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AUTHORITY

AGO lrr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO lrr 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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IN REPLY REFER TO

19

AGDA (M) (2 Mar 70) FOR OT-UT-694182

4 March 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

U.S.

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to OACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

11 31 Oct 69

12 2pp

ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 5TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
APO 96238

AVCA QN-TTOD

31 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation  
Command for the Period Ending 31 October 1969 (RCSCSFOR-65)  
(R-1)(U)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, QN  
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO-H  
APO 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command  
ATTN: AVCA GO-O  
APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

Commanding General, US Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96556

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) Command Organization:

(1) There were no significant changes in the Command organization during this reporting period.

(2) A chart of the present Command organization is attached as Inclosure 1.

b. (U) Command Group Activities:

(1) On 25 August 1969 LTC John E. Sutton assumed command of the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), replacing MAJ Frederick D. White, who had been interim commander following the departure of LTC Merrill R. Owen on 14 August 1969.

FOR DT UT  
694182  
Inclosure

1

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SUBJECT: Operational Report

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(2) The Command hosted several important guests during the reporting period. VIP's are listed in Inclosure 2.

c. (U) Personnel, Discipline and Safety:

(1) During this reporting period personnel losses have steadily exceeded in ut of replacements. The Command was at 73% of authorized enlisted strength and 78% of authorized officer strength on 31 October 1969. Indications are that losses will continue to exceed replacements during the next quarter.

(2) Disciplinary action taken during the period:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Article 15	25	35	35
Summary Court Martial	4	1	0
Special Court Martial	0	0	0

(3) Recordable accidents:

Military	6	5	3
Vehicle	0	2	0

(4) During the reporting period increased command emphasis has been placed on individual weapon and vehicle safety. Personnel have been thoroughly indoctrinated in the proper use and safety precautions to be applied in the handling of individual weapons. Prompt action has been taken to investigate reported incidents of unauthorized discharge of weapons in order to identify and evaluate those areas where further training and orientation is needed.

d. (C) Security/Provost Marshal:

(1) (C) On 202120 August 1969 a convoy consisting of fifteen (15) Han Jin (Korean contractor) cargo trucks and two (2) Han Jin gun trucks was ambushed enroute from Cha Rang to Qui Nhon, 400 meters west of A/VN MSP road, highway 440 (CR 035255). Military personnel from this Command were riding in the gun trucks as convoy guards. The convoy received heavy automatic weapons fire and M79 or rocket fire from both sides of the road. The convoy was not stopped due to fast action on the part of the Korean driver of the first truck to be hit, who drove his vehicle off the road rather than stopping and blocking the road. U.S. military casualties were one WIA and one KIA. Eleven Han Jin personnel were WIA. Eight Han Jin cargo trucks sustained damage.

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(2) (C) Change 2 to 5th Transportation Command OPORD 1-69 (U) was published and distributed in September 1969. The purpose of this change was to establish a Swimmer Defense Plan designed to deny the enemy nearby reconnaissance and ingress points to the harbor. Implementation of this plan has been effective in denying the enemy intelligence information and lengthening the approach time of would-be swimmer attackers.

(3) (C) On 17 September 1969 a study on Re-evaluation of Waterborne Ship Security at Vung Ro Outport and Qui Nhon Inner Harbor was submitted to USASUPCOM, QNH. The report dealt primarily with the effectiveness of PBR support during a selected one-week period, that being the first week in September 1969. The report concluded that PBR's could not satisfactorily meet the harbor patrol commitment because of a 63% to 75% deadline rate during the reported period. Lack of maintenance support of PBR's continues to reduce their effectiveness.

(4) (C) During this reporting period a study was made on water line illumination for the DeLong Pier and for the ammunition wharf currently under construction. It was concluded that present lighting was insufficient to detect swimmer attacks against the hulls of deep draft vessels or the piers themselves. Consequently, an extensive work order request and justification was submitted on 29 September 1969 to install waterline illumination at both these facilities. Approval is still pending.

