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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (24 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691204 29 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 210th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 210TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96530

AVGC-DC 15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Mission: There has been no change in the Battalion mission.

b. Organization:

(1) The 85th Medical Detachment was released from the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion and assigned to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion by GO 86, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, dated 15 November 1968.

(2) The 197th Medical Detachment was released from the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and assigned to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion by GO 92, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, dated 23 November 1968.

(3) Battalion organization and station. (See inclosure 1) Effective 1 February 1969 the Battalion Headquarters and five subordinate units will be reorganized under the standardized MTOEs approved by USARPAC. The complete after action report on the reorganization will be in next quarter's Operational Report-Lessons Learned.

FOR OT UT
691204
Inclosure

c. Command and Staff:

(1) The following significant changes occurred in the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion command and staff structure during the reporting period.

COMMAND

(a) On 4 November 1968, LTC B. R. WRIGHT, 069838, assumed command of the Battalion replacing LTC Leo C. BRYAN, 091775.

(b) On 22 December 1968, LTC Harry Q. DAVIS, 02204225, replaced LTC Donovan M. BEADLE, 01180807, Long Thanh North AAF and 345th Aviation Support Detachment Commander.

STAFF

(c) On 28 November 1968, CPT James J. STOVALL, 05420196, replaced CPT Lloyd C. TROMBLY as S-1.

(d) On 1 November 1968, MAJ Joel L. HARDY, 02298916, replaced MAJ Paul J. CLEMENS, 02307935, as S-4.

UNIT COMMANDERS

(e) On 29 November 1968, LTC Stephen FARISH, 01919960, assumed command of the Command Airplane Company replacing LTC William H. COX, 083908.

(f) On 22 January 1969, MAJ Lawrence F. BEYER, 098320, assumed command of the 25th Aviation Company (Corps) replacing MAJ Dennis H. BOWERS, 074084.

(g) On 31 January 1969, MAJ Billy B. DOOLY, 086077, assumed command of the 54th Quality Airplane Company replacing MAJ James E. MYRAND, 02301534.

(h) On 9 January 1969, LTC Dwight R. FRENCH, 01926729, assumed command of the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company replacing MAJ Jerry E. JULY, 079[illegible].

(i) On 21 January 1969, MAJ Eugene S. PEDRICK, 04033636, assumed command of the 120th Assault Helicopter Company replacing LTC Neal W. SANDERS, Jr., 067978.

(j) On 25 November 1968, MAJ Douglas SCHNEEMAN, 090461, assumed command of the 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company replacing MAJ Arthur R. VAUGHN, 04062955.

(2) Battalion command and staff structure (See inclosure 2).

Inclosure

d. Unit strengths as of 31 January 1969:

(1) Military

Subordinate Unit	Officer		WO		WO		TOTAL	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
HHD, 210th	19	25	3	4	86	113	108	142
Cmd Apln Co	29	50	1	1	64	94	94	145
25th ACC	8	12	18	14	89	96	115	122
54th UAC	18	19	25	19	135	127	178	165
73rd SAC	19	24	22	6	290	270	331	300
74th RAC	41	34	2	4	103	103	146	141
120th AHC	18	22	62	47	229	187	309	256
184th RAC	32	24	2	2	89	95	123	121
85th Med Det	1	1	0	0	7	4	8	5
98th TC Det	1	1	1	1	70	70	72	72
129th Med Det	1	1	0	0	7	6	8	7
197th Med Det	1	1	0	0	8	6	9	7
243rd Sig Det	1	1	0	0	7	8	8	9
255th TC Det	1	1	1	1	50	41	52	43
312th ASD	1	1	0	0	16	16	17	17
316th ASD	1	1	0	0	16	17	17	18
323rd ASD	1	1	0	0	16	19	17	20
325th Sig	1	0	0	1	8	8	9	9
365th ASD	1	2	0	0	20	31	21	33
563rd TC Det	0	0	0	0	27	17	27	17
622nd Sig Det	0	0	1	1	7	8	8	9
TOTAL	195	221	138	101	1344	1336	1677	1658

