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AUTHORITY

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (8 May 69) FOR OT UT 691341

14 May 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)**

**AD 501939**

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon  
APO San Francisco 96491

AVCA SGN GO S

26 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR),  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) SECTION 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Commands:

(1) (U) The United States Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM, SGN) and its subordinate commands continued combat service support operations during the ninety-two (92) day reporting period, 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969. The mission of the command remained unchanged, although supported troop strength showed an increase to a current total of approximately 238,000. BG Arthur Hurov assumed command from BG Morton McD Jones on 9 November 1968. COL Frank B. Case, TC, replaced COL Frederick R. Huek, Inf, as Chief of Staff on 9 December 1968.

(2) (U) Distinguished visitors to the command are listed at inclosure 1.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline:

(1) (C) The command strength on 1 November 1968 was 906 officers, 231 warrant officers and 16,916 enlisted men (total 18,053). On 31 January the strengths were 868 officers, 268 warrant officers and 18,090 enlisted men (total 19,166). Significant shortages of enlisted men have persisted in vehicle drivers (6AA and 6AB), duty soldiers, cargo handlers and ammunition apprentices (57A, 57H and 59A), general vehicle repairmen (63C) and pay specialists (73C). It is recognized that many of these MOSs are short world-wide.

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(2) (U) Special Services (Inclosure 2).

(3) (U) The Staff Chaplain and Deputy Chaplain were project officers for the Christmas visits of Dr Billy Graham and Archbishop Terrance J. Cooke. A privately sponsored religious team headed by Mrs. Geraldine Conway visited Long Binh Post 16-19 January and appeared before more than 2,000 persons in a total of 20 appearances.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) (C) Significant support operations planned or conducted during the quarter were "Liberty Canyon", "Speedy Express" and "Condor III".

(a) "Liberty Canyon", commencing on 29 October and ending 14 November, moved the 1st Cavalry Division from I CTZ. Saigon Support Command was able to receive, process, and assimilate the division without significant impact for two principal reasons. First, the 29th GS Gp, into whose area the new division was moved, is already supporting over 130,000 troops, and second, the incoming division elements were so deployed that they could be supported from established logistical support activities. This operation emphasized the importance of the tactical units having movement plans and the support commands having corresponding shipping/receiving supporting plans. Close coordination at all levels is a must.

(b) "Speedy Express" involved the problems of planning to support an airmobile brigade deployed on a wide frontage in the Delta with limited land, water, and air LOC. Real estate on which to establish a forward support activity (FSA) was at a premium. Major problems presented themselves in applying limited boat assets to support the extensive engineer preparations necessary to set the stage for the operation and in assembling equipment and personnel with which to field an FSA. The 53d GS Gp had the action. Execution of the airmobile phase never got off the ground.

(c) "Condor III" was the reception of the 2d and final increment of the Royal Thai Division into III CTZ at Bearcat. No significant problems have been experienced in the reception of the Thais, but their support is uncovering problems in increasing requirements for direct support maintenance and in close advisory effort in property accounting, basic supply procedures and in providing interface between the Thais and our logistical structure for their role as direct depot customers.

(2) (U) Saigon Support Command reversed its position on the requirement for a general support maintenance contract after reconsidering the great cost involved and the potential danger of failing to maintain in-country military GS maintenance capability. To save the necessary maintenance spaces under Program 5/6 Civilianisation, a trade-off was

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made through proposed conversion of three terminal service companies to type "F", inactivation of two light truck companies and conversion of two other light truck companies - one to a medium truck company and the other to a heavy truck company. The proposal was approved in concept by 1st Logistical Command on 27 December and carried by a USARV Team to DA in early January.

(3) (U) Civilianization has generated the problem of discovering or training a variety of local national skills which are not readily available in the unsophisticated environment of the Long Binh area. This has caused the Support Command hiring to fall behind its LN requirements.

(4) (C) T-Day planning was initiated in early November and has required review of detailed 1st Logistical Command proposals of supporting force structure for the several alternatives. In addition it has necessitated developing of manpower and equipment requirements for marshalling, port and disposal areas and has required preparing of construction requirements for development or upgrading necessary facilities in support of the plan. This planning continues.

(5) (U) As a result of a 1st Logistical Command survey of watercraft operations in the Delta conducted in December, the need for a comprehensive SOP for this area has been recognized. An SOP is being developed in conjunction with a regulation on this subject being prepared by 1st Logistical Command. The two documents are designed to provide complete guidance to commanders on watercraft operations.

(6) (U) An urgent need for Battalion Headquarters at the Can Tho and Bearcat LSAs was recognized when the complex logistical support functions taking place at these locations were reviewed. Scheduled to fill this need at these two locations are two battalion headquarters elements which will be gained from requested force structure changes in the Delta Support Package and Phase III Standardization.

(7) (U) In December, coordination began between this headquarters and the G-3 advisor III CTZ to develop a plan for increased support to the MACV Advisory teams in III CTZ. The objectives were to increase maintenance support to the many teams in the corps area and lay the ground work for review of Class I Support. The objectives were realized quickly as a maintenance contact team began traveling throughout III CTZ in early January providing direct support maintenance to the advisors. The problems in Class I Support were surfaced during the planning stage and MACV began a review of their methods of providing Class I to teams in III CTZ.

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(8) (U) During the quarter, Saigon Support Command units experienced two convoy ambushes, one on 17 December 1968 and one on 14 January 1969. The enemy suffered an estimated 172 casualties with 120 more possible, compared to friendly casualties of 8 killed, 7 wounded and 1 missing. The convoy drivers reacted promptly and properly when the ambush took place by speeding up and moving out of the "kill" zone while directing the maximum amount of fire on the enemy. Land mines continue to hazard our convoys. The past three months have seen seven convoy vehicles strike mines wounding four personnel and causing considerable damage.

(9) (U) The reserve units assigned to Saigon Support Command have, during recent inspections, been observed to be performing their assigned missions in a superior manner. They are highly motivated as evidenced by their various self help programs to improve their living conditions. Two of these reserve units are the best units in their respective battalions. They are quick to learn and are doing an outstanding job.

#### d. (U) Organization:

(1) (U) The organizational structure of the command is reflected in inclosure 3. A troop list is at inclosure 4.

(2) (U) Unit assignments, in-country activations, attachments, inactivations and reassignments are shown at inclosure 5.

e. (U) Intelligence: Security awareness of units within the command was emphasized in preparation for the intensified vigilance anticipated for TET. Close coordination has been effected with II PFV and Naval intelligence agencies to insure accurate and timely intelligence in III and IV CTZ. Increased attention has been given to timely and accurate reporting of incidents to insure alertness and security of all logistical elements in the Saigon Support Command area. Of particular importance has been the effort to insure availability of updated intelligence to the boat crews operating in the Delta.

