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Chief of Staff for Force Development  
[Army], Washington, DC 20310.

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AGDA (M) (17 Sep 70)

FOR OT-UT-702187

6 October 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army  
Support Command, Saigon, ~~Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)~~

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9) Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 70.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON  
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AVCA SGI: GC MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-141  
APO 96384

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSPOR),  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities a. (U) Command: There was no significant change within the Command Group of SSC during the reporting period. LTC Kirk was assigned to the ACofS, Supply, on 23 Feb 70, replacing LTC Bilon, who was reassigned to Cameron Sta., Virginia.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline (1) (C) Strength The command strength at the beginning of this quarter was 769 officers, 273 warrant officers, and 15,091 enlisted personnel. As of 28 April 1970, the command strength was 697 officers, 259 warrant officers, and 15,240 enlisted personnel.

(2) (U) Safety (a) During this period, the safety rating program for all drivers of passenger carrying vehicles of TAP was modified to a system whereby a driver will be rated only at certain intervals. Rating sheets are controlled by control numbers and a log system.

(b) During this same period, the SSC Safety Office initiated an improved monitoring system of Defensive Driving, Weapons Training, and other safety classes; the classes are subject to monitoring without prior notice from this headquarters. This was found to be the only way to determine that units are actually giving these classes correctly.

(3) (U) Chaplain (a) The Presidential Prayer Breakfast was observed 4 February 1970. A pre-recorded tape of the President's address was broadcast in unit mess halls during the breakfast hour. In most of the subordinate commands this observance was well attended and highly successful.

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(b) Special Easter services were arranged throughout the command. An Ecumenical Sunrise Service was sponsored by the 4th Transportation Command at Camp Davies. The service was conducted by laymen of the Command and the Commanding Officer, Colonel Armand J. Silvestri, was the principal speaker.

(c) Special services for the Jewish Passover were conducted by Chaplain (CPT) Ira A. Bader at the United Service Organization Center in Saigon. Invitations to attend this event were sent to all Jewish personnel in Saigon and IV Corps Tactical Zone and important dignitaries in the Saigon/Delta area.

(d) A photographic portfolio depicting all chapels and chaplains of this Command was forwarded to the Chief of Army Chaplains in March. Historical sketches of each chapel were also included in the file.

(e) A monthly staff meeting of Supervisory Chaplains inaugurated in March 1970 has improved communications between the Staff Chaplain of this headquarters and subordinate unit chaplains. It has created an increased awareness of mutual problem areas and solutions applied by other units.

(4) (U) Special Services (a) A swimming pool was acquired and work is underway to improve the area.

(b) More effective controls were developed to prevent personnel from taking more than one R&R. The R&R Section will require a file card to be attached to each R&R request; the cards will then be filed and monitored.

c. (U) Operations (1) The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division and several non-divisional units under Keystone Bluejay was concluded on 6 April 1970.

(2) On 29 April 1970 Camp Davies was turned over to the ARVN. This involved the move of the Saigon Logistical Support Activity to Di An and its redesignation as the 91st CS Battalion. Also elements of the 4th TC were moved to Cat Lai, Newport and Long Binh.

(3) On 20 April 1970 the Delta Logistical Support Activity was activated with its headquarters at Binh Thuy.

d. (U) Organization (Inclosure 2)

e. (U) Logistics (1) Maintenance (a) Throughout the reporting period, a concerted effort was made to revitalize the maintenance

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awareness of the command. Continual command emphasis was placed on successful Roadside Spot Check Inspections as well as successful Command maintenance Inspections. A guide for organizational maintenance for commanders in booklet form was published, and has proved an effective document by which commanders may guide and correct deficiencies in their maintenance program. Presentations at commanders conferences continued to stress the need for proper operator maintenance and proper use without abuse of our equipment.

