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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1989 c/2 to a/1 and c to u

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (16 Sep 70)

19
FOR OT-UT-702177

11 25 May 70

12-19p.

23 September 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion, ~~Period Ending 30 April 1970~~ (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 70. Donald L. Geer

DONALD L. GEER
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96226

AVCA QN-OD-C

25 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion (AMMO)
Period Ending 30 April 1970, TCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APTN: AVCA QN-GO-H, APO SF 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APTN: AVCO GO-O, APO 96384

Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APTN: AVEGC-DST APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APTN: CPOP-OT APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (c) Section I, Operations, Significant Activities:

a. During the reporting period, the 184th Ordnance Battalion (AMMO) Direct Support/General Support continued to perform its mission as a conventional ammunition battalion. The battalion has been engaged in combat service support operations during the entire 89 day reporting period.

b. During the reporting period the battalion's assets were redistributed and altered as follows:

(1) During the reporting period a change in the personnel of the 184th Ordnance Battalion was initiated. The 820th Ordnance Company initiated its phase down to zero strength between the period 5 April 1970 and 1 May 1970. The personnel were redistributed to the 630th Ordnance Company (AMMO): 504th Ordnance Detachment (Reno), the 188th Ordnance Company (AMMO) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company. This phase out provided a more efficient distribution of ammunition personnel to complete the mission. This was accomplished by being able to employ the overhead personnel of the phased out company in mission essential positions.

(2) The Ammunition Base Depot was changed to an Ammunition Supply Point by reduction of 54 pads or 68% of the existing pads. The area reduction of the depot was 60%. This reduction in area afforded a 250-400 meter clear zone outside our new perimeter wire. In addition the stockage objective was reduced from 24,000 short tons to 8,000 short tons or by 67%. Improved shipping schedules,

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the introduction of the RO-RO concept, and the implementation of more efficient stock management enabled the ASP to improve user support concurrent with significant stockage and personnel reduction.

(3) The reduction of the Class V storage and perimeter by 60% enabled a resultant reduction of security guard personnel by 57%.

c. During the reporting period the following changes of command took place.

(1) CPT Joe Stinson assumed command of Headquarters and Headquarters Company on 20 March 1970.

(2) CPT Sheridan Misklevitz assumed command of the 188th Ordnance Company on 7 March 1970.

(3) CPT Lewis E. Farley assumed command of the EOD Detachment on 30 April 1970.

d. Mission: The battalion's mission is to provide general support ammunition service to all Ammunition Supply Points in the Qui Nhon Support Command and direct support ammunition service to local units in Qui Nhon, An Khe, Pleiku and Bong Son. In addition, an ASP was opened in Phu Hiep on 18 March 1970 in order to support a contingency operation in the Tuy Hoa area. This ASP was closed on 20 April 1970; however, the 184th Ordnance Battalion continues to support user units in the area. The battalion is responsible for the operation and security of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Point, Brass Yard Annex, Ammunition Supply Point #340 at An Khe and Ammunition Supply Point #341 at Pleiku. The battalion provides personnel and equipment to operate the Ammunition Supply Point at LZ English (Bong Son).

e. Mission Activities: During the reporting period, the 820th Ordnance Company (Ammo) was reduced to zero strength. 10 Enlisted personnel and one Warrant Officer were transferred from the 820th Ordnance Company to the 188th Ordnance Company which assumed the ASP mission at LZ English (Bong Son). 75 enlisted personnel and one Warrant Officer were transferred from the 820th Ordnance Company to the 630th Ordnance Company which assumed the mission of operating the Qui Nhon ASP #1. 36 enlisted personnel and one Warrant Officer were transferred from the 630th Ordnance Company to the 188th Ordnance Company which assumed the ASP mission at An Khe.

f. Production: The following tabulated data shows the battalion's output for the reporting period:

<u>QNABD</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
Issues	13,888	16,236	13,620
Receipt	8,604	16,172	9,213
Warehousing	32,725	52,934	33,426
Total	55,297	85,342	56,259

