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ECHO - Vietnam (U)

FINAL REPORT

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**GENERAL
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ECHO - Vietnam (U)

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FOREWORD

JACK F. HELLER participated in all phases of the data collection process and was responsible for much of the data processing completed in Southeast Asia and the United States. He also had responsibility for training our indigenous interviewers and keypunchers, and he supervised many of the data collection efforts undertaken by these people. His contribution to this report cannot be overestimated, however he has not been able to review this paper (due to limitations of a Public Health Service Fellowship in Social Psychology), and he should therefore not be held responsible for its contents.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Our most obvious and greatest debt is to the GRC-Saigon staff which participated in the in-country phases of Project ECHO-Vietnam. Mr. PHAN PHI LONG, Mr. LE PHUNG THOI, Miss NGUYEN NGOC CHAT, Miss NGUYEN THI HUU, and also our office manager-secretary, Mrs. NGUYEN VAN PHOUNG, were extremely competent, adaptive and amicable coworkers. They were always willing to go the extra mile when deadlines were pressing and conditions were trying. Miss KIM VIHN, a RAND Corporation interviewer loaned to us for one field study, also deserves our thanks for her contribution to the study of PF/RF evaluations of American advisers.

A special note of appreciation is due the project's Combat and Development Test Center program manager, Major LA VAN TROUNG. Without his personal support and guidance this project could never have been completed.

We are indebted to Lt. Cmdr. RICHARD McGONIGAL, USN, for supplying us with ECHO "good (bad) to do" responses he collected from male and female adult civilians, school children, and Popular Forces troops in I Corps. These data were collected as part of the Navy's on-going Personal Response Project. A review of the McGonigal research is available in "For Want of An Attitude..." (McGonigal, 1968).

RICHARD de MILLE, of General Research Corporation, was responsible for organizing and reprocessing Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal's raw data. Without his assistance these data could not have been included in this report.

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DAN ROURKE provided computer programming assistance in both the US and SEA. He was responsible for the ECHO analysis programs developed in Bangkok, Thailand, at the National Statistical Office, Data Processing Center of Thailand, and he contributed to the development of a mathematical model of category structure.

Further, we are greatly indebted to the personnel of the ARPA Research and Development Field Unit in Saigon (RDFU-V) and the Research and Development Center in Bangkok (RDC-T). Their assistance and personal interest in ECHO contributed in innumerable ways to the completion of this research.

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ABSTRACT

The ECHO-Vietnam project evaluated the applicability of ECHO, an open-ended survey technique, to the study of verbally expressed behavioral norms and feelings of Vietnamese. During the summer of 1968, 319 subjects from the following populations were surveyed: Popular Forces, Regional Forces, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, RVN Navy enlisted men and women, Catholic and Buddhist men and women in DaNang and Saigon, Saigon school children, and Chieu Hoi Ralliers.

Three question forms were used; eliciting responses about good and bad acts (1) of persons like the respondent and (2) of American advisors, and (3) responses about good and bad events that could happen. Associated questions were asked about sources of approval of good acts and disapproval of bad acts and about causes of good and bad events. Four administration methods were compared: (1) group written, (2) self-administered written, (3) tape-recorded oral, and (4) interviewer-written oral; similar data were generated by the four methods; differences of applicability are discussed.

ECHO responses, being in the subject's own words, must be classified before analysis can occur; classifications by trained and untrained teams were compared; though inferior to trained teams, untrained classifiers from the respondent groups imparted useful indigenous meaning to the data.

It was concluded that: (1) the ten repetitions of the ECHO question can be reduced to seven or five without important loss of information, (2) "conditional data" differentiate among subcultures more precisely than do behavioral norms, (3) more sophisticated techniques are desirable for analyzing ECHO data, (4) ECHO is best used in combination with traditional methods, and (5) ECHO results are internally consistent and consistent with results from traditional methods.

Some hypotheses for further ECHO research are suggested.

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SUMMARY

The ECHO-Vietnam project had as its primary purpose the evaluation of ECHO methodology as a tool for gathering information about behavioral norms and feelings of specific Vietnamese populations. Its secondary purpose was to generate, from data collected during field tests of ECHO, hypotheses regarding those norms and feelings which might form the basis for future research.

Data were collected in I, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones of Vietnam by two General Research Corporation specialists and five Vietnamese interviewer/translators during the period of June 1, 1968 to August 15, 1968. Subjects were 319 men, women, and children, drawn from nine district populations: Popular Forces, Regional Forces, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, RVN Navy enlisted men and women, Catholic and Buddhist civilian men and women in DaNang and Saigon, Saigon school children, and Chieu Hoi Ralliers.

Three different forms of the ECHO projective survey question were used:

1. What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could do? Who would approve (disapprove)?
2. What is a good (bad) thing that could happen? Who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen?
3. What is a good (bad) thing that an American advisor could do? Who would approve (disapprove) if he did this thing?

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Four methods of collecting ECHO data were field tested and evaluated:

1. Standard group-administered form of the written instrument (Type A)
2. Self-administered form of the written instrument (Type B)
3. Oral interviews with tape recorded responses
4. Oral interviews with interviewer-written responses

Although all four methods appear to generate data which do not differ significantly, the relative appropriateness of each appears to be determined by two characteristics of the population surveyed: (1) literacy and (2) the extent to which the group is "captive." Where the subjects are literate, the Type A or Type B form of the written instrument is most appropriate. If subjects make up a captive audience at any one time, the Type A form is preferred for the sake of economy. Where subjects are functionally illiterate, one of the two oral interview techniques must be used, even though the cost is greater than with the two written instruments.

After ECHO responses have been collected, they must be classified to provide meaningful statements about the surveyed group's behavioral norms and feelings. Three types of classifiers were evaluated:

1. Indigenous classifiers (literate members of the surveyed group)
2. Professional classifiers (literate Vietnamese adults)
3. Project research staff members

Where the surveyed group was both literate and "captive," indigenous classifiers were able to properly categorize responses of other members of their group. Although they were unable to achieve the fineness of

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category discrimination shown by professional or staff classifiers, indigenous classifiers were valuable in that they imparted their own unique meanings to the data.

Based on findings of this study, the following recommendations may be made for modifications in the general ECHO methodology:

- The current number of ten questions of each valence (positive and negative) can be reduced to five or seven without sacrificing information.
- Since they appear to differentiate among subcultures more precisely than do behavioral norms, "conditional data" should be collected from randomly sampled subjects in every ECHO survey in which to do questions are used.
- Correlational and nonparametric statistical techniques commonly used for ECHO data analysis should be supplanted by more sophisticated techniques, such as Wiley's latent partition analysis.
- For maximum information and precision, ECHO outputs should be combined with data collected in traditional ways.

The ECHO-Vietnam project has demonstrated the usefulness and practicability of the ECHO survey technique for assessing cultural norms and feelings of different Vietnamese populations. Cultural norm hypotheses generated by data from this study appear both consistent with themselves and consistent with results of studies using other methods. Further research and further use of this methodology seem warranted.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFRVN	Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam; includes all military forces.
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam; the regular army.
CDTC	Combat and Development Test Center, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
<u>Cs</u>	In the ECHO methodology, <u>classifiers</u> who are <u>indigenous to the target audience</u> and who are called upon to categorize raw data.
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zones. South Vietnam is divided into four CTZs.
<u>E</u>	Interviewer in surveys, experimenter in experiments.
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces. The Allies.
GVN	Government of Vietnam. Used to refer to the National Government, to the entire governmental structure, or as an adjective to describe one of its agents or agencies.
N	Sample size, number of respondents or subjects.
NLF	The National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communists in South Vietnam.
NVA	North Vietnamese Army.
<u>PCs</u>	In the ECHO methodology, <u>professional classifiers</u> .
PF	Popular Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a district; organized in platoons and squads.
RF	Regional Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a Province. Organized as companies.
RVN	Republic of Vietnam.
<u>Ss</u>	Respondents in surveys, subjects in experiments.

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ABBREVIATIONS (cont'd.)

SEA	Southeast Asia.
SVN	South Vietnam. Generally connotes the land itself.
VC	Viet Cong, Communist insurgents against the South Vietnamese Government.
VN	Republic of Vietnam, Vietnamese.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OBJECTIVES

The primary purpose of Project ECHO-Vietnam was to evaluate the feasibility of using the ECHO survey methodology in Vietnam to gather attitudinal information. In the process of making such an evaluation within this cultural context, a subsidiary research objective was established: to generate hypotheses regarding aspirations, fears, and norms of the South Vietnamese target groups surveyed.

The query "Will ECHO work in the Vietnamese culture" subsumes several specific methodological questions; this research addresses the following:

1. The Projective Survey Questions

- Is the concept meaningful to Vietnamese respondents?
- How important are the translations of the questions? Do slight differences in translations elicit vastly different responses?
- Can respondents successfully assume an assigned role (e.g., you as a soldier or you as a father)?

2. Data Collection Techniques

- Are group administrations possible?
- Can individual members of literate non-captive target groups be surveyed with self-administered questionnaires?
- Are oral interviews feasible?
- Should records of oral responses be taped or written?
- What are the differences between oral and written responses? What is the effect of loss of anonymity?

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3. Data Classification Techniques

- Can indigenes classify "successfully"?
- Are indigenous classifiers to be preferred to professional classifiers?

4. Defining the Target Populations and Effects of Adverse Field Conditions

- Is the concept clear to children?
- Can children handle written forms of the instrument?
- Can prisoner-rallier populations be surveyed?
- Can the technique work in the field with rural, semi-literate and functionally literate respondents?
- What is the relationship between ECHO data and other attitudinal data?

To provide a complete evaluation of the ECHO technique in Vietnam, answers to these questions are presented in Sec. IV, Conclusions. The majority of the data acquired during field-testing of the methodology are summarized in appendixes, while specific hypotheses generated by these data are presented in Sec. III, Results.

B. BASIC ECHO METHODOLOGY

Opinion polls and surveys have become valued decision-making aids in government, business and politics. Two advances are responsible for their popularity: (1) improvements in statistical inference and sampling methods, and (2) the capacity of modern computers to handle large amounts of data quickly and at a reasonable cost. Yet, over the years there has been little change in basic data collection techniques; the investigator still asks the respondent to assign an evaluation to a pre-selected person, event or condition.

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The ECHO methodology not only incorporates advances in sampling, statistical inference and data processing, but also attempts to mitigate two problems which have plagued traditional surveys (especially in cross-cultural research settings): (1) the problem of previous knowledge--the need for accurate information about the target population before one can ask an intelligent question, and (2) the problem of behavioral irrelevance--how do we know that the respondent's self-reports and actual behavior will be congruent?*

Development of ECHO methodology has been funded by ARPA since 1 January 1967 (under Contract DAHCO4-67C-0040). Target populations surveyed during this period were drawn chiefly from the standard subject pools available to social psychologists: college students, office workers, etc.

The basic unit of ECHO data is an oral or written response to a so-called projective survey question**. The question is essentially a reversed opinion poll question; the ECHO investigator assigns the evaluation and asks the respondent to think of something (an event, a behavior) which carries this evaluation in his personal value hierarchy.

Two ECHO questions have been most frequently used to date:

1. What is a good (bad) [η] thing that a person like you [ρ] could do [ϵ] and who [σ] would approve (disapprove) [Π] if you did this?

* See Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, 1962, p. 174-175: "Measuring What Isn't There," and Leo Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answer." Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1967, No. 3, p. 331-345.

** ECHO is referred to generically as a projective survey technique for three reasons: (1) the originator of the concept, Professor Alex Bavelas, labeled the questions "projective"; (2) the questions clearly meet the criteria for projective techniques as outline by Lindzey (1961, pp. 41-46, 75); (3) the technique is a "survey" because it focuses on feelings and norms of groups rather than individuals.

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2. What is a good (bad) [η] thing that could happen [ϵ] to a person like you [ρ] and who or what [σ] would be most likely to cause [Π] this to happen?

Note that each of these questions contains five variables:

- η Evaluation (good/bad; like/dislike)
- ρ Role assignment (a person like you, you as a soldier; an American adviser)
- ϵ Behavior or event (could do; could happen)
- σ Source or attribution (who would approve, disapprove, cause, etc.)
- Π Reinforcement or outcome (approve, disapprove)

Multiple responses (usually ten) to each ECHO question are collected from respondents, and these data are put into categories created by indigenous classifiers. The classifiers assign to each category a descriptive label that is assumed to denote a salient value.*

C. MODIFICATIONS OF ECHO METHODOLOGY FOR THIS STUDY

Any new methodology is constantly undergoing refinement, especially in data handling and analysis. Furthermore, General Research Corporation staff members who have worked with ECHO have disparate theoretical and methodological orientations. Consequently, the ECHO survey methodology reported here differs significantly from that described in other writings. So that the reader already familiar with the basic ECHO concept can relate methodology used in other studies to that used in Vietnam, three primary differences are discussed below.

* Additional information on ECHO methodology is available in Barthol and Bridge (1967, 1968).

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1. Data Collection Techniques

There are four basic ways to collect ECHO survey data. Here-
tofore, the most commonly used method has been to distribute packets of
preprinted and coded question cards (data processing cards) to captive
audiences who receive oral instructions en masse.^{*} This method is suit-
able for traditional research samples (e.g., college students and work
groups), but it is inappropriate for functionally illiterate samples and
too inflexible for use with non-captive target audiences (e.g., random
samples of registered voters). To enlarge the universe which could be
surveyed with the ECHO instrument, the following types of data collection
techniques (which will be described in more detail in Sec. II) have been
used during ECHO-Vietnam research:

a. Standard Form of the Instrument, Type A

Twenty pre-printed and coded ECHO question cards are distri-
buted to a group; instructions are given verbally.

b. Self-administered Form of the Instrument, Type B

Respondents (Ss) complete the same packet of cards as described
above; however, instructions are printed and packets are distributed to
individuals rather than groups.

c. Oral Interviews (Tape Recorded Responses)

An interviewer asks the respondent to answer ten positive ECHO
questions and ten negative ECHO questions. Responses are recorded on
tape and later they are transcribed onto data processing cards.

d. Oral Interviews (Written Responses)

Same as (c), except the interviewer writes S's responses
directly onto ECHO data processing cards.

* This is the "Standard Form of the Instrument, Type A," described
below.

2. ECHO Processes, Terminology and Outputs

a. Process Schematics

In an earlier report (Barthol and Bridge, 1967) the ECHO methodology--including data collection, processing and analysis--was represented schematically by Fig. 1. However, evolutions in the methodology have made this simple representation inadequate; the new schematics, shown in Figs. 2 and 3, illustrate the steps in data generation and processing for the to do and to happen questions, respectively.

Two separate flow charts are necessary because the two different types of questions (do and happen) elicit empirically and theoretically different types of responses (and therefore outputs).^{*} This study's process representations do not conflict with the earlier methodology in any way; they are merely more explicit.

Note that some steps in the processes are essential to the ECHO methodology only in specific cases; e.g., translation to English (for English-speaking researchers) is clearly obviated when the target population is also English speaking. Categorization of the raw data by indigenous classifiers (Cs) may be replaced, and has been regularly, by that of "professional classifiers" (PCs). Indigenous classifiers are generally preferred; where they are not used, however, results are no more distorted than are those produced by other techniques which use non-indigenes to code responses [e.g., the Self Anchoring Scale, as invented by Cantril (1965) and used by Worchel, et al. (1967)].

b. Values, Behavioral Norms, Aspirations, and Fears of Respondents

In previous reports the ECHO category titles have been referred to as values without regard to the form of the question (happen or do) used

*

Support for this statement is given in Appendix I, where happen and do responses collected from PFs are categorized together to demonstrate the basic independence of the two types of responses. Note that each S completed both happen and do cards.

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


Figure 1. Diagrammatic Representation of Earlier Echo Processes

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GOOD (BAD) THING TO DO

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


Figure 2(U). Diagrammatic Representation Of Modified ECHO Processes

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GOOD (BAD) THING TO HAPPEN




Figure 3(U). Diagrammatic Representation Of Modified ECHO Processes

to elicit the raw data responses. To distinguish between responses to the to do (behavior) questions and the to happen (event) questions, two more specific concepts have been employed here. In this report, statements about good and bad things to do (ways to behave) are called behavioral norms. Good and bad things to happen are seen as statements about hopes and fears, respectively.*

*

There are manifold reasons for preferring this terminology. The concept of norms is well developed in the literature of sociology and psychology, and the use of the concept encourages evaluation of the to do outputs in the framework of a well developed literature. If ECHO outputs are to be maximally useful, they must be systematically compared and contrasted with outputs from more traditional survey devices and put into meaningful theoretical frameworks. The term "behavioral norm" comes from Triandis (1964) who has reviewed the literature on behavioral norms in the context of cross-cultural research settings. Hadley Cantril (1963, 1965) developed a technique for scaling the very best (and the very worst) things that could happen to a respondent and to his nation in terms of the respondent's own value hierarchy; the outputs from his Self Anchoring Scale (SAS) (which a Simulmatics project has applied in South Vietnam) are referred to as hopes and fears. The adoption of the terms "hopes, fears and behavioral norms" in place of "values" is an attempt to establish synergy with these related bodies of literature.

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Note that both behavioral norms and hopes and fears imply values. Values are defined as:

"...a broad class of motivational phenomena. Anything that a person approaches, desires or espouses is a positive value; anything that he avoids, dislikes or deplores is a negative value. A value exists whenever an emotion implying either liking or disliking attaches to a cognition" (Jones and Gerard, 1967, p. 720)

A given value may manifest itself through several behavioral norms simultaneously. A value is much broader than what is denoted in declarative statements such as: "It is bad to be corrupt" or "It is good to help poor people." Statements of this type can be further defined when the range of behavior implied by the norm is made explicit.*

3. Conditionals

Behavioral norms are statements about preferred ways of behaving; rules of behavior, however, invariably have exceptions. The exceptions define when and for whom a particular behavior is to be preferred--they define the parameters of norms. Norms are conceptualized as a range of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. In this research these exceptions to rules of behavior have been labeled conditionals; they would appear to be more powerful differentiators between subcultures than norms per se.

An example of a behavioral norm, i.e., a to do category statement generated by Vietnam Regional Forces troops, is: "It is bad to be corrupt." But what behavior is corrupt? A group of Regional Forces troops answered the question: Under what conditions is it not bad to be corrupt? Their replies included:

*

It is important to note that a norm specifies a range of expected behavior. Stouffer (1949) found that norms about appropriate performance of various roles did not specify a single correct behavior but described a range of permissible behavior. He emphasized the functional value of this "social slippage" in enabling people to adapt comfortably to conflicting role requirements.

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- I am in a repair and maintenance unit. A machine broke down and I needed a spare part that I couldn't find anywhere. I stole that piece from another place to fix up the machine and set it to work.
- If we were to go on an operation or mission through an area where we find food (rice, etc.) left by the villagers and we run out of supplies, we can appropriate the food we find, for even if we don't the VC will get to it.

(See Appendix VI, page 70 for further examples and a discussion of "acceptable corruption.")

These are conditionals, and their ability to enlarge our understanding of the behavioral consequences of a norm are immediately apparent. Conditionals for each of the behavioral norms were collected from indigenes in most of the populations sampled.

The raw data provide a second source of information about the range of behavior defining a particular norm. Many responses contain implicit or explicit conditionals. For instance, "It is bad for people under 18 to smoke" implies that people over 18 may smoke; the conditional is implicit. In "It is bad to kill except in self defense" the conditional is explicit.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Section II describes the basic research procedure followed in this study, including subject populations tested, and data collection methods employed. Section III provides an analysis of data resulting from use of ECHO methodology with the specific Vietnamese populations tested. Specific hypotheses generated by this data are also presented in this section. Section IV states conclusions about the appropriateness of the ECHO

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technique for analyzing Vietnamese target group aspirations, fears, and cultural norms. Specific recommendations are made for further modification of ECHO procedure for use with such populations.

Appendixes reproduce specific test instruments used in this study and show representative data from their use.

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II. RESEARCH PROCEDURE

Field tests of the ECHO methodology were conducted in Vietnam between June 1, and August 16, 1968, by R. G. Bridge and J. F. Heller and a team of five Vietnamese interviewer/translators. Data were collected in I, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). Preliminary data processing was completed in Bangkok, Thailand, at the National Statistical Office, Data Processing Center of Thailand, and at the MAC-V and MAC-Thai data processing facilities.

A. SUBJECT POPULATIONS

Data were collected from 319 men, women and children representing nine distinct populations. The populations sampled, sample size, and the form of the ECHO instrument used with each one are identified in Table 1.

There is an additional source of ECHO data which has not been identified in Table 1. Lt. Commander Richard McGonigal, U.S.N., collected ECHO data in I Corps during the months of January, February, and March 1968 as part of the Navy's on-going Personal Response Project. Lt. Commander McGonigal has made these data available to General Research Corporation, and they have been reprocessed and analyzed during the current project.

Whenever possible, subjects for this study were selected at random from their parent populations. However, conditions in Vietnam prohibited truly random sampling of subjects for some of the field studies; such studies are identified in Sec. III. In the several instances where random sampling could not be guaranteed, available subjects were randomly assigned to treatment groups so that between-treatment comparisons could validly be made within each sample.

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TABLE 1

POPULATIONS STUDIED

Sample Population	Sample Size	ECHO Questions and Instrument *
CDTC Enlisted Men	16	Standard Instrument - Type B "What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could <u>do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
Regional Forces, 86th Bn. Gia Dinh, Capital District	56	Standard Instrument - Type A "What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could <u>do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
Regional Forces, 86th Bn. Gia Dinh, Capital District	47	Oral Interviews (2 forms) - "What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could <u>do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
Navy Enlisted Men and Women	≈ 30	Standard Instrument - Type B "What is a good (bad) thing that could <u>happen</u> ? Who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen?
Saigon Civilians: (a) Buddhists (b) Catholics	32	Standard Instrument - Type B "What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could <u>do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
Saigon Children	20	Standard Instrument - Type B and Oral Interviews "What is a good (bad) thing that <u>a boy or girl like you would do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
Chieu Hoi Ralliers	7	Standard Instrument - Type A "What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could <u>do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove)?
DaNang Civilians	73	Standard Instrument - Type B "What is a good (bad) thing that could <u>happen</u> ? Who or what would be most likely to cause this to happen?
Rach Gia Sector, IV Corps Regional Forces	21	Oral Interviews "What is a good (bad) thing that <u>an American adviser could do</u> ? Who would approve (disapprove) if he did this thing?
Rach Gia Sector, IV Corps Popular Forces	17	(1) "What is a good (bad) thing that could <u>happen</u> ? Who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen? (2) Attitudes toward American advisers instrument.

* Standard Instrument (Type A): Ss fill out a 20 card packet of pre-printed and pre-coded ECHO question cards. Instructions are given verbally.

Standard Instrument (Type B): Ss fill out a 20 card packet of pre-printed and pre-coded ECHO question cards. Instructions are printed and enclosed in the packet; no verbal explanation is given.

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B. DATA COLLECTION

The form of the data collection instrument for any given survey is a function of two factors: (a) the characteristic literacy level of the target populations, and (b) the captive or non-captive nature of the sample to be surveyed.* As set forth in Sec. I, four data collection techniques were used and evaluated in this study:

1. The Standard Written Instrument (Type A)

This is the prototypic ECHO data collection device. A group of respondents are given twenty pre-printed and coded data processing cards on which to write their responses to two forms of the projective survey question. Half of the question cards have a positive valence and half have a negative valence; positive and negative questions are counterbalanced across respondents to control for potential sequential effects. Instructions are administered to the group as a whole; a literate captive audience is required.

- Pre-tests of the to do translations were completed with ARVN enlisted men (in the CDTC compound in Saigon); no modification of the translations was necessary.
- A copy of the instructions which were used with the RFs is presented in Appendix II. Reproductions of positive and negative to do and to happen cards are shown in Appendix III.
- The group administered questionnaire packets were used to survey three different VN samples: 86th Bn. RF enlisted men (N=56), hoi chanh (N=7), and RFs in Rach Gia, IV Corps (N=21).

*

The "captive"-non-captive" distinction involves more than (physical) proximity. The "non-captive" audience label is applied to non-face-to-face groups (e.g., "middle class" people). The group-administered ECHO instrument requires a captive audience. The self-administered form can be used with either captive or non-captive audiences. For example, if ECHO packets are distributed to the homes of a sample of registered voters, the target audience is "non-captive." If, on the other hand, the packets are distributed at a political rally, the target audience is "captive" whether it receives instructions on an individual basis (say, when leaving) or as a group. In this case, the political rally defines a face-to-face group.

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In all of the pilot studies a majority of respondents were able to complete the written questionnaire; approximately 75% of the ARVN and RF samples were able to read and write sufficiently well to handle the instrument [cf. Worchel, et al., (1967, p. 36) who reports that approximately 79% of the servicemen (PFs and RFs) and 70% of the civilian villagers they interviewed were able to read and write].

