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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(9) Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69.

(18) OACSFOR
AGDA (M) (24 Mar 70) FOR OT-UT-694231

(12) 61 p.
(11) 4 Mar 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)
APO San Francisco 96279

AVBHH

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
For Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFBDAB

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command.

(1) Brigadier General Warren K. Bennett remained in command of the brigade during the three month period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969.

(2) Changes in command occurred in the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery; 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry; 87th Engineer Company; 313th Signal Company; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 199th Infantry Brigade; 40th Public Information Detachment; 152nd Military Police Platoon; and the 503d Chemical Detachment. These changes are listed as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
LTC William A. Greynolds	CO, 2nd Battalion, 40th Arty	1 Aug 69
MAJ James H. Rink	CO, 5th Battalion, 12th Inf	30 Oct 69
CPT Robert J. Walters	CO, 87th Engineer Company	13 Aug 69
CPT Ralph D. Beamer	CO, 313th Signal Company	12 Sep 69
CPT David L. Feagins	CO, HHC, 199th Inf Bde	5 Sep 69
CPT John W. St. Leger	CO, 40th Public Info Det	28 Aug 69
CPT Richard E. Wilson	Plt Ldr, 152nd MP Platoon	18 Sep 69
1LT Paul B. Stevens	CO, 503d Chemical Det	25 Aug 69

(3) Changes of primary and special brigade staff officers were made as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
LTC John R. Black	Brigade Executive Officer	16 Sep 69
LTC John E. Hazelwood	Installation Coordinator	14 Sep 69
LTC Willard L. Portteus Jr.	Brigade S-3	22 Oct 69
MAJ Michael Seay	Brigade S-1	28 Sep 69
MAJ James A. Walker	Brigade S-4	16 Oct 69
MAJ James L. Meidl	Adjutant General	16 Oct 69

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b. Personnel.

(1) The following table indicates assigned brigade strength as of 31 October 1969:

UNIT	OFFICER		WARRANT		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
HHC 199th	40	71	8	10	155	398	203	479
2/3 Inf	43	39	2	2	875	801	920	842
3/7 Inf	43	41	2	2	875	760	920	803
4/12 Inf	43	40	2	1	875	798	920	839
5/12 Inf	43	35	2	2	875	795	920	832
2/40 Arty	52	52	3	3	587	519	642	574
7th Spt Bn	42	48	9	6	490	534	541	588
D/17 Cav	5	5	0	0	205	232	210	237
Co. M 75 Inf	2	2	0	0	59	48	61	50
87 Engr Co.	5	4	0	0	160	196	165	200
313 Sig Co.	3	5	0	0	99	108	102	113
40 PI Det	2	3	0	0	3	9	5	12
44 MH Det	1	1	0	0	1	2	2	3
49 Scout Dog Plt	1	1	0	0	27	30	28	31
76 Inf Det	0	0	0	0	10	12	10	12
152 MP Plt	1	1	0	0	39	47	40	48
179 MI Det	9	6	2	3	21	60	32	69
503 Chem Det	1	1	0	0	4	6	5	7
RCTC	0	7	0	2	0	97	0	106
TOTALS	336	362	30	31	5360	5452	5726	5845

(2) Materials distributed by Special Services included:

(a) Magazines picked up in Saigon and distributed to the units of the brigade.

(b) Movies picked up in Saigon and distributed to the units of the brigade and to the 12th Aviation Group; Company D, (Ranger) 151st Infantry; Strategic Communications Receiver Station (STRATCOM); and the 66th Engineer Company.

(3) Special Services Recreational Area utilization:

(a) The Special Services Swimming Pool and Miniature Golf Course had an average attendance of 230 per day.

(b) The Special Services Library had a monthly attendance of approximately 1,850.

(c) The Special Services Photo Lab and Craft Shop had a monthly attendance of approximately 665.

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(4) On 19 August, the Sunset Service Club at II FFBCEV held a "199th Party Night" for 175 REDCATCHERS.

(5) On 19 September, a REDCATCHER representative, PVT John Dove of Company A, 5/12th Infantry, finished third in the III Corps finals of the Vietnam Entertainment Contest.

(6) On 28 September, the Special Services Office moved across the street to building 13180. The new office has more storage area, has a large R&R waiting room and will serve to improve the Special Services Program.

(7) The following USO shows were taken to forward fire support bases:

(a) The Maori Te Poi Show on 19 September (FSB BLACKHORSE, 2/3d; FSB LIBBY, 5/12th).

(b) The Franz Jackson Show on 3 October (FSB NANCY, 4/12th; FSB MACE, 3/7th).

(c) The Gary Vinson Handshake Tour on 7 October (FSB MARGE, 2/3d; FSB BLACKHORSE, 2/3d; FSB MACE, 3/7th; FSB NANCY, 4/12th; FSB LIBBY, 5/12th).

(d) The Lucky Numbers Show on 23 October (FSB NANCY, 4/12th; FSB LIBBY, 5/12th).

(8) Out-of-Country R&R:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>	<u>UTILIZED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
HHC, 199th	137	140	102
2/3 Inf	214	245	114
3/7 Inf	216	247	114
4/12 Inf	226	273	121
5/12 Inf	213	226	106
2/40 Arty	176	154	88
7 Spt Bn	205	238	116
D/17 Cav	57	47	82
87 Engr Co	52	23	44
179 MI Det	14	29	207
856 Radio Research	14	13	93
313 Sig Co	49	37	95
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>1,573</u>	<u>1,672</u>	<u>106</u>

(9) In-Country R&R:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>		<u>UTILIZED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
	<u>FM</u>	<u>OFF</u>		
HHC, 199th	19	3	22	100

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UNIT	ALLOCATIONS		UTILIZED	PERCENTAGE
	EM	OFF		
2/3 Inf	30	3	33	100
3/7 Inf	29	3	32	100
4/12 Inf	30	3	33	100
5/12 Inf	29	3	32	100
2/40 Arty	23	2	25	100
7 Spt Bn	27	3	30	100
D/17 Cav	7	2	9	100
87 Engr Co	7	2	9	100
179 MI Det	2	2	4	100
856 Radio Research	2	1	3	100
313 Sig Co	5	1	6	100
TOTALS	210	28	238	100

(10) For the months of August through October, the AG Awards and Decorations section completed the following awards:

UNIT	MOH	DSC	DSM	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BSMV	BSM	AMV	AM	ACMV	ACM	PH
HHC, 199	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	70	1	30	0	87	1
2/3 Inf	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	38	132	1	8	40	627	26
3/7 Inf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41	117	1	61	27	139	12
4/12 Inf	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	36	144	0	16	21	153	33
5/12 Inf	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	92	1	10	7	258	35
2/40 Arty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	84	1	10	0	173	3
7 Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	126	0	1	15	315	6
D/17 Cav	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	168	4
87 Eng	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	1	0	118	1
179 MID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	23	0
75 Inf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	1	0
49 SD Plt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	5	0
856 RRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	22	0
152 MP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	15	0
313 Sig	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	23	1
503 Chem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
40 PI Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	5	0
TOTALS	0	0	0	6	4	1	1	132	824	5	137	110	2132	122

(11) Future Outlook for Awards: The Meritorious Unit Commendations for 87th Engineers and 7th Support Battalion are still being processed at Headquarters, USARV. The Meritorious Unit Commendations for Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry are being sent to the Commanding General of the 199th Infantry Brigade for his approval. The Gallantry Cross with Palm has already been presented by the Republic of Vietnam to the 199th Infantry Brigade at Xuan Loc during the month of October for the period 31 January 1968 to 19 February 1968.

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(12) Losses During the Period 1 August-31 October 1969:

(a) Battle Losses:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1 Killed Hostile Action:	0	0	42	42
2 Died of Wounds:	1	0	2	3
3 Wounded Hostile Action:	14	0	243	257
4 Missing Hostile Action:	0	0	0	0
5 Captured:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
6 Totals:	15	0	287	302

(b) Non-Battle Losses:

1 Non-Battle Dead:	0	0	7	7
2 Non-Battle Injured:	0	0	11	11
3 Non-Battle Missing:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
4 Totals:	0	0	22	22

c. Intelligence.

(1) General: The reporting period saw a continuance of the enemy's policy of conducting offensive actions with several high points of activity rather than an all out attack. The high points were of relatively low intensity and appear to have been pre-empted to some degree by concentrated allied pressure on enemy commo-liaison routes and base areas.

(2) Main Force Units:

(a) Enemy main force units located in the Brigade TAOI during the reporting period were:

- 1 Headquarters MR-7.
- 2 274th VC Regiment.
- 3 33d NVA Regiment.
- 4 J600 Transportation.

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- 5 74th Artillery Regiment.
- 6 U-1 Province Hq's (D- , D2 and D6 Sapper Battalions).
- 7 81st Rear Service Group.
- 8 84th Rear Service Group.
- 9 Rear Service Elements SR-5.

(b) During August, activity in the Brigade's TAOI was targeted in the La Nga River Base Area. This targeting resulted in heavy losses to the 33d Regiment which had established this area as a rear base area. In late August and early September PW's and documents indicated that the 33d NVA Regiment was moving out of the La Nga River Basin into the area north of Highway #20. During the month of September, the 33d Regiment remained in the vicinity of Highway #20 but south of the Dong Nai River. Captured documents which identified elements of the 33d NVA Regiment indicated at that time that their mission was to conduct ambushes along Highway #20. In late September and early October, intelligence reports indicated that the 33d Regiment had moved north of the Dong Nai; since mid-September it has remained out of identifiable contact. During the month of August and early September, the Headquarters MR-7 was co-located with the 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment who had the mission of securing this Headquarters. In mid-September, contacts with elements of MR-7 indicated that they had moved completely out of the La Nga River Basin and returned to the area east of Nui Chua Chan, where they were located prior to the 199th moving into Long Khanh. In late August, continuing throughout the reporting period, several contacts in the Bau Ham area have identified elements of SR-5, and elements of U-1 Province. Numerous small caches have been found and pressure from friendly forces has created serious logistical difficulties for enemy units.

(c) On 9 October 1969, elements of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, in ambush position, engaged 2 enemy resulting in 8 enemy KIA (BC) and documents which included a complete copy of COSVN Resolution 9 and new missions for the 33d Regiment, 274th Regiment, D440 Battalion and D445 Battalion. The 33d NVA Regiment was instructed to disperse in the area north of Highway #1 from Trang Bom to Nui Chua Chan. The Regiment was assigned the mission of supporting the local force elements in this area in order to disrupt the Government of the Republic of Vietnam's (GVN) pacification program. The captured documents indicated that the 274th VC Regiment would continue to operate in its present AO. Though continuing to experience logistical difficulties, the 274th Regiment maintained limited action against allied operations but with little or no success. In September, elements of the 274th VC Regiment moved north into War Zone D. Captured documents and PW's indicate that these elements were to obtain food and ammunition for the rest of the regiment, which was still

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south of Highway #1. However, allied operation FRIENDSHIP III, involving the 199th LIB, the 18th ARVN Division, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, and the 1st Australian Task Force has prevented the effective combat operation of the 274th. The last major offensive action by the 274th occurred against a convoy of the 18th ARVN Division on Highway #15 on 25 September by the 3d Battalion, 274th Regiment. The battalion lost 62 men KIA (BC) and one PW in this action. The documents captured by the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry further revealed that the D440 Battalion and the D445 Battalion would move into an area from FSB BLACKHORSE to Gia Ray and south of Highway #1 from their location in Phuoc Tuy Province. Friendly operations conducted by elements of the 199th LIB revealed that basecamps were being built and repaired in preparation for this move.

(3) Local Force Units: During the period, enemy documents have indicated a considerable reorganization of the Local Force Units in Northern VC Ba Long Province. VC Cao Su District enlarged its area from both VC Dinh Quan and VC Xuan Loc Districts, to complete its organization of the rubber plantations in Long Khanh Province under one VC Headquarters. In addition to boundary changes, some of the village guerrilla units were renamed, reorganized or combined. The village guerrilla units showed heavy losses of personnel during the period but by upgrading lower level personnel and recruiting new personnel, the district-level companies enlarged themselves despite battle casualties.

(4) Statistical Summary:

(a) Contents of enemy caches discovered during the reporting period:

AK-47 rifles	15
AK-47 ammunition (rounds)	18,000
AK-47 magazines	10
B-40 rocket rounds	35
B-41 rocket rounds	10
60mm mortar rounds	225
82mm mortar rounds	50
82mm mortar charges	1,125
ChiCom grenades	75
Explosives (pounds)	350
Gasoline (gallons destroyed)	330
Medicine (pounds)	150
Rice (pounds)	2,472
Foodstuffs (pounds)	45,150

(b) Cumulative enemy losses inflicted by the 199th LIB during the period:

VC/NVA KIA (BC)	466
VC/NVA KIA (Prob)	1
PWs	11
Hoi Chanhs	7

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VCI eliminated/neutralized	9
Small arms captured or destroyed	192
Crew served weapons captured or destroyed	11
Small arms ammo captured or destroyed	23,439 (rounds)
Crew served ammo captured or destroyed	765 (rounds)
Fortifications destroyed	3,181
Grenades captured or destroyed	300
Sampans captured or destroyed	21
Rice captured or destroyed	1,214 (tons)

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) During the reporting period, the 199th Infantry Brigade continued Operation Toan Thang III, in Long Khanh Province, and the north-west portion of Binh Tuy Province. Operations have been planned and executed in order to accomplish the three stated goals in the brigade mission: 1) support pacification. 2) upgrade the effectiveness of the 18th ARVN Division and territorial forces. 3) conduct combat operations against main and local force enemy units.