(b) As an adjunct to continued maintenance awareness, several classes have been initiated and school programs revitalized. Several classes to train MHE Operators in the 3rd Ordnance Battalion were conducted during the period. Also one-week classes for refrigeration and air conditioning repairmen were conducted and were so well received that the later courses were extended to two weeks. Instruction included on-the-job, practical training in the 5th Light Equipment Maintenance Company's shops. The Engine Diagnostic School Program has continued to train Support Unit Mechanics in proper use of test equipment and engine diagnostic procedures. When the building formerly occupied was pre-empted, a hasty search for new facilities was successfully undertaken. A new classroom was located and completely refurbished in little more than one week. The new facilities were occupied in mid-February; with the addition of cut-aways and additional training aids, the school has become a model instructional facility. Started with TACOM representatives as instructors, the teaching has now been assumed by highly qualified senior enlisted instructors with many years of maintenance experience.

(c) Continued drawdown of US troops continues to affect maintenance activities. Keystone Bluejay was officially brought to a close on 6 April, but the equipment left by the departing troops must be repaired and re-issued where needed. Several Keystone-oriented maintenance units have been dedicated exclusively to repair of Keystone assets. In anticipation of the need for some of the more critical items, parts were ordered before the equipment was turned in. Problems associated with identification of these parts have been resolved, and the actual flow of repair parts has allowed some of the initial equipment to be returned to service. A concentrated program of inspection and ordering required parts will reduce the accumulation of backlog before the next major redeployment. Other minor problems such as lights required to illuminate the wash rack at night, lack of bridge inspectors, and scarcity of repair parts for water blasters have been resolved or alleviated.

(d) Progress has been steady on contract operations monitored by

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this Headquarters. During this period, modifications to the government facility to be used by the tire recap facility were started, as well as installation of equipment. A delay in receipt of equipment had caused a slippage beyond the original 1 May starting date. Schedules have been adjusted and special requests have been initiated for expeditious handling of repair supplies necessary for the operation of the tire plant. The contract for repair of 500-gallon collapsible fuel drums has also fallen behind schedule. The contract was let at the end of the last reporting period, and the contractor had been assured that his vulcanizer would be delivered within 30 days. Late delivery plus customs difficulties prevented installation as anticipated, and late receipt of repair supplies has further delayed production. The first repairable drums were delivered to the contractor's facility on 3 April when preliminary cleaning and preparatory work began. Full production is anticipated shortly.

(e) Activation of the Delta Logistical Support Activity directly subordinate to the Support Command was accomplished on 20 April. Direct communication with the maintenance units in the Delta should prove beneficial and provide more responsive support to customers in IV Corps Tactical Zone. No significant problems are anticipated.

(f) In an effort to provide better support for customer needs, a realignment of missions was planned which provided that all Direct Support maintenance units were placed in the 29th General Support Group, and all General Support maintenance units reported directly to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. Unit realignment was delayed until 1 April to insure that all customers were fully informed of the support change and no degradation of any support resulted. The basic plan was sound, but has been modified by other circumstances resulting from retrograde activities. The shift has allowed realignment of maintenance supply activities, with a more equitable distribution of workload.

(g) On 20 April, Special Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material (SCRAM) Procedures were implemented for all material being evacuated through maintenance channels. SCRAM was originally developed for use in rapid handling of material from redeploying units, and it was used with all normal evacuation procedures. The SCRAM worksheet replaced the DA Form 2404, Technical Inspection formerly required, as well as DA Form 461-5 and DA Form 5-23. Disposition of equipment is predicated upon a cursory visual inspection, and current Log book entries suffice for supporting paperwork. The procedures worked extremely well for rapid redeployment teams where complete inspections followed the SCRAM classification. The long range problems of inaccuracies in rebuild programs due to missing components remain to be resolved.

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(2) Supply (a) Self Service Supply Center excesses were redistributed throughout the command. A significant quantity of ASL and fringe excess at the Direct Support Units was identified, and actions were taken to redistribute or return to depot.

(b) The Engineer Construction Material Yard's (ECMY) stock control section changed from a manual control system to the automated 3SVN system. Problem areas are being analyzed and corrected quickly and efficiently. All hand carries will be reviewed and reduced to a minimum number. Commanders at all levels have been advised to place maximum emphasis on prior planning to eliminate hand carries.

(c) ACoS, Supply has placed maximum emphasis on through put. Successful meetings with Supply, Port Transportation, Movement Control Center, and Depot have been held. Problem areas have been defined and efforts to eliminate these problems have been initiated by each section. Closer coordination has led to a smoother flow of through put.

