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Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:
Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975; AGDO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(12) 15p.

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11 13 May 70

AGDA (M) (1 Sep 70)

FOR OT-UT - 702168

4 September 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th
General Support Group ~~ending 30 April 1970~~ (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

9) *Report on op. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 70*

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 26TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
APO 96349

AVCA DNG-A-SFO

13 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Da Nang
ATTN: AVCA DNG-GO
APO 96349

OPERATIONS:

1. (C) Significant Activities:

a. Command. During the reporting period, this headquarters experienced a loss of 38 officers due to reassignment or rotation and a gain of 46 officers from in-country and out of country sources. On 15 April 1970 the 863rd Transportation Command (Provisional) (WFL/AA) commanded by Major James M. Guebelein came under the control of the 26th General Support Group, authority of GO 52, DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang. The 863rd was organized to support the activities at Tan My Ramp and Col Co Island. These activities were formerly operated by the Navy. This accounts for the increase in officer strength for this reporting period. There have been no changes in Battalion Commanders during this reporting period.

b. Personnel and administrations:

(1) Promotions: During the reporting period, there was an increase of 5 E-6 allocations, 8 E-5 allocations and 209 E-4 allocations which improved morale as a whole among the enlisted members of the command.

(2) Replacement personnel: There continues to be a problem in filling NCO vacancies within the command. Some NCO positions are being filled by SP5's and in some instances SP4's. The shortage of experienced cooks is of particular concern. The majority of cooks received have just recently completed cooks school. The lack of experience combined with the rapid turn-over of personnel has a detrimental effect on mess hall operations. This command is authorized a total of 17 SFC Mess Stewards and 17 SP6 First Cooks. In the command there is a total of 6 SFC Mess Stewards, 2 SSG Mess Stewards and 2 SP6 First Cooks.

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AVCA DNG-A-SPO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period ending 30 April 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

c. Base development:

(1) The sector of the Phu Bai Base Defense perimeter assigned to 26th General Support Group has been improved by the acquisition of two 81mm mortars. Ammo bunkers and firing positions for the mortars have been completed and a crew is being trained by elements of the 101st Airborne Division (A&E).

(2) Completed during this reporting period was the wire mesh anti-sapper obstacle initiated in the previous reporting period.

d. Organization:

(1) On 27 Feb 70, 26th General Support Group assumed support of task force Clearwater. Support included Class I, II, III & IV and maintenance support for 450 personnel initially, dropping to 200 on 1 Mar 70.

(2) On 15 Mar 70 the 12th Ord Det was detached from 26th Gen Spt Gp and assigned to the 80th Gen Spt Gp. This detachment involved the relocation of the unit from Gia Lai to Da Nang.

(3) On 15 Mar 70 the 26th Gen Spt Gp established and operated a Self Service Supply Center. This mission was assumed as part of the Army take over of the NSA. On 10 Apr 70, 26th Gen Spt Gp also assumed the mission of the unaccompanied baggage facility at Phu Bai, another phase of the Army take over of the NSA.

(4) On 15 Mar 70, the 863rd Transportation Command (Prov) was assigned to 26th Gen Spt Gp. This unit was formerly assigned to USASUPCOM, Da Nang. The 863rd continued its mission of receiving and issuing bulk fuel, end port and beach operations at Tan My Ramp.

(5) On 23 Mar 70, the 533rd Engineer Detachment (Maint), located at FSB Nancy was relocated to Quang Tri. This move was necessary for the unit to support elements of the 45th Engr Bde which relocated to Quang Tri.

(6) On 15 April 70, the 6th CM Det (GR) was brought to zero balance in personnel. Spaces were used to provide personnel to the 1st Security Company, 863rd Trans Comd.

e. Inspections. On 18 Mar, HHC, 26th General Support Group successfully completed a GMI, the second major inspection in less than three months.

2. (C) Lessons Learned:

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations: None

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FORM 100-4-SPD

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April, M 3 (GSP-RL-65 (h?))

d. Organizations: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Rations

(a) Observations: Removal of canned meats from the Class I Supply System hampered the ration support to troops in isolated areas.