(a) Pacification efforts have been intensified with the establishment of Hamlet Upgrading Teams (HUT) organized at battalion level. HUT forces conduct training and operations with Popular Force (PF) units at hamlets selected by the Province Senior Advisor. The program consists of instruction and practical work in ambush techniques, patrolling, marksmanship and small unit battle drill, followed by an informal critique and a written evaluation submitted to the appropriate District Chief. The program is geared to the needs of the individual hamlet and normally is two days in duration.

(b) Upgrading of ARVN and territorial forces units has been accomplished through the conduct of combined, coordinated and complementary operations down to and including squad level. Additionally, coordination and cooperation of planning, operations and training with counterpart ARVN and district officials has contributed toward significant improvements in this area.

(c) In the conduct of military operations, primary emphasis has been placed in targeting against local forces in and near the populated areas and exercising surveillance of and engaging main force elements with air and artillery to isolate them from populated areas. Beginning 11 September, elements of the brigade participated in Operation FRIENDSHIP III, a multi-nation, combined operation involving units of the 18th ARVN Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) and 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF). Objectives of FRIENDSHIP III are to neutralize elements of the 274th VC Regiment and base areas located in southwest Long Khanh, southeast Bien Hoa and northwest Phuoc Tuy Provinces and to deny the use of these areas to the enemy.

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(2) During the period 27-30 August, the brigade forward command post (CP) moved from FSB BLACKHORSE to Xuan Loc, vicinity YT 466088. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Xuan Loc assumed control of operations effective 28 August. This relocation was accomplished as a part of the "Vietnamization" program in transferring FSB BLACKHORSE to ARVN control; in addition, the move facilitates closer coordination with Headquarters, 18th ARVN Division and Long Khanh Sector, also located in Xuan Loc.

(3) Summary of Operations Conducted:

(a) 1-7 August 1969: 3/7th Infantry continued under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the 3rd Brigade, 9th US Infantry Division at Can Giuoc. Companies A and D, 2/3d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into an area northeast of Xuan Loc and commenced combined operations with the 1st Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment on 1 August. This operation (ending on 6 August) was targeted against elements of the 33d NVA Regiment and resulted in the destruction of 133 bunkers and numerous fighting positions, weapons, ammunition and equipment. On 4 August, Company B, 2/3d Infantry, operating west of Xuan Loc, south of Highway #1, destroyed 123 bunkers. On 7 August, elements of 2/3d Infantry, in three separate engagements west of FSB BLACKHORSE, accounted for 11 enemy KIA. 4/12th Infantry continued operations in northern Long Khanh Province. On 1 August, Company B, 4/12th Infantry returned from OPCON to 5/12th Infantry and began combined operations with the 1st Battalion, 52nd ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of the La Nga River, targeted against elements of the 33d NVA Regiment. Operations in the area during the week resulted in 25 enemy KIA, culminating in the engagement of an estimated company-size element on 7 August. During the week, Company A, 4/12th Infantry conducted combined operations with the 412th and 318th Regional Force (RF) Companies, north and northeast of FSB JOY. Headquarters and Company B, 5/12th Infantry returned from OPCON to BHTAC on 2 and 3 August respectively, and returned to parent battalion control. Elements of the 5/12th Infantry conducted combined operations with the 4th Battalion, 43d ARVN Regiment, 2/5th ARVN Cavalry and the 133d RF Company in the area south of FSB LIBBY. D/17 Cavalry, OPCON to 3/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), conducted ground reconnaissance and screening operations in the area northeast of Xuan Loc. 3/11th ACR, OPCON to the 199th Infantry Brigade, conducted maintenance stand-down, security for FSB BLACKHORSE, road clearing operations and convoy and engineer work party security. Company L, 75th Infantry (Ranger), conducting reconnaissance operations north of the La Nga River, accounted for 2 enemy KIA on 2 August. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) conducted visual reconnaissance (VR), People Sniffer and provided Hunter/Killer Team (HKT) support for the Brigade units.

(b) 8-14 August 1969: 2/3d Infantry conducted ground reconnaissance operations northwest of FSB BLACKHORSE. On 10 August, Company D, 2/3d Infantry conducted eagle flights in the area east of FSB BLACKHORSE. On 11 August, Company B, 2/3d Infantry moved by convoy to Brigade Main Base

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(b) at Capt. Frenzell-Jones, becoming OFCON to BHTAC during the period 12 and 13 August. 4/12th Infantry conducted ground reconnaissance operations in northeast Long Khanh and northwestern Binh Tuy Provinces. Company C, 4/12th Infantry, on 8 August during airmobile operations in the La Nga River area, discovered graves containing 4 enemy KIA, possibly by Arelight on 1 August in that area. Troop K, 3/11th ACR was OFCON to 4/12th Infantry from 9 to 10 August. Company C, 4/12th Infantry was OFCON to 3/11th ACR from 10 to 11 August. Troop D/17th Cav (-) was OFCON to 4/12th Infantry in the vicinity of Gia Ray. On 13 August, elements of Company B, 4/12th Infantry, operating with elements of the 3/43d ARVN regiment, engaged a small enemy force north of Dinh Quan resulting in 2 enemy KIA. On 14 August, Company A, 4/12th conducting bomb damage assessment (BDA) operations northwest of FSB JOY, engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 2 enemy KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Task Force Cloy, consisting of Company C, 4/12th Infantry and Troop D/17th Cavalry (-), became operational effective 14 August, in the vicinity of Gia Ray. 5/12th Infantry conducted operations in Central Long Khanh Province with elements of the 4/43d ARVN Regiment, 2/5th ARVN Cavalry, and territorial forces. On 10 August, Companies B and C, 5/12th Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance operations west of FSB LIBBY, accounted for 3 enemy KIA, 4 individual weapons captured, assorted greades, claymores and equipment captured or destroyed. On 12 August, Company C, 5/12th Infantry engaged an estimated 4 to 7 enemy south of FSB LIBBY resulting in 1 enemy KIA. Beginning 13 August, Recon, 5/12th Infantry, conducting combined operations with the 48th I&R Company northwest of FSB LIBBY in the vicinity of the Dong Nai River, captured two .51 caliber anti-aircraft machineguns. 3/11th ACR provided security for FSB BLACKHORSE, conducted training on M551 Sheridan Assault Vehicles, and conducted security operations along Highways #1 and #2 in support of convoys and Engineer work parties. Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger), inserted into an area northeast of Trang Bom, conducted ranger operations during the period 8 to 11 August. In addition to the conduct of VR, People Sniffer and BDA missions, Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry operations resulted in 15 enemy KIA.

(c) 15-21 August 1969: 2/3d Infantry (-) became OFCON to BHTAC effective 15 August, Companies A and B, 2/3d Infantry became OFCON to TF Keutmann, 15 August, for operations northwest of FSB BLACKHORSE. 2/3d Infantry (-) was relieved from OFCON to BHTAC, effective 19 August, with Company B, 2/3d Infantry and Company C, 5/12th Infantry conducting combined operations with elements of the 18th ARVN Division east of Dinh Quan under the control of 4/12th Infantry. 4/12th Infantry continued operations northwest of FSB JOY and with territorial forces northeast of Dinh Quan. TF Cloy continued operations with territorial forces vicinity of Gia Ray. On 16 August, Company B, 4/12th Infantry began combined operations with Binh Tuy territorial forces east of Vo Dat. On 18 August, Company C, 4/12th Infantry, OFCON to TF Cloy, engaged an estimated enemy squad south of the La Nga River, resulting in 3 enemy KIA as well as 1 machinegun, 2 AK-47's and 3 RPG launchers captured. Additional contacts in this area on 19 August resulted in 2 more enemy KIA. 5/12th Infantry continued com-

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combined operations with territorial forces and elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment in Kiem Tan District. Company B, 5/12th Infantry was OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry for the period 15 to 19 August. On 21 August, Company D, 5/12th Infantry, in a series of engagements north of Highway #1 in Duc Tu District, accounted for 5 enemy KIA. 3/11th ACR continued training on M551 Sheridan vehicles, provided security for FSB BLACKHORSE and conducted road clearing operations and security for convoys and engineer work parties. On 19 August, Troop L, 3/11th ACR began training and combined operations with the 3/5th ARVN Cavalry northeast of FSB BLACKHORSE. Troop M, 3/11th ACR returned to control of the 11th ACR on 18 August. Two platoons of Troop D/17th Cavalry were OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry until 18 August. On 18 August, the entire troop was placed OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry. Ending an operation begun 14 August north of the La Nga River, ranger teams from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) were extracted 18 and 19 August. On 20 and 21 August, ranger teams were inserted east of the La Nga River in the vicinity of FSB JOY to conduct river watch operations. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued VR, HKT and People Sniffer support of Brigade elements.

(d) 22-28 August 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued airmobile and ground reconnaissance operations in southwest Long Khanh Province. Troop I, 3/11th ACR (-) was OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry during the period 23-26 August. Company B, 2/3d Infantry returned to parent unit control from OPCON to TF Keutmann, effective 28 August. Minor sightings and contacts west and northwest of FSB BLACKHORSE during the week produced no significant results. Two platoons of Company A, 3/7th Infantry began construction of FSB MACE, in the vicinity of Gia Ray, effective 25 August, under OPCON of TF Cloy. 4/12th Infantry continued operations in northeast Long Khanh Province, one company conducting combined operations with territorial forces in Binh Tuy Province. On 22 August, Company D, 4/12th Infantry made contact to the east of Dinh Quan resulting in 3 enemy KIA. Additional contacts in the same area on 24 and 26 August resulted in 9 enemy KIA and 8 individual weapons captured. Company C, 4/12th Infantry conducted a three-day stand-down at B.L.B. 26-28 August. Elements of D/17th Cavalry which were OPCON to 4/12th Infantry conducted highway security northwest of Dinh Quan and mechanized reconnaissance operations to the northeast. 5/12th Infantry continued ground reconnaissance operations in central Long Khanh Province. During the period 23-26 August, Companies B and D, 5/12th Infantry, operating northwest of Trang Bom, located and captured a sizeable arms and ammunition cache. On 27 August, Company B, 5/12th Infantry, operating in the cache area, engaged and killed 3 enemy. Company C, 5/12th Infantry was relieved from OPCON to TF Keutmann and returned to parent unit control effective 28 August. 3/11th ACR (-) continued security operations in the vicinity of FSB BLACKHORSE while training on the M551 Sheridan vehicle. Troop L, 3/11th ACR continued combined operations with the 3/5th ARVN Cavalry until 24 August. On 26 August, Troop I, 3/11th ACR commenced operations in the vicinity of Gia Ray assuming OPCON of TF Cloy, redesignated TF Moony on 28 August. Ranger teams from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) were extracted from the area along the La Nga River on 24 August. On 27

11
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

August, teams were inserted into 5 LZs astride the Dong Nai River, north of FSB LIBBY. In four separate actions on 27 and 28 August, ranger teams were credited with 7 enemy KIA. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) was credited with 24 enemy KBA in operations in support of the brigade and 18th ARVN Division units.

(e) 29 August-4 September 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued operations with elements of the 1/48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces northwest of FSB BLACKHORSE. Company D, 2/3d Infantry conducted stand-down at BMB from 31 August to 3 September. On 31 August, a Recon Platoon from 2/3d Infantry in an AP south of Highway #1 engaged 8 to 10 enemy, resulting in 3 enemy KIA. On 2 September, an AP from Company A, 2/3d Infantry accounted for 4 enemy KIA and 2 individual weapons captured. Company A (-) and Company D, 3/7th Infantry conducted a road march from Can Gioac to BMB on 30 August, returning to OPCON of the brigade. On 31 August, the remainder of 3/7th Infantry was released from OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 9th Division and conducted a stand-down at BMB until 4 September. 3/7th Infantry established their CP at FSB LACE in the vicinity of Gia Ray and commenced operations in southeastern Long Khanh Province. 4/12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. Company B, 4/12th Infantry continued operations in northwestern Binh Tuy Province. On 2 September, Company D, 4/12th Infantry engaged a small force crossing the La Nga River west of Vo Dat, resulting in 3 enemy KIA and 3 individual weapons captured. D/17th Cavalry, OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry, conducted ground reconnaissance and surveillance of Highway #20. 5/12th Infantry continued ground reconnaissance operations in the TAOR. Company B, 5/12th Infantry, on stand-down since 28 August, returned to the TAOR on 31 August. On 3 September, Company B, 5/12th Infantry, in a series of engagements with local guerrilla forces northeast of Trang Bom, accounted for 3 enemy KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. 3/11th ACR (-) continued security operations in the vicinity of FSB BLACKHORSE and training on the M551 Sheridan vehicle. Troop I, 3/11th ACR conducted combined operations with elements of the 3/5th ARVN Cavalry and the 4th Battalion, 52nd ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of Gia Ray during the week. Troop L, 3/11th ACR completed training on the M-551 Sheridan vehicle on 31 August and commenced operations south of FSB BLACKHORSE with elements of the 2/5th ARVN Cavalry. Company L, 75th Infantry (Ranger) was extracted from the area north of the Dong Nai River, 29 August. Debriefing of teams revealed 10 enemy killed by an airstrike on 28 August. Teams conducted training until 1 September. On 1 and 2 September, three teams were inserted into an area northeast of Dinh Quan. On 4 September, C Team sighted approximately 30 men who were engaged by artillery and HKT. In checking the area, C Team engaged 3 enemy, resulting in 2 enemy KIA and 3 individual weapons captured. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) was credited with 16 enemy KBA, 1 anti-aircraft gun and several bunkers and military structures destroyed in operations supporting US and ARVN elements in the Brigade TAOR.