(d) A new Thai and Australian menu was initiated during the quarter. Both menus are highly acceptable and requirements to provide all items are adequate.

(e) The Saigon Logistical Support Activity Class I Supply Point was relocated at Di An and became operational on 21 March 1970. All non-appropriated Fund accounts were transferred to the 506th Supply and Service Class I Supply Point at Long Binh Post.

(f) During the period 16 January through 15 April 1970, the office of the ACoS, Supply was deeply involved in operation Keystone Bluejay. Considerable time and effort was spent in developing an entirely new system for accountability purposes, and in coordinating with various agencies for the disposition of approximately 16,265 Commel, 1,142 Engineer, 195,896 Quartermaster and Chemical Items, 4,833 wheeled Vehicles, and 26,894 Small Arms.

(3) Petroleum (a) Construction of the Dong Nai POL Jetty began on 24 February 1970. It is located approximately 300 feet closer to the pump station than the old jetty. Instead of a wooden causeway, a dirt roadway will be constructed from the pump station to the jetty proper. The road will be wide enough for maintenance vehicles to drive to the jetty. At present, construction is 40 per-cent complete; however, a delay exists due to an unforeseen hardness of the river bottom which will not allow the planned type of dolphins to be installed. BSK Corporation is redesigning the dolphins. The project includes burial of three six-inch pipelines from the pump station to the Long Binh perimeter.

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(b) C-130 airlift to the Mekong Delta has been drastically reduced during the reporting period. Commercial oil firms are making drummed fuel available at Can Tho, and the 120th Transportation Company is moving it to the Binh Thuy Airfield, where C-123's and C-7A's fly it to staging fields located throughout the Delta. Formerly, 1,000 drums per day were flown from Tan Son Nhut to Binh Thuy; only 300 - 500 drums per day are flown now. Commercial truck deliveries of POL have also increased substantially in the Delta. Vi Thanh, Soc Trang, and Mach Soi are being supplied almost exclusively with POL by the commercials. This totals approximately 25,000 gallons per day in JP-4 alone. During the reporting period Hoc Hoa has been supplied solely by water using both LGR's and BG barges.

(c) For the first time bulk JP-4 was supplied to Tay Ninh by BG barge. The barge was loaded at Nha Be with 150,000 gallons of JP-4 and reached Tay Ninh two and one-half days later. It took two days to off-load the barge using five 48th Group tankers. Since an average of fourteen JP-4 tankers per day are sent to Tay Ninh, nine tankers per day were relieved from making the Tay Ninh run for the two days.

(4) Retrograde and Disposal (a) The collecting point in the Delta, previously limited to maintenance items, has been expanded to include TA 50-90 items and Post, Camp, and Station property. Instructions were issued on 24 April for the establishment of a similar facility at Tay Ninh which will also include collection of scrap. Direct coordination between the PDO Officer and the collecting point will be effected.

(b) Retrograde of repairable major items was slowed during the period between late February and early March because of more rigid enforcement of Department of Agriculture and US Public Health Service standards. This, in conjunction with Bluejay, severely limited the processing of retrograde equipment.

(c) Emphasis has been placed on the improvement of retrograde procedures. A retrograde inspection team has been formed to instruct and advise Saigon Support Command units which originate or transport retrograde cargo in the proper packing, marking, documentation, loading, blocking, and bracing, and entomological requirements of retrograde cargo. A Retrograde Workshop was conducted in April to review retrograde procedures.

(d) Property Disposal Operations at Ho Nai have made several significant advances during the last quarter. First, a policy of providing

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a military escort for each contractor truck entering the yard was implemented. The yard has assumed a more business-like posture, and a more timely and cohesive control over contractor activities has been effected. Continued emphasis has been placed on improving overall job proficiency of individuals working at the yard. A mobile training team, consisting of trained personnel from Ft. Lee, has been organized by 1st Log, and will provide classroom training for yard personnel in property disposal operations.

