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FOR OT-UT-692295

22 September 1969

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, ~~101st Airborne Division~~

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Chief of Staff
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AVDG-CS

22 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne
Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

The inclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. I. MOWERY
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne
Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (C) REORGANIZATION:

1. Reorganization to the airmobile configuration was completed during this reporting period. The following units arrived or were reorganized.

2. The two remaining batteries, B & C, of the 4th Battalion, 77th Artillery (ARA) arrived in April and March respectively at Camp Eagle, and completed their in-country orientation, and were committed into combat.

3. The 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion completed its movement from COMUS with the arrival of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A, and Company D in March. Company B and Company C arrived in February.

4. The 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was reorganized into the air cavalry squadron concept. Troops A and B were combined to form the present ground troop--Troop D. The personnel were transferred within the Division and excess equipment was turned in. The organic three air cavalry troops arrived from COMUS and an infusion program with the 1st Aviation Brigade was begun. In-country orientation and training was accomplished in conjunction with the Americal Division and with the 160th Aviation Group.

5. In February Company F, 58th Infantry (LRRP) was inactivated and reactivated as Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Operation NEVADA EAGLE, which started on 17 May 1969, was brought to a successful close on 28 February 1969. This nine month operation was targeted against eliminating the local force units and the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the lowlands, and main force and North Vietnamese Army units in the mountainous regions of Thua Thien Province. The primary objectives were to deny the main force and NVA units access to the population centers and provide an environment favorable for the implementation of the Government of Vietnam's pacification program in the lowlands. The evidence of the Division's success is the complete lack of enemy activity in and around the City of Hue during the 1969 TET Season. (See Inclosure 3, Letter of Commendation

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from General Cao Van Vien, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces.)

2. During this reporting period the Division continued its policy that all combat operations would be conducted in coordination and cooperation with the 1st ARVN Division commanded by Major General Truong and the Province Forces of Colonel Thanh.

3. The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 February - 30 April 1969 is as follows:

a. Operation PLATTE CANYON (5 January - 5 February 1969) was conducted by elements of the 2d Battalion, 502 Infantry, and 1st and 2d Battalions, 327 Infantry, in addition to elements of the ARVN 7th ACAV Task Force (HQ/Scout Section, 1-7 Tank Co (-), 2-7 ACAV Troop) and 54th ARVN Regiment (1-54 (6-9 January), 3-54 (9 January - 5 February)). Intelligence obtained prior to the operation indicated that contact with the enemy would be substantial as the enemy would attempt to defend his rear supply and staging areas in the Ruong-Ruong Valley. Fire bases DAGGER and CUTLE'S were constructed to give artillery support to the later combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations in the Ruong-Ruong and Elephant Valleys against elements of the 4th NVA Regiment. Moderate enemy contact was experienced, but in most instances the enemy elected to retreat and avoid substantial contact. In addition to reconnaissance in force operations by company elements, the reconnaissance platoon patrolled the area of operations and discovered and destroyed a large cache and staging area. The maneuver elements successfully accomplished their assigned mission of securing population centers and key installations along QL-1, and in doing so killed or captured a substantial number of the local Viet Cong Infrastructure members in the assigned area of operation. When the operation concluded on 5 February enemy losses were: 80 VC/NVA killed, 10 prisoners of war, and 72 individual and 1 crew-served weapons captured, in addition to a large quantity of enemy material. Friendly forces suffered 10 killed and 19 wounded.

b. Operation SHERMAN PEAK (24 January - 9 February 1969) was launched by the 1st Battalion, 502 Infantry, D Company, 1st Battalion, 501 Infantry, and the 3/3 ARVN Regiment. Intelligence information (SLAR, Sniffer and VR missions) indicated that enemy activity had increased, and that the enemy was moving personnel and equipment from rear staging areas in the A Chau Valley in a northerly direction along Highway 547A, and the Rao Nai River into areas near FSB VEGHEL (YD 553030). Working in conjunction with the 3/3 ARVN Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 502 Infantry Task Force conducted rapid combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of FSB VEGHEL to locate and destroy enemy forces, installations, prevent enemy infiltration along Highways 547 and 547A, and provide protection for engineer reconnaissance teams along Highways 547 and 547A. The

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operation concluded on 9 February with the combined forces making little contact with enemy elements; results were: 1 NVA KIA, and a large munitions cache discovered and destroyed.

c. Operation OHIO RAPIDS (24 January - 28 February 1969) was conducted by elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 506 Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 187 Infantry, in addition to elements (Companies 1, 2, 4 with FO party, and the Reconnaissance Company) of the 1st ARVN Regiment. The Allied Forces combined to strike deep into suspected base areas of the 6th NVA Regiment to engage and destroy their security forces, cache materiel, and base camp areas. Enemy contact for the first several days of the operation was light and fleeting, ranging from trail watchers and snipers to an estimated reinforced squad defending fortified positions. The enemy appeared to be employing delaying tactics to allow for the withdrawal of the main elements to the North into Base Area 101 and westward deeper into the mountains. Therefore, the maneuver forces were directed to continue the pursuit North of the Ngon O' Lau River to destroy the fleeting enemy and to insure that the enemy had not in fact relocated in Base Area 101 since Operation TODD FOREST (31 December - 13 January), in preparation for a new TET offensive. In the course of the operation several combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations were conducted throughout the suspected enemy infested areas resulting in the discovery and destruction of the 6th NVA Regimental Command Post. The sum effect of the operation was the disruption of any 6th NVA Regiment plans to launch offensive operations during the TET Season, forcing them to disperse and relocate, and preventing them from deploying forces forward for attacks into the lowlands. Enemy losses were heavy as the figures were totaled following the completion of the operation on 28 February: 102 NVA/VC were killed, 5 prisoners were captured, in addition to 73 individual and 15 crew-served weapons. Friendly losses were light—6 US KIA and 6 ARVN KIA.

d. Operation NEVADA EAGLE (17 May 1968 - 28 February 1969), the Division-wide operation, terminated on 28 February due to the initiation of a new Division operation—KENTUCKY JUMPER. Throughout the month of February reconnaissance in force operations, and extensive night ambushes were conducted in the coastal plains, enemy base areas, and the rocket belt in the vicinity of Nui Ke. These operations were aimed at preventing enemy movement and hindering his capability to position his forces and materiel in sufficient quantity to launch a second TET offensive in Thua Thien Province. Enemy losses for the operation are categorized as follows:

- (1) KIA (BC) 1384 NVA/1915 VC
- (2) Captured 55 NVA/798 VC
- (3) Hoi Chanh 714

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- (4) Weapons Captured 3702
- (5) Rice 667.9 tons
- (6) Friendly losses:
 - (a) 205 US KIA
 - (b) 1822 US WIA (1357 evac)
- (7) Body to weapons ratio (enemy) 3299/2702 (1: 1.15)
- (8) Enemy to friendly killed ratio 3299/205 (17: 1)

e. Operation SPOKANE RAPIDS (20 February - 3 March 1969) was conducted by elements of the 2d Battalion, 502 Infantry, 3d Battalion, 187 Infantry (OPCON to 1st Brigade) and supporting artillery. Intelligence obtained prior to the initiation of the operation indicated that elements of the 5th NVA Regiment were located in the Nam Hoa area. They were using the area as a rear support base to cache supplies, and the Ta Trach and Rao Nai Rivers as lines of communication to resupply their combat elements in the forward areas. It was believed the enemy would withdraw, employing delaying tactics, to the A Shau and Ruong-Ruong Valleys rather than defend his base areas. The 2d Battalion, 502 Infantry was to secure FSB NORMANDY, construct and secure FSB SPEAR utilizing the accelerated fire support base construction concept; thereafter conduct reconnaissance in force operations in conjunction with the 3d Battalion, 187 Infantry in their respective area of operations to locate and destroy enemy base areas and caches; locate and interdict enemy lines of communication, and fix and destroy enemy troop concentrations. Inclement weather slowed construction of FSB SPEAR and the combat assaults of the maneuver forces for several days. Once in the area the maneuver elements encountered limited enemy contact and were extracted on 3 March 1969. Enemy personnel losses during the operation were: 9 KIA, and 2 wounded. Friendly losses were 3 killed, and 11 wounded.

f. Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER (1 March 1969 - continuing)--- a Division-wide operation---was initiated at the termination of Operation NEVADA EAGLE. The primary missions of the operation are: to interdict enemy base areas and infiltration routes; to seek out and destroy the NVA/VC forces; to detect, capture or destroy local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; and to disrupt the routes of supply between the rice producing lowlands and the mountain base areas. In addition the 101st Airborne Division in cooperation and coordination with the 1st ARVN Division and Government of Vietnam agencies will conduct combined operations throughout Thua Thien Province to increase the effectiveness of the ARVN Forces and to maintain the favorable environment for the Government of Vietnam's overall pacification plan.

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g. Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER (1 March - continuing).

In February intelligence had indicated an increase in the enemy activity in the southern A Shau Valley. This activity included road, bunker, and way station construction, and in addition three NVA battalions were identified in the area. Construction was begun on two fire bases—FURY and WHIP—on the edge of the valley, but poor weather conditions made it impossible to conduct airmobile assaults. As a diversion when the weather cleared C Company, 1st Battalion, 502 Infantry was air assaulted into FSB VEGHEL and immediately gained contact, killing fourteen NVA. Subsequent air assaults of the 1st Battalion, 502 Infantry, 2d Battalion, 501 Infantry, 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry (OPCON to 2d Brigade 22 March, later replaced by 1st Battalion, 501 Infantry (15 April)), and 2d and 3d Battalions, 3d ARVN Regiment, bring the total number of units on the ground to five battalions. Combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations indicated the enemy was delaying and moving his units back into Laos. Reaction to a captured document resulted in the discovery of one of the largest caches to date in the 101st Airborne Division's area of operation. Results as of 30 April are as follows:

- (1) KIA 170
- (2) PW 2
- (3) Hoi Chanh 1
- (4) Weapons:
 - (a) IWC 837
 - (b) CSWC 33
- (5) SA Ammo 184,148
- (6) CS Ammo:
 - (a) 60mm rds 3,001
 - (b) 82mm rds 1,253
 - (c) RPG rds 1,301
 - (d) Other 19,216
 - (e) Grain (lbs) 10,985
- (8) Demo (lbs) 861
- (9) Vehicles 25

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h. Operation BRISTOL BOOTS (25 April 1969 - continuing). Intelligence data gained prior to the initiation of the operation indicated increased enemy troop movement, stockpiling of material, and a massing of heavy weapons in the Ruong-Ruong Valley and surrounding areas. The primary mission of the units involved— 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry, 3d Squadron, 5 ACAV (-), C Company, 2-34 Armor, and 1st Battalion, 54th ARVN Regiment— was to conduct airmobile and armored cavalry operations into the Ruong-Ruong Valley to seek out and destroy enemy units and material.

1. Night operations throughout the coastal plains included ambushes and night patrols. Ambushes were initiated along suspected enemy lines of communication, thus severely hampering the enemy's attempts to gather food from the heavily populated lowlands. A noteworthy example was an ambush conducted by C Company, 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry of an enemy rice-gathering party on 4 February in the eastern portion of Phu Loc District. After initiating the ambush the men of Company C pursued, searched, and hunted down the fleeing enemy in the darkness killing eleven and capturing two.

4. Enemy losses during the reporting period:

	KIA	DW	INC	CSMC	RICE - TONS	DOC - LBS	AMMO		VCI
							SA	CS	
FEB	124	8	111	10	9.2	5.5	17,194	2,584	92
MAR	200	16	129	15	2.7	34.3	41,368	7,570	64
APR	<u>203</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>888</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>31.8</u>	<u>61.0</u>	<u>553,510</u>	<u>65,652</u>	<u>54</u>
TOTAL	527	29	1,138	70	43.7	100.8	610,510	75,806	210

5. Friendly losses during the reporting period were:

- a. KIA 114
- b. WIA 546 (367 evac)

6. The figures in paragraphs 4 and 5 above are the results of the actions by the 101st Airborne Division alone and do not include casualties inflicted by Republic of Vietnam Forces in combined operations.

