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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (16 Mar 70)

FOR OT UT 694284

23 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

**AD508362**

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND  
APO San Francisco 96384

AVCA GO-MH

18 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31  
October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2)(U)

THRU: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
APO 96375

Commander in Chief  
United States Army, Pacific  
APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

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as

  
WILLIAM L. DUPART  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

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**ANNEX A (U) COMMAND GROUP**

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Support Commands are indicated at Inclosure 1. The Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Retrograde was established 14 September 1969.

2. (U) Principal changes of key personnel during the quarter:

Colonel John T. Burke replaced Colonel William T. Drumright as Dep ACofS, SP&O; Colonel Arthur G. Lange, Jr., replaced Colonel Matt R. Wagner as Dir, Plans and Management, ICCV; Colonel Kenneth L. Cowan reported as Dir, Supply Management, ICCV; Colonel Matt R. Wagner became Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Retrograde (newly established); Colonel Thomas E. Gray, ACofS, Ammo was hospitalized and LTC Donald C. Porter became Acting ACofS, Ammo; Colonel Robert A. Rende replaced Colonel Robert C. Duke as ACofS, Supply; LTC(P) Owen E. Litz replaced Colonel Matt R. Wagner as Special Assistant for Retrograde; Colonel Carl P. Leinhaas replaced Colonel Norman L. Watkins as Director, POL; Lieutenant Colonel Karl F. Lange replaced Lieutenant Colonel Peter B. Petersen, Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Combat Security; Colonel Joseph A. Walsh, ACofS, Transportation replaced Colonel Homer D. Smith as Chief of Staff; Lieutenant Colonel Evangle Watley replaced Colonel Joseph A. Walsh as ACofS, Transportation.

ANNEX B (U) ACoS, COMPTROLLER

1. (U) Cost Reduction.

a. Cost Reduction Program Status. The FY 70 cost reduction goal for 1st Logistical Command is \$12,057,000.00. At the end of the first quarter one action involving a total of \$2.1 million was submitted to the United States Army Audit Agency (USAAA) for validation. During the month of October a second action was submitted for a value of \$22.2 million.

b. The month of August saw the initiation of a new Combat Support Efficiency Program, which is 1st Logistical Command's implementation of the Army Cost Reduction Program (AR 11-20), and the development of the FY 70 program objectives. The main objective was the dissemination of reporting responsibilities throughout the command by assignment of specific individual goals to all staff sections and support commands. To help introduce the new program an LC Reg 11-20, dated 11 September 1969, subject: Combat Support Efficiency Program, and an LC 11-20, dated 11 September 1969, subject: Combat Support Efficiency Program Handbook, were published by this headquarters.

c. In October staff assistance visits were conducted at the support commands for the purpose of briefing program monitors on the reporting and submission of Combat Support Efficiency Actions. Attendance at these briefings were good, and it is expected that this years program will involve more field participation.

2. (U) Budget. A tentative FY 70 Approved Operating Budget (AOB) of \$97 million was issued by USARV on 4 July 1969. This action was subsequent to the USARV approved certification of Purchase Request Commitments totaling \$103 million, plus uncertified requirements of an additional \$15 million. To preclude over obligation, immediate decommitment actions were processed, thus resulting in the documentation of \$21 million in unfinanced requirements. The unfinanced requirements with impact statements were submitted to USARV, G-4. In order to present the most current funding program, all activities reviewed requirements in accordance with adjusted workload, and presented a revised program of \$113.6 million. On 2 September 1969 this command was issued an FY 70 AOB of \$103.2 million, thus reducing the unfinanced requirements to \$10.4 million. As a result of the continuing adjustments in workload, and consistent management improvement actions, the unfinanced requirements were further reduced to \$8.2 million at the end of September 1969. Due to the constant changes in mission, the cancellation of a large contractual services, and the closing of some facilities, funds were made available for programming. Application of the available monies to the unfinanced requirements resulted in complete alignment of requirements and funds. Currently the FY 70 AOB covers all known requirements. Obligation rate is 58.4%. In view of the varied types of contracts and the regulated obligation procedures, the reflected rate is well within the accepted limitation.

3. (U) Finance and Internal Review.

a. Finance Service. Technical inspections were conducted at the 22nd Finance Section at Nha Trang, 126th Finance Section at Pleiku and the 641st Finance Section at Da Nang. On 11 August 1969, Military Payment Certificates were converted from series 661 to series 681. The 413th Finance Section (Disbursing), a reserve unit operating at Phu Bai, was returned to CONUS on 14 October 1969.

b. Internal Review.

(1) Auditors from Finance and Internal Review Division completed the following reviews and surveys during the period 1 August to 31 October: (a) 55 gallon Drum Survey, (b) Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) Accounting Procedures, Cam Ranh Bay (Command Assist), and (c) Personal Property Accounting - Graves Registration Channels and Personal Property Depot. A review of Subsistence Billings to Interservice Support Agreements is still being conducted within the 1st Logistical Command.

(2) The Internal Review Branch was reduced in strength by two auditors thus causing a revision of the Fiscal Year 70 Internal Review Program. It is expected that this revision will be approved in November 1969.

(3) As a result of internal reviews performed within the 1st Logistical Command, the Internal Review Division, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) issued the following final reports: (a) Materiel Handling Equipment, United States Army, Vietnam, (b) In-Country Mail Service, and (c) Long Binh Post Subsistence Issue and Stockage operations. The following reviews have been completed by USARV but a final report has not been received by the command: (a) Subsistence Billings to Non Appropriated Funds (NAF), (b) Review of the 13th Finance Section operations, and (c) Closed Loop Support Program. Additionally, the following reviews are continuing within the command: (a) Saigon Support Transportation Motor Pool (TMP), and (b) United States Army, Vietnam R&R program.

(4) The command received the following final reports issued by the United States Army Audit Agency (USAAA) and command replies were dispatched: (a) POL, USARV, (b) Interservice Support Agreements, (c) Maintenance and Management of Facilities by Pacific Architects and Engineers, and (d) Adequacy and Implementation of new POL Procedures. A draft report was issued on the Foreign Excess Sales Office. USAAA is continuing field and survey work on the following audits: (a) Reconciliation of United States Agency for International Development Billings, (b) Management of Serviceable Material, (c) Management of Unserviceable Material, (d) Asset Accounting - selected items of Combat Mobility Equipment, and (e) 10 Ton-Tractors.

(5) The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense completed a review of the Military Assistance Program Excess. No report has been received.


(6) The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed field work on the following: (a) Survey of Transportation of Ammunition Exit Conference, 10 October, 1969, (b) Investigation - Oil Procurement Inspection and Distribution Programs, South East Asia (Exit Conference, 8 October 1969), and (c) Review of United States Agency for International Development Cargo. GAO began field work on the following surveys: (a) Management and controls over operations of field ration messes, and (b) Utilization of Foreign Manufactured Commercial Trucks.

(7) Non Appropriated Funds (NAF): (a) Reviewed the Audit Programs for Qui Nhon, Saigon and Da Nang, and (b) Reviewed the monthly minutes and financial statements of the NAF under this command.

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## ANNEX C (C) ACoF, Security, Plans, and Operations, Security Division

1. (C) The following chart depicts the total number of incidents, stratified by type, directed at 1st Logistical Command installations during the period 1 August 1969 through 3 October 1969. Significant enemy incidents involving 1st Logistical Command during this period were of six types; attacks on shipping, attacks on convoys, interdiction of pipeline, ground/sapper attacks, harassments, and attacks by fire. The level of activity in this period was about the same as during the past three month period.



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2. (C) During this reporting period, the enemy continued to attempt to inflict a maximum amount of damage with a minimum amount of contact. It appeared as though the enemy had been conserving his strength and generally avoiding contact, especially with US units. To this end, perhaps there was less emphasis by the enemy on attacking US base areas and more emphasis placed on hitting isolated facilities, particularly Regional Force/Popular Force outposts and other lightly defended allied facilities. Of concern to 1st Logistical Command, for example, were the POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants) pipelines and pump stations. There was a 33% reduction in the number of attacks on pump stations; at the same time, the number of incidents involving pipelines increased by 32%. Ground/Sapper attacks against 1st Logistical Command installations have also decreased by 30% as did attacks-by-fire (37% fewer this period than the last). However, the enemy continued to maintain presence by the use of small sapper units and snipers. Incidents of the harassment type increased by 230% over the last reporting period and although very little damage was caused by these attacks, the appearance presented was that the enemy still controlled the country-side particularly in the Qui Nhon area where much of this type of activity took place. Even though sapper activity decreased, the enemy increased his efforts in giving more units sapper training and those sapper attacks which did occur were effective enough to highlight the need for vigilance against sappers and sapper tactics.

3. (C) In September, at the request of 1st Logistical Command, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade's Sapper Demonstration Team, visited the three northern support commands (Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay) for the purpose of evaluating defenses of selected critical areas and to present instruction and demonstrations relative to enemy sapper tactics and techniques. A total of 31 separate unit perimeters were evaluated from the view point of an enemy sapper element performing a reconnaissance prior to an attack. In addition, six "live" sapper demonstrations using actual perimeters and live mine fields, ammunition, and warning devices were presented. It was recommended that logistical units use the expertise available from near-by tactical units to strengthen all logistical installations. Effects from this program will not be available for evaluation until the next reporting period.

4. (C) The following is a breakout of enemy incidents, by type, with comments and examples:

### a. Attacks on Shipping


(1) The practice initiated in June which provides Patrol Boat (PBR) escort on designated "Special Interest Vessels" materially decreased the amount of enemy attacks on shipping in the Long Tau shipping channel. More than 75% of all the incidents (26) during the last reporting period occurred in the Long Tau channel. During this reporting period there were only eight incidents involving shipping and of those, only half were in the Long Tau channel. The reduction in total numbers of enemy attacks on shipping amounted to 69% of the last quarter's figure.

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(2) It appears that, to counter these escorts, the enemy adopted different procedures also. Two of the shipping incidents concerning 1st Logistical Command involved vessels at anchor against which the enemy placed charges by swimmer/sapper or with floatation rigged charges. These methods were used to sink the SS KIN WAH (not a 1st Logistical Command vessel and therefore not reflected in the chart's figures) in Nha Trang harbor.

(3) The following chart shows enemy initiated incidents directed against shipping for a nine month period, to include the three months covered by this report. This chart indicates a general decrease in activity directed at shipping, especially during the last two months.



(4) Some examples of attacks on shipping were:


(a) On 28 August 1969, at Nha Be, an explosive charge, attached to the anchor chain of the vessel "KENYA VICTORY" exploded and caused a 1 1/2 foot diameter hole in the hull below the water line. The vessel took on water but did not sink. There were no casualties.

(b) On 5 September 1969, 10 kilometers southeast of Nha Be, four unknown type rockets were fired at the merchant ship "Trans Colorado". None of the rounds hit the ship and there were no casualties or damages.

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(c) On 9 October 1969, 9 km East of Cat Lai, tug boat #ST2109 received two (2) rounds of B-40 rocket fire. The tug returned fire from organic weapons and received artillery support. Contact was broken immediately. There were 3 US WIA, 1 VN NAVY and 1 VN Civ WIA. Injured were evacuated and the boat continued on its mission.

## b. Attacks on Convoys



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(1) To illustrate the type and severity of enemy initiated incidents against convoys, these incidents have been divided into ambushes, sniper fire and mine incidents. Convoy incidents have decreased slightly this quarter (8%) and the overall trend over the past nine months has been on the decrease; however, the significance of these figures is that the decrease is not larger in view of the relatively low level of enemy activity. This highlights the enemy's continued interest in disrupting 1st Logistical Command's lines of communication. (LOC) It is interesting to note that the types of highway interdictions employed has remained fairly constant over the past six months. During this reporting period, convoys most often the object of enemy activity were those between Qui Nhon and Pledku on highway QL-19 in II Corps North.

(2) Road cratering and bridge destruction and LOC interdictions which seldom result in casualties, damages, or significant convoy delays; therefore, they have not been included in the statistical picture reflected in the above chart. Also, because of improved road clearing and repair procedures, security, patrolling, and reaction time by friendly forces, the frequency of this type incident has been reduced considerably. Rail interdiction has not been included because rail use by 1st Logistical Command is limited and has little effect upon logistical operations. Weather conditions, although not reflected in the chart, were of significance, particularly in II Corps on QL-1 between Qui Nhon and Vung Ro Bay where several bridge washouts caused convoy delays of a week or more. Also affected by the weather were the bridge by-passes temporarily used to keep the roads open in spite of bridge interdictions.

(3) Some examples of convoy ambushes were:

(a) On 14 August 1969, 25 km S of An Loc, a 56 task vehicle convoy, from the 48th Transportation Group, traveling south on QL-13 from QUAN LOI to LAI KHE was ambushed by an unknown size NVA force employing RPG, mortar, SA and AW fire from positions approximately 100 meters off the road. Company C, 2d Battalion (MECH), 2d Infantry reacted and engaged the enemy force. Gunships, artillery and tactical air supported. The contact terminated at 1150 hours. Results: Friendly - 1 KIA (1st Log Comd), 3 WIA (1st Log Comd), 2x5000 gallon tankers destroyed, and 3x5000 gallon tankers damaged; Enemy-20 KIA, five individual weapons captured.

(b) On 20 August 1969, at Qui Nhon, a Han Jin convoy, proceeding from the Depot to the DeLong Pier, was ambushed by an estimated 25-30 enemy personnel employing SA, Aw and B-40 rockets. Results: Friendly - 1 US KIA (264th Trans Company), 16 WIA (2 US 198th Trans Company, 1 US 593d GS Gp, 13 Han Jin personnel), 7 vehicles slightly damaged and 2 vehicles heavily damaged; Enemy-Unknown.

(c) On 23 August 1969, 17 km W of An Khe, as a 20 vehicle convoy from the 27th Transportation Company, traveling west on Highway 19, passed a 20 vehicle convoy from the 124th Transportation Company, traveling east, an estimated 40 enemy ambushed both convoys using small arms, RPG

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and 82mm mortar fire. Troops A and B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry reacted; artillery and gunships supported. The contact was lost at 1045 hours. Results: Friendly - 8 WIA, one 5000 gallon tanker destroyed, six 5000 gallon tankers and five tractors (5-ton) damaged, and an estimated 3000 gallons of fuel lost; Enemy - 4 KIA.

(4) Some examples of mine incidents were:

(a) On 14 August 1969, 20 km W of Camp Enari, a 124th Transportation Bn tanker, traveling east on QL-19, hit and detonated a mine. The right rear tire, the driver's seat, and the universal were damaged. There were no casualties.

(b) On 23 October 1969, 28 km E of Pleiku, a V-100 from the 504th MP Co, while escorting a 1st Log convoy, hit and detonated a mine in the vicinity of Bridge #33 on QL-19. The V-100 was destroyed. The convoy was held up for approximately ½ hour, then continued on its way.

(c) On 24 October 1969, 8 km SE of Tay Ninh, an M-42 duster, on escort duty with a 7th Transportation Bn convoy from Long Binh to Dau Tieng, hit and detonated an anti-vehicular mine on IFL-26. The duster was the third vehicle in the first march unit and was heavily damaged. There was no damage to any 1st Log vehicles.

(5) Some examples of sniper incidents were:

(a) On 2 August 1969, 21 km W of An Khe, an 8th Transportation Group convoy traveling from An Khe to Pleiku received 50 rounds of AW fire from the south side of the road. There were no casualties or damage.

(b) On 3 October 1969, 8 km N of Tuy Hoa, a 5th Maint Bn 5-ton S&P returning from Qui Nhon to Phu Hiep and carrying supplies, received approximately 7 rounds of SA fire from an unknown size enemy force. Some rounds hit the cab of the vehicle causing 1 EM to sustain superficial wounds in the leg. He was taken to the AF Hospital at Tuy Hoa, treated, released, and is now back to duty. The vehicle sustained minor damage.


(c) On 15 October 1969, 8 km E of Don Duong, a 36th Transportation Bn convoy traveling from Cam Ranh to Dalat west on QL-11 received an unknown number of SA fire. Guntrucks moved in for support, no fire was returned, and the convoy continued moving out of the kill zone. Results were: 1 US WIA, no damage to vehicle; Enemy - None.

c. Pipeline Incidents:

(1) Enemy initiated incidents involving pipelines increased in frequency by 16% over the past reporting period, and, as the following chart indicates, there is also a general trend which is shown by an ascending rate of frequency over the past nine months. Attacks on pump stations are also included in the chart figures (they have decreased by 33%).

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## PIPELINE INCIDENTS 1969



(2) Some examples of incidents directed against pipelines were:

(a) During the night of 15-16 August 1969, 4 km NE of An Khe, 59 sections of pipeline were damaged as a result of small arms fire.

(b) During the night of 13-14 October 1969, 4 km NE of An Khe, 50 sections of pipeline were shot up as a result of small arms fire.

(c) During the night of 23 October 1969, 15 km W of An Khe, 140 sections of pipeline were shot up as a result of small arms fire.

(3) Some examples of incidents directed against pump stations were:

(a) On 12 August 1969, 24 km WNW of An Khe, Pump Station #8 received 15x82 mortar rounds, 6 of which impacted inside the perimeter. Casualties were 4 WIA (1st Leg). There were no damages.


(b) On 18 August 1969, 15 km NW of Cha Rang, Pump Station #3 received 3 mortar rounds outside the perimeter. There were no casualties or damage.

(c) On 4 September 1969, 15 km NW of Cha Rang, Bridge #11 and Pump Station #3 received 12 mortar rounds accompanied by SA fire. There were no casualties or damage.

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### d. Ground/Sapper Attacks:

(1) Enemy initiated ground/sapper attacks involving 1st Logistical Command remained at a relatively low level. The point to be noted here is that the enemy ground/sapper effort was at a low level even against tactical units. The enemy no longer attacked with a large force attempting to overwhelm an allied position; instead, he used sapper attacks in which a few highly trained and highly motivated enemy personnel attempted to penetrate the perimeter, destroy as much as possible, then withdraw. This use of sapper units was of particular importance to 1st Logistical Command since most logistical installations were of the semi-permanent base area type and were prime targets for these enemy units. Recently, conventional attacks against fixed targets have been directed mostly toward small Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) outposts and other small isolated tactical positions. The following chart indicated a downward trend in the frequency of ground/sapper attacks over the past nine months.



### (2) The following are some examples of ground/sapper attacks:

(a) On 7 August 1969, at Cam Ranh Bay, the Air Force Base received 21 107mm rockets resulting in 1 WIA, 5 aircraft damaged and one building damaged. At the same time, the 6th Convalescent Center was attacked by an unknown number of sappers using satchel charges. Two US were killed and 54 were wounded. Seven buildings and a  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck were damaged or destroyed.


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(b) On 29 August 1969, at AN KHE, the Ammunition Supply Point received a sapper attack from an unknown number of enemy personnel employing three satchel charges against three pads. A Pad containing 96,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, was destroyed along with a pad of CS gas. There were no casualties.

(c) On 10 September 1969, at Qui Nhon, the Ammunition Base Depot received a sapper attack from an unknown number of enemy personnel who planted satchel charges against pads #62 and 63. The explosions caused a loss of 720 rounds of 105mm and 180 rounds of 106mm Recoilless Rifle ammunition. There were no friendly casualties; one enemy was killed.

### e. Harassment Incidents:

(1) After having decreased by 35% during the last reporting period, the frequency of this type of incident increased by more than double (230%) this quarter. Again, incidents involving harassment seem to have occurred in the Qui Nhon area much more often than in any other area. The following chart depicts this increase and shows the particularly active months of August and September.



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
(2) The following are some examples of harassment incidents.

(a) During the night of 18-19 August 1969, numerous harassment incidents occurred in the vicinity of Qui Nhem-Cha Rang. At 2115 hours, 75-100 rounds of sniper fire were received at the Qui Nhem water point. At the same time sniper fire was also received at a guard post at the US Army Depot. Again at 2133 hours the Depot received SA fire. At 2150 hours, the 8th Transportation Group compound received sniper fire. At 0002 hours, the Phu Tai Ice Plant received 6 B40 rocket rounds accompanied by 30-40 SA rounds. At approximately the same time Camp Granite received sniper fire and the Qui Nhem water point received 15-20 rockets. Then at 0040 hours, the 86th Maint Bn compound received SA fire. The total results were 3 US WIA and minor damage to the ice plant.

(b) On 30 August 1969, enemy personnel outside the perimeter at Camp Evans fired one RPG round into a bunker, wounding one soldier from the 176th Maint Co. The bunker was manned by two other individuals who were not hurt. There was no contact with the enemy.

(c) On 22 September 1969, the Phu Tai Ice Plant received 40-60 rounds of SA fire from a position approximately 50 meters to the SE. Fire was returned with M-60, M-79 and M-14 fire. There were no casualties or damage.

### f. Attacks by Fire:



(1) Attacks by fire against 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities decreased by 10% last quarter and by 37% this quarter, as illustrated by the above chart. Not only have the attacks decreased in

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number but they have also decreased intensity. Less than 25% of all attacks on 1st Logistical Command facilities consisted of more than 20 rounds of high explosive ordnance. Most of the attacks during this period occurred during country-wide or province-wide one night high points of enemy activity, indicating that the general level of this type of action was even lower than the figures indicate.

(2) Some examples of attacks by fire were:

(a) On 31 August 1969, the basecamp at Quang Tri received a total of 31x122mm rockets, 9 of which impacted in the 63d Maint Bn area resulting in no 1st Leg casualties but extensive damage to 3 generators. Results were; 3 USMC KIA, 30 USMC WIA, 7 buildings destroyed; 11 buildings, 3 generators and 1 water trailer extensively damaged.

(b) On 6 September 1969, Da Nang military installations received more than 120 rocket and mortar rounds in 4 separate attacks. Rounds landed in the following areas: 274th Ord Bn, 11th Meter Pool, the ASP, MAG 16, NSA Hospital, the Marble Mountain complex, NSA warehouse #4, the ARVN Ammo dump, the Korean R&R Center, an NSA covered storage area, and the gate of the airbase. Casualties and damages were: 4 VN Civ KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 14 VN Civ WIA, 12 US Army WIA, 2 Korean Civ WIA, 1 USMC WIA; 14 aircraft damaged, 30% damage to the NSA covered storage area, fire damage to NSA warehouse #4, and an unknown amount of ARVN ammo lost.

(c) On 11 September 1969, Dan Tieng received 10x107mm rocket rounds, 10x120mm mortar rounds and 35x82mm mortar rounds. One VN Civ was wounded, 2x3/4 ton trucks were destroyed and 2x2 1/2 ton trucks were heavily damaged. An artillery ammo storage area took a direct hit and 150-200 rounds of 8"/175mm were destroyed. An Engr ammo storage area was also hit, but damage was light.

5. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security actions completed during the period. The total number of personnel security actions processed decreased approximately 36% over the last reporting period.

a. Clearances Validated:	Aug	Sept	Oct	Total
(1) Top Secret	28	6	35	69
(2) Secret	111	81	120	312
b. Requests				
(1) National Agency Check	10	2	40	52
(2) USAIRR	43	55	92	190
(3) Background Investigations	10	1	7	18

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c. Clearances Granted	AUG	SEP	OCT	TOTAL
(1) Top Secret	0	1	23	24
(2) Secret	110	56	79	245
(3) Interim Top Secret	42	12	17	71
(4) Interim Secret	0	2	17	19
(5) Confidential	0	2	32	34

d. At the end of the period 86 personnel security actions were pending.

6. (C) The following is a summary of the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment during the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969.

a. Assignment of key personnel:

- (1) Major Jerry P. Campbell, Commanding Officer
- (2) Captain Clark C. Brown, Officer-in-Charge, Qui Nhon Field Office
- (3) Captain Thomas R. Cuffe, Jr., Case Control Officer
- (4) 1st Lieutenant Eric W. Prior, Officer-in-Charge, Da Nang Field Office.
- (5) CW4 Harry N. Fetter, Assistant Case Control Officer
- (6) CW3 Raymond H. Check, Administration and Supply Officer
- (7) CW2 John H. Smallwood, Officer-in-Charge, Cam Ranh Bay Field Officer
- (8) WO1 Phyllis R. Egermeier, Assistant Informant Control Officer

b. Special Studies Conducted:

- (1) 470 checks for possible outlets for Subversive and/or Anti-American literature.
- (2) 647 checks on salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified material.

c. Counterintelligence Services Conducted

- (1) 1 Counterintelligence survey.
- (2) 96 Announced counterintelligence inspections.

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(3) 93 Unannounced counterintelligence inspections.

(4) 264 After duty hours counterintelligence checks.

d. Personnel Security Investigations:

(1) Number conducted: 21

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 124

e. Incident Investigations (to include Subversion Directed Against the US Army):

(1) Number conducted: 36

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 64

f. The counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File had a total of 11,084 personalities and 767 impersonal items on file at the end of the reporting period.

g. There were 72 contacts made with installation informants during the past 90 days which produced 36 IIR's for a 50% production ratio.

h. A re-evaluation of potential threats against elements of the 1st Logistical Command was made during this period. It was determined that there is an increasing potential for sabotage and violence within the command by subversive, dissident, or extremist elements while the potential for espionage is relatively limited due to the fact that the major part of classified information is concentrated in larger headquarters and the bulk of the troops never have access to classified information. Based on this evaluation, increased emphasis has been placed on acquiring a network of military and local national informants capable of observing and reporting activities of individuals or groups whose activities would contribute to racial incidents, possible subversion, or other incidents which would be prejudicial to security or efficiency within the command. Greater emphasis was directed toward security training as a part of detailed security inspections of those units which maintained defense information classified SECRET or higher. Courtesy inspections continued at units which maintained security information classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL, and a check list report of inspection was provided to the unit commander as a replacement for the full written report which was formerly prepared. This resulted in no lessening of the security program within the command but the reduced administrative workload provided many additional man-hours which could be devoted to other problems.

7. (U) WEATHER: The Autumn Transition Period: The autumn transition period occurred during the month of October as the southwest monsoon retreated before the northeast monsoon, causing improved weather conditions in III and IV CTZ. This was the period when the Intertropical

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Convergence Zone moved south and the warm, moist air of the southwest monsoon was replaced by the relatively cooler, drier air of the northeast monsoon. During the first half of October precipitation was generally light. The passage of the Intertropical Convergence Zone through the southern half of the Republic brought several days of scattered heavy precipitation. By mid-October the northeast monsoon precipitation regime prevailed. In the area west of the Annam Range in I and II Corps, most days were rain free, while rainfall to the east of the mountains reached a maximum during this period. There was a gradual decrease in precipitation in III and IV Corps.

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ANNEX D (C) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Plans Division

1. (C) LC OPLAN 94-70. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 94-70 (Work Stoppage, Saigon Port) (U) was published on 15 August 1969. This OPLAN provides for continued operation of the Saigon Port complex by military personnel in the event of a work stoppage by civilian river pilots, stevedores, or truck drivers, singularly or in any combination.
2. (U) LC OPLAN 103-70. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 103-70 (Contingency Plan for Official Visits by Distinguished Visitors) (U) was published on 10 August 1969. This OPLAN provides for 1st Logistical Command support for official visits by distinguished visitors.
3. (U) FAMREP. During the reporting period this command provided HQ, USARV with base data, for all 1st Logistical Command units, to be incorporated into the PACOM Force and Material Report (FAMREP). This data base will be used for planning and will assist in redeployment operations. A data update is required of subordinate units whenever there is a 10% increase or decrease from the last report in personnel or equipment. As a result of the data provided, a computer printout containing the following information will be developed:
  - a. Unit by UIC.
  - b. Personnel - authorized/assigned.
  - c. TO&E/MTO&E.
  - d. Vehicles by type and quantity.
  - e. Short tons.
  - f. Measurement tons.
  - g. Tons of PCS property.
  - h. Outsize equipment.
  - i. APOE/POE.
  - j. Location.
4. (C) Test of Annex C, LC OPLAN 79-69.

Annex C (Supply Data Systems) to LC OPLAN 79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U) was revised during the report period by the Policy and Procedures Division, United States Army Inventory Control

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Center Vietnam (USAICCV). The primary change was to designate the Directorate for Data Processing (DDP), United States Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay (USASUPCOM-CRB) as the primary alternate ICCV in lieu of the 2d Logistical Command, and to redesignate the 2d Logistical Command as the secondary alternate.

b. The objective of the test was to check the hardware, software and communications available at the DDP, CRB, to support Annex C, LC OPLAN 79-69. Each ADP center is required to maintain duplicate ADP files at alternate storage sites in order to reestablish the ADP files should the original files be destroyed. The duplicate files include the Availability Balance File (ABF) and the basic cycle programs. The duplicate ADP files are updated weekly to keep them current. The basic test plan was to take the duplicate ICCV ADP files from Long Binh Post to CRB and then run 20,000 test transactions there using these files. The duplicate files would be returned and the output from CRB analyzed to ensure that the DDP could function as an alternate ICCV if required.

c. The duplicate tapes were taken to CRB in five styrofoam containers weighing a total of 150 pounds. ICCV personnel accompanied the tapes. The test was run by DDP personnel at CRB from 17-21 October 1969. The test included a total of 40 hours computer time, to include 32 hours of actual run time. All basic 3SVN cycles were completed.

d. The test at CRB was successful. Minor problems were encountered but were resolved by the ICCV and DDP personnel present at the test site. Due to the volume of the transactions handled by ICCV and the limited ADP equipment available at CRB, only the basic 3SVN ADP cycles can be handled under contingency conditions. Management reports and nice-to-have data cannot be handled.

5. (U) Courtesy Visits to SUPCOMs. Representatives of Plans Division made courtesy inspection visits to USASUPCOM-CRB, QNH and SGN to review the status of their OPLANs. SUPCOM plans personnel were apprised of shortcomings detected and are rectifying them. This was found to be an excellent means of ensuring that SUPCOM supporting OPLANs adequately support LC OPLANs and that SUPCOMs are monitoring for adequate support of their OPLANs by their subordinate units.

6. (U) Annex A of the Logistic Review.

a. During the report period, Annex A, Command, Control and Coordination, of the Review and Analysis of the US Army Logistic System in RVN was refined to its current final draft form. All that remains before publication are incorporation of the comments by HQ, USARV and the securing of additional photographs suitable for reproduction. A briefing on Annex A was presented on 13 September to GEN Frank S. Besson, Chairman, Joint Logistics Review Board and on 6 October to Team Alpha

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of the Joint Logistics Review Board.

### 7. (C) Common Service Support in ICTZ.

a. Planning is continuing for the eventual turnover of common service support functions in ICTZ from the Navy to the Army. USARV has established seventeen subcommittees representing each functional area to be turned over. Representation on the subcommittees includes members from USARV, 1st Log Comd, NAVSUPACT and USASUPCOM-DNG. The subcommittees have a two-fold mission: first, to act as focal points for solving current problems in their respective functional area as they materialize; and, second, to prepare a long range plan for the turnover of common service support in ICTZ.

b. All common service support problems which arose from Phase I and II of the redeployment have been acted upon by USASUPCOM-DNG. Some realignment of the retail functions in Northern ICTZ was required. This realignment will ensure continued logistical support to all units during the redeployment. Members of the various subcommittees held meetings at DNG to ensure a smooth transition from Force Logistic Command units to SUPCOM DNG units.

### 8. (U) T-Day Planning Actions.

a. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 69-69 (T-Day Plan) was published during the report period.

b. Supporting T-Day OPLANS were received from USASUPCOM-SGN, DNG and QNH. A review of these supporting plans was conducted and appropriate comments were furnished to the SUPCOMs.

c. A quarterly review was made of USARV OPLAN 69-69, and appropriate comments were furnished to HQ, USARV.

9. (U) LC Reg 525-7, Preparation of Operation Plans. On 20 August 1969, LC Reg 525-7, Preparation of Operation Plans, was published and distributed to the field. The regulation was based on FM 101-5, joint staffing guides and Command procedures. The purpose of the regulation was to assist all subordinate units in the preparation of their supporting operation plans and to bring a higher degree of uniformity into the planning system of the Command. The regulation contains Joint Dictionary definitions, policy and responsibility guidance; preparation, planning, staffing and reviewing procedures, and a standardized operation plan format.

### 10. (C) Evacuation of Noncombat Essential RADIAC Equipment.

a. Units deploying to Vietnam brought with them RADIAC instruments as part of their TOE. The RADIAC instruments were for the detection

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and identification of radiation in a nuclear environment. Maintenance and calibration of the instruments in Vietnam was difficult due to the shortage of trained maintenance men and calibration personnel. To alleviate this problem plans were made to keep minimum RADIAC equipment on hand for contingency purposes and evacuate the remainder to CONUS for storage for the units in Vietnam.

b. The following RADIAC equipment is to be maintained on hand for contingency purposes:

- |                          |                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) IM 174 Radiacmeter   | 2 per Div or Sep Bde  |
| (2) AN/PDR 27 Radiac Set | 1 per Div or Sep Bde  |
| (3) IM 93 Radiacmeter    | 12 per Div or Sep Bde |
| (4) PP 1578 Charger      | 1 per Div or Sep Bde  |
| (5) AN/PDR 60 Radiac Set | 1 per Div             |
| (6) TS 784 Calibrator    | 2 per 5th LEM Co      |

c. All other RADIAC equipment was declared noncombat essential and was turned in by the units to their supporting depot. USARV was ordered to ship all noncombat essential RADIAC equipment to US Army Depot Sacramento, Project Code ISB, for storage until the units return to CONUS or their home installation.

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## ANNEX E (C) ACoS, Security, Plans, and Operations, Operations Division

1. (U) During the reporting period, the 1st Logistical Command continued its support to the US and Free World Military Forces throughout Vietnam. Highlighting the reporting period were: Operation Clear Adjust, Operation Keystone Cardinal, the completion of Keystone Eagle, the closing of Logistical Supply Activities (LSA's), realignment of support for II CTZ (South), and relocation of units.