## e. (C) Operations:

(1) (C) Cargo operations: This headquarters and units within the Command engaged in logistical support operations during the entire 92 days of the reporting period. Tonnage and troop movement figures are:

(a) (U) Tonnage Handled:	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
August	111,298	219,968
September	91,276	192,463
October	<u>110,903</u>	<u>251,623</u>
TOTAL:	313,477	664,054

(b) (U) Tonnage Discharged:		
August	72,314	132,571
September	53,022	118,361
October	<u>76,406</u>	<u>161,862</u>
TOTAL:	201,742	412,794

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(c) (U) Tonnage Shifted:	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
August	2,464	6,123
September	1,215	2,100
October	<u>4,222</u>	<u>8,522</u>
TOTAL:	7,901	16,745

(d) (U) Tonnage Outloaded:		
August	36,520	31,274
September	37,039	72,002
October	<u>30,275</u>	<u>81,239</u>
TOTAL:	103,834	234,515

(e) (U) Class V Tonnage Discharged:		
August	22,461	23,211
September	10,626	14,596
October	<u>17,405</u>	<u>19,008</u>
TOTAL:	50,494	56,817

(f) (U) Sealand Tonnage Handled:		
August	12,342	31,903
September	11,512	30,025
October	<u>19,272</u>	<u>51,575</u>
TOTAL:	43,126	113,503

(g) (U) Tonnage Handled by Service (S/T) (\*):

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	76,572	65,794	69,325	211,691
Navy	404	130	46	580
Air Force	6,520	4,679	12,752	23,961
Commercial	1,146	2,407	2,897	6,750
AVN/ROK	14,160	1,744	6,475	25,995
USAID	153	1,423	126	1,720

\*Excludes Sealand

(h) (U) Train Tonnage Handled:

August	3,265	4,193
September	802	1,124
October	<u>973</u>	<u>898</u>
TOTAL:	5,040	7,215

(i) (C) Troopships called at Qui Nhon Port on five occasions during the reporting period. A total of 3542 ROKA troops

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SUBJECT: Operational Report

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debarked and 4191 embarked.

(2) (U) Control of Operations:

(a) On 15 September 1969 operational control of Vung Ro Bay Outport, to include operational control of the 854th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) and the 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC), was transferred from the Commanding Officer, 5th Transportation Command to the Commanding Officer, 394th Transportation Battalion.

(b) On 20 and 22 September 1969 operational control of the Dolong Pier, LST Beach, Barge Quay and Can Dock was transferred from the 394th Transportation Battalion to S-3, 5th Transportation Command. Operations at these sites are now being accomplished by the Korean contractor Han Jin Transportation Company, under the supervision of S-3, 5th Transportation Command. The increasing shortage of U.S. military enlisted personnel necessitated this change.

(3) (U) Operational activities:

(a) On the night of 11 October 1969 a Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo LX (LARC) #60, with a cargo of 60 tons of 750 pound bombs aboard, beached on the beach below Phu Liep in heavy surf, after encountering engine failure. The cargo was offloaded, initially with the assistance of a CH54 Flying Crane, and later by a 20 ton lift crane. A MNAV salvage team from Cam Ranh Bay made repairs on the hull, welded the ramp closed, and pulled the LARC off the beach. While the LARC was being towed to Vung Ro Bay the ramp welds broke and the salvage pumps were unable to keep up with the incoming water. The LARC sank in 120 feet of water and no further attempt has been made to salvage it.