7. G3 Air activities for the months of February, March and April 1969 included:

	February	March	April	Sub-Total
Preplanned Sorties	98	145	204	447
Immediates	27	61	107	295

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Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Sub-Total</u>
Combat Sky Spots	134	208	158	500
Flareships	10	8	15	<u>33</u>
Total Sorties				1,275

a. B-52 Missions. There were thirteen (13) ARC LIGHT strikes within Thua Thien Province during the three month period.

b. Commando Vault. During the months of March and April the 101st Airborne Division dropped fifteen (15) 10,000 pound bombs in support of the Fire Base Construction Program. Three of these targets are now active fire bases. The remainder are scheduled to be utilized in the near future.

C. (C) TRAINING:

1. A Division Mobile Training Team conducted classes on bridge defense for the RF/PF forces protecting the bridges along QL-1 commencing 14 April and presently continuing. The training consisted of employment of fougasse, construction of bunkers, and methods of static bridge protection with the objective of upgrading the bridge security measures.

2. A Reciprocal Mobile Training Team from the 2 Battalion, 506 Infantry was tasked to conduct formal instruction on the use of the Starlight Scope to the 1st ARVN Division. The training was conducted at the Van Thanh Training Center (Hue) from 7 - 19 April. This program was extremely successful and the 2d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division is employing the Starlight effectively in ambushes along the Demilitarized Zone.

3. An extensive training program was implemented for the newly arrived aviation units. The complete training cycle, conducted by the 101st Aviation Battalion resulted in one hundred and thirty (130) 158th AHB aviators receiving 2800 hours flight time with instructor pilots and aircraft commanders of the 101st AHB. This training also included armed helicopter training in both the UH-1B and AH-1G.

4. The Division Airnability School under the auspices of the 160th Aviation Group was conducted twice during the reporting period; one from 14 - 15 February with 32 students and one from 3 - 4 April with 21 students. This school is to acquaint personnel from Command and key staff positions in the standing operating procedures of the 101st Airborne Division.

5. Formal schooling of aviation mechanics and aviators was

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as follows:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
CH-6A Pilot Transition	10
AH-1G Pilot Transition	28
F-53-L-13 Engine	27
CH-47 Engine	20
Aircraft Armament	16
Jungle Environment	10
AH-1G Airframe	22
CH-6A Airframe	15
UH-1H Airframes	15
CH-47 Airframe	12
Tech Supply	12
T-63 Engine	16

6. The Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School at Bien Hoa continued during the reporting period. This school has a two-fold mission; to orient newly arrived personnel through a five day training cycle, and to conduct a combat leadership course for junior non-commissioned officers.

7. During the month of April the 2-17th Cavalry conducted an aviator training program. This program included safety briefings, in-country check rides and boresighting and test firing the organic weapons systems. Special training for the new aero rifle platoon consisted of rappel training, snatch missions, and McGuire rig training. Each aero rifle platoon was given combat experience by performing dismounted operations while attached for four days to an infantry battalion.

8. The reciprocal mobile training with the ARVN forces in Thua Thien Sector continues. All brigades participated with emphasis on heliborne operations. Subjects included combat assault, actions on landing zone and pickup zone, sling loading, fire support planning and combat logistical support planning. The classes have been extremely effective; ARVN forces are now conducting their own airborne assaults with the only Division support being the aviation assets and a command and control element.

9. Sixty-two personnel from the Division attended the twenty-one day Scout/Sniper course conducted by the 9th Infantry Division at DONG TAM. Following the completion of the training the teams were successfully employed throughout the Division's area of operation.

D. (C) CHEMICAL:

1. Chemical Operations:

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Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOL-65 (R1) (U)

a. During February, March, and April the 101st Airborne Division Chemical Section in conjunction with the 20th Chemical Detachment and the 10th Chemical Platoon continued its program of chemical combat support.

b. Due to the extensive construction of new fire bases, it became necessary to send fougasse teams to the fire bases while they were under construction. The teams were air lifted with necessary materials directly to the construction site. They installed the fougasse and upon completion of the mission were again air lifted back to the Division base camp.

c. On 20 March, a request was received from the 1st Brigade to employ persistent RCA CS-1 along the coast vicinity (AU 9409) in a reported NVA/VC stronghold. The CS (168 drums) was employed in conjunction with naval gun fire from the USS Goldsboro and 155mm howitzer artillery fire. As the CS-1 was placed on target, contact was made with the artillery FO and he directed fire into the area to take advantage of the CS-1 forcing the NVA/VC out of their bunkers. The naval gunfire FO reported four caves destroyed, six caves damaged, two secondary fires and one automatic weapons position silenced.

2. New Chemical Items:

a. The Division Chemical Section received three Agavenco Insecticide sprayers to be used for herbicide/defoliation and insecticide missions. The sprayer can be helicopter mounted in a UH-1B/D/H aircraft. It has a 200 gallon capacity, doubling the previous capability within the Division Chemical Section and can be operated by one individual. On 25 March, two tests runs were conducted using water in a UH-1H helicopter. Both tests were successful. Since 25 March 35 sorties have been flown using this system.

3. New Techniques:

a. On 23 March 1969, the 2d Brigade requested 6 flame drops in support of MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER. These drops were requested to be placed on target as rapidly as possible. Two CH-47 aircraft were employed simultaneously for this operation. While one CH-47 was on target, the second aircraft was enroute to pick-up another load. The cargo nets were dropped at the loading station after each sortie and re-rigged within five minutes, while the CH-47 either refueled or remained airborne in the vicinity. As soon as this aircraft was loaded, it returned to the target area, and the other CH-47 returned and followed the same procedure. This procedure enabled delivery of flame on target with only short delays between sorties.

b. Division Chemical Section Missions. During the reporting period, the Division Chemical Section, with attached units, accomplished the following:

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Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
CS Drum Drop	6	168 drums
Flame Drops	35	560 drums
APD	75	N/A
Tactical CS (E-158)	2	38 munitions
Fougasse emplacements	N/A	740 drums
Aerial Insecticide	45	4,550 gallons
Ground Insecticide	5	240 gallons
Aerial Defoliation	40	8,630 gallons
Ground Defoliation	18	1,865 gallons
Protective Mask Inspection	52	3,615 masks
CM41	5	N/A
IG	18	N/A

E. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Enemy Situation: During the reporting period, the following information was compiled on the enemy situation:

a. At the beginning of the reporting period, the local force companies were inactive in their respective districts and had the following number of men: C113, 100; C114, 20; C115, 30; C116, 30; C117, 30; C118, 30; and C119, 30. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion, with a strength of approximately 250 men, was a fully combat effective unit. The 5th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 1600 men, was located in its traditional base area southwest of Leech Island vic YC 7896 and was combat effective. However, Allied operations in January 1969 had kept the 5th Regiment off balance and it was incapable of launching a coordinated regimental attack. The 4th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 900 men, was operating in its traditional base areas in Phu Loc District and was combat effective. The 806th Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment which had a strength of 400 men was located vic YD 3220 and was fully combat effective. The 9th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 1300 men, was believed to be located vic A Loui or Base Area 611.

b. Enemy activity during TET and during the first phase of the "Winter-Spring Offensive" remained at a very low level. Documents captured

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by the 1st ARVN Regiment vic YD 305222 on 30 January 1969 revealed that the 6th NVA Regiment planned to conduct attacks against Allied installations in Phong Dien and Quang Dien Districts to include Phong Dien District Headquarters, Camp Evans, LZ Nancy, and An Lo Bridge. Intelligence acquired during the first two weeks of February indicated that the 806th Battalion was gathering rice, conducting reconnaissance, and establishing a commo-liaison route from the mountains to the lowlands in preparation for an attack. However, Operation OHIO RAPIDS continued to inflict heavy casualties on the 806th Battalion and disrupted the 6th NVA Regiment's plans for offensive action.

c. Unconfirmed agent reports throughout February and early March stated that the 90th Regiment had been refurbished in NVN and had arrived in Quang Nam Province in early February 1969. Thus, the 90th Regiment is no longer carried in Order of Battle holdings as a subordinate element of HQ, Tri Thien Hue Military Regions.

d. In late March and early April 1969, friendly forces made several contacts with the 816th Battalion, 9th Regiment in the area extending southwest from PSB VEGHEL towards the A Shau Valley. As a result of these contacts this battalion is currently considered to be combat effective.

e. Throughout April 1969, the enemy's rear base areas, supply depots, and key LOC's were disrupted by friendly operations. The flow of supplies in the Rao Nai Valley, the southern A Shau Valley, the Ruong-Ruong Valley, and in the area in Quang Nam immediately East of Base Area 607 were interdicted by friendly operations. 1-502 Abn Inf on 20 April 1969, vic YC 697568 found a huge cache which included 13 Russian trucks, 1 Russian scout car, large quantities of medicine and ammunition, and many radios and radio equipment. Additionally, in late April 1969, vic YD 3506, 3-187 discovered caches which contained 20 tons of rice, 12,000 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds, 168 122mm rockets, and thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition. The interdiction of these key lines of communication plus the discovery of large caches have certainly disrupted enemy plans for large scale attacks within the 101st Airborne Division's area of operation in the near future.

f. At the end of the reporting period, the local force units had approximately the same number of men which they had on 1 February 1969. The only exception is the C116 Co which was reduced to a strength of approximately 20 men. The 5th NVA Regiment was off balance and was attempting to avoid major contact with Allied Operations. The HQ of the 5th Regiment had moved South to the Dong Da area vic YC 7690, and in late April, this Regiment faced a severe rice shortage. The 4th NVA Regiment remained inactive in its base areas in Phu Loc District, and the 9th NVA Regiment was believed to be located in the area vic Base Area 611 and the northern A Shau Valley. The 6th NVA Regiment was unlocated.

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g. In summary, during this period the enemy was kept off balance and was unable to realize his plans for major attacks in the lowlands. Furthermore, friendly operations thoroughly disrupted the flow of supplies from North Vietnam to enemy units in Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. The total ineffectiveness of the enemy forces in Thua Thien Province during TET and the "Winter-Spring Offensive" reflects the progress made by the 101st Airborne Division and South Vietnamese Armed Forces in destroying Communist efforts to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam.

2. Viet Cong Infrastructure Activities

a. During the reporting period, the G2 Political Order of Battle (POB) Section accomplished the following in VCI related areas:

b. Establish a data base on VCI activity throughout the AO to include activity trends, and personalities within a given hamlet or village. In addition, VCI cadre hiding in the mountainous areas of Nam Hoa were also recorded.

c. Produced estimates and studies upon request.

d. Targeted areas within the AO for anti-VCI cordons to be conducted by United States and Government of Vietnam Forces.

e. Established a personality file of district level and higher VCI cadre.

f. Conducted briefings on VCI activity.

g. February: VCI activity during February 1969 consisted mainly of rice and tax collection and propaganda in preparation for the Spring Offensive against Hue. Terrorist incidents remained low, probably caused by the Viet Cong's fear of alienating the population. Anti-VCI operations declined significantly because of the TET holidays; however, no VCI-related incidents occurred during TET 1969.

h. March: After a post-TET lull at the beginning of the month, VCI related incidents increased to near the monthly average (60-80 incidents) with the main emphasis on propaganda and tax and rice collection. Northern and Southern Phong Dien and the Phu Bai areas were the centers of heaviest VCI activity. From 19-20 March a cordon of the Phu Bai area was conducted which has drastically reduced the infrastructure's activities in the area to date.

i. April: During the first two weeks of April Phu Loc District experienced a rash of terrorist activity whose purpose appeared to be twofold:

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(1) Decrease the impact of the hamlet and village council elections in the district.