2. Self-Administered Form of the Written Instrument (Type B)

Each S completes the card packet described above except that he receives written instructions, and Ss are not tested as a single group. Copies of the written instructions used in VN studies are presented on pages 80 and 81 of Appendix VI. This form of the instrument is most suitable for non-captive* audiences who have the equivalent of at least a fourth grade education (by American standards).**

Other researchers have attempted to develop a "self-administrated" form of the typical opinion poll questionnaire to tap literate VN target audiences. Raymond (1967), for instance, got a 57% return to an 8-page self-administered questionnaire that she distributed to 800 unselected literate women in the Saigon metropolitan area (Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh).

*

The Type B instrument was used in a pilot study survey of political attitudes of Southern California voters registered in the Democratic, Republican and Peace and Freedom parties. A randomly selected sample of registered voters was asked: "What is a good (bad) thing that the President elected in 1968 could do?" and "Who would approve (disapprove)?"

**

The conclusion that an American fourth grade education is a minimal requirement for Ss using the written ECHO instrument was explicated in an earlier report (Barthol and Bridge, 1967). Third graders could handle the instrument with supervision, and older children could handle the instrument unaided. This view was reconfirmed by experience in Vietnam (see page 84, Appendix VI).

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The self-administered form of the written ECHO instrument was used to survey the following target groups: ARVN (N=16) and Navy enlisted men (N=30), male and female civilians (N=105) and school children (N=20). All of these samples were selected from their particular target populations on the basis of availability rather than random selection.

The major advantage of the Type B instrument is that data can be collected from a large sample population with only a small number of ECHO trained researchers or skilled interviewers. The major disadvantage, however, is that such a collection method permits Ss to make more inappropriate answers. The germane question here is: What increase in the error factor (inappropriate answers) can be expected when the Type B instrument is used instead of the Type A instrument? Section III reports results of tests designed to answer this question.

3. Oral Interviews (Tape Recorded Responses)

Oral interview techniques have been developed to collect data from functionally illiterate populations. Several important questions are raised by this change, will loss of anonymity alter the ECHO responses? Is the concept even meaningful to functionally illiterate individuals who have difficulty enacting a non-personal role assignment and who typically show signs of poor abstracting ability and "time binding?" Results of pilot studies addressing these questions are given in Sec. III.

In one type of oral interview, the interviewer tape records the S's responses. An advantage of the taped interview is that it generates a permanent record of the entire subject-interviewer interaction; this record provides a check on interviewers whose behavior might influence the subject's responses with leading questions, etc.

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Note, however, that data collected in oral interviews must be transcribed onto data cards before it can be classified or processed (unless the interviewer records the response directly onto data processing cards--see (4) below). Further, tape recording the responses requires the expense of extra equipment plus the service of someone who knows how to operate it.

4. Oral Interviews (Written Responses)

In a second type of oral interview, the interviewer records responses in writing, either on pre-printed and coded IBM cards or ordinary writing paper. Many researchers believe that the presence of tape recorders (or for that matter, IBM card packets) "put people off," because the materials are associated with authority or "official people." Part of the ECHO-Vietnam research involved empirical testing of the hypothesis that tape recorders modify the survey setting significantly, and therefore the responses received in tape recorded and written oral interviews are significantly different. Results of that phase of the study are reported in Sec. III.

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III. RESULTS

Field tests of the modified ECHO methodology conducted in the summer of 1968 produced a relatively large body of data. The results of evaluating that data are reported here under three headings: (A) Comparison of Data Collection Techniques, (B) Comparison of Data Classification Techniques, and (C) Cultural Data on Sampled Groups.

A. COMPARISON OF DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

Pilot studies were conducted to discover the relative merits of the four methods of collecting ECHO data [standard written instrument (Type A), self-administered form of the written instrument (Type B), oral interviews with taped responses, and oral interviews with responses written down by the interviewer]. The pilot tests were designed to make three important comparisons:

- Standard written instrument (Type A) vs. self-administered written instrument (Type B)
- Oral interviews with taped responses vs. oral interviews with written responses
- Standard written instrument (Type A) vs. oral interviews

1. Standard Written Instrument (Type A) vs. Self-Administered Written Instrument (Type B)

As indicated in Sec. II, the main advantage of the Type B instrument is that collecting data from a relatively large sample requires only a small number of trained interviewers. The main disadvantage is that the self-administered instrument permits respondents to make a higher proportion of inappropriate answers. To determine the significance of this disadvantage of the Type B instrument, 119 members of the Vietnamese armed forces were surveyed using the four different methods of data collection. The resulting data were sorted by professional classifiers using a single set of categories. One category in both the positive and negative category systems contained cards with inappropriate answers (as defined by

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the professional classifiers). Both the percentage of cards and the percentages of respondents who contributed to this category were computed; these data are presented in Table 2.

The Type B error factor (percentage of "inappropriate answers") appears to be two to three times higher than the Type A error factor. However, this level of error is acceptable in view of the increased flexibility of the Type B self-administered questionnaire; this form of the ECHO questionnaire seems appropriate for non-captive, literate populations. On the other hand, the Type A instrument has lower per capita costs and results in fewer inappropriate answers (probably due to the demand characteristics of the test situation and the opportunity to ask clarifying questions). Further, Type A reduces error variance due to time and setting differences in administration of the instrument. The Type A instrument is to be preferred in cases where a captive literate population can be assembled. [Data processing and analysis costs are identical (per S surveyed) for the written forms of the ECHO instrument.]

2. Oral Interviews with Taped Responses (OT) vs. Oral Interviews with Written Responses (OW)

Since many researchers have suggested that the presence of tape recorders in an interview situation inhibits responses, a pilot-study was designed to test this objection.* In this study, oral interviews were

*

There is some experimental evidence germane to questions about the influence of tape recorders in oral interviews. Roberts and Renzaglia (1965) studied the effect of tape recording in "client-centered" counseling. Eight counselors conducted three interviews each under each of the following conditions: tape recorder visible and running, microphone only present, and no recorder visible although recordings were made clandestinely. Analysis showed no differences in the quality of talk or in the ratio of client-counselor talk. However, clients did make significantly more positive statements about themselves when the recorder was visible than in the other conditions. More negative self references occurred when no tape recorder was visible. In summary, tape recorders do alter manifest content in oral interviews, at least in client-centered interviews.

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TABLE 2

ERROR RATE (INAPPROPRIATE ANSWERS) BY INSTRUMENT TYPE

	Oral Interviews (Written, taped)	Standard Instrument Type A	Standard Instrument Type B	
Percent of Cards	0.4%	1.4%	4.9%	
Percent of Subjects	4.3%	7.7%	13.3%	
N	47	56	16	= 119

Subjects: 86th Bn., Rf, Gia Dinh [orals and Type A],
ARVN enlisted men [Type B]

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used to collect ECHO data from 47 randomly selected RF enlisted men (86th Bn., Gia Dinh); Ss were randomly assigned to one of the two interview conditions. In the taped response condition, responses were tape recorded openly; in the written response condition the interviewer wrote the S's response on data cards. The null hypothesis is that when all cards are classified together in an unstructured sort there are no significant differences between the taped and written distributions.

Category distributions for taped and written oral responses were compared in the following manner:

Procedure:

All of the 460 oral interview responses (224 taped and 236 written) were transcribed and classified into one category system. Classifiers were unaware of the recording method used in collecting the original data; they worked with Vietnamese transcriptions typed on data processing cards. The positive category system produced in this manner was broken down into two distributions, written and taped oral responses.

Results:

The distributions were not significantly different (although they bordered, $p < 0.10^{\dagger}$, on significance; χ^2_{k-1} , Siegel, 1956); the evidence suggests that the method of recording oral responses does not influence the type of data generated. The ranked correlation coefficient, an index of similarity, for these distributions was +0.83 ($t = 6.52$, $df = 20$, $p < 0.001^{\dagger}$, Kendall, 1948, p. 47-48).

Note that the two distributions which were compared here are percentages of cards; percent of Ss distributions may be used for ranked correlation coefficients but they are not amenable to Chi Square independence tests.

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No significant differences in category distributions were found in this comparison. These results suggest that the method of recording oral interview responses does not differentially influence the type of data generated.

More attention is given to a comparison of OT and OW source distributions than was given to OT and OW category distributions. Sources are a more suitable dimension for comparing population differences because they are more objective than category partitions, i.e., a given source distribution is less dependent on classifiers' opinions than are category partitions. Sources are coded according to a strict format, whereas categories may vary widely from classification to classification.

Source distributions (for both approval and disapproval) listing the percentage of cards mentioning each source were prepared for all the tape recorded data (OT) and all of the graphically recorded data (OW). Characteristics of these four distributions can be described as follows:

- The method of data recording did not influence the number of different sources of approval or disapproval cited by respondents in oral interviews. Sixteen sources were used in the taped "good to" data and 22 were used in the written "good to" data; there is no significant difference between these values ($X^2 = 2.25$ with $df = 1$) (see Table 3). The taped "bad to" data contained mentions of 20 different sources while the written data used 19 different sources of disapproval; there is no significant difference between these values ($X^2 = 0.05$ with $df = 1$).
- The method of data recording does not seem to influence the sources which are cited in oral interviews. The number of sources cited may not differ, but are the actual sources the same? In other words, what is the overlap between sources

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TABLE 3

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT SOURCES BY RECORDING METHOD

METHOD	VALENCE	
	GOOD to do	BAD to do
Taped OT	16	20
Written OW	22	19

cited in OT+ and OW+ data and between OT- and OW- data?

The relevant data are presented in Table 4. The same entities account for most of the sources of approval and disapproval cited in the positive and negative data. The Chi Square (df = 1) with appropriate correction for continuity (Siegel, 1956) equals 0.33 and is not significant.

- Consider the dozen most frequently used sources of approval and disapproval cited in the taped and written oral interview data. Table 5 shows that most of the ECHO responses in oral interviews cite one of twelve sources.

TABLE 4

OVERLAP IN OT AND OW SOURCES

		VALENCE	
		GOODS (+)	BADS (-)
I	How many different sources were found in <u>both</u> OT and OW data?	15	17
II	What percentage of all OT responses cited one of these "common" sources?	99.7	98.6
III	What percentage of all OW responses cited one of these "common" sources?	93.2	95.1

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TABLE 5

PERCENT OF RESPONSES CITING ONE OF 12 SOURCES

METHOD	VALENCE	
	GOODS (+)	BADS (-)
TAPED DATA (OT)	83.2	93.3
WRITTEN DATA (OW)	89.0	86.4

The commonly mentioned sources for each of these data pools are listed on the following two pages and illustrate the substantial overlap.

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Commonly Mentioned Sources of Approval

Code		% Taped Responses	% Written Responses
1	Myself, My Conscience, My Duty, My Honor, My Heart, My Happiness	21.0	27.4
3	Parents	3.6	8.9
6	Immediate Family, Family Members	2.2	2.5
20	Friends, Comrades	8.5	8.9
27	Neighbors	2.2	2.5
30	Other People	2.7	2.1
31	Everyone	1.8	4.2
33	The Person Involved in This Act	5.4	3.0
36	People, Vietnamese People, Villagers	8.5	5.1
49	My Superiors	2.7	0.8
60	Leader, Commander, Captain, Platoon Leader	24.6	21.1
32	Society	<u>---</u>	<u>2.5</u>
		83.2	89.0

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Commonly Mentioned Source of Disapproval

Code		% Taped Responses	% Written Responses
1	Myself, My Conscience, My Duty, My Honor, My Heart, My Happiness	20.3	19.9
2	Spouse	2.9	4.2
3	Parents	3.9	6.8
6	Immediate Family, Family Members	4.3	2.5
20	Friends, Comrades	12.6	11.4
27	Neighbors	3.4	2.5
30	Other People	1.4	4.7
31	Everyone	2.9	5.5
33	The Person Involved in This Act	5.3	4.7
36	People, Vietnamese People, Villagers	9.7	4.7
51	GVN, The Vietnamese Government	5.8	4.2
60	Leader, Commander, Captain, Platoon Leader	<u>20.8</u>	<u>15.3</u>
		93.3	86.4

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3. Standard Written Instrument (Type A) vs. Oral Interview

To determine whether the categories generated by "standard written form" and "oral" responses differ appreciably, data collected with the written ECHO instrument (Type A) were classified with data collected in oral interviews (half written and half taped). Respondents, drawn randomly from a single Regional Forces battalion were asked "What is a good (bad) thing to do?" and "Who would approve (disapprove if you did this thing?" The classifiers were not aware of the data recording method. The classification process produced a single category system; this system was broken down into two frequency distributions.

The Spearman rank correlation (r_s) computed for these distributions was +0.71 (significantly different from $r_s = 0.00$ at the $p < 0.001$ level, $t = 6.11$, $df = 37$). The hypothesis that the two distributions are from the same population is not rejected. Written and oral responses then are essentially similar for a given population. Of course we would expect to find some differences in responses to oral and written instruments if the former came from functionally illiterate Ss.

B. COMPARISON OF DATA CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES

To derive meaningful statements about behavioral norms, hopes and fears, the raw ECHO responses must be categorized. There are two types of classifications: (1) structured and (2) unstructured. In the former case, the responses, recorded on cards, are sorted into predefined categories. In an unstructured sort the responses are given to a team of (three) classifiers who are asked to "put the cards together than mean the same thing to you" (cf., Sherif and Sherif, 1964, Own Categories Procedure for Attitude Research). There are three types of classifiers: (1) literate members of the target audience (indigenous classifiers), (2) the research staff, or (3) "professional classifiers." In this report, professional classifiers (PCs) means literate Vietnamese adults who were not indigenous to the target audience and who were not aware of the hypotheses being tested.

1. Who Can Classify?

Indigenous classifiers (Cs) randomly selected from populations of respondents who completed the written instrument (Type A) were able to categorize the responses generated by other members of their populations. This suggests that indigenous Cs may be used with any target population where a written data collection instrument is viable.

Evidence: Six different three man teams of indigenous classifiers sorted the good and bad thing to do responses collected in oral interviews (taped and written) and with the standard form of the instrument (Type A). Respondents and classifiers were randomly selected using roll call rosters from the 86th Bn., Regional Forces stationed in Gia Dinh. The teams of indigenous classifiers partitioned batches from 200-250 cards in a model time of approximately 3 hours. The classification task appeared to be substantially more difficult for these men than for American clerical workers and students; the task, however, was successfully completed* by all of the VN teams. To the researcher this means that the target population which can successfully handle the written forms of the instrument can also complete the classification task.

2. Category Discriminations

Given two groups of classifiers one highly literate and one semi-literate, the fineness of category discriminations, as inferred from the number of categories used for a given set of cards, increases with the formal education of the classifiers. Semi-literate, military Cs did not use as many categories as PCs to sort a common data pool. Note that this statement is addressed to the characteristics of classifications made by

*

"Completed" means all of the cards were placed into categories and these categories were labeled; this does not imply that the classification were reliable (i.e., reproducible by the same team on a different occasion with a high degree of accuracy.) Data presented elsewhere, however, indicate the indigenous Cs' outputs were reliable (i.e., reproducible) at a statistically acceptable level.

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educated and less educated classifiers--it does not imply that PCs produce more veridical classifications of ECHO data, merely that they make finer discriminations.*

Evidence: The Regional Forces data described above were reclassified by two teams of professional classifiers (Vietnamese members of the ECHO staff) on different trials to produce a total of six different classifications of "good to do" data and eight classifications of the "bad to do" data. In all cases, the PCs used more categories to classify the data than did the Cs. For example, where indigenes used 13 categories to classify 205 "bad thing to do" responses, PCs used 38, 37 and 33 categories in three different partitionings of the same data.

An example of the worst (least differentiated) classification produced by indigenous classifiers is shown in Appendix IV. These data fell into 28 different categories when the data were reclassified by a team of male PCs. The relationship between the two classifications is illustrated by the behavioral norm "help others"; this category was the most frequently mentioned behavioral norm in the indigenous classification (amounting to 46.8% of all cards). In the PC classification this category was broken down into several sub-categories as the data in Appendix IV show. The recipients of altruism (whom should you help) are more apparent in the PC outputs; this added information suggests that in certain surveys professional classifiers should be used in place of indigenous classifiers.

The ECHO user can expect to find greater conceptual differentiation, (abstracting ability) among more educated classifiers. Indigenous classifiers are valuable, however, in that they impart their own esoteric meaning to the data--even if this meaning is less subtle and discriminating than that contributed by other classifiers. The value of indigenous Cs

*

Weicks has noted that "large numbers of categories do not necessarily mean that a system is exhaustive, nor do they ensure that the system is reliable or valid (1968, p. 424). Gellert (1955, p. 184) observed that with large numbers of categories finer distinctions often exist and it is usually more difficult to reach agreement on the placement of specific items.

is especially apparent when the target population has a high average level of education; the benefits drop markedly when the population is semi-literate.

As a rule, it would appear that when professional classifiers are used, their outputs should be compared with indigenous classifications of representative samples of the same data. If gross differences obtain, indigenous Cs should re-classify the data several times to ascertain the "average" or latent partition underlying the different classifications.

C. CULTURAL DATA FROM SAMPLED GROUPS

Data provided by the field tests of ECHO methodology have been used to generate a series of hypotheses regarding the hopes, fears, and cultural norms of various Vietnamese populations. Although it was often impossible to establish samples on the basis of true random selection these generalizations are both consistent with themselves and consistent with those generated by researchers using other methodologies. Several rather novel, yet plausible, generalizations can also be made.

Specific hypotheses based on this body of data are discussed here briefly. An extensive discussion, along with detailed lists of data, is given in Appendix VI, beginning on page 65. There the reader will find a step by step account of what the researchers did and how they reached the conclusions stated below.

1. Group Centered Orientation

The Vietnamese populations tested, particularly the civilian populations, showed evidence of being highly sociocentric (as opposed to the more egocentric American culture). Approval or disapproval by "everyone" was mentioned relatively more often in the Vietnamese samples than in most other non-Vietnamese cultures surveyed. Behavioral norms emphasizing pleasant relationships among neighbors and censuring disruptive behavior (e.g., quarreling) were common.

In one study approximately one third of all the good thing to do cards generated by women (N=53) cited "everyone" as the approving source. In this same study a fourth of the male civilians (N=93) cards and an eighth of the PFs' (N=34) positive responses referred to this source. Note that the military respondents mentioned "everyone" as a source less than civilian populations; one possible explanation for this finding (which was later replicated with Saigon civilians and RFs) is that soldiers, or at least many soldiers, have been quartered away from their "home village." When the soldier is in an alien environment the social influence system and its ubiquitous social control pressures are not impinging on him as much; his day to day behavior does not carry the same long term consequences that it does when he is interacting with people in his own village. This decrement in community influence may be reflected in "lack of discipline" and "oppressive" behavior reported by both civilian and military populations (e.g., one is more likely to steal a chicken when one does not personally know its owner and does not anticipate having to interact with this owner cum victim in the future).

2. Filial Duties and Relationships

Filial duties and relationships are frequently mentioned, especially by males. There seems to be an acknowledged and accepted reduction in filial duties, however, when a son is serving in the military. This alleviation of filial "oughts" is possibly a function of the relevant "cans." One does not attribute failure to himself (or experience guilt) when he fails to perform a duty he is incapable of performing. This observation is supported by the conditionals (from a group of RFs) for the statement "It is bad to be unfilial":

- in case of extreme poverty; in extreme material need
- if assigned to a remote area where contact with family is impossible

Three female civilians provided these conditions for the same statement:

- if disowned by parents since childhood
- if unjustly mistreated by bad parents
- an orphan who does not know his parents

3. Propinquity

Nearness in blood, place or time, appears to be a major determinant of perceived sources of social reinforcement in the Vietnamese culture. For example, civilian males mentioned leaders and commanders much less than did servicemen, and women did not mention these sources at all. Friends and comrades are also a powerful source of social reinforcement for soldiers. The same set of relationships holds for the South Vietnam government (GVN) as a source. Soldiers more than male civilians mention the GVN as approving of them under certain conditions. Women on the other hand view their immediate family members as an important source of approval; not one woman in a sample of 61 mentioned the government as either a source of approval or disapproval. The statements about the sociocentric bias of Vietnamese society reflect the effects of propinquity. (For an expanded discussion of propinquity see Appendix VI, page 100.)

4. Corruption and Bribery

Vietnamese make a significant distinction between corruption and bribery. Conditionals data indicate that bribery is not synonymous with corruption, at least not in the minds of many of the Vietnamese surveyed. A bribe is an accepted way of doing business; it is seen as a legitimate and expected cost of getting things done--legal things, that is. For example, bribing a traffic policeman is far more convenient than going to police headquarters to pay a fine; besides the policeman is so poorly paid that the bribe is considered to be an implicit and necessary part of his income. Note that the tickets he "dispenses" are in most cases warranted. Corruption, on the other hand, occurs when a policeman demands more than

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the "fair" size bribe or there is no basis for the demand. Corruption is one of the most frequently mentioned bad things to happen and to do. Many of the to happen responses provide detailed examples of corrupt practices. For example, a male civilian in DaNang wrote on a bad thing to happen card:

"Why is it so that a person works all day long and does not make enough money to live on while high placed persons loaf around and collect money by the handful? Certain high ranking government employees (and many officers although they have a high salary and plenty of comfort including high-storey homes and cars) still send their wives off to go into transactions such as exchange of dollars and dealing in US goods. Each of them earns up to tens of thousands which is more than their husbands' income. These ladies have government cars at their disposal at all times of the day."

Who or what would be most likely to cause this to happen?

"The fact that those government employees or army officials believe in making big money and so they let their wives go into these transactions. One evidence: the case of Mr. S_____'s wife mobilizing a fleet of GMCs to unload smuggled goods off the Saigon docks."

5. Altruism

The single largest category in behavioral norm lists produced by most American populations is "It is good to help others." This was also found to be true of the majority of Vietnamese category systems. The description of what constitutes "helping others," however, is markedly different in the two cultures. In the Vietnamese samples, the people one should help follow roughly these priorities: comrades (military men), neighbors (civilians), victims of the war, those disabled by natural causes, accidents or street incidents, and the poor. This ordering is inferred from the relative frequency with which each is mentioned when data from all populations surveyed are analyzed together. Data gleaned from school children (N=20) suggest that the altruism value is learned (internalized) at an early age.

6. Status

Ascribed status factors are a significant source of displeasure among AFRVN enlisted men. This is illustrated by Navy enlisted men's complaints about maintaining the French "main gate system," (i.e., separate gates for officers and enlisted men). Soldiers also complained about officers using men for personal profit or nonremunerated service beyond the amount that is normally expected of enlisted men. Hostilities of this type reflect low morale--a problem especially important to an Army population largely by conscripts and "civilians in military clothes." Many of these status and social distance problems are intrinsic to any military organization; others are the product of an arbitrary system. Note that social distance problems have been targeted by the Viet Cong as a significant issue for agitation among the Vietnamese people; evidence collected by others (e.g., RAND Corp.) suggests that the Viet Cong have modified their own political and military system to reflect these sensitivities. (See Appendix VI, page 141.)

7. Attitudes toward Americans

In every population surveyed some anti-American feelings and attitudes were expressed; this was particularly true of civilian populations. These negative attitudes can be classified into the following areas of concern:

- Americans cause many accidents and deaths due to their negligence and inconsideration of the Vietnamese people.
- Americans are destroying Vietnamese traditions and attacking the moral fiber of their youth by "tempting minor girls with luxury," etc.
- Americans are responsible for the inflation which has left many people, especially soldiers' families on fixed incomes, with less buying power.

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Another concern which reflects a negative attitude toward Americans is the frequently mentioned fear of several civilian and military people that the United States may withdraw or significantly reduce its military assistance to South Vietnam. [Some of the hoi chanh (ralliers), however, expressed a desire to see the American and Allied Forces withdraw and for South Vietnam to be "neutralized."]

To put these negative attitudes in perspective, it should be noted that most subjects did acknowledge that they appreciated receiving help from South Vietnam's allies.

8. Attitudes toward Advisers

Two Vietnamese military samples were surveyed to discover attitudes toward American military advisers and to evaluate the non-personal role assignment form of the to do question. One group of RFs (Regional Forces troops) generated positive and negative responses to the question: "What is a good (bad) thing that an American adviser could do?" and "Who would approve (disapprove)?" ECHO responses and interview evidence indicate that these particular RFs disliked their American advisers. Bad things to do included: fail to call air support or medivac, refuse to call an L-19 during combat, not help with improvement of living standards in compound, lack social manners, be "very economic," and fail to secure needed medicines for soldiers' families. The chief good things to do were: in combat actively join operations without complaining about being tired, call for air support or medivac quickly, and contact American authorities to secure building materials and assistance for improving the compound living conditions (steel bars and a water system were requested).

