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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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10/10/69
10 October 1969

Operational Report (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACDFOR OF TI, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Operational report ending 31 Jul 69.

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147
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 - 212th Combat Aviation Battalion

9

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 212th Combat Aviation Battalion
"Wings of Freedom"
APO SF 96349

12 August 1969

AIRACF-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for
the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSNOR-65 (R1)(U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities: a. The unit mission of the 131st Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane) was expanded to include two additional Infra-red and one additional Side Looking Airborne Radar missions. Origin and location of the mission is classified SECRET.

b. On 27 May 1969, the 220th Aviation Company (Reconnaissance Airplane) underwent an organizational change as a result of the attachment of the 59th Signal Detachment located at Phu Bai, APO 96308. An organizational chart and station list are at Inclosure 1.

c. Personnel changes of command and principal staff positions within the battalion for the reporting period are at Inclosure 2.

d. The 212th CAB and its subordinate units authorized and present for duty strength as of 31 July 1969 are at Inclosure 3.

e. The type aircraft which are authorized and on hand for the battalion and its subordinate units are listed at Inclosure 4.

f. Results of operations conducted during this quarter by subordinate units in sorties flown, troops lifted, cargo transported, enemy killed by air, sampans and structures destroyed, aircraft lost or damaged are at ~~Inclosure 5~~.

g. During this reporting period the 212th CAB engaged in operations against the enemy on 92 consecutive days, flying a total of 49,734 sorties.

h. Events of Historical Significance:

(1) The following attacks on friendly installations took place during the reporting period.

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Inclosure

14
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

(a) On 18 May 1969 at 0145 hours, the area occupied by units of this command at the Marble Mountain Air Facility received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The attack lasted approximately 10 minutes and resulted in heavy damage to two UH-1B aircraft, and light damage to a maintenance hanger and two 5 ton trucks. There were no casualties.

(b) On 7 June 1969 at 0047 hours, the area occupied by units of this command at the Marble Mountain Air Facility received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The attack lasted approximately 5 minutes and resulted in light damage to the building being utilized as the Battalion Recreation Center. Casualties were three personnel WIA and returned to duty.

(c) On 16 July 1969 at 0140 hours, the area occupied by units of this command at the Marble Mountain Air Facility received 8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The attack lasted approximately 10 minutes and resulted in light damage to three UH-1H, two UH-1B, one UH-1D, and one OV-1 aircraft. There were no casualties.

(2) The following significant flight operations occurred during the reporting period.

(a) On 21 May 1969, the 282d Avn Co (Aslt Hel) scrambled a light fire team in response to USAF Forward Air Controllers who reported troops in contact north of Quang Ngai. Battle damage resulted in 15 structures destroyed and 10 structures damaged.

(b) On 22 May 1969, the "Alley Cats" gunships of the 282d Avn Co (Aslt Hel) were called upon to engage enemy troops in an area near Hoi An. Several enemy positions were engaged resulting in 7 enemy killed by air and 2 structures damaged.

(c) On 17 June 1969, 2 gunships of the 282d Avn Co (Aslt Hel) were diverted from an escort mission to render aerial fire support to troops in contact near Dien Ban. Results included 1 enemy killed by air and 2 structures damaged.

(d) On 18 June 1969, a UH-1H helicopter of the 282d Avn Co (Aslt Hel) was hit by intense fire from enemy ground positions while conducting a combat assault west of Quang Ngai. The aircraft exploded and crashed killing the 4 crewmembers aboard.

(e) On 26 June 1969, a light fire team from the 282d Avn Co (Aslt Hel) engaged a large force of enemy troops while conducting an escort mission for U.S. Navy Swift Boats south of Hoi An. Results of the action included 22 enemy killed by air and 5 enemy wounded by air.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

(f) On 16 July 1969, gunships of the 282d Avn Co (A-1H) were scrambled to an area north of Hoi An to suppress possible enemy positions. Enemy troops were observed and engaged, resulting in 27 enemy killed by air and 1 sampans destroyed.

(3) Significant administrative activities:

(a) On 2-3-4 June 1969, four companies of this command received a Com and Maintenance Management Inspection administered by a team from the 1st Aviation Brigade.

