

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO:

FROM:

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

FROM:

AUTHORITY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**

**The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.**

**Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M)(9 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694263

17 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

AD 508036

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

- US Continental Army Command
- US Army Combat Developments Command
- US Army Materiel Command

Commandants

- US Army War College
- US Army Command and General Staff College
- US Army Armor School
- US Army Engineer School
- US Army Field Artillery School
- US Army Infantry School
- US Army Institute for Military Assistance
- US Army Ordnance School
- US Army Quartermaster School
- US Army Transportation School

DDC  
RECEIVED  
APR 8 1970  
RECEIVED

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2

DISTRIBUTION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)  
APO San Francisco 96226

AVCA QN-CD-C

18 November 1969

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion  
(Ammo) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

**THRU:** Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:  
AVCA QN-GO-H, APO 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O  
APO 96384

Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-  
DST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-  
CT, APO 96556

**TO:** Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

**1. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities**

a. During the reporting period, the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) (Direct Support/General Support) continued to perform its mission as a conventional ammunition battalion. The battalion has been engaged in combat service support operations during the entire 92 day reporting period.

b. During the reporting period the battalion's assets were re-distributed and altered as follows:

(1) On 23 September 1969, the 661st Ordnance Company was transferred from the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), to the 525th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), in the US Army Support Command, Da Nang. The unit was transferred with an assigned strength of one officer, one warrant officer and one hundred and eighteen enlisted men.

(2) The mission of the 661st Ordnance Company, which was operating the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot Brass Yard Annex and box and pallet shop, was taken over by the 820th Ordnance Company.

FOR OT UT

694263

Inclosure

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

c. During the reporting period the following changes of command took place:

- (1) CPT Robert L. Cardin assumed command of the 820th Ordnance Company on 2 August 1969.
- (2) LTC Frank G. Johnson assumed command of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Armo) on 5 August 1969.
- (3) CPT Robert M. Young assumed command of the 630th Ordnance Company on 11 August 1969.
- (4) 1LT Frederick D. Jefferson assumed command of HHC, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Armo) on 11 August 1969.
- (5) CPT Charles M. Harnish assumed command of the 661st Ordnance Company on 6 September 1969.
- (6) CPT Dennard R. Ward assumed command of USASUPCOM, QN Security Guard Command (Provisional) on 5 October 1969.
- (7) CPT John A. Robertson assumed command of the 188th Ordnance Company on 17 October 1969.

d. During the reporting period, elements of the battalion received satisfactory ratings in the following inspections:

- (1) Command Maintenance Management Inspection; 183th Ordnance Company, USASUPCOM, QN Security Guard Command (Provisional).
- (2) Annual General Inspection: HHC, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Armo), 820th Ordnance Company.

e. Mission: The battalion's mission is to provide general support ammunition service to all ASP's in the Qui Nhon Support Command and direct support ammunition service to local units in Qui Nhon, An Khe, Fleiku, and Tuy Hoa. The battalion is responsible for the operation of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot and Brass Yard Annex, Ammunition Supply Point #340 at An Khe, Ammunition Supply Point #341 at Fleiku and the Ammunition Supply Point at the Mary Lou FSE. The battalion provides personnel and equipment to operate the Ammunition Supply Point at LZ English.

f. Mission Activities:

- (1) The FSE at LZ Mary Lou was phased out and closed on 31 October 1969. Much planning and coordination had to be done in order to provide the necessary Class V support to units in that region, yet reduce the supplies on hand. The closure was successfully accomplished with a minimum retrograde program by reducing over a period of time the replacement of stocks as they were utilized.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) The 164th Ordnance Battalion (Armo) assumed the responsibility for internal security at ASP #241, at Pleiku. To accomplish this added mission the 168th Ordnance Company strength was increased to approximately 90% by the addition of approximately 50 personnel taken from the Battalion's assets.

(3) The battalion, in coordination with using units has initiated a program of unit distribution at LZ Salem and Fire Base Blackhawk. Since ammunition deliveries had to pass by these installations enroute to the FSE at LZ English (LZ Salem) and the Pleiku ASP (Fire Base Blackhawk), it proved to be more economical to deliver directly to the using units in these areas. The results of this program were a decrease in the amount of transportation required by the using units, shorter hauls by the transportation vehicle; and fewer lifts required to handle the ammunition.

g. Production: The following tabulated data shows the battalion's output for the reporting period:

<u>QUARD</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	11864	15117	16422
Receipts	11368	8969	14682
Warehousing	27276	14062	8809
Total	50276	38148	39313