A group of PFs (Popular Forces troops) in the same sector completed opinion questionnaires and a sociometric scale which asked them to evaluate their advisers and asked for their opinions about what materiel would help them to do their jobs better. These PFs thought new weapons

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(M-2s or M-16s), more ammunition, office supplies and vehicles were needed. They positively evaluated their advisers and used these terms to describe them: cooperative, pleasant, gentle, kind and nice. The adviser they liked best was praised for securing cooking oil and a TV set for the compound. The chief base of an adviser's social power appears to be his ability to mediate rewards (positive reinforcements) for the soldiers. This inference is defended in an expanded version of this section, in Appendix VI, Exhibits 6A and 6B, pages 109 and 110.

9. Attitudes of Ralliers

A very small sample (N=7) of hoi chanh quartered at the National Chieu Hoi Center generated responses to the standard form of the to happen ECHO instrument (Type B). Their responses showed they were exceedingly concerned with the GVN's (South Vietnamese government's) policy of drafting ex-hoi chanh six months after they complete the Chieu Hoi indoctrination course. The majority of ralliers praised the North for "eliminating corruption, hooliganism and prostitution," chided the GVN for failing to solve these problems in the South and blamed the Americans for a decline in the morals and traditions of South Vietnam. These latter results are congruent with those reported by a Simulmatics project in 1967 and a RAND Corporation researcher, J. J. Zasloff, in 1968. However, the concern with GVN conscription policies was not reported in either of these researches. This result probably reflects the fact that conscription policies were changed radically by General Mobilization Decree following the TET offensive (March 1968). (Translations of all the hoi chanh responses are presented in Appendix VI, Exhibits 7A and 7B, beginning on page 139.)

10. Attitudes toward Ralliers

An opinion poll questionnaire used to validate the ECHO behavioral norm: "It is bad to beat or torture POWs or hoi chanh," showed that approximately 9% of a sample of RF troops (N=30) approved of beating hoi chanh during interrogations while 66% of these respondents approved

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of torturing POWs during interrogations. ECHO conditionals information suggests that most military men (ARVN, RF and PF) disapprove of beating prisoners or ralliers except under the following conditions: (a) the man has information which you need, (b) he is "insincere" or "not a genuine rallier" or (c) the POWs are rioting or disturbing the peace. Many observers have speculated that a publicized improvement in the treatment of ralliers would lead to an increase in the number rallying (cf., Simulmatics, 1967). The majority of Vietnamese military people seem to disapprove of beating hoi chanh; this suggests that those who violate this norm should be punished and the fact publicized as a stimulus to rallying.

11. Hopes and Fears

AFRVN servicemen and civilians in DaNang (N=73) generated responses to: "What is a good (bad) thing that could happen, and who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen?" Important fears included: the decline of the Vietnamese economy, weakening of family life and Vietnamese traditions, having a hard life, loss of national independence (or having a communist or coalition government in power), and negotiating with the communists. The good things to happen included: lasting peace, economic improvement, the Americans help Vietnam, better war effort, (unity, better national policy, a stronger GVN), and an end to corruption and social evils in society (e.g., prostitution, hooliganism).

The data were re-analyzed to ascertain significant differences between Buddhists and Catholics. The results suggest that communism was a more salient fear to Catholics than to Buddhists, while Buddhists were more critical of the GVN and its policies. Buddhists were also more concerned with certain negative conditions in the South (unemployment, corruption, prostitution) and the decline in family morals. Both groups expressed anti-American fears (Americans don't respect Vietnamese laws, they are impolite, and they don't really help South Vietnam) but Buddhists tended to make more severe criticisms.

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The foregoing hypotheses generated from ECHO data appear reasonable when compared with results of other studies. In sampling many of the populations used, however, there was a lack of true randomization; therefore, these generalizations are best looked upon as tentative results which can form the basis of future research specifically designed to test them. It was sufficient for the purposes of this study that the data provided appropriate testing of various ECHO procedures and methods.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

Project ECHO-Vietnam had as its primary purpose the evaluation of ECHO methodology in Vietnam as a tool for gathering information about behavioral norms, hopes and fears--in general, values--of specified populations. Results of the study affirm the basic value of this survey technique for that specific task. Those methodological conclusions are summarized below. Recommendations for modifications to the ECHO methodology are also given and are followed by predictive generalizations based on collected data. Finally, further research and potential new applications of the technique are proposed.

A. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ECHO METHODOLOGY

The ECHO projective survey method appears to be an effective device for gathering cultural information on Vietnamese target populations. Data collected by this means were both internally consistent and consistent with results obtained in previous studies using other accepted methods. ECHO data also provided new insights into respondents' norms, hopes and fears. Conclusions regarding specific aspects of the methodology are summarized below:

1. Projective Survey Questions

The concept involved in the basic ECHO questions appears clear to all groups tested. Even children were able to demonstrate an understanding of the concept and an ability to complete the required tasks.

Translations of to do and to happen questions appeared to be completely adequate. Verification of this finding was provided through the use of the back-translation technique. The robustness of the basic ECHO concept is evidenced by the fact that Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal's data were gleaned, independent of the GRC staff, with another translation of the questions.

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Finally, the use of complex role assignments (e.g., "good for an American adviser to do") has proven feasible even with populations having a low literacy level.

2. Data Collection Techniques

Four methods of collecting ECHO data were tested and compared in the field: the standard written ECHO instrument (Type A), a self-administered form of the written instrument (Type B), oral interviews with taped responses, and oral interviews with written responses. Conclusions about these techniques are as follows.

The group administered (Type A) written instrument is the most economical ECHO data collection technique and will be preferred by most researchers. Requirements for its use are that respondents must be literate (equivalent to a fourth grade American education) members of a cooperative, identifiable group, i.e., a "captive audience."

The self-administered form of the written instrument (Type B) increases the universe which can be sampled while costs per respondent are only slightly higher than with the Type A instrument. Respondents must be cooperative and literate but need not be members of an identifiable formal or informal group. The average return, i.e., the number of cards generated per S, is slightly smaller than is expected from the Type A instrument, and significantly smaller than that elicited by oral interview techniques.

There is no demonstrably significant difference in the type of data generated by the group administered and self-administered forms of the instrument. The categories produced by the two kinds of data appear to be equitable. (The evidence here is weak. A direct test of this hypothesis with a sufficiently large sample size should be undertaken.)

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Oral interview techniques can be used when a significant proportion of the target population is functionally illiterate. The method of recording oral interview responses (written or tape recorded) does not seem to influence the type of norm mentioned or the sources of approval and disapproval which are cited. Tape recorders and "official forms" probably do "put the respondent off" as some interviewers have argued; the evidence suggests, however, that both devices have an equivalent effect.

Given a population which can use either instrument, oral interviews and written questionnaires produce the same kind of responses. Responses collected from a single group of RFs in oral interviews and Type A administrations were significantly correlated to argue that the two sets of responses represent the same population distribution.

In short, two target population factors (literacy and audience form) are seen as determining which of the data collection methods would be most appropriate in a given survey. These factors are summarized in Fig. 4. Individual oral interviews have the highest per capita data collec-

LITERACY	AUDIENCE FORM	
	Captive	Non-Captive
Literate	Type A (group administered written form)	Type B (self-administered written form)
Functionally Illiterate	Individual oral (T, W) or group oral interview	Individual oral interview (taped or written)

Figure 4(U). Data Collection in Relation to Literacy and Audience Form

tion cost, but they also have the lowest incidence of inappropriate answers. The least expensive way to collect data is through group administration of the pre-coded and printed question card packets, but this requires literate,

"captive" audiences which are not available (or not of interest) in many instances. The Type B instrument increases the universe which can be sampled but still requires a cooperative, literate target audience.

3. Data Classification Techniques

After ECHO responses have been collected, they must be classified to provide meaningful statements about the target group's behavioral norms, hopes, and fears. Three types of classifiers were used and compared in this study: indigenous classifiers (literate members of the surveyed group), professional classifiers (literate Vietnamese adults who were not members of the surveyed group), and members of this project's research staff. The following conclusions were established on the basis of this testing:

- Indigenous classifiers are able to categorize responses of other members of their group, where the Type A written instrument is appropriate.
- The greater amount of formal education of a classifiers, the greater the fineness of category discriminations he will be able to make. That is, he will use a greater number of categories for a given set of data cards.
- Although educated professional classifiers are capable of greater conceptual differentiation, indigenous classifiers are also valuable in that they impart their own unique meaning to the data. It seems appropriate to use both indigenous and professional classifiers in ECHO projects, and to statistically compare their systems of categorization. Repeated recategorizations of the data by indigenes are indicated whenever marked differences occur in the outputs of professional and indigenous classifiers.

4. Defining the Target Populations and the Effects of Adverse Field Conditions

Experience suggests that group administrations of the written ECHO instrument (Type A) are possible with most military populations; approximately 75% of the ARVN and RF populations sampled can read and write sufficiently well to answer twenty ECHO questions. Selected non-captive urban populations were able to complete the self-administered form of the written instrument.

School children appear to be a suitable target population. A sample of Saigon school children (N=20) ranging in age from 6 to 15 completed the to do form in writing and individual oral interviews (written). They understood the task, and the modal time for completing the twenty questions was similar to that of comparable American populations (where 11-year-olds and older complete the written instrument in the same modal time as adults, 30 minutes). Six-year-olds understood the task but had a difficult time generating twenty different responses.

Hoi chanh (ralliers) and prisoner populations may also be suitable target populations. Our experience with hoi chanh, while extremely limited, suggests that hoi chanh can be surveyed with the self-administered written instrument or in oral interviews.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFICATION OF ECHO METHODOLOGY

1. Number of Questions Per Respondent

Experience gained during this study indicates that a reduction in the number of questions answered by each respondent could be made without negatively affecting the resulting data. Indications are that a number between five and the present ten questions of each valence would be sufficient. Note that this suggested reduction in the number of cards per capita does not imply that a smaller total data pool would be adequate

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to support the necessary statistical tests. In most cases the power of statistical tests increases directly with the number of cards in the data pool. Until there exist data on the optimal number of questions for a given sample size, it seems prudent to ask more people fewer questions.*

2. Conditionals

Conditionals information should be collected routinely from every target population surveyed. These data have a high payoff relative to the small investment in time and money necessary to secure them. Conceivable conditionals data could provide the basis for simple paper and pencil tests which might be used to categorize people quickly into two or more subgroups. Within-group differences based on conditionals are probably more valid and reliable than differences inferred from ECHO behavioral norm data alone.

If conditionals differentiate reliably among subculture members, one might extend the concept by scaling agreement with conditionals. For instance, if one wanted to identify RFs with a high propensity to desert, he might use behavioral norms to dichotomize a group of respondents into (1) those who did say "it is bad to desert" and (2) those who did not say "it is bad to desert." This should differentiate with somewhat better than chance accuracy, but there is another technique available which probably differentiates much more accurately. Conditionals could be presented

*

A small amount of relevant data are available from the Rach Gia pilot studies of PF and RF attitudes toward American advisers and from the pre-tests of the to happen translations in which VN Navy enlisted men served as respondents. In the latter case, twenty card packets were distributed to officers who, in turn, distributed question cards which were completed anonymously and returned to the ECHO staff. Some of the officers misunderstood our verbal instructions and distributed a few cards (mean equal three) to each respondent instead of distributing the normal 20 cards per man. Comparison of the data cards collected in the normal manner shows no immediately apparent differences. However, the sample size ($N \approx 30$) and the violation of key assumptions make it impossible to demonstrate this fact empirically. In the Rach Gia studies, ten card packets (five "goods" and five "bads") were used successfully.

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to a subject with the instruction to indicate his degree of agreement or disagreement on an accompanying Likert-type scale. In practice, the scale might look like this:

IT IS ALL RIGHT TO DESERT WHEN ONE'S FAMILY IS IN DIRE NEED AND THERE IS NO ONE AT HOME TO TAKE CARE OF THE CHILDREN

Strongly
agree : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Strongly
disagree

Data from scales of this type, when combined with certain information about a soldier's family and financial situation, should provide a reasonably accurate index of the forces acting upon him to desert. The same principle and method could, of course, be applied to problems other than desertion.

3. Statistical Techniques

There is some reason to believe that, at least from a mathematical standpoint, correlations and non-parametric statistical tests which have been commonly used in ECHO data analyses could be replaced by more sophisticated (but esoteric) methods of analysis. Research in this direction is needed, and researchers who use ECHO in the future will undoubtedly seek to improve current methods of data analysis. On the other hand, care should be taken to prevent premature acceptance of unproven techniques.

One technique which deserves attention in future ECHO research is Wiley's Latent Partition Analysis. This technique permits the quantitative study of the relationships between two or more partitions of the same set of items, e.g., an "essential" or core set of category titles could be ascertained from two or more unstructured classifications of a common set of ECHO cards. Current techniques permit comparison of only two structured classifications.

4. Pre-Testing

A quantitative method of pre-testing ECHO instructions (particularly the written ones used without verbal explanation in Type B self-administrations) should be developed. The error factor (the percent of inappropriate answers) produced by a group would be a good criterion index of clarity. Instructions should be modified (with different but equivalent samples) until only an "acceptable level" of error appears in the data. Current error factors run between 0.004 of the responses in oral interviews to a high of 0.05 in Type B administrations. The wastage factor (percent of question cards unanswered) may be a suitable index of the motivational properties of a set of instructions; however, this variable is sensitive to a multiplicity of biasing conditions (e.g., time constraints imposed on respondents).

5. Multimethod Approaches

ECHO outputs are most valuable when combined with data collected in more traditional ways. This is well illustrated by the results of the Rach Gia pilot study of RF and PF attitudes toward their American advisers. The method mix used in a particular study should be selected to minimize shared method variance. For instance, researchers interested in aspirations and fears would be advised to use interviews and ECHO to happen questions OR interviews and the Self-Anchoring Scale (SAS) rather than ECHO and the SAS together. This is based on the assumption that ECHO and the SAS share significant method variance. (In Appendix VI, beginning on page 127, ECHO to happen outputs are compared with SAS data collected from Vietnamese by Dr. Phillip Worchel, et al., in 1967.)

Behavioral and behavioroid measures (cf. Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968) might provide a source of validating information for inferences made from ECHO data. For example, the sources of approval findings suggest that the GVN is more salient to servicemen than to civilians, particularly female civilians. If this inference is correct, one might expect to find soldiers more likely to contribute to a voluntary GVN cause or to answer

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a GVN request for blood donors. When possible, unobtrusive behavioral measures should be used because they are non-reactive, i.e., they do not modify the response being measured.

C. PREDICTIVE GENERALIZATIONS BASED ON COLLECTED DATA

As indicated earlier, lack of true randomization in selection of respondents from target populations prohibits the generalization of conclusions based on their responses. A summary of these data may, however, be given in the form of predictive generalizations which can provide the basis for further research.

The Vietnamese populations surveyed showed evidence of being highly sociocentric (as opposed to the more egocentric American culture). This was particularly true in the civilian populations.

Filial duties and relationships appear to have a significant place in Vietnamese cultural norms. However, there seems to be an acknowledged and accepted reduction in filial duties when a son is serving in the armed services.

Propinquity (nearness in blood, place, or time) appears to be a major determinant of perceived sources of social reinforcement in the Vietnamese culture. This is consistent with the apparent sociocentric bias of this society.

Vietnamese make a significant distinction between corruption and bribery. A bribe seems to be an accepted way of doing legal business, a legitimate cost of getting things done. In general, there are at least three criteria which individually or collectively differentiate between corruption and bribery: (1) is the end legal? (e.g., expediting passport processing after receiving authorization to leave Vietnam); (2) is the

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amount of the bribe within the informally established and accepted range?; or (3) is the bribe "public" in the sense that everyone knows you cannot get certain services without paying a bribe?*

Both Vietnamese and American populations surveyed established the largest single category in behavioral norm lists for, "It is good to help others." However, the two cultures appear to use two very different systems for determining the priorities of those who should be helped.

The arbitrariness of certain ascribed status factors seems to be a significant source of discontent among Vietnamese enlisted men.

Anti-American feelings appear to be common among the Vietnamese, particularly among civilian populations. However, most respondents pre-faced their criticism with an expression of appreciation for assistance received from South Vietnam's allies. American advisers are evaluated positively when they (a) meet the Vietnamese standards of extreme courtesy, cooperation, humility and gentleness and (b) are able to secure needed supplies and services through American channels. Willingness to work hard, especially on projects designed to raise the living standards of the soldiers

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Application of these criteria is illustrated by the case of the policeman who is bribed not to write a traffic citation. The ECHO data collected from civilians in the Saigon metropolitan area suggest that bribing a policeman is not corruption because: (1) "Everyone does it"--it is public; (2) the citizen deserves the citation, he has broken a traffic law and must be punished; (3) the bribe he pays is within the accepted range (e.g., during July 1968, 500 VN\$ to 700 VN\$ was the accepted bribe for Vietnamese drivers of American-owned vehicles who ran a light in Saigon); (4) the bribe is seen as an implicit part of the policeman's salary--his right to collect bribes is part of his informal employment agreement; (5) in many cases the motorist prefers to pay a bribe on the spot than to pay it at police headquarters. Note that reciprocation of consideration is also a way of paying a bribe.

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and their dependents, is also respected. Causes of negative evaluations of American advisers include loudness, disruptive behavior and failure to call American fire and air support (especially medivac helicopters) during operations.

The small sample of hoi chanh (ralliers) surveyed showed great concern over the GVN's policy of drafting ex-hoi chanh six months after they had completed their indoctrination course. They also praised North Vietnam for eliminating corruption, hooliganism and prostitution, and chided South Vietnam for failing to eliminate these vices.

Most military men apparently approve of beating prisoners (but only in situations where information is needed or where prisoners are rioting); however, most soldiers do not approve of beating hoi chanh.

Communism appears to be a more salient fear for Catholics than for Buddhists. On the other hand, Buddhists appear more critical of the South Vietnamese government and its policies, and they are more concerned with problems of unemployment, corruption, and the decline of Vietnamese traditions (e.g., the deterioration of "family morals").

D. FURTHER RESEARCH AND POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE ECHO METHODOLOGY IN VIETNAM

1. Analysis of VC Propaganda

Implicit in every VC propaganda message are statements about the enemy's values and about his perceptions of his target's vulnerabilities. Systematic analysis (as opposed to reading and intuitively summarizing) of VC literature and broadcasts would produce information of great value to persuasive message writers and policy makers. The need for this type of analysis is acknowledged by most psychological operations personnel in Vietnam. For example, ARPA's proposed Propaganda Analysis program has two stated objectives: "(1) To increase the speed and accuracy of enemy

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propaganda analysis in Vietnam, and (2) to contribute new precision to the definition of enemy propaganda analysis as a distinct discipline and the refinement of the tools for such analysis (CDTC-ARPA Monthly Status Report, August 1968.)"

Once a representative sample of a target population has been surveyed with the ECHO instrument, enemy propaganda aimed at this group can be analyzed and differences in assumptions can be ascertained. One procedure for doing this would be to use ECHO category titles as category units in content analyses.

An English translation^{*} of a VC leaflet aimed at South Vietnamese officers and troops is presented in Appendix V, page 63.

Even a cursory inspection of this message suggests that many of the values expressed by military men in ECHO surveys are also mentioned in the leaflet, e.g., love towards people (help people), don't destroy dwellings, property, crops, tools of the people (do not destroy people's life and property). Note in particular the appeal to "PROTEST the Americans and their servants in causing the high conditions of living which make soldiers and their families miserable due to being short of money." (This is precisely the type of ECHO "bad thing to happen" response that appeared frequently in surveys of both servicemen and civilians.) A sentence by sentence analysis of the VC propaganda messages shows that most of the ideas and appeals fall into one or more of the ECHO categories.^{**} This suggests that researchers could use the ECHO methodology to generate content analysis

* This translation was "backtranslated" (from Vietnamese to English to Vietnamese to English). O. Werner and D. T. Campbell, "Translating, working through interpreters, and the problems of decentering" (in press).

** In Exhibit 1A and 1B, pp. 67 and 68, the interested reader will find a complete listing of positive and negative ECHO category titles generated from pooled ARVN, RF and PF to do responses.

categories that are behaviorally relevant to the target population and relatively free of experimenter bias.

The sources of reinforcement and attributions of causation which are cited in ECHO data are also implicitly or explicitly referenced in the VC arguments (e.g., "the people" = everyone, society). Analysis of VC appeals in terms of perceived sources of social influence and causation may also be a useful tool for propaganda analysts.

2. Hoi Chanh (ralliers) Hopes and Fears

Two populations appear to be prime targets for study in the immediate future; they are (a) hoi chanh and (b) AFRVN troops working directly with American military advisers. The impetus for the study of hoi chanh comes from two facts:

1. Studies of the Chieu Hoi program carried out before the General Mobilization Decree cannot now be considered accurate pictures of hoi chanh motivations.
2. There is now general agreement that a successful conclusion to the current war (or at least the fighting phase of the war) is in large part dependent upon the successful re-integration of the disputants into a single society. The Chieu Hoi program is at present the best publicized and most effective means of integrating former VC. The ECHO methodology might be usefully applied to hoi chanh populations in three ways:
 - a. Research should seek to discover perceived constraints to rallying (e.g., the current GVN draft policy) in order to suggest policy alternatives to cognizant officials and message themes to psychological operations personnel.
 - b. ECHO-based trend indices might also be used to evaluate program effectiveness or acceptance; significant changes in an index would signal important events. Examples of possible indices are (1) relative frequency of anti-GVN

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statements, (2) pro-North Vietnam statements, or (3) percentage of responses and respondents who mention the GVN or the Chieu Hoi program as positive sources of reinforcement or causation.

- c. Hoi chanh are a useful, although highly biased, source of information about the active insurgents. The effectiveness of persuasive messages aimed at active VC could be markedly increased if vulnerability schedules for specific subgroups could be "tailor made." This suggests that subcultures within the hoi chanh populations could be categorized according to differences in values, and separate vulnerability schedules for each of these groups could be developed. Traditional criteria (e.g., former rank in VC organization, religious identification) are necessary but not sufficient to discriminate subcultures; value differences would be a more useful and significant criterion for identifying subcultures.

3. Adviser-Advisee Working Relationships

Adviser-advisee relationships appear to be a potentially fruitful area for immediately valuable research. The importance of behaviorally^{*} effective adviser-advisee interactions will become increasingly important as more of the combat load is shifted to AFRVN troops and combined action teams (CAPs). Adviser-advisee relationships could be improved in most cases by the kind of analysis made possible through ECHO.

ECHO survey outputs could conceivably be used in training (and possibly selection) of military advisers. For instance, empirical information about the advisers available sources of social power would perhaps

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Their behavior has to be effective whether they "understand" each other or not. Empirically, of course, understanding, interpersonal attraction and work group productivity are positively correlated.

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enhance their effectiveness in motivating and implementing improvement. Using ECHO data to focus the adviser's perceptions of the Vietnamese culture might also shorten the normal learning time substantially.

The same principle holds for selecting and training ARVN officers; in many cases these officers are not aware^{*} of important hopes, fears and norms held by the men under their command. Note that the families (spouses, children and parents) of soldiers should be included in any meaningful research; this should be obvious from the discussion of sources of social control found in military populations surveyed by ECHO-V and Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal.

Research questions and hypotheses which might be tested are discussed in Appendix VI, beginning on page 105.

4. Current Psychological Operations

Data generated by the ECHO procedure appears to be useful for two phases of current psychological operations in Vietnam: theme selection and message construction.

The ECHO methodology is helpful in theme selection in that it provides the psyoperator with a superior source of information about a target population's norms, hopes, and fears. These outputs are valuable to the degree that they validate information collected in other ways (observations, polls, experts' reports, etc.) and to the extent that they suggest new information about the target's characteristics. There is nothing in ECHO data or in any other type of cultural data which guarantees

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They may be cognizant of these hopes, fears, and norms, but they may not perceive the relative importance of these factors in the personal value hierarchies of the men. This is especially true of outfits where the officers and men have grossly different cultural backgrounds (e.g., urban oriented and trained officers in command of rural draftees of Cambodian origin).

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that the most salient themes will be discovered by the psyoperator. The ECHO outputs are, however, more likely to produce valuable theme suggestions than are polls, structured interviews or "experts' reports," since the words are those of indigenes themselves. The other methods impose a range of responses upon respondents; the most salient themes may not fall within this experimenter's selected range and nothing in the results will indicate this oversight. The ECHO technique, on the other hand, provides data for formulating truly relevant opinion poll questions and interview schedules.*

The persuasive message writer must have (a) knowledge of appropriate themes (target populations values, norms, beliefs, and opinions) and (b) an understanding of the attitude change principles appropriate to this population. Usually (and in all cases observed in Vietnam) the latter knowledge is purely intuitive--i.e., "This argument will probably have this effect."

One objective of future research in Vietnam should be to develop a more logical and objective system of extracting behaviorally relevant themes from cultural data. Replacing psyoperator intuition with appropriate decision principles (in a convenient form such as logic tables) would enhance the effectiveness of behavioral data utilization. Experimental techniques for studying attitude change are relatively sophisticated (see Kiesler, Collins and Miller, in press), and the body

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For example, the question "Do you approve of GVN soldiers beating (a) ralliers and (b) prisoners" were tested in an opinion poll format after ECHO behavioral norm data showed that many military populations believed "It is a bad thing to beat POWs or hoi chanh." The answers to these questions have immediate theme applications because of the possibility that rallying would increase with a decrease in the ill treatment that hoi chanh receive.