(c) Insure thorough control of the population during the upcoming rice harvest.

j. As terrorist incidents subsided, intensive preparations were made to collect heavy taxes after the rice harvest. VC teams visited numerous villages and told the villagers to store and to save money to be collected after the harvest. Phong Dien continued to be a center of VCI tax and rice collection with reports that supplies collected were to support VC/NVA troops in base area 101, Hai Land District, and Quang Tri Province.

k. Currently, there are approximately 2500 VCI identified and estimated in Thua Thien Province.

3. G2 Air Operations

a. Night Observation Device Mission: The NOD mission, employed over the coastal waterways, has been designated for rocket belt mortar watch in case of emergency. The NOD ship has an illumination capability (10 flares). The NOD missions utilize Starlight Scopes and flies at irregular hours during those nights of highest percentage of moon illumination. The NOD still coordinates with the Hue River Security Group and surveillance of the waterways is still its primary missions. In addition, observer usually participates in the mission.

b. OL-E (Bird Dog) Visual Reconnaissance: Support from 220th RAC continues to furnish the 101st Airborne Division with aerial reconnaissance. OL-E planes take off from Phu Bai, Sally and Evans. Units requesting OL-E reconnaissance must furnish an observer. The flights are scheduled for two and a half hours at a time. The OL-E (Bird Dog) is used extensively by Division Artillery and Naval Gun Fire for registration and fire mission stated for a significant period of time.

c. Sensors: The sensor program for the 101st Airborne Division is now under the direction of the G2 Air. Sensor trained personnel, including one officer and two EM, are now situated at Division HQ and are available for advice and coordination with subordinate units desiring to employ sensors. There are three fields presently in operations: Phu Loc, Hui Ke, and Base Area 114. Tangible results have been derived through the use of sensors in these areas in that sensor employment coupled with immediate artillery reaction has held infiltration on known trails to a minimum.

4. Weather: During the reporting period the following precipitation data was compiled:

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	<u>MIN</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>MAX</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
February	1.3	3.7	11.0	3.61
March	0.2	2.6	5.8	1.00
April	0.4	2.4	5.0	1.52

F. (C) PERSONNEL

1. During the period February, March and April the G1 Section was primarily concerned with the final transformation to the airmobile configuration and the streamlining of personnel services.

2. During the period, more than 2,000 personnel were in-processed at their arrival site as 21 new units joined the Division from CONUS to complete the change over to the airmobile TOE. These troopers were in-processed by mobile AG and Finance teams which traveled to Camp Evans, Camp Eagle, and LZ Sally to process the newly arrived units.

3. A New med-evac procedure was established to expedite the handling of reassignment messages from USARV on med-evacs. The new method of processing med-evacs which includes special reassignment instructions were initiated by USARV Headquarters in March 1969. To coordinate all aspects of casualty reporting, the Division Casualty Coordination Center was created in February 1969.

4. Limited command infusion programs were completed with the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 1st Signal Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division. Heavy May 1969 DEROS losses for the 326th Engineer Battalion were offset by assigning incoming personnel over a three month period. Other units participating in the infusion program were 2d Brigade, Division Artillery, 501st Signal Battalion, and 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

5. The AG Section completed the updating of the personnel reporting system machine personnel data files. Completion of this operation permitted the Division to become fully operational under the PERMACAP (Personnel Management and Accounting Card-Processing) Statistical and Accounting System. The 101st Airborne Division became the first Army division in Vietnam to successfully complete the change over from ROAD systems to the new PERMACAP system. The conversion vastly improved the speed and accuracy of data transmitted to the Department of the Army.

G. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. General:

a. Operation NEVADA EAGLE: During the period 1 February 1969 - 28

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February 1969 DISCOM continued normal logistical functions in support of 101st Airborne Division units participating in Operation NEVADA EAGLE. No displacement of units was necessary to support Operation NEVADA EAGLE during the reporting period thus the main thrust of division logistical support continued to come from the Division Base Camp, Camp Eagle, and the three brigade bases, at Camp Eagle, LZ Sally, and Camp Evans respectively. During the reporting period, the 1st Brigade Headquarters returned from FSB ANZIO to Camp Eagle thus making coordination between the 1st FSSE, which had remained at Camp Eagle with the Brigade Rear, and the Brigade Headquarters simpler and more effective.

b. Divisional elements commenced Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER on 1 March 1969. This operation commenced with the 2d Brigade Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIDER which projected airmobile infantry battalions deep into the southern A Shau Valley and northern Quang Nam Province. To logistically support this operation a Forward Supply Point (FSP) was established at FSB BIRMINGHAM by displacing forward elements of the 2d FSSE at LZ Sally. This FSP became a major logistical support base and was developed to include, stockage areas for: Class I (MACI); Class II & IV (Barrier materials); Class III (JP4/MOGAS); and, Class V (All types). In addition, the following installations/facilities were established: a 60,000 gallon capacity FSSP aviation refuel pad (JP-4) with 15 UH-1 and 4 CH-47 helicopter refuel points; a helicopter rear pad (50,000 sq feet) with below ground ammunition storage areas; a Brigade ASP stocked with a five day safety level of all organic munitions; a 30,000 sq ft split level Hook Pad; and, two engineer water points. At the end of the reporting period units supported by the 2d FSSE from FSB BIRMINGHAM included: normal 2d Brigade units, DS/CS divisional aviation, cavalry; and artillery units; and, selected corps artillery and engineer units. Late in the reporting period, the 1st Brigade initiated Operation BRISTOL BOOTS which combined airmobile infantry assaults with armored cavalry sweeps in the Ruong-Ruong Valley. This operation was supported by the 1st FSSE from Camp Eagle and marked the first time since becoming an airmobile division that maneuver units have been resupplied by tracked vehicle convoys. These convoys which were staged and controlled by the 1st FSSE capitalized on the inherent ground mobility of armored cavalry and self-propelled artillery units.

2. Maintenance:

a. 5th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)

(1) Aircraft Supply Operations: During this quarter the Battalion Maintenance Operation Section initiated a request for authorization to submit consolidated requisitions for all avionics float items which were currently authorized but not on hand. Upon receipt of authorization one hundred and fifty-six (156) separate float items were placed on requisition. To date, approximately thirty (30) percent of these requisitions have been filled.

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(2) Initial Issue of TOE Equipment: New aviation units arriving in country were short repair shelters and many items of avionics test equipment. Such equipment was requisitioned through the 34th GS Group, and a one hundred (100) percent inventory of avionics TOE equipment was programmed for the next quarter.

(3) Maintenance Operations: The Battalion Maintenance Section conducted twelve (12) technical assistance visits to division aviation units. Three (3) of these visits were repeat visits caused by CMH failures. In several of the visits, particular emphasis was placed on problems concerning the XM-28E1 Armament System.

(4) B Company Technical Supply: During the last quarter, B Company converted its Tech Supply operations into an automated system utilizing the NCR 500.

b. 801st Maintenance Battalion

(1) During the period 1 February 1969 through 2 March 1969 Company C supported the 2d Brigade at LZ Sally. Plans were prepared to support the 2d Brigade in Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, a sub-operation of KENTUCKY JEMFER. Several standdowns were conducted at LZ Sally for those units at the LZ who were to participate in the operation. The company's mission required a forward support base to be established at FSB BIRMINGHAM providing support in the fields of armament, signal, artillery, instruments, engineer, supply and a limited automotive repair capability. To this end a team of 12 individuals were selected and sufficient repair parts as well as organizational equipment was assembled. D-Day for the beginning of MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER was 5 March 1969. The forward support element departed LZ Sally at 0915 on 3 March 1969, and arrived at fire base Birmingham at 1130 hours on the same day. No significant incidents were encountered in route. The original plan called for two shop vans to be airlifted from LZ Sally to FSB BIRMINGHAM on the afternoon of 3 March 1969. One shop van containing supplies was delivered 3 March 1969 on schedule, while the other shop van containing signal equipment was not delivered until noon on the 4 March 1969. A site was selected at FSB BIRMINGHAM which afforded level terrain and a degree of protection as well as being adjacent to a hook pad. The area was prepared for occupation. Concertina wire was installed and a personnel bunker was built and stocked with ammunition, rations, and a limited amount of first aid equipment. The area selected was outside the perimeter of the FSB, therefore, personnel were required to abandon their location every night to take up positions on the bunker line. At 0815 hours on 5 March 1969 the unit conducted a standdown for three companies at FSB BIRMINGHAM. Concurrently a standdown was conducted by the unit base element at LZ Sally for approximately seven companies. Coordination was made with HQ and Company A, 801st Maintenance Battalion to provide direct support to this unit's forward element. Any equipment that could not be repaired by the element was evacuated directly to tech supply at A Company. During the

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period 3 to 14 March 1969, no communication difficulties were encountered with the exception that the unit was required to use the battalion frequency when making contact between the base element and the forward element because contact between the two locations could not be made on the company frequency.

(2) On 15 March 1969 it was decided to extract and return to the base element 8 personnel and two vehicles. Insufficient work prompted this decision. The three remaining personnel were adequate to support signal, armament, instrument and supply. Coordination was made with A Company to provide direct support on engineer and automotive equipment. Coordination for communications was also made with the Net Control Station to provide a relay station between the base element and the forward element in order that the daily SITREP could be transmitted to the base element. Artillery support to include "floating" of M102 howitzers was made at the base element. Sufficient support to meet the demands of the 2d Brigade was made under this new plan.

(3) It was found that from 3 through 15 March 1969 the forward element could provide a repair capability for all required commodities. Repair capabilities in the field of instruments, armament and artillery, however, were sharply curtailed at the base element, and any repair requirements in those fields had to be evacuated to HQ and Company A. The only problem encountered in logistics was the lack of repair part manuals at the forward elements. It was decided that since the skilled personnel were taken to the forward element to provide some type of information for the remaining personnel. Consequently, to obtain repair parts for the forward element it was necessary to obtain the required information, for the requisitions, from the different shops at HQ and Company A. This problem, however, corrected itself, to an acceptable degree, through experience, in that a list of high mortality parts was gathered with the necessary information to submit requisitions.

