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AUTHORITY

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 19 May 1976

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (11 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 702072 20 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION
This report is being distributed to the National Defense University, Department of the Army, 794. 100000, in accordance with the instructions of the Adjutant General.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 93D MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO 96238

AVBGF-IC

30 April 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Mission. The Commanding Officer, 93d Military Police Battalion provides Military Police and Provost Marshal type services to sub-area coordinators, tactical units, commanders without organic military police, and others, as directed by the Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group.

b. Organization. See Inclosure 1.

c. Persomel, Morale and Discipline.

(1) Decorations:

- (a) Soldier's Medal 3
- (b) Bronze Star with "V" 2
- (c) Bronze Star Meritorious17
- (d) Air Medal 2
- (e) Army Commendation Medal with "V"11
- (f) Army Commendation Medal Meritorious16
- (g) Purple Heart 2

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
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(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures.

(a) Assignments:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
KELLEY, GEORGE C.	CPT	CO	3 Feb
MEDLEY, NEIL A.	2LT	Plat Leader	4 Feb
HARDMAN, WILLIARD	CPT	S-2 Officer	9 Feb
MILLER, JAMES C.	LTC	CO	17 Feb
KNIGHT, DANIEL C.	1LT	Plat Leader	12 Mar
HARTING, BRUCE W.	CPT	Adjutant	13 Mar
MILLAR, ROBERT A.	CPT	S-4 Officer	13 Mar
CLARK, LYNN B.	1LT	Plat Leader	15 Mar
KEPPEL, ROBERT D.	CPT	Plat Leader	16 Mar
TAMAYO, JOE	1SG	1SG	16 Mar
VEGA, ROY D.	1LT	Plat Leader	20 Mar
LANGBERG, VERNON A.	SFC	Plat Sgt	26 Mar
EATER, ROBERT M.	1LT	Plat Leader	5 Apr
ANDERSON, GORDON W.	1LT	Plat Leader	6 Apr
CHAVIS, ROBERT L.	CPT	CO	12 Apr
FLORENCE, GARY M.	CPT	CO	15 Apr

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(b) Departures:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
SILVA, ROBERT	PSG	Plat Sgt	1 Feb
LICATE, JOSEPH J.	SFC	Plat Sgt	9 Feb
MILLER, DONALD D.	CPT	Opns Officer	9 Feb
SANTIAGO, RICARDO	SFC	Mess Sgt	10 Feb
ALEXANDER, JOHN T.	LTC	CO	17 Feb
LAGOMI, PAUL V.	CPT	S-2 Officer	19 Feb
EPPERSON, ROGER L.	CPT	Asst S-3 Off	19 Feb
SHORT, ROBERT	SFC	Plat Sgt	20 Feb
HEBENSTORFF, CLARENCE	MAJ	PM	27 Feb
BROWN THOMAS	CPT	Plat Leader	7 Mar
ANDERS, EARL L.	SFC	Plat Sgt	12 Mar
JACHNICKY, LUBOMIR M.	CPT	Adjutant	13 Mar
COLEMAN, JEFFERSON	2LT	Plat Leader	15 Mar
GESCHKE, GARY W.	1LT	Plat Leader	21 Mar
TAYLOR, JULIUS	SFC	Plat Sgt	21 Mar
BASILE, LEONARD A.	CPT	S-4 Officer	26 Mar
HENDRICKSON, TIMOTHY	1LT	Plat Leader	31 Mar
HUNT, FRED M.	SFC	Plat Sgt	31 Mar
JOHNSON, CHARLES W.	CPT	CO	10 Apr
HENSON, CHARLES W.	PSG	Opns Sgt	16 Apr

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
TEBBETTS, ROBERT H.	CPT	CO	26 Apr
CLARK, LYNN R.	LLT	Plat Leader	26 Apr
TAMAYO, JOE	1SG	1SG	26 Apr
BAYLESS, JAMES W.	SFC	Plat Sgt	26 Apr
PALA, ANGEL E.	LLT	Plat Leader	26 Apr
FLORENCE, GARY M.	CPT	CO	26 Apr
KERN, REMAN J.	LLT	Plat Leader	26 Apr
KNIGHT, DANIEL C.	LLT	Plat Leader	26 Apr
MULLEN, LARRY J.	LLT	Plat Leader	26 Apr
CHESTNUT, HERMAN L.	1SG	1SG	26 Apr
QUARFORD, LLOYD D.	SFC	Mess Steward	26 Apr