### 2. (C) Highlights of Logistical Support Activities

#### a. Operation Clear Adjust:

(1) This operation provided for the redeployment of US Army Reserve units, mobilized under the Mobilization Act of 1968, from the Republic of Vietnam. It also provided specific guidance for the actual transfer of missions, responsibilities, facilities and equipment to other US, GVN or FWMA forces, as appropriate. The 1st Logistical Command units included in this operation and the dates they redeployed are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVATED UNITS</u>
259th QM Bn HHC	Phu Bai	15 September 1969	528th QM Bn HHC
424th AG Co	Da Nang	6 October 1969	
237th CS Co	Quang Tri	14 October 1969	555th CS Co
413th FI Det	Phu Bai	14 October 1969	
1018th CS Co	Da Nang	16 October 1969	334th CS Co

(2) Summary of 1st Logistical Command authorized space losses as a result of Clear Adjust is shown below.

	<u>SPACE LOSSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
I CTZ	634	5

#### b. Operation Keystone Cardinal:

(1) This operation implemented a further reduction of US forces. Included in Keystone Cardinal were ten reserve component units formerly scheduled to redeploy under Clear Adjust. These units are not shown in paragraph 2a above.

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 2500.1Q

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(2) Planning for redeployment under Operation Keystone Cardinal had to be conducted on a very strict, close-hold basis as was previously done for Keystone Eagle. The policies, guidance and the designation of the actual units involved, once developed and released by the close-hold group, required additional staff actions. It was necessary, therefore, to publish detailed guidance in a piece-meal fashion in order to provide immediate instruction to subordinate units as close-hold information was released. A similar discussion of these actions is contained in part II of this report and is entitled "Guidance for Redeployment/Inactivation Operations". (para C4)

(3) The redeployment of the 3d Bde, 2d Abn Div required that special assistance be provided to them in preparation and movement for embarkation. This task was assigned to USASUPCOM-SGN.

(4) Realignment of combat service support provided by the affected SUPCOMS had to be accomplished without any degradation of their normal support mission. Phasing the relief of missions as had been done for Keystone Eagle, provided for an overlap between the redeploying/inactivating units' actual standdown and subsequent move and the assumption of the mission by a new unit.

(5) The 1st Logistical Command units which are to be redeployed from the Republic of Vietnam, or inactivated in-country under Operation Keystone Cardinal, are as indicated below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>REDEPLOYED/INACTIVATED</u>
238th CS Co Maint DS	Dong Tam	21 September 1969
172d CS Co Med Trk	Cam Ranh Bay	27 September 1969
842d QM Co POL Sup	Quang Tri	30 September 1969
826th OD Co Ammo	Long Binh	2 October 1969
513th CS Co Hq Mn Sup	Phu Bai	3 October 1969
1002d CS Co S&S DS	Phu Bai	5 October 1969
295th OD Co	Chu Lai	7 October 1969
500th TC Bn HHD	Cam Ranh Bay	15 October 1969
53d GS Gp	Long Binh	15 October 1969
448th AG Co	Phu Tai	16 October 1969

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE REDEPLOYED/INACTIVATED</u>
34th TC Plt	Vung Tau	18 October 1969
534th CS Plt C&F	Di An	22 October 1969
28th TC Plt	An Khe	30 October 1969
61st TC Co	Cam Ranh Bay	1 November 1969
274th CS Plt C&F	Da Nang	3 November 1969
377th CS Co	Cam Ranh Bay	5 November 1969
487th TC Det	Vung Tau	10 November 1969
488th TC Det	Vung Tau	10 November 1969
564th TC Plt	Cam Ranh Bay	12 November 1969
140th TC Det	Vung Tau	14 November 1969
551st CS Co	Long Giao	14 December 1969
553d CS Co	Long Binh	14 December 1969

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTIONS</u>
*Hqs, USASUPCOM-SGN	30
*Hqs, USASUPCOM-CRB	32
*Hqs, USASUPCOM-DNG	23
*USAD-CRB	221
*USAD-QNH	24
*Hqs, 1st Logistical Command	
*4th Transportation Command	

\*Indicates reduction in authorized spaces

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(6) A summary of 1st Logistical Command authorized space losses as a result of Keystone Cardinal is shown below:

	<u>SPACE LOSSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS*</u>
I CTZ	1045	6
II CTZ (North)	94	3
II CTZ (South)	888	7
III & IV CTZ	<u>1152</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL	3170	29

\* Includes units affected by space reductions.

c. Relocation of Units: In order to provide an equitable distribution of support units and realign combat service support after Operation Clear Adjust and Operation Keystone Cardinal, the relocations listed below were effected:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RELOCATED FROM</u>	<u>RELOCATED TO</u>	<u>DATE RELOCATED</u>
848th QM Plt Petri	Qui Nhon	Quang Tri	11 September 1969
2d CS Bn Hq Mn Spt Co	Vung Tau	Phu Bai	19 September 1969
148th CS Co S&S	Nha Trang	Phu Bai	21 September 1969
661st OD Co Ammo DS GS	Phu Thanh	Chu Lai	23 September 1969
6th AG APU	Long Binh	Phu Tai	7 October 1969

d. Reassignment of Transportation Companies:

(1) Non-reserve personnel and all TOE equipment, less 12 ton trailers, of the 172d Med Trk Co were reassigned and/or laterally transferred from USASUPCOM-CRB to USASUPCOM-SGN. The personnel and equipment were infused into USASUPCOM-SGN's 543d Lt Trk Co which was then redesignated as a Med Trk Co. The move was necessitated to realign port clearance capabilities at Newport due to contract termination with Philco-Ford.

(2) The 563d Medium Truck Company was reassigned to USASUPCOM-SGN from USASUPCOM-QNH. The company moved with all TOE equipment and became operational at its new location on 1 October 1969. Movement of this company was also necessitated by the immediate need for a port clearance capability created by the termination of the Philco-Ford contract.

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### e. Closing of Logistical Supply Activities:

(1) Hill 63 LSA was phased out on 15 October 1969 as a result of a boundary change in I CTZ which included Hill 63 in the Area of Operation (AO) of the 1st Marine Division. Those elements of the Americal Division supported from Hill 63 have been moved to the South and are being supported from the LSA at Chu Lai.

(2) Blackhorse LSA at Long Giao was phased out on 24 October 1969 in accordance with Hq, USARV OPLAN BLACKHORSE, 16 August 1969. The closing of the LSA involved:

(a) Transfer of facilities to RVNAF.

(b) Relocation of the 506th CS Co (S&S) to LSA Bearcat.

(c) Reduction of the 551st CS Co (Lt Maint) to zero strength. This action was taken by USASUPCOM-SGN because the unit is scheduled to inactivate in-country on 14 December 1969 under Operation Keystone Cardinal.

### f. Realignment of Support for II CTZ (South):

(1) On 12 September 1969, this headquarters granted USASUPCOM-CRB the authority to establish an LSA at Nha Trang. Combat service support for Nha Trang had previously been provided by the 54th GS Gp, the 129th CS Co, and the 148th S&S Co. However, the following actions required reevaluation and eventual realignment of combat service support for II CTZ (South):

(a) The relocation of the 148th S&S Co from Nha Trang to Phu Bai in I CTZ.

(b) The inactivation of the 500th TC Gp, located at Cam Ranh Bay, under Operation Keystone Cardinal.

(c) The inactivation of the 377th CS Co, located at Cam Ranh Bay, under Operation Keystone Cardinal.

(2) USASUPCOM-CRB's recommendation for realignment of combat service support which was approved by this headquarters included:

(a) Support of forces at Nha Trang utilizing the LSA concept. This concept provides for combat service support in the following areas: Class I, Class II and IV, stock control, Class III, maintenance, laundry, bakery, graves registration, property disposal, postal service and finance service.

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(b) Relocation of the 54th GS Gp from Nha Trang to Cam Ranh Bay to provide command and control over units subordinate to the 500th TC Gp because of its inactivation.

(c) Relocation of the 129th CS Co from Nha Trang to Cam Ranh Bay to replace the 377th CS Company which was being inactivated.

g. Keystone Eagle Review Conference: On 18 August 1969, this headquarters sponsored a Keystone Eagle Review Conference which was attended by approximately 35 officers from the support commands and various staff members from this headquarters. A detailed discussion of the many "Lessons Learned" during Keystone Eagle provided the attendees with invaluable guidance for anticipated future operations of this type.

h. After Action Report: A comprehensive after action report covering Operation Keystone Eagle was published by 1st Logistical Command on 22 October 1969. Annex A of this document discussed problem areas requiring resolution during the operation. These valuable lessons learned have been reproduced at inclosure 16, titled "Problem Areas During Operation Keystone Eagle". The detailed supporting appendices are available.

i. Transportation in the Delta: Representatives of Hq, 1st Logistical Command attended a meeting with representatives from the Delta Military Advisory Command and the 834th Air Division at MACV TMA. The topic of discussion was the transportation problem in the Delta as a result of downgrading and close-out of airfields. Some of the possible solutions discussed were:

- (1) Upgrading of airfields
- (2) Stationing C-7A aircraft closer to the Delta
- (3) Airdrop of cargo and low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES)
- (4) Providing more highway and water-type transportation

j. Move of the 101st Abn Div (rear): The 101st Abn Div moved their rear headquarters and the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) from Bien Hoa. The rear echelon relocated to Phu Bai and the SERTS to Camp Evans both in I CTZ. 1st Logistical Command is providing technical assistance to the unit in the packing of equipment and by providing essential handling equipment.

k. Special Airlift and Sealift Missions: During the reporting period, nine emergency resupply (ER) and nineteen combat essential (CE) airlift missions were conducted. Three combat essential sealift missions were also conducted. Seventeen missions carried Class V supplies and the remainder

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carried other items such as engineer stakes, generators, Class III, collapsible drums, and vehicles. A total of 2,221 short tons of supplies were shipped by special mission. The chart below gives a detailed breakdown of amount and type of tonnage hauled:

### SPECIAL MISSIONS

	<u>Total</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Tonnage</u>
August	10	1913	5	276	5	1637
September	14	242	9	136	5	106
October	7	66	3	16	4	50

#### 1. Airdrop Operations:

(1) There were no emergency resupply air drop operations during the reporting period. This inactivity resulted in some loss of expertise in this area. In an effort to remedy this, 1st Log Comd recently forwarded a letter to Headquarters, USARV apprising that headquarters of the situation and requisitioning that a series of emergency airdrop training missions be scheduled to maintain proficiency of airdrop personnel.

(2) Three airdrop training missions totaling 180.95 short tons of supplies were conducted during the reporting period. All missions were conducted during August and September and completed without any significant incidents; however, they were not the quick reaction missions required for true crew proficiency under emergency conditions.

(3) An extensive evaluation of emergency resupply contingency stocks performed by this headquarters resulted in a 60% reduction of the previous stockage objective. Removed from ready-to-airdrop status were Class I supplies because of their perishable nature and Class III because of possible deterioration. Class V supplies have been reduced considerably and are now stocked in a quantity which is based on consumption statistics received from supported tactical units.

#### 3. (C) Publication of Directives

##### a. Operations Orders:

(1) 1st Logistical Command Operations Orders 183-69 and 183A-69 were published on 29 August and 24 August respectively, and supported the Operation Clear Adjust redeployment and associated relocation of 1st Logistical Command units.

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(2) 1st Logistical Command Operations Order 184-69, Keystone Cardinal, was published on 27 September 1969 in support of the second phase redeployment of troops from RVN. Experience gained in Operation Keystone Eagle and Operation Clear Adjust was utilized in providing guidance to assist 1st Logistical Command redeploying units and other redeploying USAhV units.

b. Administrative Order: 1st Logistical Command Administrative Order 1-69 was published on 16 September 1969. This order describes the combat service support mission assigned to 1st Logistical Command, assigns responsibilities and provides guidance to subordinate commands for the performance of this mission for US Army forces, other US forces/agencies and Free World Military Assistance Forces authorized US Army support in Vietnam.

c. Letter of Instruction: A letter of instructions (LOI) prescribing the mission, responsibilities, and policies for the operation of the United States Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) was published on 8 October 1969. This is the first formal LOI published by this headquarters for USAPAV.

d. Regulation: 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-3, Convoy Operations, was published on 18 August 1969. This regulation provides policy and general guidance to subordinate commands for the conduct of 1st Logistical Command convoy operations.

#### 4. (C) Project Duffel Bag

a. Project Duffel Bag is a Department of Defense program which employs electronic devices to detect enemy ground activities. These devices, commonly called "sensors", are employed along likely avenues of approach and within suspected or known enemy base camps. Signals from sensors are quickly translated into data for timely and effective artillery fire, air strikes and other means of target destruction. During the reporting period, USASUPCOM-QNH received and emplaced sensors to upgrade security of the depot, the ammunition storage area and the POL tank farms at Qui Nhon.

b. At Cam Ranh Bay, the 1st Logistical Command operates the in-country facility for receipt, storage, issue and maintenance of sensors and associated equipment for all units (including RVNAF) in RVN. During this reporting period MACV decided that command and control of Duffel Bag logistical support would be facilitated by consolidation and centralization of the effort at Cam Ranh Bay. Assumption of the complete logistical effort has increased the mission at Cam Ranh Bay approximately 10%.

c. In March of 1969, USARV tasked 1st Logistical Command with a 400% increase in its Duffel Bag mission (exclusive of that mentioned above). 1st Logistical Command had to expand the facilities and increase the staff

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for full scale operation by 31 July 1969. All buildings, staffing and training were completed by that date; however, problems with the air conditioning system delayed full scale operation until 24 August 1969. Because of this lack of adequate temperature control, certain electronic equipment was retained at CONUS depots until the environmental conditions required for testing and maintenance could be met. The one month delay had no detrimental effect on the tactical operations.

d. The TDA for the Duffel Bag facility has been approved by USAKV and forwarded to USARPAC. The stated personnel requirement is 96. Of this total, 77 have already been financed and authorized. Presently the facility is processing 2500 to 3000 sensors per month. Should volume increase above this level, additional spaces will be required.

e. On 19 & 20 October, MACV J3-4 hosted a Duffel Bag conference at MACV Headquarters. The following Hqs/units were represented:

MACV	COMNAVFORV
USAKV	III MAV
1st Logistical Command	I Field Force
7th Air Force	II Field Force

The meeting covered a variety of topics to include:

- (1) A summary of Duffel Bag tactical and logistical operations.
- (2) A free flow of information between the user and the supplier.
- (3) An interface between the user and the supplier.

(4) Information on future developments, e.g., new sensors, an automated records-keeping system to be used by MACV, and probable influence of budgetary limitations. MACV plans to have these meetings at six month intervals.

6. (U) Resources Review Board: The 1st Logistical Command Resources Review Board did not meet during the reporting period. Redeployment/relocation of units under Keystone Eagle, Clear Adjust and Keystone Cardinal changed the projected structure of the command so rapidly that this procedure was temporarily suspended and will be accelerated next quarter.

7. (U) Project Move-Out-of-Saigon-Expediently (MOOSE): A Presidential

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directive of August 1966, directed that the US military population in Metropolitan Saigon be reduced. As a result project MOOSE was initiated to move as many units as possible out of the Saigon Metropolitan area without degrading the 1st Logistical Command's mission. Monthly and quarterly reports on the number of personnel working and billeted in the Saigon Metropolitan area were submitted by each unit. As a result of a substantial reduction in the number of units located in Metropolitan Saigon, this was discontinued as a special project as of August 1969. However, the objective of further reduction is still in effect.

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Annex F (U) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Training Division

1. (U) One of the most important programs in 1st Logistical Command directed toward Vietnamization of the war effort is Operation BUDDY. Operation BUDDY is a training program designed to improve the logistical capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In July 1969, 1st Logistical Command made an analysis of the ARVN training capability of this command. The analysis showed that this command had the capability to train approximately 1,100 ARVN soldiers each month. In a briefing presented to MACJ46, this command emphasized its training capabilities and requested MACV to evaluate ARVN training requirements. In August 1969, MACV completed a detailed evaluation of ARVN training requirements, and as a result of the study and follow-up action, the number of ARVN soldiers trained under Operation BUDDY increased from a total of 80 in August 1969 to its present level of 572 soldiers. ARVN soldiers have been trained or are currently being trained in the areas of electronic, laundry machine and marine maintenance; tug, medium and heavy boat operations; driver training; and laundry machine, floating crane, and materials handling equipment operations. A six man Instruct and Advise (I&A) Team has conducted instruction at the 832d ARVN DSU in Saigon, and plans are underway to expand this program to include one 1st Logistical Command I&A team with each ARVN Area Logistics Command (ALC).

2. (U) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program is designed to upgrade the military capabilities of RVNAF both in quality and quantity. 1st Logistical Command has been charged with providing supply, maintenance and technical inspection assistance to the program. During the reporting period, two Artillery Battalions and one Transportation Company (Medium Boat) transferred their equipment to ARVN on a unit-to-unit basis; and equipment for two Engineer Construction Battalions, two Ordnance Direct Support Companies, and one Engineer Heavy Equipment company was provided from USARV and 1st Logistical Command resources. A turnover of the equipment of one Transportation Company (Medium Boat) to ARVN was initiated on 1 October 1969. This transfer is scheduled for completion in December 1969.

3. (U) SKILLS I is a training program designed to improve the support capabilities of 1st Logistical Command by orientation and indoctrination of newly-assigned personnel and by placing additional emphasis on formal and informal logistical training at all echelons.

Number of persons trained during 1st quarter of FY 70 are listed below:

	<u>JULY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALPHA	851	1196	1157	3204
BRAVO	2112	5783	7756	15651
CHARLIE	<u>1046</u>	<u>1259</u>	<u>1495</u>	<u>3800</u>
TOTAL	4009	8238	10408	22655

4. (U) LC Regulation 350-2 was published on 2 October 1969. This regulation superseded a Letter of Instruction on SKILLS I.

5. (U) A brochure depicting the organization, mission and functions of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command was prepared in September 1969 as a handout for attendees at SKILLS I ALPHA Orientation and Indoctrination Briefings. The brochure was initially used for the 9-11 September 1969 SKILLS I ALPHA.

6. (U) Six ALPHA briefings were held at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command during the period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969. To increase interest and add realism to briefings from staff sections, 35 mm slides depicting actual logistics operations have been added to several presentations.

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ANNEX G (C) ACoS, Security, Plans, and Operations,

Force Development Division

1. (U) Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) affecting 12 1st Logistical Command units were prepared and submitted to USARV between 1 August 1969 and 31 October 1969. MTOE were submitted to increase unit strengths, realign capabilities and add equipment to support mission requirements. MTOE submitted are at Inclosure 11.

2. (U) DA/USARPAC approved the reorganization of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, and USASUPCOM, SGN, CRB, and QNH. Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) submitted in the "1834 Package" were approved by DA on 10 October 1969, with effective date of 2 February 1970. DA/USARPAC queried USARV as to whether an earlier effective date would be desired. This headquarters concurred in a USARV message to DA/USARPAC recommending that the effective date be as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 1969. These TDA document the present organizational configuration of this and the three Support Command headquarters.

3. (C) During the period August to November 1968, Program 6 increased 1st Logistical Command by 39 units. Of these, one National Guard and 24 Reserve units were assigned to the command with a public law requirement for release within one year. When KEYSTONE EAGLE was announced, 1st Logistical Command was able to meet its quota of space reductions by redeploying eleven of these reserve units, thus satisfying both requirements. The remaining 14 reserve units were scheduled for redeployment under CLEAR ADJUST, with the option of including all or part of the 14 in KEYSTONE CARDINAL upon its announcement. Three units were redeployed under CLEAR ADJUST at zero strength and replacement units were activated by USARPAC to retain the manpower spaces in 1st Logistical Command. Upon announcement of KEYSTONE CARDINAL, the remaining eleven reserve units were used to fill part of this reduction quota. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, all reserve units in the command were redeployed, simultaneously satisfying the statutory requirement for their release from active duty and providing manpower spaces to be applied against 1st Logistical Command's force reduction quota.

4. (U) A total of four Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) TDA were submitted during the reporting period. GOCO TDA are required for authorization documentation for equipment provided contractors under their contract terms. TDA have now been submitted for all GOCO contracts currently in effect in the command. COCC TDA submitted were: Lam Brothers Incorporated, Stevedore Contract, Cam Ranh Bay; Hang Thau Hiep Thang, Tugboat Contract, Cam Ranh Bay; Han Jin Transportation Company, 100 Ton Floating Crane Contract, Qui Nhon Harbor; Hang Thau Hiep Thang, 100 Ton Floating Crane Contract, Cam Ranh Bay.

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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5. (U) Two GOCO TDA were approved by Department of the Army during the period 1 August - 31 October 1969: Philco-Ford Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) Repair, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon and Vinnell Corporation Care and Preservation Facility for all classes of supply, USASUPCOM, Saigon.
6. (U) A Modified Table of Distribution and Allowances (MTDA), implementing the USARPAC Manpower Survey, was submitted for US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay on 15 September 1969. The change was in manpower authorizations of which 745 spaces were deleted (16 officer, 2 warrant officer, 203 enlisted, and 524 Local National). Four Department of the Army civilian spaces were added.
7. (U) On 5 October 1969, USARV tasked this headquarters to identify thirteen percent of 1st Logistical Command Officer spaces for deletion or conversion to warrant officer or NCO positions. This action was required to meet an established FY 70 year-end officer ceiling. A total of 313 officer spaces were nominated for deletion throughout the command. Guidance provided to the SUPCOMs for their selection of spaces for this action included: (a) Company-size units would not be reduced to less than one officer; (b) Battalion and Group staffs would not be reduced to less than 25%. Of the total of 313 spaces, 34 were converted to warrant officer positions and 269 to NCO positions. The remainder were deleted without conversion on the specific request of the support command concerned because they were either not appropriate or not required. It is understood that this action, if approved by DA, will not be implemented until year end FY 70.

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ANNEX H (U) ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations, Military History Division

1. (U) The past quarter has been characterized by a marked increase in special activities in 1st Logistical Command. Consequently several new historical projects were initiated during the period. A proposed monograph on 1st Logistical Command's vital role in the Vietnamization Program is presently in the research stage. A document file with a historical summary on 1st Logistical Command retrograde activities is being completed. A short history of 1st Logistical Command, written to familiarize the 1st Log Comd soldier with his unit, is ready for publication. A weapons display program, depicting various enemy weapons used in Vietnam, is being presented throughout the headquarters as an educational media.
2. (U) An extensive and significant series of interviews was completed during the quarter with commanders and key personnel of the 25 1st Logistical Command Reserve and National Guard units recently redeployed to CONUS. These interviews, together with unit histories and other documents were utilized to prepare a comprehensive historical volume covering the units' activities and accomplishments in Vietnam. This volume was distributed to CG, USCONARC, Chief of Reserve Components, DA, and OCMH, DA.
3. (U) In a continuing project to obtain exit interviews from senior officers in 1st Logistical Command, members of the Military History Division conducted interviews with BG Huron, Commanding General, Saigon Support Command, BG Gunn, Commanding General, Da Nang Support Command, and LTC Roddy, ACofS, Maintenance, Saigon Support Command.
4. (U) During the reporting period, the Military History Division researched and prepared a Meritorious Unit Commendation recommendation for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command covering the period 15 April 1968 to 31 August 1969.
5. (U) Planning is underway for a Command Historical Conference to be held at this headquarters 8-9 December 1969. Representatives from support commands, support groups and transportation commands will receive briefings and instructions on various projects of the command historical program and guidance on the proper preparation of the Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

ANNEX I (U) ACoFS, SUPPLY

1. (U) The reduced level of enemy activity in RVN was reflected in the low level of activity directed against FOL facilities. Enemy damage to petroleum facilities was limited to that caused by small arms fire and satchel charges.
2. (U) During this quarter, the burial of the Vung Ro Bay-Tuy Hoa pipeline and critical segments of the Qui Nhon-An Khe pipeline was completed. In the case of the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline, the burial has resulted in a marked reduction in losses. Prior to burial, losses of 25% were being experienced and subsequent to burial, these losses have been reduced to 16%. The benefits of burying the Vung Ro Bay-Tuy Hoa line have not been fully realized as yet. After burial, obstructions in the 8 inch and 6 inch lines resulted in restricted flow rates and large losses. After intensive engineer effort, the 8 inch line appears to be operating satisfactorily and losses have declined appreciably. More experience with the 8 inch line will be required before the benefits of burial can be measured. Testing on the 6 inch line continues in an effort to get it operating normally.
3. (U) In October, taxes on local FOL products were increased and subsequently prices of Mogas and Diesel fuel went up approximately 100% and 50% respectively. Higher prices on the local economy will make black market activities more lucrative and therefore, pilferage attempts may be expected to increase.
4. (U) The Dong Nai jetty suffered extensive damage from the tug berthing of FOL barges. Operations of the jetty were interrupted until emergency repairs were completed. Extensive repairs are not justifiable and a request has been submitted to build a new jetty.
5. (U) Aerial resupply continues to be the primary means of FOL support to many locations in the Delta. However, downgrading of airfields and the limited availability of air assets has made aerial resupply increasingly difficult. The feasibility of other means of resupply is being investigated with emphasis on water and ground resupply.
6. (U) During the reporting period, two audits of the Petroleum Distribution System in Vietnam were completed. On 12 October 1969, final replies were submitted to five statements of condition and recommendation as listed in the U.S. Army Vietnam, Audit Report No. PA 70-9. The Army Audit Agency (AAA) spent approximately 90 days on this audit and reviewed every facet of petroleum handling and management in this theater. During the period of 4 August 1969 thru 8 October 1969, an audit of the system was conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and an exit interview was held in the office of J4 MACV on 8 October 1969. Final results of this audit have not been published to date.

7. (U) The final three sections of the Long Binh Depot refrigerated warehouse became available during this period. The second and third sections of the refrigerated warehouse were accepted on 14 August and 31 August 1969, while the final section was accepted on 23 September 1969. This new refrigerated warehouse provides 667,404 cubic feet of cold storage space for freeze and chill items and permitted terminating leased facilities in Saigon effective 30 September 1969.

8. (U) A conference was held in Taiwan during 26 - 27 August 1969 to discuss the supply of Western Pacific Area Command (WESTPAC) fresh fruits and vegetables (FF&V) and dry ice to RVN via airlift versus sea-lift. The use of WESTPAC reefer ships to haul FF&V and dry ice to RVN was discontinued on 9 October 1969. Airlift of dry ice from WESTPAC into RVN started with Qui Nhon and Saigon Depots on 11 October 1969 and Cam Ranh Bay Depot on 16 October 1969. Airlift of FF&V from WESTPAC into Qui Nhon Depot commenced on 17 October 1969, Cam Ranh Bay Depot on 20 October 1969 and Saigon Depot on 22 October 1969. The mode of transportation for WESTPAC FF&V and dry ice was changed for the following reasons:

a. The two WESTPAC reefer vessels, Hibuera and Sixaola, which arrived in RVN on a 10 day cycle, were utilizing only 16% of their storage capacity.

b. The daily rental for each of these reefer vessels was \$4,915. This amounted to a monthly charge of \$294,900 as compared to the C-130 rotator flights which were provided at no charge to the Army.

c. The quality of FF&V improved by reducing the travel time and eliminating the rough handling inherent with hatch cargo operations.

d. The reduced travel time made it feasible to provide dry ice to Cam Ranh Bay Depot and Qui Nhon Depot. Previously, only Saigon Depot had received dry ice because of the high sublimation rate and resulting loss when shipped by reefer vessel.

9. (U) A test was conducted on the "Easy Open MCI" can by the 1st Division during September 1969. This test was controlled by the Directorate of Food in conjunction with the U.S. Army Natick Laboratories. A quantity of 1,664 cases of Meals, Combat, Individual (MCI) were distributed at Lai Khe to the combat battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. A questionnaire accompanied each meal distributed. The Division and Brigade food advisors and the battalion S4's monitored the test in the field, collected the questionnaires and returned them to the Directorate of Food. A representative of the Directorate of Food inspected the MCI's at Lai Khe and took samples to check condition of the Easy Open can prior to distribution to the combat battalions. The questionnaire and test information were returned to the U.S. Army Natick Laboratories for evaluation.

10. (U) A request for inclusion of subsistence into the Logistical Control Office-Pacific (LCOP) Logistics Intelligence File (LIF) was initiated by the Directorate of Food and subsequently approved by the Department of the Army on 17 September 1969. As a result, LCOP will now be transceiving Automated Data Control (ADC) cards to this headquarters. A program is being developed, whereby, with the use of the ADC cards, a supply manifest with pre-punched receipt cards will be forwarded to each depot prior to the arrival of the carrying ship. In the event of discrepancies between ADC cards and off-loaded items, a reconciliation sheet will be processed. The Deputy Director of Food will represent this Headquarters at a meeting at the LCOP, San Francisco, California, on 6-7 November 1969, at which time transition problems will be discussed.

11. (U) Action was initiated in October 1969 to reduce the stockage level of Meals, Combat, Individual (MCI's) in RVN by 33 per cent. This action will result in a 4.3 million dollar reduction in theater inventory of MCI's.

12. (U) Project Orange Ball

a. Experience has shown that dry cell batteries lose much of their useful life in the environment of Vietnam. Project Orange Ball was designed to alleviate this problem by modifying the supply system for dry batteries so that small quantities are provided to the user on a more frequent basis. This will minimize battery exposure time and provide a longer-lasting battery to the user.

b. The dry batteries are shipped frozen at 0°F from Japan to the depots in Vietnam, where a 15 day safety level remains refrigerated. The depots in Vietnam handle, process, issue and transport dry batteries in a manner similar to Class I perishables. Using units and direct support units request dry batteries through Class I channels and the batteries are issued as frequently as Class I supplies.

c. The implementing regulation for Project Orange Ball, LC Reg 740-6, was published on 13 April 1969. US Army, Vietnam has published guidance to the field, and each depot has informed its customers of the procedures of Project Orange Ball.

d. All depots are presently receiving frozen dry batteries from Japan; however, the 15 day operating level and the 15 day safety level have not been accumulated as yet in all cases.

e. All depots, except US Army Field Depot, Da Nang (USAFD-DNG) have a refrigerated storage capability for dry batteries. The construction of reefer pads at Da Nang has been approved and it is estimated a refrigerated storage capability will be available there within 30 - 60 days.

f. The next sixty days will show the following progress:

- (1) Completion of refrigerated storage at USAFD, DNG.
- (2) Accumulation of operating level and safety level at all depots.
- (3) Complete conversion to Orange Ball procedures by all depot customers.
- (4) Accumulation of reliable demand data to compute battery requirements.

13. (U) Project COUNT

a. Project Count I, the first perimeter-to-perimeter inventory conducted under combat conditions, was conducted during the period from September 1968 through 15 January 1969. All command depots and DSU's/GSU's actually completed their counts on 28 December 1968. The project picked up 85,000 lines previously recorded at zero balance or unrecorded on the ABF, recorded previously unregistered assets of 331.3 million dollars, and increased the reliability of the data base as indicated in the subsequent reductions in material release denials and increased demand satisfaction.

b. Realizing that a continuing inventory and locator effort was necessary to maintain and further improve the results of COUNT I, Project COUNT II was initiated on 1 February 1969 and completed in August 1969. During the Project 389,000 lines were inventoried in 1st Logistical Command Depots resulting in net dollar gain of over eleven million dollars.

c. A conference was held at Cam Ranh Bay on 3 August 1969 to review the lessons learned in Project COUNT II and establish policies for Project COUNT ALWAYS. As a result of this conference it was decided to continue to conduct inventories with a freeze and two count method, rather than implementing the 3S inventory procedures which uses a single count method without freeze of the stock records or materiel. During August and September, 1969 the 1st Logistical Command regulation on Depot Inventory Procedures was rewritten and published as part of the Depot Operating Procedures Regulation (LC Reg 700-31). During this period the computer programs were modified to incorporate a 10% and \$100 criteria for comparison of the two counts and to change the criteria for major discrepancies to \$200.

d. Da Nang Depot began inventory in August 1969. Long Binh Depot used August and September for rewarehousing and location surveys and began inventory in October 1969. Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Depots used the months of August, September and October for rewarehousing and location surveys and will begin inventory in November 1969.

14. (U) Project CARE and PRESERVATION I

a. The aim of the project is to develop a care and preservation program which will maintain or return all materiel to a ready for issue condition. The ultimate program is to determine the true condition of all items in depot stock and record the condition on the depot and USAICCV ABF. USAICCV will match unserviceable assets against theater requirements and designate priorities for care and recoupage.

b. Liaison visits to the depots have revealed that prompt action is being taken to report damage to stocks on DD Form 6. This assists in fixing responsibility for damage and in initiating corrective action to prevent recurrence.

c. Care and Preservation Bulletin No. 2-69, dated August 69, has been published and distributed. It lists, by specification number and title the most frequently used preservation, packaging, packing and marking documents and the CONUS addresses where new or additional copies may be obtained. The information is valuable to personnel involved in preservation and packing of Army materiel. Care and Preservation Bulletin No. 3-69 is now being prepared for publication. It covers the various cleaning methods used to remove corrosion from Army supplies.

d. A special project is presently underway to fabricate and test modified cleated containers using fiberboard in lieu of plywood. The purpose of the project is to determine the feasibility of using wood-cleated, weather resistant fiberboard boxes in recouping operations for outside storage use.


e. Flat steel strapping received from CONUS on pallet loads has been damaged due to inadequate pack design. To preclude further damage the pallet was redesigned in-country. It has proven satisfactory in storage, transportation and shipment. The design was forwarded to Army Materiel Command Packing and Storage Center, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, for approval and revision of specifications.

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## ANNEX J (C) ACoFS, MAINTENANCE

1. (U) During the 92 day period from 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969, certain items such as personnel carriers, tanks, self-propelled and towed artillery, and tactical wheeled vehicles achieved a very high level of operational readiness. However, the operational readiness rates of some items of equipment did not attain this same level of excellence. One of the most significant accomplishments directly related to effective combat support is the high level of operational rates for combat equipment. Despite the extreme conditions to which equipment in Vietnam is subjected, the close coordination between a more efficient supply and maintenance system has kept the operational rates for combat equipment at a level never before achieved in a combat zone. The following charts depict the operational readiness rates for major items of equipment operating within this theater of operations.