(b) On 9-13 June 1969, this command received its Annual General Inspection administered by a team from USAFV Headquarters. Results of the AGI were satisfactory.

(c) The 212th CAB ended fiscal year 1969 with an aircraft accident rate of only 12.4 accidents per 100,000 flying hours.

2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: Unit Supply:

(1) Observation: ITOE allowances for unit supply personnel are insufficient to meet the demands of the unit.

(2) Evaluation: The supply function of the surveillance airplane company encompasses a larger area and is more complex than most aviation companies and in some cases, some battalions. Aircraft and equipment of the company is valued at more than \$30,000,000 and personnel equipment is supplied for more than 300 men. The majority of equipment is very expensive and is accounted for by approximately 20 hand receipts. The unit's priority mission often requires immediate and direct supply with various support agencies throughout Vietnam. Under the present ITOE, only a Supply Sergeant (E-6), Supply Specialist, Supply Clerk and Armorer are authorized. The work load, plus the required experience level needed for supply administration exceeds the present authorization. The suggested revision is as indicated below. It is felt that this change would provide the necessary depth and experience.

WO Supply Technician	76L4
E-7 Supply Sgt	76E40
E-5 Asst Supply Sgt	76K20
E-5 Armorer	76K20
E-4 Supply Clerk Typist	76K20
E-4 Supply Clerk	76K20
E-3 Driver	71A10

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(3) Recommendation: That all Surveillance Airplane Companies in RVN be interrogated to determine if above observation exists throughout RVN.

(4) Command Action: This command is preparing a request for revision of ATOE in accordance with USARV Circular 310-44, 31 May 68.

b. Operations:

(1) Color and Camouflage Detecting Film Processing.

(a) Observation: The quality of Color or CD film is greatly affected by the temperature of the processing bath.

(b) Evaluation: On numerous occasions, the quality of Color and CD film processing has been below acceptable standards. In almost all cases, quality has been affected by poor temperature control of processing materials. To alleviate this problem, a large temperature controlled bath was locally constructed using materials on hand within the unit. Temperature control of the bath was achieved by using one of the two control units from an ES-38B photo processor. (See Inclosure 7) Results have been worth the effort and with two ES-38B's on hand, the capability of automatically processing routine black and white film has not been reduced.

(c) Recommendation: That the units processing color and CD film be advised of this method of construction and temperature bath.

(d) Command Action: All SAC units in this command have been informed.

(2) KA-60 Panoramic photographs

(a) Observation: Detail analysis of KA-60 negatives is often difficult because of small size and distortion.

(b) Evaluation: KA-60 negatives are 2½" x 10" and cover 180 degrees of scan. Detail within the negative is very small and is rather difficult to analyze. When areas of interest are noted, a 20" x 24" positive print is made utilizing an area of the negative 2" x 2½". Utilizing the technique, very small detail is readily recognized. For example, well camouflaged sampans and foot trails across streams are readily recognized and identified.

(c) Recommendation: That all units using the KA-60 panoramic camera be advised of this method for detailed analysis.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (A)(U)

(d) Command Action: All SAC units in this command have been informed.

(3) Airfield Safety Surveys by Airfield Tenant Units.

(a) Observations: Aviation Safety Officers are in many cases not making adequate airfield safety surveys, especially when they are assigned to airfields as tenant units.

(b) Evaluation: In a recent OV-1 Mohawk night accident, the pilot experienced a swerve on landing which caused the aircraft to go to the extreme right of the runway. The pilot countered the swerve, gained control of the aircraft, and started a rollout still within the white runway lights. At this point, the aircraft struck a chuck hole and concrete curbing which were the result of a recent construction project. The landing gear was torn from the aircraft causing it to skid on the fuselage. The aircraft, although factory repairable, suffered extensive damage. An investigation revealed that a comprehensive airfield safety survey would have uncovered this airfield safety hazard so that it could easily have been removed. In addition, it was learned from this accident that each tenant unit has the responsibility for conducting its own complete airfield safety survey to assist the airfield command and thus provide greater safety. Results of each airfield survey should be coordinated directly with the airfield commander so that each safety hazard can be evaluated and corrected.