<u>PLEIKU</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
Issues	3,727	1,016	5,710
Receipt	4,644	1,872	3,795
Warehousing	549	4,459	4,504
Total	8,920	8,147	14,009

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<u>AN KHE</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
Issues	2,935	2,406	2,513
Receipt	2,867	7,511	2,179
Warehousing	3,192	3,608	3,352
Total	<u>8,994</u>	<u>13,525</u>	<u>8,044</u>

<u>LZ ENGLISH</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
Issues	3,498	1,763	1,341
Receipt	3,429	1,707	1,228
Warehousing	978	698	705
Total	<u>7,905</u>	<u>4,168</u>	<u>3,274</u>

<u>BRASS YARD</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
Issues	404	248	235
Receipt	540	288	237
Warehousing	612	564	186
Total	<u>1,556</u>	<u>1,110</u>	<u>658</u>

QWBD	199,906
PLEIKU	31,074
AN KHE	30,563
LZ ENGLISH	15,347
BRASS YARD	<u>3,314</u>
GRAND TOTAL	280,204

g. Security Activities:

(1) During the reporting period the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot suffered one enemy sapper attack on 31 March 1970, which was directed at the East side of the perimeter. The attempted penetration was a complete failure, as there were no friendly casualties or damage to material and three (3) sappers were killed trying to enter the perimeter. (See inclosure #2)

(2) CHARLIE Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division departed Camp Huerper on 28 February 1970. During their stay at Camp Huerper they provided additional security to the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot.

(3) A PPS-5 Radar Team from HEB, 8/26th Artillery, An Khe has also supported the security mission at the Ammunition Base Depot during the reporting period. Their early warnings have afforded our security element the time needed to employ means of limiting enemy activity outside the Ammunition Base Depot.

2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel

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(1) Observations: The Ammunition Base Depot at Qui Nhon was reduced to an Ammunition Supply Point facility. This decreased the stockage objective and reduced the storage area needed. The storage area reduction permitted a reduction of the perimeter, which enabled a decrease in the security guard requirement and also allowed the phasing out of the 820th Ordnance Company (Ammo).

(2) Evaluations: The reduction in the security guard requirement released Security Company #2, which was transferred to USAD Long My. This move increased assets for providing security in other areas of the Qui Nhon Support Command. Phasing out of the 820th Ordnance Company provided qualified personnel to fill critical shortages in other units of the 184th Ordnance Battalion, and also provided the means to reduce overhead personnel requirements.

(3) Recommendations: That the personnel strengths of the remaining units must be maintained as shown below in order to accomplish the battalion's mission.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company - 85%

Security Guard Company #1 - 100%

188th Ordnance Company (Ammo) - 85%

630th Ordnance Company (Ammo) - 80%

504th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo) - 50%

b. Missions:

(1) Observations: The mission of the 184th Ordnance Battalion has not changed. There has been a substantial reduction in personnel and stockage objectives and the battalion support functions were realigned with no interference to fulfillment of mission requirements.

(2) Evaluations: Considerable emphasis has been placed in many key areas in order to increase the efficiency of the ammunition mission. Implementation of more efficient ammunition stock control management and inventories through competitive programs initiated among the ammunition checkers and stock records clerks have shown an immediate increase in the accuracy of records.

(3) Recommendations: That continued emphasis be placed on maintaining adequate and accurate levels of stock to insure that proper supply demands are met and that sufficient supplies of ammunition are available upon call to using units. This will enable the battalion to provide maximum support to the user with minimum personnel and equipment.

c. Maintenance:

(1) CMMI Road Side Spot Checks:

(a) Observations: During the reporting period, the battalion maintained an 82% pass rate for road side spot checks of vehicles. The pass rate for the prior reporting period was 53%.

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(b) Evaluations: The increased percentages reflect the result of increased command emphasis.

(c) Solution: The introduction of a Technical Inspection Team established within the battalion accompanied by increased supervision by Officers and key NCO's, greatly reduced the number of deficiencies on vehicles.