105mm HOWITZER, SP, M108




NOK	1.07	.49	2.32	1.29	1.90	2.00	3.50	2.41	5.37	2.77		
ORS	00	00	.62	00	00	.40	00	00	00	00		
NORM	1.07	.49	1.70	1.29	1.90	2.00	3.50	2.41	5.37	2.77		

GROUP-4  
 DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
 DOD DIR 8500.10


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105mm HOWITZER TOWED, M101



NOR	.72	.53	.84	1.03	1.00	.80	.40	.81	.46	.35		
NORS	00	.01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.08		
NORM	.72	.52	.84	1.03	1.00	.80	.40	.81	.46	.27		


105mm HOWITZER TOWED, M102



NOR	.24	.82	.36	.45	.50	.60	.70	.63	.76	.69		
NORS	.01	.17	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.25		
NORM	.23	.65	.36	.45	.50	.60	.70	.63	.76	.44		


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155mm HOWITZER TOWED, M114/123



NOR	1.44	1.33	1.31	.73	1.31	.77	.62	.35	.68	.66		
NORS	.00	.10	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.13		
NORM	1.44	1.23	1.31	.73	1.31	.77	.62	.35	.68	.53		


155mm HOWITZER, SP, M109



NOR	2.84	4.29	4.18	2.26	2.12	3.64	3.67	5.23	5.19	5.28		
NORS	.29	.52	.71	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.78		
NORM	2.55	3.77	3.47	2.26	2.12	3.64	3.67	5.23	5.19	3.50		


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8 INCH HOWITZER, SP, M110



NOR	4.33	6.36	4.14	6.38	4.78	5.88	3.61	3.48	4.52	5.58		
NORS	.79	.08	.19	.00	.48	.00	.00	.00	.12	.74		
NORM	3.54	6.28	3.95	6.38	4.30	5.88	3.61	3.48	4.40	4.84		


175mm GUN, SP, M107



NOR	6.73	7.66	7.38	6.93	5.17	4.91	4.19	5.81	4.86	3.83		
NORS	.28	.05	.28	.93	1.24	.00	.25	.00	.00	.57		
NORM	6.45	7.61	7.10	6.00	3.93	4.91	3.94	5.81	4.86	3.26		


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## TRACTOR, WHEELED



NOR	20	19	20	20	20	23	23	21	20	22		
NORS	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	8	8	10		
NORM	11	10	11	11	11	13	13	13	12	12		


## ROUGH TERRAIN & TRUCK MOUNTED CRANE, 20 TON



NOR	21	25	24	22	20	23	21	22	24	27		
NORS	12	13	11	10	9	10	10	11	12	15		
NORM	9	12	13	12	11	13	11	11	12	12		


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## ROUGH TERRAIN MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIPMENT



NCR	16	16	14	15	16	16	14	17	17	18		
NORS	8	7	6	6	7	6	6	6	5	7		
NOEM	8	9	8	9	9	10	8	11	12	11		


## TRACTOR, TRACKED (D7E)



NCR	19	18	17	20	22	18	18	16	15	19		
NORS	9	10	8	9	12	8	7	7	6	8		
NOEM	10	8	9	11	10	10	11	9	9	11		


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## TRUCK, 2½ TON



NOR	10	10	9	9	9	9	8	9	9	10		
NORS	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	4		
NORM	4	5	4	4	5	5	4	5	6	6		


## TRUCK, 5 TON CARGO AND TRACTOR



NOR	13	13	12	11	11	10	9	9	9	10		
NORS	6	5	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	3		
NORM	7	8	8	8	7	7	6	6	6	7		


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**TRUCK, 5 TON DUMP**



NOR	11	14	13	11	11	12	12	11	15	16		
NORS	6	6	5	5	6	5	5	5	6	8		
NORM	8	8	8	9	8	7	7	6	9	8		


**RADIO SET, AN/GRC-106**



NOR	16	11	11	11	10	11	12	12	12	11		
NORS	7	7	5	4	3	3	4	5	3	3		
NORM	9	7	6	7	7	8	8	7	9	8		

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**RATT (AN/GRC-26 AND AN/GRC-46)**



NOR	14	14	14	19	15	13	14	12	11	11		
NORS	6	8	8	10	8	7	7	5	2	4		
NORM	8	6	6	9	7	6	7	7	9	7		

2. (C) Repair and Return (R&R) Maintenance for M107/M110 Artillery Weapons.

a. The R&R program calls for the evacuation of a weapon to one of the direct support maintenance facilities for one week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The artillery crew accompanies the weapon to perform organizational maintenance and receive maintenance instruction. Direct support unit personnel advise, assist and train the weapon crew. All necessary support maintenance is also performed during the week. Increasing the crew's understanding of support maintenance procedures has resulted in increased emphasis on organizational maintenance.

b. During the past quarter, 54 weapons were serviced under the R&R program. The table below shows the progress of the program for the last quarter by support command:


<u>SUPPORT COMMAND</u>	<u>WEAPONS COMPLETED</u>	<u>WEAPONS ON HAND</u>
Saigon	17	44
Cam Ranh Bay	1	16
Qui Nhon	17	36
Da Nang	19	52

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c. Cumulative totals of production in the R&R program show that 251 weapons have been serviced since the initiation of the program in November 1968. (See chart below)

## ARTILLERY REPAIR AND RETURN PROGRAM

NO. Wpns.  
Processed  
Thru R&R



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d. The R&R program has resulted in a marked increase in the operational readiness rates for the M107/M110 artillery weapons. The table below gives a comparison of QR rates for the M107/M110 weapon before and after the program was initiated.

### QR RATES OF M107/M110 ARTILLERY WEAPONS

August 1968 93%	September 1968 90.5%	October 1968 90.9%
August 1969 95.5%	September 1969 95.3%	October 1969 95.2%

### 3. (U) Special Service Life Test of 175MM Gun Tubes M113E1 (Autofrettaged).

a. The objective of the autofrettaged tube service life test is to fire 1200 EFC (equivalent full charge) rounds through each of the twelve (12) autofrettaged tubes and then return the tubes to Watervliet Arsenal for further evaluation.

b. Currently the autofrettaged tube is rated at 700 EFC rounds. Laboratory tests and limited firings in CONUS have indicated that this tube could be safely rated at 1200 EFC rounds but sufficient ammunition and firing ranges were not available to test the tube and prove the laboratory findings. The lack of ammunition and ranges in CONUS prompted USAMC and USAMECOM to perform the test here in the Republic of Vietnam where ammunition is plentiful and ranges are virtually unlimited.

c. Mr. Paul Rummel, Development Engineer from Watervliet Arsenal, and Mr. Joseph Bukowski, Project Officer of DA DCSLOG, arrived in Vietnam in early June to coordinate the establishment of the test with USARV and 1st Logistical Command representatives. It was decided at this time to conduct the test with the 52nd Artillery Group at Pleiku. The weapons in this Group fire more rounds per day than most other weapons in the country and downtime in the past six months had been minimal.

d. A total of nine weapons were chosen to participate in the test. The test plan called for a total of 1200 EFC rounds or more to be fired through each of the 12 autofrettaged tubes unless sooner condemned. The 12 tubes were shipped by special air mission aboard C-141's directly from Dover AFB to Pleiku. The first tube was installed on 13 June.

e. The 177th Ordnance Detachment (Bal & Tech) initially supported the Service Life Test for pullover gauge readings, borescoping and calibration. A technical support team from AMC arrived on 7 July 1969 to replace the 177th Ordnance Detachment. This AMC team from Watervliet Arsenal brought specialized equipment for performing magnetic and black light borescope tests.

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f. An important part of extending the life of the autofrettagged tubes is the use of an M-1 chemical additive jacket on zone 3 charges combined with the use of the power rammer. Without the use of these additive jackets and power rammers, the advantage of the autofrettagged tube is considerably reduced.

g. To date eight of the twelve test tubes have been expended as listed below:

<u>TUBE #</u>	<u>DATE COMPLETED</u>	<u>PULLOVER GAUGE (IN)</u>	<u>EFC RDS FIRED</u>	<u>ROUNDS FIRED WITHOUT JACKET</u>
6042	4 Jul 69	7.100	744*	101
6095	20 Aug 69	7.088	1270	0
6096	30 Aug 69	7.082	1330	0
6097	13 Sep 69	7.090	1228	2
6036	26 Sep 69	7.095	1041	266
4132	10 Oct 69	7.096	1255	0
6041	23 Oct 69	7.092	1325	38
6332	25 Oct 69	7.090	1256	0

\* Tube #6042 fired several hundred rounds without the use of its power rammer.

h. The present status of the tubes still in service is as follows:

<u>TUBE #</u>	<u>EFC FIRED</u>	<u>PULLOVER GAUGE (IN)</u>	<u>RDS FIRED AT TIME OF PULLOVER GAUGING</u>
6321	950	7.071	950
6077	1322	7.082	1290
6051	1152	7.078	1051
4131	1125	7.064	1114

i. The test is expected to be completed by 1 December 1969.

#### 4. (U) Status of Commercial MHE

a. On 14 August 1969, the Deputy Commanding General directed that the deadline status for commercial forklifts be monitored on a daily basis due to an abnormal increase in deadlined equipment.

b. The deadline rate for these forklifts was 24 percent for August, 17 percent for September, and 16 percent for October. The decrease in the deadline rate can be attributed to two factors:

(1) Cam Ranh Bay contracted the Vinnell Corporation to perform organizational and support maintenance for commercial forklifts in

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the Cam Ranh Bay area. The Cam Ranh Bay Army Depot had allowed their organizational maintenance to deteriorate to the point where their deadline rate approached 45 percent. On 1 September, Vinnell assumed the responsibility and the deadline rate started dropping.

(2) The Saigon Support Command had a high reported deadline rate, but the main problem was incorrect reporting. Once the reporting was corrected and duplicate information eliminated, Saigon's deadline rate dropped well below the USARV objective.

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## Annex K (C) ACoS, Transportation

1. (U) GENERAL. During the reporting period transportation operators experienced a downward trend in the amount of tonnage handled and heeled. This was a result, in part, of the downward trend in activity in RVN. During the period, the Delta port of Dong Tam was closed and facilities were turned over to ARVN. Negotiations were initiated with ARVN on the turn over of the ports of Can Tho and for the joint utilization of the M&M piers at Saigon port. A new trucking contractor began work in the Saigon area. During the last month of the reporting period, the rail-road moved the highest tonnage reported since Dec 1967.

### 2. (U) Port Operations.

a. Summary. Overall operations continued to improve in all areas. However, some port congestion at Qui Nhon was experienced at the beginning of August due to an influx of ARVN ammunition and the inability of the ARVN Depot to receive it. ARVN diverted some of the ammunition to other ports which permitted a drawdown from the depot to allow the reception of future ARVN munitions shipments due in. The Cat Lai Ammunition System continued to be of concern, although hold time was drastically reduced during this quarter compared to the last reporting period.

b. Tonnages Handled. Tonnage handled by 1st Logistical Command ports during the period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969 totaled 1,802,461 short tons of cargo. This figure includes military and Sea-Land discharge and outload, and USAID cargo. (see chart below)

c. Construction and Maintenance. During the reporting period two of the anchorage systems at Cat Lai were pulled out of alignment by Victory ships. These systems are designed to maintain the ship's axis parallel to the flow of the river. The estimated time for completion of the realignment of the Cat Lai mooring buoys is unknown. Normal operations are continuing on the two remaining anchorages and a third vessel is worked in the stream.

d. Vessel Turnaround Experience. Vessel turnaround time for General cargo vessels was reduced from an average of 10.3 days last quarter to an average of 8.5 days this quarter. Ammo vessel turnaround was sharply reduced from an overall average of 25.5 days last quarter to an average of 17.7 days this quarter. The decrease in turnaround time has been accomplished by a reduced number of multiport vessels calling at 1st Logistical Command ports.

e. Shallow Draft Operations. On 23 August 1969, 10 LCM's were turned over to the 203rd Trans Gp ARVN, from the 231st Trans Co (MB) as part of

56


GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 2500.10

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the ARVNIZATION program.

THOUSANDS STONS



### 3. (U) Highway Operations

#### a. Performance

(1) A total of 1,038,657 STON's of cargo was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units during the reporting period. Contractor vehicles hauled 732,195 STON's of cargo during this quarter. Port and beach clearance constituted 38.3%, local haul 24.5%, and line haul 37.1% of the total amount of dry cargo transported by military units. Of total contractor tonnage, 32.5% was in port and beach clearance, 62.6% in local haul, and 4.9% in line haul.\*

(2) Average monthly highway performance during this period was.\*


(a) 590,284 STON'a

(b) 54,990 PAX

(c) 26,416,530 Gallons POL

(3) Total performance for the past 12 months is as follows.

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**\*NOTE:** Figures do not include commercial tonnage for Saigon area for October 69, which were not available at the time of submission.

**b. Realignment of assets.**

(1) The 737th Transportation Company (Medium Truck POL) was redeployed to COMUS from Da Nang Support Command without equipment. The equipment of the 737th was assumed by the 63rd Transportation Company (Light Truck), a Da Nang Support Command unit, as additional equipment.

(2) The 563rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) was relocated from Qui Nhon Support Command to Saigon Support Command and is assigned to the 48th Transportation Group.

(3) The 319th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was redeployed to COMUS from Saigon Support Command. The unit had been assigned to the 48th Transportation Group and its equipment was turned into the depot.

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(4) The 172nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) equipment assets and personnel were relocated from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to Saigon Support Command. The 543rd Transportation Company (Light Truck), a 48th Group unit, received the 172nd equipment and a request has been submitted to redesignate this unit from a 2 1/2 ton light truck company to a medium truck company. The 2 1/2 ton assets of the 172nd have been turned in.

c. Management Actions. During the past quarter, the Rail and Highway Division, ACoFS, Transportation, made recommendations to the USAICCV for the disposition of approximately 242 non-standard 5 ton dropside cargo trucks arriving in country. These dropside vehicles were procured by the ENSURE 175 program, which designates them for exclusive use by Transportation truck companies. These vehicles were allocated to each Support Command based upon TOE shortages and mission requirements.

#### 4. (C) Rail Operations

a. Summary. The Vietnam National Railway System (VNRS) transported 124,240.4 short tons of military cargo in support of U.S. and Free World Military Forces during the reporting period. The Chop Chai/Tuy Hoa passenger service transported a monthly average of 78,667 passengers in support of Tuy Hoa AFB. The Saigon to Thu Duc passenger service transported a monthly average of 49,753 passengers in support of RMK at Thu Duc Island. The Saigon to Ho Nai passenger service transported an average of 75,575 passengers per month in support of Long Binh Post.

b. Construction. The major rail restoration effort has continued to be in I CTZ. The An Hoa Bridge, located in Hua, and six of the thirteen kilometers of track between the An Hoa Bridge and the Song Bo Bridge have been restored by the VNRS. The Song Bo Bridge was expected to be completed by 1 November 1969, but heavy rains and flooding have delayed construction. In the Nha Trang area (V Rail Security Zone) restoration of the 43 kilometers from Thap Cham to Song Pha was completed on 16 September. Restoration of the track from Song Pha to Dalat was planned, however, because several sections of the track are rack and cog line, the VNRS decided that until new cog engines were available further restoration was unwarranted. In the Saigon area (III Rail Security Zone), a meeting was held on 12 September to discuss restoration of the line from Xuan Loc to the II Corps Tactical Zone boundary. The ARVN III CTZ commander does not consider his resources adequate to provide security for restoration. The ARVN Joint General Staff supported the ARVN III CTZ decision and restoration of the rail line was postponed until January 1970. There were a total of 56 rail incidents during this reporting period, as compared to a total of 52 incidents during the last reporting period. In the large tonnage division, running from Qui Nhon to the Tuy Hoa/Phu Hiep area, there were 10 incidents, as compared to 29 incidents

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during the last reporting period. However, severe flooding and landslides closed the line from Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa for the last 18 days of this reporting period.

c. **Railway Security.** The combined strength of the four Railway Security Battalions showed an increase since the last reporting period. Previously, the combined strength was 1773 or 82%, due to the reassignment of personnel over age 40 to support units. However, during September, 242 enlisted personnel were assigned to the Railway Security Battalions and at the end of that month the assigned strength was 2040, or 93% of total authorized strength. Due to operational requirements none of the battalions are maintaining a regular training program. Limited training is being conducted to improve basic individual skills and to review small unit tactics, and several companies are undergoing marksmanship training. As a result of enemy activity, 25 of the 73 armored cars used by the Railway Security Battalions are non-operational. A study of the feasibility of mounting Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) hulls on flat cars is being made by the office of the Special Deputy for Railway Security.

d. **Saigon - Ho Nai Passenger Service.** Passenger service between Saigon and Long Binh Post (Ho Nai Rail Head) has shown a steady increase since its initiation in early June. Two trains depart from Saigon main station in the morning and return in the evening. The first train is composed of 15 passenger cars and the second consists of 6 passenger cars. The use of rail service is designed to release passenger buses for other local service, to reduce highway congestion, and to reduce highway exposure time for local national employees.

### 5. (U) Movements Management.

#### e. Sea-Land

(1) There was a slight decrease in the total dollar value of claims against the government for damages to Sea-Land equipment, as compared to the claims from the previous reporting period. The number of incidents were less than half of those incidents reported in the previous period; however, the average cost per incident increased from \$94.82 to \$216.00. A significant number of incidents occurred while hauling Sea-Land equipment with military tractors and as a result of careless forklift operation. The costs of extended delivery increased slightly. For example, extended delivery charges between Saigon and Vung Tau/Dong Tam increased from \$6,695 to \$8,856, however, 30 more trips were made during this quarter. Charges for other cargo increased by about 50%. Second destination delivery charges for PX goods decreased slightly. The dollar amount, percent of damage, and number of incidents of damaged refrigerated cargo decreased slightly during the period.

(2) The following is a summary of the number of containers and ton-

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nage received in Vietnam during this period along with subsequent distribution to the three support commands. There was an average of 14.6 short tons loaded per inbound van during the period.

<u>TOTAL CONTAINER</u>	<u>AVG PER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AVG STON</u>
<u>INPUT</u>	<u>SAILING</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>	<u>PER SAILING</u>
5031 (837)	656.8(1195) (C4J)	74,136	9668.4 (C4J)
	108.2 (T3)		1619.2 (T3)
<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>			
<u>PORT</u>	<u>CONTAINERS</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>	
SGN	2942 (418)	420.2 (59.7)	
CRB	886 (199)	126.5 (28.4)	
QNH	1213 (220)	111.4 (31.4) -(C4J)	
		108.2	(T3)

( ) Indicates reefer vans

(3) Additional Sea-Land service to Qui Nhon and Da Nang was started with an additional T3 ship stopping at Qui Nhon for the first time in late August. This service has increased the number of dry cargo containers shipped to Qui Nhon, and has provided a scheduled transfer point for Sea-Land cargo moving between Da Nang and the southern ports. The additional C4J type vessel for the CONUS - Cam Ranh Bay run has been delayed somewhat by undergeneration of suitable cargo in CONUS. It is now scheduled to arrive in Cam Ranh Bay in late November. Sea-Land anticipates no problem in handling the increased service within RVN and the consignees do not anticipate any problem in handling extra Sea-Lands loaded with dry cargo. The slight increase in reefer containers is not expected to pose any problems for the companies. Sea-Land is considering a further increase of service to include a scheduled stop at Naha, Okinawa from Da Nang, RVN.

(4) The provisions of the new Sea-Land contract, allowing for extended delivery and partial restuffing of inbound containers for second destination delivery, continues to improve the usefulness of the service. The command continues to maintain its average unstuffing time of approximately 6 days, well below the goal of 12 days and the contracted requirement of 30 days for dry cargo containers and 15 days for reefers.

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b. Roll On/Roll Off. The Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) service is still plagued with a retention of trailer assets, primarily S&P trailers, within the local and line haul system in RVN. An intensive effort has been made during the reporting period to reduce the number of trailers so used and some improvement has been noted. It is expected to result in a reduction of the onhand levels authorized for each support command by the end of CY 1969. RO/RO trailers are being carried on deep-draft general cargo ships, LST's and Seatrain ships, in addition to regular RO/RO carriers, in an attempt to decrease the turnaround time. Regularly scheduled service is not considered feasible primarily due to cargo generation at Okinawa, and also inconsistent trailer availability. Areas of intense management continue to be:

- (1) Establishment of accurate accounting procedures.
- (2) Purging the system of lost trailers through auditing, inventory adjustments, and reports of survey.
- (3) Refinement of physical control procedures.
- (4) Maintaining loaded trailers at ports in order to provide opportune backload on a ready basis.

c. CONEX Control Program. The CONEX Operating Levels for Essential Storage (COLES) Program has been frozen at the July 1969 level until units can reach that level. Although this program continues to recognize a need for stockpiling CONEX containers to support T-Day or activities such as Keystone Eagle or Keystone Cardinal, the shipping requirement for CONUS, especially Military Ocean Terminal Bay Area (MOTBA) and Okinawa, has continued to increase. The repair of CONEX containers both in country and off shore have increased the number of containers in the system; however, the contractors are still operating slightly under the rated capability. In September, 737 were repaired, compared with the monthly objectives of 750. Even with the increase in repaired CONEX containers, the continued shipping of CONEX's out of the country will force the reduction of the stockage level which is now 70% under the desired level. A one-time inventory by serial number is being considered by MACV to determine the number of CONEX containers in Vietnam. 1st Logistical Command has provided MACV a plan for this inventory to include the use of ADPE. CONEX inventory reporting is being accomplished on a routine basis at the present time.

d. MILVAN. The MILVAN Containership Service has been postponed until at least January 1970. There have been CONUS procurement problems, especially in the areas of equipment compatibility and container condition. The accessorial equipment, repair parts, and manuals have not been received. Construction of staging areas at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay, the two selected ports, are still incomplete. Areas have been cleared

but detailed construction has not begun. The USARV Facilities Review Board is studying the project and is in the process of revalidating and rejustifying it. The 1st Logistical Command's MILVAN regulation remains in draft form awaiting the publication of the USARV regulation. It is anticipated that the 1st Log Command regulation will precede the beginning of the MILVAN program. The last Transportation Newsletter dated 30 September 1969 from the U.S. Army Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Virginia estimated the MILVAN program would encompass 6,000 containers and 2,600 chassis.

e. Air. During the reporting period the command utilized 5 special assignment airlift missions for Retrograde Shipments totaling 145,861 pounds. Three special assignment airlift missions (SAAM) were utilized for in-country movement of 150,550 pounds of oversized unit cargo.

f. Troop Movement. During the reporting period, no United States Army Personnel arrived by ship at 1st Logistical Command ports. Three thousand six hundred twenty Republic of Korea (ROK) replacements arrived in Qui Nhon and the Trang aboard the United States Navy Ship UPSHUR.

g. Project Flow. The data available from the transceived manifest has increased the validity and volume of incoming data. The 4th Transportation Command has begun a program of supplying Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command with printed manifests from the transceived cards. These manifests also contain a summary of the tonnages by supply class and consignee. This greatly reduces the manhours formerly spent in manually extracting the information from hard copy manifests. The time spent has been reduced from approximately two hours per manifest to approximately 20-30 minutes per manifest to obtain the same information. This presents an average monthly savings of approximately 150-175 man-hours. There are still some problems, such as the delay or non-receipt of manifests, but these are expected to be resolved in the near future, making the program entirely self-sufficient.

h. Project Challenge. This program challenges the priorities and requirements for cargo offered for movement in country. Of the 518,291 short tons (STONS) offered for shipment during the reporting period 73,158 STONS were challenged, resulting in 35,401 STONS being downgraded in priority and 7,778 STONS stopped. This is the first full reporting period where a goal to challenge 25% of all offerings has been in effect. During this reporting period 14.1% of all the offerings have been challenged.

The following is a summary of all the shipments in STONS that were offered, challenged, downgraded, and stopped during the reporting period.

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
OFFERED	173,129	194,770	150,392	518,291

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	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
CHALLENGED	29,528	16,615	27,015	73,158
DOWNGRADED	11,256	11,112	13,033	35,401
STOPPED	1,421	2,960	3,397	7,778

## 1. Project RETRO-REPORT

(1) During this reporting period there were a considerable number of reportable shipment discrepancies from COMUS and Okinawa, although such reports and the seriousness of discrepancies are down in frequency and degree over the last period. In addition to the 4 codes already used, a fifth code has been added called RETRO-D-Closed Loop items.

(2) During this reporting period 26 military inspectors have been certified to act on behalf of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and United States Public Health Service (USPHS) to certify that cargo or equipment has been adequately cleaned and treated to meet the standards set by the Department of Defense (DOD), USDA, and USPHS. Cargo or equipment which meet these standards will be accepted by all carriers for shipment out of Vietnam and will preclude the need for quarantine in COMUS. The USDA/USPHS registered inspectors will provide a stamped and signed copy of the ocean manifest to the vessel master indicating that the cargo meets the requirements of USDA and USPHS for importation into COMUS.

(3) There were uncertainties as to who was responsible for accomplishment of certification in accordance with AR 740-20. Most of the personnel handling retrograde thought it was the division or the Brigades responsibility, this, however, is incorrect. It is the shippers responsibility. The shipper is any 1st Logistical Command support command, unit or agency that is responsible for offering retrograde cargo for shipment. The unit making the turn-in of equipment is not the shipper except for items shipped directly to the port under THRU-PUT.

(4) Retrograde goals and performances for the period were as follows

	<u>GOAL</u> <u>(STONS)</u>	<u>PERFORMANCE</u> <u>(STONS)</u>
August	45,405	48,342
September	48,750	40,198
October	44,450	36,709

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j. Project MILSTAMP Handbook. A training program has been initiated by the 1st Logistical Command to instruct United States Army Vietnam (USARV) units and other interested services in the proper procedures for documenting cargo accomplishing the Transportation Control and Movement Documentation (TCMD). Training material used in these classes includes the 1st Logistical Command designed, MACV published MILSTAMP Handbook. The handbook is an extract of pertinent data from the Department of Defense (DOD) regulation 4500.32-R and other applicable directives. It is used in properly certifying the cargo to be explosive free and in preparation of the TCMD's used by shipping activities in Vietnam. It has been an excellent aid in training new personnel and by combining pertinent information from other regulations it has resulted in a savings in man-hours. During this reporting period a training team, composed of one officer and two noncommissioned officers, has been visiting all support command's giving classes to depot personnel and other service shippers (Air Force and Navy) on the use of MILSTAMP Handbook with the objectives of emphasizing standardized and correct documentation procedures.

k. Cam Ranh Bay MILSTAMP/ADP Project. The purpose of this project is to curtail the use of air mail ocean cargo manifests in favor of the more useful and timely transceived punched card manifests. Use of punch card manifests provides speedier manifest transmissions and ease of data manipulation. Presently, punched card MILSTAMP manifests are being received from world wide Ports of Embarkation. A UNIVAC 1005 computer is used to convert these cards to hard copy consignee summary manifests and hatch tally lists. Manifests are also being transceived for retrograde vessels and deep-draft vessels bound for Newport. Future development will include pre-printing of Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD's) for import cargo and printing of export manifests for air-mail distribution. This project should be completed on or about 1 December 1969.

## 1. Enroute Visibility MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP Interface

(1) A program was instituted in August 1969 to produce a visibility listing of Intensive Management Items (IMI). This was formerly accomplished by inspecting each manifest received and manually extracting each of the IMI items. The machine printed IMI is prepared in Federal Stock Number (FSN) Sequence by Material Category (MATCAT), giving commodity managers the ability to determine what is enroute, what vessel the item is on, the destination of the vessel and the estimated time of arrival. This IMI listing is Supply oriented, being FSN sequenced rather than by Transportation Control Number (TCN), enabling commodity managers to better utilize the data. This listing forms an effective MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP interface for a limited number of items. The data from both systems, Transportation and Supply, is combined into a single line-per-item listing. It is used as a supply management tool enabling timely vessel and cargo diversion requests to be made in order to complement

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the changing tactical and logistical situations.

(2) By agreement between the CG 1st Log Command and G-4 USARPAC, a conference was convened during the period 26 September - 9 October 1969. USARPAC, USARV, Logistical Control Office Pacific (LCOP) and 1st Log representatives developed a proposal for a full interface of MILSTAMP and MILSTRIP. Essentially, the proposal involves the use of the LCOP generated logistics Intelligence File to post shipment lift data to the 3S due-in subsidiary file. Other products of the procedure include a visibility listing for selected items, a depot storage planning listing and prepositioned material receipt cards batched by vessel. The proposal has been forwarded to USARPAC.

### 6. (C) Special Projects.

#### a. ARVNIZATION of U.S. Military Ports.

(1) General. On 12 August 1969 COMUSMACV directed that action be taken to create local joint committees composed of US and ARVN port operators, local US and ARVN logistical commanders, and US port advisory personnel. The purpose of these committees was to promote the takeover or joint utilization by ARVN of selected US military port operations. Priority was addressed to Binh Thuy/Can Tho for complete ARVNIZATION and Saigon commercial port for joint utilization. Additionally a central committee was created at MACV/RVNAF JGS level with participation from this headquarters as well as USARV, MACV and RVNAF JGS.

(2) Turnover of Binh Thuy Port. Subsequently, local committees were formed and ARVNIZATION proceeded quickly. At Binh Thuy/Can Tho the ARVN plan provided for changing the TOE from a type B to a type A effective 1 October 1969. Further, there would be a lead time of approximately six months commencing in August for the arrival of ARVN terminal service company equipment to fill out the TOE. As a result, arrangements were made to lend ARVN two 6,000 lb rough terrain fork lifts, two 20 T mobile cranes, one bulldozer and a power source for port operation. The equipment loan caused some confusion. As a result of lack of coordination on the detailed arrangements it appeared that US TOE equipment could not be made available. Consequently a Temporary Loan Authorization was issued by HQ USARV in order to expedite the equipment situation. The forklifts and cranes were not available from depot stocks. As a result, the 159th Transportation Battalion lent ARVN the two fork lifts and two cranes. A bulldozer was obtained from depot stocks and arrangements were made with the resident engineer at Can Tho to continue supplying power to the port area. In the meantime the joint agreement was drafted for submission through HQ USARV, who had reserved the right to insert the reimbursement clause. This is to provide payment in the event ARVN has to employ commercial stevedores to discharge US cargo. The agreement provides that ARVN military stevedores will normally provide the service, but under emergency conditions, providing US consent has first been obtained, commercial stevedores may be employed.

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(3) Turnover of the Saigon Port Facilities. At the initial meeting of the local committee for Saigon, ARVN requested that the M&M piers be made available to them on a share basis. Their plan was to discharge ARVN deep draft at M&M 1 and load their coastal vessels at M&M 3. ARVN also requested the use of two warehouses in the M&M area. It was agreed that ARVN could share the piers on an as-required basis, with ARVN unloading any deep draft vessels that had more than 50% of its cargo consigned to ARVN. It was also agreed that one warehouse would be given to ARVN until experience indicated that more warehouse space was needed. A trial period of thirty days was established on 1 October 1969 to try out the joint agreement prior to its formalization. The 4th Transportation Command has also instituted a training program for selected ARVN port operators as well as on-the-job training and orientation for middle managers. It is presently anticipated that ARVN can assume responsibility within the Saigon Port by 31 December 1969.

(4) Turnover of Nha Trang. Planning was initiated for the ARVN assumption of the RVNAF shallow draft port operations at Nha Trang. Coincidentally, USA Support Command Cam Ranh Bay proposed a plan for the closing of the Nha Trang deep draft operations and the transfer of the mission to Cam Ranh Bay. Full execution was contingent upon the transfer of the Republic of Korea support mission in regard to their troop replacement from Nha Trang to CRB. Incorporated in the plan was the provision for continuing ROK support at Nha Trang in event approval was not forthcoming for the transfer of locals. The closing of the deep draft operation at Nha Trang and transferring it to CRB would permit the segregation of cargo for ARVN and thus permit ARVN to work their own shallow draft operation. The proposal to transfer U.S. deep draft operations to Cam Ranh Bay is being studied.

(5) Qui Nhon. Progress in ARVNIZATION at Qui Nhon has advanced along several channels. The 5th Transportation Command is allowing ARVN supervisors to discharge selected deep draft vessels utilizing U.S. sponsored stevedores assigned to the 5th Transportation Command. The 5th Transportation Command has also instituted training programs for key ARVN terminal operators to give them practical experience in deep draft operations. Plans have been made for the handling of ARVN ammunition by ARVN. This is contingent on opening a new ammunition wharf site at Qui Nhon.

(6) Vung Tau. The RVNAF Joint General Staff representative surveyed the operations at Vung Tau, but have not yet provided the MACV/JCS Central Committee with a statement of intentions. ARVN does have a commercial contractor who has indicated a willingness to conduct operations at Vung Tau.

b. Small Boat and Amphibian Study. On 20 Sep 69, ACofS, Transportation initiated a project related to the Logistics Review to review the statistical and historical aspects of the employment of boat and amphibian

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units in RVN. Staff visits were conducted at Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon during the month of October. Information gathered from these trips is being collated. The study was prompted by a lack of valid information on boat and amphibian operations in RVN.

c. Besson Board. On 13 Sep 69, ACofS, Transportation participated in the 1st Log Comd Briefing which was held for General Besson during the visit of the Joint Logistics Review Board to Vietnam.

d. Assumption of Alaska Barge and Transport Contract (AB&T). Since the last reporting period the Army's assumption of a portion of the mission now performed by AB&T under MSTS contract has been delayed until 30 June 1970. The portion of the mission which was assumed on 8 December 1969 included land transportation and terminal operation functions at the ports of Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, and Vung Tau. Negotiations between Army and MSTS representatives on the local level concerned the turnover of equipment and facilities, joint-utilization of communication equipment, management and operation of the campsite, and the splitting of the maintenance facility at Cam Ranh Bay.

e. Saigon Commercial Trucking Contract. The need for contractual trucking to supplement military capability in the Saigon area was clearly recognized in the Spring of 1969. Original plans called for the awarding of a contract by 1 July 1969. However, the inability of the requiring activity to accurately define its requirements resulted in a three month extension of the previous contract at substantially higher rates. Whether the requirement would be for operation of government owned trucks, contractor owned and operated trucks, pole trailers, heavy - haul equipment, or a combination of all these was not finally resolved until early September, 1969. On 1 October 1969, Pope, Evans, & Robbins, International Limited (P.E.R.I.L.) assumed the responsibility for trucking in the Saigon area.