(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>1</u> Killed	0	0	0	0
<u>2</u> Wounded	0	0	1	1

(b) Non-Battle Losses

<u>1</u> Killed	0	0	0	0
<u>2</u> Injured	1	0	7	8

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(4) Reenlistments:

	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Reenlistments</u>
(a) 1st Term RA	22	5
(b) RA Career	6	6
(c) A.US	59	0
(d) Other	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
(e) Total	87	11

(5) Civilian Personnel

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Employed</u>
(a) Program Six Civilianization	12	11
(b) Augmentation TDA P5-WFPEAA-99 Dated 1 Jan 69	<u>37</u>	<u>34</u>
(c) Total	49	45

(6) R & R

<u>Month</u>	<u>% Utilized</u>
Feb	91
Mar	94
Apr	98

(7) Strengths:

(a) As of 1 Feb 70.

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
34	2	883	919	31	2	803	836

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(b) As of 30 Apr 70.

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
24	2	655	679	24	2	681	705

(8) Extensions of Overseas Tours:

(a) Total Extensions	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Feb	0	19	19
Mar	0	25	25
Apr	0	23	23

(b) Under PL 89-735 (6 mo)	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Feb	0	8	8
Mar	0	6	6
Apr	0	5	5

(9) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) General Courts	0
(b) Special Courts	4
(c) Summary Courts	0
(d) Article 15, UCMJ	60

(10) Congressional Inquiries: 8

(11) Publications:

(a) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #1; General; issued 6 Mar 70.

(b) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #2; Hospitalization; issued 7 Mar 70.

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(c) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #3; Integrity; issued
7 Mar 70.

(d) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #4; Extension of Foreign
Service Tour; issued 11 Mar 70.

(e) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #5; Commander's Open Door;
issued 13 Mar 70.

(f) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #6; SIR/ISR Reporting;
issued 1 Apr 70.

(g) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #7; Use of Firearms and
Rules of Engagement; issued 5 Apr 70.

(h) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #8; Control of Evidence;
issued 7 Apr 70.

(i) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #9; Miscellaneous; issued
10 Apr 70.

(j) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #10; Reports of Survey;
issued 10 Apr 70.

(k) Physical Security Plan, Camp Granite, 30 April 1970.

(l) Police Information Collection Plan, 30 April 1970.

(m) 93d MP Bn LOI 1-70, 560th MP Co, undated.

(n) 93d MP Bn LOI 2-70, 66th MP Co, 10 April 1970.

d. Operations.

(1) The 93d Military Police Battalion area of responsibility extends from the Cambodian border on the west to the South China Sea to the east. From the I Corps/II Corps boundary on the north to the southern boundary of the provinces of Phu Yen, Phu Bon, and Kontum. The five provinces in the 93d Military Police Battalion area of responsibility are Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bon and Phu Yen.

(2) The 93d Military Police Battalion provided Military Police resources in the following manner:

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(a) Direct support of combat units.

1 The 93d MP Bn provides one MP squad in direct support of the 173d Airborne Bde at LZ Uplift.

2 The 93d MP Bn escorted an average of 30 convoys per day, over an average distance of 2100 miles per day.

(b) Control of PW's in US custody.

1 The 93d MP Bn guarded a total of 47 PW's during this reporting period at the 17th Field Hospital, An Khe, 67th Evac Hospital, Qui Nhon, and the 71st Evac Hospital, Pleiku.

2 A total of 38 PW's were escorted from PW Hospitals and LZ English to ARVN PW camps and Hospitals by the 93d MP Bn.

(c) Specialized Physical Security Measures.