(c) Recommendation: That all Army aviation units be required to conduct active and comprehensive airfield surveys even though they are tenants on an airfield.

(d) Command Action: Battalion Safety Officer is supervising implementation of the recommendation.

c. Training: Imagery Interpretation Specialist Training

(1) Observation: Newly assigned Imagery Interpretation Specialists have experienced difficulty in plotting targets from OV-1 Mohawk sensor imagery and photographs.

(2) Evaluation: Imagery Interpretation Specialists receive outstanding training in CONUS; however, like newly assigned aviator personnel, they are originally unfamiliar with prominent terrain features and road networks in the mission area. Attempting to plot targets merely from

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

map instruction has proven extremely difficult and many times impossible. In order to better train newly assigned Imagery Interpretation Specialists, a two part program has proven effective. First, construct a large map board of the mission area with recent photography and imagery placed around the board with lines drawn to corresponding points on the map. This gives the interpreter a graphic depiction of actual terrain and roads that he will see again on tactical imagery. Secondly, all Imagery Interpreters should participate in flights into the mission area throughout their tours. This enables them to have a first hand view of general changes in the area and also have a good knowledge of key terrain features and road networks.

(3) Recommendation: That all other OV-1 aviation companies be informed of this training program.

(4) Command Action: This command has adopted the recommended training procedures.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

(1) NOILX Flight Suits for OV-1 Aircraft Crewmembers.

(a) Observation: The US Army's present two-piece NOMEX flight suit is inadequate for use by OV-1 crewmen.

(b) Evaluation: The design of the two-piece NOMEX flight suit is such that it is unsatisfactory for use in the OV-1 aircraft. The suit is binding around the waist and in the crotch area. The restraints on the ejection seat harness and the attaching straps for the survival equipment effectively block all access to the pockets of the two-piece flight suit. If objects are left in either the rear or front trousers pockets, they will annoy the pilot to distraction on a prolonged flight. It is often so uncomfortable to fly an extended mission that safety of flight becomes a factor.

(c) Recommendation: That the US Army purchase one piece NOMEX flight suits and authorize them to be worn by all OV-1 aircraft crewmembers.

(d) Command Action: None

(2) Film for use with the AN/AAS/11A Infrared System

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOA-65 (RL)(U)

(a) Observation: Several different type films are available for use with the AN/AAS/14A Infrared System.

(b) Evaluation: At present, four different films are available for issue for the IR system. Not all types are compatible with the system and/or the ES38B automatic photo processor. Film types and their FSN's are as follows:

1. Kodak Super XX type 5425 SB-11-519 FSN 6750-753-5277
2. Kodak Plus X Aerocon type 8401 FSN 6750-825-0276
3. Kodak Plus X thin base FSN 6750-926-5446
4. Anncopan type 111464 FSN 6750-825-0276

Types 1 and 2 are fully compatible with the system and excellent results are obtained. Type three is compatible with the system, but creates problems during processing with the ES-38 because of the thin base film. Type four creates problems with the system because of the weak strength of the emulsion. The emulsion flakes off the film base, clogging the film drive and also that type 4 has the same FSN as type 2 film. In addition, film types 1&2 are not readily available through supply channels while types 3&4 are.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That type four film be given a separate FSN to differentiate it from type 2 film.
2. That all OV-1 units be advised of the problems associated with film types 3&4.

(d) Command Action: All OV-1 units in this command have been advised of the problem areas indicated.

(3) Hanger Bearing Failure

(a) Observation: This command has experienced approximately twenty (20) hanger bearing failures several of which occurred in flight. All failures were experienced at the #1 and #2 positions.

(b) Evaluation: Since all positions have the same type prepacked bearing, the only difference observable among the bearing

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positions is the proximity of the #1 and #2 positions to the engine exhaust. It is suspected that either poor heat dissipation or lack of bearing pack resistance to heat might be the cause.

(c) Recommendation:

1. Emphasis should be placed on closer scrutiny of hanger bearings during preflight inspections.

2. Tests should be conducted to evaluate the heat distribution in the vicinity of the engine exhaust if this is a wide-spread problem.

