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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (5 Jun 70)

FOR OT UT 701204

12 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:




ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC

Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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184th Ordnance Battalion

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96226

AVCA QN-OD-B

25 February

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCE GCFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN: AVCA
QN-GO-H, APO 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCO GO-O, APO 96384

Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities:

a. During the reporting period, the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), (Direct Support/General Support) continued to perform its mission as a conventional ammunition battalion. The battalion has been engaged in combat service support operations during the entire 92 day reporting period.

b. During the reporting period the battalion's assets were redistributed and altered as follows:

(1) On 4 January 1970, the 183th Ordnance Company relocated its personnel and administrative area from Camp Schmidt to the 45th General Support Group Logistical Center.

(2) There was no mission change as a result of this move; however, it significantly reduced the travel time and distance for unit personnel to get to and from their duty positions at ASP #341, which is located in the Logistical Center.

c. During the reporting period the following changes of command took place:

(1) CPT Charles E. Polk assumed command of the 820th Ordnance Company on 8 December 1969.

(2) CPT Kenneth C. Collier assumed command of the 630th Ordnance Company on 2 January 1970.

FOR OT UT
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Inclosure

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Operational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. During the reporting period elements of the battalion received satisfactory ratings in the following inspections:

- (1) Annual General Inspection: 630th Ordnance Company, on 15 January 1970.
- (2) Annual General Inspection: 504th Ordnance Detachment (Renovation), on 15 January 1970.

e. Mission: The battalion's mission is to provide general support ammunition service to all ASP's in the Qui Nhon Support Command and direct support ammunition service to local unit's in Qui Nhon, An Khe, Pleiku, Bong Son and Tuy Hoa. The battalion is responsible for the operation and security of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot and Brass Yard Annex, Ammunition Supply Point #340 at An Khe and Ammunition Supply Point #341 at Pleiku. The battalion provides personnel and equipment to operate the Ammunition Supply Point at LZ English (Bong Son).

f. Mission Activities: During the week of 12 January 1970, the battalion participated in an experiment of unloading ammunition from inclosed Sealand Vans at the Ammunition Base Depot, ASP #340, ASP #341 and LZ English to determine the problems involved in off-loading ammunition from these vans. The vans were unloaded in adequate time with no apparent difficulties.

g. Production: The following tabulated data shows the battalion's output for the reporting period:

<u>QHABD</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Issues	16,883	13,186	20,628
Receipts	20,986	12,674	23,651
Warehousing	9,047	8,219	8,141
Total	45,916	34,079	52,420

<u>PLEIKU</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Issues	6,559	5,464	5,114
Receipts	8,333	5,477	4,152
Warehousing	4,792	4,796	4,698
Total	19,724	15,737	13,964

<u>AN KHE</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Issues	2,178	1,595	4,513
Receipts	2,821	1,410	4,554
Warehousing	2,869	1,099	2,281
Total	7,868	4,104	11,348

<u>LZ ENGLISH</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Issues	2,644	2,432	2,321
Receipts	2,760	2,484	2,611
Warehousing	223	418	1,073
Total	5,627	5,334	6,005

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Operational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<u>QNABD BRASS YARD</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Issues	952	480	100
Receipts	962	600	300
Warehousing	<u>484</u>	<u>390</u>	<u>250</u>
Total	2,397	1,470	550

TOTALS:	QNABD	133,415
	PLEIKU	49,425
	AN KHE	23,320
	LZ ENGLISH	16,966
	QNABD BRASS YARD	<u>4,517</u>
GRAND TOTAL		223,643

h. Enemy Activities: During the reporting period the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot suffered one enemy sapper attack on 4 January 1970. There were no casualties and only negligible damage due to this attack. The after action report is included as Inclosure 2.

i. Friendly Activities:

(1) On 10 January 1970, CHARLIE Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division arrived at Camp Humper to provide additional security for the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot during the TET period. CHARLIE Company began operations on 11 January 1970.

