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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (1 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693132

11 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

AD 506300

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 222ND AVIATION BATTALION (COMPAT)
APO San Francisco 96350

AVBACA-EC

10 August 1969

TO: [Faded text]

FROM: [Faded text]

SUBJECT: [Faded text]

1. [Faded text] through-

2. [Faded text] as

3. [Faded text] 20 Mar 1969. De-

4. [Faded text] 1 July

5. [Faded text] 1 April 1969 was re-

6. [Faded text]

7. [Faded text]

8. [Faded text]

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16 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d
Aviation Battalion (Combat) for period ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)) (U)

c. Significant Personnel Changes: Command Group and Principal Staff officer changes during the period were made on dates indicated.

(1) Executive Officer, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 11 May 69
Outgoing: QUEENEY, Richard K., MAJ, 016-30-5492
Incoming: THOMAS, Benjamin G., MAJ, 293-28-6855

(2) S1, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 21 Apr 69
Outgoing: NILES, Malcolm B., CPT, 009-28-7030
Incoming: PRESTIDGE, James C. Jr., CPT, 453-68-6862

(3) S3, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 31 May 69
Outgoing: OHLENBURGER, Clifford C., MAJ, 464-52-6504
Incoming: MURSON, Elbert W., CW4, 444-22-9749

(4) S4, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 9 May 69
Outgoing: WILHELM, Robert, MAJ, 361-30-6268
Incoming: NICKERSON, Charles, CPT, 222-03-6116

(5) Commanding Officer, HHC, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 21 Jun 69
Outgoing: SIMMONS, Bobby J., CPT, 425-84-8300
Incoming: THEYS, Richard L., CPT, 510-44-4974

(6) Commanding Officer, 117th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel)

Date: 21 Jun 69
Outgoing: MELLIN, James P., MAJ, 473-32-7096
Incoming: AVERY, Wesley B., MAJ, 237-62-2687

(7) Commanding Officer, 273d Aslt Spt Hel Co

Date: 31 May 69
Outgoing: KUYKENDALL, William K., MAJ, 463-42-2488
Incoming: WILHELM, Robert, MAJ, 222-03-6268

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Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969 (AOS CSFOR-65
(R1)) (U)

(1) Military:

d. Unit strengths as of 31 July 1969:

SUBORDINATE UNIT	OFFICER		WARRANT OFF		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL
HHC, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)	19	14	0	10	85	109	107	133
117th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	19	23	50	51	218	197	288	271
195th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	19	25	50	49	218	213	288	287
240th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	19	24	50	54	218	207	287	285
273d Aslt Spt Hel Co (Hvy) 7	7	4	17	16	97	111	129	131
93d Med Det	1	1	0	0	7	8	8	9
772d Med Det	1	1	0	0	7	8	8	9
315th Afld Sv Det	1	1	0	0	16	15	17	16
87th QM Det	0	0	0	0	8	8	8	8
652nd TC Det	1	1	1	0	57	57	59	57
478th Aslt Spt Hel Co(Hvy) 4 (Plat Itch from 1st Cav)			5	5	13	13	22	18

(2) Civilians:

SUBORDINATE UNIT	DAC		VII		3D N.T'L		TECH REP	
	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL	AUTH	ACTUAL
HHC, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)	0	0	15	15	0	0	0	0
117th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	0	0	19	20	0	0	0	0
195th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0
240th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
273d Aslt Spt Hel Co(Hvy) 1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
772d Med Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
93d Med Det	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
87th QM Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
315 ASD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)) (U)

- e. Aircraft Status as of 31 July 1969: (See Inclosure 2).
- f. Operational Results for the Period are included at Inclosure 3.
- g. Awards and Decorations: Awards recommended and received by individuals of this Battalion during period 1 May - 31 July 1969 are as indicated below:

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>NUMBERS RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>NUMBERS RECEIVED</u>
Silver Star Medal	3	12
Distinguished Flying Cross	21	10
Soldiers Medal	1	1
Bronze Star Medal	67	75
Air Medal with "V"	86	46
Basic Air Medal	191	125
Oak Leaf Clusters to Air Medal	110	70
Army Commendation Medal with "V"	30	8
Army Commendation Medal	85	104
Purple Heart	6	10

- h. Personnel Gains and Losses during Period: Following reflects the personnel turbulence experienced during the period.