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of attitude change literature for certain American audiences is extensive.* Proposals to replicate key experiments with Vietnamese target populations have been made (e.g., Newberry, 1967). We concur.

ECHO data represent significant inputs to psychological operations and their value will be enhanced (as well as the value of all cultural data) when culture-specific principles for operation on these data are discovered.

E. SUMMARY

The ECHO-Vietnam research project has demonstrated the usefulness and practicability of the ECHO survey technique for determining the cultural norms, hopes, and fears of different Vietnamese populations. Based on the findings of this study, further research and continued application of the methodology seem warranted.

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Generalization of experiments conducted in the United States to Oriental target populations seems untenable for at least two reasons. First, the external validity of these studies is questionable; the majority of these experiments were completed with cooperative college students serving as Ss and generalization to even other American target populations cannot be justified on methodological grounds. Second, the Vietnamese and American core cultures are so markedly different that simple generalization across cultures is intuitively unreasonable.

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APPENDIXES I-VI

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APPENDIX I

EVIDENCE THAT TO DO AND TO HAPPEN RESPONSES CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED TOGETHER

Category titles for BAD to happen and BAD to do responses

1. The war in Vietnam
2. North Vietnam is in an advantageous position at the Paris talks
3. Corruption
4. Social injustice
5. To be a naturally bad person
6. Not to help in air evacuation
7. Not to help in construction
8. Foreign pressure
9. To be covetous
10. To be selfish
11. To lack social manners
12. To look down on soldiers
13. Not to cooperate
14. To be criticized
15. To misbehave
16. To have bad luck
17. Separation
18. Misunderstanding
19. Inappropriate answers

Category titles for GOOD to happen and GOOD to do responses

1. Honorable peace
2. No war
3. To destroy the VC
4. To fulfill one's duty
5. Equal rights
6. To have good advisership
7. To overcome hardship
8. Good training
9. To get help
10. To be happy
11. A better military life
12. To do good things
13. To have a good friend
14. To have good luck
15. Inappropriate answers

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APPENDIX II

INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS

Good Morning.

Before we begin today, I would like to tell you a little bit about myself and what I'm doing. My name is _____. I work for General Research Corporation. This company had been asked by the Government of South Vietnam to help them try and find out more about their people and the men in their army. We are interested in finding out what is important to you; what you like and don't like. We have come here today to ask you to help us better understand these things about you.

One thing that we want to assure you of is that who you are, your names, are not of interest to us. We want you to feel free to say whatever you want. We do not want to have your names connected with anything you say. So do not put your name on any of the materials we give you. We are interested in what all of you say as a group, not in what any individual says.

Another important thing is this is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. The only thing that is correct is to tell what you honestly believe, what is important to you as an individual.

Now let me tell you what we want you to do. Each of you will receive an envelop and a pencil. Inside the envelop are 20 cards. There are two different kinds of cards, each kind has two question on it. One asks the question: What is a good thing that a person like you could do? and Who would approve if you did this thing? The other asks: What is a bad thing that a person like you could do? and Who would disapprove if you did this? There are ten of each kind of card. This is to allow you to express as many opinions as you desire. Please fill out as many of these cards as you can. Are there any questions?

(PACKETS DISTRIBUTED HERE)

Do not open the envelop yet.

Now take the envelop and move the cards to one end of the envelop by tapping it like this. Tear off the opposite end and remove the cards. Place them on the desk in front of you with the question side up. When you finish answering as many as you can, return the cards to the envelop and wait until everyone else is finished. Then, as you leave the room, deposit your cards in this box. Remember, do not put your name on anything. Please begin.

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APPENDIX III

ECHO-Vietnam

DATA COLLECTION CARDS

(FOR GOOD AND BAD THING TO DO / TO HAPPEN RESPONSES)

Nếu có một điều gì tốt có thể xảy đến, thì điều ấy là gì?

Nguyên nhân của việc này có thể bởi đâu hoặc do ai gây ra?

Xử dụng phiếu kê tiếp trong tập này

Nếu có một điều gì xấu có thể xảy ra, thì điều ấy là gì?

Nguyên nhân của việc này có thể bởi đâu hoặc do ai gây ra?

Xử dụng phiếu kê tiếp trong tập này

Good thing to happen

Bad thing to happen

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Việc gì là việc tốt mà một người như bạn có thể làm được?

Ai sẽ là người chấp thuận nếu bạn làm việc này?

Xử dụng phiếu kẻ tiếp trong tập này.

Good thing to do

Việc gì là việc xấu mà một người như bạn có thể làm?

Ai sẽ là người không chấp nhận việc đó?

Xử dụng phiếu kẻ tiếp trong tập này.

Bad thing to do

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APPENDIX IV

CATEGORY TITLES GENERATED BY INDIGENOUS CLASSIFIERS (THREE RFs) FOR DATA COLLECTED FROM THE RF 86th BN, CAPITAL DEFENSE DISTRICT, GIA DINH

This output illustrates the tendency of semi-literate classifiers to make less discriminating categorizations (i.e., to use fewer categories for a given number of cards).

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PERCENT CARDS</u>	<u>PERCENT SUBJECTS</u>	<u>CATEGORY TITLE</u>
2	.313	88.5	HELPING PEOPLE
1	.336	73.1	FULFILL MILITARY DUTY, LOYAL TO ONE'S COUNTRY
5	.088	42.3	TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
4	.124	38.5	LOVING PEACE
3	.059	34.6	TO OPPOSE THE VC
6	.042	15.4	TO BE POLITE, GENTLE, COURTEOUS
7	.023	15.4	TO BE ABLE TO DO GOOD THINGS
8	.005	3.8	TO STUDY
9	.010	3.8	THE WEAK AND IRRESPONSIBLE

NUMBER OF SUBJECTS = 26

NUMBER OF CARDS TOTAL = 217

Subjects: Regional Forces enlisted men, 86th Bn., Gia Dinh (N = 22)

Data: "Good thing a person like you could do" (216 cards)

Indigenous Classification: HELPING PEOPLE 46.8% of all cards
88.5% of all Ss

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Professional Classification: IT IS GOOD TO HELP...

1. War victims	5.6% cards	30.8% <u>Ss</u>
2. The people	3.2%	19.2%
3. Poor people	2.3%	15.4%
4. One's comrades	1.9%	15.4%
5. People in trouble	1.9%	11.5%
6. Sick and disabled	1.4%	11.5%
7. Those who ask for it	2.3%	11.5%
8. Oppressed people	1.4%	11.5%
9. Families of meriting people	0.5%	3.8%
10. Victims of street incidents	0.5%	3.8%

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APPENDIX V

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF VIET CONG PROPAGANDA LEAFLET*

DEAR COMRADES, OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS,
IN THE ARMY OF THE REBEL REGIME OF
SAIGON

As you have seen, more than 400 thousand of the AGGRESSIVE AMERICANS and their satellites are trampling across our land days and nights, causing countless bloody crimes against our people.

Their AIR PLANES AND ARTILLERY create so much destruction daily, killing innocent people.

Their TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES destructively run over how many gardens and rice fields, bulldozing down people's houses.

Their NAVAL SHIPS shell boats and sampans days and nights, disseminating wounds and deaths along the slope of river banks and sea beaches.

Their POISONOUS CHEMICALS are being sprayed everywhere, exterminating every single grass and leaf of our beloved countryside that our ancestors willed us for generations.

THE VERY CONSIDERATE CRIMES OF THE AGGRESSIVE AMERICANS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE ARE PILING UP HIGHER THAN THE MOUNTAIN!

THE HATRED OF OUR PEOPLE TOWARDS THE INVADERS AND THE TRAITORS IS DEEPER THAN THE EASTERN SEA!

AS A VIETNAMESE WOULDN'T YOU FEEL SORROW AND PAIN FOR YOUR COUNTRYMEN?

In the past year, many comrades abandoned the American-Thieu-Ky regime to come back to the Country and the people. Many others, having had higher determination, rose up in revolt and won resounding victories. Many comrades gave the Front and the people promises that they would actively carry out their patriotic activities.

* This translation was "backtranslated" (from Vietnamese to English to Vietnamese to English) as per O. Werner and D. T. Campbell, "Translating, working through interpreters, and the problems of decentering."

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For those comrades who had to temporarily remain in the enemy rank because of not yet having the opportunities to RETURN to THE PEOPLE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE REVOLUTION, you should have suitable patriotic and passionate activities in taking part in soothing the sufferings of our people.

If you have YOUR LOVE TOWARDS YOUR PEOPLE AND YOUR COMPATRIOTS, execute together: 3 NOTs, 3 SUPPORTs, and 3 PROTESTs as follows:

NOT to call for air planes and artillery to shoot and kill the people.

NOT to arrest, torture, confine, concentrate people in strategic hamlets.

NOT to destroy dwelling, property, crop and tools of the people.

SUPPORT people in their return to their old villages to make their living.

SUPPORT young comrades in their fight against the American-Thieu-Ky recruit system by force.

SUPPORT people's struggles for LIVELIHOOD, DEMOCRACY.

PROTEST the Americans and their servants in their mortar shelling, bombing, spraying poisonous chemicals to kill people, in their maltreating and destroying our comrades.

PROTEST the Americans and their servants in causing the high conditions of living, which makes soldiers and their families miserable due to being short of money.

PROTEST the Americans and their servants mischievously forcing our comrades to go in mopping-up operations, into the war, in reinforcement operations, and to die for them.

THESE ARE PATRIOTIC ACTIVITIES THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD WELCOME AND THE FRONT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE.

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APPENDIX VI

EXPANDED ACCOUNT OF CULTURAL DATA

This appendix elaborates on findings summarized in Sec. III C of this report. Presented here are findings, hypotheses, and inferences about the behavioral norms, and hopes and fears of selected Vietnamese target populations. The procedures used to generate this data appear in detail to permit independent evaluation of the inference processes used in ECHO-Vietnam research.

The material is organized around the three forms of the ECHO question which were used in ECHO-Vietnam research:

- TO DO QUESTIONS--General Person Role: What is a good (bad) thing that a person like you could do?
(These questions generate behavioral norms and conditionals.)
- TO DO QUESTIONS--Non-Personal Role: What is a good (bad) thing that an American adviser could do?
(These questions tap expectations of others norms.)
- TO HAPPEN QUESTIONS--What is a good (bad) thing that could happen to a person like you?
(These questions generate hopes and fears.)

Each of these questions produces a different type of data, and therefore results are reported separately in A, B, and C to follow. The presentation of results in each section (which is based on a single study or issue) is prefaced by a description of the sample population, a statement of the study's objectives, and a brief description of the design or procedure used to collect and process the data. Much of the actual data is included.

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A. TO DO QUESTIONS--GENERAL PERSON ROLE: BEHAVIORAL NORMS AND CONDITIONALS

1. Regional Forces Enlisted Men

a. Objectives

Objectives included comparison of four data collection formats and collection of behavioral norm information and conditionals from a relatively large sample of military respondents.

b. Procedure

Thirty-three percent (33.3%) of the respondents surveyed during this three month project were sampled from the 86th Bn., Regional Forces, stationed in Gia Dinh. Responses to the to do forms of the projective survey question were collected in written and taped oral interviews (N=47) and Type A data collection sessions (N=56).

Conditionals (When is it not a bad thing to do?) were collected* from randomly selected RFs after the behavioral norms had been defined by their comrades who served as classifiers.

c. Results

Listings of the positive and negative behavioral norms (category titles found in the RF data) are presented in Exhibits 1A and 1B followed by a summary of some of the central norms.

*

Operationally, conditionals data are gathered by asking a three-man team of randomly selected indigenes to consider a given negative behavioral norm, (category title) and to answer the question: Under what condition is it NOT bad to do this? The team lists as many conditions or situations as they can think of for each bad thing to do in the category system.

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EXHIBIT 1A

CATEGORY TITLES FOR GOOD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED
FROM REGIONAL FORCES AND ARVN TROOPS

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. To serve one's country | 24. To behave well towards people |
| 2. Peace, freedom, independence for VN | 25. To behave well towards comrades |
| 3. To fight against the VC | 26. To be filial |
| 4. Not to be influenced by VC's propaganda | 27. To be solidary |
| 5. To love one another | 28. Not to be deceitful |
| 6. To carry out one's duty | 29. Not to take advantage of other people |
| 7. To fight against dictatorship | 30. Not to disclose military secret |
| 8. To fight against illiteracy | 31. Not to lie |
| 9. To help people | 32. To be disciplined |
| 10. To help one's family | 33. To honor one's religion |
| 11. To help friends and comrades | 34. To improve oneself |
| 12. Not to rob and to steal | 35. To treat well POWs and surrenders (hoi chanh) |
| 13. To do good things | 36. To keep one's promises |
| 14. To protect people's lives and property | 37. Not to lose people's heart |
| 15. To defend the weak | 38. To respect |
| 16. To make sacrifices | 39. Not to dishonor |
| 17. To be humane | 40. To be a good soldier |
| 18. Not to kill | 41. Not to ingratiate |
| 19. Not to oppress | 42. Not to obey orders from superiors' wives |
| 20. Not to drink, to gamble or to be lustful | 43. Not to speak ill |
| 21. To be just | 44. To reconcile |
| 22. To be honest | 45. To observe traffic laws |
| 23. Not to be corrupt | 46. Inappropriate answers |

[RA, RB, OT, OW, C; Col. 23,24; Huu, Chat, Long.]

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EXHIBIT 1B

CATEGORY TITLES FOR BAD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED
FROM REGIONAL FORCES AND ARVN TROOPS

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1. To betray one's country | 22. To be selfish |
| 2. To kill people | 23. Not to help people |
| 3. To be pro-VC | 24. To behave badly toward people |
| 4. To evade one's duty | 25. Not to defend the weak |
| 5. To rape | 26. To be a hooligan |
| 6. To steal and rob | 27. To do bad things |
| 7. To be corrupt | 28. To ingratiate |
| 8. To disclose military information | 29. To speak ill |
| 9. To be dishonest | 30. To be covetous |
| 10. To be deceitful | 31. Not to respect individual freedom |
| 11. To desert | 32. To be unjust |
| 12. To be undisciplined | 33. To quarrel |
| 13. To destroy people's life and property | 34. To lose people's heart |
| 14. To cause harm to people | 35. Not to keep one's promises |
| 15. To oppress people | 36. To be a dictator |
| 16. To drink, gamble, smoke opium or be lustful | 37. Not to be religious |
| 17. Not to be compassionate | 38. To be lazy |
| 18. To create dissension | 39. To be dissatisfied |
| 19. To disobey | 40. To be careless |
| 20. To be unfilial | 41. Inappropriate answers |
| 21. To lie | 42. Blanks |

[RA, RB, OT, OW, C; Col. 23,24; Huu, Chat, Long.]

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d. Summary of Norms Generated

Altruism. The norms mentioned most frequently concerned altruistic behavior, e.g., help others, help your family, help your friends and comrades. Twenty two percent (21.6%) of the responses fell into a category labeled "help others." Another 4.3% of the cards mentioned "help friends and comrades," and a category entitled "help family" accounted for another 3.4% of the cards. The pervasiveness of altruistic values in the Vietnamese culture is documented and discussed in 4-a of this section, page 89.

Personal Character. Dishonesty, deceitfulness, lying, ingratiation and unjust acts are all personal behaviors negatively evaluated by Vietnamese service men. These prohibitions are often stated in the form "It is good to not do X"; approximately 31% of all the categories in the positive RF data are statements of the "good not to" form.

"Proper" Public Behavior, Harmonious Social Interactions. Evidence suggesting the importance of "proper" public behavior can be found in positive categories such as: behave well towards people (25% Ss) and comrades (17% Ss) and do not speak ill of others.*

Norms demanding harmonious social interactions also appear in the bad to do data, e.g., it is bad to quarrel (16.2% of all Ss), create dissension (7.1% Ss) or behave badly towards people (26.3% Ss). Together these three categories account for approximately 9% of all the RF's bad thing to do responses.

*

Note that men's responses mentioning gossiping or denigrating others consistently fall into a category which indigenes label: Do not speak ill of others. On the other hand, women's responses of this type consistently fall into two different but related categories: Do not speak ill of others, and do not speak evil of others. The difference between ill, and evil is not immediately apparent, and inspection of the response cards does not suggest reliable criteria for making this discrimination.

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Vices. Like most populations surveyed in Vietnam, soldiers said it was good to not commit the four vices, but even the four vices can be committed under certain conditions. According to the enlisted men who provided these conditionals, it is, for instance, acceptable to be lustful "...in the case of a couple without children. The husband can be lustful in order to try to have children to carry his name."

Filial "Oughts." The RFs mentioned filial demands (e.g., it is good to be filial, do not dishonor your family) just as every other Vietnamese sample did. However, servicemen mention filial responsibilities less often (per capita) than do civilian males (probably because soldiers are less able to meet filial demands when they are stationed away from home). Conditionals generated by three randomly selected RFs lend support to this hypothesis: When is it not bad to be unfilial? (a) in case of extreme need, extreme poverty; and (b) if assigned to a remote area where contact with family is impossible.

Corruption. Concern with corruption in South Vietnam was expressed by every single military and adult civilian population surveyed; conditionals evidence suggests that there is a distinct difference between bribery and corruption; not all bribery is corruption. In many cases bribery is seen as simply an accepted cost of doing business.

An idea of what constitutes "acceptable" corruption for a serviceman is provided by these conditionals:

- When it is not corruption for purely personal profit but for helping others. For instance, I am working in a Signals unit. I take a television or radio set home for the neighborhood to come over and watch television or listen to the radio.

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- When it is an "intellectual" corruption. For instance, working hours in the morning are from 8 to 12. I take off at 11 in order to have a time for moonlighting and make enough money to support my family.
- When it is not corruption in order to make one's career into a successful one, but a corruption motivated by too low and meager pay and done in order to have enough money to support one's family.

Note the help others value which is implicit in the first conditional and concern for one's family which is expressed in the last two.

Several behavioral norms appear commonly in both Vietnamese and American ECHO response. These categorical statements include:

<u>It is bad to:</u>	<u>Regional Forces Results</u>	
	<u>% Cards</u>	<u>% Ss</u>
kill	1.8%	10.1%
rape	0.6%	5.1%
rob and steal	13.2%	64.7%
<u>not</u> help people	4.0%	21.2%
be selfish or covetous	1.3%	8.1%

e. Differences Between Military and Civilian Responses

Some categories were mentioned more frequently by servicemen than by civilians; in this study of RFs, negative norms that were specifically related to the military's behavior accounted for 15 percent of all responses and included the following:

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<u>It is bad to:</u>	<u>% cards</u>	<u>% Ss</u>
desert	0.9%	7.1%
disclose military information	0.3%	2.0%
evade one's duty	3.8%	21.2%
be undisciplined	5.9%	29.3%
destroy people's lives and property	2.3%	8.1%
disobey	1.8%	12.1%

The conditionals illuminate these behavioral norms. For example, what kinds of events or conditions motivate desertion? RFs listed the following examples of "understandable" desertion:

- When you leave camp without permission because of a death in the family, then later return and prove to the commander that your presence at home was necessary
- In time of peace
- If it is to desert one unit which one doesn't like in order to join another one
- To take charge of a family in which the old father is very sick and weak and nobody is at home to support and take care of my bunch of kids

The positive data also contained military-related categories: It is good to be disciplined (38% Ss), to be a good soldier (13% Ss), to protect the people's lives and property (19% Ss), to not lose the people's hearts (9% Ss), and to carry out one's duty (47% Ss).

Soldiers also mention treatment of hoi chanh (ralliers) and POWs more often than do civilians; the frequency with which treatment of prisoners is mentioned varies as a function of the respondents duties.

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TABLE 6
PERCENT OF Ss IN THREE MILITARY POPULATIONS
WHO MENTIONED TREATMENT OF POWs

	RF 86th Bn. Sample A	RF 86th Bn. Sample B	ARVN Enlisted Men
It is good to NOT beat or torture POWs	----	20.0	6.70
It is bad to beat or torture POWs	27.3	22.7	----
Chief Duty	Infantry	Infantry	Clerical

A combat squad mentioned this category more often than a group of soldiers serving in clerical positions, as the data in Table 6 indicate.

Defend the weak^{*} and do not oppress the people are two common categories in the RF data. Examination of the responses in the category "It is good to not oppress" reveals that oppression subsumes acts which might be characterized as undisciplined, arbitrary extrusions of military power. Responses which illustrate oppressive acts include:

- I curse and beat the people, which is bad. (Who would disapprove: the people would despise me and wouldn't approve).
- To domineer the people and show power. (The commander and my conscience.)

*

Defend the weak was also mentioned by Saigon children in response to the to do questionnaire. Evidently this norm is internalized at a young age. Cf. the altruistic norms discussed on page 89 of this appendix.

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- Beating one's wife and cursing one's children when coming home are bad. (The wife and children.)
- I use my power and authority to oppress my friends. (The friends.)
- I beat the VC when they are willing to surrender. (The commander and my conscience.)

2. Saigon-Cholon Civilians

a. Objectives

This pilot study had two objectives: (1) to evaluate the self-administered (Type B) form of the written questionnaire in actual field settings, and (2) to collect behavioral norm data from civilian populations.

b. Design

Thirty-two literate, adult civilians (19 males, 5 females, and 8 Ss who did not fill out a biographical data card) answered twenty to do questions presented in a self-administered form of the written instrument (Type B). Packets with written instructions (see pages 80 and 81) were distributed by Buddhist and Catholic religious leaders; all respondents were guaranteed anonymity. A summary of the available biographical data for this sample is presented in Table 7.

c. Results

Behavioral Norms for Positive Responses. For a list of positive responses, see Exhibit 3A, page 82. The positive categories reflect the Vietnamese regard for harmonious social interactions (e.g., behave well, behave properly) and altruistic behavior (help people). Note that the percentage of help people responses (25.5% of all cards and 81.3% of all respondents), is almost identical to the percentages found in other mili-

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TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FOR SAIGON CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS

By Gender and Religion:

	Male	Female	Unknown	Total
Buddhist	5	3	-	8
Catholic	14	2	-	16
Unknown	-	-	8	8
TOTAL	19	5	8	32

By Occupation:

By Age:

No employment	1	20-29	5
Businessman	5	30-39	2
Laborer, worker	5	40-49	8
Teacher	3	50-59	2
GVN employee	2	60-69	3
Pedicab driver	1	Unknown	<u>12</u>
Student	2		32
Priest, monk	2		
No answer	<u>11</u>		
	32		

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tary and civilian populations (see Table 8, page 90). In a survey of male school children in Saigon, 26% of all responses mentioned altruistic behavior.

Respondents said it was good to advise (9%) and support the GVN and to fight against communism (19%), but they also advocated fighting the GVN inefficiency. Concern with corruption (16%) appeared in these data as it has in the majority of other civilian and military studies.

Positively evaluated personal character traits include to be honest (25.0%), forgive others (9.4%), do not envy others (9.4%), to be just (15.6%), to be grateful (9.4%). Two (out of 32) respondents said "a good thing to do is to kill in self defense."

In 4-b of this section, page 95, ECHO to do data collected by Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal are compared with the Saigon civilian's responses. One type of value which obtained in the latter sample but not in McGonigal's data regards achievement or striving behavior; * e.g., improve oneself (15.6%), be diligent (18.8%), make savings (15.6%). Women's responses were over-represented in these categories, suggesting that women are achievement oriented. **

Behavioral Norms for Negative Responses. In the negative data (Exhibit 3B, page 83) one can see the importance of filial behavior; note that responses more often say "it is bad to be unfilial" than "it is good

* This difference is probably attributable to sample differences. The McGonigal samples were drawn from more rural populations.

** Cf. Worchel, et al., 1967. In discussing dreams which RF/PF wives reported, the authors note: "Surprisingly, education activities are second in importance for the wives. Perhaps education signifies a way out of their miserable life. If so, this would be one action program that might help to 'win' the hearts of the wives of the RF/PF" (p. 86).

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to be filial." This suggests that filial behavior is demanded ("must do") rather than voluntary ("could do") behavior.

Personal characteristics negatively evaluated include: dis-honesty, deceitfulness, lying, arrogance, irresponsibility, hating, and ingratiating others. Many of the cards in these categories carry a definite anti-American message.*

Examples of these responses are presented below:

- "To be ungrateful is bad, but we can still be ungrateful toward people who help us when we know that they intend to take advantage of us, to exploit us and make us their slaves."

Who would disapprove? "Only the people who do not know the bad intention of those Americans who always help people that way."

- A Catholic businessman contributed a bad thing to do response which was classified in the category "It is bad to hate." The response read: "My hatred for foreign troops who misbehave, getting drunk on the streets, showing signs of disrespect to women, etc. I understand that such behavior would make them be laughed at in the eyes of others (the laughing stock of others), but they are away from home, are young, and not well educated. I hate them."

