 53, has a weight of 606 pounds, a maximum range of 5,700 meters and a minimum range of 500 meters. The mortar fires a high explosive round which is 23.5 inches long and weighs 28 pounds. This mortar is normally found with a divisional artillery battalion, but it is believed that in the attacks on Dau Tieng, the weapon was given to the heavy weapons platoon of the 664 Local Force Company. In addition, a rallier from the 88th NVA Regiment stated that a new 215mm rocket would be used in the next offensive. This projectile was tested in a 25 September shelling of Katum. There are indications that it was also used on a number of other occasions during September. The units which are believed to have employed this weapon were elements of the 69th Artillery Command in conjunction with the 22d Artillery Battalion of the 5th Viet Cong Division before its relocation to War Zone D.

(c) Recapitulation.

1 The VC regions, provinces and special zones in III CTZ controlled 42 Local companies and 17 Local Force platoons. (Note: Local companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or under are considered platoons).

2 The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
69th Artillery Command	COSVN
74th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th Artillery Command
208th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th Artillery Command
56th VC AA Battalion	69th Artillery Command
58th VC Artillery Battalion	69th Artillery Command
95C NVA Regiment	COSVN
274th VC Regiment	COSVN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
275th VC Regiment	5th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	5th VC Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	5th VC Division
141st NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
165th NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
271st VC Regiment	9th VC Division
272d VC Regiment	9th VC Division
273d VC Regiment	9th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	9th VC Division
24th VC AA Battalion	9th VC Division
66th VC MF Base Security Regiment	COSVN
88th NVA Regiment	Sub Region 1
101st NVA Regiment	Sub Region 1
268th VC MF Regiment	Sub Region 1
1st VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 1
2d VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 1
8th VC Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 1
6th VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 2
D16 NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
242d NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
267th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 2
2642 NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
269th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 2
308th VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 2

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
2d Ind VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
265th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
506th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
520th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
Dong Phu VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
Doan 10 VC MF Sapper Battalion	Sub Region 4
Thu Duc VC Infantry Regiment	Sub Region 4
Dong Nai VC Regiment	Sub Region 5
Special Action Element	Sub Region 6
14th VC MF Battalion	Tay Ninh Province
D440 VC LF Battalion	Ba Bien Province
D445 VC LF Battalion	Ba Bien Province
D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 Province
D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 Province
Doan Song Be Battalion	Military Region 10
46th VC MF Reconnaissance Battalion	CSVN
2d VC MF Guard Battalion	Unknown

2 The following units are located in northern IV CTZ in the II
FORCLV TAOI:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
Dong Thap I VC Regiment	Military Region 2
Dong Thap II VC Regiment	Military Region 2
295th VC MF Battalion	Military Region 2
502d VC LF Battalion	Kien Phong Province

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
504th VC LF Battalion	Kien Tuong Province
512th VC LF Battalion	An Giang Province
516th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province
518th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province
550th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province

4 Units possibly present in III CTZ are listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
96th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th VC Artillery Command
33d NVA Regiment	5th VC Division
32d NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
22d NVA Artillery Battalion	7th NVA Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	7th NVA Division
174th NVA Regiment	Possibly COSVN
320th NVA Regiment	Possibly COSVN
21st Ind VC MF Battalion	5th VC Division
Gia Dinh 4 VC Sapper Battalion	Sub Region 1
9th Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 1
12th VC LF Sapper Recon Battalion	Sub Region 2
3d Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 3
D6 Heavy Weapons Battalion	Sub Region 4
67th Engineer Battalion	Possibly COSVN
D1 VC LF Battalion	Tay Ninh Province
D168 Battalion	Phuoc Long Province
D368 Battalion	Binh Long Province

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(d) Summary of Recent Activities.

1 The past quarter has been a period of transition as the enemy attempted to move from a disengaged deployment into an offensive posture. At the beginning of the quarter enemy units were in the traditional base areas in northern and northwestern III CTZ along the Cambodian border. The enemy continued to avoid major contacts throughout the period but slowly redeployed to contest Allied operations against infiltration routes, and to move from the border areas into intermediate staging areas. Aggressive Allied operations forced the enemy to delay his movements, break up his forces into small cells to pass through Allied positions, hindered reconnaissance elements from operating, and inflicted heavy logistical losses on the enemy. The loss of vital supplies forced the enemy to divert manpower to the movement of supplies, and caused problems in the support of units that were already in intermediate areas. The Winter-Spring Offensive, which was launched by the enemy in December, was slow in evolving as the enemy's movement towards his objectives in the south central part of the corps tactical zone were hampered and delayed. As the quarter ended the enemy had still not consolidated his units into forward positions, but it seemed clear that the redeployment of major enemy units heralded the advent of a major attack on the scale of the 1968 Tet Offensive.

2 5th VC Division. At the beginning of the period, the 5th VC Division was located in northeastern War Zone C. Indications were that in November the 33d NVA Regiment and the 275th VC Regiment had begun to redeploy to War Zone D, the old area of operations of the 5th VC Division. The 88th Regiment became subordinate to Sub Region 1 and remained in the area of the Michelin Plantation (XT5155), when the division headquarters and the 33d NVA and 275th VC Regiments began their redeployment. The 5th VC Division has avoided major contact throughout the period, but it is believed that the relocation of the division to War Zone D is almost complete, in preparation for the upcoming offensive. During December, small contacts and documents captured in the Song Be Corridor indicated that the 5th Division was slowly moving south in platoon and squad size units. At the end of January a rallier reported that the 174th NVA Regiment had replaced the 88th NVA Regiment. The fact was confirmed by documents captured on 29 January. Including the 174th Regiment, the 5th VC Division has a strength of 5,250.

3 7th NVA Division. This division, with one exception, has remained out of contact in western Binh Long Province. On 27 and 29 November, in a series of company and battalion sized engagements northeast of An Loc, the 141st Regiment lost approximately 150 men. The 32d and 165th Regiments, on the other hand, have avoided major contact throughout the quarter. It is believed that the 7th NVA Division, with an estimated strength of 5,500, remains dispersed in the vicinity of the Fishhook (AT5793).

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4 9th VC Division. At the beginning of the period, the 9th VC Division was avoiding contact in base camps in western and southwestern Tay Ninh Province. Since then all regiments have been identified in contacts with friendly forces: The 271st Regiment lost approximately 100 men in a 27 November engagement southwest of Thien Ngon; the 272d Regiment lost approximately the same number of men in a 22 December attack on an ARVN night defensive position north of the Angel's Wing; and the 273d Regiment lost an estimated 50 men in a 28 November contact northwest of Ben Soi. Based on contacts in the last week of January it appears that major elements of the 9th VC Division have redeployed southward from their base areas to staging areas southwest of Tay Ninh in the Angel's Wing and Ba Thu (XT2704). The strength of the division is believed to be approximately 5,500.

5 At present three regiments are believed to be operating independently under COSVN. Two of these regiments are newly arrived units from II CTZ, the 95C and 320th NVA Regiments. These are thought to be part of the 1st NVA Division, which is also believed to have relocated to the III CTZ. However, until the headquarters of the 1st NVA Division is located and the exact composition of the division determined, the 1st NVA Division will not be confirmed and the 95C and 320th Regiments will be considered independent units subordinate to COSVN. The present area of operations of the 95C Regiment is believed to be the Crescent area (XT4160), northwest of the Michelin Plantation, while the 320th NVA Regiment is presently carried southwest of An Loc. Their strengths are 1,000 and 1,400 respectively. The 274th VC Regiment has avoided major contact during the quarter but its battalions are believed to be deployed in the area of the Binh Son Plantation and the Hat Dich area (XS3388). The present strength of the Regiment is estimated to be 1,300.

6 At the beginning of the quarter the 88th NVA Regiment was subordinate to the 5th VC Division. However, when this division relocated to its traditional area of operations in War Zone D, the 88th NVA Regiment was left behind. In December it appeared that the 88th Regiment had been resubordinated to Sub Region 1 as part of the effort to bolster the offensive capability of the sub region. The 88th Regiment had been subordinate to Sub Region 1 and operated in the Michelin area prior to rejoining the 5th VC Division during the August 68 offensive. The 2d Battalion of the 88th Regiment was identified in a 7 December contact in the Mo Bo Woods area (XT6083). It was believed, however, that this was the lead element of the regiment as it relocated into southeastern Sub Region 1, and at the end of the quarter the regimental headquarters and the other battalions were still located in the Boi Loi area.

7 The 101st NVA Regiment has been avoiding contact in the Boi Loi-Trapezoid area, where it withdrew to refit and reinforce after having suffered heavy losses in October. A prisoner taken on 23 November placed the 2d Battalion north of Trang Bang. It is believed that the 1st and 3d Battalions are dispersed in the Boi Loi-Trapezoid area. Indications are that the 101st NVA Regiment has replaced its losses and now has a strength of 1,000 men.

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8 The Dong Nai Regiment has remained out of contact for most of the reporting period. Indications are that the regiment has continued to experience food and morale problems. The disposition of the various battalions is believed to be as follows: The K1 Battalion is northeast of Binh My; the K2 Battalion is in the An Son area; the K3 Battalion is unlocated in the northeast Catcher's Mitt area and the K4 Battalion is east of Lai Khe. The strength of the unit is estimated to be 1,350.

9 Activity in the various sub regions during the quarter was light to moderate, except for Sub Region 1. Activity in Sub Region 1, a traditional bellwether of increased enemy activity, was high until early January but decreased toward the end of the quarter. Sub Region 1, with the addition of the 88th NVA Regiment, now has four regiments, two artillery battalions and a sapper battalion which represents more than a divisional threat. This reinforcement of the sub region's forces has been reflected in the level of activity in the area.

(9) VC/NVA Battle Losses.

(a) Overall personnel and materiel losses:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>RALLIERS</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>G/S</u>	<u>RICE (TCHS)</u>
NOV	4,166	456	367	1,303	273	98.4
DEC	3,670	921	345	1,299	225	100.3
JAN	3,043	428	309	1,303	226	295.8

(b) Losses in caches. One of the major factors which hampered enemy preparation for the Winter-Spring Offensive was the discovery by Allied forces of large quantities of materiel in caches. The enemy's supply system, based on the clandestine movement of materiel and caches in intermediate and forward areas, although a potential weakness, has worked with notable success in the past. During this last quarter, however, increasing Allied expertise in uncovering caches led to the discovering of very significant quantities of enemy weapons, munitions and foodstuffs.

MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ENEMY CACHES

NOV 68 - DEC 68 - JAN 69

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
122mm Rockets	53	87	5	145
107mm Rockets	15	43	48	106

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	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RPG Rounds	1,230	2,502	2,046	5,858
Mortar Rounds	2,322	7,730	5,674	15,726
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	100	758	1,329	2,187
Small Arms Ammunition	218,877	369,196	891,107	1,479,180
Grenades	4,612	5,564	5,292	15,468
Mines and Booby Traps	470	327	408	1,205
Individual Weapons	681	384	317	1,382
Crew Served Weapons	70	53	58	181
Rice (Tons)	98.4	100.3	295.8	494.5

The impact of these losses has been one of the chief factors which has caused the enemy repeatedly to postpone his planned offensive. In addition, these losses have had a sharp effect on enemy morale, since the amount of rice captured is equal to 600,000 daily rations of rice. As a result many enemy units have gone hungry during the past quarter.

(10) VC/NVA Army Tactics.

(a) In this quarter the enemy's efforts were primarily directed at the positioning of men and supplies in support of a major offensive. The enemy demonstrated a continuing dependence on his system of caches in intermediate and forward areas. In addition, the enemy once again displayed his ability to postpone his offensive operations in response to repeated Allied spoiling operations.

(b) There was continuing emphasis during the quarter on the formation and training of sapper units, with special attention given to the infiltration of sapper elements into Saigon.

(c) The enemy continued to make extensive use of attacks by fire, and increased his use of 120mm mortars during the quarter. His primary means for attacks by fire continued to be 60mm and 82mm mortars, with rockets playing an important but secondary role.

(d) There were increasing signs during the quarter of the political motivation of the enemy's military actions. Attacks against civilian targets increased as did terrorist attacks, and the enemy undertook a program of equipping all his soldiers with standardized uniforms in order to blur the distinction between the NVA and VC forces.

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(11) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Relative Probability
of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1 Attack.

a The enemy is capable of conducting another offensive aimed primarily at Saigon/Tan Son Nhut and/or Long Binh/Bien Hoa employing elements of the 7th NVA Division, the 5th VC Division, 9th VC Division, and Sub-Regional forces.

b The enemy is capable of attacking Tay Ninh, Loc Ninh, Quan Loi and An Loc utilizing elements of the 7th NVA Division and the 1st NVA Division, supported by provincial forces.

c The 74th NVA Artillery Regiment, the 208th NVA Artillery Regiment and the 96th NVA Artillery Regiment are capable of attacking civilian and military targets throughout III CTZ, independently or in support of ground attacks.

d The enemy is capable of conducting limited ground attacks and attacks by fire against friendly units, outposts and installations within the corps zone.

e The enemy is capable of temporarily interdicting and staging ambushes along friendly lines of communication.

2 Defend.

a The enemy is capable of defending base areas in northern Binh Long Province and Phuoc Long Province with elements of the 7th NVA Division, and provincial forces.

b The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone C and Tay Ninh Province with elements of the 1st NVA Division and 9th VC Division, forces subordinate to COSVN, and provincial forces.

c The enemy is capable of defending base areas in the Michelin, Trapezoid, Ho Bo and Boi Loi areas with elements of the 1st NVA Division and the forces of Sub Region 1.

d The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone D with elements of the 5th VC Division and Rear Service Group personnel.

3 Reinforce.

a The enemy is capable of reinforcing an attack on Saigon with battalions from the northern provinces of IV CTZ and from the 1st NVA Division.

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b The enemy is capable of reinforcing with infiltration groups of unknown size.

c The enemy is capable of reinforcing with units up to regimental size from II CTZ.

4 Withdraw. The enemy is capable of avoiding contact and withdrawing to relatively secure areas within III CTZ or base areas in Cambodia.

5 Other.

a The enemy is capable of replacing losses and increasing strength through upgrading guerrilla forces, recruiting and impressing civilians, and receiving replacements from North Vietnam.

b The enemy is capable of conducting resupply at the required rate when not interdicted by Allied operations.

(b) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses.

1 The enemy's continuing losses have caused a shortage of personnel familiar with the terrain, a deterioration of leadership, a drop in the level of experience and training of individual soldiers, and an overall lowering of morale.

2 The replacement of VC cadre and soldiers with NVA personnel has led to conflicts, possibly some loss of popular support and has decreased the enemy's capability to evade Allied operations.