<u>PLEIKU</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	4256	4070	6085
Receipts	4071	4329	4725
Warehousing	3329	4674	4669
Total	11656	13073	15479

<u>AN KIE</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	2834	3045	3337
Receipts	2599	3226	3189
Warehousing	2579	2747	2710
Total	8012	9027	9236

<u>MARY LOU</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	1098	978	520
Receipts	1160	645	204
Warehousing	633	626	393
Total	3981	2249	1117

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<u>LZ ENGLISH</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	1803	1978	1773
Receipts	1776	2008	1981
Warehousing	402	307	306
Total	3981	4293	4060

<u>QMABD GRASS YARD</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Issues	271	250	667
Receipts	332	271	470
Warehousing	100	175	350
Total	703	696	1487

**TOTALS:**

QMABD	128337
PLEIKU	40208
AN KHE	26275
LZ MARY LOU	6257
LZ ENGLISH	12337
QMABD BRASS YARD	2386

GRAND TOTAL                      216300

h. Enemy Activity: During the previous quarter the 184th Ordnance Battalion and the ABD had contact with enemy personnel on several occasions:

(1) On 061900 hours September 1969, the Camp Humber Cantonment Area received sniper fire which was replied to with Quad 50's. No casualties or damage was reported. Enemy casualties were unknown.

(2) At 062130 hours September 1969, sniper fire was again received on the Cantonment Area and on QL1, between the Cantonment Area and the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot. Negative casualties.

(3) At 090110 hours September 1969, six rounds of 82mm mortar hit the Cantonment Area resulting in a 1000 gallon water truck destroyed and minor damage to a mess hall. Fire was returned with unknown results.

(4) At 102345 hours September 1969, the Ammunition Base Depot came under SA fire. Fire was returned resulting in one enemy sapper KIA. At approximately 2355 hours, two ammunition pads were partially destroyed by satchel charges and five satchel charges were removed from those partially destroyed pads.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(5) On 030015 hours October 1969, an intruder was observed in the vicinity of the ABD Perimeter. The individual was driven off with small arms fire. A sweep of the area during daylight hours revealed barefoot prints in the area of the sighting.

Summary: The interdiction of a suspected sapper or reconnaissance scout on 3 October 1969 and the sapper KIA during the attack on 10 September 1969, would indicate an overall improvement in the security of the Ammunition Base Depot. In four attacks prior to the attack on 10 September, the sappers had been able to place their charges and escape without detection. In addition, swift action on the part of the ammunition personnel during this attack served to minimize damage to Class V supplies. The security of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is being continually upgraded by construction of new defensive works and improving the quality of the guard forces.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSTOR-65 (R2)

2. Section II. Lessons Learned: Comparisons Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel:

(1) Observations: The 184th Ordnance Battalion is authorized three conventional ammunition companies with essentially like TO&E, and basically the same mission. Two of these companies are in support of the Ammunition Base Depot and ASP #240, and the third operates ASP #341, at Pleiku. All units are suffering a shortage of personnel which affects the mission to varying degrees. The company at Pleiku, although having approximately the same percentage of fill was being affected to a greater extent than identical companies.

(2) Evaluation: The company at Pleiku was separated from all of its sister units and comparatively isolated from the headquarters. The other units being in close proximity with each other and with the command element, were able to adjust their work loads by exchanging and assisting as necessary. Not having the benefit of qualified personnel readily available, the unit of necessity, was organized along lines to insure continuity of personnel. This required a less flexible structure than that available in the headquarters area and consequently more overhead and a larger, more formal security element.

(3) Solution: The companies immediately adjacent to the headquarters and benefiting from certain command functions were capable of operating at a lesser overall percentage of fill than the company located at Pleiku. Policy was modified to provide more replacements to that unit, to keep it at a more stable percentage of fill at the expense of its sister companies. This resulted in all units accomplishing their mission more economically.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Observation: Intelligence information at battalion level is quite frequently of little value by the time it is acquired.

(2) Evaluation: The S-2 receives intelligence reports from several different sources i.e., higher headquarters, ROK Armed Forces, and local intelligence reported by personnel of this battalion. In the case of external intelligence by the time the information has been evaluated and disseminated, particularly when a period of increased activity is expected, it is often out dated.

(3) Recommendation: That intelligence gathering agencies either improve the distribution system for such data or make longer range projections.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

a. Operationa:

(1) Observation: Detachment "A" of the 820th Ordnance Company was assigned the task of cleaning up after the closing of an Ammunition Supply Point at Tuy Hoa.