3. Supply

a. Establishment of a forward supply point at Fire Base Birmingham in late February; fire base Birmingham was reopened to support Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER. A new helicopter refuel pad was constructed. The pad's capacity is 60,000 gallons and is capable of refueling 15 Hueys, Cobras, or LH-1's, plus 3 CH-47's and 1 CH-54 simultaneously. 241,000 gallons of JP-4 was consumed at this pad during March, for a daily average consumption of 7,774 gallons. During April, a total of 647,000 gallons of JP-4 was consumed there, for a daily average of 21,567 gallons. A Class V resupply point was also established at Fire Base Birmingham. During the reporting period, 2,793 tons of ammunition were hooked out from Fire Base Birmingham to units of the 2d Brigade.

b. Construction of Class III and Class V hook-out pads. During the month of February 1969, the 426th S&S Battalion initiated "hook-out"

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or helicopter sling-load delivery of Class III and Class V supplies from the Phu Bai ASP and Division Class III yard direct to using units on fire bases. Prior to initiation of sling-loading from the ASP, a hook-pad had to be constructed. After the site was selected and graded, elements of the 426th penprimed the entire pad, laid PSP, and built a tower. The completed pad measured 150' by 250' and can accommodate 118 loads of ammunition at one time. During the reporting quarter, 712 sorties totalling 2,869 tons of ammunition were hooked out of Phu Bai ASP hook-pad in support of Division combat elements on fire bases. The old huey refueling point was chosen as the site for the Class III hook-out pad. Extensive dozing and grading was done on the area prior to laying several heavy coats of penepriime. During the reporting quarter, 190 sorties totalling 257,000 gallons of bulk POL were "hooked out" of the Division Class III hook-pad in support of Division forward elements.

c. Clearance of Retrograde Yard. During the period 1 January to 1 February, Division units were allowed a free turn-in of excess and salvage equipment. It was received and stored in a large yard referred to as the Division Retrograde Yard. During the month of April, the 426th S&S Battalion processed all the material, segregated it, and made disposition of it through retrograde channels. By 29 April 1969, the entire yard was cleared. A total of 300 tents, 200 fuel blivets, 214 CONEX's, and miscellaneous cargo weighing approximately 70 tons was retrograded.

d. Construction and Improvement of Warehousing Facilities. During the reporting period, a multi-pack storage shed was constructed in the Class II & IV Yard to provide protection for sensitive items from sun and rain. A concrete pad was constructed in the Class I area for reefer storage. An overhead shelter was constructed to provide protection from the sun when handling and breaking down fresh foods and vegetables. In addition, a water tower was constructed in the Class I area to provide an easily-accessible source of washing reefer units. Extensive grading and penepriiming has been done in all the supply yards of the 426th Battalion in order to make supplies more easily accessible to M&E and protect food and other sensitive supplies from dust. A new vehicle refuel point was constructed at Camp Eagle providing the following improvements over the old refuel point:

- (1) An additional diesel refuel point.
- (2) Overhead MORGAS and diesel refueling points for filling tank trucks.
- (3) The addition of an oil dispensing point so that vehicle oil levels may be topped off.

e. Project Strip was instituted by DISCOM as a part of a large scale Division Supply Support improvement program. The purpose of this program is to identify and eliminate excess stocks. During this period

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of time, a total of 701 lines have been identified as excess and have been, or are presently in the process of being retrograded. Total value of the reported excess is \$3,395,682.53.

f. Edit/Challenge was also instituted as a part of the DISCOM Supply Support Improvement Program and is receiving increased emphasis by the Division Supply and Stock Control Offices. This project initiates the challenge of high priority requests and requests for inordinate quantities of "nice to have" items.

g. Project Clean was initiated to review stock record cards to determine the validity of requirements and postings. Project Clean was completed by the Stock Control Office with the following results:

- (1) Number of errors corrected: 56
- (2) Number of requisitions cancelled: 8
- (3) Value of cancelled requisitions: \$27,795.05
- (4) Number of new requisitions submitted: 178
- (5) Value of new requisitions submitted: \$285,608.89

h. Project Rags is another significant activity undertaken during this quarter by the Division Supply Office. The purpose of Project Rags is to reconcile all unfilled requisitions over 30 days old with supported units, and to reconcile all open requisitions with supporting depots which are over 60 days old. At the end of the reporting period, 54% of customer units had presented open requisition date for reconciliation.

i. Establishment of Major Items Control. During the present reporting period, the Division Supply Office established control of major items within the Division. Major items control was initiated by selecting the following items and identifying these as "major items":

- (1) TCE items identified as RICC 1 and 2 in SB 700-20.
- (2) Closed loop items.
- (3) Command interest items.

The second phase of major items control was the determination of on-hand, authorized, and on-requisition status of all TCE items in the Division. This was followed by ascertaining the validity of outstanding major items requisitions, redistributing available assets within the Division, and by directing units to requisition all TCE shortages. Major items are currently under control and intensively being managed to insure equitable distribution of critical shortages and selected items within the Division.

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j. Redistribution of Radios. During this reporting period, the 101st Airborne Division conducted a highly successful redistribution of FM radios designed to bring all units in line with TOE authorizations. Reorganization of the Division August of 1968 created excesses and shortages of all types of FM radios, most of which were alleviated by redistribution. During the program, over four hundred radios changed hands. Significant in the program was the fact that overall shortages or excesses of specific radios could be lessened by turning-in or requisitioning components necessary for conversion from one radio to another. The benefits derived from the program were:

- (1) An increase in communication capability of units in the Division.
- (2) A savings to the government of approximately 1/2 million dollars worth of radio equipment which was on requisition but not required.

4. Transportation

a. The Division Movement Control Center monitored two major convoys in support of Division operations. These were both 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry armored vehicle convoys originating at Camp Evans. The first convoy departed Camp Evans on 25 April with 30 vehicles, and the second convoy departed Camp Evans on 27 April with 4 vehicles. Both convoys closed into a area near Gia Le. The two convoys were in support of Operation BRISTOL BOOTS in the Ruong-Ruong Valley. Hue Ramp and Tan My Beach clearance operations, and the convoy conducted by the 26th CS Group relative to the beach clearance operations, were also monitored by the DISCOM Movement Control Section.

b. The Division received approximately 20,400 short tons of cargo through the Navy facilities at Tan My and Hue Ramp.

c. Aircraft sorties flown in support of the Divisions:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
February	3192	6556	9182
March	4077	6978	11835
April	<u>2369</u>	<u>12121</u>	<u>8236</u>
TOTALS	10138	25660	29253

H. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

1. Division pacification efforts continued to increase despite a split in the area of operation and the civil affairs area of operation

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in the Province. The bulk of combat operations are now being conducted in the mountains West while Civic Action remains in the densely populated areas along the coastal plain. The average number of major projects underway has risen to an all time high of sixty-six. The bulk of the Civic Action personnel in Thua Thien Province attended the III MAF Civic Action orientation in Da Nang on 26-28 March 1969. The Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division gave added emphasis to the importance of Civic Action in remarks made during the opening speech which he gave at the course.

2. The Civil Affairs program to include Med-Cap was adjusted to support the Province's pacification campaign which was initiated 1 February 1969. Confidence of the people in the Government of Vietnam manifested during the preceding period and movement by refugees to their native hamlets continued as 32,000 people returned to their former homes. The Provincial government continued to demonstrate that it had the resources and organizational structure to meet the needs of the people. New civic action sub-areas of responsibility were assigned to bring Civic Action's area of responsibility in closer alignment with current tactical responsibilities.

3. Improved liaison and coordination with military units and civilian agencies in the Province resulted in a more balanced Civic Action program with many more participants. For example; a survey of the orphanages in Thua Thien Province was conducted to determine their immediate needs and how they were being supported. The G5 now coordinates this type of support to insure that uniform coverage is maintained, and duplication of effort is kept to a minimum.

4. Many important Civic Action commodities were obtained "gratis" from the PX, Class I, II, and IV yards and the sanitary fill in the form of lumber, tin, canned food and salvaged tents. 2,500 bags of partially hydrated cement were obtained through the 32d Naval Construction Regiment and had a representative value of 750,000 \$VN; based on average market prices. G5 Section monitors and collects many items of excess and salvage for redistribution to S5's throughout the Province.

5. MEDCAP Support

a. The G5 and the Division Surgeon attended a meeting in Hue 25 March concerning MEDCAP support of the 1969 Pacification Plan. Other principal participants included: Province Chief, Province Senior Advisor, Province Medical Advisor, Province Director and the Health Chief from each district. The purpose of the meeting was to revitalize the existing program and produce one which would reflect better alignment with the new plan.

b. The Division Surgeon conducted a survey of medical resources to include non-Divisional medical personnel. A meeting to reorganize

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MEDCAP II activities and procedures was held 27 April. Other items discussed were the need to emphasize training of Vietnamese in the health care role and to create a sense of identification with the Vietnamese health care workers and the local populace.

c. Several cases of plague which were reported in the Province soon brought quick reaction teams from medical units of the Division. The villages were disinfected with a preventive dust and plague shots were administered. The rate of reported plague cases soon came to its peak and rapidly declined which was a direct result of the action of the 101st.

6. Economic Development

a. The G5 entered into a relatively new area by purchasing 1,000 hybrid day-old chicks through coordination with the CORD's agricultural advisor. After much prior liaison with regard to proper care and facilities the chicks were distributed to Vinh Loc, Quang Dien, Phong Dien and Phu Thu Districts. The overall desired goal of the "Baby-Eagles" is to provide an economically priced food supplement and to decrease the overall cost of poultry.

b. Groundwork is being laid at Tay Loc Orphanage (YD 743227) for a trade school to be conducted in the evenings during non-regular school hours. The G5 has agreed to support Lang Tho Lime Factory (YD 727200) with blasting materials until the operations become self-supporting. This is of particular economic significance as lime was formerly Thua Thien's only major export.

7. Coordination with Civil Officials.

a. On 7 April the G5, accompanied by the Province Chief, escorted a group of 14 influential civic leaders from Hue on a visit to observe US and ARVN troops at forward fire bases in the AQ. The purpose of the visit was to better acquaint the civilian leaders with the sacrifices these forces make to provide the security which the city now enjoys.

b. The Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division hosted an informal buffet for selected civil/military leaders of Thua Thien and the City of Hue. Among those attending were: Province Chief, Province Senior Advisor, and all District Chiefs and their US advisors.

c. Later in the month of April a group of citizens from Hue visited Camp Eagle to view captured NVA equipment. Vietnamese newsmen and Hue TV covered the activity which was followed by refreshments in the Commanding General's Mess. Three of the NVA trucks captured by the Division will be presented to the Province Chief as soon as maintenance personnel have them in good running order. Division personnel gave recognition to Lunar New Year (TET) festivities and sponsored numerous activities in support of the activities. The Commanding General visited

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Hue and the Citadel to observe traditional TET celebrations and distributed candy and new coins to Vietnamese children in the area.

8. Joint Civic Action. The Division Civic Action program has been enhanced by increased participation of both non-divisional and ARVN units.

a. The G5 1st ARVN Division has initiated seven projects in Phu Thu District. These will receive material support from the 101st G5. In return, the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st ARVN Division will provide transportation support to many 101st projects.

b. Quoc Hoc Library, a G5 project, was wired for electricity by MCB-40.

c. Repair of Phu Thu - Phu Vang road was accomplished by 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, 27 Engineer Battalion, 45th Engineer Group, 101st Engineer Battalion (ARVN), 1st ARVN Division. Also assisting in the project were twenty laborers and two masons which were provided by the Phu Thu District Chief. This provides a road from Phu Thu District Headquarters into Hue and should accelerated the resettlement of that District.

9. Major projects completed during the reporting period:

a. Quoc Hoc Library (YD 764211) (Hue) 16 July - 20 March, G5 - 7100 hrs.

b. An Truyen School (YD 815264) (Phu Vang) 22 February - 1 April, G5 - 40 hours.

c. Loc Hai School (AT 888963) (Phu Loc) 5 January - 5 March, 1st Brigade - 250 hours.

d. An Hoa Dispensary (YD 735233) (Hue) 8 January - 1 April, 2d Brigade - 150 hours.

e. Chi Tay School (YD 620438) (Huong Dien) 8 March - 17 April, 3d Brigade - 80 hours.

f. Chau Chu Bridge (YD 773144) (Nam Hoa) 13 February - 19 March, 2-17th Cavalry - 35 hours.

10. Projects initiated prior and completed during the period included 5 schools, 6 village headquarters, 1 marketplace, 3 dispensaries, and 5 other major projects for a total of 20 projects.

11. Projects initiated and completed during the period included 7 schools, 1 village headquarters, 2 dispensaries, and 6 other major projects for a total of 16 projects.

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12. Projects underway

a. Type of project: Schools - 32; village headquarters - 9;
dispensaries - 3; marketplaces - 3; Orphanages - 4; other - 15;
total - 66.

b. Districts: Huong Dien - 3; Phong Dien - 3; Quang Dien - 1;
Huong Tra - 7; Phu Vang - 10; Huong Thuy - 8; Nam Hoa - 1; Phu Thu - 1;
Vinh Loc - 3; Phu Loc - 11; Hue - 14; Total - 66.

13. Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Masonite/Plywood/Asbestos	218 sheets
Tin	269 sheets
Tile	1,617 pieces
Rebar	3,379 meters
Cement	1,325 bags
Sand	318 cubic meters
Gravel	317 cubic meters
Construction Lumber	10,479 board feet
Scrap Lumber	148,525 board feet
Food	130,022 pounds
Clothing	4,725 pounds
Soap	4,013 pounds
Toys	70 pounds

I. (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed.

a. Leaflets disseminated: 65,822,140

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts: 679

c. Movies shown: 76

d. TV programs conducted: 13

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e. Quick-reaction leaflets: 146,500

f. PSYOP Mobile Teams: 36

2. Standard tapes and leaflets, along with any new ones developed by JUSPAO, 7th PSYOP Battalion, or within the Division, were employed to the maximum extent possible against known and suspected NVA and VC positions, as well as against populated areas with known and suspected enemy sympathizers in an effort to deny them freedom of movement and the support that is necessary to their survival. Leaflets were also disseminated in GVN controlled populated areas in an effort to retain and strengthen the population's support of the GVN, keep a wedge between them and the enemy, and to inform them of the VIP and medical programs available to them.

3. Propaganda was developed within the Division in compliance with JUSPAO policies to exploit a reported growing rift between NVA Main Forces and Viet Cong Local Forces, to exploit enemy ralliers, and to maintain a wedge between the people of South Vietnam and the NVA/VC forces so as to retain their support of the GVN. This propaganda was usually in the form of a quick-reaction leaflet and tapes, and live broadcasts by Hoi Chanhs or other South Vietnamese PSYOP personnel.

4. A total of 74 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN within the Division AO during the reporting period. In our Chieu Hoi appeals emphasis was placed on the fact that the NVA/VC cannot resist or escape the superior Allied firepower and will be destroyed by airstrikes, armor, artillery, and persistent ground operations; that they have been misled by their leaders in the North and are not welcomed or supported by the people of the South; that it is useless for them to die now with peace so near and that by rallying they can live to enjoy the peace that will soon come instead of being buried in a lonely unmarked grave.

5. Continued support was provided for county fairs (during cordon operations) to include ground loudspeakers and movie teams, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, armed propaganda team activity, and cultural drama team performances.

6. There has been an increased use of the Division PSYOP printing capability for producing quick-reaction leaflets on Hoi Chanhs and all important exploitable PSYOP situations that arise. The printing capability was also utilized to print VCI leaflets for use during county fairs and PSYOP Mobile Team operations, and to print standard leaflets when they were needed for an immediate situation and were not available on 16 separate occasions for a total output of 146,500 leaflets of the following themes:

a. Surrender or die (forces in the A Shau Valley).

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b. NVA Hardship (Chieu Hoi) leaflets were prepared and targeted at NVA audiences in support of operations in the A Shau Valley, Ruong-Ruong Valley, and other traditional NVA base areas. These leaflets were directed at NVA regular soldiers reminding them of the hardships and suffering that they must endure while supporting an immoral cause and failing to achieve any great victories, that they were being driven out of their base areas and destroyed by Allied operations, and that their only hope of freedom and safety was to Chieu Hoi.

c. NVA Rear Service Troops (Chieu Hoi) leaflets were directed at the NVA rear area service troops, reminding them that their job is only to support the combat soldiers and not to fight, and they might be killed in the ensuing battles when they become surrounded and cut off from their infantry troops.

d. Chieu Hoi Quick-reaction Leaflets were prepared on ralliers on the Division PSYOP printing capability for exploitation of these ralliers in their former base areas. This was done by interviewing ralliers as soon as possible after they came in. If they could be exploited, a picture was taken and written statements were obtained. These would then be transformed into a quantity of leaflets suitable for aerial or ground dissemination in the base areas of the rallier's former unit. All leaflets of this type were generally a Chieu Hoi appeal with the Hoi Chanh's written statement concerning the treatment he was receiving and expounding the merit of the Chieu Hoi Program.

e. VCI Campaign leaflets were printed for all districts listing the names and job title of personnel in the Viet Cong Infrastructure and offered monetary rewards for information leading to their capture.

f. Vietnamese Victory leaflets were prepared and disseminated in areas where South Vietnamese forces had achieved a victory over enemy forces. This was done in an effort to build up the morale of the Vietnamese units and to increase the confidence of the people in the Vietnamese Government's ability to support and protect them. Victories by ARVN units, regional and popular forces, revolutionary development, and civil defense teams were generally exploited.

g. Medical Treatment leaflets advertising the medical facilities and capabilities of the Allied forces were prepared and disseminated in rural populated areas in an effort to persuade diseased persons and those with any type of physical defect to come into a medical facility for treatment. A leaflet was prepared depicting a young girl with a very bad harelip before and after corrective surgery with instructions as to when and where to go to receive medical treatment.

7. Leaflets, tapes and live broadcasts directed at NVA units are being used in the Division's current operations in the A Shau Valley, Ruong-Ruong Valley, and surrounding areas. Daily aerial broadcasts

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and leaflets drops are being made in support of these operations.

8. Montagnard tribesmen, speaking in their native dialects, were utilized for live aerial broadcasts directed at the Montagnard being used as forced laborers by the NVA in the A Shau Valley, Ruong-Ruong Valley, and surrounding areas in an effort to persuade them to Chieu Hoi and resettle to Montagnard villages in GVN controlled areas. They were also utilized on the ground as interpreters for the interrogation of any Montagnard tribesmen who rallied or were captured. Since there is no written language for the Montagnards, picture leaflets were directed at them with a theme encouraging them to Chieu Hoi.

9. The use of PSYOP Mobile Teams in the Division AO is steadily increasing. A PSYOP Mobile Team consists of a MEDCAP, ground loudspeaker and/or a movie team, depending on the situation, a cultural drama team, armed propaganda squad, Chieu Hoi speakers, and CI personnel. The team is usually sent into the villages that intelligence sources indicate have enemy families/sympathizers or active enemy political cadre. Coordination is made with district headquarters and the district chief usually accompanies the team and talks to the people. The people of the village are given medical treatment, entertainment by the cultural drama team or movies, given PSYOP leaflets, gift packets and propaganda talks by the armed propaganda squad which also solicits information, weapons, and ammunition. CI personnel then collect and pay rewards for any information or weapons that are turned in. On occasions a part of the Division band is taken along to entertain the people. This team has proven highly effective and is very much in demand in the AO at this time.

10. Ralliers and Fws within the Division AO are reporting that they have been subjected to many Allied broadcasts and leaflet drops. Most of them stated that they listened to the broadcasts, read the leaflets and believed what they heard and saw. They also indicated that many of their comrades wished to rally but could not as they had no opportunity because they were being closely watched by their cadre.

11. A PSYOP campaign was initiated and directed at the Farmer's Association and its traditional leaders, officials, and influential members in order to break the backbone of the association's support of the VC and gain its support for the GVN. The PSYOP Mobile Team plans to visit 15-20 hamlets in each district to conduct MEDCAPS, community ralliers, to exploit the Chieu Hoi Program, and to distribute propaganda material to motivate the farmers into realizing that they have been deceived and exploited by the VC to support a futile cause and to persuade the farmers to convince their VC friends to rally to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi Program. Followup visitations will be conducted by CORDS, the Province Chieu Hoi Center, and 101st Airborne Division PSYOP personnel by inviting influential farmers, traditional leaders, and officials of the Farmer's Association to visit Hue to see for themselves what the government has done for the people in general,

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for the returnees in particular, and what it is continuing to do for them.

12. A PSYOP plan has been formulated by the Division PSYOP Section to integrate into a cohesive effort all the assets and resources which are available to persuade the 4th NVA Regiment to rally to the GVN by persuading its members that they have been deceived and exploited by the government of North Vietnam and its Communist Allies to support an immoral, unpopular, and futile cause, and to convince them that their only means of avoiding death and burial in a lonely unmarked grave is to Chieu Hoi to the Government of South Vietnam. The operation was initiated on 30 April and is to be continued in three phases covering a period of about three months.

J. (C) MEDICAL

1. Operations

a. The 326th Medical Battalion continued its medical support of the 101st Airborne Division, utilizing the same policies and procedures with the exception of the Air Ambulance Platoon. "Eagle Dust-Off" committed two aircraft to the support of the 2d Brigade during the period 1 March 1969 to the present. Efforts have been made to establish helipads for one Dust-Off aircraft at both FSB WHIP and FSB FURY. As enemy activity began to pick up, it became the aim of the 326th Medical Battalion to continue the medical support for the Division as well as continue to be active in the MEDCAPS II Program. Local medical personnel and resources are continuously being integrated into this program.

b. Logistics: The logistical functions under the supervision of the Battalion Supply Officer (S-4), 326th Medical Battalion, are grouped into two general areas: Division Medical Supply and Battalion Supply Section. The Battalion Maintenance Section became a separate staff under the airmobile TOE.

(1) Maintenance: The addition of one non-rated chief warrant officer and one school trained aviation maintenance officer has proven to be the filler in the gap reported in this area last report. Excluding aircraft lost due to combat damage, our aircraft availability has been an overall 81% during this reporting period. Present construction of our new maintenance hanger was begun in April with a completion target date of 17 June 1969.

(2) Supply: During this reporting period, it has been the goal of the supply section to completely update and check all property books, hand receipts and clothing records. Frequent liaison visits by supply personnel were continued in order to facilitate good working conditions between this unit and various supply points.

(3) Division Medical Supply: The DMSO section continued to operate

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from A Company at Camp Eagle during this reporting period. Upon completion of the aircraft maintenance hanger, this section will move to the Battalion area of operation. DMSO has been filling an average of 450 items per week. This includes processing and editing of incoming requisitions, pulling from stock, ordering fringe and stockage items, picking up from depot and restocking. DMSO has been able to maintain a 93% fill.

c. Aeromedical Evacuation: The Air Ambulance Platoon continued to operate at full strength during the reporting period. Complete coverage of the 101st Airborne Division AO was maintained with special emphasis on supporting the 2d Brigade during recent operations in and around the A Shau Valley. As weather has turned for the better, "Dust-Off" operations have been able to complete missions faster and more efficiently. With the change in tactical operations to areas South of FSB BASTOGNE, the Air Ambulance Platoon has increased its number of hoist missions pulled by almost 65% per month. This has caused a problem in hoist maintenance and cable capability. The problems encountered causing increased cable maintenance are twofold. The first problem is the tactical losses. This covers both the cable being shot off by enemy ground fire and the necessity of blowing the cable when the aircraft is taking rounds and the cable is lowered. The second problem is created when the patients grab the ring located just above the jungle penetrator. Holding onto this ring prevents the unhampered twisting of the penetrator on the cable. The penetrator will continue to twist, but the added stress on the cable will cause the cable to unwind. It also causes the cable to kink inside the hoist itself. Our cables come from the Corpus Christi Bay, located at Vung Tau and the supply is extremely limited.

d. The following are the medical statistics for 326th Medical Battalion for the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969:

Total patients seen at clearing station.....11,936

Total dental patients..... 3,311

Total admissions..... 691

Total transferred..... 878

RECAPITULATION

IRHA..... 141

NBC..... 1,137

MEDICAL DISEASES

Malaria..... 24

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FUD's.....	149
Diarrhea.....	553
Skin Diseases.....	955
N/P.....	580
Gastroenteritis.....	105
Foot Problems.....	316
Heat injuries.....	39
VD.....	366
Med Evac Mission.....	679
Med Cap II Total Number of persons treated.....	9,122

Medical Supply: 7120 line items shipped at approximately (weight)
35,600 lbs.

e. Statistics for Support Company in totals of Companies A, B, C
reflects February and March only, because of destruction of medical
facility by fire and movement of the company to the Camp Eagle area.