(2) Maximum utilization of organic fork lift capabilities:

(a) Observations: At the beginning of the reporting period, the ammunition mission had 10 contract fork lifts. During the reporting period, this number was reduced to two (2) fork lifts.

(b) Evaluations: The organic fork lifts assumed the majority of the ammunition operation. Command emphasis was placed on improved maintenance procedures, driver training, and improved fork lift utilization.

(c) Recommendations: That optimum utilization of organic equipment capabilities be stressed at all levels. That utilization of organic equipment be emphasized and optimum production be derived from this equipment.

d. Personnel:

(1) Observations: During the reporting period a great many man hours were devoted to manning defensive positions because of alert status. Personnel were putting in a full work day and in addition were required to be alert throughout the night.

(2) Evaluation: Personnel became tired, unresponsive and ineffective the day after an all night alert.

(3) Solution: A standard work day has been established for all personnel. When it is necessary to lengthen the personnel's work day to effectively support the mission, every effort is made to give these personnel compensatory time to enable them to get needed rest.

e. Training:

(1) Observations: Weapons familiarization instruction was conducted during the hours of daylight and darkness. Daylight firing ranges were augmented with a night firing range. This has enabled the individual guard to become more proficient with his weapon.

(2) Evaluations: This instruction has proved to be very effective in that one member of the security guard force was instrumental in preventing an attempted sapper penetration on 31 March 1970

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(3) Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on weapons familiarization during the hours of daylight and darkness in order for the individual to become more proficient and develop confidence in his abilities.



FRANK G. JOHNSON
LTC, OrdC
Commanding

2 Incl
Organizational Chart
QWBD After Action Report

AVCA-QN-GO-H (25 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion
(Ammo) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 MAY 1970

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-G,
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel page 3, para 2a. Concur.

b. Reference item concerning missions page 4, para 2b. Concur. Action taken is adequate and no further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning road side spot checks page 4, para 2c(1). Concur. Action taken is adequate.

d. Reference item concerning utilization of fork lift capabilities page 5, para 2c(2). Concur. No further action is required of this or higher headquarters.

e. Reference item concerning personnel page 5, para 2d. Concur. No further action is required.

f. Reference item concerning training page 5, para 2e. Concur. No further action is required.

3. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R E Shibley
R. E. SHIBLEY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
184th Ordnance Bn
ACSFOR, DA w incl

AVCA GO-MH (25 May 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 184th Ordnance Battalion
for period ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters 184th Ordnance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.
2. Due to closing of this headquarters, staffing cannot be completed. Normal staffing will be done by Headquarters, USARV.

JOHN B. RITTER
CPT, OrdC
CO, 15th MHD


AVHGC-DST (25 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
Period Ending 30 April 1970, TCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 30 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain ACC

Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
HQ, 184th Ord Bn (Ammo)
HQ, USA Spt Comd, Qui Nhon, APO 96238

GPOP-DT (25 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) for
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 JUL 70


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG



* PROVIDES SECURITY FOR QASAP AND AN IGE ASP

Incl 1

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ATTACK ON QUI NHON AMMUNITION BASE DEPOT
31 MARCH 1970

1. (U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE: To review the events of 31 March 1970, concerning an attempted penetration of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot and allied operations in the immediate area.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain: The Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is located in Valley "F" Nhu Thanh, Republic of Vietnam. It is located at the northern base of the Cu Mong Pass and is surrounded on four sides by higher ground.

(1) To the east there is a high ridgeline with extremely dense vegetation. On top of the ridgeline there are several trails but there is no source of water resupply; however, during the monsoon season intermittent streams would supply adequate water to supply personnel for an extended period of time.

(2) To the South is Cu Mong Pass which is protected by the 5th Company 2nd Battalion, 26th Regiment, ROKA Capital Division (Tiger).

(3) To the West there are high hills with extremely dense vegetation, numerous valleys, well used trails and sufficient streams to provide a source of water resupply.