(2) Evaluation: The detachment originally consisted of four enlisted men and twelve Local National's, engaged in processing retro-grade material and maintaining and coordinating Class V activities in the area subsequent to the closing of the ASP. Constant re-evaluation of the situation existing in the area, allowed this team to be reduced to two enlisted personnel. The task of this team is to provide continued coordination between using units and the base depot and to monitor the effectiveness of current Class V distribution in the area. If the need should arise, to recommend steps to increase supplies and to provide reconnaissance information for possible future storage sites.

(3) Solution: Rapid changes in the tactical situation can create severe fluctuations in logistical support needs for any given area. Constant monitoring of small unit activities, particularly those involved in Class V supply, is necessary to provide adequate support to the using units, yet preclude overstockage of supplies needed elsewhere. The tonnage and bulk involved in Class V Supply further complicates the situation, necessitating a more detailed planning and inspection procedure.

d. Organization:

(1) Observation: One company involved in ammunition storage activities at the Ammunition Base Depot was having difficulty in accomplishing its objectives.

(2) Evaluation: The company had been assigning tasks to its squads on an as needed basis. If supplies needed to be restacked or relocated within its area of responsibility, a squad or section was assigned the task without regard to specific areas of responsibility. The results were frequently not up to standard in some areas. The areas of responsibility were redistributed and fixed to a particular section. Each squad was given a section of the storage area and complete responsibility for all activities in that area. The results were a significant improvement in the entire operation, increased productivity and a greater feeling of esprit de corps.

(3) Recommendation: The desire to possess an area and to be recognized as being responsible for both success and shortcomings is a prime motivating factor for most people. These teams were able to identify with and exercise control over a segment of a large depot. In this instance increased emphasis was put on productive man hours rather than on man hours expended. The teams were given tasks with a time limit but no minimum time required. Strongly recommend that whenever possible this system be utilized as a management improvement technique.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

e. Training

(1) Observation: Project Buddy was initially looked upon as a task to be avoided, by many of the individuals charged with carrying out the objectives of this program.

(2) Evaluation: Many US Military personnel are reluctant to become involved in training the ARVN. Much of this reluctance can be blamed on ignorance and rumor. This battalion was tasked with instructing an ARVN Unit in various ordnance skills. Upon completion, the ARVN publicly awarded the instructors a badge which in their service denotes a school trained ordnance technician. Although, not authorized for wear, nor an official decoration, this gesture created much good will among the personnel utilized in this program. Other personnel not previously involved began to compete for these positions in order to gain the same recognition. The ARVN likewise benefited since attending this schooling qualified them for this same badge which entitles them to specialty pay. According to information available to this headquarters, this was the only Non-ARVN course of instruction to be so recognized.

(3) Recommendation: That such presentations by foreign services be recognized officially as beneficial to the overall program. This can best be accomplished by authorizing these badges for wear in the geographic area in which earned.

f. Logistics:

(1) Observation: Frequently problems in Class V Logistics arose over lack of contact between using units and the supply personnel.

(2) Class V distribution is a vital link in maintaining the unit in the field at a high degree of combat effectiveness. Problems arise quite frequently, as a result of the using units lack of knowledge of the distribution system, or what to do if malfunctions etc occur. This battalion has undertaken a project whereby technical visits are made to the using units to determine their needs, provide information on available supplies and generally assist the unit in acquiring assistance necessary to perform the mission. Visits were made to the 4th Infantry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 62nd Artillery. Results of this project are still being monitored, but from initial observations it appears to have resulted in a better understanding of joint problems and has significantly improved Class V support within the Qui Nhon Support Command.

(3) Recommendation: Technical visits have long been recognized as an essential part of logistics. Almost every supply or maintenance activity can improve its relationship with the customer by visiting him and should be constantly encouraged to do so.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

**g. Communications:**

(1) Observation: One ordnance detachment assigned to this battalion is not authorized communications equipment by TDA or TO&E.

(2) Evaluation: For security purposes as well as mission requirements, communications equipment is considered to be vital. This unit has the responsibility for securing a portion of the perimeter and is required to maintain communications with various elements of the battalion. Presently, this equipment can only be acquired on hand receipt.

(3) Recommendation: That all units in RVN be authorized some sort of communications equipment commensurate with their mission requirements and that MTO&E's be closely scrutinized in order to preclude a units under estimating its need for communications equipment.

**h. Materiel:**

(1) Observation: The vast majority of small arms ammunition comes packed in metal cans which are then placed in wire bound boxes. The markings on the box include the DODAC, but markings on the can do not.

(2) Evaluation: Wooden boxes deteriorate rapidly in Vietnam and the markings disappear or become illegible. This creates a problem in identification. The situation is further complicated when using units turn-in quantities of ammunition which have been unpacked. Much ammunition is temporarily lost to service and requires extensive renovation to restore it to stock when these problems occur.