(2) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	DAC		VN		3rd Natl		Contractor
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	
HHC, 210th	0	0	1	24	0	0	0
Cmd Apln Co	0	0	1	1	0	0	19
25th ACC	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
54th UAC	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
73rd SAC	0	0	19	27	0	0	0
74th RAC	0	0	4	4	0	0	0
120th AHC	0	0	4	4	0	0	0
184th RAC	0	0	7	6	0	0	0
85th Med Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
98th TC Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
129th Med Det	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
197th Med Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
243rd Sig Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
255th TC Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
312th ASD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
316th ASD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
323rd ASD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
325th Sig Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
365th ASD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
563rd TC Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
622nd Sig Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	40	69	0	0	22

e. Aircraft Status: (See Inclosure 3).

f. Operational Results: (See Inclosure 4).

g. Personnel Management: (See Inclosure 5).

h. Intelligence:

(1) The S-2 conducts the Escape and Evasion program for this Battalion. A total of 11 quotas to the Jungle Survival School were received and filled during the reporting period. Priority was given to the OV-1 and O-1 aviators due to their habitual flying of single ship missions in remote areas.

(2) Requests for security clearances processed during the period were:

TOP SECRET	SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
21	136	90

i. Operations:

(1) The Deputy Commanding General, USARV, directed on 23 November 1968 that a concept of providing OV-1 Mohawk aircraft in direct support to US Divisions be tested during December 1968 or January 196 He further directed that the test would be conducted in the III CTZ and would involve the two US Divisions in RVN having organic ASTA Platoons; i.e., the 1st Cavalry Division (Ambl) and 1st Infantry Division.

(2) Evaluation of the OV-1 Mohawk concept of support is being accomplished in three phases. Phase I consisted of gathering base data on all aspects of Mohawk operations under organic and general support employment. Upon completion of Phase I, organic OV-1 Mohawk assets were withdrawn and co-located with the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC). The movement of the 1st Infantry and 1st Air Cavalry Division's ASTA Platoons completed Phase II. The 73rd SAC was then directed by II FFV to provide OV-1 Mohawks in direct support of three US Divisions (1st Air Cav, 25th Inf, 1st Inf) and general support to II FFV. Phase III will gather objective and subjective data on all aspects of divisional direct support employment while continuing the normal general support missions for II FFV. Upon conclusion of Phase III, a comparative evaluation of organic, direct support and general support employment will determine the operational effectiveness of divisional direct support in the RVN environment.

(3) On 19 January 1969 the ASTA platoons of the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division (Ambl) were attached to the 73rd SAC for Phase III. As of this date valid conclusions are not available. A detailed report will be included in the next ORLL.

j. Logistics: Aircraft availability (See Inclosure 6).

k. Aviation Safety:

(1) Major accidents:	4 Fixed Wing	3 Rotary Wing
(2) Minor accidents:	0 Fixed Wing	1 Rotary Wing
(3) Forced Landings:	1 Fixed Wing	2 Rotary Wing
(4) Precautionary Landings:	17 Fixed Wing	2 Rotary Wing
(5) Incidents:	4 Fixed Wing	1 Rotary Wing

l. Signal:

(1) During the report period 100% of the Battalion aircraft have completed the ZYR program. The ZYS program is 64% complete at this time.

(2) The companies have greatly increased the range and efficiency of their ground radios by installing antennas on telephone poles acquired for this purpose.

(3) The 36th Signal Company has installed an AN/MAR-102 Van adjacent to the BOC. This provides a backup radio relay capability for both the teletype and telephone systems.

(4) Approximately 500 ft of 24 pair cable has been installed within the Battalion area to replace field wire.

m. Installation Development:

(1) New construction during the quarter:

(a) Commercial power system 98% completed by Vinell Corporation.

(b) Roadway, 1550 meters.

(c) Defensive berm, 2533 meters.

(d) Asphalt ramp and taxi-ways, 15,555 square yards.

(e) Aircraft revetments: 20 fixed wing and 10 rotary wing.