	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>
Officers	26	21
Warrant Officers	63	32
Enlisted	261	218

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i. R & R Data: Quotas were received and filled as indicated below:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>QUOTAS RECEIVED</u>	<u>NUMBER UTILIZED</u>
Hawaii	77	77
Hong Kong	37	37
Sydney	50	50
Bangkok	50	50
Taipei	28	25
Tokyo	17	17
Singapore	17	14
Manilla	10	6

j. Security Information: Casualties experienced during the period are as follows:

<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>	<u>WOUNDED IN ACTION</u>	<u>DEGRADING INJURIES NOT A RESULT OF COMBAT ACTION</u>
4 (1 ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY)	10	10

k. Enemy Action Against Bearcat: Following is a synopsis of action by enemy forces against Bearcat Installation during the period:

(1) Stand-off mortar/rocket attacks were carried out against Bearcat causing minor damage. No casualties were incurred as a result of these attacks. On one occasion an attempt was made to enter Bearcat through defensive positions, however, the attempt was halted by friendly fires. One body was found approximately 30 meters beyond the perimeter the next morning. It is believed that this was a very small probing action, possibly by the lone individual who was killed, to test the security of the installation. No other forces were observed.

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(2) Following is dates and times enemy mortars/rockets impacted on Bearcat:

120045 May	1 - 107 mm Rocket
121230 May	1 - 107 mm Rocket
121330 May	1 - 122 mm Rocket
131145 May	1 - 122 mm Rocket and 2 - 60 mm Mortars
150040 Jun	16 - 107 mm Rockets (8 fell inside the perimeter and 8 just outside) (1 rocket caused light damage to 2 UH-1 helicopters)
151345 Jun	1 - 107 mm Rocket impacted just outside the berm
190450 Jul	1 - VC attempted to infiltrate Bearcat and was killed 30 Meters outside the berm

l. Ammunition Expenditures: See Inclosure 4

m. Construction:

(1) Billets: On 15 October 1968 construction started on the 117th and 195th Aviation Companies (Aslt Hel) BOQ and BEQ under authorization of CD 63-350-01 (11). A number of concrete pads were laid. One concrete pad was laid under authorization of CD 43-352-01 (195). On 25 October 1968 construction was halted because the Engineer unit was pulled off for a higher priority project. In February 1969 construction was started once again. Three buildings were put up, however, none of them were completely finished for the 117th. No building were put up for the 195th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel). Construction was halted at the end of March 1969. Notification from 12th Aviation Group (Cbt) on 31 July 1969 indicated that the two CDs mentioned above have been cancelled. New CDs will be coming down soon stating that the two units will get a total of twenty prefab aluminum buildings. These buildings are supposed to be erected within the next six weeks. Living conditions for the officers and men of these two companies are far from satisfactory.

(2) The CD directing the building of hangers for the 117th and 195th (CD 43-251-03-T-6S/7S) originally called for the construction of three hangers.

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A change on 30 August 1968 eliminated one hanger from the authorization. No action has been taken since the request for construction called for metal hangers and there are none available in country. On 13 February 1969 a letter was dispatched stating that wooden hangers would be acceptable. As of the end of the reporting period the project is being held up because of a lack of funds. There is no projected date when the work will be started.

(3) Construction was started in the 240th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) located at Bearcat on 12 February 1968. Work was halted in September 1968 due to the Engineers being given a higher priority project. A concrete pad was laid and the pieces of the hanger were stacked in the area. No work has ever actually been started on erecting the hangar. The 240th Engineer Brigade was mistakenly given the word that the hanger was completed so no further attempts were made to finish construction. The error was discovered in April 1969 and the project was once again made active. The parts of the hanger at the site have been inventoried and found to have many missing sections. The parts have been put on requisition but are not expected to arrive in country until this fall, at which time construction should start up again.

n. Schooling (AARTS Courses): Following quotas were received and filled during the period:

(1) Officer:

- (a) Officer Assignment No 2 1
- (b) UH-1D School (1st Bd) 3
- (c) PACAF Life Support School 1
- (d) AH-1G Transition 1

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(2) Enlisted:

(a) T-53-L-12 Engine Maint	2
(b) Tech Supply	1
(c) Enlisted Armament No 2	1
(d) M-10/M-10G Airframe	1
(e) M-10/M-10 Airframe	1
(f) T-53 L-11 Engine Maint	1
(g) Technical Inspector	1
(h) ILL	1
(i) Generator Operator	12

c. Aviation Safety: The accident rate dropped from an accident rate of 2.5 per 10,000 flying hours during the period February, March and April to 3.52 during this reporting period. The Battalion experienced only one minor accident which resulted when a crew chief standing on the skid of a M-10 helicopter lost his balance while the aircraft was on the ground at flight idle. In the process of grappling for something to avert his fall, he grabbed the pitch control stick pulling it in the up position. The aircraft left the ground to an altitude of approximately five feet, lost RPM and landed hard causing structural damage but no injuries. The Battalion has experienced 69 days of accident free flight operations at the end of the reporting period. A total of 28,327 hours were flown during 1 May - 31 July 1969.

p. PR: The Information Office continued to provide the required news and photo coverage of awards and decorations, safety, chapel and civic affairs activities. Home Town News Releases declined during this period. Many personnel who earned awards for valor are reluctant to authorize a hometown release fearing undue anxiety at home about their safety. More emphasis is being placed on other types of News Releases.

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16 August 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation
Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 July 1969
(DCI CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)**

such as: Arrival and assignment to a unit, participation in company or civic action activities, promotions and awards for service. Incoming personnel are encouraged to complete a Home Town Release form while processing through the Battalion. This system will expedite and assure at least one release on each individual who has no objection to a Home Town Release.

p. Operations: The Battalion continued daily support of operations with tasks including combat assault, direct combat support and other combat support missions each day of the ninety-two reporting days. Missions included airlift of troops, equipment, supplies, vehicular airlift, administrative, command and control and artillery weapons and engineer equipment displacement. Another type of mission was given the Battalion during the period, that of fire fly support in both day and night. Missions 20/2 and 20/1 respectively. Each fire fly team consists of one OH-1H for command/control and navigation, one OH-1H for the light snip and one OH-1H for the attack ship. The missions were taken over on 2 July 1969. During the period of 2-31 July a total of 733 hours were flown resulting in 17 sampans destroyed, six confirmed VC killed, 4 bridges destroyed, and four structures destroyed. Several Dust Off aircraft involved in medical evacuation was supported by the teams. Other support provided was that of providing light and gunship support to units in contact. Helicopter gunships also played an active role throughout the period by delivery of live ordnance upon enemy positions in support of friendly ground forces operations. The normal mission profile for OH-1 helicopters for the Battalion remained at 46 troop carrier and 16 gunships. After the reassignment of the 125th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) on 1 July 1969 Battalion daily mission requirements consisted of 35 troop carrier and 12 gunships. An average of three OH-54A helicopters were committed throughout the period.

2. (C) Section 2 Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: Shortages of Technical Inspectors and Avionics Specialists discussed in last quarter report still exists. No new problems have been incurred during this quarter.

b. Operations:

(1) Fire Fly Operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: Aircraft crews switching from normal daytime combat to that of night time fire fly operations dictates a considerable amount of training to be conducted.

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(b) EVALUATION: On 2 July 1969 one of the Aviation Companies (Aslt Hel) was given the task of providing two fire fly teams, one to B-TAC and the other to III Corps. Normal annual night flying requirements (which are waived in Viet Nam) are not sufficient for transitioning crews from normal and habitual daylight operations to the rigorous requirements of navigation and aerial gunnery imposed by fire fly missions. Adequate time was provided by higher headquarters for transition training, however, as far as can be ascertained, tactics, techniques and procedures which will assure maximum combat effectiveness of the fire fly missions have not been evaluated and published. Crews from the unit from which the fire fly requirement was inherited provided personnel to provide training, however, training was limited to what they had learned through actual operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all units involved in this type operation provide a study of how they are conducting their operations. That these studies be evaluated at the appropriate headquarters with a view toward formulating tactics and doctrine which will assure the best results. That the final conclusions be adopted and published in the 1st Aviation Brigade Operational Procedures Guide and possibly in appropriate manuals for Army Wide coverage. A copy of suggestions and current tactics being utilized at the present time are included as inclosure 8.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Lessons learned during the conduct of these missions are being provided all crew members.