(4) To the North there is a natural avenue of approach with a low ridgeline, dense vegetation and a stream that flows from the NB, through the village of Phu Tai into Lac Ho Lac.

b. The following intelligence was available to this headquarters on 31 March 1970:

(1) ROKA intelligence sources reported that on 26 March 1970, a VC platoon appeared at Nhu Hoa Hamlet (CR045273) and confiscated 45 kg of rice and then moved in a south easterly direction.

(2) On 27 March 1970, approximately 15 VC entered Long Van Hamlet (CR015245) to collect rice and other food they left the area and moved toward Vung Chau Mountain (CR0321).

(3) ROKA intelligence sources reported 4 VC appeared in Phu Tai (1) Hamlet (CR0121) and inquired about ROKA and ARVN ambush locations and then moved in an easterly direction toward Vung Chau Mountain (CR0321).

(4) On 28 March 1970, 240th Quartermaster Battalion (CR068191) received 7-8 rounds of small arms fire.

(5) US intelligence sources obtained information from documents and PW's taken in Binh Dinh Province indicating that the enemy plans to attack during the time from 28 March - 1 April and further states that the initial attacks will most likely consist of sapper attacks, ground probes by small enemy elements and attacks on convoys. 12

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3. (C) BACKGROUND TO ACTION:

a. On the evening of 31 March 1970, 43 towers and 8 bunkers were manned in the QNABD.

b. Seven dog patrols were posted in the QNABD, patrolling the following locations:

- (1) From tower 9 to tower 10.
- (2) From pad 36 to pad 38.
- (3) From tower 15 to tower 17.
- (4) From tower 19 to tower 21.
- (5) From tower 35 to tower 36 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (6) From tower 36 to tower 38 at the bottom of the ridge.
- (7) From tower 38 to tower 40 at the bottom of the ridge.

c. On the night of 31 March 1970, there were two roving patrols in the QNABD.

d. On the night of 31 March 1970, there was one 5000 gallon tanker and one 1000 gallon water truck stationed in the QNABD.

4. (C) SUMMARY OF EVENTS: (For location of towers see Enclosure #1)

a. At approximately 2213 hours, the dog handler between towers 19 and 21 was alerted by his dog.

b. At approximately 2215 hours the handler was between towers 20 and 21 when he saw a sapper trying to get through the perimeter wire. The handler fired on the sapper and killed him.

c. At 2221 hours Compound Complex Perimeter was placed on DEFENSE alert.

d. At 2230 hours a fragmentation grenade was thrown by a second sapper.

e. At 2230 hours a second fragmentation grenade was thrown by the same sapper.

f. At 2232 hours this sapper was shot while still in the perimeter wire.

g. At 2233 hours all pad guards were posted.

h. At 2240 hours the QNABD was at 100% strength.

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- i. At 2246 hours D/56th Infantry was cleared to fire mortars in grid squares GR0416 and GR0417.
- j. At 2253 hours the Battalion EOD Section arrived at the QNABD.
- k. At 2300 hours the vehicular mounted 23" searchlight arrived at tower #21.
- l. At 2311 hours the mortars began to fire into the two grid squares.
- m. At 2315 hours a systematic search of the pads in the immediate area was concluded with negative results.
- n. At 2320 hours search light support was requested on the north ridge of the QNABD.
- o. At 2330 hours the search light was in position but no activity was observed.
- p. At 2341 hours the duster fired on an azimuth east of tower 21.
- q. At 2345 hours a third sapper was seen moving away from the perimeter.
- r. At 2355 hours a third grenade was thrown by a sapper and failed to detonate.
- s. At 2356 hours the third sapper was shot.
- t. At 0025 hours the three bodies of the sappers were removed from the perimeter wire and taken to the depot operations area.
- u. At 0630 hours the alert status returned to gray.
- v. At 0700 hours a systematic search of the perimeter between towers 20 and 21 was begun. The fence approximately 60 meters south of tower 21 had been separated and trip flares in that area had been tied off with sections of torn cloth.
- w. At 0700 hours a sweep outside the perimeter wire along the east side of the depot was started.
- x. At 0700 hours the Battalion EOD Section removed 6 satchel charges and one (1) shape charge from the perimeter wire.
- y. At 0940 hours all sweeps were finished with no further results.