(b) Evaluations: Although C Rations are available, canned meats offer variety to the menu and permit serving of hot prepared meals at isolated outposts. In NICTZ there are troops on isolated mountain top posts. Helicopter landings are dangerous and have often drawn enemy fire. Resupply has to be on a tick-out basis as helicopters fly over. For this reason perishable rations cannot be used.

(c) Recommendation: That canned meats remain in the supply system to allow better support to the units in the field.

(2) Material Handling Equipment

(a) Observations: Warehouse operations are hampered because of inadequate material handling equipment.

(b) Evaluations: The rough terrain forklifts are too large to operate effectively in covered storage warehouses. TOE's fail to authorize suitable forklifts to support covered warehouse operations.

(c) Recommendations: Consideration be given to removing MHE from existing TOE's and establishing small TOE MHE cellular units comprised of differing equipment authorization to be attached to units on an as needed basis.

(3) Equipment Standardization

(a) Observations: The recent take-over at the Tan Ky River in Northern I Corp Tactical Zone from the Navy has resulted in supporting and maintaining a large variety of material handling equipment.

(b) Evaluations: Difficulty is being encountered in arranging for and obtaining the Army Supply System to provide effective repair parts support. This problem would not exist if items common to all services were standardized.

(c) Recommendation: That consideration be given to further standardizing items common to all services.

(4) Retrograde of Heavy Lift End Items

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AFSA DNG-A-SPO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 40th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFAR-65 (12)

(a) Observation: A lack of heavy lift transportation is delaying the retrograde of track vehicles in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (NICTZ).

(b) Evaluation: The Logistical Support Command Units assigned to this Group in NICTZ are authorized two tank transporters and two 25 ton lowboys. This is insufficient lift to move replacement track assets forward and accomplish the track retrograde program in a timely manner. To obtain maximum utilization of the limited heavy lift transportation assets, they have been withdrawn from the control of the units and committed, with allowance for maintenance downtime, to the Transportation Movement Control Center (TMCC). This action has increased the retrograde capability but is not enough to support the requirements because of insufficient assets.

(c) Recommendation: If not already accomplished, consideration should be given to the establishment of small heavy lift TO&E cellular units to be attached to transportation units on an as needed basis. The proposed equipment for such a unit is as follows:

2 ea - 25 Ton Lowboy Trailer

2 ea - 40 Ton Lowboy Trailer

1 ea - 60 Ton Lowboy Trailer

5 ea - 10 Ton Tractors

(5) POL Operations

(a) Observation: Pol pipeline losses in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (NICTZ) at the beginning of the quarter were averaging 10 to 15%. The loss has been reduced to an average of 2%.

(b) Evaluation: At the beginning of the quarter large quantities of fuel were pumped through the lines which were shutdown for 2 to 3 days after pumping with the greatest pilferage occurring during the shutdown period. The pumping time each day was shortened and operated at irregular intervals. This action eliminated the long shutdown periods and reduced pilferage.

(c) Recommendation: For pipe lines that have similar characteristics, i.e., age, length of pipe line, location that encourages pilferage; it is recommended that smaller quantities be pumped for shorter periods of time and eliminate long shutdown periods.

(6) Laundry Operations

(a) Observation: Field laundry operations in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (NICTZ) have been operating below acceptable standards because of a lack of trained laundry personnel.

(b) Evaluation: A shortage of qualified laundry personnel deterred efforts to upgrade the Field Laundry Service in NICTZ. This, coupled with aging machines, made it difficult to operate three separate laundry points. The three laundry

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WCS ENG-A-SFO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 20th (ASLT) Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, HCS CSPOL-05 (R2)

points have been reduced to two by expanding the laundry service at Quang Tri and operating a customer turn-in and pick-up point at Evans. This action has helped to solve the personnel shortage problem and is enabling the command to up-grade the laundry service at Phu Bai and Quang Tri and provide better customer service.

(c) Recommendation: Consolidate field laundry services where possible by establishing customer turn-in and pick-up points to haul to the centralized facility.

g. Communications: None

h. Materiel:

(1) Materials Handling Equipment

(a) Observation: During the reporting period MHE and Commercial Forklift deadline rates increased significantly. The primary problem areas consisted of cracked frames, leaking seals, in-operative hydraulic cylinders and power train failures.

(b) Evaluation: The three major reasons for the increase in forklift deadline rates are, age of equipment, negligent operator handling, and a shortage of repair parts within the command.

