

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD508303	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 NOV 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY	
30 Nov 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1982	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

IN REPLY REFER TO

24 March 1970




























"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
ESPIONAGE LAWS"

ESTING THE NATIONAL
OF THE
BY LAW.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

Kenneth G. Nickham
KENNETH G. NICKHAM

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

AD508303

US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Combat Surveillance School
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

- US Army Ordnance School
- US Army Signal School
- US Army Southeastern Signal School
- US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

- Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Research and Development
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Engineers
- The Surgeon General
- The Provost Marshal General
- Commanding Generals
 - US Army Electronics Command
 - US Army Weapons Command
 - US Army Flight Training Center
- III Corps
 - 1st Cavalry Division
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command
- USAF Air Ground Operations School
- The Air University Library
- Defense Documentation Center
- USAF Project RAND
- Commanding Officers
 - US Army Limited War Laboratory
 - US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
 - US Army Aviation Test Activity
 - US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1969

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I	
Operations	P. 1
SECTION II	
Lessons Learned	P. 75
SECTION III	
DA Survey Information	P. 84
Task Organization	TAB A
Weather and Terrain	TAB B
Surveillance Information	TAB C
Intelligence Activities	TAB D
Training/Combat Developments	TAB E
Key Personnel Roster	TAB F
G-1 Activities	TAB G
Division Quarterly Strength Report	TAB H
Casualty Statistics	TAB I
Replacement Report	TAB J
Fire Bases Constructed and Closed	TAB K
Reenlistments and Extensions	TAB L
Enlisted Promotion Statistics	TAB M
Awards and Decorations	TAB N
Special Services	TAB O
R&R Program	TAB P
Postal Activities	TAB Q
Army Emergency Relief	TAB R
VIP Visits	TAB S
Information Activities	TAB T
Judge Advocate General Activities	TAB U
Provost Marshal Activities	TAB V
Finance Activities	TAB W
Chaplain Activities	TAB X
Surgeon Activities	TAB Y
Inspector General Activities	TAB Z
Logistics Operations	TAB AA
Logistics	TAB AB
Civil Affairs	TAB AC
Psychological Operations	TAB AD
Chemical Activities	TAB AE

All Incl (TABS) wd HQ, DA, with the exception of A, C, E, V,Y, AA, AB, AC, AD, and AE.

**Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM)
APO 96490

AVDAME

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam
ATTN: AVEBC-RE-H
APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operations:

a. General

(1) The reporting period covers Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR (initiated 241200H Jun 69) as a part of Operation Toan Thang III.

(2) The August-September 1969 period saw a continuation of the roles, missions and functions from the last reporting period, but with an increase in the use of combined ARVN-US operations. During the reporting period, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) conducted operations in Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. A continued build-up of intelligence culminated with the Communist offensive on the night of 11-12 August that consisted of attacks on most fire support bases in the Division's area of operations (AO). The major portion of the battle lasted two days while some significant contacts continued for a week after the highpoint. The decrease in enemy activity in the ensuing weeks returned the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to the employment of small unit operations to locate and destroy enemy bunker complexes, cache sites,

FOR OT UT
694007
Inclosure

1

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

and interdict enemy infiltration and logistics routes and eliminate enemy forces within the tactical area of responsibility. Throughout the reporting period, the Division continuously conducted small unit combined operations with elements of the 5th ARVN Division, 34th and 35th ARVN Ranger Battalions, 1st and 15th ARVN Cavalry Squadrons, Regional Force/Popular Force Units, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the 2nd ARVN ABN BDE, when it moved into the AO in October. The use of combined operations has established profitable relationships and significantly improved the operational efficiency of all units involved.

(a) Enemy losses: 3679 KIA, 53 PW captured, 100 Hoi Chanh, 145 crew-served weapons captured, 3736 large caliber rounds captured, 87,181 small caliber rounds captured.

(b) Friendly losses: 137 KIA, 1239 WIA of which 806 required evacuation, 6 OH-6A destroyed, 5 UH-1H destroyed, 2 AH-1G destroyed, 1 3/4 ton truck destroyed, one 1/4 ton truck destroyed, 9 tanks destroyed, 39 ACAV's destroyed, one 3/4 ton trailer destroyed, and one D-5 bulldozer destroyed.

(3) The steady buildup of evidence which, in general, substantiated attack plans by the enemy forces was confirmed during the early morning hours of 12 August as enemy forces launched stand-off attacks followed by ground probes throughout the Division AO. Enemy ground attacks were launched against fire support bases Andy, Aspen, Becky and Sidewinder, the Duc Phong Special Forces District Headquarters and the villages of An Loc and Loc Ninh. Pursuit operations of the retreating enemy forces continued for a week after the general offensive with the major portion of the fighting taking place during the first three days when the enemy lost 761 KIA's.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(4) Enemy activity decreased sharply after the initial offensive and generally consisted of light indirect fire attacks. The lull was broken briefly during early September when a short upsurge of enemy activity occurred in War Zone "C" and Binh Long Province. During the latter half of September, intelligence indicated a reorientation and reorganization of major NVA/VC units within the Division AO. Indirect fire attacks continued and were accompanied by light ground probes by sapper elements. To counter this threat, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) employed extensive small unit night ambushes for the purpose of interdicting enemy units and disrupting planned sequence of attacks. Ambush operations resulted in 121 NVA KIA during the month of September.

(5) The September lull continued through the month of October. The emphasis placed on small unit operations and ambushes yielded frequent contacts with small groups (3-6 individuals) moving through the area. There was a sharp increase in the number of minor cache sites discovered. Some larger sites were located with the aid of Hoi Chanh.

(6) Combined ARVN-US operations were centered in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces throughout most of the reporting period. The use of combined operations has established an increased rapport between ARVN-US units and significantly increased the operational efficiency of the units involved. Increased emphasis was placed upon the Vietnamization of the war effort by the introduction of the 2nd ARVN ABN BDE into War Zone "C" to conduct operations in coordination with the Division's 1st Brigade. During the last half of the quarter, an increased number of enemy officers rallied to the GVN. Both enemy officers and enlisted men complained of the demoralizing aspects of disease, food shortages, and allied firepower.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1969

b. (C) 1st Brigade Operations

(1) Mission: 1st Brigade continued operations in AO KENTUCKY COUGAR to interdict enemy lines of communications, neutralize major enemy forces, and locate and destroy installations and equipment.

(2) Execution:

(a) 1st Brigade continued operations into August with the 2-7 Cav, 2-8 Cav, and the 1-12 Cav to interdict enemy movement through the Brigade AO and to neutralize all major enemy forces. Since visual reconnaissance, ground to air firings, and usually reliable sources of intelligence indicated a sizeable enemy force between FSB's IKE and JAMIE, the 1-12 Cav, with A/2-7 Cav and A and D 2-8 Cav OPCON, initiated a 2-day combined encirclement of the suspected area. Throughout the month, emphasis was placed on saturation ambushes to interdict enemy movement into and out of the AO.

(b) 1st Brigade continued operations into September with the 2-7 Cav, 2-8 Cav, and the 1-12 Cav to interdict enemy movement through the Brigade AO and to destroy all major enemy forces. Emphasis this month was placed on improving ambush techniques rather than saturating areas with poor quality ambushes and with locating and destroying enemy caches in known cache areas.

(c) During October 1st Brigade conducted operations in the central portion of the Brigade AO to interdict routes of infiltration and locate and destroy enemy caches. 1st Brigade assisted the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade in establishing two new Fire Support Bases (FSB VICKY and FSB JACKIE) and reopening FSB CAROLYN. In addition, due to an increase in troop strength, AO KENTUCKY COUGAR was increased in size by extending its Western boundary further west and on 1 November 69 will include FSB BARBARA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Operations.

(a) 11 AUG: At 0300 hrs, D/2-8 Cav at FSB DECKY received 49 mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, 15 RPG rounds, 3 unknown type rounds and ground attack from an estimated company size unit. Enemy indirect fire positions and ground elements were engaged with organics, ARA, Artillery, and Shadow (C-47 gunship). Because of early warning, quick reaction, and superior firepower, there were only 04 US KIA and 10 US WIA while the NVA suffered 17 KIA. Contact broke at 0345 hours.

(b) 12 AUG: At 0325 hours, D/2-8 Cav at FSB DECKY received 400 rounds of mixed 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, 107mm rockets and RPG's; combined with a ground attack by approximately 2 companies. The heavy volume of indirect fire resulted in 08 US KIA, 05 US MIA, and 39 US WIA (many of whom were artillerymen), and 01 155mm howitzer damaged. However, because of the extremely heavy volume of fire from organics, artillery, ARA, Shadow, and Night Hawk (UH-1H equipped with night vision devices, searchlight and minigun), and the extensive use of claymores, M60 flares, and fougasse, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses and did not succeed in penetrating the perimeter. Sporadic contact continued until 0450 hours resulting in 54 NVA KIA and 01 PW (MIA's were confirmed KIA at later date).

(c) 25-28 AUG: Intelligence indicated a sizeable enemy force in the vicinity of XT 4173 and each battalion initiated action to block enemy avenues of escape. (A/2-7 Cav to the northeast, A and D/1-12 Cav to the southeast and southwest, and A and D Co's 2-8 Cav to the west and northwest). Each unit was under control of their respective battalions. On 26 August, all units became OPCON to the 1-12 Cav and proceeded to move towards the center of the encirclement. Contact was light and sporadic in all areas. Because of light contact

5
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

and negative visual sightings by visual reconnaissance, it was determined that the enemy force had evaded the encirclement. Therefore on 27 August, A/2-7 Cav and D/2-8 Cav returned OPCON to their respective battalions. On 28 August, A/2-8 Cav returned OPCON to the 2-8 Cav and the combined operation terminated with disappointing results. There were 37 NVA KIA accounted for during the operation, mostly by airstrikes, artillery, ARA and Brigade Scout gunships.

(d) 06 SEP: At 0405 hours FSB JAMIE received 15-20 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars. At 0411 hours observed and engaged 03 individuals in wire on North side of FSB. Engaged with small arms (S/A) resulting in 03 NVA KIA. Engaged 4-5 x .51 caliber positions with Shadow, artillery, and ARA resulting in 04 NVA KIA and 01 .51 caliber position destroyed. Observed and engaged 06 individuals in wire to Northwest of FSB with s/a and 81mm mortars resulting in 06 NVA KIA. Sporadic incoming continued until 0628 hours. At 0732 hours while wounded were being carried to Medevac helicopter on log pad, received 05-06 mixed 82mm and 120mm mortars that resulted in more casualties. Total US casualties were 03 KIA and 18 WIA while there were 21 NVA KIA.

(e) 13 SEP: FSB JAMIE received 08-10 82mm mortar rounds at 0940 hours resulting in 01 US WIA. At 1107 hours received 10-12 rounds of 82mm fire with negative damage. Areas were engaged with Artillery on both occasions.

(f) 15 SEP: FSB GRANT received 03 rounds of mortar fire at 1925 hours and then at 1935 hours received 17 more 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 01 US KIA and 04 US WIA.

(g) 17 SEP: FSB JAMIE received 03 82mm mortar rounds at 0925 hours. Sporadic incoming continued until 1100 hours resulting in 05 US WIA.

(h) The above four (4) incidents point up three of our reactions of which the enemy is using to good advantage, i.e., (1) the enemy is waiting

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

until we are out in the open after mortaring to either aid the wounded or (2) to just look around and see the status of the damage. (3) They are also putting indirect fire on Fire Support Bases at hours when there is maximum movement, ie, Breakfast and Dinner. It is therefore recommended that all personnel be advised of these tactics and commanders take appropriate action to counteract these natural reactions.

(i) At 2334 hours 13 SEP: FSB IKE received 75-100 rounds of mixed 60mm, 82mm, 107mm rockets, 57mm recoilless rifle, RPG, and sporadic s/c fire. Area engaged with Artillery and Spooky resulting in 34 NVA KIA, 01 NVA PW, 14 US WIA and numerous items of equipment. This and all other attacks taken by FSB's have been of indirect nature with only light (and apparently inexperienced) sapper probes. This trend points to the possibility of a shortage of experienced/trained personnel and possibly the inability of initiating any major offensive at this time.

(j) At 1515 hours on 25 SEP: A CH-47 helicopter with a 3/4 ton loaded vehicle slung beneath it, dropped its load from 3000 feet while traveling at 70 knots. Immediately, the hook went down to lower altitudes and searched the area for signs of the truck. The Brigade Scouts and an Apache Pink Team were sent out to try and locate the vehicle. There were negative sightings until the early afternoon of the 28th. A/1-9 Cav's "Blues" were inserted and policed up equipment until 1600 hours on the 29th. The actual cause for the accident has not been determined at this time, however it probably is one of the following:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

- (1) Improper rigging.
- (2) Too heavy a load on the vehicle.
- (3) Worn or weakened sling.

(k) Recommendations for improvement in this field are:

- (1) Inspect all sling equipment thoroughly before and after each move.
 - (2) Inspect attachment points on vehicle or load before moving.
 - (3) Do not overload vehicle, especially when moving by air.
 - (4) Do not expect to find object at ground level. It was found out in wet ground (grass land) that a 3/4 ton truck with load will bury itself up to 10 feet deep and that it will resemble a bomb crater.
 - (5) Don't expect to find any usable material if it is left in the field unguarded overnight.
 - (6) Have as many aerial observer teams as possible look for dropped equipment with a stand-by team ready for insertion.
- (1) 01-13 OCT: Increased enemy activity was noted in the area surrounding abandoned FSB CAROLYN and the area to its west and southwest. The area was engaged continually by A/1-9 Cav pink teams (1 LOH and 1 AH-1G) and several B-52 strikes. On 13 October, C/1-12 Cav became OPCON to 2-5 Cav and began operations to the south and southeast of CAROLYN. On 15 October, 03 tubes of 105's were air lifted to CAROLYN which was secured by C/1-12 Cav thus increasing artillery coverage to the west and northwest. D and A Co 2-5 Cav were inserted west and northwest of FSB CAROLYN, 2-5 Recon Platoon was inserted to the southwest of FSB CAROLYN and both units attempted to locate enemy units and cache sites. Contact was very light and sporadic and on 17 October units of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

the 2-5 Cav were withdrawn back to the area covered by the guns on FSB IKE, the artillery withdrew back to FSB GRANT and C/1-12 returned OPCON to 1-12 Cav. Results of this operation were disappointing with no ground contacts of any significance and the only body count being by A/1-9 Cav (12 NVA KBH) and the Brigade Scouts (01 NVA KBH). It was evident from signs on the ground and the many sightings from the air that there were enemy troops in the area around FSB CAROLYN, however they were extremely evasive and avoided all contact with US Troops.

(m) 17-31 OCT: The 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade initiated operations with the 1st Brigade by relocating their brigade TOC in conjunction with 1st Brigade and opening a new fire base (FSB JACKIE) with their 3rd Airborne Battalion in a designated AO in the northeastern part of AO KENTUCKY COUGAR. On 20 October, the 9th Airborne Battalion opened another fire base (FSB VICKY) in the north central part of the 1st Brigade AO. On 22 October, the 11th Airborne Battalion reopened FSB CAROLYN. The areas of FSB VICKY and FSB CAROLYN were occupied beforehand by US units to provide a secure base from which to begin constructing their fire bases. The 2-5, 2-7 and 1-12 Cav were designated to aid one ARVN unit each (2-5 and 11th Battalion, 2-7 and 3rd Battalion, and 1-12 and 9th Battalion). Each sponsor was given the mission of introducing their particular Battalion to the Airmobile type of war the 1st Brigade is currently conducting. This took the form of informal coordination with the ARVN commanders and a chance for them to observe a few of our airlifts. This was followed by the ARVN units conducting secure airlifts under US observation, followed by actual extractions and combat assaults. The ARVN units have shown willingness to learn from this type of patient instruction and have adapted to the Airmobile concept of operation and are conducting offensive operations on a large scale.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

c. 2d Brigade Operations

(1) Mission: Operation Toan Thang III continued throughout the entire reporting period. During this period, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was given the mission of locating and neutralizing the 5th VC Division, of interdicting enemy infiltration routes, of denying him his traditional storage and staging locations, and preventing him from gaining the momentum needed to commence offensive operations. The 2d Brigade was also assigned the three-fold mission of assisting in the defense of the Song Be - Phuoc Long Province areas, support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program, and the promotion of Dong Tien activities. In carrying out these missions, the 2d Brigade relocated its headquarters on 11 August 1969 from Lai Khe to FSB Buttons with OPCON of three maneuver battalions.

(2) Execution: During the reporting period, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) participated in Operation Toan Thang III which continued up to the end of the quarter.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry continued operations in the vicinity of FSB O'Keefe until 4 August 1969 when it displaced to Duc Phong and constructed FSB Caldwell upon its closure on 6 August 1969. On 17 August, the 2-12 Cav again displaced, this time to FSB Alvarado in Song Be City, and began company sized offensive operations the following day. On 6 September 1969, the 2-12 Cav conducted another fire support base relocation to FSB Don, closing this location on 8 September 1969 and immediately commencing company sized operations in the vicinity of the fire support base and surrounding AO with emphasis on ground reconnaissance, trail interdiction and ambushes.

(b) The 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, located at FSB Buttons, was received OPCON from the 3d Brigade on 6 August 1969. The 5-7 Cav maintained res-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

possibility for the defense of FSB Buttons and the 2d Brigade Headquarters, and contributed to the overall defense of the Song Bé area by aggressively conducting ground reconnaissance and interdicting enemy lines of communication.

On 26 September 1969, the Battalion displaced to FSB Mary, closing on the new location and commencing operations in the surrounding AO on the same day in an effort to counter reports of an enemy build-up in that area.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry continued operations in the AO surrounding FSB Mary until 15 August 1969 when it was released OPCON from the 2d Brigade and became OPCON to Division Artillery (Divarty).

(3) The month of August was a highly successful month for the 2d Brigade. It was characterized by numerous contacts throughout the month, both by air cavalry elements and ground troops, most of these occurring with small enemy units. During the month there were four significant indirect fire attacks on 2d Brigade fire support bases. The most significant event of the month occurred at 1830 hours on 12 August when a platoon sized ambush from D/2-12 Cav spotted and engaged a large enemy element moving toward Duc Phong from the north. The platoon, then heavily engaged, was successfully reinforced by an additional platoon from D/2-12 Cav and contact continued until 2218 hours. Movement continued throughout the night and a first light check of the contact area revealed 15 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 launcher, and 1 light machine gun captured. Signs in the battle area indicated that many more dead and wounded enemy soldiers had been taken from the scene during the course of the night. On 3 August, Ranger Team 42 was engaged by an estimated 30 enemy troops. The Team returned fire with organics and directed Pink teams, ARA, air strikes and artillery into the area. The contact was broken after 45 minutes and the Team was extracted leaving behind an estimated 23 NVA KIA. On 6 August, C/1-9 Cav,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

again while conducting visual reconnaissance, spotted an unknown number of enemy in a bunker complex. The Troop engaged the area with its organic, artillery and air strikes, resulting in 14 NVA KIA. On 11 August, FSB Caldwell received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar followed by 10x107mm rockets which resulted in 7 US WIA and 2 US KIA. Counter mortar targets were engaged with 81mm mortars and artillery with negative enemy assessment. On 14 August, FSB Caldwell received another 40 rounds of mortar fire resulting in light US casualties and negative damage. Counter mortar fire was unleashed with unknown enemy losses. On 20 August, the 2d Brigade Headquarters at FSB Buttons received 10 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire which impacted in and around the base. Counter mortar targets were fired with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties and damage. On 26 August, C/1-9, while conducting visual reconnaissance, spotted and engaged 50 enemy in the open. Air strikes, artillery and C/S were employed in the area resulting in 12 NVA KIA. At 1030 hours on 27 August, 2d Brigade Scouts spotted and engaged an unknown number of enemy in the open resulting in 12 NVA KIA. On 28 August, D/5-7 received small arms and B-40 fire and returned fire with its organics, artillery, ARA and an air strike. A sweep of the contact area revealed 8 NVA KIA. On 29 August, D/5-7 continued sweeping the contact area and found an additional 11 NVA KIA for a total of 19 NVA KIA for the action. At 2139 hours on 30 August, the Reconnaissance Platoon of 5-7 Cav on Nui Ba Ra began receiving incoming small arms, 82mm mortar and B-40 fire which continued sporadically until 0305 hours on 31 August. Fire was returned with small arms, artillery, ARA and a Spooky gun ship. A first light sweep of the contact area revealed 10 NVA KIA.

(4) The month of September began with moderate enemy resistance in the Black Horse Brigade area of operations. A significant increase in ground-to-air

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

firing occurred during this period. During the daylight hours of 10 September, C/1-9 aircraft reported a total of three separate instances of ground-to-air fire. Each location was engaged by the aircrafts' organics, artillery and air strikes accounting for a total of 26 NVA KIA. FSB Buttons on 11 September received 15x82mm mortar rounds which resulted in no casualties or damage. At 0120 hours on 12 September, FSB Buttons received small arms, automatic weapons, 60mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire, resulting in no friendly casualties or damage. FSB Buttons engaged the suspected enemy locations with organics and counter mortar fire with unknown enemy losses. On 15 September, B/5-7 Cav spotted and engaged an estimated two NVA companies. B Company was reinforced by G Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and later by A/5-7 Cav. After a fierce fire fight the enemy was forced to withdraw. A sweep conducted of the contact area by A/5-7 Cav revealed the bodies of 14 NVA KIA and numerous items of ammunition and enemy equipment. Air strikes, C/1-9, ARA and tube artillery were also employed during the contact with devastating results. Numerous blood trails and discarded bandages found in the area indicated that enemy losses were extensive. At 1805 hours on 16 September, while supporting a contact initiated by B/5-7 Cav, a Brigade Scout aircraft struck a tree and crashed. The crew was extracted without injury. Several hours later, B/5-7 Cav heard voices coming from a bunker complex near the downed aircraft. Artillery was adjusted into the area throughout the night and two air strikes were employed at first light. An unopposed sweep of the contact area on 17 September revealed the bodies of 10 NVA KIA and resulted in the capture of 2 AK-47 rifles, 126 assorted mortar rounds, 14 RPG rounds, 1000 AK-47 rounds, and other items. The downed aircraft, which could not be extracted due to heavy foliage, was stripped of all usable components and destroyed. At 1017 hours on 25 September, C/5-7 Cav spotted and engaged

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

movement near its position. A sweep of the area found 2 VC KIA and resulted in 2 AK-47 rifles captured. Several hours later, C/5-7 Cav, while conducting ground reconnaissance, spotted and engaged 6 enemy resulting in 3 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. Ranger Team 35 spotted an estimated 50 enemy at 1450 hours on 29 September. The Team called in and adjusted ARA, artillery and C/1-9 support. An aerial VR of the area the following day revealed 10 NVA KIA. At first light on 29 September, 27 individuals rallied to the allied cause at FSB Mary. The ralliers were members of the village of Duc Bon and stated that they were dissatisfied with the treatment which they had received from the VC/NVA and were frightened by allied fire power, aerial surveillance and aggressive US ground reconnaissance.