(2) On 17 January 1970, a PPS-5 radar was installed at tower #32 on the north ridge of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot to increase security for the TET period.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Observations: The 184th Ordnance Battalion is authorized three conventional ammunition companies with essentially like TO&E and basically the same mission. Two of these companies are in support of the Ammunition Base Depot, LZ English ASP, ASP #340 and the third operates ASP #341 at Pleiku. All units are suffering a shortage of personnel which affects the mission to varying degrees.

(2) Evaluation: The shortage of personnel in the three companies was found mostly in the lower pay grades, i.e., E-3 and E-4. This necessitated the personnel in these pay grades to work much longer hours, thus reducing their effectiveness. They were also required to serve as perimeter guard, as often as every other day. The extended work load and security requirements created a morale problem, reduced the productivity per man hour and resulted in a decrease in storage standards.

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Operational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(3) Solution: Personnel not bearing an ammunition MOS were assigned to the battalion for retraining and utilization. The majority of these replacements had infantry MOS's. These personnel were readily retrained and fit into the battalion operation with few difficulties. Although the percent of fill in the ammunition MOS's rose to only 46.3%, the increase of personnel and decrease of individual work load has improved the battalion's morale and increased it's productivity per man hour.

b. Mission:

(1) Observations: The 184th Ordnance Battalion operates ASP #340 at An Khe, ASP #341 at Pleiku, and the ASP at LZ English. All ammunition is sent to these ASP's by convoy over the available road net.

(2) Evaluation: Intelligence sources indicated increased interdiction of the local road net during the forthcoming TET period. If the ammunition convoys were delayed for any extensive period of time, serious ammunition shortages could develop in these areas.

(3) Solution: The on the ground stockage at these 3 locations was substantially increased to insure an adequate supply of ammunition would be available at all times to using units.

c. Maintenance:

(1) Observations: The battalion was obtaining an unusually high number of failures on road side CMMI inspections indicating unsatisfactory maintenance standards.

(2) Evaluation: All vehicles in the 184th Ordnance Battalion were inspected after motor stables each morning by the respective company motor pools. Due to the large influx of vehicles to each motor pool, shortcomings and deficiencies were apparently unnoticed by the inspectors. Lack of aggressive supervision by officers and key NCO's was also apparent.

(3) Solution: A battalion technical inspection team was organized to inspect all vehicles leaving the battalion compound. This battalion TI is accomplished after the vehicle has gone through company motor stables and a company TI. The only duty of this team is to insure that all deficiencies are corrected before a vehicle is dispatched. Since the beginning of this program, there has been a significant improvement in the material readiness posture of the battalion. This is emphasized by the battalion pass rate of roadside spot check inspections, which has climbed from 54% in January to 85% in February.

d. Personnel:

(1) Observation: Recently, during a practice yellow alert a despondent member of one unit of this command tried to take his own life. He placed a round in the chamber and shot himself through the left chest, missing his heart but collapsing his left lung.

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Operational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) Evaluation: The man on one previous occasion had been admitted to the hospital for mental disorder. When he was released from the hospital he seemed in very good health. The day the man tried to take his life some of the men in the company had noticed he was acting peculiar but no one reported this until after the man tried to take his life.

(3) Recommendations: That the supervisors be aggressive in learning the behavior patterns of their men, especially those men with a history of mental disorder or possible mental disorder. Peculiarities should be noted and immediately communicated up and down the chain of command for the appropriate NCO and officer supervisors. Further recommend that men with mental disorders be carefully evaluated before returning them to duty and a detailed statement from the medical facility of the man's condition, be sent to the commanding officer when the man is returned to duty.


o. Training:

(1) Observations: Water truck drivers in this battalion receive no training in fire fighting techniques.

(2) Evaluation: Water truck drivers on several occasions have been required to fight a variety of ammunition fires. Prior to assignment to this battalion, they have had no formal training, to include the necessary safety precautions involved.

(3) Recommendations: That classes be continuously set up by qualified personnel to instruct water truck drivers in the correct manner to approach and fight an ammunition fire, to include required safety precautions.