(f) 5-11 September 1969: During the period 8-10 September, Brigade operations were characterized by trail-watch operations in accordance with

CONFIDENTIAL

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the limited stand-down imposed. 2/3d Infantry conducted combined/coordinated operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 5 September, Company B, 2/3d Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance and BDA northwest of FSB BLACKHORSE, received heavy fire from an estimated enemy company in bunkers. Contact was maintained for five hours, resulting in 7 US KHA, 22 US WHA and 4 enemy KIA (BC). Later, in the area of contact, 35 bunkers and assorted arms and ammunition were captured. Starting 11 September, 2/3d Infantry (-) participated in operation FRIENDSHIP III, a combined operation with elements of the 18th ARVN Division, 1st ATF and RTAVF. 3/7th Infantry (-) conducted combined/coordinated operations in southeastern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company D, 3/7th Infantry conducted combined operations with territorial forces in Binh Tuy Province. Company A, 3/7th Infantry became OPCON to 2/3d Infantry effective 10 September. 4/12th Infantry conducted combined/coordinated operations in northern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 5 September, Company D, 4/12th Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance operations south of Dinh Quan, engaged 4 enemy resulting in 2 enemy KIA (BC). Company A, 4/12th Infantry conducted stand-down during the period 6-9 September. On 10 September, Company D, 4/12th Infantry was engaged by an estimated 15 to 20 enemy southeast of Dinh Quan while conducting trail-watch activities. A sweep of the area on 11 September resulted in the discovery of 12 enemy KIA and the capture of 3 AK-47's, 3 K54 pistols and 1 ChiCom pistol. Blood trails in the area indicated an estimated 12 enemy were wounded as a result of the action. 5/12th Infantry conducted combined/coordinated operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company D, 5/12th Infantry conducted a stand-down from 9-12 September. 3/11th ACR (-) was relieved from OPCON of the 199th Infantry Brigade effective 6 September and returned to parent unit control. Troop K, 3/11th ACR remained OPCON to the brigade at FSB BLACKHORSE. D/17th Cavalry (-) remained OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry until 9 September. Beginning 10 September, one platoon was OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry, one platoon was OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry and the Troop (-) conducted a maintenance stand-down at FSB BLACKHORSE. On 6 September, Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) was extracted from its operational area and began training in preparation for future operations. Two heavy teams were inserted on 11 September into an AO east of the Dong Nai River, 20 kilometers north of Dinh Quan to conduct ranger operations. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) was credited with 6 enemy KBA, 22 bunkers and 11 structures destroyed in operations supporting US and ARVN elements in the brigade TAOI.

(g) 12-18 September 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces and in support of Operation FRIENDSHIP III. Company C, 2/3d Infantry conducted a stand-down and served as the Brigade Ready-Reaction Force (RRF) from 12 to 15 September. Company A, 3/7th Infantry (-) continued combined/coordinated operations in eastern Long Khanh Province. One company conducted operations south and east of Gia Ray, while another combined with terri-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

territorial forces for ground reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Vo Dat in Binh Tuy Province. On 15 September, Company C, 3/7th Infantry, in a combined operation with elements of the 3d Battalion, 52nd ARVN Regiment east of Gia Ray, was engaged by an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 10 enemy KIA, 8 individual weapons captured and 14 bunkers destroyed. 4/12th Infantry conducted combined/coordinated operations in northern Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company D, 4/12th Infantry conducted a stand-down and served as the brigade RRF from 15 to 18 September. On 17 September, Company B, 4/12th Infantry conducted an airborne assault and ground reconnaissance into blocking positions southeast of Dinh Quan in response to the sighting of an estimated 400-500 enemy by an AP of Company A, 4/12th Infantry. No further sightings of this force were reported. One platoon of D/17th Cavalry continued under OPCON of 4/12th Infantry. 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Companies A and B, 5/12th Infantry, in a series of engagements south of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, accounted for 7 enemy KIA, 1 individual weapon captured and the discovery of an enemy basecamp. On 14 September, Company C, 5/12th Infantry conducted operations in the vicinity of Binh Loc resulting in 2 enemy KIA, 2 PWs and 5 individual weapons captured. D/17th Cavalry (-) conducted maintenance at FSB BLACKHORSE. Ranger teams from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) were extracted on 13 and 15 September from an operational area north of Dinh Quan. On 18 September, teams were inserted into 4 LZ's northeast of Trang Bom. One team engaged 2 enemy, resulting in 2 enemy KIA and 2 AK-47's captured. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) conducted visual reconnaissance, performed BDA and provided HKT teams in support of the brigade. On 13 September, while conducting BDA east of Gia Ray, a HKT returned ground fire resulting in 14 enemy KIA, 3 bunkers and 2 huts destroyed. Troop K, 3/11th ACR, under OPCON of the 199th, provided security for FSB BLACKHORSE and conducted road clearing operations and ground reconnaissance operations southwest of FSB BLACKHORSE.

(h) 19-25 September 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued operations in support of Operation FRIENDSHIP III and in southwestern Long Khanh Province. Company A, 2/3d Infantry conducted a stand-down at B&B during the period 21 to 24 September. One Platoon of D/17th Cavalry and Company A, 3/7th Infantry remained OPCON to 2/3d Infantry. 3/7th Infantry (-) continued combined/coordinated operations in eastern Long Khanh Province with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. 4/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in northern Long Khanh Province. On 21 September, a sniper team from Company A, 4/12th Infantry engaged two enemy northeast of Dinh Quan, resulting in two enemy KIA. Company B, 4/12th Infantry began a three-day stand-down on 24 September. One Platoon of D/17th Cavalry remained OPCON to 4/12th Infantry. 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 19 September, Company A, 5/12th Infantry, with the 133d RF Company, engaged an unknown-size enemy force south of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, resulting in one US KHA, two US WHA, two enemy KIA (BC) and assorted small

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

arms, medical supplies and foodstuffs captured. D/17th Cavalry (-) conducted a maintenance stand-down and provided elements for convoy security. Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) ranger teams were extracted from their operational area on 21 September and reinserted on 24 September north of FSB LIBBY along the Dong Nai River. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) conducted VR and BDA missions in support of ARVN/US operations. Troop K, 3/11th ACR, OPCON to the 199th, continued to provide security for FSB BLACKHORSE and to carry out platoon size ground reconnaissance operations west of FSB BLACKHORSE.

(1) 26 September - 2 October 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued operations in the southwestern portion of Long Khanh Province. Company C, 3/7th Infantry became OPCON to 2/3d Infantry effective 26 September, while Company A, 3/7th Infantry was released to parent unit control. Battalion elements continued training and operations with territorial force units in the vicinity of populated areas. On 1 October, Company D, 2/3d Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance east of Trang Bom, killed two enemy and captured a small amount of ammunition and explosives. 3/7th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. One platoon of D/17th Cavalry became OPCON to 3/7th Infantry effective 29 September while Company A, 3/7th Infantry, became OPCON to the 5/12th Infantry effective 1 October. On 2 October, Recon, 3/7th Infantry, conducting reconnaissance operations west of Suoi Cat, discovered a food cache containing 9,050 pounds of corn, which was later evacuated. 4/12th Infantry continued operations with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in northern Long Khanh Province. On 26 September, Company C, 4/12th Infantry located seven enemy bodies south of Dinh Quan, credited to a former contact involving Company D, 4/12th Infantry. On 1 October, Company D, 4/12th Infantry began a three-day stand-down at BMR. 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in west-central Long Khanh Province. During the period 26-28 September, Company A, 5/12th Infantry, with the 4th Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment, the 231st and 415th RF Companies, the National Police (NP) and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), conducted a cordon and search of Bau Ham Hamlet. Results of this operation were: four enemy KIA, one PW captured, two AK-47's captured and 238 personnel detained, including 18 VC suspects. After terminating the cordon, Company A, 5/12th Infantry conducted a motor march to BLB for a three-day stand-down. D/17th Cavalry (-), with one platoon OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry and one platoon OPCON to the 4/12th Infantry, continued a maintenance stand-down at FSB BLACKHORSE. On 1 October, D/17th Cavalry (-) went OPCON to the 5/12th Infantry with one platoon remaining OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry. Rangers from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) were extracted from their operational area on 27 September. Four teams were inserted on 1 October in an area along the Dong Nai River west of FSB LIBBY. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued VR and BDA missions in support of the brigade's operations. The Aerial Rifle Platoon (ARP) performed ready reaction force missions. Troop K, 3/11th ACR (OPCON) continued security operations for FSB BLACKHORSE and for engineer work parties in the TAOR. The troop also conducted platoon-size reconnaissance operations south-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

west of FSB BLACKHORSE.

(j) 3-9 October 1969: 2/3d Infantry, continuing combined/coordinated operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province, conducted operations in support of Operation FRIENDSHIP III and with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company A, 4/12th Infantry became OFCON to 2/3d Infantry effective 3 October. On 4 October, Company C, 2/3d Infantry engaged and killed two enemy in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Company D, 2/3d Infantry conducted a stand-down at Bui Lanh during the period 4-7 October. 3/7th Infantry (-) continued operations in eastern Long Khanh Province in conjunction with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company A, 3/7th Infantry continued OFCON to the 5/12th Infantry until 7 October. Company C, 3/7th Infantry continued OFCON to the 2/3d Infantry. Company D, 3/7th Infantry began a three-day stand-down on 7 October. On 9 October, an AF from Company B, 3/7th Infantry engaged an estimated 12 enemy north of Gia Ray resulting in seven enemy KIA and six enemy weapons captured. 4/12th Infantry continued operations in northern Long Khanh Province combined with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company A, 4/12th Infantry became OFCON to the 2/3d Infantry effective 3 October. 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 9 October, a helicopter crashed while extracting elements of Company A, 5/12th Infantry from a PZ northwest of the Cay Gao rubber plantation. Two persons were rescued and rescue operations were conducted for seven others with negative results. 3/17th Cavalry (-) was relieved from OFCON with the 5/12th Infantry and one platoon (relieved from OFCON to the 2/3d Infantry) conducted a road march to Bui on 3 October. The Troop conducted a maintenance stand-down and training on M-551 Sheridan vehicles which were received on 3 October. Company B, 75th Infantry (ranger) continued operations with the 18th ARVN Division I&F Company in an area west of FSB LISBY. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) conducted VU and SBA missions in support of the brigade resulting in five enemy KIA and 25 bunkers destroyed. Troop K, 3/11th ACR (OFCON) continued the securing of FSB BLACKHORSE and road clearing operations in the TAOR. On 4 October, one platoon engaged an unknown size enemy force southwest of FSB BLACKHORSE, resulting in four enemy KIA and three AK-47's captured.

(k) 10-16 October 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in support of Operation FRIENDSHIP III. Effective 11 October, Company D, 3/7th Infantry became OFCON to the 2/3d Infantry, while Company C, 3/7th Infantry returned to its parent battalion's control. On 13 October, Company A, 4/12th Infantry was relieved from OFCON of the 2/3d Infantry and was replaced by Company B, 4/12th Infantry. On 13 October, a 2½ ton truck from Company C, 4/12th Infantry detonated a pressure type mine west of FSB BLACKHORSE, resulting in four US WHA and completely destroying the vehicle. 3/7th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in eastern Long Khanh Province in conjunction with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. 4/12th Infantry continued

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

combined/coordinated operations with the 42nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in northwestern Long Khanh Province. Company C, 4/12th Infantry conducted a stand-down at BMB during the period 10-13 October. On 11 October, Recon, 4/12th Infantry located an extensive training area north of the La Nga River and south of Dinh Quan. Further search of the area on 12 October revealed 20 pounds of documents, 40 pounds of cooking utensils, 60 pounds of medical supplies and a complete surgical set, in addition to miscellaneous items of arms and equipment. 5/12th Infantry continued combined operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and RF/PF forces. Company B, 5/12th Infantry conducted a stand-down at BMB during the period 13-16 October. On 13 October, Company C, 5/12th Infantry located and destroyed a battalion-size enemy base camp northeast of Trang Bom. D/17th Cavalry continued training on the M-551 Sheridan vehicle. Two teams of Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) were extracted from an operational area west of FSB LIBBY on 10 October and the remaining teams followed on 12 October. On 16 October, ranger teams were inserted along the Dong Nai River north of the Cay Gao rubber plantation. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued HKT operations in support of the brigade and of the 18th ARVN Division. Troop K, 3/11th ACR (OPCON) provided security for FSB BLACKHORSE and conducted platoon-size reconnaissance operations west and south of FSB BLACKHORSE.