(b) While berthing at Qui Nhon on 23 October 1969, a fire was discovered in the number 6 hatch of the S.S. China Bear. Assistance was provided the ship by U.S. Army tugs, the USASUPCON, QN Fire Department, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. When it became evident that the fire could not be put out immediately, the hatch was closed and the hold flooded with CO<sub>2</sub> gas. On 24 October 1969 the vessel captain determined that the fire had been extinguished and the ship put to sea. Approximately five miles out to sea the fire was again in evidence. The S.S. China Bear returned to Qui Nhon, where the hold was again flooded with CO<sub>2</sub>. On 26 October 1969 the hatch was reopened and the cargo flooded with water. The hatch was again closed and the ship proceeded to its next port of call (Sattahip). None of the cargo affected was destined for this port.

(c) During this reporting period heavy early monsoon rains repeatedly washed out the road between Tuy Hoa/Phu Liep, thus

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disrupting motor convoys going south. As a result, heavy reliance was placed on LCU, LCM watercraft and BC barges to move cargo to these areas via Vung Ro Bay Outport.

(d) Enemy activity has constantly disrupted rail service to Tuy Hoa and Phu Cat during the reporting period with the result that minimum tonnage has moved by rail.

(e) A throughport system for selected items of cargo was initiated in the Port in October 1969 with the arrival of the S.S. Steel Scaferer and the S.S. American Hawk. The system is designed to move large quantities of bulky cargo directly from the Port to the consignee, thereby eliminating the time consuming and costly handling of cargo at intermediate supply depots. The first implementation of through port resulted in 78 S/T of cargo being moved directly from the Port to customers.

(f) The S.S. American Condor sailed from Qui Nhon on 10 September 1969 with 9,364 S/T of MEA1 matting, sandbags and cable for Cam Ranh Bay. The vessel had 2000 S/T of cargo that remained aboard after her discharge at this port, thereby sailing at her deadweight with a mean draft of 32 feet at highest possible tide. This load is by all indications a record for a backload vessel (E-3 type) with general cargo sailing from the Port of Qui Nhon.

f. (U) Comptroller: On 31 July 1969 the terms of the Government contract with the Han Jin Transportation Company, Ltd., were finally approved. Features of the new contract include (1) a reduction in the price of stevedoring services by 9.25%; (2) a reduction in the price of trucking services by 10%; and (3) the addition of a surcharge of 10% covering all backload cargo. Although the new contract commenced 1 August 1969, its provisions were retroactive to the beginning of the fiscal year.

g. (U) Construction in the Port Area:

(1) Construction of the new ammunition wharf is complete with the exception of the installation of lighting, fire fighting equipment and asphalt paving. The latter projects cannot be completed until dry weather prevails, therefore use of this facility is not expected before early 1970.

(2) Phase I (levelling) of construction of a Final Cargo Staging Area within the Port was begun in October, and is 30% complete. Phase II will consist of the application of soil stabilization material and Phase III will consist of asphaltting 30,000 square yards of the area. Expected start dates on the last two phases are not known.

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(3) In October 1969 construction of a sand spit was begun in preparation for the forthcoming dredging of the harbor. Dredging is scheduled to begin approximately 15 November 1969 and will result in a fill area to be used as an LST beach. When completed, better security will be provided and LST's will not be affected by tides and currents as is now the case.

h. (U) Port Veterinarian: None.

i. (U) Maintenance: Deadline equipment during the reporting period remained at a low level. Average equipment availability was as follows: wheeled vehicles 92%, material handling equipment 84%, and marine craft 91%. Increasing age of M&E is responsible for decline in availability. Replacement M&E is beginning to arrive in the Command.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel: None.

b. (C) Intelligence: On 20 August 1969 a Han Jin contractor convoy was ambushed as previously described in the Significant Activities portion of this report. Several lessons learned were derived from this incident.

(1) (C) Observation: Han Jin gun trucks used flashing yellow lights to warn civilian populace of approaching vehicles.

(2) (C) Evaluation: This practice alerted the VC that a convoy was coming and the exact position of the gun trucks.

(3) (C) Recommendation (already implemented): This practice has been stopped, and instead, the lead vehicle of the convoy has a spot light which is randomly used to warn civilians and scan for road obstructions.