(5) Activity during the month of October was again characterized by light to moderate enemy activity with numerous instances of ground-to-air firings recorded throughout the month. The month's most significant events concerned the record number of persons who rallied to Black Horse Brigade fire support bases and forces in the field. At 0630 hours on 1 October, A/5-7 Cav received mixed mortar fire and B-40 rounds. A Medevac aircraft dispatched to the scene received ground-to-air fire. A/5-7 Cav engaged the suspected enemy locations with small arms and organic mortar, and called artillery and ARA onto the suspected enemy positions. Upon conducting a sweep of the area, A Company, following blood trails, found a total of 10 NVA KIA and captured several weapons. On 5 October, FSB Buttons received 24 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative casualties or damage sustained. The suspected enemy locations were engaged with counter mortar and artillery fire with unknown enemy losses. On 6 October, FSB Mary received 25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 6 rounds of B-40 fire. Negative casualties or damage were inflicted. The suspected enemy locations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

were engaged with unknown results. At 1120 hours, C/5-7 Cav found 18 5'x8'x6' bunkers forming a circle around 7 10'x12'x6' bunkers. There were also 3 bamboo tables which could seat 10 individuals each, and a classroom area 12'x20', complete with benches, podium, bulletin board and equipment rack. On 8 October, FSB Buttons received 24 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 30 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. A total of 8 Hoi Chanh surrendered to B/2-12 Cav. The next day, 11 more individuals rallied to 2-12 Cav at FSB Judie. While on a ground reconnaissance mission, B/2-12 Cav detained a total of 9 individuals. Continuing its reconnaissance, the Company found 1x82mm mortar and 1x60mm mortar, both complete with sights and base plates. Included in this find were 60 rounds of 82mm mortar and 30 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. On 11 October, villagers continued to rally to Black Horse Brigade forces with 91 individuals placing themselves under GVN control. At 1325 hours, one of the Hoi Chanh led US troops back into the jungle near FSB Judie and found 1 AK-47 and 3 SKS rifles. On 12 October, 9 more ralliers turned themselves in to FSB Mary from the Duc Bon village area. Ralliers continued to turn up within the Black Horse AO on 13 October. At 0750 hours, two men and one woman rallied to 2-12 Cav at FSB Judie. They brought in with them 1 AK-47 rifle and 1 Chicom sub-machine gun along with ammunition for both. At 0800 hours, a man, woman and child rallied to the 5-7 Cav at FSB Mary. The man indicated that he was a VC and knew the location of an NVA company and a VC platoon. On 14 October, a Hoi Chanh led members of the Recon Platoon of 5-7 Cav to a weapons cache near a bunker complex. That night, the Brigade Night Hawk received ground-to-air fire on two occasions, the first incident lasting 25 minutes. The Night Hawk and escort engaged with their organics and adjusted artillery on the enemy locations. Shadow gun ship came on station and expended into the target area for two and a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

half hours. Based upon the sighting of the Night Hawk aircraft and the effectiveness of the suppressing fires, a total of 28 enemy KIA was assessed for this action. On 16 October, A/5-7 Cav detained 2 Hoi Chanh without weapons who came into its position. At 2010 hours on 19 October, FSB Judic received approximately 46 rounds of 82mm mortar, all of which impacted outside of the perimeter. The 2-12 Cav engaged the suspected enemy locations with mortars and artillery resulting in unknown enemy losses. On 21 October at 1520 hours, A/2-12 Cav received 25 to 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground probe. A Company returned fire with its organics, and the enemy was further engaged with artillery, ARA, air strikes, and Brigade Scouts. A sweep of the contact area revealed 14 NVA KIA. On 27 October, helicopter gunships from the Brigade Scouts and B/1-9 Cav accounted for a total of 16 enemy KIA in 4 separate actions. On 29 October a Hoi Chanh led A/2-12 Cav to a small weapons cache which contained 1 Soviet MAT 44 carbine and several munitions. At 1600 hours, the Brigade Scouts spotted 7 individuals carrying AK-47 rifles on a trail. The Scouts and their cover aircraft engaged with their organics resulting in 7 enemy KIA. On 30 October, B/1-9 Cav accounted for 14 enemy KIA in 6 separate actions. The 1-9 Cav was credited with 10 enemy KIA, an air strike following a ground-to-air firing accounted for 2 KIA, and observed artillery fire for 2 enemy KIA. While on a ground reconnaissance mission, B/2-12 Cav found a rice storage area containing 120x220-lb bags of high quality rice which was subsequently evacuated to the Song Be Chieu Hoi Center. 31 October found another 12 enemy killed by air action, 4 killed by Brigade Scouts and 8 KIA credited to B/1-9 Cav in 3 separate air-to-ground actions.

d. 3d Brigade Operations

(1) Mission: At the beginning of this quarter, the 3d Brigade was prin-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

cipally committed to continuing security operations in the northwestern portion of Phuoc Long Province and the eastern third of Binh Long Province. The Brigade mission remained essentially unchanged except for the addition of a contingency mission to reinforce the Bo Duc/Du Dop population complex. This mission, previously assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, was passed to the 3d Brigade owing to current road conditions between Bo Duc and Loc Ninh which precluded movement of tracked vehicles.

(2) Execution: During this quarter, prevailing weather conditions were typically monsoonal. Heavy ground fog and limited visibility in the early morning hours frequently precluded first light aerial reconnaissance. The morning ground fog coupled with frequent early afternoon thundershowers severely hampered the conduct of airmobile operations by restricting the number of daily flyable hours to a strict minimum. In addition, ground contacts and enemy ground-to-air fire incidents occurring after 1600 hours were frequently denied tactical air support owing to the rapidly deteriorating weather conditions prevailing between 1700 and 1900 hours daily. Daily logging of units in the field was hampered as well by the limited amount of flying time that was available. The hours of good flying weather were allotted to conducting aerial reconnaissance operations, combat assaults, and rotating units through the firebases as priority missions. The practice of logging field units on a three-day cycle permitted the Brigade to contend with the limitations imposed by the weather and still continue normal operations. In summary, the monsoonal weather conditions significantly affected operations within the AO, requiring the Brigade to adopt specific operational procedures to maintain its combat effectiveness at a high level.

(3) There were no significant changes in key personnel in the command structure of the Brigade Headquarters during this period. The 1st Battalion,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

7th Cavalry received a new battalion commander during the period. No significant effects on combat operations were experienced as a result of loss or transfer of key command personnel.

(4) During the latter part of July and early August, intelligence indicated a gradual build-up in enemy forces in known safe areas located in the vicinity of Bo Duc/Bu Dop with an attending increase in the threat of attack. On 4 August, the first elements of 1-7 Cav, including C/1-7 Cav, closed on the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp, established a forward CP and began ground reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of the Camp. On 5 August, A/1-7 Cav arrived at Bu Dop and a two company ground reconnaissance operation was launched in a southerly direction toward the Bo Duc District Headquarters. On 7 August, the main CP of 1-7 Cav displaced from FSB Vivian to Bu Dop and co-located with the USSF detachment. D and E Companies of 1-7 Cav remained on FSB Vivian.

(a) Enemy activity throughout August was characterized by generally light and sporadic contacts with enemy units, except during the offensive high point of 11-12 August. On 11 August, the 3d Brigade lost OPCON D/5-7 Cav to the 11th AGR and received OPCON A/1-4 Cav. A/1-4 Cav was then placed further OPCON to 1-8 Cav and deployed in the area south of Quan Loi Base Camp to block a traditional axis of advance on Quan Loi. During the evening of 11 August, the major population and military complexes of Binh Long Province, with the exception of Quan Loi Base Camp, began receiving heavy stand-off and ground attacks. Then, at 0109 hours on 12 August, Quan Loi Base Camp began receiving incoming mortar rounds, most of which impacted near the southwest end of the runway. This action signalled the beginning of a NVA/VC attack on the Base Camp. Enemy sappers launched an attack on the northwest side of the perimeter. ARA, Shadow, Night Hawk, and tube artillery engaged the enemy forces throughout

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

the night and early morning hours. This attack resulted in 54 enemy KIA and 8 PW, 5 US KIA and 51 US WIA. Captured weapons included 2 AK-47, 3 RPG-2, and 3 RPG-7. During the attack on Quan Loi, A/1-4Cav spoiled an attack by a large unknown size enemy force, suspected to be a major follow-up attack on the base camp. Contact continued throughout the night as ARA, Nighthawk, and tube artillery fired on the enemy positions. This contact resulted in 23 enemy KIA, 1 US KIA and 14 US WIA. Captured material included 1 RPD MG, 2 RPG -2, and 1 Chicom radio. A/1-4 Cav had 1 tank destroyed, 1 tank heavily damaged, and 3 APC lightly damaged. In reaction to the offensive, D/1-7 and B/1-7 Cav were released OPCON to the 11th ACR and relocated to FSB Eagle. FSB Vivian was officially closed on this date.

(b) Due to increased enemy activity to the south and east of the Song Be area and an increased threat of a VC 5th Division attack on Song Be, plans were developed to close FSB Ellen and relocate 5-7 Cav to FSB Buttons. The 5-7 Cav relocated to FSB Buttons, leaving its ground reconnaissance efforts to the south of FSB Buttons. On 15 August the CP of the 5-7 Cav relocated to FSB Buttons, leaving C/5-7 to close FSB Ellen. At 1706H 15 Aug, a CIDG company operating with the 1-8 Cav made heavy contact with 30 NVA southwest of FSB Wescott, ARA expended on the enemy position drawing ground to air fire from three .30 caliber machinegun positions. Three sections of ARA and three airstrikes were adjusted on the target area. A/1-4 Cav moved toward the contact area and linked-up with the CIDG. The enemy was forced to retreat and moved east into a bunker complex. A sweep of the contact area revealed 5 NVA KIA. There were negative friendly casualties. On 16 August the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) directed a major boundary realignment, releasing OPCON of the 5-7 Cav to 2d Bde. The AO change passed tactical responsibility to the 2d Bde for all Phouc Long Province east of north-south grid line 05 from the Cambodian Border south to AO Chief. The boundary was later

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

adjusted to follow the 05 north-south grid line north from AO Chief to the Dak Hoyt then east along the Dak Hoyt to the Cambodian Border. With the 2d Bde targeted against the increasing threat of the 5th VC Division, the 3d Bde was now able to concentrate on the activities of the 141st and the 165th NVA Regts and the D 368 local force battalion. E/1-7 Cav was released from OPCON 11th ACR and returned to OPCON 1-7 Cav at Bo Duc. On 17 Aug a CIDG force working with the 1-8 Cav made contact with 30 NVA attempting to re-enter the bunker complex discovered on 15 August. The area was engaged with ARA and airstrikes. A sweep of the contact area revealed 5 NVA KIA and 1 NVA KBARTY. There were negative friendly casualties.

(o) As the intelligence picture developed around Bo Duc/Bu Dop area there were indications of a possible armor threat developing. Based on the indications of this armor threat, six 106 RR and crews of D/1-9 Cav were moved to Bu Dop and placed OPCON 1-7 Cav. In addition, on 18 August, A/1-11 ACR moved by fixed wing (C-130) from Loc Ninh to Bu Dop and were placed OPCON 3d Bde. Upon closure, they were further placed OPCON 1-7 Cav. Contact remained light throughout the remainder of the month. On 28 August D/1-7 Cav was released from OPCON 11th ACR and returned to the 1-7 Cav. During the night of 30 August Quan Loi received two mortar attacks involving a total of thirty mortar rounds. Incoming rounds resulted in 1 US KIA and 22 US WIA, six of whom were evacuated. On 31 August B/1-9 Cav reported three incidents of ground to air fire from northeast of Bo Duc. The area was engaged with artillery and airstrikes resulting in 9 NVA KBA and 2 NVA KBH.

(5) Enemy activity during the month of September was characterized by intense standoff attacks directed at units securing the Bu Dop/Bo Duc population complex and by moderate to heavy contact by infantry units conducting ground reconnaissance operations to the southwest of FSB Jerri. Light and sporadic

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

contact and scattered incidents of ground to air firings were predominant throughout the remainder of the brigade AO.

(a) On 3 September D/1-9 Cav spotted a burning UH-1H southeast of FSB Wescott. D/1-9 Cav Blues (infantry platoon) were inserted to secure the aircraft. Inspection of the wreckage revealed the aircraft had been shot down by .51 caliber ground to air fire resulting in 8 US KIA. Among the KIA were the CO of the 8th Engr Bn and the CO of Co C, 8th Engr. Since this general area had been the site of numerous ground to air firings, C/1-8 Cav was inserted into the area to locate and destroy the enemy force. Initial ground reconnaissance operations resulted in no enemy contacts. Late on the evening of 6 September C/1-8 Cav spotted individuals at an old log site. The area was engaged with artillery and C/1-8 Cav pursued the withdrawing enemy force. Upon reaching the location where the individuals had been spotted, C/1-8 Cav began receiving small arms and heavy machinegun fire. They observed approximately thirty individuals with two .50 caliber machineguns, one .30 caliber machinegun, and one 82MM mortar. C/1-8 Cav immediately returned fire with organics, ARA expended on the enemy positions and tube artillery fired blocking fires. The enemy was forced to retreat and broke contact. A sweep of the area revealed 4 NVA KIA and one RPG captured. The following morning, September 7th, C/1-8 Cav again received fire from approximately 30 individuals. Fire was returned with organics and again ARA and tube artillery engaged the area. The enemy was forced to retreat after one and one-half hours of fighting. A sweep of the contact area resulted in finding 12 NVA KIA and two .51 caliber machineguns and one AK-47 captured. Since the capture of these weapons on 7 September there have been no incidents of ground to air fire in this area.

(b) On 5 September, elements of 1-7 Cav received heavy standoff

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

attacks throughout the day. Between 0046 hours and 0220 hours, B/1-7 Cav received 40x82mm rounds, impacting inside its perimeter, resulting in 1 US KIA and 38 US WIA (23 Medevac). The CP of the 1-7 Cav, located at Bu Dop SF Camp, received approximately 60x82mm mortar rounds and 2x107mm rockets resulting in 4 USSF WIA Medevac. The mortar attacks continued throughout the remainder of the morning. with Bo Duc District Headquarters, A/1-7 Cav and D/1-7 Cav receiving between 5 and 10x82mm mortar rounds. These attacks resulted in light casualties. Artillery fired counter mortar fire during and after each of the standoff attacks. ARA and Night Hawk were on station during the hours of darkness to assist in locating the enemy firing positions.

(c) The 1-7 Cav CP was initially co-located with the Bu Dop SF Camp to take advantage of existing facilities including secure artillery positions from which to support Bu Dop/Bo Duc. An improved fixed wing airstrip was also available at this location. However, due to the range of the 105mm Howitzers, it became apparent that artillery could not support ground reconnaissance operations along the Son Be River and the southern portion of the area of interest. Positioning 155mm Howitzers at Bu Dop would have provided effective artillery coverage to the southwest, south, and east, but effective utilization of the 155mm Howitzers could not be realized in the area to the north of Bu Dop owing to the close proximity of the Cambodian border. The northern area was adequately covered by the 105mm Howitzers located at Bu Dop. The decision was made to open a FSB either south or southeast of Bu Dop from which three 155mm Howitzers could effectively fire in all directions. Establishing the FSB at this location, with three 105mm Howitzers and three 155mm Howitzers, would permit the 1-7 Cav to provide direct support artillery to units conducting ground reconnaissance operations throughout the area. On 7 September 1969, A/1-7 Cav (A/1-11 ACR OFCON)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October

conducted ground reconnaissance operations to the south and secured and opened FSB Jerri. At 2325H on 7 September the CP of 1-7 Cav at Bu Dop received another standoff attack, lasting until 0603H on 8 August 1969. In all, a total of thirty 122MM rockets, ten 82MM mortar rounds, ten 75MM recoilless rifle rounds, and one hundred-twenty assorted rounds were fired at the CP resulting in 3 US KIA, 4 US WIA, and 1 CIDG WIA.

(d) In recognition of the passing of president HO Chi Minh of North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese declared a ceasefire from 072400H Sep until 110001H Sep. During this period maximum engineer effort was directed toward improving the Bu Dop airstrip and constructing FSB Jerri. During the early morning hours on 11 Sep, Bu Dop SF Camp and Bo Duc District Hq received a light standoff attack resulting in light casualties. The memorial ceasefire was terminated.

(e) Owing to the heavy casualties sustained by the 1-7 Cav, the tempo of the operations to which they were exposed, and physical problems attending the wetness of the area and high incidence of malaria in the area of operations, an exchange of operational areas was effected between the 1-7 Cav at FSB Jerri and the 1-8 Cav at Wescott. On 15 September B, C and E/1-8 moved by FW to Bu Dop and commenced ground operations vicinity Bo Duc. D and E/1-7 Cav moved by FW to Quan Loi Base Camp, then combat assaulted into their new AO. On 16 September the exchange was completed with 1-8 Cav and A/1-4 Cav was placed OPCON 1-7 Cav. During the relocation operation, Bu Dop received an additional standoff attack of thirty rounds of 82MM mortar, all of which impacted northeast of the runway, resulting in negative casualties.

(f) On 18 September the 3d Bde received a Division FRAG-O outlining a two phased withdrawal of US units from the Bo Duc/Bu Dop area. The plan directed the movement of the 35th Ranger Bn (ARVN) to Bu Dop to assume the mission of securing the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area. The 1-8 Cav was then to conduct ground

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

reconnaissance to the south and southwest, intensifying interdiction of the Serges Jungle Highway. On 21 September the 35th Ranger Bn (ARVN) closed on Bu Dop and on 23 September commenced ground reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Bu Dop/Bo Duo. Subsequently, the 1-8 Cav directed their major effort to the south toward interdiction of the Serges Jungle Highway. As A and D/1-8 Cav moved to the southwest, indications of fresh enemy activity became more apparent. Visual reconnaissance detected numerous trails with heavy recent movement by bicycle. Numerous bunkers and structures were uncovered indicating signs of recent use. On 21 September A and D/1-8 Cav began making daily contacts with reinforced squad and platoon sized enemy elements moving through the area. As part of the effort to exert more pressure on the Serges Jungle Highway, the 11th ACR opened FSB Deb on 27 September with B/1-11 ACR securing the FSB while A and D/1-5 Cav conducted ground operations to the northeast. The enemy forces began to feel the pressure and ground contacts became more frequent. Numerous ground to air firings were directed at scout teams attempting to pinpoint enemy positions. Visual reconnaissance aircraft retaliated with organic and adjusted artillery and airstrikes into the area. On 29 September 69, the 3d Bde received OPCON of TF 1-5 Cav and tactical responsibility for the area surrounding FSB Deb. A and D/1-8 Cav were placed OPCON TF 1-5 Cav on this date.

Moderate to heavy contact continued through the end of September in this portion of the brigade AO, while contacts in the remainder of the AO remained light and sporadic. The major effort of the brigade was now directed at intensifying interdiction of logistical and troop movements along the Serges Jungle Highway.

(6) Operations during the month of October were characterized by extensive ground reconnaissance and interdiction operations along the Serges Jungle Highway. The principle area of interest centered on the Song De River north of Quan Loi

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

Base Camp. Ground reconnaissance operations resulted in uncovering several major supply and arms caches, thus depriving the enemy of badly needed supplies.

Ground operations further forced the enemy to vacate several bunker complexes abandoning arms and material as they evaded. The continuous movement of friendly forces along the trail networks resulted in numerous meeting engagements, as well as frequent successful ambushes. As a direct result of the ground effort, enemy forces in the area were frequently exposed to detection and attack from the air.

Intensified aerial surveillance in conjunction with the maneuver of the ground units resulted in the detection and engagement of numerous small groups of enemy forces moving along the trails. Enemy response to the increased aerial surveillance effort was manifested in 28 incidents of ground to air fire. Twenty-two of these incidents occurred during the first two weeks of the month. No significant offensive operations were launched against firebases, SF camps and friendly population centers. Several minor standoff attacks were conducted by small mortar elements firing 5 or 6 rounds. None of these attacks resulted in friendly casualties. In many instances the mortar rounds impacted well outside the perimeter indicating poor planning and execution. Significant enemy contacts during this month were restricted to engagements with maneuver units and/ or aerial reconnaissance aircraft.

(a) On 1 October TF Ianni, (D/1-5 Cav, and 1/E/1-5 Cav) was given the mission of reopening FSB Vivian. A/1-8 Cav and D/1-8 Cav remained OPCON 1-5 Cav operating out of FSB Deb. Primary emphasis during the first week was directed toward locating and plotting the trail network along the west bank of the Song De River. The Bu Dop SF Camp was subjected to an enemy mortar attack on the night of 1 October. Enemy mortars fired twelve rounds of 82 mm with negative friendly casualties. Artillery fired counter mortar fire with negative

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

assessment. On 2 October there were five minor ground contacts in the brigade AO. The results of these contacts were 6 NVA KIA, 1 US carbine captured and 1 US WIA. The most significant find of the day occurred at 1100H when D/1-8 Cav found an enemy cache containing 1,500 lbs of salt and 11,000 lbs of rice. This food was subsequently evacuated and turned over to GVN authorities at Bu Dop and Loc Ninh. A/1-8 Cav replaced C/1-8 Cav assuming the mission of C/1-8 Cav, OPCON to 1-5 Cav.

(b) On 4 October B/1-9 inserted its infantry platoon southwest of FSB Jerri. The platoon made contact at 1600H with an estimated company size enemy force. The enemy positions were hit with artillery, ARA and one airstrike. Results were 8 NVA KIA, 8 NVA KBH, 4 NVA KBA and 4 NVA KBARTY. One friendly casualty resulted, lightly wounded and not requiring medevac. The platoon was reinforced at 1720H by B/1-5 Cav. Both units linked up and set up a night defensive position. The next day both units continued to conduct ground reconnaissance to the southeast. At 1545H, B/1-5 Cav (-) made contact with an estimated company size enemy force. The lead platoon was subjected to an intense volume of enemy fire from both light and heavy MG positions, B-40 rockets, claymores and small arms. This contact resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 NVA KIA. Sporadic contact continued with the enemy force, now believed to be a battalion size element. The decision was made to extract both units from the area. Extraction was completed at 1701H and the area was subjected to an artillery TOT of 338 rounds (105MM, 155MM, and 175MM). On 5 October the 3d Bde released OPCON of the 35th Ranger Bn (ARVN) moving them by fixed wing aircraft (C-130) from Bu Dop to Dien Hoa. During the first five days of October there were six instances of ground to air fire. In each case enemy positions were engaged with aircraft organic weapons, a heavy volume of artillery fire and an immediate airstrike. Results were 10 NVA KBH, 7 NVA KBARTY, and 4 NVA KBA. On 6 October

26

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

one platoon of A/1-11 ACR conducted a fixed wing (C-130) move from Bu Dop to Loc Ninh and reverted OPCON to the 1-11 ACR. The remainder of A/1-11 ACR completed the fixed wing move the following day at 1745H.

(c) At 1245H on 6 October, B/1-11 ACR spotted and engaged twelve NVA. The enemy force retreated to a village. Tm B/1-11 ACR pursued the enemy force and sealed off the village. B/1-9 Cav while screening to the flanks with scout teams spotted and engaged three NVA, resulting in two NVA KBH. As Tm B/1-11 ACR approached the village, a civilian truck attempted to escape. The truck was blocked by an APC and its three occupants detained. The village was cordoned and VN National Police were brought to the area from Loc Ninh. A complete check of the village was conducted and 17 VCI/VCS were detained and moved to Loc Ninh for further questioning.