3 Successful Allied operations against VC infrastructure have resulted in a reduced capability to support enemy forces.

4 The enemy's medical facilities are inadequate and he is short of medical supplies.

5 The enemy's supply system, based on extended lines of communication and caches in the forward areas, is vulnerable to Allied operations.

6 The enemy's continued planning for operations directed against Saigon could cause him to become vulnerable to concentrations of Allied forces, firepower and mobility in the Capital Military District.

7 The enemy is vulnerable to being misled by his own propaganda concerning the state of morale of Allied forces and the civilian population.

8 The enemy's continued use of known base areas while avoiding contact with friendly forces, renders him susceptible to B-52 strikes.

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(c) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

1 The enemy will probably increase offensive activity throughout the II FFORCEV TAOI with concentrated effort either to threaten or attack toward the Capital Military District, the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, Tay Ninh City, and the Trang Bang/Cu Chi area.

2 The enemy is likely to reposition Sub-Regional Forces around the Capital Military District in attack configuration.

3 The 5th VC Division, the 7th NVA Division and the 9th VC Division will probably be redeployed into positions to support or conduct attacks toward Saigon, while the 1st NVA Division prepares combat positions in the vicinity of Tay Ninh City.

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period, II FFORCEV continued Phase II of Campaign Toan Thong, conducting operations throughout the III CTZ to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict infiltration routes. Intelligence received during the quarter indicated the enemy had planned to conduct a Winter-Spring Offensive against populated areas and critical installations during December. However, rapid planning and reaction on the part of friendly forces caused the planned offensive either to be delayed or cancelled. The enemy continued to attempt to prepare for his offensive and to avoid decisive battle. His most frequent tactic was to conduct harassing attacks by fire and light ground probes against friendly units and installations. The capability of II FFORCEV to bring pressure upon the enemy was increased with the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from I CTZ to III CTZ in November. Its employment in the northern tier of the CTZ reduced the operational areas of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, enabling both to increase their emphasis on supporting pacification within their respective areas. The 1st Cavalry Division initiated operations in the vicinity of the Fishhook, Serge's Road, and Adam's Road, along the Cambodian border. The division deployed a brigade (-) to the Parrot's Beak/Angel's Wing area to conduct interdiction operations, while the remainder of the division continues operations along the northern tier. Operations in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak areas were conducted in coordination with Naval Riverine Forces (Giant Slingshot), operating along the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. Preparations were made and work initiated on the upgrading and restoration of ground lines of communication from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai, Bunard and Song Be. Operations consisted of combined efforts on the part of US and ARVN forces to clear the area along the road and replace bridges and culverts to restore military and civilian traffic. The 9th Infantry Division continued offensive operations in the III CTZ with one brigade, and in the IV CTZ with two brigades. The Division conducted operations

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Quyet Chien and Kudzu in the IV CTZ under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. On 1 December, the division, less the 3d Brigade, was placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. The 3d Brigade continued operating under II FFORCEV control in the southwest portion of III CTZ. The Capital Military Assistance Command continued operations in and around the Capital Military District with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light) and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne under its operational control. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, less one squadron, remained under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Australian Task Force continued operations in the southern portion of III CTZ, in December and January carrying out offensive operations in the Hat Dich area. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force conducted offensive and security operations in the region surrounding its base camp at Bearcat. At the close of the reporting period, II FFORCEV combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continued to limit the ability of the enemy to wage large-scale offensive actions.

(b) Results of Operations in the III CTZ.

1 Significant results of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, during November, December and January were: 786 US/FWMAF killed (753 US, 21 Australians, 10 Thais, two New Zealanders), 4,297 wounded (4,141 US, 77 Australians, 71 Thais, and eight New Zealanders), 12 US missing, 6,272 enemy killed, 296 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses include 2,036 small arms, 437 crew served weapons, 1,296,513 rounds of small arms ammunition, 18,689 high explosive rounds, 150 122mm rockets, 1,520 mines, and 431.86 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

2 Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, include 1,746 US/FWMAF killed (1,676 US, 40 Australians, 27 Thais, and three New Zealanders), 27 US missing, 15,846 enemy killed, 956 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses include 4,593 small arms, 1,056 crew served weapons, 1,974,688 rounds of small arms ammunition, 31,088 high explosive rounds, 256 122mm rockets, 4,076 mines and 1,199.67 tons of rice captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As the reporting period opened the division was deploying to the northern portion of the III CTZ, an operation which had commenced on 27 October. Combat elements of the 3d Brigade, upon closing in the new area, were placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, while combat elements of the 1st Brigade were placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The division headquarters deployed to Phuoc Vinh

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and operational control of 3d Brigade was passed from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 7 November 1968. On 9 November the division assumed operational control of the 1st Brigade from the 25th Infantry Division. Combat elements of the 2d Brigade closed and became operational under division control on 12 November, with the last combat essential equipment of the division closing in III CTZ on 15 November. From the outset of operations in III CTZ the division conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to block enemy infiltration and movement of supplies along Adam's Road, Serge's Jungle Highway and south from the Fishhook. Throughout the period, the 1st Cavalry Division actively engaged large enemy elements, inflicting heavy casualties. The division's first major action in the III CTZ occurred on 13 November when the enemy launched a determined two-battalion attack against FSEB Det, seven kilometers northwest of Tong Le Chon. The base was occupied by elements of 5-7 Cavalry and the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), in direct support of the division. The attack began at 2351 hours when the base was hit by heavy mortar fire. US and ARVN artillery, tactical air, Spooky and flareships supported the friendly units. At 0125 hours the perimeter was breached at two points, but was restored by 0240 hours, when the intensity of the attack decreased. At 0255 hours the attack resumed in full force with intensive ground and mortar fire. Supporting aircraft received heavy anti-aircraft fire from 50-caliber machineguns until 0515 hours. At first light, Scouts of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, with 1-9 Cavalry, supported the action. At 0725 the enemy force began to withdraw. Ten minutes later the Rangers began a sweep of the area, receiving small arms fire. Airstrikes were called in, and at 0815 hours the base again commenced receiving mortar and rocket fire which continued throughout the day. Results of the action were nine ARVN killed, 41 wounded and one missing; 287 enemy killed, including 77 by air elements, 114 by artillery and 96 by ground fire (credited to the ARVN Rangers), and three 60mm mortars, 12 RPG launchers, 53 AK-47 rifles, seven light machineguns, and two ChiCom carbines captured. At 0630 hours 16 November, B/E/1-7 Cavalry, occupying a night defense position seven kilometers northeast of Thien Ngon, received a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. The friendly units returned fire with organic weapons as aerial rocket artillery and airstrikes supported. Contact was lost at 0800, and at 0825 hours a sweep was initiated. The units immediately began to receive fire from snipers hidden in trees. At 1315 hours the enemy attacked with small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire, and fighting continued until contact was again lost at 1530 hours. Results of the day's action were 11 US wounded, 37 enemy killed, and 11 AK-47 rifles, two machineguns and nine RPG rounds captured. On 25 November, elements of 1-7 Cavalry engaged in two sizeable contacts. The first commenced at 0620 hours five kilometers west of Thien Ngon, when the company engaged elements of the 273d VC Regiment. The fighting, which continued for four hours, resulted in 52 enemy killed and seven captured, and five US killed and 13 wounded. In addition, 12 RPG launchers, 45 RPG rounds, 20 AK-47 rifles, 19 mortar rounds and five

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machineguns were captured. At 1705 hours approximately one kilometer to the southwest, A/1-7 Cavalry received fire from an enemy force. In the resulting action, 12 US were wounded and 40 enemy were killed. On 27 November, seven kilometers north of Loc Ninh, B/2-12 Cavalry, and C/1-11 Armored Cavalry, engaged an estimated enemy company, killing 57 enemy and capturing five crew served weapons, four RPG launchers, and 13 individual weapons. Friendly losses were 20 wounded. At 0900 hours 28 November six kilometers north-northeast of Loc Ninh, C/2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment (ARVN), under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, engaged an enemy force of undetermined size, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. Airborne rocket and ground-based artillery supported until contact was lost at 1046 hours. At 1313 hours, contact was reestablished about one kilometer to the northwest when C/2-2 Infantry and 2-9 Infantry began receiving fire. Artillery, air strikes, and aerial rocket artillery resumed support until contact was again lost at 1630 hours. Results of the action were 70 enemy killed, and two RPG launchers, 25 small arms, one 12.7mm machinegun and two 60mm mortars captured; friendly losses were 14 wounded. At 1110 hours 29 November, six kilometers north of Loc Ninh, C/2-2 Cavalry engaged an estimated enemy battalion in bunkers. The enemy was supported by RPG and mortars while the friendly force called in artillery, light fire teams and air strikes. The action continued until 1530 hours when the enemy withdrew to the west and contact was lost. Results were seven US killed and 16 wounded, 78 enemy killed, and 10 individual weapons, one crew served weapon and four RPG launchers captured. On 3 December, 17 kilometers northeast of Hon Quan, A/2-7 Cavalry conducted a combat assault into a landing zone which appeared to be free of enemy activity. Suddenly, the company came under heavy attack from RPG, 82mm mortars, 50-caliber machineguns, automatic weapons, small arms, and command-detonated claymore mines. Airstrikes, airborne rocket artillery and ground artillery support enabled the company to repulse a number of ground attacks by the estimated battalion-sized force. A/2-7 Cavalry air assaulted into the landing zone to reinforce Company D. The contact broke after more than five hours of fierce fighting. Known enemy losses were one killed and one RPG launcher and five RPG rounds captured, while friendly losses were 24 killed, one missing and 52 wounded. Beginning at 0245 hours 4 December, A C/D/2-8 Cavalry night defensive position 17 kilometers east of Katum came under attack from 75 to 100 rounds of 82mm mortar and heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The two companies returned fire with organic weapons, supported by aerial rocket artillery, in fighting that continued until nightfall, and killed 40 and captured one enemy while losing three killed and 19 wounded. Twenty small arms, two RPG-2 launchers, and one light machinegun also were captured. That same day a sizeable cache was located in a bunker 14 kilometers northwest of Song Be by B/1-12 Cavalry. It contained 600 mortar rounds and 100 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. On 7 December, during a reconnaissance in force mission nine kilometers northeast of

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Dong Xoai, A/2-5 Cavalry uncovered a cache containing 50 bicycles, 8,000 pounds of rice, 876 B-40 rockets, 100 B-41 rockets, 256 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle and 60,920 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 9 December, six kilometers southwest of Hoh Quan, A/5-7 Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy company. C/1-11 Armored Cavalry provided fire support in the five-hour battle. The enemy left behind 93 killed, and one captured, two RPG-2 and one B-40 rocket launchers, 12 individual weapons, 53 B-40 rockets and 34 60mm mortar rounds. Friendly casualties were 14 killed and 17 wounded. Operating 10 kilometers north of Trang Sup on 14 December, A/1-9 Cavalry engaged 30 enemy, killing 20 of them. In mid-December the division's operations were extended into Hau Nghia Province, with particular emphasis on infiltration and supply routes in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak. At 1300 hours 18 December, the 1-9 Air Cavalry, while conducting operations in northern Phuoc Long Province, sighted an estimated 15 enemy in an open area near Bu Gia Map (YU3437). The enemy attempted to evade the aircraft, but were engaged. During this contact, air cavalry elements observed an estimated enemy battalion, and attacked with organic weapons and air strikes, killing 41 enemy without incurring casualties. The same day, 25 kilometers southeast of Bunard (XT474823), C/1-9 Cavalry located 15 enemy killed as the result of a previous air strike. On 23 December, C/1-8 Cavalry located a large weapons cache five kilometers northwest of Hiep Hoa. It contained 80 82mm mortar rounds, 138 B-40 rounds, 37 bangalore torpedoes, 155 60mm mortar rounds, 29 claymore mines and 195 grenades. On 24 December, the company found another large cache in the same area containing 270 grenades, 101 rounds of 60mm and 48 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, and 86 B-40 rounds. On 26 December, 12 kilometers northwest of Ap Luu Loc, C/1-9 Cavalry engaged approximately 60 enemy, killing 41 without friendly losses. On 27 December 10 kilometers northwest of An Loc, B/2-2 (Mechanized), under the division's operational control, made contact with an estimated enemy company. The fighting lasted three hours and resulted in 52 enemy killed and two captured. In addition, five RPG launchers and 25 rocket grenades, three rifles and 15 grenades were captured. Friendly losses were two killed and 27 wounded. On 28 December, B/1-9 Cavalry, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance in the Phuoc Binh area, received heavy automatic fire. In the resulting contact 59 enemy were killed. While searching the area, additional small groups of enemy were sighted and an additional 12 enemy were killed. There were no friendly losses. On 31 December B/2-12 Cavalry located a large ammunition cache 10 kilometers north of Hiep Hoa. It contained 84 B-40 rockets, 45 122mm rockets, 162 rounds of 82mm and 571 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, and 90,150 rounds small arms ammunition. On 10 January, the division accounted for 53 enemy killed in scattered action. At 1252 hours 11 January, A/1-11 Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size nine kilometers south of Phuoc Vinh, killing 31 and capturing one enemy, while losing three killed and 20 wounded. The division accounted for an additional 30 enemy killed in scattered actions. The following day, the division killed 50 enemy and captured

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one prisoner, 22 small arms, 10 crew served weapons and 41 high explosive rounds. On 19 January, 20 kilometers east-south-east of Phuoc Vinh, the 2-505 Infantry (airborne), under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, located and enemy killed from air strikes. In other operations that day division forces killed another 14 enemy and captured three prisoners, 13 small arms, six crew served weapons, five tons of rice, 325 high explosive rounds, 30 122mm and six 107mm rockets, and 134,728 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 21 January, the 5-7 Cavalry conducted operations in the area eight kilometers southwest of the fish-hook (XT5483). Between 1110 and 1624 hours, contacts with scattered enemy forces resulted in six enemy killed and the capture of four AK-47 rifles and one 60mm mortar. In the same area the unit also located caches containing 331 82mm mortar rounds, 312 60mm mortar rounds, 44 107mm rockets, 40 RPG-2 rounds, 15 RPG-7 rounds, 75 recoilless rifle rounds, 246 grenades, 147,020 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1.1 tons of TNT, .33 tons of C4 explosives, 24 mines and 11,760 time fuzes. On 31 January, elements of the 1-9 Air Cavalry operating 23 kilometers southeast of Phuoc Vinh, engaged an enemy force, killing 34, without suffering friendly losses. Also on that date the division killed an additional 14 enemy, and captured or destroyed 51.2 tons of rice, 63,150 rounds of small arms ammunition, 762 high explosive rounds, and 178 grenades.