(1) 17-23 October 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued combined operations in support of Operation FRIENDSHIP III and with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in southwestern Long Khanh Province. On 19 October, Company D, 3/7th Infantry was relieved from OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry and return to its parent battalion. On 22 October, Company D, 2/3d Infantry engaged an estimated 15 to 25 enemy north of Highway #1, east of Trang Bom, resulting in 6 enemy KIA and two weapons were captured. A stay-behind ambush in the area of contact engaged six more enemy, resulting in two additional enemy KIA. 3/7th Infantry continued operations in southeastern Long Khanh Province with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 19 October, a 2½ ton truck from the 3/7th Infantry detonated a mine on Highway #333 south of Gia Ray, resulting in three US WHA and the complete destruction of the truck. Also on 19 October, Company A, 3/7th Infantry, in two separate engagements east of FSB BLACKHORSE, accounted for three enemy KIA. In approximately the same area on 20 October, Company A, 3/7th Infantry discovered a weapons cache consisting of 2 Browning Automatic Rifles, 1 Light-machinegun, 1 M16, 9 M1 Rifles, 4 M1 carbines, 2 M79 grenade launchers, 19 SKS rifles and assorted grenades, mortar and small arms ammunition. Company C, 3/7th Infantry conducted a stand-down at BMB during the period 19-22 October. 4/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in northwestern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 17 October, Company B, 4/12th Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance operations southwest of Dinh Quan, discovered a battalion-size enemy base camp which included a training area complete with wooden mock-ups of US fortifications. Also on 17

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

October, Company D, 4/12th Infantry, operating in the same general area, was engaged by an estimated three to five enemy, resulting in two US WHA. 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in west-central Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 17 October, a saper team from 5/12th Infantry engaged 17 enemy west of Gia Kiem, resulting in four enemy KIA and two AK-47's captured. On 22 October, Recon, 5/12th Infantry engaged three enemy west of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, resulting in one enemy KIA, one PW and two AK-47's captured. D/17th Cavalry completed training on the M-551 Sheridan vehicles on 21 October and became OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry for operations in the FRIENDSHIP III AO. On 19 October, a ranger team from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged two enemy north of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, resulting in one enemy KIA. All teams were then extracted. On 23 October, four ranger teams were inserted south of FSB BLACKHORSE to conduct ranger operations. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (Ds) continued HKT operations in support of the brigade. On 19 and 20 October, in two separate engagements north of the Dong Nai River, Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry actions resulted in eight enemy KIA. Troop K, 3/11th ACR (OPCON) continued security operations in the vicinity of FSB BLACKHORSE until 20 October after which it began a stand-down in preparation for the return to its parent organization.

(m) 24-31 October 1969: 2/3d Infantry continued operations in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area and with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in southwestern Long Khanh Province. On 24 October, Company C, 2/3d Infantry engaged three enemy west of FSB BLACKHORSE, resulting in two enemy KIA and two weapons captured. Company C, 2/3d Infantry conducted a stand-down at BMB during the period 24-31 October. D/17th Cavalry (-) continued OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry until 31 October when it conducted a motor march to BMB for a stand-down in preparation for future land clearing operations. One platoon continued OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry. 3/7th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations in southeastern Long Khanh Province with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. On 28 October, Recon, 3/7th Infantry engaged six enemy east of Gia Ray, resulting in one enemy KIA and one M16 captured. 4/12th Infantry continued combined operations in northwestern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces and initiated operations in northwestern Binh Tuy Province. Company B, 4/12th Infantry became OPCON to the 2/3d Infantry effective 24 October while Company C, 4/12th Infantry returned to the control of its parent battalion. On 28 October, Company A, 4/12th Infantry began construction of FSB WARRIOR (vicinity YT 832427) in the "rice bowl" area in preparation for future operations. The 5/12th Infantry continued combined/coordinated operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 24 October, a series of engagements in the vicinity of Binh Loc Hamlet, involving Company C, 5/12th Infantry resulted in one US KHA, six US WHA, one enemy KIA and three weapons captured. A search of the general area the next day resulted in the discovery of graves containing three enemy

CONFIDENTIAL

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KIA. Company D, 5/12th Infantry conducted a stand-down at BMB during the period 25-28 October. On 31 October, Company B, 5/12th Infantry engaged two enemy south of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, resulting in one enemy KIA and one .38 caliber pistol captured. Ranger teams from Company M, 75th Infantry (Ranger), operating south of FSB BLACKHORSE engaged eight to ten enemy on 25 October, resulting in two enemy KIA and one AK-47 captured, with documents and medical supplies also being captured. Ranger teams were extracted on 26 October and were inserted along the Dong Nai River west of FSB LIBBY on 29 October. One team engaged two enemy, resulting in one enemy KIA. Troop C, 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued HKT and VR support of brigade units. On 28 October, a HKT operating west of FSB BLACKHORSE received ground fire from one or two .50 caliber machine-guns. The HKT returned fire, resulting in the destruction of one machinegun and four enemy KRA.

(4) Training Activities:

(a) The following personnel were trained at Redcatcher Combat Training Center (RCTC) during the quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
199th LIB	1,353 EM 90 OFF
54th Arty Group	206 EM
1st Sig Bde	134 EM 1 OFF
44th Med Bde	93 EM
II FFOBCEV	75 EM
Capital Military Assistance Command	18 EM
BHC, Long Binh Post	14 EM
398th Trans	7 EM
90th Replacement Battalion	<u>5 EM</u>
TOTALS	1,905 EM 91 OFF

(b) The Brigade Mobile Training Team (MTT) continued its mission of general training support of the 199th Infantry Brigade. The first six days of August were spent on a maintenance stand-down and in coordinating training. The second week of August, the MTT conducted mortar training on Signal Mountain. The training consisted of all basic instruction on the 81mm mortar, FDC procedures, and registration designed to give the crews a basic proficiency in the use of the weapon. Following the Signal Mountain mission, the MTT traveled to FSB JOY and

CONFIDENTIAL

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presented a course of instruction to the 4/12th Infantry, to include counter-sapper training. Per request of the 5/12th Infantry, the MTT went to FMB to train Company B, 5/12th Infantry which was on stand-down. After the stand-down of Company B, 5/12th Infantry, the 3/7th Infantry came into FMB for a redeployment stand-down. The MTT instructed the 3/7th Infantry on intelligence and terrain of the new AO, jungle operations, VC/NVA tactics, airmobile operations in the jungle, use of fire support, counter-sapper operations and dustoff procedures. During the first part of September, the MTT went to FSB BLACKHORSE to instruct the 2/3d Infantry on the use of claymore mines and ambushing. On 11 September, the MTT instructed Company D, 5/12th Infantry, while on a stand-down, in the subjects previously taught to Company B, 5/12th Infantry. During the period 12-17 September, the team did not operate because its members were on R&R. After the 17th of September, the team moved to FSB LIBBY to aid in preparing firing ranges to be used for marksmanship training. During the month of October, the MTT conducted an inspection of training records throughout the brigade with the pre-AGI team in preparation for the AGI in November.

(c) The ARVN Mobile Training Team conducted training for the 1st Battalion, 3d Battalion and the 48th Intelligence and Reconnaissance Company of the 48th ARVN Regiment. The team trained each company for one week and after the entire battalion had been trained, a three-day operation was conducted to evaluate unit effectiveness. The program of instruction consisted of weapons training on the M16 rifle, M-60 machinegun, M-79 grenade launcher and the M-72 LAW. The M16 rifle instruction included characteristics, disassembly and assembly, care and cleaning, and marksmanship, to include the zeroing of each individual's weapon. This training was conducted for personnel below squad leader level. Squad leaders and above received instruction in artillery and air support, communication techniques, security and intelligence, and land navigation. Each company was given training in demolitions and the M18A1 claymore mine, night firing techniques, fire and movement, ambush techniques, quick kill, patrolling, airmobile operations, convoy counter-ambush and night vision devices. The majority of the tactical instruction was conducted at squad and platoon level, and a minimum of 20 per cent of all training was conducted at night.

(d) The course conducted during the reporting period by the 18th ARVN Division Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) consisted of VC tactics, including infiltration, identification of VC and VCI, jungle tactics, mining, the uses of civilians by the VC and organization of VC/NVA units. The information for the class was drawn from the instructor's wide experience of operating in War Zone D and Long Khanh Province. Approximately 2,300 US personnel of the 199th Infantry Brigade received training from the ARVN RMTT during the reporting period. The quality of the instruction presented by the ARVN RMTT was excellent and troop interest was high. The instruction served as an aid to better understanding of the war as seen through the eyes of the Vietnamese, and helped to develop an appreciation in the US soldier for the Vietnamese as people and as soldiers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Chemical Operations:

(a) Personnel Detector: During the quarter ending 31 October, 52 People Sniffer missions were flown. Operations were completed using 3/17th Air Cavalry (DS) helicopters with HKT gun cover. The 503d Chemical Detachment continues to maintain records of all sniffer missions.

(b) Herbicide Operations: During the quarter, two herbicide operations were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment. In the two operations a total of 1,600 gallons of a 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ % solution of herbicide "Orange" were sprayed around the perimeter of FMB.

(c) Riot Control Agents: During the quarter, work was started on the manufacture of Bunker Use Restriction Bombs (BURB). 385 BURB's have been completed, 205 issued, of which 85 have been used. Six E-158 CS air drops were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment during the reporting period. On 3 September, eight E-158 were dropped in the area of YT 274048 and YT 590495. On 7 September, eight E-158 were dropped in the area of YT 582490. On 22 October, nine E-158 were dropped in the areas of YT 285195, YT 270358 and YT 302389. On 26 October, four E-158 were dropped in the area of YS 323994.

(d) Insecticide Operations: During the period, four insecticide operations were conducted by aerial spraying. All missions were flown over fire support bases in the brigade area of operations. One mission was flown by the 503d Chemical Detachment, with the remaining three being flown by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit. Significant results have been achieved in the control of malaria within the brigade TAOR by utilizing hand sprayers, foggers and helicopter spraying.

(6) Air Operations:

(a) United States Air Force: During the period 1 August to 31 October, the USAF supported the brigade with close tactical air support and with Shadow aircraft for surveillance and engagement of targets at night. The substantial increase in the number of air strikes conducted during this reporting period is a result of a higher number of lucrative targets developed by hard intelligence throughout the brigade TAOR.

(b) During the reporting period, the USAF supported the brigade in the following manner:

1 Air Strikes:	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Approved</u>
a Preplanned:	387	95
b Immediate:	190	190
c Combat Skyspot:	146	92

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d Diverts: 11

e TOTALS: 723 388

2 Bomb Damage Assessment:

	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>UNCOVERED</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a Bunkers:	723	206	12		941
b Fighting positions:	45				45
c Hootches:	123				123
d Trench line (meters):	170		50		220
e Secondary explosions:					179
f Secondary fires:					35
g Bridges:	1				1
h KBA:				21	21

(c) Army Aviation: The 199th Brigade Aviation Section performed missions during the reporting period of 1 August to 31 October as follows:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>PAX HAULED</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>
UH1H:	894	1,521	2,622	99
OH6A:	<u>1.055</u>	<u>1.675</u>	<u>1.131</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTALS:	1,949	3,196	3,753	117

During the reporting period, the hours flown showed a slight increase. The substantial reduction in sorties and pax flown is due to the availability of the First Aviation Brigade aircraft to accomplish troop insertions and resupply. The maintenance availability has increased for both UH1H and OH6A due to the availability of repair parts.

e. Logistics, Transportation and Engineer Operations.

(1) Logistical support remains centered at the BMB at Camp Frenzell-Jones, with daily resupply being accomplished to each battalion's forward fire support base. The unit's organic resupply capabilities continue to be augmented by a platoon of the 120th Transportation (Light Truck) Company from the 7th Battalion, 48th Transportation Group which is attached to the brigade.

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(2) The brigade recently received 10 Sheridan Assault Vehicles which are organic to D/17th Cavalry. M-73 machineguns, infra-red scopes and searchlights, which are component parts of the Sheridan, were also received.

(3) The brigade has continued to successfully operate within the allocated Available Supply Rate during the entire reporting period. Favorable comments from higher headquarters have been received with reference to the overall effective and efficient management of Class V within the 199th Infantry Brigade.