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ANNEX L (C) ACoFS, AMMUNITION

1. (C) Ammunition Activity. During the reporting period, total on hand serviceable stocks averaged 132,752 STON which is below the 60-day stockage objective of 199,284 STON, compared with an average balance on hand during the same period in 1968, of 250,754 STON. The relatively low stockage on hand during this period is in consonance with the ammunition supply concept of "inventory in motion" as reported in the ORLL for May to July 1969. Although average on hand tonnage has been slightly less than desired, requiring intensive management of certain line items, the advantages of ammunition supply through use of this concept justify its use, i.e. better storage, flexibility, asset knowledge, and minimum stockage deterioration in storage. With approximately 10,000 STON in transit in the theater at all times, visibility and asset knowledge of the pipeline enables this command to operate under this concept. It is estimated that the serviceable balance on hand for the next three months will increase as follows:

November: 145,000    December: 160,000    January: 165,000

This estimate is based upon average monthly issues of 72,000 STON which is susceptible to fluctuation due to expenditure adjustments caused by unit redeployments and the level of enemy activity.

### 2. (U) Surveillance Activities

a. The fifth course of instruction for Ammunition Technical Inspectors, MOS 55X, was presented 13 - 23 October 1969. This is a continuation of a program instituted by the ACoFS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command to train qualified enlisted surveillance inspectors in ammunition handling, identification, inspection, and maintenance techniques. Twenty-one students were graduated from this course bringing the total number of personnel trained this year to 93.

b. The monthly Suspended Ammunition Report has been reduced to punch card format. The format includes DODIC, lot, quantity, location, date suspended, suspension number, type of suspension, date disposition was requested, date disposition was received, and final disposition. A machine run is printed and forwarded to each support command monthly. The support command updates and returns one copy of the printout to this headquarters where new cards are punched for additions or quantity changes. A new printout is made to include the update data and is sent to United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) and United States Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (USAAPSA) for disposition instructions. This new system eliminates the possibility for errors due to constant manual manipulation of lots, DODIC's, and quantities. Once disposition of an item is requested and a card is punched, the support command need


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only verify the quantity each month until final disposition is received. Previously, the support commands typed the report each month which consisted of all suspended items on hand.

### 3. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities.

a. EOD personnel responded to 5,333 incidents throughout Vietnam, made 1,547 liaison visits to supported units, and trained a total of 17,234 personnel during 319 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance classes. A graphic representation of CY68 and CY69 EOD incidents is shown in the following chart.



b. This headquarters was requested to present and identify problem areas, potential or real, within the US Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program for inclusion in the EOD Program Review Conference at Department of the Army. Recommendations from key EOD supervisors were as follows:

(1) Career Program for EOD Officers: General consensus is that there is a definite need to establish a career program. Since EOD is a segment of total ammunition service support, the career pattern for EOD officers should be fully integrated into the ammunition officer's career program. This should not be by chance but by normal programming and

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
should preclude consecutive EOD assignments, thus broadening the EOD officer's career field. Implementation of such a program will enable the Army to derive maximum advantage from the experiences and knowledge of these officers when they attain field grade rank.

(2) Shortage of RA officers in EOD: The apparent shortage of RA officers in EOD is attributed to the lack of a definite career development program as mentioned above. An integrated career program would increase the attractiveness of EOD by ensuring officers remain competitive for schooling beyond the advance career course. This could then lead to the assignment of these officers to positions that would greatly aid the Army.

(3) A similar program is needed for career enlisted men, particularly since the EOD proficiency pay program has been terminated.

#### 4. (C) Supply Activities.

a. The chart below shows ammunition receipt and issue activity for FY70.



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b. Total issues for the period of 24 July through 24 October 1969 were 225,415 STON versus receipts of 160,102 STON. Total issues, receipts, and balances on hand were as follows:

	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>BALANCE ON HAND</u>
August	46,383	74,648	144,510
September	65,621	78,300	132,166
October	48,098	72,467	121,580

Receipt and issue figures exclude unit turn-ins and losses and gains due to condition code changes. Therefore, ending BOH is not numerical sum of beginning BOH plus receipts minus issues.

c. Enemy action of 29 August 1969 resulted in the loss of 16.17 STON at the An Khe Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), valued at \$ 32,676.20. This brings the total theater losses for CY69 to 12,644.98 STON, valued at \$ 17,611,062.78.

d. Retrograde:

(1) The Class V Retrograde Program was instituted at 1st Logistical Command Headquarters to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. The program was divided into phases; progress since the program was initiated is shown below.

	<u>TIME PERIOD</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>STON RETROGRADED</u>
Phase I	1 Sep - 31 Dec 68	14,800	15,967
Phase II	1 Jan - 28 Feb 69	35,000	33,562
Phase III	1 Mar - 30 Jun 69	10,000	13,397
Phase IV	1 Jul - 31 Jul 69	1,000	1,745
	1 Aug - 31 Aug 69	1,655	1,588
	1 Sep - 30 Sep 69	1,000	2,868
	1 Oct - 31 Oct 69	1,000	2,016

Phase IV Covers the Period 1 July to 31 December 1969.

(2) All retrograde ammunition is inspected by DAC ammunition surveillance inspectors and US Coast Guard inspectors before it leaves the ammunition depot. Only that ammunition certified by the USCG can be moved to ports. As the result of deficiencies reported by consignees of retrograde ammunition, several changes have been instituted. Stronger

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boxes are being used and the banding of pallets and boxes has been improved. To prevent bottoms falling out of retrograde boxes due to the weight of the load, pallets are now placed under the boxes. Further, weight is now limited to 2,000 pounds per box, rather than 4,000. Additionally, recipients of retrograde ammunition have been requested to provide this command with detailed reports of discrepancies so that appropriate corrective action can be taken.

### 5. (C) Ammunition Operations.

a. Four Class V installations closed and one reopened during the period:

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>OPEN/CLOSED</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Dong Tam ASP	IV CTZ	Closed	28 Aug 69
Vung Tau ASP	III CTZ	Closed	31 Aug 69
Hill 63 ASP	I CTZ	Closed	31 Aug 69
Ban Me Thuot ASP	II CTZ	Opened	03 Sep 69
Kontum	II CTZ	Closed	30 Oct 69

The above closeouts were due to relocation of major supported units. This reduced the number of active Class V installations to 23 as of 31 October 1969.

b. A series of conferences have been initiated between the ARVN Senior Ordnance Advisor and the ACofS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command for the implementation of Project Buddy. The first meeting held on 14 August 1969, covered a review of the capacities of various ammunition storage sites throughout Vietnam; methodology, procedures, and policies used by this headquarters in developing ammunition status reporting, requisitioning, and intra-country stock leveling; and surveillance practices. Future conferences are planned to include ARVN ammunition personnel.

c. A change to MACV Ammunition Storage Planning Factor from 14 square feet per STON to 18 square feet per STON was requested by this headquarters on 28 June 1969. Headquarters, MACV has granted the requested change. This factor will be used in computing capacities and for requesting future construction. The planning factor of 18 square feet per STON allows sufficient storage space to operate material handling equipment and to maintain physical separation of lots and storage of small quantities of excess and unserviceable/repairable ammunition. New capacity figures for all Class V installations are listed as follows.

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE STORAGE</u>	<u>CAPACITY STON</u>
Long Binh	ASD	100,000
Tay Ninh	ASP	6,400
Vinh Long	FSA/Modular	694
Can Tho	FSA/Modular	694
Soc Trang	FSA/Modular	544
Phouc Vinh	ASP/Modular	2,000
Quan Loi	ASP/Modular	2,000
Cu Chi	ASP/Modular	750
Lai Khe	ASP/Modular	2,000
Cam Ranh Bay	ASD	63,889
Ban Me Thuot	ASP/Modular	1,944
Phan Thiet	ASP/Modular	1,361
Da Lat	ASP/Modular	1,250
Qui Nhon	ASD	24,116
An Khe	ASP	4,938
Pleiku	ASP	7,500
LZ English	ASP/Modular	667
Da Nang	ASP/Modular and Hillside	6,400
Chu Lai	ASP	9,000
Phu Bai	ASP	9,333
Quang Tri	ASP/Modular	4,477
Camp Evans	ASP/Modular	2,000
Duc Pho	ASP/Modular	2,000

d. Representatives from the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board (ASESB) toured a number of US Army Class V installations and port facilities during the period 18 August through 5 September 1969. This was the first tour of ammunition facilities in RVN by this board and team members were generally impressed with operations and conditions noted on the ground. Prior to their departure, they requested a listing of capacities and a map or drawing of ports and installations. A package containing the requested information was forwarded on 14 October 1969.

e. A 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Conference was held at this headquarters on 27 September 1969. Topics for discussion were Class V

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supply reporting, inventory control, diversions, movements, retrograde, emergency shipment requirements, storage policies, review of regulations, surveillance program, resources utilization, and future ammunition structure. The conference was held as a result of 100 percent turnover in key personnel in the support commands and the need for review of current policies and proposed changes to policies. Areas of special interest were:

(1) Procedures for handling emergency cargo shipments were reviewed. Accuracy of stock control was emphasized to preclude errors in posting which result in sudden zero balances requiring emergency airlifts.

(2) The 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-6, Ammunition Storage, has been completely revised. This regulation now includes all policies and changes to storage procedures implemented since the Post-TET Offensive of 1969. The regulation now requires, in addition to established policies, that:

(a) Storage plans of all Class V installations be submitted to this headquarters.

(b) Flanographs be maintained at each ASP.

(c) NEW restrictions of 200,000 pounds per pad for facilities other than modular be maintained.

(d) Restrictions on stacking such as, not more than two pallets in height for Class 6 and 7 items with a maximum of 15,000 pounds NEW.

(e) Lots to be separated by a minimum of 18 inches.

(f) Slow moving ammunition is to be retrograded out of ASP's after 60 days without issue.

(3) A new 1st Logistical Command regulation covering technical inspections was discussed. When implemented, it will state that inspections are to be performed by this headquarters quarterly. Procedures for conduct of the inspection to include technical assistance were outlined. The regulation will also include three comprehensive checklists covering operations, stock control, and surveillance.

(4) Timeliness and accuracy of daily stock status reports were stressed. A review of the use of Unit Identification Codes (UIC) and codes recently assigned to identify all Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) customers was made with emphasis on the need for prompt reporting.

(5) Policies and procedures governing inventory control were reviewed. The importance of conducting thorough and accurate cyclic inventories was

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stressed as a management action to preclude significant corrections to post which may dictate ship diversion, airlift from offshore and air shipments between the various support commands.

(6) The problem of ASP stockage in accordance with weapons densities within a geographical area was discussed. While it was agreed that it was extremely difficult to stay abreast of weapons densities in an ASP area without the full cooperation of tactical forces, it was concluded that ASP's should be stocked based on line item consumption which could then be expressed in days of supply. Accordingly, chances of emergency airlifts would be minimized; resupply convoys could be readjusted considering the ASP storage capacity; and total days of supply for supported forces could be maintained by computing stock turnover by location.

f. The Central Munitions System-Vietnam (CMS-V) computer program is a program written in the native mode of the 360/50 Computer for the improved management of ammunition over the current mixed manual and 1005 computer program. The CMS-V program is divided into two segments, the Availability Balance File Segment (ABF), and the Requisition History Segment. The ABF segment provides all the outputs of the current 1005 program plus status of allocated items. The Requisition History Segment will provide automated calculation of requisition requirements and preparation of candidate requisitions, asset forecasts, and improved visibility and control of all in-transit ammunition. A pilot program consisting of the major portions of the ABF segment, was completed on 26 September 1969. Implementation of this pilot program is now awaiting command decision.

g. The 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Technical Inspection Program celebrates its first anniversary this quarter with 23 Class V installations being inspected. This program has continued to reap benefits for both higher and lower headquarters by keeping commanders at all levels informed of mission performance and problem areas. Improvements in all phases of Class V operations are continuing.

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## ANNEX M (C) ACofS, SERVICES

### 1. Engineer Services (C)

a. (U) Burial of POL pipelines was continued during this period in order to decrease losses due to enemy action and theft. Burial of the Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa lines was completed, but there was a considerable problem in putting them into operation since scrap lumber and other debris had been placed in the lines during construction, probably by the Viet Cong. When the first tanker discharged its cargo into the lines, the debris collected at valves and bends, clogging the lines. It was extremely difficult and time consuming to locate these obstructions in the buried lines. Burial of the Phan Rang pipeline is now under study. Welded buried lines are being built by the contractor from Qui Nhon to the intersection of QL-1 and QL-19 and to Phu Cat AFB. Da Nang SUPCOM has requested burial of a welded pipeline between Tan My and Hue to replace the old invasion pipe system.

b. (U) Problems with port facilities recurred during this period. The submarine POL lines at Vung Ro Bay were dropped into the water again, and they became worn to the point where replacement was required. The 497th Engr Co (PC) replaced the lines in September and simultaneously realigned the POL anchorage. The unit then proceeded to Qui Nhon to begin work on the POL jetty protective dolphins on 27 October. Work by the contractor on the Vinnelli seawall at Cam Ranh Bay continued and repairs to the seawalls in the pier area were started by the 497th Engr Co, which was moved to Cam Ranh Bay to work on port construction projects.

c. (U) The backlog of horizontal projects at Cam Ranh Bay continued to increase. There was a slight increase in the contractor effort on the Charlie ammo area upgrade, but the estimated completion date slipped to June 1970. The 595th Engr Co (LE) constructed a road between ammo areas Yankee and Charlie and did some work on several smaller projects. A request to retain the company past 1 November was denied by USARV.

d. (U) It was determined that at least two of the Cat Lai deep-draft anchorages were not adequately constructed for the conditions at Cat Lai, and they will have to be strengthened and relocated. A second buoy pulled loose during this period, putting a total of two anchorages out of operation. OICC and USAECAV are working on a solution to the problem.

e. (U) Additional damage was incurred by the Dong Nai POL jetty as a result of docking collisions by POL barges. Approval was obtained for a new jetty closer to the pumping station and a buried pipeline to the Long Binh tank farm. Construction is due to start in November.

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 2500.10

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f. (U) A number of POL storage tanks at Vung Tau and Cam Ranh Bay began to leak around the bottom, and the support commands requested repair support from the engineer brigades. USAECAV design required coating the tank with epoxy caulking compound. Repairs will be made as soon as materials are obtained. The source of the leaks was found to be corrosion caused by organisms in the POL; the problem occurred because of failure of the operating unit to rotate and periodically clean the tanks.

g. (U) Both the Qui Nhon and Long Binh cold storage warehouses were completed. Minor problems were encountered due to faulty roof designs which required correction in both buildings. The air-conditioning contractor was not able to make the hydraulic control systems at the Long Binh and Qui Nhon facilities work properly, and they were removed. Spare parts have been ordered to replace those which were used during installation of the cooling equipment, but they have not yet arrived.

h. (C) The construction curtailment policies announced by USARV and MACV during the reporting quarter led to the establishment of certain control procedures. First was the reconstitution of the USARV Facilities Review Board, charged with the mission of reviewing planned, on-going and requested MCA-funded projects with a view toward cancelling, terminating or reducing the scope in line with the MACV policy of construction austerity. Second is the requirement that all OMA-funded minor new construction costing over \$500 be reviewed and certified essential and urgent by the major subordinate commander (e.g., 1st Logistical Command) and that these projects then be forwarded to USARV Facilities Review Board for approval.

(1) MCA Project Review. To conduct their review, the Facilities Review Board (FRB) established working committees to visit the principal base camps and make on-the-ground evaluations of all projects in coordination with the using unit. Prior to the visits of the USARV committee to 1st Logistical command installations, project reviews were conducted by this headquarters in conjunction with the appropriate support command. The reviews eliminated as many projects as possible prior to consideration by USARV. Representatives of this headquarters accompanied the FRB working committees on their visits.

(2) OMA-Funded Project Review. The requirement to have all OMA projects costing over \$500 reviewed and certified by the Commanding General or Deputy Commanding General resulted in the review, certification, and forwarding of many projects. During the three-month period covered by this report, 105 job order requests for minor new construction were processed through this headquarters.

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1. (C) The redeployment of units from RVN has necessitated further construction at processing facilities to handle large-scale retrograde of cargo. Strict standards of cleanliness for cargo entering the United States have been established by DOD in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture and the US Public Health Service. Emphasis was placed on the planning and construction of retrograde facilities during the reporting period. The Long Binh and Newport facilities have been placed on the USARV list of the ten highest priority construction projects and are being redesigned to provide adequate facilities for retrograde operations. Construction programmed in support of redeployment plans include:

(1) Long Binh. A paved marshalling area, including washing and maintenance facilities.

(2) Newport. An intransit hardstand area, paved roads, and wash racks for final rinsedown of equipment.

(3) Qui Nhon. A wash facility at Cha Rang with the use of existing hardstand for marshalling of equipment. An intransit hardstand and final rinsedown facility at the port.

(4) Cam Ranh Bay. A final rinse facility at the port.

j. (U) The program of periodic engineer seminars initiated earlier during the year (as reported in paragraph 12, Annex K, Operational Report for period ending 30 April 1969) was continued during this quarter. Engineer representatives of all support commands met on 3 August 1969 to discuss such timely subjects as the current MCA funding status and austerity of construction, the scheduled phase-down of the construction contractor, procedures for the requesting of construction, and construction priorities.

k. (U) There has been a continuing effort to improve the fire protection posture of the 1st Logistical Command ports. As the result of procurement action taken in early 1967 through the ENSURE program, the command received six Hale Model 40, 500 GPM trailer-mounted gasoline-driven fire pumps. Upon arrival they were shipped to Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands. The recommended distribution of these pumps was to Cogido, Vung Ro Bay, Cat Lai, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and the Dong Nai POL off-loading area. Since these pumps are portable, it is anticipated that they can be used not only for standby fire protection but also for the final rinse down of retrograde equipment. A training program has been formulated and distributed to ensure the proficiency of selected port personnel in the operation of these pumps and in basic fire-fighting techniques. Additional pumps are on order and will be distributed to other 1st Logistical Command ports upon arrival.

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1. (U) Air conditioning in the USAICCV computer room became non-operational on 4 September 1969, and representatives of ACofS, Services were called to provide coordinating efforts to effect repairs. PA&E was unable to make repairs for approximately two weeks because of lack of parts. Since the system was not designed to accommodate the additional load caused by the recent installation of the IBM 360/50 computer, temperature ranges were still unsatisfactory when the unit was repaired. Installation of an additional 10-ton air conditioning unit was completed on 3 October 1969, and has lowered the computer room temperature by 10 degrees. A maintenance and parts support program has also been developed by the contractor in order to ensure uninterrupted operation of the USAICCV air conditioning system and other operationally-required air conditioners supporting 1st Logistical Command ADP installations throughout the country.

2. Direct Support Supply.

a. (U) Detailed analyses of self service supply centers (SSSC), conducted on a command wide basis over the period March-May 1969, have isolated and verified many significant problems ranging from store operations to CONUS requisition fill. SSSC averaged 40% zero balance countrywide and only 50% customer request fill in May.

b. (U) One of the problems contributing to this condition was units over-ordering to survive "dry spells" for certain items, or ordering nice-to-have items. Quantity control is a measure established to curb these conditions and ensure that a percentage of available supplies get to each customer. The SSSC exercises quantity control by marking the bins with maximum quantities that may be issued to a customer. These quantities were established by the SSSC officer in charge. This type of control, commonly termed item control, does not take into consideration the type of unit (combat, combat support or combat service support) or size of the unit (detachment, company, battalion, brigade).

c. (U) The other type of quantity control is credit control. Although not formal financial inventory accounting (FIA), credit control is a monetary control system whereby each customer initially receives \$3.00 per man per quarter for SSSC supplies. It may be adjusted upon authorization from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, based on justification for an exception to policy (i.e., large usage factors for items such as paper for a brigade adjutant or tabulating paper for an automatic data processing unit). After one quarter's experience, the dollar amount per man can be adjusted if the original amount is not realistic. The validation of customers by SSSC will be controlled by the support command through the support command's ACofS, Supply.

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d. (U) On 1 October, this command implemented the credit control system mentioned above. After the support command determines (in terms of dollars) each customer's requirements, the store manager can better manage his available stocks and make more equitable distribution of available supplies between all of his customers. At the end of the first quarter, an analysis will be made of each customer's expenditure to reevaluate credit limitations.

### 3. General Services.

a. (U) In April 1969, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces Vietnam requested some instruction for their personnel in the use and maintenance of both field and garrison mess equipment and in the preparation of baked and dehydrated foods. Instruction in these subjects and in nutrition, food poisoning, personal hygiene, mess management and sanitation was presented during the period 2 - 25 October 1969. All students completed the course and graduation certificates were presented to the twelve students on 25 October 1969.

#### b. (U) Operation Compassion.

(1) At the present time there are hundreds of unrecovered remains of US military casualties located throughout Vietnam. While some of these remains are located in areas that are still inaccessible because of the tactical situation, many are in areas that have been cleared.

(2) It is the policy of the military to list a man as missing until positive identification of a remains has been made before notifying next of kin that the individual is in fact deceased. This policy undoubtedly causes much anguish and grief for next of kin, and encourages the false hope that the individual may still be alive when in fact confirmed reports indicate otherwise.

(3) In order to relieve the suspense of the next of kin, this headquarters initiated Operation Compassion on 18 October 1969. The object of this program is not to endanger lives in areas where the enemy is still active but to recover remains, some dating from 1964, that are in easily accessible areas. (Example: six remains located between LBN and Saigon, and approximately 30 remains located between LBN and Tay Ninh.)

(4) The 1st Log Comd mortuary, located at Tan Son Nhut, is making constant efforts to accumulate all available information concerning known missing personnel and to update their files when information is received. An alphabetical file has been established containing these statistics as well as the health and dental records for most of the missing casualties. Card files are being assembled reflecting the locations of all known recovered personnel. These files also indicate the location of partial

recoveries which will facilitate the future operations in each area and are cross-referenced to grid coordinates for use when unknowns are brought in for identification. Card files for known missing personnel are being assembled by grid coordinates to facilitate the matching of recovered remains with known missing personnel. There are approximately 1,500 personnel who fall into the category.

(5) A one-week course of instruction will begin on 17 November at the US Army Mortuary, Saigon. Each support command will have one officer, MOS 2430, and two NCO's, E-6 or above, with the MOS 57F40, attend this course. Only mature, stable individuals with at least six months remaining on their current tour will be selected. These classes will cover such things as search and recovery, area sketches, overlays, and map and compass reading. All personnel attending these classes will be school-trained and thus will receive only refresher training. Upon completion of the course of instruction, a listing of remains located in the support commands area of responsibility, along with location, circumstances and anatomical charts, will be disseminated to their representatives.

(6) Assistance from tactical unit and support command commanders will be required for such things as EOD specialists, transportation, heavy equipment for movement of wreckage, and search teams to assist in locating the remains. Actual recovery of remains will be accomplished by personnel after making photographs and overlays of the location and filling in necessary paperwork. Upon recovery of remains, they will be evacuated to the US Army Mortuary, Saigon where they will be identified, processed and returned to CONUS for final interment.

#### 4. Sales and Disposal.

a. (U) During the past quarter the Project Disposal Program has been seriously hampered in its efforts to reduce the on-hand tonnage of foreign excess personal property. Item sales continued at the same rate as the previous quarter with 13 sales being conducted from 1 August through 31 October 1969. Acquisition cost of items sold was \$3,701,849. A 9.08 percent return was realized. In addition, almost 23 thousand short tons of scrap were sold bringing the total proceeds from the period to \$329,875.85.

b. (U) The tonnage of scrap sold reflects an increase of 20 thousand short tons over the previous quarter. However, due to customs problems (basically at Da Nang and Qui Nhon) and limited port capabilities, tonnages on-hand have increased. Other major contributions to the increase in on-hand inventory have been a tremendous increase in generations from the Air Force at two of its installations (Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang) combined with the termination of a major contract at Cam Ranh Bay and acquisition of property at the newly developed Chu Lai activity. The

beginning inventory for the quarter was 46.4 thousand short tons. This has increased by 15.4 thousand to reach the ending inventory of 61.8 thousand short tons. About 66% of the total on-hand inventory is scrap. The usable property on-hand has a value of \$33,708,298. Emphasis is on the reduction of inactive inventory. Commensurate with this policy, the period between receipt of property by the activities and its being listed for sale will be reduced during the next quarter. Also, it is anticipated that the number of sales will increase 100%. Issues to the Military Assistance Program Excesses (MAPEX) have continued at a rapid rate with releases to date having reached 20.5 thousand short tons.

c. (U) The Property Disposal Assistance Team completed initial visits to all activities during the past quarter as well as an additional follow-up visit to observe implementation of suggested changes in operation. The over-all effect of this program has been a substantial improvement in disposal activities. During the next quarter this team will place emphasis on the reporting of property for sale as soon as possible after receipt by the activities. This will assist in the reduction of the inactive inventory which is currently 43% of the total usable inventory. The acquisition of specialized scrap handling equipment has been completed with over 90% of this equipment being installed and operational. A survey is currently being made to determine the need for additional personnel, equipment and yard space.

ANNEX N (U) ACofS, PERSONNEL

1. (U) Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCO'LP). Continuing emphasis is being placed on designation of Noncommissioned Officers Logistic Program (NCO'LP) positions and on encouraging eligible noncommissioned officers to apply for entrance into the NCO'LP. All commanders and staff officers have been directed to review key positions within their commands or staff sections to ensure that all noncommissioned officer positions which meet the basic Department of the Army requirements are recommended for designation as NCO'LP positions. This command has 248 NCO'LP positions approved by the Department of the Army. There are 11 positions presently pending approval for entrance into this program. The Adjutant General will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCO'LP positions.

2. (U) Project Overhead

The Personnel Utilization Evaluation Team was established under IC Reg 600-27 and is currently visiting units within 1st Logistical Command. The purpose of the visits is to determine if personnel resources are effectively utilized throughout the command. Special emphasis is being placed on the following:

- a. To determine if the overhead functions of the companies are over-staffed at the expense of other portions of the companies.
- b. To determine if military personnel are being utilized in accordance with normal management techniques.
- c. To determine if civilian personnel are performing those duties for which hired.

3. (U) Accident Reduction

a. The Army motor vehicle accident rate for the 1st Quarter of FY 70 decreased 21.5% under the 4th Quarter of FY 69. The primary causes of Army motor vehicle accidents during the 1st Quarter of FY 70 were excessive speed, unsafe acts of local national motorists and pedestrians, following too closely, mechanical failure, and improper driving techniques of Army drivers. The command's frequency rate of 7.3 accidents per million miles driven is below the expectancy rate of 7.9 established by Headquarters, USARV.

b. The military disabling injury rate for the 1st Quarter of FY 70 is 21.2% lower than the rate for the 4th Quarter of FY 69. The primary injury causes for the 1st Quarter of FY 70 were unsafe operation of Army motor vehicles, falls, burns, and mishandling of individual weapons. The command's frequency rate of 34.5 injuries per million mandays of exposure is below the expectancy rate of 35.3 established by Headquarters, USARV.

c. The following actions are being taken to meet the 1st Logistical Command's objective of reducing accident losses to an absolute minimum.

(1) Safety bulletins (lessons learned) covering the more serious accidents are being published. The bulletins describe the accident, causative factors and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

(2) Safety newsletters are being published monthly to provide commanders with information pertinent to recent developments in accident prevention and ideas to minimize accidents.

(3) Accident prevention is a major topic of discussion at command and staff conferences.

(4) The chain of command is being used to fix responsibility for all accidents.

(5) Serious incident reports and reports of corrective action are being personally reviewed by the Commanding General.

(6) Command safety regulation has been revised to provide current and more comprehensive guidance in safety program administration.

(7) Safety management reviews are published monthly to assist commanders in evaluating safety performance.

(8) Accident reports are reviewed through the chain of command for accuracy, completeness and the propriety of corrective action.

(9) Special safety instructional and promotional materials are being used in training and indoctrinating personnel in safe practices and procedures. The materials are aimed at specific accident problem areas such as the improper operation of motor vehicles and mishandling of weapons.

(10) Letters and messages from the Commanding General covering specific safety program deficiencies are frequently dispatched to subordinate commanders directing corrective action. Reports of corrective action are reviewed by the Commanding General.

(11) The variety and quantity of safety promotional materials have been increased.

(12) Comprehensive surveys of accident prevention programs are being conducted by the command safety director in conjunction with inspections.

4. (U) Army Education Program.

a. The Command Education Program of General Educational Development (GED) faced many problems and challenges when it was first conceived and authorized within the Command in 1967. During the first two years, the GED program grew command-wide with the establishment of nine Army Education Centers and the recruitment of eleven DAC Education Services Officers. During the third quarter of FY-69, facilities were greatly enlarged with the erection of two to five portable classrooms at each Education Center, purchased through non-appropriated funds. Classroom furniture, language laboratory equipment, and educational supplies were also purchased and distributed to each location. The education facilities and DAC education positions at Phu Bai and Quang Tri were transferred to USAFV during the first quarter, FY-70. The Education Center at Tuy Hoa was closed during FY-69. Despite this reduction in the number of Education Centers to six and DAC Education Services Officers to eight, the scope of the program has more than doubled during the past fiscal year. For the first quarter of FY-70, the remaining six Centers showed a substantial increase in activity of 23% over the fourth quarter of FY-69. (See charts, para c and d below).

b. Each Education Services Officer establishes goals for his Army Education Center consistent with the objectives set by higher headquarters and the provisions of AR 621-5. It has been found that instruction and educational services call for increased emphasis on certain areas peculiar to the 1st Logistical Command. Dependent upon availability of classroom space and equipment, each Center offers as varied a program as possible to meet a wide spectrum of educational requirements:

(1) A foreign language program. A capability in this regard is a distinct advantage for military personnel assigned to Vietnam. Education Centers, equipped with language-instruction equipment, conduct a vigorous language program. A total of 353 officers and enlisted men were instructed in language courses during the first quarter of FY-70 with 152 completions.

(2) High school academic subjects generally available in civilian schools are offered during off-duty hours. The courses are designed to prepare personnel for completion of their high school requirements and for remedial work prior to taking the high school equivalency tests. A total of 634 students participated in this program during the first quarter, FY-70, with 419 completions. In addition, 412

enlisted men successfully passed the high school equivalency tests and received their high school certificates or diplomas during this same period.

(3) Courses in support of MOS-related programs. These courses have had a real impact on the increase in skills acquired by military personnel. A total of 952 students participated in both classroom instruction and correspondence courses during the first quarter, FY-70, with 256 completions.

(4) The college-resident course program includes classroom work designed to enable military personnel to complete two-year college requirements or to work toward or possibly finish requirements for the baccalaureate degree. Courses are offered through the special overseas branch of the University of Maryland. A total of 381 officers and enlisted men enrolled in University of Maryland courses during the first quarter, FY-70. The same quarter showed a completion of 97; however, this figure included courses offered during the fourth quarter of FY-69 which had a total enrollment of 132 officers and enlisted men.

c. The following statistics give a comparison of activities between the fourth quarter, FY-69, and the first quarter, FY-70, by Support Commands and Education Centers:

---

Education Center	Correspondence Course Enrollments <sup>1</sup>		Group Study Enrollments		USAFI Tests Administered		University of Maryland Enrollments	
	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr
SCM SUPCOM Vung Tau	72	689	148	138	1185	880	0	0
CRB SUPCOM Cam Ranh Bay	752	696	534	344	829	1454	29	65
Nha Trang	1223	1247	360	371	1072	1066	8	94
DNG SUPCOM Da Nang	478	656	166	327	1118	722	63	222
Phu Bai <sup>2</sup>	1085	0	94	0	1194	0	29	0
Quang Tri <sup>2</sup>	152	0	52	0	637	0	3	0
QNH SUPCOM Qui Nhon	1059	986	45	176	1137	1933	0	0
Fleiku <sup>3</sup>	0	87	0	17	0	471	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5480</b>	<b>4361</b>	<b>1399</b>	<b>1373</b>	<b>7172</b>	<b>6526</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>381</b>

d. The following figures show the number of individuals who successfully achieved a higher educational level during the first quarter, FY-70, compared with the fourth quarter, FY-69.

<sup>1</sup>Correspondence enrollments are for one year unless sooner completed by a USAFI test. Therefore, figures shown represent accumulative enrollments for four quarters less completions.

<sup>2</sup>Operational control of Army Education Centers at Phu Bai and Quang Tri was transferred to the XXIV Corps during the first quarter, FY-70, thus reducing the number of Centers from eight to six. Figures for the 4th Quarter include both Phu Bai and Quang Tri

<sup>3</sup>The Education Center at Fleiku was without an Education Director until August.

	<u>Individuals</u>	
	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u> <sup>1</sup>
Completion of 8th Grade	175	141
Completion of High School	632	412
Completion of One Year of College	32	31
Completion of Two Years of College	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	840	589

5. (U) Civil Military Operations.

a. The civil-military operations activities of 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to rebuild the nation. Civil-military operations activities are conducted to support the GVN Pacification Campaign, to support RVNAF unit capabilities to conduct civic action, to improve relations between US units and adjacent civilian communities, and to facilitate tactical operations. The 1st Logistical Command's civil-military operations activities cover all of these areas, however several special civic action and community relations type programs have been initiated. These programs are long-term in nature and consequently cannot be measured on a periodic basis to show an exact degree of achievement. Primarily, these programs are designed to encourage the Vietnamese people to "help themselves". The special programs developed by the command are listed below.

(1) The Scouting Program, instituted to support Vietnamese scouting, is continuing to develop. A large number of Vietnamese youths are being reached through this program. There is, however, a hesitancy on the part of scout leaders to become identified with any government's agency. The program objectives are: to promote development of leadership, national identity, and social consciousness among the youth of Vietnam; to encourage cooperation and mutual understanding between the Government of Vietnam and the nation's youth; and to assist in the development and strengthening of the Vietnamese Boy Scout Association by encouraging its participation in construction, social actions, and nation building activities. This

<sup>1</sup>The decline for the 1st quarter is due to the transfer of the Education Centers at Phu Bai and Quang Tri to the XXIV Corps.

scouting program provides an excellent opportunity to assist the Vietnamese in developing a stable future through their youth. Support of scouting, as well as other youth activities, is an activity in which this command is well suited due to the nature of the commands activities, the permanently located logistical base areas, and the number of military personnel with scouting and youth activity backgrounds.