(d) Command Action: EIR's have been submitted in accordance with Fl. 38-750.

f. Organization: None .

g. Other: .

(1) High EGT on UH-1H Helicopters.

(a) Observation: High EGT in UH-1H noted while operating in mountainous areas.

(b) Evaluation: It has been noted in this unit that UH-1's operating at high gross weight and in mountainous terrain tend to have a higher EGT than normal for standard operating limitations. Although this condition is not a flight hazard it causes unnecessary wear on engine components and unnecessary replacement of parts at Hot End Inspection, thus putting a greater demand on supply channels and causing an excessive amount of aircraft down time, lowering aircraft availability.

(c) Recommendation: Block bleed AIR valve at AFT of compressor.

(d) Command Action: An EIR has been submitted.

(2) MWO for 2.75" Aerial Rocket System.

(a) Observation: There have been numerous instances of misfire of the 2.75" rockets carried by the O-1 aircraft. Mainly the misfires consist of the rockets not firing when the trigger

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

pin is pulled, but instances have occurred where the rockets suddenly fire, no arm or trigger switches having been activated.

(b) Evaluation: Upon investigation, it was determined that the old procedures for grounding the rocket system were not in fact doing so effectively. The old grounding wire was 0-010" copper wire, used for quick breakaway. This wire ran from the rear connector plate of the rocket tubes to the shackle bolt. To correct the poor grounding, all old wiring was removed and replaced with 16-18 gauge copper wire with spaghetti insulation. Stakons (circular electrical connectors) are used at all connecting points. The stakon under the aft shackle bolt should have the forward one - third of the ring port cut out to provide a fast release for jettison (see Inclosure 6).

(c) Recommendation: That this modification be applied to all O-1 2.75 rocket systems to provide a positive ground and thus safe operation.

(d) Command Action:

1. EIR's have been submitted.
2. All O-1 aircraft units in this command have been informed.

(3) Relocation of the First Aid Kit in the OV-1 Mohawk Aircraft.

(a) Observation: The location of the first aid kit makes it inaccessible when the pilot is having trouble controlling the aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: On 5 May 1969, an armed OV-1A aircraft from this unit was hit in the right propeller by a 37mm antiaircraft projectile. Pieces of shrapnel riddled the cockpit, one of them striking the observer in the right shoulder. The pilot was having difficulty controlling the crippled aircraft and was unable to reach the first aid kit which is located on the sloping bulkhead between the ejection seats. Fortunately, the wound was not bleeding severely and it was located in such a place where the observer could put pressure on it simply by leaning back in the seat. If the wound had been in another part of the observer's body and bleeding severely, it could have been fatal.

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(c) Recommendation: That the first aid kit in the OV-1 Mohawk aircraft be relocated so that either crewmember can reach it in an emergency situation.

(d) Command Action: An EIR has been submitted.



TURNER J. TRAPP
LTC, III
Commanding

- 7 Incl
- 1. ~~Organizational Chart~~
- 2. ~~Personnel Changes~~
- 3. ~~Authorizations for duty strength~~
- 4. ~~Aircraft status~~
- 5. ~~Operatory Statistics~~
- 6. ~~Blower, IAC for Rocket System~~
- 7. ~~Blower, Temperature Control Bath~~
- 8. ~~Blower, IAC, DA~~
- 9. ~~Blower, IAC~~
- 10. ~~Blower, IAC~~
- 11. ~~Blower, IAC~~
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- 19. ~~Blower, IAC~~
- 20. ~~Blower, IAC~~

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for
the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

1 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20315

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with
the contents except as noted below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2a, page 3, addresses an insufficient ITCOE authoriza-
tion for unit supply personnel. Nonconcur with the suggested addition
to ITCOE allowance for unit supply personnel of the surveillance airplane
company. Approval of the additional personnel would not be in agreement
with the DA directed USARV ITCOE Standardization Program. It is felt,
however, that a revision to the ITCOE providing for the addition of a War-
rant Officer, Supply Technician, 761A, would provide the unit with a much
needed technician to serve as Property Book Officer.