(4) The results of roadside spotchecks/inspections over the reporting period pointed out the need for stronger emphasis at the command level on organizational maintenance. Common items which units were neglecting included:

(a) Vent valves for transmissions and differentials.

(b) Oil and fuel filters.

(c) Lubrication.

(d) Motor mounts.

(e) Neglect of the aforementioned items contributes significantly to increased wear and added maintenance requirements.

(5) The following supplies were issued by the 7th Combat Support Battalion:

(a) Class I

1 Tons of "A" rations issued:	962.74
2 Tons of "C" rations issued:	413.32
3 Total:	1,376.06
4 Weekly average:	105.85
5 Pounds of ice:	1,441,200.00
6 Sundry packs issued:	2,530.00

(b) Class II and VII

1 Requisitions received:	21,389.00
2 Requisitions filled:	10,659.00

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3 Demand accomodation: 85.7%

4 Average number received per week: 1,645.30

(c) Class III

1 Gallons issued: 1,056,165.00

2 Average weekly: 81,243.40

(d) Class V

1 Tons drawn: 4,275.16

2 Average tons drawn weekly: 328.70

(6) The following is the current supply status of the brigade:

(a) Class I

	<u>STORAGE CAPACITY</u>	<u>ON-HAND</u>
1 "A" rations (days of supply):	15.00	12.00
2 "C" rations (meals):	170,000.00	54,196.00
(b) Class III		
1 JP-4 (gallons):	25,000.00	20,270.00
2 Mogas (gallons):	11,200.00	3,800.00
3 Diesel (gallons):	11,200.00	4,600.00

(c) Class V: Portions of units' basic loads are stored in the Brigade Ammunition Dump.

(7) Major items of supply obtained for the brigade:

(a) Weapons:

1 Mortar 81mm	14
2 Rifle M16	196
3 Rifle M14	20
4 Machinegun .50 caliber	3

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5	Grenade launcher M79	8
6	Pistol .45 caliber	2
7	Howitzer M102	1
8	Machinegun M60	16
9	Mortar 4.2"	12

(b) Mobility:

1	Armored personnel carrier M113A1	11
2	Trailer, ammunition	9
3	Truck, cargo 2½ ton	7
4	Recovery vehicle VTR	1
5	Trailer 1½ ton	2
6	Truck, ambulance ½ ton	1
7	Trailer, water	4
8	Truck tractor 10 ton	2
9	Armored reconnaissance airborne assault vehicle (M-551)	10
10	Truck, cargo 3/4 ton	2
11	Truck, ½ ton	8
12	Truck, tractor 5 ton	5

(c) Commo:

1	Antenna RC 292	10
2	Radio set AN/VRC-47	4
3	Radio set AN/PRT-4	3
4	Radio set AN/PRR-9	22
5	Radio set AN/VRC-46	7

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<u>6</u>	Radio set AN/GRC-142	1
<u>7</u>	Radio set RT-524	9
<u>8</u>	Test set radio AN/V/RM-1	1
(d) TOE		
<u>1</u>	Multimeter ME-260/U	2
<u>2</u>	Night vision sight PVS/2A	27
<u>3</u>	Detector concealed person	1
<u>4</u>	Test set electrical AN/GRM-55A	1
<u>5</u>	Refrigerator	13
<u>6</u>	Generator 10KW	7
<u>7</u>	Periscope M17	3
<u>8</u>	Typewriter	100
<u>9</u>	Miniscope PVS/3	66
<u>10</u>	Generator 2KW	9
<u>11</u>	Desk, office	34
<u>12</u>	Night vision sight PVS/2	1
<u>13</u>	Bladder 10,000 gallon	1
<u>14</u>	TV set	4
<u>15</u>	Adding machine	6
<u>16</u>	Pump centrifugal 100 gpm	2
<u>17</u>	Generator set 1½ KW	4
<u>18</u>	Binoculars infra-red	3
<u>19</u>	Mine detector	1
<u>20</u>	Polaroid camera "250"	2
<u>21</u>	Welding machine electric	1

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<u>22</u>	Night vision sight AN/PVS/1	1
<u>23</u>	Searchlight	6
<u>24</u>	Camera K5-99B	1
<u>25</u>	Tank, liquid 400 gallon	5
<u>26</u>	Compressor flame thrower	4

(8) The following is a list of Engineer construction activities for the quarter:

(a) Construction of a 5,000 meter section of road east of FSB BLACKHORSE (from YS 444967 to YS 498968) in a combined US/ARVN Engineer operation.

(b) Clearance of one three-ship landing zone.

(c) Construction of two battalion size fire support base camps (FSB's MACE and NANCY). This construction consisted of the berm, perimeter fence, bunker emplacements, showers, latrines, mess halls, electrical wiring and lighting, drainage of the area and normal upkeep and improvement operations.

(d) Construction, upgrading and improvement of the brigade forward area at Xuan Loc included:

- 1 Upgrading the road network and drainage of the area.
- 2 Installation of additional shower and latrine facilities.
- 3 Upgrading and improving numerous buildings within the compound.
- 4 Reconstruction of the perimeter fence.
- 5 Construction of the brigade heliport, with six helipads.

(e) Closing out of FSB JOY utilizing D-5A airmobile dozer.

(f) Clearance of a portion of the minefield around FSB MACE and construction and marking of an inner minefield fence.

(g) Coordinated and assisted in the emplacement and removal of a float bridge across the Song La Nga on QL #20.

(h) Construction of an access road into FSB NANCY.

(i) Pre-fabbing building components, showers, latrines, and bunker

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kits in the R&U yard:

1 Bunker kits issued to units	57
2 Latrines	25
3 Showers	13

(j) Hauling ground materials to work sites: Crushed rock--1,395.9 tons.

(k) Various squads and pieces of heavy equipment are in continuous direct support of the 2/3d Infantry, 3/7th Infantry, 4/12th Infantry, 5/12th Infantry, 2/40th Artillery and Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry of the 199th Infantry Brigade, providing demolition and mine detector teams, and performing general engineer support. These teams are also constructing and repairing bunkers, bridges (both foot and vehicle), mess halls, billets, revetments, perimeter defenses, landing pads, clearing firing lanes and landing zones, upgrading and constructing forward roads, constructing berms and hauling ground materials to forward areas.

f. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

(1) S-5 activities of the 199th were enhanced by the support and assistance of the 9th Civil Affairs Platoon of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company.

(2) Civil affairs and Civic Action conducted during the period were in the following order of priorities:

(a) Support the objectives of the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Plan.

(b) Improve the public health and welfare of the local populace and the dependents of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), territorial forces, and para-military units.

(c) Improve the capabilities and responsiveness of the territorial forces and para-military units.

(d) Establish a community relations program.

(3) Objectives for the Combined 1969 Accelerated Pacification Plan for Long Khanh Province were based on the objectives of the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The objectives in the basic plan were increased for Long Khanh Province since at the beginning of the program the status of pacification in the province already exceeded the objectives. The objectives of the combined plan were accomplished or exceeded prior to 31 October 1969. The objectives and accomplishments in the five major areas are as follows:

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OBJECTIVE

STATUS 31 OCT 69

(a) Improve security of 100% of the population to relatively secure (A, B, C ratings) and improve the security of hamlets to provide secure environment day and night (A, B) to 65% of the population.

100% of the population in relatively secure hamlets; 79.4% of the population in hamlets secure day and night; no contested hamlets remaining. A total of 54 hamlets upgraded to "B" rating during the quarter.

(b) Eliminate or neutralize 57 hard-core VCI.

78 VCI were neutralized or eliminated.

(c) Eliminate 4,694 refugees from the rolls.

All refugees were paid their allowances and removed from the rolls.

(d) Induce 39 Hoi Chanhs to rally to GVN.

73 Hoi Chanhs rallied.

(e) Increase Popular Self Defense Forces to 15,000; train 11,400 and arm 4,000.

PSDF recruited 16,134; trained 12,293 and armed 4,031.

(4) Civic action program was designed to provide the following results:

(a) Improve security of the populated areas.

(b) Improve health and welfare of the population.

(c) Improve the attitude of the population and to support the psychological objectives.

(d) Improve the civic action performance of RVNAF and provincial elements, and to provide continuity to the civic action support of the populace after re-location of the brigade.

(5) Description of primary civic action projects, reason for success and methods employed:

(a) Youth Program: Brigade elements provided playground equipment and assisted in construction of swings and volleyball courts for schools. During the period, 14 projects were undertaken and completed, providing schools with valuable facilities for furthering the athletic programs.

(b) Voluntary Agency Accounts: The brigade has established accounts with Catholic Relief Service and the Seventh Day Adventist Relief Service to provide commodities and medical services to schools and RF/PF widows

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in Long Khanh Province. Arrangements were made to provide these services on a continuing basis, and in the event the brigade is re-located, the accounts will be continued by the province advisory staff and by their attached civil affairs platoon. This arrangement will ensure continuous support of schools and widows in the area.

(c) Assistance Provided to Increase Security of Hamlets: The brigade has assisted the local territorial forces in the improvement of their perimeter defenses to include clearing fields of fire. During the period, four hamlet perimeters were cleared and the outposts of seven additional hamlets were reconstructed. Barrier materials were provided only when these were not available through province channels and assistance was requested by the district senior advisors. This program assists the upgrading of the security provided for the populated areas and further improves the capabilities of the territorial forces in the defense of their areas.

(d) Assistance to the Xuan Loc Chieu Hoi Center: The brigade is providing assistance to upgrade the Xuan Loc Chieu Hoi Center. Assistance includes: MEDCAPs, commodity distribution to the dependents, and materials for repair of the facilities. This project will improve the initial impression of the ralliers and their dependents arriving at the center for their indoctrination program. Continued support of the Chieu Hoi Center improves the image of the GVN and will result in further inducement to potential returnees.

(e) Training of Medical Personnel: The brigade medical section conducted an on-the-job training program for medical personnel at the Xuan Loc Provincial Hospital, Long Khanh Province, and at the Ho Nai Hospital, in Bien Hoa Province. This training program for 45 doctors and nurses, resulted in upgrading the expertise of the medical personnel and provided valuable medical support to communities. As an ancillary action, steps were taken to improve the medical supply distribution system to support the civilian population and RVNAF dependents. This project was supported by the 2nd Civil Affairs Company.

(f) English Instruction to Employees and Students: The brigade conducted English language classes for employees and school children. This off-duty teaching program was conducted in four locations for eight classes. Interested US personnel utilized assigned interpreters to conduct the classes.

(6) During the period, 16 of the 22 RF Companies and 39 of the 63 PF Platoons in Long Khanh Province were thoroughly retrained by the combined efforts of the brigade and the MACV Mobile Advisory Teams. The brigade provided considerable amounts of material support and technical assistance to this program. The territorial forces were further upgraded through combined tactical operations and on-site training by 199th battalions. This operation improved the capabilities, morale and self-confidence of the units.

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(7) Psychological Operations

(a) PSYOP Operations were increased during the period. This increase was made possible by closer coordination of the program through the Long Khanh Province PSYOP Coordinating Committee and the 18th ARVN Division. While the support provided by the III Corps PSYOP Coordinating Center was reduced, support and assistance from PSYOP Team HB of the 6th PSYOP Battalion further improved 199th performance.

(b) Qualitatively, the PSYOP activities improved through local designing of leaflets and posters, increased experience of PSYOP personnel, diversification of the program, improvement of quick reaction capabilities and development of plans for targeting the population and enemy units.

(c) Quantitatively, the PSYOP activities increased by emphasis and increased priorities assigned to PSYOP activities, utilization of organic helicopter assets 2-3 hours daily for PSYOP, pre-stocking of leaflets at brigade and battalion level, targeting on a weekly basis all known and suspected enemy base camps and infiltration routes, utilization of all types of assets (i.e. resupply flights, courier flights, visual reconnaissance flights, artillery observers, and ground troops) and increased face-to-face communication and leaflet distribution.

(d) PSYOP programs and priorities for targeting during the period were:

1 Targeting the 274th VC Regiment and SR-4 elements.

2 Targeting the local populace to break accommodation with the enemy forces, to improve the GVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) image, and to cause the local populace to voluntarily support and identify themselves with GVN. This combined plan developed for the brigade, the 18th ARVN Division and for provincial elements became a model for other units in the Republic of Vietnam.

3 Exploitation of Hoi Chanhs to cause increased numbers to rally. Success was achieved in this area by retargeting ralliers; in one case 5 Hoi Chanhs were induced by successive retargeting of ralliers and in another case 3 Hoi Chanhs rallied.

4 Targeting the 33d NVA Regiment, Regional Headquarters MR-7, and the 84th Rear Services Groups.

(e) The brigade encouraged and assisted the provincial elements to conduct periodic indoctrination sessions for VC relatives. Initially the sessions were at the Province Chieu Hoi Center, but the program was further developed by scheduled visits to the homes of the VC relatives. These operations now form an important part of the Chieu Hoi inducement program.