#### f. (C) Logistics:

##### (1) (C) Ammunition:

(a) The ammunition effort continues to be frustrated by a chronic shortage of I312, Signal Illuminating Flares, and by increasing demands for very large quantities of M490, Rocket HE, 2.75 inch, resulting from the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Saigon Support Command area. The 152mm ammunition which was introduced in early January in support of the M551 Sheridan will require intensive management until adequate stockage levels are established and experience factors are gained.

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(b) Although still in its infancy, reasonable strides have been made in thru-put of Class V from the Cogido Barge site. With tonnages of 968 STON in November, 1776 STON in December, and 2,230 STON for January, the effort shows modest but positive progress. Additional effort is being applied in this area.

(c) A minor, but continuing, ammunition problem persists with the arrival of the 2d Thai Increment. Their inexperience in stock record management requires close attention and assistance from a 29th GS Gp technical assistance team.

(d) Increased emphasis on the Class V retrograde program has surfaced deficiencies in missing NRCs, confusion in terminology, improper reporting and a consequent breakdown in clear communication between all elements in the chain. Action has been taken to reconcile NRCs and to clarify terminology and reporting procedures. In spite of these hindrances, retrograde ammunition continues to move with a count of 2,806 STON for November, 1,766 STON for December and a disappointing 946 STON in January. Intensive management effort is being applied in this important area.

(e) Ammunition issues averaged 62,006 STON per month while ammunition receipts averaged 56,261 STON. Both were increase over the last report. The assignment of the 826th Ordnance Company (Program 6) in mid-October has noticeably enhanced the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot's shipping, receiving and stock control capabilities.

## (2) (U) Engineers

(a) No troop port construction effort was available during the period as a result of the enemy's blowing the Phuoc Cuong bridge in early November. Diversion of Engineer effort to bridge protection measures affected the Cat Lai Damage Wharf and the Cogido Wharf construction.

(b) Funds were provided to construct a \$6 million logistical support facility at Binh Thuy.

(c) Army Depot, Long Binh nearly completed its move from Camp Davies to Long Binh. Construction of the new depot facilities at Long Binh reached 80 percent completion. At the same time, major elements of the 4th Transportation Command moved to Camp Davies, and the 29th General Support Group's Saigon I&A began moving from scattered leased facilities throughout Saigon to Camp Davies.

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(d) MACV construction priorities changed during the period, upgrading ARVN expansion and downgrading base construction.

(3) (U) Petroleum:

(a) Improvement of the Vung Tau (53d General Support Group) petroleum facilities is progressing satisfactorily. Three 50,000 barrel storage tanks were completed during the latter part of this period; two are in JP-4 and one is in Diesel service. The drawings of the manifold have been approved, and construction should begin soon; work on the permanent pier and jetty system should begin about 15 March with an expected completion date of 30 June 1969. Likewise, two 10,000 barrel tanks have been rehabilitated; one tank was returned to JP-4 storage, but the other was rejected due to excessive leakage. Its date of return to service is unknown. As a result of the completion of the tanks outlined above, reliance upon Nha Be is decreasing and responsiveness to Delta locations has improved.

(b) Due to the increased demands of a constantly changing situation, a complete revision of stockage objectives for bulk and drummed fuels was accomplished in late November 1968. Bulk storage capability has been reassessed, and the amount of time and effort required to handle drummed fuel sharply reduced.

(c) On 3 January 1969, a procedure was initiated to speed bulk and drummed fuel to air LOC IV CTM locations (primarily 1st Aviation Bde). Time from request to receipt was cut from approximately 111 hours to approximately 65 hours. This was done by eliminating two headquarters from the reporting/requesting scheme.

(4) (U) Maintenance:

(a) The MHE deadline during the past quarter has been a problem, with the peak deadline reaching 29.5% in January. Attempts to discover the cause of the high deadline revealed that the life expectancy for forklifts is approximately 2,000 hours rather than 4,000 hours; the average age of the current forklift fleet is 2.4 years or 1,600 hours; and the forklifts have been utilized on double shift operations and are exposed to adverse working conditions. Repair parts have not been able to keep pace with demands. To reduce the deadline rate to an acceptable level, several management programs have been initiated. First, a program to identify and wash out "Dogs" was started. Second, an intensive effort was directed toward determining the status of requisitions for repair parts, identifying the status of PLLs and ASIs, and reviewing efficiency of the DX system. To establish a foundation

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for improved support management, major effort has been devoted to complete identification of the fleet with respect to density, make, and model. This project, just completed, revealed conclusively that additional care must be given to data reported.

(b) The direct support units of the command have been experiencing great difficulty in obtaining valid densities of equipment from their supported units. Several factors accounting for this are:

1. The constant movement of the supported units without notifying their support units. Station listings supplied from all headquarters are not the solution since they are invariably out of date by the time they are received at the DSU.

2. Reluctance of units to provide density data. Many units are reluctant to report on hand quantities since they feel that "someone" will take the equipment from them. However, there is no reluctance about demanding that all items of equipment on hand be provided maintenance support. The excuse that the density of equipment is classified has also been used. An effective method of obtaining densities is personal contact with the supported unit commander or his staff.

(c) TOEs for maintenance units have not proven sufficiently flexible to keep pace with constantly changing tactical and operational situations. This has been particularly true with engineer equipment maintenance capability. While resources are generally available within this command to handle new or expanded missions, the shifting of personnel and equipment from unit to unit by attachments lowers morale and produces disciplinary problems due to loss of identification with the parent unit. Cross training is currently being utilized to the maximum to offset these difficulties and to reduce turbulence.

(d) The failure rate and subsequent non-operational time of multifuel engines continues to be a problem. Factors contributing to this failure rate are the complexity of maintenance actions, requirement for additional drivers training, and the requirement for filtering sand and other particles from all fuel used to prevent damage to the injector pumps and nozzles. Operating units do not have or are not utilizing test equipment required to completely inspect incoming work to organizational shops and many drivers do not understand the RPM driving ranges best suited for various driving conditions.

(e) Continuing effort has been made to identify aged and worn out equipment which is difficult to maintain and causes a disproportionate maintenance burden. Equipment so identified ("Dogs") is reported for replacement planning purposes. If the item is supported under closed loop, an attempt is made to retrograde the piece of equipment. This program should greatly reduce the maintenance backlog and, as long as replacement

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vehicles are available. It will provide for cyclic upgrading of the vehicle fleet.

(f) This command has been experiencing extreme maintenance problems with the AM/PFS-5 Radar Set. This radar set was deployed without first developing a complete mission support plan. The initial repair parts input was accomplished through the issuance of repair part kits. While each kit was intended to provide the repair parts necessary for support of a certain number of radar sets, it was found that certain items in these kits developed a much higher failure rate than was anticipated. Replacement parts have been difficult to obtain through normal supply channels.

(5) (U) Supply:

(a) In December, a fire at the 506th S&S Co bakery, Long Binh, destroyed half of the building, two trailer mounted ovens and all three proofing cabinets, reducing the bakery capability by 50 percent. Demands are being satisfied by utilizing commercial contractors.