1 The 93d MP Bn provides, through the 458th Trans Co (PBR), security for the Qui Nhon Inner Harbor and the Vung Ro Bay harbor. At Qui Nhon this security is intensified around three (3) large electropower (Vinnel Corp) ships, the DeLong Pier, LST Beach/Can Dock area, and the approaches to the causeway. Four watercraft (2 PBR's, 2 Boston Whalers) are used for night security and three watercraft (2 PBR's, 1 Boston Whaler) are utilized during daylight hours. At Vung Ro Bay the main security emphasis is on shipping tied up at the DeLong Pier. At this installation, during the hours of darkness, two watercraft (1 PBR, 1 Boston Whaler) are used and during the daytime one watercraft (PBR) is utilized. An average of 25 Vietnamese watercraft are searched daily and approximately 20 Vietnamese are detained monthly by the 458th Trans Co (PBR) operating in the 93d MP Bn area of responsibility.

2 The 93d MP Bn provides on board security for PX and ammo ships loading and unloading in the Qui Nhon Inner Harbor. During this reporting period, the 93d MP Bn provided security personnel (3-5 men per ship) to guard an average of 11 ships per month. Each ship remains in the harbor approximately 5 days.

3 The 93d MP Bn provides one daytime and three nighttime motorized patrols, plus a static 2-man post, for pipeline security in the Phu Hiep/Vung Ro Bay area. These personnel come from the 127th MP Co (4 95B's) and D/58th Inf (6 11B's).

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4 The 1st platoon, 981st MP Co (SD) attached to the 66th MP Co, has provided an average of 24 sentry dogs each night, walking 8 posts per shift at the ABD, Phu Tai, 2 posts per shift at Lane Army Airfield, An Son, and 2 posts per shift at Tank Farm #2, Qui Nhon. The 3rd platoon, 981st MP Co (SD) attached to C/54 Inf Co, Pleiku, has provided an average of 34 sentry dogs each night, walking 17 posts per shift at the ASP, Pleiku. In An Khe, 16 sentry dogs are utilized each night walking 4 posts per shift at the ASP, 1 post per shift at the Class I yard, 1 post per shift at the Class II & IV yard, and 2 posts per shift at the POL Tank Farm.

5 C/54 Inf Co, on 15 Jan 70, modified its existing patrol operation plan from a 24 hour operation to a 72 hour operation. A 35-40 man infantry patrol is employed daily around the ASP. This patrol remains in the field 72 hours and is replaced by another 35-40 man patrol. This active patrolling has helped deter attacks against the ASP.

6 D/58 Inf Co has modified its operation from a semi-stationary ambush position around Tank Farm #1 and #2 during the Tet season, to a 72 hour active patrol operation. D/58 Inf Co patrols daily with a 15-20 man unit in predesignated areas along the entire Vung Chua Mt. chain. This unit's active patrolling has helped deter attacks against the ABD, Tank Farms #1 and #2, and other US and ARVN installations in the area. D/58 mortar positions fire approximately 15 missions monthly in support of the US Army Installations and facilities in the area.

7 The 66th MP Co and the 560th MP Co have unit responsibility for convoy escort within their areas of responsibility. These units utilize 19 V-100's, 1 2½ ton gun truck and 3 ½ ton scout jeeps in escorting convoys. This force provides escort for convoys on QL #1, QL #14, and QL #19 throughout II CTZ North. These units escort approximately 930 convoys over 60,000 miles each month.

(d) Discipline, Law and Order.

1 With the movement of the 4th Inf Div from Camp Enari, Pleiku, to Camp Radcliff, An Khe, the Provost Marshal's Office, An Khe, previously operated by this battalion, became the responsibility of the 4th Inf Div on 4 Mar 70. The DLO mission on Camp Radcliff became that of the 4th Division releasing 93d MP Bn patrol units to conduct DLO on QL #19 and An Khe City proper. This increase of active patrolling on QL #19 reduced the number of accidents significantly.

2 The 93d MP Bn utilizes a total of 36 day/nighttime Military Police patrols throughout its area of operations. These patrols perform traffic, highway and DLO type missions.

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3 The 93d MP Bn utilizes a total of 20 day/nighttime Combined Police patrols throughout its area of operation.

4 Seven checkpoints were operational during this reporting period and were manned by the 93d MP Bn. An eighth checkpoint has been temporarily established north of Kontum to check and assist drivers traveling on QL #114 north to Dak To and Ben Het during enemy activity in the area of Dak Seang.

5 1,640 Military Police Reports were initiated during the reporting quarter.