(b) 1st Infantry Division. Operations during the quarter were characterized by two distinct battle areas and types of combat. Major enemy units were fought and defeated in areas remote from major population centers, while areas near population centers were the scenes of numerous guerrilla and local force platoon-sized contacts. Combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division, Regional and Popular Forces and the National Police proved valuable in enhancing the detection of the enemy, locating caches and acquiring intelligence. Combined operations generally proved more successful than operations using US or ARVN forces alone. The assignment of Kit Carson Scouts to battalions and National Police Field Forces to brigades has improved the intelligence acquisition and rapid reaction capability of units in the field. As the reporting period opened on 1 November, beginning at 0333 hours, FSPB Rita (XT500805) received heavy RPG, small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire from an estimated 800 enemy. The attack ended at 0700 hours and resulted in 12 US killed, 54 wounded, 27 enemy killed, and 42 RPG rounds, 17 grenades, and 57 satchel charges captured. At 1135 hours 11 November, B/1-11 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of enemy seven kilometers west-southwest of An Loc. The contact, supported by artillery and airstrikes and reinforced by B/1-4 Cavalry, continued until 1540 hours. Results were one US killed, 38 enemy killed and six RPG launchers, 11 RPG rounds and one AK-47 rifle captured. On 13 November, in a sharp 20-minute contact eight kilometers west of Tong Le Chon, Aero Scouts of the 1st Infantry Division engaged 40-50 enemy, killing 38 without taking casualties. On 16 November, while searching a base camp 16 kilometers east of Chon Thanh, A/2-28 Infantry located 900 82mm mortar rounds, 160 claymore mines, 200

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bangalore torpedoes, 960 grenades and 750 one-quarter pound blocks of TNT. At 0300 hours 1 December, FSPB Junction City (XT620328), occupied by elements of 2-28 Infantry, was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. The action lasted for two hours and resulted in one US killed and 36 wounded, 44 enemy killed, two prisoners and 21 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. The division was credited that day with killing a total of 79 enemy. During the remainder of the reporting period, division contacts were generally light and scattered. As the period closed the division continued operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict his movements and logistical operations toward the Capital Military District and the Long Bien/Binh Hoa military complex.

(c) The 25th Infantry Division. As the period opened, 25th Infantry Division forces were deployed with the 1st Brigade to the east of Hui Ba Den, northeast of Tay Ninh; the 2d Brigade, west and south of Cu Chi, and the 3d Brigade to the west and south of Dau Tieng. Throughout the period the division aggressively sought out enemy forces operating in its areas and conducted operations to interdict enemy movements of personnel and supplies toward critical installations and population centers. Despite enemy attempts to avoid decisive combat during the period, the division developed a number of major contacts and located several sizeable caches of enemy materiel. At 1335 hours 13 November seven kilometers southwest of An Loc, A/2-12 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size, receiving small arms and RPG fire. The battalion returned fire with organic weapons and called in artillery and airstrikes. Contact was lost at 1805 hours. Results were 31 enemy killed and one captured, and two US killed and five wounded. On 22 November seven kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng, elements of the 1-27 Infantry located a cache containing 31 RPG rounds, 6,600 small arms rounds, 31 individual weapons, and 14 rifle grenades. On 20 November, the 3d Brigade commenced a new operation, Casino Sabre, as part of Campaign Toan Thang in the Trapezoid area. This operations resulted in 171 enemy killed and six captured. Among the items captured included one ChiCom radio, one commercial receiver-transmitter, 6.2 tons of rice, 650 pounds of salt, 110,000 piasters, 19,080 rounds of small arms ammunition, 43 RPG rounds and 76 weapons. On 28 November, A/2-27 Infantry, conducting operations 12 kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha received a heavy ground attack. The company, supported by artillery and light fire teams, killed 36 enemy and captured one prisoner and 15 weapons, while suffering light casualties. On 24 November, a light fire team from the 173d Assault Helicopter Company received automatic weapons fire from an enemy position adjacent to the Cambodian border west of Thien Ngon (WT975625). The team returned fire, killing 34 enemy. On 27 November, near the Renegade Woods (XT230290) C/D/3-22 Infantry reinforced five Regional Force companies, killing 25 enemy. Friendly losses were one killed and 14 wounded. At 0130 hours 11 kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha, an A/2-27 Infantry night defensive position received a ground attack, supported by 60mm mortars, from an enemy force of unknown size. The company returned fire with organic

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weapons and called in artillery, light fire teams and fireship support, killing 36 enemy and capturing one, while losing three US killed and six wounded. In addition, the unit captured nine RPG launchers, 11 small arms, three light machineguns, and 22 RPG-7 rounds. Eight kilometers southwest of Trang Bang a Firefly team supporting Regional Force elements engaged an enemy force killing at least 30 enemy. On 6 December two kilometers southeast of Trung Lap, B/1-5 Infantry found a cache containing 140 RPG rounds, 127 mortar rounds, 13 anti-tank mines, 150 pounds of plastic explosives, 492 82mm mortar fuzes, and 64 ChiCom grenades and 8,500 small arms rounds. On 15 December in the Hobo Woods (XT555203), elements of 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2-14 Infantry, made contact with a large enemy force. Thirty enemy were killed in the resulting action. There were no friendly losses. At 1105 hours 17 December, a 25th Infantry Division convoy moving between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng was attacked at the western edge of the Ben Cui Plantation by an estimated enemy battalion employing small arms, RPG and automatic weapons. The ensuing contact, which was supported by elements of 2-22 Infantry, B/3-4 Cavalry and C/1-27 Infantry, resulted in five US killed and 11 wounded, 75 enemy killed and 66 high explosive rounds, 81 grenades, eight small arms, one rocket launcher and five gas masks captured. One US truck was destroyed and five damaged in the action. On 20 December, B/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized), elements of the 4-49 ARVN Regiment and one Regional Force/Popular Force company from Trung Lap conducted a combined sweep near A. May Dang (XT660180), and engaged a force estimated at two enemy companies. A/3-4 Cavalry and B/D/2-12 Infantry reinforced the contact, which resulted in 30 enemy killed and four R.G. rocket launchers and 15 AK-47 rifles either captured or destroyed. On 22 December, at 0010 hours FSB Iole City (XT249309), manned by elements of the 4-9 Infantry, received a heavy attack by a force estimated at two battalions. The initial ground attack was preceded by a preparation which included fire from 51-caliber machineguns and 82mm mortars. Elements of 4-9 Infantry returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars, supported by air strikes, AC47 (Spooky), artillery and light fire teams. Contact was lost at 0630 hours. A sweep of the battlefield revealed 108 enemy killed. In addition, 34 rifles, nine light machineguns, two RPG-7 launchers, two ChiCom radios, and three pistols were captured. US losses were 17 killed and 34 wounded. On 13 January, elements of 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized), conducting security and reconnaissance in force operations on the west edge of Michelin Plantation, uncovered caches containing 15.7 tons of rice. On 14 January, elements of the 3d Brigade engaged in two sizeable contacts. At 0850 hours seven kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, 2-22 Infantry (Mechanized)(-) contacted an enemy force of undetermined size, killing 23 enemy while losing one US killed and two wounded. Contact was lost for a short period but regained at 1045 hours. Results of this engagement were 99 enemy killed and four US killed and five wounded. Air strikes in support of the brigade killed another 36 enemy. On 17 January, the 3-4 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the area 10 kilometers south of Michelin Plantation. At 0905 hours,

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the unit contacted an enemy force of undetermined size, killing 46. One US was killed and 17 were wounded in the action. During the remainder of the period, the division's contacts were light and sporadic.

(d) The 9th Infantry Division.

1 During the reporting period the 9th Infantry Division conducted operations in Long An Province of the III CTZ under the operational control of II FFOCEV and in the IV CTZ under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Division elements operating in III CTZ participated in Campaign Toan Thang, while the remainder of the division conducted Operations Quyet Chien and Kudzu. On 1 December, the division, less the 3d Brigade and supporting elements, was released from the operational control of Commanding General, II FFOCEV, and placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Operations conducted in the IV CTZ after 30 November are discussed in the Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division.

2 Campaign Toan Thang. The 1st Brigade continued Toan Thang in Long An Province with four battalions, 2-39 Infantry, 3-39 Infantry, 2-60 Infantry and 2-47 Infantry, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry conducted operations in support of the brigade. From 31 October to 3 November, elements of the 3-39th Infantry, gunships and scout ships of A/3-17 Cavalry, and elements of 2-4 Artillery conducted Night Hunter operations near Can Giuoc. Reacting to radar sightings and engaging targets under illumination, maneuver elements of the 3-39 Infantry and 3-17 Air Cavalry accounted for 47 enemy killed and 11 sampans destroyed. On 13 November, the 3d Brigade replaced the 1st Brigade in 9th Division participation in Campaign Toan Thang, employing the 2-47 Infantry (Mechanized), 2-60 Infantry and 5-60 Infantry. Sporadic contact continued throughout the remainder of November with the following results: 226 enemy killed and 37 captured. Contacts on 6 and 7 December by elements of the 3d Brigade with small groups of enemy resulted in 59 enemy killed at a cost of one US killed. On 13 December, the Viet Cong launched a three-hour attack by fire against the base camp of the 2-60 Infantry at Tan Tru (XS669631). Results of the ensuing battle were 33 enemy killed and two US killed and 45 wounded. On 24 December, while conducting operations six kilometers southwest of Can Giuoc, A/2-60 Infantry found the graves of 32 enemy killed by artillery. On 4 January, A/3-17 Air Cavalry, operating in the area 15 kilometers northwest of Tan An, captured 391 high explosive rounds, 43,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 12 booby traps and 12 mines. In scattered actions on 26 January, the brigade killed 52 enemy, received one rallier and captured one prisoner, 12 small arms, six crew served weapons, seven high explosive rounds and 16 grenades. Friendly casualties were seven US wounded. On 28 January, 5-60 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area 21 kilometers northwest of Tan An and captured 424 rounds of high explosive ammunition, 37,000 small arms rounds and 38 grenades. Contacts continued light during the remainder of the reporting period.

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3 Operation Quyet Chien. The 2d and 3d Brigades continued operation Quyet Chien in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces of the IV CTZ. Task organizations consisted of the 2d Brigade, with the 2-47 Infantry and 3-60 Infantry, and the 3d Brigade, with 4-39 Infantry, 5-60 Infantry, and the 6-31 Infantry. On 13 November the 1st Brigade replaced the 3d Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province. During the night of 14 November, near My Phuoc Tay, 27 enemy were killed while moving by sampans along canals in the area. On 23 November, A/C/D/6-31 Infantry, supported by A/3-17 Air Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy company west of Cai Lay (XS120490). Airstrikes and supporting artillery were directed into the area. Results of the operation were 51 enemy killed and 10 prisoners, six small arms and one crew served weapon captured. Thirty motorized sampans and 70 structures were destroyed. On 30 November, A/3-17 Air Cavalry, supporting 2-39 Infantry in an airmobile operation, made contact with an estimated enemy company north of Gai Be (XS190450). The action resulted in 86 enemy killed, seven prisoners and 33 weapons captured. Cumulative results of Operation Quyet Chien as of 30 November were 94 US killed, 721 US wounded, 10 US missing, 1,571 enemy killed and 19 captured, 18 ralliers, 1,005 detainees, and 304 small arms, 101 crew served weapons, 18.32 tons of rice, 115,126 small arms rounds, 801 high explosive rounds, 3,632 grenades, and 165 mines captured or destroyed.

4 Operation Kudzu. At the beginning of the reporting period the 4-47 Infantry was conducting Operation Kudzu with the mission of securing the 9th Infantry Division base camp at Dong Tam. No major contacts were developed during November. Cumulative results of Operation Kudzu as of 30 November were two US killed and 15 wounded, 11 enemy killed, three detainees apprehended and one grenade captured.

(e) Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). During the reporting period, CMAC continued offensive operations in Gia Dinh Province and adjacent areas to counter the enemy ground and rocket attacks against Saigon. Operations focused on denying the enemy the resources and staging areas needed to conduct offensive operations by locating enemy caches and interdicting routes of infiltration. Contacts during the period were sporadic, and limited to actions against small groups of enemy. Probing and the use of mine detectors proved successful in locating cache sites. Booby traps continued to be encountered, however the use of armored suits reduced the number of casualties incurred from these devices. CMAC began the reporting period with a task organization consisting of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light), 2-3 Infantry, 3-7 Infantry, 4-12 Infantry and the 5-12 Infantry; the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne, with the 1-505 Infantry (Airborne), 2-505 Infantry (Airborne) and the 1-508 Infantry (Airborne); the 3-17th Air Cavalry (less Headquarters Troop), and B, 7-1 Air Cavalry. On 9 November, the 4-12 Infantry was released by CMAC to become direct support to the 1st Australian Task Force, and on 19 December the unit went under the operational control of Binh Hoa Tactical Area Command. The 3-17 Air Cavalry, less two hunter-killer teams of A/3-17th Air Cavalry, was released on 6 December. On 1 November in the vicinity Ap Tay village,

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11 kilometers west of Saigon, C/1-505 Infantry found two caches containing one 60mm mortar, 37 122mm rockets, 10 B-40 rockets and four B-41 rockets. In response to an intelligence report on 10 November, D/1-505 found a cache two kilometers northwest of Tan Thoi Nhut. The cache contained 384 pounds of TNT, 96 pounds of C-3, 60 pounds of an unknown type of explosive, 2,250 rounds of AK rifle ammunition, five B-40 rockets and one B-41 rocket. On 2 December, with the assistance of a prisoner, B/2-3 Infantry located a cache two kilometers southwest of Tan Buu, and D/2-3 Infantry located a cache in the vicinity of Tan Nhut. The cache contained 131 B40 rocket charges, five AK-47 rifles, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. On 5 December, two kilometers east of Vinh Loc, B/1-505 Infantry found a cache containing 15 107mm rockets. On 15 December, a Navy patrol boat found two 122mm rockets and one rocket motor adjacent to the Vam Co Dong River, six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc. A search of the area the following day by A/3-7 Infantry resulted in finding 11 AK-47 rifles, 34 AK-47 magazines and a 55-gallon drum of gasoline. On 19 December five kilometers northeast of Hoc Mon, A/2-505 Infantry found a cache consisting of 64 B-40 rockets, 48 B-41 rockets, 59 82mm mortar rounds, 10 60mm mortar rounds and 150 B-51 charges. On 21 December, a combined cordon and search operation in the vicinity of Tan Buu with three companies of 2-3 Infantry and the 648th Regional Force Company resulted in finding 13 AK-47 rifles, 41 B-41 rockets, 42 B-41 charges, 11 120mm mortar rounds, six 82mm mortar rounds, seven mines, 32 ChiCom grenades, and a bipod for an 82mm mortar. On 23 December, six caches were found by elements of the 199th Infantry Brigade. Three were located five kilometers northwest of Ben Luc and three in the vicinity of Tan Buu village. They contained a total of 29 B41 rockets, 174 B40 rockets, 252 60mm mortar rounds, four AK-47 rifles, 12 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 221 B40 boosters, 35 pounds of TNT, and 165 gallons of diesel fuel. The following day, A/2-3 Infantry found three additional cache sites near Tan Buu. They contained 234 ChiCom grenades, 44 B40 rounds with charges, 116 rifle grenades, 6,000 rounds of AK rifle ammunition, three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, one 55-gallon drum of gasoline, 150 blasting caps and 50 pounds of TNT. C/2-3 Infantry continued to search in the vicinity of Tan Buu village on 26 December, locating three cache sites containing six 122mm rockets, two 122mm rocket motors, 100 pounds of TNT, 3,000 rounds of AK rifle ammunition and 24 82mm mortar charges. On 27 December four kilometers southwest of Tan Buu along the Rach Tri Canal, D/3-7 Infantry found a cache of 42 82mm mortar rounds with 300 charges. On 30 December, A/D/3-3 Infantry, searching north of Tan Buu, found three caches which held 43 B41 rockets, eight B40 rockets, 54 82mm mortar rounds with charges and fuzes, five 105mm rounds, and 450 rounds of 30-caliber ammunition. On 20 January, 5-12 Infantry, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations in the Pineapple six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc, located a cache containing a total of 85 small arms and five rockets. On 28 January, the 4-12 Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and patrol operations in the area eight kilometers northeast of Ben Luc. The unit located a cache containing 18 tons of rice. At the close of the reporting period, CMAC continued day and night operations to locate and destroy the enemy, interdict his movements and capture his stocks of materiel.