(d) At 0445H on 7 October FSB Deb received six 82MM mortar rounds with negative US losses. At 1850H the SF camp at Bu Dop received ten 60MM mortar rounds with negative friendly casualties. In both instances the suspected enemy mortar location was engaged with a heavy volume of countermortar fire. Again on 8 October at 0230H, FSB Deb received four rounds of 82MM mortar fire with negative US losses. The suspected enemy mortar location was again engaged with artillery. During the two day period 7-8 October, there were seven ground contacts in the 3d Bde AO. Results were negative US casualties and 4 NVA KIA, one RPG-2 rocket launcher and 2 AK-47's captured.

(e) On 9 October D/1-8 Cav conducted a combat assault and reopened FSB Ellen. On 10 October at 1010H 1-5 Cav released OPCON of C/1-8 Cav and at 1640H the CP of 1-8 Cav displaced from FSB Jerri to FSB Ellen. A/1-8 Cav remained at FSB Jerri to dismantle the firebase. D/1-8 Cav found an enemy cache consisting of eighty 82MM mortar rounds with 200 powder charges, eighty 120MM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

mortars, forty 75MM RR rounds, 100 anti-tank mines and three rocket launchers.

The entire enemy cache was destroyed in place.

(f) From the 6th to the 10th of October there was a noticeable increase in enemy ground to air firings. Enemy locations were engaged with organic aircraft weapons, artillery and airstrikes, resulting in 21 NVA KBH and 8 NVA KBA. The most significant ground to air firing occurred at 1520H on the 10th of October. A LOH from B/1-9 received an unknown number of hits and crashed. The crew was able to evacuate the aircraft and set up a defensive perimeter while awaiting the insertion of the Saber Blue Platoon. The Blues had inserted one rifle squad when a lift aircraft (UH-1H) received an intense volume of enemy small arms fire and crashed 75 meters from the first downed aircraft. Part of the crew of the second aircraft was trapped in the wreckage. The Saber White platoon leader landed his LOH near the wreckage, freed two of the trapped crew members and evacuated them in his LOH. Meanwhile, enemy positions were heavily engaged by suppressive ARA fire and successive airstrikes. The remainder of the Blues were inserted, they secured both aircraft and the wounded were evacuated. The Blues were extracted and the entire area was subjected to an artillery CS mission, followed by two additional airstrikes and finally an artillery TOT of 408 rounds (105MM and 155MM mixed). Known enemy losses totaled 15 NVA KBH and 2 NVA KBA.

(g) On 11 October at 1700H the CP of the 1-5 Cav displaced to FSB Vivian and FSB Deb was closed. D/1-8 Cav was released OPCON to the 1-8th Cav at 0800H.

On 12 October B/1-11 ACR was released OPCON to 11th ACR at 1745H, and C/1-8 Cav was released OPCON to the 1-8 Cav at 1240H.

(h) On 13 October, A/1-8 Cav completed dismantling FSB Jerri and conducted a combat assault to a position 15 kilometers west of Song De City. During the three-day period 11-13 October, there was a continued increase in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

ground-to-air firings in the 3d Brigade AO. There were eight incidents and each was engaged with the aircraft organics, artillery and air strikes. Enemy losses totaled 19 NVA KBH, 3 NVA KBA, and 4 NVA KB Artillery. Fourteen and 15 October were significant for their lack of enemy ground-to-air fire incidents and only five minor ground contacts. On 16 October, an additional ground-to-air firing occurred and the enemy position was engaged by organics and artillery. Resulting losses totaled 7 NVA KB Artillery and 1 NVA KBH.

(i) During the period 16-18 October, there were nine minor ground contacts resulting in 3 US WIA, 7 NVA KIA, 1 Chieu Hoi, and 4 AK-47 rifles, 1 SKS rifle, 1x.45 caliber pistol, and 1x9mm pistol captured. On 18 October, C/1-8 Cav was placed OPCON to 1-5 Cav at 1040 hours.

(j) The period 18-23 October was marred only once by a ground-to-air firing. This occurred at 1324 hours on the 20th. The area was engaged by artillery, one air strike and a CS drop. There were negative enemy losses reported. During this six day period there were eight ground contacts resulting in negative US casualties. Enemy losses totaled 3 VC KIA, 1 VC PW (WIA), 4 VN women and 1 child detained, and 2 NVA KIA. Enemy equipment captured included 1 AK-47 rifle, 1x75mm recoilless rifle round, 32 RPG rounds, 4x60mm mortar rounds, 2x107mm rockets, 2x82mm mortar rounds, and 3500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition.

(k) During the period 24-25 October, three ground-to-air fire incidents occurred. Enemy positions were attacked with aircraft organics, artillery and air strikes. Resulting losses included 5 NVA KBH and 1 NVA KBA. At 1535 hours on 25 October, D/1-5 Cav conducted a final extraction to Loc Ninh and was placed OPCON to the 11th ACR. At 0940 hours on 26 October, F/2-11 ACR conducted a road march to FSB Deb, was placed OPCON to 1-5 Cav and secured FSB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

Deb. At 1000 hours a jump CP of the 1-5 Cav displaced to FSB Deb. A five day combined US/CIDG operation was launched against suspected base areas of the enemy and lines of communication (LOC) emanating from Base Area 330.

(1) From 26 to 31 October there was only one incident of ground-to-air firing in the AO. It occurred at 1800 hours on 30 October northwest of FSB Buttons. The target area was engaged with the aircraft organics and artillery. Resulting losses were 5 NVA KBH. During this six day period there were 11 minor ground contacts. Resulting friendly losses included 2 US KIA, 7 US WIA and 1 CIDG KIA. Enemy losses included 8 NVA KIA, 5 VC KIA, and 6 AK-47 rifles, 1 SKS rifle, 2 B-40 rocket launchers and 4 B-40 rockets captured. On 30 October at 1400 hours, C/1-5 Cav returned OPCON to the 3d Brigade. FSB Deb was closed out and 1-5 Cav jump CP returned to FSB Vivian. At 1700 hours on 30 October, F/2-11 ACR returned OPCON to the 11th ACR. At 1605 hours on 31 October, B/1-9 Cav spotted signs of very recent enemy activity east of Ft Granite. For the next three hours Pink teams, ARA, artillery and air strikes engaged numerous enemy positions. Resulting enemy losses included 22 NVA KBH, 10 NVA KB Artillery and 9 NVA KDA.

(m) Operations conducted during the month of October resulted in a significant interdiction of enemy movement along the Serres Jungle Highway. Maximum effort was directed toward this interdiction mission and indications are that these operations have appreciably denied NVA/VC forces the use of traditional LOC, base areas, and materials pre-stocked therein.

e. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the reporting period. The Regiment continued operations along Highway 13 and in the vicinity of An Loc and Loc Ninh. At the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

close of the reporting period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was operating with all three of its organic squadrons. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment prepares and submits a separate ORLL direct to IFFV.

f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations

(1) The 1-9 Cavalry Squadron continued operations throughout the tactical area of responsibilities, conducting extensive reconnaissance and surveillance operations and destroying enemy forces operating within the area. During the reporting period the Air Cavalry troops supported 1st, 2d and 3d Brigade operations.

(2) During the reporting period, Squadron forces shifted as necessary, capitalizing on reconnaissance, to determine enemy locations throughout northern III CTZ. Priority of effort was concentrated in War Zone C to determine the locations of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions. Squadron forces were moved in accordance with shifts in enemy posture and assumed shifts in his intentions, both within War Zone C and elsewhere. The Squadron's concept of operation was responsive to actual and assumed changes in the enemy's intentions. If it appeared that major enemy elements were attempting to move into or out of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) area of operation, Air Cavalry troops were employed to complement each other in order to enhance reconnaissance operations and deny concealment to the enemy.

(3) Squadron operations during the three month period reflected damaging losses on the 1st NVA, 7th NVA and 5th VC Divisions, severely disrupting the enemy's logistical redoubts. The kill ratio for the reporting period was 90 to 1, reflecting confirmed enemy dead. Obviously, the actual kill ratio was much higher. Specific results of the reporting period were as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

- (a) Enemy: 900 killed by Helicopter, 108 killed in action, 12 prisoners of war.
- (b) U.S.: 11 KIA, 118 WIA
- (c) The 1-9 Cavalry Squadron accounted for 28% of the 1st Cavalry Division's kills during the reporting period. Many of THE FIRST TEAM's significant contacts were a direct result of sightings or contacts by units of this Squadron.

(4) The reporting period was a highly successful quarter for the 1-9 Cavalry Squadron. It was characterized by numerous contacts throughout the quarter. The most significant events follow.

(a) On 9 August, B Troop spotted approximately 70 individuals in what appeared to be a supply point. This began a day long operation resulting in 23 NVA KBH, 2 NVA KB Artillery, and 1 NVA KDA. During mid-afternoon, a troop scout aircraft was shot down. Blues were inserted to provide security for the crew. The A Troop Infantry Platoon (Blues) made contact with an estimated three-company sized force. Supported by Pink teams, ARA, and air strikes, the contact resulted in 24 NVA KIA. The crew members were lost due to post-crash fire.

(b) on 13 August, B Troop spotted and engaged an unknown sized enemy element resulting in 21 NVA KBH and 100 pounds of destroyed rice.

(c) On 17 August, B Troop spotted 20 NVA on a high speed trail. Engagement of the area resulted in 15 NVA KBH.

(d) On 10 September, C Troop received heavy ground-to-air fire from an unknown number of individuals. Engagement of the area with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes resulted in 21 NVA KBH and 5 NVA killed by ARA.

(e) On 14 September, D Troop (-) had completed a convoy security

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

mission to FSB Nancy. Upon moving from FSB Nancy on Highway 311 south enroute to FSB Mary, a reinforced enemy battalion in an ambush position was forced to activate the ambush prematurely because of heavy reconnaissance by fire. This started a day long operation. The enemy opened fire with RPG, B-40, automatic weapons, individual weapons and mortar fire. Five vehicles were hit by RPG rounds; 2 of the vehicles were destroyed. D Troop engaged with organics, ARA, and tube artillery resulting in 17 NVA KIA. US losses were 1 KIA and 10 WIA.

(f) On 22 September, A Troop, in support of H Company, 75th Rangers, engaged an unknown sized enemy force. This action started a day long operation which resulted in 16 NVA KBH.

(g) On 29 September, the A Troop Infantry Platoon was inserted for general reconnaissance and was engaged by an unknown sized enemy element. Supported by Pink Teams, tube artillery, and ARA, the engagement resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 7 NVA KBH, and 3 NVA KB Artillery. A Troop Blues found communication wire, 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 battery powered field telephone, books, documents, and 5 packs which contained NVA clothing and equipment.

(h) On 4 October, the B Troop Infantry Platoon made contact with an estimated company sized enemy element. The Blues engaged with organics, ARA and tube artillery, resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 8 NVA KBH and 5 NVA KB Artillery.

(i) On 7 October, A Troop spotted a large bunker complex with stoves, tables and several bunkers under construction. This resulted in a day long operation. Engagement of the area resulted in 13 NVA KBH and 15 bunkers uncovered.

(j) On 20 October, A Troop, while conducting a BDA of a B-52 strike, spotted 4 individuals. The Pink Team engaged with organics starting a day long operation in the vicinity of the B-52 strike. Engagement of the area resulted in 21 NVA KBH and 11 NVA KBA.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(k) On 22 October, A Troop, on a day long operation, located a large bunker complex. Numerous bunkers in the area were under construction. Engagement of the area resulted in 17 NVA KBH and 4 NVA KB Artillery.

(l) On 23 October, the C Troop Infantry Platoon engaged 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA. Three AK-47 rifles were secured and the bodies were stripped for intelligence.

(m) On 27 October, the A Troop Blues were inserted for general reconnaissance. The Blues were engaged by an unknown sized enemy force and received heavy AK-47 and B-40 fire resulting in 1 US WIA. Starting a day long operation, the entire area was engaged, and the contact broke in the late afternoon. As a result of the engagement 6 NVA were killed. The Blues recovered 1 NVA pack and a red flag with the words "North Vietnam Revolutionary Revolt Group."

(n) On 28 October, the B Troop Infantry Platoon was inserted for general reconnaissance. The Blues found cooking utensils, 700 pounds of rice, 6 Chicom grenades, 20 NVA uniforms, writing paper, and documents.

(o) On 30 October, the C Troop Blues were inserted for general reconnaissance. They made contact with an estimated company sized enemy element starting a day long operation. The area was engaged by ARA and artillery resulting in 12 NVA KBH, 10 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KB Artillery, 3 NVA killed by ARA, and 1 US KIA.

(p) On 31 October, B Troop spotted 15 NVA in the open and engaged them with organics starting a day long operation. B Troop aircraft received heavy ground-to-air fire throughout the entire day. Continuous engagement with organics, ARA and tube artillery resulted in 30 NVA KBH, 9 NVA KBA, 3 NVA KB Artillery and 7 NVA killed by ARA.

(5) During the reporting period, Company H (Rangers), 75th Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

deployed 96 long range patrols. The majority of the patrols were planned for a 4 to 5 day duration. Each patrol averaged a total of 264 hours in the field, or a total of 11 days. A total of 58 enemy sightings were made resulting in 37 contacts for a total of 77 NVA/VC KIA and 2 detainees. The patrols incurred 35 US WIA and no KIA.

(6) During the reporting period, the 62d Infantry Platoon (Combat Trackers) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) with four teams. Heaviest utilization of the teams has been to provide ground reconnaissance to determine the number, direction and age of enemy movements, both after contacts and on pre-planned insertions into suspected enemy locations. A total of 69 missions were made resulting in 4 NVA KIA. The teams incurred 2 US WIA and no KIA.

g. Division Cumulative Results: Results of Operations from 1 August to 31 October 1969.

(1) Enemy: 3679 KIA, 53 PW, 100 Hoi Chanh; 145 crew-served weapons captured, 3736 large caliber rounds captured, 87,181 small caliber rounds captured.

(2) US: 137 KIA, 1239 WIA (of which 806 required medical evacuation), 6 OH-6A destroyed, 5 UH-1H destroyed, 2 AH-1G destroyed, 1x3/4 ton truck destroyed, 1x1/4 ton truck destroyed, 9 tanks destroyed, 39 ACAV's destroyed, 1x3/4 ton trailer destroyed, and 1xD-5 bulldozer destroyed.

h. Combat Support Elements Operations

(1) Division Artillery: Submitted Separately

(2) 11th Aviation Group

(a) Major Operations

(1) Kentucky Cougar

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(2) Toan Thang III

(3) Insertion of 2nd ARVN Bde

(b) General: During the reporting period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 11th Combat Aviation Group continued to provide general, tactical and logistical support for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Support was also furnished to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, CIDG Units and the 25th Infantry Division. On 15 October 1969 support to the 25th Infantry Division was terminated and support began for the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade.

(c) Significant Activities: Support of above units involved participation in the following operations:

(1) Operation Toan Thang III - initiated 17 February 1969 and still in progress.

(2) Operation Kentucky Cougar - initiated 24 July 1969 and still in progress.

(3) Insertion of 2nd ARVN Bde in the 1st Bde area of operation, was initiated 17 October 1969 and completed on 23 October 1969.

(4) In conjunction with the above operation, the 11th Combat Aviation Group assisted in the relocation of the following Fire Support Bases; CALDWELL, EAGLE I, ALVARADO, VIVIAN, DON, JERRIE, BU DOF, ANN, MARY, IKE, DEB, JUDIE, ELLEN, JACKIE, VICKIE, AND CAROLYN. The 11th Combat Aviation Group also extracted Fire Support Bases; O'KEEFE, CALDWELL, MARY, ELLEN, BECKY, EAGLE I, JERRIE, BU DOF, DEB, AND ANN.

(5) "A" Company 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion was deployed in direct support for the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. They were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

normally provided with ten mission ready aircraft per day. During this period "A" Company 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion provided 656 mission ready aircraft, flew 3905 hours, completed 1341 log sorties transporting 161 tons of equipment and 1148 passengers. A total of 14,643 Combat Troop sorties were flown, air lifting 33,997 Combat Troops. The support of the 25th Division was accomplished by direct coordination between the brigade and the 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion. The Battalion Liaison Officer assisted the unit in planning operations and passed the finalized missions to the battalion.

(6) On 17 October 1969 the 2nd ARVN Abn Bde began to operate in the 1st Cav Area of Operations and established Fire Support Bases at JACKIE, VICKIE, and CAROLYN. Numerous Combat Assaults and Logistical Missions were conducted from these bases. Problems usually encountered during joint US-ARVN operations have been minimized by having the Flight Leader arrive early at the support unit's location to make final coordination.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion Operations

(a) During the period covered by this report, the 13th Signal Battalion provided communications for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in the conduct of Operation Kentucky Cougar and for the Division Forward CP.

(b) Operation Kentucky Cougar: This operation was in process at the start of the reporting period and continued throughout the quarter. Communications installed in support of this operation were reported in the ORLL ending 31 July 1969.

(c) Division Forward CP: On 7 August 1969, a Division Forward CP displaced to Quan Loi Base Camp to co-locate with the 3rd Brigade Headquarters. On 14 September 1969, the Forward CP was displaced back to Camp Gorved. Communications to support the CP were provided as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(1) Radio Nets:

- (a) Division Command-Secure (FM)
- (b) Division Operations/Intel-Secure (FM)
- (c) Task Force command-Secure (FM)
- (d) 11th Aviation Group Operations-non secure (FM)
- (e) Divarty Command Fire-Secure (FM)
- (f) 9th ARVN Command-non Secure (FM)

(2) Two voice four channel systems (AN/GRC-163)

- (a) Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi
- (b) Phuoc Vinh to Chan Thanh

(3) Four circuits were provided by the Army Area System and terminated at the following designated points:

(a) One hotline voice circuit from Division Forward TOC to MACV Sector TOC.

(b) One hotline voice circuit from Division Forward TOC to 9th ARVN Regt CP.

(c) One hotline voice circuit from Division Forward TOC to 11th ACR S-3.

(d) One hotline voice circuit from Division Forward to 1st Cavalry Division (AM) LNO to 5th ARVN Div.

(4) 3rd Brigade Switchboard provided alternate routing capability.

(5) Secure teletype communications were provided by 3rd Brigade Communication center.

(d) The move of the 2nd Brigade to Song Be created the need for additional circuits to Division Headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(1) Additional circuits were provided by:

(a) Four common user voice circuits from Skyking to the Brigade Switchboard forward.

(b) Two voice circuits from Divarty to the DS Artillery Battalion forward.

(c) One common user voice circuit from the Brigade forward Switchboard to the Brigade rear switchboard.

(2) In addition several circuits were moved to Song Be from Lai Kho. These were:

(a) One teletype circuit for Communication Center traffic.

(b) One teletype circuit for passing intelligence.

(c) One voice circuit from Skyking Switchboard to 2nd Brigade S-2/3.

(d) One common user voice circuit from LCC forward to Brigade FSSE.

(e) One common user voice circuit from Aviation Platoon to 2nd Brigade Forward Switchboard.

(f) One common user voice circuit from 11th Aviation Group Switchboard to 2nd Brigade Forward Switchboard.

(g) AM HF SSB radio team to operate in DISCOM D-7 RATT net.

(h) Personnel to operate FSSE Switchboard (SB-22).

(3) FM radio retransmission facility was established on Nui Ba Ra to link 2nd Brigade forward with Division Headquarters. This facility is maintained for the Division D-1 and D-2 radio nets and a four channel VHF System.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(4) Two AN/VRC-49's were moved to 2nd Brigade Forward to terminate Division D-1 and D-2 radio nets for a period of two months pending arrival of brigade equipment.

(5) An additional HF SSB radio team was sent to the 2nd Brigade to operate in the Division D-3 RATT net.

(e) A new switchboard, MTC-1, capable of terminating 200 local lines and 20 trunk circuits was installed to provide better telephone switching capabilities at Division Headquarters.

(f) A new cable plant to support the 1st Cavalry Division's (AM) tactical circuits was begun during the reporting period and is still in progress. This cable plant will separate the tactical and strategic circuits.

(g) During the reporting period, the 15th Signal Battalion also provided:

(1) FM radio terminations in all Division and Field Force nets and Support Command Headquarters.

(2) AM HF SSB terminations in all Division nets for Division Headquarters and the Support Command Headquarters.

(3) Four channel VHF systems to 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades and four channel VHF systems in support of 2 infantry battalions.

(a) Quan Loi to FSB Wescott.

(b) Tay Ninh to FSB Grant.

(4) Switchboard and wire installation service for the Division Headquarters and Support Command Headquarters.

(5) Message Center and courier service for the Division Headquarters and Support Command Headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(6) Terminations for approximately 25 voice and teletype channels to higher and adjacent headquarters (circuits provided by Army Area Communications System).

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion Operations:

(a) During the reporting period the greatest part of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Operation TOAN THANG III. The battalion, being involved in operations for 92 days during the period, constructed or reopened 14 fire support bases for the Division, upgraded 5 other FSB's which were operated by the Division, and dismantled 8 FSB's which were no longer required for tactical operations. Non-divisional engineer efforts in the Division area of operations was mainly directed toward upgrading roads and airfields along with the facilities at Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Quan Loi, and Song Be. This effort by non-divisional engineer units was coordinated by the 8th Engineer Battalion and has been significant in enabling the 8th Engineer Battalion to devote the majority of its time to direct combat support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(b) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. The equipment platoons were involved in several construction and maintenance projects in the Division area of operations. Two coats of penepime were applied to the entire surface of the BU DOP airfield. The 400 foot extension of the runway increased its class to a Type II, C-130, and enabled the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to conduct the first airmobile armored operation of the war. The construction of 3 helicopter sling-out pads was initiated in September at FSB BUTTONS and was completed one month later. HHC also supported line company elements at FSB's with construction

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

equipment and at the same time maintained and upgraded vital road networks and drainage systems throughout AO Chief. The latter two efforts still continue at the close of the reporting period. A total of 375 CH-54 and CH-47 sorties were required to move engineer equipment and material throughout the Division area of operation in support of widespread construction efforts. At Camp Gorvad, engineer equipment and personnel maintained existing road and drainage systems. The Divisional water points, operated by HHC personnel, produced over 1 million gallons of potable water.

(c) Company A remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade with its base camp at Tay Ninh. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support the infantry. FSB IKE was closed and reopened while FSB's JAMIE and GRANT were upgraded and maintained. FSB BUCKY was closed and the material retrograded. Major assistance was given to the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade during construction of FSB's JACKIE, VICKIE, and CAROLYN. In Tay Ninh, limited construction projects were completed on a mission request basis. Major projects completed at Tay Ninh included the construction of revetments around the 1st Brigade CO's hut and the construction of a timber trestle bridge for civic action. One platoon deployed to Camp Gorvad on 8 September to take over SEA Hut construction and other base development projects. This platoon was relieved on 17 October and returned to Tay Ninh to provide tactical and general engineer support for elements of the 1st Brigade.