(b) Requisitioning procedures were changed at the 506th S&S Co and Bearcat LSA Class I Points in an attempt to reduce subsistence stocks on hand in the command. These Class I Points are now requisitioning 7 days of supplies every 7 days instead of 14 days of supplies every 14 days, thereby reducing quantities on hand by 50 percent, improving stock turnover, and permitting better management of stockage.

(c) In early December, a comparison between quantities of perishable subsistence requisitioned and quantities actually received on the same document number showed, in many cases, a great discrepancy between the two figures. Previously, complaints (discrepancy reports) were registered only if quantities received on a certain ship differed from the quantities manifested for that ship. Now the shipments and accumulated data are monitored to determine the number and percent of error in the total system.

(d) Milk shipment by air from Cam Ranh Bay was initiated to compensate for the shortfall in milk production in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Can Tho, Vung Tau, and Tay Ninh are receiving milk in sufficient quantity by daily air shipment with no difficulties. This action which has proven very successful, releases reefer vans for movement of other perishable subsistence.

(e) High subsistence losses due to condemnation have been prevalent during the past three months. Class I Officers are now required to

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explain in detail all condemnation losses exceeding \$1,000.00 per item, stating also the corrective action taken to preclude similar losses in the future. It is expected that condemnation losses will be monitored more closely now that the Class 1 Officers are required to explain excessive losses.

(f) Changes to the 28 day cyclic menu were initiated to provide a basis for including Depot excesses in the men. thereby reducing the excesses. The changes are coordinated between the USA Depot, Long Binh, and the USASUPCOM, SGN, Food Advisor, and are submitted to, and approved by, the USASUPCOM, SGN Area Menu Board each month.

(g) The issue of cantonment mess equipment was halted by direction of USARV in December 1968. An inventory of all cantonment mess equipment was made to determine the total assets in country. Many mess halls have current requirements for the equipment.

(6) (U) Retrograde and Disposal:

(a) Repairables evacuated during the period totaled 28,239 STON, of which 142 STON was shipped by air and 28,097 STON by surface transportation. The major closed loop items involved were 270 Armored Personnel Carriers and 153 M48 Tanks.

(b) 14,562 STON of Depot Excess and Station Returns were evacuated during the period.

(c) Tremendous gains were made in the area of property disposal where 99,730 STON were disposed of by sale or issue. 8,625 STON remained on hand on 31 January.

(d) A shortage of heavy lift capability within the CC&S activity of Long Binh Depot has been a limiting factor affecting retrograde operations. Additional cranes, forklifts and M88s are required before this activity can operate at the level required to keep up with the work load. An MIDA has been prepared and submitted for approval. Requisitions, based on this MIDA, have been submitted.

(e) Efforts to improve the efficiency of the wash rack operation have resulted in measurable improvements. The drilling of a well and the installation of a water tower as a water source for steam cleaners has eliminated the requirement for hauling water. The innovation of placing equipment to be cleaned on trailers so that it can be towed on and off the wash rack, then delivered directly to port on completion of the cleaning process, has reduced handling and increased efficiency

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appreciably. A construction project to increase the size of the concrete hard stand, which will provide the capability of straight line thru-put, is currently underway. Construction on the new C&S facility continues with a BOU of late March, with the exception of the raw water supply for washing which may not be available until May. The increasing retrograde work load will require continued use of both old and new facilities far into the foreseeable future.

(7) (U) Transportation and Distribution:

(a) Transportation in Saigon Support Command experienced an increasing orientation toward the projects and goals of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, notably FLOW, CHALLENGE, and THRU-PUT (direct delivery). The objective is to have the Safety Level on the ground and the Operating Level in transit delivered to the requisitioner when required. To this end, the distribution management concept is under evaluation. The managerial control data of the functional areas of ammunition, petroleum, retrograde and disposal, supply, and transportation, are inter-related primarily through the organizational device of a Distribution Operations Center (DOC). The DOC is a logistics support center which portrays support status and activities on a real-time basis. SSC Movements Control Center activities were expanded both as to responsibilities and geographic locations to provide some of the ganglia for the DOC. MCC field elements were collocated with US Traffic Management Agency (TMA) (MACV) field elements to increase and exploit real-time logistic intelligence. Theater inbound cargoes, terminal facilities, mode operators, consignee requirements (stock status and receiving capabilities), and retrograde requirements, are conceived and treated as one interacting system. FLOW deficiencies (too few REPSHIPS, insufficient advanced documentation data, failures to properly receipt and account for deliveries), constitute system frictions, are problem areas, and are being attacked. A major concern has been TURNAROUND of all manner of cargo carriers. Prompt unloading and release of transportation assets increases transport capability without logistical snowballing (if more equipment assets are employed, more facilities and personnel are required and consumption of all manner of commodities increases).

(b) Developments during the quarter included:

1. The loss of Equipment Incorporated assets, due to contract termination, left Philco-Ford Incorporated as the only commercial contractor providing highway capability primarily engaged in port clearance. The transition from a "straight-truck" operation to the use of tractor-trailers produced many problems, resulting chiefly from contractor inexperience. By the end of the quarter the contractor was beginning to perform acceptably.

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2. Limited storage facilities continued to be the primary constraint on the discharge and turnaround of reefer vessels. This condition should be alleviated during the next quarter with the completion of the storage facilities at US Army Depot, Long Binh.

3. The absence of barge discharge facilities in the sub-ports of Vinh Long and Can Tho in the Delta accounted for the slow discharge of barges and the cargo backlogs at Vung Tau and Saigon destined for the Delta. The next quarter should see the completion of the RMK - constructed pier at Bin Thuy (Can Tho) and a resolution of the Vinh Long situation.

g. (U) Other:

(1) (U) Civic Action (Incl 6).

(2) (U) Comptroller:

(a) The final report of the Audit of the Foreign Excess Sales Office was received in November 1968 and format replies to the audit were prepared in December. Audits of Reimbursable Support Program and PDO operations were initiated in January 1969. A GAO Review of Reefer Vessels in Southeast Asia commenced in early December 1968.

(b) This headquarters was advised of a realignment of finance support in RVN early in November 1968. This plan provided that part of the finance service now performed by USASUPCOM, SGN units would be the responsibility of division finance offices. The 10th Finance Section was to be absorbed by Central Finance and Accounting Office, the 292d Finance Section was to be relocated in the IV CTZ, and the 7th Finance Section was to be relocated to the MACV Annex. The target date for entire reorganization was set at 15 January 1969. On 14 January, a new "B" agent office was organized under the 292d Finance Section at Vinh Long. As of 31 January, due to a lack of facilities, the headquarters element of the 292d had not been relocated and a request for postponement was sent to higher headquarters. The 7th Finance Section has not moved, also due to a lack of facilities.

(c) 1st Logistical Command established Project Clean V in December 1968. Clean V is a command and control improvement program (CCIP) which was implemented by a supplementary program by this headquarter's Management Improvement Program.