(2) A second program which this command has developed is one of providing support for the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program. In the past, when foodstuff was condemned by the veterinary food inspectors, it was taken to a sanitary fill and destroyed. In many instances the condemned food was fit for human consumption, however due to its storage, the taste and/or appearance had deteriorated to a point where it no longer met the standards established by AR 40-656. The program consists of donating condemned foodstuff from ports and edible waste from mess halls to the Vietnamese for animal consumption. The Vietnamese army has established military farms for the purpose of developing protein foods which can be used to supplement the soldiers diet. The success and growth of this program is attributed to the fact that the logistical base areas have a continuous supply of condemned foodstuffs as well as large quantities of edible garbage from their numerous mess halls. Due to the stabilization of the command, it is in a position to contribute significantly to this program. In addition to the military farms, there are numerous small farm cooperatives and institutions engaged in small scale animal raising in the vicinity of logistical base areas.

(3) The Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, which was implemented in September 1967, continues to progress. While the original program initiated by USARV has been discontinued, this command has continued its civil-military operations activities which developed from the original program. The US Army Support Command, Saigon is responsible for 48 hamlets within the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. These hamlets have a total population of about 153,000 people. Many of these people are refugees forced into the area due to enemy activities. The program, designed to create a friendly buffer around the Long Binh area, involves weekly hamlet visits and the conduct of an intensive civic action program in the districts adjacent to the Long Binh area.

b. Due to the success of the Long Binh People-to-People Program, this headquarters developed similar programs for the major logistical base areas throughout the country. The logistical base areas develop civic action programs in areas adjacent to support commands and sub-area commands within a minimum radius of 6,000 meters of US installa-

tions or troop units. This program was put into effect in May 1968 and has progressed well. It has reduced duplication of effort and waste of resources, two of the major problem areas of the past.

c. The command civil-military operations statistics for the period are as follows:

(1) Total number of man-days (10 hr days) personnel of this command devoted to civic action activities: 4,357.

(2) Cost of civic action projects:

(a) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic actions projects: 12,457,322 \$VN.

(b) Expenditures from the US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 1,225,846 VN.

(3) Voluntary contribution:

(a) Collections: 1,708,524 \$VN.

(b) Expenditures in support of civic action: 1,647,484 \$VN.

(4) Percent of US Military civic actions activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Other FWMAF	14.3%	70%	8.8%	0%
RVNAF	90%	20%	23.6%	15%
US Civilian Voluntary Agencies	5.2%	10%	10%	9.3%

(5) Average percent of self-help contributed by the people:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Self-Help Labor	63.4%	65.0%	75.0%	77.5%
Materials furnished	7.3%	20.0%	6.9%	5.0%

(6) Major civic action programs:

	<u>MAN-DAYS</u>	<u>VN\$</u>
Economic	1,047	3,543,190
Education	701	1,279,742
Social Welfare	1,999	5,527,523
Transportation	292	174,110
Refugee Assistance Support	<u>789</u>	<u>2,486,606</u>
TOTAL	4,826	13,011,171

(7) Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

(a) Schools	123
(b) Hospitals/Dispensaries	27
(c) Orphanages	77
(d) Playgrounds	4
(e) Churches	7
(f) Bridge Construction	2
(g) Village Offices	2
(h) Boy Scout Troops	4
(i) Roads (Km)	<u>12</u>
TOTALS	258

(8) Educational efforts:

(a) Classes:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>No. OF CLASSES</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
English	37	725
Vietnamese	6	64

(b) Training:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
Nurses Aides	10
Machine Operator	14
Husbandry	25
Mechanic	40
Forklift Operators	9
MHE Operators	33
Basic Typing	56
Advance Typing	5
Basic Stevedoring	36

(9) Out of the 186 construction projects completed during the reporting period, 50 of them were joint US/FWMAF projects.

(10) Commodities distributed:



(a) Building materials:

(1) Cement (lbs)	1,516,016
(2) Tin Sheets (Ea)	3,916
(3) Lumber (bd ft)	486,706
(4) Paint (gal)	1,200
(5) Fire Wood (lbs)	15,000
(6) Bricks (ea)	6,000
(7) Sand (mtr)	64
(8) Nails (lbs)	860

(9) Ribar (ft)	2,800	
(10) Rope (ft)	180	
(b) Kits distributed (Health, school, refugee)		4,110
(c) Food (lbs)		17,193
(d) Clothing (lbs)		7,536
(e) Agricultural Tools (ea)		31
(f) Edible Garbage (lbs)		2,124,000

ANNEX O (U) ACoS, Procurement

1. (U) Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&C's) Received. PR&C's for Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 received during the current reporting period ending on 31 October 1969, numbered 379 and were valued at \$11.9 million. By 31 October 1969, the total number of PR&C's received for FY 1970 numbered 792 with a value of \$271.7 million. The following charts show PR&C's received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart #1), and dollar value of PR&C's received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart #2).



2. (U) Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&C) Distribution.


a. The 379 FY 1970 PR&C's valued at \$11.9 million received during this reporting period were distributed by the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) as follows:

(1) 49 PR&C's valued at \$7.7 million were forwarded to other WESTPAC agencies toward the purchase of cement, lumber, fruits and vegetables, asphalt and other small supplies.

(2) 87 PR&C's valued at \$80,000 were forwarded to the United States to be used in the purchase of small dollar value supply type items.

(3) 243 PR&C's valued at \$4.1 million were retained by USAPAV and applied to satisfy requirements concerning repairs and utilities, stevedoring, trucking and maintenance services.

b. Chart #3 shows the PR&C distribution for FY 1970.



3. (U) Distribution of Requirements. The value of FY 1970 requirements received is \$271.7 million, distributed as follows:

a. Repairs and Utilities \$125.8 million

b. Transportation 64.4 million


- e. Supplies \$ 14.5 million
- d. Subsistence 27.5 million
- e. Maintenance 13.5 million
- f. Services 26.0 million

4. (U) Contracts under Administration.

a. Total contracts presently under administration number 268 with a value of \$810.3 million.

b. Of the 268 contracts presently under administration, 140 valued at \$318.0 million are classified as active, with the remaining 128 valued at \$492.3 million considered inactive. Inactive contracts are those in which the contractor has completed performance but the contract has not been closed out because of some pending administrative action (such as payment of final invoices, negotiation of final overhead or settlement of disputes).

c. Those active contracts presently under administration consist of 5 types: firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee, and cost-plus-award-fee. Net active firm-fixed-price contracts under administration total 53 this reporting period, valued at \$10.7 million; while net active firm-fixed-price-indefinite quantity contracts total 78, valued at \$138.6 million. The number of active cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts total 7, with a value of \$61.2 million. One CPIF (cost-plus-incentive-fee) contract valued at \$6.7 million is for operation and maintenance of Electric Power Generating Facilities. One CPAF (cost-plus-award-fee) contract valued at \$100.8 million is for Repair and Utilities Service in RVN. Active contract administration activity is shown graphically in Chart #4.



d. FY 1970 purchase orders total 91 and are valued at \$100,482. Eighty FY 1970 delivery orders have been processed for a value of \$364,809. Current FY 1970 blanket purchase agreements total 149 with FY 1970 expenditures totaling \$2.8 million.

5. (U) Decommitments. Decommitments during the reporting period total \$816,416, bringing FY 1970 totals to \$18.0 million.

6. (U) Quality and Facilities. Policies and programs have been revised to provide an aggressive program of scheduled contract surveillance inspections. One hundred eighty-eight inspections were formed from 1 July 1969 through 31 October 1969. Realignment and on-the-job cross training of procurement functions have resulted in an increased utilization of assigned personnel. Surveillance inspection check lists have been developed and distributed for use by the Contracting Officer Representatives (CO's), Ordering Officers and US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) personnel. These check lists provide unskilled personnel with guides to perform inspections and quality audits of contractor operations as well as quality history documentation for use in the future evaluation of contractors' performance. These lists will also furnish guidance concerning pre-award surveys. The compilation of USAPAV source lists has been changed from mechanical to manual. Controls have been established to preclude the placement of applications from non-responsive offerors on the source lists.

7. (U) Procurement Operations, Subsistence Division. This division has acquired the services of a Staff Veterinarian to review inspection techniques and to provide more objective methods for grading subsistence supplies. This will enhance the quality of locally procured subsistence and will also provide liaison between USAPAV and the inspection facilities.

8. (U) Control of Government-Furnished Property (GFP) in Possession of Contractors. The early concept of requiring contractors to comply with Army Regulations for control of GFP in their possession caused considerable difficulty in both administration of the contract and control of the property by the contractor. The difficulty stemmed primarily from the lack of expertise on behalf of the contractors, coupled with the communication barrier between 4 different nationalities (American, Vietnamese, Korean and Philippine). Aggressive management action was taken through direction and assistance for development of contractor procedures for control of GFP which could readily be understood and applied by all contractor personnel. These procedures comply with ASPR Appendix B requirements and apply Army Regulation criteria only where necessary or appropriate. This action is providing more satisfactory control of GFP, and otherwise proving advantageous.

9. (U) Property Control System Surveillance. System surveys of GFP in possession of contractors were accomplished to the maximum extent possible consistent with available resources. However, the lengthy time span between each visit did not permit aggressive and continued followup

action on deficiencies found. Consequently, GFP controls were either nonexistent or very poorly applied. Increased manpower permitted an increase of inspections by almost 135%. This increase coupled with developing inspection procedures under ASFR criteria and contractor procedures are providing better control of GFP through more timely and responsive action.

ANNEX P (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL

1. (U) 1st Logistical Command exceeded the reenlistment goals, established by Department of the Army, each month of the past quarter. A statistical resume of enlistments and reenlistments is at inclosure 2.

2. (U) Command strength dropped during the reporting period, primarily as a result of unit redeployments. Inclosure 3 reflects the command strength posture during the period. Personnel losses exceeded gains during the reporting period (inclosure 4), thus the attritive factor of loss-gain is somewhat offset by the reduction in authorization. In an effort to improve the situation created by the loss of skilled personnel (inclosure 5), USARV gave 1st Logistical Command priority on those MOS areas not specifically required by combat units. In the critical area of MOS 64 (vehicle drivers), all divisional, separate brigade and regimental units were levied for personnel for retraining. These profiled infantrymen were to be retrained and reclassified as truck drivers.

3. (U) A total of 11,070 enlisted promotion allocations were received and used by the command. Statistical data pertaining to command promotions is at inclosure 6.

4. (U) Thirteen members of the command were killed by hostile action, while 28 persons died not as a result of hostile action. Injured as a result of hostile action were 58 persons. The command experienced a marked drop in non-hostile injuries incurred over the previous period, reporting 96 such injuries. A detailed breakdown is at inclosure 7.

5. (U) A total of 5,598 awards were approved by the command (inclosure 8).

6. (U) The command received a total of 428 in-country Rest and Recreation (R&R) allocations, and utilized a total of 449. Out-of-country R&R allocations totaled 9140 with 7506 utilized (inclosure 9).

7. (U) Twenty postal inspections were performed during the period. A report of units inspected, dates inspections were performed, and the ratings awarded are at inclosure 10.

a. The 488th APU at Qui Nhon Support Command was redeployed to CONUS for inactivation.

b. The 6th APU was assigned to Qui Nhon from Long Binh Post to replace the 448th.

c. The 45th APU was assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command from the 173d Infantry Brigade (Airborne).

d. During the period, a decision was made to mechanize the Army Postal Directory (APD) by replacing it with an Automatic Mail Delivery System (AMDS), to be located at San Francisco, California. The AMDS is a time-phased operation. Phase I began on 1 November with the building and testing of the data base and programs. Phases III through IV, programmed for completion on 1 May 1970, will assume all postal directory responsibilities, with concurrent inactivation of the APD.

**ANNEX Q (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL**

1. (U) Inspector General assistance was extended to 632 members of the command. Approximately 70% of the complaints and requests for assistance received concerned assignment, reassignment and transfer; unit administration; and promotions/demotions. Of the 161 complaints processed, 49 were justified. There were 84 Annual General Inspections conducted. Three units were rated Unsatisfactory. Security, Administration, Maintenance and Training continue to be major areas of interest.

2. (U) Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

394th Transportation Battalion, Headquarters Company	27 Aug 69
5th Transportation Command, Headquarters Company	28-29 Aug 69
Vung Tau Sub Area Command (VTSAC)	10-12 Sep 69
292d Finance Section	11 Sep 69
570th Army Postal Unit	11 Sep 69
US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam	16-17 Sep 69
45th General Support Group, Headquarters Company	1-3 Oct 69
Da Nang Field Depot	20-22 Oct 69
80th General Support Group, Headquarters Company	23-25 Oct 69
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, Headquarters Det	28-30 Oct 69

IG, USASUPCOM, CAM RANH BAY

69th Maintenance Battalion, Headquarters Detachment	7 Aug 69
21st Supply and Service Company	12 Aug 69
59th Field Service Company	13 Aug 69
24th Transportation Battalion, Headquarters Detachment	16 Sep 69
24th Transportation Company	17 Sep 69

592d Transportation Company	18 Sep 69
109th Quartermaster Company	21 Oct 69
566th Transportation Company	23 Oct 69

IG, USASUPCOM, DA NANG

56th Heavy Material Supply Company	18 Aug 69
516th Personnel Services Company	20 Aug 69
855th General Supply Company	25 Aug 69
156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	28 Aug 69
40th Ordnance Company	8 Sep 69
63d Maintenance Battalion, Headquarters and Main Support Company	15 Sep 69
59th Explosive Ordnance Detachment	16 Sep 69
67th Maintenance Company	22 Sep 69
666th Transportation Company	23 Sep 69
560th General Support Company	29 Sep 69
74th Repair Parts Company	6 Oct 69
578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	13 Oct 69
515th Transportation Company	14 Oct 69
588th Maintenance Company	20 Oct 69
133d EOD Detachment	21 Oct 69
57th Transportation Battalion, Headquarters Detachment	28 Oct 69

IG, USASUPCOM, QUI NHON

510th Engineer Company	6 Aug 69
243d Field Service Company	7 Aug 69

188th Ordnance Company	8 Aug 69
320th Ordnance Company	21 Aug 69
1098th Transportation Company	22 Aug 69
561st General Supply Company	3 Sep 69
126th Finance Section	4 Sep 69
90th Headquarters and Main Support Company	6 Sep 69
545th Transportation Company	10 Sep 69
19th Supply and Service Company	17 Sep 69
134th Quartermaster Company	18 Sep 69
5th Maintenance Battalion, Headquarters and Main Support Company	19 Sep 69
184th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters Company	1 Oct 69
304th Supply and Service Company	3 Oct 69
444th Transportation Company	9 Oct 69
119th Transportation Company	10 Oct 69
FSA, 593d GS Gp (1)	16 Oct 69

IG, USASUPCOM, SAIGON

61st Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	4-5 Aug 69
610th Maintenance Battalion, Headquarters and Main Support Company	7-8 Aug 69
10th Transportation Company	11-12 Aug 69
62d Transportation Company	25-26 Aug 69
624th Supply and Service Company (Re-inspection)	28-29 Aug 69
506th Supply and Service Company	1-2 Sep 69
86th Transportation Company	4-5 Sep 69

758th Supply and Service Company	8-9 Sep 69
321st Transportation Company	11-12 Sep 69
Company D, Troop Command, USADLBN	15-16 Sep 69
378th Maintenance Company	18-19 Sep 69
Company A, Troop Command, USADLBN	22-23 Sep 69
Company C, Troop Command, USADLBN	25-26 Sep 69
59th Signal Company	29-30 Sep 69
124th Transportation Company	6-7 Oct 69
1099th Transportation Company	8-9 Oct 69
11th Transportation Battalion, Headquarters Detachment	10 Oct 69
3d Transportation Center (MC)	16-17 Oct 69
5th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	20-21 Oct 69
7th Finance Section (Disb)	23-24 Oct 69

3. (U) Complaints and Requests for Assistance. The following is a summary of complaints and requests for assistance received by Inspectors General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMPLAINTS</u>		<u>REQUESTS</u>
	<u>JUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
HQ, 1st Logistical Command	0.2	0.0	5.4
USASUPCOM, CRB	0.1	0.3	4.9
USASUPCOM, DNG	0.6	1.2	1.5
USASUPCOM, QNH	0.4	1.0	3.2
USASUPCOM, SGN	0.4	0.8	3.0
Command Wide	0.3	0.8	3.3

ANNEX R (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) There were 156 personal property claims of U.S. military and civilian personnel, totaling \$33,653.83, processed and paid through the Judge Advocate offices of this command during the past quarter. This was an increase of 28 claims and \$11,460.37 from the preceding quarter. In addition, Judge Advocates throughout the command handled 5,486 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and legal instruments. This was an increase of 953 cases over the preceding quarter.

2. (U) Court-martial rates per thousand changed as follows from the previous quarter: Summary courts-martial rate decreased from 1.49 to 1.03; special courts-martial rate decreased from 3.72 to 1.39; and general courts-martial rate decreased from .16 to .08. Article 15 rate decreased from 26.78 to 25.64. The number of 1st Logistical Command (1ST LOG COMD) personnel in confinement increased from 26 in confinement on 30 July 1969 to 37 in confinement on 29 October 1969.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by 1st Logistical Command commanders during the period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969.

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	8	20	3	31
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	477	486	648	1611
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	218	221	106	545
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	374	391	308	1073
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	118	128	122	368
Totals	1195	1246	1187	3628

4. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown for the past quarter of cases tried by courts-martial based upon the organizations to which the accused were assigned:

a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	0	1	0	1
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	1	3	0	4
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	0	0	1	1
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	3	3	0	6
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	0	0	0	0
Totals	4	7	1	12

b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	3	0	1	4
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	27	33	36	96
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	17	4	8	29
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	4	8	0	12
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	19	26	11	56
Totals	70	71	56	197

c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	3	0	0	3
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	52	41	15	108
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	3	3	0	6
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	16	10	1	27
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	0	2	0	2
Totals	<u>74</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>146</u>

5. (U) Courts-Martial and Article 15 rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for comparative purposes as follows:

	<u>1ST LOG COMD</u> (Present qtr)	<u>USARV</u> (1st qtr, FY 70)	<u>Army Wide</u> (4th qtr, FY 69)
General Courts-Martial	.08	.08	.15
Special Courts-Martial	1.39	1.4	3.42
Summary Courts-Martial	1.03	.50	.89
Article 15 Punishment	25.64	13.7	18.18

6. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed, or damaged incident to service under the provisions of AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

	<u>Number Paid</u>	<u>Amount Paid</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	29	\$ 9,097.21
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	19	2,694.35
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	39	8,618.99
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	39	8,487.01
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	30	4,756.27
Totals	<u>156</u>	<u>\$33,653.83</u>

7. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled by Judge Advocates within this command during the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969:

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and Change of Name	119	11	130
Citizenship, Immigration & Passport	269	10	279
Civil Rights	45	6	51
Domestic Relations and Paternity	879	34	913
Non-Support	97	4	101
Personal Finances & Debts	643	80	723
Personal Property, Auto, Etc.	283	10	293
Powers of Attorney	1,053	740	1,793
Real Property, Sales, Lease, Etc.	141	8	149
Taxation	236	52	288
Torts	39	0	39
Wills and Estates	280	208	488
Miscellaneous	1,402	190	1,592
	<u>5,486</u>	<u>1,353</u>	<u>6,839</u>

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## ANNEX S (C) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (C) Sentry Dogs. On 4 August 1969, this command received the results of sentry dog suitability surveys conducted during May and June 1969 by the 18th Military Police Brigade. Suitability surveys had been requested on 52 potential sites by this headquarters. Of the 52 sites surveyed, 15 were found to be acceptable to effective utilization of sentry dogs. On 19 October 1969, based upon current information, 7 of the suitable locations were selected for priority construction of required kennels and supporting facilities. Suitability surveys are currently being conducted on additional sites for possible use of sentry dogs.

2. (U) US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail (PS&WD).

a. The four Explosive Loading Detachments under operational control of PS&WD supervised the loading and offloading of 119 deep draft vessels totaling 432,854 tons of military munitions during the reporting period.

b. PS&WD coordinated with MACV J-42 and 1st Logistical Command ACoF3, Ammunition, on the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board visit to in-country ammunition sites. The informal visit was conducted from 18 August to 6 September 1969. No major criticisms were made by the board related to US Army handling of ammunition at the ports.

c. A demonstration of defenses against swimmer/sapper attacks was conducted at Cat Lai for members of the 4th Transportation Command and for the 18th Military Police Brigade on 26 September 1969.

d. 1st Logistical Command defense posture against swimmer/sapper attack was improved with the publication of a physical security bulletin outlining the construction and use of a Navy-developed "anchor chain collar" designed to assist in the detection of explosive charges attached to anchor chains.

e. An additional Patrol Boat, River (PBR) and three Boston Whaler craft were redeployed to Qui Nhon Support Command to provide for better port security.

3. (U) Physical Security.

a. The Provost Marshal's office continued the program of inspecting depot/port security to prevent/deter the loss/theft of US Government supplies and property. During this period, the following logistical facilities and their physical security systems were inspected:

1-4 August - Saigon Port and Newport Terminal

13-17 August - Vung Tau Sub-area Command

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26 August-2 September - Qui Nhon Support Command

24-28 September - Nha Trang Outport

6-10 October - 15th General Support Group, Pleiku

20-25 October - US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

27-30 October - Can Tho Logistical Support Activities

b. In conjunction with the above, inspections of POL Call-Forward and customer operations were conducted to determine weaknesses and to recommend methods to improve the system for security of POL products. In addition, postal activities at most of these locations were inspected and recommendations were made to improve procedures and security safeguards at these activities.

c. During the reporting period, five Physical Security Bulletins were published to alert members of the command to potential problem areas:

(1) Number 69-7, "Mind Your Fences" - related how disregard of perimeter fence maintenance can result in loss of supplies.

(2) Number 69-8, "For Want of Communications", emphasized the importance of providing security guards with communications equipment.

(3) Number 69-2 (republished), "Control of Local National Personnel", advised commanders on common deficiencies noted in gate control and pass system enforcement.

(4) Number 69-9, "Mirror Searching Device", illustrated an apparatus which assists gate guards in inspecting the undercarriages of vehicles for contraband and explosive devices.

(5) Number 69-10, "Anchor Chain Collar Confuses Charlie", illustrated a counter swimmer/sapper technique to detect unauthorized attachments on ship anchor chains.

d. On 6 September 1969, Logistical Command Regulation 525-2, Control and Safeguard of US Supplies and Military Property, was republished incorporating new provisions applicable to the physical security of petroleum products.

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ANNEX 7 (U) Staff Chaplain

1. (U) The most significant fact of this reporting period is an all-time high of 36.3% of the Command attended services during the month of September. The total attendance 1 August to 31 October was 186,612 which is 33% of the Command. This is a 1.8% increase over that of the last reporting period. The increase in chapel attendance is directly related to the success of projects "Prayer", "Chit Chat" and "Street Corner". Chaplains have increased the number of weekly services from 9.9 to 11.6. On the average, chaplains spend over 60% of their time out of the office and with the men.

2. (U) The following donations were made by 1st Logistical Command personnel through the Chaplain Funds to further community relations projects:

	<u>Churches</u>	<u>Schools &amp; Orphanages</u>	<u>Misc</u>	<u>Total</u>
August	VN\$259,939	VN\$261,514.00	VN\$366,818.00	VN\$988,271.00
September	216,167	189,845.00	207,134.00	613,146.00
October	<u>153,489</u>	<u>210,021.45</u>	<u>310,021.45</u>	<u>673,531.90</u>
Total	VN\$629,595	VN\$661,380.45	VN\$883,973.45	VN\$2,274,948.90

ANNEX U (U) INFORMATION OFFICE

1. (U) A total of 142 news stories and 36 photo captions were released to more than 45 news media during the reporting period. Selective distribution techniques ensure that news finds its way to appropriate media. To ensure quality and comprehensiveness of news and photo coverage, this headquarters monitors all releases from subordinate information offices. Continued emphasis is placed on the information offices of the subordinate commands to seek out, write and photograph news in depth throughout their areas of responsibility. Additional support is available to the Support Commands through the use of personnel assigned to the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters Information Office. In cases where requirements exceed capabilities, writers and photographers are put on TDY with the Support Command for the purpose of assisting that command in covering the news. Enlisted writers in this office spend approximately 60 to 70 percent of their time in this support capacity.

2. (U) Press support continues to be a major aspect of the information program. Press queries have resulted in direct contact with the news media to include television, radio and film. This command constantly keeps news representatives aware of current events and helps the civilian media in every possible way.

3. (U) The newly reorganized Audio-Visual Division within the Information Office is currently producing a 15-minute radio program, "Log Briefs," aired every Sunday morning on AFVN radio at approximately 1130. Material for this program is gathered throughout the week from the entire command. The first program was aired on 5 October 1969 and will continue weekly.

4. (U) The Audio-Visual Division has been tasked with the maintenance and currency of the First Logistical Command slide file. The slide file consisting of over 2,000 35mm slides was categorized by the Special Projects division during the last quarter and is increasing daily in variety and depth. Staff sections requiring the use of these slides may review them and those necessary will be copied. Originals of all slides remain in the file for reference use.

5. (U) Special Projects Division prepared letters of appreciation for the 25 Reserve units from the First Logistical Command returning to the United States for inactivation.

6. (U) The Command Information Section has published two newsletters for all 1st Logistical Command Vietnamese employees. The newsletter, Ban Tin, has a 5:1 distribution of 3,000 copies.

7. (U) Subordinate units continue to publish four weekly or bi-weekly mimeographed or multilith newspapers and two magazines. During this quarter Qui Nhon Support Command has instituted a monthly photo offset newspaper "The Logman." The 1st Logistical Command Vietnam Review is being published on a semi-monthly schedule with tentative plans for a weekly publication. The printing of 17,000 copies permits a distribution ratio of approximately one copy for every four military personnel in 1st Logistical Command. In addition, nearly 200 copies are mailed to other military information offices, military logistics organizations and VIFs including media executives.

8. (U) The 1st Logistical Command magazine is scheduled for publication in November with distribution of 20,000 copies or a ratio of two copies for every 5 military personnel assigned. Previously an annual publication, the magazine will become a quarterly publication with this issue.

ANNEX V (U) SIGNAL OFFICE

1. (U) Approval was obtained to inactivate the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Communications Center. Prior to inactivation of the communications center, traffic was routed over the Army Area Communication System for a 15 day period to compare transmission times between the sole-user circuits and the Army Area Communications circuits. No significant time differences were noted. On 20 September 1969, sole-user circuits to Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and Qui Nhon Support Commands were inactivated. On 4 October 1969, the sole-user circuit to the Long Binh Army Area Communications Center was inactivated and the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Communication Center completely closed down. Personnel were reassigned and all equipment returned to supply channels.

2. (U) During the month of August, 1st Logistical Command Signal Office conducted a review and rejustification of all sole-user voice, teletype and speech-plus circuits within the command. Due to the improved communications made available because of the implementation of the automatic telephone system in RVN, a total of thirty-one (31) sole-user circuits were inactivated. Remaining sole-user circuits continue to be reviewed periodically to determine if they are still required. To be retained, sole-user circuits must be fully justified on the basis of operational necessity.

3. (U) During the month of September, two 10A2 key telephone systems were installed within the headquarters complex. Criteria used to determine installation priority was size of office, volume of traffic, and condition of existing facilities. In addition, seven each type 187 (3-button) key telephones were installed in various offices within the headquarters. Primary consideration were large offices where one centrally located person could answer all incoming calls and direct traffic flow, thus reducing work interruptions. These installations enabled this headquarters to release to 1st Signal Bde a large number of telephone instruments and miscellaneous equipment. A third 10A2 key system is awaiting installation and should be operational during the month of November. Further installations of key telephone equipment will be dependent upon availability of these systems.

4. (U) During the month of September, the 101st Radio Research Company (LBN Det) conducted a communications security check of telephones in the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters complex. A total of 40 telephone lines of key personnel were monitored. A total of four (4) violations were reported and involved discussing FOUO information over the telephone. All violations concerned were in violation of AR 380-26 which prohibits discussing the movement of general officers over the telephone. In general, the report of the 101st RR Co noted improvement over the last inspection both in reduction of incidents and serious-

ness of violation. Personnel committing the violations were shown a transcript of the conversation and an extract of the regulation regarding the infraction.

5. (U) During the month of September, a Senate investigation committee initiated an investigation of tactical and strategic communications facilities within Vietnam. Reports were submitted which listed all sole-user circuits and radio nets (together with bubble charts), and signal equipment (indicating types, totals, and costs) available within this command and subordinate units.

**ANNEX W (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LOGISTICS REVIEW**

1. (U) During the reporting period the Logistics Review Working Group received its full complement of personnel as authorized by the manning document approved on 23 May 1969. A second contract operations research analyst arrived on 11 August 1969, and on 23 August 1969 the Transportation Project Officer, a major, joined the group. With the assignment of a fourth clerk-typist on 7 October 1969, the administrative manning of the Logistics Review Working Group was complete.

2. (U) Work continued on the drafting of the 26 annexes to the Logistics Review report in accordance with the provisions of the study directive dated 28 May 1969. Final drafts of all annexes were scheduled to be submitted on 28 August 1969, with review and redrafting to be completed during September. There has been some slippage in this schedule, however, due to the fact that the process of review, rewriting and redrafting has taken longer than anticipated. Drafts of all 26 of the annexes have been received by the Logistics Review Working Group and have been edited, reviewed and returned to the appropriate staff sections or agencies with comments and suggestions for redrafting. At the close of the reporting period 11 annexes are undergoing revision and redrafting by staff sections, 7 are undergoing second editing and review in the Logistics Review Working Group, and 8 have been completed in final draft. Of the 8 completed, 6 have been submitted for review to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command and to the Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam.

**ANNEX X (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR DATA SYSTEMS**

1. (U) The initial and two subsequent editions of a monthly 1st Logistical Command newsletter were published. The newsletter serves as an informational media within the command to keep processors abreast of technical changes.
2. (U) Authorization was received to move two NCR 500 systems into the 624th S&S Co, USASUPCOM Saigon; one system into the 266th S&S Co, USASUPCOM Da Nang; and one system into the 19th S&S Co, USASUPCOM Qui Nhon.
3. (U) An IBM 1401 System was installed and accepted at the Data Processing Installation of USAD, Long Binh on 1 October 1969. This system was transferred in-country from its previous user, Pacific Architects and Engineers. This additional capability should significantly reduce previous input/output problems at USAD, Long Binh.
4. (U) From 5 September to 5 October 1969, an ADP system work group was assembled at USAD, Cam Ranh Bay to design a standard 3SVN depot system. The system was subsequently tested and installed at USAD, Long Binh, USAD, Qui Nhon and USAD, Cam Ranh during October 1969.
5. (U) Minimum command standards of performance were set for processing basic supply cycles at USAD, CRB, DNG, LBN, and QN in October 1969. These standards are 20, 20, 17, and 20 cycles per month respectively. The minimum standards set for USAICCV were 20 Red Ball and 8 basic supply cycles per month.

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### SECTION II: Lessons Learned, Observations, Evaluations, Recommendations.

#### A. (C) PERSONNEL

##### 1. (C) Reduction in Direct Support Infantry Security Guards Provided by 18th Military Police Brigade. (Provost Marshal)

a. OBSERVATION: As of 30 September 1969, D Company, 52 Infantry and D Company, 87th Infantry were reduced to zero strength. These two 18th MP Brigade units provided supplementary physical security personnel and equipment for the protection of three critical logistical sites, namely the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot, Cogido Ammunition Discharge Point, and Dong Nai POL Pumping Station. Adjustments were made by the 18th MP Brigade to provide as much support as possible from other of their resources to reduce the impact on 1st Logistical Command units to the minimum possible.

b. EVALUATION: The loss of direct support infantry security forces and their constant understrength position has required that mission-oriented personnel have had to be diverted from their primary duties to perform guard duties necessary to operate logistical facilities. Consequently, the command's ability to satisfy its logistical function has diminished. By in large the geographical dimensions and security requirements of these sites have changed very little.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Critical logistical facilities should be authorized a dedicated force of sufficient size to preclude the need to divert skilled technicians from their primary mission. This security force should be an authorized/integral part of logistics elements of battalion and larger size.

##### 2. (U) Chaplains (Staff Chaplain)

a. OBSERVATION: As of 31 October this Command had 66 authorized TOE/TDA spaces for chaplains and 68 TOE/TDA spaces for chaplain assistants. Sixty-eight (68) chaplains and seventy-three (73) chaplain assistants were assigned as of that date.

b. EVALUATION: Seven spaces were lost due to the inactivation of one General Support Group and one Transportation Group. One other space was lost when a reserve battalion returned to CONUS. The present overage of chaplains has been caused by the above mentioned inactivations, but this surplus is going to be of short duration.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a study be made of the difficulties involved when chaplain spaces are lost due, for example, to the inactivation of the units to which they are assigned, without a corresponding inactivation of the units which they are serving.

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### 3. (U) Reduction of Personnel in the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam. (ACofS, Procurement)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Reduction of Personnel in USAPAV on a percentage basis compared with all other command activities is creating a problem that will adversely affect both the quality and quantity of procurement actions.

b. **EVALUATION:** USAPAV's workload is related to the number of PR&C's received, the variety of services required, and the number and complexity of contracts under administration, rather than a reduction in the quantity of a particular service or supply. For example, a contract for stevedore services to unload 1,000 ships creates just as much workload in USAPAV as does a contract to unload 2,000 ships. The workload will not be reduced significantly until the volume and variety of the contracts USAPAV has under administration are reduced. As elements of organizations supported by USAPAV are reduced in number, USAPAV's workload will increase as a result of additional contracts for retrograde of materials and equipment. This will include additional work for packing and crating, care and preservation, transportation and stevedoring.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Action be taken to review the activities and the requirements of work to be performed before a percentile reduction is made on procurement activities.