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(f) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). During the reporting period there were no changes in the RTAVF organization. Missions consisted of security operations near Bearcat, Long Thanh, Binh Son, and along Highway 15, and reconnaissance in force operations throughout its assigned tactical area of responsibility. RTAVF contacts during the period were generally light and scattered, with no major actions reported. On 15 November, nine kilometers southeast of Binh Son, a mortar attack resulted in two Thais killed and 13 wounded. On 28 November, five kilometers north-east of Binh Son, a mortar attack resulted in nine Thais wounded. On 14 December, three kilometers north of Binh Son, elements of the 2d Battalion engaged an enemy force. The contact resulted in five enemy killed and three weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 22 December a mortar attack on Fire Support Patrol Base Tak resulted in 10 Thais wounded.

(g) 1st Australian Task Force. The task force continued participation in Campaign Toan Thang throughout the period, with operations designed to destroy enemy elements, base areas and supply caches in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 9 November, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the task force and began operations in the southwestern portion of Base Area 300. Contacts were light in this area, but numerous caches were located. The most significant items located were 130 small arms, 13 crew served weapons and 2,465 grenades. On 20 November, the 3d RAR returned to Australia and was replaced by the 9th RAR. In early December the task force, reinforced by the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and K/L/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and two battalions of the 2d ARVN Airborne Regiment, began extensive operations in the Hat Dich area. Light scattered contacts in this area resulted in 123 enemy killed. Friendly casualties were light. On 3 December, the 1st ATF commenced Operation Goodwood in the Hat Dich area with the mission of locating and destroying the 274th VC Regiment. During the remainder of the period, the force killed 220 enemy, most of them as the result of Operation Goodwood, while suffering light casualties. In addition, the force captured 28 crew served and 160 individual weapons, and 10.2 tons of rice.

(h) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (Provisional)(BHTAC). On 1 November 1968 the command was organized with an authorized strength of 12 officers and 27 enlisted men. The mission of BHTAC is to coordinate US and RVNAF forces in the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex against ground, rocket and mortar attack; to coordinate operations of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force which affect the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex; to exercise control over United States and Free World Military Assistance force fire support within the BHTAC area of operations and to operate the Bien Hoa Artillery Warning Control Center. On 5 November the BHTAC Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) and the Artillery Warning Control Center (AWCC) became fully operational. The FSCE has the responsibility of coordinating all artillery fires in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex; coordinating the efforts of the Flash Base Center and the 10 flash base towers around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex that assist in the detection of mortar and rocket firing sites. The Artillery Warning Control Center

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is responsible for broadcasting all artillery data to aircraft entering the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. On 11 November, BHTAC, working with the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Special Zone, became fully operational and began planning and coordinating in an effort to improve the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. At 2225 hours, 5 December, the BHTAC billeting area (XT15143) received an estimated 125 to 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, which resulted in one US killed and two US wounded. The command assumed control of the following units on the dates indicated: 4-12 Infantry and L/3-11 Cavalry, 18 December, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry and A/D/1-508 Infantry (Airborne), 21 December. These elements were used on 22, 24, and 25 December when BHTAC conducted Operation Hollyhock, a security mission for Long Binh Post. On 23 December an ambush patrol of A/1-508 Infantry engaged two sampans moving west on a river eight kilometers south of Long Binh Post (vicinity of XS040970). A Firefly team was deployed to the area to assist. The two sampans were located by the Firefly team and were captured by the ground element. The Firefly then proceeded to sweep the area, resulting in 19 enemy killed and three sampans, five RPG launchers with three rounds, one mortar, three AK-47 rifles with ammunition, rucksacks with rice, 80 grenades, eating utensils, one claymore with wire, and three entrenching tools captured or destroyed. On 25 December, C/1-11 Cavalry replaced L/3-11 Cavalry, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry was released to its parent unit. On 28 December Task Force Walter was established and conducted operations with D/4-12 Infantry and 4th Company, 51st Ranger Battalion (ARVN) until 30 December. On 7 January, 2-3 Infantry was placed under the operational control of BHTAC, and A/D/1-508 Infantry were replaced by B/C/1-508 Infantry. The following day B/C/1-508 Infantry were returned to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. On 11 January, C/1-11 Cavalry was returned to its parent unit, and on 25 January the 2-3 Infantry was released to the 25th Infantry Division. During the remainder of the reporting period no forces were under the operational control of BHTAC.

(3) Air Operations.

(a) B-52 Operations. B-52 operations are discussed in Paragraph 1c (7) (a). Inclosure 6 indicates the number and distribution of Arc Light strikes in III CTZ.

(b) Army Aviation Operations.

1 Resources.

a The following non-divisional resources were under the control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period:

Rotary Wing:

*14 Assault Helicopter Companies

1 Armed Helicopter Company

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*4 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Med)

1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy)

1 Aviation Company (CORPS)

*1 Air Cavalry Squadron

Fixed Wing:

2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies

1 Utility Airplane Company

1 Surveillance Airplane Company

*1 Air Cavalry Troop, 4 Assault Helicopter Companies, and 1 Assault Support Helicopter Company were placed OLCOM to IV Corps on 1 December 1968.

b At the close of the reporting period, there were 455 helicopters and 124 airplanes assigned. These do not include 214th Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft under the operational control of IV Corps. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G2 in surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by G3 in air cavalry, combat assault, airmobile, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continued to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

c Allocation. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units by Commanding General, II FFORCEV or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and Allied organizations under the operational control of II FFORCEV and III Corps.

2 Employment. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy valid requirements. The policy of allowing each AHC to stand down two days each month has improved availability and quality of maintenance. In addition, the operational limitation of six hours of flying time a day for each committed aircraft has resulted in a more efficient utilization of aviation support to II FFORCEV and III Corps by requiring more thorough planning of tactical operations. The use of preparatory fires and smoke on landing zones prior to insertion has reduced the loss of personnel and aircraft to enemy fire.

3 Helibucket. The 12th Combat Aviation Group is presently evaluating the use of helibuckets to assist in fire control in contested areas. A CH 47 employing two (2) 375 gallon water buckets is being employed on a standby status.

4 Statistical summaries of close air support and Army aviation support are at Inclosures 4 and 5, respectively.

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(4) The following changes occurred in force structure:

(a) Gains.

1 The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) closed in III CTZ between 26 October and 12 November. The maneuver elements of the division became operational as follows:

a	2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry	30 Oct
b	2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry	31 Oct
c	2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry	1 Nov
d	1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry	5 Nov
e	1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry	6 Nov
f	1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry	7 Nov
g	5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry	11 Nov
h	1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry	12 Nov
i	2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry	13 Nov
j	1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry	15 Nov

2 The Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry advance party arrived in Vietnam 21 December 1968. The main body closed on 30 December 1968.

(b) Losses.

1 The 9th Infantry Division (less the 3d Brigade) was released from the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam on 1 December and placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV CTZ.

2 Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry was inactivated on 26 December 1968 by USARPAC General Order 888, 23 December 1968. On 27 December, the unit was organized as the II FFORCEV Long Range Patrol Company (Provisional) by II FFORCEV General Order 59, dated 10 January 1969. The company will be deactivated on 15 February. (See paragraph 1d (7).)

(5) Training.

(a) Four ARVN battalions completed Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training during the period 1 November - 31 January. Two additional battalions were in training at the end of January. The training is progressing on schedule and is being well received by the ARVN battalions.

(b) The 1st Infantry Division has reinitiated a refresher training program for engineer units of the 5th ARVN Division.

(c) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division, the 25th Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Division, and the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th ARVN Division during the reporting period. This program involves

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the exchange of RMTT between US and ARVN divisions. The type of training conducted by the RMTT depends on the needs of the particular units involved.

(6) Test of Fuze and Burster, Bomb System, XM 925. At the request of this headquarters the Fuze and Burster, Bomb System, XM 925, for the CS-filled 55-gallon drum, was tested for reliability by the 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). This system, which provides only an impact burst, is designed to detonate CS containers for dispersion of persistent CS in target areas. The first drop was conducted from a height of 2,100 feet. Of the 30 drums involved, 50 percent failed to detonate. A second drop was made from an altitude of 3,000 feet to insure that the fuzes would have more than sufficient time to arm. A 15-percent dud rate was experienced. A third test drop conducted under identical conditions, but in conjunction with a rigid pre-check of fuze assembly and arming procedures, resulted in three duds out of 30 drums released. In addition, a fourth drum experienced a low grade burst, indicating that it had broken apart without the burster having been activated. A fifth drum failed to burst because the lanyard parted at the snap fastener at the time of ejection from the aircraft. The results of these tests indicate in its present state the system does not meet this command's requirements. A dud rate of 15 percent is unacceptable, from the standpoint of both the efficient use of munitions and aircraft, and the potential for enemy reclamation of the material. Action was being taken by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam to request that the fuzing system be retested in the United States.

(7) Operations of Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry. From 1 to 4 November, Company F conducted operations southwest of Cu Chi. Its missions included monitoring waterways and harassing and interdicting enemy supply operations in the vicinity of the Song Vam Co Dong. From 5 to 12 November the company underwent a stand-down to prepare for its Annual General Inspection. From 13 November until 23 December, the unit conducted intelligence-gathering patrol operations in the Rang Rang area northeast of Bien Hoa, under the operational control of II FFORCEV. After 24 December the company operated south of Rang Rang and prepared to conduct operational training of Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry, which arrived in country in late December. During the remainder of the period the company conducted training for Company D, including practical exercises in patrolling, helicopter utilization, the use of weapons in patrol operations, artillery forward observer techniques, the utilization of air controllers in the conduct of air strikes and the employment of light fire teams. Initially, personnel of Company D were taken on three-day patrols made up of three men from each company and led by an experienced patrol leader. Subsequent patrols were conducted by Company D personnel with an experienced team leader-observer monitoring. On 26 December, Company F was deactivated and continued operations and training on 27 December as the II FFORCEV Long Range Patrol Company, preparatory to its inactivation on 15 February 1969.

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e. Logistical Operations

(1) Programs and Projects.

(a) Preparations continued during the period for the receipt and support of the second increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force at Bearcat. The upgrading of facilities was accomplished and the issue of TOE and TA equipment continues with support provided by US Army Support Command, Saigon.

(b) Preparations were also made for the receipt and support of Company D (LRP), 151st Infantry at II FFORCEV. The G4 Section, II FFORCEV, coordinated extensive logistical and engineering support with the Engineer Section and the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) which sponsored the unit upon its arrival in Vietnam in December.

(c) During the period the fortification of critical bridges in III CTZ was intensified. Plans for standardized protective and lighting systems were developed.

(d) Province and District Advisor Support. Coordinated action to upgrade the maintenance support rendered to US advisors at province and district level was taken by Headquarters II FFORCEV, Saigon Support Command, and the III Corps advisory staff. Weekly schedules for maintenance support were developed and implemented. US Divisions in III CTZ were instructed to establish liaison with, and provide necessary support to advisors located in their tactical areas of interest.

(e) Logistics Readiness Program.

1 The quarterly meeting for Logistics Readiness Officers of II FFORCEV assigned and attached units was held 15 January. Topics discussed were closed loop support items, material readiness expediting procedures, organizational maintenance and supply inspections, the II FFORCEV Vehicular Maintenance and Utilization Team, a new weekly command deadline reporting procedure, and the 1st Logistical Command's "Project Dog," which is designed to remove unserviceable equipment from the supply system.

2 During the reporting period 16 organizational maintenance and supply inspections were conducted of II FFORCEV assigned and attached units. Thirteen units received a satisfactory rating and three were rated unsatisfactory. This was a significant improvement over the last reporting period during which 11 units were rated satisfactory and 11 unsatisfactory.

3 The program of visits to each assigned and attached unit by the II FFORCEV Logistics Readiness Officer has been implemented and is progressing satisfactorily.

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(2) Aircraft Maintenance.

(a) Receipt and issue of helicopters. During the period 40 AH-IG (Cobra) and 75 OH-6 (Cayuse) helicopters were received and were issued as follows:

1 AH-IG (Cobra):

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
7	12th Avn Gp
15	1st Cav Div
6	9th Inf Div
6	25th Inf Div
6	1st Inf Div

2 OH-6 (Cayuse):

17	1st Cav Div
13	1st Inf Div
13	25th Inf Div
6	3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
13	9th Inf Div
4	23d Arty Gp
9	11th ACR

(b) Dropping of external loads from helicopters continues to be a problem among II FFORCEV units; however, improvement was noted during the last month of the quarter due to command emphasis. Sling failure has been, and continues to be, the primary cause of dropped loads. Slings are not always being maintained, stored, or inspected as required by TM 55-450-11. Aerial Delivery Equipment Assistance and Inspection teams have been instructed on methods to correct this problem.