(3) Recommendation: That in all cases of using units unpacking ammunition which is not going to be used in the immediate future, the DODAC be transferred to the can. A magic marker or grease pencil would suffice. That this fact be publicized. Ideally that the DODAC be stenciled on the can at the time it is filled with small arms ammunition.

**i. Other:**

(1) Observation: A unit was experiencing maintenance problems on vehicles used by a detachment separated from the parent unit.

(2) Evaluation: Policy had been to perform maintenance when it was scheduled or when a malfunction affecting the operation occurred. Due to the very considerable down time experienced on these vehicles the policy was changed whereby the vehicles were rotated bi-weekly between the parent unit and the detachment. Having the vehicle under closer supervision of experienced maintenance personnel reduced the problems experienced.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(3) Recommendation: That all small unit commanders consider this method of vehicle maintenance as a possible solution to similar difficulties. That this information be disseminated widely to units required to maintain field detachments for long periods of time.



FRANK G. JOHNSON  
LTC, OrdC  
Commanding

3 Incl  
Organizational Chart  
QMABD After Action Report  
ASP #340 After Action Report

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVCA QN-GO-H (18 Nov 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 12 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0, APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

a. SECTION II, paragraph b: Concur. This headquarters disseminates information to the appropriate commands as soon as it is received. Intelligence agencies which pass information to this headquarters are continually seeking ways to improve their methods of collection, evaluation and dissemination.

b. SECTION II, paragraph d: Concur. This management technique will be utilized whenever possible.

c. SECTION II, paragraph e: Concur. Action by higher headquarters would be required to authorize wear of ARVN military insignia by US personnel.

d. SECTION II, paragraph f: Concur. An improved technical assistance program has been implemented. Each major unit is visited at least once a month and also upon request if additional help is required. These visits are made by personnel of the 184th Ord Bn and ACoS Supply & Services (Ammo Br) of this headquarters. This has improved the service provided for these units and has resulted in fewer ammunition support problems.

e. SECTION II, paragraph g: Nonconcur. Not all units in RVN need communication equipment to accomplish their missions. Should special requirements (such as perimeter security) exist, provisions have been made for submission of appropriate MTOE/MTDA and temporary equipment loans.


f. SECTION II, paragraph h: Concur. Information of this type is disseminated through the "Bullet-In", a bi-weekly publication of the 184th Ord Bn and through technical assistance visits.

g. SECTION II, paragraph i: Concur. Rotation of vehicles from detachments in isolated areas to the parent unit on a periodic basis is an effective means of providing adequate maintenance for vehicles used in areas which lack adequate organizational maintenance facilities.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QN 2161

  
ROBERT J. FLORCZAK  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

AVCA GO-MH (18 Nov 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 184th Ordnance  
Battalion for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65  
(R2)(U)

12 JAN 1970

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning wearing of foreign ground badges, page 8, paragraph 2e. Concur. Provisions are established in paragraph 4a, USARV Regulation 672-2 for authorization to accept and wear foreign badges.

b. Reference item concerning packing of small arms ammunition, page 9, paragraph h. Nonconcur. Small arms ammunition that has been removed from its original packing (metal can) by a using unit, loses its identity immediately. If this ammunition is returned to the Class V supply point it must be retrograded to be inspected and tested to determine its serviceability. If found to be serviceable it is repacked and given a conglomerate lot number. No further renovation is authorized for small arms munitions. The DODIC is now being stenciled on metal containers for small arms munitions at the time of manufacture.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839



C.D. STAFFORD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst, AG

CF:  
USASUPCOM, QNH  
184th Ord Bn


AVHGC-DST (18 Nov 69) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 30 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion (AMMO) and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, ACC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:  
184th Ord Bn  
1st Log Cnd

GPOP-DT (18 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 184th Ordnance Battalion (AMMO) for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 FEB 1970


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. TUCKER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



\* PROVIDES SECURITY FOR QNABD AND AN KHE ASP  
 \*\* ATTACHED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES

Incl 1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96226

AVCA QN-OD-B

11 September 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Attack On the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

Attached as inclosure 1 is the final after action report concerning the attack on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot on 10 September 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*Phillip A. Hennan*  
PHILLIP A. HENNAN  
CPT, OrdC  
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

3-CG, 1st Log Cmd  
3-CG, USASUPCOM, QN  
3-CO, 8th Trans Gp  
3-CO, 593rd GS Gp  
1-CO, HHC, 184th Ord Bn (Ammo)  
1-CO, 188th Ord Co  
1-CO, 630th Ord Co  
1-CO, 820th Ord Co  
1-CO, 504th Ord Det  
2-CO, Prov Guard  
1- Materiel Officer

Protective marking cancelled when  
separated from inclosure.