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(8) Statistical Summary:

(a) Civic Actions:

1	MEDCAP/ICAP operations:	521
2	Patients treated:	35,013
3	English language classes:	8
4	English students:	350
5	Schools supported:	18
6	Doctors/nurses/nurse aides trained:	65
7	Orphanages supported:	5
8	Construction: (US-supplied materials, joint US/GVN or US/local populace labor)	
a	Roads constructed (kilometers):	15
b	Roads repaired (kilometers):	40
c	Hospitals repaired:	2
d	Dispensaries constructed:	"
e	Dispensaries repaired:	"
f	ARVN dependent quarters constructed:	54
9	Construction supplies distributed:	
a	Cement (pounds):	37,000
b	Lumber (board feet):	2,200
c	Roofing tin (sheets):	475
d	Paint (gallons):	105
e	Engineer stakes:	400
f	Barbed wire (rolls):	1,040
g	Sand bags:	9,000

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h Culverts (meters):	45
i Bricks:	2,800
j PSP (sections):	25
k Sand (cubic meters):	509
l Fencing (meters):	400
10 Food distributed (pounds):	28,400
11 Kits distributed:	
a Health kits:	2,000
b School kits:	1,000
c Food kits:	900
d Toy/book kits:	600
12 Clothing distributed (pounds):	31,000
13 Wells dug:	1
(b) <u>Psychological Operations:</u>	
1 Total PSYOP missions:	1,718
2 Total quick reaction missions:	562
3 Total leaflets dropped:	72,722,405
4 Total aerial missions with organic assets:	572
5 Total ground broadcast/hours:	1,348
6 Total aerial broadcast/hours:	282
7 Total Armed Propaganda Team (APT) operations:	88
8 Target themes used (times used):	
a Chieu Hoi program theme:	2,204
b Pacification support theme:	1,484

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c Tactical support theme:	995
d Volunteer informant program theme:	487
9 Total leaflets designed:	22
10 Total posters designed:	2
11 Total tapes produced:	23

(9) Results Achieved:

(a) MACV IBM printouts for September and October list Long Khanh Province first in security for populated areas among the 44 provinces in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) MACV IBM printouts list the 199th as more active in most PSYOPS areas than all separate regiments, all separate brigades and three divisions.

(c) The attitude of the populace toward the US has improved and valuable information of intelligence value has been volunteered.

(d) The 18th ARVN Division responsiveness to PSYOP has improved and support has been forthcoming at levels similar to that in the US Army.

(e) The capabilities and responsiveness of territorial forces and para-military units has improved. Toward the end of the period, the territorial forces and para-military units demonstrated an aggressive attitude, which contributed greatly toward the accomplishment of the pacification objectives. Based on the quantity of supplies captured and the neutralization and elimination of hard-core VCI, Long Khanh was rated first within III CTZ for its programs of resource control and neutralization/elimination of VCI.

(f) The 18th ARVN Division, territorial forces and other provincial elements began to take active part in civic action planning and performance.

g. Fire Support Coordinator.

(1) During the past quarter the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery has continued its active role in brigade activities. A total of 96,540 rounds were fired. This is due mostly to the number of intelligence targets fired which accounted for 68.1% of the total rounds fired. The batteries of the battalion made 25 displacements during this quarter in support of brigade operations.

(2) To provide necessary support to the infantry units, the battalion operated from as many as 8 fire support bases simultaneously.

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On 27 August the battalion headquarters (forward) was displaced from FSB BLACKHORSE to Xuan Loc along with the brigade headquarters and has remained co-located with the brigade headquarters (forward). In most cases, due to the size of the TAOI it was impossible to have mutually supporting fires or to mass howitzers on any target. Some of the gaps were filled by General Support Reinforcing Artillery from II FFORCEV units and the 18th ARVN Division artillery units.

(3) There were four artillery raids run during this quarter (two with eight-inch howitzers and two with 175mm guns) consisting of fires on preplanned intelligence targets in the northern portion of the TAOI and resulting in numerous bunkers destroyed, 20 secondary explosions and two enemy killed by artillery.

(4) An artillery training team was formed and provided assistance to the 18th ARVN Division artillery mobile training team in the training of their units in gunnery, communications and other related subjects. Additionally, contact teams were provided at several ARVN artillery locations to assist in training and to provide liaison when ARVN units were firing for US ground forces.

(5) An SOP was developed to provide quick reaction fires on "duffle bag" activations. All duffle bag areas are assigned to specified firing units and block clearance is obtained each day. The activations are reported directly from the read-out station to the battalion FDC, sent to the appropriate battery and fired. The average reaction time from activation to firing has been $4\frac{1}{2}$ minutes.

h. Signal.

(1) The brigade forward CP displaced from FSB BLACKHORSE to Xuan Loc during the period. The 4/12th Infantry displaced from FSB JOY to FSB NANCY and the 3/7th Infantry returned to the 199th LIB from OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 9th US Infantry Division. Communications systems were displaced to support the brigade forward CP, 4/12th Infantry and 3/7th Infantry in their new locations.

(2) The brigade forward TOC was displaced from FSB BLACKHORSE to Xuan Loc 281400H August 1969. On 20 August, the 313th Signal Company sent an advance party to Xuan Loc to establish FM radio, Single-Side Band Radio, Communication Center facilities, and telephone communications for the brigade forward CP. One VHF terminal was re-located at Xuan Loc to establish a telephone trunking system through VHF relay on Hill 837 to 4/12th and 5/12th Infantry. Sole user telephone lines previously installed on the 1st Signal Brigade Area System from FSB BLACKHORSE to 199th LIB liaison elements at Xuan Loc were re-terminated at FSB BLACKHORSE and Xuan Loc for common and sole user trunks between the new brigade forward CP and the 2/3d Infantry and other elements remaining at FSB BLACKHORSE.

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(3) The 313th Signal Company moved a VHF Radio Terminal from FSB JOY to FSB NANCY on 26 August in support of the 4/12th Infantry. The VHF system between the 199th LIB rear TOC at Camp Frenzell-Jones and the 3/7th Infantry at Can Giuoc was removed on 1 September upon the return of the 3/7th Infantry to the 199th LIB. The 3/7th Infantry moved to FSB MACE on 3 September 1969. Initially a VHF system was established from brigade forward via relay on Hill 837 to FSB MACE. However, operating and logistic problems encountered on Hill 837 dictated re-location of the VHF relay from Hill 837 to FSB LIBBY on 24 September.

(4) The 1st Signal Brigade area signal center at FSB BLACKHORSE deactivated the multi-channel system between Long Giao (YS 439971) and Xuan Loc on 20 October. A four channel VHF system operated by the 313th Signal Company was installed and placed in operation 19 October to provide telephone communications to the 2/3d Infantry.

(5) The automatic re-transmission station on the Brigade Command Net (Non-Secure) was activated from the forward CP at Xuan Loc via directional antennas to reduce interference. The secure manual relay on Hill 837 continued in operation.

(6) The brigade communication posture on 31 October 1969 was as follows:

(a) Radio Relay Systems:

1 Inclosure 1, Radio Relay Systems Diagram, outlines the system utilized to provide command and control, speech plus teletype, and telephone communications.

2 The 53d Signal Battalion terminated VHF radio relay and HF radio (RATT) from II FFORCEV to the 199th Infantry Brigade forward CP at Xuan Loc. The 313th Signal Company operated the brigade VHF system at Xuan Loc, FSB BLACKHORSE, FSB LIBBY, FSB NANCY and FSB MACE

(b) Radio:

1 Brigade forward CP at Xuan Loc.

a Brigade Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).

b Brigade Command Net-FM (Secure).

c II FFORCEV Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).

d II FFORCEV Command Net-FM (Secure).

e Spare Net- FM (Non-Secure).

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- f Brigade Air and Fire Control Net (Non-Secure).
- g 199th Aviation Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- h ALO Net FM, AM, UHF (USAF)(Non-Secure).
- i Air Mobile Monitor UHF (Non-Secure).
- 1 Brigade Command Net-SSB (Non-Secure).
- 2 Brigade rear TOC at Camp Frenzell-Jones.
- a Brigade Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- b Brigade Command Net-FM (Secure).
- c Brigade Command Net-SSB (Non-Secure).
- d II FFORCEV Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- e II FFORCEV Command Net-FM (Secure).
- f Combined Reconnaissance & Intelligence Platoon (CRIP Command Net-FM (Non-Secure)).
- 3 Infantry Battalions
 - a Each Infantry Battalion operated a Command Net-FM (Non-Secure), a Battalion Secure Net-FM, a Clear to Fire Net and a Logistics Net. The infantry battalions (except 3/7th Infantry) installed AN/VRC-24 UHF radios at the "SB"s for monitoring air mobile operations.
 - b Each infantry company operated a Command Net-FM (Non-Secure) and a Fire Direction Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- 4 Artillery.
 - a The 2/40th Artillery operated a Command Net and monitored each battery's Fire Direction Net. The Fire Direction Center entered supporting artillery nets as required. A re-transmission station was installed at Gia Ray for FM communication with FSB MACE.
 - b Each firing battery operated Fire Direction Nets-FM (Non-Secure).
- (c) Wire and Cable:
 - 1 Wire lines were limited to local distribution within CP's and perimeter security lines. Wire and cable lines were utilized by the 2/3d Infantry and the 3/7th Infantry for coordination with co-located infantry regiments of the 18th ARVN Division.

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2 Switchboard:

a Central Office Telephone Manual AN/MTC-7 (dismounted) was utilized at brigade forward and rear CP's. Dial service at Camp Frenzell-Jones was operated by Plantation Signal Company (Provisional).

b Artillery and infantry battalions utilized the SB-22/PT Switchboard.

(d) Communication Centers:

1 The Brigade Rear Communications Center at Camp Frenzell-Jones utilized one AN/MGC-34 Teletype Central Office (dismounted). One HDX on-line circuit to brigade forward is terminated at this facility.

2 The Brigade Forward Communications Center used two each AN/MGC-17 Central Office Teletypewriters (dismounted) to terminate one HDX on-line circuit from II FFORCEV and one HDX on-line circuit from brigade rear.

3 An on-line Tactical Teletype System was installed using speech plus technique from brigade forward to each infantry battalion's FSB.

(e) Messenger and Courier:

1 Scheduled messenger service was operated twice daily between brigade rear and forward.

2 Scheduled air courier service was initiated on 13 August from brigade forward to the infantry battalion FSB's.

(7) Power: PA&E provided principal power sources at brigade forward and rear. Backup power to each system was provided by organic 3, 5 and 10 kilowatt generators. Primary power at FSB's is organic 5 and 10 kilowatt generators.

1. Public and Command Information.

(1) The high level of news releases to the Army Home Town News Center was continued.

(2) Although the number of press visits was less than the previous period, with the brigade's increasing emphasis on pacification and upgrading the 18th ARVN Division, press visits became more numerous

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near the end of the period. All three major networks—ABC, CBS and NBC—came to the 199th to do feature material. Other visits were made by Associated Press, Stars and Stripes, AFVN, SEAPAC and the Army Special Photo Team.

(3) Plans for a second edition of the REDCATCHER Yearbook, the brigade magazine, were approved and the actual layout and copy work was begun late in October. In accordance with the approved plan, the second edition of this publication will be 48 pages long (twice the length of the initial issue) and will cover the highlights of 199th operations through November 1969.

(4) Publication of the twice-monthly REDCATCHER newspaper was continued. However, in order to supplement the efforts of the newspaper, a weekly newsletter was instituted. There have been problems with distribution to the troops in the field but steps have been taken to alleviate these problems. The newsletter has been well received.

(5) In order to broaden the spectrum of operations of the 40th PI Detachment, an audio-visual program was instituted. Three personnel with broadcasting backgrounds were added to the detachment. Sources for requisitioning audio-visual equipment to support this program were also investigated.

(6) The acceptance of stories submitted to outside publications (i.e., Reporter, Observer and Stars and Stripes) showed some degree of improvement, but much remains to be accomplished in this area. As this period ends, two actions have been undertaken in this regard:

(a) Brigade IO personnel will be dispatched to the field on a more frequent basis to gather material.

(b) IO Specialists within each battalion have been directed to submit material on a quota basis. It is anticipated that these actions will result in a much expanded material input from which to select stories to send to outside publications, as well as a greater diversification of material in the REDCATCHER newspaper and newsletter.

