

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD509404

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: **unclassified**

FROM: **confidential**

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

Distribution: Further dissemination only as directed by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, VA, 1 Apr 1999 or higher DoD authority.

AUTHORITY

DARPA ltr, 1 Apr 1999; DARPA ltr, 1 Apr 1999

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD- 509404

SECURITY REMARKING REQUIREMENTS

DOD 5200.1-R, DEC 76

REVIEW ON 28 APR 90

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

HSR 5/70
Copy of

**SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT:
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES--VIETNAM (U)**


AD509404

Group 3
Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals;
Not Automatically Declassified

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

In addition to security requirements which apply to this document, it may be further distributed by any holders only with specific prior approval of Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency Washington, D. C. 20301

att: T10



Prepared for:

Advanced Research Projects Agency
Office of the Secretary of Defense
ARPA Order 1474

HSR

human sciences research inc

WESTGATE RESEARCH PARK
7710 OLD SPRINGHOUSE ROAD McLEAN, VIRGINIA 22101

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) This research was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense under ARPA Order 1474 and was monitored by the U. S. Army Missile Command under Contract Number DAAH01-70-C-0217. Views and conclusions expressed herein are the primary responsibility of the author or the contractor, and should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of USAMICOM, ARPA, DOD or any other agency of the Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

April, 1970

HSR-TN-70/1-Wn

**SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT:
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES--VIETNAM (U)**

Group 3
Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals;
Not Automatically Declassified

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

In addition to security requirements which apply to this document, it may be further distributed by any holders only with specific prior approval of Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency Washington, D. C. 20301

Prepared for:
Advanced Research Projects Agency
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
ARPA Order 1474

Prepared by:
Human Sciences Research, Inc.
Westgate Research Park
7710 Old Springhouse Road
McLean, Virginia 22101

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

This report was prepared by
Ernest F. Bairdain, Project Director, and Edith M. Bairdain

With the research assistance of:

Robert W. Brink
Mildred English
Neil L. Jamieson, III
Roger V. Russell
Robert A. Silano

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

(U) The men who conduct psychological operations, the men who direct and plan psychological operations, must meet extraordinary demands for tactical, military, economic, sociological, anthropological, political and psychological knowledge in their often brief assignment in a psychological operations position in Vietnam. Needs arise that require them to devise new approaches and create appeals in situations that have no precedent in the individual's experience. Moreover, this individual is asked to report on the effectiveness of the resulting psyop effort. There is no store of general information to which he can turn for answers. Knowledge that is acquired by the individual during a one- or two-year assignment is not institutionalized but remains widely dispersed among people with varying levels of experience and capability. The press of urgent operational demands compels the continued meeting of immediate problems, excluding time directed to long-range considerations and consolidation of knowledge which already exists.

(U) ARPA is meeting this problem. In order to alleviate the two pressing needs--the need for short-term research for solution of immediately urgent psyop problems and the need for long-range research to develop broad theoretical principles to provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops--a research program was instituted that will respond to urgent current problems and at the same time furnish a systematic framework for use by Vietnamese and Allied psy-operators and their managers. ARPA contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR) for an interdisciplinary research effort working with and through responsible military and governmental agencies in Vietnam to support and systematize the field of Psychological Operations. The research approach requested follows that defined and initiated in 1968 by an HSR team directed by the present HSR-V Director.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

(U) HSR is using a systems approach which requires extensive interaction and exchange of information with the entire psyop community, both Vietnamese and Free World Forces, military and civilian. The individuals within this community are in essence part of the systems study team.

(U) Two highly integrated programs have been designed to meet the two types of research needs. One program, for long-range research considerations, is essentially directed to the problems of formulating and establishing means by which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyops. This is concerned, of course, with the institutionalization of existing knowledge and explication of procedures for the conduct of psyop projects and campaigns to develop meaningful criterion measures and procedures for assessing results of psyop efforts. The other program, for short-range research questions, is organized as a bank of research hours to be drawn upon for tasks defined as immediately urgent research problems by the two agencies most responsible for directing all the psyop efforts in Vietnam--the Military Assistance Command (MACV) and the Joint United States

CONFIDENTIAL

Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), under a Project Advisory Group (PAG) whose three principals are from ARPA, MACV, and JUSPAO.

(C) The general approach followed during the initial six-month period of the contract has been to bring a confluence of subtasks from individual workstream efforts to bear on major task problems. Urgent short-range tasks during the first half of the year were concerned with obstacles to enemy defection and determination of enemy vulnerabilities, with specific current interest focused on the North Vietnamese Army soldier. Efforts on these subtasks have included location and organization of study findings which exist in-country on the problems stated, determination of field procedures used which affect the subject under investigation, assessment of activities, projects and process having pertinence to research questions, development of test instruments, and conduct of surveys both to develop survey instruments and to close in on the problem under investigation. These workstream efforts involved search of the approximately 3,500 titles of studies available in sponsor agency files in Vietnam, screening of those which seemed pertinent to the research questions, and detailed review of those identified as containing information needed; meeting significant individuals within all agencies belonging to or interacting with the psyop community; holding discussions with knowledgeable individuals to abstract pertinent unpublished information; administration of questionnaire surveys to enemy personnel. Results of preliminary surveys using already available questionnaires showed the urgent need for appropriate data collection instruments. Four new and radically different questionnaires and procedures were developed for four specific groups:

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Prisoners of War (POW's)

South Vietnamese Viet Cong (VC) Prisoners of War

North Vietnamese Army Ralliers to the South Vietnamese Government (Hoi Chanh)

South Vietnamese Viet Cong Ralliers to the South Vietnamese Government

(C) The four new questionnaires were designed to cover all significant aspects of NVA and VC POW's and ralliers that are appropriate and feasible for treatment in such surveys. The questionnaires are composed of independent sections, each of which can be used alone or in any combination of sections depending on the focus of interest. In addition, as a partial solution to the problem of maintaining "conceptual equivalence" in working between different languages, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested and used to supplement questionnaire data.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FINDINGS

(C) Findings at the midstream point in an ongoing research program include the following.

General

- Development, explication, and systematization of the psyop process is urgently required in terms that permit translation to the needs and capabilities of other cultures and changing situations.
- Validity and reliability of count in every reporting process, both military and civilian, represent problems of the greatest urgency if the measure of the effectiveness of psyops is of interest or concern at any level.
- Two types of enemy are attacking South Vietnam. North Vietnam Army personnel who are invading South Vietnam in steadily increasing numbers are very different from South Vietnamese Viet Cong forces; radically different approaches, messages and appeals, are needed for each.

Obstacles to Defection

- Three major obstacles to defection, applicable to both the NVA and the VC soldier, have been identified:
 - Fear of harm to self by either side,
 - Fear of punitive action against one's family,
 - Belief in, faith in, dedication to the notion of ultimate victory.

(C) All other items identified from the literature survey can be regarded as contributory conditions which are not, in isolation, of sufficient significance to be considered as obstacles and which function to create or enhance the actual obstacle.

Vulnerabilities

(C) Vulnerabilities are found to differ for the two enemy, the NVA soldier and the VC soldier.

(C) The primary NVA vulnerability is potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a generalized disaffection (receptivity is discussed in terms of potential because the available evidence

CONFIDENTIAL

supports only the notion of a developing trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather than any active dissatisfaction). The primary mediating factor is "recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards."

(C) A secondary NVA vulnerability is decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparity between NVN indoctrination and GVN reality encountered once in the South. (There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture.)

(C) Another secondary NVA vulnerability is increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family. Its related secondary mediating factor is: "Family-centered concerns" which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of dependency and obligation.

(C) The primary VC vulnerability is greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future. Its related mediating factor: "Generalized deterioration of the will to fight."

(C) A secondary VC vulnerability is increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his plight and feelings, which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls, and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest possible extent by description of procedures and what is to be expected. Its related mediating factor is: "Negative reaction against Party control methods."

(C) Another secondary VC vulnerability is increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation. Its mediating factor is: "Feeling of victimization."

(C) The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the most important single concern in the life of the North or South Vietnamese soldier. It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude is less marked in the current adolescent generation and appears to be trending towards a considerably reduced importance.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) Recommendations have been made in response to immediately urgent questions posed by the psyop community. The following are in response to requests for means to overcome obstacles to defection:

1. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the "obstacles" rather than to the audience and situation.
2. Formulate single unitary education programs for military personnel, government personnel, and civilians to instruct them in procedures for dealing with all types of defectors.
3. Standardize actions and behavior involved in rallying and surrendering and standardize actions and procedures relevant to friendly involvement in a rally or surrender situation to the most minor details. This will furnish the content of the education program described in "2" above, which should be executed as quickly as possible, beginning with all military and paramilitary personnel.
4. Develop and use a limited number of the best-possible-quality messages emphasizing on a realistic level that it is possible to rally or surrender safely.
5. Test thoroughly themes analogous to "surely your family will accept some discomfort to help you stay alive so that you can be together again?"
6. Prepare simple single messages for a limited number of statistical aspects of the conduct of the war, emphasizing those related to things which most soldiers have experienced personally. Present; do not sell.

(C) The following is in response to the request from the psyop community to detect, assess, and select for exploitation vulnerabilities of target audiences to GVN/US/FWF psychological operations:

1. Give formal endorsement or formalize a procedural requirement for use of the definitions, terminology, and classification concept developed in order to provide a consistent and systematic base for theory and practice in psyop communications.
2. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the vulnerabilities defined. This results in targeting the largest possible audience with the highest potential for receptivity

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

with a message appropriately tailored to the sub-factors given in the description of each vulnerability.

3. Gain the advantage represented by "build-up" and "familiarity" effects of repetitive use of the same high-quality messages by developing and using a limited number of best-possible-quality messages. Devote the man-hours saved through reduction of design and development workload to a quality assurance program during development--not after distribution.
4. Task a group of individuals qualified to develop standardized actions and procedures for any type of "friendly" involvement in a rally, surrender, or capture situation; the product of this task must cover the subject down to the lowest level of detail in operating instructions; policy statements are not needed.
5. Formulate and implement a uniform coordinated education program for all friendly forces, government personnel, and civilians. Implementation does not mean handing out booklets.

If a top GVN or U. S. official would involve himself and set the pattern by personally conducting a training session--even if it is for his cabinet or staff--it would be a very valuable psyop effort.

The content of this program should be the standardized procedures described in "4" above plus emphatic descriptions of all laws, penalties, sanctions, etc., that can be identified as pertinent to such situations. Maximum publicity should be given to implementation of these activities. Execute the training/orientation program as quickly as possible beginning with all military and paramilitary personnel.

6. Develop and make massive repetitive distribution of one or two leaflets devoted to the themes:
 - a. "The worth of your family is known well--their friends will not reject them just because you, after fighting bravely, are in GVN hands."
 - b. "Surely your family will rejoice in accepting some discomfort to help you stay alive so you can all be together again."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) In addition, for long-range research considerations, two recommendations should be emphasized. These are:

Evaluate the application of recommendations made to meet ongoing psyop needs; explicate and systematize the process as developed in terms that translate to changing situations for use by GVN.

Continue the long-range research program (Program I) as planned, with major focus on the transfer of the psychological operations effort in Vietnam to Vietnamese responsibility.

LIMITATIONS

(U) This is an interim report of work that is ongoing. Conclusions and recommendations stated here are based upon work as accomplished to date. The continuing program of studies is designed to move from, test, validate, elaborate and supplement these findings to accomplish total program objectives.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED (U)

ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
CIC	Combined Interrogation Center
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CORDS	Civil Operations & Revolutionary Development Support
EEl	Essential Elements of Information
4th Psyop Gp	Fourth Psychological Operations Group
FWF	Free World Forces
GVN	Government of South Vietnam
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
KB	Knowledgeability Brief
MACJ3-11	Psychological Operations Director of the Military Assistance Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
NIC	National Interrogation Center
NLF	National Liberation Front (a Communist organization)
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
Obstacle	(1) Reasons an enemy soldier would not want to defect or desert; (2) reasons why it would be difficult for an enemy soldier to desert or defect if he wanted to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAG Project Advisory Group
PIC Province Interrogation Center
Psyops Psychological Operations
VC Viet Cong

Vulnerabilities (1) Aspects of VC/NVA that have a negative effect on
VC/NVA personnel; (2) aspects of QVN that have a
positive effect on VC/NVA personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY	iii
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
SECTION I: SCOPE OF PROBLEM	
Chapter 1. Requirements	7
Background and Objectives	7
Scope of Effort	7
General Requirements	8
Specific Requirements	9
Chapter 2. Program to Meet Requirements	11
Program Plan	11
Major Considerations	12
SECTION II: METHOD AND PROCEDURE	
Chapter 3. Research Approach	17
Long-Range Research Approach	18
Short-Range Research Approach	20
Chapter 4. Development of Research Instruments and Procedures	22
Questionnaire Development	23
Problem of Conceptual Equivalence Between Languages	24
Chapter 5. Individual Workstream Effort	26
Survey of the Literature	26
Monitoring of Document Flow	27
Survey of Interrogation Procedures	31
Assessment of Psyop Campaign	33
Assessment of Communications Media	36
SECTION III: RESULTS	
Chapter 6. Long-Range Research	41
Psyop Program Review	41
Criterion Development	42
Special-Purpose Large-Scale Psyop Campaign	43
Summary of Campaign Conduct	43
Selection of any Criterion Factor	45
Determination of its Ability to Measure Outcome of a Psyop Effort	46
Determination of Means for Obtaining Valid and Reliable Counts	46

CONFIDENTIAL

Assessment of Psyop Products and Procedures	47
Selection of any Criterion Factor	48
Determination of its Ability to Measure	
Outcome of Psyop Effort	48
Determination of Means for Obtaining	
Valid and Reliable Counts	48
General Research Plan for Criterion Development	48
Extension of Research Capabilities	50
Chapter 7. Short-Range Research	52
Study of Obstacles to Defection	52
Study of Enemy Vulnerabilities	60
VC Vulnerabilities	67
Primary: Deterioration of the Will to Fight	67
Secondary: Reaction Against Party Control Methods	68
Secondary: VC Feeling of Victimization	69
NVA Vulnerabilities	70
Primary: Trend Toward "Generalized Disaffection"	70
Secondary: NVA Disillusionment in South Vietnam	75
Secondary: NVA Family-Centered Concerns	78

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 8. Mid-Stream Conclusions and Recommendations	83
The Nature of Current Psyop Activities	83
Obstacles and Vulnerabilities	83
Factors Requiring Systematic Research	88

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF TABLES AND CHART

Tables

1	Program Tasks	13
2	"Obstacles" Identified from the Literature on Defection	57
3	Vulnerabilities Classification Matrix	63
4	Military Service/Trip to South Vietnam: Attitudes	73
5	Combat Experience: NVA POW's	74
6	NVN Indoctrination Versus GVN Exposure: Comparison	77

Chart

1	Document Summary Report	28
---	-------------------------	----

CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The men who conduct psychological operations, the men who direct and plan psychological operations, must meet extraordinary demands for tactical, military, economic, sociological, anthropological, political and psychological knowledge and insight in the course of their often brief assignment in psychological operations positions in Vietnam. Needs arise that require them to devise new approaches and create appeals in situations that have no precedent in an individual's experience. Moreover, this individual is asked to report on the effectiveness of the resulting psyop effort. There is no store of general information to which he can turn for answers. Knowledge that is acquired by the individual during a one- or two-year assignment is not institutionalized but remains widely dispersed among other individuals with varying levels of experience and capability. The press of urgent operational demands compels the continued meeting of immediate problems, excluding time directed to long-range considerations and to consolidation of knowledge which already exists.

(U) ARPA is meeting this problem. To alleviate two pressing needs--the need for solution of urgent immediate psyop problems, and the need for development of broad theoretical principles to provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops--the Advanced Research Projects Agency has contracted for research in Vietnam that will respond to high-priority pressing problems and that will at the same time furnish a systematic framework for use by Vietnamese and Allied psyoperators and their managers. This effort requires the on-site involvement of senior research personnel who have both the professional competence and the experiential background to respond effectively to real-time, real-world critical problems in a practical problem-solving manner. Working always from a disciplined research background, these personnel must simultaneously develop a foundation of general principles. Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR) is furnishing this capability. The senior on-site personnel have wide experience in meeting information and communication systems problems in both industry and the military. The HSR research team, composed of behavioral scientists from several disciplines and linguistic and experimental research scientists, has been in the field approximately five months.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) This document reports progress and status at the end of the first six months since contract award. It is arranged in four major sections to discuss: (I) the scope of the problem, (II) the methods and procedures being used to address it, (III) the results to date, and (IV) those conclusions and recommendations which may be stated at this time.

(U) Section I, Scope of Problem, describes the overall task in terms of the requirements and the program designed to meet those requirements.

(U) Section II, Method and Procedure, discusses the research approach used, describes development of research instruments and procedures for their use, and reports the effort undertaken in the various subtasks to meet major task requirements.

(U) Section III, Results, describes and analyzes the merging of various workstream efforts into the long-range research program and the short-term research program.

(U) Section IV presents conclusions reached at this interim point and recommendations for continuing effort.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION I: SCOPE OF PROBLEM (U)

Chapter 1. Requirements

Chapter 2. Program to Meet Requirements

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 1. REQUIREMENTS (U)

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

(U) A program of psychological operational studies to be conducted in Vietnam was mounted in response to (1) the long-term need to institutionalize what has been learned by experience and to consolidate knowledge that, in the press of urgent operational demands, has long remained widely dispersed among people and offices of varying levels of experience and capability, and (2) the concurrent short-term need to conduct research to meet urgent operational problems.

(U) The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR) for an interdisciplinary research effort to work with and through responsible state, military, and governmental agencies in Vietnam to support and systematize the field of Psychological Operations (psyops). The research approach requested followed that defined and initiated in 1968 by an HSR team directed by the present HSR Field Team Director.

(U) The primary objectives of the contracted effort are to develop and validate criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of psyop programs, to develop and assist in the establishment of a system of evaluation that can be used by psyoperators, both U.S. and Vietnamese, and to help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops in an insurgent environment wherever it may occur.

SCOPE OF EFFORT

(U) The scope of this effort reaches psychological operations throughout South Vietnam. It is stated in the contract in terms of three goals:

1. To develop a systematic program of operations research to provide effective and continuing support of the psyop objectives in Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

2. To provide research for the psyop community that will enable it to more effectively evaluate psyops in Vietnam through the identification and development of operational criteria as a base for the valid measure of effectiveness.
3. To provide a theoretical and empirical basis from which the psyop community can implement a system of operational evaluation of its activities in order that it may more effectively meet the changing needs of psyops in a counter-insurgency and nation-building environment.

(U) Responsible conduct of the program requires continuously updated information as to psyop objectives in Vietnam in order to provide effective and continuing support for those objectives; effective program development requires extensive interaction with those individuals responsible for planning and implementing psyop programs.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

(U) Recognizing that very little effort has been given to the creation of an overall theoretical model for psyops in terms of an empirical base from which to evaluate specific programs, ARPA posed research objectives in the contract which would move toward correcting this lack. The measurement of psyop effectiveness requires identification and use of independent and generally applicable criteria. Efforts in this direction to date have not been satisfactory; in fact, criteria which have wide applicability to psyops in general or to any major portion of the total range of psyop programs have not been identified (and may not exist).

(U) Recognition was given to the difficulty of identifying such criteria. Many interacting factors affect psyops, and the situation in which they are conducted is complex--non-psyop factors may have much greater significance and impact than the psyop program. It has also been stated that within the existing state of knowledge, criteria cannot be selected and applied independently of the specific nature and the context of the situation in which an individual psyop program is executed. However, expressing the belief that the effect of psyop programs can be measured, and that the nature of the psyop programs found to be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

effective can be specified as well as the conditions in which they were effective, the following research objectives were stated:

1. To measure the effectiveness of psyop programs by developing and validating criteria according to the specified aims of the psyop campaign.
2. To develop a system for operational measurement of the effectiveness of psyop programs.
3. To assist in the establishment of a continuing system of evaluation capable of being employed by psyoperators.
4. To help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops in an insurgent environment.

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

(U) In consideration of these expressed goals and objectives, ARPA stipulated the following:

The contractor shall conduct a program of research to be entitled Psychological Operations Studies in the Republic of Vietnam, consisting of the following:

1. A study of current psyop programs in Vietnam to identify significant factors requiring further systematic research and development.
2. Formulating and establishing criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyop measures proposed or utilized.
3. Concurrent with the above, formulate and initiate a systematic program of applied research to provide effective and continuing support of the psyop objectives. While it should reflect appreciation of fundamental theory and principles, this program shall emphasize research on problems of immediate need and application and shall be inherently interdisciplinary in character.
4. Develop through cooperative research and training related action research capability within the Vietnamese intellectual, academic, governmental, and military communities. This indigenous capability will be encouraged to develop

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

into a task force capable of initiating and sustaining independent research contributing to psyop programs.

5. Conduct research studies within the program defined above to determine the effectiveness of the selected action techniques and to accomplish specific psyop objectives.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 2. PROGRAM TO MEET REQUIREMENTS (U)

(U) Two major work programs were planned to fill the requirements and meet the objectives desired. These programs were designed to be conducted concurrently. A program of systematic research concerned with analysis of existing information and research results and generation of new concepts and approaches needed is being carried out on one hand, while a program of applied research studies to meet urgent operational needs of the psyop community is accomplished on the other. These two programs have been integrated through a total systems approach, with individual workstream studies from the applied effort feeding major task mainstream work effort, all feeding the overall program into which both programs merge.

PROGRAM PLAN

(U) Of the approximately sixty-six man-month time period contracted for research effort in Vietnam, one-third was apportioned to the systematic research and development area (Program I) and two-thirds to the applied studies area (Program II). Time required for preparation of management reports (the Program Plan required within the first sixty days after contract award; one weekly report each week; one monthly report each month; one quarterly report for each of three quarters; an interim report due at the end of the seventh month after start of contract; and any briefings and program status reports necessary) is drawn from Program I time. The time necessary for preparation of reports of the applied studies requested by the psyop community is drawn from the time allocated to these tasks within Program II during the period in which the report is wanted.

(U) Program I is concerned with long-range problems and is directed primarily to investigation of the area of effectiveness criteria. Program II is concerned with short-range problems and is directed primarily to investigation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of urgent research questions of immediate concern to the psyop community. The two programs are integrated to allow the greatest pay-off to both long-range and short-range goals. Long-range research theory and principle guide the planning and provide a basis for creative problem-solving approaches for short-range research tasks. The short-range research program in turn provides an "operational world" laboratory to test and validate developing systems and theory.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

(U) The need to conduct research within ongoing field efforts and dependence upon sponsoring agencies for liaison and support are major considerations.

(U) Any research under this contract must be conducted within scheduled ongoing efforts. Basic contract effort involves identification of psyop projects that will serve as vehicles for research study into aspects of various problems. The requirement to train a related "action research" capability involves, further, identification of research programs which can serve as instruction laboratories for research methodology.

(U) Performance and productivity of the research team under this program plan, if it is to respond effectively to the contract requirements, depends almost entirely on the ready availability of continuing liaison and support from the sponsoring agencies in Vietnam. This interaction is needed to insure access to facilities and to needed informational sources, and to provide accurate and timely information and assistance. The research effort must receive current information regarding overall psyop objectives in Vietnam, and continual information regarding current psyop programs in Vietnam. Effective accomplishment rests upon timely receipt of appropriate liaison and support from the psyop community.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1. PROGRAM TASKS

RESEARCH PROGRAM STATUS (U)				
PROGRAM I	Preparation of Plan Psyop Program Review Criteria Development Extension of Research	Task A	Completed as scheduled	
		Task B	Completed as scheduled	
		Task C	In process--initiated ahead of schedule	
		Task D	In process--initiated ahead of schedule	
PROGRAM II	Obstacles Vulnerabilities	Task 1	Completed as scheduled	
		Task 2	In process--scheduled phase completed	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION II: METHOD AND PROCEDURE (U)

Chapter 3. Research Approach

**Chapter 4. Development of Research
Instruments and Procedures**

Chapter 5. Individual Workstream Effort

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH APPROACH (U)

(U) The ISR systems approach to the problem of psychological operations studies in Vietnam requires extensive interaction and exchange of information with the entire psyop community, both Vietnamese and Free World Forces, military and civilian. The individuals within this community are in essence a part of the system study team.

(U) An integral factor in a systematic approach to problems using interdisciplinary team effort is the selection of resource skills pertinent to a specific problem and the application of those skills in the strengths and priorities the problem requires. A major resource in psyop problems is the user agency personnel--in this case, the Directors of Psychological Operations and the psyoperators. Another major resource in the study of psychological operations in a specific culture is the understanding and skill applicable to the problem that is resident within and native to that culture.

(U) The importance of manner of entry to responsible organizations and the establishment of not only working relationships but real rapport at the operating level in the conduct of programs selected for intensive study is a task that must be accorded necessary time by research personnel. The effort required in the study of psyops in Vietnam presumes abilities to work within and through ongoing operations in order to provide valid research results to sponsoring agencies and also to upgrade research abilities within the organizations involved.

(U) This effort demands not only sponsorship and cooperation at the top management levels, but requires the eliciting of cooperation and genuine interest on the part of the operating personnel who are ultimately tasked with furnishing the information needed.

(U) The long-range research program (Program I) comprises four sub-tasks. The first was preparation of a program plan due at the end of the second month after start of the contract. The second was a review of current psyop programs and projects, completed at the end of the fourth month, with input

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

effort from short-range projects in Program II. The third subtask, development of effectiveness criteria, was scheduled to begin at the start of the fifth month and continue through the twelfth month to constitute major program effort. The fourth subtask, the extension of research capabilities to the Vietnamese community, was to begin at the end of the third month and continue through the contract.

(U) The short-range research program (Program II) is composed of a number of subtasks to provide research support on problems of immediate need and application for the psyop community. It is responsive to priority research needs defined by a Project Advisory Group (PAG), whose members represent ARPA, MACV, and JUSPAO, and has received intensive effort from the time the first HSR scientists reported in-country on 1 September. An early task under this program was preparation of a general program for conduct of applied research under the plan. Subsequent efforts involved preparations of a research plan, research implementation, and a summary report for each task which meets contractual stipulations for acceptance for performance of effort. Tasks are programmed within the projected forty-four man-months allotted to this program within the twelve-month period.

LONG-RANGE RESEARCH APPROACH

(U) Program I, addressed to Systematic Research and Development, was designed to feed into and draw upon all of Program II, the applied research effort directed to problem areas defined by JUSPAO and MACJ3-11.

(U) Program I was essentially directed to the formulation and establishment of means by which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyop measures proposed or utilized, beginning with a study of current psyop programs in Vietnam to identify significant factors requiring further systematic research and development.

(U) Research into the problem of effectiveness criteria was scheduled to continue from this effort beginning in January. The research plan was designed to coordinate two lines of attack in the formulation and development of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

criteria with which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyop measures which have been used or which have been proposed. The two lines of attack were described as a deductive approach and an empirical approach. A deductive approach, directed toward development of theory, concepts and methods from which to deduce criteria, and an empirical approach, oriented to the solution of immediate problems, are being conducted concurrently with the empirical studies program serving as a laboratory to confirm, modify, and extend theory and methods developed from the deductive approach. The previous research which prompted the requirement for the current program indicated that criteria cannot be selected and applied across the board independently of the nature and the context of the situation specific to each psyop project. The two-pronged attack was designed to have research accomplished in Program II (empirical studies) provide the laboratory in which a sufficient number of selected specific projects could permit evaluation of criterion factors hypothesized.

(U) A review of current psyop programs in Vietnam has shown that the activity now in effect is largely directed to a continuing support effort for major programs and objectives specified at national level. This review did identify a major psyop campaign directed primarily to military audiences and a psyop project concerned with communications media directed primarily to civilian audiences; these two psyop efforts offered an early opportunity to begin research on the effectiveness criteria task while obtaining first-hand information on current psyop practice. Moreover, it revealed the opportunity to design a highly useful series of comparable psyop campaigns which can serve research ends.

(U) The approach is based upon the hypothesis that criteria can be formulated for evaluation of psyop effectiveness when applied within the plan and context of the situation specific to each psyop project. The imposition of necessary research considerations on specific psyop projects to permit valid assessment is the factor that is considered most crucial to valid use of effectiveness criteria.

(U) Procedural steps used in this approach are:

- Step 1. On the basis of results of Task B, and Program II projects during the contract term, select projects judged to be suitable to serve as vehicles for criterion measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Step 2. Formulate criteria by which to evaluate effectiveness of selected psyop projects or programs.

Step 3. Impose necessary research considerations on the selected projects to permit valid assessment.

Step 4. Evaluate results in terms of adequacy of criteria under investigation.

(U) The effort to fulfill the requirement to encourage an indigenous capability to develop into a task force capable of initiating and sustaining independent research contributing to psyop programs will be accomplished with Program I through its interrelation with Program II.

(U) The research approach used on this effort is that of transfer of training and skills through cooperative joint team efforts. The objective here is seen as bringing three factors into a mutually enhancing complex. The research task should be enhanced by the combination of Vietnamese resources with HSR resources, and understanding and insight should be shared as research methodology is developed.

SHORT-RANGE RESEARCH APPROACH

(U) Program II, addressed to applied research and development, was organized as a bank of research hours to be drawn upon for tasks defined as immediately urgent research problems by MACJ3-11 and JUSPAO. The program itself both receives support from and feeds into all of Program I, the Systematic Research and Development Program for long-range goals.

(U) Two tasks have been defined and accepted for effort to date, with a third task nominated. These are highly interrelated tasks and represent first priority research questions for both JUSPAO and MACJ3-11; these questions are: (1) What means can be used to overcome obstacles to defection? (2) What are the primary vulnerabilities of the enemy and how can knowledge of these and their changes with changing situations be used most effectively in stopping hostilities?

(U) Subsequent tasks will be formally requested by the PAG.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The general approach used for the initial six-month period has been to bring a confluence of subtasks from individual workstream efforts to bear on the major task problems. These subtasks have included attempts to locate and organize any study findings which may exist on the problem, to determine field procedures used which affect the subject under investigation, to assess activities, projects, and processes which may have pertinence to the question, to modify and develop test instruments, and to conduct surveys considered necessary to close in on the problem under investigation.

(U) It was found early in the in-country effort that before priority research questions could be answered, test instruments appropriate for responsible response to these questions would have to be developed. This major effort is discussed in the next chapter, and some of the other workstream efforts are described in the following chapter in this section. Results in terms of mainstream major task efforts which were fed by these workstream efforts are described in the next section.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES (U)

(U) A major workstream effort during the first six months of the contract period has been the design, development and field-testing of four separate comprehensive, compartmentalized, computer-compatible questionnaires. These four questionnaires were developed for survey of prisoners of war (POW) and ralliers to the South Vietnamese government (Hoi Chanh), both from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) in the South.

(U) In mid-September 1969, HSR research personnel participated in a quick-response questionnaire survey of 60 NVA Hoi Chanh using an already available questionnaire. Early in October, HSR personnel played a major part in executing a survey that proposed to sample 40 to 50 NVA POW's to obtain useful data while pretesting a questionnaire developed jointly by representatives of several groups within the psyop community, including HSR. Work was terminated after the questionnaire had been administered to 24 NVA POW's when it became clear that the questionnaires in use were not appropriate nor productive for the task.

(U) HSR personnel completed the analysis of the utility of the questionnaire and the summarization and analysis of the data. Results from both the Hoi Chanh and POW studies are reported separately in HSR Working Paper Number 1.

(U) Results of the two studies described above emphasized the urgent need for appropriate data-collection instruments. When the inadequacies of the existing questionnaires became clearly evident, effort was shifted to focus on development of questionnaires, procedures and other types of data-collection instruments. These instruments were especially designed to provide information required to accumulate evidence in a quantity and of a quality and consistency to permit conclusions and justify action.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT

(U) Results of participation in surveys using questionnaires obtained from other sources, or questionnaires designed in large part by other participants, showed clearly that new and radically different questionnaires and procedures would have to be developed for at least four specific groups: NVA POW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC POW's, and VC Hoi Chanh.

(U) The four new questionnaires were designed to cover all significant aspects of NVA and VC POW's and ralliers that are appropriate and feasible for treatment in such surveys. The questionnaires are composed of independent sections, each of which can be used alone or in any combination of sections depending on the focus of interest. Headings of some of the sections are: Personal Data/Religion; Family--Number/Composition; Family--NVA Aid to/Control Through; Departure for RVN--Attitudes/Expectations; Exposure in RVN--NVA/VC Relationships.

(U) The questions combine the use of pre-selected answer choices where appropriate for speed, accuracy, and consistency, and with provision for narrative response or elaboration of all questions where desirable and appropriate. In this fashion, the questionnaire makes use of the advantages inherent in both the open-end and closed type of questions.

(U) The questions are pre-coded to enable the data to be key-punched directly from the questionnaire even without knowledge of the Vietnamese language. The questions are so numbered that all four forms are fully compatible (with the exception of a small number of specific questions which do not hamper processing) and the data can thus be processed on cards or tape with the same program and report format even though they treat four different types of subjects. Those questions which permit elaboration of a pre-coded response will show, in machine-produced reports, whether a narrative answer exists for any specific question for a particular subject but will not show the content of the narrative answer itself. The narrative portion of the answer must be extracted later in narrative form from the original questionnaire by a Vietnamese translator; the "present"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

or "absent" indicator in the machine-produced report will eliminate the necessity to search all questionnaires to find out whether or not a narrative response was given.

PROBLEM OF CONCEPTUAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN LANGUAGES

(U) In the course of development and translation of the questionnaires into Vietnamese, it was established that there is a considerable disparity between the Vietnamese and English languages in the range of distinctions or nuances that are possible for many key words. This issue is extremely important because the nature of the research objectives makes it imperative that these fine distinctions be made; it is clearly possible that some apparent ambiguities or contradictions in the literature may have resulted from this problem.

(U) As a partial solution to this problem, i.e., the problem of maintaining "conceptual equivalence" in working between different languages, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested, and used to supplement questionnaire data. It is important to recognize that, under the time and operational pressures which exist in a war, no full solution to this problem (which is both a technical and an operating problem) may be realistically possible.

(U) Rather than using a single word such as "surrender" which has or may have unfortunate connotations in Vietnamese, and because the Vietnamese language cannot easily handle the distinction between "surrender," "allowing capture," and "being captured" (indeed, they require some operational elaboration to make a distinction in English), several very consistently formulated functional descriptions which relate to rallying, surrendering, being captured, or deserting have been printed on cards. The individual, who reads (or has read to him) the description, then sorts the cards in four successive choices by placing the card on a labeled section of a large chart in response to the following four questions given in sequence:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- | | | |
|---|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Do your leaders consider this action in this situation acceptable or unacceptable? | Acceptable
_____ | Not acceptable
_____ |
| 2. Do your leaders believe this action in this situation to be honorable or dishonorable? | Honorable
_____ | Not Honorable
_____ |
| 3. Would your families be affected or not affected if you took this action in this situation? | Family not affected
_____ | Family affected
_____ |
| 4. Would you do this in this situation? | Would
_____ | Would not
_____ |

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 5. INDIVIDUAL WORKSTREAM EFFORT

(U) In addition to the development of test instruments and procedures, other individual workstream efforts have included surveys of available literature pertinent to specific task questions regarding enemy defection, monitoring current available document flow through JUSPAO, investigation of certain field procedures, assessment of the effectiveness of a major joint U. S. and Vietnamese psyop campaign, and assessment of communications media.

(U) Most of these activities were conducted concurrently.

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

(U) A survey of literature relevant to enemy defection was conducted. A particular objective was to compile a list of those enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to defection reported in previous research in Vietnam. The survey was limited to documents physically available in Saigon with publication dates prior to 1 September 1969.

(U) Among the sources covered, four major sources were: (1) the ARPA study files, (2) the JUSPAO files, (3) the MACJ3 Information Center, and (4) the MACV CORDS Information Center.

(U) Inquiries were made also to investigate the possible existence of additional higher-classified documents. Of those found, inspection did not disclose any material that added significantly to the list of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles already identified; therefore, these higher-classified documents were not searched further during this period.

(U) A total of approximately 3,500 documents was available; all of these titles were searched, and 115 documents were selected for screening. Abstracts and other descriptive material in these 115 documents were read and 46 were identified as containing information on the subject of enemy defection. These 46 studies were reviewed in detail.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Documents from which information was extracted reported studies of two types: (1) analyses of existing data, and (2) analyses of new data collected specifically for research projects. The first type, the kind usually done by elements of the U. S. Mission in Vietnam, consisted largely of captured documents, interrogation reports, field reports, intelligence summaries, previous studies, and returnee reports. The second type, generally done by contractors, usually collected new data through interviews and/or questionnaire surveys, supplemented by use of already-existing data. Publication dates of these studies covered the time period from 1964 to mid-1969; periodic reports were not within the survey's scope, and the cut-off date for documents surveyed was 1 September 1969.

(U) It was found that many of the references in the literature are circular; i.e., A quotes B who quotes C who quotes A. Also, several documents are based upon data collected and previously reported upon by other writers or are based on the same sets of data or documents. Due to the large number of documents available, together with the absence of a comprehensive master list or accessible and adequate information as to their content, it was necessary to perform a manual title search to identify documents potentially of interest, obtain the documents, scan and reject or accept for further review, and conduct an intensive analysis of documents judged to be pertinent. For this reason, some pertinent documents may have missed review or relevant information implicitly stated in those reviewed may have missed extraction.

(U) Detailed information obtained from the studies relevant to defection was summarized on forms designed for the purpose (see Chart 1). "Obstacles" and "vulnerabilities" were listed. It was from these records that data analyses were made.

MONITORING OF DOCUMENT FLOW

(U) It was necessary to consider the current information relevant to enemy defection. Copies of all documents possibly pertinent to enemy "vulnerabilities" or "obstacles" to defection available within JUSPAO were requested for the HSR research team on a daily basis. The request had two purposes: one was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHART 1. DOCUMENT SUMMARY REPORT

	Reviewer	Date
A. Title:		
B. Source:	Author:	
Agency:	Classification:	
C. Date of Publication:	Date of Research:	
D. Research Problem:		
E. Research Approach:		
F. Principal Conclusions:		
G. Abstract of Recommendations of Author, if any:		
H. Comment: Ideas for Further Consideration; Fruitful Research Directions (recommended by reviewer):		
I. Related or Subsequent Work, or Relevant Sources (known to reviewer):		
J. List Statements of following (as defined by author):		
1. Susceptibilities	2. Vulnerabilities	3. Obstacles

CONFIDENTIAL

to identify the most productive sources of current pertinent intelligence data relative to "vulnerabilities" and "obstacles," and the other was to assess the kind, amount, utility, and timely availability of such materials. This information was also used to develop perspective on other activities contemplated for the future.

(U) Three recurrent publications, which are unclassified and which originate with JUSPAO, were received regularly:

1. "Principal Radio Reports from Communist Radio Sources" (daily)
2. "Saigon Press Review" (daily)
3. "Vietnam Documents and Research Notes" (periodic)

(U) The first contains translations of communist radio broadcasts. The second contains translations of news headlines and editorial comments from Vietnamese and Chinese daily newspapers published in Saigon. Both publications provide some useful background information about certain aspects of the current situation but little that is specific to the subject of enemy "vulnerabilities." The third publication presents excerpts from captured documents plus background information and interpretation; some are quite relevant to "vulnerabilities."

(U) Other recurrent publications received irregularly were:

1. "Combined Document Exploitation Center Bulletins" (daily)
2. "Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report" (daily)
3. "International Press Service Correspondent" (periodic)
4. "Mission Press Releases" (periodic)
5. "Vietnam Roundup" (periodic)
6. "Wireless File" (daily)

(U) In this group, Publications 1 and 2 are confidential; the others are unclassified. Publication 1 is originated by the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) and contains descriptions of captured documents. Publication 2 is originated either by CDEC or the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC). CDEC issues translations of captured documents, and CMIC issues Knowledgeability Briefs concerning information potential of prisoners of war and returnees, and transcripts of interrogations of prisoners of war and ralliers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Captured documents are screened at CDEC for exploitation potential and some are sent to JUSPAO daily. Interrogation reports are sent to JUSPAO daily. These two types of material represent the raw material from which almost all intelligence analysts, payop analysts, and other analysts in South Vietnam work.

(U) The sources of these materials were investigated to supplement the materials received within JUSPAO. Fifty-eight recurrent reports and their sources were identified as potentially useful. After a review of files of each of these sources of reports, it was judged that thirty-two of the recurrent reports would have potential value for the "vulnerabilities" task. Coverage, abstraction, and maintenance of files of these reports, which are not included in the flow of documents which has been monitored, would require much more time than can presently be allocated; therefore, arrangements have not been made for regular receipt of these documents. A list of the fifty-eight reports is included in internal project reports. If the direction of future work indicates the desirability of obtaining these documents, preliminary arrangements have already been made to expedite access to or receipt of most of these that may be needed.

(U) In summary, monitoring of the flow of documents through JUSPAO proved to be a valuable means of cross-checking on "vulnerabilities" reported in the literature. For instance, some of the literature-identified vulnerabilities continue to be reported with varying frequencies, some have disappeared, and some not mentioned in the literature have been identified in the document flow.

(U) If future tasks and their priorities permit time allocation, monitoring the flow of current documents should be reinstated as a significant workstream effort. While it would be expensive in terms of manhours, it would almost certainly be productive in terms of (a) increasing confidence in inferences and findings by providing cross-checks for current field research data; (b) through providing current research data cross-checks, shortening the length of time required to accumulate evidence in a quantity and of a quality and consistency that permits conclusions and justifies action; (c) flagging indications of changes in currently held views of target population characteristics, such as enemy behavior, intentions, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SURVEY OF INTERROGATION PROCEDURES

(U) A survey was made of interrogation procedures in current use to consider their effect on prisoner of war responses to subsequent interviews.

(U) As part of the investigation into means to overcome obstacles to defection and to assess enemy vulnerabilities, information is derived in large measure from that obtained from prisoners and defectors. In making use of this source of information, whether collected especially for a specific project or drawn on by researchers from official records, it is desirable to know what interrogation procedures are used. What procedures are in general use for obtaining any information? What is that set of standard information that is available from official files on any individual who has undergone interrogation? What is the experience of the prisoner or defector over the first few days? the first weeks? the first months? These are some of the questions the subtask was designed to answer.

(C) For reasons of accessibility and sensitivity, the project report did not cover the interrogation procedures and treatment accorded prisoners captured by units other than the United States.

(C) It was found that there is no standard situation which faces every prisoner of war. Depending on time, place, unit of capture, and his assessed exploitation value, a prisoner is subjected to a wide range of situational factors. Added to this is the complexity which ensues when he encounters handling by the personnel of second or third countries.

(C) In Vietnam, the first formal interrogation of prisoners captured by United States units takes place at the brigade level. This is conducted by a trained interrogator assigned to the brigade by the division level military intelligence detachment (MID). Generally, three or four interrogators are assigned to each brigade, depending on the amount of contact with the enemy. Interrogators are allocated between the brigades and the division G2 as needed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) After interrogation at the brigade, the PW is taken to division. Here he will be interrogated further if, from brigade reports, it seems warranted. The interrogation at division level, like brigade, is primarily tactical in scope. Although Corps is not a necessary step in the interrogation chain, it may request a particular prisoner for interrogation. The normal procedure after division level is to be sent to the PW camp for the particular Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), where further exploitation may occur at the Combined Interrogation Center (CIC). Prior to this, the PW may pass through the Province Interrogation Center (PIC).

(C) A Viet Cong who is captured may be reclassified a Hoi Chanh only with approval of a joint committee made up of members of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Chieu Hoi. A North Vietnamese Army PW, on the other hand (according to information obtained to date), may not be reclassified at any time. At times an NVA Hoi Chanh may ask to be reclassified as a PW, with the thought of some chance of returning home. At any point along this chain, the PW may be selected for further interrogation by any one of several agencies.

(C) The type of questions and the interrogation procedure vary with each MID. Basic questions asked of everyone are name, rank (if NVA) or position (if VC), unit of assignment, date and place of birth, and family background. The PW is next questioned with regard to significant activities from a certain date (his birth, or the day he joined the VC/NVA) to the present. Significant activities include where the subject was at what time, with what unit, as well as his promotions and combat activities. These questions are not asked from a standard form. The interrogator attempts to direct the questioning in a chronological sequence, but retains the flexibility to follow any leads. The results of each interrogation are kept in a dossier which is retained by the particular camp or agency in control of the PW.

(C) Although the interrogations in the normal chain are not standardized, certain military units and agencies use standard forms for their own special purposes. For example, the 4th Payop Group has a standard questionnaire given to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PW's they select for interrogations tailored specifically to psyops. CMIC uses a Knowledgeability Brief which covers many different areas and is designed to pinpoint areas in which further questioning might be productive.

(C) The physical environment and other situational aspects of the interrogation vary. It is for this reason that trained interrogators are often reluctant to utilize standard forms in their interrogations. Rather, they will guide the direction of the questioning on the basis of essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements as provided by higher command. This enables the interrogator to achieve and maintain the initiative, which is considered essential to a successful interrogation. It also insures that the subject of the interrogation is not completely aware of the objective of the interrogation. In addition, the interrogator may change the line of questioning to examine more fully any unforeseen knowledge produced by the subject.

(C) Generally, it is not until the prisoner is evacuated to brigade or division level that a complete interrogation takes place.

ASSESSMENT OF PSYOP CAMPAIGN

(U) Another workstream effort that fed all ongoing contract effort was evaluation of a major psyop campaign conducted over a six-week period. This evaluation was conducted in response to requests from the psyop community for a systematic assessment of the campaign effort itself, its planning and conduct, materials used, and of the results of an effort to increase the number of Hoi Chanh and prisoners.

(U) This inquiry was also a major effort in the investigation of criteria of effectiveness. The evaluation effort served further as a review of current psyop approaches, projects, and materials and to identify significant factors requiring systematic research and development. It provided an initial start in the study of means by which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyop measures proposed or utilized. It further indicated future cooperative research situations with Vietnamese military personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Project inception was the suggestion of JUSPAO, supported by MACV, that an effort be made to determine if "saturation" of an area with an appeal to specific audiences could in fact increase the hypothesized tendency of NVA forces to respond to the Chieu Hoi appeals and to see further if appeals directed to this group to become prisoners of war would be effective. The cooperative effort by Vietnamese and United States military and civilian groups was a first-time effort in this direction on this scale. The plan was endorsed and accepted by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and headquarters for the combined effort was its 5th Division.

(U) The plan had been developed, the operation order written, and campaign start date was imminent before evaluation by HSR was requested. It was necessary from that point in time to agree with sponsoring agencies as to scope of evaluation, establish performance objectives to be evaluated, specify data required to assess the meeting of these performance objectives, establish reliable sources of needed data on a timely basis, and determine the feasibility and utility of various levels of assessment.

(U) Scope of evaluation was fixed in individual meetings with sponsor principals at MACV and JUSPAO, who requested assessment for campaign plans, materials used, and the conduct as well as results of the campaign. Assessment of results was asked in terms of two questions. (1) Would a psyop campaign in fact contribute to an increased number of NVA ralliers? (2) Would it contribute to the number of NVA prisoners who surrendered? If answers to these questions were negative or results nondiscernible, what could be suggested for future efforts? Performance objectives were then deduced from the operations order within this scope.

(U) Information was collected through field observation, interview, and official records sources.

(U) One member of the research team devoted full time before and during the campaign to collection of data from field areas and was responsible for maintaining accurate records during the six-week activity as to conduct of the campaign, coordination between agencies, actual activity as it varied from planned

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

activity, interagency and intergovernmental cooperation, and the collection of pertinent data.

(U) The purpose of the campaign was to induce increased numbers of NVA defectors. A five-member interview team was employed and trained to administer a specifically developed, comprehensive, compartmentalized questionnaire to ralliers and prisoners during the campaign. One member of the research team devoted full time during the latter part of the campaign to running the field test program. Sources of needed information from intelligence records were located; form and content for computer output specified.

(U) Findings were reported as results in terms of campaign missions accomplished and enemy ralliers and prisoners taken, and as conclusions in terms of performance objectives met.

(U) Conclusions were drawn on the basis of the extent to which four performance objectives were met: (1) campaign conduct; (2) materials used; (3) indoctrination of local populace; and (4) effect of appeals to induce enemy to rally and surrender.

(U) The report was based on intensive monitoring of the campaign in the field and extensive efforts to obtain both current and background data pertinent to evaluation. It represented assessment after bringing under consideration as many factors pertinent to evaluation as could be collected, and was directed to furthering the use of evaluation procedures as much as to assessment of the one campaign.

(U) It was recommended that future similar campaigns which are to be mounted be planned in consultation with the research evaluation group and that this group be part of every pre-planning and planning stage. Primary attention should be given to selection of area on the basis of explicit factors, to the stating of objectives in operational terms that permit either comparative or absolute counts, and to the imposition of research considerations in implementation of the campaign plan. Specific campaign suggestions were made.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) It was suggested that Vietnamese personnel from the military units involved and from research agencies be brought increasingly into the evaluation process to permit cross-transfer of information and techniques between United States and Vietnamese research effort, and with the thought that evaluation of a future campaign be conducted entirely by Vietnamese, with HSR consultation.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

(U) One workstream effort fed particularly the overall psyop program review task and the effectiveness criteria task. This was design of and assistance with a project to survey the effectiveness of five communications media, beginning with the very basic question having to do with media reaching its intended audience.

(U) Some of the JUSPAO communications media have been in operation for as long as seven years. Available history indicates that while there may have been intermittent efforts to survey the distribution machinery, penetration, and impact of the various communications instruments, this project is the first systematic attempt to provide such information on five publications. In the first phase of the project, two aspects of evaluation were under investigation: (1) the reliability of the distribution network, and (2) the frequency of reader receipt and reader use of the various publications.

(U) The second phase of this project is concerned with a survey of the effectiveness of the communication instruments as related to their intended objectives.

(U) Three major information sources were:

1. Interviews with key people involved with and responsible for the production and distribution of these publications;
2. Standardized interviewing methods (questionnaires) in the field--three different questionnaires were prepared;
3. Review and summarization of any previous surveys.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The effort resulted in a general description of the five publications covering history, production, policy, content, purpose, and audience for whom intended; and a description of the operational distribution systems, including description of the two systems currently used, with comparison of effectiveness of the two systems. Further effort will produce a report of consumer reaction.

* * * * *

(U) Results from each of these and many minor workstream efforts have fed into the mainstream major task efforts reported in the next section, and have provided a groundwork for and permitted planning of the continuing effort scheduled for the second six months.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION III: RESULTS (U)

Chapter 8. Long-Range Research

Chapter 7. Short-Range Research

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 6. LONG-RANGE RESEARCH (U)

(U) The workstream efforts described in the preceding section have provided input for three major tasks having long-term research implications. These are a psyop program review, effectiveness criteria, and extension of research capabilities.

PSYOP PROGRAM REVIEW

(U) The objectives of a review of psyop programs were (1) to learn the scope of ongoing and planned psyop activities and the characteristics of current psyop materials and practice, (2) to identify projects which may serve as research vehicles, and (3) to identify significant factors within psyop activities for which further research is indicated.

(U) It was found that psychological operations in Vietnam at this time do not consist primarily of individual projects or defined and scheduled research activities with a specified objective within a stated time period. Rather, the psychological operations field as a whole is directed toward support of country-wide and interagency goals which are stipulated at the highest political and military levels of policy and plans. For example, there is a continuing effort to further the Chieu Hoi program and an extensive program to support certain major programs such as the Tet 1970 campaign. This support is furnished to civilian and governmental agencies of the United States, Vietnamese, and Free World Forces generally.

(U) Both the discussions with psychological operations managers in the agencies visited and observations made in monitoring the large psychological campaign mentioned above furnished information as to psyop program characteristics and permitted identification of significant factors requiring further research and development. Among those identified to date as requiring research to facilitate the conduct of psychological operations are notably:

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

Definition of certain pysop terminology;

Formulation of project objectives;

Institution of planning controls to enable assessment of projects conducted;

Reassessment of certain psyop products and procedures.

(C) Formalized psychological operations programs at the present time in Vietnam are largely directed to the support of broad areas of political and military objectives. Free to conduct psychological operations projects and studies within broad bounds of policy and guidance, various organizations initiate numerous psyop activities in military and pacification groups and units throughout South Vietnam. There are special psychological campaigns associated with tactical operations for which evaluation of results is desired, and products and procedures for which assessment is needed. Plans for these campaign evaluations and assessments are sufficiently formalized and anticipated in a time frame that should permit their use as research vehicles.

(C) Significant factors which indicate the need for further research and development in order to facilitate psychological operations and enhance their effectiveness have been identified. These and others coming to attention in the continuing contract effort will receive due consideration.

CRITERION DEVELOPMENT

(U) A major psychological campaign, mounted and conducted during the period of this program review, furnished a prime opportunity to not only obtain a picture of the range and extent of psychological activity and materials currently in use in Vietnam, but afforded the opportunity to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the campaign itself. Thus, effort on the effectiveness criteria task began ahead of schedule. An inquiry into the distribution of and response to several items involving communication media also afforded opportunity to obtain a view of specific current psyop activities. Continuing need for assessment in this area is expected to result in one or more projects which can serve criteria of effectiveness research needs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) At this present stage of psyop development, the question central to the problem is the selection of a criterion measure for psyops, determination of its ability to measure outcome of an effort, and determination of means for obtaining valid and reliable counts. The research approach, based upon ongoing psyop efforts, is to select those criterion measures appropriate for specific projects, to state the research considerations which should be imposed on the selected projects to permit valid assessment, and to evaluate results in terms of adequacy of criteria under consideration in those cases where actual psyop projects permit evaluation.

(U) This approach is discussed in terms of the two types of psychological operations efforts currently judged suitable for research on criteria of effectiveness: (1) evaluation of special-purpose large-scale psyop campaigns, and (2) assessment of psyop products and procedures.

Special-Purpose Large-Scale Psyop Campaign

(U) A special psyop campaign called "Tinh Thuong" ("Affection") conducted in III Corps late in 1969 has been evaluated in terms of the problem of criteria of effectiveness. Discussion of the campaign here is addressed to the point of the problem of criteria of effectiveness in a complex large-scale psyop campaign. It focuses on three factors central to research on criteria of effectiveness at this stage of development:

1. Selection of any criterion measure;
2. Determination of its ability to measure outcome of a psyop effort; and
3. Determination of means for obtaining valid and reliable counts.

Summary of Campaign Conduct

(C) A special six-week campaign was conducted in four provinces with the expressed purpose "to test the effectiveness of intensified psyop efforts in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender." Although it was a major experimental

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

program, intended to be a test of several innovative features, sponsored at the highest national levels, no evaluative factors or provisions for measurement were built into the plan itself (the operations order). The research problem involved the establishing of performance objectives to be evaluated, establishing means for employing an evaluation process, and location and determination of data sources, their reliability, timeliness, and feasibility.

(C) The operations plan specified a primary area defined by coordinates, with three additional areas for leaflet drops within border provinces. Certain operations were conducted only in this primary area; other limited operations were conducted only in the defined portion of some of the other three provinces. Actual conduct of the campaign was not confined to defined bounds. Some of the counts were obtained on a province-wide basis; others on the special area as defined by coordinates.

(C) Assessment was asked for campaign plans, materials used and conduct as well as results of the campaign. Assessment of results was asked in terms of two questions. (1) Would a psyop campaign in fact contribute to an increase in number of NVA ralliers? (2) Would it contribute to the number of NVA prisoners who surrendered? If answers to these questions were negative or results nondiscernible, what could be suggested for future efforts? Performance objectives were then deduced from the operations order within this scope.

(C) After investigation and attempt to establish reliable sources of needed data on a timely basis, an evaluation plan was drawn up to assess campaign conduct and its results, in terms of interagency, intergovernmental coordination and cooperation; materials used and their appropriateness for desired objectives and their compliance with policy guidelines; indoctrination of local populace to encourage rally and surrender; effectiveness of inducing NVA rally or surrender appeals to reach two major vulnerabilities and to overcome two major obstacles, and the effect of the campaign on this audience.

(C) Conditions encountered, while not undesirable factors in overall campaign effect, seriously affected the evaluation. These conditions involved controls, coordination, communication, additional activities within the campaign

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

area, and additional similar projects conducted in areas adjacent to the campaign area.

(II) Information was collected by field observations, interviews, and from official records sources.

(U) Assessment then was based upon intensive monitoring of the campaign in the field and extensive efforts to obtain both current and background data pertinent to evaluation. The resulting evaluation was reached after bringing under consideration as many factors pertinent to evaluation as could be collected, and was directed to explication and furthering the use of evaluation procedures as much as to assessment of the one campaign.

Selection of any Criterion Factor

(U) Factors for criterion measures must be established within the plan and operations order establishing a specific psyop campaign or other psyop project and should be selected with reference to stated objectives.

(C) In the case of the Tinh Thuong campaign the stated purpose was: "...to conduct a special six-week Chieu Hoi Campaign in special areas..." Measures of effectiveness of activities directed to such a purpose could be based upon three factors indicated in that phrase: (1) time frame, (2) a defined area, (3) a defined content.

(C) The time frame, in this case, was six weeks; a defined area was spelled out in the operations order in terms of map coordinates; and the content was "Chieu Hoi" appeals. A further purpose in the order was expressed: "...to test the effectiveness of an intensified psyop effort in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender..." This second statement indicates the ultimate criterion would be the number of NVA troops to rally or surrender as a result of the campaign.

(C) In order to answer later the question "was the campaign effective?" and especially the attendant question "how effective?" the campaign results must be assessed within the restrictions of time, area, and content bounds. The six

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

week period should be defined in such a way that the events occurring within that time can be distinctively reported. Area boundaries should be defined so that distinction is possible between events occurring within and without those boundaries. The campaign content should be such that the theme and intensity have face validity in inducing NVA troops to defect.

Determination of its Ability to Measure Outcome of a Payor Effort

(C) If the number of NVA defectors is selected as the criterion measure in such a campaign, with what precision can it measure outcome? It is at this point that the necessity for stating objectives in terms to permit either comparative measure or absolute measure becomes clear. As stated in the objectives, the surrender or rally of one NVA soldier could be said to prove the campaign effective. There was reason to believe before mounting the special effort that NVA troops could be induced to rally or surrender. The intention here was actually to increase the number of such defections and the objectives should have stated what measure of increase the campaign efforts sought to achieve or what absolute number of defectors the campaign effort was designed to induce. In other words, the objective could have stated, "to increase the number of NVA defectors over the corresponding period last year" or "over the previous six-week period" to permit comparison measure or it might have been stated that a specified number of NVA defectors was the goal of the intensified psyop effort to permit absolute measure. It is only in this way that the campaign organizers could know if they had reached an objective or by what degree they had failed or exceeded some goal.

Determination of Means for Obtaining Valid and Reliable Counts

(C) Assuming that the number of defectors is the criterion measure, assuming that an absolute or comparative number is the goal, the third important consideration is establishing means to obtain count of each and every defector within the time frame and area bounds stipulated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The operations order did include a system which would have permitted count of all Hoi Chanh and prisoners taken within the time and area bounds of the Tinh Thuong campaign. Lack of coordination within the Vietnamese military command structure and lack of reporting controls and structured communication channels resulted in an ambiguous count of rallies and no account of prisoners from the campaign.

Assessment of Psyop Products and Procedures

(U) One evaluation effort has involved design of and assistance with a project to survey the effectiveness of five communications media, beginning with the very basic question having to do with media reaching their intended audiences.

(U) These media included three magazines, a newspaper, and ground tapes for loudspeaker rebroadcast. Some of these JUSPAO communications media have been in operation for as long as seven years. This project was the first systematic attempt to survey distribution machinery, penetration and impact of publications. In the first phase of the project, two aspects of evaluation were under investigation: (1) to determine reliability of the distribution network, and (2) to determine frequency of reader receipt and use of the various publications. A second phase of this project will involve execution of a survey of the effectiveness of the communications instruments as related to their intended objectives.

(U) Major information sources were:

Interviews with the key people involved with and responsible for the production and distribution of these publications;

Standardized interviewing methods, following preparation of three different questionnaires;

Review and summarization of any previous surveys.

(U) The first phase effort resulted in a general description of the five publications covering history, production, policy, content, purpose and audience for whom intended; and a description of the operational distribution systems,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

including description of the two systems currently used, with comparison of effectiveness of the two systems. Further effort will produce a report of consumer reaction.

(U) Review of results of the effort to date and review of previous survey efforts on these media provide discussion of criteria measures consideration.

Selection of any Criterion Factor

(U) Effectiveness of distribution machinery must be based upon the production and delivery schedules for each medium. Penetration must be assessed with consideration of size and location of audience and degree to which that audience has access to the medium. Audience impact must be assessed on the basis of recordable responses which can be assumed to reflect the influences of the particular psyop program directed to that audience.

Determination of its Ability to Measure Outcome of Psyop Effort

(U) In the matter of assessing the meeting of production and delivery schedules, it is a fairly straight-forward procedure to set up and evaluate the result and also to suggest means of improving those results where desired. This is true to some extent in the matter of assessing media coverage.

(U) Evaluation of media impact, however, is more difficult, and requires specialized techniques and skill and experience in interpretation.

Determination of Means for Obtaining Valid and Reliable Counts

(U) Experience has shown that obtaining any count is the most difficult problem of all in the operating climate of psyops in Vietnam. Validity and reliability of count represent problems of the greatest urgency if measure of the effectiveness of psyops is of interest or concern at any level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

General Research Plan for Criterion Development

(U) A broad statement of the effort planned for the next two quarters to develop criteria of effectiveness can be outlined for integrated efforts within Programs I and II.

(U) Within Program I, the effort to develop concepts, methods and theory for deduction of criteria of effectiveness will proceed in terms of assessment of campaigns and products and providing plans and recommendations for subsequent implementation and reassessment as suitable psyop projects can be made available by sponsors for this purpose. Future work might involve activities such as those enumerated below to the extent that suitable opportunities are found:

1. Assess results of the "Tinh Thuong" campaign in terms of criterion needs.
 - a. Suggest criteria that could have been "planned in."
 - b. Recommend use for future campaigns.
2. Assist in planning and monitoring implementation of future campaigns where possible.
 - a. Assess utility of criteria in view of degree of control/goodness of data.
 - b. Recommend documentation or process as found appropriate.
3. Assist in planning campaigns conducted solely by a Vietnamese group, if possible.
 - a. Assist that group to assess utility of criteria in view of degree of control/goodness of data.
 - b. Assess utility of procedures and recommend modifications.

(U) Concurrent activity within the applied research program would provide the means to test the utility of certain effectiveness measures and to develop and test systematized procedures for their use.

(U) These activities can be anticipated broadly along the following lines:

1. Participate in evaluation of major psyop campaigns.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. On basis of campaign results, compare/contrast:
 - a. Conduct.
 - b. Control.
 - c. Data Accession.
 - d. Results.
3. Consult/assist in evaluation of specific psyop products and processes such as:
 - a. Panel Review
 - b. Material Readability.
 - c. Publication Survey

EXTENSION OF RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

(U) Broad contractual objectives for the overall program are to develop and validate criteria by which to measure effectiveness of psychological programs, to develop and assist in the establishment of a system of evaluation that can be used by psyoperators, both U. S. and Vietnamese, and to help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psychological operations in an insurgent environment wherever it may occur.

(U) A specific requirement to be performed by the six-man research team in Vietnam within this program is to develop through cooperative research and training a related action research capability within the Vietnamese intellectual, academic, governmental, and military communities. The effort to extend research capability within the Vietnamese community is to encourage development of a task force capable of initiating and sustaining individual research contributing to psyop programs.

(U) The research approach used on this task is that of transfer of training and skills through cooperative joint team efforts. Any cooperative research under this task must be conducted within scheduled contracted program efforts. Basic contract effort involves identification of psyop projects that will serve as vehicles for research study. Training of a related "action research" capability involves, further, identification of research programs which can serve as instruction laboratories for research methodology.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) This ongoing task is being conducted following a four-step procedure which is to continue over a major portion of the contract period:

1. Meet with significant leaders of Vietnamese groups and establish interaction and communication in research programs.
2. Throughout the contract period, provide systematic attention to opportunities for extension of research capabilities and mutual research assistance with the Vietnamese research community.
3. Identify research programs which can involve interaction so as to serve as instruction laboratories for research methodology.
4. Establish appropriate working relationships and, in the process of accomplishing psyop research tasks, give full consideration to encouraging the development of individual research interests and skills within the Vietnamese community by whatever means may be present and practical.

(U) To date, opportunities to further development of specialized research skills within the Vietnamese community have occurred with approximately twelve research personnel with JUSPAO and the Center for Vietnamese Studies.

(U) In the process of HSR familiarization within the psyop community under the Program Review (Task B, Program I), in working on high priority research questions pertaining to defection (Tasks 1 and 2, Program II), and in working closely with JUSPAO planning and research personnel in total contract effort, interaction with the Vietnamese research community was possible and desirable. This has resulted in an early start on Task D with extension of certain principles of questionnaire development, interview techniques and survey results and interpretation to Vietnamese personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 7. SHORT-RANGE RESEARCH

(U) The workstream efforts described in Section II have provided the input for major tasks in both the short-range and long-range work programs. Two high priority tasks for short-term research goals were requested by the psyop community for scheduled effort during the first six-month period.

(U) The changing picture in the military situation has seen increasing numbers of North Vietnamese Army entering all four Corps areas in South Vietnam. An immediate problem of major interest at all levels is the nature of the NVA soldier, how he compares with and differs from his VC ally, his receptivity to and resistance to appeals to get out of the war by rally or surrender, how this receptivity and resistance is affected by the changing political and military situation and the physical and psychological environment, and how these changes are reflected.

(U) One investigation of these questions has been a study of obstacles to defection, which has been completed. Another investigation requested for continuing effort over the contract term, with periodic reporting after major findings, has been a study of enemy vulnerabilities. Both studies have been conducted concurrently and each has drawn heavily from some of the same subtasks. These two studies are discussed in this chapter.

STUDY OF OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION

(U) The objective of an eight man-month study was to attempt to identify major "obstacles to (enemy) defection" and discover means of overcoming such "obstacles." While a good deal of research time and effort over the past number of years has gone into the question of determining means to persuade the enemy to defect, those factors--situational, psychological, environmental--which counter the decision to do so have not received systematic study.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Identification of major obstacles to enemy defection should begin with the results of research studies already available in Vietnam which bear on the subject. Efficiency required that this information be sought, to avoid duplication of effort and to bring relevant findings together for operational use. The list of obstacles brought out in previous research should serve as the baseline for the task effort. A survey of available pertinent literature was conducted to obtain this information. Concurrently, a wide-spread effort to collect current data involved monitoring an available flow of intelligence data, interviewing knowledgeable individuals, developing data-collection instruments and procedures, and conducting field research. From these workstream efforts, described in an earlier chapter, three major types of obstacles have been identified.

(U) It was found that "obstacles to defection" is not a concept that has been treated directly in the literature; it has been treated indirectly under such terms as "deterrents" or "elements of cohesion." No unified nor widely accepted definition of this concept of "obstacles" was identified in the literature or by interviews; neither are definitions offered in any of the available military official or quasi-official dictionaries. Obstacles were therefore defined as (1) reasons why an enemy soldier would not want to defect or desert and (2) reasons why it would be difficult for him to do so if he should want to defect or desert.

(U) Using this definition, fifty-two representative "obstacles" were identified in the literature. These were not specifically described as "obstacles" but were often described as "deterrents" or "elements of cohesion," etc. The inclusion of an item in this list of "obstacles" was based solely on the fact that it was indicated to be or was treated as an "obstacle" by the original author.

(U) "What are obstacles?" remained a question even after conclusion of a sizable search of pertinent literature. The various types of official and semi-official dictionaries produced by several military services do not offer definitions for "obstacles to defection."

(U) The assortment of "obstacles" produced by a search of the literature represented a somewhat disorganized set of statements on different levels of penetration or generalization by individuals with diversified points of view who have used markedly divergent frames of reference.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) There is a considerable range in the degree of consequence or significance of specific findings. The range is from very broad generalizations to specific minor issues.

(C) As a first step in ordering and organizing the "obstacles" in a meaningful fashion, similar items were grouped. In spite of great variation in study procedures and research instruments, the "obstacles" reported fall into six basic categories, although there are many differences in detail. The six categories and sample of entries in each category are listed below.

Fear of Harm to Self

- Fear of GVN punishment, mistreatment, torture, execution.
- Fear of reprisal against would-be rallier if caught on way to rally.

Fear of Harm to Family or Friends

- Fear that defection will provoke reprisals against family and friends, especially in VC-controlled areas, or in NVN.
- Fear that family or friends of ralliers in VC-controlled areas will be censured or harmed.

Fear of Damaging One's Future

- VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally and making of statements that rallying is a heinous crime.
- Loss of channel of upward mobility for the poor and uneducated provided by the VC.

Physical Difficulty of Getting Away

- Difficulty of getting away from one's unit.
- Fact that with 3-man cell system one is rarely alone.

Idealism

- Belief that it is treasonous even to allow capture or that it is better to die in glory than live in shame.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- NVA acceptance of service in South as necessary action against foreign aggressor and as a responsibility from which there is no escape.

Control and Blocking of Information

- Control of contact between troops and villagers and between troops and their families.
- Punishment for reading or keeping leaflets, listening to radio broadcasts, or reading newspapers from GVN areas.

(C) Table 2 contains the 52 so-called "obstacles" identified. These are grouped by type of control method and associated motivations (positive and negative); by the resultant perceptions of states, conditions or products of the existence and application of the controls and motivations; and the nature of the impact of these perceptions on the individual enemy, i.e., physical (the body), behavioral (actions), logical/intellectual (thoughts), attitudes/beliefs/opinions (predispositions and orientations), and the resultant psychological (emotional) state.

(C) Each group was sufficiently homogeneous to warrant a label, such as "Fear of Harm to Self." This category contains such simple specific statements as "fear of arrest on way to rally" (which is not necessarily a genuine deterrent, since the implication of expectation of what follows after arrest is the genuine deterrent but is not specified) or "fear of GVN punishment, mistreatment, torture, execution."

(C) This relatively simple type of categorization, which is the most sophisticated level identifiable in the literature, highlights some of the problems in terminology. In the category labeled "Fear of Damaging One's Future," one item is "inability of the rullier to go home to a VC-controlled area" and a second item is "VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally and making statements that rallying is a heinous crime...etc."

(U) The way in which the two obstacles are described points up the question. One "obstacle" is a causal factor, the punitive threatening practice of an organization or group directed towards an individual partly or wholly under its control. The other "obstacle" is an effect, a resultant factor, i.e., the state of fear or apprehension created in the individual by the threat.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) From the standpoint of counter-propaganda, an important question is raised: "What level of approach to or manner of description of 'obstacles' both represents a meaningful, systematic, and informative method of identifying and categorizing obstacles and facilitates identifying appropriate and effective counter-action?"

(U) Because of the disorganized nature of the findings and the considerations discussed in the preceding paragraph, the findings were analyzed in terms of cause/effect and input/output. From this analysis three types of obstacles were identified, two primary and one secondary.

(U) "Primary obstacles" are defined as psychological/emotional states of an individual; the two primary obstacles are:

1. Fear of harm to the self by either side.
2. Fear of punitive action against one's family.

(C) "Secondary obstacles" are defined as attitudes/beliefs/opinions of an individual; the secondary obstacle is:

Belief/faith/dedication to the notion of ultimate victory.

(C) All other "obstacles" identified from the literature can be regarded as contributory conditions which are not, in isolation, of sufficient significance to be considered as obstacles and which function to create or enhance the actual obstacle.

(C) Data obtained from field research supported the existence and significance of the three major types of obstacles identified. Moving from identification of obstacles to means to overcome them, results from this study raise a serious question in regard to the productive utility of the concept of targeting specific groups and tailoring specific messages or appeals.

(U) The trade-off issue is the distinction between (a) using many different appeals thought to be specifically appropriate for many presumably different groups and (b) using a very restricted number of messages with a very small number of themes all addressed to all individuals. Evidence from this study and

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2. "OBSTACLES" IDENTIFIED FROM
THE LITERATURE ON DEFECTION (C)

CONTROL TYPE/METHOD			RESULTS/PRODUCTS OF CONTROL	
Mental/Parapsychological Constructive/Defensive	Physical/Behavioral Denial/Punitive	Secondary Motivators Positive/Negative	Perceived Situation: Evaluation of Action Situations/Conditions	Physical
52. Indoctrination and control by 3-man cell; criticism sessions (12)	50. Orders attempts to keep troops away from villages and people of DRV to prevent confusion between what troops have been told and reality (11)	30. Loyalty to the nation; to the people; to the revolution; to one's unit; to one's comrades (9, 10)	38. Sense of mission (8)	
53. Continued indoctrination at every opportunity during and after infiltration (11)		29. Nationalism (8)	33. Expectations of victory or at least no expectations of defeat (8)	
		31. Trust in leaders (8)		
6. Mental conditioning via indoctrinated self-criticism sessions and official propaganda (7)	37. Spirit of self-sacrifice and political and disciplinary control instilled via 3-man cell (7)	25. Devotion to VC cause based on career incentives (1)	28. Channel of upward mobility for poor and uneducated (9, 10)	
76. System of self-critique, intensive indoctrination, and 3-man cell (13)		26. Opportunity for education; self-improvement and advancement in Communist forces without much education (3)	27. Lack of career and educational opportunities with GVN (3)	
7. The 3-man cell and practice of self-criticism (3, 8)		35. Need of cadres for a political rationale for defection (9, 10)	36. Lack of legitimate political alternative to support (3)	
12. Surveillance and organization (8)	1. Control of contact between troops and villagers and between troops and their families (9, 10)		9. Fact that with 3-man cell system, one is rarely alone (9, 10)	
51. Maintenance of morale and discipline through indoctrination and criticism; self-criticism sessions (11)	23. VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally, and making statements that rallying is a heinous crime; ralliers are bad characters, ralliers are deluded, ralliers are motivated by base feelings, ralliers are escaping punishment for crimes (9, 10)	24. Need of cadres for a professional future with GVN (9, 10)	55. When an NVA soldier rallies or surrenders, he does not know what actions are taken against his family in NVN (11)	
			22. Inability of ralliers to go home to a VC-controlled area (2)	
11. System of surveillance and control (5)	10. Strict supervision of military and civilian movement; VC checkpoints requiring VC personnel to produce VC ID and orders (9, 10)		6. Difficulty of getting away from one's unit (2)	
75. 3-man cell system and self-criticism; reinforcement in field (1)	14. Attempts to improve vigilance in unit where desertion occurred (11)		13. Difficulty of leaving a region under tight VC control and lack of knowledge of a route leading to a GVN-controlled area and reasonably free of checkpoints and risks of being shot at by US or RVN (3)	
	2. Destruction of leaflets and efforts to drive away loudspeaker planes (9, 10)		62. NVA troops don't know of Chieu Hai program or don't know it is for them, too (6, 9, 10)	
	3. Punishment for reading or keeping leaflets, listening to radio broadcasts, or reading newspapers from GVN areas (9, 10)			

(C) Table

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL

<u>Physical</u>	<u>Behavioral</u>	<u>Logical/ Intellectual</u>	<u>Attitudes/ Beliefs/Opinions</u>	<u>Psychological/ Emotional</u>
		58. NVA fatalistic acceptance of situation and prospect of violent death (1)	54. Belief in ultimate victory because of fighting for the just cause (3)	
		59. NVA acceptance of service in south as necessary action against foreign aggressor and no responsibility from which there is no escape (1)	60. Belief that U.S. invaded VN to exploit it and that role of North is to liberate southern brothers (11)	
		55. NVA has no choice but to remain with his unit in SVN because of lack of knowledge of SVN's geography and not knowing where to look for sanctuaries in SVN and resentment of southern villagers and peasants for helping him (1)	61. Belief that Communism will win. Americans, like French, will be expelled. American public will not allow war to continue (11)	19. Fear that defection will provoke reprisals against family and friends in VC-controlled areas or in NVN (2)
				20. Fear that family or friends of ralliers in VC-controlled areas will be censured or harmed (9, 10)
				21. Fear for physical safety after leaving Chieu Hoi center (9, 10)
		5. Thinking Chieu Hoi program is only for rank and file soldiers and minor cadre (4)	4. Belief that those who serve VC for long time in responsible positions were not included in GVN offers of amnesty and good treatment (5)	18. Fear of reprisal against would-be rallier if caught on way to rally (8)
		57. When an NVA soldier rallies or surrenders, he becomes a traitor to his unit (11)	56. Belief that it is treasonous even to allow capture or that it is better to die in glory than to live in shame (1, 9, 10)	17. Cadre's fear of being singled out for severe punishment (9, 10)
				15. Fear of arrest by GVN on way to rally (5)
				16. Fear of GVN punishment, mistreatment, torture, execution (2, 3, 5, 9, 10)

CONFIDENTIAL

2

CONFIDENTIAL

from sound business practice favors option "b." The generalized approach enables time, manpower, and effort (that otherwise would be needlessly devoted to design, development, production, distribution, control and use of materials with a restricted audience) to be devoted to:

- intensive attention to quality and quality control of the total product,
- intensive planning, guidance, and control of the use of the products,
- intensive timely control checks on effectiveness of the product in use.

(U) The generalized approach also facilitates:

- quicker reaction time on all design, production, and distribution actions,
- quicker adaptation to sudden changes, newly-perceived needs, or changed requirements.

(U) An additional unique advantage is:

- the need for exceptional expertise and competence is reduced to a minimum,
- conversely, the products of the most competent and qualified specialists will have the broadest possible distribution and greatest potential for productive impact.

(C) Accordingly, the following recommendations are made:

1. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the "obstacles" rather than to the audience and situation.
2. Develop and use a limited number of the best possible quality messages emphasizing on a realistic level that it is possible to rally or surrender safely.
3. Formulate single unitary education programs for military personnel, government personnel, and civilians to instruct them in procedures for dealing with all types of defectors.
4. Standardize actions and behavior involved in rallying and surrendering and standardize actions and procedures relevant to friendly involvement in a rally or surrender situation

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

to the most minor details. This will furnish the content of the education program described in "3" above. Execute the training/orientation program as quickly as possible beginning with all military and paramilitary personnel.

5. Test thoroughly themes analogous to "Surely your family will accept some discomfort to help you stay alive so that you can be together again."
6. Prepare simple single messages for a limited number of statistical aspects of the conduct of the war, emphasizing those related to things which most soldiers have experienced personally. Present; do not sell.

STUDY OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

(U) Objectives of the continuing study of enemy vulnerabilities are detection, assessment, and selection of "vulnerabilities" of target audiences for exploitation.

(U) Research activities during the first six months of this effort have included a survey of the literature, monitoring an available flow of pertinent current documents, interviewing knowledgeable individuals in the psyop field, developing appropriate data-collection instruments and procedures, and conducting field research to collect current data and to check hypotheses. Procedure on these workstream efforts has been described in an earlier section. In this chapter, analysis of results of these individual workstream efforts is discussed and mid-stream interpretation, conclusions and recommendations given.

(U) Despite the attention given the subject of vulnerabilities and exploitation of vulnerabilities, it has not been reported widely in the research literature.

(U) In the absence of a usable official operational definition of the term, "vulnerabilities" were defined for purposes of this study as (a) aspects of VC/NVA that have a negative effect on VC/NVA personnel and (b) aspects of GVN that have a positive effect on VC/NVA personnel. Using this definition, one hundred and thirty representative "vulnerabilities" identified in the literature were compared with the vulnerabilities identified through interviews with psyoperators and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

by monitoring the current document flow, and were cross-checked against field research data.

(U) The assortment of "vulnerabilities" identified represents observations made on many different levels of generalization from highly diversified points of view within many different frames of reference. The degree of consequence or significance of specific findings varies greatly. This was not surprising in what is clearly a newly emerging field of research, as evidenced by the absence of generally accepted working definitions. While it could be expected that there has been no systematic consolidation and organization of the results of research efforts, such organization and consolidation is essential in order to provide proper perspective for readers and users on the relative consequence of each vulnerability and the specificity or generality of its applicability.

(U) Because the manner of describing vulnerabilities represented such diversity, including mention of objective external conditions, evaluative statements about military practices, emotional reactions, physical conditions, logical analyses, etc., a test question was formulated to crystallize the objectives of further work. The question was: "What is the most informative and systematic manner for definition and specification of vulnerabilities in a fashion that facilitates recognition, communication to others, and productive exploitation?" After exhausting the possibilities of more simple forms of analysis, a more sophisticated approach than any noted in the literature--a modified input/output analysis--was employed to analyze and organize the data in meaningful fashion. Imposition of this organizing procedure on the data made several facts evident:

1. As now described in the literature or in general discussion, many "vulnerabilities" deal with various partial aspects of the same condition/event/action/or state of being.
2. Many "vulnerabilities" represent descriptions of the same condition/event/action/or state of being but appear to be different because of being directed toward different levels of analysis or generalization.
3. All or almost all descriptions of vulnerabilities deal with intermediate factors, i.e., conditions/events/actions/or states of being/or nature of impact on the individual. It

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

is invariably left to the reader or user to draw the needed inferences to arrive at the actual vulnerability.

4. In the absence of any mention of the need to draw inferences, and because the described phenomenon is already labeled a "vulnerability," there is no basis for assuming either that the need for further inference is known or that it is indeed made by the psyoperator.

(U) Integration of the products of the analysis as shown in Table 3 with data obtained in the field surveys against a background of knowledge gained from the literature, previous pertinent research, and related experience, indicated that items which had been treated as vulnerabilities in the literature could be, depending on their nature, more correctly termed "Primary Mediators" (of vulnerability), "Secondary Mediators" (of vulnerability), and "Contributory" or "Facilitating" factors which enhance or decrease the intensity of effect of "primary" or "secondary mediators."

(U) The "primary vulnerabilities" are derived mainly from the emotional states which, in a stressful situation, are the primary determinants of behavior. "Secondary vulnerabilities" are associated with and are inferred mainly from attitudes, opinions, and beliefs which have less ability to affect behavior. "Contributory" or "facilitating" factors are all other aspects of the human psyche that function to create or enhance, in positive or negative direction, the psychological state of receptivity or resistance to input of any type of data.

(U) Each of the "primary vulnerabilities" is the resultant of a complex of interacting factors; the secondary and contributory factors may change to a small or large extent over time and may change frequently or infrequently, but the "primary vulnerability," representing a summation of the subordinate factors, operates in a different time frame. It comes about more slowly, changes more slowly, and disappears more slowly. However, in the case of truly significant events, changes of any kind can occur over night.

(U) In reporting results, for ease and clarity of communication and convenience in discussion, the manner of description of vulnerabilities found in the literature and in general use for discussion purposes is continued in use here in conjunction with definition of the inferred or true vulnerability.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3. VULNERABILITIES CLASSIFICATION MATRIX (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON CRITICAL				
Physical	Behavioral	Logical/Intellectual	Attitudinal/Religious/Spiritual	Emotional/Personality
79. Inability to sustain hardships and privation (17)	60. Friction between military and civilian codes (5)	49. Disrespect shown military strategy/ tactics between North Vietnam and South Vietnam (13)	60. Disinformation with military policy (17)	1. 175. Fear of death (17)
120. Disease during infiltration (1)	140. Increasing strife between NV and VC (1)			8. Fear of being killed (7)
	150. Rising desertion from VC (1)			185. Fear of allied arms (105)
	160. Continuing defection and desertion (1)			
	71. Fear, uncertainty, and morale among lower-ranking cadre (6)		17. 120. War weariness (12, 1)	
125. Much disease (7)				
130. Poor health (16)				
16. Hurt-burn (11)				
17. Sickness, malaria (12)				
14. Hunger (13)				
		60. Conclusion that Front cannot win (6)	61. Feeling that VC cause is hopeless and that GVN will win (13)	150. Hatred of NV personnel at being far from home and family with no hope of an early return (9)
			61. Disappointment in policies, promises, and actions (3)	160. Frustrations, anxieties and fears arising from the policies of NV/GVN security systems (8)
			62. Disinformation with VC policies and aims (7)	19. Fear or resentment of being punished for a shortcoming (13)
			19. Hatred of feeling of being mistreated and under constant surveillance (13)	
			19. Resentment at being criticized or punished (13)	
			61. Feeling of being exploited by VC for benefit of Party with no real care for the individual and no personal benefit (13)	
			60. Frustrated idealism (13)	
			60. Dislike of Communism being imposed on Vietnamese people (13)	
			61. Dislike of VC methods of controlling villagers -- kidnapping (or restrictions on their movements), enforced labor as porters and battlefield cleaners, often under atrocious conditions (2)	97. VC fears of being abandoned by the people, who are actually necessary to the long-term success of their insurgency (2)
			70. Disinformation with VC (17)	
			99. Dislike and distrust of VC civilian cadres for continued abuses by forcible measures (2)	
			16. Feeling of having gained nothing for service to VC (1)	
			40. Resentment over mistreatment (13)	
		13. Realization that the revolutionaries will be much more than a brief struggle (19)	11. Concern for welfare of family and relatives (1)	140. Fears and anxieties about a protracted war among military and civilian cadre and the population (17)
			34. Homelessness (1)	
			30. Resentment over denial of home leave (1)	
			150. Disinformation with VC (17, 1)	
		12. Conclusion that personal sacrifices for the Front have been insufficiently rewarded (6)		

Attitudinal/Conditions/Dispositions	Operational/Personality	Individual's Psychology/Consciousness
127. Being during infiltration (1)	140. Hardships of infiltration and life in wilderness (17)	70. Living conditions too low or difficult (17)
170. Air and artillery strikes with no safe refuge (19)	180. Abandonment of sick, wounded, and dead, plus being wounded enroute to GVN (12)	140. Fighting and killing fellow Vietnamese (7)
5. Air harassment (8)	160. Hardships of infiltration (13)	70. Growing hardships of life (1)
3. Exposure to attack (4)	230. Lack of shelter and food (18)	
10. Exposure to combat (1)	170. Hardships (19)	
177. Air and artillery strikes (18)		
7. 180. Harassment by allied forces (9, 12)	60. Temporary difficulties of the revolution caused by allied group activities or tight encirclement (17)	10. Inability of VC to protect hideouts (6)
11. Battle, bombardment, noise, pressure (13)		27. Being constantly on the move (13)
8. Heavy battles and heavy losses (17)	190. Defeat (22)	65. Military effectiveness of the GVN (13)
11. Break operations, disruption of supplies, and forced movement (17)	63. Temporary difficulties of the revolution caused by allied group activities or tight encirclement (17)	60. Declining faith in victory (4)
	190. Lack of medical supplies and personnel (13)	54. Loss of faith in victory (7)
	100. Lack of medical supplies (1, 1)	11. Inadequate medical supplies and care (13)
	137. Lack of vitamins (13)	177. Low morale at camp (10)
	20. No adequate food, no water (13)	110. Inadequate medical supplies (13)
	19. Ragged clothing (13)	20. Personal hardships (1, 2)
6. Military pressure (10)	130. 170. 179. Lack of food (1, 10, 19)	15. 111. Inadequate food (1, 10, 19)
66. The moving into the area of large numbers of allied forces and evidence that they will stay (13)	95. Evidence that the GVN is establishing military and security and police (17)	140. Being trained in tactics and control in south and about degree of popular support (1)
		145. Reduced expectation of victory (8)
66. Failure to carry out promises (13)	140. Contrast between what cadre say and what soldiers experience (13)	140. Ineffectiveness at finding propaganda along at variance with reality (13)
73. Improper exploitation of policy (17)	61. Lack of democracy in criticism and self-criticism sessions (17)	190. Ineffective discipline (13)
	50. Restrictions on freedom of movement and individual liberty (13)	51. Increasing structure of control over day party members (13)
60. Family and inter-relationships (13)	70. Incidence of discrimination against persons of higher social status (13)	40. Criticism and punishment (7)
	77. VC responsibility for some violation of the struggle and the destruction (2)	70. Violence to be resisted (13)
	69. Improvement of facilities by VC and military and security (2)	70. Conflict between political, religious, political, and other VC and democratic, reform-minded ideology of younger G. (13)
		40. Increasingly party of human dignity and liberty (13)
60. The declining ratio of participants to forces in VC struggle with villagers (1)	177. Sensitivity of VC/GVN to human and social aspects and attitudes (17)	54. Sensitivity of the interests and well-being of the people to the interests of the apparatus (17), causing indifference in treating fulfillment of goals and responsibilities (6)
63. VC recruiting and forcing (2)	41. People's participation into VC (17)	10. Increasingly military recruitment methods (1)
	90. Lack of chief of resistance in many families (17)	10. Human situation of the population (1)
	140. Sensitivity to trend information indicating VC/GVN are losing ground, morale, control over resources, and control over intelligence and security (2)	10. Human situation of the population (1)
50. War attrition (13)	50. Attrition, usually, especially with which VC lose those not their friends (1)	10. Human situation of the population (1)
60. Incidence on propaganda war until reunification achieved (6)	40. Increased propaganda from home and abroad (13)	140. Family separation (17)
	13. Decline in family income (6)	130. Loss of reputation from family (17)
67. High VC losses (7)	90. Family economic hardship (9)	140. Loss of status from home and family (13)
	50. Family deprived of basic needs (13)	50. Denial of villagers of full share of provincial work (13)
90. Bureaucracy and indifference among leading cadres to other personnel difficulties and hardships (17)	70. Incidence of cadre being rewarded with more land or other personal advantages (13)	10. Ineffectiveness of villagers with VC failure to carry out propaganda and participation and to continue to maintain with actual losses (2)
	72. Incidence of nepotism (13)	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Two primary vulnerabilities and their related primary mediating factors have been identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each of the two primary vulnerabilities, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors are identified.

(C) The primary VC vulnerability is: Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future. Its related primary mediating factor is: "Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

(C) The first of two secondary VC vulnerabilities is: Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest possible extent by description of procedures and what is to be expected. Its related secondary mediating factor is "negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

(C) The second of the two secondary VC vulnerabilities is: Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation. The related secondary mediating factor is the "feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, chief of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic for larger numbers but which are not oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "Liberation" cause.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The primary NVA vulnerability is: Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed in terms of potential because the available evidence supports only the notion of a developing trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather than any active dissatisfaction. Its related primary mediating factor is "Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards" in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half-war. The modest amount of current information available does not suggest active resistance to or rejection of the cause.

(C) There are two secondary NVA vulnerabilities. The first is decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between indoctrination received in the North and the GVN reality perceived on reaching the South. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc. Its related secondary mediating factor is "NVA disillusionment" in the South which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with GVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrination-derived notions and what is actually seen.

(C) The second secondary NVA vulnerability is increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family. Its related secondary mediating factor is "family-centered concerns" which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of dependency and obligation. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the most important single concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

(U) It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude is less marked in the current adolescent generation and appears to be trending towards a considerably reduced importance.

(U) Each of the vulnerabilities is treated in detail in the sections that follow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VC Vulnerabilities

(U) There are many differences between the situation of the VC and the NVA soldier; two major differences are the fact that the VC are in familiar territory and have many personal contacts within the local population while the NVA are in an area unfamiliar to them, far from their families and civilian friends, and are unlikely to know anyone in the local civilian population. These aspects of the situation, sometimes referred to as vulnerabilities, are not vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of VC/NVA vulnerabilities.

Primary: Deterioration of the Will to Fight

(C) Despite reduction in the intensity of military operations, because of the apparent increase in GVN strength and effectiveness, the prototypical VC soldier perceives his total situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding. This feeling is reflected in the literature in such general terms as "war weariness," "dissatisfaction with military policy," "ARVN pressure," "pressure from Allied Forces," "fear of Allied arms," and in such specific terms as "dislike of being sent on missions," "fear of being killed," etc.

(C) The major perceived danger has shifted from fear of death in battle to anxiety over the increased likelihood of capture and imprisonment. Logically, imprisonment would seem less dangerous. However, the same reasons that cause the reduction in military operations also result in there being fewer motivating factors to push the VC soldier in a positive direction. With the shift of the war in GVN's favor, there is no longer a valid basis for enthusiasm for a glorious victory; for visions of personal success, recognition, promotion; for dreams of "liberating brothers," etc. In other words, the positive motivating factors have vanished.

(U) In the human, changes in perception and adjustment to perceive "reality-situations" can be described as being mediated by a psychological process termed "adaptation-level." This mechanism which affects human thought

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

processes can best be described as a sliding scale of values that is continually unconsciously adjusted or recalibrated to provide psychological comfort within an individual; being unconscious, it is not bound by logic and therefore its workings cannot be described in the usual logical or mathematical terms. It can be assumed to follow some precise feedback mechanism within the individual as a result of momentary sensory input within a specific physical and psychological environment.

(U) In the VC soldier, functioning of the "adaptation-level" process can cause him to perceive his present situation as one in which he has little to gain and much to lose (capsulized in the literature as "feeling that the VC cause is hopeless"). More specifically, the varied benefits that would have accrued to him through victory do not now exist as motivators; the risk of his own death, or injury, or loss of years of living-time are deglamorized and cannot be justified by any grandiose expectations.

(C) The primary vulnerability that is created by the generalized deterioration of the will to fight, representing the sum of many large and small factors, is a greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about his near-term future.

Secondary: Reaction Against Party Control Methods

(U) As the overall situation becomes more difficult for the VC leadership, efforts to improve their position result in more oppressive actions, increased restrictions, and stronger and more punitive methods of control and motivation, all becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application. This is seen in the literature and in the current document-flow in such statements as "frustrations and fears arising from operations of the VC/NVA security systems," "fear or resentment of being punished for a shortcoming," "resentment at being criticized or punished," "dislike of feeling of being mistrusted and under constant surveillance," "opposition to cadre," "arrest or execution of a family member or friend," etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The adaptation-level process causes the VC to view this aspect of the overall VC structure with an ever more jaundiced eye as the once-existing compensatory factor--faith in victory and associated material and psychological rewards--deteriorates.

(C) The secondary vulnerability created by the increase in scope and intensity of Party control methods and the individual VC's negative reaction toward the perceived effects of these actions is an increased readiness to give credence to messages which reflect recognition of this (to him) unfortunate situation and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of the Party controls. Such a message should also remove uncertainty about the future to the greatest extent possible by specific description of what can be expected. For instance, the basic logic of the Chieu Hoi concept easily encompasses the notion that a VC eventually can be returned to his former village, have returned to him his former holdings and even offices, and perhaps unrealistically, some form of indemnity for his losses.

Secondary: VC Feeling of Victimization

(C) A sense of personal loss, which ranges in intensity up to a feeling of having been victimized, exists among the VC. This is encapsulated in "vulnerabilities" identified in the literature such as "feeling of being exploited by VC for the benefit of the Party with no real care for the individual and no personal benefit," "dislike and distrust of the VC civilian cadre for continued exactions by forcible methods," "conclusion that personal sacrifices for the Front have been insufficiently rewarded," "feeling of having gained nothing for services to the VC," etc.

(U) With waning fortunes, the process of obtaining material support from the civilian population becomes more difficult and increased effort and stronger methods must be used. As the forcible levies for supplies, money, and manpower grow in scope and as the methods for the exactions increase in harshness in order to fulfill quotas, the families and friends of the VC soldiers can seem to be receiving worse treatment than is customarily given to the GVN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

civilian population by VC soldiers. This is noted in the literature as "sacrifice of the interests and well-being of the people to the interests of the apparatus, i.e., callous indifference in demanding fulfillment of quotas and requirements."

(U) The adaptation-level process makes it easy for the VC soldier in this situation to develop or accept a rationale that justifies his acting to change his situation for a less frustrating or more rewarding one.

(C) A secondary vulnerability created by this condition is increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change the situation.

NVA Vulnerabilities

(U) The NVA soldier, even though he is also Vietnamese and engaged in liberating his "brothers," apparently is easily distinguished from his southern brothers by his language and manner of speech. While in the South, he is also identifiable as a northerner through his lack of what, for a southerner, is the most basic and ordinary knowledge of names and locations. As a consequence, unlike the VC who are at home, he cannot merge with and disappear into the local population. These factors are not vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of actual vulnerabilities.

Primary: Trend Toward "Generalized Disaffection"

(C) General disaffection with the "just cause" or "liberation" effort, where it exists, is caused by unfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and lack of any discernible reward for service and sacrifice. The effect of these factors is exacerbated by fear of a long drawn-out unsuccessful half-war in which lack of success over a long period of time has degraded the concept of "dying gloriously for a noble cause" to a "risk of life for no good reason" (this is a different order of concern than fear of death itself).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) If a generalized erosion leading to widespread deterioration of morale and the "will to fight" is to occur, it will have to be prompted by evidence that leads to generalized loss of conviction in what is the keystone of the NVA motivational structure and a major factor in NVA propaganda and indoctrination, i.e., belief in eventual victory. Suggestions of a beginning trend toward erosion of this conviction can be seen in the literature in such terms as "war weariness," "fear of Allied arms," "fears and anxieties about a protracted war," "fighting and killing fellow Vietnamese," "defeats," "rising desertion rates in weeks just prior to infiltration," "doctrinal disillusionment," etc.

(C) More specifically, the positive motivating factors that create internally generated initiative and which cause individuals to persevere logically or illogically in the face of obstacles can undergo considerable erosion or can have evaporated without any significant change in behavior occurring; this is because a major sustaining factor will remain in the form of habit--an inertia caused by conditioning and environment--and absence of a powerful external factor/event which would disrupt their accustomed routine. The external factor in the case of the NVA would have to be, for example, of the magnitude of a surprise execution of ARVN's announced intention to carry the war into NVN. This is a purely hypothetical example, not a suggestion; it is illustrative of the point being made. Assuming hypothetically that an action of such magnitude were possible, the surprise, consternation, and disruption it would cause would be lost if it were publicized prior to occurrence.

(C) A state of generalized disaffection, although it would constitute a major vulnerability, is not easily exploitable because of the complex interaction of the multitude of minor factors that summate to create the whole pattern described by the term "generalized disaffection." It is not possible to tell at this time whether concern about the possibility of a protracted wartime state is reduced or increased by the well-publicized and already partly implemented plans for Allied withdrawal.

(U) The adaptation-level process allows the mental and emotional state of an NVA soldier to arrive at a disaffected state with less difficulty than might

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

be expected, since field research data shows, rather surprisingly, that neither he nor his family wanted him to come South to fight (see Table 4). This attitude, surprising in view of the thoroughness and effectiveness of indoctrination on so many other issues and attitudes, is not an adequate cause for him to initiate action to "leave the field." Part of the reason for this appears in field research findings that tend to put in question the notion that the NVA are uniformly combat-weary and subjected to intense hardship. Many state that they were not experiencing hardships, and of fifty POW's, only five had been in actual combat more than once; moreover, only five had been in combat lasting for one hour or more (see Table 5).

(U) Despite frequent references to "hardships" in the literature and the frequent occurrence of that term in interviews with prisoners and ralliers, it is important to place the interpretive meaning and implications of this term in proper perspective.

(U) Most of the NVA soldiers come to NVA military service and to the South from what is, for an American, an unbelievably impoverished environment; some research data from NVA POW's is:

"As a civilian, did you earn more or less than your military pay?"

Much more	20%
More	14
About same	6
Less	24
Much less	16
(Other)	20

"While in service in NVN, how many NVN piastres were you paid each month?"

5 - 6 NVN\$	90%
7 - 10 NVN\$	10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4. MILITARY SERVICE/TRIP TO
SOUTH VIETNAM: ATTITUDES (C)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent</u>
In what way did you enter military service?	2. Volunteered	14%
	3. Drafted	82
	(Other)	4
How did you feel about entering military service?	2. Wanted to	30%
	3. Neutral	24
	4. Did not want to	46
	(Other)	(0)
How did your parents feel about your going to South Vietnam to fight? (Did they want you to go?)	2. Not sure	12%
	3. Wanted me to go	14
	4. Were neutral	16
	5. Did not want me to go	58
When you left NVN to go to the South where the actual fighting is going on, did you want to go?	2. Not sure	2%
	3. No	54
	4. Yes, a little	20
	5. Yes, very much	24

When you left NVN to go to the South where the actual fighting is going on:	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes, Little</u>	<u>Yes, Very Much</u>
- were you afraid to go?	2%	62%	18%	18%
- were you in a hurry to get there?	0	72	18	10
- expect support from people in GVN areas?	4	16	20	60
- expect to get needed food from NLF sympathizers?	4	14	28	54
- think trip would be dangerous?	-	14	18	68
- think trip would be hard?	-	6	16	78
- worry about safe return to NVN?	4	16	24	56

CONFIDENTIAL

**TABLE 5. COMBAT EXPERIENCE:
NVA POW'S (C)**

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Have you ever been in combat?	No	74%
	Yes	26
How often in combat?	Never	74%
	One time	16
	Three times	6
	Four times	2
	Seven times	2
What was the longest period of time you were in any single battle?	Never	74%
	10-30 minutes	16
	04-08 hours	6
	20-24 hours	4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"While in the South, before becoming a prisoner, how many GVN piastres did you receive each month?"

000 - 80 GVN\$	82%
100 - 200 GVN\$	6
300 - 1800 GVN\$	6
(Other)	6

(U) It is not possible to make an accurate comparison of the value of the NVN dollar (piastre) but the best available estimate indicates the ratio to the GVN dollar to be about 1:20. The monthly pay of the NVN soldier is about 30 cents in U. S. money based on the free rate of exchange.

(U) It must be kept in mind that what the foreign observer may view as incredible hardship in the jungle or swamp may very well be the high point in the life of someone (NVN) who would otherwise have been bound for the remainder of his life within one or two square miles. He is traveling, and--for someone with his limited purview--seeing the world, seeing many interesting and exciting new things, places, events. He may be impressed or even exalted by his first access to authority, symbolized by possession of a weapon which renders him able to overpower others. Finally, many of the "hardships" referred to in interview records, upon further elaboration, turn out to be danger from bombing and other military operations.

(U) In summary, the very great differences in the life style and mental outlook of the NVN population and the NVA soldier from that of the average American causes it to be almost impossible to maintain "conceptual equivalency" across language lines.

Secondary: NVA Disillusionment in South Vietnam

(U) Among the NVA, a feeling exists that is similar in nature to the VC feeling of having been victimized, but is much less intense. The origin of the feeling lies mainly in the disparity between the objective evidence forced upon them by their experience in the South and the expectations and beliefs created by propaganda and indoctrination in the North. This feeling is mentioned in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

literature in such terms as "disillusionment at finding propaganda claims at variance with reality," "doctrinal disillusionment," "friction between old-line VC and new NVA in the Delta," "increasing strife between the NVA and VC," "being misled about degree of popular support and about the extent of Communist control in the South," "villagers hostile and uncooperative to requests to supply NVA with food," etc.

(U) After a lengthy and exhausting trip to the South, the NVA soldier appears to have little contact with the civilian population and spends little time in hamlets or cities; therefore, impressions formed in the North remain unaffected unless there is contact with the local population on food-gathering trips. The resistance that apparently is frequently encountered acts to raise questions about the validity of claims regarding the support of the GVN population. This is seen in the literature as "villages uncooperative and hostile to requests to supply NVA food."

(C) Table 6 contains a sample of the questions and responses from 50 NVA POW's which illustrates some of the disparities or changes in perception of significant features treated in indoctrination and propaganda while still in NVN and later personally experienced in the South.

(C) The gradual cumulative effect of personal experiential evidence which points up the disparities between indoctrination-derived concepts and actuality provides stimuli that can, by the adaptation-level process, cause the NVA soldier to feel that he has been misled or manipulated. This feeling does not yet appear to exist with sufficient intensity or pervasiveness to constitute a major vulnerability in the sense of producing ralliers or surrenderers if exploited. In adaptation-level terms, this is because an off-setting factor--belief in eventual victory--still holds firm in the NVA mind.

(C) The vulnerability resulting from recognition of disparities between propaganda or indoctrination and personal experience in the South does not appear to have significant value at the present time as an avenue through which action can be stimulated. It can best be exploited by incorporating assumptions of recognition of disparities in messages relating to family-centered concerns; the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**TABLE 6. NVN INDOCTRINATION VERSUS
GVN EXPOSURE: COMPARISON (C)**

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Indoctrination in NVN</u>	<u>After Time in South</u>
How was the military strength of GVN and its allies compared to the military strength of NVN and its allies?	2. GVN much stronger	0%	22%
	3. GVN stronger	8	12
	4. About equal	10	10
	5. NVN stronger	44	34
	6. NVN much stronger	10	6
	(Other)	(28)	(16)
How was the military strength of GVN alone compared to NVN alone?	2. GVN much stronger	0	14
	3. GVN stronger	4	12
	4. About equal	4	6
	5. NVN stronger	38	38
	6. NVN much stronger	20	12
	(Other)	(34)	(18)
According to what was said, who would win the war?	2. GVN certainly	0	12
	3. GVN probably	0	
	4. In doubt	4	--
	5. NVN probably	2	56
	6. NVN certainly	70	
	(Other)	(24)	(32)

	<u>Response</u>	<u>Money/Supplies: Manpower</u>	<u>Money/Supplies: No Manpower</u>
Can NVN win the war if US continues to support GVN with:	3. No, definitely	18%	8%
	4. Probably not	4	10
	5. Stalemate	8	0
	6. Yes, probably	28	12
	7. Yes, certainly	18	46
	(Other)	(24)	(24)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

negative feelings aroused by recognition of the disparities would counterbalance to some extent the indoctrination and training-inculcated factors which are negative to the possibility of rally, surrender, or desertion.

Secondary: NVA Family-Centered Concerns

(C) The literature contains many references to concern about or attachment to the family, some stated quite succinctly, such as "homesickness," and others more informatively, such as "anxiety of NVA personnel at being far from home and family with no hope of an early return." Many references deal with the individual's own reaction such as "long absence from home and family," "family separation," "separation from family," etc.

(C) It is extremely important to recognize, and keep in the forefront of one's thinking, that the concept of "relationship to the family" for Vietnamese is just as difficult to understand as is any other aspect of Vietnamese life and culture; this is apparently often overlooked because "everyone has a family."

(U) The basic unit of the Vietnamese culture is the extended family (grandparents, parents, children plus ancestors) and the prototypical Vietnamese personality is egocentric to the ultimate degree. In contrast, the American basic family unit is composed of parents and children and is acquiring a heavy loading of childless couples. Also, while it might be oversimplification to describe a prototypical American personality (other than in terms of "ideal or traditional"), the American can be characterized as other-oriented or outwardly oriented rather than as egocentric.

(U) The significance of the differences between Vietnamese and Americans in family relationships lies in the fact that the individual Vietnamese must look to his family for all things, since there are few other sources of aid. Also, the early training of Vietnamese, particularly rural Vietnamese, inculcates a tremendous sense of obligation to the family. There are no rest homes for the aged in Vietnam.

(U) In contrast, Americans have a wide variety of sources to draw upon before turning to the family, and would look to their family only as a last resort.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) In summary, the "family" factor for Vietnamese is not based purely in emotions or attitudes. It is deeply ingrained cultural characteristic but it also has a heavy loading of financial or personal welfare elements. This cultural phenomenon is, in effect, an institutionalized social, financial, and personal security system.

(C) The degree of vulnerability created in the NVA soldier by a complex of family-centered concerns is counterbalanced to some extent by his egocentricity. Stated very simply:

- he would not accept a given risk if both he and his family could lose
- he would not accept the same risk if he or his family could lose
- he might not accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would lose
- he might not accept the same risk if he could lose but his family would gain
- he might accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would not be affected either way
- he might accept the same risk if he would not be affected either way but his family would gain
- he would accept the same risk if both he and his family would gain.

(C) The adaptation-level process, if the weight of the effect of family ties and egocentricity were joined rather than acting as counterbalances, would be very likely to enable an NVA soldier to devise logical grounds for any action that he was persuaded would benefit both himself and his family at an acceptable risk level.

(C) The NVA soldier, to the extent that he is vulnerable, is most likely to be interested (although not necessarily stimulated to action) in messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify his taking an action which he can interpret as being of benefit to both himself and his family.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

**Chapter 8. Mid-Stream Conclusions
and Recommendations**

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 8. MID-STREAM CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(U) From the investigations and analyses to date, certain conclusions have been drawn at this mid-point in the study of psychological operations problems in Vietnam. These pertain to the nature of current psyop activities and their relevance as research vehicles; to short-range problem areas concerning obstacles to defection and enemy vulnerabilities; and to factors in the area of psychological operations requiring further systematic research and development.

THE NATURE OF CURRENT PSYOP ACTIVITIES

(U) Current psychological operations activities are directed from a viewpoint of broad and continuing support of government and inter-agency goals stipulated at the highest political and military levels of policy and plans. These are primarily to end the war and develop a nation with increasing self-sufficiency. Psyop activities and psyop products directed to both military and civilian audiences can serve long-range research purposes; at the same time, research upgrades and enhances these psyop activities and products in terms of their short-term objectives.

OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES

(U) From the study of obstacles to defection, it was noted that the so-called "obstacles" identified in studies on the subject in Vietnam to date represented descriptions of causal factors, resultant conditions, intermediate states, by-products of causal factors, etc. The question became one of developing an identification and classification system for "obstacles" that would also facilitate the identification of appropriate counteraction.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The highest level of analysis or categorization previously applied to the general question of "obstacles" and "vulnerabilities" was "grouping by similarity." In the present study "grouping by similarity" served mainly to highlight the way in which problems in interpretation were created by variability in terminology and level of description or analysis.

(U) When the data were organized systematically, the answer to the question became obvious. It is not realistically possible to eliminate the causal factor, i. e., to stop the enemy from his practice of public condemnations; therefore, effort toward this practice is wasted. It may be possible to attempt to deal with the resultant effect of the causal factor (the threat or control)--the fear of public condemnations held by individuals; these fears which reside in the individual are the true obstacles and they are of a nature that could possibly be changed. Therefore, the individually based element is the obstacle and it is upon the individual psychological state that psyops should be focused. This fact is not evident in the manner in which the majority of "obstacles" are described in the literature.

(C) Two Psychological/Emotional factors which can be termed "primary obstacles" were identified. These are:

1. Fear of harm to the self by either side.
2. Fear of punitive action against one's family.

(C) One "secondary obstacle," an Opinion/Belief/Attitude factor is:

Belief/Faith/Dedication to the notion of ultimate victory.

(U) In summary, the stated (or the to-be-inferred) psychological state represents the only true obstacle and is the aspect that should be focused upon and attacked by the psychological operator in any attempt to nullify or overcome "obstacles to defection."

(C) Accordingly, the following recommendations were made:

1. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the "obstacles" rather than to the audience and situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Develop and use a limited--very limited--number of the best-possible-quality messages emphasizing on a realistic level that it is possible to rally or surrender safely.
3. Formulate single unitary education programs for military personnel, government personnel, and civilians to instruct them in procedures for dealing with all types of defectors.
4. Standardize actions and behavior involved in rallying and surrendering and standardize actions and procedures relevant to friendly involvement in a rally or surrender situation down to the most minor details. This will be the content of the education program described in "3" above. Execute the training/orientation program as quickly as possible, beginning with all military and paramilitary personnel.
5. Test thoroughly themes analogous to "Surely your family will accept some discomfort to help you stay alive so that you can be together again?"
6. Prepare simple single messages for a limited number of statistical aspects of the conduct of the war, emphasizing those related to things which most soldiers have experienced personally. Present; do not sell.

(U) From studies to this point in a continuing effort, conclusions have been drawn regarding conceptualization and effective exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities.

(U) A more precise and consistent approach to data collection, data analysis, and definition of vulnerabilities is a basic requirement for valid conceptualization and productive exploitation of vulnerabilities. A formal definition of "vulnerability" and the manner in which it is to be described for users must be established in use in order to systematize thinking, theory, and practice regarding vulnerabilities.

(U) The manner and level of generalization with which vulnerabilities should be described for all purposes has been tentatively identified and can be described as follows:

- Vulnerability may be primary (which implies generality of applicability) or secondary (which refers to a sub-factor included within and facilitating the primary vulnerability). Other conditions/events/actions or states of being are contributory or facilitating.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Diagnosis of a vulnerability must be preceded by identification of the mediating factors (actions/situations/events, etc.)
- The relationship of the mediating factor and resultant primary or secondary vulnerability to other major characteristics and current situations of the enemy individual or group must be considered before decision on diagnosis.
- The primary or secondary vulnerability must be expressed in terms of the impact of the mediating factor upon the resistance or receptivity of enemy individuals or groups.
- The objective expected to be achieved by exploitation of the vulnerability should be expressed in terms of impact on resistance or acceptance and/or the specific behavior the exploitation is designed to evoke.

(U) A procedure has been devised for classifying and positioning data about an external event/situation/action/or state of being in the External Factor/Consequence/Implication/Impact on Individual sequence shown in the Vulnerabilities Classification Matrix in Table 3 in Chapter 7. Use of this means of classification, in combination with formatting of the description of the inferred vulnerability according to the manner of definition described, provides a consistent and systematic means of describing and defining vulnerabilities and of communicating this information to others in a form ready for use. There is no implication that the process is easy, but the method and the proper focus of attention for psyop communications is now identified and usable. The accuracy of an initial assumption of existence of a condition/situation/event/or state of being that leads to diagnosis of a vulnerability is, of course, a function of the quality and quantity of available pertinent data interacting with the extent of pertinent knowledge and degree of skill possessed by the diagnostician.

(U) It is recognized that the current practice of quick-reaction exploitation in the field would be seriously hampered by attempting to follow the steps listed in sequence, and it is not intended to prevent quick-reaction exploitation where appropriate. However, it does appear to be possible to restrict quick-reaction operations to function within the limits of primary vulnerabilities already identified but with the option of adding certain carefully specified features to already selected and approved themes or procedures.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The concept of targeting and tailoring can be applied profitably to vulnerabilities as they are defined here since, by definition, appeals would represent "the most appropriate messages aimed at the biggest potential" if the intelligence data used as a base is valid. Field research data provide the direction that must be taken to overcome the multiple obstacles represented by indoctrination-inculcated attitudes and justified or unjustified fears. The added factor is pressure. Approximately a third of the NVA sampled report that it would not cause harm to them or to their family if they were captured in combat or in various forms of hopeless situations. Such a situation, then, must exist before the psyop message can do its part. If pressure is provided by military operations to create a situation in which it is acceptable and honorable to become a prisoner, thereby nullifying fears inculcated by Party indoctrination and controls, and if an earlier stream of psyop messages have conveyed credible information about safe procedures and methods for coming into GVN hands, then the timely introjection during combat or any other similar pressure-situation of appeals which normally relate to secondary vulnerabilities may be successful.

(C) At the present time, field research data indicate that evocation of desired behavioral responses--such as surrender, rally, desertion, and self-induced capture--are most likely to be promoted by an integrated combination of military operational pressure and psyop messages, if they occur at all. A study to assess the extent to which psyops is incorporated in tactical planning is needed to provide perspective on the realistic possibility of increasing such integrated planning and on the extent to which it can be increased. In comment on this point, rally, surrender, and other such appeals directed to NVA in the South are attempting to induce or trigger an action of a kind that may have more important, sweeping, and radical consequences than any other possible action; the danger involved is an added negative factor. When one factors in the additional consideration that the NVA is in strange territory, and operates with full awareness that his family--perhaps his most important concern--is to some extent a hostage, it is clear that even the most artfully devised and compellingly persuasive message or flood of messages must overcome some very solid obstacles.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FACTORS REQUIRING SYSTEMATIC RESEARCH

(U) A number of significant factors require further research and development, primarily in the area that will permit some control over and provide valid statistics for assessing effectiveness of specific psyop activities and products. All of these may be subsumed under a larger factor which is significant not only for ongoing efforts, but is vital to the successful meeting of U.S. policy and goals in Vietnam. This is the explication and systematization of processes and procedures which the nation will require as more and more of the effort now furnished by Allied Free World agencies is assumed by South Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) Human Sciences Research, Inc. 7710 Old Springhouse Road McLean, Virginia 22101		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP 3
3. REPORT TITLE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES--VIETNAM(U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) SEMI-ANNUAL		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) BAIRDAIN, Ernest F. BAIRDAIN, Edith M.		
6. REPORT DATE April 1970	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 103	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. DAAH01-70-C-0217	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) HSR-TN-70/1-Wn	
8c. PROJECT NO.		
8d.		
8e.	8f. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
9. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT In addition to security requirements which apply to this document it may be further distributed by any holders only with specific prior approval of Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington, D. C. 20301.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Advanced Research Projects Agency Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C.
13. ABSTRACT (U) A program of psychological operational studies to be conducted in Vietnam was mounted in response to (1) the long-term need to institutionalize what has been learned by experience and to consolidate knowledge that, in the press of urgent operational demands, has long remained widely dispersed among people and offices of varying levels of experience and capability, and (2) the concurrent short-term need to conduct research to meet urgent operational problems. (U) The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR) for an interdisciplinary research effort to work with and through responsible state, military, and governmental agencies in Vietnam to support and systematize the field of Psychological Operations (psyops). (U) The primary objectives of the contracted effort are to develop and validate criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of psyop programs, to develop and assist in the establishment of a system of evaluation that can be used by psy-operators, both U.S. and Vietnamese, and to help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops in an insurgent environment wherever it may occur. (U) This document reports progress and status at the end of the first six months since contract award. It is arranged in four major sections to discuss: (I) the scope of the problem, (II) the methods and procedures being used to address it, (III) the results to date, and (IV) those conclusions and recommendations which may be stated at this time.		

DD FORM 1473

1 NOV 64 1473 1 JAN 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE FOR ARMY USE.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