(d) Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its CP at Lai Khe until the middle of August when a forward CP was established at FSB BUTTONS. Later, in October, the rear CP moved from Lai Khe to Camp Gorvad. Direct combat support included daily minesweeps and demolition support to infantry units in the field. Construction, rehabilitation and closing of FSB's

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

in the Brigade Area of Operations were also conducted. During the reporting period, FSB's CALDWELL, MARY, DON, ALVARADO, and CALDWELL were opened, while FSB JUDIE was reopened. Material was later retrograded from FSB CALDWELL which was closed the middle of August. Maintenance of FSB's BUTTONS, and O'KEEFE was also provided during the reporting period. Construction efforts in support of the 2nd Brigade included the construction of perimeter bunkers at FSB BUTTONS, a Class 60 timber trestle bridge near BUNARD, and a signal relay station on top of NUI BA RA. The latter effort was still in progress at the close of the period. In early September one platoon returned to FSB BUTTONS from Camp Gorvad where they had been constructing SEA Huts. This platoon is currently at FSB BUTTONS and continues to provide tactical and general engineer support to elements of the 2nd Brigade.

(c) Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its GP at Quan Loi. Minesweeps and demolition support were provided to the infantry on an as required basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of fire support bases in the 3rd Brigade area of operation was the company's main concern during the reporting period. New fire support bases were constructed at EAGLE I, JERRI, and ANN, while FSB WESCOTT was maintained. FSB's ELLEN and VIVIAN were closed and later reopened. Other construction in support of the brigade was furnished on an as required basis and included upgrading the Quan Loi Green Line, the 3rd Brigade TOC, and the Special Forces Camp at BU DOP. Construction and demolition support was also provided to elements of RHC, 8th Engineer Battalion, who were extending the airfield runway at BU DOP. One platoon was deployed to Camp Gorvad on 17 October to undertake SEA Hut construction and other base development projects. This element was still at Camp Gorvad at the close of the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

2. (c) Significant Activities

a. General: See paragraph 1a.

b. Significant activities occurring within the Division AO during the reporting period.

(1) 3 August: Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry completed a three day search of a cache site northwest of Fire Support Base (FSB) Jamie. The total enemy equipment found in the area was 126x82mm mortar rounds, 30x120mm mortar rounds, 7x107mm rockets and 2 B-40 rockets.

(2) 4 August: Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry completed reconnaissance in the vicinity of the cache site discovered on 3 August. Findings in the area were 7 NVA KIA, 4 B-40 rockets, 120 AK rounds, 1M-16 rifle, 48 82mm mortar rounds, assorted medical supplies, 10x60mm mortar rounds, 30 AK 50 rounds, and 250 pounds of rice.

(3) 6 August: Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, conducting operations northeast of FSB Grant, found 2 B-40 rounds, 20 AK-47 rounds, 2x60mm mortar rounds, 23 Chinese Communist (Chicom) grenades, and 100 pounds of rice in a bunker complex. Later in the day, it found 64 B-40 rounds, 78x82mm mortar rounds, 10x57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 422 Chicom grenades, 3 bangalore torpedoes, 1000 pounds of rice, and 1 bicycle in a bomb crater.

(4) 7 August:

(a) Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, conducting operations south-east of FSB Becky, found 2 M-1 carbines, 1x12 gauge shotgun, 5800 pounds of rice and a large quantity of medicine in a bunker complex.

(b) Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, exploiting the area north-east of FSB Grant, found 222 B-40 rockets, 231x82mm mortars rounds, 12x60mm mortar rounds, 120 Chicom grenades, 27 bangalore torpedoes, 1020x.51 caliber

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

rounds, 17,280 AK-47 rounds, 1 Chicom anti-tank mine, and 25 bicycles.

(5) 9 August:

(a) The Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at 0905 hours, while conducting a bomb damage assessment (BDA) of an ARC light (B-52 strike), observed an unknown sized enemy force east of the Fishhook. The enemy were engaged with organic weapons, ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR (air strikes). After the contact, the ACT spotted six dazed individuals in the area whom it extracted alive. Other results were 37 NVA KBH, 2 NVA KB Artillery, and 3 AK-47 rifles, 4 SKS rifles and 1x9mm pistol captured.

(b) At 1145 hours, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry spotted 70 individuals west of FSB Ellen and engaged with organic weapons and TAC AIR. The enemy returned small arms fire. The contact resulted in 21 NVA KBH. A BDA of the artillery and air strikes at 1430 hours disclosed an additional 2 NVA KB Artillery, 2 NVA KBH and 1 NVA killed by air (KBA).

(6) 10 August: The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment spotted 32 individuals in a lightly vegetated area northwest of FSB Eagle I. The Armored Reconnaissance Platoon and the Infantry Platoon of B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry were inserted into the area. They received small arms fire and returned fire with organic weapons, ARA, and TAC AIR. The contact resulted in 23 NVA KIA, 4 NVA PW, and 4 NVA Hoi Chanh (enemy defector).

(7) 11 August:

(a) Company D and Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, providing security for FSB Becky, received an unknown number of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds at 0300 hours. This was followed by rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire, and a ground attack by a company sized sapper unit. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, ARA, and Shadow. The contact broke

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
at 0345 hours with the following results: 17 NVA KIA, and 5 AK-47 rifles, 5 RPG launchers, 6 B-40 rounds, 190 Chicom grenades, 18 bangalore torpedoes, and 15 satchel charges captured. Friendly losses were 4 KIA and 14 WIA.

(b) Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry spotted two individuals setting up 107mm rockets in the vicinity of FSB Becky at 1010 hours. The Company engaged the individuals with organic weapons resulting in 2 NVA KIA, and 2 AK-47 rifles, 1x60mm mortar tube, 2x107mm rockets, 10x60mm mortar rounds, and 15 M-60 rounds captured.

(8) 12 August:

(a) Major enemy ground attacks were launched on Fire Support Bases Becky, Andy, Aspen, Sidewinder, the Duc Phong Special Forces District Headquarters, and the towns of An Loc and Loc Ninh. Additional stand-off attacks were made on Fire Support Bases Grant, Mary, Thunder III, and Thunder IV, as the enemy posture changed from defensive disengagement to offensive ground assaults.

(b) The enemy offensive was initiated at 0109 hours with a 60mm mortar and RPG attack on Quan Loi. An enemy ground attack, supported with 107mm rocket fire and led by sappers was made at 0120 hours from the south-southeast. The ground action continued until 0430 hours when the enemy force broke contact and withdrew to the southwest. PW's taken in the vicinity of the Quan Loi base camp were tentatively identified as being from the 271st Regiment, 272d Regiment, 88th Regiment, and 4th Battalion, N16 Armored Office of Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN). After breaking contact with US forces, the enemy launched an attack on An Loc city. At 0430 hours, the east gate of An Loc was reported to be under heavy fire. The enemy force withdrew to the north-northeast from An Loc. However, sporadic mortar fire was received up to 0745 hours. Reaction operations by 1st Cavalry Division (AM) forces were conducted to the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

west and northwest of the area by combat assaulting two companies and the battalion headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry from Camp Gorvad (Phuoc Vinh) to predetermined blocking positions, and moving the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry from FSB Vivian to FSB Eagle I. Additionally, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry conducted pursuit operations to the southeast. Results of the enemy initiated action and 1st Air Cavalry Division reaction operations in the Quan Loi-An Loc area for 12 August were 68 enemy KIA, 7 PW, and 11 Hoi Chanh. Friendly casualties were 7 US KIA and 67 WIA.

(c) Action in the Loc Ninh area (Fire Support Bases Kelly and Jon) was initiated at 0130 hours with enemy elements assaulting the perimeter of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment trains area. Small arms, grenade and RPG fire, from inside the perimeter, was received by US forces. Contact was broken at 0330 hours with enemy forces withdrawing to the north. Both Fire Support Bases (Kelly and Jon) received stand-off mortar and rocket attacks. The enemy unit identified in the ground attack was the 7th Battalion, 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. Reaction operations by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were initiated with two troops conducting pursuit operations to the north. Results of the enemy initiated action and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) reaction operations in the Loc Ninh area for 12 August were 39 enemy KIA. Friendly casualties were 8 US KIA and 27 WIA.

(d) Aspen and Sidewinder Fire Support Bases were attacked almost simultaneously at 0140 and 0145 hours. A 60mm mortar attack started the action at Aspen while at Sidewinder it was initiated by a ground attack without benefit of stand-off mortar fire. The ground assault at Aspen was launched from the southeast. The wire was not breached and contact was broken at 0400 hours with the enemy force withdrawing from the area. The ground assault on Sidewinder

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

was launched from the north. The wire was breached, forcing the ARVN troops to withdraw to the south. ARVN forces, reinforced by E Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, re-established the northern perimeter at 0430 hours, with the enemy force breaking contact and withdrawing to the north. The enemy unit identified in the ground attack on Sidewinder was the K2 Battalion, 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division. Reaction and pursuit operations in the area were continued throughout the day. Results of the enemy initiated action and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) operations in the FSB Aspen and FSB Sidewinder areas for 12 August were 185 enemy KIA, 4 PW, and 4 Hoi Chanh. The action resulted in 3 US KIA, 71 WIA, and 3 MIA. ARVN losses were 44 KIA and 37 WIA.

(e) Action on FSB Caldwell, in the Duc Phong Special Forces Camp area, was initiated at 0210 hours with a mortar and rocket attack supported with 57mm recoilless rifle fire. The major ground assault was launched from the north against the Duc Phong District Headquarters. The CIDG camp and FSB Caldwell were not penetrated. Enemy forces broke contact at 0415 hours and withdrew to the north. The enemy unit identified in the ground attack was the 3d Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. Reaction operations in the area resulted in a tightened ring around the contact area to cut off avenues of withdrawal. Results of the enemy initiated action and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) reaction operations in the FSB Caldwell, Duc Phong area for 12 August were 74 enemy KIA. The action resulted in 2 US KIA and 20 WIA.

(f) At Fire Support Base Becky, enemy activity was observed on radar at 0145 hours with the movement of a truck from 1800 meters south to 700 meters north of the FSB. Radar returns indicated that the truck made two trips of this type discharging personnel. Artillery engaged the movement resulting in a secondary explosion at 0225 hours. The Fire Support Base received a heavy

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

mortar and rocket attack commencing at 0340 hours, followed by a ground attack from the north-northwest at 0410 hours. Two bunkers were destroyed by direct hits, and at 0345 hours direct hits destroyed the 155 artillery ammunition storage area. Enemy forces reached the wire but did not penetrate the perimeter. Heavy small arms and automatic weapon fire continued until 0450 hours at which time contact was broken and enemy forces withdrew to the northwest. Fire Support Base Becky was closed as of 2007 hours, 12 August, when all forces from the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry moved to Fire Support Base Ike. Results of the enemy initiated action and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) reaction in the FSB Becky area for 12 August were 101 enemy KIA and 1 PW. The action resulted in 6 US KIA, 46 WIA, and 5 MIA.

(g) A general analysis of 12 August saw the enemy shift his tactics from a disengagement posture with minimum contact to a general offensive posture employing ground attacks supported with mortar and rocket attacks. Sporadic contact continued throughout the day as Division forces conducted reaction operations to pursue and block the enemy's withdrawal from the contact areas. Cumulative results of the day's operations show 467 enemy KIA, 12 PW, and 15 Hoi Chanh. The action resulted in 36 US KIA, 231 WIA, and 8 MIA.

(9) 13 August:

(a) The major contact of the day was made in the Loc Ninh area by the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion while conducting a joint ground operation 3 kilometers west of Loc Ninh city. Contact was made with elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division resulting in 79 enemy KIA; friendly losses were 2 KIA and 6 WIA.

(b) Pursuit operations by 1st Cavalry Division (AM) forces and forces under its operational control (OPCON) in the An Loc, Quan Loi, Sidewinder and Aspen areas developed light and sporadic contacts resulting in 8 enemy KIA

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
and 5 US WIA.

(c) Action in the FSB Caldwell, Duc Phong Special Forces Camp area, continued on 13 August. Company D, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was in general contact with an unknown sized enemy force 7 kilometers northwest of FSB Caldwell through the night of 12 August and early morning hours of 13 August. Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was combat assaulted into the contact area on 13 August to block withdrawal routes and engage the enemy force. Results of the days' operations were 17 enemy KIA; friendly losses were 4 KIA and 12 WIA.

(d) In War Zone C, elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry found 20 bodies 10 kilometers south of FSB Becky during a sweep of that area on 13 August. Friendly losses were negative.

(e) At 0830 hours 1 NVA was killed by the CIDG force at Bu Dop. From documents taken off the body, it was believed that the individual was part of a ground reconnaissance party. The documents also indicated that a major NVA attack was planned in the Bo Duc-Bu Dop area. In response to this information, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) elements in the Bo Duc area were increased to four rifle companies and five 105mm Howitzers. Another force adjustment was the move of Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry from Fire Support Base Mary to the Song Be city area to reinforce 1st Cavalry Division (AM) elements already at that location.

(f) Overall, operations on 13 August accounted for 160 enemy KIA. US losses were 6 KIA and 23 WIA. Operations on 12 and 13 August in the Division area of operations resulted in 627 enemy KIA.

(10) 14 August:

(a) On 14 August, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and OPCON forces continued pursuit and search operations of enemy forces in the area of oper-

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

ations. Enemy units identified so far are:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
FSB Becky	1st Battalion, 18B Regiment, 1st NVA Div
Quan Loi	K33, K37 Co, 4th Bn, J-16 Regt; 2d Bn, 272d Regt; 9th VC Div. Dong Phat LF Guerillas
FSB Aspen FSB Sidewinder	H17 Co, 271st Regt, 9th VC Div; 2d Bn, 271st Regt, 9th VC Div
Hwy 13 - Chon Thanh	1st Bn, 101D Regt, 1st NVA Div; 2d Bn, 101D Regt, 1st NVA Div; C-18 Co, 101D Regt, 1st NVA Div
Loc Ninh	2d Bn, 209th Regt, 7th NVA Div
FSB Eagle	HQ, 9th VC Div Elements; 3d Bn, 272d Regt, 9th VC Div
Duc Phong-FSB Caldwell	3d Bn, 275th Regt, 5th VC Div

(b) Joint US/ARVN operations in the Loc Ninh area, by the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion, resulted in additional contacts with elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. Contacts on 14 August by the joint force resulted in 22 enemy KIA; friendly casualties were 1 ARVN KIA, 5 ARVN WIA, and 5 US WIA.

(c) Delta and Echo Companies, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery on Fire Support Base Eagle, 7 kilometers northwest of An Loc, withstood a 60mm mortar attack and follow-up ground attack by a company sized enemy force early on 14 August. Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (Mechanized) assisted the defenders in a sweep of the area. Results were 16 NVA KIA and 1 PW taken; US casualties were 13 WIA. Elements of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment uncovered 9 enemy who were killed in action on the previous day.

(11) 15 August: The major activity of 15 August occurred in the central

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

portion of War Zone "C", where Companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry continued operations southeast of Fire Support Base Becky. A search of the area where contact had been established on 14 August produced 31 NVA KIA.

Action by Company D, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry in the same general area accounted for 10 NVA KIA.

(12) 15 August:

(a) The major activity of 16 August occurred in the central portion of War Zone "C" where Companies A and D, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry conducted operations west of Fire Support Base Becky. Ground contact was established at 0845 hours and maintained until 1000 hours when the enemy withdrew from the area. A search of the contact site produced 25 enemy KIA; friendly casualties were 1 KIA and 3 WIA. A PW captured in this area by A Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry was identified as a member of the 95C Regiment, 1st NVA Division, giving strong indications of the presence of this unit in central War Zone "C".

(b) 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and OPCON forces continued pursuit and search operations in Binh Long Province. Enemy action in this area consisted of a stand-off mortar attack and light ground probe on FSB Eagle I resulting in 10 NVA KIA and 6 US WIA, a light stand-off mortar attack on FSB Thunder IV, and minor exchanges of small arms fire with friendly units operating in the province area. Although no major ground contact was established during the day's operations, a total of 28 NVA were killed in Binh Long Province by friendly forces. US casualties were 6 WIA.

(c) The planned reorientation of 1st Cavalry Division (AM) forces was altered during the course of the day to react to intelligence information indicating a heightened enemy threat in the Song Be area. The 2d Brigade assumed responsibility for the eastern two-thirds of Phuoc Long Province with the

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

following units OPCON: the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry; D Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry (-); and C Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 3d Brigade remained oriented in the Quan Loi, An Loc, Bo Duc/Bu Dop areas. The 1st Brigade, with three battalions reinforced by two companies from the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, continued operations in central War Zone "C".

(d) Overall operations on 16 August accounted for 53 enemy KIA and 1 PW. US losses were 1 KIA and 9 WIA.

(13) 17 August: The major activities of 17 August in central Binh Long Province occurred in the Quan Loi and Loc Ninh areas, and further activity was recorded west of FSB Jamie in central War Zone "C". Central Binh Long Province was the site of nine separate minor engagements with enemy forces as 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and OPCON forces continued their pursuit and search operations in this area. Although no major ground contact was established during the day, a total of 27 enemy were killed in Binh Long Province by US forces. US casualties were 6 WIA. A Hoi Chanh who turned himself in to FSB Eagle I on 16 August was positively identified as a member of the 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment, 9th VC Division. With this identification, personnel from all three battalions of the 272d Regiment were identified in the Eagle I-Quan Loi area since the enemy-initiated offensive of 12 August 1969.

(14) 18 August:

(a) The major activities of 18 August occurred in the Quan Loi-Loc Ninh area, in central Binh Long Province, and west of FSB Jamie in War Zone "C". It was the 7th consecutive day that major action within the Division area of operations had been centered in these two locations. Central Binh Long Province was the site of eight separate minor engagements with enemy forces as 1st

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

Cavalry Division (AM) and OPCON forces continued their pursuit and search operations in this area. Although no major ground contact was established during the day, a total of 23 enemy were killed and 1 PW was captured in Binh Long Province by US forces. US casualties were 13 WIA, resulting from a 3 round stand-off rocket attack that impacted in the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry motor pool on Quan Loi Base Camp.

(b) In central War Zone "C", minor ground action continued west of FSB Jamie as elements of the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted ground reconnaissance operations in the area where contact had been established on 17 August. Results of the day's operations in central War Zone "C" accounted for 21 enemy KIA. There were no US casualties.

(c) A phased, two day displacement of A Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from the Loc Ninh area to the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was initiated. The move was to be completed on 19 August. In addition to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and OPCON forces already in the Bu Dop/Bo Duc complex, further reinforcement was completed with the move of four 106mm recoilless rifles from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to the area on 18 August.

(d) Overall operations on 18 August accounted for 50 enemy KIA and 1 PW. US losses were 13 WIA.

(15) 23 August: Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, conducting operations north of FSB Eagle, found 40 NVA KIA in graves.

(16) 26 August: D Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in a sweep of the area northeast of FSB Ike, found 33 NVA KIA, 1x82mm mortar round, and 250 AK-47 rounds.

(17) 28 August:

(a) Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, conducting a search of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

an area east of FSB Ike, found 4 NVA KBA, 1 SKS rifle, 6x82mm mortar rounds, 98 M-79 rounds, 410 small arms rounds, 100 pounds of rice, and a large quantity of medicine, military equipment and documents.

(b) Company D, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting a combat assault into an area northwest of FSB Mary at 1215 hours, received automatic weapons and B-40 fire from an unknown sized enemy force. The Company continued the combat assault and engaged the enemy with organic weapons, ARA, and artillery. The contact resulted in 17 NVA KIA; friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA.

(18) 31 August:

(a) Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in a sweep of a contact area, found 1 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 rifle, 3 Chicom grenades, 1 B-40 launcher, and numerous documents. At 0945 hours, Company B engaged several individuals and received small arms and 60mm mortar fire in return. The contact, supported by ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR, resulted in 3 NVA KIA; friendly losses were 2 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1520 hours, the Company engaged an unknown sized enemy force in bunkers and received automatic weapons and B-40 fire. It returned fire with organic weapons, ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR. The contact resulted in 25 NVA KIA, and 2x.30 caliber machine guns, 15 B-40 rounds, and 27 Chicom grenades captured. Friendly casualties were 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

(b) At 0001 hours, the Base Defense Platoon from the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry at Nui Ba Ra received an unknown number of mortar rounds, automatic weapons and RPG fire. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and Spooky aircraft resulting in 10 NVA KIA.

(19) 1 September: 1st Brigade Scouts spotted 15 to 20 individuals sitting on the side of a trail southeast of FSB Jamie at 1345 hours. They engaged

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

the enemy with organic weapons, artillery, and D Company, 229th Helicopter Battalion gunships resulting in 12 NVA KBH, 4 NVA KB Artillery, and 1x107mm rocket destroyed.

(20) 2 September: Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, searching an area northwest of FSB Ike, spotted one individual in a spider hole. When the individual would not Chieu Hoi, he and his AK-47 rifle were captured. At 1315 hours in the same area, Company B engaged an unknown sized enemy force and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. It engaged the enemy with organic weapons, ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR. The contact resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KB Artillery, 6 NVA KBA, and 2 B-40 rounds, 15 Chicom grenades and 1 NVA field telephone captured. US losses were 2 KIA and 1 WIA.

(21) 4 September: Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry ambushed an unknown sized enemy force northwest of FSB Eagle at 0651 hours. The enemy returned automatic weapons fire and was engaged with artillery. Results of the contact were 2 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA (PW), and 1 AK-47 rifle, 11x60mm mortar rounds, 1x60mm mortar sight, 5 Chicom grenades, 50 pounds of rice and numerous documents were seized. A sweep of the contact area at 1045 hours produced one additional NVA KIA.

(22) 6 September:

(a) Companies C and E, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at 0405 hours, received a heavy barrage of 107mm rocket, 60mm mortar, and 80mm mortar fire at FSB Jamie. The indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack supported by intense machine gun and RPG fire. The ground attack was stopped by 0625 hours by organic weapons, claymore mines, direct fire, artillery, Shadow, ARA and TAC AIR, but sporadic incoming continued until 0740 hours. A first light

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

reconnaissance revealed 23 NVA KIA. Captured equipment included 1 destroyed heavy machine gun, 2 rocket launchers, 2 Chicom claymores, 1x107mm rocket, 10 60mm mortar rounds, 1 AK-47 rifle, 420 small arms rounds, 28 grenades, and 15 B-40 rocket rounds. Friendly losses were 3 US KIA and 18 US WIA.

(b) Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, conducting a search of an area in the vicinity of FSB Ike, found 1 NVA KIA, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 4 B-40 rounds, and 3 Chicom grenades. At 1515 hours, the Company ambushed two individuals resulting in 2 NVA KIA, and then received mortar and automatic weapons fire from an unknown sized enemy force. The enemy was engaged with unknown results; friendly casualties were 3 US WIA.

(c) B Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, as a part of a combined operation with the CIDG from A-33 Special Forces Team, at 0950 hours, encountered and engaged an estimated two company sized enemy force southwest of FSB Jon and received heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire. The contact was supported by ARA and artillery. C and D Troops, 1-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment, maneuvered against and engaged the enemy with organic weapons. A sweep of the battle area revealed 55 NVA KIA, 5 NVA PW, and 2 AK-47 rifles were captured. Friendly casualties were 2 US KIA and 14 US WIA.