(c) The operational readiness rate for CH-54 (Flying Crane) helicopters has been below the criteria established by Department of Army. Contributing factors have been a critical shortage of tail rotor blades and main rotor heads both in the Republic of Vietnam and the continental United States.

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(3) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply are managed through the use of available supply rates (ASR) to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all units within II FFORCEV. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items, specifically 81mm, 4.2-inch, 105mm, 155mm and 8-inch high explosive ammunition are also controlled by means of ASR.

(b) During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the number of items under ASR control for the allocation period was:

Nov 68 - 16

Dec 68 - 12

Jan 69 - 17

These totals show the number of items was consistent with the number managed by ASR during the previous quarter.

(4) Transportation.

(a) An airlift conference was sponsored by II FFORCEV on 20 November. The purpose of the conference was to orient II FFORCEV airlift customers, airlift traffic managers, logistical managers and airlift operators on various facets of the system and to discuss problem areas. Problem areas taken under study included the method of reporting missions completed, the importance of complying with cargo show times, advance planning meetings for large scale airlift operations, late changes to missions already scheduled, establishment of priorities for shipment, 463L palletizing of ammunition, and documentation of emergency shipment.

(b) USAF C130/C123 sorties flown in support of II FFORCEV units are summarized in Incl #3.

(5) Engineer Support.

(a) General. Engineer support was provided throughout the III CTZ in the form of airfield maintenance and rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of artillery fire support bases, improving lines of communications, jungle clearing, and support of tactical operations.

(b) Combat support. Engineer activities were characterized by a wide variety of combat support during the quarter.

1 Elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade provided support to the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam by removing a canal obstruction in the Tra Cu Canal at XS 442951.

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2 Support of these operations involved divisional and non-divisional engineer elements. Knife rests and flame mines were constructed and emplaced on suspected infiltration routes being used by the Viet Cong in the area between the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing.

3 Combat engineer support of the 24th Infantry Division was provided by the 20th Engineer Brigade on Highway LTL 15 north of Tay Ninh. The support required the opening of approximately 10 kilometers of Route LTL 13, from QL 22 to the Rach Ben Da River. The road opening permitted the extraction of elements of the 25th Infantry Division operating along the Cambodian border.

4 Jungle clearing continued to be an important component of engineer combat support during the quarter. A total of 38,850 acres was cleared in support of tactical operations to deprive the enemy of traditional strongholds. Major clearing operations were conducted in the Catcher's Mitt, Dau Tieng area, the Citadel, the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area, and along Route LTL 1A north of Phuoc Vinh.

5 Organic divisional and supporting non-divisional engineers provided continuous tactical support to maneuver elements in the form of mine sweeping, constructing pioneer roads, operating water supply points, erecting tactical bridging, and clearing barriers, obstacles and fields of fire.

a Tactical support was provided at special forces camps by constructing and rehabilitating berms, constructing defensive bunkers and installing mines. Camps which received support during the past three months were Katum, Thien Ngon, Tong Le Chon, and Rang Rang.

b Organic engineer elements cleared minefields at Bien Hoa Air Force Base, Phuoc Vinh Camp, and Fire Support Base St. Barbara.

c The quarter showed a significant improvement in the fortifications at many of the critical bridges within III CTZ. The engineer effort consisted of constructing pier protection, lighting systems, mine booms, watch towers, and approach roads.

d Operation Liberty Canyon, the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from I CTZ to III CTZ, required a large amount of engineer effort and resources, including immediate repair of airfields to facilitate the initial move. Revetments were constructed at Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Song Be, Lai Khe, Tay Ninh, Bearcat, Phu Loi, Cu Chi, and Dau Tieng. Additional support at those locations consisted of constructing bunkers, fuel facilities, watch towers, perimeter wire obstacles and prefabricating brigade and battalion-sized tactical operation centers. Support of this operation was terminated 30 December 1968.

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e Continuous effort was expended during the quarter by engineer units on the maintenance and upkeep of lines of communication. During the quarter 50.2 kilometers of roads were paved to MACV standards.

f On the night of 6 November 1968, three spans of the Phu Cuong highway bridge were destroyed by enemy action. The contingency plan for this bridge was implemented immediately, and a 708-foot M476 floating bridge was emplaced within 24 hours by the 65th Engineer Battalion supported by elements of the 79th and 159th Engineer Groups. The fallen bridge was reconstructed and opened to traffic on 25 January 1969.

g The continuous airfield maintenance and improvement program included work at Lai Khe, Ca Chi, Katun, Phuoc Vinh, Long Thanh, Dong Xoi, Bunard, Song Be, Tong Le Chon, Quan Loi, and Thien Ngon.

h Engineer support of artillery units included work at Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) St. Barbara (XT 2768), FSPB Concord (YT 0112), and similar bases located at Ben Luc, Can Giuoc, Thien Ngon, Saigon, Bearcat, Tan An, and Xuan Loc. Support included constructing and upgrading gun pads, perimeter berms, defensive personnel positions and access roads.

(c) Miscellaneous Engineer Support.

1 Signal facilities at Nui Chua Chan and Nui Ba Den were rehabilitated by non-divisional engineers. Additional non-divisional engineer support was provided to signal units at Lai Khe.

2 Elements of the 29th Engineer Brigade conducted well drilling operations at Bao Trai, Long Binh Post, and FSPB St. Barbara.

3 Revolutionary Development: During the quarter, in support of the Long An Pilot Pacification Program, construction of six schools with a total of 16 classrooms, one teacher's house, two village offices, and one warehouse were completed. The 159th Engineer Group removed its elements from Long An Province during this period; the last two-room schools to be built during the CY 68 program were transferred to the 34th Engineer Group for construction.

(6) Status of Primary Land Lines of Communication as of 31 January 1969.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following terms concerning the condition of land lines of communication are defined:

1 Condition I. The route is capable of carrying up to class 50 loads (all division loads).

2 Condition II. Up to class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport, e.g., 5,000 gallon fuel tanker).

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3 Condition III. Up to class 16 loads (armored personnel carriers and 2 1/2 ton trucks).

4 Condition IV. Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is only open to light reconnaissance vehicles.

5 Condition V. Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL-1.

1 Cambodian border (XT284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT383250), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Go Dau Ha (XT383250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), condition I.

3 Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XS793942), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

4 Saigon (XS793942) to road junction 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

5 Road junction 316 (YT072130) to Xuan Loc (YT456080), all bridges unlimited capacity, condition I.

(c) Route QL-4.

1 Road junction QL-1 (XS845914) to Ben Luc (XS618758), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Ben Luc (XS618758) to IV CTZ boundary (XS599600), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

(d) Route QL-13.

1 Road junction QL-1 (XS879971) to Phu Cuong (XT810148), capacity class 30, condition III.

2 Phu Cuong (XT810148) to An Loc (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

3 An Loc (XT755885) to Cambodian border (XU683233), lowest bridge capacity class 6, condition IV.

(e) Route QL-14. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to II CTZ boundary (YU588175), bridge out at YT166820 and YU303011, condition V.

(f) Route QL-15.

1 Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

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2 Baria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity class 12, condition IV.

(g) Route QL-20. Road junction QL-1 (YT343101) to II CTZ boundary (YT763572), lowest bridge capacity class 20, condition III.

(h) Route QL-22. Go Dau Ha (XT384251) to Tay Ninh (XT199500), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(i) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YTO02114) to junction LTL 1A (XT287373), lowest bridge capacity class 40, condition II.

(j) Route LTL 1A.

1 Dong Xoai (YT079759) to Phuoc Vinh (XT970490), no bridges, condition I.

2 Phuoc Vinh (XT975491) to road junction QL-13 (XT812140), ford at XT862262, condition IV.

(k) Route LTL 2. Road junction QL-1 (YT437045) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 24, condition III.

(l) Route LTL 5A.

1 Saigon (XS816890) to Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775) to Can Giuoc (XS830731), no bridges, condition I.

3 Can Giuoc (XS830731) to Cau Noi Ferry (XS786568), lowest bridge capacity class 16, condition IV.

(m) Route LTL 23.

1 Baria (YS380607) to YS628653, lowest bridge capacity class 35, condition II.

2 YS628653 to Ham Tan (ZS023821), 13 bridges out, condition V.

(n) Route TL 9A. Road junction QL-1 (XS739003) to Duc Hoa (XS598966), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(o) Route LTL 26 and Route 239. Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Jau Tieng (XT490460), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

(1) Psychological Operations.

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(a) The II FFORCEV psychological operations program directed against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel, as well as civilians under the influence of the Viet Cong, continued during the reporting quarter. A total of 499 million leaflets were disseminated by Army and Air Force aircraft. More than 1,680 psychological warfare sorties were flown and 2,329 aerial loudspeaker hours were broadcast in support of tactical operations.

(b) A total of 1,021 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN during the reporting period.

(2) Civil Affairs and Civic Action.

(a) Community relations continued to constitute an important part of the Civic Action program. Headquarters, II FFORCEV conducted a number of community relations programs during the period, including coordinating the establishment of Community Relations Committees and Friendship Councils. These organizations are being formed by installation coordinators whose facilities are located near major population centers. In addition, commanders of separate units which have a strength of at least 600 men and are located in populated areas have been encouraged to form these committees and councils.

(b) As an adjunct to existing programs, on 6 December II FFORCEV and III CTZ conducted a pilot Combined Civilian Orientation Conference in Bien Hoa Province. Among those attending were middle-level Government officials, province officials, educators, and religious and civic leaders of Bien Hoa Province. Guests received brochures explaining US/GVN programs, attended briefings and viewed demonstrations designed to enhance the peoples' appreciation and support of the efforts of the United States and GVN to achieve peace and democracy in Vietnam. The conference was well received, and spokesmen for those attending urged that similar conferences be held on a periodic basis and be expanded throughout the III CTZ. Present plans envision the conduct of quarterly conferences in Bien Hoa Province. Additionally, commanders of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV are being encouraged to conduct similar programs in their areas.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Refugee Program.

(a) Resettlement Planning. During the reporting period detailed plans were developed for the completion of resettlement activities at each refugee site in III CTZ, including the scheduling of all construction work and the distribution of food, tin and cement. In addition to providing a means to assess the resettlement problem on a corps-wide basis, these plans have proved a valuable management tool in that they provide a forecast of commodity and money requirements on a monthly, province-by-province basis.

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(b) Emergency Prestockage. Plans providing for the prestockage of certain commodities necessary for emergency refugee relief in province warehouses were developed during this quarter. Amounts of commodities to be stocked at province level were determined on the basis of average refugee generation during selected base months. Supplies which are prestocked are sufficient to sustain 18,000 refugees for 30 days. It is felt that the prestockage concept will enhance the provinces' capability to respond to emergency relief requirements. Significant reduction in the use of air transportation will be realized by supplying commodities on a routine rather than a priority basis.

(2) Territorial Security.

(a) Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) activity increased during the reporting period as compared to the previous period. In contrast, enemy activity directed against RF/PF units decreased with the exception of shelling of friendly installations in December. Continued participation in joint operations with US/FWMAF forces has enhanced the fighting capabilities of the RF/PF and assisted the US/FWMAF forces in the accomplishment of their missions.

(b) The increased effectiveness of the RF/PF can be further attributed to the equipment modernization program, the Mobile Advisory Team Program and an increased interest on the part of Vietnamese leaders in the care and well-being of the individual soldier.

(3) Revolutionary Development. The Revolutionary Development program continued to accelerate during the reporting period. Of the 281 hamlets targeted for pacification in 1968, 277 have been certified as completed and four have been abandoned. No significant disruption occurred during the reporting period, as compared with VC TET and May offensives and the major attacks in August and September, which had earlier disrupted the program. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was implemented in November and carried to its completion in January. The impetus provided by this campaign plus the intensification of efforts in the regular RD program brought outstanding results in the extension of government control. By the end of December the VC had lost control of 150 hamlets in the III CTZ. While the final results have not been fully reported, it is apparent that in addition to the 281 APC-targeted hamlets and the 277 Regular RD program hamlets more than 100 additional hamlets were brought under government control. As a result of this remarkable success, III CTZ is in excellent posture to begin the 1969 Pacification and Development program. With the exception of Long An and Hau Nghia, all provinces are able to target for pacification all of the contested and VC hamlets in their areas. This reporting period brought about a full recovery in pacification from the disruptions encountered earlier in the year and provided an expansion of GVN control well beyond that enjoyed at the end of 1967.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

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(a) During the period 1 November through 31 January, 1,021 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN, an increase of 209 over the previous three months. In November, 367 Hoi Chanh were received. This was the largest number to rally since October 1967. In December, a total of 345 rallied, and in January, 309.

(b) The Third Party Inducement Program, a new means of encouraging ralliers, went into operation on 7 November. The program provides for awards to be paid to any Vietnamese citizen, civilian or military, who induces a VC/NVA to rally. The program, which was authorized by the Chieu Hoi Ministry by Directive 691, dated 31 October, was directly credited with producing 518 Hoi Chanh during the reporting period. As a result of this effort, a total of 86 VC Montagnards from one village were induced to rally over a three-day period.

(5) New Life Development.

(a) Economic Development.

1 Harvest of the first crop of high yield 1R-8/5 rice planted in 1968 has been completed. Production averaged 4.07 metric tons per hectare on 4,888 hectares planted. Approximately 2,000 hectares were planted in the second crop. The goal for 1969 is 45,310 hectares.

2 The Broiler Production Program was augmented by the receipt and distribution of 150,000 day-old chicks.

3 The vaccine center distributed 650,000 doses of assorted vaccines.

4 Significant programs during the reporting period were the construction of hamlet classrooms, training of teachers, development of vocational/technical high schools, construction of schoolmasters' quarters, and workshops for teachers in adult education, and the development of prototype school libraries.

(b) Community Development. Priorities for Community Development projects have been established for military civic action and self-help activities, with first priority on cash income-producing projects. Primary emphasis was given to economic development projects as opposed to projects which merely provide services. However, because many resources are not suitable for economic development, projects for general social improvement, which contribute to the American image, continued to be accomplished.

(c) Public Administration.

1 Regional GVN administration continues to be hampered by the continued delay in the appointment of a new chief of the regional inspectorate. Reportedly he will not be appointed until the Chief Executive signs a bill abolishing the office of Government Delegate. This bill has been passed by the Lower House.