### 4. (U) Shortage of Non-commissioned Officers. (Adjutant General)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The 1st Logistical Command is presently experiencing shortages of Noncommissioned Officers in the ammunition, general duty, maintenance, transportation, administration and supply career groups.

b. **EVALUATION:** The 1st Logistical Command is short key noncommissioned officers as follows:

<u>MOS</u>		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>%</u>
55B	Ammunition Storage Supervisor	253	118	46
57E	Laundry Bath and Impregnation Supv	156	57	36
57H	Cargo Supervisor	478	353	74
63Z	Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor	195	128	66
64C	Truckmaster	696	578	83
71H	Personnel Supervisor	177	140	79
71N	Movements Supervisor	126	80	63
73C	Pay Disbursing Supervisor	131	63	48
76V	Equipment Storage Supervisor	520	151	29
76W	Petroleum Storage Supervisor	293	139	47
76X	Subsistence Storage Supervisor	110	88	80
76Z	Senior Supply Sergeant	194	159	82

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The continued shortage of Noncommissioned Officers could have a serious impact on the command ability to accomplish its mission in the foregoing MOS areas.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the number of replacement Noncommissioned Officers in the MOS's be increased to allow for a more favorable Non-commissioned Officer Strength Picture.

5. (U) Shortage of Ammunition Helpers (MOS 55A) (Adjutant General)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The 1st Logistical Command continues to be critically short of personnel in MOS 55A, Ammunition Helpers.

b. **EVALUATION:** The 1st Logistical Command is presently at 9 percent of its authorized strength in MOS 55A. During this period, only 37 replacements in MOS 55A10 were received by this command. This shortage has been brought to the attention of Headquarters, USARV and the USCONARC Service School Liaison Team. As an interim measure, the SUPCOMs were advised to utilize personnel in overstrength MOS to perform duty in MOS 55A under the provisions of paragraph 3-5b, AR 600-200. This is not the most desirable solution however, since the assigned enlisted strength of this command is constantly less than authorized.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That either a training base for MOS 55A be established in CONUS or that this command's requirements for personnel in MOS 55A be filled by personnel in MOS 55B to bring this command to a more favorable strength posture in this MOS.

6. (U) Shortage of Drivers (MOS 64A/64B) (Adjutant General)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The status of vehicle drivers again reverted to a stage of being critically short during this period.

b. **EVALUATION:** Last quarter, this command's assigned driver strength rose to 92% of authorized at the close of period. During this period the trend reversed itself as the assigned driver strength dropped to 77 percent of authorized. During this period, 1150 replacements in MOS 64A and 64B were received. This decline can be attributed to heavy DEROS losses and the redeployment of the Keystone Eagle and Clear Adjust units during this period. This decline has been brought to the attention of Headquarters, USARV and has resulted in this command being given priority of driver replacements. Additionally, USARV levied the combat elements for 170 profiled infantrymen to be retrained in MOS 64A/64B. However at the close of the period, all had not reported to this command.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That this command be maintained at 90 percent or more of authorized strength in MOS 64A/64B to enable this command to accomplish its transportation mission.

7. (U) Shortage of General Duty Personnel (MOS 57A) (Adjutant General)

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command continues to be critically short of personnel in MOS 57A, Duty Soldier.

b. EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command is presently at 13 percent of its authorized strength in MOS 57A. During this period only 80 replacements in MOS 57A10 were received by this command. This shortage has been brought to the attention of Headquarters, USARV and the USCONARC Service School Liaison Team. As an interim measure the SUPCOMs were advised to utilize personnel in overstrength MOS to perform duty in MOS 57A under the provisions of paragraph 3-5b, AR 600-200. This is not the most desirable solution, however, since the assigned enlisted strength of this command is constantly at less than authorized strength.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That either a training base for MOS 57A be established in CONUS or that this command's requirements for personnel in MOS 57A be filled by personnel in MOS 57H to bring this command to a more favorable strength posture in this MOS.

8. (U) Implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968. (Staff Judge Advocate)

a. OBSERVATION: The Military Justice Act of 1968 became fully effective 1 August 1969, requiring that, if an accused so requests, he must be represented at a special court-martial by officer-lawyer counsel certified as competent to perform such duties by The Judge Advocate General of the Army. There were insufficient Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) officers in this command or U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) to implement the Act. There were, however, sufficient JAGC officers and certified non-JAGC officers present within the command. A sufficient number of JAGC officers should be available in USARV by May 1970. As a result of the initial shortage of JAGC officers, non-JAGC officer lawyers were identified as they arrived in the command and distributed among the support commands so as to ensure that each support command would have sufficient lawyer counsel to implement the Act. Some of the non-JAGC lawyers were utilized as counsel on a full time basis while others were utilized on a part time basis. Special court-martial jurisdictions were also consolidated to the maximum extent feasible to provide for the best possible utilization of the officer lawyers.

b. EVALUATION: During this quarter certified officer-lawyer defense counsel were detailed to nearly all special courts-martial within the command, and on all such cases when the accused so requested.

Correspondingly, in nearly all cases when the accused was represented by lawyer counsel the government was also represented by lawyer counsel. The Act, therefore, is being successfully implemented, and should continue to be in the future. This would not have been probable without the services of the non-JAGC officer lawyers.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That non-JAGC officer lawyers continue to be utilized as special courts-martial counsel, but that they be replaced in the Judge Advocate offices as additional JAGC officers are assigned to the command. This recommendation has been carried out within this command this quarter and will continue to be in the future.

B. (U) INTELLIGENCE

(NONE)

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## C. (C) OPERATIONS

### 1. (U) Combat Essential (CE) and Emergency Resupply (ER) Missions (ACofS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: Often combat essential (CE) and emergency resupply (ER) missions were not completed by the required delivery date (RDD) due to the failure of the consignor to properly check the shipment for content or to insure timely arrival of the supplies at the aerial port.

b. EVALUATION: Currently, combat essential (CE) and emergency resupply (ER) missions are conducted in accordance with 1st Logistical Command Regulation 55-40, date 22 March 1969. This regulation covers, in detail, actions to be taken to properly execute a CE or ER mission; however, many times the supplies arrived at the aerial port after the availability time and/or arrived in the wrong quantity or type. These errors were usually the result of failure to specify a single responsible person to follow-up the mission from the point of origin to the aerial port. Considering the criticality of these missions, a change to the regulation is being published by HQ 1st Log Comd. To insure responsibility is fixed during the complete move, the regulation will require that an officer or NCO (E-7 or above) accompany the cargo from the point of origin (normally the depot) to the aerial port, and that he physically check the cargo against the documentation. Additionally, an officer or NCO (E-7 or above) will be required to be at the destination airfield to check the cargo and accompany it to the consignee.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That "intensive management" procedures be applied to all CE and ER missions. There must be closed loop supervision and on the ground checks from the point of pick up until the supplies are delivered to the consignee.

### 2. (U) Management Technique for Redeploying/Inactivating Units (ACofS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: Management tools were necessary to effectively monitor and supervise the major events that had to be accomplished by 1st Log Comd and redeploying/inactivating units under operations Keystone Cardinal and Clear Adjust.

b. EVALUATION: This headquarters was responsible for planning and supervising the redeployment of 27 1st Log Comd units to CONUS and relocation of 5 1st Log Comd units within RVN. Close control of each unit's major activities such as major item turn-ins and lateral transfers were needed. To accomplish this, Keystone Cardinal Events Charts (Gantt Charts) were developed for each redeploying and relocating unit. These charts programmed major events on a time-phased basis. Each support command reported

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daily to the Logistical Operations Control Center the date on which the scheduled events were initiated and/or completed, in addition to any problem areas encountered. A sample Keystone Cardinal Chart is shown at inclosure 14.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That event charts of this or similar type be used as management tools in future unit redeployments/relocations.

### 3. (U) Assistance to Redeploying/Inactivating Units (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** 1st Logistical Command units redeploying/inactivating required special assistance in solving logistical problems.

b. **EVALUATION:** Hq, USARV formed a redeployment assistance team (URAT) to assist all US Army units redeploying/inactivating during Operation Keystone Cardinal/Clear Adjust. The 1st Logistical Command units involved in operations Clear Adjust/Keystone Cardinal encountered problems peculiar to combat service support units, e.g. disposition of large ASL/PLL. To provide these units with the assistance required, this headquarters formed the Logistical Redeployment Assistance Team (LRAT). This team was composed of one representative from ACofS, SP&O and at least one representative from the 1st Logistical Command staff section having primary interest in the unit visited; for example, ACofS, Maint provided a representative to visit maintenance units. To provide the LRAT with uniform and comprehensive procedures, a check list was prepared which could be used in part or in its entirety depending on the size and type of unit being visited. A sample of the LRAT check list is shown at inclosure 15.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the Logistical Redeployment Assistance Team (LRAT) and LRAT check lists be considered for use as management tools in future redeployments/inactivations.

### 4. (C) Guidance for Redeployment/Inactivation Operations (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Guidance from higher headquarters concerning redeployment operations during Operation Keystone Cardinal was not timely.

b. **EVALUATION:** Both prior and subsequent to the publication of ILC OPOD 184-69, numerous oral and written changes affecting logistics guidance were received by this headquarters. Timeliness necessitated the piecemeal dissemination of this information to subordinate commands rather than delay furnishing guidance until all instructions were finalized.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That guidance concerning redeployment operations be published by higher headquarters as far in advance of the operation as possible.

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### 5. (U) Helicopters for Pipeline Surveillance. (ACofS, Supply)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Commencing 30 July 1969, two helicopters were made available to the Qui Nhon Support Command from 0600 - 1130 hrs daily for pipeline surveillance. On 3 August 1969 this was reduced to one helicopter which was available all day.

b. **EVALUATION:** These helicopters proved to be very effective in locating line breaks, discouraging and detecting pilferers, and improving communications along the pipelines. A request for an additional helicopter was initiated on 29 October 1969.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Because helicopters have proven to be very effective in overland pipeline operations, consideration should be given to modifying TOE's of pipeline units to provide for helicopter support.

### 6. (C) Leaking Modified Lifting Plugs. (ACofS, Ammunition)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The nose lifting plugs for ICM loaded projectiles were modified to include a blow out aluminum core centered in the steel nose plug. Surveillance inspection of the nose plugs revealed that moisture is entering the fuze cavity of ICM projectiles assembled with the modified lifting plug.

b. **EVALUATION:** In September 1969 it was discovered at Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) that 155mm and 8" ICM projectiles (D561 and D684) assembled with the modified ICM lifting (nose) plug had moisture in the fuze cavity. Further inspections and evaluations revealed that moisture was entering the cavity through the aluminum blow out core of the plug. A 100% inspection was conducted of D561 and D684 revealing that 15% of these items assembled with the modified lifting plug had moisture in the fuze cavity. Ammunition personnel were instructed to remove moisture from fuze cavities by wiping with a clean dry rag, and reassemble serviceable lifting plugs with gaskets. Plugs were to be torqued to 100 to 200 inch pounds. Further, all D561 and D684 were to be under protective cover, which in most cases consists of an A-frame covered with canvas. United States Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (USAAPSA) was advised of this condition. Reply from USAAPSA indicated that a new plug has been designed and would be shipped to this command as soon as possible. The new plug has been subjected to pressure, vibration and water tests.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That new plugs be subjected to environmental test of 110° or higher, prior to shipment to this command.

### 7. (C) Five-Ton Rough Terrain (RT) Crane. (ACofS, Ammunition)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Eight 5-T, RT Cranes were received on conditional release from CONUS for use at the 3d Ord Bn in order that contract crane

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service could be terminated. Request of conditional release of the 5T (RT) Cranes, which are the TOE authorized items, was required as the item had not completed all acceptance tests. USATECOM, the testing agency, had completed all the series of tests and had indicated minor maintenance problems but no operational problems.

b. **EVALUATION:** Immediately upon placing the 5-RT Crane into service at the 3d Ord Bn, certain operational and safety problems were noted. These problems included: limited operator visibility due to the placement of the operator and the cab design; stationary placement of the operator precluding continuous visibility of the load; multiple manipulation of control by the operator to complete one load/off-load cycle, thus resulting in slow operations; design characteristics requiring the use of mirrors in attempts to maintain load surveillance which resulted in load distortion and operator judgement problems; and structural design weakness in the boom extension which buckles when attempting to lift less than two tons at zero degrees thus precluding the expeditious placement of ammunition in storage locations. Action has been taken locally to overcome problems, (i.e., operator cabs have been removed and use of boom extension have been prohibited) however, subject item is not suited for ammunition operations.

e. **RECOMMENDATION:** That human engineering studies and tests be added to the new equipment requirements/adoption cycle.

8. (U) Policy for Conduct of Postal Inspections (Ref item 1, page S1, ORLL for the period 1 May through 31 July 1969) (Adjutant General)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The checklist described in the referenced report has been placed in use and has proved an invaluable tool in reducing postal errors.

b. **EVALUATION:** The checklist has proven to be an excellent tool for inspectors and inspected postal units. The flexibility introduced into the system by reducing the items contained therein as deficiencies has proven its worth. Further, use of the locally designed form permits changes as they occur in regulatory documents, and is not dependent upon field printing plants for revision when needed.

e. **RECOMMENDATION:** That, to preclude printing and distribution costs, Department of the Army prescribe the necessary items for inspection in regulations, providing for local reproduction of checklist forms to be used in inspections.

9. (U) 3SVN Programs. (Data Systems)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Installation of certain programs of the new standard 3SVN depot system at USAD, QNH and LBN created unexpected problems when certain programs failed to perform properly.

b. **EVALUATION:** When depot operations were automated in January 1969 with installation of IBM 7010/1460 ADPE configurations, no central design and programming group was established to police the system and maintain the standard machine programs. With changes occurring continuously and each depot making its own system, the standard system soon ceased to exist. To restandardize depot ADP operations, a work group mentioned in paragraph 4, page 116 was established. This group reviewed the programs of each depot, selected one for each run, and modified them as necessary to reduce processing times. After test at CRB, the standard system was then installed at QNH and LBN. However, through an oversight, not all programs were thoroughly tested and when run at QNH and LBN problems developed in three areas. The major problem in Program SO6VB for processing A $\beta$ , A3 and A4 transactions resulted in lost production time of 34 hours at Long Binh and 42 hours at Qui Nhon during October 1969.

c. **RECOMMENDATIONS:** (1) More time should have been allocated for testing prior to implementation.

(2) Although canned data was used for testing, runs with "live" data should also be used to provide a thorough test of the program.

10. (U) ADP Production Loss. (Data Systems)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Air conditioning and power problems resulted in loss of considerable ADP production at major data processing activities.

b. **EVALUATION:** Data processing activities at USAICCV, USAD, Qui-Nhon, and 4th Transportation Command all experienced air conditioning failures during the period 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969. Although air conditioning is provided for and maintained by a civilian contractor, unreliability of equipment maintenance and service during this period had considerable impact on mission ADP operations of the command. Air conditioning had considerable impact on mission ADP operations of the command. Air conditioning units involved are commercial units of varying makes and models.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Although commercial equipment, which is provided and maintained by a commercial contractor is involved, the activity supported must ensure as a minimum:

(1) That adequate manufacturer technical manuals are on hand for maintenance and repair.

(2) That a prescribed load list of repair parts is maintained and available in the data processing activity for rapid use in repair of down equipment.

(3) That preventive maintenance is scheduled and performed by contractor personnel.

(4) That backup equipment (particularly compressor motors) is provided in-country for direct exchange purposes.

(5) That specified individuals with adequate refrigeration training are available (by name) on call to repair the air conditioning equipment in event of failure and that they check in with the administrative section of the data processing activity when making all service calls to the activity.

(6) That all failures of contractor personnel to adequately perform maintenance duties be documented and appropriate action taken to notify the contracting officer.

11. (U) Operational Readiness Rate Reporting (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command maintains a daily status report on selected items of equipment. Information is reported in DA Form 2406 format by phone each day through maintenance channels. The information is transferred to chart and graphical form by the ACofS, Maintenance and presented to the Commanding General and his staff at the morning briefing the following day.

b. EVALUATION: This system of monitoring deadline equipment for selected items has proved valuable in the management of USARV Materiel Readiness. It ensures command attention to problem areas almost immediately after they are reported. The briefing is attended by the commander of the ICCV and representatives of USARV (in addition to the 1st Log Comd staff) and therefore problems involving more than one staff element can be resolved and coordinate within minimum time. This system is especially beneficial for interface and information exchange between supply, maintenance and ICC elements.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the system of management and reporting of operational Readiness rates by the 1st Logistical Command be adopted for use by other organizations to increase operational readiness rates.

12. (U) Instruct and Advise Teams. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Geographical dispersion, peculiar operational situations, organizational structures, mission requirements, and personnel rotation policies seriously affected direct support operations in RVN.

b. EVALUATION: Instruct and Advise Teams consisting of an officer, one supply and one maintenance warrant officer and 4 NCO's were established at 1st Log HQ. These teams provide the SUPCOM's with assistance in improving supply and maintenance operations within subordinate elements, provide the operating elements with objective evaluation of operations, instructional assistance, and provide 1st Logistical Command command and control elements with information for evaluating mission performance and identifying problem areas. Instruction by the teams is necessary to fill the gap in continuity and training created by the rapid rotation of personnel in RVN and the unique environment in which company size elements are required to operate.

e. **RECOMMENDATION:** That other logistical organizations investigate the merit of using Instruct and Advise Teams to enhance direct support supply and maintenance operations.

13. (U) Repair Parts Direct Exchange Procedures. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** In this command productivity of the DSU repair facilities supporting Direct Exchange activities were far below the minimum requirements.

b. **EVALUATION:** Observations revealed that reasons for the low productivity were poor management, improperly trained personnel, understaffed repair sections and poor maintenance and supply procedures.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-53 outlines the supply procedures for requesting, issuing and accounting for supplies to support the repair facilities, 1st Log Command Regulation 710-2 provides a country-wide list of parts and kits required to repair Direct Exchange items and instructions on the operation of a DX facility. These two regulations can be used as a tool by all commanders to establish a productive repair facility to support their DSU direct exchange operation.

14. (U) Increase of Order-Ship-Time Factor. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** 1st Logistical Command was sustaining a high NORs rate for many items of equipment.

b. **EVALUATION:** Analysis indicated a heavy percentage of DSU ASL's at zero balance. DSU OST Factor was 15 days. A country wide study of DSU OST revealed that actual OST far exceeded 15 days.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Divisional units' OST factor was increased to a 30 day factor.

15. (U) Maintenance Unit Country Stores. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** A system did not exist to ensure the efficient distribution of expendable low dollar value repair kits, accessories and common hardware items except through requisitioning on the DSU.

b. **EVALUATION:** Maintenance DS and GS units were developing distribution systems in conjunction with Direct Exchange Operations. The items stocked in these systems were inadequate as they did not provide a complete line of required repair kits, accessories and common hardware items.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** 1st Logistical Command Regulation 725-1 was developed to cover this need. This regulation eliminates unit requisitions and provides policies and procedures for the operation of a maintenance

country store. The regulation directs each DS and GS unit with a "tech supply mission" supporting customer units to establish a country store through a comprehensive stockage of recommended items.

16. (U) DSU Bulletins. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** As a result of Instruct and Advise Team visits it was determined that support units and their customers were not receiving timely supply and maintenance information.

b. **EVALUATION:** Updated information, technical instructions, helpful hints, and other data are gathered by 1st Logistical Command and published periodically in a DSU Bulletin. These bulletins are mailed directly to support units in the theater.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Continued use of this method of providing fresh information to supply and maintenance personnel in the theater.

✓ 17. (U) Electronic Items Repair and Return Program. (AcofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** A repair and return to user program for electronic items is in effect between USARV and CONUS maintenance activities. This program had been authorized by DA Supply Bulletin 11-617 and implemented by USAECOM Supply Information Letter, however, the program was not functioning.

b. **EVALUATION:** The program, as first conceived, was modified by various messages changing instructions and adding items to the program. On visits to the field it was found that the maintenance shop personnel did not know what was to be returned, where it was to go, or how it was to be shipped. Unserviceable equipment eligible for the program was being stock piled. Repairable assets were being discarded. Shipping clerks were working from hand written or typed scraps of paper. All the instructions were gathered and published in a single document by 1st Logistical Command. This document and the latest SIL containing the authorized listings were given widespread distribution. Extra copies were given to all USAECOM representatives who work out of this headquarters for distribution to any shops visited which did not have the information.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That all concerned, continue to keep the electronics R&R program information updated and distributed.

18. (U) Electronic Component Testing. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Design defects necessitated modification of all AN/GRC-106 Radios in country. Due to expected problems in modifying 1800 sets in-country, the modification was to be accomplished in CONUS and sets would be exchanged in the field. Upon testing the first shipment, modified sets were found to be inoperable.

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b. **EVALUATION:** When the first shipment arrived, 1st Logistical Command instructions were given to sample test the equipment to ensure serviceability prior to exchange with units. This testing immediately uncovered that 30 percent of the sets were unserviceable. The trouble symptoms were numerous, however, certain deficiencies were recurring. Using units would immediately lose confidence in the modified equipment if they received it unserviceable. The results of these tests were forwarded to USAECOM and Sacramento Army Depot which was performing the modification. Several of the symptoms were eliminated as a result of readjusting the idle current on the Power Amplifier Tube to center scale.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** All sets received in country will be tested until the unsatisfactory condition is corrected.

### D. (C) ORGANIZATION

#### 1. (U) Time Lag Between Receipt of General Orders and Receipt of MTOE/TDA. (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** General Orders implementing Phase III Standardization were received during this period, reorganizing, activating, or inactivating a total of 85 of 1st Logistical Command units.

b. **EVALUATION:** No approved authorization documents were received for these reorganizations and activities. The time lag between receipt of general orders and receipt of MTOE/TDA creates a hardship on units concerned as no basis for requisitioning of personnel and equipment exists until receipt of the authorization documents. This was especially critical since several units were inactivated, thereby removing requisitioning authority for those units. Requisitioning authority for units activated to replace the inactivated units is not available until an authorization document is received. This creates a time lag of several weeks to a month in this command's requisitioning base.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that authorization documents and implementing general orders be published and distributed as a complete package.

#### 2. (C) Temporary Loan of Equipment. (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the period a total of 66 requests for temporary loans of equipment were processed. Most requests were for items in four general areas: Materials handling, power generation, weapons and equipment for defense augmentation, and heavy transport. It has been noted that loans for weapons and some heavy transport equipment have been more readily obtained than in the past. Materials handling equipment continues to be difficult to obtain, with the exception of some types of warehouse forklifts. MTOE and MTD A actions continue to be submitted to authorize equipment loaned for continuing requirements.

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b. **EVALUATION:** As the redeployment of combat forces gains momentum, the problem of defense of logistical installations and increasing retrograde workload will become more acute. Excess equipment for accomplishment of these tasks will become more readily available (i.e. weapons, power generation equipment for security lighting and MHE and heavy lift equipment for retrograde). However, temporary loans will not completely satisfy these requirements since retention of the loaned equipment is dependent upon authorization documentation. The moratorium imposed upon MTOE/MTDA submissions will impede documentation of this badly needed authorization.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that the exceptions allowed in the MTOE/MTDA moratorium be extended to include actions to authorize not only combat essential requirements, but also retrograde and combat service support requirements.

### 3. (U) Non TOE Missions. (ACofS, Services)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Supply and Service Companies are required to perform non TOE mission activities such as operation of Self Service Supply Centers. This diverts unit personnel from other mission activities to perform these functions.

b. **EVALUATION:** Frequently personnel from the Graves Registration and Laundry Sections are diverted to these activities. Graves registration activities must be adequately manned to assure that remains and personal property are expeditiously evacuated. Without sufficient trained personnel to handle this sensitive mission, the possibility of errors in identification and loss of property is increased and results in unnecessary grief to the next of kin and subsequent embarrassment to the Army. Additionally, personnel have been diverted from laundry sections. This reduces production capability and increases contract costs during a period when every effort is being made to economize on fund expenditures.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the Supply and Service Company TOE 29-147 be changed to make provision for sufficient personnel to operate the Self Service Supply Centers as part of the supply mission of the Company.

### B. (U) TRAINING

#### 1. (U) Driver Training. (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** An extensive amount of driver training continues to be required after personnel arrive in Vietnam.

b. **EVALUATION:** Driver training conducted in CONUS is primarily for light vehicles while requirements in Vietnam are primarily for drivers of heavy equipment.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the CONUS training base provide more training for drivers of heavy vehicles.

2. (U) **Chaplain Training Conference. (Staff Chaplain)**

a. **OBSERVATION:** Each Support Command conducted a monthly Chaplains' Training for its chaplains. There were frequent opportunities in all Support Commands for spiritual growth of chaplains through weekly religious retreats, monthly prayer breakfasts, and days of recollection.

b. **EVALUATION:** These regular conferences provided the supervisory chaplain the opportunity to keep chaplains informed as to the current policies, projects and goals of the Command. The chaplains have benefited greatly from these training conferences and from the opportunity for worship and meditation.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Continued interest should be given to the monthly Chaplains' Training Conference and additional opportunities to provide the chaplains with spiritual growth and enrichment.

3. (U) **ARVNIZATION (ACofS, Transportation)**

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the process of ARVNIZATION of military ports, it has been observed that ARVN lacks sufficient hard skills in some areas to adequately conduct deep draft port operations except at Saigon Commercial Port.

b. **EVALUATION:** To ensure that maximum efficiency is obtained in deep draft port operations, a high skill level in the areas of stevedoring, material handling, drayage, and documentation is needed.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That U.S. port operators engaged in ARVNIZATION continue providing additional training for ARVN terminal service personnel who are about to assume responsibility for cargo discharge or who are conducting joint operations.

3. (U) **BUDDY Training (ACofS, SP&O)**

a. **OBSERVATION:** ARVN has not taken full advantage of the Operation BUDDY capability of this command.

b. **EVALUATION:** Although the number of ARVN soldiers being trained has increased, the ARVN input is still short of the estimated training capability of this command of approximately 1100 ARVN soldiers each month. It is believed that most ARVN logistics training requirements can be filled by this command, if known. Past determinations of ARVN logistics training requirements may require revision in view of the recent emphasis being placed on improvement of ARVN capability.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That MACV and ARVN continually evaluate and update the ARVN training requirements for determination of those areas in which this command can be of assistance.

3. (U) **BUDDY Training (ACofS, SP&G)**

a. **OBSERVATION:** ARVN logistical commands are not fully utilizing Operation BUDDY training.

b. **EVALUATION:** There appeared to be a reluctance on the part of ARVN to accept the training this command offered. The reasons for this were not apparent; however, it may well have been that political and sociological factors may have influenced their attitude towards the training. Once training started and ARVN soldiers began living and working side-by-side with US soldiers, each developed a respect for the others' capability. When ARVN graduates returned to their parent units and demonstrated their proficiency, many others saw the benefits of this training and wanted to take part in it.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the intent and results of a training program like Operation BUDDY be given the widest possible dissemination. Formal graduation ceremonies should be conducted and all available news media used to disseminate to all ARVN units the benefits which ARVN graduates enjoy.

F. (U) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Tire Inflation on Retrograde Vehicles (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Tires on retrograde vehicles were deflated in an attempt to better stabilize the vehicle during shipment. This deflation of tires resulted in many serviceable tires being ruined due to the weight of the vehicle resting on the tire rubber.

b. EVALUATION: A review of the TM55 Series Transportability Guidance Manuals revealed that wheeled vehicles were to be inflated to 10 PSI above highway operating pressures. Inflating tires above normal operating pressures not only helped preserve the tires but also better stabilized the vehicle during shipment. By overinflating the tires after loading and tying down a vehicle the tie down chains were additionally tightened and therefore better stabilized the vehicle. 1st Logistical Command published special RETRO-RIGHT Newsletters and messages in order to give this information the widest distribution to the field.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That key transportability guidance information be included in the TM's for each vehicle, and also in such publications as PS Magazine.

2. (U) Excessive Time Required to Overhaul Watercraft. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Time lost in overhaul of tug boats and landing craft (ICUs) deprived 1st Logistical Command use of the craft for extended periods. In August 1969, 14 tug boats were in out-of-country commercial shipyards for overhaul. This was 38% of the tug fleet. Five had been in overhaul for more than a year; 14 for more than six months. Forty four percent of the total ICUs assigned were then in drydock overhaul.

b. EVALUATION: Although periodic drydocking and overhaul was due and scheduled, evacuation of additional tug boats and ICUs would have reduced the numbers available below minimum operational requirements. The overhaul schedule was suspended and a one-for-one policy established. For each vessel returned from overhaul, a like vessel was released to maintenance for overhaul. The policy remains in effect and has had the desired effect of retaining sufficient craft in-country for operational requirements.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the one for one watercraft policy remain in effect until the high percentage of the fleet that is in overhaul is reduced to normal. Generally, the lesson to be applied is that realistic programming of marine equipment will often require intensified management on an item and operational requirement rather than program estimates based upon purely time interval.

3. (U) DS & GS Maintenance of River Patrol Boats. (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The MOn of river patrol boats operated by the MP Bde exceeded 50% in late August 1969. The primary cause of deadline was lack of repair parts and supporting maintenance capability. The patrol boats had been obtained under Project ENSURE.

b. **EVALUATION:** The underlying maintenance problem was determined to be that on-board spares, major repair parts, engines, and propulsion pumps initially supplied to the operational unit to support the boats were consumed and the unit failed to requisition replacement parts. A PLL had not been established and filled with the supporting maintenance activity. Further, the using unit was performing levels of maintenance beyond its capability. The MOn rate at the end of October was reduced to 12% of the patrol boats on hand. Actions to reduce the deadline rate were coordinated by a project officer designated by the 1st Logistical Command. A PLL was prepared and an initial stockage of repair parts requisitioned. Critical repair parts were obtained through RED BALL, expedited requisitions from CONUS, and an ISSA was established with the Navy to obtain critical repair parts from sources-in-country. Commercial contractor facilities in-country were used to overhaul engines and other components. The unit was relieved of maintenance responsibilities beyond organizational level and support maintenance responsibilities assigned to appropriate DS and GS activities in the Support Commands. Five patrol boats were withdrawn from service for complete overhaul by the USA Marine Maintenance Activity in Cam Ranh Bay.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That supporting maintenance capability and responsibilities plus procedures to obtain repair parts be firmly established simultaneous with procurement action of any nonstandard item of equipment. Similar problems have been experienced with out-board motors and shallow draft boats purchased under project ENSURE.

4. (U) Redeployment Criteria for Keystone Cardinal. (Adjutant General)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The redeployment criteria for redeployment/inactivation of unit should be received in adequate time to allow adequate reaction time.

b. **EVALUATION:** The redeployment criteria for Keystone Cardinal Units redeploying/inactivating on or after 16 October 1969 was not received until 1800 hours, 9 October 1969. The late receipt of this criteria did not allow for adequate planning and caused hasty actions and general confusion in preparing these units for redeployment/inactivation.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the redeployment criteria be disseminated at an earlier date to allow for adequate and orderly planning.

5. (U) Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) Excesses (ACofS, Services)

a. **OBSERVATION:** The extremely large quantities of OICC excesses released to PDO in the past two quarters created many property disposal problems. A principal objective is to obtain maximum utilization of this property and reduce the possibility of reprourement of like property in the future due to insufficient screening of the property listings.

b. **EVALUATION:** Troop Reservation (TR) Listings have created many problems to PDOs. TR-15 had an acquisition cost of \$8 million and weighed 20,000 short tons. Basic problems stemmed from a lack of definitive policy indicating priorities of screening and physical handling of the property for ultimate disposition. Another problem is the dissimilarity of the OICC 12 digit stock identification system with the military federal stock numbering system. During the next few months another \$30 million of OICC excesses becomes available and possibly could be turned over to PDO for final disposition. Numerous conferences were held to determine requirements and possibilities in solving the OICC excesses dilemma. In September a final conference was held at 2nd Logistical Command attended by representatives of OICC, 1st and 2nd Logistical Commands, CINCPAC, USARPAC, MACV and USARV. The result of this meeting was the definitive guidance required to economically and expeditiously process future OICC excess listings:

(1) OICC/RVN will provide all possible identification data at the initiation of the screening process to include listings of manufacturer codes.

(2) 2nd Logistical Command will correlate manufacturer part numbers with federal stock numbered items.

(3) Authorized units/agencies desiring to obtain these materials on a non-reimbursable basis may obtain these directly from the OICC - thus alleviating the PDO workload.

(4) Upon completion of OICC screening within established priorities, residues will be sent to property disposal for sale.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Construction materials should be procured under the federal stock number system. Maximum quantities of property should be issued to fill valid requirements prior to being turned over to PDO.

6. (U) Credit Control System (ACofS, Services)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Self Service Supply Centers (SSSC) were originally managed in conjunction with the wholesale supply system and did not receive intensive management until May 1969. There were no controls established over the issue of SSSC supplies. Commanders complained of the lack of SSSC supply support.

b. **EVALUATION:** Customers were allowed to order what they wanted on a first-come-first-serve basis. Stocks would become depleted and customers would hoard supplies. Customers would receive uneven distribution of available supplies. The credit control system allowed higher headquarters to evaluate the requirements of supported units. Formerly this determination was made by the store manager based on his best judgment. In addition, this system requires customers to justify expenditures over and above their basic allocation and helps eliminate requesting nice-to-have items.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the credit control system be continued to get the required supplies to the right customer in the required time frame.

7. (U) Project RED BALL (ACofS, Supply)

a. **OBSERVATION:** In the 4th quarter FY69, it was recommended that US Army Field Depot, Da Nang be satellited on US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for RED BALL requisitions. It was suggested that by routine RED BALL requisitions through Qui Nhon a greater percentage of fill could be achieved before requisitions reached the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam.

b. **EVALUATION:** After a 3 month trial period, statistics showed that requisitions passed by Da Nang to Qui Nhon were arriving at USAICCV 10 or more days after the date of the document number. This time frame is considered excessive for processing Red Ball requisitions. Investigation showed that the Red Ball Division of US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, did not have enough personnel to process Red Ball requisitions for both Qui Nhon and Da Nang Field Depot within the necessary time frame. Action was taken to suspend this procedure and Red Ball requisitions are presently being transceived straight from Da Nang Field Depot to the USAICCV.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** None.