(d) F Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in a night ambush position to the southwest of FSB Aspen, engaged an unknown sized enemy force at 2030 hours, and received automatic weapons and RPG fire in return. The contact, supported by ARA and artillery, resulted in 2 NVA KIA and 5 US WIA.

(23) 7 September:

(a) In response to a ground-to-air firing incident south of FSB Vivian, Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry maneuvered into the vicinity of the enemy firing position. At 0920 hours, an estimated enemy platoon was

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

encountered and engaged with organic weapons, ARA, and artillery. As the enemy withdrew and C Company pursued, one platoon of D Company and artillery fires were employed to attempt to block their escape. A sweep of the contact area produced 12 NVA KIA, and the capture of 2x.51 caliber machine guns, 248x.51 caliber rounds, 3 B-40 rounds, and 60 AK-47 rounds.

(b) F Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in a sweep of the 6 September contact area southwest of FSB Aspen, found 24 NVA KIA, 4 AK-47 rounds, 1 light machine gun, and 21 RPG rounds.

(c) At 1330 hours, an AH-1G (Cobra gunship) from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry received .51 caliber ground-to-air fire northeast of FSB Janie. The enemy position was engaged with organic weapons and artillery resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1x.51 caliber machine gun destroyed.

(d) The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, received ground-to-air fire at 1550 hours north of Loc Ninh. It spotted 15 individuals and engaged them with organics resulting in 15 NVA KBH.

(e) I Troop, 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, while conducting a reconnaissance northwest of FSB Aspen II, encountered and engaged an estimated enemy battalion at 1515 hours, and received heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire in return. Support from M Troop, ARA, and artillery was employed. At 1700 hours, a UH-1H medevac helicopter was hit by RPG fire and crashed. Results of the contact were 42 NVA KIA and 2x.51 caliber machine guns and 1 M-16 rifle were captured. US losses were 4 KIA and 9 WIA, with 1 tank and 1 UH-1H helicopter classified combat losses.

(24) 10 September: Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry engaged the enemy in response to three separate ground-to-air firings (1045, 1135, and 1532 hours) west of FSB Mary. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery and

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

TAC AIR resulting in a total of 26 NVA KIA.

(25) 11 September:

(a) The base defense forces of Camp Gorrad, at 0018 hours, 0058 hours, and 0158 hours heard movement on the southeast side of the perimeter and engaged the area with organic weapons, causing the movement to cease each time. At 0222 hours, an unknown number of individuals approached the wire and were engaged with sniper and M-79 fire. Night Hawk came on station and engaged the area. A first light check of the area revealed 1 NVA killed by sniper fire, 3 NVA KIA, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 1 RPG-7 rocket launcher, 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 AK-50 rifle, 16 B-40 rounds, 6 RPG rounds, 56 grenades, and 2 pair of wire cutters were captured. A read-out of documents found on the bodies identified them as members of the M-16 Armor Office, a COSVN sapper unit.

(b) Troop C, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, northwest of FSB Eagle at 1025 hours, received an unknown number of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The enemy firing position was engaged with mortar and artillery fire. While making a sweep of the area, the Troop encountered and engaged a platoon sized enemy force. The enemy withdrew, leaving behind 8 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47 rifles. The contact resulted in 4 US WIA.

(c) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, southwest of Loc Ninh at 1510 hours, engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons and received automatic weapons and RPG fire in return. Troop D reinforced the contact supported by ARA and artillery. A sweep of the area revealed 17 NVA KIA. The action resulted in 7 US WIA.

(d) At 1130 hours, to the west and southwest of An Loc, the 9th ARVN Reconnaissance Platoon, 14th Company, 4th Battalion, 9th ARVN Regiment and the 2d Squadron, 15th ARVN Cavalry Regiment began a series of contacts.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

The units engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons supported by artillery. At 1545 hours, the enemy retreated in an unknown direction, leaving behind 39 NVA KIA, and 1x.51 caliber machine gun, 6 AK-47 rifles, 3 B-40 rocket launchers, 12 B-40 rounds, 300 AK-47 rounds, and 100x.50 caliber rounds. The contacts resulted in 1 US KIA, 10 ARVN KIA, and 37 ARVN WIA.

(26) 12 September: Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, conducting operations north of FSB Grant, found 11 B-40 rounds, 1978 AK-47 rounds, 1 M-16 rifle, 1 Sub-machine gun, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 M-1 carbine, 267 M-16 rounds, 32 M-79 rounds, and 1x82mm mortar round in a bunker complex.

(27) 14 September:

(a) Beginning at 0001 hours, Companies C and E, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, base defense for FSB Ike, received 75 to 100 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar, RPG, and 107mm rocket fire from the north and northeast. This was followed by a ground probe and heavy .51 caliber fire from the north and northeast. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, supported by ARA, artillery, and Spooky aircraft, causing the incoming fire to cease and the enemy forces to withdraw at 0400 hours. A first light sweep of the contact area revealed 34 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 6 AK-47 rifles, 2 B-40 launchers, 1 B-40 round, 1 SKS rifle, 5x107mm rockets, 5x57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 5 B-41 rounds, 172 Chicom grenades, 5 rifle grenades, 450 AK-47 rounds, and 1 bangalore torpedo. The contact resulted in 14 US WIA.

(b) Troop D, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, at 1145 hours northwest of FSB Mary while on a road clearing mission, pre-empted an enemy ambush which apparently was being set up to engage a convoy scheduled for 15 September. By conducting a reconnaissance by fire, Troop D avoided being ambushed and engaged an estimated reinforced enemy battalion, receiving automatic weapons, B-40

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

rocket, and mortar fire in return. At 1200 hours, Troop G, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment maneuvered to reinforce the contact and engaged the enemy force, supported by ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR. At 1310 hours, the enemy fire ceased as his forces withdrew from the contact area. Company A, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry was inserted and conducted a sweep of the area with Troops D and G revealing a preliminary total of 7 NVA KIA, and 2 B-40 rounds. The units continued to search the contact area. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA and 11 WIA.

(28) 17 September:

(a) An OH-6A (light observation helicopter) from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while making a visual reconnaissance west of FSB Ike at 1145 hours, spotted a 2½ ton truck and 7 individuals. The aircraft received ground-to-air fire and engaged the individuals and truck with organic weapons resulting in 5 NVA KBH and 1x2½ ton truck destroyed.

(b) B Company, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting operations west of FSB Mary, found 1 NVA KIA, 112x82mm mortar rounds, 14x60mm mortar rounds, 1 AK-47 rifle, 14 RPG rounds, and 1000 AK-47 rounds.

(29) 18 September:

(a) The Reconnaissance Platoon of Company E, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, at 0700 hours southeast of FSB Ike, ambushed an unknown sized enemy force when the enemy triggered a friendly warning device. The enemy was engaged with claymores and organic weapons, supported by artillery. The enemy retreated, firing small arms as they fled. The Reconnaissance Platoon maneuvered into the contact area and found 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 B-40 launcher, 2 B-40 rounds, and 2 blood trails with drag marks. Following the blood trails, it spotted an additional 2 NVA KIA and observed 6 individuals in fighting positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969.

The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery and air strikes, resulting in 6 NVA KIA, bringing the total to 10 NVA killed.

(b) Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, at 1030 hours west of Loc Ninh, found a trail that showed recent signs of use by several individuals. An element from Company C followed the tracks and observed 3 individuals. A hasty ambush was established and the enemy was engaged with organic weapons resulting in 3 NVA KIA, and 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 B-40 launcher, 1x.51 caliber machine gun mount, and 2 B-40 rounds were captured.

(c) Team 43, Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry, at 0950 hours north of Camp Gorvad, ambushed several individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA. A sweep of the area revealed 31 cases of Chicom grenades, 3 additional grenades, 1x122mm rocket, 40 bangalore torpedoes, 37 rocket fuses, 13 shotgun shells, and 100 shovel heads. The contact was reinforced by the insertion of the Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, the 2d Platoon of Company A, and the 3d Platoon of C Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry.

(30) 19 September:

(a) Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, at 1830 hours east of FSB Ike, encountered an unknown sized enemy force and received automatic weapons and rocket fire. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, supported by AAA, artillery, and Shadow aircraft. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night. At 0255 hours, an individual was observed in a tree and engaged with Spooky aircraft. At 0330 hours, several individuals were heard moving toward the perimeter and were engaged with Shadow aircraft. During a first light sweep of the area, Company D found 25 NVA KIA, numerous blood trails, and pieces of clothing.

(b) Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, at 1655 hours north of FSB

62
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

Janie, had an AH-1G receive .51 caliber ground-to-air fire. The enemy was immediately engaged with organic weapons and by artillery. The results showed 6 NVA KIA and 1x.51 caliber machine gun destroyed.

(31) 21 September:

(a) Team 41, Company H (Ranger), 75 Infantry, at 1255 hours south-east of FSB Vivian, ambushed several individuals and received automatic weapons and RPG fire in return. The contact resulted in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. The Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Rifle Platoon was immediately inserted to support the contact. During the exploitation, it engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons supported by ARA, resulting in 6 NVA KIA and 8 NVA KBH. The entire action resulted in a total of 16 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA.

(32) 22 September:

(a) A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, at 1845 hours in the vicinity of FSB Rita, had an OH-6A receive heavy automatic weapons fire. As a result, the Troop engaged the enemy with organic weapons and ARA resulting in 11 NVA KBH. During the extraction of a Ranger Team at 1915 hours south of FSB Rita, another OH-6A from Troop A received heavy automatic weapons fire causing the aircraft to make a forced landing. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons and artillery resulting in 5 NVA KBH.

(b) The Reconnaissance Platoon of Company E, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at 1528 hours south of FSB Vivian, discovered an enemy cache containing 2x.30 caliber machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 1400 small arms rounds, 5X57mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 8 B-40 rounds.

(33) 24 September: While conducting ground reconnaissance through a suspected enemy location, the Reconnaissance Platoon of Company E, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, at 1022 hours west of FSB Grant, encountered and engaged an

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

enemy platoon in bunkers and received automatic weapons fire in return. The contact was supported by artillery and TAC AIR, causing a large secondary explosion from which smoke rose 1600 feet into the air. A sweep of the contact area revealed 3 NVA KIA, 21 NVA KBA, 75x107mm rockets, 200x82mm mortar rounds, 100 grenades, 25 anti tank (AT) mines, 1 US M-1 carbine, 2 B-40 rounds, 200 AK-47 rounds, 15 M-1 rounds, 1 NVA claymore, miscellaneous medical supplies, and assorted equipment .

(34) 28 September:

Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, conducting operations northeast of FSB Grant at 1640 hours, encountered and engaged a platoon sized enemy force and received automatic weapons, B-40 and claymore fire in return. The contact was supported with artillery, ARA, and TAC AIR resulting in 16 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47 captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA.

(35) 1 October:

(a) Company A, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at 0625 hours north of FSB Mary, received 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire causing 6 US WIA. Following the indirect fire attack, Company A received incoming automatic weapons fire and a ground probe from the northwest. The enemy mortar position was immediately engaged by ARA and artillery causing the incoming mortar fire to cease. The enemy force to the northwest was then engaged with organic weapons, supported by ARA and artillery, causing the force to withdraw. During a sweep of the contact area, Company A found numerous blood trails, 10 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 K-54 pistol, 1x.30 caliber machine gun, and documents identifying the 174th Regiment, 5th VC Division.

(b) Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, at 1335 hours south of FSB Jamie, encountered a platoon sized enemy force in bunkers. The enemy was

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

immediately engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery, ARA, and an air strike. The enemy returned sporadic small arms fire, but the intensity of Company B's attack and the large volume of supporting fire caused the enemy to withdraw from his bunker positions. Company B continued to press the attack, and while sweeping the contact area discovered 7 NVA KIA.

(36) 2 October: Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, conducting ground reconnaissance at 1600 hours northeast of FSB Deb, discovered one hut containing 30x200-pound bags of rice and a second hut containing 15x100-pound bags of salt. A further search of the area disclosed a third hut containing 52x100-pound bags of rice. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry conducted aerial reconnaissance throughout the area, and at 1620 hours found an additional 3x100-pound bags of rice. The total results of the operations were 3/4 of a ton of salt and 8.4 tons of rice captured.

(37) 4 October:

(a) The Rifle Platoon of B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was inserted at 1404 hours north of FSB Deb in reaction to intelligence reports of enemy activity in the area. While conducting ground reconnaissance at 1555 hours, the Troop encountered and engaged an enemy company in bunkers and received claymore, automatic weapons, and .30 caliber machine gun fire in return. The Troop maneuvered against the enemy and engaged him with organic weapons, supported by ARA, artillery and TAC AIR. The intensity of the attack and the overwhelming fire support caused the enemy to withdraw from his bunker positions leaving behind 24 NVA KIA.

(b) Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting ground reconnaissance through suspected enemy locations at 1350 hours, east of FSB Grant, discovered three recently prepared cache sites. A thorough search of

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

the area resulted in the capture of 46x82mm mortar rounds with charges and fuses, and 37x107mm rockets.

(38) 5 October:

(a) At 0610 hours west of FSB Ike, Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry ambushed two individuals and received automatic weapons fire in return. One individual withdrew, leaving behind 1 PW and 1 AK-47 rifle. The prisoner stated he was part of a twenty man team of the 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment, 9th NVA Division. Company C conducted a sweep of the area, and at 0725 hours spotted three individuals. A hasty ambush was established and the enemy was engaged resulting in 3 NVA KIA, and 3 AK-47 rifles and 360 AK-47 rounds captured. Company C continued to search the area and at 1120 hours engaged a suspected enemy location with organic weapons and received automatic weapons and B-40 fire in return. Company C's fire, supported by ARA and artillery, caused the enemy to withdraw leaving behind 1 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 2 US WIA.

(b) A CIDG Company from A-331, Loc Ninh, at 1335 hours west of FSB Kelly, encountered and engaged an estimated enemy battalion and received automatic weapons and RPG fire in return. The contact was supported by ARA and artillery. Troop C, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment maneuvered to reinforce the CIDG. A combined sweep of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, 5 AK-47 rifles, 1 light machine gun, 1x60mm mortar, 2 B-40 rounds, 2 telephones, and 1 PW. The prisoner stated that he was a member of C-3 Company, 7th Battalion, 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. At 1715 hours, the CIDG spotted and engaged two individuals resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 6 CIDG WIA.

(39) 7 October: Troops A and B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry operations resulted in a total of 29 NVA KIA. Troop A, while making an aerial reconnaissance

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

of suspected enemy locations at 1000 hours west of FSB Jamie, observed several individuals and engaged them with organic weapons and an air strike resulting in 4 NVA KBH, 1 NVA KBA, and 2 B-40 launchers destroyed. While continuing aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations in the same area at 1200 hours, Troop A observed one individual and engaged him with organic weapons resulting in 1 NVA KBH. At 1220 hours, Troop A observed and engaged two individuals resulting in 2 NVA KBH. While checking a bunker, an additional NVA KBH was discovered. An OH-6A and an AH-1G from Troop A, at 1745 hours, observed several enemy. They were engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery and an air strike, resulting in 5 NVA KBH, 2 NVA KB Artillery, and 1 NVA KBA. An OH-6A from Troop A, at 1810 hours, received .30 caliber machine gun ground-to-air fire and engaged the enemy with organic weapons, supported by artillery and TAC AIR, resulting in 6 NVA KBH. An OH-6A from Troop B, at 1815 hours east of FSB Vivian, observed seven individuals and received ground-to-air fire. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, supported by ARA, resulting in 7 NVA KBH.

(40) 10 October:

(a) Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, while conducting ground reconnaissance through suspected enemy locations at 1638 hours north of FSB Vivian, discovered an enemy cache containing 80x82mm mortar rounds, 81x120mm mortar rounds, 220 mortar charges, 100 AT mines, 3 unknown type launchers, 30 Chicom grenades, and 40x57mm recoilless rifle rounds.

(b) The B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, Infantry Platoon was inserted at the scene of a ground-to-air firing incident north of FSB Vivian at 1630 hours and encountered a large sized enemy force. It engaged the enemy with organic weapons and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. The

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

contact, supported by ARA, artillery, and TAC AIR, resulted in 15 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 2 US WIA. At 1930 hours, Troop B observed and engaged an additional 5 individuals resulting in 5 NVA KDH.

(41) 13 October:

(a) 2d Brigade operations during the past 2½ months in the vicinity of FSB Judie and FSB Mary resulted in a total of 396 ralliers. This was brought about as a direct result of combined US-ARVN operations directed against known VC base areas. Successful operations on 13 October resulted in a total of 10 Hoi Chanh returning to the government. Psychological broadcasts were conducted throughout the villages in the 2d Brigade's AO utilizing the themes: "CHIEU HOI APPEAL", "RALLY TO THE GVN", and "LIVE CHIEU HOI INDUCEMENT". At 0730 hours, 3 individuals rallied to FSB Mary. One of the individuals stated that he was a VC and that he knew the location of a VC platoon and an NVA company. He also stated that VC in the area wanted to rally, but feared reprisals by the NVA. At 0750 hours, 3 individuals rallied to FSB Judie with 1 AK-47 rifle, 120 AK-47 rounds, 1 Chicom machine gun, and 40 Chicom machine gun rounds. While conducting ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of FSB Judie at 1105 hours, Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry had 12 individuals rally to its position. Ten of the ralliers were classified as Hoi Chanh. Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, using a Hoi Chanh who rallied on 11 October as a guide, at 1240 hours near FSB Judie, discovered an ammunition cache in a bunker complex. The cache contained 4 SKS rifles, 1 M-1 rifle, 1 German Mauser rifle, 1 M-60 machine gun, 300 M-60 rounds, and 40 M-16 rounds.

(b) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry operations resulted in a total of 14 NVA KIA. While conducting aerial reconnaissance at 1515 hours west of FSB Vivian, Troop B engaged an enemy location with organic weapons and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire in return. The engagement, supported by artillery and an air strike, resulted in 1 NVA KB Artillery. At 1758 hours, Troop B spotted and engaged 13 individuals with organic weapons and received an intense volume of automatic weapons fire in return. Supported by artillery and an air strike, the contact resulted in 9 NVA KBH and 4 NVA KB Artillery.

(c) Two successful Night Hawk missions netted a total of 5 NVA KIA. Companies C and D, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, in support of the 1st Brigade, at 0035 hours north of FSB Jamie, spotted and engaged one individual on a trail resulting in 1 NVA KBH. E-Battery, 82d Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery at 0135 hours east of Camp Gorvad while conducting operations in AO Chief, spotted and engaged four individuals with organic weapons resulting in 4 NVA KBH.

(42) 14 October: A highly successful Night Hawk mission resulted in 28 NVA KIA. A Night Hawk team consisting of aircraft from Companies C and D, 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, in support of the 2d Brigade, at 2355 hours spotted and engaged several individuals with organic weapons north of FSB Buttons and received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire in return. The Night Hawk team engaged the enemy until all ammunition was expended. Artillery was then placed on the target forcing the enemy to remain in the area. Having reloaded, the Night Hawk team, while conducting an artillery damage assessment, spotted an unknown sized enemy element and immediately engaged it with organics, again receiving a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire in return, this time from three separate locations. Artillery, Shadow, and one Skyspot mission supported the Night Hawk team.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(43) 19 October: Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, while in its night ambush position north of FSB Judie at 1902 hours, spotted an unknown sized enemy force moving cautiously towards its location and engaged the force with automatic weapons fire and claymore mines. The enemy, upon being discovered, immediately returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire, and the defensive position of Company B began receiving mortar fire of unknown caliber from an enemy position to the northeast. Artillery fire immediately silenced the enemy mortar position and blocking fires were established on possible enemy avenues of withdrawal. Supported by ARA and Shadow, the intense volume of fire from B Company forced the enemy to retreat from the area through the massed concentration of supporting artillery fire. A first light check of the contact area revealed numerous blood trails, 8 NVA KIA, 12 NVA KBA, and 3 AK-47 rifles were captured. Friendly casualties were 3 US WIA.

(44) 20 October:

(a) Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, while conducting a ground reconnaissance south of FSB Jerri, discovered a cache containing 1500 pounds of salt, 15x57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 10 land mines, 20 AK-47 rounds, 20 bolts of cloth and plastic material, 100 pounds of tobacco, 1x9 foot sampan, and assorted military equipment.

(b) Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting operations southeast of FSB Vivian, found a bunker complex containing over 100 bunkers and 3.5 tons of rice.

(c) Using a Hoi Chanh as a guide, A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry was led to the VC District Military Headquarters for the Bo Duc and Phuoc Long Districts. The area, located west of FSB Vivian, contained a weapons cache which included 30 individual weapons, 11 AT mines, 100 B-40 rounds, and other assorted military equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(d) Company A, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at 1520 hours, spotted and engaged an unknown sized enemy force southeast of FSB Judie and received heavy automatic weapons fire and 25x82mm mortar rounds in return. Company A employed artillery, ARA, and TAC AIR, causing the enemy to retreat from the contact area. A sweep of the area revealed heavy blood trails, 14 NVA KIA, and 1 AK-47 rifle was captured. Friendly casualties were 5 US KIA and 13 US WIA. Company A conducted a final extraction at 1620 hours and was airlifted to FSB Judie.

(45) 21 October: A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while conducting a BDA of an ARC light northwest of FSB Ike, found 7 NVA KBA. Troop A also spotted 14 individuals digging into collapsed bunkers to evacuate casualties, engaged them with organic weapons and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. Supported by TAC AIR, the contact ended with 10 NVA KBH and 4 EVA KBA.

(46) 23 October:

(a) Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, while conducting a sweep of a contact area west of FSB Vivian, found 1 VC KIA, 2x107mm rockets, 9 RPG rounds, 23 B-40 rounds, 4x60mm mortar rounds, 2x82mm mortar rounds, 1x57mm recoilless rifle round, and 350 AK-47 rounds.

(b) B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance west of FSB Jerri at 1230 hours, spotted a pick-up truck and 2 individuals. The area was engaged with organic weapons resulting in 2 NVA KBH and 1 pick-up truck destroyed. At 1419 hours, B Troop spotted 3 individuals near a truck and engaged them with organic weapons resulting in 3 NVA KBH. While following truck tracks, B Troop discovered at 1430 hours enemy attempting to evade the area and took them under fire resulting in an additional 3 NVA KBH. At 1435 hours, B Troop fired upon 3 individuals on a bunker structure

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
resulting in 3 NVA KBH. Another individual was spotted near the structure and engaged resulting in 1 further NVA KBH.

(47) 24 October: Company B, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry spotted and engaged an unknown sized enemy force at 1440 hours west of FSB Ike. The enemy returned 60mm mortar and automatic weapons fire and was engaged with artillery, ARA, and TAC AIR. A sweep of the contact area revealed 12 NVA KIA and 4 NVA KBH.

(48) 26 October: The night ambush position of A Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, while set up to the west of FSB Ike at 0455 hours, received 10 incoming mortar rounds and a ground probe from the south. The enemy firing position was engaged with counter mortar fire and the attacking force was taken under fire with organic weapons and artillery. A first light sweep of the area revealed 8 NVA KIA, and 5 AK-47 rifles and 1 NVA radio were captured.