6 Two radar and four mirror box units have been utilized daily throughout the 93d MP Bn area of responsibility.

7 The 93d MP Bn processed 231 SIR's during the reporting period.

e. Training.

1 Capsule and guardmount training is conducted daily by all units within the area.

2 OJT of 95B's is being done by all units to replace critical soft-skills MOS's.

3 On Feb 9-10, this unit conducted a 3 day in-country training program for approximately 30 Military Policemen arriving from CONUS.

4 This command trained approximately 60 military personnel from the Qui Nhon Support Command in military police subjects during February. These personnel were utilized as security police on the Qui Nhon Army Airfield.

5 Five personnel attended the Physical Security School held at the 18th MP Bde from 16-22 Feb 70. This training has enhanced the Physical Security Program throughout II CTZ North.

6 During March, the 8th CID presented a class on marijuana and dangerous drugs to members of this command in an effort, not only to show military police the harmful effects of drugs, but also for their recognition of its use by others.

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7 On 18 April, nine personnel were sent to the generator training course at 97th MP Bn. This training is necessary in a combat zone when electric power may fail at any time.

8 One NCO and an enlisted man from the 93d MP Bn have been assisting in the training of QC's at the II Corp ARVN QC Training Center in Pleiku. This program has been highly effective.

9 Coordination has been affected with the 173d Airborne Bde to train 93d MP Bn infantry personnel at the 173d Airborne Bde school in the 11B MOS. This training will provide newly arrived infantrymen with a better understanding of infantry tactics in Vietnam and relieve the gaining unit of having to conduct this training.

f. Intelligence. Counterintelligence

(1) During the period a separate S-2 section was established due to the size of the battalion area of operation. The primary sources of combat intelligence are the individual Military Policeman, elements of M.C.V, and tactical units.

(2) The primary sources of police intelligence are the Provost Marshals, CID detachments, 16th MP Gp, and 18th MP Bde.

(3) A weekly intelligence summary is now being published by the battalion S-2 section. This summarizes enemy activity for the past week that affect MP operations in the cities or along the highways. It also contains a brief analysis of general enemy activity in the 93d MP Bn AO and an estimate of enemy intentions.

(4) There were no security violations or incidents of compromise.

(5) Following are the sources of intelligence:

(a) Individual Military Policeman.

(b) Daily intelligence summaries of II CTZ, 4th Inf Div, USASUPCOM, 4NH, and the five province advisory teams.

(c) Periodic Intelligence Report, IFFV.

(d) Interrogation Reports from M.C.V Sectors and 22d ARVN Div.

(e) Liaison with various intelligence units of FVMAF in the area of operations (i.e., 172d MI Det, 524 MI Det, 525 MI Det, etc.).

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g. Force Development.

(1) On 21 January, B/504th MP Co moved from Camp Schmidt, Pleiku, to Camp Radcliff, An Khe. This unit experienced little difficulty in the actual loading, lashing, and transporting of equipment and personnel the 70 miles from Pleiku to An Khe. It did experience difficulty in logistic support, especially in getting work order requests honored in such areas as troop billeting and unit mess. This unit, being a non-divisional one, suffered from a lack of prompt support.

(2) On 20 February 1970, the B/504th MP Co was assigned back to its parent battalion, the 504th MP Bn in Phu Bai. It was replaced by the assignment of the 560th MP Co, located at Vung Tau, to the 93d MP Bn. This relocation did not involve any personnel changes as only the colors of the 560th MP Co and B/504 MP Co moved. The 560th MP Co was established at Camp Radcliff, An Khe.

(3) The 560th MP Co was given, in March, the unit responsibility of escorting convoys on QL #19 from grid line RR 56 west to Pleiku. Upon the closing in of the 4th Inf Div from Camp Anari, Pleiku, to Camp Radcliff, An Khe, the responsibility of convoy escort on QL #14 was given to the 560th MP Co on 1 Mar 70.

(4) Both C/54 Inf Co and D/58 Inf Co experienced a reduction in strength from an authorized 5 officers and 134 EM per company to an authorization of 5 officers and 114 EM. This change was brought about by 18th MP Bde letter, AVBGF-P, dated 3 January 1970, subject: USARV Manning Level (U).