Who would disapprove (of his hatred)? "People who take advantage of their bad habits to make money."

*

This might be due to the respondents' desire to give the American researchers "a piece of their minds." (The written instructions to respondents clearly identified General Research Corporation as one sponsor of the survey.)

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- A Cholon pedicab driver's response illustrates this same form (It is bad to hate, but...) and also reflects his racial prejudice: "It is bad for me to hate a black man, but why on earth does he look so dirty with his thick lips pursing out and his eyes pale white. When he is drunkingly hopping along the street with a beer can in his hand he looks just like an ape. Too I would dislike a white man if he were to have the same manners that a black one has."

Who would disapprove (of his hating Negro GIs)? "His (the GI's) parents possibly don't agree with me, but my country has been hurt."

Laziness, weakness, failing to help others, and "behaving badly" were also listed as "bad things to do." The behaving badly category subsumes a range of behaviors which "good people do not do," e.g., be a bar girl.

Norms about national identity are reflected in categories such as: "It is bad to advocate against GVN policies" and "It is bad to betray your country." Once again concern about corrupt behavior was voiced; approximately one in three people contributed a response which was classified as "It is bad to be corrupt." The relationship of bribery to corruption is illuminated by this GVN employee's response:

- "Personally I don't want to take bribes. But since everyone around is doing it I will accept only small bribes which would not hurt me much in case I am caught."

Who would disapprove? "Honest people in the government wouldn't approve."

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Explicit and Implicit Conditionals. Two common characteristics of Vietnamese responses to ECHO questions are: (1) respondents tend to cite examples or to provide extensive explanations, and (2) many of the explanations are explicit conditionals; they define the circumstances under which a behavioral norm applies. Both of these characteristics are illustrated by these responses:

- A Buddhist female said: "To abandon one's husband is bad, but one could still do it if her husband were brutal, fooled around and did not care for his family."

Who would disapprove (if a woman left her husband)? "Outmoded people."

- A 46 year old Catholic who listed himself as a "private company employee" provided this example: "To steal is bad, but we could still do it because we were never resigned to die of hunger when people did not want to give us a job. We never hesitated (under these conditions) when we had to violate the laws that society had set up."

Who would disapprove? "Only the people who were not in that situation."

The letter of instructions (in English and Vietnamese) accompanying the packets distributed for this study appears in Exhibit 2, and is followed by a complete listing of behavioral norms, percent of respondents who mentioned each category and the percent of cards in each category for positive and negative data in Exhibits 3A and 3B.

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EXHIBIT 2

TRANSLATION AND ORIGINAL OF COVER LETTER DISTRIBUTED WITH SELF-ADMINISTERED FORM OF ECHO INSTRUMENT

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are from a research corporation that has been invited to do a project in Vietnam that we hope will help us to better understand what the people of Vietnam believe is important. To do this we are trying to ask people from many different areas and of different opinions to help us by writing down their opinions on these 20 cards. We want to gather opinions from many in order to get not one individual's opinion, but the opinions of many. We ask you not to write your name on any of the material we give you. We do this to assure you that we are not interested in finding out what any single person says or believes. We want you to feel free to say whatever you wish. Your opinions are what is important to us. We do not want your names connected with what you say so do not write your name anywhere on the material.

Here is how to fill out the cards. You will see that there are 20 cards but we only ask you two questions: What is a good thing a person like you could do? Who would approve? What is a bad thing a person like you could do? Who would disapprove? Each of these are asked ten times. There are many good things and many bad things that people can do. We are asking you to think of only ten different good things and ten different bad things. Please write one bad or one good thing on each card. Then also write who would approve or praise this good thing and who would disapprove or scold the bad thing.

When you have filled out the cards, return them to the envelop. Then fill out the information about your age, sex, occupation and religion on the last card in the envelop.

Thank you

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EXHIBIT 2 (Cont.)

GENERAL RESEARCH CORPORATION

KẾ HOẠCH DÂN-Y

Thưa quý vị,

Có quan nghiên cứu chúng tôi được mời qua Việt-Nam để thực hiện chương trình Dân-Y với hoài bão thấu đáo triển vọng chánh đáng của nhân dân Việt-Nam. Để hoàn thành công việc này chúng tôi mong mỗi quý vị ở nhiều nơi khác nhau và có nhiều quan điểm khác nhau vui lòng giúp đỡ chúng tôi ghi giùm quan điểm của quý vị vào 20 tấm phiếu đính kèm.

Chúng tôi cố ý gom góp ý kiến của nhiều người để đúc kết, không phải quan niệm một cá nhân nhưng là quan niệm của một tập thể. Chúng tôi xin quý vị đừng ghi tên vào những tài liệu này, vì chúng tôi không muốn danh tánh quý vị bị liên hệ đến bất cứ một lối lẽ nào đã ghi trên phiếu.

Trên 20 tấm phiếu chỉ vốn vẹn có hai loại câu hỏi. Mỗi loại sẽ được hỏi 10 (mười) lần.

Có nhiều việc tốt cũng như nhiều việc xấu mà người ta làm được. Xin quý vị lựa trong những điều ấy 10 điều tốt và 10 điều xấu khác nhau; và ghi mỗi điều trên một tấm phiếu.

Sau đó, xin quý vị ghi thêm ai sẽ đồng ý hay hoan nghênh từng điều tốt này; ai sẽ không đồng ý hay không chấp nhận mỗi việc xấu kia.

Khi quý vị ghi xong 20 tấm phiếu, xin quý vị bỏ giùm vào bao thỏ. Sau cùng xin quý vị ghi giúp chúng tôi thêm vài yếu tố về thành phần nhân dân.

Xin thành thật cảm ơn quý vị.

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EXHIBIT 3A

CATEGORY TITLES FOR GOOD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM SAIGON CIVILIANS

Category Code	Raw Freq.	Percent of Subjects	Rank	Category Title
10	26	81.3	1.0	To help people
15	14	43.8	2.0	To behave well
12	11	34.4	3.0	To behave morally
11	9	28.1	4.5	To promote love for humanity
18	9	28.1	4.5	To counsel people to do good
13	8	25.0	6.0	To be honest
1	6	18.8	8.0	To fight communism
22	6	18.8	8.0	Not to oppress
32	6	18.8	8.0	To be diligent
3	5	15.6	13.0	Peace for Vietnam
5	5	15.6	13.0	Not to be corrupt
14	5	15.6	13.0	To be just
25	5	15.6	13.0	To improve oneself
28	5	15.6	13.0	To lead a healthy life
31	5	15.6	13.0	To support government policy
34	5	15.6	13.0	To make savings
2	4	12.5	18.5	To serve one's country
6	4	12.5	18.5	Not to steal
21	4	12.5	18.5	To keep promises
26	4	12.5	18.5	To be sympathetic to our allies
7	3	9.4	23.5	To fight against injustice
17	3	9.4	23.5	To advise the government
27	3	9.4	23.5	To forgive
29	3	9.4	23.5	To take care of one's household
30	3	9.4	23.5	To be grateful
33	3	9.4	23.5	Not to envy
9	2	6.3	28.0	To have a sense of duty
23	2	6.3	28.0	To protect public properties
35	2	6.3	28.0	To kill for self defense
4	1	3.1	32.0	A good government
8	1	3.1	32.0	Not to betray
19	1	3.1	32.0	To fight against the government's inefficiency
20	1	3.1	32.0	To safeguard secrecy
24	1	3.1	32.0	To promote agriculture

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EXHIBIT 3B

CATEGORY TITLES FOR BAD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM SAIGON CIVILIANS

Category Code	Raw Freq.	Percent of Subjects	Rank	Category Title
18	15	51.7	1.0	To behave badly or be a dancing girl
13	11	37.9	2.0	To be irresponsible
9	10	34.5	3.5	To steal or rob
10	10	34.5	3.5	To oppress
5	9	31.0	5.5	To be corrupt
8	9	31.0	5.5	To be deceitful
7	8	27.6	7.0	To be dishonest
4	7	24.1	9.0	Not to fulfill one's duty
16	7	24.1	9.0	To enjoy the four vices
23	7	24.1	9.0	To take advantage of others
26	6	20.7	11.0	Inappropriate answers
1	5	17.2	13.5	To kill people
2	5	17.2	13.5	To betray one's country
12	5	17.2	13.5	To lie
15	5	17.2	13.5	Not to help people
6	4	13.8	17.5	To disregard law and order
14	4	13.8	17.5	To hate
17	4	13.8	17.5	To be arrogant
20	4	13.8	17.5	To ingratiate
19	3	10.3	21.5	Not to keep one's promises
22	3	10.3	21.5	To advocate against GVN policy
24	3	10.3	21.5	To be weak
25	3	10.3	21.5	To be lazy
11	2	6.9	24.0	To be unfilial
3	1	3.4	25.0	The US to surrender to the communists

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3. School Children

a. Objectives

Behavioral norms data were collected from school children (N=20) to ascertain if children understand ECHO questions and to determine which data collection formats are appropriate for audiences of children.

b. Procedure

Thirteen boys and seven girls generated responses to the question "What is a good (bad) thing a boy (girl) like you could do and who would approve (disapprove)? Ss ranged in age from six to fifteen years; all were attending school in Saigon. Data were collected from the younger children in oral interviews conducted by an interviewer of the same gender as the S; older children completed the self-administered packets. The data consisted of 179 positive responses (119 from boys, 60 from girls) and 180 negative responses (120 from boys, 60 from girls).

c. Results

The category titles and frequency distributions (by percent of Ss) for the positive data and the same information for the negative data are presented in Exhibits 4A and 4B, respectively.

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EXHIBIT 4A

CATEGORY TITLES FOR GOOD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM MALE AND FEMALE SCHOOL CHILDREN

Code	Number of Children Who Mentioned This Category (N=20)	Title
1	6	To obey my parents
2	2	To be honest
3	5	Not to steal
4	3	To listen to teachers
5	9	To be studious
6	7	To be polite
7	4	Not to follow bad examples
8	5	To be good to brothers and sisters
9	2	To teach younger brothers
10	2	Not to curse
11	1	Not to play cards
12	1	Not to play hooky
13	2	To be a brilliant student
14	2	To get school rewards
15	1	To help family
16	5	To help people in disaster
17	3	To help the blind and the disabled
18	7	To help poor people
19	4	To help the old
20	3	To respect old people
21	4	To help the government and the society
22	2	To defend the weak
23	1	Not to bully
24	1	Not to run away from home
25	5	To do housework
26	4	Not to quarrel or fight
27	3	To baby-sit
28	1	Not to beg money from foreigners
29	2	To dress properly
30	7	To help classmates
31	4	To be well-liked
32	6	Not to be mischievous
33	2	Not to be punished
34	2	Not to participate in school activities
35	1	Not to cause an accident

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EXHIBIT 4B

CATEGORY TITLES FOR BAD TO DO RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM MALE AND FEMALE SCHOOL CHILDREN

Code	Number of Children Who Mentioned This Category (N=20)	Title
1	14	To steal
2	2	To cheat
3	3	To lie
4	4	To make parents unhappy
5	8	To disobey
6	8	Not to be studious
7	6	To be impolite
8	4	To follow the hoodlums
9	1	Not to listen to teachers in class
10	5	To play hooky
11	1	To evade one's work
12	1	To play cards for money
13	1	To smoke cigarettes
14	3	To curse
15	6	To fight with neighbors
16	1	To speak ill
17	2	To quarrel
18	6	To bully
19	2	To make fun of people
20	2	Not to help people
21	3	To be cruel to animals
22	3	To wander in the streets
23	1	To let a thief run away
24	2	To beg money from foreigners
25	3	To be mischievous
26	3	To disturb people
27	1	To go to school late
28	1	To drive dad's vehicle without permission
29	1	To be jealous
30	2	To hide friends' things
31	2	To stay up late
32	3	Not to baby-sit
33	3	To eat on the sly
34	2	To be a little glutton
35	1	To be dirty

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The similarities between these children's responses and adults' responses are substantial, as the examples below demonstrate. Children in the first sample had already learned social harmony and politeness norms.

<u>Category Number</u>	<u>It is good to:</u>	<u>% Children Mentioning</u>
6	be polite	35
20	respect old people	15
26	not quarrel and fight	20
	<u>It is bad to:</u>	
7	be impolite	30
15	fight with neighbors	30
16	speak ill	5
17	quarrel	10
26	disturb people	15
18	bully	30

Regard for the family and the acceptance of family "oughts" are reflected in these statements:

<u>Category Number</u>	<u>It is good to:</u>	<u>% Children Mentioning</u>
1	obey my parents	30
8	be good to brothers and sisters	25
9	teach younger brothers	10
15	help the family	5
25	do housework	25
27	baby-sit	15
	<u>It is bad to:</u>	
3	make parents unhappy	20
5	disobey	40
32	not baby-sit	15

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Altruistic behavior was also mentioned by these children, suggesting that norms of altruism, too, are learned at an early age.

<u>Category Number</u>	<u>It is good to:</u>	<u>% Children Mentioning</u>
16	help people in disaster	45
17	help the blind and disabled	15
18	help poor people	35
19	help the old	20

Several categories reflect the saliency of school-related norms for this sample of urban school children.

<u>Category Number</u>	<u>It is good to:</u>	<u>% Children Mentioning</u>
4	listen to teachers	15
5	be studious	45
12	not play hooky	5
13	be a brilliant student	10
14	get school rewards	10
	<u>It is bad to:</u>	
6	not be studious	40
9	not listen to teachers	5
10	play hooky	25

The results suggest that school children are an appropriate target population for ECHO surveys.

Younger children (e.g., six to eleven years old) are able to answer the to do projective survey question, but data must be collected in oral interviews. Older children are capable of handling the standard written forms of the instrument.

Studies should be undertaken to generalize the Vietnamese school children results to rural children populations; this is important because children in contested areas may be an important (and accessible) source of data about norms, hopes and fears of a less cooperative and less accessible adult population.

4. Conclusions

a. Altruism, The Dominant Norm

The studies already described have each reported a strong adherence to the norm "help others"; it has also consistently been the most frequently mentioned category (both by percentage of cards and of Ss) in most American samples surveyed with ECHO. This dominance of one norm merits a special discussion.

The recurrence of similar results over many applications of ECHO demonstrates at least the consistency of the method despite variations in sample, setting, researcher, etc. How can this consistent result be explained? It may be that indeed helping others is a dominant norm in the populations studied, or it may be that ECHO or a similar instrument is bound to bring out verbal adherence to universal virtues which in fact do not relate directly to the behavior of the respondents. The second point deserves further study and considerable discussion beyond what is possible at this point; it may be helpful, however, at least to bring together the relevant data and observations on this topic which this research activity has yielded.

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The following conclusions can be stated with some certainty:

- (1) Altruism, i.e., "helping others," is a positive value in the Vietnamese and American cultures samples; altruism may be a pervasive value in both Occidental and Oriental cultures. The recipients of this altruism are very similar in the two cultures; differences are largely a function of nation-specific conditions, e.g., the war in South Vietnam makes "helping wounded and disabled comrades" salient to military men and "helping people in disaster" salient to Vietnamese children.

Evidence: The percentage of cards mentioning "It is good to help _____" in each population are shown in Table 8. Note that no population failed to mention this behavioral norm and in most cases "to help," was the largest category. The altruism value obtains reliably across populations.

TABLE 8

PERCENT OF CARDS IN "HELP OTHERS" CATEGORIES

METHOD	TYPE A		ORAL		TYPE B			
	RA	RB	OT	OW	CDTC	SAIGON CIVILIANS	BOYS	GIRLS
GROUP								
N	26	30	23	24	16	32	13	7
% "HELP OTHERS"	31.5	29.5	29.9	27.1	23.0	25.5	26.0	5.1

- (2) This phenomenon is also reliable across classifiers, researchers, interviewers, and translations of the ECHO questions. The findings are not artifacts of a particular team of classifiers or of "experimenter effects."* Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal's data contain twelve different "helping" categories. ECHO-Vietnam and McGonigal found basically identical relationships using different interviewers, different Ss, different data collection methods (Type A, Type B and written and taped oral interviews) and even different translations of the basic to do question.

Evidence: Many of the data pools were partitioned several times in unstructured sorts by different teams of indigenous and professional classifiers. The "help" categories which appeared in three different sorts of one batch of data (cards = 261, N=30) are shown in Table 9. In all cases altruism was the most frequently mentioned behavioral norm.

- (3) The most frequently mentioned recipients of Vietnamese altruism appear to be: friends and comrades, "people" and society (generalized other), the government, the poor, the old, the disabled, victims of war or disaster, and one's family. Mentions of family were made less frequently than mentions of "people," or of friends and comrades.

Evidence: Each of the percentages in Tables 8 and 9 is a composite sum of all of the categories which mentioned "to help." Examination of the categories contributing to this composite reveals the particular recipients of this help. Table 10 shows the contributing categories and the percent of Ss who mentioned each category.

*

Experimenter effect refers to influence, usually unintentional, which is exerted on Ss by experimenters so that the results conform to the E's expectancies. Experimenter bias refers to the differential treatment of Ss in different conditions of an experiment. (cf. Rosenthal, 1966)

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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF CATEGORIES PRODUCED FROM THREE DIFFERENT SORTS OF SAME CARDS*

	Percent of all Responses	Classifiers
Help war wounded and infirmed soldiers	13.4	Indigenous Classifiers Group 1
Give help to public works	3.4	
Give help to those who ask	3.1	
Help the population with their work	1.9	
Help comrades	4.6	Indigenous Classifiers Group 2
Help war victims	4.2	
Help people	3.1	
Help people in difficulty	2.3	
Help sick and disabled	2.3	
Help poor people	2.3	
Give help to those who ask for it	1.5	
Help victims of street incidents	2.3	
Help people	24.9	"Professional" (Non-indigenous) Classifiers
Help friends and comrades	3.1	
Help one's family	1.5	
	29.5	
	N=30	

* Responses collected from Regional Forces troops.

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TABLE 10
"HELP OTHERS" CATEGORIES

POPULATION	CATEGORY	% OF Ss CITING
Regional Forces Sample A	War wounded and infirmed soldiers	60.0
	Help public works	26.7
	Give help to those who ask	20.0
	To help the population with their work	13.3
Regional Forces Sample B	Comrades	26.7
	War victims	20.0
	People	20.0
	People in difficulty	20.0
	Sick and disabled	20.0
	Poor people	20.0
	Victims of street incidents	20.0
	Give help to those who ask	13.3
	Those in troubled situations	10.0
	People in trouble	6.7
	Those who are oppressed	6.7
	Help people across roads	6.7
	Arrested persons	3.3
	Put out fire	3.3
Regional Forces Oral Interviews (Taped)	Help people	73.9
	Help friends and comrades	52.2
	Help one's family	34.8
Regional Forces Oral Interviews (Written)	Help people	(87.5)
	Help one's family	(41.7)
	Help friends and comrades	(29.2)
School Children	Help the poor	50.0
	Help people in disaster	33.0
	Help the old	33.0
	Help the GVN and society	33.0
	Help the blind and the disabled	25.0
ARVN Enlisted Men	Help people	(80.0)
	Friends and comrades	(33.3)
	Help one's family	(6.7)

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We have argued here that (1) the Vietnamese are on the whole more sociocentric than most American populations surveyed, and (2) there are strong demands of filiality and concern for one's family placed on adults (particularly male civilians). Why then do we find so few mentions of "help one's family?"

One hypothesis is that the populations tested are more oriented toward generalized society than toward families. This seems untenable at first glance (especially in a war-torn country where familial interdependence is increased), however propinquity may well take preference here over family ties; the issue is uncertain. Note however that in distributions of sources of approval and disapproval "everyone" and "society" sources are mentioned far more frequently than is "immediate family." This has been true of data collected by different researchers (ECHO-Vietnam and McGonigal) in Vietnam, also with different interviewers and with different forms of the ECHO instrument (Type A, B, and Oral Interview).

A second hypothesis is that altruistic behavior is voluntary, not required, while service to one's family is a universal duty. The ECHO question may be psychologically interpreted as: "What is a good thing a person like you could do even though you don't have to do it?" The could do clause was explicitly made in the ECHO questions used in VN, and it probably excludes a must do interpretation. Experimentation with the must do form of the projective survey question might prove productive; results should be compared to those generated by the could do form presently used.*

*

In pilot studies completed in Thailand by R. P. Barthol, two forms of the question were used: what ought you to do, and what would you like to do? The two forms were used to capture the dual meaning of the concept of "good (bad) thing to do" in the Thai language.

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b. Perceived Sources of Social Reinforcement^{*}

Sources (who would approve/disapprove?) represent the respondent's perceptions of the social reinforcements in his social environment. If one assumes that people seek rewards (positive reinforcements) and avoid punishments (negative reinforcements), it follows that sources reflect, in an imperfect way, the social influence system impinging on the respondent--as he perceives it.

The data discussed in this section are drawn largely from the to do responses which Lt. Cmdr. Richard McGonigal, USN, collected in I Corps during the Spring of 1968. The McGonigal data demonstrate the robustness of the ECHO survey methodology. An inference based on ECHO data is more acceptable when independent researchers use different translations of ECHO questions, different interviewers, and different samples at different times yet obtain similar results.

Subjects. Table 11 describes the McGonigal data and sample sizes.

Procedure. These people generated responses to the to do questions in oral interviews. Note that the translation of the to do question used by Lt. Cmdr. McGonigal was not the same one used by the ECHO-V team.^{**} McGonigal's translations are shown in Exhibit 5.

^{*} Because sources are one of the more objective ECHO outputs, source data are an appropriate dimension for comparing different populations. Sources are coded according to strict format, so there is less opportunity for a researcher to interject his personal biases into the analysis.

^{**} McGonigal reports having problems with earlier translations eliciting "What did you do?" type responses.

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TABLE 11
USN PERSONAL RESPONSE PROJECT SAMPLES

	School Children Sch	Female Civilians FC	Male Civilians MC	Popular Forces PF	Total Sample N
Number of Respondents	28	61	99	34	222
Percent of Sample	12.6	27.5	44.5	15.4	
Number of Cards	102	148	275	101	626
Number of Respondents	29	53	93	34	209
Difference	+1	-8	-6	0	-13

Bad
to do

Good
to do

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Results. The responses generated in this manner were categorized on two different occasions by teams of PCs in Saigon. The sources were coded by R. de Mille of General Research Corporation. The major positive sources are presented in Table 12 where the percentage of cards in each source and the percentage of Ss mentioning each source are also shown.

Certain relationships in the source data for PFs, male civilians and female civilians should be noted.

- Military authorities are most important to military respondents; civilian males mentioned leaders and commanders much less frequently, and women did not mention this source at all. Friends and comrades are also a powerful source of positive social approval for soldiers.
- The same set of relationships holds for the GVN as a source. Soldiers more than male civilians mentioned the GVN as approving of them under certain circumstances. Not one woman in 61 surveyed mentioned the government as either a source of approval or disapproval.
- Women on the other hand view their immediate family members as an important source of social approval. On the average, women cite their families as a source five times more often than do men.*
- The sociocentric nature of Vietnamese village life is reflected in the frequency with which everyone or other expressions connoting society in general are cited as sources of approval or

*

The infrequent mention of the GVN and the widespread concern with one's immediate family were also found by Simulmatics researchers (Worchel, et al., 1967). In analyzing their Self-Anchoring Scale data they found that "...the Vietnamese worry a great deal about their families. This concern becomes even more apparent when we look at the different respondent types and their responses on specific sub-categories (Worchel, et al., 1967, p. 67)." Women, in this case wives of PFs and RFs, consistently showed more concern than men for "Improvement of decent standard of living for self and family, hopes for happy family life and concern for extended family, and fears of family misfortunes" (p. 67).

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EXHIBIT 5

TRANSLATION OF THE GOOD AND BAD TO DO QUESTIONS USED BY
LT. CMDR. R. MCGONIGAL; I CORPS, SPRING 1968
(PRE AND POST TET OFFENSIVE)

tot (GOOD)

Điệu tốt nào mà ông (bà) có thể làm để cho người khác sẽ
khon ông?

Ai sẽ khon?

xuá (BAD)

Điệu xuá nào mà ông (bà) có thể làm để cho người khác có thể
chê trách ông?

Ai sẽ chê trách?

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TABLE 12

SOURCES OF APPROVAL IN USN PERSONAL RESPONSE PROJECT DATA

Sources of Approval	PERCENT OF CARDS			PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS		
	PFs	Male Civilians	Female Civilians	PFs	Male Civilians	Female Civilians
Myself	2.6	9.5	9.3	8.8	19.2	16.4
Everyone	12.1	25.9	32.0	32.4	44.4	55.7
Immediate Family	1.7	1.2	9.3	5.9	4.0	24.6
Parents	0.9	9.5	8.2	2.9	28.3	19.7
VN People, Villagers	43.1	21.6	7.2	73.5	48.5	18.0
Leader, Commander	10.3	1.5	-	32.4	5.1	-
GVN	5.2	4.9	-	11.8	14.1	-
Friends and Comrades	17.2	4.3	2.6	38.2	14.1	6.6
	101	275	148	N=34	N=93	N=53

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disapproval. Approximately one third of all the good thing to do cards generated by women cited "everyone" as approving. A fourth of the male civilians' cards and an eighth of the PFs' positive cards carried this source.