K. (C) SIGNAL:

During the reporting period, the Battalion provided communications support to elements of the Division in Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER, MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, and BRISTOL BOOTS. It established 4-channel VHF radio systems with FSB's ROY, PISTOL, WHIP, LASH, PIKE, BLAZE, BASTONE, and BERCHTESGADEN. The Battalion installed AN/ARC-121 radios into two U-6 aircraft giving the Division an airborne radio retransmission capability. This equipment was used four times in the latter part of April in support of combat operations in the AO. The Battalion also successfully used a helium-filled balloon to raise an FM radio and remote unit to an altitude of 400 to 500 feet, thereby obtaining extended ranges for the radio. During the reporting period, the Battalion filled 38 requests for public address systems, completed 273 work orders for organizational electronics repair, and 150 work orders for direct support maintenance of crypto equipment.

L. (U) ENGINEER:

1. Operations

a. During the reporting period, engineer assets were heavily committed

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to fire base construction and improvement in support of the Division's Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER. Nine new fire bases were constructed, ranging from FSB AIRBORNE, on the periphery of the Northern A Shau Valley, to FSB SHIELD, East of the Laotian border. Several new construction techniques were introduced and proven to be a significant contribution to the Battalion's operational effectiveness. Additionally, the Battalion developed and expanded its rappelling operations with the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry. These operations were typified by inserting Engineer rappellers with Cavalry ground troops into suspected locations and planned fire base sites. Late in the quarter, the Battalion received a rating of "satisfactory" on its Annual General Inspection.

b. Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, was in general support of the Battalion's three line companies for the duration of the reporting period. In that the equipment platoons are organic to the Headquarters Company they were directly, or indirectly, concerned with all equipment support of the Division's area of operations. From 1 February through 30 April, the following equipment support was provided to the Battalion's line companies and Division Headquarters:

D7 Bulldozer	- 570 hours
D5A Bulldozer	- 2170 hours
M450 Bulldozer	- 1870 hours
Cat 112F Grader	- 1860 hours
Front Loader	- 1700 hours
3414 Backhoe	- 1210 hours
MRS-100	- 190 hours
5T Dump Truck	- 950 hours
2 1/2 T Dump Truck	- 1450 hours

(1) Providing the above support in the Division's area of operations required 176 "Chinook" (CH-47) and 88 (CH-54) "Crane" sorties. These sorties constituted a 96% increase over the previous quarter's requirements. The equipment support rendered by Headquarters Company was utilized on more than twenty-five fire bases with approximately fifty percent of the quarter's total effort devoted to assisting in the construction of the nine new fire bases.

(2) Toward the close of the quarter, Headquarters Company began training personnel in techniques of sectionalizing its heavy equipment, e.g. graders, front loaders, and MRS's, for movement by helicopter. Items of

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equipment, exceeding the airlift capacity of a "Crane", must be disassembled into two or more sections before air movement is possible. Anticipating a future requirement for heli-lifting such equipment, Headquarters Company performed the necessary instruction and training, thus adding to its support capabilities.

(C) The Headquarters Company also has the responsibility of providing potable water for divisional troops. Thus the Battalion maintained water points at FSB BIRMINGHAM, Bridge Number 2 near FSB ANZIO, the An Lo Bridge, and Eagle Beach. During the quarter 3,181,850 gallons of potable water were produced and distributed at the four water points. Other operations successfully accomplished by the Headquarters Company included continuous dust suppression activities at the four principal Brigade and Division Headquarters; reconnaissance missions of tactical bridges and LOC's; and engineer design and drafting of plans for numerous base camp and fire base structures, TOC's, FDC's, bunkers, and towers. In April, the engineer detachment at Phan Thiet, in support of the 3/506th Infantry Battalion, was reassigned from Company A to Headquarters Company, thus improving support and administrative relationships with the Battalion.

M. (C) ARMY AVIATION:

1. During the period from 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969 the 160th Aviation Group provided continuous aviation support to combat operations of the 101st Airborne Division. Primary support to the Division involved the last phase of operation NEVADA EAGLE (1-28 February) and Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER which commenced on 1 March 1969 continuing through the end of this reporting period. A major effort of KENTUCKY JUMPER involves the support of Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER which began on 6 March and also continues as of this date. During the last 10 days of April the 160th Aviation Group has also been in support of the 1st Brigade in Operation BRISTOL BOOTS.

2. Concurrent operations supported throughout the reporting period involved the UEMC Operation DEWEY CANYON, Special Forces FOB, COM, Project Delta, ARVN support in I Corps, selected missions outside RVN, and heavy lift support to both the 1st Marine Division and Americal Division as directed by XXIV Corps.

3. The following statistical data is provided for the reporting periods:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HRS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>	<u>ACFT RECOVERIES</u>
101 AHB	14023	63560	86851	2372	1
158 AHB	9999	24185	38054	997	See Note 1 (Page 33)

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UNIT	HRS FLOWN	SCORTIES	PAX	TONS CARGO	ACFT RECOVERIES
163d Avn Co	3428	9877	7376	0	0
159 ASHB	9447	31508	76924	52349	168
Total	36897	129130	209205	55718	169

UNIT	TYPE ACFT	AVG M/R AVAIL
101 AHB	UH-1H	73.3%
	AH-1G	69.0%
	CH-6A	89.0%
158 AHB	UH-1H	73.3%
	AH-1G	60.4%
	UH-1B	46.6%
	CH-6A	72.6%
159 ASHB	CH-47B	58.0%
	CH-47C	76.0%
	CH-54	70.0%

Note 1. The average mission readily available is shown from the first day that the unit attained 50% availability after receipt of aircraft from CONUS.

- a. HHC: Start date: 6 February 1969.
- b. CO A: Start date: 4 March 1969.
- c. CO B: Start date: 22 March 1969.
- d. CO C: Start date: 25 February 1969:
- (1) UH-1B: Start date: 18 March 1969.
- (2) AH-1G: Start date: 18 April 1969.

Note 2. AH-1G Cobras were not received until 7 April 1969.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE ACFT</u>	<u>AVG M/R AVAIL</u>
	CH-6A	90.0%
163d Avn Co (GS)	UH-1H	87.0%
	CH-6A	80.0%
	U6A	79.0%

4. Elements of the 160th Aviation Group participated in over 450 combat assaults during the reporting period.

5. 109 incidents of ground fire were recorded. Identification of incidents by mission is as follows:

	<u>UH-1</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-54</u>	<u>CH-6A</u>
Armed Escort	13			
Armed Helicopter Close Support	2			
Troop Carrier Operation	24			2
Logistical Resupply	11	24	7	
Other (FOB, VR, Sniffer, Flare)	26			

6. Aircraft losses incurred during operations are as follows:

	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Combat	31	14	45
Non-Combat	25	7	32
Totals	56	21	77

7. Direct Support Concept

a. On 1 April the Commanding Officer, 160th Aviation Group, initiated a new concept of placing 1 aviation company in direct support of each infantry brigade. DS companies deal directly with their respective brigade for all log and combat assault requirements. Advantages include more responsive aviation support, closer liaison and, as a result more combat effectiveness from the airmobile unit.

b. The three aviation companies not in DS are considered as general support companies. Their assets are used to supplement DS units

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when necessary perform out-of-Division missions such as FOB, CCN, and XXIV Corps requirements, as well as handle other general missions, i.e., sniffer, psyops, insecticide, and other staff originated requirement.

N. (U) INFORMATION:

The Division Information Office during the reporting period submitted 2,632 hometown news releases to the hometown center in Kansas City. In addition, this officer has published seven editions of the Division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle," and one edition of the Division magazine, Rendezvous With Destiny.

Coverage has been provided for 25 visiting general officers or equivalent and support has been provided to 87 correspondents.

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II. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. Chaplain Space Authorization

a. Observation: TOE Chaplain spaces within the Division do not meet the 1/700 Chaplain-to-troop ratio for combat units as authorized by AR 310-22

b. Evaluation: With a strength of approximately 22,000 the Division is authorized only 23 Chaplains. If the authorized ratio were adhered to, it should be authorized 31. The Division AO is sizeable, encompasses extremely rugged terrain, and is characterized by isolated small unit operations. Additionally, two separate installations require assignment of a Chaplain each. Coverage is supplied the maneuver battalions only by having combat support and combat service support unit Chaplains take on more coverage than normal or desirable.

c. Recommendation: That TOE of 2d/17th Cavalry be modified to authorize one Chaplain (Captain) and one enlisted Chaplain's Assistant. That TOE of Administration Company be modified to authorize additional Chaplains and enlisted assistants, up to the authorized ratio as determined by the strength of the Division, to be utilized based on need as determined by the Division Chaplain.

B.(C) OPERATIONS

1. Emergency Extraction

a. Observation: During the past quarter several STABO rigs used to conduct emergency extractions were tested and compared to the McGuire rig.

b. Evaluation: The STABO rig has proven to be greatly superior to the McGuire rig in the test environment. It is quicker, safer, and may be used to extract personnel in a prone position — the McGuire rig may be so used only under the most ideal of circumstances. The STABO rig may be used to extract seriously injured or unconscious personnel — the McGuire rig cannot be so used. The rig features a harness which leaves both arms free enabling the extracted personnel to use their weapons if necessary.

c. Recommendation: That the STABO rig be made available for testing and usage by this unit.

3. Airborne Personnel Detector Missions

a. Observation: Airborne Personnel Detector (sniffer) missions were scheduled daily and were flown on an average of one mission every two days. Inflight readings were relayed to the supported unit TOC and were then given

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to the artillery for immediate exploitation.

b. Evaluation: The sniffer missions were helpful in pinpointing the movements of enemy troops and in providing fruitful targets for the artillery. When sniffer missions were cancelled it was usually because gunship escorts were not available. In several instances the sniffer ship was denied entrance to a scheduled area because they could not get artillery clearance.

c. Recommendation: An alternate area of coverage should be designated in case the sniffer ship is denied access to the primary zone due to artillery hazards. Communications between the sniffer ship and the supported unit TOC should be maintained during a mission to facilitate immediate response to sightings and to aid in resolving coordination problems the ship might encounter once on station.

4. Accidental Fougasse Ignition

a. Observation: Accidental fougasse ignition, caused by lightning in mountainous areas of Vietnam, can be prevented by removing the blasting caps from the claymores daily.

b. Evaluation: A problem area has arisen due to fougasse explosion caused by direct hits of lightning on FB WHIP. The fougasse barrels were set off by the explosion of the claymores emplaced behind the barrels. A total of 35 barrels of fougasse were prematurely detonated due to lightning striking the top of FB WHIP on two separate occasions. The barrels exploded simultaneously with 19 detonating the first time and 16 detonating the second.

The standard emplacement is to bury the fougasse barrel and claymores 1/2 to 3/4 under ground and sand bag the rest of the barrel with at least 5 layers of sand bags, leaving a small aperture on the enemy side. This procedure was used at FB WHIP, but proved unacceptable due to the violent electrical storms that occur in this tropical mountainous area of Vietnam.

The problem was solved by removing the blasting caps from the claymores each morning and rolling up the wire to the command bunker, and each night after the electrical storm, just prior to darkness, uncoiling the wire and attaching the blasting caps to the claymores. To do this, a rectangular hole, behind the buried and sandbagged fougasse barrel, was dug. The hole was dug so that two claymores could be taken out easily and replaced. The hole would be covered up with two sand bags when the blasting caps are in place.

Since implementing the emplacement of fougasse with the removal of the blasting caps each day, no barrels of fougasse have been ignited by lightning.

c. Recommendation: That units with fougasse on their perimeters,

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remove the blasting caps each day. This will assist in controlling the premature detonation of the fougasse due to a lightning strike.

5. Tube Artillery Support

a. Observation: Problems involving tube artillery support during airmobile operations.

b. Evaluation: The Division Artillery Executive Officer presented a formal briefing to all aviators within this battalion concerning artillery support, problems and hazards. This class was very detailed, and served a valuable purpose in alleviating the fear of being hit by friendly artillery fire, etc., while flying throughout the AO. The artillery advisory system was discussed, check fire methods elaborated upon, which include primarily that the requirement for check fires is very remote, if flight route planning takes advantage of the artillery positions, and not overfly these areas along the flight route.

c. Recommendation: That all incoming aviators be required to attend a briefing on aviation hazards from artillery which would be given by Division Artillery personnel.