(2) Airlift of gun platforms.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the configuration and light weight, approximately 9,000 pounds without guns, the 105mm gun platform is extremely unstable in flight.

(b) EVALUATION: The gun platform is used in areas unsuitable for placement of weapons on firm ground. Normally these platforms are placed in swamps, marshes, or areas where it is impossible to place them by boat and therefore are placed by CH-54A. In flying with this load, using the single point suspension system, with the load in normal position, 10 to 15 feet below the main landing gear, the drag created by relative wind caused the load to exceed weight limitations and only 30 knots of airspeed could be obtained. Due to this reduced airspeed, the distance this load could be carried was reduced by 50 percent. It was discovered that the load could be made more stable by placing enough weight on the platform to bring the total weight from 9,000 pounds to 12,000 pounds. Further experiments showed that if load is carried 15-30 feet below the main landing gear it is in undisturbed air and a maximum speed of 60-65 knots could be obtained and the range for transport greatly increased.

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OPERATIONAL: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation
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(RCS CSFCR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the gun platform be re-weighted to 12,000 pounds and carried 25-30 feet below the main landing gear.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Above solution has been implemented in the 273d ASHC (Hvy).

(3) Airlift of boats for River Marine Force.

(a) OBSERVATION: Airlift of boats for the River Marine Force by CH-54A has enabled the Navy to operate in areas that before were considered to be inaccessible.

(b) EVALUATION: Airlift of boats for the River Marine Force has proven to be an expedient method for deploying the forces to areas in the Delta, interlaced with rivers and canals. This method enables the boats to move overland, thus saving valuable time which would normally be spent traversing the many rivers in the Delta. Only one problem was encountered while attempting to move the boats by CH-54A. While at a hover, the CH-54A creates a rotor wash of air in excess of 100 knots. It was found that the boats became uncontrollable in the rotor wash and a hook-up to the aircraft cargo hook was impossible with the boat floating on the water. Due to the rotor wash, the boat continued to move away from the aircraft and in some cases was close to being capsized. After several attempts failed to accomplish a hook-up over the water the boats were beached and the hook-up made without further difficulties.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that further missions of this type be made from areas where the boats can be beached and made stable for hook-up to the UH-54A. Drop off of boats over water presented no problems.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics:

(1) Wasted Ammunition:

(a) OBSERVATION: Excessive amounts of 7.62 mm ammunition for the M-60 machine gun used on troop ships are being condemned and disposed of due to corrosion.

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Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969
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(b) EVALUATION: During combat operations it is necessary to maintain the M-60s mounted on the aircraft in a ready position while in areas of operations. This exposes the ammunition gun boxes to the elements, dirt and especially rain during the monsoon season. If not properly cleaned and cared for, in a short period of time corrosion sets in and the ammunition must be condemned and replaced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the driver and crew chief on each aircraft ensure that upon UH-1C installation of the M-60 ammunition, the bottoms are protected by several nail holes to prevent corrosion from rain water.

(d) EVALUATION: Inspection of the M-60s reported as a considerable number of them had been stored.

(1) General

(a) General

(1) UH-1C Stabilizer Assembly Mounting Bolts

(a) EVALUATION: A UH-1C developed severe vibrations during a mission and upon inspection, six of the stabilizer assembly mounting bolts were found to be missing.

(b) REMARKS: Inspection revealed washers were incorrectly installed and in some cases, the incorrect washers had been used.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all aircraft stabilizer assembly mounting bolts and washers be inspected for correct installation and torque.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All UH-1C and UH-1H aircraft were required to be inspected for correct installation of washers and torque.

(2) Safety Wire

(a) OBSERVATION: Safety wire made by one contract company was found to be weak and highly unsatisfactory. The complete nomenclature follows: Wire, steel, corrosion resisting, annealed, 032, P/N 9505-293-4208.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found upon installation that this particular wire would break even with the least amount of pressure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To have all units stop using this wire until cause for weakness is determined.

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(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Letter was sent to the 34th Group for their evaluation two months ago.