It is interesting to note that the military respondents mentioned "everyone" less often than did the civilian populations. As with responses concerning filial duties, an explanation for this finding (which was later replicated with Saigon civilians and soldiers) is that soldiers, or at least many soldiers, have been quartered away from their home villages; consequently social control pressures are not as great.* Friends and comrades seem to take the place of everyone, and myself as social control factors for soldiers. This decrement in community influence may also be reflected in "lack of discipline" and "oppressive" behavior reported by both civilian and military populations.

Propinquity, nearness in blood, place or time, appears to be the chief determinant of perceived sources of reinforcement.**

Analysis of source citations among the four populations (male and female civilians, children and PFs) lends support to this statement.

*

Popular Forces are by definition "home guard" or village defense militia who are volunteers and quartered in their own villages. In fact, however, the law provides for conscription of men for PF units, and draftees are often billeted some distance from their own hamlets.

**

Several psychologists (e.g., Heider, 1958) and philosophers (e.g., Ryle, 1948) have noted that the central norms and beliefs of a culture are embodied in the common language and literature of the people. A popular Vietnamese aphorism which reflects the importance of harmonious relations with neighbors is "Sell distant kin, buy close neighbors." Gerald Hickey, who cites this aphorism in his book Village in Vietnam, noted that "Close neighbors are treated as kin, and in this respect proximity of resident might be considered a more universal determinant of strong bonds in the village than kinship" (1964, p. 96).

Correlations of the source distributions for each possible pair of sample populations produce an index of the similarity of perceived sources for the different groups; the higher the positive correlation the more similar the perceptions. Table 13 presents these indices for positive sources of social reinforcement. These data show that sources of social reinforcement were not significantly related for female civilians and PFs, or for school children and PFs. Male civilians and PFs had similar social influence perceptions, but source responses of male civilians were more similar to those of female civilians than to those of PFs. The school childrens' sources of approval were more similar to the civilian women's than to civilian men's.

For the sources of disapproval, the same basic relationships obtained; there was, however, more similarity between all those pairs of distributions than there was for the approval distributions. One might speculate that sources of approval are more diffuse and group specific than are sources of disapproval. Analysis, however, fails to support this hypothesis; for Vietnamese respondents, the range (number) of sources cited is equivalent for good and bad things to do responses.

Indexing Internalization and Locus of Control Orientations.

- The frequency of myself mentions (self, my conscience, me) as a source of social reinforcement may be an index of the degree to which a particular behavioral norm has been internalized. Internalized norms are maintained in the absence of external authority, whereas mere compliance with society's public norms requires that surveillance and sanctions be imposed by an active external authority. For this reason adults more than children mention myself as a source of social control.

TABLE 13
INTER-GROUP CORRELATIONS OF SOURCES (GOODS), USN PROJECT DATA

GROUPS	r_s	t^*	α
Male Civilians and Female Civilians	0.676	4.29	0.001
Male Civilians and PFs	0.632	3.73	0.01
Female Civilians and School Children	0.443	2.32	0.05
Male Civilians and School Children	0.378	1.89	0.10
School Children and PFs	0.311	1.53	0.20
Female Civilians and PFs	0.263	1.26	0.30

*Significance test for r_s is described in Siegel, 1956, p. 210-212.

- Mentions of myself as a source causing things to happen is thought to indicate internality, i.e., the degree to which one sees himself as being in control of his own reinforcements. Research with American populations indicates that individuals differ reliably in their generalized expectancies for internal or external control, and this expectancy appears to hold in a variety of situations. Locus of control orientations are probably important determinants of observing-response acquisition and information-seeking. They also relate to performance on several skill tasks (reviewed in Rotter, 1966) and in a person's subjective feelings of "alienation" (Seeman, 1966, 1967).
- In McGonigal's populations, more civilians than military men and more males than females mentioned myself as a source of positive and negative social reinforcement. This is consonant with results obtained in studies completed in both Vietnam and the United States. Many researchers believe that culturally-based role expectations account for male-female differences in behavior; the size of the difference is postulated to vary as a function of the inequality between the males and females in a society. There are large differences between the male and female roles in Latin cultures, and these differences are faithfully reflected in ECHO responses from such populations--males mention "myself" far more often than do females. American college students show less difference in the frequencies with which males and females cite themselves as a source of social approval or disapproval, which accords with the increased blurring of roles for the two sexes in that setting.
- How does one account for the differences in mentions of myself between Vietnamese civilian males and PFs? One answer may be that men under military control have far fewer alternatives and decisions open to them; they must respond to another's

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orders without deliberating over the outcomes. This situation may seriously depress their feeling of internality ("I'm in control of my life and my outcomes"). The less frequent mention of self sources on the to do questions may actually reflect a low internalization or acceptance of military codes of conduct. For instance, one category of responses in the McGonigal data was: It is good to obey and respect your superiors. Who would approve? The superiors. It would be informative to have a study of self mentions and attributions for groups of men before induction, during training, during military service and after discharge. Such a study would test directly the hypothesis that locus of control orientations change for those men and are reduced in military situations.

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B. TO DO QUESTIONS: NON-PERSONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENTS

The "to do" questions discussed in Sec. A of this appendix all used a personal, general person role assignment, that is, What could a person like you do? The role assignment is "personal" because it says "like you," and "general person" because it does not define one specific role of the many that every individual holds simultaneously.* The general person role assignment allows the respondent to select (without explicitly stating) the particular role which he will assume in answering ECHO questions; his selection probably reflects the relative saliency of the roles he holds. On the other hand, specifying a personal role assignment (e.g., you as a citizen) allows the researcher to focus the ECHO response on a particular area of behavior.

Non-personal role assignments instruct the respondent to answer in terms of behaviors appropriate to a role he cannot (or does not) hold. For example, in one pilot study, political values were examined with the question "What is a good thing the President elected in 1968 could do?" In this case, "the President elected in 1968" is a non-personal role assignment.

In Vietnam, experience with non-personal role assignments was gained in a study of PFs and RFs evaluations of their American advisers. The remainder of this part (B) of this appendix describes this study.

1. Vietnamese Troops Appraise Their American Military Advisers

What behaviors differentiate good from bad military advisers? This, of course, depends on whom you ask; advisers and the men they lead may have markedly different definitions of what constitutes a good adviser.

*

The multiple roles an individual may hold are illustrated by the man who is simultaneously father, son, husband, employee, supervisor, citizen, church-goer, club member, and perhaps brother. Under normal circumstances the individual enacts only compatible roles in a given setting. There are some cases, however, in which role demands are in conflict. For example, an ARVN officer is supposed to be apolitical, yet as a citizen he has specific desires for the political life of his nation.

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Moreover, they may differ significantly in their perceptions of how much a particular adviser meets these criteria. There is also some question as to whether the common Vietnamese soldier even knows the advisers assigned to his group.

A study addressed to these questions and designed to evaluate the ability of the ECHO concept (and the current research team) to operate in the field was undertaken in the Rach Gia Sector of IV Corps during August 1968. Two units in the sector were surveyed in this pilot study: (1) Regional Forces enlisted men and (2) popular Forces troops. The RFs were asked: What is a good (bad) thing that an American adviser could do? And who would approve (disapprove) if he did this? Several types of data were collected from these troops. ECHO data were collected from RFs are discussed in Sec. 2; Sec. 3 presents sociometric data and opinion poll responses generated by PFs. All of the data are summarized in Sec. 4 and used in Sec. 5 to illuminate a discussion of the advisers' bases of social influence. Suggestions for research designed to improve the adviser-advisee interface are also included in that section.

2. ECHO Responses: "What's a good (bad) thing for an American adviser to do?"

a. Objectives

It will be recalled that the American advisers pilot study had three objectives: (a) to gain some experience in Vietnam with non-personal role assignment ECHO questions, (b) to evaluate the ability of military samples in rural areas to answer ECHO questions, and (c) to learn if inter-role perceptions could be collected with the ECHO methodology.

b. Procedure

Twenty-four semi-literate RF enlisted men (of Cambodian origin) stationed in the Rach Gia Sector of IV Corps were asked: "What is a good (bad) thing that an American adviser could do?" and "Who would approve

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(disapprove) if he did this?" The standard form of the instrument, Type A, was used, but Ss were asked to complete only five cards of each valence instead of the normal ten cards.

After completing the ECHO task Ss answered (verbally) the opinion poll and biographical data questions reproduced in Figs. 5 and 6, pages 112 and 113.

c. Results

The ECHO responses (and conversations with the ARVN officer leading these men) indicate that these RFs were extremely negative about their advisers.*

What is a bad thing that an American adviser could do?

The following categories (presented in the order of their frequency of mention) account for most of the "bad things" an adviser does or could do:

- Fails to call in a helicopter to evacuate wounded during an operation.
- Fails to help with living standards improvement in the compound.
- Lacks respect or despises the Vietnamese people or soliders.
- Refuses to call for food on an operation; lets Vietnamese troops go hungry.
- Won't call L19 during combat operation.
- Lacks social manners.
- Is very "economic."
- Won't help build bunkers and do other physical work.

*

Readers should note that this is not a typical case, even in this particular sector. The PFs quartered in the same sub-sector were very satisfied with their advisers according to the results of opinion polls and a sociometric instrument they completed. (See Sec. 3, page 111.)

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- Won't find a way to provide needed medicine for soldiers and families.

Examples of responses which cite these behaviors are presented in Exhibit 6A.

What is a good thing that an American Adviser could do?

The "goods" were dominated by "exclusions of bads"--it is good to not--or inappropriate answers (e.g., "I don't see anything done by American adviser which could be said as good"). The remainder of the good thing to do responses can be accounted for by three general themes:

- American advisers should actively join combat operations without complaining about being tired.
- Advisers should be in contact with American authorities to secure building materials and assistance for the compound (e.g., steel bars and a water system). They should help in improving the compound.
- In combat, advisers should call for air support or medivac assistance quickly when needed.

Typical responses which illustrate each of these categories are in Exhibit 6B. Examples of "inappropriate answers," most cases responding to a positively valenced question with a "bad thing to do" response, are also included.

The data presented here illustrate the ability of non-personal role assignment questions to discover interrole perceptions and expectations.

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EXHIBIT 6A

"BAD FOR AN AMERICAN ADVISER TO DO" RESPONSES *

RACH GIA
YP01101 Lack of warm friendship towards people living together with them. For example, a jeep on the way to Rach Gia still has vacant seats, but the driver refuses to give a lift to soldier. (Majority of soldiers in the company)

YP01102 American adviser witnessed soldiers living conditions--the place is crowded and short of furniture--but he didn't find way to ask American authority to give materials for construction. I believe American adviser could do this. (Almost everyone in the company)

YP01104 There is a shortage of much-needed items for the soldiers such as electricity, portable water and dwelling places. American adviser could realize this but pretends to be cool like an Englishman. He doesn't find way to get help from the authority. (The whole company)

YP01103 Not find way to provide appropriate medicines of which the company is short. There is only available medicines which couldn't be used. (Almost the whole company)

YP01501 There are operations in which American adviser couldn't get anything for the patients. He asked for an airplane but there wasn't one coming. (People don't know how to approve of American adviser)

YP01504 There are operations in which we clashed with the enemy--and there was only one L19. (People don't know how to approve)

YP01704 A bad thing an American adviser used to do is that on the day we received orders to go on an operation, once we had some wounded comrades, we could not get the copter we had asked to evacuate them. (All of us think so)

YP01605 American adviser wouldn't send for the airplane when our comrades are wounded in an operation. (Everyone doesn't approve)

YP00101 Sometimes American adviser showed he despised the soldiers. I don't know whether it's intentional or not. (A majority of men in the company)

YP01001 1. American adviser is a good guy, but when we crashed with the enemy he called for a L.19, but there was no plane coming.
2. When a soldier is wounded, there is no helicopter he asked for. (Every soldier is upset about this)

YP00704 Mister American adviser doesn't help the company in building sandy bunkers for guard around the compound. It's possible he would do it, but he doesn't want to do it.

YP00901 Lack of mutual help. American adviser has seen here a crowded and unfurnished quarters of soldiers, and yet he doesn't find way to ask American organization to build better camp. I think as American adviser, he could do it. (Most of the company complains)

YP01701 A bad thing an American adviser used to do is, for example, every morning when I couldn't start my Dodge, I come to borrow his vehicle to tow mine--he refuses. (Ngo-ky-nam of the company)

YP01702 A bad thing an American adviser used to do is that, on our daily operation, once we have some wounded, we couldn't get the helicopter we asked for. (Company)

YP01703 A bad thing an American used to do is not to provide, as we requested, helicopter to evacuate our wounded comrades during our daily operation. (Myself, company)

YP01705 Today I am talking about the fact that the fighting men don't mind hardship but American adviser doesn't please me much, because there is no air evacuation for my wounded comrades.

YP00401 Had discriminative act. In combat, he couldn't do anything to help wounded soldiers such as to call for air evacuation. (My unit)

YP00501 Mister American adviser lacks social manners and is very economic. In so doing, he proves that he isn't sociable in the company.

YP00601 Vietnamese soldiers had no copter to be evacuated while the comrades fighting day and night had no food to eat to be able to keep fighting.

* Items in parentheses indicate who would approve or disapprove.

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EXHIBIT 6B

"GOOD FOR AN AMERICAN ADVISER TO DO" RESPONSES

RACH GIA

YP00303 If an American adviser could do something good. (My whole company would approve him)

YP00401 Bad--he didn't help any to the unit. (My unit)

YP00501 To actively join combat operation and never complain of being tired. (The army)

YP00602 I don't see anything done by American adviser that could be said as good.

YP00701 It's OK for a soldier to go on an operation, but once being wounded he wouldn't ask for the helicopter to evacuate him.

YP00801 I don't see yet anything either good or bad done by American adviser.

YP00901 He should be in contact with American authority to get means to build the compound for the unit. A number of soldiers presently don't have their quarters. (The men in the unit would approve him)

YP01101 American adviser should call for air support quick in an operation so that the soldiers would have some confidence in him. (Almost the whole company)

YP01102 American adviser should prove to be in accord with ARVN soldiers during the operations. (Understandable men in the company)

YP01201 The unit is now short of water system and housing. And American adviser could help to improve these situations. (All of the men in the unit would approve)

YP01405 Anything that is good. (My entire company would approve)

YP01501 American adviser could supply steel bars and equipment to build guard posts around the compound.

YP01701 It would be a good thing if American adviser could ask for an air evacuation for the soldiers during a clash with VC. (Company 4/823)

YP01801 There was an ARVN operation in which some soldiers were wounded, but American adviser wasn't good on his job because he couldn't send for a helicopter.

YP01902 When there are wounded soldiers during an operation, American adviser could ask for the helicopter to evacuate them.

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This has especial relevance for training in cross-cultural adaption and for improving the accuracy of intergroup perceptions.*

3. Sociometric and Opinion Poll Data

a. Procedure

A random sample of PFs at one subsector headquarters compound provided opinions about their American advisers and responded to a series of job related opinion questions in an oral interview following completion of an oral ECHO interview.** Two different interview schedules were used. One contained a photo identification task which was designed to tap the respondents' familiarity with and evaluations of their advisers.

b. Opinion Survey

Both open and closed ended questions were used in the opinion poll; interview recording sheets A and B are shown in Figs. 5 and 6.

*

For instance, differences of opinion are often based on value conflicts; this is undoubtedly true of American advisers and their Vietnamese counterparts. Differences in VN and American perceptions of what constitutes a good adviser could be discovered by having the two groups respond to an appropriate role assignment question. The responses could be classified by Americans and Vietnamese independently in unstructured and structured sorts. The former classifications tell us something about the important categories and their definitions. The structured sorts allow us to ascertain indices of agreement and difference in the relative weightings of particular categories.

**

PFs generated answers to these questions: "What is a good (bad) thing that could happen?" and "Who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen?" Five responses to questions of both valence were recorded in writing by E during oral interviews. These "to happen" data are not reported here. To happen questions are discussed in the next part of this appendix, page 121.

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Interviewer Schedule: PF Enlisted Men

S _____ Interviewer _____ Date _____ Hour _____

REMINDE THE SUBJECTS THAT ALL RESPONSES ARE ANONYMOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL.

1. How long have you been in the service? _____ years _____ months.
2. Compared with all of the other squads you've seen, how is the one you are in now?

_____ Excellent, one of the very best
_____ Better than the average
_____ Average
_____ Below Average
_____ Very poor, one of the worst
3. What squad are you in? _____.
4. Can you think of any equipment that you need to help your squad work better? (List the items)
5. Can you quickly think of any words which describe the American advisers you work with? (List the words)
6. How good a job are the American advisers doing?

_____ Very poor, they are almost no help at all
_____ Not very good, they help sometimes though
_____ Fair
_____ Pretty good, they help quite a bit
_____ Very good, they are a very great help

Figure 5. Sheet A

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S _____ Interviewer _____ Date _____ Hour _____

REMIND THE SUBJECT THAT ALL RESPONSES ARE ANONYMOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL.

1. How long have you been at this post? _____.
2. Where do you usually see or come into contact with Americans? What kind of Americans are they?
3. Here are photographs of the American advisers assigned to this area. Do you know these people? (List the ones he does know)

(Select the pictures he has identified and place them before him.)
Now, of these advisers you know, whom do you personally like the best? _____.
Of the remaining people, whom do you like best? _____.
Of the remaining people, whom do you like the best? _____.

(Select the picture of the adviser he liked best) Now, can you tell me some of the good things about this man?

Can you tell me some of the bad things or things you don't like about this man?

Figure 6. Sheet B

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An overview based on both the ECHO responses and the opinion poll results suggests that American advisers are evaluated positively when they (a) meet the Vietnamese standards of extreme courtesy, cooperation, humility and gentleness and (b) are able to secure needed supplies and services through American channels. Willingness to work hard, especially on projects designed to raise the living standards of the soldiers and their dependents, is also respected. Causes of negative evaluations of American advisers include loudness, disruptive behavior and failure to call American fire and air support (especially medivac helicopters) during operations.

The PFs and RFs interviewed said they needed new weapons and more ammunition, better means of transportation, and more office supplies (typewriters) to do their jobs better.

The importance of cooperation, courtesy and respect for the Vietnamese people and their traditions cannot be overemphasized; these factors are mentioned consistently by all the Vietnamese military and civilian populations surveyed. There would probably be a tremendous improvement in American-Vietnamese relations if American advisers were trained to develop more cooperative behavior (once it is learned what, exactly, constitutes such behavior in the Vietnamese culture).

Photo Identification Task

Question 3, Fig. 6, refers to a procedure which was invented to answer the question: "Do advisees really know advisers?" Polaroid pictures were taken of five advisers assigned to the post and of two officers who happened to be visiting the area. All of the men were dressed identically (in fatigues) and the pictures were taken against the same background (a bunker wall) so that extraneous cues in the pictures were controlled.

The results of the photo identification task were informative, even though time permitted including the identification question in only

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seven of the interviews. The results of the identification questions are summarized in Table 14.

TABLE 14
RESULTS OF IDENTIFICATION QUESTIONS

S Number	Americans Respondent Knew	American S "liked best"
51	1,2,3,4,5,6,	3 1 2
52	1,2,3,5	3 1 2
53	1,2,3,3	2 1 3
54	1,3	3 1
55	3	3
56	1,2,3,5	3 1 2
57	1,2,3,5,6	3 6 2

In respect to the responses:

- Two Ss said they knew the man in the filler picture (a major from MAC-V who had been visiting the compound for only a day and half.) Further questioning revealed that these two Ss had in fact observed him during this period; their responses were not misidentifications as was initially thought. Vietnamese living in the compound are apparently much more observant of Americans and their activities than had been anticipated (even though the Americans live in a closed-in corner of the subsector headquarters compound).
- Six out of seven respondents identified Number 3 (a lieutenant) as the "adviser they personally liked best." Ss listed the following "good things about this man": very polite, modest and pleasant, very courteous, very gentle, works hard and helps the men a lot, helps the PFs improve their camps, very helpful, very concerned about the work, provided soldiers with

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cooking oil every month, helped to get supplies for the unit, and "he contacted other Americans in order to provide the subsector headquarters with a TV set."

The single respondent who did not identify the lieutenant as his number one choice mentioned a corporal, man number 2. This man was described as: "very nice to his Vietnamese friends and a hard worker."

- Only one S responded to the question: "Can you tell me some of the bad things you don't like about this man?" (the man they "personally liked best"). This S did not, however, address his remarks to the man he liked best; rather he mentioned that one man "had a superiority complex and was haughty toward his counterpart."
- In general, the PFs liked their American advisers; this is in marked contrast to the RFs who completed the ECHO questions about their advisers. These differences can, in theory, be attributed to two factors: (1) the differences are a function of the different data collection instruments--the Vietnamese do not like to negatively evaluate others in direct questions but they are willing to do so in anonymous ECHO responses, or (2) the differences reflect veridical differences in evaluations of the two groups of advisers. Antecdotal evidence and information observations suggest the latter explanation accounts for most of the variance.

4. Discussion

To consider the differences between good and bad American military advisers is to raise a more basic issue: Why should Vietnamese soldiers accept an adviser's guidance or follow his orders? In terms of the psychological literature the question is: What is the basis of the adviser's social power? Five possible kinds of social power are reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and information or expert. The following notes discuss the adviser's sources of influence in terms of these five types:

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Reward power. The adviser can mediate rewards for the VN troops. He can call air support, medivac helicopters, fire support, etc. He can obtain difficult-to-get supplies and services from American authorities.

Coercive power. The adviser can punish directly and indirectly those who disagree with him or refuse to heed his advice. The range of his potential punishments runs from "accidentally shooting" a man during an operation to turning in negative reports to powerful superiors.

Legitimate power accrues from the subject's internalized belief that the powerful person has a legitimate right to direct the subject's behavior in certain situations. If military training is successful, the enlisted man comes away believing that an officer has a right (regardless of his power to punish) to give orders.

Referent power exists when an individual believes that another person's behavior is a suitable model for his own and attempts to emulate his actions. If a PF soldier behaves like his adviser does, it may be because he desires to be like him or to possess his qualities (as perceived by the soldier, of course).

Information power or expert power occurs when an adviser provides information which causes the advisee to modify his behavior. Information power, however, does not imply "expertness." Expert power accrues from the adviser's esoteric knowledge. For instance, a soldier has informational power over his adviser if he sees there is danger behind the man and shouts a warning. He has influenced the adviser's behavior (exercised power). On the other hand, the adviser is exercising expert power when he tells a soldier how to conceal himself so as to present a lesser target to the enemy.

The ECHO data and interview methods indicate that American advisers' power accrues chiefly from their ability to mediate rewards and punishments. Reward power appears to be the most influential (e.g., get building materials, call American air and ground support during combat, etc.).^{*} It would appear that American reward power, chiefly materiel, should be used in a "carrot and the stick" manner to lead the PF and RF forces in meeting command objectives. However, there is some danger in such a procedure; the "led" individual tends to lose any ability to lead or to act independently. (cf. Tannenbaum and Allport, 1956).^{**}

5. Future Research

a. Importance of PF/RF Relations with American Advisers

The decision to shift more of the actual combat operations to AFRVN troops means that in the future effective adviser-advisee working

^{*} Informal discussions with American military advisers indicate that they disdain the "supply sergeant" role which they find themselves in. They would prefer to think of themselves as valued for their esoteric military knowledge. This does not seem to be the case however; no PF or RF respondent mentioned his adviser's superior military knowledge or fighting skill. (There is some anecdotal evidence that VN and American military men have different ideas about what constitutes effective tactics.) The adviser's expectations and needs appear to be a prime topic for future research.

^{**} The distribution of weapons provides an example. The soldiers want better weapons (e.g., 50% of PFs mentioned this in the Rach Gia survey) and the people want them to have better arms (e.g., 12% of all Ss in DaNang said a good thing to happen would be for the ARVN to be issued "modern and powerful weapons.") This presents a case where American reward power (the ability to provide new weapons) could be used to meet other ends. For example, weapons could be allocated to individual troops or to squad size groups rather than to entire companies. Allocation priorities could be determined by competition following a training program. Operation and maintenance of the new weapon could be taught as just one facet of a total re-training program, and the opportunity to "win" assignment of a new weapon could be used to motivate attention and performance. Assignment and retention of the weapon would be based on merit, not on favoritism, nepotism, or rank. The alternative, handing out new weapons to a large group at one time, does not reinforce self-improvement or the taking of initiative because it is not contingent upon the individual soldier's behavior.