(7) The following is a breakdown of the detachment's news media activities during the reporting period:

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(a) News Media Visits: 16

(b) Home Town News:

	<u>Releases</u>	<u>Pictures</u>	<u>Radio</u>
August:	524	235	35
September:	605	200	145
October:	<u>488</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>266</u>
TOTALS:	1,617	554	446

(c) Hard News:

	<u>Releases</u>	<u>Pictures</u>	<u>Radio-TV</u>
August:	43	21	1
September:	31	8	1
October:	<u>56</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS:	130	40	2

j. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period, this command paid \$1,081.50 in personal property claims to US military personnel. The breakdown is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CLAIMS</u>	<u>AMOUNT PAID</u>
August:	2	\$ 581.55
September:	3	207.00
October:	<u>3</u>	<u>292.95</u>
TOTALS:	8	\$1,081.50

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(2) The breakdown of non-judicial punishment imposed during the period:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3d Infantry	7	17	10	34
3/7th Infantry	13	9	6	28
4/12th Infantry	11	14	5	30
5/12th Infantry	17	26	18	61
2/40th Artillery	11	26	11	48
7th Support	18	12	23	53
HHC, 199th	6	3	11	20
87th Engineer Co.	2	0	5	7
Troop D, 17th Cav	0	1	3	4
313th Signal Co.	2	4	2	8
M Co., 75th Inf	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS:	90	112	96	298

(3) During the reporting period, with 27 Special Courts-Martial being convened by the Commanding General under the provisions of the Military Justice Act of 1968, the use of a military judge sitting alone has greatly increased, having been utilized on twenty occasions. The breakdown of Courts-Martial during the reporting period:

GENERAL: None.

SPECIAL:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3d Infantry	3	1	1	5
3/7th Infantry	3	0	2	5
4/12th Infantry	2	2	4	8
5/12th Infantry	2	1	0	3

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/40th Artillery	0	1	0	1
7th Support	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS:	14	5	8	27

SUMMARY: There were two summary courts-martial held in brigade during the period and they were administered by the 3/7th Infantry and the 152nd Military Police Platoon.

(4) A complete breakdown of legal assistance cases handled during the period is as follows:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) Adoption and change of name:	3	2	2	7
(b) Citizenship:	3	3	3	9
(c) Civil rights:	0	0	2	2
(d) Domestic relations:	15	26	18	59
(e) Depositions:	0	0	2	2
(f) Non-support:	0	0	2	2
(g) Notarizations:	3	15	14	32
(h) Personal finances:	8	9	17	34
(i) Personal property:	3	3	1	7
(j) Powers of attorney:	12	11	18	41
(k) Real estate:	1	3	2	6
(l) Taxation:	1	0	2	3
(m) Torts:	0	0	2	2
(n) Wills and estates:	5	4	7	16
(o) Miscellaneous:	<u>47</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>148</u>
(p) TOTALS:	101	127	142	370

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k. Provost Marshal.

(1) Due to a considerable increase in the larceny of private and government properties, a policy was implemented, at command levels, whereby the Staff Duty Officer will inspect one unit each day for security of valuables.

(2) Brigade forward was re-located from FSB BLACKHORSE to Xuan Loc. The forward MP station was also re-located to Xuan Loc and re-established to provide TOC security, gate security, and to provide courtesy patrols in the village area. A Provost Marshal Investigator is also assigned to investigate crimes involving 199th Infantry Brigade personnel.

(3) The BMB perimeter fence line was repaired and reinforced during July and August. Approximately two miles of chain-link fencing was constructed and the remainder was reinforced with additional tactical wire.

(4) All perimeter towers manned by the Security Guard Platoon at BMB have been equipped with M-60 machineguns. Eight additional search lights were also procured and put into operation at BMB to enhance security.

(5) The Security Guard Platoon was re-organized. The sentinel duties are now performed by infantrymen and the military policemen were sent back to their platoons.

(6) During this reporting period there were a total of 268 convoys which included 1,765 vehicles escorted by the Military Police. These vehicles logged a total of 25,797 miles, which includes troop movements to the forward area and resupply missions.

l. Chaplain.

(1) The Brigade Chaplain's Office was moved from FSB BLACKHORSE to brigade forward headquarters at Xuan Loc. The Chapel area was completely renovated and beautified by the 199th Infantry Brigade Chaplain's section.

(2) Religious films, morning devotions, a Protestant Choir, Protestant services, Episcopal services and Catholic Mass are conducted on a weekly basis. These services are available for all English speaking people of the Xuan Loc area.

(3) In order to provide area coverage, a Chaplain Duty Roster is in effect for BMB. Each Chaplain spends at least one day each week visiting patients in the Long Binh area hospitals and providing counselling for Camp Frenzell-Jones personnel. This arrangement also provides a Chaplain for companies on stand-down.

(4) During this period, Chaplain (CPT) Edison F. Burleson returned to

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CONUS after completing one year with the 199th Infantry Brigade. Chaplain (MAJ) David W. Williams is his replacement.

(5) Statistical Breakdown of Chaplain Activities:

		<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
(a) Number of Services:	472	14,875
(b) Memorial Services:	23	2,045
(c) Orientations:	12	1,211
(d) Hospital Visits:	161	1,216
(e) Counselling Cases:	1,202	
(f) Letters to Churches:	178	
(g) Letters of Condolence:	67	

III. Brigade Surgeon.

(1) The health of the command showed an average admission rate of 483.4/1,000/annum. The non-effectiveness in respect to sick days revealed an average of 2.6 per day. The admission rate is higher than the previous quarter as a result of the continued malaria problem and an increase in foot disease. However, as a result of early diagnosis and effective treatment, hospitalization was shortened, resulting in decreased daily non-effectiveness.

(2) Immunizations administered throughout the brigade reached an average of 2,020 per month during the recent quarter.

(3) The Hepatitis rate during this quarter remained essentially the same with a monthly average of 1 or 2 cases. However, a definite decrease in cases was noted during the last month of this quarter.

(4) Malaria:

(a) The malarial incidence showed a dramatic decrease during August subsequent to the increased emphasis placed on malaria prevention. However, despite continued anti-malarial emphasis, the incidence again rose in September and October along with intensification of the rain just prior to the end of the rainy season.

(b) At the end of the last quarter, inventory requests were distributed to each unit to determine the availability of anti-malarial

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items. This served two purposes. It enabled this office to determine what each unit had in stock while at the same time told the unit what it should have. It also made commanders more aware of what items were necessary to aid in malaria prevention. These statistics were compiled during August.

(c) On 1 August 1969, a command letter was distributed throughout the brigade providing guidance on malaria prevention. At the same time, the medical lecture given at the Redcatcher Training Center was re-evaluated and additions were made to insure that newly arrived personnel understood the necessity of malaria prevention.

(d) The monthly Army Medical Services (AMEDS) meetings are being held on a regular basis. Medical and para-medical personnel are appraised of the malarial problem and guidance is provided on prophylaxis measures.

(e) The use of anti-malarial tablets was stressed as well as the need for continued urine testing for Chloroquine-Primaquine residue. With continued emphasis on the Chloroquine-Primaquine and Dapsone tablet ingestion, a noticeable decline in negative urine tests was noted.

(f) In conjunction with the chemical detachment, a letter was distributed in September providing instructions for modification of a 3/4 ton vehicle to enable it to be used for ground-fogging of insecticide.

(g) In early September, a letter from the Brigade Surgeon was distributed to all members of the brigade informing them of the complications and problems involved when an individual gets malaria and stressing prevention. The weekly REDCATCHER Newsletter displayed an article in early October which explains the problems involved when one gets malaria.

(h) On 8 October 1969, a command letter was distributed to re-emphasize malaria prevention.

(5) Venereal Disease.

(a) In the recent quarter, venereal disease averaged 89 cases per month. This was a decrease from the previous quarter but showed a slight upward trend towards the end of the quarter. Because of this trend, increased emphasis was placed on troop education in regards to VD prevention. Redcatcher Training Center medical lectures were reviewed and updated to insure that all newly arrived personnel are aware of the problems involved and preventive measures recommended.

(b) In October, a command letter was distributed to set forth policies, provide guidance, and establish responsibilities for VD prevention and control.

(c) Battalion surgeons were instructed to initiate discussions at

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small unit level in order to provide information and to answer questions on this subject.

(d) Physical examinations were conducted on female employees in areas where VD rates had shown an increase, however, these produced negative results.

(6) Foot Disease:

(a) Foot disease has resulted in a considerable manpower loss during this quarter. As a result of the rainy season and length of exposure, foot disease has shown a dramatic increase. Because of this problem, command emphasis has stressed preventative measures. In early August, a command letter was distributed from II FFORCEV regarding prevention of foot disease. This was followed shortly by a 199th command letter providing guidance on the prevention of skin and foot disease.

(b) In September, a preventive foot disease test program was initiated. This consisted of providing one platoon in a company with daily prophylactic Griseofulvin (an anti-fungal medication) while in the field. In addition, some units applied tincture of benzoin to the feet of another platoon in the company as a skin toughening agent. In all units, one platoon was given no additional protective measures other than those usually provided. The results of this test should be available for the next reporting period.

(c) A letter was forwarded by the S-3 section to the G-3, USARV stating the justification and requirements for additional protective footgear as outlined in Inclosure 1 of the II FFORCEV letter dated 23 July 1969, subject: Foot Disease. In response to this letter, protective footgear is programmed for future use.

(d) Continued medical supervision has been stressed by battalion surgeons and repeated foot inspections are held by platoon medics to insure proper aeration and early detection of foot disease.

(7) Drugs: The use and abuse of drugs is a growing concern among US personnel in RVN. In order to make the personnel of the 199th LTB aware of the problems involved and the potential hazards of using harmful drugs, two films about drug abuse were shown throughout the brigade during the month of October. In addition, articles published in the REDCATCHER Newsletter amplified the risks inherent in the use of these drugs.

(8) Medevac Program: During this period a dust-off helicopter with a jungle penetrator and hoist was stationed at the Xuan Loc CP in order to have medevac support closer to personnel in the brigade AO. Since the arrival of this helicopter on 9 October, it has proven to be of exceptional value, having already flown 120 missions to evacuate 150 battle casualties.

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(9) Animal Bites:

(a) Animal bites increased last quarter. A total of 18 bites were reported for the previous quarter as compared with 21 for the recent quarter. Of the total bites recorded, 13 were rat bites. Continued emphasis was placed on elimination of trash and garbage piles as sources of food for rodents. Also, intensification of rodent elimination with traps and poisons has been implemented.

(b) Emphasis on removal of stray animals from BMB and FSB's was accomplished through Daily Bulletin announcements. The restriction of monkeys from BMB, Xuan Loc and FSB areas was also announced through the Daily Bulletin. Liaison was made with the 4th Medical Detachment (Veterinary) in Long Binh to provide veterinary service for legal pets within the brigade.

(10) Medical Care to Vietnamese Civilians: The high incidence of infectious disease requires close scrutiny of the health of hired indigenous personnel. The utilization of Vietnamese civilians has increased the potential health problems of the 199th LIB. For this reason, the Brigade Surgeon's Office has initiated a health screening program for Vietnamese civilians. Individual units have been directed to contact Company C, 7th Support Battalion to obtain appointments for medical examinations of all civilian employees. These exams include stool samples, chest X-rays, and blood tests for evidence of parasites, respiratory disease and venereal disease respectively. In conjunction with the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO), the Brigade Surgeon's Office administers periodic immunizations to civilian employees to insure a high level of protection against infectious disease.

(11) Medical support for the HHC, 199th LIB and attached units is provided by the Brigade Surgeon's Office. The Brigade Surgeon's Office also provides medical personnel (field medics) to small units within the 199th LIB; three medics to 9th Cavalry, one medic to the CRIP Platoon and one to the security platoon at a nearby signal center. Medical supplies for these units are coordinated through the Brigade Surgeon's Office.

(12) Field Sanitation. Field Sanitation Team classes were held in August by the 20th Preventive Medicine Detachment. Properly trained field sanitation teams have provided line units with readily available preventive medicine personnel. Increased emphasis has been directed toward upgrading area sanitation at each FSB.

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(13) Area Sanitation: Monthly inspections of mess halls and weekly inspections of clubs, barber shops and sanitation facilities were performed. The Brigade Surgeon's Office maintains a record of all Vietnamese personnel working in the open mess system and has personally verified all health exams to insure compliance with health regulations.

(14) Medical Statistics:

(a) The Brigade Surgeon's Office compiles various medical reports necessary to evaluate the health of the command and the effectiveness of the medical sections. Among these reports are the Command Health Reports and MEDCAP reports submitted monthly. In addition, weekly reports include the Skin and Infectious Disease report and Morbidity reports which provide information over a shorter period to enable better coordination among medical sections for control of disease. Other weekly medical reports were required during this reporting period. These reports provide the Brigade Surgeon's Office with information concerning MEDCAPS, problems encountered in the field which have not been resolved, and preventive medicine projects initiated at battalion FSB's and battalion areas of BMB.

(b) Bi-monthly medical rosters are now required. Rosters include valuable information about each medic.

(15) Preventive Dentistry: In addition to the dental facility provided at BMB, the mobile dental van provided care to FSB's NANCY, LIBBY, BLACKHORSE, and MACE as well as the CP at Xuan Loc. This service has proven to be beneficial not only from the health standpoint, but also for troop morale by providing services they could not normally obtain.