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2 The caretaker of civil affairs in the III CTZ area, the Administrative Assistant to former Deputy Government Delegate, has been directed by the Prime Minister's Office to maintain offices and a staff for an inspector general and for the ministries personnel who will be assigned to his operation. The Inspector General and his staff will have no authority other than to perform inspections in the provinces and to report their findings to the office of the Prime Minister. They will work for the Prime Minister and will not be subject to the orders of the Commanding General of III CTZ. This is a change designed to accomplish separation of military and civilian authority.

3 All provinces in III CTZ continued to conduct training for local officials pending the opening of the national training school at Vung Tau. The school is expected to be operational by mid-March.

(d) Engineering/Public Works. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Director of Construction Contract Maintenance Teams, began the repairing and rehabilitation of public works equipment in the provinces. The teams worked in Gia Dinh, Long Khanh, Binn Duong and Phuoc Tuy Provinces as well as in the municipality of Vung Tau. This action decreased the percentage of deadlined equipment in III CTZ from 33 percent to 25 percent.

(e) Logistics. A significant breakthrough was experienced in efforts to acquire trainees to staff provincial maintenance shops. Forty-three Hoi Chanh were selected and placed in various Region III province maintenance shops for training. This has resulted in considerable progress in opening and sustaining operation of the maintenance shops, while at the same time providing returnees an opportunity to learn a skilled trade.

h. Communications. Significant changes and improvements in communications in support of II FFORCEV operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

(1) During the period of 16 October - 15 November, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was assigned to II Field Force Vietnam and moved to Phuoc Vinh. Initial communications support necessitated one teletype circuit and telephone service through the corps area communications system from Headquarters, II FFORCEV to the advance party at Long Binh. During the first week of November, tactical VHF, FM and HF radio systems were established between Headquarters, II FFORCEV and Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division at Phuoc Vinh. This headquarters effected the necessary coordination for lateral telephone circuits among the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division, using a combination of division and corps area VHF and cable systems.

(2) The activation of the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) on 1 November resulted in a requirement for additional communications. The US and Vietnamese units which form the command have a relatively austere but effective communications system. Their mission, the defense of the

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Bien Hoa-Long Binh area, requires responsive FM secure and non-secure radio and wire communications. BHTAC has, in addition to its own radio command net and flash base net, sufficient radio equipment available to monitor or enter the II FFORCEV command nets, II FFORCEV Artillery command net, or any subordinate unit command net. Wire communications include dial trunk access to the corps area communications system and sole user circuits to the tactical operations centers of all major combat support units, flash base towers, and local defense command posts in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh area. The ARVN component in BHTAC has generally parallel communications with its units in the area.

(3) During this period the II FFORCEV G-2 and G-3 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) moved from a semi-permanent underground bunker into an adjacent permanent underground structure. The II FFORCEV tactical switchboard (Hurricane TOC) was moved to the old underground bunker and became operational on 7 December. This bunker also houses the II FFORCEV net control stations for the Commanding General's command (FM) secure and non-secure voice radio nets, the radio wire integration station and base defense radio station. Remotes from these radio stations to the tactical operations center provide G-2/G-3 operations personnel ready access into all FM radio nets. Additionally, four active VHF radio-carrier systems have been placed in the underground bunker to provide dispersion for the systems. A new 162-foot radio tower was erected adjacent to the underground bunker. Additional VHF antennas have been installed and oriented toward all OPCON units for contingency purposes. In the event the main tower and VHF complex, located some distance away, is damaged or destroyed, communications can be restored to all units under II FFORCEV operations control within a few hours.

(4) On 15 December, the II FFORCEV Communications Center (Commcenter) was relocated to a new facility. The new building furnishes completely air conditioned, larger accommodations which permit segregation of subsections and therefore contributes to increased efficiency. Electronic equipment maintenance has been reduced as a result of heat reduction and alleviation of the dust problem. New wiring was installed throughout and machines are now arranged for maximum manpower utilization and efficiency. Tempest hazards have been reduced considerably, providing increased security. The new building was built adjacent to the former Commcenter which was refurbished and occupied by Adjutant General Message Center in January. Windows now exist between the Commcenter and Message Center which permit immediate delivery of terminated and originated messages, thus eliminating the frequent hand-carry method previously employed because of the distance between the two functions.

(5) An additional teletype circuit was installed in the II FFORCEV Main Commcenter on 16 December to accommodate backlogs of message traffic destined for the Phu Lam Major Relay (AUTODIN). It is terminated on normal teletype equipment and the distant end is a torn tape relay adjacent to the AUTODIN Automatic Electronic Switching Center (AESC). This temporary

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circuit will be discontinued as soon as the new fixed station AUTODIN Mode V terminals are installed in the II FFORCEV Commcenter. The latter is scheduled to be installed in February 1969. The last shipment of equipment is scheduled to arrive on 15 February and installation will begin as soon as the remaining items of equipment are received. The two terminals will be owned, operated, and maintained by the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM).

(6) In December the mobile, narrowband Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminal was deactivated and replaced by a wideband AUTOSEVOCOM terminal. The new secure voice terminal was installed in the underground II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center for use by operations personnel. A second terminal was later installed in the Commanding General's office. The new wideband systems provide high quality secure voice communications and greater reliability.

(7) A II FFORCEV Prisoner of War Release Team was formed to meet with enemy representatives on 25 December and 31 January. The nearest military installation to the meeting site was at Tay Ninh West, the location of Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Additional telephone and radio circuits were installed from Headquarters, MACV and Headquarters, II FFORCEV to 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center to provide timely communications support for the II FFORCEV Commanding General and staff located at the 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center during the meetings. Non-secure and secure FM radio contact was maintained between the release team and the 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center via a command and control ship in the vicinity of the meeting site. Communications established for this purpose worked well.

(8) An active four-channel radio relay system to Detachment B, 56th SIGMA was discontinued when the unit moved to a new location on 17 January. The system provided for teletype and voice circuits to Headquarters, II FFORCEV. This results in additional radio relay and terminal equipment being made available for other uses.

(9) In the latter part of November it was noted that II FFORCEV Regulation 66-1 was outdated in relation to courier services then being provided. A new regulation was published in December reflecting completely accurate information and included for the first time instructions for use of the Armed Forces Courier Service for delivery of top secret and SPECAT material. This valuable service is now being used effectively.

(10) In December a review was made of the crypto material received in Headquarters, II FFORCEV. Action was taken to reduce the amount of keying data and low level (operations, numeral, and authentications) codes issued to this headquarters. This will result in savings in production of material and in manhours spent in destruction of unneeded material, plus elimination of a storage problem. Action was also taken to initiate direct distribution of certain material to the subordinate

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units possessing COMSEC accounts. This new distribution procedure reduces excessive paperwork and time delays by eliminating Headquarters, II FFORCEV as an intermediate redistribution point.

(11) Late in October, MACV changed the locally promulgated address indicator group (AIG) system by assigning unique temporary numbers to all AIG previously controlled exclusively by subordinate commands in RVN. Elimination of unnecessary AIG and a complete update of existing AIG took place within this command and our requirements were submitted through USARV to MACV for application of the new designations. The results were received by this headquarters in the latter part of January and a new II FFORCEV regulation was staffed and is currently pending publication. Temporary AIG lists were previously promulgated as appendices to the II FFORCEV Regulation 105-1. Because of staffing and publishing delays, the old procedure was somewhat inflexible. New AIG lists will be published in the form of an unnumbered directory and the frequent changes will be disseminated by message, providing the maximum in flexibility and expeditious response to authorized originators' needs.

(12) The Command Message Review Board conducted an active program during the past quarter. The major achievements are:

(a) A regulation concerning the disposition of VMAC messages was published, implementing MACV Directive 105-8. The new regulation pinpointed responsibilities previously misinterpreted or neglected and furnished guidance to II FFORCEV operational control units on distribution requirements within their headquarters.

(b) Emphasis was placed on proper message preparation through inclusion of deficiencies found in originating messages filed with the II FFORCEV main Commcenter in the minutes of the monthly Message Review Board meeting.

(c) A message preparation guide was published on 9 January. The guide condensed information in AR 105-31 into brief, easy to follow instructions and concentrated on the more common, recurring errors found in II FFORCEV staff originated messages. Sufficient copies of the guide were distributed to insure receipt by most potential drafters within the headquarters.

i. Information Officer.

(1) The Information Office continued production of the II FFORCEV monthly magazine, "The Hurricane," at a circulation of 36,000 copies. The November, December and January issues contained a total of 24 feature articles illustrated by color and black and white photographs. Among the subjects of these articles were Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support nation-building activities, community relations projects, psychological operations, pacification, specialized US Army units, Vietnamese units, and Operations of the US Navy in Vietnam.

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(2) The Information Office also produced 32 hometown television interviews, 642 hometown radio tapes, 510 hometown news releases, 63 general news stories and 11 newspaper feature stories.

g. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General conducted two investigations, inspected nine assigned or attached units, and rendered assistance in 65 cases.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support to Headquarters, II FFORCEV assigned and attached units, and to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) The Staff Judge Advocate also continued to assist the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment by verifying the classification of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) Twelve general courts-martial were conducted during the period. Of these, four resulted from offenses committed during disturbances at the Long Binh Post Stockade on 29 August 1968.

(4) The Staff Judge Advocate also disseminated information and gave instruction on changes to the Manual For Courts-Martial which became effective during the period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Military Police Support to Major Units Undergoing Redeployment.

(a) OBSERVATION. When a major unit is scheduled to conduct a redeployment, coordination of Military Police requirements at the receiving end, to include area support, should be accomplished expeditiously, and re-evaluated throughout the operation to determine future needs.

(b) EVALUATION. On 28 October, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) commenced deployment to the III CTZ. Initial coordination was conducted with the Provost Marshals of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions concerning discipline, law and order and convoy support within their tactical areas of interest. It was agreed that military police of the 1st Infantry Division would escort 1st Cavalry Division convoys until the new organization could assume this responsibility. This procedure was implemented and functioned smoothly until 23 November when

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1. Infantry Division resources were no longer adequate to support convey movements. Shortages of organic transportation precluded the 1st Cavalry Division from providing the required escorts. An immediate request was submitted to the Deputy Commanding General, USARV for area military police assistance in accordance with existing regulations. Assistance was obtained, beginning on 18 December, from the 18th Military Police Brigade. The procedure of employing the military police assets of units in the receiving area proved workable, however, the operations could have been facilitated had the requirements for area military police support been realized earlier, and USARV given more time in which to prepare to support the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(2) Successful Multi-Company Regional Force (RF) Operation.

(a) OBSERVATION. Regional Force units have proved capable of conducting effective multi-company operations against major enemy forces.

(b) EVALUATION. During the morning of 27 November, Tay Ninh Province Headquarters received information from a Hoi Chanh that an enemy battalion was located in a hamlet 15 kilometers south of the city of Tay Ninh. The Regional Force/Popular Force Group at Tay Ninh dispatched three RF companies, the 905th, 547th and 388th, as a blocking force, and scheduled two additional companies as an attacking force. At 0850 hours, while moving into position near the occupied hamlet, the 905th RF Company made contact. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and a 75mm recoilless rifle. The 905th RF Company called for and received ARVN artillery support and a heavy fire team. By 1025 hours, the three blocking force units had made contact. At 1110 hours these companies pulled back to allow airstrikes on the enemy. At 1200 hours the attacking force, composed of the 164th and 688th RF Companies, commenced insertion within one kilometer of the enemy force, and by 1205 hours, the insertions were complete. Airstrikes continued and during the afternoon the friendly forces cordoned off the enemy position. The enemy attempted to break out of the cordon at 2040 hours and again at 0300 hours, but were repelled with the aid of Spooky, a flareship and a light fire team. At 0530 hours the enemy launched a concerted attack on the cordon force employing RPG and mortars, but again was halted. The enemy force then broke up into small groups and exfiltrated the area. Results of this action were nine RF killed, 19 wounded and one missing, 117 enemy killed and seven AK-47 rifles and one RPG-2 rocket launcher captured. The aggressiveness of the RF forces was credited in part to the fact that they had been issued M-16 rifles the week before this action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(3) US Army and ARVN Participation in Operation Giant Slingshot.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, III Field Force, Vietnam for
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(a) OBSERVATION: The conduct of river operations by US Navy elements requires close coordination and extensive support on the part of air and ground forces.

(b) EVALUATION: The conduct of river operations by US Navy elements requires close coordination and extensive support on the part of air and ground forces.

1 On 6 December, Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, commanded Operation Giant Slingshot along segments of the Nam Co Dong and Nam Co Tay rivers in III and IV CTZ to interdict enemy movement of troops and supplies on the waterways in the vicinity of these rivers. As envisioned initially, the operation was to involve the use of teams of fast river patrol craft, supported by reaction force of approximately 100 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) personnel. US Army and ARVN forces in the area were to provide support as necessary, including on-call artillery fire and air strikes, Spooky, Firefly and light fire teams.

2 A number of conferences were conducted among elements concerned with coordinating Operation Slingshot both prior to and during the operation. Among those participating were representatives of II FFORCEV, III Corps, Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, the 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, Capital Military Assistance Command, Tay Ninh, Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, and the 730th Surveillance Airplane Company (Mohawk). Coordination was effected on communications, logistics, and ground, artillery and air support.

3 Communications between US/RVNAF and Naval forces were conducted by means of a Navy liaison team located at Headquarters, 25th ARVN Division. Because of the close relationship between the US and ARVN 25th Divisions, this arrangement functioned satisfactorily, providing an effective reporting channel to higher US headquarters.

4 During the planning for Operation Slingshot it had been anticipated that the presence of the naval elements would deter enemy activity, and that the enemy would attempt to evade the patrol craft. With this in mind, the ready reaction force was maintained as a separate element, on assault support patrol boats some distance away from the patrol boats. As the operation progressed, the enemy launched increasingly determined attacks against the patrol craft, inflicting unacceptable casualties and damage before the reaction forces could be brought in to support them. Reaction forces were then placed on the patrol craft from which they could be employed immediately. Later, the CIDG forces were augmented by combat elements from US and RVNAF commands in whose areas of responsibility the boats were operating.

5 On at least one occasion, the PBR assault craft encountered channels too small to move through. These channels were bypassed by airlifting the boats over them. The boats were stripped to the minimum weight possible and airlifted by CH-54A Flying Crane helicopters. Remaining associated equipment and personnel were transported separately.

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6 Giant Slingshot proved the effectiveness of employing small, highspeed water craft in day and night patrol and search operations to interdict water lines of communications, when they are supported by adequately coordinated air and ground support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That units undertaking such operations insure provisions are made for detailed coordination, the establishment of a central point for communications and liaison, and adequate, responsive supporting forces.

(4) Test Burning of Jungle.

(a) OBSERVATION. Headquarters, II FFORCEV has conducted a test to determine the feasibility of burning off large areas of jungle to deny their use to the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION.