(5) On 26 April 1970, GO #964, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, reassigned Company C, 54th Infantry (rifle) WFTPA and Company D, 58th Infantry (rifle) WFTPA from 18th MP Brigade to 1st Logistical Command.

h. Communications.

(1) The 93d MP Bn communications center has five (5) radio sets (AN/PAC 74) which will be set up in Phu Hiep, Vung Ro Bay, An Khe, Kontum and LZ Uplift. These will be netted with an AN/GRC 106 located at Qui Nhon. These will enable this battalion to have AN communication with all outlying units. Target date for completion is 30 April 1970. The communication section has received Nostor Equipment which provides voice secure communication with all unit commanders and Provost Marshals within the battalion. This equipment, in use at present time, has proven itself in numerous enemy attacks as a fast and reliable way to pass information.

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(2) The two RTT units assigned to this battalion are located at Camp Schmidt, Pleiku, and Camp Granite, Qui Nhon. A total of 418 messages were sent and 263 messages received during this reporting period.

(3) B/504th MP Co, which was previously located at Camp Schmidt, Pleiku, utilized the available RTT unit at that location. There was no available RTT unit when they moved to An Kho. Decoding techniques had to be utilized for the reception and transmission of classified messages.

(4) A Tactical Operations Center (TOC) has been built in D/58th Inf Co area. This fortified bunker is capable of sheltering 30 personnel. It is now used as a communication center equipped with a VRC 46, PNC 25, and a 292 antenna to maintain contact with D/58th Inf patrols and battalion headquarters.

i. Logistics.

(1) This battalion was issued five additional V-100 armored cars during this reporting period.

(2) These vehicles were immediately placed into convoy escort operations by the 66th MP Co and 560th MP Co.

j. Civic Action.

(1) A total of 50 man-days have been spent in civic action during this reporting period.

(2) 21,300\$VN has been contributed for the education of Vietnamese students and teachers and has shown beneficial results at the Normal College, Qui Nhon, and Sub-Elementary School at the Qui Nhon Poor House.

(3) Military Police have provided security for 23 MEDCAP missions during the reporting period.

(4) Collection of unit mess garbage from the 66th MP Co is contributed to Trinh Vuong Elementary and High School, Qui Nhon, for the feeding of domestic animals.

k. Self Help.

(1) The 127th MP Co has shown considerable progress during this reporting period as reflected by appearance of the unit area. Two new bunkers and revetments around the platoon areas have been built. Revetments for the

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unit day room, BOQ and BEQ, are now under construction. A new perimeter fence has been constructed using barbed wire, steel posts and concertina wire. The foliage and shrubbery is being burned from the perimeter on a daily basis.

(2) The 560th MP Co was required, due to lack of support from civilian agencies, to do most of the renovation for their company area in An Khe. The area into which they moved was in a deplorable condition. The company completely renovated a former MI club into an outstanding mess hall. An old supply room was remodeled into an attractive company orderly room. Enlisted men barracks were completely renovated, latrines, revetments and bunkers built, area beautified, and perimeter fencing strengthened. The 560th MP Co is furnishing men and equipment for the renovation of a building, adjacent to the National Police headquarters, to be made into a combined police station.

(3) The 66th MP Co emphasized strengthening their unit's defensive posture by the continued repair of bunkers and revetments and the installation of noise makers and trip flares on the perimeter fencing.

(4) D/58th Inf Co was active in the self-help program by:

(a) Renovating the orderly room.

(b) Remodeling the company theatre above the dayroom to facilitate better viewing and more comfort.

(c) Enlarging and improving the class five storage facilities so that ammunition may be stored by type and lot number.

(d) Renovating the civilian latrine.

(e) Building a large TOC for use as a communication center and bunker for 30 personnel.

(5) The 458th Trans Co (PIR), on 11 Jan 70, completed their move to an area adjacent to HQ, 5th TTC (CR 106236). This unit converted an old, open frame, maintenance shed into living quarters for 35 men. The unit also built a shower facility and renovated three motor section bays for their smaller watercraft. An old storage room was converted into two living quarters for the duty NCO's.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence:

(1) Employment of enemy mines in pairs.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy, on numerous occasions have employed mines in pairs.