(5) Services (a) Numerous engineering projects were undertaken during the reporting period. The 900 - man cantonment at Binh Thuy is now virtually complete. At Cat Lai, two deep draft mooring systems were relocated, a 600 Kw power plant was installed, and work began on the relocation of one PASCOE building from Camp Davies to house the HMAV storage activity at Cat Lai. At Long Binh, a pad upgrade project at the Ammunition Supply Depot was completed. Projects at the Depot involving perimeter security lighting and fencing and road paving in the 208 Yard and PDC Yard were completed. Work continued on the 4th TC Headquarters complex and the Long Binh railroad. Several T-Day retrograde projects at Newport, including open storage areas, roads, and a wash rack, were completed; in addition, the IST ramps were repaired and a six-weeks dredging project was concluded. The Tay Ninh barge off-loading site was completed.

(b) Field Laundry locations have been reduced from ten to eight in III CTZ. The laundries at Lai Khe and Dau Tieng were removed due to lack of requirement. Toward the end of the reporting period, Vung Tau, Cu Chi, Long Binh, Tay Ninh, and Phu Loi field laundries were processing mainly flatwork items (sheets, pillow cases, and mattress cases). These laundries are in competition with contract laundries while Phuoc Vinh, Juan Loi, and Song Be are supporting the more forward areas where no contract laundries exist. Bath units are supporting customers in Song Be, Juan Loi, Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Fire Support Base Concord, and Fire Support Base Hase. For FY 70, nineteen contract laundries are offering laundry service in eleven locations in III and IV CTZ. Twelve of these nineteen laundries offer sewing services; it is not likely that the other seven will be modified before the end of the fiscal year.

(c) During the period it was learned that Depot was not issuing substitute items for unavailable perishable subsistence. The procedure was to place a due out voucher on file until the item was received, and then to issue the amounts due out at one time. This practice caused forced issues at Station Breakdown Level, and resulted in loss due to spoilage.

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Depot was requested to issue a substitute item when stocks of fresh fruits and vegetables were depleted. Difficulty was experienced with Class I points failing to submit requisitions to Depot for items out of stock in the Self Service Condiment Stores. All Class I Officers were instructed to closely supervise the condiment store operation, and to insure submission of timely requisitions in order to reduce out of stock conditions.

(6) Communications (a) During this period the Saigon Support Command Communications Section completed the move into the command tactical operations center (TOC). Through the efforts of communications personnel, the TOC was wired for electrical lighting and air conditioning. To ensure the safety of personnel operating radio and wire-associated equipment, a ground system for permanent equipment was installed.

(b) A study was conducted of existing radio and wire nets to determine the most effective means of operation. This study was presented to all staff sections to make them aware of the systems available for their use. A notable increase of traffic over the wire net and the radio teletype net was observed. Awareness and usage of these nets enables better utilization of existing telephone circuits.

(c) A two hundred pair underground cable was installed in the TOC to facilitate installation, repair, and maintenance for all associated wire equipment within the Saigon Support Command headquarters. This underground system will be of vital importance during tactical operations and alert status.

(7) Information (a) During the period of this report Hometown News Releases averaged more than 1,000 per month, with 1,070 in February, 1,189 in March and 1,114 in April. Despite having fewer persons in the command eligible for releases, the monthly totals were almost even with last year's figures. This was accomplished by several innovations in the administration of the program. Personnel from this office conducted seminars with major subordinate units, explaining releases and how to complete the DA Form 1526 properly. A "Hometown Handbook" was distributed to unit information officers and enlisted personnel.

(b) News Releases submitted to 1st Logistical Command for distribution increased during the quarter, with 24 in February, 23 in March, and 25 in April. These figures reflect a steady gain over the previous quarter, when manpower shortages caused a decline in the total number of releases. More releases are being used in more publications than previously. Stories from this office appeared in Army Times, USARV Reporter, 1st Log Review, Vietnam Guardian, and Stars and Stripes.

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(c) Photo releases were less numerous during this quarter because of a new criteria in numbering them. Photos accompanying Hometown News Releases are no longer counted. However, results of better photo techniques have appeared. Photos released from this office are being used more by other publications, including the Vietnam Review and the Army Logistician.

(d) The command newspaper HI-LITE was distributed twice monthly during the quarter. A large percentage of stories used in the publication were written by staff members of this office, in contrast to previous times when it was necessary to rely on Army News Features and Armed Forces Press Service. Geographical coverage was good, with a large proportion of the stories coming from areas off Long Binh Post.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence. None

c. Operations. None

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

f. Logistics.