(3) Protection of 159C Rocket Pod

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Rocket pods not adequately protected affects the usable life of the pod.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Although the 159C pod is operable, they are often in short supply, however, it is necessary to eliminate their usage from except 1. One of the major factors affecting the life span of a pod is the loss of sand and gravel inside the pod due to low or high winds. These rockets are filled with sand or gravel to cushion the result is a rip in the pod rendering the tube useless.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Findings show that covering the ends of the 159C's when the aircraft is not in operation has increased pod life by 50%. The black plastic dust cover that comes on a new engine is excellent for this purpose and is quite durable.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** All aircraft in the unit carrying 159C pods are being supplied with these covers.



ROBERT W. HUEBNER
LTC, IN
Commanding

8 Incl

1. Org Chart
2. Left Status Report
3. Operational Statistics
4. Armo Expenditures
- ~~5. Detail Statistics for May~~
- ~~6. Detail Statistics for June~~
- ~~7. Detail Statistics for July~~
8. Fire Fly Information

Incls 5, 6 and 7 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5-CG, 1st Avn Gp (Cbt), ATTN: AVBACA-SC
- 2-CMUSARFIC, ATTN: GPCP-DT, APO 96558
- 3-CG, 1st Avn, ATTN: AVGHGC (DST), APO 96375
- 2-CG, 1st Avn Gp, ATTN: AVBAGC

AVBACA-30 (15 Aug 69, 1st ILM)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation
Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 24 August 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

In accordance with USARV Reg 525-15, subject report is forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GORDON M. HUNT
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

AVFBC-RE-H (2 Sep 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for period ending 31 July 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 5 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307


Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(UST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational report -
Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period
ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. J. McDONALD
AVBA-C
ASST AG

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AVBAGC-O (16 Aug 69) 3d Ind **16 SEP 1969**
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation
Battalion (Combat) for period ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, APTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with
the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:


a. Paragraph 2a, page 9, addresses shortages of Technical Inspectors
and Avionics Specialists.

(1) This headquarters recognizes the shortage of these personnel.
However, it is not within the resources of this command to relieve the si-
tuation. The 1st Aviation Brigade presently has only 45% of the authorized
305 Technical Inspectors in the specialist grades. To help offset this
shortage, qualified Maintenance Supervisor NCO's perform technical inspec-
tion functions as an additional duty, and some additional relief is obtained
by in country training of highly qualified crew chiefs. The 222d Aviation
Battalion (Combat) has an equitable share of available assets.

(2) Although Avionics Specialist shortages exist periodically, the 1st
Aviation Brigade is presently at 90% strength. The 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) assigned strength is presently 90% of its authorized strength in
Avionics Specialists.

b. Paragraph 2b(1), page 9, discusses Fire Fly Operations. The recom-
mendation that a study be conducted by units responsible for fire fly
missions to determine the tactics and policies used to execute this mission
successfully is valid. This headquarters has requested information on
techniques utilized by subordinate commands relative to this study. The
results will be consolidated and published in the revision of the 1st
Aviation Brigade Operational Procedures Guide.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG.

Cy of Ind Furn:
CO, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)

16

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DD FORM 5200 10

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AVHGC-DST (16 Aug 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOE-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 13 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Personnel", section II, page 9, paragraph 2a; concur. Helicopter technical inspectors and avionics specialists have been critical shortages throughout USARV for a considerable period of time. Army-wide resources are insufficient in these fields to meet continuing short tour area requirements. The 1st Aviation Brigade compares favorably with the USARV average in these critical MOS fields.


b. (C) Reference item concerning "Fire Fly Operations", section II, page 9, paragraph 2b(1); concur. ACTIV will conduct an evaluation of several airborne night vision systems and employment concepts during the next six month period. The results of these tests will be furnished all units when available.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Airlift of gun platforms", section II, page 10, paragraph 2b(2); concur. The recommendation has been noted and will be furnished directly to the US Army Transportation School, the proponent for TMs on external helicopter rigging.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Safety Wire", section II, page 12, paragraph 2g(2); nonconcur. The correct safety wire should be requisitioned using the nomenclature given in the observation. The 34th General Support Group has taken action to preclude the issue of all defective wire. This information was disseminated in the Group's June 1969 Newsletter to all aviation units.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Protection of the 159C Rocket Pod", section II, page 13, paragraph 2g(3); concur. The XM-200 rocket pod, scheduled to replace the XM-159C in September through November 1969, is equipped with a plastic protective cover.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
222d Avn Bn (Cbt)
1st Avn Bde