(2) A new Base Development Master Plan was submitted in December 1968.

n. Medical:

(1) Twenty-five flight physicals were completed during the reporting period.

(2) Medical evacuation to the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals:

REQUESTED	COMPLETED
128	128

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

Signal Personnel Shortage.

(a) OBSERVATION. Standardized G-Series MTOEs have been approved in accordance with USARPAC GO 771, dated 22 November 1968. This order inactivates the 243rd Signal Detachment which provided avionics support to the two O-1 companies in the Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION. The 74th RAC has one avionics repairman in their new MTOE and the 184th has none. The two companies have a combined total of 224 installed aircraft radios. Direct Support companies are not manned or equipped to provide all organizational avionics repair for a fleet of 56 aircraft. To remain operationally ready, O-1 companies must have organic or attached avionics repair capabilities. If this is not provided then avionics support is required from a Direct Support company having a significantly greater capability than is now available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a minimum of four avionics repairmen (35K20) be authorized for each O-1 company, and sufficient float and test equipment be authorized to provide the required avionics repair support to each unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. A recommended change to the MTOE will be forwarded through command channels with justification for additional personnel and equipment.

b. Operations:

(1) Use of High Purity Nitrogen in the UAS-4A System.

(a) OBSERVATION. Experience has shown that the High Purity Nitrogen, 99.95%, is the only type nitrogen suited for infrared preamplifiers.

(b) EVALUATION. Due to delays in logistical support, high purity nitrogen has not been available during the past quarter. A substitute in-country produced nitrogen of 99.50% purity has been used and has resulted in moderate to severe fadeout of infrared film. This is due to condensation of water in the impure nitrogen on the inside of the refrigerator and preamplifiers. When fadeout occurs the cyrogenic refrigerator system, HD 723/AAS-14A must be removed from the aircraft and purged for 24 hours resulting in excessive downtime. Non-availability of vacuum pump oil, CAT 69100, FSN 9150-985-7236, has caused further delays.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that supply agencies be instructed not to issue substitute nitrogen to units using the gas for infrared systems. Ample supplies of high purity nitrogen must be made available in RVN, clearly marked 99.95% purity, and for use with infrared systems only.

This may prevent this expensive item from being issued to motor pools and maintenance installations where it is often being used to inflate vehicle tires. In addition, vacuum pump oil should be supplied through other than POL channels and ear-marked solely for use in vacuum pumps. If supplied to AMC installations, requisitions could be filled without delays, which in some cases exceed four months.

(2) Use of Preamplifiers (Detectors) in the UAS-4A System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The infrared system utilizes three types of preamplifiers, Long, AM-4467/AAS-14A, Medium, AM/4464, and Short, AM/4468.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past, two medium detectors have been utilized for infrared missions. This permits the imagery interpreters to read out heat emissions, even if one of the channels fades out. However, the medium detector which photographs in detail the terrain covered, often masks as many as 60% of heat emissions. When using the medium detector on A Channel and a short detector on B Channel, outstanding heat emitters are picked up on B Channel without the terrain display, then compared and plotted with the terrain on A Channel. This technique has increased the number of plotted heat emissions by 60%.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the selection of detectors for each mission be dictated by the target and terrain. Consideration should be given to improving the system by providing in-flight selection of detectors.

(3) Preflight Runup of Cryogenic Refrigerators HD-723/AAS-14A

(a) OBSERVATION. Frequent cycling of the cryogenic refrigerator has resulted in the failure of high pressure lines and other components.

(b) EVALUATION. When the system is shut down after the pre-flight runup, the refrigerator should be left on. This maintains a constant pressure in the lines until the system is activated again. By preventing the overpressures associated with initial activation of the system, high pressure line failures and leaks have been significantly reduced. The system remains pressurized until it is necessary to remove the components from the aircraft. This procedure is now unit policy for the UAS-4A system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this procedure be adopted by all units employing the UAS-4A system.

(4) Employment of Infrared Surveillance During Daylight Hours.

(a) OBSERVATION. Until recently the infrared sensor system was only employed during the hours of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION. This type of battlefield surveillance has been successful although the use of infrared equipment is not limited to this kind of employment. Tests showed that the infrared system, utilizing the long detector, AM-4467/AAS-14A plus certain micron filters, was able to detect camouflaged enemy positions, weapons caches, and newly constructed defensive positions. When employed concurrently with photography, it not only assisted photo interpreters in plotting the photo runs, but also provided valuable supplemental information regarding the photo target.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. At this time, tests are not completed utilizing infrared sensors on daytime flights, but it is recommended that units in RVN and the US Army Electronics Command conduct separate tests to determine feasibility of daytime infrared employment. Use of preamplifiers and filters will differ with types of terrain (sandy, moist, swampy) and weather conditions (hazy, foggy, cloudy, clear). Imagery interpreters must receive additional training on daytime infrared readout procedures.

(5) Target Acquisition by the OV-1C.

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past infrared sensors have been employed primarily as battlefield surveillance devices.

(b) EVALUATION. Recent tests show that the infrared sensor, well suited for battlefield surveillance is also able to serve in a target acquisition role. By turning down contrast and level on the control panel in the cockpit (using a short detector on B Channel) hot emissions show up clearly as white blips. Superimposing a clear acetate grid card over the TDI plate and making use of the doppler navigation system, the technical observer is able to immediately plot emitters as 6-digit grid coordinate locations and inflight them to fire support elements. Several such missions have been flown and stationary target detection has been effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That OV-1C infrared aircraft be employed with Firefly teams or armed aircraft in a target acquisition role.

(6) Anti-aircraft fire suppression and destruction of firing positions.

(a) OBSERVATION. The number and frequency of hits received and anti-aircraft fire incidents reported by OV-1s has been increasing steadily.

(b) EVALUATION. OV-1s fly day and night missions regularly along the entire Cambodian border in the III CTZ. This area has extremely active anti-aircraft fire for a number of reasons.

(1) The proximity of escape routes and immediate sanctuary provides confidence.

(2) Many of the remote areas are not within range of artillery.

(3) If they are within range, the proximity of the anti-aircraft positions to the border often precludes engagement due to range probable error restrictions.

(4) If available, tactical air strikes are difficult and often impossible to employ without violating Cambodian airspace.

(5) The time required to request, receive approval, scramble a helicopter fire team, flight time to the area and a briefing on the target practically precludes the use of armed helicopters.

These factors have resulted in the unarmed OV-1 being engaged with impunity by anti-aircraft fire along the border. Problems of effective engagement are intensified during the hours of darkness when most of the missions are flown.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That provisions for responsive anti-aircraft retaliation be provided the OV-1. One or a combination of the following could be initiated:

(1) Arm the OV-1 with target marking rockets and/or HE warheads.

(2) Provide helicopter fire teams in secure locations in the mission area on 5 minute ground alert.

(3) Coordinate lighting bug/firefly missions to be airborne along the mission route at specific times during the hours of darkness.

(4) Provide airborne FACs both day and night with TAC air available.

(5) Pre-arranged artillery for especially "hot" areas on call with or without adjustment.

c. Training. None.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics.

(1) Utility mission support aircraft for O-1 and OV-1 companies.

(a) OBSERVATION. Utility aircraft are not authorized by MTOE or TOE for the Bird Dog or Mohawk companies.

(b) EVALUATION. The O-1 and OV-1 companies provide reconnaissance and surveillance over large areas. To accomplish this mission the O-1s are placed in direct support and remain with the supported unit. There are 23 O-1 aircraft permanently based away from home station at 6 airfields throughout the III CTZ. The OV-1s provide support for all units in the III CTZ.

The required maintenance, parts delivery, liaison and command flights average more than two per day, per unit, thereby reducing each unit's capability by portions of 60 mission days a month. The configuration of both aircraft preclude transporting adequate maintenance personnel or parts for most emergency repair situations. The 1st Aviation Brigade has recognized this problem and authorized the loan of one U-6A to each unit. Experience has proved that one utility aircraft per unit cannot fulfill the requirements generated by normal support operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That two utility aircraft (U-6A) be authorized for each O-1 and OV-1 company.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. A study is being prepared in support of this recommendation and will be submitted through command channels. A recommended change to the appropriate MTOE/TOE will be submitted.

(2) U-1A Engine Failures.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the period 1 July to 15 November 1968 21 engine changes were made on assigned aircraft. Time on these R-1340-61 engines ranged from a high of 699 hours to a low of 2 hours. The average was 317 hours for a utilization of 24.3% of the normal TBO of 1300 hours. This average does not include 3 engines which were changed with 0 hours flight time due to major deficiencies being discovered after the engines had been installed on the aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION. It is the opinion of assigned maintenance personnel that the majority of low time engine failures was due to insufficient quality control at the overhaul/rebuild facility. It was determined that several engine failures were the result of deficiencies which could have been detected by a more thorough inspection and corrected prior to installation on the aircraft. Of the 3 engines that were changed with 0 hours, one was due to a bent propeller shaft and two were due to lack of required modifications to provide oil pressure for propeller pitch change. It was determined that the two engines were -57's designed for use on the UH-19 series helicopters and were signed off as having been modified during rebuild to the -61 configuration. However, inspection of the crankshafts revealed the modification to be incomplete due to lack of oil ports in the crankshaft to provide the pressure required for the hydromatic propeller. Subsequently, four additional engines without this modification were received, but the discrepancy was discovered by inspecting the crankshaft prior to removing the engines from the shipping containers. These engines were returned through supply channels as unserviceable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all new and/or rebuilt engines be inspected prior to issue build-up and installation to determine the existence of deficiencies which could lead to premature failure.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. Using the inspection guide lines and standards contained in Chapter 5, TM 55-1510-205 -20 an engine conditioning inspection was developed to include the following:

(1) Removal of all rocker box covers and inspection of valves for specified clearances, leaking guides, broken springs, rocker arms for excessive side play and rocker box covers for warpage.

(2) Complete compression check of all cylinders.

(3) Overall visual inspection of cylinders, crankcase, and accessory section for security, cracks, seepage and missing parts.

(4) Timing of magnetos and visual internal inspection of points and distributor blocks.

(5) Inspection of ignition harness for chafing and deterioration, and "cigarettes" for cracks and oil accumulation.

This pre-inspection has been made on the last six new engines installed and the following deficiencies have been found:

(a) Pushrods with the improper amount of spacers installed.

(b) Valve clearances improperly adjusted.

(c) Crushed oil screens.

(d) Magnetos timed 180° out.

(e) Numerous cracked cylinders.

After correction of deficiencies and installation, these six engines have accumulated an average of 304 hours with no failures to date. An engine conditioning inspection is now being made on all new engines prior to installation. In addition, the complete engine conditioning inspection is being conducted on all previously installed engines. The most common deficiency found on these engines has been improper valve clearances due to increased wear.

(3) Receipt of Unserviceable Aircraft Parts.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Tech supply section of the Command Airplane Company has received numerous U-21 ailerons, flaps and elevators which were unserviceable due to corrosion.

(b) EVALUATION. New parts arrive in a corroded condition within crates and packing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a thorough evaluation be made of the process used in packing and storing aircraft parts.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. This unit has submitted EIR's on five (5) of. these items and presently is holding two (2) ailerons as EIR exhibits.

(4) Elevator Skin Cracks.

(a) OBSERVATION. Recent inspections of U-21 A aircraft revealed cracks in the left elevators of three aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION. Since all the cracks have occurred in the same area on the left elevator, and because elevators are interchangeable (left and right), a possibility exists that these cracks could be caused by an aircraft rigging or design flaw.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an engineering evaluation be made of U-21A rigging, design, flap speeds, etc., for a cause of vibration stress upon this particular part of the aircraft. Further recommend that the practicality of adding additional ribs inside elevators and/or thicker skin be evaluated.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. EIR's have been submitted on all cracked elevators. In an attempt to lessen the "burbling" effect vibrations upon elevators caused by flap extension, unit policy has lowered the maximum flap extension speed from 174 knots to 160 knots.

(5) Doppler System Fuse Failure in the OV-1.

(a) OBSERVATION. On several occasions the fuse F03 has failed during installation of the APN/168 in the aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION. When the case was removed from the APN/168 the fuse did not fail during extensive bench testing. Replacing the case and then shaking or slapping the unit resulted in fuse failure. The insulation on the wire running from the F03 to the antenna connection had been worn through by chafing against the case during repeated removals and insertions. This caused a short circuit overload and F03 fuse failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Relocate the wire to preclude contact with the case.

(6) FM Radio Tube Failure in the OV-1.

(a) OBSERVATION. RF Power amplifier tube V803 part of the RF power amplifier module in RT-348 failed after only 15 hours of operation. It was further noted that the RT-348 was extremely hot when it was removed from an aircraft for repair right after the failure.

(b) EVALUATION. It was found that the case of the RT-348 was dented or depressed slightly in the rear as a result of rough handling. The dented case jammed the blower and prevented it from operating. As a result, V803 overheated and burned out.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all RT-348 units be checked carefully to ensure that the case is not obstructing the blower. The case should not protrude inward near the blower. Also, personnel should be instructed not to set the RT-348 on it's back side. This could result in a dented cover.

(7) Survival Radio Handling.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many RT-10 survival radios are being returned for maintenance because of power supply connector damage incurred through mishandling.

(b) EVALUATION. It was found that battery cap connectors were broken or loosened through improper technique in removing and reinstalling batteries. Battery connector probes are connected to the radio by very fine wires and are sensitive to alignment and pressure. Care must be taken to insure that batteries are properly aligned and seated before securing them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Greater familiarization with operator level maintenance procedures would significantly reduce operational problems with the RT-10 survival radio.

B. R. WRIGHT
LTC, FA
Commanding

6 Inclosures
1. Organization Chart
~~2. Command and Staff Structure~~
3. 210th Aircraft Status
4. 210th Operational Statistics
~~5. Administration~~
~~6. Aircraft Availability~~

Incl 2, 5, 6, wd Hq DA

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4. DA, Headquarters, 12th Cbt Avn Gp, ATTN: AVGC-SC, APO 96266 (5)
5. HQ, 210th Cbt Avn Bn File Copies (3)

AVGC-SC (15 February 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, HEAD QUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 18 February 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. In accordance with USARV Reg 525-15, the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion, for the period ending 31 January 1969, is forwarded.

2. Reference Section 2, Lessons Learned, para 2a, signal personnel shortages. Avionics support for the G-1 organizations is currently being provided by a signal detachment co-located at the same airfield. This arrangement is accomplishing the mission at the present time. However, the need exists for a signal detachment to support G-1 organizations provided they are not co-located.

3. Reference Section 2, Lessons Learned, para 2b(5), Target Acquisition. A test of this concept has been tried. However, the current non-availability of assets limits its application. The concept reflects great promise, and should be further developed as assets are available. Command interest will be directed into this area.

4. Reference Section 2, Lessons Learned, para 2b(6), Anti-Aircraft Fire Suppression. The increase in anti-aircraft capability, and the resulting combat damage and loss reflects that serious consideration should be directed into this area. Recommendations (1), (2), and (3) are not considered appropriate answers to the problem. Recommendation (4) would require extensive air alert of limited TAC air assets. The immediate solution would be the use of artillery. However, due to time delays it is not considered appropriate. It is recommended that a working conference be held at II FFV level to consider this ever increasing problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR M. MOUNTCASTLE
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Adjutant

AVFBC-RE-H (15 Feb 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 11 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period ending 31 January 1969, as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference para 2b(6), Antiaircraft fire suppression and destruction of firing positions:

a. Concur with para 4 of 1st Indorsement.

b. During December 1968, this headquarters, in response to the increased enemy antiaircraft capability, developed a comprehensive program to provide to aviators a means of rapidly calling in artillery fires on antiaircraft positions. This counterflak program established procedures for pilots to alert the artillery through an AWCC, which selects the appropriate artillery firing unit and notifies them of the request. Both the battery and the pilot then switch to the newly established artillery counterflak frequency.

c. This system provides the pilot with immediately responsive fires in areas within range of existing artillery positions. However, it does not provide a solution to the specific problem of engaging antiaircraft positions in close proximity to the Cambodian border. Little artillery is positioned within range of this sensitive area and most that can reach it are weapons with relatively large probable errors. Only redisposition of more accurate artillery weapons could provide the needed support; however, such moves would reduce the artillery density in areas where there is a more pressing tactical requirement for coverage.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVBAGC-O (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 17 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C, 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2b(1), Page 7: Nonconcur.

(1) High-purity nitrogen, 99.95%, and low-grade nitrogen had been accidentally mixed at the depot. The depot has corrected this error. To obtain supplies and equipment, where only the requested item will suffice, the procedures and requisition codes, as outlined in AR 735-35, with Change 2, dated 19 November 1968, should be complied with.

(2) Vacuum pump oil is, in fact, available in-country in pint, quart, 5 gallon and 55 gallon containers. The unit has been notified.

b. Paragraph 2b(2), Page 8: Concur in the comments, however this method is taught in the Surveillance School at Fort Huachuca and is considered a standard capability of the system. That portion of the recommendation which suggests consideration be given to providing a capability to change detectors in flight is valid, but not presently within "The state of the Art" as far as being cost effective.

c. Paragraph 2b(3), Page 8: Nonconcur. This problem was discussed with the unit commander on 24 February 1969. It was determined that this is not a significant problem area. Additionally, it is against established procedures for the UAS-4A system as described in the standard check list.

d. Paragraph 2b(4), Page 8: Nonconcur. The UAS-4A system is capable of detecting heat emissions; the system operates independently of the sun position in relationship to the earth. The factors noted in the recommendation are conditions which dissipate heat and must be contended with on any IR flight. The surveillance school presently teaches day time employment of the IR system and considers such employment a capability of the system.

AVBAGC
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

e. Paragraph 2e(2), Page 11: Concur. The 34th GS Group has been consulted and is aware of the problem which existed in the time frame mentioned. The Maintenance Officer of the 34th GS Group stated that corrective action has been taken to alleviate the situation.

f. Paragraph 2e(4), Page 13: Concur. The 34th GS Group Maintenance Officer has been made aware of the situation. He states that AVCOM will be contacted, and if necessary, a study will be initiated to determine the cause of subject cracks.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID R. ANDERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst. AG

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 210th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning U-1A Engine Failures, page 11, paragraph 2e(2), and 3d Indorsement, paragraph e; concur. The Deputy Commander for Logistical Support, US Army Aviation Support Command, was made aware of this problem on a recent visit to RVN.

b. Reference item concerning Elevator Skin Cracks, page 13, paragraph 2e(4), and 3d Indorsement, paragraph f; concur. This information has been forwarded to 34th General Support Group for dissemination in their maintenance newsletter. Further information will be disseminated upon receipt of response to the submitted Equipment Improvement Recommendations.

c. Reference item concerning Doppler System Fuze Failure in the OV-1, page 13, paragraph 2e(5). Concur with recommendation. However, recommend that the following guidance be utilized to secure an approved modification for relocation of the wire:

(1) Inspect all OV-1 aircraft having AN/APN-168 systems installed. Submit Equipment Improvement Recommendations on each system found to have this defective wiring condition. Recommend relocation of the wire on each EIR submitted.

(2) Replace any defective wires found during inspection (do not relocate wires until approved Modification Work Order (MWO) is provided authorizing such relocation).

(3) Upon issuance of modification approval relocate wires per instructions provided.

d. Reference item concerning FM Radio Tube Failure in the OV-1, page 13, paragraph 2e(6); concur. This information has been forwarded to 34th General Support Group (AM&S) Avionics Division, for inclusion in the monthly newsletter. This will insure dissemination to all avionics maintenance activities pending receipt of any action generated by submission of Equipment Improvement Recommendations.

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 210th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

e. Reference item concerning Survival Radio Handling, page 14, paragraph 2e(7); concur. This information has been forwarded to 34th General Support Group (AM&S) Avionics Division for inclusion into the monthly newsletter. This radio set is a 1st Logistical Command responsibility; however, it is primarily utilized by aircraft pilots. Consequently, the dissemination through aviation channels will provide information to operator personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
210th Cbt Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

GPOP-DT (15 Feb 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 210th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

210TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
HHD
APO 96530
Long Thanh
RVN
CAC
APO 96530
Long Thanh
RVN
25TH ACC
APO 96266
Long Binh
RVN
120TH AHC
APO 96384
Long Binh
RVN
54TH UAC
APO 96291
Vung Tau
RVN
73RD SAC
APO 96291
Vung Tau
RVN
74TH RAC
APO 96289
Phu Loi
RVN
184TH RAC
APO 96289
Phu Loi
RVN
365TH ASD
325TH SIG DET
316TH ASD
255TH TC DET
85TH MED DET
563RD TC DET
243RD SIG DET
197TH MED DET
312TH ASD
129TH MED DET
98TH TC DET
622D SIG DET
323RD ASD

Incl 1

210TH CAB AIRCRAFT STATUS
31 JANUARY 1969

FIXED WING

Subordinate Unit	O-1 Auth	O-1 O/H	U-6A Auth	U-6A O/H	U-1A Auth	U-1A O/H	U-21 Auth	U-21 O/H	OV-1 Auth	OV-1 O/H
HHC			1	1						
CAC			1	1			26	26		
25th ACC							1	1		
54th UAC					18	17				
73rd SAC			1	2					18	17
74th RAC	32	32	1	2						
184th RAC	24	25	1	2						
210th CAB	56	57	5	8	18	17	27	27	18	17

ROTARY WING

Subordinate Unit	OH-6A Auth	OH-6A O/H	UH-1B Auth	UH-1B O/H	UH-1D/H Auth	UH-1D/H O/H
HHC	3	1				
25th ACC	6	6			7	7
120th AHC	6	6	8	9	30	23
210th CAB	15	13	8	9	37	30

	AUTH	O/H
FIXED WING	124	124
ROTARY WING	60	52
TOTAL	184	176

All aircraft authorizations are IAW 1st Avn Bde Ltr, dtd 10 Sep 68, subj: Authorized Aircraft.

210TH CAB OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (C)
QTR ENDING 31 JANUARY 1969

SUBORDINATE UNIT	SORTIES FLOWN	PAX	CARGO LIFTED (TONS)	ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURES DAM	STRUCTURES DEST	SAMPANS DAM	SAMPANS DEST	AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED LOSS	AIRCRAFT DAMAGED
HHD, 210	180	60	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cmd Apln Co	7205	16129	196	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25th ACC	11784	16281	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
54th UAC	5235	8925	493	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
73rd SAC	5379	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	18
74th RAC	6794	0	0	8	24	39	0	1	3	3
120th AHC	17457	26798	31.5	33	44	59	6	11	3	0
184th RAC	3674	0	0	9	0	30	0	6	0	2
210th CAB	57708	68193	730.5	50	68	128	6	18	7	25

Note: Enemy KIA, Structure and Sampan results listed by the 74th and 184th RAC's were inflicted by the employment of artillery.

UNIT	AIRCRAFT LOSS	AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
54th Util Apln Co		2 U-1A
73rd Surv Apln Co	1 OV-1	18 OV-1
74th Recon Apln Co	3 O-1	3 O-1
120th Aslt Hel Co	1 OH-6, 2 UH-1	
184th Recon Apln Co		2 O-1

UNCLASSIFIED

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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

5. AUTHOR(S) *(First name, middle initial, last name)*

CO, 210th Combat Aviation Battalion

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