6. Aircraft Losses

a. Observation: A substantial number of UH-1 aircraft are lost through blade strike and stump damage while operating in dangerous and poorly selected LZ's.

b. Evaluation: The 160th Aviation Group has suffered loss of aircraft due to main rotor blade strikes and tail rotor blade strikes in pickup zones and landing zones. It is recognized that, in the event of an emergency, standards of selection must be somewhat relaxed. However, on a recurring, planned operational basis, landing zones and pickup zones should be selected in accordance with established standards. Allowance must be made for a buffer factor in blade clearance. As much as possible, the PZ and LZ should allow for a normal or at the most a steep approach as opposed to a vertical take off and landing. After a PZ and LZ is occupied, maximum effort should be made to improve the site. The size should be increased and landing and departure lanes cleared.

c. Recommendation: That aviation personnel be given an active role in selecting landing and pickup zones. That ground commanders at all levels be impressed with the necessity of continually improving zones after occupation.

7. Chainsaws

a. Observation: The chainsaw is the most critical item of equipment during the initial phase of fire base construction.

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b. Evaluation: Experience has shown that a minimum of eight chainsaws are required per platoon during construction of a fire support base. Under normal conditions six chainsaws will be in use at one time with two in reserve. Maximum results are achieved when two personnel are assigned per saw. One man operates the saw while the other clears underbrush, notches trees, and carries the resupply of gas and oil. The practice of using two men per saw permits operator rotation. Experience shows a high mortality rate of certain chainsaw parts; i.e. starter rewinds, guide bars, chains and carburetors.

c. Recommendation: Personnel, properly trained in operation and maintenance procedures, should be assigned in two-man teams during fire base construction. The following P1L is recommended per eight chainsaws:

chainsaw blade	- 6 each
starter rewind	- 6 each
guide bar	- 2 each
carburetor	- 3 each
magneto	- 3 each
spark plug	- 2 each

Two chainsaws should receive a maintenance stand down each day. By using this procedure a deadlined chainsaw can be exchanged for a reserve with little or no loss of work time.

8. Land Clearing

a. Observation: the amount and placement of demolitions is inversely proportional to the requirement for engineer equipment used in fire base construction.

b. Evaluation: In clearing trees and bush vegetation during fire base construction, there is a dependent relationship between demolitions, chainsaw, and bulldozer requirements. It is operationally conceivable that any one of the three items could be eliminated by an increase in the other two. For instance, demolitions are not required but there is such a great increase in chainsaw and bulldozer work that the time required for construction becomes too great. However, by increasing the amount of demolitions, it is possible to decrease the chainsaw and bulldozer effort. This has brought about the "prepping" of fire base sites with large quantities of ordnance. Once on the site, employment of shaped charges followed by cratering charges would result in greater clearing per pound of explosives.

c. Recommendation: Following fire base "prepping", shaped charges should be emplaced and detonated on ridge lines and hilltops, creating small craters. Subsequently, cratering charges should be placed in the craters and detonated, resulting in an uprooting of heavy timbers, destruction of light vegetation and levelling the high ground. The end result will be a lowering of high elevations and a widening of flat areas. These

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activities should be conducted with a minimum number of personnel. One or two bulldozers should then be airlifted to finish and level prepared areas while chainsaws clear aircraft approaches, etc.

C. (U) TRAINING

1. Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31M)

a. Observation: Newly trained Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31M) are unfamiliar with the AN/TCC-3 and AN/GRC-10 used by the Airmobile Division Signal Battalion. This requires further training of the individuals before they can be utilized.

b. Evaluation: Students in the 31M course, Ft. Gordon, are not given sufficient exposure to Airmobile Signal Equipment.

c. Recommendation: That more emphasis be given to Airmobile Signal Equipment during the formal training of Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants.

2. Ambush Execution

a. Observation: The average US soldier should be better trained in the techniques of ambush execution prior to his arrival in RVN.

b. Evaluation: This Division has had notable success in ambush operations, but reports continue to indicate that numerous ambushes have been executed against enemy forces with poor or negative results, mainly due to individual actions. After action reports and interviews confirm that a majority of the unsuccessful ambushes can be attributed to detection of the ambush by the enemy and their appropriate countermeasures, such as immediate withdrawal or circumvention and, in isolated cases, aggressive counterambush techniques. A significant number of unsuccessful ambushes can also be attributed to improper techniques in the use of weapons and other ambush ordnance. Recurring deficiencies are improper placement of claymores, inaccurate small arms fire at night and misuse of trip flares. Unit training alleviates some of the problems, but education is a slow process and costly in terms of results during the learning period. Though well versed in the philosophy and concept of the ambush, the soldier at times fails to execute the fundamentals with disastrous results.

c. Recommendation: That greater emphasis be given to the practical application of the techniques of ambush execution in all pertinent programs of instruction to include BCT and AIT.

3. Rappelling Training

a. Observation: Rappelling and McGuire Rig Training for aero rifle and air cavalry personnel is needed in CONUS.

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b. Evaluation: Our air cavalry troops were deployed to Vietnam without training in rappelling and extraction with the McGuire Rig which is a major aspect of their operations. This has caused a serious delay in mission assignment while the personnel went through an intensive training process.

c. Recommendation: That all deploying Air Cavalry units be required to conduct this training for all aircrew members and Aero Riflemen and that this training be included in the appropriate ATP's.

D.(C)INTELLIGENCE

1. Editing of Document Readouts

a. Observation: Document readouts have occasionally been unclear because of the ambiguities caused by translation.

b. Evaluation: Ambiguity in translation of document readouts has been eliminated by the new procedures of utilizing only a qualified linguist for the task of editing document readouts.

c. Recommendation: That the use of this procedure be continued.

2. Evaluation of Document Readouts

a. Observation: Comments on document readouts by 9th ARVN MID personnel have not always been consistent with 101st OB holdings.

b. Evaluation: The inconsistency of 9th ARVN MID comments on document readouts has been greatly reduced by the recently inaugurated practice of having draft copies sent to 101st OB Section for their comment prior to publication of the readout.

c. Recommendation: That this practice be continued with all readouts containing 9th ARVN MID comments.

3. Information and Operations Security

a. Observation: Casual discussion of pending Division operations in unauthorized places such as clubs, laundries and barbershops greatly increased the possibility of the enemy gaining knowledge of the operations.

b. Evaluation: The areas mentioned above are locations where local nationals and Third Country Nationals are normally employed. Also present in these areas are numerous U.S. personnel who have no need to know about operations. While all indigenous personnel are required to possess an ARVN Military Security Service (MSS) clearance, the clearance itself does not guarantee the complete reliability of the individuals concerned. Established security checks and control procedures do not in themselves prevent the enemy from exploiting members of the on-post indigenous labor force in regard to U.S. operations, activities and intentions. Unguarded conversation in the

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presence of indigenous employees serves only to assist the enemy in gaining critical information about U.S. operations and intentions.

c. Recommendation: Commanders at all levels should stress the risks inherent in discussing Division operational intentions with individuals who have no need to know of such operations, with special emphasis placed on security in the presence of Local National Employees. Commanders should remember that established security procedures for information security and control of Local Nationals, are only as effective as they are enforced.

4. AN/US Q42 Problems

a. Observation: Personnel operating portable AN/US Q42 were having problems maintaining portables, interpreting sensor readouts and passing readout information to the artillery for action. The time periods between when the sensor was activated and the artillery's TOT were often so long that the results of any mission were negligible.

b. Evaluation: CONUS trained personnel began arriving and were used to further train OJT personnel in maintaining portables. Instruction was also given on interpreting of digital sheets. Operators were trained in recognizing patterns necessary to detect enemy personnel. No activations were received from the emplaced MAGIDS-DT-368/GSQ. The MAGIDS were probably improperly emplaced and the result was that the sensor modules polarized themselves.

c. Recommendations: In order to facilitate readout time, sensors emplaced in a string should be emplaced so that their identity codes run in sequence — 19-20-21, etc. This will simplify the monitoring process at the monitoring station. If possible, in conjunction with this, the personnel who are encoding sensor devices should strive to put different codes on sensors to be monitored from the same station. This should be done even if the sensor devices are on different channels. Personnel emplacing sensors should receive additional instruction in the emplacement of the MAGIDS-DT-368/GSQ. The external sensor cables should be placed so that they form perpendicular angles with the satellite wire. If they are emplaced within two feet of the satellite wire, polarization occurs. Personnel emplacing MAGIDS should be informed of this and, if possible, participate in a practice exercise in emplacing the MAGIDS. Most of these problems are minor and can be solved by giving the personnel involved more training. The instructors for these training periods should be qualified in the sensor field and, if possible, at least one CONUS trained individual should be assigned to each monitoring site. These suggestions would simplify the monitoring process and expedite fire missions.

B. (C) LOGISTICS

1. Color Coding Collapsible Drums

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for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

a. Observation: Liquids transported in collapsible drums has become contaminated when different types of liquids were placed in the same drum.

b. Evaluation: The instances of contamination can be greatly reduced by color coding the drums. This color coding can be accomplished by painting the metal rims of the drums a distinctive color indicating the type liquid it contains.

c. Recommendations: That all units transporting liquids in collapsible drums color code the drums as well as writing on the drum the type of liquid transported.

2. Major Assemblies for Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton. M151

a. Observation: Major assemblies for this vehicle are difficult to obtain causing excessive "down time" throughout the Division. The source of supply is rebuild facilities.

b. Evaluation: Rebuild facilities are unable to keep up with demands from the field due to the lack of rebuildable assets.

c. Recommendation: That these assemblies be put on a direct exchange basis. To initiate the program, each Division and major unit should be issued a stockage of serviceable assemblies. When a serviceable assembly is used in a vehicle, the unserviceable one can be directly exchanged for another that is serviceable.

3. Forward POL Points

a. Observation: Forward POL points.

b. Evaluations: Under the airmobile concept most aviation units are equipped with POL equipment for the purpose of establishing forward refueling points for organic aircraft. When an Airmobile Division will normally be operating in an extensive area of operation, it is important that strategically located refueling points be established to be used, not by one unit alone, but by all aircraft operating in the vicinity of that point. While the rearward capability may not be organic to certain aviation units, every attempt should be made to establish combined rearward/refuel points wherever practical.

c. Recommendation: In the establishment of rearward/refuel points the following must be accomplished to insure success:

(1) A thorough reconnaissance to ascertain the number of refueling points the area is capable of handling.

(2) A determination of the approximate number of aircraft that will be using the point daily must be made so that a stockage level can be estimated.

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The logistical operators of the point must coordinate daily with operations personnel to determine anticipated increases in utilization of the point.

(3) Analyze daily consumption rates in both refuel and ammunition to determine a daily utilization figure. Based on this analysis, daily resupply amounts can be programmed into the daily logistical requirements. However, coordination with the resupply agency must be affected to establish emergency resupply back-up in case of unprogrammed utilization of the point.

(4) Effective communications must be established between:

- (a) Point and staff agency that coordinates with resupply agency.
- (b) Point and resupply agency.
- (c) Logistical resupply aircraft.

4. Gunship Support of CH-47 Vertical Resupply Sorties

a. Observation: Logistical sorties to develop fire bases in dense jungle terrain frequently results in considerable risk to CH-47 crews and aircraft. At these times gunship support is needed to counter the threat of hostile ground fire and to suppress it when it occurs.

b. Evaluation: Security of resupply vehicles is a responsibility of the providing unit not the requesting unit (e.g. GS truck battalions receive movement requests and arrange security from within organic assets). The same technique should also apply to aviation logistical support since the requesting unit is normally a support unit which has neither the means to control nor the authority to deploy tactical aircraft in brigade areas of operation.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that the 160th Aviation Group be required to arrange for, or provide, gunship support of logistical sorties in coordination with the brigade whose area of operation includes the LZ/PZ in question.