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10


GPOP-DT (16 Aug 69) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Incl 1 to 222d Avn Bn (Cbt) ORLL dtd 12 August 1969

ORGANIZATION CHART



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Incl 2 to 222d Avn Bn (Cbt) ORLL dtd 12 Aug 69

Incl 2

222D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION AIRCRAFT STATUS
31 JULY 1969

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>UH-1D/H</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>CH-54A</u>	<u>ASGD</u>
HQ, 222D AVN BN (CBT)	0	0	0	2**	2	0	0	0	0
117th AHC	8	6	6	23	19	0	0	0	0
135th AHC*	8	5	5	23	18	0	0	0	0
195th AHC	8	7	7	23	19	0	0	0	0
240th AHC	8	7	7	23	18	0	0	0	0
273d ASHC	0	0	0	0	0	9	13***	0	0

*AS OF 30 June 1969 (Unit reassigned 1 July 1969)

**BN Auth 3 CH-6A by TOE - Special. Auth by 1st Avn Bde Authorizes 2 UH-1Ds in lieu of CH-6As

***1 - Maint Float

***3 - Atchd from 478th ASHC (Hvy)

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Incl 3 To: 222D Avn Bn (Cbt) ORILL dtd 12 Aug 69

Incl 3

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969

SUBORDINATE UNIT	SORTIES FLOWN	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO TONS LIFTED	ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURES DAM / DEST		SAMPANS DAM / DEST		AIRCRAFT CONFED LOSS	AIRCRAFT DAMAGED	A/C RECOVERED
					DAM	DEST	DAM	DEST			
117th AHC	19,232	24,035	75	8	14	19	7	21	0	**2	0
135th AHC	15,131	43,504	69	29	16	46	4	12	**1	*9	0
195th AHC	21,889	29,200	155	0	0	0	0	0	0	*5 **2	0
240th AHC	26,165	43,866	34	209	0	33	0	7	*4	*12 **8	0
273rd ASHC (HVT)	2,986	0	8,206	0	0	0	0	0	0	**4	11

* -- UH-1H
 ** -- UH-1C
 *** -- CH-54
 **** -- Period Ending 30 June (Unit Reassigned 1 July 1969)

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Inclosure 4 to 222d Avn Bn (Cbt) ORLL dtd 12 Aug 1969

Incl 4

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES FOR PERIOD 1 MAY - 31 JULY 1969

	<u>M-60</u>	<u>Mini-M</u>	<u>5.56</u>	<u>40mm</u>	<u>2.75 RKT</u>	<u>.38</u>	<u>.45</u>	<u>12 GA SHOTGUN</u>
HHC, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)	0	0	3,000	0	0	500	1,000	50
195th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	153,700	85,000	11,000	0	3,745	3,000	550	0
117th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	225,000	613,100	16,000	813	1,900	1,500	200	20
240th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	454,559	803,289	10,800	2,000	6,007	2,000	250	0
273rd ASHC	0	0	4,600	0	0	1,000	0	0

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Closure 8 to 222D Avn Bn (Cbt) ORLL dtd 16 Aug 1969

FIRE FLY INFORMATION

1. Normally the armed reconnaissance at night is restricted to a definite area such as a river, canal or highway. It is difficult at best to recon an area covered with heavy trees or vegetation, unless targets are well defined or their location has been designated as a free fire zone, the targets located in these areas are suspected targets and must be verified by the sector advisor or sector observer, as enemy before engaging them.

2. The fire fly formation will normally operate between 10ft to 1500ft absolute altitude, however smoke, haze and fog will dictate the safe flight altitude.

3. Firing passes at night are more difficult than during daylight attacks, requiring the normal engaging distance to be reduced. Gunners must strive to keep the target located in relation to other subjects on the ground, i.e. road junctions, curves in a river or building areas. Always conduct a post strike recon to ascertain the effectiveness of your strike.

4. General:

a. Attack helicopters will normally be expected to provide the same quality and types of direct fire support at night as provided during daylight hours. To provide this support the helicopters must have a highly motivated, well-trained crew that is aware of the capabilities and limitations of the fire team.

b. The cardinal rules apply equally well to night operations. Limited visibility at night works to the advantage of the attack helicopter team. The limits of the "Deadman zone" are sharply reduced.