(16) Pre-IG Medical Inspection: The Brigade Surgeon's Office performed pre-IG inspections of all medical facilities within the brigade. Advice and guidance was provided to insure maximum efficiency in these areas.

n. Brigade Finance. The major activity during the current reporting period was the announcement and completion of Conversion Day. The conversion activities were initiated by HQ USARV on the morning of 11 August. This was the second conversion of MPC within one year and experience gained from the first conversion proved to be invaluable. Upon announcement of C-Day, normal office operations were terminated. The Finance Office had a sufficient supply of conversion forms on hand to meet all requirements. Every battalion and separate company within the brigade had been briefed on C-Day procedures and had been issued the required forms. All units, at the insistence of the Finance Officer, had Conversion Agents on orders, so no bottlenecks were encountered. The entire operation went smoothly.

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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Chaplains in Forward Areas.

(a) Observation: Close personal contact between the chaplains and the troops is a positive force to assist the command in dealing with various problems.

(b) Evaluation: During the past quarter the chaplains have been living in each Battalion Fire Support Base. The readily available source of encouragement and counseling is a substantial morale builder for troops in the forward area.

(c) Recommendation: That each battalion FSB have an area set aside as a living area for the chaplains

b. Operations.

(1) Preparation for C-Day.

(a) Observation: The battalions and separate companies were quite well prepared for the conversion

(b) Evaluation. The operation went very smoothly. This can be attributed to the fact that shortcomings experienced during the previous conversion were noted and steps were taken to prevent these shortcomings from recurring. All units were required to keep conversion officers on current agent orders. Sufficient forms were distributed to each unit, and several briefings were conducted by personnel of the Finance Section to insure familiarity with the procedures involved.

(c) Recommendations: That in the future, the above procedures be followed. Conversion Agents' orders should be updated quarterly. Battalion S-1's should keep the agents briefed quarterly on their duties. The Finance Office will supply the necessary documents and instructions.

(2) Operations in Enemy Base Areas.

(a) Observation: Enemy bunkers are normally well-built and concealed in a mutually supporting pattern and inter-connected by well-used footpaths and/or logging roads.

(b) Evaluation: By conducting movement off-trail but parallel to major trails in base areas, units can effectively avoid becoming engaged by snipers who habitually position themselves to engage targets on trails. This tactic also enables searching units to approach bunkers from the blind side. Teams organized specifically for clearing bunkers are the most effective means of neutralizing base areas. Engagement of bunkers is characterized by LAW's and M-79 canister rounds employed at the bunker entrance, followed by a fragmentation grenade thrown into the bunker and an immediate search by a

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soldier equipped with a caliber .45 pistol and flashlight. Supporting M-60 and M-16's are positioned to provide covering fire and to engage snipers.

(c) Recommendation: That the tactics and techniques described above be considered for use by all units.

(3) Hunter Killer VR Teams.

(a) Observation: HKT have proven to be effective in locating targets for rifle companies and guiding companies to the target.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to an airmobile assault, VR teams can search the area of interest, develop new or better targets and verify landing zones. A large area can be searched using a minimum of force and the situation developed prior to insertion of ground troops. Care must be exercised by the HKT pilots to preclude compromise of intended landing zones. If ground troops are already present in the general area, the HKT can effectively guide them to the target and at the same time afford them some protection and cover during the move.

(c) Recommendation: That units utilize HKT to develop targets for reaction by airmobile insertion of ground troops and to assist in guiding ground troops to likely targets.

(4) Establishment of Ambush Positions.

(a) Observation: Ambush patrols moving into position prior to darkness have observed enemy movement between the hours of 1730 and 1900.

(b) Evaluation: Small groups of enemy, probably engaged primarily in resupply activities, increase their activity in and around villages during the early evening hours. Hasty ambushes set up to counter this movement usually have not produced desired results.

(c) Recommendation: That ambush positions be fully established prior to 1730 hours in areas where the above type of activity has been observed or is likely, so that they can effectively interdict enemy movements. Subsequent movement of these ambush positions after dark normally will be necessary in order to maintain security and to optimize results. Proper sniper team employment should be effective in these operations.

(5) Ambush Patrols.

(a) Observation: Squad-size patrols are significantly more effective than larger ambushes, however, platoon-size ambushes are sometimes necessary when large enemy forces are known to be present in the area.

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(b) Evaluation: Small ambush patrols are much easier to conceal and therefore escape enemy detection more readily. A larger area can be covered when a company is split into smaller, separate ambush patrols. When the enemy has been disorganized and is attempting to escape from an area, small ambush patrols are effective in locating and destroying these elements. Each ambush patrol should have radio communication; this normally can be done by lateral redistribution of assets.

(c) Recommendation: That units utilize squad-size ambush patrols to the maximum extent practicable, resorting to larger ambushes only when the enemy situation clearly dictates the use of a larger force.

(6) Tactical Movement.

(a) Observation: Movement during operations in the jungle requires all personnel to be constantly alert to the signs of enemy presence.

(b) Evaluation: Units must move quietly in order to maintain the element of surprise. Alertness is necessary to detect signs of recent activity, e.g. newly cut trees, fresh footprints and other signs which appear unusual or out of the ordinary. Flank and rear security and overhead observation must be maintained to deny the enemy an advantageous time and opportunity to engage our units. If necessary speed of movement must be reduced to allow proper care in moving quietly.

(c) Recommendation: That units place maximum emphasis on scouting techniques during tactical movement to reduce the incidence of unexpected enemy engagement (ambush).

(7) Base Area Denial.

(a) Observation: Use of CS-2 canister by an infantry rifle company is an effective means of base camp denial.

(b) Evaluation:

1 Advantages: No special training is required for troops to handle and dispense the CS-2 canister. The canister is dispensed by lighting a time fuse and placing the canister in its desired location. A large number of bunkers can be denied in a relatively short period of time. An average enemy base camp of 20 to 25 bunkers can be denied in 10 to 15 minutes. Experience has shown that CS-2 employed in a base camp was at 35 percent strength and the area still denied two months later.

2 Disadvantages: A landing zone (LZ) must be used to deliver the CS-2 to the operational area, as the canister is not air droppable. The time fuse must be protected from water to function properly. The CS-2 canister is fragile and tends to leak, causing discomfort. The operation area must be evacuated by friendly personnel once the denial operation starts. The CS-2 does not permanently deny the bunkers.

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c. Intelligence. None

d. Organization. None

e. Training.

(1) Chemical Training.

(a) Observation: Use of portable flamethrowers during perimeter burn operations will enhance unit proficiency in the use of the weapon.

(b) Evaluation: Individual and unit proficiency with the portable flamethrower decreases through lack of use. Significant training value can be derived through the concurrent training and use of portable flamethrowers during the conduct of routine perimeter burn operations in the vicinity of FSB's.

(c) Recommendation: That units employ portable flamethrowers during perimeter burn operations to enhance technical proficiency.

f. Logistics. None

g. Communications. None

h. Material.

(1) Field Expedient Position Markers.

(a) Observation: Field expedient devices for marking unit positions in jungle terrain are often necessary when issue signal devices are not available or do not perform satisfactorily.

(b) Evaluation: The following techniques have been developed and employed successfully for the marking of positions:

1 Light Jungle: Remove shot and plastic cover from an M-79 canister round. Roll approximately 10 feet of white engineer tape to a diameter equal to the inside diameter of an M-79 canister round. Place a 1½ inch square piece of engineer tape on the bottom of the rolled tape and insert roll into the M-79 canister round. When projectile is fired, the tape reaches a height of approximately 100 feet, unravels and catches on tree tops, where it is easily observed by helicopter crewmen.

2 Heavy Jungle: Chamber an M-79 canister round, after having removed the shot and plastic cover. Ignite a signal smoke, ground, XM166. When smoke appears, drop signal into bore of M-79 and fire into the air. Projectile will reach an approximate height of 150-200 feet, leaving a smoke trail visible to helicopter crewmen.

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(c) Recommendation:

1 That units consider the use of these techniques when issue signal devices are not available.

2 That a time-detonated smoke round be developed for use in the M-79 grenade launcher.

1. Other.

(1) Wet Weather Loading of Engineer Equipment Transporter.

(a) Observation: A transporter became stuck on a muddy access road after being loaded with a scoop loader. After a slight delay, a recovery team rescued the transporter and sent it on its way. The team, using a pair of 2½ ton dump trucks chained in tandem, provided sufficient traction to move the transporter to the hard-surfaced highway.

(b) Evaluation: The procedure of using mounded earth to load engineer equipment, though reliable in the dry season, offers an undue risk during the monsoon season. Trails, secondary access roads, and other unsurfaced areas are susceptible to becoming bogs after steady rain and are particularly hazardous under a heavy load. Rather than risk the chance of becoming stuck, transporter operators should load their vehicle on a solid, well-drained surface. Because such surfaces are not normally appropriate for mounding earth, an alternate method of loading is required. The transporter is equipped with two ramps to facilitate loading. These ramps are normally left back at the base motor pool because of the operators' reliance on the mounded earth ramps. If the steel ramps are used, the transporter can be loaded on any convenient hardstand without mounded earth. Use of the steel ramps preclude losing time finding a suitable area where the terrain or mounding permits loading; hence, a time savings results, in addition to the lessening of the risk of becoming mired (and the resulting requirement to tie up more equipment in the rescue of the transporter).

(c) Recommendation: During the monsoon season, transporter operators will carry and utilize their steel ramps for loading engineer equipment. They should be instructed to choose their loading location on a solid surface with stable access to the departure roads.

(2) Accidental Detonation of Claymore Mines.


(a) Observation: Claymore mines are subject to detonation from lightning during thunder and electrical storms.

(b) Evaluation: A shunt board, consisting of a small piece of board, two nails and a small single strand of WD-1 wire, is a satisfactory method of rendering the claymore mine safe during electrical storms. The shunt board is placed on the inside bunker wall. Two nails

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are driven through the board, and the claymore wires are attached to the nails on the backside. The single strand of WD-1 wire is attached to the head of each nail. As long as this wire is connected, the claymore cannot be detonated. To detonate the claymore, remove the wire from the nails, and detonate electrically with the PRC-25 battery.



(c) Recommendation: That shunt boards be installed in all bunkers as a safety measure against accidental detonation of claymore mines.

(3) Increasing Illumination of Trip Flares.

(a) Observation: Trip flares used on perimeters serve as an adequate warning device but provide only a limited amount of light.

(b) Evaluation: Increasing the light capacity of the trip flare will enable perimeter personnel to easily identify and engage intruder(s) who trip the flares. One effective means of increasing illumination is to fill a 105mm canister with excess powder and place the trip flare inside the canister, covering with gun plastic and tape to waterproof the container. Using such a device, illumination will cover an area of about 75 meter radius for about 60 seconds.

(c) Recommendation: The units employ this illumination device in lieu of the trip flare alone to increase perimeter illumination.

(4) Combat Effectiveness of the Individual Soldier.

(a) Observation: The combat effectiveness of the individual soldier is greatly reduced by the excessive amount of gear required for extended operations. Platoon-size and higher unit movement, both by day and night, is hindered greatly due to this excessive equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Establishment of a company CP, secured by the weapons platoon, would provide an area for units to ground excess equipment and continue on ground reconnaissance and ambushes with weapons, basic load of ammunition and water only. Units could recon during the day, then return


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to the company CP to prepare prior to moving out on night ambushes. The weapons platoon would secure the company CP and also ambush in the vicinity of the CP.

(c) Recommendation: That the weapons platoon establish and secure a company CP to allow units to ground equipment so they can continue maneuvering unhampered by excessive equipment.

- 1 Incl
1. Radio Relay Diagram


WARREN K. BENNETT
Major General, USA
Commanding

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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
For Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFBDA8

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 962661 2 DEC 69

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOB-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for the period
ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVEGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65, RCS CSFOR-65, (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14.

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific **TN:** GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Chaplains in Forward Areas", page 49, paragraph 2a(1). In that it is not possible for all Fire Support Bases to have a Chaplain assigned, decision concerning Chaplain billets at Fire Support Bases is and should continue to be a local command decision.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Operations in Enemy Base Areas", page 49, paragraph 2b(2); concur. This information pertaining to operations in enemy base areas will be considered for publication in USARV's Battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Field Expedient Position Markers", page 52, paragraph 2h(1); nonconcur. The systems proposed are in direct contradiction to the procedures established in paragraph 110b, TM 9-1300-206. Disassembly, alterations, substitutions and improvisations of ammunition or ammunition components is hazardous and is strictly prohibited. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Accidental Detonation of Claymore Mines", page 53, paragraph 2i(2); concur. Information pertaining to the use of shunt boards being installed in all bunkers as a safety measure against accidental detonation of Claymore mines will be considered for publication in USARV's Battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Increasing Illumination of Trip Flares", page 54, paragraph 2j(3); nonconcur. The method proposed is in direct contradiction to the procedures established in paragraph 110b, TM 9-1300-206. Disassembly, alterations, substitutions, and improvisations of ammunition or ammunition components is hazardous and is strictly prohibited.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Cy Farn: 199th LIB
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GPOP-DT (Undtd) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Radio Relay Systems Diagram as of 31 October 1969



NOTES:

- (1) 12 Channel VHF System
- (2) 4 Channel Employment 12 Channel VHF System
- (3) 4 Channel VHF System

INCLOSURE 1

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Security Classification

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