(3) (U) Public Information:

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(a) A total of 3,985 releases were generated by this headquarters during the reporting period. Type and number by month are shown below:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
General News Releases	41	42	42	125
Photo Releases	26	42	39	107
Homecom Releases	<u>1097</u>	<u>824</u>	<u>1632</u>	<u>3753</u>
TOTAL:	1164	908	1913	3985

(b) The winter edition of the quarterly magazine Hi-Lite was distributed within the command. Preparation began on the spring edition, which should be ready for distribution in April 1969. All subordinate units continued to publish a unit newspaper.

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2. (U) SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendation.

a. (U) Personnel: None.

b. (U) Training: None.

c. (U) Intelligence: None.

d. (U) Operations:

(1) (U) ITEM: Approval of MTOEs:

OBSERVATION: DA approved MTOEs have been forwarded in the past without implementing general orders. Many of the MTOEs were approved 9 months before a USARPAC general order was received. This headquarters now maintains a file of all MTOEs approved by DA without implementing general orders.

EVALUATION: The orders should be attached to the approved MTOE. An MTOE is of limited value if implementing general orders are not available when the MTOE is approved. This headquarters is holding all MTOEs received by DA until a USARPAC general order is received. Once the general order is received, the material is forwarded to the unit concerned as a package.

RECOMMENDATION: That USARPAC general orders be forwarded to the unit concerned as the MTOE is approved. If the general order is not available at time of distribution of MTOE, the MTOE should be held until the order is published.

(2) (U) ITEM: Project Ready II

OBSERVATION: Project Ready is designed to assist the Program 6 Units upon arrival in the Republic of Vietnam. Project Ready II, the second phase of Project Ready, consists of staff visits by Saigon Support Command personnel to render assistance as well as to inspect in the areas of operational readiness of equipment, PLL and ASI where applicable, personnel strength, to include MOS qualifications, critical equipment shortages, ability of the unit to perform its assigned mission, morale, living conditions, welfare and attitude of personnel.

EVALUATION: A visiting team from this headquarters consisting of representatives from ACoS, SP&O, AG Directors of Supply, Maintenance, Ammunition, Petroleum and Transportation was organized and is conducting

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the staff visits. At the present time eight of the ten Program 6 Units have been visited. All eight units have been found to be in good condition and are performing their assigned missions in a superior manner. The remaining two units will be visited during the month of March.

RECOMMENDATION: These staff visits have been a help to the Program 6 Units and should be used again under similar circumstances. However, this type of Project should be controlled to prevent over inspection of new units.

e. (U) Logistics:

(1) (U) Petroleum:

ITEM: Performance of newly acquired contract tug/barge has not been satisfactory.

OBSERVATION: On 9 December 1968, a tug/barge was obtained from Central Navigation and Trading Company to supplement this command's barge/tanker assets. Army Procurement Agency granted the contract to this company because it was the low bidder, and appeared to meet all terms of the contract. The company, however, had a record of default on previous US contracts. As of this date numerous contract failure complaints have been forwarded to the Army Procurement agency, and the company has been formally warned that further failure will not be tolerated.

EVALUATION: Army Procurement Agency states that contracts will be terminated if additional unsatisfactory reports are received.

RECOMMENDATION: That low bids not be the final factor in determining contractor when one is available that has successfully performed over a long period of time. Awarding of contracts should be very carefully considered when the low bidder is known to have previously defaulted on US contracts.

(2) (U) Maintenance:

(a) ITEM: Materiel Readiness Report Processing.

OBSERVATION: Saigon Support Command is responsible for the processing of the monthly selected items and quarterly materiel readiness reports. This requirement was placed on the Support Command in order to utilize more data processing equipment than was available at USARV.

26 February 1969

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Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

**EVALUATION:** Present processing procedures have proved unmanageable. Transportation difficulties, the use of different key punch facilities, and the requirement to hand carry the report have all contributed to making the complete processing difficult. These difficulties can be overcome by processing the monthly and quarterly reports in one centralized location. In the Saigon Support Command the organization with the capability and machine time available to complete the required processing is the US Army Depot, Long Binh. Effective with the 1st quarter, FY 69 report, all units will deliver their reports, wait for initial edit program to be run, and then make the necessary corrections. The completed report for all units will then be distributed as required.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

1. That all commands not having a centralized material readiness report processing center establish this capability.

2. That a centralized TAERS Data Reduction Center be established at USARV.

(b) ITEM: Command Control of 6140-057-2554, batteries (2½-ton & 5-ton Series Vehicles) and 2610-051-9450, 1100K20 tubes (5-ton Series Vehicles).

**OBSERVATION:** These items were very critical and in very short supply. Saigon Support Command had a large number of vehicles deadlined for these two items. Items were being received by US Army Depot, Long Binh but only in very small quantities. As these items were coming in, the first Materiel Readiness Expeditor to see them requisitioned the entire quantity. This resulted in one unit being in an overstocked position and the rest having nothing. The deadline rate remained essentially the same.

**EVALUATION:** In order to uniformly lower the deadline rate and insure all units were receiving these items, the items were placed under control by Director of Maintenance, Saigon Support Command and issued only to units with deadlined equipment. This enabled units to remove all vehicles from deadline that needed either batteries or tubes. It also permitted build-up of a reserve stock which should prevent this critical shortage from happening in the near future.

**RECOMMENDATION:** All critical items that are in short supply and have generated a high deadline rate should be controlled and intensively managed by responsible headquarters until a sufficient stock can be assembled to meet demands.

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(c) ITEM: Communication-Electronics General Overhaul Program.

OBSERVATIONS: Numerous items of unserviceable/repairable C-E equipment which are excess to the needs of the using unit or which have been wrongfully classified by the DSU, are being turned into the CC&S Activities for retrograde.

EVALUATION: A program needs to be established under which all Communication-Electronics equipment, regardless of classification, is evacuated to the General Support Maintenance facility for determining disposition, i.e. retrograde, salvage, repair and return. This program would enhance the availability of repair parts and decrease the time a piece of equipment is lost to the using unit. Controlled cannibalization at the GS level would make maximum utilization of recoverable repair parts for removal of equipment from deadlines and thus increase the over all posture of Communication-Electronics equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: This command is currently studying this program for possible implementation in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. A recommendation will be submitted separately.

(3) (U) Supply:

(a) ITEM: Subsistence Excesses at Class I Points.

OBSERVATION: The 14 day interval between requisition submissions has led to excessive stockage at the Class I Points.

EVALUATION: A pilot program was initiated at two Class I Points which requires submission of requisitions for 7 days of supplies every 7 days, instead of 14 days of supplies every 14 days. The quantity of stocks on the ground at any one point in time is reduced by 50%. To date, the program has progressed satisfactorily at the 506th S&S Co and the Bearcat ISA Class I Points. The program requires close stock management and constant awareness of requirements and RDDs but the resulting reduction in condemnation losses at the Class I Point is the great benefit gained.