(b) EVALUATION: One such incident occurred, 15 March 1970, on QL #19 1/2 mile from bridge 34. An APC hit a mine on the right side of the highway, thus blocking that portion of the highway. The area was swept but failed to uncover a 2nd mine along the left shoulder of the road. A defile was established and as the traffic moved over this road portion, a 5-ton cargo truck hit the 2nd mine. This tied up the convoy for a period of time and created a lucrative target for the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That when one mine is discovered, mine sweep teams immediately sweep the opposite side of the roadway and any other potential by-pass route to insure that additional mines are not present. That Military Police traffic control and convoy escort personnel exercise caution in selecting a path around a mine and in directing traffic around a mine.

(2) Covering fire during sapper attacks.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sapper teams making penetrations into a perimeter usually have supporting mortar fire or small arms fire to assist them in the entering and exiting of a facility.

(b) EVALUATION: In a recent sapper attack, the enemy was caught inside the perimeter. Once the enemy knew surprise had been lost, he used his covering force to help extract his trapped men. A deputy fire chief was killed within the POL facility by the enemy's covering fire. The enemy was able to extract his men leaving only lead behind. V-100's were utilized to move in to secure this facility.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When sappers have been spotted in or entering a facility, enemy covering fire must be taken into consideration when making an estimate of the situation. If possible, a heavy volume of fire must be placed upon his position. If the enemy has fire superiority, armored vehicles must be used to neutralize this fire.

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(3) Sapper Methods.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sappers, targeting an area for a penetration, spend days in the reconnaissance of the entry and exit points. These points of entry and exit are at those places which provide cover and concealment from guard personnel. Sappers often work in teams, so extreme care must be taken in meeting the threat.

(b) EVALUATION: In two recent attempts in the penetration of facilities, sappers have utilized drainage draws and ditch washouts to make their penetration. Sappers, on one occasion, crawled in a single file through an "S" shaped washout ditch. An alert sentry dog guard sighted one crawling under the perimeter fence and brought fire to bear upon the position. Another guard crawled into the ditch to retrieve what he thought was one body and was confronted by another sapper who was about to throw a hand grenade. Fire was brought to bear upon this person. A total body count of three sappers composed this team. All three were inside the wire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders at all levels alert guards to the areas that sappers utilize and of the dangers inherent if the size of the enemy force is underestimated.

c. Operations.

(1) Need for dispersing heavy lift chains throughout a convoy.

(a) OBSERVATION: Vehicles which have accidents within convoys often flip over, pinning personnel under the cabs. A great deal of difficulty is experienced in removing these personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Heavy transport trucks moving over the narrow, twisting roads in Vietnam often roll completely over on turns, coming to rest on their tops thus trapping personnel inside. Heavy jacks are ineffective in lifting, as places to lift are limited and the sheet metal tears when stressed. Lifting chains can be fastened onto the trucks frame and a chinook, flying crane, or wrecker can lift the vehicle to free the trapped personnel. It has been this command's experience that wreckers with chains are usually located at the trail of the convoys and great difficulty is experienced navigating along the backed up convoy to the scene of the accident. A chinook was recently used, with great success, in getting a man freed; however, time was lost sending personnel back to the rear of the convoy to get chains for rigging the vehicle.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That convoy commanders in planning their operations, consider placing heavy lift chains in every 10th vehicle so that

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time is not lost in getting chains to rig a truck in preparation for lift. The difference between life and death in these situations is usually a matter of minutes and chains must be readily available.

(2) Infantry Utilization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Offensive active patrolling has proven of greater value than the employment of infantrymen in a static defensive role.

(b) EVALUATION: Infantry patrols were previously employed in stationary or semi-stationary roles within or just outside the perimeters of Tank Farm #1 and #2 in Qui Nhon. This type of employment gave the enemy the advantage of knowing approximately where the infantry were deployed. This command was instrumental in getting the infantry away from these facilities and out into the 20-25 square kilometers of terrain which dominate these facilities. On 15 Mar 70 and again on the evening of 17-18 Mar 70, the infantrymen intercepted and stopped VC units which had selected Tank Farm #1 as their intended target. This active patrolling by the infantry was instrumental in aborting these attacks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Infantry units with installation security missions be allowed sufficient latitude to conduct offensive or mobile defense patrols rather than static guard duties.

d. Organization. None

e. Training.