5. Planning: Planning for night target attacks requires considerable care and coordination. Even with experienced crews, a detailed mission briefing is required.

6. Natural Illumination:

a. Target attacks using natural lighting at night provide certain advantages which are not possible when using flare or lighting system (Fire Fly Illumination)

(i) Advantages

(a) The element of surprise is maintained longer.

(b) Night vision is conserved.

(c) All helicopters in the team maintain the security provided by the darkness.

(d) Ground fire is more readily seen.

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6. Disadvantages

- (a) Target identification may be more difficult to identify.
- (b) Target locations are more difficult to maintain.
- (c) Even after initially identified, target locations are more difficult to maintain.

7. Fire Fly Formation:

a. Because of the danger of midair collision, and since navigation lights are visible only from above, the team will normally fly at least a 100 ft separation between each aircraft operating altitude limit. The prescribed formation must be rigidly adhered to at night, since everyone in the formation must know the location of the others. Standard procedures of assigned airspace limitations in which each helicopter must operate unless given permission to deviate are: MSN CMNDR may give permission to deviate:

- (1) Normal enroute altitude from staging area to operational area:
 - (a) High Ship - 2200 ft
 - (b) Light Ship - 2100 ft
 - (c) Low Ship - 2000 ft
 - (d) This is providing sufficient weather minimums prevail.
 - (e) This procedure is also an aid to identification of each A/C in the formation.

b. Normal cruise airspeed enroute.

- (1) 80 knots unless otherwise designated by the Mission Commander.

c. Light Procedures:

- (1) ENROUTE: High Ship - NAV: bright flash/beacon
Lite Ship - NAV: bright flash/beacon
Low Ship - NAV: dim flash/beacon
- (2) HIGH DENSITY AREA: Fire Fly formation: NAV bright flash/beacon.

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(3) UPON ARRIVING IN SEARCH AREA. (Light procedures)

(a) High Ship - NAV as desired/beacon on

(b) Lite Ship - With Fire Fly lit, all NAV lights dim or off to prevent excessive glare in the cockpit. Rotating beacon may be left on to aid the high ship. Excessive glare around the cockpit of the lite ship enhances vertigo to the pilot and co-pilot.

(c) Low Ship - Will go black at the discretion of Aircraft Commander.

d. Upon Arriving in Search Area:

(a) High Ship - Above 1,000 ft absolute altitude; No A/S restriction.

(b) Lite Ship - 550 - 900 ft absolute altitude; 50 - 70 Knots A/S.

(c) Low Ship - 10 ft above highest obstacle to 450 ft absolute altitude 60-90 knots A/S.

5. FIREFLY TARGET ENGAGEMENT:

a. To allow sufficient room for the attacking helicopter(s) to maneuver and for the light to illuminate a large enough area, the light is normally employed between 550 ft absolute altitude to 900 ft absolute altitude. MINIMUM altitude while flying the light ship should be called out by the aircraft commander during search and strictly adhered to.

b. Once the target is located, the helicopter carrying the light orbits the target, maintaining illumination until the mission is complete. These orbits may be large enough to maintain sufficient airspeed for protection but not so large that the light is ineffective.

c. In addition to the primary cone of light produced by the Fire Fly, there is also an area of secondary illumination (Halo area). In the halo area, the illumination is inadequate for target engagement but is sufficient to silhouette the attacking helicopter(s). For this reason the attack should be discontinued before reaching the halo area.

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d. Minimum safe distance for engagement

(1) 500 meters will be ample time to set up a rocket run to neutralize target on suppress.

(2) Less than 500 meters with rocket will not allow sufficient time to properly set up a run and therefore will probably result in wasted ordnance.

e. Minimum safe distance for disengagement

(1) 100 meters is the minimum safe distance to disengage your target, due to ricochets and shrapnel from your own weapons.

(2) All gunners and crew chiefs should be trained to hit a target easily at no less than 100 meters.

(3) The mission must be worth the risk involved. A casualty for a sampan is an example of sub-optimal performance.

(4) Mission of each A/C

High - Navigate

Lite - illuminate

low - Attack

UNCLASSIFIED

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