(c) Recommendations and Command Action: Intensive management is required to insure the availability of sufficient operational forklifts for mission accomplishment. The Materiel Management Section initiated new procedures for tighter control of maintenance operations. Daily status is maintained on each forklift by location, supporting unit, owning unit and by USA Registration Number. Required repair parts are cross-levveled and requisitions expedited at all levels. The total forklift maintenance posture is improved by expedited use of controlled substitution.

Preventive maintenance, training and proper supervision of maintenance and equipment operation have also contributed to an improved readiness condition.

It is specifically recommended that forklifts be governed to a maximum speed of 10 MPH when extensive road travel is required. Reduced speed will decrease the number of cracked frames and failures in the steering, hydraulic system, and power train.

(2) Road Graders:

(a) Observation: Grader, Road, Motorized (Huber Waco Model 40) FM 300 - 512-2996 was being deadlined for clutch failure due to worn thrust rollers and pressure plate levers.

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AVCA DNG-A-SPD

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CSFCA-65 (12)

(b) Evaluation: Neither the levers (part number 77873 CL6412) or the next higher assembly were on hand in depots within RVN at the time subject road graders were deadlined. Research of Technical Manual 9-2320-211-35P revealed the thrust bearing and pressure plate levers used with 5 ton trucks are the same as those used with the above referenced road graders. Serviceable pressure plate levers were subsequently obtained from unserviceable clutch assemblies from 5 ton trucks.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that action be taken to establish the low R/O's for deadlining parts for low density engineer equipment without the accrual of demand data.

(3) Radar Shock Damage

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, Forward Support Fire bases were increased in size, thereby causing heavy gun positions and radar set positions to be located closer to each other. A sharp increase in radar dead-line has been the result of this base reconstruction. In some instances guns are located within fifty (50) feet of radar positions.

(b) Evaluation: Concussion from weapons firing in the close proximity of radar sets, causes premature failure of magnetrons, thyratron tubes and other internal components. Failures occur more often when radar sets are operating during firings.

(c) Recommendation: That radar sets be employed on positions where they are spaced from heavy weapons by at least seventy-five (75) meters, whenever possible.

(4) Radar Support Problems

(a) Observation: The 578th Maint Co (GS) is providing direct support for radar sets belonging to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), with ninety (90) percent of the support being performed by Contact Teams on the radar sites. The 578th Maint Co (GS) also has no float AN/TPS-25 Radar Set on hand.

(b) Evaluation: The organization of general support units does not provide the necessary equipment or sufficient personnel to sustain contact team support of radar equipment. The assumption of a direct support mission by the 578th Maint Co (GS) significantly reduces the units capability for providing general support to supported DSU's. Test instruments required for radar repair are not constructed for use in the field and many times lose their accuracy during rough travel to remote radar sites. Electrical power on the site is not sufficient for test equipment use. Float sets are necessary to provide operating components for installation in deadlined radars, so that faulty components may be repaired in the shop. Float sets are also necessary to test repaired components for operational effectiveness.

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
AVCA D. G-A-SPO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (12)

(c) Recommendation: That the 801st Maint Bn be provided personnel and equipment necessary for direct support of 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) radar equipment. That at least one float Radar Set AN/TFS-25 be issued to the 578th Maint Co (GS) to facilitate effective and rapid repair functions.

i. Other: None

1 Incl
1. Organizational Structure


ROBERT D. WORTHEN
COL, OD
Commanding

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AVCA DNG-GO-MH (30 April 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 26th General Support
Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, APO 96349

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 26th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.
2. (C) Pertinent comments follow.
 - a. Paragraph 2f(1). Concur, no further comment required.
 - b. Paragraph 2f(2). Nonconcur. Procedures are presently prescribed for the modification of TOE's when special equipment, not listed in the TOE, is required to accomplish the mission. Special requirements of short duration may also be secured through temporary loans.
 - c. Paragraph 2f(3). Nonconcur. Unit has been instructed to establish a parts pipeline. Parts are presently available through the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang.
 - d. Paragraph 2f(4). Concur, no further comment required.
 - e. Paragraph 2f(5). Concur, no further comment required.
 - f. Paragraph 2f(6). Concur, USARV is aware of this personnel shortage.
 - g. Paragraph 2h(1). Concur, no further comment required.
 - h. Paragraph 2h(2). Concur, no further comment required.
 - i. Paragraph 2h(3). Concur, no further comment required.
 - j. Paragraph 2h(4). Concur, no further comment required.