b. Paragraph 2b(1), page 4, concerns the quality of color and camou-
flage detecting film processing. This information has been disseminated
to all OV-1 companies in the 1st Aviation Brigade.

c. Paragraph 2b(3), page 5, addresses the adequacy of airfield safety
surveys. Paragraph 6, 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 305-10 requires
each Aviation Group (Combat) to survey all airports and helipads within
their area of responsibility on a continuing basis.

d. Paragraph 2c(1), page 5, addresses imagery interpretation special-
ist training and suggests a recommended training program. Concur. All
OV-1 units of this headquarters have been advised of this recommended
training method.

e. Paragraph 2e(1)(c), page 6, recommends the army purchase one piece
NOMEX flight suits. Nonconcur. The two piece NOMEX flight suit is designed
with adjustable waist straps to assist in final fit and maximum comfort.
Pockets are available in the flight suit which are not blocked by the
ejection seat harness and associated paraphernalia. The one piece flight

11

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, AFS 3210.-69 (1)(5)

suit offers no greater access to pockets than the two piece suit and the relative location of the usable pockets differ. Crew members are instructed to relocate all objects from pockets which have restricted access during extended periods of flight. The recommendation by the suit for the US Army to purchase one piece HELIX flight suits for use by OH-1 crew members is inconsistent with a previous recommendation and maintenance of OH-1 requesting redesign of the two piece flight suit pockets in flight paper.

f. Paragraph 2e(2)(e), page 7, addresses the problem of various types of film for AN/AAS-14A Infrared System. USAICCV electronics branch advised that this problem has been recognized by Electronics Command, DA and instructions have been issued not to substitute unscopan film for Kodak film when requisitioned by aviation units. Presently the stock of unscopan film has been exhausted. All requisitions being processed by USHIC V will contain a statement "Do Not Substitute - Only Kodak Plus X is acceptable". AFS 3750-926-5546 cannot be identified as a valid ASK within the Army inventory.

g. Paragraph 2e(3), page 7-8, concerns OH-1 hanger bearing failure. The number of hanger bearing failures in this unit indicates that the frequency of hanger bearing inspections should be increased in order to prevent possible in-flight failures. It has been recommended that the interval be 25 flying hours between inspections. This inspection criteria is recommended only for special cases such as that being experienced by this unit. Hanger bearing (P/N 9107 1HPP) is the one with which the most problems have been experienced. Although this hanger bearing meets quality control specifications, it is not of the same quality as P/N 204-040-623-1. Units should make a special effort to obtain P/N 204-040-623-1 hanger bearings. If the number of hanger bearing failures should decrease, then a return to normal inspection intervals is recommended. Units have been advised that the bearings mentioned above will feel rough after 150 to 200 hours of operation. Units have been instructed to follow inspection procedures in the applicable technical manuals and Bell Engineering Note No. OH-04-7-5, dated 13 June 1967.

h. Paragraph 2g(1), page 8, recommends blocking the bleed air valve aft of the compressor to reduce EGT in the OH-1H operating at high altitudes. It is an accepted practice in Vietnam to install a block between the anti-ice valve and customer air bleed port on T53-113 and T53-113A engines. This procedure must be approved by the unit commander and an entry made in the aircraft historical records to reflect the installation.

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AF 440-0 (12 Aug 69) 1st Ind

1317

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSAC-65 (A)(3)

of the block. This procedure will in most cases decrease EGT a proportionally 20 degrees or maintain EGT at an acceptable level for operation at high gross weights. A recommendation has been submitted to the manufacturer to inspect the first stage nozzle thoroughly at hot end for cracks if the increase of EGT continues to be higher than normal. If cracks are found they should refer to applicable technical manuals for tolerance limitations.

i. Paragraph 2g(3), page 8-9, recommends an electrical positive ground for C-1 2.75 rocket systems. Nonconcur.


(1) The recommended grounding modification, while appearing to be an improved technique, in reality is a cover-up for the problem of stray current. Dirty contacts on the rocket launcher, a faulty interlock, a faulty firing switch or wiring is the probable cause of malfunctioning or inadvertent firing experienced by the operator.