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relationships will be even more important. Relatively little is known about the ways in which the Vietnamese and the American perceive one another or about the behavioral consequences of these perceptions. In making an effort to advance knowledge in this area, more is at stake than compatibility alone. It is as essential to a team's effectiveness to improve interpersonal and work group relations as it is to provide it with new weapons. This is accentuated by the knowledge that the VC have often capitalized on the importance of psychological and motivational factors in successful combat operations.*

b. Research Suggestions

The PF and RF populations reported on here are the type of subjects that might be suitable for future research. The PFs and RFs lived in compounds only a few kilometers apart; how did they rate their respective compounds in terms of security or in terms of comfort and adequacy for their families? In their opinion what part did their American advisers play in creating or maintaining these conditions? How do they feel about their advisers' fighting ability, and are their perceptions related to their evaluations of their own combat strength? What reinforcement do advisers need and expect from their counterparts? From the troops? How accurately can Americans estimate attitudes of the Vietnamese toward them, and what marks the difference between accurate and inaccurate

*

There are, whether the VC realize it or not, excellent psychological reasons for some of their organizational policies. For example, the three man "cell" is maintained by making the interdependent members' reinforcements largely contingent upon their cooperation and mutual support (cf. Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Social distance factors which reflect an ossified status hierarchy have been mitigated by encouraging criticism of officers at specified times (thus making it inappropriate to criticize privately or outside of the group) with the net effect that soldiers become more involved and committed to decisions and group goals.

A second expression of the VC-NLF desire to reduce traditional social distances is found in their promotion policies; nepotism is discouraged and family origin is not a restraint; although there is some evidence that this policy has led to a reaction against "middle farmer" class soldiers in favor of the "very poor and poor farmer class."

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perceivers? How do Vietnamese express appreciation of an adviser or displeasure with his behavior? How can advisers be sensitized to these cues, or is it impossible to learn to read these cues and monitor one's own behavior to respond appropriately? Do the values of American advisers change over time to become more like those of their counterparts, or is there an active rejection of alien values as they are learned during the American's tour of duty. And how are these value similarities represented in behavior? Do teams with "similar value patterns" show better combat performance or greater improvement on Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) indices of pacification in their areas of responsibility?

Several respondents mentioned the importance of "respect" and politeness in the Vietnamese culture and the frequent failure of Americans to observe these preferences. If groups' advisers could be identified as "respectful" or "disrespectful" (in terms of the Vietnamese definition of the term) would we find that one group or the other was superior on a behavioral index like desertion rate, number of ralliers received, combat effectiveness, prisoners taken, amount and kind of improvements made in quarters, etc.? All of these problems and others should be researched with multimethod approaches in the near future.

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C. TO HAPPEN QUESTIONS: HOPES AND FEARS

Variations on the basic good (bad) thing to do question have been discussed in Secs. A and B of this appendix. The second basic question asks: "What is a good (bad) thing that could happen (to a person like you, to your nation, to a soldier in this unit, etc.)" and "Who or what would be most likely to cause this thing to happen?" Answers to the latter query are perceived sources of causation or attributions. This section describes our experience with the "good (bad) thing to happen to a person like you" form of the projective survey question.

1. DaNang Study

a. Objectives

This study had two primary objectives: (a) to evaluate the ability of the self-administered (Type B) form of the instrument to collect ECHO data from "non-captive audiences" without the direct supervision of a trained researcher, and (b) to build up the sample size that had answered the "good (bad) thing to happen" questions.

b. Design

A male, ECHO trained Vietnamese employee of General Research Corporation distributed one hundred pre-printed and coded to happen packets to contacts in DaNang. Each contact was given a set of packets and asked to complete one himself and to distribute the remainder to acquaintances. Packets were completed, sealed and returned to General Research Corporation during a one week period.

c. Limitations

The inferences in this section should not be generalized to other civilian or military populations nor to this same population at a later date. There are two reasons for this caveat: (a) since this is a non-random sample, a selection factor is operating and (b) the saliency of particular hopes and fears change across time, and current inferences

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are proffered on the basis of a single "snapshot" rather than a trend analysis. The following results apply only to the sample surveyed.

d. Results

General Results. Seventy-three percent of the people contacted returned a completed packet. Sixty-seven males and six females generated a total of 705 responses to the positive question and 714 responses to the negative question. The biographical data available for these respondents are summarized in Table 15.

TABLE 15

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FOR DANANG RESPONDENTS
CONTRIBUTING TO HAPPEN RESPONSES

GENDER		AGE						RELIGION REPORTED
M	F	10	20	30	40	50	60	
2	-		1			1		2 - Ancestor Worship
28	3	1	8	6	6	8	2	31 - Buddhist
1	-		1					1 - Cao Dai
26	2	9	9	4	1	2	3	28 - Catholic
4	-	1	1		1	1		4 - Confucian
4	-	1		1	1	1		4 - No religion
2	1	2					1	3 - Unknown
67	6	14	20	11	9	13	6	N = 73

Classification of the positive cards produced 43 categories. The abbreviated category titles, the percent of cards in each category are shown in Table 16. The "bad thing to happen" responses were partitioned into the 48 categories shown in Table 17. There is a strong congruence between these data and the Vietnamese hopes and fears found in another recent study by Worchel, et al (1967). Evidence supporting this assertion is presented in Sec. 2 of this part, Cantril's Self-Anchoring Scale and ECHO To Happen Questions, page 127.

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TABLE 16

CATEGORY TITLES FOR GOOD THING TO HAPPEN RESPONSES
COLLECTED FROM DANANG RESPONDENTS

CATEGORIES	Percent SUBJECTS	Percent CARDS
Peace	49.3	8.7
The U.S. and the Allies Help Vietnam	33.3	5.2
To have National Independence	32.0	5.8
Education	32.0	5.0
Economic Improvement	30.7	6.1
To Improve One's Living Conditions	29.3	4.4
To Improve GVN Employees Living Conditions	26.7	3.7
The U.S. and the Allies Help VN Fight Against the Communists	25.3	3.1
The GVN and the People Fight Against Communism	25.3	4.5
To Achieve Solidarity Behind the Fight Against Communism	25.3	3.7
To End Corruption	24.0	3.1
To have Freedom and Democracy	21.3	3.1
The Improvement of Medical Facilities	21.3	3.0
To have Understanding Among Allies	18.7	3.0
Job Opportunities for the Populations	18.7	2.1
To Boost Up the Morale of the Population	18.7	2.8
The Americans are Putting Efforts into Civic Action Activities	17.3	2.8
To Improve Communications	17.3	2.3
To have High Morale within the Army	16.0	1.8
To Help the Refugees	14.7	1.6
The Army is Issued Modern and Powerful Weapons	12.0	1.7
To Maintain Good Mores and Customs	12.0	1.6
General Mobilization	12.0	1.4
To become Dedicated to One's Work	10.7	1.4
To have Happiness within the Family	10.7	1.8
To have Justice	10.7	1.4
To Maintain the Vietnamese Ethical Code	10.7	1.4
The Allies have Undergone Many Hardships for this Country	8.0	1.4
The Eradication of Delinquency	8.0	.9
To Destroy Communist Organizations in North VN	8.0	1.1
To Achieve Common Rights	6.7	1.1
Peoples' Self Defense is Strengthened	6.7	.9
Effective Information and Propaganda	6.7	.7
To have a High and Good Mental Life	6.7	1.1
Leisure for Servicemen	6.7	.7
Simple Happiness	6.7	2.0
The VC Rally to our side	5.3	.6
To Give Importance to Social Discipline	5.3	.7
To Preserve Tradition	4.0	.9
To Diminish the Difference between Rich and Poor	2.7	.3
To Help Children	2.7	.3
To Improve the GVN's Administrative System	1.3	.4
Not to Give Protection to Bad People Because of Self Interests	1.3	.3

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TABLE 17

CATEGORY TITLES FOR BAD THING TO HAPPEN RESPONSES
COLLECTED FROM DANANG RESPONDENTS

CATEGORIES	Percent SUBJECTS
Corruption	34.7
Disunity	32.0
The Decline of the VN Economy	32.0
Having a Hard Life	29.3
Mournings Caused by the War	26.7
To Lose National Independence	25.3
The Allies Being Unable to Gain People's Sympathy	24.0
Being Irresponsible to One's Work	24.0
The Fall of VN Society's Culture	22.7
Disasters Caused by the Communists	21.3
Unjustice	21.3
Inconvenience of the Lines of Communications	21.3
The War Continues	20.0
Lack of Effective National Policy	18.7
Hooliganism	18.7
The People Don't Believe in Their Government	18.7
A Corrupted Society	17.3
To be Uneducated	17.3
Prostitution	16.0
Lack of Military Conduct	16.0
The American Impoliteness	16.0
The Americans do not respect VN Laws	14.7
Lack of Personal Courteousness	14.7
Lack of National Spirit	13.3
No Educational Opportunities	13.3
Stealing and Robbery	12.0
Coalition Government	12.0
Not to Put People in Their Right Place	12.0
Lack of One's Sense of Duty	12.0
Lack of Public Health Facilities	12.0
To Give into the Communists	10.7
The Indifferences of the People	10.7
People are Being Oppressed	10.7
Lack of Organization in Foreign Aids	10.7
Ineffectiveness of Propaganda Programs	10.7
The US Does Not Really Help Vietnam	10.7
Being Impolite Towards Women	10.7
The Decline of Family Morals	9.3
To Be Defeated by the Communists	9.3
To Negotiate with the Communists	9.3
Unemployment	9.3
To Evade Military Service	6.7
To Get Rich over Peoples' Work	5.3
Communist Victory	5.3
Selfishness	4.0
To do Illegal Things	2.7
Inappropriate Answers	2.7
Talk Nonsense	1.3
Number of Subjects = 75	

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Differences in Catholics' and Buddhists' Hopes and Fears.

Analysis of Catholics' and Buddhists' responses produces some interesting comparisons. The procedure used here consists of comparing the percent of Ss in each group who contributed to a given category; these percentages are compared against an expected value for each population. Notable between-group differences are described below.

In general, Communism is more salient to Catholics than to Buddhists; Catholics were over-represented in five of the six categories which mention Communism.

	<u>Percent Catholic Ss</u>	<u>Percent Buddhist Ss</u>
BAD TO HAPPEN...		
To give in to the communists	17.9	3.1
To negotiate with the communists	17.9	3.1
Communist victory	3.6	6.3
Coalition government	21.4	6.3
Disasters caused by the communists	35.7	18.8
To lose national independence	35.7	18.8

Buddhists on the other hand were over-represented in categories which are critical of the GVN.

	<u>Catholic Ss</u>	<u>Buddhist Ss</u>
Lack of effective national policies	10.7	25.0
People don't believe in the GVN	14.3	21.9
Lack of public health facilities	3.6	21.9

Both the Catholics and Buddhists criticized Americans in approximately equal proportions, although the more severe criticisms were made predominately by Buddhists.

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	<u>Catholic Ss</u>	<u>Buddhist Ss</u>
The US doesn't really help SVN	3.6	18.8
Americans do not respect VN laws	17.9	12.5
Americans are impolite	10.7	21.9
Allies can't gain the peoples' sympathy	25.0	12.5

Buddhists were especially upset by certain negative conditions in the South; they also complained about the deterioration of Vietnamese traditions and morals:

	<u>Catholic Ss</u>	<u>Buddhists Ss</u>
Decline of family morals	3.6	12.5
Unemployment	3.6	15.6
Prostitution	7.1	21.9
Corruption	32.1	46.9
A corrupted society	10.7	9.4
People are oppressed	14.3	9.4
Injustice	10.7	28.1
Hooliganism	28.6	12.5
Decline of VN economy	10.7	15.6

Catholic subjects were more likely than Buddhists to mention unity, organization of the war effort, and the importance of national spirit:

	<u>Catholic Ss</u>	<u>Buddhists Ss</u>
Lack of organization of foreign aid	17.9	6.3
Lack of national spirit	10.7	9.4
Disunity	46.4	25.0

In summary, one can speculate that Catholics are more concerned than Buddhists with the threat of communism or a coalition government, with re-organizing war and relief efforts, and with maintaining the independence of GVN. Buddhists focus on poor conditions in the South, the decline of family morals and Vietnamese traditions, and social evils like prostitution, hooliganism, and corruption. Buddhists also appear more willing to criticize the GVN directly. Respondents of both religious groups made a number of criticisms of the Americans and of the allies.

2. Cantril's Self-Anchoring Scale and ECHO to Happen Questions

Hadley Cantril has noted, "Clearly, an accurate appraisal of an individual's reality world can never be obtained if he is forced to make choices or selections between categories, alternatives, symbols, or situations as these are posed in the usual type of questionnaire" (Cantril, 1965, pages 21-22). This observation motivated Cantril (1963, 1965) to develop the Self Anchoring Scale Technique.* His objective was "...essentially that of devising some means to get an overall picture of the reality worlds in which people live, a picture expressed by people in their own terms; and to do this in such a way that without sacrificing authenticity or prescribing any boundaries or fixed categories it would still be possible to make meaningful comparisons between different individuals, groups of individuals, and societies" (1965, p. 21).

*

The Self Anchoring Scale (SAS) technique entails the following procedures: (1) Ss describe, in an individual oral interview, what are their personal aspirations and hopes for the future--the very best future that could befall them; (2) then they describe their fears for the future--what are the very worse things that could occur? (3) Ss are shown a ten rung ladder and told that the bottom rung represents the very worst future and the top rung represents the very best future--as they described them. They are then asked "Where would you say we stand now?" Note that the question formats can be varied to tap respondents' hope and fears about either their own future or about the future of their nation. Responses assigned to the anchor points on the ladder scale, i.e., the ladder, are coded according to a standard 125 item category system.

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Dr. Phillip Worchel and his Simulmatics colleagues used the SAS instrument in Vietnam with RF and PF target populations in 1967 (Worchel, et al., 1967). Some of the major hopes and fears military respondents had for their nation and their personal lives are summarized in Table 18 and 19 respectively.

TABLE 18
HOPES AND FEARS FOR NATION, SIMULMATICS STUDY*

<u>Hopes for Country</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1. National political situation (internal peace makes up 64% of this figure)	70
2. International relations, cold war, peace, etc.	56
3. National economic situation	52
4. Independence, status and importance of nation	37
5. National social situation	6
6. General, status quo	0
<u>Fears for Country</u>	
1. Independence, status and importance of nation	56
2. National economic situation	32
3. International relations, cold war, peace, etc.	28
4. National political situation	17
5. National social situation	3
6. General, no fears	3

*From: Worchel, et al., 1967, pages 63-64.

Comparison of these hopes and fears with the ECHO good and bad to happen data in Tables 16 and 17 suggest that the two methods produce similar results.

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TABLE 19

PERSONAL HOPES AND FEARS, SIMULMATICS STUDY*

<u>Personal Hopes</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1. Personal economic situation	51
2. Personal character	34
3. Other references to family	32
4. International situation and world	17
5. Job or work situation	13
6. Personal political hopes	9
7. Personal social hopes	6
8. Hopes in religion, morality, public service	6
9. Hopes for health, old age, miscellaneous	4
10. General, status quo	2
<u>Personal Fears</u>	
1. Personal economic situation	42
2. Personal character	26
3. International situation	17
4. Other references to family	15
5. Fears for health, dependence, miscellaneous	15
6. General, no fears (suffering is normal)	11
7. Job or work situation	9
8. Personal political fears	5
9. Fears in religion, morality, public service	2
10. General economic situation	2
11. Personal social situation	1

* From: Worchel, et al., 1967, page 63.

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To evaluate the actual overlap between ECHO happen and SAS responses, the DaNang good to happen response cards were sorted into categories consisting of Worchel's personal hopes categories, and the percentage of Ss mentioning each category was computed. The data are presented in Table 20.

TABLE 20
PERSONAL HOPES OF THE VIETNAMESE AS
INFERRED FROM ECHO AND SELF-ANCHORING SCALE DATA

Personal Hopes*	Rank on SAS	Rank on ECHO
1. Improved or decent standard of living for self and family. Make ends meet	1	6
2. Concern for extended family	2	4
3. Peace, end of war, no war	3	2
4. Happy family life	4	7
5. Emotional stability and maturity	5	5
6. Have wealth (more than just making ends meet)	6	11
7. Adequate opportunities for children	7	9
8. Desire to be useful to others or hold public office	8	14.5
9. Acceptance by others	9	14.5
10. Good job for self or other family member	10	14.5
11. Self development and improvement	12	1
12. Have own land or own farm	12	17.5
13. Steady employment	12	10
14. Government help	14	3
15. Health of family	15	8
16. Success in one's work, contribution to one's field	16.5	12
17. Happy old age	16.5	14.5
18. Have own house	18	14.5

Spearman Rank Correlation = $+ .466$ ($t=1.97$, $df=17$, $p<.05$)

*Categories are from Worchel, et al. 1967, page 61.

The Spearman Rho correlation of ranks for these two distributions is $+0.47$ ($t = 1.97$, $df = 17$, $p < .05$). This suggests that the SAS and ECHO hope responses are probably drawn from the same population distribution, i.e., the two techniques elicited similar responses.

The differences between SAS and ECHO happen results in this particular instance can be conceptually classified into five sources of variance:

- a. Simple error variance, or stated differently, differences produced by reliability considerations.
- b. Actual changes in hopes and fears which obtained during the period 1967 (Simulmatics SAS tests) to August 1968 (ECHO happen survey). Many significant events occurred during this period: the Tet offensive, the General Mobilization (March 1968) and the summer attacks on Saigon and DaNang (where the ECHO data were collected).
- c. Sample population differences present the most important source of variance in the present study. The Simulmatics team used the Cantril instrument with Regional and Popular forces troops and their wives. The ECHO to happen responses came from a predominantly civilian population of males and females in DaNang; the respondents ranged in age from 15 to 67 years.
- d. SAS data were collected in individual oral interviews; the ECHO data were collected from "non-captive audiences" with the Type B self-administered form of the ECHO survey instrument.
- e. Differences in the number of SAS and ECHO questions are also a significant source of differences in outputs. The ECHO methodology asks the respondent to generate ten good things that could happen (hopes) and ten bad things that

could happen (fears); the SAS instrument allows the respondent to list as many hopes and fears as he cares to mention.

3. Hoi Chanh (Ralliers): Hopes and Fears

a. Subjects

A small number (N=7) of hoi chanh (ralliers) detained at National Chieu Hoi Center in Thi Nhe Hut were made available to ECHO researchers by Major Luan, Director of the Center. (Conditions at the time of the field work made it impossible to arrange for a larger group of hoi chanh despite attempts to do so.) Table 21 contains summaries of the biographical data collected from this group.

TABLE 21

HOI CHANH SUBJECTS BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Age	Gender	Occupation*	Religion
--	--	--	--
20	Male	"Hoi Chanh"	Buddhist
22	Male	PFC-Serviceman-Farmer	--
31	Male	NLF-Second-in-Command of a Platoon-Farmer	Buddhist
21	Male	PFC (Private First Class)	Buddhist
28	Male	"Hoi Chanh"	Buddhist
21	Male	"Hoi Chanh"-soldier-Farmer	Buddhist

* The occupation question on the standard biographical data card reads "occupation or rank." The ranks refer to rank in the VC organization.

b. Procedure

Standard ECHO packets (Type A) were completed by the non-randomly selected ralliers during a 30 minute test session; 60 "good thing to happen" and 69 "bad thing to happen" responses were generated. Responses were classified and attributions were coded by members of the research team.

The minuscule sample size makes normal data analysis untenable; however, translation of the original data and categories are presented in Exhibits 7A and 7B. A list of the English translations of the positively valenced cards begins on page 139; a list of the negatively valenced cards begins on page 146. The remainder of this section presents some tentative interpretations based on mere speculation, and no defense of the conclusions is tendered. Statistical analyses were not made nor were hypotheses tested.

c. Discussion

In September 1967, the Simulmatics Corporation published the results of a study of the Chieu Hoi program which was conducted during 1967. Many of the hoi chanh attitudes, beliefs and opinions that Simulmatics reported also appeared in the ECHO data; there were, however, some significant differences. The most important item, for instance, is the hoi chanhs' displeasure with the GVN policy of drafting ex-hoi chanh six months after the completion of the indoctrination program. This matter was not mentioned anywhere in the Simulmatics report; evidently the draft was not salient to any of the 289 men they interviewed in depth. The current data probably reflect reactions to changes wrought by the 13 March 1968 General Mobilization Decree. The GVN conscription policies have changed since the earlier Chieu Hoi studies, according to information provided by L.A. Newberry (October, 1968: ARPA-Vietnam):

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"In response to your question about the official GVN policy toward drafting hoi chanh, there are two answers. Previously, all hoi chanh were exempt from conscription for one year from the day they first reported to a Chieu Hoi Center. Since the normal period of 'repatriation' in the Chieu Hoi Center is two months, this means, in effect, that they had ten months of grace following their release. On March 13, 1968, in connection with the National Mobilization Decree, this policy was changed. The present rule states that hoi chanh are exempt from the draft for a period of six months from the date they are released from the Chieu Hoi Center. Thus, at the present time, there are hoi chanh at large who fall under either of these rules, depending on whether they rallied before or after 13 March 1968."

With the above exception, the ECHO data are consonant with many of the results of the Simulmatic study. Consider the following for example:

- Hoi chanh openly disdain the GVN and are wont to criticize everything in the South from the electric service ("There are too many power failures in the South; the North doesn't have this problem") to the GVN's complicity in corrupt activities and failure to curb prostitution and "hooliganism." Similarly, Simulmatics found: "There are some items that might seem to be good psywar themes to Americans, but which have little impact on the VC.* One of these is praising the virtues of the GVN. Most ralliers rally against the VC not for the GVN" (Simulmatics, 1967, p. 31).

* Note the logic implicit in this statement. The lack of impact on active VC is inferred from the self-reports of poor impact on former VC. This inference may or may not be valid; there is a good deal of theoretical evidence that suggests hoi chanh reports of VC realities may be unconsciously distorted by selective perception and retention (forgetting). Dissonance theory's predictions about resolution of post-decisional dissonance may also be applicable here especially where the decision is so important to the future of the VC cum rallier.

- Simulmatics identified five major reasons for rallying: (1) hardships, (2) family separation, (3) war weariness, (4) disapproval of VC acts, and (5) desire for a better life. (See Sec. 11.8 of the Simulmatics study.) Family separation, war weariness and desire for a better life were all mentioned in the hoi chanh ECHO responses.
- The September report noted that "...disillusionment is directed at the VC for failure to deliver, not at the reforms for which they fought" (Simulmatics, 1967, p. 37). This seems consonant with the amazingly high proportion of ECHO responses which praised North Vietnam for its "social progress"; 42 out of 69 good to happen cards mentioned North Vietnam expressly. All of the respondents in this small sample made two or more positive references to conditions in the North, as Table 22 indicates.

TABLE 22

POSITIVE MENTIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM BY HOI CHANH

S#	Mentions of positive item about North VN	Mentions of positive item about South VN
003	3	3
005	9	-
008	2	2
009	5	3
011	3	3
025	10	-
032	<u>10</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	42	11

- J. J. Zasloff's 1966 study (reissued by RAND in 1968) is an example of another inquiry which found this same uniform respect for the Communists among prisoners and ralliers to the GVN side. Like the Simulmatics team, Zasloff used common interview protocols as data. Quoting Zasloff (1968):

The Communist Party in North and South commanded the respect of the regroupees (including the nonmembers among them and defectors who were tired of the war or critical of the Hanoi regime) (p. ix)...Even those, however, who denounced the communist movement often betrayed a guiding respect for those who continued to serve it. Some seemed to feel guilty at their own inability to stand the hardships that their former comrades could face, others had been disillusioned by the GVN's rallier program (p. xi).

- According to the earlier observers, "Good treatment will produce more ralliers" (Simulmatics, 1967, p. 7), and "The place where abuse is most common and most feared is before the rallier reaches the Center" (p. 32). One of the commonly mentioned behavioral norms in military (and civilian) populations is "It is bad (or good not) to beat or torture POWs of Hoi Chanh" (see Table 6, page 73).

To illuminate the ECHO data with more traditional survey data, a new group of RFs (N=30) were asked two opinion poll type questions: (1) Do you approve of GVN soldiers beating POWs during interrogations? and (2) Do you approve of GVN soldiers beating hoi chanh during interrogations? The first question received an affirmative answer from 65.5% of the respondents; however, only 9.4% approved of beating hoi chanh. One might speculate that punishment of AFRVN men who beat hoi chanh, i.e., enforcement of the Chieu Hoi principle of safe conduct, would meet with the approval of most soldiers. Presumably this would lead to a reduction in beatings and (if well publicized) an increase in rallying. High level cadres who

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have information the GVN wants and who expect to be pressured for it are the ones who should be most influenced by a propaganda move of this type.

There may be some valuable payoffs from a compilation of biographical data collected from hoi chanh; for example, reasons for rallying and VC rank may be dependently related--suggesting that different themes and probably different media should be used for subgroups within the VC target population. Identification of stable subgroups within the hoi chanh ranks would permit the development of separate vulnerability schedules* for each of these groups.