2 Incl
Organizational Chart
CIMBD After Action Report


FRANK G. JOHNSON
LTC, OrdC
Commanding

AVCA QN-GC-H (1 Mar 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report/Lessons Learned, 184th Ordnance Battalion
(Ammo), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS GSPen-65 (R2)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Men, APO 96286 17 March 1970


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GC-C, APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

- a. Section II, paragraph a: Concur. Personnel.
- b. Section II, paragraph b: Concur. Mission.
- c. Section II, paragraph c: Concur. Maintenance.
- d. Section II, paragraph d: Concur. Personnel.
- e. Section II, paragraph e: Concur. The 184th Ordnance Battalion will be directed to set up such a class.
- f. Inclosure 2: Concur. Equipment required is presently on order and will be installed as soon as possible.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


G. L. LAMBORN
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

TEL: QN 2161

AVCA GO-MH (25 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 184th Ordnance Battalion for period ending 31 Jan 70 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

3 APR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning defoliation, inclosure 2, page 5, paragraph 6. Concur. No suitable technique has been developed for defoliation near perimeter wire. Some means should be developed which will not only kill the vegetation but cause it to disappear without burning to avoid collapsing perimeter wire.

b. Reference item concerning seismic devices, inclosure 2, page 6, paragraph 6. Concur. Seismic and other sensors have been issued to USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon in quantity. These have been emplaced around logistic installations. The success of this program has been extraordinary. Accordingly, this practice should be included in doctrine for rear area security and defense of logistic installations.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862



DONALD R. WILLIAMS
LTC, AGC
Deputy AG

CF:
USASUPCOM, QNH
184th Ord Bn

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AVHGC-DST (25 Feb 70) 3d Ind

13 APR 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Vegetation Control", Inclosure 2, page 5, paragraph 6: concur. Chemical defoliant is available and is authorized where their use does not endanger friendly crops. MACV Directive 525-1, dated 12 August 1969, outlines the procedures to be used for requesting defoliation projects. Due to the extreme toxicity of chemical herbicides, stringent controls must be enforced to prevent crop damage. In those cases where potential crop damage precludes the use of a chemical defoliant (herbicides), diesel fuel is the most satisfactory substitute. It is an excellent contact herbicide and does not need to be burned to kill vegetation. In certain cases defoliation will be more effective if the diesel fuel is applied without burning since the toxic qualities are volatilized and lost during the burning process.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY,
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd
184th Ord Bn

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GPOP-DT (25 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo),
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D.D. CLINE

2LT, AGC

Asst AG



ATTACK ON QUI NHON AMMUNITION BASE DEPOT
4 January 1970

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1. (u) PURPOSE AND SCOPE: To review the events of 4 January 1970 concerning initial explosions and subsequent fires in the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot and allied operations in the immediate area.

2. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain The Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is located in Valley "F" Phu Thanh, Republic of Vietnam. It is located at the northern base of the Cu Mong Pass and is surrounded on four sides by higher ground.

(1) To the east there is a high ridge line with extremely dense vegetation. On top of the ridgeline there are several trails but there is no source of water resupply; however, during the monsoon season intermittent streams would supply adequate water to supply personnel for an extended period of time.

(2) To the south is Cu Mong Pass which is protected by the 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, 26 Regiment, ROKA Capital Division (Tiger).

(3) To the west there are high hills with extremely dense vegetation, numerous valleys, well used trails and sufficient streams to provide a source of water resupply.

(4) To the north there is a natural avenue of approach with a low ridgeline, dense vegetation and a stream that flows from the ABD, through the Village of Phu Tai into Bac Ho Lac.

b. The following intelligence was available to this headquarters on 4 January 1970:

(1) A ROKA operation was conducted in the vicinity of Mt. Vung Chau on 11-15 December with the following results:

(a) 12 December 1800 hours contact was made at CR 030189 with 5 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's and 1 M-16 captured.

(b) 13 December 1969, 1010 hours, at CR 064217, 1 AK-47 and 2 Hand Grenades were found in a cave. At 1445 hours 2 carbines and 2 blankets were found in a cave at CR 035190/ At 1700 hours 1 B-40 Rocket Launcher, 8 rds B-40, 20 hand grenades and 250 rds of small arms ammo were found in a cave at CR 034185.