(2) Normally, the rocket motor will not store enough current to fire a 2.75 inch rocket. Therefore, the rocket launcher is receiving stray voltage from the aircraft's electrical system, and corrective action should be taken to locate the source of current.

(3) 54th General Support Group Newsletter, dated August 1967, provides a complete wiring diagram for 2.75 inch rocket launchers installed on C-12 aircraft.

j. Paragraph 2g(3), page 9-10, concerns the location of first aid kits in OV-1 aircraft. Concur. A recommendation for the relocation of first aid kits in OV-1 aircraft has been forwarded to USAFSSCI. The new location, as it will pertain to the different OV-1 models and avionics configurations, will be made available to the field in the future.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG.

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212th Aviation Battalion (Combat)

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
AVHGC-DST (12 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for The
period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 6 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DI,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion.
2. (C) Comments follow:
 - a. (U) Reference item concerning "Unit Supply," section 11, page 3, paragraph 2a; concur. At the present time and in the foreseeable future there will be no spaces available with which to finance an increase in personnel. Trade-off spaces should be identified by paragraph and line number, and an MTOE action initiated by the unit. Because of the standardization program this change will have to be acceptable to all like units.
 - b. (C) Reference item concerning "Airfield Safety Surveys by Airfield Tenant Units," section 11, page 5, paragraph 2b(3); concur. MACV regulation 95-5 and 95-9, and USARV regulation 95-3 direct that airfield surveys be conducted as recommended. Recommend the use of USABAAH Aircraft Accident Prevention Survey Manual for assistance in conducting a thorough survey. No further action is required by USARPAC or DA.
 - c. (C) Reference item concerning "Film for use with the AN/AAS/14H Infrared System," section 11, page 6, paragraph 2e(2); concur. USAICCV has requested sole source procurement of Kodak film. No further action is required by USARPAC or DA.
 - d. (C) Reference item concerning "Hanger Bearing Failure," section 11, page 7, paragraph 2e(3); concur. Units have been informed that no AIRs are on file at 34th General Support Group for this failure. Tests are automatically directed by the UH-1 Project Manager, USAMC, when a sufficient number of AIRs are submitted. No further action is required by USARPAC or DA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
212th CAB
1st Avn Bde

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
GPOP-DT (12 Aug 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 212th Combat Aviation
Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND

UNIT	OH6A		UH-1B		UH-1C		UH-1D		UH-1H		O-1		OV-1		U-6L		U-2L	
	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH	AUTH	OH
HHC, 212th CAB	3	0				0	2								0	2	0	1
21st UAC											24	23			0	1		
62d Avn Co (Corps)	4	3							10	10							2	2
131st SAC													18	20	0	1		
220th UAC											32	32			0	1		
245th SAC													18	19				
282d AHC			0	7	8	0			23	21								
212th CAB (TOTALS)	7	3	0	7	8	0	0	2	33	31	56	55	36	39	0	5	2	3

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212th CAB OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
QTR PERIOD 31 Jul 69

Subordinate Unit	Sorties Flown	Troops Lifted	Cargo Lifted (tons)	Enemy KBK	Structures Dam	Structures Dest	Sarpans Dam	Sarpans Dest	Aircraft Confirmed Loss	Aircraft Damaged
HHC, 212th CAB	1,245	510	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
21st UAC	3,582	0	0	101	130	170	11	7	0	1
62d Avn Co (Corps)	11,163	18,796	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
131st SAC	2,090	0	0	0	5	15	1	3	1	6
220th UAC	6,339	0	0	143	11	0	0	0	0	17
245th SAC	902	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
282d AHC	23,713	43,421	266	136	56	87	30	27	2	48
212th CAB (TOTALS)	49,734	62,727	326	380	247	272	42	37	3	76

AIRCRAFT LOST


AIRCRAFT DAMAGED*

HHC, 212th CAB	0	1 UH-1
21st UAC	0	1
62d Avn Co (Corps)	0	4 UH-1H
131st SAC	1 CV-1	5 OV-1
220th UAC	0	17
245th SAC	0	1
282d AHC	2 UH-1H	16 UH-1B 32 UH-1H


*Includes locally repairable battle damage.

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OLD WIRING




NEW WIRING



Incl 6

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