(4) (C) Observation: Convoy security consisted of U.S. military personnel manning M60 machine guns on Han Jin gun trucks and Korean drivers with M14 rifles.

(5) (C) Evaluation: The number and type of weapons present did not constitute sufficient firepower to adequately counter a determined ambush force.

(6) (C) Recommendation (already implemented): Five 4-ton trucks from this Command are armor plated and fitted with pedestal mounted M60 machine guns to act as convoy escort. Three 2-ton trucks

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have been armor plated and fitted with pedestal mounted M60 and .50 cal. machine guns to also act as convoy escort. All of these vehicles are totally manned by U.S. military personnel from this Command.

(7) (C) Observation: The convoy did not have any radios. A nearby MP checkpoint observed the ambush and summoned help.

(8) (C) Evaluation: Lack of radio communication made it virtually impossible to assure immediate response by a reaction force in the event of ambush.

(9) (C) Recommendation (already implemented): All of the five armored 1-ton trucks are equipped with AN/VRC-46 radios and are netted with local MP security forces.

(10) (C) Observation: Han Jin gun trucks (1-ton commercial pick-ups) had armor plated sides and doors, but were unprotected in the front and rear.

(11) (C) Evaluation: Examination of the two vehicles involved in the ambush revealed numerous rounds had been taken through the tail gates.

(12) (C) Recommendation (already implemented): Armor plating has been installed on the tail gates and around the cabs of all Han Jin gun trucks.

## c. (U) Operations:

### (1) Operation of LCM's between Qui Nhon and Sa Huynh:

(a) Observation: During the monsoon season LCM's experience difficulty in running between Qui Nhon and Sa Huynh.

(b) Evaluation: Due to lack of experienced crews, proper navigational equipment, and the basic design of the LCM, operation of LCM's along the seacoast during monsoon season is extremely hazardous.

(c) Recommendation (already implemented): Through coordination with TML, it is possible to divert the majority of Sa Huynh cargo to Chu Lai via LST for transshipment from there.

### (2) Documentation of cargo:

(a) Observation: Vehicles and equipment moved through this port in connection with Project Switch III and various intraRVN unit moves have been in numerous instances improperly prepared for shipment, improperly marked and improperly documented.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report

31 October 1969

(b) Evaluation: It has taken as much as three additional days to remark, redocument and properly prepare vehicles and equipment for shipment. This causes an undue hardship on the moving unit and port personnel.

(c) Recommendation: Instruction in shipping procedures must be given in advance of unit moves to responsible personnel. This can be accomplished by teams composed of personnel from the port and/or Support Command staff visiting the unit well in advance of a planned move. Another means, which has been effective in the past, is for the unit to send liaison personnel to the port prior to the move or shipment to receive detailed instruction and assistance in shipping procedures.

### (3) Retrograde ammunition:

(a) Observation: Backload of Air Force retrograde ammunition onto the Greenbay Victory during the period 24 September - 4 October 1969 was difficult due to the fact that some of the ammunition received or nominated in the port was unacceptable cargo.

(b) Evaluation: Inspection of the ammunition upon receipt revealed deficiencies such as improper banding and broken pallets. Additional time and effort were required to correct these deficiencies.

(c) Recommendation: Retrograde ammunition must be inspected and repackaged before it is removed from the ammunition storage area. ACoFS, Supply, US/SUPCOM, QN has agreed to draft a letter specifying proper packaging and shipping of retrograde ammunition. The U.S. Coast Guard has agreed to inspect retrograde ammunition before it leaves the ammunition storage site.

### (4) Damage to navigation and mooring bouys:

(a) Observation: The aids to navigation marking bouys located in the various channels and anchorages in the harbor have been subjected to an extraordinary amount of damage and destruction.