(1) Kosher foods.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some Kosher foods arrived for the Passover Seders at the last possible moment.

(b) EVALUATION: Because Kosher food arrived at the last minute, special handling at the port was necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Kosher food should be procured and shipped with sufficient lead time to avoid special handling and last-minute preparations. Kosher food should also be in readily-identifiable pallets or containers and preferably packed with like items. Manufacturers should be asked to add one week to preparation lead-time to preclude last minute delivery for Rosh Hashanah and Passover.

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## (2) Reporting Excess Equipment in Command Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 19 December 1969, USARV sent out a message directing all subordinate commands to report all excess equipment on DA Form 444, Inventory Adjustment Report (IAR). It was recognized that many units had items on hand in excess of authorized allowances which were not being accounted for on unit property books or reported on the AR 711-5 report. Many of these items are essential to the accomplishment of the units' mission due to the unique and changing environment in Vietnam. Procedures were set forth for picking up the equipment on unit records and at the same time allowing the items to be retained by the units to accomplish their mission, regardless of authorization. Upon the receipt of these IAR's by USARV, temporary loans would be issued to all reporting units. The tremendous amount of equipment reported in this project has resulted in the introduction of a new program, Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedure (VARP). This program provides for a continuous pickup of excess equipment on an IAR and a temporary loan being issued for those items that are occasionally found to be excess. Through this system our command has been able to effectively account for much of the excess equipment that in the past has floated throughout the command with little or no control. (USARV MSG 141146Z Apr 70)

(b) EVALUATION: Although this program had good initial results, it could create problems if continued. Many subordinate S-4's have already discussed the fact that the continuance of this program could result in a license to steal. If a company decides it needs an item, it could steal the item and pick it up on the IAR; consequently, an item could conceivably be picked up, reported, and be put on temporary loan to several different property books.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This program should be given a deadline for units to pick up excess and after such date the program should terminate. As all lateral transfers within this command must be approved by this headquarters, allowance could still be made for picking up that equipment that is excess by lateral transfer on the IAR.

## (3) Resupply of Non-Perishable Rations by Barge to Tay Ninh and Binh Thuy.

(a) OBSERVATION: Non-Perishable rations loaded on barges at Newport from the depot for Tay Ninh and Binh Thuy failed to arrive by the required delivery dates (RDD) on several occasions.

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(b) EVALUATION: The requisitioning cycle, 14 days, did not allow enough time for the requisitions to be filled, transportation to be obtained, supplies to be shipped, and unloaded to arrive at the Class I Point in time to meet the required delivery date. The delay went unnoticed until the rations were needed. This caused a critical shortage of non-perishable rations at Tay Ninh and Binh Thuy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a twenty-one (21) day requisitioning cycle be established in lieu of the fourteen (14) day cycle. This plan has been put into effect and will be monitored by this headquarters.

(4) Resupply of POL to Tay Ninh by barge.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is possible to supply Tay Ninh with bulk POL by barge.

(b) EVALUATION: It requires six days for a round trip for a BG barge from Nha Be to Tay Ninh. A barge carries two days supply of JP-4. The 48th Group must provide five or six 5,000 gallon tankers to off-load the barge at Tay Ninh.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a BG barge be used to resupply Tay Ninh as an alternate resupply means in emergencies and/or when 5,000 gallon tankers are in short supply.

(5) Retrograde of Packaged POL products.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 512th CI Company sent 197 short tons of packaged POL products to Okinawa in March. Some of this retrograde product arrived in poor condition and without the proper shipping documents or laboratory reports.

(b) EVALUATION: The retrograded POL products were packed improperly and containers were not sent because the unit did not know they were needed. A regulation on the retrograde of materials has been published. It includes the proper method to inspect and package products and the documentation required with each shipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units involved in retrograding packaged POL products become thoroughly familiar with the regulations involved.

(6) LCH-8 Deadline Rate.

(a) OBSERVATION: The deadline rate for LCH-8's has increased steadily over the past three months with the current percentage deadline at 20%.

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(b) EVALUATION: A lack of organizational maintenance in conjunction with the shortage of trained crew members has resulted in a steady rise in organizational deadline rates. The condition of the vessels turned in to MAAV for support maintenance also reflect this lack of organizational maintenance.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That continued command emphasis be placed on organizational maintenance for LCA-8's.