Incl 2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**ATTACK ON QUI NHON AMMUNITION BASE DEPOT  
10 September 1969**

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE: To review the events of 10 September 1969 concerning the initial explosions and subsequent fires in the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot and Allied Operations in the immediate area.

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain: The Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is located in Valley "F" Phu Thanh, Republic of Vietnam. It is located at the northern base of the Cu Mong Pass and is surrounded on four sides by higher ground.

(1) To the East there is a high ridge line with extremely dense vegetation. On top of the ridgeline there are several trails but there is no source of water resupply.

(2) To the South is Cu Mong Pass which is protected by the 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, 26th Regiment, ROKA Capital Division (Tiger).

(3) To the West there are high hills with extremely dense vegetation, numerous valleys, well used trails and sufficient streams to provide a source of water resupply.

(4) To the North there is a natural avenue of approach with a low ridge-line, dense vegetation and a stream that flows from the ABD, through the Village of Phu Tai into Dao Ho Lac.

b. The following intelligence was available to this headquarters on 10 September 1969.

(1) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 5 September 1969 one VC platoon, approximately 20 personnel, appeared from vic CRO320 to Long Ban Hamlet (CRO125) and collected some salt, and some rice and then moved to vic CRO320.

(2) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 5 September 1969, one VC platoon, approximately 25 personnel, moved from vic CR 0627 to Mt. Ko Sin (CR 0223). They had one 81mm mortar.

(3) ROKA intelligence sources reported that no contact was made during an operation conducted on Vung Chau Mountain, during the period 6-8 September 1969.

(4) On 6 September 1969 at approximately 1900 Camp Humper received sniper fire on the western section of the perimeter, fire was returned with Quad 50.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(5) On 6 September 1969 at approximately 2130 hours, sniper fire was received on the western perimeter of Camp Humpor and in the S-curve between Camp Humpor and the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot.

(6) At 090110H September (vic CR 007186) QN Compound Complex F, the 184th Ordnance Battalion received 6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. 1 Round landed outside the perimeter and 5 rounds impacted inside. 1 Round impacted near a 1000 gallon water truck rendering the truck unrepairable. 1 Round hit near the 15th Engr Co (LE) Mess Hall with negligible damage. There were no casualties. Enemy suspected firing position CR 0017. Fire was returned with small arms and mortar with unknown results.

(7) At 0800 hours 9 September 1969, a ROKA Special Forces Company began an operation in the vicinity of Vung Chua Mountain. Up to the time of the attack on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot there were no reports from ROKA intelligence of any enemy activity in this area.

(8) At 1100 hours 9 September 1969, a ROKA two company operation began in the hills to the south of Camp Humpor. Up to the time, of the attack on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot there were no reports from ROKA intelligence of any enemy activity in this area.

(9) Message received from AVCA QN-SACS at approximately 1300 hours indicated increased enemy activity and read as follows: "There is a possibility that the enemy will use the so-called "cease fire" period to make preparations and motivate his forces for attack immediately after the end of the mourning period. A gray alert status will be in effect as of 101800 hours Sept 1969".

(10) At approximately 2100 hours 10 September 1969, a message was received from the Qui Nhon TOC. The message stated that information gained from captured documents indicated increased activity in the Qui Nhon area after 0100 hours 11 September 1969.

(11) The ROKA ambushes around the depot neither saw movement nor heard the enemy.

**3. BACKGROUND TO ACTION:**

a. On the night of 10 September 1969, 43 towers were manned in the QNABD.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

b. On the night of 10 September 1969, there were seven ambushes in the area surrounding the depot at the following locations:

- (1) Approximately 80 meters to the front of Tower 13.
- (2) Midway between Tower 17 and 18, approximately 80 meters out from the perimeter.
- (3) Midway between Towers 22 and 23, approximately 80 meters out from the perimeter.
- (4) To the left front of Tower 31, approximately 15 meters from the perimeter.
- (5) Midway between Towers 36 and 37, approximately 15 meters from the perimeter.
- (6) To the right front of Tower 40, approximately 15 meters from the perimeter.
- (7) Midway between Towers 4 and 5, just inside the perimeter wire.

c. On the night of 10 September 1969, seven dog patrols were posted in the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot at the following locations:

- (1) From Tower 8 to Tower 9.
- (2) From Tower 9 to midway between Towers 11 and 12.
- (3) From Tower 14 to Tower 15.
- (4) From Tower 15 to Tower 17.
- (5) From Tower 17 to Tower 19.
- (6) From Tower 21 to Tower 23.
- (7) Between Towers 38 and 39 at the bottom of the ridge.

d. On the night of 10 September 1969 there were three roving patrols in the depot.

19  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

e. On the night of 10 September 1959, there were three 5000 gallon tankers and one 1000 gallon water truck stationed in the depot.

4. SUMMARY OF EVENTS: (For location of pads see Inclosure 1)

a. At approximately 2345 hours the listening post between towers 35 and 36 received small arms fire.

b. At 2347 hours a Viet Cong was observed attempting exit between towers 38 and 39. The individual was taken under fire and killed at the outer fence line.

c. At 2348 hours Compound Complex Foxtrot was placed on yellow alert status.

d. At 2348 hours six additional water trucks were notified to proceed to the depot.

e. At 2348 hours two additional depot patrols were notified to proceed to the depot.

f. At 2349 hours the depot react force was formulated and taken to critical pads for pad guards.

g. At 2349 hours two ten man react forces from the cantonment area were notified to proceed to the depot.

h. At 2350 hours an explosion was observed on pad 62. A fire started on the pad.

i. At 2353 hours an explosion was observed at Pad 63. A fire started on the pad.

j. At 2355 hours a water truck arrived at Pad 62 and under the direction of the driver, began fighting the fire on that pad.

k. At 2357 hours a water truck arrived at Pad 63 and began fighting the fire.

l. At 2358 hours the fire was extinguished on Pad 62.

m. At 0001 hours the fire was extinguished on Pad 63.

n. At 0005 hours a second explosion was observed on Pad 62. A fire was again started on this pad.

o. At 0025 all fires were extinguished in the depot.

p. All pad guards were posted by 0035 hours.

20

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

q. At 0045 hours a sweep of the stream beds and immediate area of the blown pads was conducted with negative results.

r. At 0045 hours a systematic search of all the pads in the immediate vicinity was conducted with negative results.

s. At 0630 hours personnel from the EOD section arrived and began inspecting the blown pads.

t. At 0630 hours a sweep of the interior of the depot was started.

u. At 0630 hours a sweep outside the fence line on the north ridge was started.

v. At 0635 hours a satchel charge was found on Pad 63 by EOD personnel.

w. At 0700 hours a satchel charge was found on Pad 62 by EOD personnel.

x. At 0800 hours the exit point of a second sapper was found between towers 37 and 38. Leaflets were found on the back side of the north ridge and foot prints indicated that the sapper had entered and exited the depot at this point.

y. At 0900 hours all sweeps were finished with no further results.

5. ANALYSIS OF EVENTS:

a. Between 2350 and 0001 hours three explosions occurred within the depot. From the description and results of the explosions it appears that these explosions were caused by a satchel charge similar to the type previously employed in the QNABD.

b. It is probable that the sappers set the second satchel charge on Pad 62 with a delayed fuse to produce casualties among those persons fighting the initial fire.

c. A fourth satchel charge was found on Pad 62. The charge was the same type found in the attack on the depot on 11 July 1969. The charge consisted of 2 1 quart solid oil cans tied together. The charge had only one fuse, a time fuse approximately 30 seconds. The fuse had not been ignited. The blasting cap was of foreign make and resembled the American type 6 blasting cap. The cap and fuse were placed in a hole cut in the top of the can. A second hole was cut in the can, possibly for dual priming. The explosive was a plastic type similar to C-4. It was oily, dulish white in color and easily molded.

d. A fifth satchel charge was found on Pad 63. The charge looked like a cement block and consisted of TNT/Tritentol. The block was approximately the size of a four sided gallon can. The deminsions of the block were 12"X6" X4". A hole was cut in the center approximately 2" long and 2" wide. A small hole 1 inch deep was filled with a booster to assist in setting off the main charge. It is felt that a charge of this type did not detonate on either of the two pads.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

e. The damage due to this attack was negligible. A complete listing of items lost by DODIC is as follows:

C445	206 rds
C650	24 rds

5. CONCLUSION: From the evidence and statements available it is apparent that the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot was attacked by 3 personnel utilizing satchel charges at 2350 hours, 10 September 1969. Two personnel were able to penetrate the depot perimeter in the Northern section, place five charges and return to the perimeter. The third person started a diversion, by firing at the towers, to assist the 2 sappers exit of the depot. One of the sappers was seen however and killed as he attempted to exit the outer perimeter fence.

6. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Situation: At approximately 0010 hours all of the Han Jin vehicles were ordered to leave the depot and proceed to the Brass Yard. The Han Jin truck driver did not go to the Brass Yard but proceeded to the Camp Huaper Main Gate. The trucks were directed to return to the Brass Yard, and park their trucks off the road and inside the Brass Yard Perimeter.

Observation: Due to a lack of guidance or misunderstanding the Han Jin truck drivers did not go initially to the Brass Yard as directed.

Recommendation: That the Han Jin supervisor lead the trucks from the Depot to the Brass Yard.

b. Situation: Sappers are placing two to three charges on pads with a different time delay.

Observation: Apparently multiple charges are being placed on pads with different time delays to injure or kill fire fighting personnel. One charge detonated and personnel arrived to extinguish the fire. Upon putting out this fire the personnel left the pad, prior to the second charge detonating. Extensive search in the day light revealed that additional charges had been placed within the pads. One of the charges was not properly armed and the other charge found was apparently misplaced and failed to detonate.

Recommendation: At the same time personnel are fighting the fire an extensive and thorough search must be made to discover and remove or disarm any additional charges prior to detonation.

c. Situation: This Battalion is not authorized fire trucks. Fire fighting coverage is provided by PA and E, located in Phu Tai, approximately 12-14 minutes away. Fires were fought with unit water trucks.

Observation: Experience has shown that ammunition fires must be attacked vigorously with large quantities of water within 3-5 minutes, to successfully bring it under control. Unit water trucks do not provide an adequate means for fighting fires.

**CONFIDENTIAL**


Recommendation: That this Battalion be authorized fire trucks with crews for the purpose of fighting ammunition fires.

d. Situation: Enemy sapper was discovered leaving the depot approximately 3 minutes before the first explosion was observed.

Observation: Enemy sappers have been penetrating the depot perimeter along the north ridge and indications are that the sapper has left the depot before the first charge detonates.

Recommendation: That a neon search light be stationed in the vicinity of the Brass Yard for immediate employment on the outer face of the north ridge when an explosion is heard within the depot or movement is reported by towers.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96226

AVCA QN-OD-B

3 September 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Attack On ASP 340 at An Khe

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached as Inclosure 1 is the final after action report concerning the attack on ASP 340 at An Khe on 29 August 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*Phillip A H*  
PHILLIP A. HENNAN  
CPT, OrdC  
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - CG, 1st Log Cnd
- 3 - CG, USASUPCOM, QN
- 3 - CO, 8th Trans Gp
- 3 - CO, 593 GS GP
- 1 - CO, HHC, 184th Ord Bn
- 1 - CO, 188th Ord Co
- 2 - CO, 630th Ord Co
- 1 - CO, 661st Ord Co
- 1 - CO, 820th Ord Co
- 2 - CO, Prov Guard Cnd
- 1 - Materiel Officer

Incl 3

ATTACK ON ASP 340, AN KHE  
29 August 1969

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE: To review the events of 29 August 1969 concerning the initial explosions and subsequent fires in ASP 340 at An Khe and Allied Operations in the immediate area.

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain: ASP 340 is located in the south western portion of Camp Radcliff, An Khe, Viet Nam. It is situated on the southeastern base of Hong Kong Mountain.

(1) To the north lies Hong Kong Mountain with extremely dense vegetation running down to the ASP fence line.

(2) To the west is the "Green Line" or outer perimeter of Camp Radcliff, approximately 100 meters from the perimeter of the ASP.

(3) To the south there is an ice plant which operates 24 hours a day and some administration buildings which are not occupied at night.

(4) To the east there is an old ammunition area which was abandoned about 10 months prior to this attack. This area is now covered with dense vegetation.

b. Intelligence available to ASP 340 on 29 August 1969.

(1) Enemy activity was at a low in the An Khe area.

(2) Intelligence sources indicated no increase in enemy activity in the Camp Radcliff area.

(3) On 240404 hours August 1969 at BR 401449, bridge 22 received a coordinated sapper attack and attack by fire from an estimated 2 VC squads.

(4) On 271510 hours August 1969 at BR 535602 17 km NNE of An Khe, Haw-Koye 1c observed 2 NVA armed with AK-47's moving west. Element engaged them with small arms fire, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Team then evaded, heard movement to the south, observed 1 individual following team, employed small arms fire resulting in 1 more NVA KIA.

3. BACKGROUND TO ACTION:

a. On the morning of 29 August 1969, 10 guard towers were manned.

b. On the morning of 29 August 1969, four dog patrols were posted in the ASP.

c. Dog patrols were in the midst of change over. The second shift had been on duty for approximately 15 minutes when the first explosion occurred.

d. All posts on the Green Line were manned.