8. (U) KEYSTONE CARDINAL (ACofS, Supply)

a. **OBSERVATION:** At the time of announcement that units would redeploy under Keystone Cardinal the inactivation plan and redistribution procedures for equipment had not been fully developed.

This hampered the orderly preparation of subordinate headquarters' directives. Also, sufficient time was not allotted to publish the 1st Logistical Command implementing order prior to the first unit standdown.

b. **EVALUATION:** Procedures, rules and methods to implement a large scale turn-in of equipment and maintaining accountability and an audit trail are required prior to beginning the exercise. Experience gained during this exercise indicated that late planning provided many follow-on problem areas in actually inspecting, reporting, and obtaining disposition instructions on equipment.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That directives and letters of instruction establish necessary processing locations a minimum of 10 days prior to the first unit standdown and be provided in sufficient time to permit subordinate headquarters to properly plan for implementation of the exercise.

9. (U) Rail Operations. (ACofS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the reporting period, members of the Mail and Highway Division, ACofS, Transportation, made spot inspections of about 70 percent of the U.S. Army owned railway equipment throughout RVN. Special attention was directed to assets within the Saigon area, where the Vietnam Railway System has a large concentration of equipment and trained maintenance personnel. The inspections revealed a lack of routine maintenance being performed on rolling stock.

b. **EVALUATION:** The VNRS has been negligent in maintaining U.S. Army owned railway equipment at standards established in the maintenance contract. The results of inspections by personnel of the Mail and Highway Division are being brought to the attention of the VNRS by the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** None.

10. (U) ARVNIZATION (ACofS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** In certain ports, ARVN's ability to assume a larger portion of the port operations workload is dependent upon their ability to recruit an adequate labor force and then maintain that labor force.

b. **EVALUATION:** ARVN recruitment of local laborers for port operations places them in direct competition with U.S. sponsored stevedoring contractors who also hire from the available labor supply.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That plans be made on a local level, to provide more training for local nationals. This could be done by expanding existing programs or by requesting U.S. contractors to conduct the

training of LM's as is already the case in Da Nang and Qui Nhon. Also recommend that the port tariff contain provisions to prevent contractors from proselytizing workers from firms which pay lower wages as would be the case with ARVN contractors.

11. (U) Non-Compliance with Subsistence Requirements. (ACofS, Supply)

a. OBSERVATION: CONUS supply sources shipped Thanksgiving Holiday meal items early and not containerized as requested. Also, deliveries of subsistence for Jewish High Holiday meals were not received by the Required Delivery Dates (RDD).

b. EVALUATION: Defense Personnel Services Center (DPSC), Alameda, was notified of the problems encountered and it was requested that these items be closely monitored in the future.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

12. (U) Chaplain Supplies (Staff Chaplain)

a. OBSERVATION: The number of line items of ecclesiastical supplies is so small in comparison with other supply items that there is a constant problem of zero balance unless there is continued monitoring of these items.

b. EVALUATION: The effectiveness of the present system is solely dependent upon the constant monitoring of the Requisition Objectives and the close coordination with ICCV.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Constant coordination must continue in all long range planning so that the Requisition Objectives may be adjusted to meet realistically the needs of the religious program.

G. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

None

H. (U) MATERIEL

1. (U) Garrison Mess Equipment (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: Garrison Mess Equipment of inactivated and deploying units is normally removed from messes and turned in at a designated location for disposition.

b. **EVALUATION:** Unit representatives visit storage locations, view and check mess equipment for serviceability. These representatives take these items without documentation and in quantities excess to requirements. Many of these units do not have an immediate need for the items, but retain them for future use. Items have been improperly stored near unit messes, exposed to the elements, and deteriorate prior to being utilized by acquiring units.

e. **RECOMMENDATION:** That Garrison Mess Equipment of inactivated and/or deploying units be inspected by qualified personnel. Items which are economically repairable should be repaired by PA&E and properly stored in a controlled area for re-issue to units which have a valid requisition for this equipment. Equipment considered not economically repairable should be cannibalized by PA&E and utilized as repair parts for installed equipment.

## 2. (U) Critical Shortage of Lumber (ACofS, Supply)

a. **OBSERVATION:** In June 1969, the supply of lumber and plywood became critical.

b. **EVALUATION:** To meet the most critical requirements, USARV established command control over all small dimension lumber (1x, 2x, 4x) and all sizes of plywood. USARV allocates lumber to each major command based on the monthly requirements submitted by each major command and available assets. 1st Logistical Command units use large quantities of lumber and plywood in depot operations, including contractor operated care and preservation facilities. Over the past 4 months 1st Logistical Command allocations have been approximately 50% of lumber requirements and 10% of plywood requirements. The productive output of all C&P facilities has been hampered by the shortfall of lumber, necessitating recovery of scrap lumber for reuse. Field fortifications, R&U repairs and depot rewarehousing operations have received only minimum assets so that lumber would be available for the more critical recoup and retrograde projects. The shortage of lumber has not halted the above projects but has significantly reduced the level of performance.

e. **RECOMMENDATION:** That command emphasis continue to be placed on lumber requirements; that projects receive extensive research and thorough planning; and that realistic demand data be developed to ensure adequate material is on hand to meet requirements for planned projects.

## I. (U) OTHERS

None

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (18 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Operation Keystone Cardinal", section I, page 23, paragraph 2b(1). Change "...eleven reserve units scheduled to redeploy under Clear Adjust also." to read: "...ten reserve component units formerly scheduled to redeploy under Clear Adjust."

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Reduction in Direct Support Infantry Security Guards Provided by the 18th Military Police Brigade", section II, page 117, paragraph A1; nonconcur. Referenced item recommended that critical logistical facilities should be authorized a dedicated force of sufficient size to preclude the need to divert skilled technicians from their primary mission and that they be an authorized/integral part of battalion and larger logistical elements. Paragraph 3d, section I of TOE 9-86F (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Ordnance Ammunition Direct Support Battalion) states that "individuals of this organization can engage in effective coordinated defense of the unit's area or installation." Most combat service support unit TOE include a unit defense capability. Because of the current drawdown and redeployment of units, it is not feasible to reorganize all logistical support units of battalion size or larger to provide for an authorized/integral security force.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Chaplains", section II, page 117, paragraph A2; concur. Experience in Vietnam has focused on the problem of assigning chaplains to separate group headquarters versus subordinate battalions. The deletion of group headquarters from the chain of command and control often results in deletion of the total chaplain support for all subordinate battalions. Recommend that DA study the feasibility of assigning chaplains at battalion level with one chaplain at group headquarters level to coordinate religious coverage for subordinate battalions. The elimination of group headquarters would not thus render the chaplain coverage of subordinate battalions impotent. This is a recurring problem in general support, transportation and artillery groups.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVFPC-DST (18 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Reduction of Personnel in the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV)", section II, page 118, paragraph A3; concur. However, the recommended review of activities and requirements of work to be performed before a percentile reduction is made on procurement activities should be accomplished by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command in conjunction with USAPAV. If it is determined that additional manpower requirements exist, recommendations should be submitted through channels with DA Form 140-4 (Schedule X-Manpower and Workload Data). Department of Army Pamphlet 1-45 (Manpower Procedures Handbook) provides guidance and instructions concerning manpower management procedures and utilization of DA Form 140-4.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Shortage of Non-commissioned Officers", section II, page 118, paragraph A4; concur. Shortages of NCOs, particularly in the middle grades, is a world-wide problem and DA is aware of USARV's posture. In all cases when on hand lower graded personnel are applied against NCO requirements the percentage of most MOS rises to a non-critical level. Substitution in accordance with the DA criteria should be applied and beyond that, utilization within career fields.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Shortage of Ammunition Helpers (MOS 55A)" and "Shortage of General Duty Personnel (MOS 57A)", section II, pages 119 and 120, paragraphs A5 and A7; nonconcur. While it is desirable to have every MOS at 100% of authorized the two in question are at the lower end of the soft skill spectrum and the duties entailed can be performed by individuals with any background. The establishment of a training base for either is not considered warranted. The overall operating strength of the 1st Logistical Command has been approximately 96 to 99% of manning level so the shortage is not so acute to preclude effective utilization under para 3-5b, AR 600-200. Every effort is made to maintain all units at 100% of manning level.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Shortage of Drivers (MOS 64A/64B)", section II, page 119, paragraph A6; concur. Ninety percent of authorized is a desirable objective. Since the close of the ORLL reporting period 1st Log 64A/B operating strength rose to 85%. That is currently above the USARV average and replacements are now being allocated on a proportionate share with the rest of USARV.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Guidance for Redeployment/Inactivation Operations", section II, page 123, paragraph C4; concur. Every effort is made by USARV to publish guidance as soon as possible. However, much of the essential personnel and logistical criteria are provided by DA and USARPAC, and are not available until subsequent to the announcement of a redeployment phase. This guidance is developed at the CINCPAC Planning Conference, held as soon as possible subsequent to the announcement of a phase. Guidance is then disseminated by DA and USARPAC in the form of LOI's. This information is a basic essential, upon which all subsequent guidance is based. Recommend this problem be examined by USARPAC and DA with a view toward increasing the response time available between publication of guidance and implementation of redeployment actions.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Helicopters for Pipeline Surveillance", section II, page 124, paragraph C5; concur. Unit should initiate action to submit a request for MTOE change. In the interim, action has been taken on the 1st Log Comd request for an additional helicopter--USARV G4 message, 180223Z Nov 69, subject: Helicopter Support, POL Pipeline, requested CG I FFV to provide one additional helicopter daily to improve the effectiveness of pipeline patrol and surveillance. One UH-1 helicopter supported by 3/82 ABN is being assigned to I FFV specifically to provide support for this additional mission.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Leaking Modified Lifting Plugs", section II, page 124, paragraph C6; concur. The new lifting plugs should be subjected to environmental test of 110 degrees or higher, prior to shipment to this command. Message was sent to Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (APSA), Joliet, Illinois advising them of the recommendation.

k. (C) Reference item concerning "Five-ton Rough Terrain (RT) Crane", section II, page 124, paragraph C7; concur. However, further recommend, since the 5-T RT crane was brought in for the purpose of terminating the contract crane services (HanJin), that some interim capability be provided 3d Ord Bn to make up for their loss in MHE capability. When the CG, USA Mobility Equipment Command, (MECOM), visited the 3d Ord Bn in the summer of 1969, a demonstration was put on showing the capability of the HanJin crane vs US MHE. The former was shown to be vastly superior to the latter both in ease of operation and amount of work accomplished. GEN Case, CG, MECOM, indicated he would look into this situation to see if some type of US equipment could be provided to improve the Ammo MHE situation in RVN. It is believed this matter should be followed up with MECOM or the further use of the HanJin cranes by contract be investigated.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "Policy for Conduct of Postal Inspections", section II, page 125, paragraph C8; nonconcur. Chapter 15, AR 65-1 provides detailed instructions on the conduct of audits of postal activities, and outlines twenty (20) specific areas of examination in the postal inspections. Using the common error method, inspection checklists can be developed for command when desired.

m. (U) Reference item concerning "ADP Production Loss", section II, page 126, paragraph C10; concur. Necessary instructions have been furnished through facilities engineering channels to all Installation Managers to provide increased supervision of the preventive maintenance program for air conditioning at vital facilities including ADP centers. In addition a program for maintenance was outlined which includes all elements of the recommendation.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Operational Readiness Rate Reporting", section II, page 127, paragraph C11; concur. Most equipment can be effectively managed on the basis of weekly reports. Submission of a daily DA Form 2406 imposes an extremely heavy administrative burden, both

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on using units and support units. Extreme care must be exercised to insure that the value gained from a daily report exceeds the cost in terms of resources required to compile it. This situation exists only when maintenance and supply managers can react on a daily basis. Furthermore, daily reports must be subjected to frequent review to insure that the items reported are combat/mission essential.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Electronic Items Repair and Return Program", section II, page 129, paragraph C17; concur. The Latest Supply Information Letter (SIL) #9-69 has been distributed to all shops.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Electronic Component Testing", section II, page 129, paragraph C18; concur. Quality assurance procedures have been revised at the Sacramento Army Depot. Each set is checked by the 147th LEM Company prior to issue. The situation has improved and should clear itself up within thirty days.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Time Lag Between Receipt of General Orders and Receipt of MTOE/TDA", section II, page 130, paragraph D1; concur. Headquarters, USAFV has recommended to USARPAC that the current procedures of forwarding the general order, parent unit summary and detailed documents separately be reviewed and that consideration be given to forwarding the documents simultaneously. The recommendation was made on 8 September 1969 at the USARPAC conference on The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS).

r. (C) Reference item concerning "Temporary Loan of Equipment", section II, page 130, paragraph D2; nonconcur. Referenced item recommended that exceptions allowed in the USAFV MTOE/MTDA moratorium be extended to include actions to authorize not only combat essential requirements, but also retrograde and combat service support requirements. However, letter, Hq USAFV, dated 12 October 1969, subject: Moratorium on Processing TDA, MTDA and MTOE already provides that subordinate commands may submit TDA, MTDA and MTOE actions when critical circumstances require. Submission of TDA, MTDA and MTOE changes must include detailed justification.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Non TOE Missions", section II, page 131, paragraph D3; concur. The recommendation that the Supply and Service Company TOE 29-147 be changed to provide for sufficient personnel to operate the Self Service Supply Centers as part of the supply mission of the company appears to have merit. Recommended changes to TOE will be prepared and submitted through command channels to the US Army Combat Developments Command IAW AR 310-31 and AR 310-44.

t. (U) Reference item concerning "Chaplain Training Conferences", section II, page 132, paragraph E2; concur. This type of training and spiritual exercise is required by AR 165-20. 1st Logistical Command has done an outstanding job in implementing the requirements of the regulation.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
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u. (U) Reference item concerning "Tire Inflation on Retrograde Vehicles", section II, page 134, paragraph F1; concur. Policy guidance on this subject was disseminated to all Army Commands in USArV message AVHGD-SPP, 241332Z Oct 69. The recommendation is valid, as current TM's to include the 1969 edition of the TM 750 series on Retrograde do not mention overinflation of tires to better stabilize vehicles during shipment. 1st Log Comd, ACofS, Maint, is also planning to submit a recommended change to the TM's.

v. (U) Reference item concerning "DS & GS Maintenance of River Patrol Boats", section II, page 135, paragraph F3; concur. The policies established for standard equipment by AR 700-70 should be followed when non-standard equipment is introduced into a command.

w. (U) Reference item concerning "Keystone Cardinal", section II, page 137, paragraph F8; concur. The short reaction time available between announcement of a redeployment phase and the commencement of standdown activities by designated units is recognized as a distinct problem. The difficulties experienced by the 6th Bn, 15th FA in beginning the processing of its personnel, records and equipment before procedures could be developed and implemented at all planning and supporting levels exemplifies the problem involved. Emphasis must be made by all concerned at all levels to assure maximum coordination and use of concurrent planning so that procedures can be implemented at the earliest possible moment. Although sequential planning and ~~implementation by each level~~ of command involved is ideal, reality dictates maximum use of concurrent activities by counterparts at all levels.

x. (U) Reference item concerning "Logistics", section II, page 138, paragraph F10; concur. The point of adding provisions to the port tariff to prevent contractors from proselyting workers from firms which pay lower wages involves Saigon as it is the only port with a tariff. USAID is the Saigon Port Advisor. This point will be considered in the formation of any future port authorities.

y. (C) Reference item concerning "Provision of boxes, crates, cartons and CONEX containers", Inclosure 16, page 4, paragraph 2c(1); nonconcur with: "It is essential that all units down to company level begin planning immediately for redeployment". Recommend the statement be changed to: Unit redeployment contingency planning should address the problems of packing material requirements in detail. Supporting units and supported units should verify all requirements on a regularly scheduled basis. Reason: Correct address of the problem. As written, the statement psychologically implies that units should immediately prepare for redeployment.

z. (U) Reference item concerning "Holding Areas for redeploying troops", Inclosure 16, page 13, paragraph 4a. Concur only if and when necessity dictates a 24-hour departure operation. Every emphasis must be made to adhere to the present policy of unit departures during daylight hours only. This is essential

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to the safety of troops in that unnecessary night departures needlessly expose departing units to the hazards of possible attack by hostile mortar or rocket fire.

aa. (U) Reference item concerning "Units may attempt to test, inspect, process and package their own equipment independently, resulting in inefficiency", Inclosure 16, page 14, paragraph 4c; concur. 1st Log Comd and Army Materiel Command Technical Representatives have developed procedures for preparing unit equipment for redeployment using assembly-line techniques. Every effort will be made by this HQ and the local Supcom HQ to consolidate processing locations for small redeployment units, permitting use of assembly lines for preparing equipment for retrograde.

bb. (U) Reference item concerning "US Air Force representation at meetings", Inclosure 16, page 18, paragraph 4d; nonconcur. Planning the use of Air Force transportation for out-of-country departures is done at CINCPAC. Planning for use of Air Force transportation for in-country movement of units or personnel to APOE's is done at MACV. USARV and Air Force representatives are included at both of these meetings. Additionally, close coordination is maintained on a constant basis between USARV, G4 Transportation representatives and Air Force APOE personnel.

cc. (U) Reference items concerning "Problem Areas During Operation Keystone Eagle", Inclosure 16, paragraphs 1a, 1b, 1d, 1f, 2e, 2i, 2q, 4f, and 4k. These lessons learned have been similarly addressed in other ORLL's and subsequently applied during Keystone Cardinal.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*L. D. Murray*  
for L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Log Comd

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GPOP-DT (18 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Logistical Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
2. Reference paragraph 21, Inclosure 16. Recommend consideration be given to the development of simplified MILSTAMP documentation procedures designed to facilitate shipment of equipment and supplies during rapid deployments such as Keystone Eagle.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EVENTS CHART  
UNIT 661 OD CO

2 SEP 1965



- 1. RECEIPT OF WARNING ORDER \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. RECEIPT OF OPERATIONS ORDER \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. STANDDOWN \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. INVENTORY AND TECHNICAL INSPECTION \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. PROPERTY ACTIONS \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. MAJOR ITEM TURN IN/LATERAL TRANSFER \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. ASI/FLL ADJUSTED \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. REQUISITIONS CANCELLED/RECONCILED \_\_\_\_\_
- 9. FACILITIES TRANSFERRED/TURNED IN \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. PROPERTY BOOK ADJUSTED \_\_\_\_\_
- 11. PRESERVE, PACKAGE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT \_\_\_\_\_
- 12. TURN IN/TRANSFER ALL NON-APPROPRIATED FUND ACCOUNTS & EQUIPMENT \_\_\_\_\_
- 13. CLOSE/TRANSFER PUBLICATION AND FILM ACCOUNTS \_\_\_\_\_
- 14. COMPLETE RECORDS MANAGEMENT ACTIONS \_\_\_\_\_
- 15. SHIP HOLD BACKAGE \_\_\_\_\_
- 16. IN/OUT PROCESS PERSONNEL AS APPROPRIATE \_\_\_\_\_
- 17. FINAL PREPARATIONS \_\_\_\_\_
- 18. FINAL UNIT INSPECTIONS \_\_\_\_\_
- 19. ADVANCE PARTY CLOSURE \_\_\_\_\_
- 20. MAIN BODY CLOSURE \_\_\_\_\_
- 21. ASSUME MISSION/EQUIPMENT \_\_\_\_\_

IF COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE  
MAKE IN GREEN.  
IF PLANNED EVENT SLIPS, MARK  
NEW DATE IN RED.

INITIATION/COMPLETION OF EVENTS  
TO BE REPORTED TELEPHONICALLY  
TO THE LOCC ON THE DAY OF  
OCCURRENCE

GROUP 1  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Inclosure 14

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# DISPOSITION FORM

# CONFIDENTIAL

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office. (When completed)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
AVCA GO-C	Inactivating/Redeploying Unit Check List

TO ACofS, SP-0	FROM	DATE	CMT 1
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Following are data and observations made during a visit to the Inactivating/Redeploying unit identified below.

CONFIDENTIAL (when filled in)

### CHECK LIST

UNIT _____	DATE _____
CG _____	NAME (S), 1ST LOG TEAM _____
LOCATION _____	_____
	_____

Date of Receipt of Warning Order \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Receipt of Operation Order \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Standdown \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Redeployment (R Day) \_\_\_\_\_

AREAS CHECKED	TIME PERIOD	INACTIVATING UNIT	REDEPLOYING UNIT
	Action to be conducted (R- to R- )		
1. Inventory and TI			
a. Has time and location for TI been scheduled with support maintenance (DSU)?		x _____	x _____
b. Has equipment been repaired within organization capability?		x _____	x _____

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c. Has other unserviceable equipment been submitted on a DA Form 2407 to DSU.

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

## 2. Major Item Disposition (Maint)

a. Has list of retention items been received?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

b. Was inventory of PMA, PCS, and special service property been conducted and forwarded in format shown in 14-69 to USANV within 5 days after standdown?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

c. Have recommendations for redistribution of inventoried equipment not required in country been made?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

d. Have items been disposed of as directed by SUPCOI or USANV?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

e. Has unserviceable, uneconomically repairable (CRCH) material been sent to PDO after verification by an AIC certified verifier?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

f. Has economically repairable equipment been inspected and condition coded by a DSU inspector at the processing location?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

g. Has turn-in credit been provided to the unit by the supporting supply activity?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

h. Do all vehicles, water craft and armored vests have a certificate for ammunition (IC Reg 750-9) or a materiel inspection tag (DA Form 9-1)?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

## 3. ASL/PLL Disposition

a. Is PLL/ASL being redistributed within SUPCOI?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

b. Has all excess PLL/ASL not required by the parent unit been packed into conex containers for retrograde out of country?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Facilities

a. Has an inventory been conducted of all real and installed property and submitted with plot plan to the installation coordinator?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

b. Have facilities been accounted for on DL Form 1354 and turned over to either PA&L or the receiving unit in case of direct transfer?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

c. Have security measures been taken to prevent damage to facilities?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

d. Have facilities been cleaned?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

e. Has the Installation Engineer been notified of movement schedule?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

f. Has clearance certificate been obtained?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

5. Property Book: Has property book been audited by next higher headquarters, zeroed out and destroyed?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

6. Preparation & Transportation of Equipment & Supplies

a. Has need for PP&P Supplies been coordinated with the DSU?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

b. Have in-country transportation requirements been identified and forwarded to MCC?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

c. Are movement plans up to date?

X \_\_\_\_\_

d. Has water port call been received at R-10 from the port commander?

X \_\_\_\_\_

e. Has unit indicated disposition of all CONEX containers to include excess to the support command CONEX Control Officer?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

f. Is redeployment cargo properly marked and identified?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

g. Are CONEX with retrograde cargo properly retro-coded to indicate condition of contents?

X \_\_\_\_\_ X \_\_\_\_\_

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- h. Are retrograde or redeployment CONEX and sealed vehicles customs and entomologically prepared, cleared and documented? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Are units customs clearance personnel appointed on valid orders? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
7. Publication and Film Accounts
- a. Has Film Account (16mm) been cancelled and equipment turned in? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Have AG Publications Centers been notified of unit's status and address? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- (1) CO, USA AG Publications Center  
1655 Woodson Rd, St Louis, Mo 63114 x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) CO, USA AG Publication Center  
2800 Eastern Blvd, Baltimore, Md. 21220 x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Director, AG PPC, Japan, APO 96503 x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
8. Personnel
- a. Have all ineligible personnel for redeployment been reassigned? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Have all personnel activated with the unit been reassigned to the unit? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Have personnel excess to the SU/COA and not eligible to redeploy with the unit been reported as surplus? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Have personnel been made aware of the provisions of Art 614-30 in regards to tour completion? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Have personnel serving on extension been made aware of the fact they will accompany the unit? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Have personnel having an approved FST extension and have not commenced travel been made aware of the fact they will not be permitted to take Special Leave? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Have all records been received from the servicing PSC? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

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h. Have all records been reviewed for completeness?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

i. Have the records of personnel being returned with the unit for reassignment within COMUS, been identified and separated accordingly?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

j. Has the unit been made aware of the provisions of AR 335-60 concerning enroute and final morning reports?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

9. Administration

a. Organization files - redeploying Units

(1) Have files been destroyed in accordance with AR 345-210/215 (Ex: Ref Pub Files such as USANV negs, MACV negs, LC negs, etc. and Ref Paper Files which are no longer applicable)?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Are files created in 1968 with a retention period of 2 years or more to include permanent and current files accompanying the unit?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Have files created in 1967 and earlier which have a retention period of 2 years or more to include permanent files been packed & shipped to records holding area, Hq USANV, APO 96375. Particular attention should be given to the following files:

- (a) Organization Planning Files #201-45/2-07
- (b) Operation Planning Files #201-46.1/2-08
- (c) Pub record Set Files (Cbt Orders, GOs, numbered pub) #205-02/2-01
- (d) Personnel Type Orders Files (LOs, SOs, UOs) #205-02.1/2-03
- (e) Command reporting Files (Cbt After Action reports, Operational reports, etc) #206-05/2-12
- (f) Annual Historical Summary Files #206-06.1
- (g) Daily Journal Files #206-07/2-06
- (h) Operational intelligence registers, Civil Affairs, periodic or special reports, and other documents designated by the Military Historian as having special historical significance.

x \_\_\_\_\_

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(4) Inactivation in CONUS (When completed)

(a) Are current (69) and preceding year's (68) files accompanying the Unit? Special attention will be given to essential files such as Morning rep, Pers rec, Pers registers, Unit History, UO and Company rosters to insure that they are readily available.

x \_\_\_\_\_

(b) has an officer, responsible for the transfer of records, been appointed on orders?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Inactivation in Country (AVN)

(a) Have files eligible for destruction been destroyed?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Have remaining files been transferred to records Holding Area, Hq USAAV, APO 96375?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(c) If there is a transfer of functions, has the successor unit received the files involved and has the receiving organization maintained the files as a separate entity?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Preparation of records Shipment List:

(a) Have files eligible for transfer to records Holding Area, Hq, USAAV, APO 96375, been identified on SF 135?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Has SF 135 been prepared in 4 copies in accordance with para 5-6, AR 340-1, Chap 8, Ar 345-215 and USAAV Reg para 11, Ar 304-1?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Have unclassified records and FOJO been sent by MCM (Military Ordinary mail)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(d) Have records classified through SECRET been sent by registered mail?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

b. Finance

(1) Have arrangements been made for conversion of MPC?

x \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Has local FEA0 or FLS been notified of change?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

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c. Postal Services (When completed)

(1) Have Locator Cards (DL Form 1175) been prepared by each individual and distributed as follows:

- (a) 1 - each correspondent
- (b) 1 - gaining APO
- (c) 1 - losing APO
- (d) 1 - Area Postal Directory, APO 96381    x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Has advance arrival notice been furnished gaining APO or installation?    x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Has unit fund custodian cancelled and furnished change of address for unit fund supplies, publications and pocket books?    x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Has the commander notified this headquarters, ATTN: AVCA AG-11, of the effective date receipt of mail at the old address should be discontinued as well as the new forwarding address including the Zip Code, if appropriate?    x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Has the losing APO been furnished a revocation date of DL Form 235?    x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

d. Unit Fund

(1) Has request for transfer of assets been submitted?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Have all outstanding obligations been paid?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Terminal audit performed?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Statement of financial condition?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Check to USAAV Central Welfare Fund?    x \_\_\_\_\_

e. Disposition of Open Messes Property

(1) Disposal of properties:

(a) Gift to authorized nonappropriated welfare fund activities?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Gift to Army Open Mess of same type?    x \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Sale to highest bid of at least three responsible bidders?    x \_\_\_\_\_

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- (2) Transfer of residual assets to  
USARV Central Loss Fund?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Terminal audit performed?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Final audit performed?  \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Sundry Funds
- (1) Disposal of properties:
- (a) Gift to authorized nonappropriated  
fund activities of same type?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (b) Sale to highest bid of at least  
three responsible bidders?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Transfer of residual assets to  
USARV Central Loss Fund?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Terminal audit performed?  \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Vietnamese Labor Funds
- (1) Disposition of cash, assets,  
properties by:
- (a) Donation to charitable organization?  \_\_\_\_\_
- (b) Distribution to members of unit on a  
pro-rata basis?  \_\_\_\_\_
2. Final audit performed?  \_\_\_\_\_
- h. Civilian Personnel
- (1) Have the ACPO and the major sub-  
ordinate Command been notified of local  
national direct hire (LNDH) personnel to be  
released/reassigned?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Has coordination been effected with  
gaining ACPO and major subordinate command  
to re-acquire all local national direct hire  
(LNDH) spaces?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Assistance in Kind Fund - Has the  
fund been closed out by the custodian re-  
turning total value of his account to USARV  
and been relieved of responsibility?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_
- j. Chaplain Account & Chapel Property -  
Has the Chaplain fund been transferred to an  
adjacent or higher headquarters?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

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k. Central Post Fund (CPF) - Have CPF assets, liabilities, and property been transferred to the serving Central Post Fund and terminal audit been submitted? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

l. Non-Appropriated Funds - Has property been disposed of in accordance with MACV 230-10 and USAFV 230-10? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

m. Exchange Accounts - Have accounts with Vietnam Regional Exchange been cleared? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

10. Hold baggage

a. Has unaccompanied baggage been shipped? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

b. Is unit aware that accompanied baggage will not exceed 66 lbs? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

c. Have arrangements been made for timely delivery of accompanied baggage to the air terminal? x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

11. Final Preparations

a. Has unit received initial air personnel port calls from Hq USAFV at N-7? x \_\_\_\_\_

b. Has unit received confirmation of air personnel port calls 24 hours prior to flight time? x \_\_\_\_\_

c. Has unit prepared final personnel manifest upon receipt of final personnel port call? x \_\_\_\_\_

d. Has unit movement officer notified Trans Branch, Service Div, G4 USAFV 10 days prior to departure as to the number of personnel on SAAH flights desiring to off-load at West Coast APOB? x \_\_\_\_\_

e. Have customs requirements been coordinated with SUPCOMs? x \_\_\_\_\_

12. Remarks/Comments x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

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## 13. Journals and Journal Files

a. Are journals being maintained by the unit under guidelines specified in para 2, LC Reg 870-2?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

b. Is the journal format essentially the same as that prescribed in Appendix I to LC Reg 870-2?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

c. Are entries recorded in the journals as they occur (para 6i, USARV Reg 870-2; para 6g, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

d. Are journal entries in sufficient detail to fully explain the entry (para 6e, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

e. Is a summary included at the end of the journal period (para 6k, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

f. Is the security classification proper (Sect II, AR 380-5)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

g. Are journal entries being initialed and is the journal being authenticated by the commander, staff section head, or appropriate representative (para 6j, and 6i, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

h. Are all branches of a staff section, who have significant input, contributing to journal entries (para 5b, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

i. Are source documents available to support the entries in the journal where appropriate (paras 6d and 6m, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

j. Are journal entries cross-referenced to source material included in the journal files (para 6d, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

k. Does each daily journal cover the period 0001 to 2400 hours (para 6c, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

l. Are statements such as "routine activities" avoided (para 6e, LC Reg 870-2)?

x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

m. Are file titles (labels) in accordance with Appendix B to LC Reg 870-2?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

n. Are files titled and labeled in the third (right) position of the folder (Appendix B, LC Reg 870-2)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

o. Do the responsible files personnel know the proper disposition instructions for journal file (as specified in the label sample in Appendix II, LC Reg 870-2)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

14. Command Historical Program

a. Has a unit historian been appointed on orders (para 66, LC Reg 870-1)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

b. Has a copy of the appointing orders been forwarded to Headquarters, 1st Logistic-al Command (para 8, LC Reg 870-1)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

c. Does the unit maintain historical files (para 76, LC Reg 870-1)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

d. Are disposition instructions correct on historical files (para 7b, LC Reg 870-1)?  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

e. Are all historically significant documents being maintained in the historical file (para 7b(1), LC Reg 970-1)?

(1) Mission statement.  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Letters of Instruction.  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Operational Report - Lessons Learned (if Bn level or higher)  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(4) General Orders for attachment and detachments, etc.  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Organizational Chart  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Certificate of Lineage and Honor.  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Copy of annual historical supplement (company level units)  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

- (8) Briefing and orientation notes      x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- (9) Properly captioned photos            x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Is the historical file so organized that material is easy to find (suggest an index system) (no references)            x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- g. If a company level unit (or higher unit not required to submit CRLL), has it submitted its annual historical report (AR 870-5, para 7e, LC Reg 870-1)?      x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- h. Has proper distribution been made of annual unit histories (para 7e, LC Reg 870-1)?            x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Was the unit historian established, and is he pursuing, an effective interview program (para 7c, LC Reg 870-1)?            x \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_

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## Problem Areas During Operation Keystone Eagle

### 1. (C) 1st Logistical Command Units

a. Problem: Lack of time between notification and relocation created problems.

(1) Discussion: The short lead time on notification of units caused some problems and confusion regarding technical inspection and turn-in of equipment. Although these tasks were accomplished prior to the deadline furnished the units, the entire operation would have progressed in a more efficient manner had an earlier notification of movement been possible. Late notification also caused some units to have insufficient time to perform maintenance on vehicles and equipment that were laterally transferred within the command. In many instances, for the sake of expediency and to accomplish the task of unit relocation, equipment that would not normally be acceptable was accepted in order to meet the time table.

(2) Recommended Solution: Prior notification should be given redeploying units as soon as possible.

b. Problem: Some relocating units could not be given a sufficient standdown period.

(1) Discussion: Due to the short time period between notification and execution, some relocating units could not be given a sufficient standdown period. The mission assigned to relocating units had to be continued until the Support Command had time to internally realign combat service support. Since many adjustments of units had to be made within this command in a short period of time, some units were not relieved of their missions in a timely manner.

(2) Recommended Solution: Notification should be given as early as possible when units are to be relocated so internal adjustments of units may be made in a timely manner.

c. Problem: Disposition of LNs employed by relocating units was not considered.

(1) Discussion: Civilian personnel who were employed by relocating units were still needed to continue the mission in some cases. However, after relocation, the LN personnel may not be authorized in the new parent unit, therefore necessitating that an MTDA be approved before LNs can be employed. This takes considerable time.