(49) 27 October:

(a) The A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Rifle Platoon, while conducting a ground reconnaissance through suspected enemy locations at 1450 hours, encountered and engaged a company sized enemy force and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. The contact was supported by ARA and artillery, resulting in 6 NVA KIA, and 1x.30 caliber machine gun destroyed.

(b) At 1510 hours, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance east of FSB Judie, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry discovered a bunker complex and fired on the structures causing several enemy soldiers to try to evade. The enemy was engaged by helicopter fire, supported by two air strikes, resulting in 10 NVA KBH, 2 NVA KBA, and 5 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, and 1x82mm mortar were destroyed.

(50) 28 October: C Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance north of FSB Jamie at 0955 hours, observed 17 enemy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

soldiers. The enemy was engaged by helicopter fire, supported by artillery, resulting in 12 NVA KBH and 5 NVA KB Artillery.

(51) 29 October:

(a) An ambush element from Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry observed, at 0920 hours, 3 individuals moving along a trail north of FSB Vivian. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons resulting in 3 VC KIA, and 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 4 B-40 rounds, 210 AK-47 rounds, and numerous documents captured.

(b) At 1538 hours, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry ambushed 1 individual north of FSB Vivian and received heavy automatic weapons and B-40 fire from approximately 20 individuals in return. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, ARA, and artillery resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 SKS rifle captured.

(c) The 2d Brigade Scouts, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance east of FSB Mary, observed a trail showing signs of recent heavy use. They followed the trail and, at 1600 hours, spotted 7 enemy soldiers. The enemy was taken under fire by helicopter resulting in 7 NVA KBH.

(52) 30 October:

(a) Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations west of FSB Mary, fired on an enemy base camp at 1145 hours, causing several individuals to try to evade. The enemy was taken under fire by helicopter resulting in 7 NVA KBH.

(b) Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, while conducting a ground reconnaissance through suspected enemy locations east of FSB Judic, discovered an enemy bunker complex at 1215 hours. A detailed search of the area revealed a large food cache containing 13 tons of rice.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(53) 31 October:

(a) Company C, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting a ground reconnaissance northwest of FSB Jamie at 1050 hours, found a set of bicycle tracks heading east. Company C followed the tracks and discovered an enemy food cache containing one ton of rice. It then established an ambush in the vicinity and at 1145 hours spotted and engaged one enemy soldier resulting in 1 NVA KIA: 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 3 B-40 rounds were captured. A further search of the area revealed a weapons cache containing 25 SKS rifles, 20x82mm mortar rounds, 3 M-1 rifles, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 10 Chicom grenades, 2 AK-47 rifles, and 2 B-40 rounds.

(b) B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, while on an aerial reconnaissance north of FSB Ellen, observed three enemy soldiers at 1610 hours, and fired on them causing an additional 15 enemy to attempt to evade the area. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, ARA, artillery, and air strikes, and returned fire with automatic weapons. The contact continued until 1820 hours and resulted in 29 NVA KBH, 9 NVA KBA, and 3 NVA KB Artillery.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

I. Personnel: None

II. Operations:

A. Locating Enemy Infiltration Routes:

(1) Observation: Locating enemy infiltration routes is often a difficult, time consuming process.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Enemy forces take great pains in preparing major infiltration routes which are very difficult to detect by the casual eye.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) In addition to utilizing aerial reconnaissance assets, i.e., photo and low level Visual Reconnaissance, intelligence personnel should pay careful attention to concentrations of Side Looking Aerial Radar (SLAR) and Infra Red (IR) readings within a given area. As soon as a buildup in readings is detected, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's) are a highly economical and efficient means in determining if major infiltration routes are present and how extensively they are being used.

B. Utilization of Ground Sensor Fields:

(1) Observation: The emplacement of a single ground sensor gives many false activations and allows little or no opportunity to determine the direction and speed of movement.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) In order to obtain maximum effectiveness from the use of ground sensors, the monitor must be able to separate false activations from actual targets.

(b) In order to react to sensor activations which are determined to be targets, the direction and speed of movement must be known.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Sensors should be employed in groups of two to four in the same vicinity to be sure of maximum usefulness and effectiveness.

C. Exploitation of Ralliers:

(1) Observation: US forces are not taking full advantage of civilian ralliers.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) When the civilian populace in enemy controlled areas rally to government forces, the primary intelligence gathering effort is normally devoted to the adult men and women while the children are ignored. Children sometimes possess more information than adults and in most instances willingly assist government forces in locating enemy base areas or cache sites.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Interrogators should take the time to carefully question children as well as the adults.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

D. Joint Coordination Committee:

(1) Observation: In order to effectively utilize both ARVN and US Forces within the same AO, some type of coordination committee is required.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) By mutual agreement of the Province Chief, Senior Advisor and commanders of Government of Vietnam (GVN) units in the Song Be area, and the Commanding Officer of the 2d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division, a Joint Operations Coordination Committee (JOCC) was established. Its purpose is to effect, direct coordination between the Vietnamese Air Force and US units on all operations in the AO with emphasis on combined operations. The committee meets 3 times weekly and has proven itself extremely effective. The JOCC has upgraded ARVN confidence in themselves and the willingness of the US units to promote Dong Tien (the spirit of cooperation between US and ARVN Forces).

(b) The establishment of a good intelligence net between ARVN and US Forces within an operational area will lead to more successful tactical operations. The Brigade S-2 should coordinate and share all local intelligence information with ARVN, Provincial, and District S-2's and their advisors. The exchange of radio frequencies and call signs to promote rapid dissemination of information, frequent liaison visits, and scheduled intelligence planning meetings will provide the coverage needed to assist commanders in planning sound tactical operations.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That similar coordination committees be established wherever possible to promote the combat effectiveness of both ARVN and US units operating in the same AO's.

E. Fixing the Enemy in Bunker Complexes:

(1) Observation: During this reporting period units frequently engaged the enemy in bunker complexes and in areas with heavy undergrowth. Before air strikes can be put in, friendly troops withdraw, NVA forces also withdraw knowing an air strike is pending. This pattern has been established and NVA forces take full advantage of it.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Withdrawing to allow sufficient distance for an air strike is required and must be continued. Since the weapons now employed will not penetrate heavy undergrowth, another means of "fixing" the enemy until air support arrives on station must be found.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Employment of a 50 caliber machinegun to fix the enemy in position while friendly forces withdraw, has proven extremely effective.

(b) The 50 caliber machinegun can be used to fill in the lulls between artillery fire and to cover the distances between friendly troops and artillery concentrations.

F. Exploitation of B-52 Strikes:

(1) Observation: The destructive force of a B-52 strike has a tremendous psychological impact on an enemy soldier. Appropriate PSYOPS action taken soon after a strike will produce substantial results.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) B-52 strikes destroy the command and control of the targeted unit.

(b) It has been observed that personnel surviving a B-52 strike are in a dazed condition and not immediately susceptible to PSYOPS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

Recent successful PSYOP exploitation have shown that after a delay of four to six hours, the enemy personnel are extremely susceptible to surrendering or rallying, if induced by PSYOP operations. Specific instructions as to how and where to surrender or rally should be given during the four to six hour time frame after B-52 strikes.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) All B-52 strikes be exploited by PSYOPS from four to six hours after the strike giving specific directions on how and where to rally.

G. Last Light Operations:

(1) Observation: Allied ground and air activity is minimal to non-existent during the period just before sundown.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Agent reports and interrogation of Hoi Chanhs reveals the VC/NVA are rather confident during the period just preceding last light. At this time the day operations are essentially terminated and night operations have not yet begun. This is an excellent opportunity for the enemy to take advantage of the remaining light.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) Emphasis must be placed on conducting last light Visual Reconnaissance Missions using Pink Teams and conducting Mini-Cav Operations along with increased intelligence collection efforts. Operations like these will deny enemy forces freedom of movement during this time period.

H. Fire Support Coordination:

(1) Observation: During combined US/ARVN operations, when both US and ARVN artillery is employed, it is necessary to have a single clearing authority for artillery fires.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Past experience indicates clearly that the lack of a single clearing agency compounds artillery coordination, and clearance problems while a single agency enhances responsiveness to operational requirements, reducing to a minimum the time and effort required to clear fires.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) In the initial coordination for combined operations a specific clearing agency must be designated to control and coordinate all US/ARVN artillery in support of the operation.

I. Marking Targets for Air Strikes:

(1) Observation: A large percentage of all air strikes requested as preplanned are for areas where units have made contact, especially in bunker complexes. However, friendly forces have often left the contact areas within a few days making it necessary to repeat identification efforts by having a Pink Team relocate the target, since no one is on the ground to direct the air strike.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Some means of directing the Forward Air Controller (FAC) without using additional resources is necessary.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) It has been found that areas for air strikes can be successfully marked by ground troops using parachutes from 105 Howitzer illumination rounds. The parachute is staked to the ground in the center of the target area. If vegetation is too dense in the target area, the parachute can be staked in open ground and an azimuth and distance given from the chute to the target. In either case, the unit should log the exact coordinates

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

of the parachute.

J. Enemy Tactics

(1) Observation: The enemy is capitalizing on certain patterns that have been established on FSB's to inflict maximum casualties.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) After enemy elements have directed indirect fire attacks against FSB's, they will wait enough time for friendly forces to get into the open aiding the wounded and observing the status and damage of equipment to launch a second indirect fire attack.

(b) It has also been observed that indirect fire attacks are being launched against FSB's by the enemy during hours of maximum movement, i.e., during breakfast, lunch, and supper.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) All personnel be advised of these tactics and that all commanders take appropriate action to counteract these circumstances.

III. Training:

A. Night Mission Training:

(1) Observation: Units lack proficiency in night combat assault operations and the employment of Pathfinder Teams.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Night combat operations are infrequent, and difficulties experienced at night are unique. Lack of training and experience also increases problems associated with these missions.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Practice night combat assaults have been conducted by lift units of the Division Aviation Group. In preparation for night training operations, Pathfinders set up landing zone (LZ) markers, and a glide slope indicator on a secure heliport. Flight leaders from each company participated in the mission briefing. Radar assistance instrument facilities, and FM homing were found useful, and in some cases necessary for navigation. The complete backward planning process must be used for all, night combat assault missions. The initial night practice mission showed the need for further training, especially in pilot techniques such as formation flying and airspeed control. The subsequent missions showed that the flight time spent in practice was extremely helpful.

B. Support of ARVN Units:

(1) Observation: The majority of the ARVN units, supported by Division Aviation Assets, are not familiar with airmobile operations.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Many hazards to supported units and aircrews exist because of a lack of knowledge of airmobile operations on the part of the ARVN commanders and their American advisors.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Aviation Safety training be conducted for ARVN units. This training consists of approaches to and departures from an aircraft, rapid on and off loading, and general safety. Additionally, a formal class for ARVN commanders, their advisors, and other personnel involved in the planning of airmobile operations will pay high dividends in improving ARVN Airmobile Operations. The instruction should cover the tactics, planning and conduct of airmobile operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

IV. Intelligence: None

V. Logistics:

A. Logistical Support in Response to Increased Enemy Activities:

(1) Observation: Increased enemy activity during the month of August resulted in the following actions:

(a) A special Task Force was organized and one of the 1st Air Cavalry Division's Brigades was re-enforced and given responsibility for a large portion of the threatened area.

(b) Two areas, Song Be and Duc Phong had to be resupplied by air.

(c) Resupply using Common Service Airlift (CSAL) was basically unsatisfactory.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Combined forces were made up of Division and non-division units to counter the enemy threat. This organization required a somewhat complex logistical organization in that combined force elements received support from more than one source. Additionally, several units that were under the operational control of this Division were unfamiliar with THE FIRST TEAM's organization for logistical support. Efforts to avoid emergencies were hampered by a lack of coordination by commanders to reconcile differences in planning, especially in Class V stockage levels at ammunition supply points (ASP's). Adding to the overall problem was the unreliability of the CSAL response to requests.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That, when an operation involving non-divisional units is contemplated, the Division Support Command actively enter the planning stages and coordinate with the units concerned to determine the precise types and level of support to be provided by the division.

(b) That stockages at ASP's be actively monitored to insure that shortages are anticipated and action is taken prior to reaching a zero balance in key types of ammunition.

(c) That intensive management of cargo be accomplished to insure that the highest priority supplies are placed on the first available airlift.

B. Protection of Fragile Electrical Equipment During Movement:

(1) Observation: Electrical equipment being evacuated from Forward Support Detachments of the 27th Maint Bn to the Maint Support Detachment for repair is being damaged severely during shipment.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) It was determined that a better method of evacuation was needed to retrograde equipment to the rear. A large wooden box was built on a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck (mile) and constructed with partitions of different sizes. The resulting compartments were padded for added protection.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) The possibility for commercial manufacture and purchase of these items, as an addition to the Airmobile TO&E, should be explored. In the meantime, local production of these items has been initiated to insure that each Forward Support Detachment has at least one of these padded wooden evacuation cabinets.

VI. Organization: None

VII. Other:

A. Field Expedient Repair of H-189 Handset:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(1) Observation: Handset, H-189 cord assembly, used with radio set AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-77, cannot withstand the stress of utilization under prolonged combat conditions.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The cord is easily pulled out of the handset, thereby rendering it inoperative. A field expedient method of strengthening the connection at the handset can be accomplished by doubling the cord around and taping it to the side of the handset.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) All handsets, H-189, have their cords taped in the above manner for strength pending re-evaluation of handset design.

B. Repair of Long Whip Antennas:

(1) Observation: The elastic cord used to hold collapsible whip antennas (e.g. AT-271A used with radio sets AN/PRC 77) has a tendency to rot and break in a relatively short period of time.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) This problem is primarily attributed to the extremely humid climate prevalent in Southeast Asia. The nylon cord used to repair parachutes is sufficiently strong and elastic to be utilized to re-string antennas. Should this method of repair be adopted, the critical shortage of long whip antennas within supply channels will be greatly reduced.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That organic maintenance personnel adopt the above procedure as an expedient repair of long whip antennas.

C. Civic Action Program/Medical Civic Action Program (ICAP/MEDCAP):

(1) Observation: During ICAP/MEDCAP missions, leaflet distribution is usually restricted to those people who need medical attention. However, in order to draw a larger crowd, a lottery can be held, and the lottery of poultry has been found to be especially effective. In order to segregate the populace requiring medical attention from those who do not so to prevent interference with the medical team, entertainment can be scheduled to occupy the healthy in another location.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) A lottery draws a larger crowd which allows for a larger distribution of propaganda. Entertainment would occupy children and allow medical teams to perform their mission uninterrupted.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Lotteries should be incorporated into ICAP's for better PSYOP's on those operations. The ICAP/MEDCAP team organizational structure should provide for including indigenous entertainers.

D. Power Cable, Public Address System, AEM-ABS-4:

(1) Observation: In its present configuration and use with the UH-1 helicopter, the power cable of the public address system is not equipped with a receptacle to take advantage of the interior heater blanket receptacles of the UH-1.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The present situation requires more ground installation time as the public address system power cable must be routed to the helicopter radio and battery compartment. In addition, an unsafe condition exists as the loud-speaker power cable connectors frequently shake loose from the battery posts. This could cause either an electrical short or an electrical arc which could result in damage to the aircraft.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Fit power cables of Public Address Systems with an appropriate receptacle for use with the interior heater blanket receptacles of the UH-1 helicopter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

E. Bunker Construction:

(1) Observation: Recently, the supply of lumber suitable for use as siding on FSB structures has become critically short. Several Fire Base Kits have not contained enough such material, due to substitution of undersized lumber, to complete the siding of the three authorized structures (TOC, FDC, and Medical Aide Bunker).

(2) Evaluation:

(a) There is a definite need for an available, adequate substitute for siding material. At one FSB, it was decided to experiment using corrugated steel roofing as siding for the structures. This required a redesign to the number of posts reduced to 48" center to center, and the corrugated steel roofing was adequate to support the backfilled earth. This substitution had an added bonus in that it, being waterproof, reduced the requirement for tarpaper, and additionally, being an excellent light reflecting surface, resulted in a brighter, more desirable work area. This substitution should only be made under the supervision of the Direct Support (DS) Engineer Commander, and it is not recommended for overhead decking or for above ground structures.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That corrugated steel roofing be issued for use for siding on Fire Support Base Structures when suitable siding lumber (2" x 12", 3" x 10") is not available.

F. Ralliers:

(1) Observation: The combined operations of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the 2d Brigade during the reporting period have produced over 400 people who returned to GVN control. Returnees included VC, Viet Cong Infra-structure personnel, and civil defendants.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Psychological operations have played a significant part in the success of these operations. Interrogation of the returnees revealed the following items of importance:

1. Returnees revealed that leaflets with maps showing rally points were very effective.

2. Many people in outlying area which are under VC control are illiterate, so that use of Quick Reaction (QR) tapes and picture leaflets can be used most effectively in these areas.

3. When QR tapes are made, names of people known to be remaining in the village should be broadcast. This personal appeal is direct and effective, while the pictures of returnee families dropped over their home village show that good treatment awaits others who rally.

4. VC propaganda describes the GI as a loathsome, blood-thirsty killer, hence many people do not rally out of fear, however, combined operations with ARVN units has overcome this. Also the use of armed propaganda teams with US units is successful.

5. Usually, the local VC guards are suffering the same hardships as the people. Targeting these guards is important, because when they come in they will bring most of the people they are guarding.

6. Recently, the use of ground speaker units on FSB's has been used to encourage people near the FSB to come in. Night broadcasts from the FSB were very effective.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Continued emphasis be placed on PSYOPS based in information obtained from returnee interrogations. 81

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

G. Sandbagging Walls:

(1) Observation: During the rainy season, sandbag protection for vertical structures tend to topple away from the walls, resulting in loss of protection and greater expenditures of men and material.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The deterioration and settling of the sandbags and their increased weight, due to water, tend to cause the sandbag walls to fail by falling away from the protected structure. An expedient method of securing the sandbags to the structure is needed. This may be accomplished in the following manner:

1. Lay the sandbags up to five layers.
2. Nail the ends of empty sandbags to the structure, using scabbing or roofing nails, so that the sandbags form a flap laid over the fifth layer.

3. Continue to add layers and repeat procedure 2 every five layers. These empty sandbags serve to tie the sandbag walls to the structure itself and gives lateral support to the sandbags.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That future sandbag protective walls be strengthened by using the technique explained above.

H. Employing a 1000 Watt Speaker in a U6-A (Dellavilland, Beaver):

(1) Observation: Conducting PSYOP missions is hampered by the poor amplification of tape broadcasts on rotary wing aircraft. Hoi Chanhs have stated that broadcasts from fixed wing aircraft are understood clearly on the ground, whereas rotary wing broadcasts were barely audible.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) A 1000 watt loudspeaker system is easily installed in a U6-A by removing the two rear seats and sliding the speaker and frame into the aircraft. The speaker is highly effective at an altitude of 1500-2000 feet covering an extensive area.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) It is recommended that organic fixed wing aircraft U6-A be utilized whenever possible to conduct PSYOP missions.

I. Improve FSB Trafficability:

(1) Observation: Fire Support Bases built during the rainy season are complicated by the inevitable mud that results from the rain. Construction of efficiency is decreased and general movement around the base is hindered.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) It is exceedingly difficult to keep personnel and equipment out of the muddy areas on a firebase, and constant traffic over these areas is the major cause of a great deal of further decomposition of the soil. The consequence of continued use of a muddy area is virtually bottomless mud.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) Construct corduroy roadways, using native timber for use as traffic ways from area to area and restrict vehicular traffic to these roadways. Also construction of timber bridges enables vehicles to cross washed out slush-mud areas and drainage ditches, rather than ride through the bad spots where they eventually bog down when the mudholes get too deep.

(b) Drainage should always be a consideration on a FSB and as soon as priorities will permit, the DS Engineer Platoon Leader and the supported unit should work out a drainage plan and a traffic pattern to minimize traffic concentration to a single path.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(c) Existing ground cover, wherever possible, should be left intact within the perimeter. Trees and brush should be cut off above the ground ~~because~~ the roots of the vegetation, particularly grasses, help to stabilize the soil.

J. Retention of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS)

(1) Observation: Kit Carson Scouts, because of inability to communicate, have difficulty adjusting and being accepted in US units.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The initiation of an English training program assisted the KCS, however, it did not completely solve the retention problem. To further assist, the 1st Air Cav Div initiated a buddy program, which brings together a KCS with a US rifleman from his future unit of assignment for the final 4 days of the KCS training program. Together the KCS and his buddy complete the training program at THE FIRST TEAM Academy and proceed to the US unit. This program gives the KCS a point of contact within a US unit and forces him to use the English language in order to communicate with his buddy. During the critical period of adjustment the KCS and his US counterpart are a team and employed as such. Through this relationship the KCS develops loyalty for the US unit and rapidly becomes accepted as a member of the unit.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That units experiencing KCS retention problems initiate a similar buddy program.

K. Control of Grass on FSB's:

(1) Observation: Control of grass on FSB's should not be a problem associated solely with the rainy season.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Units give little thought to controlling the growth of grass until the rainy season begins at which time extremely rapid growth makes it very difficult to effectively control growth. A program to eradicate these grasses during the dry season will help prevent them from becoming a problem in the wet season. Units can install wire in a manner that will allow access to critical areas. This could include parallel lanes in Concertina and Tangle foot wire sufficiently spaced to allow a vehicle to traverse between the rows of wires. Several types of hand sprayers are available which can be used to spray diesel or defoliant on the unwanted grass, and can be applied from the constructed rows.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That care be given to the layout of protective wires on FSB's to permit vehicle access to critical areas.

(b) That units maintain enough hand sprayers to support a continued program of grass eradication throughout the year by spraying diesel and when approved, herbicides.

L. Failure of Cargo Slings:

(1) Observation: On at least one occasion cargo being sling loaded underneath a CH-47 Chinook helicopter has broken away and lost during flight.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The causes of accidents of this nature may be any of the following:

1. Improper rigging.
2. Too heavy a load.
3. Worn or weakened sling.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969

(3) Recommendations:

- (a) Inspect all sling equipment thoroughly before and after each move.
- (b) Inspect attachment points on vehicle or load before moving.
- (c) If a vehicle is being moved, make sure it is not carrying too much cargo so that the combined weight of the cargo and the vehicle will not strain the sling and the attachment points.
- (d) In the event the sling-load is lost in flight:
 - 1. Do not expect to find the object on the ground without an extensive search because the cargo will usually bury itself and will look like a bomb crater, especially from the air.
 - 2. Do not expect to find any usable material if it is left in the field overnight.
 - 3. Have as many aerial observer teams as possible look for dropped equipment with a stand-by team ready for insertion.