1 The test was conducted on 28 January, in War Zone D, 74 kilometers east of Rang Rang. The test area was characterized by a thick growth of trees, many of whose top branches were dead and dry. Green vegetation covered the ground under the tree canopy. The growth in the test area was typical of that found in War Zone D.

2 The tests were conducted by dropping 48 drums containing a mixture of 50 percent JP-4 aircraft fuel and 50 percent diesel oil from CH-47 aircraft. The drops were made from a height of approximately 200 feet at an airspeed of 20 knots. The overwhelming majority, if not all, of the drums burst, either on impact with the ground or heavy tree branches. Three to four minutes later, gunships commenced firing rockets and tracer ammunition into the drop area. Repeated firing over a period of an hour and a half failed to ignite the fuel.

3 The failure of the fuel to ignite may have been caused by one or more of the following factors:

a The ordnance may have missed the drop site. This is unlikely since the area was located positively and firing was conducted both in and around the area where the fuel had been placed. Further, the low altitude and airspeed of the drop aircraft limited dispersion of the drums as they fell.

b The delay between the time of the drops and the commencement of firing into the test area may have permitted the fuel to volatilize and to soak into the ground sufficiently to prevent ignition. That much of the fuel volatilized is confirmed by the fact that fumes could be detected at an altitude of 2,000 feet over the area.

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c. A previous test, in which similar drops were made into an area covered by dry grass and brush, and were followed immediately by the delivery of ordnance, obtained ignition of the fuel. The fire burned satisfactorily until it reached the type of forest in which the test was conducted, at which point it burned out.

(c) RECOMMENDATION None.

(5) Enhancement of Operations Involving Contacts with the Vietnamese People.

(a) OBSERVATION. The presence of a GVN official can enhance the effectiveness of direct dealings between US elements and the Vietnamese population.

(b) EVALUATION. The 1st Infantry Division has found that psychological, MEDCAP and other operations are facilitated by the presence of a GVN official. This person, by his presence, indicates official sanction to the American operation, and serves to minimize the American presence in favor of that of the GVN. These two factors have been found to increase the level of cooperation obtained from the Vietnamese people as well as increasing the prestige of the GVN.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the advantages of employing GVN officials in such operations be made known to organizations and units concerned.

c. Training. In-Country Training of Long Range Patrol Companies.

(1) OBSERVATION. The rapid and effective employment of newly arrived long range patrol companies can be facilitated by a period of training and joint operations with an experienced unit.

(2) EVALUATION. In late December 1968, Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry closed into Vietnam to commence operations. The company underwent one week of in-country training with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). Following this period, an additional four weeks of in-country mission training was given by Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry. The training with Company F included practical exercises in petrolling, helicopter utilization, the use of weapons in patrol operations, artillery forward observer techniques, the utilization of air controllers in the conduct of air strikes, the employment of light fire teams and practical training in voice radiotelephone procedures. Members of Company D also were taken on joint patrols with experienced personnel from Company F. Initially, personnel of Company D were taken on three-day patrols made up of three men from each company, and led by experienced patrol leaders. The second and third patrols consisted of five members from Company D and one experienced member from Company F. All patrols of Company D participated in three such operations during the mission training phase, prior to conducting independent operations beginning on 8 February.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION. None.

d. Intelligence. Employment of Long Range Patrols.

(1) OBSERVATION. Long range patrols obtain more complete information and better results by moving over a selected route through an objective area of dense vegetation and heavy foliage than by occupying observation or listening posts for long periods of time.

(2) EVALUATION. When long range patrols are employed in static positions, particularly in areas offering limited visibility, there is a good possibility that incomplete and misleading information will be gained. Although moving through an objective area increases the possibility of a patrol being compromised and brought under enemy fire, a thorough reconnaissance of the objective area may be necessary to gain an accurate picture of the enemy situation. Routes should be selected which are most likely to discover enemy activities within the objective area.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That the employment of long range patrols emphasize the need for patrols to move about in objective areas where visibility is limited.

e. Logistics.

(1) The Capabilities of Vietnamese Contractors.

(a) OBSERVATION. Private Vietnamese contractors have the capability and technical skill to construct all but the most sophisticated types of projects.

(b) EVALUATION. The use of Vietnamese contractors to carry out construction projects was emphasized during the reporting period by CORDS. This approach proved highly successful. Construction projects for which bids were open received an average of 30 responses from Vietnamese contractors. With close engineering supervision by CORDS personnel, nearly all projects were accomplished on schedule and the quality of work produced was acceptable. Vietnamese contractors also have the capability of carrying out major road repair projects. However, they have not been given the opportunity as yet, to work on large scale projects such as road repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the scope of projects offered to Vietnamese contractors be broadened to include the building and maintenance of roads in III CTZ.

(2) Effectiveness of the Vietnamese Supply System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The recent issue of M-16 rifles to Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units demonstrated that the Vietnamese supply system can function effectively.

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(b) EVALUATION. During the past quarter M-16 rifles were released to the 3rd Area Logistics Command for issue to RF/PF in III CTZ. Issue orders were prepared and the weapons issued and delivered without undue delay. All echelons of the supply system functioned effectively down to the lowest level. Concurrent with the issue of the rifles, repair parts and ammunition were issued to all units. In some cases, lubricants were not issued in a timely manner primarily due to a failure on the part of the units to request them. Command interest and emphasis at all levels accounted for the efficient functioning of the supply system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That continued emphasis be placed on all aspects of the Vietnamese supply system to insure that it functions properly and effectively.

f. Organization of 9th Infantry Division Riverine Units.

(1) OBSERVATION. Riverine units of the 9th Infantry Division require the capability of conducting both riverine and sustained land-based operations.

(2) EVALUATION.

(a) During the period July - November 1968, the 9th Infantry Division reorganized two brigade headquarters, seven infantry battalions and two artillery battalions to a riverine configuration. This conversion reduced the equipment and personnel which were later required by these units for the conduct of land-based operations. During the initial period of employment of the Riverine concept, excellent results were obtained. However, since that time enemy forces have adapted their tactics to counteract riverine operations to the point that, in recent months, the results obtained from riverine operations have declined to an unacceptable level. As a result, emphasis has been placed recently on profitable land-based operations. Now, of the seven riverine infantry battalions, only two are afloat, and this is due to administrative necessity rather than to operational desirability. Further, the Navy is turning over to the GVN assault craft equivalent to two or three battalions of lift.

(b) Experience has shown that infantry units can conduct both riverine and land operations without significant difficulties. Riverine units, on the other hand, are handicapped in sustained land-based operations because of personnel and equipment shortages. With the increased necessity for land-based operations, these shortages create problems which over a long period of time may seriously impair the operational effectiveness of the division.

(c) The cost of reorganization in man and materiel is minimal when viewed in the light of the increased combat flexibility and ability to conduct sustained land-based operations. A total of 490 men, including

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35 officers, 12 warrant officers and 443 enlisted men would be required and a limited amount of materiel, most of which is already on hand.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That the two brigade headquarters and seven infantry and two artillery battalions presently organized under riverine configurations be reorganized into light infantry and standard artillery units.

g. Other.

(1) Economic Development Manual.

(a) OBSERVATION. Community Development Advisors need a manual which describes development projects for small, rural communities.

(b) EVALUATION. Small, rural communities have a serious need for cash-income producing projects. Advisors in the field, who are third-country nationals, often lack the knowledge to develop projects on their own, but could follow ideas suggested in a manual.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That qualified economists be employed to prepare a manual on rural economic development projects.

(2) Recruitment of Maintenance Shop Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. The GVN has been unable to provide sufficient numbers of personnel to be trained for employment in vehicle and equipment maintenance and repair facilities.

(b) EVALUATION. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the GVN have co-sponsored a nationwide program for the construction and development of a vehicle and equipment maintenance and repair facility in each province. The program included plans for training a Vietnamese work force to staff each shop. To accomplish this phase of the project, USAID negotiated a contract providing for teams of third country national technicians to train the work forces. Region III logistic officers have assisted in recruiting trainees by obtaining teen-age youths, females, category II veterans, Hoi Chanh and others. The recruitment of Hoi Chanh has proved the most successful and appears to offer the best source of trainees.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That provinces encountering difficulties in recruiting province maintenance staff trainees investigate the possibility of recruiting Hoi Chanh as a temporary means of maintaining a staff of mechanics. For long range planning and development of an adequate maintenance capability in the provinces, immediate consideration should be given by the US/GVN to establishing a contract operation utilizing private contractors.

(3) Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TG-A)(U)

(a) OBSERVATION. It was apparent during this campaign when a fully coordinated and supported US and GVN effort is made in pacification, dramatic results can be achieved.

(b) EVALUATION. Much of the work in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was accomplished without utilizing Revolutionary Development Cadre. They were required to finish previously programmed hamlets prior to being employed. Much of the work in the APC was accomplished by the Regional Force and Popular Force utilizing the principles of pacification. They completed tasks similar to those of the cadre. The US/GVN effort brought about a greater advancement in pacification than any other previous program had accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the same close coordination in program planning, development and supervision from the national to the lower levels of government serve as the guiding principles to be continued in the 1969 pacification program.

(4) Reduction in Force of Regional US Aid for International Development Technical Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Reduction in Force of CORDS detailed regional USAID Technicians has resulted in a lack of supervision for on-going programs.

(b) EVALUATION. With the Reduction in Force, technical backstopping is unavoidably being switched to a correspondence chain directly from Saigon to provinces. This creates mass confusion since the regional CORDS headquarters is usually not informed until after the fact. This could lead to embarrassment of the II Field Force Commander and the JEPCORDS if quizzed on activities in the region. There are currently two enlisted technically trained personnel being employed as Regional Agriculture Engineer-Educational advisor technicians and are doing an outstanding job.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1 That technically qualified military personnel be assigned to regional positions, formerly staffed by USAID, to overcome the budgetary reduction in force of USAID technicians.

That the regional CORDS Joint Table of Distribution be revised to include these requirements at the earliest opportunity.

(5) Reduction of the CORDE Public Administration Advisory Staff.

(a) OBSERVATION. The effectiveness of the public administration advisory staff in III CTZ continued to be limited by a shortage of personnel.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

(b) EVALUATION. Only one man is authorized as the public administration advisor to cover 11 provinces and one autonomous city. Because of this, GVN officials and province advisory teams are not receiving the public administration advisory support they require. The success of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program is dependent, to a large measure, on the adequate training of the personnel charged with administering village-level government. The high priority which has been given to training village/hamlet officials is an indication of the recognition which has been afforded to the importance of public administration. The use of civil affairs generalist platoons to augment the advisory program does not appear feasible. Additionally, the personnel of these platoons are not normally trained in public administration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That military personnel with the requisite training be made available to augment CORDS III CTZ to assist in this program.

(6) Combined Civilian Orientation Conference.

(a) OBSERVATION. Formal conferences conducted for Vietnamese civic and political leaders can serve as an effective means of enhancing civil affairs community relations programs.

(b) EVALUATION. On 6 December, Headquarters, II FFORCEV, and Headquarters, III CTZ, held a pilot Combined Civilian Orientation Conference for middle-level government and province officials, educators, and religious and civic leaders of Bien Hoa Province. Guests were given brochures explaining US/GVN programs, attended briefings and viewed demonstrations designed to enhance their support of the efforts of the United States and GVN to achieve peace and democracy in Vietnam. The conference was well received, and spokesmen for those attending urged that similar conferences be held on a periodic basis and be expanded throughout the III CTZ. Present plans envision the conduct of quarterly conferences in Bien Hoa Province. Additionally, commanders of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV are being encouraged to conduct similar programs in their areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That information concerning the Combined Civilian Orientation Conference be made available to organizations concerned with community relations.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

- 9 Incl
1. II FFV Order of Battle
2. II FFV Area of Operations


WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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REF ID: A68097

SECRET

Period Ending 31 January 1969, ROS CSFOR - (R) (A-DIO-0-0-0)
Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
AFD-02-R

AVFC-22-4100
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, IIRAF, Period Ending 31 January 1969, ROS 0870-11(1) (U)
3. Statistical Summary USAF F-105 Losses
4. Statistical Summary, Close Air Support
5. Aviation Statistics
6. Statistical Summary B-52 Bombing Missions
7. Enemy Disposition
3. II FFORCEV Troop List
9. Enemy Organization in the LIT OTS

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ACofS, G5, IFFORCEV - 1
DEPCORDS - 1
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AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1)(W-DHO-TO-A)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 3 MAP 1000

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, II
Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:


a. Reference item concerning enhancement of operations involving
contacts with the Vietnamese people, page 58, paragraph 2b(5); concur.
The benefits of employing GVN officials in conjunction with civic ac-
tion projects are recognized and the process is regularly employed by
many units. Minimizing US presence is encouraged in the USARV Civil
Affairs Handbook. Reminders that GVN officials should participate in
civic action projects will be included in future newsletters.

b. Reference item concerning organization; reorganization of the
9th Infantry Division Riverine Units, page 60, paragraph 2f. The ac-
tion is currently under study by HQ USARV.

c. Reference item concerning an economic development manual, page
61, paragraph 2g(1); concur. The recommendation appears to have merit.
Since this information already may be published, a survey of available
information must be made prior to committing more personnel to research.

d. Reference item concerning combined civilian orientation confer-
ence; page 63, paragraph 2g(6); concur. The conference is an effective
vehicle for establishing improved relations with local Vietnamese offi-
cials. Information concerning the conference will be disseminated in
periodic newsletters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
II Field Force Vietnam


GPOP-DT (31 Jan 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operations1 Report of HQ, II Fld Force Vn for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 Jan 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. E. HOLEYFIELD
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE

LINE	UNIT/TYPE	COORD	PROVINCE	STATE	COORD	COORD	COORD
1	1st FFORCEV (MA)	000018	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	XT051111	201	COMNSMACY
2	1st Cav Div (AM)	000018	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH	XT966489		II FFORCEV
3	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	000018	BIEN HOA	TAY NINH	XT158513		1st Cav Div (AM)
4	2-12 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	GRANT	XT986623		1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
5	1-8 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	WHITE	XT455623		1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
6	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	000018	BIEN HOA	QUAN LOI	XT820910		1st Cav Div (AM)
7	2-8 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	RITAACH	XT499802		2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
8	5-7 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	TON LE CHAN	XT625812		2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
9	2-5 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	RITAACH	XT499804		2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
10	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div	000018	BIEN HOA	QUAN LOI	XT813900		1st Cav Div (AM)
11	2-7 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	JILL	XT955908		3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
12	1-12 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	CAROL	YT058888		3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
13	1-5 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	ELVANDER	XT966736		3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
14	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)	000018	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH	XT962488		1st Cav Div (AM)
15	2-19 Arty (105 T)	000018	BIEN HOA	TAY NINH	XT158513		DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
16	2-20 Arty (ARA)	000018	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH	XT970491		DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
17	1-7 Cav	000018	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH	XT967490		DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)