H. D. SMITH
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding


AVCA GO-MH (13 Jun 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 26th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forward.
2. Due to closing of this headquarters comments can not be staffed. Normal staffing will be done by Headquarters, USARV.



JOHN B. RITTER

CPT, OrdC

CO, 15th MHD

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AVHGC-DST (13 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General
Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 C 9 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 26th General Support Group and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Rations," page 3, paragraph f(1): nonconcur. B rations are not authorized for Army stockage in Vietnam (AR 11-11). Telephonic communication with US Army Support Command, Da Nang revealed that the request for canned meats was for a one time requirement. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Retrograde of Heavy Lift End Items," page 3, paragraph f(4): concur. Recommendation should be forwarded to CDC for evaluation. Action by DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Road Graders," page 5, paragraph h(2): nonconcur. Previously, special projects IME and IMG were established to support key mission essential construction equipment. To date 90% of the IME parts and 50% of the IMG parts have been received. IME parts were to support higher density engineer construction equipment and the follow-on IMG were to support low density engineer equipment (rock crushers, asphalt plants, quarry equipment and pavers). A special Red Ball program has been established by Department of the Army to expedite delivery of deadline repair parts to improve support of key mission essential construction equipment. In view of the actions above, further increased stockage without demand data accrual is unreasonable. The cost to provide a stockage of each parts line for low density engineer equipment in a quantity of two each would exceed 33 million dollars. No action by USARPAC is recommended. Recommend that Department of the Army continue to monitor weekly operational readiness reports for key mission essential construction equipment to improve the repair parts support of engineer construction equipment.

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AVHGC-DST (13 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General
Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. Reference item concerning "Radar Support Problems," page 6,
paragraph h(4): concur. The 801st Maintenance Battalion is initiating a
MTOE change for personnel and equipment necessary to perform full direct
support on radar equipment of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).
One AN/TPS-25 Radar set has been issued to the 578th Maintenance Company
(GS). No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain, USAF

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USASUPCOM-DNG
26th GS Gp

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GPOP-DT (13 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 26th General Support Group for
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L. E. GLENN
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

Organizational Structure

6TH AIRBORNE SIG. OPT. GROUP

AHC, 26th GS Co

##AFCO

HLS Co, 2nd Maint Bn (DS)

67th Maint Co (DS)(DIV)

43rd Sig Det (Maint) Team EA

42nd APU (Type Z)

578th Maint Co (LEM) (GS)

525th M Co (Patrol Sup)(-)

148th SAS Co (DS)

6th M Plt (GRREG)

Phu Bai CI I Plt (Prov)

Phu Bai Bakery Plt (Prov)

***Class 3 Sec, 64th Par Sec

**Det 103, 571st Ord Co (Armo)

**287th Ord Det (EOD)

MHD, 39th Trans Bn (Trk)

515th Trans Co (Lt Trk)

585th Trans Co (Hdn Trk)

666th Trans Co (Lt Trk)

805th Trans Co (Hdn Trk)

MMS Co, 63rd Maint Bn (DS)

528th Sig Det (Air Maint)

533rd Eng Det (Maint)(EB)

##AFCO

57th Trans Co (Lt Trk)

40th APU (Type V)

178th Maint Co (DS)(DIV)

555th Maint Co (DS)(-)

#Det, 428th M Co (POL)

#Det, 148th SAS Co

625th SAS Co (DS)

178th M Plt (Patrol Sup)

106th M Det (Bury)

***Class 3 Sec, 64th Par Sec

**Det 101, 571st Ord Co (Armo)

**Det 102, 571st Ord Co (Armo)

**59th Ord Det (EOD)

Special Trans Command

43rd Terminal Co (-)

1st Security Co (-)

105th Helicopter Co (1st Plt)

**Attachment: Logistical Support and Administration

***Attachment: Air Base, Maintenance, and Training Wing

#Attachment: All purposes, less Personnel Administration

#Attachment: Logistical Support, Physical Security and Administration

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