RECOMMENDATION: That the program be expanded to include all Class I Points.

(4) (U) Retrograde and Disposal:

ITEM: CC&S Wash Rack Activity.

ANCA SEN GO 3

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period <sup>25</sup> February 1969  
Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

**OBSERVATION:**

1. Operations, and therefore tonnage output figures, have been improved immensely, due to revised methods of material handling and improvement of facilities.
2. The thru-put concept, which entails using the customer unit's organic transportation to carry the item through the washing process and then on to the port, has helped to eliminate a great amount of double-handling.
3. An improved water supply, generated from the new well, has shortened production time for washing vehicles.
4. Low bed trailers are now being loaded with the equipment to be processed prior to washing, thereby expediting movement within the yard, and preventing the item from being placed back in the dust and dirt after washing. Once the item has been washed it is hauled directly to a staging area at the port and off-loaded.

**EVALUATION:** Continued improvement in management of the wash rack facility should produce a substantial increase in retrograde tonnage. As most items being retrograded must meet stringent cleaning standards, this facility is of major importance. The new CC&S area, now under construction will definitely stimulate the unit's productivity. With the ever increasing emphasis on the retrograde of equipment and the possibility of a greatly increased work load due to another offensive and troop movements, any delay in the completion of the new CC&S facilities could greatly hinder operations.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Continued emphasis must be placed on the completion of the new facilities and obtaining the authorized MHE and crane equipment for CC&S.

(5) (U) Ammunition:

- (a) ITEM: Nan Jin Contract for "Cherry Picker" Cranes (7 ton).

**OBSERVATION:** Twenty ton (20) cranes, issued in lieu of normal 5 ton type authorized by normal TOE, reduces the off-loading capability of the unit when off-loading projectile type (155mm, 175mm, and 8 inch) ammunition.

**EVALUATION:** Late in September of 1968 this command received a temporary (90 day) contract for the use of 3 seven ton (cherry picker) cranes.

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These cranes have proven to be a most versatile piece of equipment. They are extremely maneuverable, small in size and require minimum maintenance. Experience indicates that the 7 ton cranes can handle approximately twice as many projectiles during loading and off-loading operations as the RT 20 ton cranes which were issued in lieu of the 5 ton cranes authorized by TOE. Whereas one ammunition pad can hardly accommodate two RT cranes, the "cherry picker" can readily work in tandem with either a RT crane or another "cherry picker" can readily work in tandem with either a RT crane or another "cherry picker" on the same pad.

RECOMMENDATION: That Han Jin Contract Cranes be utilized until such a time as authorized 5 ton cranes are available to 3d Ordnance Battalion.

(b) ITEM: Ammunition Inventories.

OBSERVATION: Inventory adjustment reports on ammunition items were far in excess of those normally expected. This prompted changes in inventory procedures.

EVALUATION: A marked improvement in ammunition inventories has been noted during the reporting period. The improvement stems from new procedures implemented by the IBASD. This procedure calls for 2 or 3 inventory teams to independently count each DODAC. Cross checks require that 2 counts must agree before inventory sheets are checked against records. On agreement of 2 independent counts all inter depot transfers and issues are processed. An audit section then completely audits all transactions thus limiting the possibility of incorrect posting and figure transpositions. To maintain further accuracy in stock record keeping, a weekly check of 5 cards is made by Director of Ammunition staff and the Deputy Commanding Officer, Saigon Support Command. This five count checks quantity and location at random and also serves to observe policy, neatness of stacking, and general condition of ammunition assets.

RECOMMENDATION: That inventory procedure now being utilized be noted for possible incorporation in relevant field manuals.

(6) (U) Transportation:

(a) ITEM: Use of the AB&T RO/RO Barge.

OBSERVATION: In January 1969, AB&T under MSTIS contract, introduced a self propelled, stern ramp discharge flat topped barge into South Vietnam. The deck dimensions of the barge measure 56x192 feet. Agencies involved in the barge's use have cooperated to employ it in a variety of ways to various Delta destinations. The barge can carry 27 loaded S&P

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trailers and 3 ea 5-ton tractors. It can carry 2,200 STON conventionally loaded. It can be used "mixed", with general cargo conventionally loaded in combination with tractors and trailers aboard.

EVALUATION: This transportation asset should be employed with its versatile and flexible capability in mind. For example, in addition to uses outlined above it might profitably serve as a mobile pier, which, when combined with a tailored team comprised of various functional skills and equipment (crane, forklifts, tractors, trailers), would permit unloading of other barges at undeveloped Delta locations.

RECOMMENDATION: That the RO/RO barge not be thought of solely as a cargo carrier but as a key to introducing flexibility into the accomplishment of the Delta logistic support mission.

(b) ITEM: Theater TDA for an equipment pool to accomplish the movement segment of the Distribution Mission.

OBSERVATION: Current TOE transportation units such as medium truck companies and boat companies, are frequently tasked with missions for which suitable equipment is not available. These units frequently operate in environments where consignees do not have MHE and other equipment to off-load vehicles or boats rapidly.

EVALUATION: A theater TDA should provide for a pool of such equipment as low-bed trailers, pole trailers, rough terrain forklift trucks, 5-ton cranes, and other end items not normally available to mode operators.

RECOMMENDATION: A theater TDA should be compiled, authorized, and constituted for allocation to group level organizations for the purpose of effective, efficient accomplishment of the distribution mission.

(c) ITEM: Contractor Equipment - Harborcraft and Lighterage.

OBSERVATION: The harborcraft and lighterage of contractors is costly and/or substandard. Most marine salvage operations, which require a commitment of limited military engineering capabilities, have involved contractor barges which sank under load.

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EVALUATION: The funds spent on contracts for substandard  
lighterage equipment might be better spent buying new equipment for  
the Army lighterage fleet.

RECOMMENDATION: That new lighterage equipment be procured and  
provided this command to replace contract lighterage.

f. (U) Organization: None.

g. (U) Other: None.

~~6~~ Incl - Incl 1 & 2 w/d, Hq, DA  
as

  
ARTHUR HUROW  
Brigadier General  
Commanding

AFSA CO-MH (26 Feb 69) 1st Ind

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report-Lessons Learned of US Army Support Command, Saigon for Period Ending 31 January 1969 ROS CRFCR-65.