Incl 1

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ATTACHMENT TO ORDER OF BATTLE

LINE	UNIT/STATE	PROVINCE/STATE	STATION/COORD	CONTROL/NO
18	1st Artillery (105 T)	BINH LONG	QUANG BINH XT813900	1st Cav Div (AM)
19	1-30 Artillery (155 T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT972492	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
20	1-77 Artillery (105 T)	BINH LONG	QUANG LOI XT813900	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
21	E Btry, 82d Artillery	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT971492	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
22	11th Avn Gp	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT962500	1st Cav Div (AM)
23	227th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT962500	11th Avn Gp
24	228th Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT XT9145980	11th Avn Gp
25	229th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG XT495472	11th Avn Gp
26	11th GSO	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT962500	11th Avn Gp
27	1-9 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
28	8th Engr	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT954488	1st Cav Div (AM)
29	13th Sig	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT965486	1st Cav Div (AM)
30	Co E, 52d Inf (LRP)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
31	2-2 Inf (MECH)	BINH LONG	SHIRLEY XT763891	2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
32	2-505 Inf	PHUOC LONG	JUNES XT137788	1st Cav Div (AM)
33				
34				
35	1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE XT772388	1st Inf Div
36	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE XT777373	1st Inf Div
37	1-2d Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE XT779384	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
38	1-26th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE XT773372	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
39				

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
40	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907073	1st Inf Div
41	1-18th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907076	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
42	2-18th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903077	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
43	2-16th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905077	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
44	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764378	1st Inf Div
45	1-16th Inf (MECH)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT770379	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
46	1-28th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT783388	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
47	2-28th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
48	1-4th Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907077	1st Inf Div
49	1st Inf Div Arty	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760375	1st Inf Div Arty
50	1-5th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760372	1st Inf Div Arty
51	1-7th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905077	1st Inf Div Arty
52	2-33d Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760375	1st Inf Div Arty
53	8-6th Arty (155/8"SP)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760372	1st Inf Div Arty
54	1st Avn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT831171	1st Inf Div Arty
55	1st Engr	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764379	1st Inf Div
56	121st Sig	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	1st Inf Div
57	Co F, 52d Inf (LRP)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT761381	1st Inf Div
58					
59					

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
60	9th Inf Div (-)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	II FORCE
61	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	9th Inf Div
62	2-47th Inf (REGH)	LONG AN	BINH PHUOC	XS610550	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
63	2-60th Inf	LONG AN	ABO TAN THANH	XS656621	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
64	5-60th Inf	LONG AN	BAOH KIEN	XS740698	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
65	9th Inf Div Arty (-)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	9th Inf Div
66	1-11th Arty (105 T)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	9th Inf Div
67	2-4 Arty	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	9th Inf Div
68					
69					
70					
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75					
76					
77					

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	COORD	CONTROL NO.	
78		PHU THO	PHU THO		
79		PHU THO	PHU THO		
80		PHU THO	PHU THO		
81		PHU THO	PHU THO		
82		PHU THO	PHU THO		
83		PHU THO	PHU THO		
84		PHU THO	PHU THO		
85		PHU THO	PHU THO		
86		PHU THO	PHU THO		
87		PHU THO	PHU THO		
88		PHU THO	PHU THO		
89	1st ACR (Sep)(-)	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438968	1st Inf Div
90	1-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440970	11th ACR
91	2-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11th ACR
92	3-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS433963	11th ACR
93	919th Engr Co	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11th ACR
94	Air Cav Trp	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438960	11th ACR
95	25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	II FORCIV
96	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25th Inf Div
97	3-22d Inf	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT169469	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
98	4-23d Inf (RECH)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT297487	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
99	4-9th Inf	TAY NINH	HIEU THIEN	XT249310	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
100	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
101	2-14th Inf	HAU NGHIA	DUC HOA	XT602015	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL NO
102	1-5th Inf (MCH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT593218	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
103	2-12th Inf	HAU NGHIA	PHU DUC	XT517255	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
104	2-27th Inf	HAU NGHIA	DUC HUF	XT476126	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
105	2-34th Armor (-)	TAY NINH	PHU HOA	XT741167	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
106	3-4th Cav	TAY NINH	GO DAU HA	XT414241	25th Inf Div
107	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25th Inf Div
108	2-22d Inf	TAY NINH	KHIEN HANH	XT465378	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
109	1-27th Inf	BINH DUONG	XOM EEM TRANH	XT525412	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
110	25th Inf Div Arty	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
111	1-8th Arty (J25T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div Arty
112	2-77th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25th Inf Div Arty
113	7-11th Arty (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25th Inf Div Arty
114	3-13th Arty (155/ 8"SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
115	25th Avn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
116	65th Engr	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
117	125th Sig	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
118	Co F, 50th Inf (LRP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div

Incl 1

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
119	RTAVF (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	II FFORCEV
120	1st Bde	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160015	RTAVF
121	1st Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	1st Bde, RTAVF
122	2d Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT165015	1st Bde, RTAVF
123	3d Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT168013	1st Bde, RTAVF
124	RTAVF Arty (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS167997	RTAVF
125	105 Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT165008	RTAVF Arty
126	Engr Bn (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT157008	RTAVF
127	Sig Bn (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS167999	RTAVF
128	CMAC	GIA DINH	SAIGON	XS841915	II FFORCEV
129	199th Inf Bde (Sep)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	CMAC
130	2-3d Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
131	3-7th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
132	4-12th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
133	5-12th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
134	D/17th Cav	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
135	2-40th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
136	87th Engr Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
137	3-82d Abn Div	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	CMAC

Incl 1

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
138	1-505 Inf	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
139	SECURITY	BIEN HOA	PHU LOI		
140	1-508 Inf	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
141	SECURITY	BIEN HOA	PHU LOI		
142	2-321 Arty	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
143	HQ 1st ATF (Sep)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	II FFORCEV
144	4th RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443676	HQ 1st ATF
145	3d RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS448658	HQ 1st ATF
146	1st RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS441684	HQ 1st ATF
147	2d SAS Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS436676	HQ 1st ATF
148	A Sqdn/3d Cav Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS429669	HQ 1st ATF
149	12th Fd Regt RAA (105PK)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
150	1st Fd Sqdn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
151	104th Sig Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433668	HQ 1st ATF
152	C Sqdn/1st Armd Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS445664	HQ 1st ATF
153	161 (Indep) Recce Flt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443682	HQ 1st ATF
154					
155	HQ, II FFORCEV Arty	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV
156	5-2d Arty (40mm AWSP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	II FFORCEV Arty
157	D/71st Arty (MG)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
158	I/29th Arty (SLT)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty

Incl 1

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LINE NO	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COCED	CONTROL NO
159	2-25th Arty (TAB), HQB	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT021112	II FFORCEV Arty
160	HQ, 23d Arty Gp	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT007162	II FFORCEV Arty
161	2-13th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT047153	23d Arty Gp
162	3-197th Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT050153	23d Arty Gp
163	6-15th Arty (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT140520	23d Arty Gp
164	1-27th Arty (155 SP)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT490468	23d Arty Gp
165	6-27th Arty (8"/ 175SP)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT812903	23d Arty Gp
166	2-16th Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT970494	6-27th Arty
167	2-32d Arty (8"/ 175SP)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT141521	23d Arty Gp
168	HQ, 54th Arty Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT047118	II FFORCEV Arty
169	7-8th Arty (8"/ 175SP)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT021154	54th Arty Gp
170	7-9th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS166991	54th Arty Gp
171	2-35th Arty (155 SP)	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT474096	54th Arty Gp
172	5-42d Arty (155T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS177002	54th Arty Gp
173	Co A, 5th SFGA	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007123	II FFORCEV
174					
175					
176					
177					
178	12th Cbt Avn Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT059118	II FFORCEV
179	11th Cbt Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	12th Cbt Avn Gp

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
180	128th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
181	173d Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780380	11th Cbt Avn Bn
182	213th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
183	205th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
184	145th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT995102	12th Cbt Avn Gp
185	68th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT988129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
186	118th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT990128	145th Cbt Avn Bn
187	190th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT987129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
188	334th Armd Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT991129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
189	210th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	12th Cbt Avn Gp
190	120th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT076065	210th Cbt Avn Bn
191	25th Avn Co (Corps)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050105	210th Cbt Avn Bn
192	54th Util Apl Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	210th Cbt Avn Bn
193	73d Surv Apl Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295472	210th Cbt Avn Bn
194	74th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865155	210th Cbt Avn Bn
195	184th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT862160	210th Cbt Avn Bn

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL NO</u>
196	214th Cbt Avn Bn	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	12th Cbt Avn Gp
197	147th Aslt Spt Hel Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	214th Cbt Avn Bn
198	167th Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn
199	191st Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn
200	222d Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	12th Cbt Avn Gp
201	117th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT068113	222d Cbt Avn Bn
202	135th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
203	195th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
204	240th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
205	273d Aslt Spt Hel Co (Hvy)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
206	269th Cbt Avn Bn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12th Cbt Avn Gp
207	116th Aslt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT657158	269th Cbt Avn Bn
208	187th Aslt Hel Co	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT178521	269th Cbt Avn Bn
209	242d Aslt Spt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662152	269th Cbt Avn Bn
210	3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	YT908058	12th Cbt Avn Gp
211	335th Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn

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
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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL NO</u>
212					
213					
214	Co D, 151st Inf (LRP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT083117	II FFORCEV
215					
216	53d Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORCEV

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY USAF C130/C123 SORTIES 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAC E</u>	<u>ER</u>	<u>CE</u>	<u>PRI 1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Inf Div	0	27	50	148	225
9th Inf Div	0	0	0	2	2
25th Inf Div	0	0	0	232	232
1st Air Cav Div	0	6	180	916	1102
II FFV Arty	7	10	59	458	534
79th Engr Gp	0	0	24	128	152
5th SF GP	0	0	8	201	209
12 AVN GP	0	0	4	36	40
11 ACR	0	0	4	10	14
2d CA	0	0	0	3	3
III Corps	0	0	1	0	1
53d SIG Bn	0	0	0	1	1
303 RR Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	7	43	330	2137	2517

TOTAL SHORT TONS: 21,394

TOTAL PASSENGERS: 23,847

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U) 1 November - 31 January 1969

	<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. (C) FAC-Controlled Air Sorties.		
FWAF	10,259	
VNAF	6,479	16,738
2. (C) FAC-Controlled Sorties in Support of RVNAF.		
By FWMAF	2,609	
By VNAF	3,806	6,415
3. (C) FAC-Controlled Sorties in Support of FWMAF.		
FWMAF	10,259	
VNAF	64	10,323
4. (C) Distribution of Sorties (FAC-Controlled) in Support of:		
RVNAF	6,415	
1st Inf	1,191	
1st Cav	2,890	
9th Inf	1,397	
25th Inf	2,566	
CMAC	478	
11th ACR	522	
1st ATF	522	
3d Bde, 82 ABN	14	
RTAVF	232	
Co A, 5th SFG	409	
SIGMA	2	
Co F, 51st Inf	90	
BTAC	10	
5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat, Sky Spot) Missions in Support of:		
RVNAF	141	
1st Inf	50	
1st Cav	155	
9th Inf	19	
25th Inf	120	
CMAC	26	
1st ATF	22	
Co A, 5th SFG	19	
HQ II FFORCEV	50	602
6. (C) Results.		
KBA (BC)		648
KBA (EST)		671
Structures (Destroyed)		2,104
Structures (Damaged)		643
Sampans (Destroyed)		344
Sampans (Damaged)		67

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AVIATION STATISTICS

<u>ROTARY WING</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HOURS	49,697	51,972	52,463	154,132
TROOPS LIFTED	259,425	250,786	276,392	786,603
TONS OF CARGO	32,159	32,999	24,986	90,044

FIXED WING

HOURS	9258	12048	10686	31,992
TROOPS LIFTED	8150	7038	7125	22,313
TONS OF CARGO	345	206	268	819

PERSONNEL

CREWMEMBERS WIA	26	38	43	107
CREWMEMBERS KIA	14	6	5	25
CREWMEMBERS MIA	1	0	0	1
VC KBA	653	634	597	1884

* The above statistics include all 12th Combat Aviation Group assets.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY E-52 DOMEING MISSIONS (U) 1 November - 31 January 1969

	Bien Hoa	Einh Duong	Einh Long	Einh Tuy	Sia Dinh	Hau Nghie	Long An	Long Khanh	Phuoc Long	Phuoc Tuy	Tay Ninh		
1st Cav (AM)			14							31		50	95
1st Inf Div	12	37	4							10		20	83
9th Inf Div													
1st ATF	6								1		1		8
25th Inf Div		26					2					40	68
II FFORCEV	3	1							7	8		2	21
III CORPS							7					11	18
5th SFG												4	4
CMAC													
RTAVF	1												1
TOTALS	22	64	18				9		8	49	1	127	298

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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM PROGNOSTIC

21 Jan 66

CIGCH UNITS

UNIT	DATE	LOCATION
1st Cav Div (AL)	26 Oct 66	PHUOC THUAN
1st Inf Div	15 Mar 66	LAU NHE
9th Inf Div	14 Dec 66	DOAN
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	QU CHU
CINCPAC	4 Jun 68	SAIGON
199th Inf Bde (SEP) (LT)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH
1st AAF	Jun 66	HUI DAT
3d Bde, 82d Abn Div	3 Oct 68	PHU LOI
STANT	22 Jul 68	BEATON
23d Arty Gp	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI
54th Arty Gp	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH
6th PSYOP Bn	6 Dec 66	BINH HOA

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH
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ASSIGNED UNITS

IIIC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH
II B, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH
BHE, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH
2d CA Co	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH
9th Trans Co (CAL)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH
16 PI Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	LONG BINH
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH
44th APU	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
53d Sig Bn (CORPS)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
219th LI Det	20 May 66	LONG BINH
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	LONG BINH
Co D, (LRP), 31st Inf	31 Dec 68	LONG BINH
I Btry, 29th Arty (SLT)	27 Mar 67	LONG BINH
30 CA Det (Chap Tm)	5 Jan 69	BINH HOA


ATTACHED UNITS

11th ACR	20 Jun 68	LONG GIAC
56th Lr, 2d Arty (AMSP)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
D Btry, 71st Arty (AM)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH

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
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 Enemy Organisation in the III CTZ
 31 January 1969



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


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Enemy Organisation in the III CTZ
31 January 1969

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