4. SUMMARY OF EVENTS: (For Location of Pads See Inclosure 1)

- a. At approximately 0030 hours an explosion was observed on the small arms area in shed # 2
- b. At 0035 hours a second explosion was observed on the small arms area in shed # 1.
- c. The communications bunker was notified by the guard in tower # 3. The ASP OIC, 1LT Christie was notified.
- d. At 0035 hours the fire station was notified to dispatch fire trucks to the ASP.
- e. At 0038 hours a fire truck arrived at the small arms area and began fighting the fire.
- f. At 0040 hours 1LT Christie arrived at the small arms area.
- g. At 0042 hours 1LT Christie sent personnel to search pads 2, 3 and 4 for additional satchel charges. Those pads were adjacent to the small arms area and contained white phosphorous and HE projectiles.
- h. At 0045 hours a rough terrain fork lift arrived and began scattering the burning pallets around the small arms area in order.
- i. At 0045 hours personnel were sent to search pads 6-11.
- j. At 0047 hours the fire truck ran out of water leaving several pallets still burning.
- k. At 0050 hours a third explosion was heard on pad 5, which contained CS powder.
- l. At 0051 hours the fire was extinguished in the small arms area with the use of buckets of water from the fire barrels.
- m. At 0052 hours a fire truck and water truck arrived at pad 5 and began fighting the fire.
- n. At 0055 hours the fire was extinguished on pad 5.
- o. At 0055 hours personnel from the EOD detachment arrived at the ASP and started a systematic search of pads.
- p. At 0105 hours a fourth explosion was observed on pad 5.
- q. At 0108 hours this fire was extinguished.
- r. At 0115 hours pad guards were placed on all critical pads in the ASP.

s. At 0400 hours a team of scout dogs arrived at the ASP. They proceeded to pad 5 and found the tracks of two individuals leading into and out of the ASP between towers 3 and 4. These two people had apparently crawled under the perimeter wire and proceeded into the ASP using a gully halfway between the two towers for cover. All evidence indicates that the two individuals left the same way.

t. At 0500 hours the tower guard in tower 2 spotted movement to the south-east of his tower and fired two rounds in that direction. The scout dogs were sent to the area where they found the tracks of 2 people. The dogs lost the trail and the search was abandoned.

u. At 0630 hours a 30 man force made a search of the south face of Hong Kong Mountain with negative results.

v. At 0730 a sweep was made of the west side of the ASP with negative results.

#### 5. ANALYSIS OF EVENTS:

a. Between the hours of 0030 - 0105 four explosions occurred on two pads in ASP 340 at An Kho. These explosions were caused by satchel charges placed by two sappers who had penetrated the ASP.

b. The four explosions resulted in the destruction or retrograding to Qui Nhon for inspection of the following ammunition.

A131	CTG 7.62mm LKD 4-1	204,000 each
D505	Proj 155mm Illum M3A1	102 each
F497	Con Clus E 158	7 each
K772	Chon Agent (80 lbs)	7 drums
L/07	Flare A/C Para MK24 w/o Band	34 each

6. CONCLUSION: From the evidence and statements available it is evident that ASP 340 was attacked by 2 personnel utilizing satchel charges at approximately 0030 hours 29 August 1969. These personnel were able to penetrate the ASP perimeter in the northern section of the ASP without being seen.

#### 7. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Situation: Fire fighting equipment was not readily available at the ASP.

Observation: All fire fighting equipment available to the ASP is requested through P&E. The fire truck dispatched to the ASP ran out of water before the fire was extinguished.

Recommendation: That a 1000 gallon water truck be made available to ASP 340. The truck to be stationed at the ASP at all times.

b. Situation: A forklift was readily available in the ASP and took immediate action in stopping the fire from spreading.


Observation: The use of the forklift to move burning pallets was instrumental in containing the fire to a few pallets.

Recommendation: That measures be taken to insure that a forklift and operator are available to the ASP during the hours of darkness, and that a training program be established to familiarize forklift operators with the necessary precautions and actions to be taken when moving burning pallets of ammunition.

c. Situation: The South face of Hong Kong Mountain is covered with a thick growth of vegetation.

Observation: The sappers used the thick vegetation for cover and concealment while advancing to and entering the ASP.

Recommendation: That funds be made available to strip the south face of Hong Kong mountain of all vegetation.



UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 184th Ordnance Battalion		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug '69 to 31 Oct 69.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 184th Ordnance Battalion			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
18 November 1969		33	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.		694263	
c.		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.21-R  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED ON  
ITS USE AND DISTRIBUTION