SECTION III: HQS, DA SURVEY INFORMATION

Escape, Evasion and Survival: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

K. R. Swaim
K. R. SWAIM
CPT, AGC
ASST, AG

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 10 DEC 1969


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period
ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 01 FEB 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Locating Enemy Infiltration Routes", section II, page 75, paragraph IIA; concur. This is a good example of the coordinated use of all available assets to uncover enemy infiltration routes.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Utilization of Ground Sensor Fields", section II, page 75, paragraph IIB; concur. MACV Handbook for Sensor Planning and Emplacement dated June 1969 outlines typical employment examples (chapter three, para 10). This item is covered in the Handbook.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Exploitation of Ralliers", section II, page 75, paragraph IIC; concur. All sources of intelligence should be exploited to the maximum. Action by higher headquarters is not required.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Joint Coordination Committee", section II, page 76, paragraph IID; concur. A Joint Coordination Committee made up of representatives from ARVN and US forces should be established in order to effect direct coordination between the Vietnamese Air Force and US units on all operations in an assigned AO with emphasis on combined operations. Similar coordinating committees, if established, will help promote the combat effectiveness of both ARVN and US units operating in the same AO.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Exploitation of B-52 Strikes", section II, page 76, paragraph IIF; concur. To exploit B-52 strikes to the maximum, sufficient planning should be effected to conduct joint PSYOPS and intelligence operations.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Last Light Operations", section II, page 77, paragraph IIG; concur. Since VC/NVA forces feel confident during the period just preceding last light, operations by friendly forces should be increased during this period.

CONFIDENTIAL

86

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Fire Support Coordination", section II, page 77, paragraph IIH; concur. In order to reduce the time and effort required to clear fires during combined US/ARVN operations, when both US and ARVN artillery are employed, recommend a single clearing agency be established. This agency should be manned by US and ARVN personnel and have authority for clearing artillery fires.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Marking Targets for Air Strikes", section II, page 77, paragraph II I; concur. Any means of directing the forward air controller (FAC) without using additional resources should be considered. However, care must be taken to insure the parachute remains in the target area, and not relocated by enemy forces.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Logistical Support in Response to Increased Enemy Activity", section II, page 79, paragraph V A; concur. Problem is one which can best be solved by 1st Cav Div Support Command. Key personnel of the Support Command must be intimately involved in matters of this nature otherwise problems arise which require resolution by higher echelons. ASPs referred to are not ASPs in their true sense. These are unit ammunition dumps run by the Div Support Command and not installations operated by ammunition personnel of the 1st Log Comd. The experience of this time period has been used to establish better policy, planning, and procedures to cope with periods of high activity should they occur again. Working closely with the DISCOM CO, the G4, HQ II FFV, and 1st Log Comd, the ammunition supply and storage situation in the 1st Cav Div has improved considerably and should continue to improve. The remark regarding unsatisfactory support from the Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) should be further explained to reflect that a portion of the operation took place during the rainy season.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Protection of Fragile Electrical Equipment During Movement", section II, page 79, paragraph V B; concur. Protection of fragile electronic equipment during movement is a problem common to most US Army units. This problem is generally resolved on a local basis by use of available packaging material or special carrying cases provided with the equipment. The 27th Maint Bn appears to have developed an excellent field expedient which serves their particular purpose for evacuation of electronic equipment. It is believed that this problem is one that can continue to be resolved at unit level without commercial procurement for special containers.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Repair of Long Whip Antennas", section II, page 79, paragraph VII B; concur. Another good source of this string is the parachute suspension line. The ECOM office will conduct an investigation on the feasibility of modifying this antenna.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

l. (U) Reference item concerning "Civic Action Program/Medical Civic Action Program (ICAP/MEDCAP)", section II, page 80, paragraph VII C; concur. Gaining attention of as much of the populace as possible is essential. A scheme such as the one recommended not only provides a means of distracting the villagers, but can be used to effectively extend a PSYOP message. MEDCAP/ICAP teams should be organized to include indigenous entertainers when required. Coordination should be initiated with the MACCORDS advisors and Province and District officials in order to obtain local indigenous entertainers. If presented in the proper manner, it could enhance the image of the GVN. Application and coordination of this recommendation should be handled by the local commanders.

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Power Cable, Public Address System, AEM-ABS-4", section II, page 80, paragraph VII D; concur. The 1st Cav Div should submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) in accordance with TM 38-730.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Ralliers", section II, page 81, paragraph VII F; concur. The gathering of information from ralliers to use as PSYOP themes against the enemy has proven effective in encouraging surrender. By using the intelligence gathered, planning and preparation of recorded messages with specific appeals for use under particular conditions can be initiated and they can be used as the need arises.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Sandbagging Walls", section II, page 82, paragraph VII G; nonconcur. This is an extravagant use of sandbags, which are a critical supply item. Recommend that consideration be given to alternate methods of restraining sandbag walls, to include building the wall at a slight angle inclined toward the structure.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Control of Grass on FSB's", section II, page 83, paragraph VII K; concur. However, vehicular access lanes should not be provided. Protective wire installations must include wire so arranged as to prevent lateral movement between rows. This is not compatible with the recommendation to provide vehicle access lanes.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Failure of Cargo Slings", section II, page 83, paragraph VII L; concur. USARV message 65227, 031105Z Jun 69, subject: Service Life Criteria for Helicopter External Lift Slings, extended the service life of slings from 6 to 12 months providing the slings meet the inspection and serviceability requirements of TM 55-450-11. Units should be extremely careful to insure that slings in use over six months are inspected in accordance with the USARV message and destroyed when no longer serviceable.


CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance of Unit Strength", Tab G, page G1, paragraph 2. Records at this headquarters indicate the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) is currently at or above the USARV average in 11 series MOS in grades E5, E6, and E7. The shortage of middle grade non-commissioned officers is common throughout USARV and is expected to continue as Army-wide resources are insufficient to offset continuing requirements in short tour areas. A shortage of infantry captains existed command-wide during the period. With the PRA for infantry captains established at about 50%, this shortage will continue to exist with armor captains and infantry lieutenants being used to make up the shortfall.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st CAV DIV (AM)
II FFV

GPOP-DI (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB A: Task Organization

Task Organization

a. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

- HHC, 1st Cav Div (AM)
- Security Plt (Prov)
- 184th Cml Plt (DS)
- 14th Military History Detachment
- 1-9th Cav
 - 545th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 151st Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 98th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 62nd Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
 - Ground Sensor Plt (Prov)
- 8th Engr Bn
- 13th Sig Bn
- Co H (Ranger), 75th Inf
- 545th MP Co
- 26th Cml Det
- 371st R&R Co
- 191st MI Det
- 585rd MI Det
- Operational Location #2, 5th Weather Squadron (USAF)
- 322nd Avn Spt Det
- 391st QM Det
- 273rd Avn Co (Hvy Hel)
- b. 1st Bde
 - 2-5th Cav
 - 2-7th Cav
 - 1-12th Cav
- c. 2nd Bde
 - 5-7th Cav
 - 2-12th Cav
- d. 3rd Bde
 - 1-5th Cav
 - 1-7th Cav
 - 1-8th Cav
- e. Div Arty
 - 2-8th Cav
 - HQB, Div Arty
 - 2/19th Arty
 - 2/20th Arty
 - 80th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 171st Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 329th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 1/21st Arty
 - 1/77th Arty
 - Btry E, (Avn), 82nd Arty
 - 564th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 1/30th Arty
 - 268th FA Det (Radar)
 - 273rd FA Det (Radar)
- f. 11th ACR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB A : Task Organization (Cont)

- 1-11th ACR
- 2-11th ACR
- 3-11th ACR
- g. 11th Avn Gp
 - HHC, 11th Avn Gp
 - ATC Plt (Prov)
 - 11th Avn Co (GS)
 - 150th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 227th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
 - 166th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 390th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 394th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 400th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS) (MDM) (Tm Ke)
 - 228th Avn Bn (Aslt Spt Hel)
 - 51st Trans Det (Acft MDM CGO HEL MAINT) (DS) (Tm Kf)
 - 166th Trans Det (Acft MDM CGO HEL MAINT) (DS) (Tm Kf)
 - 255th Trans Det (Acft MDM CGO HEL MAINT) (DS) (Tm Kf)
 - 229th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
 - 391st Trans Det (ACFT MAINT) (DS) (MDM) (TM KE)
 - 392nd Trans Det (ACFT MAINT) (DS) (MDM) (TM KE)
 - 393rd Trans Det (ACFT MAINT) (DS) (MDM) (TM KE)
 - 571st Trans Det (ACFT MAINT) (DS) (MDM) (TM KE)
- h. Division Support Command
 - HHC and Band
 - 15th Admin Co
 - 41st PI Det
 - 42nd PI Det
 - 15th Mod Bn
 - 15th Sup and Svc Bn
 - 15th Trans Bn
 - 27th Maint Bn
 - 25th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
 - 34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB C : Surveillance Information

1. Aerial Surveillance

a. Mission Statistics for the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1969.

<u>MISSION TYPE</u>	<u>SCHD/COMP.</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
IR	368/311	326 IIRs
SLAR	424/404	929 IIRs
Photo	177/148	79 IPIRs

b. General Comments: Flying weather during the reporting period was fair to poor, causing 47 mission aborts. Maintenance of aircraft and equipment was not a significant problem.

(1) IR - During the quarter 84.5% of the mission were completed. 57 missions were cancelled; 41 due to weather, 10 due to IR system malfunction, 10 due to contact artillery in the area, 1 due to A/C malfunction.

(2) SLAR - During the quarter 95.5% of the SLAR missions were completed. 20 missions were cancelled; 13 due to A/C malfunction, 6 due to weather, 1 due to sensor malfunction.

(3) PHOTO - During the quarter 83.6% of the photo missions were completed. 29 missions were not completed, all due to weather.

2. Ground Sensor Surveillance.

a. Mission Statistics for the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69.

- (1) Mission sched/comp - 20/20
- (2) New sensors emplaced - 365
- (3) Average sensors per mission - 18.3
- (4) Air emplaced - 235 (69.8%)
- (5) Hand emplaced - 130 (30.2%)
- (6) Maximum sensor density - 354
- (7) Number of targets detected - 1329

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB E: Training/Combat Developments

1. DIVISION TRAINING:

a. The FIRST TEAM Academy at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement training for all incoming replacement personnel during the reporting period. A total of 760 officers and 5,154 enlisted men received the three day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course (CLC) graduated 310 personnel during the quarter. The ten (10) day course of instruction provides training for selected personnel (E-3 thru E-5) who have demonstrated leadership potential in the field and are programmed to become team leaders and squad leaders. The subjects stressed are small unit tactics, air assault techniques, map reading, communications procedures, first aid, and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout training program graduated 96 personnel during the reporting period. The objective of the program is to provide maneuver units within the Division with well-trained former VC/NVA soldiers who perform as scouts with American units during operations. Training includes basic air-mobile tactics and techniques, care and operation of US equipment, English language, and the mission of the Kit Carson Scout.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 67 personnel during the quarter. The program is designed to train selected personnel in advanced marksmanship and sniper techniques. Course of instruction also includes communications procedures, map reading, adjustment of indirect fire and night firing techniques. Upon graduation, the trained snipers are returned to their units to be employed as a battalion asset. The FIRST TEAM Academy dispatched two (2) mobile training teams, consisting of sniper school cadre, to the field during the period 13-28 October 1969. Rotating among the battalions they inspected equipment, provided additional guidance on employment techniques, and serviced inoperable weapons.

e. During the reporting period, counter-sapper training was conducted, under the control of Division Artillery, at each fire support base within the Division from 24 September to 7 October 1969. This training consisted of a brief class dealing with enemy sapper tactics and techniques and effective counter measures to be employed in defending against such attacks. This class was followed by an infiltration demonstration utilizing former enemy sappers to penetrate the perimeter wire.

2. NON-DIVISIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS:

a. The Division made extensive use of the USAFV school system during the reporting period. The following figures indicate the utilization rate for the quarter:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB E : Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

	OFF	EM
Army Aviation Refresher Training School	17	161
AH-1G Transition	21	
AH-1G IP/SIP	3	
OH-6A IP/SIP	5	
US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade		54
MACV Recondo School		16

b. There were thirty-nine (39) aviators within the Division who attended the Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST) course in the Philippines during the reporting period.

3. COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:

a. A 30 day evaluation of the Thin Film Plastic Utility Kit was conducted during June and July with the final evaluation submitted on 15 August. Among the varied uses of the kit was as a protective for small items, its length allows several layers of protection and keeps moisture from the items for a long period of time. The material used to form the plastic kit was not of sufficient strength to withstand heavy duty use or the wear and tear of constant field use. Although the item had several good uses, the plastic bags from batteries and sundry packs serve the same purpose at less cost to the government.

b. In February 1969, the Division was issued the Universal Field Maintenance Shelter (ENSURE 205) for operational use. In July, the Division was requested to conduct a 30 day evaluation of the shelters. The shelters were found to be acceptable and useful. The shelters fulfilled all requirements placed upon them and contributed to an increased aircraft availability by providing a sheltered maintenance area. The shelters have adequate room to accommodate both aircraft and maintenance crews simultaneously. The units did have some suggested modifications to the shelter but overall found it to be useful in contributing to their aircraft maintenance program.

c. On 2 June 1969, the Division began a 60 day evaluation of the uniform, Combat Tropical, Improved Mosquito Protection. The evaluation concluded that the uniform was acceptable for wear in a tropical climate and does offer increased protection against mosquito bites. Test units differed on whether the uniform was hotter or cooler than the standard tropical combat uniform. The use of the test uniform did not reduce the malaria rate in the units that evaluated them. In the final analysis, although the test uniform does offer some increased protection against mosquito bites, it does not afford enough additional protection to warrant an increased cost over the present tropical combat uniform.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB E : Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

d. During July and August, the Division cooperated in an ACTIV evaluation of the Helicopter Mounted Searchlight System, Lightweight (ENSURE 260). The ACTIV project officer worked directly with the test unit. The final analysis was that the system was unsatisfactory due to a poor slue rate, narrow beam width, and inability to switch in flight from the white to the pink mode.

e. From 15 July to 14 September 1969, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) conducted an evaluation of the USALWL Waste Disposal System. The system was found to be conceptually superior to the present method of waste disposal but not suitable for employment due to structural weaknesses. The tanks showed a tendency to deform when filled with water, one melted in the hot sun, and the tank cover and inlet system was not securely fastened to the bowl.

f. The Division was issued two Telescoping Floodlight and Trailer Mounted Generators, Self-Contained (ENSURE 261) on 7 June, for a 60 day evaluation. The floodlight system is considered suitable for use as a mobile floodlight set. The items have been an asset to the night maintenance program of the units using them. The system can be maneuvered and the extendable boom adjusted to a height to provide sufficient light on any work area. Recommended modifications included strengthening the welds, the crank handle, and the outrigger mounts and using circuit breakers in lieu of fuses. The systems have been in continuous use since the completion of the evaluation and have become an integral part of the aviation units maintenance program.

g. On 1 October 1969, the Division began evaluations of the MPA Big Screen Viewer (ENSURE 276) and Front Line Trace Markers. These items are being used by units on forward fire support bases and in the field. Preliminary indications are that the items are suitable and serving their intended purpose superbly; however, the tests and evaluations were not complete at the conclusion of the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB V: Provost Marshal Activities

1. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of six hundred and sixty-two offenses.

a. Offense Statistics:

Crimes against persons/property	233
Miscellaneous offenses	158
Military Offenses	114
Traffic offenses	<u>157</u>
TOTAL	662

b. Breakdown of offense statistics:

(1) Crimes against persons/property 233; murder 1; aggravated assault 15; simple assault 18; robbery 4; burglary 3; larceny over \$50 165; larceny under \$50 23; wrongful appropriation 3; forgery 1.

(2) Miscellaneous offenses 158: disorderly conduct 24; drunkenness 1; marijuana 106; drugs 10; currency violation 10; suicide 7.

(3) Military Offenses 114: AWOL 51; pass violations 2; off limits 31; discharge of firearms 20; desertion 7; weapons violations 3.

(4) Traffic violations 157: speeding 90; no operators permit 4; failed to stop for a stop sign 16; overloaded vehicle 2; unsecured vehicle 9; parking in a prohibited area 11; failure to give turn signal 1; operating a defective vehicle 4; inattentive driving 2; improper over-taking 2; failure to yield the right of way 3; failure to maintain control of the vehicle 9; backing without a guide 2; speed excessive to road conditions 1; driving under the influence of alcohol 1.

c. Comments on Offender Statistics:

(1) The over-all offense rate decreased by 11% from the preceding reporting period.

(2) Within the four (4) major reportable categories crimes against persons/property increased by 15% and miscellaneous offenses increased by 5%, whereas, traffic offenses were down 32% and military offenses were down 26% from the previous period.

(3) Significant fluctuation with regard to particular offenses reported during the previous period are as follows; murders decreased from 4 to 1, larcenies over \$50 increased from 137 to 165, acts of disorderly conduct increased from 12 to 24 and marijuana cases increased from 85 to 106.

(4) No definitive pattern or conclusion is established from the above

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB V: Provost Marshal Activities (Cont)

information.

2. During the period the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of fifty-nine detainees:

Detainee statistics:	Aug	Sep	Oct	TOTAL
Returnees	0	23	0	23
Prisoners of War	16	10	5	31
Civil Defendants	0	0	0	0
Innocent Civilians	2	3	0	<u>5</u>
			TOTAL:	59

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB Y : Surgeon Activities

1. Submitted are the complete and final statistics for the stated period.

2. Medical

a. Disease and injury statistical data:

(1) Non-battle injuries	286
(2) Disease	1741
(3) Malaria	539
<u>1</u> Vivax	151
<u>2</u> Falciparum	352
<u>3</u> Unknown	36
(b) RUO	597
(c) Psychiatric Cases	95
(d) Others	564
(3) Remaining in hospital (In country)	310

b. Discussion of Disease:

(1) Malaria cases: A total of 539 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69, inclusive. Of them 151 (28%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

(a) The malaria incidence is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 1st Bde	0	1	0	1
1/8	12	36	30	78
2/8	4	8	3	15
1/12	4	1	6	11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
 TAB Y: Surgeon Activities (Cont)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 2nd Bde	0	0	0	0
1/5	6	48	35	89
2/5	1	13	3	17
2/12	20	45	13	78
HHC, 3rd Bde	4	7	1	12
1/7	62	32	24	118
2/7	5	11	4	20
5/7	6	23	23	52
Div Arty	2	2	4	8
1/9	1	1	2	4
Avn Gp	1	5	1	7
Spt Cnd	6	5	7	18
Sig Bn	0	0	2	2
Eng Bn	0	1	2	3
HHC Div	0	1	0	1
LRRP	1	3	1	5
545 MP	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	135	243	161	539

(b) The malaria rate is the highest for any quarter since the Division moved into III Corps Tactical Zone. The marked rise in incidence is associated with the moving of large number of troops into the northern sections of Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.

(2) Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Immersion Foot	0
Heat Exhaustion	4
Poisoning	2
Animal Bites	2
Hepatitis	17
Dengue Fever	0
Infectious Meningitis	0
Scrub Typhus	8

(c) WIA: From 1 Aug 69 through 31 Oct 69, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1179 U.S. Army personnel who were WIA. Of those, 681 were admitted and 498 were CRO.

100
 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations

1. SECTION 1, OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

a. During the reporting period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 Division Support Command (DISCOM) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operation Toan Thang III. Combat service support provided and/or coordinated by DISCOM included supplies, maintenance, medical services, transportation, evacuation of captured enemy material and salvage, bath, laundry, graves registration and explosive ordnance disposal for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), attached elements and contiguous units. Support rendered remained basically unchanged in mission requirements as compared to previous periods.

(1) The 1st FSSE provided support to the 1st brigade maneuver battalions from its base at Tay Ninh. The 1st FSSE provided material and transport for four new fire support bases, moved three battalion rears and trains from Tay Ninh and retrograded one fire support base. The 1st FSSE coordinated the movement of 13,037 tons of cargo and 9,639 passengers from its consolidated sling-out pad. Additionally, 456 tons of cargo and 13,726 passengers were moved through the fixed-wing air strip at Tay Ninh. The ARVN Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade became co-located with THE FIRST TEAM'S 1st Brigade on 14 October 1969. By 23 October 1969 all three ARVN battalion fire support bases were established. ARVN logistical resupply was accomplished daily from the consolidated sling-out pad. This consolidation of US and ARVN use of the sling-out pad facilitated operations in support of their respective AO's. The movement control team could better support both operations from one area, therefore the rigger section was able to teach and assist the ARVN brigade riggers in developing sound rigging techniques and procedures.

(2) The 2nd FSSE initially staffed two locations in supporting the 2nd Brigade. The 2nd FSSE consolidated its operation at Fire Support Base Buttons with the movement of the 2nd Brigade rear to FSB Buttons near Song Be. The 2nd FSSE became the most unique of all the Forward Service Support Elements by assuming responsibility for providing all classes of supply to the brigade. Additionally, the 2nd FSSE assumed a more diversified mission with the responsibility for operation of a US helicopter refuel and rearm service. During this reporting period the 2nd FSSE retrograded one Fire Base Kit and provided the material and transport for the opening of three Fire Support Bases. In each instance, the fire base kits were moved by fixed-wing aircraft to FSB Buttons and further airlifted by CH-47 helicopter to the Fire Support Base locations. FSB Buttons is rapidly developing into a complete brigade base. The 2nd FSSE is increasing its capability to provide continuous support of all classes of supplies to the brigade.

(3) The 3rd FSSE provided support to the 3rd Brigade and attached units based at Quan Loi. During the reporting period Class I, II, III, and IV as well as maintenance support, medical service and air transport was furnished and/or coordinated through the 3rd FSSE. The 3rd FSSE assumed operational control of the 8th Aerial Port in conjunction with the Air Force at Quan Loi when the 2nd FSSE moved to Fire Support Base Buttons. Elements of the 3rd Brigade and one troop from the 11th ACR were moved to Bu Dop to counter an

101

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
 TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

	HQ&CoA	MSD				
	Bien Hoa	Phuoc Vinh	B	C	D	TOTAL
Automotive	190	301	175	227	124	1017
Engineer	116	355	208	203	94	976
Electronics	454	2529	1540	807	1078	6408
Armament (Artillery)	0	33	30	20	18	101
(Small Arms)	168	427	774	481	268	2115
(Instruments)	239	722	166	238	122	1487
Other	322	1098	158	86	122	1786
TOTALS	1489	5465	3051	2062	1855	13890

NOTE: "Other categories of completed work order requests wn above include machine shop work, welding, canvas repair, glass cutting, office machine repair and fuel and electrical component repair.

(5) Summary of supply data for the quarter reveals the following:

(a) Total ASL requests received	30,250
(b) Total Fringe requests received	4,261
(c) Demand accomodation	87.6%
(d) Demand satisfaction	73.4%
(e) Average ASL lines stocked	6,297
(f) Average zero balance lines	3,195
(g) Average fringe lines on hand	0
(h) Fringe lines turned in	2,230
(i) Units supported by ASL	88
(j) Lines inventoried during the period	5,375

(6) Receipt of repair parts at the supply base at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

Red Ball receipts - 42,670 lbs

Parcel Post - 27,000 lbs

Normal Stockage - 450,000 lbs

c. The 15th Supply and Services Battalion (AM) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during this reporting period. The battalion operated from a base area in Bien Hoa and forward locations in Tay Ninh, Phuoc

102
 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

enemy threat. Due to the lack of adequate and usable road networks an aerial resupply system was initiated for providing support to the elements at Bu Dop. The 3rd FSSE provided a movements control team to handle and process the receipt of Class I, III, and V supplies at the airfield. The 3rd FSSE provided material and transport for the establishment of four Fire Support Bases and coordinated the retrograde of the supported elements from Bu Dop.

b. During the reporting period, the 27th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for all ground equipment (less medical and cryptographic) of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The "Anywhere - Anytime" attitude of support is substantiated by the following percentage of operational equipment at the close of this reporting period:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>% OPERATIONAL</u>
Vehicles	98.3%
Artillery	100.0%
Generators	96.4%
Communications	95.7%

(1) During the quarter there were 19 technical assistance visits conducted by units of the Battalion.