In addition to the GVN conscription policies, hoi chanh were concerned with conditions in the South (particularly prostitution, corruption and "hooliganism") which they attribute in large part to the influence of American officials and soldiers. There was a widespread (all Ss mentioned) and strong (each S mentioned two or more times - 61% of all responses) positive evaluation of North Vietnam; this is consonant with the findings of other studies of hoi chanh populations. The GVN was seen as the single most salient source of causation for events happening in the South; the (Communist) Party and Bac ("Uncle Ho"--Ho Chi Minh) were seen as strong determinants of events in the North.

* For instance, the standard practice of publishing (or broadcasting) a rallier's "story and pleas to his former comrades" (often referred to as "compromising the rallier") serves two purposes: (1) to propagandize active VC target groups, and (2) to make the rallier's decision "less revocable." It may be effective in convincing a high ranking cadre of the man's safe physical condition, but it certainly would not be expected to act as powerful stimulus to his rallying. Why? Because high prestige people rarely hold low status persons as reference individuals or sources of social comparison. This is especially important where presently the bulk of hoi chanh are low ranking members of the VC-NFL organization.

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In terms of research questions answered, the pilot study has demonstrated that the ECHO concept and data collection system is viable in hoi chanh populations and may provide valuable data as a supplement to interview data at a reasonable time, manpower and dollar cost.

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EXHIBIT 7A

GOOD TO HAPPEN RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM HOI CHANH (RALLIERS)

Chieu Hoi Program [2/7 Ss]

- 008 10 That a man gains his freedom and happiness is a good thing that could happen. (It's caused by the policy of the government of the Republic of Vietnam.)
- 008 02 The Chieu Hoi policy. (RVN of the South.)
- 009 05 The ralliers think that the Chieu-Hoi policy (Open Arms) is right. (Due to the government and the Chieu-Hoi department of the Republic of Vietnam.)

GVN hoi chanh Conscription Policies [2/7 Ss]

- 011 08 One good thing is that ralliers have contributed a large part in the task of fighting Communism. Why then do they have to do their military service six months after they have been allowed to return to normal life? (The reason for this is because the government is making it into a compulsion.)
- 009 07 If the hoi chanh (ralliers) are forced to enter military service, the authority of Saigon will someday in the near future fall into the hands of the communists. I think the ralliers must be exempt completely from the draft; otherwise they will be once again underground cadres for the communists. This is the general observation of the whole body of ralliers. ...moreover if the ralliers are drafted, they have to confront the communists again. Consequently, the war will continue and will cause more deaths, and in the meantime the Vietnamese people will be ruled by American imperialists and (Red) Chinese. Therefore, ralliers and the government must solve the problem of finding jobs for them. In order to have the situation on hand, I think the essential condition is that the ralliers must be exempt from the draft.
- 011 07 It is absolutely stupid that ralliers have to do their military service, for if they have given up their arms to rally to the government it means that they have become fed up with the war. Thus, if they are forced to serve within the army's ranks, I am convinced that they will not be fit for fighting, except, of course, for those who voluntarily join the army. (The government policy.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

- 011 03 A sad thing is why the republic government wants to draft those ralliers who are in 6 months after their returns. (The cause is the good effect of the ralliers in reducing the enemy strength--when they return to the government side.)
- 011 04 I disagree with the government's draft policy towards ralliers, which causes dissatisfaction and lack of discipline among them. This policy runs counter to their aspirations, and the freedom and enthusiasm they thought they would get when they came back to the government. (This is a cause of the unpopular policy mentioned above which makes ralliers lose their confidence and go into the state of being undisciplined.)

Personal Freedoms [3/7 Ss]

- 011 09 Freedom of religion for the Catholics as well as for the Buddhists. (The cause of this to happen is policy formulated by the government of the Republic of Vietnam.)
- 009 04 The population could have freedom. (The Saigon government.)
- 008 09 Freedom of speech. (By the government of RVN.)
- 008 01 Freedom of religion. (The government of RVN.)
- 008 07 Freedom of work. (The government of RVN.)

The War and National Independence [3/7 Ss]

- 005 01 The people's war that is taking place now in Vietnam has, and is achieving great victories because it has the support of the people of the whole world, including the American people. (Because this is a war for a just cause.)
- 008 06 The South VN neutralized. (The people's wish.)
- 011 05 The US has given Vietnam all kinds of food and weapons in order to help her to fight against aggression. (The US government.)
- 008 03 A Vietnam independent, peaceful, unified, and prosperous and powerful. (The people's wish.)
- 008 04 The South is not intervened by the foreign troops. (The people's wish.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

Conditions in the South [3/7 Ss]

- 003 06 In the future electrification of the rural areas of the country.
- 003 08 The South has a good agriculture.
- 003 05 Society's culture--arts, etc. --is progressing.
- 009 03 There are ample supplies of meat, fish, fabrics, and other food-stuffs in a free regime. (The Saigon government.)
- 011 06 The people of the South have freedom of clothing and working. They are not forced. (The government of the South.)

Conditions in the North [7/7 Ss]

- 032 10 There are neither very rich people nor very poor ones in the North. Generally speaking the people are not poor and miserable, they are average. (Because of the good leadership of the Party and the government as well as of Uncle Ho.)
- 011 10 To establish a cooperative society for a collective life, eat together and work together is a good thing to the people, because there is no existence of the rich and the poor. (It's the cause of each individual consciousness and it's formulated by the government and the Party.)
- 032 09 In the North, women are equal to men, they do not have to depend on men. Also, they are not in men's pleasures as under the old regime. (It is because the Party and the government have thought of women's happiness.)
- 032 08 In the North, women also keep as important a role in the Assembly as men. (The Party and the government think of the people's equal rights.)
- 009 01 The North has a very talented leader who is very faithful towards the people of Vietnam in particular and the world in general; that is President Ho Chi Minh. (He has a very high esteem and is being educated and helped by the Party and the people.)
- 008 08 The (NVA) troops and the people love each other and treat each other as nicely as if they were from the same family. (The troops and the people of North VN. The government, the troops and the people of North VN.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

- 008 05 Industries develop. If the war is ended, the country will be powerful, the people will be rich. (The actual regime of the RDVN of the North.)
- 005 10 The North has been under Socialism for over ten years, the people have been able to live in freedom and equality. Leaving out the classes and factions, the people have united in order to establish a prosperous and powerful regime. (The cause has been the leadership of the Communist Party headed by Ho Chi Minh who has brought it to the people.)
- 005 09 The people in the North can freely meet, the children can all go to school without being distinguished -- the rich from the poor; there are medical stations in the rural areas to take care of the people's health. (Because the "Uncle" and the Party want to bring freedom and equality to the people's life in the society.)
- 005 08 The North's socialism has established a mechanized farming system and a cooperative society to bring people into a collective life. From then on, there is no more exploitation among people in the society. (Due to the leadership of the Party and Bac (Uncle Ho), which is to provide the people the comfortable life, to wipe out individual ownership and to clean out the exploitation in the society.)
- 005 07 The unemployment does not exist in the North anymore. The workers have had a better life, their children can go to school or to kindergarten where they are taken care of. (The cause is because the people have heeded the Party's and the "Uncle's" policy.)
- 005 06 In the North there are no longer either prostitutes or hooligans or delinquents. There is no longer private property. There is no longer any case of stealing or robbing. (After having achieved the setting up of socialism the Party got its hands on and succeeded in eradicating every one of the social evils.)
- 005 05 In the North, each person is a military man because their policy is during war time, the people are ready to fight against the enemy. (The people carry out the Party's policy for the war.)
- 005 04 In the North everyone from children to old age people love the country and nourish resentment against the US imperialists who have invaded their country and are responsible for the daily bombing operations on their villages and hamlets. (Thanks to the Vietnamese people's undying tradition of love for their country.)
- 005 03 The North Vietnamese Communist Party stands for peace, real freedom and happiness for all its people, and it is on the way to achieving those goals. (The Party and its clever leadership.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

- 005 02 Every North Vietnamese youth is ready to volunteer into the army in order to go and liberate the South even though he knows that he will have to sacrifice his life. (Because of his love for the country and his hatred of the imperialists and their lackeys.)
- 003 02 There is no longer any hooliganism or prostitution in the North.
- 003 04 In the North one lives and works collectively. Everybody is like everybody else. No one is rich and no one is poor.
- 003 07 Equal development of specialized skills and agriculture in the North.
- 032 07 In spite of the war over the North, the cost of living has not been higher or lower. It has been always the same. (Because of the good and effective leadership of the Party and the government.)
- 032 06 Under socialism in the North, the labor-workers' children have been able to go to school without being distinguished from the rich. (By the leadership of the Party, the government of Ho Chi Minh.)
- 032 05 In the North, it is not only the workers' children, but they themselves also go to school for advanced courses. (The Party and the government think of the people's future and rights for surviving in this society.)
- 032 04 In the North, the labor people live together, so, they participate enthusiastically and cheerfully in working. (The Party and the government have thought of the people's happiness and future comfortable life.)
- 032 03 There is no prostitution, delinquency and hooliganism in the North. (It is also because of the superiors' good leadership and the people's understanding in the North.)
- 032 02 In the North, there is no demonstration for a higher salary or cutting short the working hours. (Because of the good leadership of the superiors that there is no such demonstration.)
- 032 01 The unemployment does not exist in the North. Workers always have work to do. (The good leadership of the Party and the government.)
- 025 10 The regime and society of the North are getting better every day concerning economical and cultural activities, such as arts, theaters, movies and magic. (This has been organized and built up by the ministry of culture and the central office of political affairs.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

- 025 09 Militarily, politically, culturally and socially, etc.... generally speaking, the whole regime and society of the North are good. (The unity of mind of the entire people under the Party's and the government's leadership.)
- 025 08 Military discipline is highly observed because the military men have a sense of self-discipline during the fighting as well as during their mission. They are weak, but their morale is higher than the Americans' and the ARVN's. (This is taught and maintained by the ministry of defense and the government.)
- 025 07 The people's sense of responsibility over the public properties is very high, therefore the public places in the North are very clean and beautiful. It is also because the people consider the public properties theirs. (From the policy of the construction of the society nowadays and the new civilized activities.)
- 025 06 The youth in the North volunteer into the military and fight bravely with their bodies and their spirits, and always accomplish their mission victoriously. (They fight for their people, their ideals and their own families. The Party provides for them financially.)
- 025 01 The entire people of the North have been following the agricultural cooperative. This is the first step leading them to Communism. (The people's unity of mind under the Party's leadership.)
- 025 02 The people in the North have worked hard and actively built up the country; factories and industrial plants have grown as crowded as mushrooms; nobody can be hungry. (The people realize that this is the truth that the Party has brought to them.)
- 025 03 The troops and the people are all extremely obedient and faithful; they sacrifice themselves for the country in order to win the last victory. (Everybody is taught carefully about the policies of the Party.)
- 025 05 The entire people and troops are determined to follow the Party in the fight against the foreign invasion; such as the imperialist American invasion although they have to make sacrifices and to live miserably. (The Party's and the government's leadership is so good that the people extremely believe in them.)
- 011 02 Thanks to compulsory education, the people become literate and know about the new techniques, science and culture. (The government of Hanoi's policy.)

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EXHIBIT 7A (cont'd.)

- 011 01 The North is much better than the South in the fact that there is no longer any drinking, gambling, prostitution or other depravation there. (The reason for this bad thing being society's poor leadership.)
- 009 10 The social evils of the North have been exterminated such as: gambling, sex, prostitution, corruption and the debauched culture of feudal society of the past. (Due to the determined and smart leadership of the Labor Party of the North and in the meantime the apperceptive support of the people.)
- 009 09 The regular army of the North and the NLF (National Liberation Front) of the South are organizations with high discipline; they never burn the houses, shoot to kill, rape and rob the people, and they fight with discipline. (Due to the good leadership of the Labor Party of North VN.)
- 009 08 The industry of the North has been built and developed tremendously, especially the heavy industry: the iron industry of Thai-Nguyen, the industry area of Viet-Tri, the coal mines of Nong-Bi, the hydro-electric plant of Thap-Ba etc... In the meantime light industry was also being widely developed to serve agriculture. (Due to the leadership of President Ho Chi Minh and the Party.)
- 009 02 The government of the North is a just government, therefore the people of both zones unanimously give it their support; so in 14 years of leadership, there is no one who dares to revolt. (Due to the talented leadership of the Labor Party of the North.)
- 025 04 The people of the North have been going toward Socialism, therefore, their life has been continuously progressing, and later on, they will reach Communism. (The cause of this has been from the Party's and the government's good leadership.)

Miscellaneous [1/7 Ss]

- 003 10 To have money available to help good friends.
- 003 09 Strong military authorities.

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EXHIBIT 7B

BAD TO HAPPEN RESPONSES COLLECTED FROM HOI CHANH (RALLIERS)

Americans and the Allies [7/7 Ss]

- 00506 The Americans, Nationalist Chinese, and Thais came into the South as allies, but in reality, they have unsubmitively stolen, destroyed, beaten, killed the Vietnamese people, raped the women, young girls and old women. This has happened in many places in the South of Vietnam. (Because of the blindness of the authority of the South which has to depend on the U.S.)
- 03204 It is because of the Americans' arrival that we, South and North, have to undergo sufferings and hardships. Because of them (Americans) fathers are separated from their children, wives from their husbands. How many happy love affairs have been broken because of them (Americans)? (The government of the Republic of Vietnam is responsible for this.)
- 02509 The U.S. imperialists are invading us and are responsible for so many of the Vietnamese people's sufferings which are the result of this terrible war. (The U.S. imperialists and the blood-thirsty bunch of dictators are responsible for this. They want to turn the South into a new type of colony.)
- 02507 The bombing carried out by the war-thirsty Americans over the North. The people are very resentful. (The unscrupulous Americans are responsible for this. They want to dominate Southeast Asia.)
- 02505 The Americans and ARVN bombed and shelled the innocent people and then they blamed the communists. (The Americans and the ARVN caused it.)
- 01107 Most cases of car accidents with the victims being killed are cases of careless American drivers. (Americans are responsible.)
- 00309 Still there is some deficiency in the American military service: a few elements are still far from satisfactory.
- 00802 Americans are interfering in many administrative affairs, and this brings to question our independence. (The Republic of Vietnam, South VN,)
- 00803 Not to trust people who are giving us help, for instance our American Allies. (The Republic of Vietnam, South VN.)

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 00505 The economy and military of the South are completely dependent on the Americans. (Because the government of Saigon does not have the ability to restore the economy.)
- 00310 Political activities (over here) are not suitable for the American politicians.
- 01110 U.S. troops indulge in debauchery and depravation. They squander their money on prostitutes. (President Johnson's G.Is.)
- 00901 The U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam have turned the Vietnamese girls into somebody of not much worth. (The Republic of Vietnam is responsible.)
- 00504 U.S. troops have squandered their money to buy South Vietnamese girls' love, and as a result, South Vietnamese girls are not worth much now. (The Republic of VN is responsible for it.)
- 03210 U.S. troops indulge in sex and debauchery. They squander their money, spending it on women and living licentiously and getting the Vietnamese people into depravation. (The U.S. troops are responsible for this.)
- 00909 ROK (Republic of Korea) troops kill and annihilate innocent people. They destroy the people's properties. They are unscrupulous. Down with Korea! (The barbarian Koreans.)
- 00910 Korean troops are too cruel and brutal. They oppress the civilian people; they rape, mistreat prisoners and ralliers. (Koreans.)
- 03207 ROK (Republic of Korea) troops are unscrupulous. They kill POWs, ralliers and innocent people. (Korea is responsible.)

The GVN Policy Toward Conscription of Hoi Chanh [4/7 Ss]

- 03203 It does not make sense to draft ralliers since it is because they have become fed up with the war that they have returned (to this side). (The GVN is responsible for it.)
- 00908 To rally is to take a short cut toward peace, but unfortunately the government calls on us to return, but barely six months after our being released home we are drafted. It is really not much of a life, the life of a rallier! To put one's trust into the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) policy! If the Assembly and President Thieu do not revise their policy, one day they will have to face a threat posed by ralliers once they have been issued arms.

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 00907 The bad thing that could happen is if the GVN does not stop drafting ralliers, there certainly would be cases of great disagreement taking place. (The reason being ralliers do not agree with the government's draft measure.)
- 00906 To be drafted is something that a rallier completely dislikes. It can be said that he dislikes the draft 1000 times more than at the time he was on the other side of the battleline. If as it is argued that because he has been given back every citizen's right he is expected to fulfill his military duty, and if the government is determined to implement this policy then in effect the rallier has been cheated and bought, and this fact can result in lots of sufferings for him who, in fact, should be given privileges and help in order to start a new life.
- 00502 It is not right to force ralliers to do their military service because all of them have become fed up with the war. (The Saigon government.)
- 00503 The ralliers have hated war, and now the government of the South drafts them. (By the government of the RVN.)
- 01101 The worst thing is the GVN forcing ralliers to do their military service. The ralliers are the ones who contribute the major part in the diminishing of the enemy's firepower. (Could it be that the reason for this is the GVN's shortage of troops?)

Gambling, Drinking and Prostitution [6/7 Ss]

- 01109 In the South there still is depravation and debauchery. There is quite a lot of prostitution, drinking and gambling, all of which lead to quarrels and fights. There still are hooligans in the streets. (This is a product of present times and circumstances. On the other hand youths are not aware of their role and place money above everything else.)
- 03201 Hooliganism and prostitution that are spreading and are so shocking. A regime depraved by money. (South Vietnam's regime.)
- 03205 The social evils of prostitution, hooliganism and delinquency continue to spread. (U.S. troops' wicked plot of seducing and misleading our young people. But they (U.S. troops) will be unmasked by our people.)
- 02506 The free regime is responsible for nobody knows how many prostitutes, delinquents and for nobody knows how much drinking, gambling, debauchery and stealing and robbing. This has resulted in a deterioration of society's mores and customs. (The free regime is responsible and perpetrating this.)

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 02503 The soliders killed each other, cursed each other, gambled and got drunk. (The ministry of defense does not have a discipline for the troops so that many bad things have happened.)
- 00807 Drinking and gambling lead to a debauched and corrupt society. (The government of RVN.)
- 00808 Prostitutes, hooligans. (The government of RVN cannot maintain good morale in the society.)
- 00508 In the South there is still prostitution, delinquency, hooliganism, and corruption. (The GVN's free regime.)
- 00307 Gambling, drinking, stealing.
- 00308 There are hoodlums and prostitutes in the South now.

SV Conditions, The GVN And Its Policies (Except for Conscription) [7/7 Ss]

- 00806 The handicraft and industry of the country have not been developed. Things have always been imported, therefore the Vietnamese handicraft has been dying and we will have to depend on the other countries' industries. (The government of RVN in the South VN.)
- 01103 Soldiers steal things from the people while on operation or search and create resentment and hatred among the people. (The GVN itself.)
- 03209 Provincial Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) centers do not carry out the policies formulated by the Central Government. They force ralliers to do more labor work than if they were POWs. (Republic of Vietnam.)
- 01102 The shops are decorated in too tasteless and awful a manner. They make appeals to sex, and debauchery. They are responsible for youths becoming depraved. (The government of South Vietnam.)
- 00301 The people's standard of knowledge is not high enough.
- 00302 There isn't much development in all social aspects.
- 00304 As far as commodity prices are concerned, they go higher every day. This greatly affects the people's and the workers' living conditions.

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 00305 There's still not much public hygiene in the cities. There are still lots of dirty streets and stagnant water. There are lots of excrements floating in the river on the bank of which one sits to take a breath of fresh air. The river is just foul.
- 00306 In the South there is no regularity for water and power supply. There are often water and power cuts.
- 00501 A policeman is rewarded 5,000 piasters if he catches a draft dodger. This is a declining and corrupt regime, a regime that breeds corrupt people. (The Saigon regime.)
- 00507 In the South the Thieu-Ky government has decreed a general mobilization, but ironically the government has had to implement the term "mobilization" by launching sweep operations to get at draft age youths. It has had to deploy whole battalions to make sweeps and get at them. (Because they (draft age youths) know who causes this war and whom they are fighting for. This is the reason why they evade the draft.)
- 00801 Unstable government, many coups d'etat. (The Republic of Vietnam, South VN.)
- 00805 Unemployment has resulted in the collapse of the political foundation and the hopelessness of the national welfare plan. (The Republic of VN, an offspring of capitalism in South VN is responsible for this.)
- 00809 To be arrogant toward the people. (The capitalist government of the South VN causes it.)
- 00810 Corruption is all over the government, therefore the people do not trust it, and the government leaders lose their reputation. (Because the old capitalist regime is still in the South of VN.)
- 00902 A reward of 5,000 piasters for everyone catching dodger. This is a good measure for the bunch of corrupt policemen who make indiscriminate arrests. A corrupt regime! (The Saigon government.)
- 01108 A reward of 2,000 piasters for a policeman who catches a draft dodger is a product of a corrupt regime where money is placed above everything else. (The government of South VN.)
- 02501 There are people among the cadres, intellectuals, troops and policemen who work for the communists faithfully and nobody knows. (It is because of the free regime. This regime is unjustful.)

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 02504 Daily traffic accidents are responsible for the death and injury of about 30 persons every day in Saigon. (The authorities in charge of communications and the Ministry of Labor are responsible for this because they don't pay attention to the problem.)
- 02508 The Thieu-Ky government made a pact with a bunch of the bandits intending to sell off our country and partition it. The result of this has been our people have had to bear so many sufferings and shortcomings! (The U.S. imperialists and the bunch of traitors who have sold out their country are responsible for this.)
- 03202 The government of the Republic of Vietnam has brought Americans in here, and as a result, how many factories, work sites and industrial plants as well as civilians homes in the North have been destroyed. (The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is responsible.)
- 03206 It is certain that the Republic of Vietnam and the U.S. will be defeated in this war. It is certain that the government of (South) Vietnam will be overthrown. The unjust cause will be defeated. (Because its regime is but a corrupt one. Its cadres and officers are corrupt and thirsty for position, they indulge in prostitution and put their own personal interests above all.)
- 03208 If the war continues forever South Vietnam will collapse under the influence of its bad regime. (The Saigon government is responsible.)
- 00509 In the South there are still oppression, rank and bribery. (Because the South Vietnamese government is playing with having Freedom.)
- 00510 There are still in the South people who are too rich while others don't have enough to eat. This has resulted in a distinction of classes, the rich despising the poor. (South Vietnam's free regime.)
- 00804 Some are rich while others are poor. (The capitalist regime is responsible.)
- 00904 Whatever one says as long as there are poor people there will be communism. (The reason being there will still be a regime in which men exploit men.)
- 00903 As long as there are still poor people there will be communism, and as long as there is communism there is very little chance for the South Vietnamese regime to survive. (The reason for this being there will be a class struggle and in such a struggle the poor will always fight harder and be stronger.)

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EXHIBIT 7B (cont'd.)

- 00905 A bad thing in the South is the fact that there still is exploitation of men by men. Rich people usually have from one to five servants working in their home. (The reason for this is the free capitalist regime.)
- 01104 There is still too much discrimination in society. Money and talent are the two most important parts. (The GVN and its policies are responsible for this.)
- 01105 One bad thing that has happened is that there is no justice in society. Some people are rich others are poor. (The Republic of Vietnam's policies are responsible for this.)
- 02502 There are still people who oppress other people. Some are very rich, and on the contrary, some are beggars. (The free regime causes this.)
- 00303 In the South, there are beggars who have not been helped to get a job.

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13. ABSTRACT			
The ECHO Vietnam project evaluated the applicability of ECHO, an open-ended survey technique, to the study of verbally expressed behavioral norms and feelings of Vietnamese. During the summer of 1968, 319 subjects from the following populations were surveyed: Popular Forces, Regional Forces, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, RVN Navy enlisted men and women, Catholic and Buddhist men and women in DaNang and Saigon, Saigon school children, and Chieu Hoi Ralliers. Three question forms were used; eliciting responses about good and bad acts (1) of persons like the respondent and (2) of American advisors, and (3) responses about good and bad events that could happen. Associated questions were asked about sources of approval of good acts and disapproval of bad acts and about causes of good and bad events. Four administration methods were compared: (1) group written, (2) self-administered written, (3) tape-recorded oral, and (4) interviewer-written oral; similar data were generated by the four methods; differences of applicability are discussed. ECHO responses, being in the subject's own words, must be classified before analysis can occur; classifications by trained and untrained teams were compared; though inferior to trained teams, untrained classifiers from the respondent groups imparted useful indigenous meaning to the data. It was concluded that: (1) the ten repetitions of the ECHO question can be reduced to seven or five without important loss of information, (2) "conditional data" differentiate among			

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13. ABSTRACT (Continued) subcultures more precisely than do behavioral norms, (3) more sophisticated techniques are desirable for analyzing ECHO data, (4) ECHO is best used in combination with traditional methods, and (5) ECHO results are internally consistent and consistent with results from traditional methods. Some hypotheses for further ECHO research are suggested.			

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