(b) Evaluation: Damage is being caused by collision with vessels and indiscriminate discharge of weapons and hand grenades by friendly forces. The latter cause is primarily responsible for total destruction of bouys, as collision seldom results in a bouy sinking. Repair of bouys, and particularly salvage of sunken bouys, is costly and dangerous work. Of no less significance is the fact that the corresponding channel or anchorage cannot be used as long as the marker is missing or inoperable.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report

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(c) Recommendation: Letters have been issued to all agencies operating vessels within the Port urging them to immediately report incidents of collision with navigation bouys. Response thus far has been encouraging. Similarly, letters and phone calls have been made to responsible officers in charge of land based and water-borne security guards (PER's) urging them to indoctrinate their personnel as to the seriousness of indiscriminately firing at or near navigation markers.

(5) Broaching of LARC LX #60:

(a) Observation: On 10 October 1969 LARC LX #60 of the 540th Transportation Detachment broached in the surf south of Phu Hiep. The craft was enroute from Vung Ro Bay Outport to Phu Hiep with a cargo of 60 tons of 750 pound bombs.

(b) Evaluation: It was deemed absolutely essential to remove the cargo before salvage operations could be safely implemented. The heavy surf made it impossible to remove the cargo with cranes or forklifts and created a situation whereby the longer the craft remained the more damaged and dangerous it became. It was decided to attempt lifting the cargo out with a helicopter and sling. The first attempt was made with a CH47 Chinook. This proved unsuccessful because high waves breaking over the craft prevented the helicopter from getting low enough and made it very difficult to affix the sling to the bombs. A second attempt was made with a CH54 Flying Crane. This resulted in 6 of the 23 pallets of bombs being removed. However, operations had to be stopped to prevent salt water spray from the high waves from contaminating the skin of the aircraft. Also, the high winds which accompanied the heavy surf made it difficult to stabilize the larger aircraft over the vessel.

(c) Recommendation: In theory, the use of a helicopter to discharge a vessel stranded in surf appeared feasible. However, in practice, the same factors which prevented use of ground equipment, i.e., high winds and waves, also made it impractical to use helicopters.

- d. (U) Organization: None.
- e. (U) Training: None.
- f. (U) Logistics: None.
- g. (U) Communications: None.
- h. (U) Material: None.

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AVCA QN-TTCO  
SUBJECT: Operational Report

31 October 1969

1. (U) Other: None.
3. Section 3, DA Survey Information: None.

*Charles H. Whitledge*  
CHARLES H. WHITLEDGE  
COL, TC  
Commanding

- 3 Incl
1. Command Organization Chart
  - ~~2. VIP Visits~~
  3. Command Operational Chart
- Incl 2 wd HQ, DA

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AVCA QN-GO-H (31 Oct 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 4 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO 96384

1. (C) The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

a. SECTION 2, paragraph c (1): Concur. LCU 1575 is also being used to ship cargo to Sa Huynh via Chu Lai.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph c (2): Concur. Instruction on shipment documentation will be obtained from the ACofS, Transportation at this headquarters and augmented when required by representatives of the 5th Terminal Command.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph c (3): Concur. Action is being taken, as stated in the recommendation.


d. SECTION 2, paragraph c (4): Concur. Action is being taken as stated.

e. SECTION 2, paragraph c (5): Concur. The command's experience in the incident described substantiates the validity of the recommendation.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QN 2161

  
ROBERT J. FLORCZAK  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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AVCA GQ-MH (31 Oct 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation  
Command for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

30 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,  
5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969  
is forwarded.

2. Concur with the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

  
C.D. STAFFORD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst, AG

CF:  
USRSUPCON, GWH  
5th TC Comd

AVEGC-DST (31 Oct 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command  
for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for  
the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 5th Trans-  
portation Command and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
I. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:  
5th Trans Cnd  
1st Log Cnd

**GPOP-DT (31 Oct 69) 4th Ind (U)**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)**

**HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 FEB 1970**


**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310**

**This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.**


**FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:**



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CPT, AGC  
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