(1) Inadequate Training of Infantry personnel with basic weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: LLB personnel arriving in Vietnam from CONUS lack, in many instances, fundamental knowledge of basic TO&E equipment found at the company level.

(b) EVALUATION: Infantry personnel are lacking in such skills as how to employ and fire the M18A1 Claymore Mine, M-60 machine gun, M-79 grenade launcher, and the employment of Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices. The infantry personnel are only adequately trained on their basic weapon, the M-16. Despite the fact that this is a recurring lesson learned, the importance must not be under-emphasized. Infantrymen confront situations in a combat zone in which there is little time to react. Their reactions must be automatic with little time lost in getting their weapons set up and into action.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That more intensive CONUS and in-country training be given on basic infantry weapons to personnel sent into a combat zone.

(2) V-100 Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Incoming military police are unfamiliar with the V-100 armored car.

(b) EVALUATION: New arrived personnel are not familiar with the operation, safety, maintenance and weaponry of the V-100. Approximately two weeks of intensive training is needed to familiarize personnel on this piece of equipment with another 2-3 weeks OJT. While in CONUS, military police receive only a brief orientation on the vehicle and no hands-on instruction. This is not considered sufficient for personnel being assigned to RVN. These vehicles are in daily use and, in this battalion, must frequently RON 40 or more miles from their maintenance facility. RVN designees must be more thoroughly trained on this vehicle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That training centers incorporate in their POI, additional hours in the operation of this vehicle. If this is not possible, then personnel on orders for Vietnam should receive no less than 24 hours training on this and reduce the number of dismounted drill and traffic direction (TCP) classes that they must attend.

f. Logistics. Handset Connectors.

(1) OBSERVATION: Handset connectors for the VRC-46 radio and associated equipment are difficult to put on and the small metal aligners inside the connector wears out rapidly.

(2) EVALUATION: The handset connector is currently designed with a flat surface to aid in proper alignment of the connector and the audio receptacle. Experience has shown that considerable difficulty still exists in attaching the connector. The metal alignment pins inside the connector wear out rapidly and form faulty connections. With the speaker connector attached to its receptacle, there is insufficient space to properly grasp and twist the handset connector.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That manufacturers of signal equipment consider the employment of jack connectors similar to those used on a switchboard (SB 22/PT) in future designs of signal equipment.

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30 April 1970


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None

i. Other. None

1 Incl
Organizational Chart


JAMES C. MILLER
LTC, MPC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96307
- 5 - Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, ATTN: AVDGF-B, APO 96240

AVBOF (30 April 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96240 20 May 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
(ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310
Commanding Officer, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBGC,
APO 96491

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970, for the 93d Military Police Battalion, APO 96238 is submitted.

2. (U) This command considers the report adequate. The following comments refer to the parts of the report indicated.

a. Reference paragraph 2b(1): Concur. Coordination with EOD to obtain more effective mine sweeps can be accomplished at battalion level

b. Reference paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Personnel having the responsibility for organizing perimeter defenses often underestimate the enemy's capability to support sapper attacks with a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, rocket and mortar fire. As a result, many perimeters in Vietnam are grossly underarmed in terms of the volume of suppressive fire they are able to place on enemy position during combination standoff/sapper attacks.

c. Reference paragraph 2b(3): Concur. Perimeter guards, many of whom work days as clerk-typists and other office personnel, are often not fully aware of the importance and danger of their night guard duty. This is due to inadequate supervision and training on the part of commanders and to the general apathy of the guards themselves, particularly in those installations which have not received enemy attacks for a long period of time.

d. Reference paragraph 2c(1): Concur. The inconvenience and additional expense of maintaining heavy chains dispersed throughout a convoy is a small price to pay for the possession of the capability to effect an immediate rescue of personnel pinned beneath overturned vehicles.

e. Reference paragraph 2c(2): Concur. This problem, however, no longer impacts directly upon this Headquarters since infantry units were reassigned in April 1970.

f. Reference paragraph 2e(1): Concur. While this Headquarters no longer has assigned infantry units, the same recommendation can be applied to military police personnel. Military police personnel arriving in Vietnam are inadequately trained in the use of organic weapons and totally untrained in the use of pyrotechnics.