(c) 14 December 1969, at CR 030193, 2 carbines were found in a cave.

(d) 15 December 1969, 1305 hours contact was made resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 weapon captured.

(2) ROKA intelligence sources reported that no contact was made during a 5 company operation in the vicinity of Vung Chau Mountain, during the period 20-25 December 1969.

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- (3) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 27 December 1969, 10 VC appeared at Phu Tai Hamlet (CR 015215) and collected 60 Kg of rice and then moved to Mt. De Sin (CR 0320).
- (4) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 28 December 1969, 5 VC appeared at Phu Tai (2) Hamlet (CR 020212) and collected 40 kg of rice then moved to Vung Chau Mountain (CR 0319).
- (5) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 28 December 1969 15 VC appeared at Long Van Hamlet (CR 011248) and collected 20 kg of rice, then moved to Vung Chau Mountain (CR 0221).
- (6) An ARVN Company started a 6 day operation on 30 December 1969 at 0800 hours. They contacted the enemy on 4 January 1969 at 1430 hours killing 5 VC.
- (7) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 31 December 1969, 9 VC appeared at Phu Tai (2) hamlet (CR 020212) and then moved to Vung Chau Mountain (CR 0321).
- (8) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 31 December 1969, 10 VC appeared at Long Van Hamlet (CR 010249).
- (9) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 1 January 1970. 8 VC appeared at Long Van Hamlet (CR 010249) and collected 20 kg of rice and then moved to Vung Chau Mountain (CR 0321).
- (10) Enemy activity in the Qui Nhon Area was at a low.

3.(c) BACKGROUND TO ACTION:

- a. On the night of 3 January 1970, 43 towers were manned in the QNABD.
- b. On the night of 3 January 1970, there were 6 ambushes in the area surrounding the depot at the following locations:
 - (1) Approximately 100 meters to the front of tower 38.
 - (2) Approximately 100 meters to the front of tower 36.
 - (3) Approximately 100 meters to the front of tower 34.
 - (4) Approximately 150 meters to the front of tower 30.
 - (5) Approximately 150 meters to the front of tower 15.
 - (6) Approximately 200 meters to the front of tower 20.
- c. Eight dog patrols were posted in the QNABD, the 1st relief patrolled the following locations:
 - (1) From tower 14 to tower 15.

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- (2) From tower 15 to tower 17.
- (3) From tower 17 to tower 19.
- (4) From tower 21 to tower 23.
- (5) From tower 35 to tower 36 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (6) From tower 36 to tower 37 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (7) From tower 37 to tower 38 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (8) From tower 38 to tower 40 at the bottom of the ridge.

d. Eight new dog patrols were posted at 0001 hours at the following locations:

- (1) From tower 13 to tower 14.
- (2) From tower 14 to tower 15.
- (3) From tower 17 to tower 19.
- (4) From tower 21 to tower 23.
- (5) From tower 35 to tower 36 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (6) From tower 36 to tower 37 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (7) From tower 37 to tower 38 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (8) From tower 38 to tower 40 at the bottom of the ridge.

e. At 0010 the dog patrol between towers 13 and 14 was relieved and not replaced due to illness of the dog handler.

f. On the night of 3 January 1970, there were three roving patrols in the QNABD.

g. On the night of 3 January 1970, there was one 5000 gallon tanker and two 1000 gallon water trucks stationed in the QNABD.

4.(c) SUMMARY OF EVENTS: (For Location of Pads See Inclosure 1)

a. At approximately 0130 hours an explosion was observed on pad 38. A fire started on the pad.

b. At 0131 hours two water trucks were dispatched to pad 38.

c. At 0132 hours remaining water trucks and roving patrols were dispatched to the depot from Camp Humber.