5. Unit Distribution of Supplies

a. Observation: During the reporting period DISCOM initiated a system of unit distribution of all classes of supply, with minor exceptions, to relieve supported units of the need to draw, spot, and rig helicopter sling loads. Under this system, FSSE's receive requests for supplies and then perform all functions which include; issue, spotting loads, rigging and inspecting loads, arranging for CH-47 sorties, and controlling CH-47 sorties delivering the requested supplies to the designated FSB.

b. Evaluation: Unit distribution has proved to be an effective method of supporting maneuver and combat support units of this Division. By using DISCOM assets and personnel, supported units are relieved of the major burden

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of resupply functions. To effectively operate a unit distribution system it is essential that all supply requests in a brigade AO be monitored by the brigade S4 so that appropriate priorities can be assigned. In addition, it is important that air items and collapsible drums be backhauled to ESSE Hook pads in an aggressive manner to preclude disruption of support.

c. Recommendation: That brigade S4 establish priorities for all supplies consumed within the brigade AO. Also that aggressive procedures be instituted by all divisional units to insure the timely backhaul of air items and collapsible drums.

F. (U) ORGANIZATION

None

G. (U) SIGNAL

1. Intercom in LOH-6

a. Observation: The intercom and transmission capability for passengers in the rear seat of LOH-6 is unsatisfactory.

b. Evaluation: The rear seat passenger has difficulty communicating with personnel in the front seats of the LOH and is unable to transmit to other stations. An intercom solution has been to modify a headset so that one side is plugged into the LOH intercom and the other side is plugged into an AN/PRC-25.

c. Recommendation: That a suitable intercom system be developed for the LOH-6.

2. Battery Leakage

a. Observation: Radio sets AN/PRC-25, AN/PRC-77, and secure voice equipment KY-38 have been damaged by leaking dry battery, BA386/PRC.

b. Evaluation: Battery leakage damage is caused by prolonged storage of the radio or security equipment without removing the battery.

c. Recommendation: All commanders should insure that batteries are removed when radio or security equipment is stored or turned in for maintenance.

H. (U) MAINTENANCE

None

I. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/CIVIC ACTION

1. Distribution of Food and Clothing

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

a. Observation: When giving out clothes to refugee camp inhabitants, there have been instances of confusion and loss of control of the situation due to lack of prior planning.

b. Evaluation: Much of this problem stems from the method by which the clothes are issued. The lack of a definite listing of families with the number of people in each family, their ages and sex has caused countless good will efforts to fall short of their intended mark.

c. Recommendation: The following guide lines should help to produce correct distribution practices.

(1) First know that you have enough goods to distribute to all the target families.

(2) Next approach the Vietnamese Official in the refugee camp or village, and request a detailed list of families, by name, with the number of people in each family, their ages and sex.

(3) Then prior to entering the hamlet or refugee camp break down the goods into family lots and bag them in clean sand bags. Place a simple shipping tag, with the family name on the bag and have the camp chief choose an appropriate time and place for distribution. Make it a dignified occasion and the people will appreciate it.

(4) The local ARVN military leader should be present to emphasize the role of the Vietnamese Government in the program. With a little added time in the preparation stage of the distribution, the benefits can be many and the good will results from such steps will carry over to any US and ARVN units within the area.

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AVII-GCT (22 May 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (P1)

MAJ Markl/rrm/2506

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96308 17 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of the 101st Airborne Division has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.
2. (C) Except as noted below, HQ, XXIV Corps concurs without further comment on Commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations listed in Section 2 of the report. Comments follow:

a. Reference Section I, Operations, Significant Activities.

(1) Paragraph E1c, page 11. In addition to unconfirmed agent reports mentioned in the ORLL, more substantial information from PW interrogation reports and documents led to locating the 90th Regt in Quang Nam Province.

(2) Paragraph E1d, page 11. Contact with elements of the 9th Regt during March and April resulted in an estimated 150-200 casualties to the 816th Bn/9th Regt, rendering that unit marginally effective or less. Indications are that the 815th Bn/9th Regt also suffered approximately 100 casualties from the engagements, thus substantially reducing its combat effectiveness.

b. Reference Section 2, Lessons Learned.

(1) Paragraph B1, page 36, Emergency Extraction. Recommend unit submit a request for the device through appropriate channels.

(2) Paragraph B5, page 38, Tube Artillery Support.

(a) Detailed briefings concerning artillery support, problems and hazards would be very beneficial for both air crews and ground personnel.

(b) Recommend that the detailed artillery briefing be included in the in-country orientation for newly assigned aviators.

(3) Paragraph D4, page 42 AN/US 042 Problems.

(a) Although it is generally proper to emplace sensors on a string so that identity codes are sequential, an exception occurs in the case of an external device or verifying sensor such as a MASID or PIRID. Using an out-of-sequence number on such a device enables the operator to verify the target more rapidly.

(b) Monitoring different channels from the same station is improper procedure, since the operator must switch channels on the readout device. All

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17 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

sensors in the same string on the same portatale station should be on the same channel.

(4) Paragraph E4, page 44, Gunship Support of CH-47 Vertical Resupply Sorties. Recommend that the aviation company in direct support of each brigade coordinate gunship escorts for cargo aircraft when the tactical situation indicates the need for additional security.

(5) Paragraph G1, page 45, Intercom LOH6. A light weight console has been developed for the LOH and is expected to become available in limited quantities in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H.R. Taylor
H.R. TAYLOR
CPT AGC
ASST AG

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AVHCC-EST (22 May 1969) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, LGS CSFOR-65 (A1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,
APC 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Chaplain Space Authorization," section II, page 36, paragraph A1.

(1) Concur with the recommendation that the 2/17th Air Cavalry Squadron be authorized one Chaplain (Captain) and one enlisted Chaplain's Assistant. The recommendation is applicable to all Air Cavalry Squadrons and therefore is in line with the USAFV Standardization Program. The unit is advised to submit a proposed ETOH to this headquarters in accordance with established procedures.

(2) With respect to the recommendation that the TOE of the Administrative Company be modified to authorize additional Chaplains and enlisted assistants based on a 1:700 Chaplain-to-troop ratio as indicated in AR 310-32; nonconcur. The 1:700 Chaplain-to-troop ratio is a general yardstick used to establish Chaplain space authorizations. The Chaplain support available to this Division is generally in line with support provided other similar organizations in RVN.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Emergency Extraction," section II, page 36, paragraph B1; concur. Testing of the STABO rig has been accomplished by the 5th Special Forces Group. The STABO rig is scheduled for delivery to the 101st Airborne Division, however the exact time frame for delivery has not been established.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Accidental Fougasse Ignition," section II, page 37, paragraph B4; nonconcur. A simple shunt device, installed at the battery end of the wire, will prevent lightning from prematurely setting off electric blasting caps.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Tube Artillery Support," section II, page 38, paragraph B5; concur. The briefing is required by USAFV Regulation 95-26, Appendix I.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Chainsaws," section II, page 38, paragraph B7; concur. Proper maintenance and operator training will insure maximum availability of equipment. The recommended PLL appears to be excessive in quantity and should be supported by demand experience. No further action required by this or higher headquarters.

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AVHGC-DJT (22 May 1969) 2d ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (d1)

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Major Assemblies for Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, M151," section 11, page 43, paragraph E2; concur. Major assemblies for the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck are direct exchange (DX) items and should be placed in the DX System. Required repairs will be accomplished by using available new repair parts or parts obtained from cannibalization points. The prompt turn-in of repairable major assemblies is necessary to insure an adequate supply of serviceable assemblies. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Intercom in LOH-6," section 11, page 45, paragraph G1; concur. HAO 55-1520-214-30/19 and 30/29 will be applied to improve the intercom system as soon as they become available. An INSURE request has been submitted for an aircraft-powered lightweight command and control console for the back seat passenger. As an interim measure a battery powered console designed around the AN/PRC 77 radio is being locally fabricated and tested. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
101st ABN Div
XAV Corps

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GPOP-DT (22 May 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward-
ing indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. C. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

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Inclosure 1 (Task Organization) to ORLL, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 1-101
1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty (-) (DS)
A/326 Engr (-) (DS)
FSSE (Fwd Serv Spt Elm)
 A/326 Med
 B/801 Maint
 1/A/426 S&S
1/265 RRC
1/101 MP Co
FST/A/501 Sig
TACP 20 TASS
42 Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
557 Inf Plt (Cbt Trackers)
Team 101 MI Det
3-5 Cav (-) (OPCON)
C/2-34 Armor (-) (OPCON)
A/101 AHB

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 3-101
1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf
3-187 Inf
2-319 Arty (DS)
B Co (-) 326 Engr (DS)
FSSE
 C/326 Med
 D/801 Maint
 3/A/426 S&S
3/265 RRC
3/101 MP Co
58 Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
Team 101 MI Det
FST/A/501 Sig
TACP 20 TASS
25 PI Det
Plt/E/3-5 Cav (OPCON)
Plt/C/2-34 Armor (OPCON)
A/158 AHB

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 2-101
1-501 Inf
2-501 Inf
1-502 Inf
1-321 Arty (DS)
C/326 Engr (DS)
FSSE
 B/326 Med
 C/801 Maint
 2/A/426 S&S
2/265 RRC
2/101 MP Co
47 Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
Team 101 MI Det
FST/A/501 Sig
TACP 20 TASS
34 PI Det
C/101 AHB

160 Avn Gp, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 160 Avn Gp
101 AHB
158 AHB
159 ASHB
163 Avn Co
478 Avn Co (-) (CH-54A) (OPCON)
359 Avn Supt Det
382 Trans Det
273 Trans Det
159 Trans Det
169 Trans Det
168 Trans Det
625 Trans Det
327 Trans Det
499 Trans Det
510 Trans Det
516 Trans Det
527 Trans Det
530 Trans Det
649 Trans Det

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Inclosure I (Task Organization) to ORLL, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCE CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Division Artillery, 101st Abn Div

HHC 101 Division Artillery
4-77 Arty (ARA)
650 Trans Det (Acft Maint)
A/2-94 Arty (GS)
1 Bn 83 Arty (GSR)
A/6-33 Arty (GSR)
B/6-33 Arty (GSR)
B/1-40 Arty (GSR)
Plt/D/1-44 Arty (AWSP) (GS)
Sec/G/29 Arty (Searchlight) (GS)
Sec/G/65 Arty (Quad 50) (GS)
2-138 Arty (155 SP) (GS)
A Btry (Avn) 377th Arty
331 Trans Det
263 Trans Det
388 Trans Det
266 Fld Arty Det (Radar)

Division Support Command

HHC and Band
801 Maint Bn (-)
67 Maint Co (DS)
426 ASB Bn (-)
SCOP (-) 501 Sig Bn
526 Med Bn (-)
5 Trans Bn (Acft Maint)

Division Troops

HHC 101 Airborne Division
2-17 Air Cav
L Co 75 Inf (Ranger) (Attached)
332 Trans Det
333 Trans Det
507 Trans Det
326 Engr Bn (-)
501 Sig Bn (-)
101 MP Co (-)
265 RRC (-)
10 Cml Plt
20 Cml Plt
22 MIL Hist Det
Det 16, Sub Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO
101 MI Det (-)
4th Det, 7 Psyop Bn
7 Flt, 29 CA Co (DS)
101 Post Exchange Det
27th Engr Bn 45th Sp (GS)
Operation Location 6
5th Weather Det

Task Force 3-506 (OPCON I FFV Phan Thiet)

D/2-320 Arty (DS)
4/A/326 Eng
3-506 MI Det (Prov)

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