AVBQF (30 April 70) 1st Ind 20 May 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
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g. Reference paragraph 2e(2): Concur. The XM 706 (V-100) has become the principle convoy escort vehicle of the military police in Vietnam, and just recently became a standard B item. Training in the operation and maintenance of the XM 706 armored car is non-existent in military police AIT. Immediate steps should be taken to correct this problem.

h. Reference paragraph 2(f): Nonconcur. Difficulty in attaching the handset connector can be eliminated by giving the moisture seal ("O" ring) a light coat of silicone compound, FSN 5970-224-5277. Use of this compound and proper care in installing the handset connector will result in reduced wear on the metal alignment pins. The employment of "phone-type" jack connectors is not practical because the sleeve of the connectors are easily pulled loose when the handset is used away from the radio, as in the front seat of a vehicle which has the radio mounted in the rear.



H. N. ELLIOTT
COL, MPC
Commanding

CF: CO, 93d MP Bn

AVHGC-O (30 April 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491 10 June 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. Reference item concerning employment of mines in pairs, paragraph 2b (1), page 15, basic correspondence and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement: Concur.
2. Reference item concerning covering fire during sapper attacks, paragraph 2b (2), page 15, basic correspondence and paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement: Concur. At the very minimum there should be a reaction force available to respond immediately to these attacks.
3. Reference item concerning sapper methods, paragraph 2b (3), page 16, basic correspondence, and paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement: Concur.
4. Reference item concerning need for dispersing heavy lift chains throughout a convoy, paragraph 2c (1), page 16, basic correspondence and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Not only would this effect an immediate rescue of personnel but also prevent a convoy from being halted on a roadway for an extended period of time making them a vulnerable target for enemy units.
5. Reference item concerning infantry utilization, paragraph 2c (2), page 17, basic correspondence and paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement: Concur.
6. Reference item concerning inadequate training of infantry personnel with basic weapons, paragraph 2e (1), page 17, basic correspondence and paragraph 2f, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Classes on these weapons should be included in the instruction at AIT Centers.
7. Reference item concerning V-100 training paragraph 2e (2), page 18, basic correspondence and paragraph 2g, page 2, 1st Indorsement: Concur.
8. Reference item concerning handset connectors, paragraph 2 (f), page 18, basic correspondence: Nonconcur. Concur with paragraph 2h, page 2, 1st Indorsement.



W. E. HAWKINS
Colonel, MPC
Deputy Commander

CF:
CO, 16th MP Gp

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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 30 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Covering Fire During Sapper Attacks", page 15, para b(2) and 1st Ind para 2a: Concur. The following additional considerations should be made in countering sapper attacks.

(1) Counter sapper training should be emphasized by all commanders to better prepare perimeter guards to effectively react to sapper attacks.

(2) Installation commanders/coordinators should ensure that rules of engagement against sappers detected inside the perimeter are understood by perimeter guards and reaction forces.

(3) Frequent rehearsals and practical training by mobile reaction forces at selected blocking positions should be conducted.

b. Reference item concerning "Need for Dispersing Heavy Lift Chains Throughout a Convoy", page 16, para e(1): Concur. Convoy commanders should insure that all vehicles have the tools authorized in the basic issue items list (BIIL) prior to the start of convoy operations. A 16 foot chain is authorized as part of the BIIL for all 2½ ton trucks with winch, all 5 ton truck tractors and all wreckers. No further action required by USARPAC or DA.

c. Reference item concerning V-100 training page 18, para c(2) and 1st and 2d indorsement: Concur. USARV has submitted to DA a TOE basis of issue plan for the V-100. If this plan is approved the Military Police Advanced Individual Training Course would incorporate V-100 operator training into their formalized instruction program. It is also recommended that the Officer Basic Course POI place increased emphasis on the employment of the V-100. Action by DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Seavers Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
HQ, 18th MP Bde
HQ, 93d MP Bn


GPOP-DT (30 Apr 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 93d Military Police Battalion
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JUL 70


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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Inclosure 1

UNCLASSIFIED

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