(2) The Battalion AIM Team visited a total of 23 units during the reporting period.

(3) The disposition of elements of the Battalion as of 25 October 1969 was as follows:

Headquarters and Company A	Biên Hoa
Main Support Detachment	Phuoc Vinh
B Detachment	Quan Loi
C Detachment	Phuoc Vinh and FSB Buttons
D Detachment	Tay Ninh

(4) The consolidated Battalion production for the period shows the following completed jobs:

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

Vinh, Quan Loi, and Song Be. Major operational achievements were:

(1) Establishment of a forward base at Song Be: As Division operations spread into Phuoc Long province, the requirement for a logistic base at Song Be became more obvious. The 15th S&S Battalion assigned a Supply Platoon and a rigger section to Song Be to provide the required support. Supply operations have increased on a daily basis since the establishment of the base. The platoon provides full support in Class III and Class V supplies; however, at present only limited redistribution points are provided for Class I and Class II and IV supplies. As physical security is improved and facilities are expanded, the platoon will be able to maintain greater stocks and provide full support in all classes of supply.

(2) Lay-out of new ASP for Song Be: Technically qualified ammunition personnel from this battalion were called upon to recommend the lay-out of a new Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) to be constructed at Song Be. Drawings and preliminary work have been finished, and the ASP is scheduled for construction during the coming quarter.

(3) Training of Rigger Personnel: Personnel of this battalion conducted training classes on external helicopter sling-out procedures. These classes were given throughout the Division area of operations to both Divisional and non-divisional units. In addition, sling-out instruction has been incorporated into the training program at the FIRST TEAM Academy. Battalion personnel are supporting combined operations with the ARVN by training ARVN riggers in sling-out procedures.

(4) Increased Emphasis on Inspection of Air Delivery Items: An inspection team from the battalion conducted a one-time 100% inspection of all air delivery equipment throughout the Division. In addition, monthly inspections of air delivery items are being emphasized to insure that only serviceable equipment is in use.

(5) Publication of Supply Bulletin: 15th S&S Battalion published a supply bulletin applicable to all Divisional units. This bulletin has proven to be an effective means of disseminating information to commanders and supply personnel and will be published on a regular basis.

(6) Reduction of ASL Lines: The 15th S&S Battalion has reduced the number of line items on the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) from over 3,000 to less than 1,200. The immediate effect has been a reduction in the number of supply documents being processed, and has enabled the battalion to reduce the time required to process a customer's requisition. The end result is faster response to the customer's requirements.

(7) Class I Issues:

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
 TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(a) <u>Rations</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>	<u>Aug-Sep-Oct</u>
"A" rations	1562 tons	2213 tons
"B" rations	1201 tons	1035 tons
"C" rations	1,315,762 meals	1,039,973 meals
LRRP rations	114,655 meals	461,313 meals
(b) <u>Ration Supplements</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>	<u>Aug-Sep-Oct</u>
Ice	3702 tons	4026 tons
Sundry Packs	370 tons	368 tons
Milk	2,712,986 pints	2,427,677 pints
Ice Cream	19,340 gal	13,353 gal
(8) <u>Class II & IV, Issues</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>	<u>Aug-Sep-Oct</u>
Quarterly Total	4783 tons	3787 tons
(9) <u>Class III Issues</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>	<u>Aug-Sep-Oct</u>
JP-4	5,769,400 gal	7,246,000 gal
AVGAS	77,400 gal	305,000 gal
MOGAS	1,049,500 gal	1,229,000 gal
DF-2	1,512,900 gal	1,649,200 gal
(10) <u>Class V Issues</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>	<u>Aug-Sep-Oct</u>
Quarterly Total	13,828 tons	13,286 tons

d. Maintenance Operations (Aircraft)

(1) Decentralized Maintenance Project OQO (15th Transportation Battalion)
 During this period Project OQO was fully implemented with the fielding of nineteen (19) complete Direct Support Detachments. All detachments were operational by 17 October 1969. Personnel were provided from assigned personnel of the 15th TC Bn; packages of PLL parts were distributed by Stock Control; complete receipt and distribution of TO&E equipment, shop sets, and special tools were made by the battalion S-4.

(2) The former Company B reached zero (0) strength in conjunction with project OQO and was closed out, and the former Company A finished turning in all of the equipment. The battalion was reorganized under MTOE 407. The MTOE and HQ, USARPAC GO 577 dated 16 Jul 69 reduced the number of companies of the battalion from four (4) to two (2). The mission of the battalion changed to back-up Direct Support for the detachments and remained as direct support for the brigades and medical battalion. Supply support remained unchanged.

(3) Production Control

(a) Aircraft Work Orders Received - 1135

(b) Aircraft Released - 724

(4) Shop Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

- (a) Production Control Internal Work Orders - 720
- (b) Direct Support Internal Work Orders - 1934
- (c) Total - 2654
- (5) Production Maintenance Man Hours (DA Form 2407) - 294,216.
- (6) Recoveries - 0
- (7) EIRs submitted - 5
- (8) Technical Assistance Visits to Units - 26

(9) Unit Locations:	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
	HHC	BEARCAT
	Company A	LONG THUAN (N)
	Company B	PHU LOI

(10) Avionics:

(a) The former "B" Co Avionics shop at Cu Chi was moved to Phuoc Vinh during September, to provide direct support avionics repair to 1st Cav Aviation units located at Phuoc Vinh on 27 September, and is part of "A" Co, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S).

(b) An Avionics contact team was established at Tay Ninh, on 19 September, in the A/229th area, for the purpose of providing a DX facility and assistance as capable on site. It supports 1st Cav Aviation units in the Tay Ninh area. This facility is operated by "B" Co, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S).

(c) Both of these facilities are interim measures, to improve Avionics support to the Division, until the deployed DS Detachments receive sufficient test equipment to operate their own Avionics facilities.

(d) Installation of command consoles in OH-6A aircraft began, with the first one being installed in a 1st Bde LOH on 14-15 October. The second installation was completed on a 3rd Bde OH-6A on 20 Oct 69 at "A" Co, 15th Trans Bn, with two remaining consoles to be installed.

(11) Tech Supply:

(a) Lines Stocked (ASL)	26,778
(b) Lines at Zero Balance	6,785
(c) Lines at Zero Balance With Dues Out	3,661
(d) Fringe Items on Hand	2,185
(e) Total Requests Received	40,532
ASL Requests Received	30,907
Fringe Requests Received	9,625
Red Ball Requests Received	N/A
Priority Group 1 Requests Received (IPD 01 to 03)	14,656
Priority Group 2 Requests Received	12,242

106
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(IPD 04 to 08)	
Priority Group 3 Requests Received	2,529
(IPD 09 to 15)	
Priority Group 4 Requests Received	0
(IPD 16 to 20)	
(f) Total Requests Filled	15,495
ASL Requests Filled	15,414
Fringe Requests Filled	81
Red Ball Request Filled	N/A
Priority Group 1 Requests Filled	5,356
Priority Group 2 Requests Filled	4,980
Priority Group 3 Requests Filled	1,433
Priority Group 4 Requests Filled	0

(g) Warehouse Refusals - 1,199

(h) Demand Accomodation (Percent) - 76.6%

(i) Demand Satisfaction (Percent) - 47.7%

(j) Number of units supported - 28

e. During the reporting period, the 15th Medical Battalion continued to provide division level medical support, and unit level medical support to THE FIRST TEAM. The 15th Med Bn was employed as follows:

Hq & Spt Co	Camp Gorvad
Co A	Tay Ninh Base Camp
Co B	Quan Loi Base Camp
Co C	Quan Loi Base Camp

(1) The Bn Hqs provided administrative and logistical support to elements of the 15th Med Bn, as well as psychiatric, veterinary, optometry, and medical supply support for all units of THE FIRST TEAM. Additionally, the Air Ambulance Platoon provided aeromedical evacuation support to THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) HSC provided medical support to the Division base camp, and back up support to the letter companies of the 15th Med Bn.

(3) A Co provided medical support to elements of the 1st Bde. During the latter portion of the period the company provided back-up support, as required, to elements of the 2nd ARVN Abn Bde.

(4) B Co provided medical support to elements of the 2nd Bde. Towards the end of the reporting period, a medical team was deployed to FSB Buttons to support the Hqs element of the 2nd Bde. A lack of real estate prevented B Co from deploying in total, along with Hqs, 2nd Bde to the new Base Camp.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(5) C Co provided medical support to elements of the 3rd Bde. The unit also provided support of the 11th ACR. One medical company from the 11th ACR was co-located with C Co.

(6) Due to periods of increased enemy activity within THE FIRST TEAM AO, a distinct need arose for better control of the Battalion's resources. This need resulted in the development of a Command Medical Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC becomes operational on order of the battalion commander, and serves specifically to regulate the flow of patients and casualties into the Division Clearing Stations, monitor medical evacuation missions, determine the need for an increase or redistribution of medical resources, and to keep the battalion commander appraised of the overall medical support being rendered during periods of increased enemy activity. On 12 and 13 August, operation of the CMOC facilitated the treatment and evacuation of 450 casualties within a 48 hour period.

(7) Twice during the reporting period, the Medical Battalion was called upon to reinforce the existing medical resources at a U.S. Special Forces camp within THE FIRST TEAM AO, when the camp generated casualties beyond their capability to medically accommodate. A medical team consisting of 3 MC officers, 1 MSC officer and 6 EM, with medical supplies, was deployed to the USSF camp to reinforce the camp treatment facility. The team was augmented by an aeromedical evacuation crew.

(8) Personnel from the 15th Med Bn, augmented the efforts of the Division Surgeon's Office in collecting and testing urine samples from throughout THE FIRST TEAM. The purpose of this program is to determine whether or not personnel are taking the weekly CP malaria tablet.

(9) In order to standardize medical evacuation procedures throughout THE FIRST TEAM, Cav Reg 40-15, Medical Evacuation was published.

(10) During the month of September, the 15th Med Bn had 8 Med Evac aircraft damaged by hostile fire, and had 3 crew members killed and 5 crewmen wounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AD: Logistics

1. (C) Section I.

a. The quarter has been characterized by continuing receipts of $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles in the Division though not at as great a rate as experienced during the previous quarter. 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons, 34 $\frac{3}{4}$ tons, and 15 $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons have been received. No further $\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles (mules) are expected for the balance of the calendar year. Despite the receipts mentioned above shortages exist among $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks. Particularly critical is a shortage of 13 M49C fuel trucks.

b. The Division's position on night observation devices continued to improve from the previous quarter. This was true for PVS-1/2's where an additional 34 became part of the inventory.

c. In the area of radio equipment the shortage of PRC 25/77 radios continued. In the VRC 12 family, 20 VRC 46's and 13 VRC 47's were received and provided increased communication capability for the infantry battalions.

d. Aerial rocket expenditures during this quarter were within ASR and stringent controls were continued. Overdraws on illuminating rounds (B535 - 40mm Illum, C226 - 81mm Illum, L307 - Sig Illum GD, L312 - Sig Illum WSP, and L495 - Flare Surface Trip) prompted more rigid controls on these items. These controls will continue during the next quarter.

e. Fortification materials, construction materials, and M8A1 matting remain critical, and all are command controlled items. Shortages exist throughout the Division in small sized lumber and plywood. The Division received no allocation of these vital materials during October. Prospects for next quarter are that allocations will be extremely limited.

f. The introduction of an ARVN Airborne Brigade into the Division's area of operation has placed additional demands on the supply system. Logistical support for the Airborne Brigade is provided through ARVN supply channels. Shortfalls in combat service support needed for combat operations are absorbed by the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Logistical support provided to the ARVN Brigade included helicopter lift for movement of troops and equipment and the use of generators and radios. Some increase in ammunition expenditures is attributed to support of the ARVN Airborne Brigade. Prospects for the next quarter are the demands for logistical support will increase with the addition of another ARVN Brigade.

g. The requirement to resupply the Song Be area entirely by air lines of communications continues to place great demands on the Air Force for air lift. Indications are that this requirement will continue during next quarter.

h. An extensive construction effort has been initiated to upgrade housing conditions at fire bases. The objective is to bring all troop facilities up to an acceptable standard in accordance with existing regulations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TABAB : Logistics (Cont)

and availability of construction materials.

i. Project OQO was initiated in mid July 1969. This project established a decentralized direct support (DS) maintenance concept within the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The previous DS maintenance organization consisted of a DS maintenance battalion with four companies. Project OQO changed this organization to create 19 DS maintenance detachments that are assigned to each of the company size aviation units within the 1st Cav. These DS detachments are backed up by a DS battalion with two companies. This project indicates that it will solve a number of aircraft DS maintenance problems within the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AC: Civil Affairs

1. (C) Population and Resources Control.

a. Refugees

(1) During the reporting period, 236,200 lbs of food was distributed to refugees within the Division's TAOR primarily in the vicinity of Song Be.

(2) In the vicinity of Bo Duc, a refugee hamlet was constructed using materials supplied by the Division and GVN authorities. The project was self-help on the part of the refugees and met with great success.

(3) The Division provided assistance in flood control to a refugee hamlet in Song Be. During the monsoon season, the Division was credited with saving 6 homes and 15 hectares of rice within the hamlet.

b. Security Control: The Division provided technical and material assistance in the upgrading of Peoples Self-Defense Force defenses throughout the AO.

2. (U) Civic Action

a. Through the Division Commodity Distribution Program, 1,282,763\$VN worth of supplies was contributed from military resources to villages and hamlets throughout the TAOR.

b. The Division provided financial support; 277,500\$VN in the building of 3 hospitals/dispensaries, 11 schools, 4 bridges, 4 orphanages and numerous smaller village/hamlet self-help projects.

c. The Division Engineer units provided equipment for the repair of 7 kilometers of road and the construction of soccer fields, wells, and drainage ditches.

d. A total of 176 MEDCAPS and 2 DENTCAPS were conducted during the reporting period treating 8,092 patients.

e. A demonstration farm was started in Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province, supported by funds from the Division's Voluntary Civic Action Fund. The purpose of the farm is to show the farming community that by using the proper management techniques of soil preparation, proper application of fertilizers and insecticides, yields can be markedly increased. Crops being demonstrated are those commonly grown in the area so that improvement in quality and quantity of yields will be readily apparent. All cultivation techniques are within the capabilities of the Vietnamese farmers. The demonstration farm created a great deal of interest among the Vietnamese, and the Division is making plans to initiate similar farms in Phuoc Long and Binh Long Province.

///

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for: Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TAB AC: Civil Affairs (Cont)

f. During the quarter, the Division, with USAF assistance, transported local Boy Scouts to Vung Tau for field trips and Vietnamese sports groups to various sports festivals. In addition, refugees were transported to new life hamlets, greatly enhancing the GVN/FWF image.

g. Spoken English classes were conducted for local Vietnamese students at An Loc and Phu Giao District, three times a week during the reporting period.

h. 385 health kits, 860 board feet of lumber, 1985 health items (soap, toothbrushes, etc.) and 51,000 lbs of excess food were distributed through village officials to needy families within the Division TAOR.

i. A total of 1661 man days were devoted toward civic action projects by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during the last quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1969
TAB AD: Psychological Operations

1. (C) General:

a. As the Quarter commenced, THE FIRST TEAM was actively engaged in intensified campaigns directed against elements of the 9th VC Division, the 275th Regiment of the 5th VC Division and the people of the VC controlled floating village of Phuoc Sang. General campaigns directed against major enemy units continued. The 1st NVA, 5th VC, 7th NVA, and 9th VC Divisions were located in the Division's TAOI and were preparing a major offensive to seize Dinh Long and Phuoc Long Province capitals.

b. A platoon leader from the H21 Sapper Reconnaissance company rallied to An Loc. He knew the plan for the attack on An Loc. The attack was initiated on 12 August and was defeated on all fronts. PSYOP counter-attack was initiated primarily against 95C, 271st and 272nd Regiments utilizing rally and surrender themes exploiting the tremendous losses suffered during the attack on 12 August. This campaign resulted in 5 ralliers.

c. Operation Phuoc Sang was in progress at the beginning of the period. This campaign was directed at the residents of a VC controlled force labor camp located approximately 15 kilometers north of Camp Gorvad. Special leaflets and tapes were produced providing directions on how and where to rally. The results to date are 18 ralliers, 5 of whom were VC. It was learned that the VC divided the remaining people into small groups and dispersed them throughout the area.

d. A rallier from the 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division just prior to the beginning of the reporting period caused the initiation of an intensified PSYOP campaign directed at that regiment. Close coordination was maintained among the Division PSYOP section, G2, and G3 Air. The concurrent targeting of the 275th with B-52 strikes and tailor made PSYOP media through the end of September resulted in four officers rallying from the 275th, one VC Assistant District Chief who provided information leading to the arrest of 17 additional VCI, and a group of Civilian forced laborers from the village of Duc Bon, a VC controlled forced labor camp located about 10 kilometers south of Song Bo.

e. As a result of interviews with the ralliers from the village of Duc Bon, it was learned that approximately 400 men, women, and children were being held captive by the VC. The people were suffering from a severe lack of food and medicine. An intensified PSYOP campaign was initiated on 23 September employing QR leaflets and tapes disseminated by air, initially resulting in 18 ralliers to Dunard. After a continuous day and night PSYOP effort directed at the area surrounding the suspected Duc Bon location, 33 individuals rallied to Dunard and 27 rallied to FSB Mary. Combined ARVN/CIDG operations supported by FIRST TEAM PSYOP in the Duc Bon area resulted in 92 ralliers on 30 September and 50 ralliers from Phu Van, a village very similar to Duc Bon. A concentrated PSYOP campaign was initiated against Phu Van concurrently with the continuing Duc Bon campaign. 78 individuals rallied to FSB Judie on 11 October. The resulting success led to the installation of a 250 watt ground mounted loud-speaker system on FSB Judie and FSB Mary. Messages were broadcasted period-

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending, 31 October 1969
TAB AD: Psychological Operations (Cont)

ically day and night. On 13 October, 3 individuals rallied to FSB Mary and 15 rallied to FSB Judie. The campaign directed against the people in the Duc Bon, Phu Van village complexes continued. To date there have been 511 individuals returned to GVN control, 178 Hoi Chanh, 51 refugees and 282 dependent wives and children.

f. Support was given to II Field Force Vietnam directed "Family Tree" and "Exploiter" campaigns; operation Exploiter terminated on 3 September 1969.

2. (C) Support

a. The 6th PSYOP Battalion located at Bien Hoa continued to provide general support to THE FIRST TEAM operations by printing 68 special request leaflets for a total of 6,020,000 leaflets.

b. The 5th Special Operations Squadron supported CAV PSYOP until 10 October with U10 and C-47 aircraft. On 10 October, the 9th Special Operations Squadron assumed support from the 5th Squadron providing O2B and C-47 aircraft. During the reporting period 51,697,000 leaflets were dropped and 71 hours loudspeaker time was employed in support of THE FIRST TEAM PSYOP Program.

c. The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Brigade HB PSYOP teams operating from Division UH-1H helicopters broadcast 544 hours and dropped 29,689,000 leaflets. Brigade operations included pre-planned and daily planned target areas as well as quick reaction PSYOP exploitation. Battalion command and control as well as logistical aircraft were also used to disseminate leaflets. A 1000 watt speaker system was mounted on a U6A "Beaver" and was employed effectively to broadcast and drop leaflets.

d. PSYOP efficiency was increased by capitalizing on specific known vulnerabilities as early as possible after disclosure. Through close coordination among G-2, G-3, and Division PSYOP the number of Hoi Chanh throughout the Division AO increased from 131 during the last reporting quarter to 250 during this reporting quarter. This quarter 88 Hoi Chanh rallied to FIRST TEAM units compared to only 4 ralliers last quarter.

e. The quarter closed with coordination between the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the ARVN Airborne Division to form a joint PSYOP coordinating committee to insure a unified PSYOP effort directed at the enemy during the next quarter.

3. (C) Kit Carson Scout (KCS)

a. Recruiting: Recruiting activities during the reporting period were expanded to include the Chieu Hoi Centers at Tay Ninh and Hau Ngia. The Binh Long and Tay Ninh Centers proved excellent recruiting areas producing 64 KCS recruits.

b. Training: Because of a serious KCS retention problem during the first two months of the reporting period, the Division initiated the "KCS Buddy

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
TABAD: Psychological Operations (Cont)

Program." The objectives of the program are to weld the KCS and his US Buddy into a team, facilitate the adjustment of the KCS into an American unit, encourage the KCS to increase his knowledge of the English language, and to instill in the KCS a loyalty to his unit. The US Buddy from the KCS's future unit joins the KCS at the FIRST TEAM Academy and they attend the final phases of KCS training together. Indications are that the objectives of the program are being fulfilled.

c. Administration: Two death gratuity payments have been made to families of KCS killed in action. Battalion Chief Scouts have been designated for all units and a pay raise was granted for Brigade, Battalion, and Company Chief Scouts. One KCS received the Silver Star, and one received the Bronze Star for Valorous actions with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). At the end of the quarter, the Division KCS strength was 170. One scout was killed and seven wounded in combat operations during the quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1969
TAB AE: Chemical Activities

1. Operations: During the reporting period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969, chemical activities generally stayed at the same level as the last reporting period.

a. Defoliation by helicopter received increased emphasis as the Division moved into remote areas of Phuoc Long Province, III Corps Tactical Zone. Division Chemical flew defoliation missions on 26 separate days dispersing some 4285 gallons of agent ORANGE.

b. Ground Commanders found numerous garden plots tended by VC/NVA personnel. They wanted immediate crop destruction missions flown to deny the enemy this valuable source of fresh food. The problem of slow response from the herbicide program for approval of crop destruction and the fact that most gardens were nearly ready for harvest hampered herbicide operations.

2. Operational Totals: Totals given include most but not all of the Chemical support given to THE FIRST TEAM.

CS Drum Drops

44 sorties for 1279 drums (102,320 lbs)

Sniffer Missions

423

Fougasse Installed

506x55 gallon drums

E-158 Munitions Dropped

321 Munitions dropped. (Includes only those dropped by
chemical personnel)

Bunker Use Restriction Bomb (BURB)

2154 manufactured and delivered to the field.

Napalm dropped from CH-47

18 drums (990 gallons)

Hush Flares

82 Installed

Defoliation Operations

39 Missions using 4,285 gallons of agent Orange.

116

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

2b. GROUP

4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CG, 1st Cavalry Division

6. REPORT DATE

15 November 1969

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

120

7b. NO. OF REFS

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

b. PROJECT NO.

N/A

c.

d.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

694007

9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

117

DD FORM 1473

NOV 68

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification