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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (5 Jun 70)

FOR OT UT 701248

11 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96384

AVCA GO-MH

17 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: CPOF-DT
APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report-Lessons Learned of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862

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ERNEST A. MAIELLO
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS

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ANNEX A (U) Command Group

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command are indicated at inclosure 1. During the reporting period the position of Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Retrograde was abolished. The Directorate for Retrograde, Office of ACofS, Supply was established 7 December 1969 to assume the retrograde functions. The functions of the Special Assistant for Logistics Review were transferred to ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations on 8 December 1969.

2. (U) Principal changes of key personnel during the quarter: Colonel Nevin L. McCartney replaced Colonel Joseph A. Walsh as Chief of Staff; Colonel Harry T. Jackson replaced LTC Donald C. Porter who was acting ACofS, Ammo; Colonel Clyde W. Woods departed the Command and the position of Special Assistant for Logistics Review remains vacant; LTC(P) Jerome M. McCabe reported as Dep ACofS, Maintenance; Colonel Ernest A. Maiello replaced Colonel William L. Dupart as Adjutant General; LTC(F) Oscar E. Harrison reported as Dep ACofS Supply; LTC Donald J. Hagel replaced LTC Karl F. Lange as Special Assistant for Combat Security; Colonel Owen E. Litz was appointed Director Retrograde; Colonel Francis X. Wallace replaced Colonel Ray Rowland as Staff Chaplain; LTC(F) Robert E. Saksa replaced LTC Evangle Watley as ACofS, Transportation; Colonel John J. Wren replaced Colonel Robert D. Worthen as Commanding Officer of ICCV; LTC(P) Ralph J. Dixon replaced Colonel Wren as ACofS, Comptroller.

Annex B (U) ACoFS, Comptroller

1. (U) Management Engineering Branch.

a. A management survey was made of the allocation of Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) in Qui Nhon Support Command. The survey was conducted to determine how increased utilization of organic military MHE could be achieved, thereby reducing the use of contractor furnished equipment, and achieving a cost savings in the operation of Qui Nhon Support Command.

(1) The analysis of MHE resources in the Qui Nhon area was approached from two directions: (a) Could units afford to use their organic equipment more fully and give up some MHE support now provided by the Han Jin Company contract? (b) Could one unit afford to give some of its MHE to another unit, thereby reducing the dependence of the second unit on contractual support?

(2) The study team recommended that the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon relinquish a given number of contractual MHE assets utilized in certain supply areas over a scheduled time period. The recommended reduction in contractual MHE support at the depot was coupled with the simultaneous release of excess organic MHE from the 5th Transportation Command. In addition, it was further recommended that the 184th Ord Bn be given priority on the receipt of six additional MHE operators, which in turn would enable the 184th Ord Bn to effectively utilize its organic MHE, and thus reduce its dependency upon contractual MHE support.

(3) It was further recommended that the Contracting Officer's Representative for the commercial contractor hold a quarterly on-site briefing for key personnel of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, the 5th Transportation Command, and the 184th Ord Bn to acquaint them with the provisions of the commercial contract, and to review their needs for contractual MHE support.

b. A series of ammunition performance indicators were developed which could serve as a basis for management decisions within the ammunition field. The approach used to develop the performance indicators was to view the operating unit (e.g., Ammunition Depot, as producing an output of value to the command, consuming in the process certain scarce inputs. The performance of the unit can then be measured in terms of how much output is produced per unit of input per time period. The performance of a Support Command can be measured by aggregating the indicators for individual operating units.

(1) The role of the ammunition operating unit is to receive, store, and issue ammunition. A measure of the output produced in the receipt and issue function is short tons of ammunition processed, i.e., the sum of short tons of ammunition received and short tons of ammunition issued. A measure of output produced in the storage function is short tons of ammunition warehoused. The scarce resources consumed in producing an ammunition unit's output are materials handling equipment (MHE) and personnel.

(2) Combining output measures and input measures yields a series of performance indicators. Specifically:

(a) Receipt and Issue Function

- I. Short tons processed per assigned machine day.
- II. Short tons processed per available machine day.
- III. Short tons processed per available man day.
- IV. Short tons processed per available man day after satisfying security requirements.

(b) Warehouse and Storage Function

- I. Short tons warehoused per assigned machine day.
- II. Short tons warehoused per available machine day.
- III. Short tons warehoused per available man day.
- IV. Short tons warehoused per available man day after satisfying security requirements.

These performance indicators can be used in two ways: first, to compare the performance of one Support Command with another for a given month; second, to compare each Support Command with its own performance in the previous month. While the indicators do not reveal the specific problem which caused poor performance, they will respond to the presence of a problem, thus drawing management attention to the situation.

c. A management survey was conducted on the material handling procedures in the US Army Field Depot, Da Nang with specific attention given to the possible double or unnecessary handling of materials. The management study recommended that the following actions be taken which would contribute to the efficient handling of depot materials: (1) Effective utilization of available advance information in planning for the receipt of incoming cargo, e.g., manifests for incoming vessels, and the weekly listing of Intensified Management Items (IMI) published by ACofS, Transportation, HQ, 1st Logistical Command; (2) Construction of a center access aisle in the SACO 600 area for commercial fork lift use; (3) Continuous nomination of slow moving material for retrograde in order to release valuable storage space for more effective use; (4) Loading of truckload shipments directly from storage areas; and (5) That a system be established to divide the receiving pad in SACO 600 area into sub pads by location.

d. The Organization and Functions Manual of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command was completely revised and published in December 1969. This manual superseded LC Memo 10-1, dated 6 January 1968. The basis for revising the manual was as follows: (1) Outdated due to many internal organizational realignments; (2) Transfer of functional responsibilities among the various staff elements; (3) Need for a simple and concise format; (4) Standardization of organizational charts; and (5) Clear delineation of responsibilities and functions of our staff elements.

e. On 10 November 1969, the Commanding General asked the ACofS, Comptroller to establish and recommend staffing for an organizational element within the

Office of the ACofS, Supply which would have staff responsibilities for the retrograde of materiel exclusive of that managed under the Closed Loop Program and that accompanying units being redeployed outside RVN.

(1) The job to be done by the proposed retrograde element was previously accomplished by ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal until approximately 5 Nov 1968 when that office was dissolved and the nine spaces associated with the headquarters. Under this concept the retrograde function was being performed on a decentralized basis.

(2) On 12 Nov 1969, ACofS, Comptroller submitted for approval the recommended organization and staffing to the Commanding General. The recommended organization was approved on 21 Nov 1969, with additional direction on the staffing requirements. The Directorate of Retrograde was officially established within ACofS, Supply on 7 Dec 1969. The Directorate of Retrograde is currently staffed with six officers and three detailed enlisted personnel.

f. A management survey was conducted during November 1969 for the purpose of: (1) organizing a policy and procedures manual for property disposal yard operations in RVN, and (2) documenting the organization and functions of the Sales and Disposal Division to include a review of the flow of documentation and the internal controls existing within that organization. As a result of the survey, a policy and procedures manual for property disposal yard operations was prepared and submitted to Directorate for Property Disposal for publication and distribution to the Property Disposal Holding Activities throughout Vietnam.

2. (U) Review and Analysis Branch

a. In November 1969 a new regulation, LC Reg 5-3 Chart Standardization, was published. This regulation is designed to provide guidance in preparation of all charts for briefings and review and analysis publications within the 1st Logistical Command.

b. (1) The Reports Control Review Board, set up at the CG's request in May 1969, is continuing its review of existing 1st Logistical Command recurring reports. During the period from 1 Nov 1969 to 31 Jan 1970, the Board has reviewed 35 recurring reports. As a result of this review, 16 reports have been rescinded, 19 have been rejustified, and three have been revised to lessen the reporting requirement. One hundred fifteen 1st Logistical Command recurring reports have now been rescinded since the inauguration of the Reports Control Review Board. During the past quarter 14 new reports have been justified, bringing the end of the quarter recurring reports total to 82.

(2) Field trips to the four support commands have been planned to review their systems of reports control. A second objective will be to insure that the support commands are not preparing and submitting reports that have previously been rescinded. As of 31 Jan 1970, the effort was being initiated at the Saigon Support Command, and plans have been made to visit the other three in Feb 1970.

(3) An intensive study has been performed at the ICCV to control the number of one time and recurring special inventories required to be taken at the depots. These inventories are requested as a supplement to the ABF reporting system, and to date have been required without the concurrence of the Reports Control Office (RCO). A liaison between the ICCV and RCO is being initiated.

(4) The Reports Control Branch has taken on the additional task of keeping an accurate and current daily historical journal. This was initiated at the request of the Military History Division, ACOFS, SP4O.

3. (U) Budget

a. In December 1969 a detailed analysis of the FY 70 In-Country OMA funding resources was accomplished with the intent of releasing excess funds to USARV for redistribution. An excess of \$2,755,000 was generated and released as a result of workload adjustments and the utilization of military resources in lieu of contracted services. Currently all known requirements are financed with the available FY 70 Approved Operating Program. The obligation rate reflected as of 31 Dec 69 is 68.6% of the committed funds. Though the rate may appear excessive, it is well within the accepted limitation. Established obligation procedures preclude the relation of rate to the proportionate period of the fiscal year.

b. The Bulk Certification of Funds Letter, 70-2, dated 6 March 1969, issued by the Centralized Financial Management Agency, Hawaii, initially allocated \$4,000,000 for out-of-country procurement of supplies and services. Subsequently, increases were issued of \$32,000,000 for lumber, \$5000,000 for RVN Popular Forces Dependent Housing, and \$5,245,000 for continuation of FY 70 operations. Currently, BCF Letter, 70-2, including all amendments totals \$42,000,000.

c. As a result of constant review of the out-of-country expenditures, the Commanding General established a tentative target of \$450,000,000 FY 70. Accordingly, all responsible staff activities and ICCV were required to screen requirements, the focal point being to reduce to the minimum essential and to reprogram in accordance with the tentative goal. In addition, action was initiated to obtain data from staff activities and ICCV to formulate the FY 71 Out-of-Country Budget.

4. (U) Finance and Internal Review

a. Finance Service Technical Inspections were conducted at the following units: (1) the 92d Finance Section, Cam Ranh Bay; (2) the 292d Finance Section, Vung Tau; (3) the 13th Finance Section, Qui Nhon; and (4) the 7th Finance Section, Saigon.

b. Internal Review

(1) Auditors from the Finance and Internal Review Division completed the

following reviews and audit during the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970: (a) Subsistence Billing to Customers of Interservice Support Agreements (b) Reconciliation of Foreign Excess Sales Office Financial Transactions (c) Cash Reconciliation - Personal Effects Branch, US Army Mortuary, Saigon (d) Unannounced audit of Imprest Funds (USAPAV, 525th MI Group, Long Binh Post, and 25th Infantry Division).

(2) The Revised Fiscal Year 70 Internal Review program was approved in November 1969. The Internal Review Branch was reduced in strength to one auditor, causing the elimination of the Approved Revised FY 70 Internal Review Program. The capability of this branch is reduced to the performance of audits/reviews required by regulations and those actions directed by the commander.

(3) As a result of internal reviews performed within the 1st Logistical Command, the Internal Review Division, US Army, Vietnam (USARV) issued the following reports: (a) Subsistence Billings to Non-Appropriated Funds (b) Review of the 13th Finance Section (Disbursing) Operations (c) Closed Loop Support Program (d) Saigon Support Command Transportation Motor Pool (e) US Army, Vietnam R&R Program (f) Issue Priority Designators and (g) Review of the 7th Finance Section (Disbursing) Operations. The following reviews are continuing within the command: (a) Currency Conversion Procedures and (b) Review of FY 70 Accounting Procedures.

(4) The command received a final report by the US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) on the reconciliation of the cash transactions of the Foreign Excess Sales Office and the reconciliation of USAID Billings. Draft reports were received on Selected Items of Combat Mobility - Asset Reporting and Management of Unserviceable Material. USAAA is continuing field work on the following Audits: (a) Inventory Balances Audit (b) Subsistence Management (c) 10 Ton Tractors Audit.

(5) The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed field work on the audits, "Utilization of Foreign Manufactured Commercial Trucks" and the "Preliminary Review of Import Duties Paid on Non-Fat Dry Milk Solids and Bakery Products in the Far East Area". No reports have been received. Field work is continuing on the following audits: (a) Management and Controls over Operations of Field Ration Messes and (b) Operation Bluejay.

(6) Non Appropriated Funds (NAF): (a) Reviewed the audit programs for Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay (b) Reviewed the monthly minutes and financial statements of the NAFs under the jurisdiction of this command (c) Performed assist and instruct visits to Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau (d) Terminal audit of the Long Binh Depot Officers Lounge (e) Courtesy audit of the 1st Log Officers Field Ration Mess Other Sundry Fund (f) Updated Audit check lists for Central Post, AER, and Chaplains Funds.

5. (U) Cost Reduction

a. Cost Reduction Program Status. The FY 70 cost reduction goal for

the 1st Logistical Command was supplemented during the second quarter by Project 100 Million. This program, initiated by the Commanding General in December 1969, was aimed at instilling a sense of urgency within the support commands and ICCV for obtaining official credit for the efficient utilization of resources throughout the command. The specific aim of this project is to obtain \$100,000,000 in validated cost reduction actions by the end of the fiscal year. The accomplishment of this goal was programmed over the second half of FY 70 by establishing subgoals in each of three 60-day periods (1 Jan to 28 Feb, 1 Mar to 30 Apr, and 1 May to 30 Jun) with 30%, 45% and 25% of the total goal assigned designated respectively to the three 60-day periods.

b. November and the first half of December 1969 witnessed the submission of several additional actions to the Army Audit Agency (AAA) for review. AAA review of 1st Logistical Command actions during December resulted in the validation of four actions totaling \$6.1 Million. Validation of several smaller actions during January 1970 raised this figure to \$6.4 Million. It is expected that by 28 Feb 70, the subgoal of \$30,000,000 will be met.

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ANNEX C (C) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Security and Intelligence Division

1. (C) During the reporting period, the enemy continued to attempt to inflict a maximum amount of damage with a minimum amount of force. The enemy's efforts have been aimed at three major objectives: (1) to concentrate all his forces in counter-pacification; (2) to intensify guerilla warfare and increase local level activity; and (3) to gear his political machinery for continuing the struggle when the US withdraws. The strong stress on these objectives by the enemy suggests that since the death of Ho Chi Minh, the leadership in Hanoi has shifted emphasis from an attempt to win the war in one fell swoop to a drawn out guerrilla struggle. This new policy, which seems in reality a return to the war as it was fought before the American commitment, requires the establishment of a strong political base among the populace. In light of this position, the current communist concern with the pacification program, with "Arvnization" or "de-Americanization" of the war, with attacking South Vietnamese outposts, and with weakening the government of South Vietnam's political structure becomes clear. Equally clear is his slackening of emphasis on the need to destroy U.S. units, and thus his less than vigorous attempts to attack U.S. installations during this reporting period.


2. (C) Of concern to 1st Logistical Command, for example, are the base camps where logistical facilities are located. These installations have been hit by attacks by fire 32.2% less than the same installations were hit during the last quarter. In fact, every category of enemy initiated incidents directed at 1st Logistical Command this reporting period decreased (overall figures represent 42.5% fewer actions this quarter than last). These figures appear to be parallel to the figures which indicate the level of enemy actions involving tactical units. Even though sapper activity decreased, it appears that this tactic will be of primary significance in the future because it is well suited for the guerilla war/protracted conflict. Also expected should be increases in incidents of sabotage, terrorism, assassination and harassment all directed primarily at the Government and Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

3. (C) The following chart depicts the total number of incidents, stratified by type, directed at 1st Logistical Command installations from February 1969 through January 1970. Significant enemy initiated incidents involving 1st Logistical Command during the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970 were of six types; attacks on shipping, attacks on convoys, interdiction of pipelines, ground/sapper attacks, harassments, and attacks by fire. As the chart indicates, there has been a significant trend of decreasing frequency of incidents over the past six months.

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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING 1st Log 1969 - 1970



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
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4. (C) The following is a breakout of enemy initiated incidents, by type, with comments and examples:

a. Attacks on Shipping

(1) This type of activity has decreased by 12.5% since the last quarter totaling only seven incidents for this three month period. Of the incidents represented by this figure, less than half occurred in the Long Tau shipping channel, indicating that the "Special Interest" procedures have been effective. Perhaps they have been so effective that the enemy now considers that on the Long Tau channel it is too risky to attempt interdiction.

(2) The following chart shows enemy initiated incidents directed against shipping for a 12 month period, to include the three months covered by this report. This chart shows a general decrease in activity directed at shipping since June 1969.



(3) Some examples of attacks on shipping were:

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(a) On 10 November, 1969, at Cat Lai, tug #1932, while changing barges, received an unknown amount of automatic weapons fire from the south side of the river. There were no casualties or damages.

(b) On 28 December, 1969, 9 kilometers southeast of Nha Be, the USA PHOVO was fired on with two unknown type rockets from the east side of the Long Tau channel while it was enroute to Vung Tau. The rockets missed the vessel and landed in the river resulting in no casualties or damages.

(c) On 2 January, 1970, four kilometers north-northeast of Rach Gia, two LCM's (Landing Craft Mechanized) from the 1099th Boat Company received an unknown number of mortar rounds. There was minor damage to the vessels and two 1st Logistical Command personnel were wounded.

b. Attacks on Convoys

(1) To illustrate the type and severity of enemy initiated incidents against 1st Logistical Command convoys and land vehicles, these incidents have been divided into ambushes, sniper fire and mine incidents. Convoy incidents have decreased slightly this quarter (13.2%), and the overall trend over the past year has been on the decrease; however, the significance of these figures is that the decrease is not larger in view of the relatively low level of enemy activity. This highlights the enemy's continued interest in disrupting 1st Logistical Command's lines of communication. It is interesting to note that the ratios of occurrences of the types of convoy incidents to each other has remained fairly constant over the past year. During the reporting period, more than half the enemy activity directed at land vehicles occurred in II Corps North, primarily on highway QL-19 between Qui Nhon and Pleiku.


(2) Rail interdiction has not been included because rail use by 1st Logistical Command is limited and the interdiction of rail lines has little effect on logistical operations.

(3) Road cratering, bridge destruction and other highway interdictions designed to limit allied use of lines of communication seldom result in casualties, damages or significant convoy delays; however, the frequency of this type of incident has increased enough to make it worthy of note. This tactic is more in keeping with guerrilla type warfare since it requires very few personnel to accomplish a mission of comparatively little risk to the perpetrator. These incidents are not reflected in the convoy chart.

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INCIDENTS INVOLVING CONVOYS 1969 - 1970



(4) Some examples of convoy ambushes were:

(a) On 22 November 1969, 25 kilometers south of Song Be, a 300 vehicle convoy, traveling north on highway LTL-1 from Long Binh to Song Be, was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 and mortar fire. The first serial included 58 vehicles from the 13th Transportation Group and the second serial included vehicles from U.S. Engineer units and 175 ARVN vehicles. There were two US personnel killed (Engineers) and nine US personnel wounded (four from the 1st Logistical Command). Seven 1st Logistical Command vehicles were damaged. Fourteen enemy were killed.

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(b) On 7 January, 1970, 11 kilometers west of An Khe, a 124th Transportation Battalion convoy, traveling west on highway QL-19 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku, was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Two 1st Logistical Command personnel were wounded and two five ton tractors were damaged. One enemy was wounded and captured.

(c) On 19 January, 1970, 10 kilometers east of An Khe, a Han Jin and 27th Transportation Battalion convoy, traveling west on highway QL-19, was ambushed by an estimated 100 man enemy force employing automatic weapons, B-40 and heavy machinegun fire. One Han Jin employee was killed and four Han Jin employees were wounded. There were also three US personnel wounded. Two five ton tractors and two guntrucks from the 27th Transportation Battalion were damaged. Also damaged was a Han Jin pickup and a Han Jin eight ton truck.

(5) Some examples of mine incidents were:

(a) On 7 December, 1969, 10 kilometers south of Camp Evans on highway QL-1, a 666th Transportation Battalion two and one half ton truck, while on a training mission with the 101st Airborne Division, hit and detonated an artillery round rigged as a mine. There were no casualties but the truck was destroyed.

(b) On 29 December, 1969, 15 kilometers north of Pleiku, a five ton tractor from the 359th Transportation Company, traveling on highway QL-14 south from Kontum to Pleiku in a convoy, hit and detonated a mine on the west shoulder of the highway. The rear duals were blown off the vehicle but there were no casualties.

(c) On 10 January, 1970, 15 kilometers northwest of Chu Lai on highway QL-1, a five ton tractor from the 363rd Transportation Company pulling a Sea Land van was damaged by a suspected command detonated mine. The vehicle was the fifth vehicle in a convoy. There were no casualties but the rear duals were blown off the tractor.

(6) Some examples of sniper incidents were:

(a) On 17 November, 1969, in Qui Nhon, a two and one half ton truck, returning to Long My from Phu Tai, received one round of small arms fire which went through the windshield. One 1st Logistical Command soldier received fragment wounds on the face.

(b) On 26 December, 1969, 11 kilometers southeast of Camp Evans, personnel from the 148th Supply & Service Company in a one quarter ton vehicle, traveling north on highway QL-1 from Phu Bai to Camp Evans, received one round of small arms fire. There were no casualties or damages.

(c) On 12 January, 1970, 12 kilometers southeast of Dalat, 3 vehicles from the 557th Maintenance Company, traveling northeast on highway QL-11, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. There were no casualties. One vehicle sustained minor damages.

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(7) Some examples of highway interdiction were:

(a) On 11 November, 1969, 21 kilometers west of An Khe, a mine sweeping team from the 1/69th armor discovered a 16' X 8' crater on highway QL-19.


(b) On 13 December, 1969, 15 kilometers south of Can Tho, Long Thanh bridge on highway QL-4 was destroyed by an estimated 750 pound mine.

(c) On 5 January, 1970, 18 kilometers west of An Khe, bridge #25 on highway QL-19 was blown by an unknown size explosive charge. The bypass was also mined.

c. Pipeline Incidents

(1) Enemy initiated incidents involving pipelines decreased by almost 50% over the reporting period and as the following chart indicates, there has not been a significant attack on a pump station since September 1969. Although the chart shows a decreasing frequency of pipeline incidents, the number of sections damaged by each incident has increased particularly on the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline. Product loss from these interdictions has resulted in excessive costs, and as a result, the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline was shut down in January and will be dismantled.

PIPELINE INCIDENTS 1969 - 1970



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(2) Some examples of incidents directed against pipelines were:


(a) On 8 November 1969, at two separate locations on the Qui Nhon to Pleiku pipeline (four kilometers east of An Khe and four kilometers west of An Khe) 58 sections of pipe were damaged by small arms fire.

(b) On 28 December 1969, 9 kilometers west of An Khe on the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline, 28 sections of pipe were damaged by small arms fire.

(c) On 10 January 1970, 200 meters south-southwest of Long Binh Post, the three adjacent pipelines (MOGAS, Diesel and JP-4) running from the Dong Nai River Jetty to the Long Binh tank farm, were blown by a satchel charge. Thirty sections of each line were damaged and an unknown amount of product was lost.

d. Ground/Sapper Attacks

(1) There were few conventional ground attacks, even against tactical units, during the quarter, and with what appears to have been the enemy's return to guerrilla warfare, it is likely that there will be few if any large scale ground attacks against major allied installations in the near future. Ground/sapper attacks against 1st Logistical Command this quarter have decreased by 42.8% over last quarter, and as the chart shows, this decrease continues a downward trend since June 1969. These few highly trained and highly motivated enemy personnel were of particular importance to 1st Logistical Command since most logistical installations are of the semi-permanent base area type and were prime targets for sapper units. Recently, conventional attacks against fixed targets have been directed mostly toward small Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) outposts and other small isolated tactical positions.



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
(2) Some examples of Ground/Sapper attacks were:

(a) On 1 November 1969, Tank Farm #4 at An Khe received an unknown amount of recoilless rifle fire and a sapper attack. Four 126,000 gallon bolted steel storage tanks were destroyed (tanks seven, eight, nine and ten). Also lost were 22 sections of pipeline, 73,762 gallons of JP-4, 11,340 gallons of diesel fuel, 21,000 gallons of MOGAS and 2,394 gallons of AVGAS. There were no casualties. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel determined that all the tanks were destroyed by satchel charge. The sappers escaped.

(b) On 4 January 1970 at Qui Nhon, an unknown number of sappers penetrated the Ammunition Base Depot. Satchel charges detonated on pads 36 and 38. A charge was found on pad 34, but it was thrown out of the area by explosive ordnance disposal personnel prior to detonation. There were no casualties but approximately \$38,000.00 worth of ammunition was destroyed. The sappers escaped.

(c) On 8 January 1970 at Ban Me Thuot, while on a routine check of the Ammunition Supply Point, personnel discovered six armed satchel charges and four cases of US Composition-C Explosive armed with enemy blasting caps. All explosives were disarmed by the ASP personnel. There were no casualties or damages.

e. Harassment Incidents:



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(1) Since the August/September surge of harassment incidents, most of which occurred in the Qui Nho area, there has not been a significant number of these incidents recorded in any one month. Of those incidents which did happen, most were again in II Corps North.


(2) Some examples of harassment incidents were:

(a) On 21 November, 1969, in Qui Nho, the US Army Depot at Long My received one round of F-79 fire and seven rounds of small arms fire. Two 1st Logistical Command personnel received fragment wounds. There were no damages.

(b) On 3 December, 1969, in Pleiku, the 121st Transportation Battalion compound received an unknown amount of small arms and automatic weapons fire. One 1st Logistical Command soldier was wounded and one guntruck was slightly damaged.

(c) On 17 January, 1970, in Qui Nhon, the US Army Depot at Long My received four rounds of small arms fire and one B-40. One 1st Logistical Command soldier was wounded.

f. Attacks by fire:



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(1) As the above chart indicates, the number of attacks by fire against 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities has been decreasing since March. This quarter's total of 40 incidents is 32.2% less than last quarter's total of 59 incidents. Not only have the attacks decreased in number, but they have also decreased in intensity. Less than 20% of all attacks by fire on 1st Logistical Command facilities consisted of more than 20 rounds of high explosive ordnance. This category of incidents is generally a good indicator of the overall level of enemy activity and as can be readily seen on the chart, the level was low during this quarter.

(2) Some examples of attacks by fire were:

(a) On 12 November, 1969, in Qui Nhon, Camp Granite received six or seven B-40/B-41 rocket rounds and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Two rockets hit a 527th Personnel Services Company barracks and completely destroyed it; one rocket hit a 127th Military Police Battalion barracks destroying two rooms; one rocket hit a bus damaging the roof and 2 dud rounds were found at guard towers 10 and 19. There were 22 wounded (10 from the 527th Personnel Services Company, 10 from the 127th Military Police Battalion, and two Vietnamese post employees).

(b) On 10 December, 1969, Long Binh Post received nine x 122mm rockets. Three additional rounds were suspected of impacting in the area but were unconfirmed. There were four personnel wounded, all from the 1st Logistical Command (one hospitalized, three treated and released). Four house trailers were damaged by fragments.

(c) On 21 January, 1970, Long Binh Post received six x 122mm rockets. Two rockets impacted in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade area and four rockets impacted outside the perimeter. Two house trailers and one BOQ were lightly damaged, two UH-1H helicopters were moderately damaged and one OH-6A helicopter was destroyed. Three personnel from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade were wounded, one hospitalized, two treated and released.

5. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security actions completed during the period. The total number of personnel security actions processed increased approximately 10.8% over the last reporting period.

a. Clearances Validated:	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) Top Secret	88	36	43	167
(2) Secret	76	62	48	186
b. Requests:				
(1) National Agency Check	8	25	76	109

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(2) USAIRR	108	84	226	418
(3) Background Investigations	8	4	29	41
c. Clearances Granted:				
(1) Top Secret	-	-	5	5
(2) Secret	32	54	46	132
(3) Interim Top Secret	14	13	37	64
(4) Interim Secret	1	2	18	21
(5) Confidential	10	2	4	16

d. At the end of the period 197 personnel security actions were pending.

6. (C) The following is a summary of the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment during the period 10 November 1969 through 31 January 1970.

a. Assignment of key personnel:

- (1) Captain George A. Sartor, Operations Officer
- (2) Captain Ruben Henderson III, Officer-in-Charge, Cam Ranh Bay Field Office
- (3) Captain David D. Prior, Officer-in-Charge, Qui Nhon Field Office
- (4) Captain Bruce Ev, Officer-in-Charge, Da Nang Field Office
- (5) 1st Lieutenant James A. Towman, Officer-in-Charge, Pleiku Field Office
- (6) 1st Lieutenant Neal R. Foster, Officer-in-Charge, Long Binh Field Office

b. Special studies conducted:

- (1) 137 checks for possible outlets for Subversive and/or Anti-American Literature.
- (2) 401 checks on salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified material.

c. Counterintelligence Services Conducted:

- (1) There were no counterintelligence surveys conducted.

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- (2) 41 announced counterintelligence inspections.
- (3) 39 unannounced counterintelligence inspections.
- (4) 103 after duty hours counterintelligence checks.

d. Personnel Security Investigations:

- (1) Number conducted: 16
- (2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 88

e. Incident Investigations to include Subversion Directed Against the US Army:

- (1) Number conducted: 72
- (2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 170

f. The counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File had a total of 11,384 personal and 775 impersonal items on file at the end of the reporting period.

g. There were 110 contacts made with installations informants during the past 90 days which produced 45 hits for a 41% production ratio.

7. (U) WEATHER: This was the quarter of the northeast monsoon, characterized by improved weather conditions in III and IV CTZ and by generally poor weather on the windward slopes of the Annam Range and along the east coast of I CTZ. During January, the Siberian high reached its maximum intensity. Temperatures began increasing from their normal annual minimum in December except along the eastern coastal region where January was the coldest month of the year. As the cold dry air from the Siberian high flowed southward, it was gradually heated by contact with the warmer China coast and waters of the South China Sea. This polar air merged over the water with the warm, moist, tropical air from the western Pacific and arrived over the Republic of Vietnam much warmer and more moist than when it left the continent. There were many days with light rain or drizzle, low cloudiness and poor visibility along the coast, but the inland areas enjoyed their best overall weather of the year. Inland there was little precipitation and what did fall occurred with one or two thundershowers. Cloudiness was at a minimum and ceilings were generally non-existent. Visibilities were generally good except for early morning fog.

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Annex C (C) ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations, Plans Division

1. (U) LC OPLAN 104-70. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 104-70 (Classified) (U) was published on 15 December 1969.
2. (U) LC OPLAN 65-70. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 65-70 (Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment) (U) was published on 25 December 1969.
3. (C) LC OPLAN 105-70. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 105-70 (Continuity of Operations) (U) was published on 12 January 1970. This OPLAN provides for 1st Logistical Command support of a possible relocation of HQ, USARV, as the situation might require.
4. (U) Courtesy Visits to Support Commands. Representatives of Plans Division made periodic visits to Support Commands in order to review status of existing OPLANS and to coordinate requirements for those in the process of being published. These staff visits are beneficial in that they provide an opportunity for personal contact and discussion between planning personnel at both levels, resulting in a better understanding of the Support Commands' individual problems.
5. (C) Common Service Support in ICTZ.
 - a. Planning for the turnover of Phase III functions and facilities is complete. LC OPOD 105-70, Common Service Support ICTZ Phase III, was published on 29 January 1970. USASUPCOM-DNG will publish their implementing OPOD within 15 days after receipt of LC OPOD 105-70. ACofS, SP&O, 1st Logistical Command will assure an orderly transition of functions and facilities from NAVSUPACT to USASUPCOM-DNG during Phase III.
 - b. Planning is continuing for the complete turnover of common service support functions in ICTZ from the Navy to the Army. LC OPLAN 107-70, Common Service Support ICTZ, will be published during February 1970. Major problem still to be resolved is the inter-departmental transfer of funds and spaces from the Navy to the Army.
 - c. Guidance used to prepare both the OPOD and OPLAN is as follows:
 - (1) No relocation unless absolutely required for mission accomplishment.
 - (2) Consolidate and reorganize as required after Navy has departed.
 - (3) Identify the facilities required. Relocate stocks and personnel after Navy has departed.
 - (4) Only new units assigned should be considered for new billets at this time. Plan for other required billets, but do not plan on movement until after Navy has departed.

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- (5) Use only those facilities required for mission.
- (6) Maximum use of local nationals and contracts.
- (7) All supplies and equipment not required by the Army must be retrograded, or otherwise disposed of, by the service concerned.
- (8) All facilities not required by the Army must be closed out, or otherwise disposed of, by the service concerned.

6. (C) USARPAC Logistical Concept Southeast Asia 1970-1971.

a. Planning is continuing for preparation and implementation, on a phased basis, of the USARPAC Logistical Support Concept for the Pacific Area 1970-1971. Representation to the USARPAC planning task group includes a member of the 1st Logistical Command.

b. DA conceptual guidelines contained in a letter to USARPAC, dated 5 Dec 1969, required a theater plan which would provide for the integration of planning, programing and budgeting with supply/stock control management for U.S., Free World and ARVN forces by USARPAC.

c. The supply system designed is to include provisions for a single requisition pipeline and a central control facility for all forces supported. The concept further required the complete management responsibility by USARPAC of Operation Maintenance Army Appropriations, stock fund and PEMA Secondary Items. DA responsibilities for management of PEMA Principal Items is to remain unchanged.

d. A USARPAC conceptual plan in response to the DA letter was forwarded to DA on 4 January 1970, and was approved for development of a specific system design by message on 13 January 1970. DA has requested that the detailed USARPAC implementing plan be forwarded no later than 6 March 1970 for final approval.

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ANNEX C (C) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Logistical Operations Division

1. (U) During the reporting period, the 1st Logistical Command continued its support to the U. S. and Free World Military Forces throughout Vietnam. Highlighting the reporting period were Operation Keystone Cardinal, Operation Keystone Bluejay, PHILCAGV's return to the Philippines, relocation of units and transfer of equipment and Duffel Bag activities.

2. (C) Highlights of Logistical Support Activities: a. Operation Keystone Cardinal:

(1) This operation implemented a further reduction of U. S. Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, in addition to the relocations, inactivations, and subsequent realignments of 1st Log units. BSASWPCOM-SGN was tasked with assisting in the phase-down and redeployment of the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, the major Army unit to redeploy under Keystone Cardinal.

(2) A summary of 1st Logistical Command space and unit losses as a result of Keystone Cardinal is shown below:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPACE LOSSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS*</u>
I CTZ	1,045	6
II CTZ (North)	94	3
II CTZ (South)	888	7
III and IV CTZ	<u>1,152</u>	<u>13</u>
Totals	3,179	29

*Includes units affected by space reductions

(3) After Action Reports from Support Commands and HQ Staff for this operation were received on 20 January. A final After Action report on Keystone Cardinal is under preparation.

b. Operation Keystone Bluejay:

(1) Operation Keystone Bluejay is the Phase III redeployment of US Forces which began with receipt of MACV SECRÉT message 7113 dtg 030318Z Dec 69, subject: Redeployment of Forces, Phase III. The 1st Logistical Command, anticipating this operation, prepared a plan which needed only the addition of two annexes (Troop List and Logistics) in order to begin the execution of Phase III redeployment. On 19 Jan. 70, all support commands were ordered to execute OPLAN 104-70.

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(2) Equipment processing sites were selected at the following locations:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUPPORT COMMAND</u>
Di An	USASUPCOM-SGN
Long Binh	USASUPCOM-SGN
Pleiku	USASUPCOM-QNH
Cha Rang	USASUPCOM-QNH
Cam Ranh Bay	USASUPCOM-CrB
Dong Ha	USASUPCOM-DNG

(3) The 1st Logistical Command was tasked by USArV to provide the following direct support of Phase III redeployment:

(a) Establishment and operation of marshalling areas within the vicinity of the depots or ports designated to support redeploying US Forces.

(b) Redeployment of 1st Logistical Command forces designated on the troop list.

(c) Operation of the necessary port facilities in II, III, and IV CTZ to support the redeployment of US Forces.

(d) Designation of a central location for holding, classifying and processing excess equipment from redeploying units in each CTZ.

(4) As the designated units began standdown, in the largest Army redeployment to date, the equipment processing, reporting and disposition instructions were moving in a more rapid and efficient manner than in Phase I and II redeployments. Much of this improvement can be directly attributed to incorporation of recommendations made as a result of lessons learned during the two previous operations.

c. Redeployment to Republic of Philippines:

(1) During the reporting period the Philippines Civic Action Group, Vietnam (PHILCAGV) redeployed from Tay Ninh to the Philippines. The PHILCAGV contingent consisted of approximately 1,500 personnel comprising the following units:

(a) 1 HQ and Svc Co

(b) 1 Medical/Dental Bn

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- (c) 1 Security Bn
 - (d) 1 Field Arty Battery (105)
 - (e) 1 Logistical Support Company
- (2) The redeployment was planned and executed in four phases:
- (a) Phase I: Movement of advance party by U. S. Military Airlift to Manila (1 and 8 Dec 69).
 - (b) Phase II: Movement of main body by U. S. Military Airlift from Tay Ninh West Airfield to Bien Hoa then by bus to Newport (13 Dec 69).
 - (c) Phase III: Movement of main body by two Filipino LSTs and one destroyer from Newport to Manila (13 Dec 69).
 - (d) Phase IV: Turn in of equipment and movement of rear party (15 Jan 70).
- (3) Saigon Support Command was responsible for supporting the entire move and for accepting and disposing of all US property which PHILCAGV received from the US Government. Saigon Support Command established an equipment processing point, much like the one established for Keystone Cardinal, and utilized the same logistical support personnel and the same accounting and disposition procedures in handling the PHILCAGV equipment.
- (4) The operation was accomplished successfully and was completed on 15 Jan 70.
- d. Reassignment of Units:
- (1) In order to provide direct support maintenance for counter mortar radar systems located in VI CTZ South, USASUPCOM-CRE requested assignment of a fully equipped signal radar team to their command. The Support Command did not have the required repairmen or special test equipment to accomplish repair of the radars. A study was made of the workloads of the radar maintenance teams in each of the support commands with a resultant decision to transfer the 518th Signal Det from USASUPCOM-SGN. The move of the unit, consisting of one warrant officer and four enlisted personnel, was completed on 7 Dec 69.
- (2) As a result of a steady increase in the area of engineer maintenance in III and IV Corps Tactical Zone, a reevaluation of all available support was made with a view toward augmenting the capability of the units in USASUPCOM-SGN. As a result, the 510th Engineer Co, Maint (DS) will be reassigned from US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to USASUPCOM-SGN effective 20 Feb 70. One Maintenance platoon with PLL and necessary equipment to perform mission work relocated on 31 Jan 70 to Binh Thuy to provide immediate relief to the overtaxed engineer maintenance unit in that area.

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e. Closure of ASP:

The Can Tho ASP, in the IV CTZ, was closed on 15 December 1969. This closure was made possible by the continued success of the Arvnization program in the Delta. ArVN established an ASP at Binh Thuy from which they provide common user type ammunition to US Army units on a reimbursement in kind basis. Army air munitions used by the 164th Aviation Group are still resupplied to rear points from the US Army Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot and from the US Army operated ASPs at Vinh Long and Soc Trang.

f. Contact Team at Nhon Co:

As a result of a request for assistance from CG, IFFV, a contact team was dispatched to Nhon Co by USASUPCOM-CrB on 24 Nov 69. The team, consisting of an officer (CMT), an NCO and five EM, provided assistance in the issue of Class III (M-4) and Class V. They also coordinated overall support to accommodate increased tactical operations in Southwest II CTZ. They were billeted with the Special Forces detachment at Nhon Co. Security for the detachment was provided by the 23d ArVN Div. The special assistance provided by the team was discontinued on 3 Jan 70 and its members returned to their parent units at LSA Ban Me Thuot and Cam Ranh Bay.

g. Closure of An Khe - Pleiku Pipeline:

During the period from 1 Nov 69 to 7 Jan 70, 6,400,000 gal of product were pumped through the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline. Of this total 3,700,000 gal (58%) were lost. These losses occurred as a result of enemy action against the pipeline, pilferage by indigenous personnel and other damages to the pipeline. In order to reduce product loss, CG, USASUPCOM-QNH requested permission to discontinue operations. Simultaneously he requested an augmentation of 25 each 5,000 gal PCL tankers to use in resupplying the Pleiku area by road. A total of 20 were issued, ten from depot stock at USASUPCOM-CrB and ten from USASUPCOM-SGN's operating assets. Line haul operations began on 8 Jan and are producing satisfactory results.

h. Use of Aircraft for Pipeline Observation:

QNH SUPCOM made extensive use of helicopters for pipeline observation in an attempt to minimize the excessive product loss due to pilferage and other causes. The mission consisted of one observer in the aircraft and a combined military police patrol on the ground using radio communications. The effectiveness of this operation for the period 11 Oct 69 to 10 Dec 69 can be measured by the following results:

- (1) Seventy leaks and breaks were spotted and reported to ground maintenance crews.
- (2) Several pilferers were apprehended and turned over to local authorities.

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(3) Over two hundred 55-gal drums of fuel were found in one village by a combined party of US and ARVN Military Police and National Police.

i. Ammunition and POL Resupply for the IV CTZ:

(1) Resupply of the IV CTZ during the reporting period continued to be a problem. Because of the lack of surface transportation assets, wide geographical dispersion of units and limited capability of existing LOCs, the Air Force received a large number of requests for airlift resupply of POL and ammunition to the Delta. Over the past several months, airlift requirements in the Delta have increased by approximately 40%. This increase, coupled with aircraft drawdowns and airfield degradation, created a serious problem. Deterioration of the landing strips further complicated resupply because the Air Force was forced to use smaller aircraft with reduced payloads. This resulted in more flights to accomplish the same missions. Because of the seriousness of this situation, MACV requested that USAFV review current resupply activities, as they pertain to POL and ammunition, with a view to reducing resupply by air. This task was later assigned to this headquarters by USAFV along with a requirement for preparing a surface resupply plan.

(2) ACOFS, SP&O, this HQS, developed a plan in conjunction with ACOFS, Transportation, ACOFS, Ammunition, Director of POL and their counterparts from Saigon Support Command. The basic concept submitted to USAFV was that, although the use of land and water LOCs should be increased, full use could only be realized by augmenting Saigon Support Command's current surface assets. upgrading roads to support 5 ton truck traffic, laying pipelines to allow for POL product discharge from LCM-8's and LCU's, and increased convoy security.

(3) On 28 Jan 70, a meeting attended by representatives from MACV, USAFV, DMAC, HQS, 1st Log Comd and HQS, Saigon Support Command was held at MACV J-45. The plan submitted by this HQS was discussed and, although no decisions were made, the contents of the plan were approved in principle.

j. Airdrop Operations:

(1) Due to airfield deterioration and overcommitment of C-7A aircraft, there was a shortfall of approximately 50% of petroleum shipments to IV CTZ during this period. In an attempt to reduce this backlog, it was jointly recommended by HQ, 1st Log Comd and HQ, 834th Air Division to deliver as much as possible by airdrop. The method used for this operation was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES).

(2) Many problems were encountered using this system. One load to Vi Thanh (a small helicopter staging field) was destroyed by fire when the platform skidded over a small metal plate welded to the steel matting. The plate impaled the platform and one of the 55 gal drums causing sparks, ignition and destruction of the load. In another instance, at Cao Linh, a load of 500 gallon collapsible drums were destroyed when the first drum in the load broke

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free, burst, and sprayed JP-4 over the remainder of the load which subsequently ignited and destroyed. Because of these difficulties it was decided to stop LAPES operations, except for emergencies, until final joint instructions are received from CONARC.

(3) The Container Delivery System continued to prove its reliability and versatility during this period as it was used to deliver Class I, II, III, and V supplies to the 101st Abn Div, 5th SFG and the 25th Inf Div. There were no malfunctions and all loads were recovered intact.

AIRDRÖP TONNAGES (SHORT TONS)

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
LAPES	26.0	161.41	0.0	187.41
C. D. S.	29.9	38.95	13.5	82.35
TOTALS	55.9	200.36	13.5	269.76

k. Special Airlift and Sealift Missions:

During the reporting period, two emergency resupply (ER) and 26 combat essential (CE) airlift missions were conducted. Twenty-three combat essential sealift missions were also conducted. Twenty-one missions delivered Class V supplies and the remainder carried other items such as Class III, collapsible drums, and repair parts. A total of 3,713 short tons of supplies were shipped by special mission. The chart below gives a detailed breakdown of amount and type tonnage hauled: (December total includes three ocean CE's)

SPECIAL MISSIONS

	<u>Total Missions</u>	<u>Total Tonnages</u>	<u>Class V Missions</u>	<u>Class V Tonnage</u>	<u>Other Missions</u>	<u>Other Tonnage</u>
Nov	19	208	11	125	8	83
Dec	7	3,428	6	3,421	1	7
Jan	5	77	4	48	1	29

1. Relocation from Camp Davies:

This headquarters was directed by HQ, USARV on 15 January 1970 to formulate a time phased plan to relocate all 1st Logistical Command units from Camp Davies in two phases. Phase one concerned the complete withdrawal of all 1st Logistical Command personnel from Camp Davies by 30 June 1970. Phase two, concerning the

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relocation of applicable units into Newport, is to occur over a long range period, starting after 30 June 1970. This plan was formulated by USASUPCOM-SGN, reviewed and approved by this HQ, and submitted to HQ, USARV on 26 January 1970.

m. Publication of Directives:

(1) Operations Orders. 1st Logistical Command Operations Order 101-70 was published on 31 December 1969 and implemented the relocation/inactivation/reduction of 1st Logistical Command units in the Vung Tau area. The areas and facilities vacated were turned over to ARVN control. 1st Logistical Command units involved are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>NEW LOCATION</u>
ARMC Center	Reassign	N/A
Vung Tau Afld Sect	Reassign	N/A
338th Avn Det	Reassign	N/A
574th S&S Det	Relocate	Can Tho
VTSAC, HHD	Inactivate	N/A
159th Trans Bn	Relocate	Cat Lai
Det #2 USAMMV	Relocate	TEA

(2) Letter of Instruction: A letter of instruction prescribing the mission, responsibilities and policies for the operation of USASUPCOM-SGN was published on 26 December 1969. This letter of instruction was a revision of an outdated document.

(3) Regulation: 1st Logistical Command supplement 1 to AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, was published on 28 November 1969 adding to the Army's regulation certain terms unique to logistical operations in this theater.

n. Project Duffel Bag:

(1) Project Duffel Bag is a Department of Defense sponsored program involving the use of various electronic and electro-mechanical devices to detect enemy movement.

(2) At Cam Ranh Bay, the 1st Logistical Command operates the in-country facility for receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance for all Duffel Bag equipment used in the Republic of Vietnam. The production has now leveled off after steadily increasing through most of CY 69. A TDA for the facility which was approved by USARV in the last reporting period has been approved by both USARPAC and the Department of the Army effective 2 February 1970. This TDA authorizes an augmentation of the 128th Signal Company (Depot) to include personnel and equipment necessary to operate the facility.

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(3) This reporting period has seen increased use of Duffel Bag sensors to improve the defensive posture of 1st Logistical Command installations. Most of the sensors in the Duffel Bag inventory were not specifically designed for close-in surveillance around fixed installations. This, plus a general lack of knowledge of sensor capabilities by 1st Logistical Command personnel, has retarded their employment. At present, Duffel Bag equipment is being operated by 1st Logistical Command personnel at three locations. These include the Long Binh and Qui Nhon ammunition depots and the logistics complex at An Khe. The use of sensors at these locations will increase in the near future. Several other locations are under study for possible sensor employment. The area around the 45th General Support Group at Pleiku was surveyed in late December to determine whether Duffel Bag sensors could be put in use around the ASP and logistical center at Pleiku. As a result of this survey, the 45th General Support Group has initiated a request for sensors to improve the defense of these installations, as well as Camp Wilson, where the 45th headquarters is located. A similar survey at Long Binh resulted in the use of line sensors at the ammunition depot, and a plan to use them around the POL tank farm operated by the 64th Quartermaster Battalion. A survey is planned for the near future to investigate the applicability of Duffel Bag sensors in the defense of ASFs in I CTZ. All of the surveys are made by a Technical Liaison Team from the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) liaison office in Saigon, along with the 1st Logistical Command Duffel Bag Project Officer.

(4) MACV J3-04 operates a school on the operation of Duffel Bag equipment. This school, located at Vung Tau, instructs both MACV advisors and Vietnamese troops. In January, a special class was held at the MACV Duffel Bag school at Vung Tau for fourteen personnel from this headquarters, Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, and Qui Nhon Support Commands. The fact that a number of trained people are present throughout the 1st Logistical Command should cause an expansion in the amount of Duffel Bag equipment dedicated to the defense of the command's fixed installations.

c. Project MOOSE II:

Project MOOSE II, a continuation of the MOOSE I program to relocate personnel out of the Saigon area, was initiated by Headquarters, USARV in unclassified message O4323, DTG 221157Z January 1970. This message prescribed the format and other pertinent information required to be submitted in the report. The initial report is due to Headquarters, USARV on 31 January 1970.

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ANNEX C (U) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Training Division

1. (U) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program is designed to upgrade the military capabilities of RVNAF both in quality and quantity. 1st Logistical Command has been charged with providing supply, maintenance and technical inspection assistance to the program. During the reporting period, one transportation company (medium boat) transferred its equipment to ARVN on a unit-to-unit basis; and equipment for two Ordnance Direct Support Companies was provided from 1st Logistical Command resources. A turnover of the equipment assets of two Composite Service Companies (Light and Heavy Maintenance) to ARVN was initiated in December 1968 and is scheduled for completion in March 70.

2. (U) Operation BULLY is a training program designed to improve the logistical capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The program was designed to provide on-the-job training (OJT) for ARVN soldiers in US units. When a sufficient number have been trained, ARVN units are to be formed and trained by larger US units. The ultimate goal of the program is the formation of trained ARVN units which could assume the logistical mission of US units thereby allowing the US units to redeploy. As of 1 January 1970, 814 ARVN soldiers have been trained and 843 were in training under Operation BULLY in the areas of tug, medium and heavy boat operations; harbor-master techniques; crane operations; marine, fuel, electrical, electronic, and canvas repair; PCI drivers training; wheeled vehicle mechanic and laundry machine operations; forklift operation and maintenance care and preservation; and CD training. In September 1969, 1st Logistical Command began providing small training teams (Instruct and Advise Teams) to instruct at ARVN Direct Support Units and base depots. The Instruct and Advise (I&A) team identifies operational deficiencies and provides advice and assistance in correction of these deficiencies. One I&A team is deployed to each of the five ARVN Area Logistics Commands.

3. (U) SKILLS I is a training program designed to improve the support capabilities of 1st Logistical Command by orientation and indoctrination of newly assigned personnel and by placing additional emphasis on formal and informal logistical training at all echelons. The number of persons trained during the period 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70 are listed below:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALPHA	1203	1262	1731	4301
BRAVO	7287	5234	6122	18643
CHARLIE	115	1043	1464	3660
TOTAL	9605	7639	9317	26601

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ANNEX C (C) ACSIS, Security, Plans and Operations, Force Development Division

1. (U) Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) affecting 27 1st Logistical Command units were prepared and submitted to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) between 1 November 1969 and 31 January 1970. MTOE requirements were submitted to increase unit's strengths, realign capabilities and add equipment to support higher requirements. MTOE submitted are at In-closure 1C.

2. (U) USARV directed that units having excess equipment on hand will report these items on DA Form 144, Inventory Adjustment Report (IAR). The items reported were assumed to be mission essential and placed on temporary loan to the reporting units. Of 77 temporary loan requests submitted to this headquarters between 1 November 1969 and 31 January 1970, 27 were returned without action. The requests for temporary loans returned without action were the result of the IAR action.

3. (U) DA approved summary and detailed Modification Tables of Distribution and Allowances (MTDA) were received for the United States Army Support Commands at Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, and Qui Nhon, with accompanying instructions to align the MTDA requirements with the latest manpower survey, and withdraw from the documents Local National (LN) requirements and authorizations documented for TOE units. A total of 2763 Local National spaces were deleted and will be documented on TDA augmentations to the subordinate headquarters of those units. The Local National TDA augmentations will reflect the requirements and authorizations of voucher spaces within each command.

4. (C) 1st Logistical Command developed a concept plan for the formation of units for Property Disposal Operations (PDO). A concept plan was formulated to organize a PDO agency and four companies. A proposed TLA for personnel and equipment was documented, identifying a total of 660 spaces for trade-off. Four companies were organized provisionally in each of the commands, based upon the Concept Plan, consisting of 157 military personnel and 50 LN personnel, capable of processing 1,000 tons of scrap and waste per day. The Concept plan and proposed TLA for the PDO agency and its companies were forwarded to USARV on 10 December 1969, with final documentation completed on 6 January 1970, changing the Concept Plan to a complete proposed TLA. The document included MTDA actions to delete trade-off spaces offered and detailed justification for personnel and equipment. Formation of the PDO companies negated the required PDO capabilities in the depots. PDO capabilities in the depots were deleted from the MTDA authorization documents.

5. (C) The support commands were directed to organize Provisional Security Companies. MTOE 7-14G was developed to provide organizational structure and personnel and equipment requirements. The MTOE was forwarded to each support command with instructions to organize provisionally.

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Formation of provisional units was taken as an intermediate step, prior to submission of MTOE to obtain LA approval for requisitioning authority of personnel and equipment. Support Commands were tasked to submit MTOE/MTDA action to provide trade-off spaces. Each company will be comprised of 5 officers and 155 enlisted men.

6. (U) Department of the Army/United States Army of the Pacific (USARPAC) approved the reorganization of the 12th Signal Company, Cam Ranh Bay. A TDA submitted in June 1969 was approved by USARPAC effective 2 February 1970.

7. (U) HQ, USAFV published new guidance for authorization documentation for Government Owned - Contractor Operated (GOCO) contract equipment requirements. Under previous policy a separate TDA for each GOCO contract was required. New policy directs that future GOCO equipment requirements will be documented by modification of the appropriate Support Command TDA.

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ANNEX C (U) ACOFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Military History Division

1. (U) Command Historical Conference. Realizing the need for continuity in the history program due to the rapid personnel turnover and the decentralized character of the program, the Military History Division devised, planned, and hosted a Command Historical Conference on 8-9 December 1969. Over 40 historians from the support commands, groups, and battalions throughout the command attended. All aspects of the command historical program were discussed to include preparation of Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, writing unit histories, maintaining journal files, as well as specific programs of historical significance within the Command such as BUNNY and retrograde. The conference, an event heretofore unique to 1st Logistical Command, was an effective tool in building a successful history program. It instilled an awareness of the operational and future benefits of an active and comprehensive historical program.

2. (U) Journal Improvement Program. In order to improve the quality of the daily staff journal and journal files in the headquarters staff sections, the Military History Division began a journal improvement program in early December. Each week the staff sections submit a sample of their daily journal. Through a written critique of the sample journal and individual guidance to staff section action officers, the quality of the journal content has remarkably improved. The historical value of the headquarters journals will be increased as a result of this program.

3. (U) Environmental Effects. By direction of the Commanding General, a historical reference file has been established to document adverse environmental effects upon 1st Logistical Command operations. Each support command submits a monthly report on incidents in which the weather hampered any logistical operation.

4. (U) POL Study. The Military History Division prepared a photographic survey of 1st Logistical Command's POL facilities throughout Vietnam. Utilizing both its own assets and those of the Information Office, the division developed a comprehensive briefing which describes modes of delivery, coordination with other services and commercial contractors, and POL locations throughout the country.

5. (U) Project TOCSA. Project TOCSA, the first test of containerized shipments of ammunition, provided the subject of a special historical study. Action officers who participated in the project were interviewed. Photographic coverage and document collection completed the study.

6. (U) The Senior Officer Exit Interview Program continued during the quarter. Interviews were obtained from COL Gleason, former CO of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and COL Worthen, former CO of the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam.

ANNEX C (U) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Logistics Review Division

1. (U) US Army Vietnam in a letter, AVHGD-PO, dated 3 January 1969, tasked Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command with conducting a comprehensive, documented, and analytical review of the US Army logistics system in Vietnam. The purpose of the study is to determine the effectiveness, identify the weaknesses, and develop recommended changes in doctrine, organization, systems and procedures. It will include the documentation of the evaluation of the Army logistic structure and system in Vietnam, identification of the shortfalls, and evaluation of "lessons learned".

2. (U) The proposed scope, concept of organization, and time phasing schedule were presented to Headquarters, US Army Vietnam on 15 February 1969 and approved by that headquarters on 3 March 1969. High level guidance for the project is provided by a Logistical Review Advisory Council composed of senior officers and commanders of all services in Vietnam. Supervision of the study effort itself is provided by a Logistical Review Board consisting of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, as chairman, and high ranking commanders and staff officers more directly concerned with the direction and supervision of Army logistical support in Vietnam. A small Logistics Review Working Group provides full-time supervision and coordination of the day to day work of the study and gives continuity to the effort.

3. (U) During the reporting period the Logistics Review Working Group (LRWG) ceased to be a special function operating under a Special Assistant to the Commanding General. It was reassigned to ACoFS, SP/O on 8 December 1969 and became the Logistics Review Division. Improvements were made to upgrade the quality of typing for the study; 4 electric typewriters have been provided and the Division was augmented by two additional typists. One of the two contract civilians assisting the Division in the preparation of the study returned to CONUS on 10 December 1969. Estimated completion date for the Logistics Review is 1 April 1970.

4. (U) Internal review, rewriting, and redrafting was performed on the annexes and sections during the period. Final drafts were submitted to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command and the Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam for review and approval. When approved, drafts were placed in final form on reproduction mats. At the close of the reporting period all 26 annexes and 7 of the 8 sections prepared by the staff had been submitted to the Logistics Review Division. Of the 26 annexes submitted to the Division, all have been sent to HQ, USARV for review. Headquarters, USARV has reviewed and approved 22 annexes, and disapproved one; three are in process of review. HQ, USARV has approved one section and disapproved two; three sections are in the USARV review process and two are in Logistics Review Division edit. Thirteen annexes have been typed on mats by the Logistics Review Division for production; two are still in process. This office coordinated with ACoFS, Procurement regarding reproduction of 70 pictures for the study. A quality check of the completed pictures is in progress.

ANNEX D ACoS, Supply

1. (U) Project Count Always

a. Purpose. Project Count Always is a cyclic inventory of all depot stocks every six months. The purpose of the project is to maintain the accuracy of the supply data base. Project Count Always succeeds Projects Count I and II. Project Count I was conducted during the period September 1968 through January 1969 and was the first wall to wall inventory of stocks ever conducted in a combat zone. Project Count II was a second wall to wall inventory and was conducted from February 1969 to August 1969.

b. Requirements. Project Count Always requires a continuous cyclic inventory effort by each depot with all stocks to be inventoried at least once every six months. The 1st Logistical Command Regulation and the portion of the 3SVN Standard Operating Procedures concerning inventories were rewritten for this project, and the computer programs were modified to conform to the new inventory requirements. The inventory requirements within the 1st Logistical Command are higher than those established by Department of the Army (DA) and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) in that:

(1) Army Regulation 780-76 requires a complete inventory of high dollar value and controlled items annually with inventory of other items annually either by complete inventory or by sampling inventory. As noted above, 1st Logistical Command requires a complete inventory every six months.

(2) USARPAC requires inventory using a single count method. 1st Logistical Command uses a double count method with the requirement that the two counts agree within 10% and \$100 before a count is accepted as valid.

(3) USARPAC requires inventory without freeze and uses exception cards to control documentation in float. 1st Logistical Command freezes stocks during inventory with only Red Ball and handcarry materiel release orders (MRO) being processed.

2. (U) Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C).

a. FY 71 Submissions. During the months of August and September the support commands submitted the following PR&C's to cover contractual services required in FY 71: Motor Vehicle Park at Cam Ranh Bay, Engineer Construction Material Yard (ECMY) and Care and Preservation Facility (C&P) at Cam Ranh Bay, ECMY and C&P at Long Binh, and C&P at Qui Nhon.

b. Closeouts. A decision was made to close the ECMY at Vung Tau before 31 October 1969. The mission was assumed by the Long Binh Depot and the Vung Tau ECMY has been closed. Also the ECMY at Cha Rang was closed on 31 December 1969 with the mission assumed by the depot.

c. Savings. Savings have been accomplished on FY 70 contracts to date. A concerted effort is being made to reduce present contracts and some reductions are scheduled for the remainder of FY 70. FY 71 PR&C's are significantly lower than FY 70 negotiated costs.

3. (U) Care and Preservation.

a. Instructions. Care and Preservation Bulletin No. 3-69 dated November 1969 has been published and distributed. It covers each of the various cleaning methods used to remove corrosion and delay or eliminate deterioration. The bulletin can be used as a guide by interested personnel for proper utilization of supplies and equipment. Also, instructions were distributed to all depots for the medical and agricultural treatment and processing of retrograde material. Specific procedures were outlined for the treatment of retrograde material leaving Vietnam.

b. Use of weather resistant boxes. The test project to determine the feasibility of using wood-created weather-resistant fiberboard boxes for a limited period of outside storage was temporarily halted. Two of the three test boxes were lost during C&P contractor changes. Instructions will be prepared for the new contractor to continue the test, as the remaining container indicates it can withstand environmental conditions. This packed box has been in outside storage since September 1969.

c. Pallet change. The proposed specification change for palletizing flat steel strapping for shipment, as prepared and forwarded to US Army Natick Lab through Army Material Command by 1st Logistical Command, was accepted for level B packing.

d. Packaging requirements on data film. It was determined that an operational need existed for each depot to have data film which provides packaging requirements by Federal Stock Number and will assist involved personnel in the preparation of supplies for shipment and storage. A 16mm microfilm file housed in Recordak cartridges was ordered.

4. (U) Holiday Meals. The traditional Thanksgiving and Christmas meals were served to all US and FVMAF. All troops were fed this menu commensurate with the tactical situation.

5. (U) Pineapples from Thailand. On 24 November 1969 a test shipment of fresh pineapple arrived via airlift from Thailand. Prior to this time this item was procured in Vietnam to meet the 28 day cyclic menu requirements. The test was conducted because of the poor quality and extremely high price of this item in RVN. The net savings to the Army was \$0.07 per pound. The test results were very favorable and a PR&C was submitted to the Procurement Agency, Thailand for the

remainder of FY 70.

6. (U) Conference at LCO-P. The Deputy Director of Food attended a conference held at the Logistics Control Office-Pacific (LCO-P) on 6-7 Nov 69 to discuss the subject of including subsistence in the LCO-P Logistics Intelligence Files (LIF). As a result of the meeting, it was determined that only nonperishable items could be included in the system at this time. Defense Personnel Support Center (D PSC) perishable commodity suppliers are not presently programmed to properly interface with LCO-P.

7. (U) Refrigerated Tonnage. Additional Sealand ships were placed into service thus increasing refrigerated tonnage lifted by this means and reducing the time interval between arrival of each ship. At the same time refrigerated hatch vessels were removed from service increasing the time interval between arrivals. These two moves required changes in perishable requisitioning procedures. Those items shipped via Sealand are computed in 8 day requirements and those by hatch in 12 day requirements.

8. (U) Revised menu. The revised 28 day cyclic menu was approved for full implementation effective 1 January 1970.

9. (U) Milk deliveries. Milk deliveries from Cam Ranh Bay to Tay Ninh, Vung Tau and Can Tho were discontinued and the mission assumed by Foremost Dairies in Saigon. This change was possible as a result of increased plant production by Foremost. This change released aircraft being used to fly milk daily from Cam Ranh and improved service to these areas in that Foremost is providing direct delivery to these points.

10. (U) Special menus. Special revised 28 day cyclic menus were approved for the Royal Thai Army and the Royal Australian Forces. The implementation dates for issues against these menus will be 15 February 1970. The menus were revised to meet special dietetic desires of these two services not available in the US Army 28 day menu.

11. (U) Directorate of Retrograde. A Directorate of Retrograde was formed within ACofS, Supply on 7 December 1969. Its mission is to exercise staff supervision over the retrograde of all 1st Logistical Command material from Vietnam and to develop the command retrograde program and the policy and procedures for its implementation. This excludes Closed Loop items, which are managed by the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV). Emphasis was placed on creating a centralized organization in each of the support commands to increase the outflow of retrograde material and to control and promote its proper shipment.

12. (U) Results of Keystone Cardinal. Keystone Cardinal operations

resulted in the turn-in to 1st Logistical Command of 26,455 PEMA items classified as Reportable Item Control Code 1 (RICC 1) and RICC 2. Of these, 8191 were reissued to Army units, 240 were issued to Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units, 7500 were retrograded, 9828 were returned to depot stock in Vietnam, 118 were shipped to property disposal, and 578 are awaiting disposition.

13. (U) Keystone Bluejay.

a. Accounting for PEMA items. A comprehensive review of the procedures used for processing, accounting and reporting PEMA items under Keystone Cardinal was made. Results of this review showed that additional emphasis was required to insure that all items were recovered and information was available for command level and ICCV review. A card system was developed which provides maximum data display and retention of information on all PEMA items. The procedures were developed, implemented, and tested in January 1970. Data on these cards will provide information as to when an item is received and disposition actually effected, who turned in the item and who received it, the total identification of the item including line item number, federal stock number and quantity, and information as to the processing location which received the item.

b. Accounting for secondary items. It was apparent following the Keystone Cardinal exercise that additional information was required on secondary items and post, camp and station property. The use of stock record cards at the processing location was considered impractical due to the quantity of work involved and the number of personnel required to support the volume of equipment. A system was developed which provides for summary accounting of items in bulk on a daily basis. For each federal stock number an accounting sheet is prepared that provides by condition code totals of items received and shipped on that date. Weekly, a report by FSN is submitted by each support command.

14. (U) Dollar values of retrograde materiel. Retrograde dollar values averaged over five million dollars per month during November, December, and January; however, there were appreciable differences in the number of lines and quantities shipped during each of these months. The following categories of equipment are included in the chart below: depot excess/station returns, reparable, ammo/ammo components, property disposal, and marine. Shipments varied for the following reasons:

a. Depot excess shipments were delayed during the months of December and January because excesses were offered to ARVN through MACV and also screened by Eighth U.S. Army.

b. A large amount of bulk items had already been shipped and excesses generated by SEE-MOVE team actions and by screening depot records against theater RO's have not produced the tonnages of previous months.

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RETROGRADE CARGO SHIPMENTS

<u>Month</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Lines</u>	<u>Dollar Value of Shipments</u>
30 Nov 69	39,817	14,806	\$5,295,600
31 Dec 69	27,544	5,038	\$5,861,400
22 Jan 70	19,503	3,310	\$5,037,000

15. (U) Retrograde performance versus goals. As indicated below, retrograde performance is compared with retrograde goals. The assignment of these goals is being restudied to find a more realistic method for determining what the goals should be. They will be based on the on-hand assets for shipment and the ability of the stock control system to direct shipment.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Depot Excess/ Station Returns</u>		<u>Reparables</u>		<u>Ammo/ Ammo Components</u>	
	<u>goal</u>	<u>shipped</u>	<u>goal</u>	<u>shipped</u>	<u>goal</u>	<u>shipped</u>
30 Nov 69	23,950	11,760	19,500	22,542	1,000	1,248
31 Dec 69	23,950	6,445	19,500	15,630	1,000	1,101
22 Jan 70	10,725	4,955	16,875	10,415	750	1,918

* all figures represent short tons

16. (U) Qui Nhon to Phu Cat pipeline. In November, the Qui Nhon to Phu Cat pipeline was filled with water and line haul of product by 5000 gallon tank trucks and rail tank cars was increased. Burial of a welded wrapped six inch pipeline to supply the Phu Cat Air Force base began on 31 December 1969 and is progressing at the rate of approximately one mile per week.

17. (U) Construction of POL discharge facilities at Vung Tau was completed during this period and a light loaded T-2 tanker was discharged for the first time 26 December 1969. The harbor is currently limited to a 26 foot draft which does not allow fully loaded T-2's to discharge. Additional tankers will be scheduled into Vung Tau to resupply the terminal as required.

18. (U) During this period, Petroleum Technical Assistance teams have been formed to provide an urgently needed capability for inspection of field petroleum quality control and aircraft refueling procedures. There is a team in each support command and their primary mission is to identify deficiencies and provide assistance.

19. (C) Enemy activity directed against pipelines. On 1 November 1969 the An Khe tank farm was penetrated by sappers and four 3000 barrels (bbl) tanks were destroyed. The destruction of these tanks and the high losses on the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline resulted in low stocks at the Pleiku terminal throughout the month of November. On 8 January 1970, the An Khe

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to Pleiku pipeline was ordered closed because of continued high losses. Twenty additional 5000 gallon tank trucks were put in service to line haul product to Pleiku. In addition, an MCA project for construction of four replacement 3000 bbl tanks was submitted and approved by MACV and a 10,000 bbl tank was constructed and placed in service. By the end of the period, Pleiku fuel levels approximated the established stockage objectives.


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ANNEX E (C) ACofS, Maintenance

1. (U) A high level state of readiness was maintained for combat vehicles, artillery weapons and selected tactical vehicles. This state of readiness was achieved through constant alertness to the trends reflected in the daily deadline reports, close coordination between supply and maintenance and the excellent response of the supply system.

105mm HOWITZER, TOWED, M101




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
NOR	.44	.83	.46	.35	.99	.25	.47					
NORS	0	0	0	.08	.62	.10	.33					
NORM	.44	.83	.46	.27	.37	.15	.14					

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
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105mm HOWITZER, TOWED, ,102



NOR	.71	.63	.76	.69	.75	1.43	1.05					
NORS	0	0	0	.25	.25	.43	.44					
NORM	.71	.63	.76	.44	.50	1.00	.61					

105mm HOWITZER, SP, M108




NOR	3.5	2.4	5.4	2.8	2.1	2.76	6.81					
NORS	0	0	0	0	0	.19	5.07					
NORM	3.5	2.4	5.4	2.8	2.1	2.57	1.74					


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155mm HOWITZER, TOWED, M114/123



155mm HOWITZER, SP, M109




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
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8 INCH HOWITZER, SP, M110



NOR	3.6	3.6	4.52	5.54	5.31	5.01	5.27					
NORS	0	0	.12	.74	1.23	1.93	2.95					
NORM	3.6	3.6	4.40	4.80	4.08	3.08	2.32					

175mm GUN, SP, M107




NOR	4.14	6.20	4.90	3.77	3.71	5.73	5.19					
NORS	.25	0	0	.57	.49	.51	.95					
NORM	4.19	6.20	4.90	3.20	3.22	5.22	4.24					

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
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M551



NOR	15	15	16	12	12	10	11					
NORS	0	4	4	5	5	6	5					
NORM	15	11	12	7	7	4	6					


TRACTOR, WHEELED



NOR	23	21	20	22	26	20	17					
NCRS	10	8	8	10	12	10	7					
NORM	13	13	12	12	14	10	10					


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TRACTOR, FULL TRACKED




NOR	18	16	15	19	15	11	12					
NORS	7	8	6	8	6	5	4					
NORM	11	9	9	11	9	6	8					

CRANE, TRUCK MOUNTED AND ROUGH TERRAIN, 20 TON




NOR	21	22	24	25	28	24	23					
NORS	10	11	12	13	14	11	11					
NORM	11	11	12	12	14	13	12					

ROUGH TERRAIN FORKLIFTS




NOR	14	17	17	18	20	16	13					
NORS	6	6	5	7	7	6	6					
NORM	8	11	12	11	13	10	7					

COMMERCIAL FORKLIFTS




NOR	23	24	17	17	11	9	9					
NORS	9	8	7	6	4	3	3					
NORM	14	16	10	11	7	6	6					

TRUCK, 2-1/2 TON




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
NOR	8	9	9	10	11	11	10					
NORS	4	4	3	4	4	5	5					
NORM	4	5	6	6	7	6	5					

TRUCK, 5 TON CARGO AND TRACTOR




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
NOR	9	9	9	10	10	10	10					
NORS	3	3	3	3	3	3	3					
NORM	6	6	6	7	7	7	7					

TRUCK, 5 TON DUMP




NOR	12	11	15	16	16	11	13					
NORS	5	5	6	8	7	6	5					
NORM	7	6	9	8	9	8	8					

RADIO SET, AN/VRC-12



NOR	7	9	8	8	8	9	8					
NORS	2	3	2	2	3	3	2					
NORM	5	6	6	6	5	6	6					

RADIO SET, AN/ORC-106



NOR	12	12	12	11	9	11	10					
NORS	4	5	4	3	3	3	3					
NORM	8	7	8	8	6	8	8					

2. (U) 175mm Autofrettaged Gun Tube M113E1 Special Test for Service Life

a. The M113 (Mono-bloc) gun tube was limited in its service life by metal fatigue resulting from high pressures experienced in some firing. A limited life of 400 EFC rounds (maximum of 300 some 3 rounds) necessitated frequent resupply operations and gun retubings. These resupply operations have been in support of fire bases located at the end of long and unsecured LOC's which involved extensive engineer effort and combat operations to keep them open. A gun tube with a greater EFC round life was needed to reduce the frequency of retubing.

b. To increase the fatigue life of the 175mm gun tube, the autofrettage or "pre-stressing" process is now utilized in manufacture of the M113E1 tube. The term "Autofrettage" refers to pre-stressing of the gun tube by applying hydraulic pressure to the rear one-third of the tube. This is the area which is subjected to firing pressures sufficiently high to induce fatigue cracks. After release of the hydraulic pressure, the outer portion of the tube wall exerts inward stresses which counteract stresses resulting from firing pressures. The M113E1 tube now has a life of 700 EFC rounds. To evaluate the possibility of extending the life of the autofrettaged tube to 1200 EFC rounds, a special test was established to investigate wear and fatigue properties of the new tube.

c. Based on firing rates and proximity to each other, nine fire bases were chosen to test the M113E1 gun tube. These nine fire bases are in the

II CTZ, near Pleiku, RVN.

d. The test began on 13 Jun 69 and was completed on 27 Dec 69. Throughout the test period, progress was monitored by two civilian teams; one from Watervliet Arsenal and the other from AMC Materials and Mechanics Research Center. These teams were responsible for monitoring and reporting wear rates and fatigue crack propagation. Twelve M113E1 tubes were tested and all were fired until wear limits were reached. There were no condemnations for fatigue cracks.

e. The autofrettaged process has improved the fatigue life such that tube wear is now of predominant concern. The maximum wear allowable, before tube condemnation, is 0.200 inch. Based on the results obtained from the service life test, the life expectancy of the M113E1, 175mm gun tube appears to be much longer than the present limit of 700 EFC rounds. The average life of the 12 tubes tested was 1287 EFC rounds when condemned, based on 0.200 inch of wear.

f. Firing Summary:

<u>Gun Tube No.</u>	<u>EFC W/O Jacket</u>	<u>Wear (Inches)</u>	<u>EFC Rounds</u>
*6042	101	.235	744
4132	0	.206	1255
*6036	266	.205	1033
6051	45	.209	1599
6097	2	.200	1228
6095	0	.198	1270
6041	38	.202	1317
6077	0	.206	1534
6096	0	.192	1330
6321	0	.211	1181
6332	0	.195	1159
4131	0	.203	1805

* Tube numbers 6042 and 6036 were condemned for having reached the maximum allowable wear limit even though the EFC rounds were significantly less than 1200. This is attributable to failure to use the M1 additive jacket on some 3 rounds. This problem was corrected after command emphasis was directed toward the importance of the M1 additive jacket in reducing tube wear. The wear rate per EFC round was greater with tube number 6042 than tube number 6036. This difference is attributed to an inoperative power rammer on the vehicle with tube 6042. Hand ramming does not seat the round as well as power ramming, and gas blow-by causes the greater wear rate.

3. (U) Marine Maintenance

a. Drydocking Capability - A 1900-ton floating dry dock was put into operation on 1 Nov 69 at the government-owned, contractor operated marine repair facility at Cam Ranh Bay. Replacing an obsolete and failing 400-ton capacity dry dock, the new facility provides the command with a capability to dry dock every class of US Army watercraft in Vietnam except the Beach Discharge Lighter. In addition to the increased lift capability, the 272 foot length of the dry dock permits simultaneous drydocking of two landing craft or barges. The dry dock was acquired on loan from the US Navy. It had been in use at the Navy Small Craft Repair Facility at Da Nang but was determined to be excess to the requirements of the facility. Another small floating dry dock with a 500-ton capacity continues in operation at the Cam Ranh Bay facility.

b. Expanded Shore Maintenance Capability - The capability of the marine maintenance facility at Cam Ranh Bay was further increased during this period with completion of the restoration of the retaining sea wall at the facility. In May of 1969, 150 feet of the steel piling sea wall gave way and collapsed into the bay precluding use of the eight drydocking pads (hardstands) positioned on the filled area behind the sea wall. It was not possible to lift watercraft over the collapsed sea wall to the drydocking pads. By the end of November, the entire seawall had been restored. In addition to the eight drydocking pads, three vessels can be tied along side the sea wall for wet berth repairs. The marine maintenance facility now has a capacity to simultaneously dry dock three vessels in floating dry docks, eight landing craft on shore drydocking pads and also a capability for wet berth repairs of six vessels at the sea wall and alongside the floating machine shop. At the end of January, the full capacity of the facility was in use.

b. (U) Material Handling Equipment (MHE)

During December, the daily Commercial MHE deadline dropped below 10%; however, the Rough Terrain (RT) MHE deadline remained above 15%. To offset and reduce the apparent upward trend in the RT MHE deadline rate, the Deputy Commanding General directed that a report be shown in the Commanding General's Morning LOCC on a daily basis. The first report was made on 18 Dec 69. Concurrently, the Commercial MHE report was reduced to a weekly report.

ANNEX F ALOCS Transportation

1. (U) General. During the reporting period the downward trend in tonnages handled and hauled was arrested somewhat by the preparations for TET. November-January port tonnages showed a slight up turn while highway tonnages hauled rose in December but fell in January. Highlights of the period include bringing 5 ton cargo truck units to their authorized fill of dropside trucks; the ARVNization of the M&M Piers at Saigon Port; and the initiation of project TOCSA, (Test of Containerized Shipments For Ammunition). TOCSA was scheduled for completion in January with a full report to be released in February.


2. (U) Port Operations.

a. Summary. During the reporting period the monsoon weather had an adverse effect on port operations in II CTZ (North). Qui Nhon lost a total of 105 ship days because of high tide and rain. Newport experienced silting problems at the deep draft piers and dredging is now taking place to correct the situation. During the month of December, Cat Lai set an all time record by discharging 62,985 STON. In an economical move, 30 contracted barges in Cat Lai - Cogido ammunition system were put off hire. Seasonal monsoon weather in the Vung Ro Bay area with its prevailing north-easterly winds caused berthing problems for some ships. A tug of sufficient horsepower to berth tankers at buoys and dry cargo ships at piers is required at Vung Ro during the monsoon.

b. Tonnages Handled. Tonnages handled by 1st Logistical Command ports during the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970 totaled 1,823,106 short tons of cargo. This figure includes military and Sea-Land tonnage, and USAID tonnages.

c. Average turnaround time. Vessel turnaround time for General cargo vessels was reduced from an average of 8.5 days last quarter to an average of 7.9 days this quarter. Ammo vessel turnaround increased from 17.1 last quarter to 27.7 this quarter. This increase was primarily due to the monsoon weather, which caused delays in discharging.

OPERATIONAL AT ALL PORTS



TOTAL	623	732	666	674	733	641	590	629	600	580	594	649
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3. (U) Highway Operations.


a. Performance.

(1) A total of 1,309,977 STON's of cargo was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units during the reporting period. Contractor vehicles hauled 698,185 STON's of cargo during this quarter. Port and beach clearance constituted 45.5% local haul 23.9%, and line haul 30.2% of the total amount of dry cargo transported by military units. Of total contractor tonnage, 50.4% was in port and beach clearance, 45.5% in local haul, and 4.1% in line haul.

(2) Average monthly highway performance during this period was:

- (a) 692,754.8 STON's.
- (b) 69,264.7 PAH.
- (c) 23,300,634.7 Gallons Per.

(3) Total performance for the last 12 months is as follows:



Commercial
Military

Line Haul

Local Haul

Port & Beach

b. Realignment of assets. There were no units redeployed or realigned during the past quarter.

c. Management Actions. During the past quarter, final action was taken on the disposition of non-standard 5-ton dropside cargo trucks. These dropside vehicles were procured by the ENSURE 175 program, which designated these 5 tons for exclusive allocation to transportation truck companies. The four support commands have now been brought to their desired fill. The remainder of 5 ton dropside cargo trucks in the depots have been released to be issued to other than transportation truck units.

4. (U) Railway Equipment.

a. Railway Equipment Status.

(1) Locomotives. During the past quarter, the Plymouth diesel hydraulic locomotives were used for limited switching service. Locomotive 1997 was in the Chi Hca repair shop for engine oil leaks and a

faulty transmission hose. These conditions have been corrected and the unit has been returned to service. Locomotive 1995, in need of piston repair and replacement of leaking gaskets, is presently in the Saigon shop for that purpose.

(2) Refrigeration Cars. The need for reefer cars increased during the past quarter with expanded rail service in the Qui Nhon area. Members of the ACoFS, Transportation Rail Branch flew to Qui Nhon with replacement parts and two reefer cars were returned to service, bringing the number of operational cars in that area to four. Two non-operational reefer cars are being sent to Saigon from Qui Nhon for repair. Two additional reefer cars are in the Saigon shops undergoing repair.

(3) Gondolas. Three gondolas were damaged during the month of November in an accident at the Ho Hai rail head. These cars are in the Saigon shop pending approval of the estimate for repairs.

(4) Flat Cars. Flat cars continue to be in demand throughout the command and are being efficiently utilized. Some improvements are being seen in their maintenance, and inspections by members of the Rail Branch continue.

b. Semi-annual Inventory. As a result of the semi-annual inventory, it was discovered that some repair parts were removed from stock by the Vietnamese National Rail System without notifying this office. The problem seemed to be one of communication. A bilingual form has been produced to facilitate parts requisitioning procedures.

c. Rail Transport. On 5 January 1970, this office sent a message to all support commands reminding them of their responsibility to offer rail suitable cargo to the local Traffic Management Agency (TMA) representatives for movement. The message also advised that consistent with established movement priorities and required delivery date (RDD), greater emphasis should be placed on the movement of compatible cargo by rail.

5. (U) Movements Management.

a. Sea-Land.

(1) The following is a summary of the number of containers and tonnage received in Vietnam during this period along with subsequent distribution to the three support commands. There was an average of 15.0 short tons loaded per inbound van during the period.

<u>TOTAL CONTAINER INPUT</u>	<u>AVERAGE PER SAILING</u>	<u>TOTAL SHORT TONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE STON PER SAILING</u>
5,934	396	95,220	6,348

DISTRIBUTION

<u>PORT</u>	<u>CONTAINERS</u>	<u>AVG PER SAILING</u>
SGN	3,263	363
CRB	1,249	125
QNH	1,422	102

(2) Project TOCSA. Project TOCSA (Test of Containerized Shipments of Ammunition) was conducted during January 1970 and will be reported in the next ORLL.

b. Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO). Vigorous efforts by this command, together with excellent cooperation from the 2nd Logistical Command RO/RO Liaison Officer, have eased the problem of excessive numbers of in-country RO/RO trailers. As of 31 December 1969 the 1st Logistical Command level of trailers declined to 458, which is 92 under the authorized level of 550. A study completed by this command determined that regular scheduling of RO/RO vessels is not possible at this time because of fluctuating tonnages offered from Okinawa to RVN ports. Use of RO/RO trailers for shipment of retrograde cargo to Okinawa has become increasingly important. A system was developed in conjunction with 2nd Logistical Command to offload empty trailers from Sattahip, Thailand at Qui Nhon (Sattahip generates little retrograde cargo). The trailers are then loaded with retrograde cargo at Qui Nhon and sent to Okinawa on the next ship. Command emphasis is continuing to be placed on the following management problem areas:

- (1) Retention of trailers in-country for longer than 90 days.
- (2) Damage and unauthorized immobilization of trailers.

c. CONEX Control Program. The CONEX Operating Levels for Essential Storage (COLES) Program has been frozen at the July 1969 level until units can reach that level. Although this program continues to recognize the need for stockpiling CONEX containers to support T-Day and such activities as KEYSTONE BLUEJAY. The shipping requirement for CONUS, especially for the Military Ocean Terminal Bay Area (MOTBA) and Okinawa have continued to increase. The repair contractors presently are exceeding their rated capability. In December, 945 containers were repaired compared to the monthly objective of 750. Even with the increase of repaired CONEX containers, the continued shipping of CONEX out of country will force the reduction of the stockage level to below

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the present standard of 8,000 containers. There are presently around 4,000 CONEX in-country. A one time CONEX serial number inventory will be conducted during the period 15-16 February 1970. The purpose of the inventory is to purify the records and remove from the CONEX inventory those CONEX no longer suited for their designed purposes.

d. MILVAN. The MILVAN containership service is slated to begin on or about 1 March 1970, using commercial containers. CONUS procurement problems, especially in the areas of equipment compatibility and container condition have hindered the development of Army-owned containers. Other problems areas encountered are non-receipt of accessorial equipment, repair parts and manuals and cancellation of construction of permanent staging areas in RVN. In order to provide a suitable base to stage the MILVAN containers, temporary staging areas have been completed at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. The 1st Logistical Command's MILVAN regulation remains in draft form awaiting the publication of the USARV regulation. The Transportation Newsletter dated 30 Sep 69 from the US Army Transportation School estimated the MILVAN program would encompass 6,000 containers and 2,600 chassis. Ten knocked down MILVAN chassis are being shipped to Cam Ranh Bay aboard the SS Seatrain Ohio with an ETA of 27 Feb 70. These will be used for training purposes.

e. Air. During the reporting period the command utilized six Special Assignment Airlift Missions for retrograde shipments, totaling 253,140 pounds.

f. Troop Movement. During the reporting period, no United States personnel arrived by ship at 1st Logistical Command ports. Eight thousand forty nine Republic of Korea (ROK) replacements arrived in RVN via the United States Ship Upshur.

g. Project Challenge. This program challenges the priorities and requirements for cargo offered for movement in-country. Of the 630,654 short tons (STON) offered for shipment during the reporting period 111,231 STON were challenged. Of this, 49,586 STON were downgraded in priority and 7,882 STON were stopped. The overall percentage of challenged offerings was 18 percent, which was less than the command-wide goal of 25 percent. However, this is primarily due to large amounts of cargo being challenged by the depots prior to being offered to transportation. The following is a summary of 11 shipments of STON that were offered, challenged, downgraded and stopped during the reporting period.

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	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
OFFERED	154,719	172,924	303,011	630,654
CHALLENGED	20,435	22,719	68,077	111,231
DOWNGRADED	7,540	13,743	28,303	49,586
STOPPED	2,216	3,612	2,054	7,882

h. Project MILSTAMP Handbook. The MILSTAMP handbook continues to be used with great success in RVN. Movements Control Centers are now insisting on adherence to proper MILSTAMP procedures and are using the handbook as a reference. There appears to be a shortage of the handbooks in the support commands even though they have been distributed through channels. A proposed change is being prepared by the ACoFS, Transportation incorporating the procedures for Serviceability/FSN/Nomenclature (T-6 entries) and other minor changes. Target date for the distribution of the change is 1 March 1970.

i. Cam Ranh Bay/Qui Nhon MILSTAMP Automatic Data Processing Project. This project, designed to curtail the use of air mailed cargo manifest in favor of transceived punched card manifests is established at Cam Ranh Bay and is firmly under way at Qui Nhon. Both Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay are now transceiving manifests from CONUS and WESTPAC ports and are utilizing UNIVAC 1005 computers to convert the punched cards to hard copy manifests and hatch tally sheets. Future programs envisioned are pre-printing of Transportation Control Movement Document's and automated cargo outturn reports. The target date for completion of the program at Qui Nhon is 1 March 1970.

6. (C) ARVNization of US Ports.

a. ARVNization activities continued during the reporting period. The local committees formed during the previous reporting period made progress in their efforts to train ARVN terminal units and to gradually phase out US operations.

b. The greatest progress was made in III and IV CT2. The ARVNization of the Binh Thuy port was nearly completed during the period. The draft agreement was submitted in October, 1969 and staffing was completed at the USARV level by December 1969, following the insertion of a special reimbursement clause. The clause provided for payment of an ARVN contractor in the event ARVN could not meet sudden surge requirements with military effort. By January 1970 a bilingual agreement was submitted by MACV to RVNAF JGS for a final check. Ratification is expected in February 1970. In the meantime, ARVN and US port units continue to operate their respective sides of the Binh Thuy port, pending approval of the agreement.

c. Vung Tau was offered to ARVN as a possible operating site. However,

60

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10**

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the only cargo that is consigned to Vung Tau for ARVN is Military Assistance Service Funded ammunition. Consequently ARVN did not need Vung Tau except as an ammunition transshipment point. In January 1970 ARVN indicated they would be interested in handling ARVN ammo at Vung Tau provided 5 electric forklifts and a battery charger were made available to them on a loan basis. USARV stated that this equipment would be made available and MACV was so informed.

d. ARVNization of Saigon Commercial Port made steady progress and by the end of the reporting period, the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (STTC) was operating at the MSM piers entirely on its own utilizing equipment on loan from the 4th Trans Command. The ARVNization effort at Saigon port was not without its problems. The STTC was not officially notified by RVNAF to begin negotiations with 4th Trans Comd until 15 Dec 69. USASUPCOM, SGN had, in the meantime, been directed by 1st Logistical Command to be out of Saigon port by 31 December 1969. On 15 December 1969, a meeting between 4th Transportation Command and Saigon Transportation Terminal Command started serious negotiations. By 24 Dec, ARVN was informed that they would be expected to begin handling ARVN cargo only and that they were expected to assume responsibility for the MSM piers by 1 Jan 70. STTC agreed to accept the mission. On 7 January 1970, a draft agreement was forwarded to USARV and MACV for coordination. On 29 January STTC and 4th Trans Comd agreed on procedures for turnover of buildings.

e. ARVNization of Saigon Commercial port would work only if US cargo could be manifested exclusively for Newport and ARVN and USAID cargo for Saigon port. Messages were sent by 1st Logistical Command to CONUS and PACOM ports, requesting that ARVN cargo be manifested for RCl (Saigon) and US military cargo be manifested for RGU (Newport). It was also requested that when it was necessary to use shipping agreement vessels for ARVN cargo, that US and ARVN cargo be block stowed and that shipments not be any smaller than 1,500 MTONS.

f. Some progress was made at the other ports. On 19 Jan 70, ARVN informed 1st Logistical Command port operators at Nha Trang that they were ready to enter into negotiations for complete takeover by 1 July 1970. In the meantime port operation of the shallow draft activity was working well. At Qui Nhon, 5th Trans Comd and the Qui Nhon Transportation Terminal Command have been working together to introduce QNHITC into port operations. The 5th Trans Comd provided civilian laborers to an ARVN type B terminal service company. As an example on 13 December, the QNHITC discharged an ARVN ship (Kaaphoora) in the stream. ARVN port operators have also been introduced to deep draft discharge at pierside. ARVN presently is discharging their ammo from barges at the Can Dock and clearing the cargo from the port. ARVN boat operators have been integrated into operations within Qui Nhon harbor.

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ANNEX G (C) ACoS, Ammunition

1. (C) Ammunition Activity

a. During the reporting period, total on hand serviceable stocks averaged 162,000 STON. This is compared with an average balance on hand of 225,000 STON during the same period a year ago. The average on hand at present is up 28,000 STON from the previous period as predicted in the last summary. The reason for the increase is the preparation for the expected enemy "TET Offensive". It is to be noted that the on hand stocks are still lower than the previous year due to the supply concept of "Inventory-in-Motion". With approximately 100,000 STON intransit in-theater at all times, visibility and asset knowledge of the pipeline enables this command to operate under this concept. It is estimated that the serviceable balance on hand for the next three months will be as follows:

February: 154,000 March: 149,000 April: 148,000

This estimate is based on estimated issues of 75,000 STON a month.

b. It has also been noted that, despite the drawdown in troop strength, ammunition issues have remained fairly constant. This trend can be seen in rise in issues in heavy artillery shown below and the significant reduction in brigade issues (issues to infantry units). Figures below do not include Inter Service Support issues.

Item	PREVIOUS PERIOD		RECENT 3 MONTHS		
	Tonnage Iss	% of Total	Tonnage Iss	% of Total	Trend
8 in & 175mm Arty	8,450	13	10,800	16	UP
155mm Arty	12,300	19	15,900	24	UP
105mm Arty	15,600	24	21,500	32	UP
2.75 Rocket	4,500	7.0	5,000	7.6	UP Slightly
Bde Roll-up	<u>24,150</u>	37	<u>13,000</u>	20.4	DOWN
Tonnage Totals	65,000		66,200		

Generally, as US troops are withdrawn, this loss in firepower has been offset by increased employment of artillery. This is evident in the trends of 105mm, 155mm, and 8 inch/175mm issues. Aircraft issues were up just slightly during the period while issues to infantry-type weapons showed a significant decrease.

2. (U) Surveillance Activities. Two more courses of instruction for Ammunition Technical Inspectors, MOS 55X, were presented during the period. A total of seven courses have now been given. It is also significant to note that two of the field units, 1st Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), both sent students. This program is a continuation of a program


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instituted by the ACofS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command, to train qualified enlisted surveillance inspectors in ammunition handling, identification, inspection, and maintenance techniques. Forty-nine students were graduated during the period, bringing the total number of personnel trained during the fiscal year to 142.

3. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities

a. During this fiscal year EOD incidents are shown graphically below. A comparison is made with fiscal year 69:



b. MTOE 9-5206 was submitted by the 5338 Ord Det (9040) to help alleviate the following problem areas:

(1) The vehicles presently authorized for EOD units/sections are not sufficient to adequately support this mission.


(2) Communications (AN/VRC-46 & AN/PRC-25) presently authorized for EOD units/sections do not have sufficient range to provide necessary communication within their units. Most units/sections maintain at least one on-site team and telephonic contact is not available; therefore, they may go days without communications contact.

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4. (C) Supply Activities

a. The chart below shows ammunition receipt and issue activity for FY 70.



b. Total issues for the period of 25 Oct 69 to 30 Jun 70 were 233,401 STON versus receipts of 288,096 STON. Total issues, receipts and serviceable balances on hand were as follows:

	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Balance On Hand</u>
November	103,535	82,373	147,289
December	96,605	74,693	163,974
January	87,956	76,320	175,221

Receipt and issue figures exclude unit turn-ins and losses and gains due to condition code changes. Therefore, ending balance on hand (EOH) is not the numerical sum of beginning BOH plus receipts minus issues.

c. Enemy action on 3 Jan 70 resulted in the loss of 3 STON at the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) valued at \$2,152.30. This brings the total theater losses for FY70 to 21.57 STON, valued at \$38,507.58.

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d. Retrograde:

(1) The Class V Retrograde Program was instituted at HQ, 1st Log Comd, to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. The program was divided into phases. Progress since the program was initiated is shown below:

	<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>STON Retrograded</u>
Phase I	1 Sep - 31 Dec 68	14,800	15,967
Phase II	1 Jan - 28 Feb 69	35,000	33,562
Phase III	1 Mar - 30 Jun 69	10,000	13,397
Phase IV	1 Jul - 31 Dec 69	6,655	10,566
	1 Jan - 31 Jan 70	1,000	2,083

(2) LC Reg 746-6, Marking, Packaging, and Shipment of Surplus Ammunition and Equipment, was published to establish policies for retrograding ammunition from RVN. The underlying goal is to rid the ASP's and depots of excess and unserviceable munitions. The regulation clearly defines and illustrates how retrograded ammunition is to be marked and packaged, and assigns the responsibilities for moving the retrograde. Once the ammunition has been retrograded, a report format is shown so that data can be accumulated as to the nature of munitions that have been actually retrograded.

5. (C) Ammunition Operations

a. One Class V installation was closed during the period.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>
Can Tho	IV CTZ	Closed	15 Dec 69

This supply location was closed due to the lack of sufficient customers resulting from the movement of tactical US forces out of IV CTZ and because it was a serious safety hazard due to its close proximity to the Can Tho airstrip.

b. The Central Munitions System - Vietnam (CMS-V) pilot system programs, ready since 26 Sep 69, were given a command implementation date of 25 Mar 70. The entire Availability Balance File (ABF) segment of the system is now awaiting testing. A majority of the Requisition Segment has been coded and is being assembled. Problems developed in implementing the pilot system due to two factors. The first was the lack of available computer time on the 360/50 due to the 3S Supply System. This has now been remedied. The second problem resulted from the lack of a means of securing classified disc packs and tapes at the Inventory Control Center - Vietnam (ICCV), and the fact that the machine

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was not cleared to run classified data. The clearance for running classified data has been granted and a security vault for classified storage is now in the construction phase at the ICCV.

c. Initial systems design was started on a means for automatically keeping lot locator records at the ASD's and thus generating input data for the CMS-V. The system, as designed, supplies daily lot status for the ammunition battalion and daily asset status for the support command so that it can manage the assets in the command more effectively. Managerial data as to tonnage, dollar value and unserviceable asset status becomes available in minutes. The system is designed to operate on the UNIVAC 1005.

d. Ammunition was shipped directly from CONUS in Sealand containers under PROJECT TOCSA (Test of Containerized Shipments of Ammunition). Some 226 vans of various DODIC's were received. Thirty-three vans were throughputed to Pleiku and An Khe. The overall results of this concept of containerized shipments showed that ammunition was received in the best condition ever as the rounds were not handled from the time they were loaded in the containers until the unloading of the containers. Extensive ease in unloading of the ammunition ships, the elimination of multiple handling of the munitions (2 - 8 times), the elimination of costs associated with processing this cargo in and out of depots by direct throughput to the ASP's, and a reduced danger in handling ammunition especially at pier side due to rapid evacuation of discharge and reduced hazard of exposure time, were some of the benefits derived from containerized ammunition.

e. The US Army assumed responsibility for primary ammunition retail supply in Northern I CTZ with the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division. The minor USMC elements remaining are supported from the 1st Log Comd ASP's with issues to USMC to be repaid in kind in Da Nang. As a result of the USMC withdrawal, Quang Tri ASP is managed entirely by the Army.

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ANNEX H (C) ACofS, Services

1. (U) Property Disposal Directorate.

a. Sales.

(1) Increase in Sales. During the past quarter, Vietnam Property Disposal operations established procedures for reduction of the command inventory. The initial step in this process was an almost 200% increase in the number of sales conducted during the quarter. Thirty-three (33) sales were conducted during this quarter as opposed to 13 sales conducted during the previous quarter. The effect of this increase in sales will be the reduction of on-hand inventory during the 1 February through 30 April quarter.

(2) Reporting Time. The acquisition cost of items sold was \$2,546,085. An 8.7% return was realized. In addition, 20.5 thousand short tons of scrap were sold bringing the total proceeds for the quarter to \$2,711,037.13. Emphasis has been placed on reporting usable property for sale in a shorter time frame. This has been partial cause for the increase in sales conducted. Reducing reporting time on usable property will reduce the inactive inventory, expedite sales, and ultimately reduce the command inventory.

b. Inventory Trends. The beginning inventory for the quarter was 61.8 thousand short tons. The ending inventory was 104.9 thousand short tons of which 42% was inactive inventory. Seventy-six point five percent (76.5%) of the total was scrap and the total dollar value of the usable inventory was \$41,550,001. Total property removed for the quarter was 28.7 thousand short tons of which 2.6 thousand short tons of total removals were transferred to the Military Assistance Program Excesses (MAPEX). Total MAPEX releases from Vietnam activities to date have reached 23.1 thousand short tons. Continuing emphasis will be maintained during the next quarter on the prompt reporting of property for sale. The quantity of property sold will again increase. Prior to the close of the February through April quarter this should be reflected as a decrease in the command inventory.

2. (U) General Services Division

a. Attachment of Insignia. AR's 700-84, 670-7 and 670-12 require that insignia and nametapes issued at government expense be attached without charge to the individual. Capability did not exist in-country, so contracts were negotiated for this service to be performed at each of the existing contract laundries in RVN.

b. Reorganization. The position General Services Officer, O3, MOS 4200, is now an approved position for ACofS, Services, General Services Division. This position was established to process Purchase Request and Commitment documents under the ACofS, Services auspices. He will also

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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provide policy guidance to the subordinate commands on the administration and management of contracts for which the ACOFS, Services has staff supervision.

c. Operation Compassion

(1) An Operation Compassion seminar was held on 20 January 1970 at the Tan Son Nhut Mortuary to discuss the program since its inception in November 1969. Twenty-five personnel were in attendance with representatives from the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), MACV, 7th Air Force, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force, USAFV Casualty, US Army Support Commands, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Saigon. During the seminar it was learned that the JPRC maintains a file on all personnel listed as missing. This information is catalogued according to name, unit, grid location and navigational location for cross referencing date of incident and type vehicle involved if applicable. Listings by corps area were given to all Operation Compassion personnel. This listing will facilitate identification of unknown remains recovered by having the computer search the files by geographical area from where remains are recovered and provide a listing of personnel lost in the area.

(2) There have been eight names removed from the missing in action roster since the onset of the program. Five remains were recovered and identified and three persons were released by the Viet Cong.

3. (C) Engineer Services Division.

a. (U) Pipeline Burial. The construction of welded and buried 6" pipelines from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat AFB and from Qui Nhon to the intersection of QL-1 and QL-19 was started in December by the contractor, RMK/BFJ. Steps have been taken to acquire a capability for repairing the line once it is finished by incorporating repair equipment and personnel in the quartermaster battalion which will run the pipeline. The 18th Engr Bde was also directed by USAFV to develop a capability to make those repairs which are an engineer responsibility. Quartermaster units responsible for operating the buried coupled pipelines in-country are sometimes hampered by the lack of organizational ditch digging equipment to use to make repairs. Appropriate equipment is available only from engineer units which also require it for road construction projects.

b. (U) Fort Repairs. Increased redeployment requirements necessitated expeditious construction of retrograde washing and storage facilities at Long Binh, Newport, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. Scheduled completion dates are 5 February for the Long Binh facilities and 21 March for those at Newport. Facilities at Qui Nhon were started in January with an expected completion date of May 1970. Temporary facilities are being constructed to handle retrograde vehicles until the permanent ones are completed. Facilities at Cam Ranh Bay were approved, but construction has not yet started.

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c. (U) Port Reports. Repairs to the seawall in the DeLong pier area at Cam Ranh Bay continued during this period. The section between piers 2 and 3 was completed, and work began on the section between piers 3 and 4. Another platoon from the 47th Eng Co is scheduled to move to Cam Ranh Bay from Qui Nhon where it completed construction of four dolphins at the Qui Nhon POL jetty. On the way to Cam Ranh Bay it will stop at Vung Ro Bay and realign the POL anchorage system and add one barge mooring.

d. (U) POL Storage. POL storage tanks continued to be a problem. Repairs on two tanks at Phan Thiet were finally completed, but one 500-barrel tank continues to leak. Fourteen (14) J1-4 storage tanks at Cam Ranh Bay, which were leaking due to corrosion holes in the bottoms, are being repaired by pouring concrete floors inside the tanks and sealing them with epoxy. It is anticipated that additional tanks in Vietnam will develop similar leaks unless steps are taken to clean and paint them with epoxy paint. Repair program is planned to alleviate this problem.

e. (U) An Khe POL Tanks. A 10,000-barrel POL tank was erected at An Khe and four 3,000-barrel tanks were approved for construction to replace those lost to a sapper attack in October 1969. Problems were encountered in erecting the large tank due to the deteriorated condition of gaskets which had been in storage for many years. Painting of the inside of the tanks with epoxy paint before they are put into use is being requested.

f. (U) Don Nai POL Jetty. The old POL jetty on the Dong Nai River near Long Binh was almost completely demolished during this quarter. This was caused by barge berthing action hitting the jetty. A project to build a new jetty has been approved, but construction delayed by design problems. A new jetty is under design with anticipated start in the next quarter.

g. (U) Railroad Construction. Very little progress was made on the Long Binh and Newport railroad spur. Delay of the GVN in negotiating land for the right of way at Newport has prevented construction of this spur. At Long Binh higher priority projects, such as the ammunition handling and upgrade and the marshalling and staging area, required the use of all available equipment for most of the period. Work on the Long Binh spur resumed in January.

h. (U) Cam Ranh Bay Ammunition Area. Work on the ammunition area continues despite erosion problems which have caused several water tank failures. Sand drifting into the pads has also caused some difficulties and anticipated maintenance problems.

i. (U) Cat Lai Anchorage. Work was started on realigning one of the two anchorages at Cat Lai and unition off-loading area.

j. (U) PMS/MS Facilities. OICC, in coordination with PMS, continued

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to plan the reduction of the contractor construction force in Vietnam. As the contractor's work force draws down, contractor installations and facilities become excess to his needs. Two such facilities, at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, were identified during this period. 1st Logistical Command identified those facilities as fulfilling the requirements of previous construction requests. As a result, seven projects were canceled, or reduced in scope, since RFA facilities will be used instead. The resulting savings is in excess of two million dollars.

k. (U) Tire Retread Facility. At present one tire retread facility exists in Vietnam, located at Da Nang and operated by Philco Ford under a lavy contract. Through a MIPR 22,000 tires will be provided to the Army through fiscal year 1970. This leaves a deficiency of approximately 250,000 tires. As a result, 1st Logistical Command initiated a contract with Wisdom Rubber Company, Honolulu, Hawaii to provide a tire retread facility in the Long Binh area. This contract has been approved at the cost of approximately \$200,000. A work request was submitted and approved by the Facilities Review Board on 20 January 1970 for the necessary alterations needed for an available building to accommodate this facility. The work requested provides necessary utility connections including sufficient electrical service for a 300 KW peak load; interior partitions for a buffing room; outside mechanical equipment room and air-conditioned rubber storage room; outside mechanical equipment shed with concrete pad for boilers and compressor; and latrine facilities. This work will cost an estimated \$23,000. When the tire retread facility is operational, it will be capable of producing 120,000 retread tires a year at an annual cost savings of \$4,500,000. The facility will be operated by the Vinnell Corporation.

l. (C) Dog Kennels. During the period, 1st Logistical Command gained 94 sentry dogs for physical security of installations in I and II Corps. Additional kennels were required for dogs at Quang Tri, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Long My, Vung Ro and Nha Trang. Construction requests are currently being processed.

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ANNEX I (U) ACOFS, PERSONNEL

1. (U) Noncommissioned Officer Logistics Program (NCOLP). Continuing emphasis is being placed on designation of NCOLP positions and on encouraging eligible noncommissioned officers to apply for entrance into the NCOLP. All commanders and staff officers have been directed to review key positions within their commands or staff sections to insure that all noncommissioned officer positions which meet the basic Department of the Army requirements are recommended for designation as NCOLP positions. This command has 260 NCOLP positions approved by the Department of the Army. There are presently 8 positions that have been forwarded for deletion due to the reduction within Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. The Adjutant General will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCOLP positions.

2. (U) Project Skills Training. The increasing role of local nationals in the work force of 1st Logistical Command created a special need for formal classroom training and on-the-job training. Under the Project Skills Programs surveys were conducted in each command to identify training needs. On-the-job training programs were developed for those skills not formally taught. Schools for interpreters were established to augment other training requirements. Through on-the-job training, training conducted by the Area Civilian Personnel Offices, and training conducted by the Central Training Institute, the skill level of the local national employees has been improved. In conjunction with the Central Training Institute, selected local national employees of this command with demonstrated managerial or supervisory potential participate in courses in personnel management, advanced English, and other advance job-related courses.

3. (U) Army Education Program. a. The command's General Education Development (GED) program was authorized in FY-67. During the first two years, it grew to nine Army Education Centers staffed by eleven DAC Education Services Officers. In the third quarter of FY-69, the physical facilities were enlarged with the erection of two to five portable classrooms at each center. These were purchased through nonappropriated funds. Classroom furniture, language laboratory equipment, and educational supplies were also purchased and distributed to each location.

b. FY-69 and FY-70 have seen cut-backs in the number of Education Centers and DAC positions. The center at Tuy Hoa was closed during FY-69 due to a reduction the number of troops served. The education facilities and DAC positions at Phu Bai and Quang Tri were transferred to USARV during the first quarter FY-70. Despite these reductions, the scope of the GED Program has shown substantial increases. During the first quarter of FY-70, the remaining six centers had a 23% growth over the fourth quarter of FY-69. The second quarter of FY-70 saw an additional expansion of 5%. (See charts, para d and e below)

c. Each Education Services Officer establishes goals for his Army Education Center consonant with the objectives set by higher headquarters and the provisions of AR 621-5. It has been found that instruction and educational services call for increased emphasis on certain areas peculiar to the 1st Logistical Command. Dependent upon availability of classroom space and equipment, each center offers as varied a program as possible to meet a wide spectrum of education requirements:

(1) A foreign language program. A capability in this regard is a distinct advantage for the military personnel assigned to Vietnam. Education Centers, equipped with language-instruction equipment, conduct a vigorous language program. A total of 365 officers and enlisted men were instructed in language courses during the second quarter of FY-70 with 122 completions. The enrollments show a slight increase over the first quarter; however, the completion rate is down considerably over the first quarter, which had 152.

(2) High School academic subjects generally available in civilian schools. These are offered during off-duty hours. The courses are designed to prepare personnel for completion of their high school requirements and for remedial work prior to taking the high school equivalency tests. A total of 566 students participated in this program during the second quarter of FY-70 with 529 completions. The enrollments show a decline from the first quarter, which had 634 students; but the completion rate jumped considerably from 419 students who completed their work in the first quarter. In addition, 451 enlisted men successfully passed the high school equivalency tests and received their high school certificates or diplomas during the second quarter, which is up from the 412 enlisted men in the first quarter.

(3) Courses in support of MOS-related programs. These courses have had a real impact on the increase in skills acquired by military personnel. A total of 1193 students participated in both classroom instruction and correspondence courses during the second quarter, which is up from the 952 shown for the first quarter. Of these, 304 completed their courses, which again shows an increase over the first quarter which had 256 completions.

(4) The college-resident course program. College-level courses are offered through the special overseas branch of the University of Maryland. The program is designed primarily to enable military personnel to complete their two-year college requirements or to work toward or even possibly finish a baccalaureate degree. A total of 599 officers and enlisted men enrolled in University of Maryland classes during the second quarter, up considerably from the 381 reported for the first quarter. No completions are shown for the second quarter, other than 198 who were enrolled in the first quarter and completed their work in the second quarter. Those enrolled in the second quarter will not finish their course work until the first part of the third quarter.

d. The following statistics give a comparison of activities between the first quarter and the second quarter of FY-70, by support command Education Centers:

<u>Education Centers</u>	<u>Correspondence Course * Enrollments</u>		<u>Group Study Enrollments</u>		<u>USAFI Tests Administered</u>		<u>University of Maryland Enrollments</u>	
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
	USASUPCOM-SGN Vung Tau	689	952	138	118	880	735	0
USASUPCOM-CRB Cam Ranh Bay Nha Trang	696 1247	710 1250	344 371	313 199	1454 1066	1457 1079	65 94	80 195
USASUPCOM-QNH Qui Nhon Pleiku	986 87	1221 136	176 17	263 31	1933 471	1817 900	0 0	40 0
USASUPCOM-DNG Da Nang	<u>656</u>	<u>801</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>722</u>	<u>497</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>234</u>
TOTAL	4361	5120	1373	1082	6526	6485	381	599

* Correspondence enrollments are for one year unless sooner completed by a USAFI test. Therefore, figures shown represent cumulative enrollments for four quarters less completions.

e. The following figures show the number of individuals who successfully achieved a higher education level:

	<u>Individuals</u>	
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
Completion of 8th Grade	141	91
Completion of High School.....	412	451
Completion of One Year of College.....	31	30
Completion of Two Years of College.....	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	589	572

4. (U) Safety: a. The accident rates for the 2d quarter of FY-70 increased slightly over the rates experienced for the 1st quarter. Comparisons of the Army motor vehicle and military disabling injury

rates for the two quarters are as follows:

(1) The Army motor vehicle accident rate for the 2d quarter of FY-70 is 8% above the 1st quarter of FY-70. The primary causes of Army motor vehicle accidents during the 2d quarter of FY-70 were unsafe acts of local national motorists and pedestrians, excessive speed, mechanical failure, and following too closely. The command's frequency rate of 7.9 accidents per million miles driven coincides with the expectancy rate of 7.9 established by Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam.

(2) The military disabling injury rate for the 2d quarter of FY-70 is 8% higher than the rate for the 1st quarter of FY-70. The primary injury cause for 2d quarter of FY-70 were unsafe operation of Army motor vehicles, falls, burns, and mishandling of individual weapons. The command's frequency rate of 37.2 accidents per million mandays, is 1.9 above the expectancy rate of 35.3 established by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam.

b. Significant actions taken by the command during the 2d quarter of FY-70 to reduce the frequency of accidents are listed below.

(1) Command emphasis was increased on the planning for accident prevention, designating competent and responsible persons to administer the safety program, safety training, safety promotion and education, establishing and enforcing standing operating procedures, and the prompt reporting of all accident situations and losses.

(2) Maximum effort was given to improve the efficiency of accident investigating and reporting. The adequacy and promptness of accident investigating and reporting were continuously stressed. Properly conducted investigations provide a basis for determining an estimate of the situation from which commanders can direct appropriate courses of action. Accident reporting conveys the accident picture through the command channels, thus permitting analysis, decision, preventive action, and feed back information.

(3) More command support was required to provide, through policy and regulation guidelines and pinpointing accident prevention, responsibility of command and staff.

(4) Using the chain of command for fixing responsibility for accidents was re-emphasized.

(5) Commanders were required to let their personal interest and influence in the accident prevention effort be felt by their junior officers and non-commissioned officer. This interest and influence will filter down to the lowest operational level where the accidents occur and the only place they can be prevented.

(6) Commanders were required to frequently review their accident prevention programs, with primary attention being given to a before the fact review of what is being done to prevent accidents.

(7) Accident prevention was made a subject matter at all commanders' conferences.

(8) Frequent follow-ups were required to insure compliance with accident prevention directives at the operational level. Every directive issued was required to be accompanied by a positive provision for follow-up to insure enforcement.

(9) All encompassing accident prevention programs were established within each subordinate command to meet the needs of the respective command. The programs were implemented to where the individual truck driver, fork lift operator, stevedore, ammunition handler, etc., knew he was working with the thought in mind of preventing an accident.

(10) Commanders and staff were made fully cognizant of the fact that to obtain maximum effectiveness, accident prevention depends first and foremost on command leadership. Forceful leadership and strict enforcement of safety rules and regulations will prevent accidents. It was strongly pointed out that a properly informed, properly supervised military member or civilian employee is rarely instrumental in causing an accident.

5. (U) Civil Military Operations: a. The civil-military operations activities of 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to rebuild the nation. Civil-military operations activities are conducted to support the GVN pacification campaign, to support RVNAF unit capabilities, to conduct civic action, to improve relations between US units and adjacent civilian communities, and to facilitate tactical operations. The 1st Logistical Command's civil-military operations activities cover all of these areas, however several special civic action and community relation type programs have been initiated.

b. The two major civil affairs activities in which this command is engaged are civic action and community relations. They are defined as:

(1) Civic Action: The use of military personnel and resources to support projects which are useful to the local population, and which contribute to the economic and social development of the country and in addition to serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

(a) The objectives of civic action are:

(1) Develop popular support for the GVN.

(2) Develop spirit of cooperation among the Vietnamese.

(3) Improve the living conditions of the people.

(b) During the reporting period, 25 civic action projects were started within the command, 26 were completed, and 42 projects continued.

(2) Community Relations: To develop activities which serve to enhance mutual understanding and encourage cooperation between the US Army personnel the people of the Republic of Vietnam and other members of the FVMAF.

(a) The objectives of Community Relations are:

(1) Lessen the impact of US presence.

(2) Correct or prevent situations which alienate the people.

(3) Develop a spirit of good will towards the US military forces.

(b) During the reporting period, 27 community relations projects were started within the command, 24 were completed, and 35 projects continued.

c. The Animal Husbandry Program is being supported by donating condemned foodstuffs and edible garbage to the Vietnamese for use in animal raising. The foodstuffs, which have been declared unfit for human consumption, but fit for animal consumption are donated to the ARVN military farms, small scale farmers, farm cooperatives and private institutions for their use in raising animals. The objectives of this program are to assist the Vietnamese in the raising of animals that will supplement their diets, help them achieve additional income and allow them to become self-sufficient. The donation of foodstuffs also provides a useful outlet for foodstuffs condemned at the ports and generated in mess halls, thus reducing the disposal costs. Monthly, an average of 800,000 lbs of edible garbage is donated by the 1st Logistical Command mess halls.

d. The MEDCAP Program (Medical Civic Action) is one of the most useful and effective programs conducted by military forces in Vietnam. MEDCAP has two related goals.

(1) To establish a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation among and between the civilian population, Government of Vietnam (GVN), civilian officials, and the RVNAF.

(2) To support Revolutionary Development by improving the health environment of RVN civilians through the commitment of military medical resources to the extent permitted by operational requirements. This commitment may be an adjunct of, or in addition to, military operations. 1st Logistical Command units provide transportation, equipment, etc. and

coordinate with local GVN officials, dispensaries, and hospitals, who provide medical personnel and medical supplies, and the military police who provide security. The MEDCAP teams then move into an area and treat the people. During the reporting period a total of 11,000 patients were treated throughout the command.

a. Following the lines of Vietnamization, the Government of Vietnam has initiated the Village Self-development Program, whereby the GVN gives financial support to each village to conduct self help programs. 1st Logistical Command units must coordinate with and receive approval from MACV and GVN officials before initiating projects, US units will assist with equipment, supplies and funds but the people will do the work. In conjunction with the redeployment of US units, the level of civil affairs activities is also being scaled down. The US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund for 1st Logistical Command, which was 900,000 \$VN per month, has been cut by 70% for the first quarter CY70. The fund will be further cut by 80% for the second quarter CY-70 and by 90% for the third and fourth quarters CY-70. This will drastically reduce expenditures and minimize projects to the short term high impact category.

f. The command civil-military statistics for the period are as follows:

(1) Total number of man-days (10 hrs days) personnel of this command devoted to civic action activities: 7,544.

(2) Cost of civic action projects:

(a) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 55,455,133 \$VN.

(b) Expenditures from the US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 644,660\$VN

(3) Voluntary Contributions:

(a) Collections: 2,172,491 \$VN.

(b) Expenditures in support of civic actions: 2,170,784 \$VN

(4) Percent of US Military civic actions activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Other FWMAF	15	73	3	0
RVNAF	34	23	23	10
US Civilian Voluntary Agencies	10	3	5	22

(5) Average percent of self-help contributed by the people:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CBP</u>	<u>QMR</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Self-help labor	92	53	80	73
Materials furnished	10	17	10	7

(6) Major civic action programs:

	<u>MAN-DAYS</u>	<u>\$VN</u>
Economic	1,641	1,115,260
Education	798	945,863
Social Welfare	2,843	50,162,082
Transportation	1,127	459,060
Refugee Assistance Support	<u>1,263</u>	<u>1,335,180</u>
TOTAL	7,672	54,017,445\$VN

(7) Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

- (a) Schools 111
- (b) Hospitals/Dispensaries 44
- (c) Orphanages 73
- (d) Scouting Organizations 6
- (e) Refugee Centers 6
- (8) Educational efforts:
 - (a) Classes:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF CLASSES</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
English	48	1313

(b) Training:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
Nurses Aide	57

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
Machine Operators	2
Husbandry	8
Mechanics	42
Typing	10

(9) Commodities distributed:

(a) Building Materials:

- (1) Cement 558,481 lbs
- (2) Tin Sheets 1,367 ea
- (3) Lumber 714,054 bd ft
- (4) Paint 376 gal
- (5) Firewood 85,500 lbs
- (6) Bricks 32,600 ea
- (7) Sand 70 m³
- (8) Nails 3,010 lbs
- (9) Ribar 22,500 ft

(b) Kits distributed (Health, school, refugee) 2,018

(c) Food 138,938 lbs

(d) Clothing 8,800 lbs

(e) Agricultural tools 10 ea

(f) Potable Water 50,000 gal

(10) Summary of civic action projects:


(a) Construction projects completed during the reporting period:
(Joint projects are marked with a J next to the number)

	<u>BUILT</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>
(1) Dwellings	18	121 - 6J
(2) Roads	2	8 - 1J
(3) Churches	3 - 1J	5 - 3J
(4) Hospitals	0 - 1J	11 - 1J
(5) Dispensaries	3 - 2J	9 - 3J
(6) Schools	7 - 11J	12 - 31J
(7) Bridges	2	3
(8) Well and purification system	1	0
(9) Village Headquarters	1	0


ANNEX J (U) ACoS, Procurement

1. (U) Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&Cs) Received. PR&Cs for Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 received during the current reporting period, ending on 25 January 1970, numbered 382 and were valued at \$16.6 million. By 25 January 1970, the total number of PR&Cs received for FY 1970 numbered 1174 with a value of \$288.2 million. The following charts show PR&Cs received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart # 1), and dollar value of PR&Cs received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart # 2). Thirty-seven FY 1971 PR&Cs valued at \$219.1 million have been received for procurement during FY 1971.

NUMBER PR&Cs RECEIVED, FY 68, 69 & 70



VALUE OF PR&Cs RECEIVED, FY 68, 69 & 70



2. (U) Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&Cs) Distribution.

a. The 382 FY 1970 PR&Cs valued at \$16.6 million received during this reporting period were distributed by the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) as follows:


(1) For the purchase of cement, lumber, fruits and vegetables, asphalt and other small supplies, 16 PR&Cs valued at \$11.0 million were forwarded to other MACV/PAC agencies.

(2) For the purchase of small dollar value supply type items, 67 PR&Cs valued at \$141,000 were forwarded to the United States.

(3) To satisfy the requirements concerning repairs and utilities, stevedoring, trucking and maintenance services, 299 PR&Cs valued at \$5.5 million were retained by USAPAV.

b. Chart # 3 shows the PR&C distribution for FY 1970.

DISTRIBUTION OF FY-70 PR&Cs



3. (U) Distribution of Requirements. The value of FY 1970 requirements received is \$288.2 million and is distributed as follows:

a. Repairs and Utilities	\$126.3 million
b. Transportation	\$ 67.2 million
c. Supplies	\$ 25.8 million
d. Subsistence	\$ 28.3 million
e. Maintenance	\$ 14.0 million
f. Services	\$ 26.6 million


4. (U) Contracts Under Administration.

a. Total contracts presently under administration number 296 with a value of \$853.9 million.

b. Of the 296 contracts presently under administration, 140 valued at \$310.9 million are classified as active, with the remaining 156 valued at \$543.0 million considered inactive. Inactive contracts are those on which the contractor has completed performance, but the contract has not been closed out because of some pending administrative action, such as payment of final invoices, negotiation of final overhead, or settlement of disputes.

c. Those active contracts presently under administration consist of six types: Firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-award-fee, and time-and-material. Net active firm-fixed-price contracts under administration total 49 this reporting period and are valued at \$10.0 million, while net active fixed-price-indefinite-quantity contracts total 80 and are valued at \$109.3 million. The number of active cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts totals six with a value of \$43.8 million. One cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract valued at \$9.4 million is for operation and maintenance of electric power generating facilities. One cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract valued at \$101.0 million is for repairs and utilities service in Vietnam. Three time-and-material (T&M) contracts valued at \$37.4 million are for aircraft maintenance in Vietnam. Active contract administration activity is shown graphically in Chart # 4.

ACTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION



TYPE OF CONTRACT	JUL 69		AUG 69		SEP 69		OCT 69		NOV 69		DEC 69		JAN 70		FEB 70		MAR 70		APR 70		MAY 70		JUN 70	
	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$	No.	MIL \$
FFP	62	11.4	56	11.8	48	10.3	53	10.7	51	10.7	45	9.0	48	10.0										
FPIQ	77	103.6	83	139.0	92	139.9	76	38.1	70	126.1	73	104.9	80	109.3										
CPAF	1	100.8	1	100.8	1	100.8	1	100.8	1	101.1	1	10.0	1	101.0										
CPFF	8	90.3	7	61.0	7	61.0	7	61.2	7	63.1	10	87.9	6	63.8										
CPIF	1	7.0	1	6.7	1	6.7	1	6.7	1	6.7	1	6.7	1	9.4										
T&MAT																								
TOTAL	149	313.1	148	319.3	139	348.9	140	318.0	138	328.7	138	312.3	140	310.8										

d. FY 1970 purchase orders total 162 and are valued at \$186,642. FY 1970 delivery orders total 150 and have been processed for a value of \$456,455. Current FY 1970 blanket purchase agreements total 165 with FY 1970 expenditures totaling \$4.7 million.

5. (b) Decommittments. Decommittments during the reporting period total \$6.9 million, bringing FY 1970 totals to \$24.9 million.

6. (U) Procurement Operations, Subsistence Division. This division has acquired the services of a staff veterinarian to review inspection techniques and to provide more objective methods for grading subsistence and will also provide liaison between USAFAV and the inspection facilities.

7. (U) Transfer of Procurement Responsibility for Contractual Aviation Support in Vietnam for FY 1971. Draft of procurement package for FY 1971 from the 34th General Support Group was received, reviewed and returned for dispatch to USARPAC for approval of the maintenance requirement. Pending receipt of firm procurement directive in early February, it is planned to release the solicitation in late February with a closing date of mid-March, which should result in execution of contracts by 21 May 1970.

8. (U) Control of Government Furnished Property (GFP) in Possession of Contractors. Through continuous effort by both Property Administrators and Contractors, a significant increase in the effectiveness of contractor control of GFP has been realized. This increase in effectiveness is attributed primarily to the transition from property administration under army regulations to property administration under ASPA requirements. Property administration under army regulations is extremely difficult as contractors are subjected to directions from activities other than the Property Administrator or Contracting Officer, which results, in many instances, in conflicting information and requirements. Continual emphasis is placed on bringing the property control systems of contractors completely under ASPA requirements and applying AK criteria only where required.

9. (U) Property Administration Management Improvements. Resolution of the difficulties and problems encountered in administering the property provisions of contracts in Vietnam requires quick response, adequate planning, and tight but realistic controls. Improvements implemented to date have increased the ability of the Property Administrators to meet this requirement. Actions taken include: (1) quarterly reports by Property Administrators showing status of the contractor's property control system, status of the Property Administrator's surveillance efforts, financial management data, summary of improvements realized/recommended, and summary of contractor and contract data; and (2) development of CY 1970 surveillance schedules. Actions planned for CY 1970 include but are not limited to: (1) complete revision of the surveillance check list to conform to ASPA; (2) closer coordination with Contracting Officers; (3) assignment of Property Administrators to procurement actions from inception to contract award and subsequent administration and completion; (4) periodic meetings to discuss actions, objectives and results; and (5) surveillance from contractor management to the field rather than from the field to management so that the "cause" rather than the "result" will be corrected.

10. (U) Directorate of Quality and Facilities. The revised Quality Assurance (QA) Surveillance Program put into effect at the beginning of FY 1970 has resulted in significant improvements in the overall quality of supplies and services procured by USAPAV, elimination of many problem areas, and a better understanding of contract requirements by the contractors. As of 4 February 1970, 375 surveillance inspections and 199 pre-award facilities surveys have been performed by Directorate personnel. In addition to improved quality, these inspections have also resulted in a number of contract terminations. Additional QA Surveillance Check Lists have been developed, reproduced and disseminated for use. Progress continues to be made in the purification of the source list files. Inactive files are being eliminated, and recently established procedures preclude the placement of unqualified offerors on the source lists.

Annex K (U) Adjutant General

1. (U) Reenlistment goals established by Department of the Army were exceeded during November and December 1969 and January 1970. A statistical resume of reenlistment achievement is at Inclosure 2.

2. (U) During the quarter, 23,644 electrical messages were processed; 307 general orders, 92 special orders, and 870 letter orders were published. Reproduction jobs totaled 2,242, aggregating 4,922,519 impressions.

3. (U) Postal Activities.

a. Relocation of Units: (1) On 1 Nov 69, the 41st Army Postal Unit (APU), Can Tho, and the 570th APU, Tung Tau, "changed flags". Mailing Address Only (MAO) APO's 96357 and 96359 remained as units of the 570th APU and thus their serving APO was changed from 96221 to 96215. This "changing of flags" was accomplished because the 570th APU was not supporting its TOE capacity and the 41st APU in Can Tho was operating above its rated capability.

(2) On 23 November 1969, the 45th APU, APO 96317, became operational in Phan Thiet with an MAO at Bao Loc, APO 96493. This was accomplished in order to ease the workload of the 39th BPO, whose personnel resources had been previously overextended as a result of operating in three widely separated geographical locations in addition to its main location at Cam Ranh Bay. The 45th APU was formerly assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade, which has its own organic postal capabilities, and was reassigned to the 1st Logistical Command by US Army Vietnam.

b. Seventeen technical inspections of 1st Logistical Command postal activities were conducted to determine whether operations were being conducted in accordance with pertinent postal laws, regulations, and directives. Inspections listed at Inclosure 3. In addition to conducting the inspections mentioned above, personnel from the AG Postal Division assisted the inspection team from US Army Vietnam in conducting three annual inspections and one reinspection of 1st Logistical Command units during the reporting period.

c. A monthly 1st Logistical Command Postal Bulletin was initiated on 9 December 1969. It will be used to disseminate postal information and to inform units of changes in operating procedures pending revision of applicable regulations.

4. (U) A total of 20,919 enlisted promotions were received by the command, of which 13,279 were used. Statistical data is at Inclosure 4.

5. (U) Command strength increased during the reporting period by .2 percent over the previous quarter. A total of 553 authorized spaces were lost. Inclosure 5 reflects the command strength posture during the period. Personnel gains exceeded losses during the period by 1639. A summary of gains and losses during the period is at Inclosure 6.

6. (U) A total of 5,212 awards were approved during the period (see Inclosure 7).

7. (U) Two members of the command were killed by hostile action and 39 died as a result of non-hostile action. There were 44 injuries due to hostile action and 102 non-hostile injuries incurred during the reporting period. A summary of casualty data is at Inclosure 8.

8. (U) The command received 474 in-country Rest and Recuperation (RAR) allocations during the period, utilizing 440 of them. Out-of-Country RAR allocations totaled 7,632 with 7,252 utilized (see Inclosure 9).

ANNEX L (U) Inspector General

1. (U) Inspector General assistance was extended to 485 members of the command. Approximately 65% of the complaints and requests for assistance received concerned assignment, reassignment and transfers; unit administration; and promotion/demotions. Of the 120 complaints processed, 45 were justified. There were 72 Annual General Inspections conducted. Two units were rated Unsatisfactory. Security, Administration, Maintenance and Training continue to be major areas of interest.

2. (U) Annual General Inspections. Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND

US Army Support Command, Da Nang, HQ & HQ Detachment	12-14 Nov 69
US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, HQ & HQ Detachment	1-3 Dec 69
593d General Support Group, HQ & HQ Company	10-12 Dec 69
US Army Support Command, Saigon, HQ & HQ Detachment	18-20 Dec 69
26th General Support Group, HQ & HQ Detachment	6-7 Jan 70
8th Transportation Group, HQ & HQ Detachment	20-21 Jan 70

IG, USASUPCOM, SGN

576th Ordnance Company	3-4 Nov 69
624th Supply & Service Company (reinspection)	6-7 Nov 69
51st Maintenance Company	10-11 Nov 69
574th Supply & Service Company	12-13 Nov 69
HHC, 91st Composite Service Battalion	14 Nov 69
120th Transportation Company	15-16 Nov 69
147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	20-21 Nov 69
Troop Command, USASUPCOM, SGN	26 Nov 69
229th Supply and Service Company	3-4 Dec 69
446th Transportation Company	8-9 Dec 69
Co E, Troop Command, USADLB	11-12 Dec 69
632nd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	22-23 Dec 69
223rd Supply and Service Company	5-6 Jan 70
526th Maintenance Company	7-8 Jan 70
Saigon Logistical Support Activity	9 Jan 70
HHD, 7th Transportation Bn	15-16 Jan 70
94th Maintenance Company	19 Jan 70
148th Ordnance Company	26-27 Jan 70

IG, USASUPCOM, CRB

HHD, 10th Transportation Battalion	10 Nov 69
97th Transportation Company	11 Nov 69

155th Transportation Company	12 Nov 69
870th Transportation Company	13 Nov 69
21st Supply and Service Company (Reinspection)	19 Nov 69
59th Field Service Company (Reinspection)	20 Nov 69
191st Ordnance Battalion	5-13 Dec 69
Security Guard Company	5 Dec 69
HHD, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay	8 Dec 69
33d Ordnance Company	9 Dec 69
46th Ordnance Company	10 Dec 69
174th Ordnance Detachment	11 Dec 69
606th Ordnance Company	12 Dec 69
611th Ordnance Company	13 Dec 69
360th Transportation Company	2 Jan 70
Bao Loc LSA	14 Jan 70
HHD, 262d QM Bn	26 Jan 70
136th Light Maintenance Company	29 Jan 70

IG, USASUPCOM, DNG

585th Transportation Company	3 Nov 69
805th Transportation Company	4 Nov 69
HHC, 34th Supply and Service Battalion	20 Nov 69
HHC, 39th Transportation Battalion	24 Nov 69
Quarterly Complaint Session	23 Nov 69
571st Ordnance Company	25 Nov 69
287th EOD Detachment	26 Nov 69
596th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	2 Dec 69
29th Civil Affairs Company	8 Dec 69
Quarterly Complaint Session	14 Dec 69
625th Supply and Service Company	15 Dec 69
85th Maintenance Company	12 Jan 70
Quarterly Complaint Session	18 Jan 70
226th Supply and Service Company	19 Jan 70

IG, USASUPCOM, JNH

FSA 593-1	
13th Finance Section	6 Nov 69
98th Light Equipment Company	7 Nov 69
554th Light Equipment Company	19 Nov 69
527th Personnel Services Company	20 Nov 69
2d Transportation Company	4 Dec 69
160th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	5 Dec 69
597th Transportation Company	7 Jan 70
552d Maintenance Company	9 Jan 70
630th Ordnance Company	15 Jan 70

359th Transportation Company
64th Transportation Company

27 Jan 70
28 Jan 70

3. (U) Complaints and Requests for Assistance

The following is a summary of complaints and requests for assistance received by Inspectors General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMPLAINTS</u>		<u>REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
	<u>JUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIABLE</u>	
HQ, 1st Logistical Command	0.2	0.0	3.4
USASUPCOM, CRB	0.7	0.6	5.0
USASUPCOM, DNG	0.2	0.5	2.3
USASUPCOM, QNH	0.4	0.6	2.3
USASUPCOM, SGN	0.3	0.7	1.8
Command Wide	0.3	0.6	2.7

ANNEX M (U) Staff Judge Advocate

1. (U) There were 241 personal property claims of U.S. military and civilian personnel, totaling \$57,971.17, processed and paid through the Judge Advocate offices of this command during the past quarter. This was an increase of 85 claims and \$24,317.34 from the preceding quarter. In addition, Judge Advocates throughout the command handled 6,134 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and legal instruments. This was an increase of 648 cases over those reported for the preceding quarter.

2. (U) a. Court-martial rates per thousand changed as follows from the previous quarter: Summary courts-martial rate decreased from 1.03 to .21; special courts-martial rate remained fairly constant at 1.43; and general courts-martial rate also remained fairly constant at .11. Article 15 rate increased from 25.64 to 30.14. The significant decrease in the summary courts-martial rate is attributed to command emphasis at all levels and represents compliance with USARV policy to try by summary courts-martial only those individuals refusing punishment by Article 15.

b. The number of 1st Logistical Command personnel in confinement increased slightly from the end of last quarter to the end of the previous quarter, from 37 in confinement on 29 October 1969 to 39 in confinement on 31 January 1970.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by 1st Logistical Command commanders during the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970.

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	7	10	9	26
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON	604	581	544	1729
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY	197	164	197	558
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON	356	437	402	1195
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DA NANG	<u>182</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>185</u>	<u>555</u>
Totals	1346	1380	1337	4063

4. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown for the past quarter of cases tried by courts-martial based upon the organizations to which the accused were assigned:

a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	0	0	0	0
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON	2	0	1	3
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY	1	1	0	2
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON	5	3	2	10
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	8	5	3	16
b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	0	0	0	0
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON	39	34	30	103
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY	10	19	5	34
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON	0	3	1	4
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DA NANG	<u>26</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>52</u>
Totals	75	72	46	193

c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	0	0	0	0
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON	7	7	3	17
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY	1	2	0	3
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON	3	4	2	9
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	11	13	5	29

5. (U) Courts-Martial and Article 15 rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for comparative purposes as follows:

	<u>1st Log Comd</u> (Present qtr)	<u>USARV</u> (2nd qtr, FY 70)	<u>Army Wide</u> (1st qtr, FY 70)
General Courts-Martial	.11	.09	.14
Special Courts-Martial	1.43	1.2	2.54
Summary Courts-Martial	.21	.20	.73
Article 15 Punishment	30.14	14.8	17.07

6. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed, or damaged incident to service under the provisions of AR 27-20 and related regulations:

	<u>Number Paid</u>	<u>Amount Paid</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	20	\$11,296.48
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON	18	3,135.42
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY	77	13,052.35

U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON	79	23,848.49
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DA NANG	<u>47</u>	<u>6,638.49</u>
Totals	241	\$57,971.17

7. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled by Judge Advocates within this command during the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970.

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and Change of Name	58	16	74
Citizenship, Immigration & Passport	175	27	202
Civil Rights	34	1	35
Domestic Relations and Paternity	636	165	801
Non- Support	122	48	170
Personal Finances & Debts	402	237	639
Personal Property, Auto, Etc.	227	80	307
Powers of Attorney	624	719	1,343
Real Property, Sales, Lease, Etc.	156	39	195
Taxation	<u>118</u>	35	153
Torts	36	18	54
Wills and Estates	175	192	367
Miscellaneous	<u>1,402</u>	<u>392</u>	<u>1,794</u>
Totals	4,165	1,969	6,134

ANNEX N (U) Provost Marshal

1. (U) On 14 November 1969, a DF and statement of US Government Vehicle Possession or Control was dispatched. Its purpose is to comply with the desire of the Commanding General that a one-time statement be obtained from all US members of HQ, 1st Logistical Command to the effect that all vehicles under control are properly dispatched.
2. (U) On 20 November 1969, IC Reg 190-11, "Carrying, Possession, Registration, Control and Use of Government and Privately-Owned Weapons", was published. It provides stricter requirements of control and safeguarding of weapons and ammunition.
3. (U) On 17 December 1969, a fact sheet was prepared and furnished to the Commanding General for possible presentation at the December Commanders' Conference. The fact sheet concerned safeguarding supplies and equipment. It pointed out that reviews of Serious Incident Reports, Loss and Recovery Reports, Military Police Reports and other sources, show that personnel who handle supplies and equipment are not supervised closely enough to prevent their stealing, hiding, and removing items from installations.
4. (U) On 26 December 1969, a fact sheet was provided for the Commanding General with background information relative to the "Off-limits" status of Cam Ranh Village.
5. (U) On 30 December 1969, a letter to the Commanders, United States Army Support Commands, was published. It concerned a series of stolen vehicles and requested, (1) the number of vehicles recovered, (2) administrative and judicial actions taken in each case, (3) actions taken to impress upon subordinate commanders the need for increased security over their vehicles, (4) steps taken to increase security of vehicles, i.e., closer controls over dispatch of vehicles, tighter motor pool security, installation of locking devices, storage of vehicles in motor pools when not required for official business, (5) additional actions taken which may prove beneficial to other commanders in preventing vehicle thefts.
6. (U) On 2 January 1970, a letter was published concerning Military Police Manning Level. This was in a reply to a letter from HQ, USMACV, AVHFM-PO.
7. (U) On 9 January 1970, a letter was dispatched on security guards. Its purpose was to obtain data upon which to evaluate the need for and possibility of developing security guard forces composed of other than US personnel, to provide security for 1st Logistical Command installations.

8. (U) On 17 January 1970, LC Reg 335-2 was published. Its purpose is:

a. To establish uniform reporting procedures on all serious crimes/incidents or cases of suspected criminal conduct, wrongdoing or mismanagement which may result in damaging public confidence in the Army occurring within RVN involving personnel and equipment of this command.

b. To insure that the Commanding General is informed immediately of all serious criminal offenses, or serious disciplinary incidents in which 1st Logistical Command personnel are involved.

c. To insure that the Commanding General is informed of any disciplinary action taken against personnel involved, and of corrective administrative action taken to preclude a similar incident.

9. (U) On 17 January 1970, change 1 to LC Reg 190-25 was drafted and prepared for publication. It provided additional security measures to be used for the International Scout type vehicles. Because the ignition keys are interchangeable between vehicles, a lock and chain are now required. This same additional security also applies to any other commercial type vehicle that cannot be adequately secured by its existing locking device.

10. (U) On 30 January 1970, a message was dispatched to all support commands to alert subordinate commanders to the magnitude of grenade and weapons incidents in the command. With the increased preparation for TLT, it is anticipated that troops will have more and easier access to weapons, ammunition and grenades. This fact, coupled with the increased psychological tension associated with the TLT period, requires that commanders, junior officers and NCOs at all levels extend their leadership responsibilities to the maximum.

11. (U) On 30 January 1970, a fact sheet on pilferage of cargo was prepared for the Commanding General. Its purpose was to provide a report of action taken concerning pilferage of supplies afloat at Daiaf by both truck convoys and aircraft.

12. (U) On 30 January 1970, a fact sheet was prepared for the Commanding General giving updated information concerning an investigation of fuel diversion in Can Tho.

13. (U) The US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail, under OPCON of the Provost Marshal, participated in the following activities during the reporting period:

a. Coordinated the location and distribution of eleven Hale 500 GPM portable fire pumps to Army outposts thereby upgrading their fire fighting capabilities.

b. Printed and distributed a large supply of no smoking signs at each deep draft ammunition handling facility. The signs were made of a reflective paper and international orange in color to attract attention.

c. Drafted and distributed a physical security bulletin describing the plan for an anchor chain collar to prevent a swimmer/sapper from attaching an explosive charge. The bulletins were distributed to each Support Command, Vietnamese Customs and USNSUPACT, Da Nang.

d. Provided instruction to the 71st Transportation Battalion on the safe handling of napalm at Newport. Bursters and igniters are not permitted thereby reducing the hazard and qualifying the napalm to be handled as a flammable solid.

e. Coordinated 1st Logistical Command efforts to set up standards and procedures for dumping large quantities of ammunition at sea. The 3d Ordnance Battalion has action on the project and this office will monitor the progress.

f. Participated in Project TOCSA (Test of Containerized Shipment of Ammunition) by supervising the safe off load of the S.S. Azalea City at Cam Ranh Bay and collecting sufficient data to enable the Commandant, US Coast Guard to draft new regulations for this means of transporting ammunition.

g. The four US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Detachments located at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Cat Lai supervised the handling of 424,953 short tons of military munitions during the period.

ANNEX O (U) Staff Chaplain

1. (U) Religious Services: Participation in religious services exceeded that of the last reporting period by 0.3% and is the highest ever recorded in this command. During the quarter 36.6% of the command participated in religious services each week. The total attendance for the period of 1 November to 31 January was 187,155. Though this reporting period had the benefit of the extra services of Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Jewish High Holy Days, it reflects a tremendous dedication on the part of the chaplains to meet the challenge of providing a religious experience for men who perform their various duties under demanding conditions. Chaplains conducted 11.3 services per chaplain per week.

2. (U) Staff Personnel: Chaplain (COL) Ray P. Rowland departed this command 27 December 1969. Chaplain (COL) Francis X. Wallace was assigned to the 1st Logistical Command as the Staff Chaplain, 30 December 1969. 7 January 1970, Chaplain (LTC) John E. Gremillion was reassigned to PAC, Saigon, and Chaplain (LTC) Charlie S. Mills assumed his duties as Deputy Staff Chaplain.

3. (U) Offerings: The following donations were made by the 1st Logistical Command personnel through the Chaplain Funds to further community relations projects:

	<u>Churches</u>	<u>Schools and Orphanages</u>	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nov VN\$	119,201	232,034	293,435	644,670
Dec VN\$	432,218	237,392	425,243	1,094,853
Jan VN\$	5,708	22,512	271,724	299,944

ANNEX P (U) Information Office

1. (U) Public Information Division

a. A total of 148 news stories and 25 photo captions were released to more than 42 news media during the reporting period. This headquarters monitors releases from subordinate information offices to ensure quality and comprehensiveness of news and photo coverage. Information Offices of the subordinate commands are encouraged to seek out, write and photograph news in depth throughout their areas of responsibility. Personnel assigned to HQ, 1st Logistical Command Information Office render additional support when required. In cases where requirements exceed the capabilities of the support commands, writers and photographers are put on TDY for the purpose of assisting that command in covering the news events.

b. Press support continues to be a major aspect of the information program. Press queries have resulted in direct contact with news media. The command constantly keeps news representatives aware of current events and assists the civilian media in every way possible. An extensive hometown news release program is continuing.

2. (U) Audio-visual Division

a. A 15 minute news program, "Log Briefs," is aired every Sunday on AFVN Radio. Material for the program is gathered throughout the week from the command and produced by members of the audio-visual division.

b. The division also maintains a current 1st Logistical Command slide file containing over 2,500 35mm slides categorized by special subjects. The file increases daily in variety and depth. Staff sections requiring the use of these slides may review them and when necessary slides are copied. Originals of all slides remain in the file for reference use.

3. (U) Special Projects Division

a. The division is preparing a brochure for the Skills I briefing held monthly at Headquarters. It will illustrate the information publications of 1st Logistical Command Headquarters and encourage officers of the command to utilize their respective information facilities.

b. One minute news briefs for AFVN Television in Saigon are being filmed, with signal support, under the direction of information officers.

c. Reporters of the special projects division travel to many areas of the country to assist the support commands in covering a varied and

wide range of activities. Articles reporting the way Americans and Vietnamese are working together have been given special emphasis.

4. (U) Command Information Division

a. The division continues to publish a monthly newsletter for 1st Logistical Command Vietnamese employees. The newsletter, Ban Tin, has a 1:5 distribution ratio of 3,000 copies.

b. Subordinate units are publishing weekly or bi-monthly mimeographed or multilith newspapers and two magazines. The Da Nang Support Command publishes the NORTHERN LOG and the Saigon Support Command publishes the HI-LITE magazine. The Qui Nhon Support Command continues to publish its offset newspaper "The Logman." 1st Logistical Command's newspaper, "Vietnam Review," is being published on a bi-monthly schedule. The printing of 17,000 copies permits a distribution ratio of approximately one copy for every three military personnel within the command. Nearly 200 additional copies are mailed to other information offices, military logistics organizations and VIPs including media executives. The 1 February 1970 issue was prepared on the MACV photo offset equipment, and the paper will continue to be so published.

c. The winter issue of the 1st Logistical Command magazine, "DYNAMO," was distributed on 28 February 1970. The 20,000 copies allows for a 1:2½ distribution ratio to military personnel assigned. The magazine, previously an annual publication, is now being published quarterly.

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ANNEX 2 (U) Special Assistant for Data Systems

1. (U) ADP Equipment Systems. During the reporting period, the Data Systems office monitored the following ADFE configurations throughout 1st Logistical Command: One IEM 360/50 system at USAICCV; four IBM 701C/146C systems at USAICCV and Long Binh, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Depots; ten UNIVAC 1005 Card Systems at USAICCV, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang Depots, and AG Personnel Services Companies; thirty NCR 500 systems in DSU/GSU units throughout the command; and numerous IEM punch card machines in support of the above ADFE configurations.

2. (U) Command Automatic Data Processing Policies. The following command ADP policies and directives were issued during the quarter:

a. Ltr, AVCA DS, subject: ADP Workload Statistics - R/S AVCA DS - 70 - 1.

b. Ltr, AVCA DS, subject: Data Automation Requirement - USAFB, Da Nang, 15 November 1969.

c. Message, AVCA DS, subject: IBM Systems Engineer Services, DTG 100802Z Jan 70.

d. Ltr, AVCA DS, subject: USAICCV Data Processing Standards and Priorities, Jan 70.

e. Data Project Directive for 1st Logistical Command Centralized Wholesale Supply System.

f. Ltr, AVCA DS, subject: Supplies for Micronation, 20 Dec 69.

g. Ltr, AVCA DS, subject: USAICCV Data Processing Standards and Priorities, 9 Jan 70.

3. (U) ADP Systems Analysis. The following analyses were completed during the quarter: analysis of USAF, Long Binh Data Processing Operations; analysis of USAICCV Data Processing Operations; and recommendations for revision of NCR 500 System for DSU/GSU units.

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ANNEX R (C) Special Assistant for Combat Security

1. (C) Activities during this period have been oriented toward a review of the command security posture in anticipation of increased activity during TET. This included a visit to all subordinate commands and a detailed review of defense plans and facilities.
2. (C) Particularly significant was the increased emphasis on the use of sensors around logistic installations. All support commands have sent personnel to the MACV Duffel Bag School at Vung Tau. Each command has made extensive plans for the use of seismic and pressure systems. Additionally, USARV has allocated 90 AM/MSG-138 Anti-Intrusion detectors to 1st Logistical Command. The initial increment of these seismic intrusion devices has been received and forwarded to subordinate commands.
3. (C) Two techniques for improving security awareness have been developed and are being staffed. They are: a security conference to encourage an initial exchange of security information and a convenient means for airing problems, and the development of a security reference book to be used by the Commanding General and Staff.

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (C) PERSONNEL

1. (U) Self-Help Programs (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: Many units are inclined to treat civic actions as a charitable activity.

b. EVALUATION: Experience has shown that "give away" programs destroy initiative.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on self-help programs with maximum Vietnamese participation.

2. (U) Concentration of Civic Action (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: There is a tendency to concentrate civic action in pet institutions or small areas.

b. EVALUATION: This results in pockets of excessive support and the creation of "haves" and "have nots".

c. RECOMMENDATION: Civic action should contribute to general social and economic improvement.

3. (U) Large Projects Reaching a Limited Number of People (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: Related to para 2, above, units often undertake large projects reaching only a limited number of people. An example might be a long range project for a school for the blind.

b. EVALUATION: While commendable, it does not benefit the majority.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Civic action should be designed to benefit the largest number of people.

4. (U) Circumventing GVN Agencies (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: There is a tendency to circumvent GVN agencies and officials.

b. EVALUATION: This serves only to interpose the image of the US between the GVN and the people.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That projects be coordinated with and conducted through GVN agencies to enhance the image of the GVN in the eyes of the people.

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5. (U) Long Range Projects (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: Units frequently undertake long range programs requiring continuing support.

b. EVALUATION: Many long range projects may be left unfinished when US units redeploy, creating ill feelings among the people.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Since the GVN may not be able to maintain programs at the same level upon our departure, projects should be short term and high impact in nature.

6. (U) Needs of the People (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: We are sometimes guilty of establishing projects we think the people need rather than attempting to determine what their real needs are.

b. EVALUATION: In such cases, the people will show little interest in supporting or maintaining them.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That projects be coordinated with local GVN officials to give the people what they want.

7. (U) Publicity (ACofS, Personnel).

a. OBSERVATION: Publicity frequently places too much emphasis on the US effort.

b. EVALUATION: Our goal is to enhance the GVN image, US activities should be shown only in a supporting role.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all publicity, particularly that going through the Vietnamese news media, emphasize the GVN's efforts on behalf of the people.

8. (U) Reduction of Personnel in the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (ACofS, Procurement).

a. OBSERVATION: Continuation of reduction of personnel in USAPAV on a percentage basis compared with all other command activities is creating a problem that will adversely affect both the quality and quantity of procurement actions.

b. EVALUATION: USAPAV's work load is related to the number of PR&Cs received, the variety of services required, and the number and complexity of contracts under administration, rather than to a reduction in the quantity of a particular service or supply. USAPAV has assumed, in the last quarter, \$37.4 million of time-and-material contracts from the US Army Aviation Systems Command (USAAVSCOM) for aircraft maintenance and will assume about

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\$50.0 million more contracts in the near future from other commands. This will bring USAFAV's total number of contracts under administration to 325 with a value of over \$900.0 million. As other commands withdraw from Vietnam, USAFAV will assume their procurement activities. This will result in additional contracts for retrograde of materiel and equipment, additional work for packing and crating, care and preservation, transportation, and stevedoring.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to change the Table of Distribution Allowances (TDA) with a Manpower Survey to review the activities and the future requirements of work to be performed and to assure that USAFAV will be awarded the personnel needed to perform the mission assigned.

9. (C) Rail Personnel (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: The Rail Branch does not have sufficient personnel in order to travel to all locations in which US Army railway equipment is located and repaired. In addition, the position of stock control supervisor was eliminated.

b. EVALUATION: Lack of personnel will seriously limit the branch's ability to effectively administer the rail equipment maintenance contract, to maintain an inventory of more than 950 line items of repair parts and components, and to maintain accountability for US Army railway equipment in Vietnam.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the above functions be made a mission at the MACV Advisor level. MACV-TMA presently maintains operational control over US owned railway equipment.

B. (C) INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Local National Informant Program (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: More information concerning the location of enemy cadre or infra-structure and the execution of enemy activities among the populace in communities near 1st Logistical Command installations would improve the external security posture of these installations and aid tactical units in protecting logistical assets.

b. EVALUATION: The Installation Informant Program of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment, which uses local national personnel employed at logistical installations as sources, has provided accurate and timely information concerning labor unrest among local nationals employed on US bases, VC penetration of the Vietnamese labor force employed at logistical bases, and other activities which might disrupt the mission of the 1st Logistical Command. This program has been expanded to include informants who monitor possible enemy activity in the communities where the US employed Vietnamese personnel reside.

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c. RECOMMENDATION: Initial results achieved as a result of this expansion have proved useful and continued expansion will be pursued.

2. (C) US Military Informant Program (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, it became evident that more information concerning potentially disruptive incidents among the US military personnel of the 1st Logistical Command would materially aid 1st Logistical Command in preventing delays in the accomplishment of its mission.

b. EVALUATION: A formalized program was established by the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment which uses US Army personnel of the 1st Logistical Command as sources to provide timely and accurate information concerning anti-war movements, racial disorders, subversive organizations or individuals, and other potentially disruptive activities among 1st Logistical Command personnel.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Initial results indicate that the program is effective in providing advanced warning so that these activities can be thwarted before they affect mission capabilities or morale; therefore, this program will be continued and expanded.

3. (C) Stevedore Strike (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: Newport and Cat Lai underwent a 24 hour stevedore strike on 8 January 1970.

b. EVALUATION: The strike was of 24 hours duration. Some knowledge of the impending work stoppage was given beforehand since the strike of stevedores was in sympathy with the commercial bus drivers strike in the area. This advance notice allowed port operations personnel to prepare alternate work forces and work plans to continue uninterrupted operations. As a result of this advance planning little time or tonnage handled was actually lost during the period. Military personnel were organized into stevedore gangs. These personnel were normally engaged in administrative or support functions. Some additional training had to be provided in winch and forklift operations. The military stevedores performed the tasks assigned, and showed every indication of being able to continue for an indefinite length of time. Other military operations in which these people normally engaged suffered some loss of production. The civilian stevedores returned to work without incident after completion of the strike.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That plans for military assumption of contractor missions be maintained and updated as necessary.

(2) That cross training in stevedore skills be given to those selected to perform emergency stevedore missions to insure ready response to requirements.

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(3) That all possible intelligence sources be employed to get maximum advance warning of impending labor problems to enable preventive or minimizing actions to be planned. Higher headquarters should insure that any intelligence information indicating impending labor difficulty is immediately forwarded to the port operators.

C. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) Initial Guidance - Keystone Cardinal (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: Lack of timely dissemination and understanding of initial guidance.

b. EVALUATION: Initially there was a lack of understanding of turn-in procedures and documentation required due to late guidance from higher headquarters. The Saigon Support Command retrograde team was on the ground and operating before the USAFV LCI was published. It was also discovered that staff officers from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division were given a different version of the documentation required, during earlier briefings by USAFV. For a short period of time this caused confusion among the team. The briefings were discontinued and, through coordination with the staff at USAFV and Saigon Support Command, definitive instructions were worked out.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That OPERDs and LCIs be published well in advance of the time the retrograde team gets on the ground.

2. (C) Movement of Stocks (ACofS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: In one instance Class I stocks were moved to a new location within an ISA. A review of this action revealed that the move was improperly planned at the unit level and not adequately monitored at the various command levels.

b. EVALUATION: The initial move was made before a new programmed facility was completed; construction of required hardstand area had not been started and there was inadequate drainage in the area. In addition, stocks were not placed on proper dunnage. The location on which a concrete pad was subsequently constructed proved to be unsatisfactory as the height of a required shed over the pad was a safety hazard to aircraft using the adjacent runway. This required the construction of a new concrete pad approximately 50 yards from the original location. A warehouse, which was constructed, included an office. After the building was opened for operation, the unit decided that the location of the office was unsatisfactory and a new office had to be reconstructed in another section of the building. This headquarters has directed that the responsible unit develop a plan prior to any major moves of stocks to a new location within a supply installation or the establishment of a new stockage area. This plan must be approved at support command level prior to implementation and the support command is required to monitor execution of the move of stocks.

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c. RECOMMENDATION: None; action directed is considered satisfactory.

3. (U) Mail Contract (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: The Purchase Request and Commitment (PR²C) form for railway equipment maintenance was submitted and staffed through this headquarters in September 1969. The PR²C was delayed in higher headquarters and not returned through channels to the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) until 1 December 1969.

b. EVALUATION: Sufficient procurement lead time was not available to permit the full procurement cycle.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That PR²Cs be expeditiously staffed by higher headquarters to insure that procurement lead time is maintained.

4. (U) Weather Delays (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: Considerable ship delay was encountered in Vietnam ports due to monsoon weather during the reporting period.

b. EVALUATION: Weather has been a recurring seasonal problem for ports along the coast of the South China Sea. In an attempt to minimize the effects of monsoon winds from offshore and the resulting high swells, particularly at Da Nang and Qui Nhon, ship scheduling and operations were closely monitored. In several cases, ship diversions or reroutings were effected at the expense of economy. Transshipment resulted, but the tactical requirement for cargo, particularly ammunition, outweighed the need for economy. Ammunition waivers were granted to allow ships to work at pier-side in Qui Nhon. This practice, while potentially hazardous, can be undertaken as long as proper precautions are taken. It provides a means of overcoming the problems posed by adverse sea and weather conditions.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That continued emphasis be placed on the scheduling and routing of ships during the monsoon season to lessen the effect of weather on ship operations.

(2) That the processing and granting of ammunition waivers be expedited during monsoon seasons to insure continuous discharge operations.

5. (U) Coordination for Keystone Bluejay (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: Coordination of Keystone Bluejay shipping requirements was conducted through a projection of port workload and capability and the transmission of a letter of intent to TMA-MACV on the amount of cargo projected to be shipped as retrograde.

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b. **EVALUATION:** This procedure caused an advance of the shipping space procurement cycle and allowed for shipping space to be allocated earlier and for the cargo to be retrograded earlier. A coordinated and accelerated shipping program resulted from this action. The action required considerable coordination with transportation staff elements of 1st Logistical Command, Saigon Support Command, and TMA, but the time seems to have been well spent. The outcome was shorter time between offerings and shipments, increased shipment intelligence for all concerned agencies and more realistic ship planning. The normal procedures were completed as a backup for the plan and to provide information in the customary format.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Prior to execution of planned deployments, interested agencies including 1st Logistical Command, TMA, USARV, and MSTSO-V meet for pre-planning informational contacts in order to obtain the most rapid response to deployment shipping requirements.

6. (U) Cargo Bookings (ACofS, Transportation).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Cargo offerings for retrograde movement via deep draft shipping are often slow, and shipping is often nominated on short notice.

b. **EVALUATION:** This practice puts a considerable strain on the retrograding facility, local drayage and on the port's capability to call cargo forward. All retrograde cargo is not staged in the immediate port area. It must often be called forward from a considerable distance and often involves the requirement for heavy lift drayage for movement. With sufficient advance notice, the call forward can be properly conducted and the cargo staged in the port in time to meet the nominated shipping. It is realized that MSTSO occasionally is only able to clear cargo bookings on short notice, and that any offering is theoretically better than none, but lack of sufficient response time negates cargo planning and staging, and generally speaking does not produce satisfactory results.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That cargo clearances processed by TMA and granted by MSTSO be issued in sufficient time to allow for proper staging the cargo and planning for ship loading.

7. (C) Joint Agreements for ARVNization of US Port Facilities (ACofS, Transportation).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Staffing joint agreements for transfer of port responsibilities from local level to JCS delayed the finalization of ARVNization agreements.

b. **EVALUATION:** During the initial stages of the process of ARVNizing US ports, local committees were formed as directed by MACV/RVNAF and directed to negotiate joint agreements for the turnover of port responsibilities to ARVN. In the case of the Binh Thuy agreement, negotiations were completed at the local level, revised at USARV level and staffed through MACV to

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the RVNAF Joint General Staff. The draft agreement was then officially returned from MACV to USAFV for additional staffing. At that time, the reimbursement procedures problem surfaced and the agreement was returned to 1st Logistical Command for revision. In the meantime, the process of ARVNization at Binh Thuy was halted, pending resolution of the problem. The draft agreement was originally submitted for staffing in October 1969. It was finally returned to MACV in late December 1969.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Where efficiency and speed are important, agreements for turnover of facilities to ARVN should be negotiated at the MACV/JGS level, bringing local participants into the negotiations only after the ground work has been laid and procedural questions disposed of. Use of this method would have saved much valuable time in the completion of the Binh Thuy ARVNization project.

8. (U) Rats aboard Ship (ACofS, Transportation).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Rats were discovered aboard two ships arriving at 1st Log Comd ports.

b. **EVALUATION:** In both cases the ships involved were small Vietnamese coastal craft chartered to haul US Army Class III package products. They loaded in Saigon (Nha Be) area and discharged at up-country ports. The vessels involved were general cargo ships in a tramp trade and they are used to haul all types of cargo including foodstuffs. The ships were not properly prepared for the cargo and the rat infestation made it impossible to work the cargo safely for discharge. These ships are not normal MSTIS charters but represent local contract by the shipper service. The cargo is military sponsored and liable for discharge and berthing at a military pier. There was no MILSTAMP cargo manifest, and the cargo was apparently loaded by commercial stevedores.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That only MSTIS chartered shipping be used for military cargo in intra-RVN movement because of the inspection and handling requirements and the required documentation, loading and handling procedures. MSTIS chartered shipping is under US control and inspection for control of vermin.

9. (U) Physical Security (Adjutant General).

a. **OBSERVATION:** It was brought to the attention of the AG Postal Division by means of various postal incidents and reports from inspectors that physical security was lacking in several postal units of the 1st Logistical Command.

RECOMMENDATION: In an attempt to alleviate the problem of substandard security measures, two actions have been taken. First, physical security inspections of 1st Logistical Command postal activities were conducted in

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coordination with the Provost Marshal, who subsequently published physical security criteria. The second action consisted of a revision of the Postal Inspection Check List (AVCA Form 131) to include items pertinent to physical security and the publishing of appropriate items in the 1st Logistics Command Postal Bulletin.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That physical security continue to be an item of command interest in all inspections of postal facilities.

10. (U) Christmas Mail (Adjutant General).

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the Christmas Mailing Season (1 October - 31 December) postal activities are taxed with a greatly expanded workload.

b. **EVALUATION:** Preparations for Christmas 1969 began with the publishing of MACV Directive 65-3, Subject: Support for Christmas Mailing Season, on 22 July 1969. This directive outlined the responsibilities of commanders at all levels. The early date of publishing of this directive coupled with other advance publicity, messages concerning surface mail boat arrivals, instructional letters and messages, and cooperation by all concerned contributed to a successful and efficient Christmas mail operation.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That preparations for the Christmas Mailing Season be initiated as early as feasible in future years.

11. (U) Ship Diversion (ACofS, Ammunition).

a. **Observation:** The ammunition requisition system is designed so that ammunition is shipped from CONUS and consigned to a specific support command. All shipments are made by deep draft vessel. During the monsoon season, which varies throughout the length of the country, ship discharge is impossible when harbor swells exceed the five foot limit imposed by safety considerations. Under these conditions, vessels must either be placed in a hold status at an offshore location, diverted to another port, or brought into the designated port and held until conditions permit discharge.

b. **EVALUATION:** Placing a deep draft vessel in a hold status is expensive. Demurrage increases at a high rate, and results in a higher shipping cost for ammunition. Even more important, ammunition which may be needed in country is afloat, and not readily available for issue or movement to a location by intra-theater transportation to where it is needed. It is then necessary to be able to predict those ports where difficulties can be expected and to have a predetermined plan for diversion to a port where discharge can be made and storage capacity is available. Based on long range, country-wide weather forecasts, experience, projected ammunition requirements, known ship arrivals, port capacities, and anticipated availability of intra-theater transportation, a detailed analysis of each shipment was made to determine the optimum port of discharge of each vessel.

Based on this action, ships were diverted to other ports. These diversions reduced the number of ships placed in a hold status, and more importantly, made the ammunition available for transshipment by barge and LST.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Ships be diverted when possible to other ports based upon the above evaluation criteria when monsoon weather strikes a given port, making it impossible to unload ammunition ships there.

12. (U) Engine Consumption (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. OBSERVATION: The daily Deadline Report for combat vehicles showed an excessively high number of M113A1 APC's requiring replacement of engines. The ACofS, Maintenance started to keep information on a monthly basis on engine consumption by major units. Information is obtained from the Inventory Control Center and portrayed in graphical form.

b. EVALUATION: This information, when related to average mileage, has proven to be a valuable management practice to determine trends, reconcile requirements and receipts, identify units with maintenance problems and determine status of programs to decrease engine consumption.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That similar information be maintained and used in management of the Operational Readiness rate for other vehicles.

13. (U) Exchange of Road Wheel Arm Assemblies for Combat Vehicles (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. OBSERVATION: Combat units have experienced considerable delay in repairing combat vehicles that are non-operational ready (NOR) as a result of mine damage to roadwheel arm assemblies. This delay results from the multiple requisitions that have to be submitted for parts required to assemble a roadwheel arm assembly.

b. EVALUATION: Maintenance support units requisition the required parts and assemble the roadwheel arm assemblies in anticipation of requirements. The roadwheel arm assemblies are then exchanged on a one for one basis. This cuts down considerably the downtime of combat vehicles deadlined for mine damage to the roadwheel arm assemblies.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That USAMC list the roadwheel arm assemblies for M48A3 tank, M113A1, APC family of vehicles and AR/AAV M551 as a complete assembly for issue.

14. (U) Prepositioning of Major Assemblies (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. OBSERVATION: 1st Logistical Command establishes stocks of high demand, critical, intensively managed major assemblies in support of combat vehicles, selected tactical vehicles and artillery weapons.

b. **EVALUATION:** The deadline reports show that failures of specific major assemblies are the most common causes of deadline equipment in the NUR category. These major assemblies have a high demand, and are command controlled items for which stock visibility of serviceable and unserviceable items must be maintained on a country-wide basis. Prepositioned major assemblies remain in depot stock accounts. This insures expeditious return of unserviceable items for overhaul. Priority of issue is provided by ACofS, Maintenance based on the daily deadline report. Positioning of these assemblies in the forward support areas insures quick response to user requirements.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That this be considered as a standard procedure to be followed in distributing and controlling high demand, critical, major assemblies.

15. (U) Repair and Return Program (R&R) for Communications-Electronics Equipment (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. **OBSERVATION:** The R&R program for Communications-Electronics Equipment is very valuable to the maintenance program; however, lack of proper record keeping has caused many items to be "lost" in the system.

b. **EVALUATION:** The repair and return program was initiated in 1968. Piecemeal instructions were issued to the field. There was no regulation covering the program. Equipment was being shipped to COMLE depots without proper documentation. No register was being kept for the items. Follow-up was not being performed on items which were not returned or for which no receipt was received. As a result, units were carrying open work orders for long periods of time. The diverse instructions were consolidated by 1st Logistical Command in a letter of instructions in September 1969. USARV Regulation 750-31 was published in November 1969. Instructions for follow-up action have been sent to the field. However, units still have open entries on their books.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That retrograding units make a one-time reconciliation of old records and close out open work orders under appropriate supply regulations. It is further recommended that USARV Regulation 750-31 be amended to incorporate the requirement for a register and proper follow-up procedures.

16. (U) Diagnostic Test Equipment (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Analysis of the DSU DX operation reveals that a high percentage (40-60%) of items exchanged for serviceable items are in fact not unserviceable. Various techniques have been used to test DX items before turn-in such as routing customers through fuel and electrical sections or other applicable shops, co-location of the DX facility with shops, positioning test equipment with the DX facility, or combinations of the three. Each method works to a varying degree but has resulted in cumbersome procedures, customer delays or a requirement for test equipment that is not available in the shop or to contact teams. An adequate simple test procedure would aid in detecting problems of serviceable turn-ins as unserviceables.

b. EVALUATION: The quantity of serviceable turn-ins being received at our DX facilities warrants the establishment of a one stop testing capability.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that diagnostic simple GO-NO-GO type test equipment for fuel and electrical assemblies be made available by AMC to all DX shops and using unit maintenance activities and that this subject be expanded by US CONARC in CONUS service schools teaching organizational maintenance.

17. (U) Maintenance Country Stores (ACofS, Maintenance).

a. OBSERVATION: Instruct and Advise Teams have noted an excessive amount of labor and automatic data processor time at DSU's being spent on low cost small quantity customer requests. Also, the customer wastes considerable time preparing and submitting formal requests to their support units for these low cost items. Most technical supply operations are understaffed and overburdened with customer requests. Low cost, fast moving hardware type requests require the same processing as large expensive items.

b. EVALUATION: A well planned country store stocked with fast moving, non-repairable type spare parts which have a value of \$10.00 or more per year, can reduce considerable labor and valuable machine time and travel requirements for the customers.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That DA develop more specific directives for establishing a Maintenance Country Store in each Maintenance DSU-OSU unit with a Tech Supply mission supporting customer units and that USCONARC stress this concept in schools.

18. (U) Subsistence Seminar (ACofS, Supply).

a. OBSERVATION: The first subsistence seminar was sponsored by the Directorate of Food on 21-22 November 1969 at 1st Logistical Command. Forty-two Class I supply officers and NCO's attended representing all support commands. Information presented included requisitioning, receiving, storing, and issuing of Class I supplies; accounting for issues to US units, Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF), Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) customers and Defense contractors; and guest presentations on procurement, veterinary inspection, insect control in stored products, and preventive maintenance on refrigeration units.

b. EVALUATION: The seminar provided a much needed exchange of ideas between subsistence personnel at all levels. As a result, many improvements were made in storage, receiving, shipping, and accounting procedures.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Due to the rapid turnover of personnel in Vietnam, seminars should be held at least quarterly.

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19. (U) Chocolate Milk Production (ACofS, Supply).

a. **OBSERVATION:** In an effort to utilize excess stocks of powdered nonfat dry milk the dairies were requested to conduct organoleptic tests using this powder for the production of chocolate milk.

b. **EVALUATION:** The tests were very favorable and as a result the contracts were modified to require the use of government-furnished powdered milk in the production of chocolate milk until excesses were depleted.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Procurement of dehydrated items such as powdered milk should be tightly controlled at all times to preclude generating excesses.

20. (C) Day light Pumping Operations (ACofS, Supply).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Twenty-four hour operation of pipelines is normal procedure; however, in a combat environment as in Vietnam, night time operation on relatively insecure pipelines often results in unacceptable high loss rates when a break occurs since repair crews cannot go out to make repairs until first light.

b. **EVALUATION:** Interdiction of petroleum pipelines through enemy action, local national pilferage, or friendly action at night result in large losses because the inability to provide security to repair crews precludes accomplishment of required rapid repairs. Pipeline operations should cease sufficiently in advance of darkness to permit closing of strategic valves followed by complete pipeline inspection, repairs as necessary and valve openings before pumping is resumed after daylight. Experience indicates that adoption of the latter procedure can result in significant loss reductions.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That in insecure areas, petroleum pipelines with sufficient through-put capability be operated only during daylight hours.

21. (U) Commingled Remains (ACofS, Services).

a. **OBSERVATION:** An air crash incident occurred that involved both US and ARVN personnel. The remains were segregated at the crash site by untrained personnel utilizing uniform characteristics and items found on the body such as rings and watches. Those remains thought to be US personnel were evacuated through GR channels to the mortuary and those thought to be ARVN personnel were taken and buried almost immediately. At the mortuary it was discovered that a mix up had occurred and one of the remains was Vietnamese.

b. **EVALUATION:** Published procedures were not followed because of lack of knowledge by the individuals making the initial segregation. The senior US person involved in the recovery should attempt to take charge of all remains when a possibility of commingling exists and have them evacuated to the mortuary (ref USAKV Reg 638-30). There, with the aid of technical laboratory

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equipment, the identification specialists can make positive identification of remains.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Periodic publicity must be given to procedures to be followed when the possibility of having commingled remains exists. This can be accomplished through command letters distributed at least once each quarter. This procedure is necessary because graves registration procedures and regulations are not readily available to all personnel.

22. (U) Contract Laundry Supervision (ACofS, Services).

a. OBSERVATION: Ordering officers are not performing their duties adequately.

b. EVALUATION: Commanders are appointing personnel as ordering officers without regard to availability of time to perform their duties. There is inadequate emphasis placed on the performance of ordering officers at support command and lower levels.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should be made aware of the importance of an ordering officer's duties and ensure that personnel devote sufficient time to their duties.

23. (U) Leakage of POL Tanks (ACofS, Services).

a. OBSERVATION: Steel storage tanks used for storing JP-4 fuel at Vung Tau and Cam Ranh Bay have developed bottom leaks after being in service 1½ to 2 years.

b. EVALUATION: Leaks are due to corrosion caused by water which collects in the tanks. Oxidation of the steel is hastened by the action of the JP-4 which causes the corrosion to flake off the metal, the lack of a corrosion inhibitor in JP-4, galvanic action, and the growth in the fuel of anaerobic bacteria which react to form acids. Air Force POL tanks are painted on the inside with epoxy paint before use to prevent corrosion; these tanks have a life expectancy of 15-20 years. Painting of Army tanks in Vietnam is not required since their installation is termed "temporary". This classification is obviously not applicable since the tanks are required longer than their expected life without painting.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the painting of the inside of all Army POL tanks erected in Vietnam with epoxy paint be made mandatory.

24. (U) Construction in Unstabilized Sand Areas (ACofS, Services).

a. OBSERVATION: Construction of an addition to ammunition area Charlie at Cam Ranh Bay has been hampered by excessive wind and water erosion. Erosion control will require extensive maintenance effort in the future.

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b. **EVALUATION:** Charlie area was sited in an area of unstabilized sand dunes which are exposed to strong winds from the northeast or southwest. Extensive cut and fill operations were required to build the roads, ammunition pads, and protective berms. Initially some fill materials were blown away because they were left exposed to wind erosion. Experiences showed that this could be reduced by application of asphalt on roads and pads and peneprine on berms as the earthwork progressed. Runoff from monsoon rains often overflowed drainage ditches and quickly undermined berms and roads. To reduce erosion, road cross sections were modified to provide curbs along the roads with lined interceptor ditches to transport runoff down sand fill embankments. However, drainage systems are often quickly filled with windblown sand and require continuous maintenance to keep them functional.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That particular care be taken in site selection for ammunition storage projects or similar construction requiring cut and fill operations in order to avoid areas of unstabilized sand subject to wind and water erosion. If such areas are used, construction should be modified to reduce erosion effects as discussed above.

D. (U) ORGANIZATION (none)

E. (C) TRAINING

1. (C) Training for use of Duffel Bag Sensors around 1st Log Comd Installations (ACofS, SP&O).

a. **OBSERVATION:** The employment of Duffel Bag resources in the defense of 1st Logistical Command installations has markedly improved since personnel of this command attended the Duffel Bag School at Vung Tau.

b. **EVALUATION:** The presence of Duffel Bag trained personnel in the command has been beneficial to the employment of sensors, and therefore to the entire defensive posture of the 1st Logistical Command.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That MACV J3 C4 periodically establish classes for 1st Log Comd personnel at the Vung Tau Duffel Bag School.

2. (U) BUDDY Training (ACofS, SP&O).

a. **OBSERVATION:** On-the-job training of ARVN soldiers in highly technical areas is generally unsuccessful.

b. **EVALUATION:** Experience in highly technical Operation BUDDY programs has shown that generally ARVN trainees have very limited backgrounds in fundamentals such as electronic and mechanical theory. This limited background coupled with language difficulties encountered in presenting highly technical training makes it very difficult for the ARVN trainee to achieve full benefit from a technical OJT program.

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c. RECOMMENDATION: That ARVN trainees for technical Operation BUDDY programs be screened by ARVN to ensure that they are essentially trained in fundamentals and theory in order to benefit from an OJT program. If practical, interpreters should also be assigned with students to minimize the language barrier.

3. (U) Forklift Training (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: US soldiers require an extensive amount of training in forklift operations.

b. EVALUATION: Although school trained subsistence storage specialists (MOS 76V) arrive in country with some training in forklift operations, the Rough Terrain Forklift and Loader Operators (MOS 62M) are primarily trained by OJT methods.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the CONUS schools system establish a formal training program to qualify sufficient numbers of Rough Terrain Forklift and Loader Operators to alleviate the excessive training requirement in RVN.

F. (C) LOGISTICS

1. (C) Decrease of Logistical Capability, Keystone Cardinal (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: Decrease of logistical capability because of early standdown.

b. EVALUATION: The premature standdown of some logistical elements resulted in decreased organic supply and maintenance capability needed by the redeploying unit as well as 1st Logistical Command.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the logistical elements of a redeploying unit be among the last elements to standdown.

(2) That the redeploying unit designate a stay-back force to assist in supply and maintenance operations.

(3) That this stay-back force be released at the discretion of HQ, USARV, i.e., whenever it is determined that their efforts are no longer required in processing redeploying units' equipment.

2. (C) Ammunition Planning Factor (ACofS, Ammunition).

a. OBSERVATION: Experience in Vietnam clearly indicates that the published Class V planning factors as found in FM 101-10-1 and FM 9-6 are not realistic for this type conflict. To adequately plan for the future, ammunition requirements must be developed.

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b. **EVALUATION:** Throughout the Vietnam War ammunition has been expended in quantities which are unlike any preceding conflict. There are no easily definable lines of contact with the enemy. Contact is generally sporadic, but intense, and occurs usually at a place and time chosen by the enemy. For this reason, with due consideration given to the massive use of artillery, it became obvious that published planning factors for predicting the ammunition requirement for residual and for interim forces were not adequate. Analysis of issue data for the past year indicated clearly that the preponderance of ammunition issued was for artillery. The ratio of artillery to all other types of ammunition was 80/20%. It was further concluded that the majority of the 20% was issued to combat troops. The quantity issued to combat service could be considered negligible. Using this rationale, it was determined that the mean issues to artillery units by type are 1,016 short tons of 175/8", 937 short tons of 155mm, 749 short tons of 105mm per battalion per month. The mean issues of combat brigades is 550 short tons per month.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** The above mentioned figures be used for the estimation of issues for forces in Vietnam instead of those found in FM 101-1 and FM 9-6, when determining future ammunition needs as troops are withdrawn from RVN.

3. (U) Ammunition Stockage in ICTZ (ACofS, Ammunition).

a. **OBSERVATION:** With the advent of bad weather (monsoon season) in the ICTZ during Nov, Dec, Jan, difficulty has been experienced in offloading deep draft ammunition vessels in the Da Nang Harbor. This is a critical period in that it immediately precedes the VC/NVA Winter-Spring Offensive.

b. **EVALUATION:** Essentially all ammunition brought into Vietnam is transported on deep draft vessels and discharged at the four deep draft harbors in Vietnam, one per support command. The deep draft port in ICTZ is located at Da Nang. During the Nov-Jan time period, harbor swells often exceed the maximum five foot limit at which ammunition can be unloaded. This is a particularly critical time period since it immediately precedes the annual VC/NVA Winter-Spring Offensive of the TET period. In early October 1968, an aggressive program was initiated to bring all ASP's in the ICTZ up to their stockage objectives. This was done by use of a special mission, intra-coastal waterway ships and barges. By 1 November 1969, the balance on hand in the Da Nang SUPCOM was 106% of the stockage objective. With the onset of bad weather in Nov and Dec, resupply was either halted or limited and stocks dropped significantly. However, the fact that the stocks on hand were high prevented a critical situation from developing.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** The Da Nang SUPCOM be adequately stocked before November to preclude weather seriously hampering the ammunition posture.

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4. (U) Property Disposal Accounting Procedures (ACofS, Services).

a. OBSERVATION: During the past quarter the inventory at the property disposal activity at Cam Ranh Bay was increased 20,000 short tons through Inventory Adjustment Reports (IAR).

b. EVALUATION: In May of 1969, the location of the Cam Ranh Bay disposal yard was changed and existing, unsegregated property was sold on one contract. When the contract was awarded, the accountability for the property was dropped from the property disposal records. As a result of poor performance, this contract was terminated in October 1969 with an estimated 20,000 short tons of property remaining in the old property disposal yard. This property was picked up on the property records of the disposal activity through an inventory adjustment action.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Regulatory procedures prescribe that accountability for property be dropped concurrent with removals. Compliance with regulations will preclude future occurrences of this nature.

G. (C) COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) Sole User Circuits—Keystone Cardinal (ACofS, SP&O).

a. OBSERVATION: The effectiveness of reporting Phase II equipment assets from the redeploying units processing location to the Inventory Control Center was hampered by lack of dedicated (sole user) telephone circuits.

b. EVALUATION: 1st Logistical Command personnel experienced difficulty in meeting report requirements because of the lack of responsiveness in the common user circuits (this applied primarily to US Army Support Commands other than Saigon). Although requests for temporary (90 day) sole user circuits were submitted and given approval, installation of circuits were not completed prior to termination of the operation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That USARV authorize a high installation priority for sole user circuits between Depot and the ICCV to preclude future delays in reporting.

2. (C) Harbor Pilot Communication (ACofS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: Several instances of difficulty between pilots and berthing tugs or harbor masters have resulted in damage or delays in ship berthing.

b. EVALUATION: Pilots are not authorized communications by TOE. This function is one which has been assumed by the Army in Army ports in Vietnam and which has had to be supplemented by MTOE authorizations. Lightweight, portable and reliable radio communications is essential to the ship pilot. He must be able to communicate from the ship's bridge to the supporting tugs

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or the harbormaster in order to obtain immediate response. Restricted maneuver conditions in harbors and the effects of coastal or harbor winds and currents make decisive and rapid action essential to safe berthing operations. Boarding ships in the stream requires that the pilot's gear be lightweight and portable. Currently squad size radios are employed with limited success. A hand held, commercial style walkie-talkie is more desirable. It should be capable of netting with the standard radios provided to tugs and harborcraft operations. Such communications might have prevented the collision and sinking of LT 1969 in Qui Nhon.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That HOCI action be taken to equip harbor pilots with appropriate communications equipment support for tug-pilot and harbormaster-pilot communications.

II. (C) MATERIAL

1. (C) Misuse of Port Operations Assets (ACoPS, Transportation).

a. OBSERVATION: Port operations barges are currently being used at MAWV direction as static temporary rock barge piers in support of the Delta Transportation Plan.

b. EVALUATION: These port assets have been effectively eliminated from employment in their primary role and design use as cargo lighters in the transportation system. They are employed in Vietnam in port operations rather than line haul. Use of the barges outside the port system represents a misuse of a valuable transportation asset and decreases the flexibility and capability of the affected port to conduct discharge and loading operations.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That attention be given to providing suitable assets to the Delta Transportation Plan and USAECAV from outside the transportation system, and that the barges currently in use for this program be returned to their primary use.

1. (b) OTHER (none)

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AVHGC-DST (17 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning the "Bulk Certification of Funds Letter, 70-2," page 5, paragraph 3b; nonconcur. The figure given for RVN Popular Forces Dependent Housing should be \$500,000. If this figure is substituted for the erroneous \$5,000,000, the total will not be \$42,000,000. The Budget Division, Office of the ACofS, Comptroller, 1st Logistical Command has been notified of the discrepancies, and is in the process of correcting them.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Lack of surface transportation assets", page 27, paragraph 1i(1) & (2); concur. Nonconcur with paragraph 2i(3) as the following decisions were made:

(1) US Army Support Command Saigon will establish bulk POL storage at Can Tho with POL supplied by commercial barge shipments from Nha Be. This will eliminate C-130 POL flights into Binh Thuy Air Base. Commercial trucks will then deliver bulk POL to Binh Thuy from Can Tho commercial facilities for air delivery elsewhere within the Delta. Contractor drum/bulk POL delivery to specific outlying Delta sites is currently in progress and should increase. Military drivers are to be trained and will provide a local delivery capability.

(2) USARV is identifying highway and water craft assets which might be dedicated to the common service system in support of the Delta. Highway assets have already been increased in the Delta. Two LCM-8's equipped with 10,000 gallon bladders have been tested and will continue to be used for local POL delivery within the Delta.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-2) (U)

(3) The 164th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) is initiating planning to place all future Class V-A ammo requirements exclusively with DMAC ASP's. Complete reliance on Delta ASP's is being developed between 164th CAG and US Army Support Command Saigon, thus eliminating the past routine practice of requesting ammunition directly from the Long Binh Depot for delivery by the Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) to stagingfields in the Delta. The number and locations of US ASP's in the Delta will be reviewed for adequacy by USARV. The 164th CAG is reviewing organic transport assets against mission responsibilities in order to obtain sufficient air/surface assets to accomplish the unit responsibility for pickup and delivery of ammo from ASP's to unit operating sites. The 164th CAG will advise 1st Log Comd of changes desired in numbers and locations of Delta ASP's.

(4) Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) is preparing POL pipeline installation requests to forward to Director of Construction, MACV. Permanent installation will be identified. DMAC will identify the highway sections and bridges which should be repaired and upgraded in order to improve highway ammo and POL delivery capability.

(5) The Saigon Support Command Movement Control Center (MCC) will be colocated with the TMA regional office in the Delta in order to provide the units with total transportation management from a single location. As a separate action, USARV has requested MACV assistance in increasing the ARVN transportation role in IV CTZ in support of US forces directly supporting ARVN combat units. Isolated sites will continue to receive aerial resupply. CSAS assets will be used when appropriate and in accordance with CSAS mission responsibilities.

(6) Follow-up on actions identified are:

(a) The MACV Transportation Advisor Division will determine the ability of ARVN to respond to USARV requirements in conjunction with Common Service Support in the Delta.

(b) MACV J42 (Ammunition) with J46 should explore the possibility of expanding the current RVNAF-US Ammunition Agreement to include ARVN assumption of responsibility for all ammunition operations in the Delta. The agreement now excludes Class V-A and Class V issued by the 164th CAG. This will be brought to MACV's attention by separate correspondence.

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c. (U) Reference item concerning "Self-Help Program", page 103, paragraph A1; concur. Guidelines on the self-help program are contained in USAFV Pamphlet 515-1, and USAID booklet "Helping People Help Themselves".

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Concentration of Civic Action", page 103, paragraph A2; concur. Guidelines for conducting an effective civic action program are contained in FM 41-10 and USAFV Pamphlet 515-1.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Large Projects Reaching a Limited Number of People", page 103, paragraph A3; concur. Coordination of civic action projects must be initiated with COMUSMACV advisors and province and village officials to determine if the people want the project, if it is of a local need and to ensure that it can be supported locally once the military withdraws. It also has to be determined whether or not the project supports GVN objectives and goals. Policies of initiating civic action projects are contained in FM 41-10 and USAFV Pamphlet 515-1.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Circumventing GVN Agencies", page 103, paragraph A4; concur. All projects must be coordinated through GVN officials as agencies. RVNAF forces should be incorporated in the project as supervisors and/or laborers. The use of RVNAF forces enhances the image of GVN in the eyes of the people as well as trains the forces in ways to conduct civic action. Specific guidelines are contained in Annex H (CIVIC ACTION) to Combined Campaign Plan 1970.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Long Range Projects", page 104, paragraph A5; concur. Projects should be initiated only when they are thoroughly coordinated and approved by COMUSMACV advisors and province and village officials. The more permanent type units, such as support units, should be the only units that undertake long range projects, and in addition, they should be prepared to assume responsibility for projects undertaken by combat units that are forced to depart. This provides continuity to the overall program. Policies and guidelines are contained in FM 41-10 and USAFV Pamphlet 515-1.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Needs of the People", page 104, paragraph A6; concur. Coordination with local GVN is a must. Guidelines on coordination of civic action projects are contained within existing directives and regulations.

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AVHGC-DST (17 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1970 (KCS CSFOR-65) (R-2) (U)

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Reduction in USAPAV personnel on a percentage basis", page 104, paragraph A8. Concur with recommendation that Manpower Survey be conducted to review USAPAV activities and establish future requirements for work. Reduction in personnel in certain activities on a percentage basis related to other command activities is not a sound practice in all cases. There are activities which will acquire an increased workload due to retrograde operations. This appears to apply to USAPAV. USAPAV is being tentatively scheduled for a Manpower Survey in September 1970.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Stevedore Strike", page 106, paragraph B3; concur. USAFV O PLAN 94-69 (Work Stoppage, Saigon Port) (U) provides for military assumption of contractor missions in cases where work stoppages occur because of a strike or enemy action. The plan is updated semiannually in June and December. Paragraph 3d(5), USAFV O PLAN 94-69 provides for the training by 1st Log Comd of personnel of units tasked to provide augmentation personnel.

k. (C) Reference item concerning "Initial Guidance - Keystone Cardinal", page 107, paragraph C1: Concur in the need for timely dissemination and understanding of initial guidance. It should be pointed out that 1st Log Comd participated in all meetings in which Keystone procedures were established and had an opportunity to influence decisions therein by contributing their expertise. Apparently, 1st Log Comd had difficulty passing information gained from these meetings to subordinate elements prior to publication and distribution of the USAFV Logistics Guidance - Keystone Cardinal. In addition to the difficulty in solidifying retrograde procedures, the late receipt of the USAFV and DA LOI caused a delay in publication of the USAFV Logistics Guidance - Keystone Cardinal. Also confusion on required documentation was caused by a 1st Log Comd (subordinate battalion) commander who unilaterally dictated documentation standards contrary to prior agreement. In Keystone Bluejay, USAFV provided advanced copies of logistics instructions, and published and distributed the logistics instructions without waiting for receipt of USAFV and DA LOI's.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "Rail Contract", page 108, paragraph C3; concur. 1st Log Comd had only 30 days after receipt of the PR&C to submit a request for proposal to the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS), receive an answer or proposal from the VNRS, submit the proposal to USAPAV for evaluation, start and complete negotiations with the VNRS, draw up a contract, and approve the contract. G4 Services Division has informally informed concerned personnel in the office of the Comptroller that in the future a minimum of 60 days procurement lead time will be required on PR&C for railway equipment maintenance.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-05) (R-2) (U)

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Weather Delays", page 108, paragraph C4; concur. Scheduling of vessels for ports in I and II CTZ during the months of November and December should be done with the knowledge that considerable delays in discharging because of bad weather are probable. The requirement for increased shallow draft capability for transshipment of cargo must be anticipated.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Cargo Bookings", page 109, paragraph C6; concur. Lack of stowage planning of vessels has resulted in the under-utilization of available ship space. Therefore, sufficient time for stowage planning, as well as for staging cargo, is important.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Rats Aboard Ship", page 110, paragraph C8; concur. These vessels were contracted by civilian petroleum firms who supply POL products to the Army. These vessels do not meet MSTS standards and therefore, jeopardize the health of cargo handlers. Civilian petroleum firms should make use of MSTS Controlled shipping in order to preclude a recurrence of this nature. This recommendation will be forwarded to MACV by separate correspondence.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Ship Diversion", page 111, paragraph C11; concur. Ship diversions were made during the recent monsoon season and the ammunition transshipped by shallow draft vessel in order to reduce waiting time and to expedite the ammunition to its destination. However, there are times when vessels must be put in hold when the RVN ports are filled. Holding a vessel outside RVN is far less expensive than having it wait in RVN waters.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Exchange for Road Wheel Arm Assemblies for Combat Vehicles", page 112, paragraph C13; concur. In many instances units have been unable to assemble and DX roadwheel arm assemblies because of delays resulting from multiple requisitions. Recommend that USATACOM explore the feasibility of listing roadwheel arm assemblies as a complete assembly for issue.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Prepositioning of Major Assemblies", page 112, paragraph C14; concur. Recommend that AMC study the method of prepositioning major assemblies used in RVN with a view toward Army-wide adoption.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-2) (U)

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Repair and Return Program for CE Equipment", page 113, paragraph C15; concur. USAFV Msg AVHGD-MDM, 070757Z Jan 70, advises all evacuating DS/GS units to survey their historical records and attempt immediate reconciliation with appropriate CONUS depots for CE items which have not been acknowledged as received. This message further advises that every attempt should be made to trace items through postal and transportation channels prior to initiating action to adjust property records IAW AR 735-11 or AR 15-6. Instructions for follow-up action have been sent to the field and units maintain a receipt copy of 2407's for equipment being repaired in CONUS Depots. All of the above procedures will be incorporated in a supplement, presently being written, to USAFV Reg 750-31.

t. (U) Reference item concerning "Diagnostic Test Equipment", page 113, paragraph C10; concur. GO/NO-GO type test equipment would be beneficial to this command and save time and money for the government. Recommend that AMC develop such test equipment, and that COMARMC place added emphasis on the use of diagnostic test equipment.

u. (C) Reference item concerning "Day Light Pumping Operations", page 115, paragraph C20; concur. The procedure as cited has proven highly beneficial in its causing a significant reduction in pipeline losses. The procedure has been made policy within USAFV. Due to the fact that doctrine on pipeline operations calls for their installation only in secure areas, it is felt that it would be unnecessary to take action on this recommendation at any higher levels.

v. (U) Reference item concerning "Commingled Remains", page 115, paragraph C21; concur. The possibility of commingled remains increases as joint American/ARVN operations increase. Periodic Command letters are published on all aspects of memorial activities. Continued emphasis will be placed on adherence to USAFV Reg 638-30 which states that the senior US person involved will attempt to take charge. Continued emphasis on the wearing of ID tags is a necessity especially for air crew and passenger personnel.

w. (U) Reference item concerning "Leakage of FOL Tanks", page 116, paragraph C23; concur. Painting JP-4 storage tanks with epoxy will increase the expected life of the tank from 1½ years to 15-20 years. Subject to the availability of epoxy paint, future tanks will be painted with epoxy paint.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-2) (U)

x. (C) Reference item concerning "Decreased Logistical Capaocility, Keystone Cardinal", page 118, paragraph F1; concur. Premature standdown of logistical elements in redeploying units places an unnecessary workload on 1st Log Comd and allows the redeploying unit to abrogate its responsibilities for organizational and direct support maintenance. USARV is taking action to request that organic maintenance elements of divisions and separate brigades, which are inactivating or redeploying without equipment, be retained up to 90 days after the departure date of the parent organization to assist in the processing and repair of equipment.

y. (C) Reference item concerning "Ammunition Planning Factor", page 118, paragraph F2; concur. The need is evident for developing better ammo planning factors for use in planning storage space, discharge capabilities, thru put capabilities, troop basis and related matters. Attention is invited to the following:

- (1) Figures displayed are issue figures not expenditures.
- (2) Included in the 20% (of the 80/20 breakout) is an appreciable percentage of rocket artillery (2.75" FFAR's).
- (3) Straight line computations based on tonnage by caliber per battalion per month are risky in a situation such as Vietnam. It can be stated with reasonable certainty that issues for comparable artillery battalions will vary considerably from CT4 to CT2.
- (4) FM 9-6 contains no planning factors such as those described here.

z. (U) Reference item concerning "Ammunition Stockage in I CTZ", page 119, paragraph F3; concur. The Da Nang SUPCOM should be adequately stocked before November to preclude weather seriously hampering the ammunition posture. However, the preferred method of ammunition stockage in I CTZ during inclement weather is to react quickly using shallow draft vessels for thru put to port sites in I CTZ. Sufficient ammunition on the ground is helpful; however, this is a temporary measure. What is necessary is a back up capability, shallow draft vessels, which can haul from CRB all up and down the coast, during inclement weather and fair weather. Experience during Dec 69 - Jan 70 with dedicated LST's for movement of ammo from CRB up the coast to discharge sites servicing ASP's substantiates this.

aa. (U) Reference item concerning "Property Disposal Accounting Procedures", page 120, paragraph F4; concur. This procedure would provide a more accurate picture of C/h total and eliminate large items in case of a contractor's failure to perform.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (k-2) (U)

ab. (U) Reference item concerning "Sole User Circuits- Keystone Cardinal", page 120, paragraph G1; nonconcur. All circuit requests approved by USANV were installed within 15 days of the request. There were no outstanding circuit requests on termination of the operation.

ac. (C) Reference item concerning "Communications difficulty between ship pilots and berthing tugs and harbormasters", page 120, paragraph G2. The requirement for the light FM radio for ship pilots appears valid. Nonconcur that squad sized radios are unsuitable. Conversation with 1st Logistical Command Harbor Craft Officer established that radio referred to as being unsuitable was AN/PKC-77, which is not a squad radio. Harbor Craft Officer agreed that the AN/PKC-88, the squad radio, would meet the requirement. Recommend that those Transportation Boat Companies which have added mission of furnishing ship pilots for harbor operations initiate MTCs action to reflect added mission and requirement for AN/PKC-88 radios. Submission of MTCs will be considered as an exception to current moratorium on MTCs actions.

ad. (U) Reference item concerning "Misuse of Port Operations Assets", page 121, paragraph H1; nonconcur. barges are being used as cargo lighters at temporary rock off-loading sites to preclude the cost of dredging areas to allow for loaded barges to dock for off-load to land area. Cost of operating a barge for one month is estimated by MSTC at \$1,000. Average length of time for operation of temporary off-loading site is six months. Mobilization cost for a small dredge is \$75,000 plus \$1.75/m³ of dredged material pumped. Dredge assets are limited and must be programmed far in advance and consequently would not be responsive to the Delta Transportation Plan. It appears both economical and expedient to continue to use the barges as cargo lighters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

~~L. D. MURRAY~~

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (17 Feb 70) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Logistical Command for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

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