2 That every possible effort be made to provide the trained Engineer and other crew members necessary to effectively operate and maintain LCA-8's.

(7) Shortage of Breech Mechanisms for S.P. Howitzer, M-107.

(a) OBSERVATION: There presently is a critical shortage of Breech Mechanisms for the M-107. Depot has a zero balance.

(b) EVALUATION: There are several contributing factors:

1 New life criteria of 3600 EFC. These were previously turned in as unserviceable after 1600 EFC. Attempts are being made to recover these mechanisms, but most have deteriorated beyond use.

2 There have been a large number of M-110 to M-107 conversions as well as many rounds fired.

3 Log book forms are not properly maintained. Few mechanisms can be reissued as gun crew records do not accurately reflect the rounds fired.

4 There is a shortage of repair parts to rebuild the breech mechanisms.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That log books forms be properly maintained to reflect current, accurate number of EFC rounds fired.

2 That M-110/M-107 conversions be kept to a minimum.

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(8) Through put in the Ammunition Re-supply System.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ammunition through put as a percentage of total ammunition shipments had been quite low for several months. In December 5.3 per cent of total ammunition moved was shipped as through put. This figure dropped to 2.9 per cent in January, to 0.5 per cent in February, and rose slightly to 1.8 per cent in March.

(b) EVALUATION: Ammunition through put, like through put of other cargo, is highly desirable as it reduces the number of assets required to accomplish the mission while providing expeditious service to the customer. Through put loss was the result of surges in US and ARVN in-bound ammunition. The level through put has been increased through close and more effective coordination among 3rd Ordnance Battalion, 48th Transportation Group, 4th Transportation Command, and 3rd Movement Control Center, the principal parties concerned in the ammunition supply and distribution systems.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ammunition and transportation managers evaluate each potential bulk break-point, deep draft port, ship to light-erage point, or pier to vehicle point in the transportation system to assure that no opportunity for effective through put is being overlooked.

(g) Communications. None

(h) Material. None

(i) Other. None

TSL: LBN 2604

2 Incl  
~~1. Distinguished Visitors List~~  
2. Organisational Chart  
Incl 1 wd HQ DA

*H. B. Gibson*  
H. B. GIBSON, CR.  
Colonel, OrdC  
Commanding

AVHEC-DST (Undated) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1970, EOS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 1

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Kosher Foods," page 9, paragraph f(1): nonconcur. Kosher food items for the last Passover were procured with sufficient lead time. Transportation delays and improper manifesting caused these items to arrive late. To preclude further incidents of this nature for Rosh Hashanah holiday, 1st Logistical Command, by message 010900Z Jun 70, requested that Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) Regional Headquarters, Alameda, California procure and assemble the special Kosher items for shipment by Sea-Land Van. Shipment via Sea-Land Van will provide maximum control and facilitate movement through the ports. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.


b. Reference item concerning "Reporting Excess Equipment in Command Reports," page 10, paragraph f(2): nonconcur. The Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedure (VAREP) program has been extended indefinitely, IAW DA guidance, to continue obtaining visibility and accountability as additional excesses are discovered. The unit having the item on temporary loan has the same responsibilities for controlling the material as those on the permanent property book. Any loss of items picked up on the Inventory Adjustment Report (IAR) must be accounted for IAW AR 735-11. Picking up excesses by means of lateral transfers within subordinate commands does not meet the objective of the program; that is to obtain centralized control and accountability of excesses. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

AVRGC-DST (Undated) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

c. Reference item concerning "Resupply of POL to Tay Ninh by Barge," page 11, paragraph f(4): concur. In April a POL barge made the trip from Nha Be to Tay Ninh. Because several bridges had to be raised and lowered to allow passage of the barge, the trip was time consuming and tied up a valuable asset. POL barges represent a back-up means of support which can be used when 5000 gallon tankers are not able to resupply Tay Ninh. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Breech Mechanisms for SP Howitzer, M-107," page 12, paragraph f(7): concur. M-110/M-107 conversions are being kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
Clint W. Stevens Jr.  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
USASUPCOM - SGN


GPOP-DT (Undated) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS  
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

# UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON



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