5. (8) ANALYSIS OF EVENTS:

a. On 31 March 1970, at approximately 1015 hours 3 sappers attempted to penetrate the perimeter defenses of the Qui Thon Ammunition Base Depot. The sapper personnel were detected by a sentry dog and taken under fire by the dog handler. Additional personnel arrived resulting in 3 enemy KIA.

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b. Several pamphlets were found on the bodies reflecting a much stronger propaganda issue than pamphlets found in the past, by playing up significant political issues in the United States.

c. There were no casualties or damage caused by the attempted penetration.

d. Explosive charges picked up at QNABD, 1 April 1970:

(1) Findings: Six satchel charges with approximately ten pounds of explosives measuring 10"x6"x4", two Chi Com grenades and two chemical delay pencil fuses were picked up. The charges were made with C-4 mixed in motor oil and wrapped with U.S. sandbags. Each bag was held by what appeared to be claymore mine wire minus the insulation. A six inch stick was inserted in each charge with the last inch of wood protruding. This gave the sapper a ready made fuse well to insert the chemical delay pencil or time fuse and blasting cap. Only one charge had a time fuse and blasting cap inserted; the time fuse was test burned for 40 seconds. Each charge was opened and examined; two blasting caps were found in three (3) of the charges, 3 caps were found in 2 of the charges and 4 caps were found on one charge, each cap was individually wrapped in paper. These additional caps would have acted as boosters to accomplish a high order detonation.

(2) Remarks: Much time and know-how went into the making of these satchel charges. These were indeed the most professionally made charges ever found in this area during the past 15 months. Had these charges been planted as intended, each would have gone high order. Unlike the last two sapper attacks, no low order of explosives would have occurred.

(3) Recommendations: Grenades and satchel charges have been found in the past by EOD to contain chemical delay pencils. Ninety percent of the time, this device will be inserted in the explosive, hidden from view. All personnel should be aware of the potential danger of this type of satchel charge. All charges should be suspected of containing delay devices until examined by EOD personnel.

6. (C) OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Situation: Numerous depressions are present in the depot perimeter.

Observations: The perimeter has many cuts and depressions which make total observation of the surrounding area impractical.

Recommendation: That additional seismic devices be made available to improve the detection capability of tower guards.

b. Situation: Failure to communicate between Ammunition Base Depot and Battalion Command Bunker.

Observation: During the initial contact and insuring events, the flow of information to the Battalion Command Bunker was extremely fragmentary.

Recommendation: That in the future more emphasis be placed on insuring that an account of all activity be passed to the battalion command bunker as soon as possible.

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c. Situation: On several occasions movement has been detected by tower guards and objects taken under fire with negative results.

Observations: Since the 4 January 1970 penetration, extreme emphasis has been placed on night firing techniques. A night firing range has been constructed and all personnel have been scheduled on a systematic basis. During this attempted penetration personnel were taken under fire with positive results.

Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on training personnel in night firing techniques.

d. Situation: Ammunition at the point of contact was used with no planned resupply.

Observation: The amount of ammunition available at the point of contact was insufficient.

Recommendation: That a prescribed basic load be developed for resupply of tower personnel and that all security vehicles in the depot carry this basic load.

c. Situation: There was no record of who the pad guards were when they were posted.

Observation: Pad guards were posted by security personnel. The pad guards were supplied by the ordnance companies, the results being that after the pad guards were posted there was no knowledge of what individual was on what pad.


Recommendation: That the two ordnance companies be assigned pads to post their people on. In this manner a better knowledge of the personnel on guard will be maintained.

f. Situation: The use of sirens for practice alerts causes confusion when an actual alert is called.

Observation: By using the same notification for both practice alerts and actual alerts reliance is placed on the use of radio and telephone communications to distinguish between the two. By this method a slower means of communication is used to pass out notification of an actual alert.

Recommendation: That a varying pitch blast of the siren be used for notification of practice alert and that a steady three minute blast of the siren be used for notification of an actual alert.

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