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- d. At 0135 hours water trucks reached pad 38 and immediately began fighting the fire.
- e. At 0140 hours Compound Complex Foxtrot was placed on yellow alert.
- f. At 0142 hours two 10 man react forces were called and directed to report to the depot as rapidly as possible.
- g. At 0143 hours 8th Transportation Group and 5th Maintenance Battalion were contacted and requested to place additional water tankers on dispatch.
- h. At 0145 hours the flames on pad 38 was extinguished, but an additional five minutes of cooling with water was required on the burned area to cool the heated rounds and insure embers were extinguished.
- i. At 0204 hours a third react force was sent to the brass yard.
- j. At 0210 hours an explosion was observed on pad 36. A fire started on the pad and water trucks were dispatched to that location.
- k. At 0211 hours water trucks reached pad 36 and began fighting the fire.
- l. At 0211 hours requested one additional water trailer from Long My Depot.
- m. At 0211 hours requested water trucks from 8th Transportation Group and 5th Maintenance Battalion arrived at the depot.
- n. At 0215 hours all pad guards were posted.
- o. At 0217 hours all fires were extinguished in the depot. However, there was an additional 5 minutes of cooling with water on the burned area of pad 36 to cool the heated rounds and insure embers were extinguished.
- q. At 0225 hours a 5000 gallon tanker arrived from US Army Depot, Long My.
- r. At 0227 hours the charge removed from pad 34 exploded, causing no damage.
- s. At 0230 hours a systematic search of all pads in the immediate vicinity was begun which concluded negative results.
- t. At 0230 hours a sweep of the immediate area of the blown pads was begun which concluded with negative results.
- u. At 0259 hours personnel from the Battalion EOD Section arrived at the depot.
- v. At 0700 hours a sweep of the interior of the depot was started and the point of entry of the sapper was found. The fence approximately 60 meters to the right of tower 13 had been separated and trip flares had been tied with sections of torn cloth. Tracks led from this point to pad 38.

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w. At 0700 hours a sweep outside the fence line along the east side of the depot was started. Tracks were found leading up the ridge from the fence at the point of entry but were lost in the rough terrain.

x. At 0900 hours all sweeps were finished with no further results.

5. (C) ANALYSIS OF EVENTS:

a. Between the hours 0130 and 0227 three explosions occurred within the depot. From the description and results of the explosions it appears that these explosions were caused by a satchel charge similar to the type previously employed in the QNABD.

b. Several pamphlets were found in the area reflecting a much stronger propaganda issue than pamphlets found in the past, by playing up racial issues in the United States.

c. A stick 2 feet long wrapped on one end with cloth strips like those used to tie off the trip flares was found near one of the pads. Indications are that this stick was used to push the satchel charges deeper into the ammunition stacks, to make the removal of the charge extremely difficult.

d. The damage due to this attack was negligible. A complete listing of items lost by DCDIC is as follows:

0226	49	0282	1
0445	91		

e. The calculated cost of destroyed ammunition was 3375 dollars.

6. (C) OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

Situation: Quick reaction has proven to be a primary factor to successfully combat ammunition fires. Experience has shown that ammunition fires must be attacked vigorously with large quantities of water within 3-5 minutes, to successfully bring it under control. Unit water trucks do not provide an adequate means for fighting fires.

Observation: The immediate response to the fires on the two pads kept the loss low and enabled battalion operations to resume in a minimal amount of time.

Recommendation: That this battalion be authorized fire trucks with well trained crews for the purpose of fighting ammunition fires and that a training program be set up to instruct water truck drivers and MHE personnel in the techniques of fighting ammunition fires.

Situation: Extensive vegetation afforded the sappers good concealment between the fence-line rows.

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Observation: At the point of entry of the sappers, vegetation grows to within approximately 5 yards of the perimeter wire. Heavy equipment cannot be used in this area due to the slope of the ground. Hand cutting is extremely time consuming and yields little results.

Recommendation: That commercial herbicide be made available for use in areas where other means of vegetation control are unfeasible. Ranch-hand operations should be started over the entire area as soon as possible.

Situation: Numerous depressions are present at this location in the depot perimeter.

Observation: This portion of the perimeter has many cuts and depressions which make total observation of the surrounding area impossible.

Recommendation: That a sufficient number of seismic devices be made available to improve the detection capability of tower guards.

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