(2) Recommended Solution: Consideration should be given to the status and usage of critical LN personnel in future unit relocations and that automatic authority be granted to retain LN personnel spaces in relocating units.

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d. Problem: Guidance concerning personnel to redeploy from RVN was not clear.

(1) Discussion:

(a) The criteria as to which personnel were to redeploy from RVN were not established early enough. There was insufficient initial guidance from higher headquarters as far as specific personnel actions were concerned.

(b) Initial guidance received in USARV message 67679, DTG 190317Z Jun 69, was that only Reserve Component personnel who were ordered to active duty or deployed to RVN with the USAR/NG Unit were eligible to redeploy with the unit. ANNEX L, USARV OPORD 182-69, received on 28 Jun 69, changed the eligibility criteria to allow RA and AUS personnel and Individual Ready Reserves assigned to redeploying units on or prior to 8 Jun 69 to redeploy with USAR/NG units.

(2) Recommended Solution: Accurate, specific guidance concerning personnel actions for redeploying units should be furnished as early as possible.

e. Problem: Loss of Class V command, control and stock control.

(1) Discussion: The 336th Ord Bn redeployed, leaving ammo companies without a command and control element. For critical, specialized materiel such as ammo a command and control element is required.

(2) Recommended Solution: If a command and control unit can not be re-located within country, a provisional Bn HHC should be formed as was the 274th Ord Bn HHC (Provisional) which was formed in USASUPCOM-DNG.

f. Problem: Shipping of personal baggage to CONUS by USAR personnel prior to receipt of unit movement orders.

(1) Discussion: Problem was encountered at all units visited, as personnel were concerned about having their personal hold baggage available upon arrival and REFRAD in CONUS. AR 55-71 and USARV Reg 55-2 preclude shipping of personal baggage prior to receipt of the Unit Movement Order, unless the individual submits a request for exception in writing with proper justification, in which case Headquarters, USARV, may grant approval. Experience indicates that, normally, the final unit movement directive is received only a few days prior to actual redeployment date, resulting in late shipment of baggage and inconvenience to the individual. Authority was obtained from USARV to grant approval of individual requests to ship hold baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders. This authority was redelegated to USASUPCOM-SGN which could approve individual requests. These procedures would not apply in the Da Nang Support Command since the Navy controls such functions in that area.

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(2) Recommended Solution: Where warranted, authority should be obtained and delegated to the support command to approve shipment of personal baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders.

g. Problem: Disposition of Equipment of Relocating Units

(1) Discussion: The units relocating within RVN replaced like redeploying units. Therefore relocating units took only that equipment which was authorized and on hand but not on hand at the location of the redeploying unit. This policy was necessary in order to effectively utilize limited transportation assets by not transporting equipment unnecessarily.

(2) Recommended Solution: That close coordination between gaining and losing Support Commands should be accomplished so that the minimum amount of equipment accompany relocating units.

2. (C) Support of Redeployment of 9th Inf Div (-)

a. Problem: Organization to support redeployment.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Many factors influenced the organization established to support the KEYSTONE EAGLE operation. Critical were time, geographical location, unit configuration and tactical situation. It should be understood that these factors will differ with each future redeployment. All the functions required to be performed will be constant regardless of these variables. In view of the above, an organization to perform these functions is proposed. Rationale behind this proposal is:

1 The 1st Logistical Command supporting element must be co-located with the redeploying unit to assure that maximum use is made of available labor and to assure that as much as possible is done as soon as possible.

2 As the support element grows in size it is essential to establish a command and control element to provide administrative support and operational control to these non-divisional elements.

3 It is unrealistic to expect 1st Logistical Command to provide all the technical/supervisory, personnel. Technical competence is readily available in the division and, with a minimal amount of training and reorientation, combined with adequate supervision, they can accomplish a majority of the processing requirements. It is important, however, that these technical specialists be relieved from their normal operating mission responsibilities.

4 It is extremely important that the existing DISCOM staff be augmented during the planning phase to insure that all support constraints are considered during the operation. This augmentation should be at the top of the command structure as well as among the staff. This presupposes that the DISCOM will be tasked with control of the logistical aspects of redeployment, which is the logical assumption.

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5 Shown in Appendix 6 is a Saigon Support Command proposal advocating the establishment of a provisional "battalion", organic to the DISCOM, to support the redeployment of a division. The concept chart shows one company of the maintenance battalion and one company of the S&T battalion detached from their parent organization and assigned to the provisional battalion. This reflects the fact that two-thirds of this provisional battalion will be constituted from division assets. The Log Advisor shown on the staff of the DISCOM commander would function as the Commanding Officer's XO for redeployment and would exercise control of redeployment operations in the name of the DISCOM CO. This approach permits utilization of the existing DISCOM Staff and substantially reduces the advisor overhead which must be provided to support 1st Log Comd personnel. The make up of the third company would be a combination of divisional assets and those skills peculiar to the external support command element.

(b) Appendix 7 reflects the functions which would be assigned to these companies. When company functions are examined, it becomes clear that there is a need to infuse personnel from non-divisional elements to provide all required capabilities. The size of these companies is not discussed because of changing requirements.

(2) Recommended Solution: The concept as shown above would make optimum use of division capability, provide an organization for redeployment where all expertise rests, and provide for optimum organization into which non-divisional elements can be infused.

## b. Problem: Processing of hold baggage.

(1) Discussion: The processing of hold baggage posed no difficulty as a military supervised, contractor operated operation. It became apparent that the estimated size of workload was grossly over stated. For lack of any better information, a planned operation was set up to process hold baggage for approximately 85% of assigned personnel. In fact, less than 35% of personnel assigned to an infantry battalion had hold baggage. Additionally, it was impossible to accelerate the processing because the process was initiated by AG orders which could barely keep up with unit standdown and redeployment. This will only be a problem when a unit, such as a division, redeploys as a unit.

(2) Recommended Solution: A canvas of redeploing units should be made ASAP to determine estimated requirements. The initial capacity should be provided based on this estimate and then scaled up or down accordingly.

## c. Problem: Provision of boxes, crates, cartons and CONEX containers.

(1) Discussion: It is essential that all units down to company level, begin planning immediately, for redeployment. The plan should include both TOE and Post, Camp and Station property requirements. This planning had not been accomplished at the start of this redeployment so the following actions were taken:

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(a) A review of available manuals pertaining to preservation and packing was conducted and three standard wooden crate sizes were selected. These standard crates were then ordered through USARV Engineer to be fabricated by PA&E located at Dong Tam. A quantity of 200 of each of the below listed sizes constituting the initial increment was ordered on 28 Jun 69. This order was supplemented by another order for 600 on 18 Jul 69.

40" X 24" X 20"

60" X 40" X 20"

60" X 40" X 30"

(b) A survey of packing boxes available in III & IV Corps was conducted and 1300 unserviceable foot lockers were located at Bien Hoa. These footlockers, although classified as unserviceable, proved to be ideal for unit packing requirements. Approximately 95% of these footlockers were usable.

(c) Fiber board boxes were ordered initially in the three standard sizes shown below:

18" X 12" X 7"

24" X 24" X 14"

27" X 19" X 14"

Again these sizes were arbitrarily selected based on a review of the most popular size in selected package and preservation manuals. Subsequent reprovioning of these boxes, as they were consumed, was made with either the above sizes or substitutes of similar sizes. These three standard sizes were selected for issue to units doing their own packing. Additional sizes were ordered to facilitate packing and crating by the 1st Log Command support element. The critical size (40" X 23" X 24") utilized by processing elements was used to pack M16 rifles. Generally, units do not know what size they need.

(d) CONEX containers were furnished to the redeploying unit on an "as required basis". A push package of 70 each was arbitrarily selected and as requirements were established a "package" was called forward. Efforts should be made to use empty CONEX containers on hand in the unit.

(e) The availability of CONEX inserts is critical to a good job of packing at the unit level. If these inserts are not available, a disproportionate amount of smaller containers will be consumed and the tightness of the pack will suffer accordingly.

(f) Because it took time to develop demand experience in PP&P supplies, there were periodic zero balances. This caused an artificial demand for other sizes which may or may not be realistic in subsequent redeployments.

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(2) Recommended Solution: The development of a list of standard size boxes should be made available for issue to units. A critical in-storage inspection of fiberboard containers at depot should be conducted prior to shipment of cartons to redeploying unit locations. Over 10% of cartons shipped to Dong Tam were unserviceable due to water damage. Finally, a fairly knowledgeable individual should be utilized to edit unit requests. Units should be encouraged to draw requirements on a weekly basis rather than their entire needs at one time because their requests usually exceed their lift and storage capability.

d. Problem: Division Accountability for Equipment Turn-In.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Equipment turn-in from a redeploying element must initially be funneled through the Division Supply Officer (DSO). In normal operations, the DSO is principally involved in issuing serviceable equipment in relatively small amounts. The sudden standdown of an entire brigade literally swamps the DSO activity with serviceable turn-ins. The DSO activity is not adequately staffed to receive, document, package, preserve and ship this quantity of equipment in such a short period. It is essential, however, that paper work accounting for this equipment flow through the DSO for purposes of clearing property book accounts. Under normal operating conditions, a turn-in takes approximately 11 days for necessary paperwork to be initiated, inspections and classifications finalized and movement of equipment to be completed. These procedures must be compressed to 36 hours in order to be responsive to a valid redeployment schedule. When this system is initiated on a compressed basis the DSO activity cannot accomplish the necessary and required documentation. It must be recognized that during this significant increase in retro-grade workload, the S&T battalion and the DSO are still supporting a fighting division with its normal operating requirements. Augmenting the existing division S&T operation with 1st Log Comd personnel is not a satisfactory solution. There is not a clear chain of command and control for the augmented personnel who must inject expertise which may conflict with existing procedures.

(b) In an effort to reduce and divert the tremendous flow of equipment into the DSO, an informal account was established by Saigon Support Command to accept all weapons, communication and electronic equipment, gas masks, CODE "H" TOE major items of equipment and Post, Camp and Station Property. This equipment was receipted for by Saigon Support Command personnel and turn-in credit was given to the using unit. This turn-in credit was again used by the unit to clear property books with SDO. The selection of weapons and C&E equipment as critical items to divert from normal DSO turn-in procedure was considered essential because, as mentioned earlier, the volume exceeded the DSO capability. Because unit personnel were not adequately trained to accomplish required documentation, this function was assumed by Saigon Support Command personnel and all paper work was correct at the time of turn-in. This system proved completely satisfactory.

(2) Recommended Solution: Procedures as shown above should be established.

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### e. Problem: Heavy lift capability.

(1) Discussion: The availability of MHE, cranes and wrecker for out loading redeployment cargo will ultimately dictate the speed with which back-load can be accomplished. Recognizing that approximately 50% of TOE authorized MHE is not going to be available in the unit, a problem is apparent immediately. When this shortage is combined with the fact that the unit must continue to carry out its normal support functions, MHE becomes the controlling factor in all back-load operations. It must be recognized that cargo back-load on S&Ps is a unit responsibility, thus all MHE is retained by the owning unit for moving their own requirements. There is also a shortfall in training of unit personnel on utilization of wreckers and cranes to accomplish lift normally performed solely by RT forks. Pallets can be lifted by a crane or wrecker with slings. Any individual with experience in port operations and rigging is very valuable in providing instruction. The organic engineer units can provide considerable lift capability.

(2) Recommended Solution: All MHE should be centralized under the operational control of one office or activity within the division. All unit requirements would be placed on this office and would be accomplished on a 24 hour operation. All equipment should be required to be available until the last possible time regardless of when their parent unit stands down and redeploys.

### f. Problem: Free turn-in of equipment.

(1) Discussion: It must be recognized that all units have more excess on hand than even the unit knows about. If considerable pressure is exerted to make sure that these excesses are turned in early, the unit may resist because of the paper work requirements associated with equipment turn-in. In an effort to preclude losses, a free turn-in point was established. "No questions asked" was the governing rule. From the view point of the tactical commander and the tax payer this is an optimum approach. The logistical support element, however, inherits a problem of monumental proportions. This equipment comes in to the turn-in point totally unsegregated with no effort to prepare it for turn-in. It is almost impossible to devote adequate resources to keeping up with this equipment which grows at a fantastic rate, because of the need to get serviceable TOE equipment processed and moved. If pressure is brought to bear to resolve this problem and require at least minimum paper work requirements, there is equal reverse pressure stating that you are violating the concept of "free turn-in".

(2) Recommended Solution: There should be active and aggressive command emphasis at every level to identify and turn-in excess equipment. Minimal identification i. e. NOUN & QTY should be required and clearly apparent salvage should be salvaged with existing procedures. Anything less creates an unmanageable problem.

### g. Problem: Documentation for transportation.

(1) Discussion: Although a movement document SOP was prepared and classes were given to key personnel, the completion of required documentation was never adequately supervised.

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(2) Recommended Solution: The urgency of this documentation requirement should be emphasized at the onset. The movement document SOP (Appendix 8) should be used by all levels of command.

h. Problem: Movement of non-divisional units from a division base camp.

(1) Discussion: With the redeployment of a division size element consideration must be given to the non-divisional units satellited on the division. Such activities as Army air, medical, engineer, cavalry, and many others have to be moved also. Units inactivating can be processed with the divisional elements, and should be considered as part of the package. Units relocating in country may pose a different problem. Because they are moving in country they may take nothing or everything including real property.

(2) Recommended Solution: All units should be moved in accordance with the standards imposed on the division units. Packing and crating should follow the same standards imposed on division units.

i. Problem: To provide the intricate MILSTAMP documentation of supplies and equipment being redeployed with the 9th Inf Div (-) to Hawaii.

(1) Discussion: A key element in any successful large scale unit movement is proper documentation and marking of supplies and equipment. Early discussions with the 9th Div transportation officer indicated that the 9th Div did not have the sufficient know-how and experience in documentation, marking and certification procedures required by DOD Reg 3500.32-R and AR 740-20. Previous experience of officers assigned to the ACofS, Trans, 1st Log Comd was that the MILSTAMP regulation is too complex and cumbersome for use by personnel not trained in transportation. When units redeployed from CONUS the documentation was by and large closely supervised by installation transportation officers using DA civilians who had years of experience with MILSTAMP. A quick evaluation affirmed that neither USARV, 1st Log Comd nor Saigon Support Command had sufficient personnel to provide any sustained documentation assistance. The Documentation Assistance Team, provided from 402d Trans Det, would not be able to do all of the documentation for the units and fulfill their mission of staging and cargo planning management.

(2) Recommended Solution: The redeploying unit should accomplish its own documentation and certification using streamlined and simplified procedures. 1st Log Command support units must be prepared to provide instruction to the redeploying units on the details of the procedures.

j. Problem: In the course of a division or comparable sized unit move, many transportation elements (movement control, motor transport, traffic management, port, air, rail and staff) may be involved. Controls must be exercised, through a single transportation element, to coordinate the efforts of all transportation activities for optimum efficiency, economy of effort and teamwork.

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(1) Discussion: In the case of the retrograde movement of the 9th Infantry Division, the complex task of coordinating and synchronizing the combined efforts, on site, of the 3d TC, 4th TC, 48th Group, TMA and transportation staff, was solved by establishing a "Transportation Operations Center" (TROC) at Dong Tam. The function of the TROC is to serve as a "Clearing House" and point of central coordination, on site, for all participating transportation elements. The TROC need not enter into normal command chains, nor should it. It functions through cooperative effort and the ready interchange of vital information among the participating agencies, allowing each agency to take advantage of the "pooled" knowledge of all, and thereby promoting better transportation decisions.

(2) Recommended Solution: Future planning for the redeployment of major units should include provision for the activation, at an early stage in preparations for movement, of a "Transportation Operations Control Center" (or comparable designation) co-located with the unit to be moved, until the unit move is completed.

k. Problem: During the "standdown" of a major organizational element (such as a division) which has been the operator as well as the principal tenant of an overseas installation, provision must be made for the supporting logistical agency to assume "post, camp and station" transportation support upon the "standdown" of the departing organizations' organic transportation capability without disruption of service or impairment of the out-processing schedule.

(1) Discussion: The 9th Division operated its own base camp installation at Dong Tam, Vietnam. Upon receipt of redeployment orders, the 9th Division, in coordination with the Saigon Support Command (SSC), developed a time-phased movement schedule. SSC arranged to provide transportation elements organic to SSC (a light truck platoon, water tanker, POL tankers and bus support) to perform "post, camp and station" transportation functions at Dong Tam effective upon the start of "standdown" of the Division's own S&T battalion. In this manner, continuity of service was maintained. The management of this transportation service was exercised by SSC, allowing the division to concentrate on its preparations for movement.

(2) Recommended Solution: Future planning for division, or comparable size unit retrograde moves should include definite provisions for continuity of logistical support, particularly transportation, of the type generally rendered by posts, camps, stations, or by organic elements of the unit to be moved.

1. Problem: Coordination of transportation for retrograde cargo.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Equipment being retrograded from a redeploying unit can be generally classified into the following general categories:

- 1 Serviceable - remaining in country.
- 2 Unserviceable/repairable - remaining in country.

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- 3 Unserviceable/repairable - retrograde.
- 4 Unserviceable/salvage.
- 2 Serviceable - redeploying out of RVN.

(b) Categories 1 thru 4 represent both a lift requirement and a reposition problem to 1st Logistical Command. The final category represents a lift requirement only. As the division redeploying unit begins to stand-down there are several areas which can be addressed immediately. One is the removal of unserviceable retrograde equipment on hand in the division. By and large, this equipment is only waiting paper work completion and lift availability. With a minor amount of assistance in paper work this equipment can be retrograded immediately.

(c) The second area requiring immediate attention is the maintenance backlog on hand in organic and backup direct support maintenance units.

1 A determination was made on the expected length of time it should take to repair and return equipment to the user. If it appeared the equipment could not be repaired within 72 hours the job order was "closed out" and turn-in credit was given to the owning unit. The equipment on hand in DS was then offered for movement to the back-up DS.

2 If the equipment was in the possession of back up DS they were directed to repair and return to stock or depot. Although the 1st Logistical Command support element provides the technical direction on this disposition of maintenance backlog, there is normally adequate lift capabilities available within the redeploying unit. As the redeploying unit begins to accumulate cargo and equipment for movement, it is essential that a system be established where the lift requirements funnel through a centrally located activity. The DTO is the logical agency but must be augmented to handle the volume. The DTO then coordinates directly with TMA & MCC for lift requirements. It is advisable, if possible, that available heavy lift belonging to the deploying unit be pooled and allocated to MCC for additional capability. Once established this system worked extremely well. There is also a delicate balance between what a unit desires to move, what they require in the way of lift, and what they can off load and backload in a given period. For example, if a unit requires ten each twelve Ton S&Ps, it is not realistic to provide all S&P's loaded and expect the unit to off load and back load for the same day convoy. A mix of some RON (remain over night) trailers and trailers that require off load and reload might be optimum. Another aspect of transportation coordination is the movement of combat serviceable equipment to both the port and the nearest depot for turn-in. This equipment must be driven by personnel from the redeploying unit. Coordinating the availability of drivers, making provisions for mess and overnight accommodations, as well as for transportation back to their unit, requires detailed planning.

- (2) Recommended Solution: Prior to beginning redeployment, a complete

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transportation plan should be developed. The plan should be published to all units so all understand their responsibilities.

m. Problem: Surveillance inspectors should visit camps and fire support sites to inspect basic loads of Class V prior to turn-in to ASP.

(1) Discussion: Before standdown of redeploying units a 9th Division representative and an ammunition inspector visited unit base camps and fire support sites. Purpose of visit was to determine condition of ammo and to assist and inspect in proper procedure for preparing ammunition for turn-in and destruction of unserviceable ammunition. Only minimum quantities of unserviceables were turned in to the ASP. Majority of unit turn-ins were in proper pack, reducing the hazards associated with unit returns.

(2) Recommended Solution: Prior to standdown of redeploying units, a team composed of an ammunition inspector, an EOD trained NCO and a representative of the Division Ammunition Office should contact and advise units, as to proper procedure for disposition of ammunition.

n. Problem: Integration of the supply and attrition program of ammunition during standdown phase of units selected for redeployment requires intensive management of personnel and assets.

(1) Discussion: Effective coordination was made between the WOIC, Dong Tam ASP and the DAO of the 9th Division to schedule supply of ammunition to the redeploying units. This enabled the redeploying units to call smaller quantities forward and to deplete basic loads through attrition, thereby reducing quantities of ammunition on hand at time of standdown. Simultaneously the supporting ASP was able to reduce its stock and dispose of excesses. Additionally, EOD personnel disposed of unserviceable ammunition at base camps and sites, thus reducing the hazards of transporting ammunition in questionable condition to the ASP's. Only 331.7 S/Tons of ammunition were back-hauled to LBASD. All hazardous, unserviceable non-repairable ammunition items were destroyed by EOD personnel. The majority of these items were disposed of at the unit sites.

(2) Recommended Solution: As soon as possible after redeployment notification, the local ASP and the DAO should coordinate to insure that the integration of supply and attrition of ammunition are conducted in an efficient manner.

o. Problem: Turn-in of ammunition.

(1) Discussion:

(a) As divisional units begin to standdown it is necessary that ammunition requirements be adjusted accordingly. The Division Ammunition Officer (DAO) and ASP personnel must monitor on hand assets on a daily basis, as a minimum.

(b) Several problems arise when artillery battalions standdown a battery

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at a time. The first battery to standdown transfers on hand assets to remaining firing units who also may continue to receive their normal resupply. The last battery to standdown may be swamped with the transfers from preceding unit standdowns.

(c) Units scheduled to standdown should also make a concerted effort to retain ammunition storage containers to facilitate turn-in. In the event that ammunition is to be turned over to ARVN, an accurate inventory must be maintained to assure adequate documentation can be prepared reflecting disposition or transfer to ARVN. Although this area was discussed at length prior to artillery standdown a large excess did build up when the last unit of the first battalion stood down.

(2) Recommended Solution: The DAO should participate in all battery standdown operations by conducting a joint inventory with the unit to assure that an accurate count is obtained to reduce excess ammunition on hand.

p. Problem: Processing of individual weapons.

(1) Discussion: The receipt, inspection, classification and packing of individual weapons is a formidable problem, primarily because of the volume involved. Additionally, the individuals will retain their assigned weapons until they board the aircraft. To facilitate this, it often becomes necessary to receipt for a unit's individual weapons and then hand receipt them back to the unit until their departure. Needless to say this necessitates a substantial amount of additional paper work. It is also necessary to establish a "production line" for the packing of these weapons prior to shipment, regardless of destination.

(2) Recommended Solution: Advance coordination should determine whether the unit desires to retain the weapons. If so, a hand receipt should be prepared for all weapons retained. An austere inspection, packaging and preservation line should be established as shown in appendix 9. The quantity of weapons received and processed as well as disposition of the weapons is shown in appendix 10.

q. Problem: Problems which require timely resolution are inherent in large scale unit redeployment, and the dial telephone system in use in RVN is not responsive when used off-post.

(1) Discussion: "Hot Lines" or point to point telephone circuits are required to provide information and instructions to, and receive logistical intelligence from, major size units (brigade and larger) redeploying.

(2) Recommended Solution: Point to point telephone circuits should be used in future large scale unit redeployments.

3. (C) Support of Redeployment of 6/56 Arty (HAWK) (AD)

a. USARV OPORD 182-69 stated that operational control of the 6/56 Arty (HAWK) (AD) would be assumed by HQs, 1st Logistical Command on 1 July 1969.

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The Americal Division was tasked to process all personnel actions pertaining to the redeployment of 6/56 Arty (HAWK) (AD). On 1 July 1969 USARV informed this command that the OPCON of the 6/56 Arty (HAWK) (AD) involved only the provision of required logistical support to expedite redeployment of the battalion.

b. The 1st Logistical Command concentrated its logistical support on assisting in the preparation of missile peculiar items for retrograde to Pueblo Army Depot.

c. The redeployment of the 6/56 Arty (HAWK) (AD) was conducted without any major problems and was completed on 1 August 1969.

#### 4. (U) Redeployment Support to All U.S. Army Units

a. Problem: Holding areas for redeploying troops are required at the departure airfield if the airfield is used for redeployment at night.

(1) Discussion: The move out of Bien Hoa Airfield was relatively smooth because it was solely a daylight operation. If airfields in future moves are to be used on a 24 hours basis, there is a definite need for a holding area at or near the airfield. A holding area should contain both a snack bar and a small exchange should be established for the sale of cigarettes, toiletries, magazines and essential items. Billeting facilities are needed with day rooms equipped with televisions, library, desks, lounge furniture and facilities for showing movies. Also needed are currency exchanges, and a first aid dispensary and Chaplain coverage. The area should be isolated from all other facilities. Adequate communications and transportation to the airfield are also necessary for an efficient operation.

(2) Recommended Solution: A holding area should be established and operated at the airfield if a redeployment airfield is to be used at night.

b. Problem: Security of equipment turned in to the 1st Log Comd support element.

#### (1) Discussion:

(a) As a redeploying unit begins to standdown, the equipment being turned in must be secured. The variety of equipment, compounded by the various condition classifications by which it must be segregated, makes temporary storage a real problem. Normally, covered storage is at a premium and dry hardstand is also scarce.

(b) It soon became necessary to locate this equipment in relatively insecure areas until transportation was available.

(c) It is recognized that the ideal solution to this problem would be to ship as soon as the equipment is received. This is not practical in all cases because of delays in paper work preparation and availability of CONEX or lift to economically move equipment.

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(2) Recommended Solution: The initial planning for redeployment should recognize the need for providing adequate limited storage facilities for equipment turn-in. Preparations must be made to speed up paper work completion so that it does not slow equipment flow.

c. Problem: Units may attempt to test, inspect, process and package their own equipment independently, resulting in inefficiency.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Once the testing, inspecting, processing, and packaging begins it should be accomplished in a centralized area with "assembly lines" set up for each type of equipment. Each line should be manned by personnel of the redeploying unit and supervised by qualified technical representatives furnished by 1st Logistical Command. This procedure would provide for constant expert supervision and would allow the job to be accomplished in a more expeditious manner.

(b) The use of assembly line methods for care and preservation is definitely preferable. However, it must be realized that this is not always possible or practical. The assembly line is recommended when large units, i.e., battalion or larger, are phased out in one centralized location, such as Dong Tam. When small units are phased out in remote locations the use of assembly lines is not practical.

(2) Recommended Solution: The "assembly line" method should be utilized for processing equipment of battalion or larger size redeploying units where practicable.

d. Problem: Technical inspection and classification must be accurate and performed by qualified personnel.

(1) Discussion:

(a) One relocating unit performed its own technical inspections (TIs) and classification of vehicles, and this was accepted by its direct support maintenance unit which should have performed the work. Consequently, when the vehicles arrived at the depot the condition codes assigned by the unit, were not accepted since the codes were incorrect. Coordination was made, and the vehicles were reinspected and turned in prior to the deadline; however, unnecessary confusion and delay were caused by improper procedures.

(b) The conduct of TIs is a responsibility of the supporting DSU and should not be performed by the unit.

(2) Recommended Solution: The technical inspection and classification should be performed only by the designated support unit.

e. Problem: Too many types of oils and barrier paper are presently required by TM 750 series manuals.

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(1) Discussion: Training manuals in the 750 series presently require a large amount of basically similar types of oils and barrier papers for use in preservation of materiel. The use of a few basic types of oils and barrier papers would greatly expedite preservation processing.

(2) Recommended Solution: That oils and barrier papers required for use in preservation be standardized to the extent possible while insuring that preservation standards are met.

f. Problem: Most personnel within the Army are not trained in the fundamentals of classification, preservation and packing procedures.

(1) Discussion: Although supervisory personnel may be expected to be available to assist units which are redeploying, these personnel require the assistance of unit members who have fundamental skills in classification, preservation and packing procedures.

(2) Recommended Solution: When a unit is alerted for redeployment, it should receive immediate instruction in fundamental classification, preservation and packing procedures.

g. Problem: The SUPCOMs did not have an SOP or set of procedures specifying how the PP&P supplies stockpiled in their depot would be issued to the units and controlled.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Certain items and quantities of care and preservation supplies have been specifically stockpiled at each depot in RVN to be available for the packing and preservation of redeploying unit equipment. These supplies are set aside in each depot and rigidly controlled to prevent misuse and retrograde as excess.

(b) The SUPCOM and depot action officers had been briefed as to the procedures regarding the receipt and storage of these supplies. However, instructions concerning their issue and control had not been completed.

(2) Recommended Solution: The S-4/G-4 of the redeploying unit, using guidance contained in the 750 series of TM's and the technical expertise of the SUPCOM technical assistance personnel, should determine his PP&P requirements as far in advance of standdown as possible. The SUPCOM representative then requests the release of required PP&P material from the depot. Particular items and quantities that are not available from either the pre-stocked PP&P supplies or regular depot stocks are requested from another depot in RVN, Linawa reserves or LCO-P.

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h. Problem: Washing facilities for equipment being retrograded.

(1) Discussion:

(a) It is essential that a minimum of two high pressure pumps 100-350 GPM be made available to the deploying units as early in the deployment plan as possible. A water source capable of providing 25,000 GPH should be dedicated to the washing facility. The actual washing site should be well drained and be "hard stand", preferably cement. The area should be well lighted to provide ample illumination for work areas and equipment during hours of darkness. An NCO and one well trained mechanic must be provided to the deploying unit to supervise operation and maintenance of the pumps. These maintenance personnel should be provided necessary equipment for maintaining the pumps and also sufficient pipe, fittings, hose, (approx 300'), couplings and pipe cutting equipment to facilitate adapting local water outlets to pump requirements. These maintenance people should not be used to supervise the cleaning operation but work solely on maintenance of pumps.

(b) There is a tendency for deploying units to use the washing facility at all hours and security of pumps is critical. If not secured, the pumps will be ruined in short order. Throughout the operation there is a tendency to attempt to complete the job with just high pressure water. There is no substitute for troop labor under strict supervision. A considerable amount of time was wasted when equipment was rejected at the processing point because of a poor cleaning job.

(c) There is also a tendency for units to take short cuts. Examples include the following:

1 Units flipped trailers to "piggy back" configuration before washing. This made thorough cleaning of trailer beds extremely difficult, and it was impossible to get the mud off the bottom of the top trailer. Water can move it around but will not kick it out over the frame channels.

2 Units stacked and banded bows in truck bed prior to washing the vehicle. The bows are not cleaned prior to banding and are difficult to move and clean in the truck bed, to say nothing of the difficulty experienced in trying to clean the truck bed properly.

3 Units insist on banding seat cushions down and taping the glove compartments shut before washing. They do not clean them out prior to securing and must go through the entire process again.

4 There is also a tendency to repaint rather than wash. Vehicles are often painted while the vehicle is still filthy.

(2) Recommended Solution: A check list (Example at Appendix 11) should be prepared and distributed in sufficient quantities that each vehicle which is presented to the preservation point for processing is accompanied by a check sheet completed by the unit inspector. This check list provides a guide to the redeploying unit for cleaning requirements.

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1. Problem: Entomology and sanitation processing.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Equipment retrograded to CONUS must meet Department of Agriculture and Department of Public Health standards for cleanliness and pest and rodent control. Although this requirement was well known and had been in force for years on retrograde of unserviceable repairable equipment, the magnitude of a rapid large unit retrograde requires a new system, complete with a training program, to assure conformance. Perhaps the largest part of this problem is the cleanliness standards which must be adhered to. Critical to achieving the cleanliness standard are:

1 Adequate water source, capable of providing up to 25,000 gallons per hour, depending on type of pump used.

2 Adequate pumps to provide high pressure water for vehicles equipment/cleaning.

3 Clean hardstand for staging CONEX containers.

(b) The dusting and placement of rodenticide blocks posed no problem for CONEX cargo. Initially it was planned to dust all boxes and crates prior to loading in CONEXs. This proved impractical and it was decided to inspect all equipment for cleanliness prior to placement in crates or boxes. The CONEX was then loaded and braced and dusted prior to sealing. This procedure was explained and demonstrated to Department of Agriculture and Public Health inspectors on site, at Dong Tam and they approved this procedure. The dusting of all containers was accomplished by three four-man dusting teams. The teams consisted of three PA and E employees and one Non-Commissioned Officer for supervision. The entire operation was placed under DISCOM S-3 for scheduling and actual operation. Units requiring entomology service called and asked to be placed on a schedule. At the time of dusting the Rodenticide block was issued to the unit. A certificate was initialed by the team showing that dusting was complete and a block had been issued. This was done at the unit location. Vans requiring entomology processing were given identical treatment at the equipment processing point. A team was committed full time to the processing point.

(2) Recommended Solution: Procedures shown above should be implemented. Further, a comprehensive training program for key personnel involved in supervision of packing is considered essential.

j. Problem: The retrograde policy during Keystone Eagle was not firm. This led to confusion and failure to accomplish tasks efficiently.

(1) Discussion: The CONUS trained retrograde augmentation group units (RAGS) arrived in this command during the redeployment operations. Although their training on arrival was minimal, they were utilized extensively. The RAGS has now written detailed SOP's for use in a processing location (Appendix 12). The requirements for processing tools and equipment preservation,

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packaging and packing materials have been reviewed and revised based on experience gained in Keystone Eagle. All required tools and equipment and PR&P are either available in country or on requisition.

(2) Recommended Solution: The SOP on processing equipment for retrograde should be utilized in future redeployments (Appendix 12).

k. Problem: Movement plans for units redeploying were generally inaccurate or non-existent.

(1) Discussion: All units should have accurate up-to-date movement plans to include packing and preservation materials required in order to assist planners in identifying all transportation requirements in a timely manner.

(2) Recommended Solution: HQ, USARV should emphasize the fact that all units must have accurate, up-to-date movement plans.

1. Problem: The US Air Force was not represented at meetings at the USARV level which involved Air Force transportation.

(1) Discussion: At the beginning of any large scale move which involves US Air Force transportation Air Force representatives must be brought into the planning at the USARV level. This would help eliminate confusion and last minute coordination by personnel at the operating level who do not have time to be planners in many cases.

(2) Recommended Solution: The US Air Force should be represented at meetings at the USARV level which involve Air Force transportation.

NOTE: Appendices mentioned in this Annex were not received at HQ, DA.

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