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

1 APR 1969

**TO:** Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, **ATTN:** AVHCO-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning approval for MTOE, Section II, page 13, paragraph d(1). **Concur.** This headquarters feels that approved MTOE should be forwarded to units concerned as soon as possible. These will provide a basis for planning and for preparation of requisitions which may be submitted upon receipt of implementing general orders.

b. Reference item concerning performance of newly acquired contract tug/barges, Section II, page 14, paragraph e(1). **Concur.** In accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, it is the policy of the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam to procure supplies and services only from responsible contractors as defined by ASPR 1-903.1 and 1-903.2. In all cases where low bidders for a contract have previously shown an inability to perform, an extensive pre-award survey is performed to determine whether the contractor is responsible, i.e. able to perform satisfactorily. In this case, the contractor had to demonstrate this ability by making a test run from Nha Be to Vung Tau. In the future, The US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam will continue to make every effort to insure that each contractor is able to perform before he is awarded a contract.

c. Reference item concerning Material Readiness Report Processing, Section II, page 14-15, paragraph e(2)(a). Monthly selected items and quarterly materiel readiness reports are processed by each support command. The establishment of a centralized materiel readiness report processing center at each support command not having it would not only follow DA policy of centralization of data processing, but also would overcome difficulties stated. Information received from ADefS, Maintenance, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, indicates that the other support commands are following this policy. Centralized TAERS data reduction should be done at USARV.

d. Reference item concerning subsistence excesses at Class I Points, Section II, page 16, paragraph e(3)(a). **Concur.** Concept as outlined

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of US Army Support Command,  
Saigon for Period Ending 31 January 1969 BCS CSFCE-65.

requires a range of 7 to 14 days supply. If all supplies are received at one time the proper range would be from 1 or 2 days supply to 8 or 9 days. All concerned have been advised.

e. Reference item concerning CC&S wash rack, Section II, page 16, paragraph e(4). Concur. Emphasis is continually being placed on the rapid completion of the new facility, which is one of USARV's top ten projects. A beneficial occupancy date (BOD) by 1 April is expected. The non-potable water system for washing vehicles has also been expedited and will be completed with the CC&S facility, with the exception of certain contractor furnished long-lead items. Arrangements are being made to secure interim substitute for the long-lead items, so that the facility may be fully operational on BOD.

f. Reference item concerning ammunition inventories Section II, page 18, paragraph e(5)(b). Nonconcur. Proper inventory procedures are outlined in 1st Log Comd Reg 700-26. Procedures as described in the evaluation are basically the same. No action required by higher headquarters.

g. Reference concerning use of AB&T RO/RO barge, Section II, page 18-19, paragraph e 6(a). Concur. Maximum flexibility should be used in committing these assets to accomplish the logistical support mission. The MSTS contract currently calls for only five of these barges in the system. They are committed to the common user intracoastal service and as such can be committed anywhere in Vietnam. Under certain circumstances they might be committed for purposes other than solely as a cargo carrier, however, MACV-FMA has operational control of common user assets and would make this decision.

h. Reference item concerning Theater TDA for an equipment pool to accomplish the movement segment of the distribution mission, Section II, page 19, paragraph e(6)(b). Nonconcur. There are many TOE equipment deficiencies which hinder efficient movement of cargo. At the present time reliance must be placed on commercial contractors to provide this capability or available, but often less efficient, military equipment must be used. A pool of equipment available to the theater would allow for efficient allocation of this equipment to meet requirements in areas where TOE capability is either not available or not sufficient. However, listed equipment should be retained as EDA of units requiring and utilizing this equipment in order that the local commander can maintain operational control of his assets.


AVCA GO-ME (26 Feb 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of US Army Support Command,  
Saigon for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RGS CSFOR-65.

j. Reference item concerning contractor equipment-harbor craft and lighterage Section II, page 19-20, paragraph e(6)(c). Concur with recommendation. At the earliest possible date Department of the Army should consider buying new marine equipment to improve the posture of the Army fleet and reduce reliance on contractor equipment. This position has previously been forwarded. This headquarters does not concur, however, that contractor equipment has been substandard. Most contractor marine equipment has performed satisfactorily and at least as well as military equipment. The requesting activity for contractor equipment has the opportunity and responsibility to examine and test this equipment to insure it will meet contract requirements before accepting it. In addition the COR of the using activity has a responsibility to inform the contracting officer of all instances where contractor equipment fails to perform satisfactorily under the provisions of the contract.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

  
LANNY K KELSEY  
1LT AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

CF:  
USASUPCOM, SGN

AVHGC-DST (26 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (BCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 7 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. Reference item concerning TDA for an equipment pool to accomplish the movement segment of the distribution mission, section II, page 19, paragraph e(6)(b), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2h; nonconcur. The movement volume of supplies requiring this type equipment is not sufficient to justify a pool. Specialized units have adequate low bed trailers, pole trailers, and materials handling equipment which can be made available for the movement of the supplies in question.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
US Army Spt Comd, Saigon  
1st Log Comd

GPOF-DT (26 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Spt Comd, Saigon for Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
2 CS BN MAINT (DS), HMS CO	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
3 CS CO MAINT SPT CO (DIV) (DS)	610 CS MAINT BN	DI AN
3 OD BN AMMO, HHC	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
4 TC COMD TML C, HHC	USASUPCOM, SGN	SAIGON
5 CS CO LT EQ MAINT (GS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
5 TC CO HVY BOAT	159 TC BN TML	VUNG TAU
6 TC BN LT TRK, HHD	48 TC GROUP MOTOR TRANS	LONG BINH
7 FI SEC DISB	USASUPCOM, SGN	SAIGON
7 TC BN MDM TRK, HHD	48 TC GROUP MOTOR TRANS	LONG BINH
10 TC CO MDM TRK	7 TC BN MDM TRK	LONG BINH
11 TC BN TML, HHD	4 TC COMD TML C	CAT LAI
13 QM PLT (TML OP)	528 QM CO POL	VUNG TAU
14 QM PLT (OP PLT)	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
19 CS CO LT MAINT (DS)	185 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
29 GS GROUP GS, HHC	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
34 TC FLT HVY BOAT	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
38 AG BPO TYPE E	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
41 AG APU TYPE T	277 CS BN S&S	TAY NINH 1/
46 AG APU TYPE S	CAN THO ISA (PROV)	SOC TRANG 1/
47 TC CO POL	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
48 AG APU TYPE S	590 CS CO MAINT SPT	BEARCAT 1/
48 TC GP MOTOR TRANS HHD	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
51 CS CO LT MAINT CO (DS)	CAN THO ISA (PROV)	CAN THO
53 CS GP GS, HHC	USASUPCOM, SGN	VUNG TAU
54 OD CO AMMO DS/GS	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
59 SC CO SIG DEPOT	79 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
60 EN DET SP EQ MAINT	79 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
60 OD CO AMMO DS/GS	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
61 CS CO HVY EQ MAINT (GS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
62 TC CO MDM TRK	7 TC BN MDM TRK	LONG BINH
64 QM BN POL, HHD	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
71 TC BN TML, HHD	4 TC TML COMD TML C	LONG BINH
71 OD CO AMMO DS/GS	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
74 EN DET (CO GAS GEN)	USADLE	LONG BINH
78 OD DET AMMO REMOV	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
79 CS BN MAINT (GS), HHC	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
81 QM PLT LAUNDRY	610 CS BN MAINT	PHU LOI
82 QM PLT LAUNDRY	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
86 TC CO MDM TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH

1/OPCOM 1st LOG COMD

Inlosure 4

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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS (Con't)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
87 TC CO LT TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
94 CS CO MAINT SUPT (DIV) (DS)	277 CS BN S&S -	CU CHI
120 TC CO LT TRK	CAN THO LSA (PROV)	CAN THO
124 TC CO TERM SVC	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
125 TC TML COMD A	4 TC TML COMD TML C	SAIGON
140 CS CO HVY EQ MAINT (GS)	185 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
147 CS CO LT EQ MAINT (GS)	79 CS BN MAINT	LONG BINH
148 OD CO AMMO DS/GS	2 CS BN MAINT	VUNG TAU
151 TC CO LT TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
154 TC CO TML SVC	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
159 TC BN TML, HHD	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
177 OD DET BAL & TECH	185 CS BN MAINT	LONG BINH
185 CS BN HQ & MAINT SPT CO (DS)	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
223 CS CO S&S (DS)	SAIGON LSA (PROV)	SAIGON
228 CS CO S&S (DS)	277 CS BN S&S	TAY NINH
229 CS CO S&S (DS)	610 CS BN MAINT	PHUOC VINH
231 TC CO MDM BOAT	159 TC BN TML	VUNG TAU
233 QM DET (TEAM KD)	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
238 CS CO MAINT (DS)	DONG TAM LSA (PROV)	BINH DUC
258 QM DET LAUNDRY	DONG TAM LSA (PROV)	DONG TAM
259 QM DET LAUNDRY	490 CS CO (GS)	VUNG TAU
259 TC DET FLTG CPT MNT	1099 TC CO MDM BOAT	CAT LAI
261 TC CO LT TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
262 TC DET CRANE (JB)	402 TC CO (TT)	LONG BINH
264 TC DET CRANE (JB)	402 TC CO (TT)	LONG BINH
265 TC DET CRANE (JB)	402 TC CO (TT)	LONG BINH
266 CS BN S&S (GS), HHC	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
267 TC DET BARGE (BC)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
275 TC DET PICK BT (PF)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
277 CS BN S&S (DS), HHC	29 GS GROUP	TAY NINH
292 FI SEC DISB	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU <sup>1/</sup>
297 SC DET MBL RAD	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
319 TC CO LT TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
321 TC CO MDM TRK	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
329 TC CO HVY BOAT	159 TC BN TML	VUNG TAU
338 AV DET AFLD OP	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
349 SC DET RAD MNT	79 CS BN MAINT LONG BINH	LONG BINH
351 SC DET SUP & ISS	610 CS MAINT BN	PHU LOI

<sup>1/</sup>OPCON 1st ICG COMD

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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS (Con't)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
352 TC CO LT TRK-ST	6 TC BN LT TRK	LONG BINH
355 TC DET Y-TANKER	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
368 TC CO TML SVC	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
372 TC CO TML TRF	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
378 CS CO MAIN SUPT	185 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
379 TC CO MDM TRK (REEFER)	7 TC BN MDM TRK	LONG BINH
380 TC DET Y-TANKER	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
383 QM DET AER SUP	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
402 TC CO TML TRF	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
472 TC DET TUG (PG)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
473 TC DET TUG (PG)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
474 TC DET BARGE	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
481 TC DET CRANE (FK)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
483 CS CO FLD SVC (DS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
485 SC DET RAD RFR	79 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
487 TC DET REEFER	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
488 TC DET REEFER	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
490 CS CO GEN SUP	2 CS MAINT BN	VUNG TAU
492 TC DET REEFER	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
497 TC DET FLTG CRFT	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
504 TC DET REEFER	5 TC CO HVY BOAT	VUNG TAU
505 CS PLT FOR & CONST	277 CS BN S&S	TAY NINH
506 CS CO S&S (DS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG GIAO
506 TC DET (TTPO)	48 TC GP MOTOR TRK	LONG BINH
508 TC DET (TTPO)	48 TC GP MOTOR TRK	TAY NINH
511 TC DET TML CNTR SUPV	4 TC TML COMD TML C	SAIGON
512 QM CO POL	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
518 BN DET GAS GEN	USADLB	LONG BINH
518 SC DET HDR RFR	CAN THO LSA (PROV)	CAN THO
519 SC DET HDR RFR	SAIGON LSA (PROV)	SAIGON
519 TC DET TUG (PG)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
520 AG CO PERS SVC	USASUPCOM, SGN PSC	BIEN HOA
525 QM CO, LAB FLT	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
528 QM CO POL	2 CS MAINT BN	VUNG TAU
528 TC DET FLTG CRANE	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
529 TC DET FLTG CRANE	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
534 CS PLT FORT & CONST	610 CS BN MAINT	DI AN
534 TC CO MDM TRK	7 TC BN MDM TRK	LONG BINH
536 CS CO HVY EQ MAINT (GS)	SAIGON LSA (PROV)	SAIGON
537 CS CO PERS SVC	USASUPCOM, SGN PSC	BIEN HOA

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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS (Con't)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
538 TC CO POL	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
538 TC DET TUG (FG)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
539 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
543 TC CO LT TRK	7 TC BN MDM TRK	THU DUC
544 TC CO MDM TRK	159 TC BN TML	VUNG TAU
548 CS CO LT MAINT (DS)	277 CS BN S&S	TAY NINH
549 CS CO LT MAINT (DS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
550 OD DET AMMO SPT	DONG TAM LSA (PROV)	DONG TAM
551 CS CO LT MNT MAINT (DS)	185 CS MAINT BN	LONG GIAO
551 TC CO TML SVC	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
553 CS CO HVY EQ MAINT (GS)	79 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
556 TC CO POL	64 QM BN POL	LONG BINH
556 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
557 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
558 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
559 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
560 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
561 TC DET LIQ BGE (FD)	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
565 TC CO TML SVC	CAN THO LSA (PROV)	CAN THO
567 TC CO TML SVC	71 TC BN TML	LONG BINH
570 AG AFU TYPE 2	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
572 TC CO MDM TRK	6 TC BN MDM TRK	LONG BINH
574 CS CO S&S	CAN THO LSA (PROV)	CAN THO
576 OD CO AMMO	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
586 TC DET MAINT (JA)	124 TC CO TS	CAT LAI
588 TC DET MHE (JE)	124 TC CO TS	CAT LAI
589 AG CO PERS SVC CO	53 GS GROUP	VUNG TAU
590 CS CO MNT SPT (DIV) (DS)	BEARCAT LSA (PROV)	BEARCAT
592 TC DET MHE (JE)	124 TC CO TS	CAT LAI
599 QM DET REEFER OP	379 TC CO MDM TRK	LONG BINH
610 CS BN MAINT (DS), HMSC	29 GS GROUP	PHU LOI
622 TC DET PTRL BOAT	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
623 TC DET PTRL BOAT	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
624 TC DET PTRL BOAT	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
624 CS CO S&S (DS)	266 CS BN S&S	LONG BINH
626 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
628 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
629 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
630 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
631 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
632 CS CO HVY EQ MAINT (CS)	79 CS MAINT BN	LONG BINH
633 TC DET TUG	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
634 TC DET TUG	159 TC BN TML	VUNG TAU

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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS (Con't)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
758 CS CO S&S	610 CS MAINT BN	PHU LOI
765 SCTY FLT AFLD	338 AVN DET	VUNG TAU
783 TC DET CGO DOC SEC	4 TC TERM COMD TML C	SAIGON
805 TC CO IT TRK	2 CS BN MAINT	VUNG TAU
826 OD CO AMMO	3 OD BN AMMO	LONG BINH
854 SC DET MEL RAD	29 GS GROUP	LONG BINH
950 AG APU TYPE U	CAN THO ISA (PROV)	CAN THO
1011 CS CO S&S (DS) (-)	BEARCAT ISA (PROV)	BEARCAT
1099 TC CO NDM BOAT	11 TC BN TML	CAT LAI
TD AUG TO 4TH TRANS COMD	4 TC TML COMD TML C	SAIGON
US ARMY DEPOT LONG BINH	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
USASUPCOM, SAIGON, MORTUARY	USASUPCOM, SGN	TAN SON NHAT
HHC, USASUPCOM, SAIGON	USASUPCOM, SGN	LONG BINH
ARMY AREA POSTAL DIR (PROV)	38 AG UNIT BPO	LONG BINH
SAIGON ISA (PROV)	29 GS GROUP	SAIGON
BEARCAT ISA (PROV)	29 GS GROUP	BEARCAT
CAN THO ISA (PROV)	53 GS GROUP	CAN THO
DONG TAM ISA	53 GS GROUP	DONG TAM

### ATTACHED UNITS

7 EN DET	507 EN DET	BIEN HOA 3/
9 FI SECT	10 FI SECT	BIEN HOA 2/
10 FI SECT	USARV SP TRF	BIEN HOA 2/
10 EN DET	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
28 EN DET	213 EN DET	CAN THO 3/
34 EN DET	213 EN DET	CAN THO 3/
42 OD DET (EOD)	533 OD DET	CU CHI 1/
43 FI SECT	10 FI SECT	BIEN HOA 2/
44 OD DET (MOD)	533 OD DET	CU CHI 1/
59 EN DET	213 EN DET	CHI LANG 3/
82 EN DO (WTR SUP)	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
93 EN DET	507 EN DET	BIEN HOA 3/
96 EN DET	507 EN DET	QUAN LOI 3/

1/OPCON 1ST LOG COMD  
 2/OPCON USARV  
 3/OPCON USAECAV

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## US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON UNITS (Con't)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT HIGHER HQ</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
99 OD DET (EOD)	533 OD DET	PHUOC VING 1/
114 EN DET	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
142 EN DET	507 EN DET	DAU TIENG 3/
198 QM DET (GRR&G)	1ST LOG COMD	SAIGON 1/
213 EN DET	USAECAV	CAN THO 3/
269 OD DET (EOD)	533 OD DET	DONG TAM 1/
306 EN DET	507 EN DET	PHU LAM 3/
507 EN DET	USAECAV	LONG BINH 3/
508 EN DET	213 EN DET	CAN THO 3/
510 EN DET	213 EN DET	CAO LANH 3/
524 MI DET	1ST LOG COMD	LONG BINH 1/
531 EN DET	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
562 EN DET	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
565 EN DET	507 EN DET	QUAN LOI 3/
573 EN DET	507 EN DET	LONG BINH 3/
594 EN DET	507 EN DET	MY THO 3/
595 EN DET	507 EN DET	DONG TAM 3/
596 EN DET	213 EN DET	VINH LONG 3/
597 EN DET	213 EN DET	SA DEC 3/
598 EN DET	213 EN DET	SOC TRANG 3/
MAGAZINE FLT, 661 OD CO	3 OD BN	LONG BINH
US MARINE MNT ACT, DET #2	1ST LOG COMD	VUNG TAU 1/
US MARINE MNT ACT, DET #4	1ST LOG COMD	SAIGON 1/
USACF & AO VN	USARV	LONG BINH 2/

1/OPCON 1ST LOG COMD  
2/OPCON USARV  
3/OPCON USAECAV

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## CHANGES IN STATUS OF UNITS

### 1. Units assigned from the other support commands within this theater:

233d Quartermaster Detachment (Team KD)  
329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)  
544th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)  
572d Transportation Company (Medium Truck)  
589th AG Company Personnel Services

### 2. Units assigned after activation in-country:

372d Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer)  
379th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Reefer)  
505th CS Platoon Fortification & Construction Supply

### 3. Units attached:

99th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)  
198th Quartermaster Detachment (GRREG)  
Magazine Platoon, 661st Ordnance Company (Ammo)  
Det #2, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, VN  
Det #4, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, VN

### 4. Program 6 units joined:

74th Engineer Platoon (CO<sub>2</sub>)  
534th CS Platoon Fortification & Construction Supply

### 5. Units inactivated:

75th CS Heavy Materiel Supply Company  
139th CS Heavy Materiel Supply Company

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## CHANGES IN STATUS OF UNITS (Con't)

551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Supply)

561st Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

563d CS Heavy Materiel Supply Company

570th US Repair Parts Company

### 6. Units reassigned from this command:

569th CS Company General Supply (GS)

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## CIVIC ACTIONS

1. The rapid turnover of personnel and the inexperience of most unit CA officers made it very difficult to have projects worked from the start to the finish in a smooth orderly fashion without more centralized control. Problems occurred in identifying projects by size, location, sponsor, US/GVN agreements, and the progress of the projects. In order to correct this situation, charts and written records were initiated and maintained. They consisted of the following:

a. MAP PIN CHARTS: The command's 60 civic action projects are identified on map with a numbering system to identify exact locations. These numbers are the same as in the project worksheet file.

b. PICTURE PROGRESS CHART: This provides a visual means to identify the progress of the 60 civic action projects. Each picture is given a number that corresponds with the number in the project worksheet file.

c. PROJECT WORKSHEETS: This worksheet has the following information:

- (1) Identifies a project by name and project number.
- (2) States if it is a civil affairs or community relations project.
- (3) Describes a project as to its function. For example, a school, orphanage or a market place.
- (4) Gives exact location of the project by six digit coordinate.
- (5) States the sponsor down to company level.
- (6) States the US/GVN agreement. This results in a better understanding of what each party is obligated to do.
- (7) Gives an estimate of the cost of materials to used for the Project. This material is listed regardless of planned source. This estimate was made a duty of the assistant civil affairs officer and is required to have knowledge of the amount of materials available and their cost.
- (8) The civil affairs officer became the approving officer for all projects, and in addition, each expenditure is approved by him in order to give him a running knowledge of the completion of the project.

2. Pilferage of materials at the worksites has been a continuous problem. This has been reduced to a minimum by keeping stockpiles at the sites to that amount which can be utilized during a one week period.

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